A CLEAR, SINCERE, AND MODEST confutation of the unsound, fraudulent, and intemperate Reply of T. F. who is known to be Mr. Thomas Fitzherbert now an English JESVITE. Wherein ALSO ARE CONFUTED THE chiefest objections which D. Schulckenius, who is commonly said to be Card. Bellarmine, hath made against WIDDRINTONS' Apology for the right, or Sovereignty of temporal PRINCES. BY Roger Widdrington an English Catholic. LUKE 6. Benedicite maledicentibus vobis, & orate pro calumniantibus vos. Bless them that curse you, and pray for them that calumniate you. printer's or publisher's device IHS Permissu Superiorum 1616. THE CONTENTS of this Treatise. The Epistle to English Catholics. Wherein 1. IT is showed first, that it is not safe for the consciences of Catholics to adhere always to the Pope, and neglect the command of their temporal Prince. 2 That if the Pope should exact from Catholics, that obedience, which is due only to their temporal Prince, they should by obeying the Pope disobey the command of Christ, and be truly traitors to their Prince. 3 That it is possible for Popes to challenge such an obedience, and that de facto Pope Boniface did challenge it of the King, and inhabitants of France. 4 That it is probable, that the Pope that now is, in condemning the late Oath of Allegiance, and in challenging a power to depose temporal Princes, demandeth of English Catholics the foresaid temporal Allegiance, and usurpeth that authority, which Christ hath not given him. 5 That although it should be granted, that it is probable, that the Pope hath such an authority, yet so long as it is but probable, it is titulus sine re, a title, which can never be put in execution without manifest disobedience to God, and injustice to temporal Princes. 6 That the Pope neither is the judge of temporal Princes in temporal causes, nor as yet by any authentical instrument hath defined, that he hath power to depose temporal Princes, and that therefore it is probable, that he hath no such power. 7 That the manner of his Holiness proceeding in condemning my books, and commanding me to purge myself, and the fallacious dealing of my Adversaries, doth clearly show, that they in their consciences are not persuaded, that the doctrine for the Pope's power to depose Princes, is a point of faith. 8 The causes of the beginning and increase of this doctrine are briefly insinuated, and that if all temporal Princes would use the like means to defend their Sovereignty, this controversy would be quickly at an end. 9 That Catholics are bound to read, and examine this question, otherwise their ignorance will be wilful, damnable, and inexcusable. 10 That they may lawfully read my books, notwithstanding the Popes, or rather Card. Bellarmine's prohibition to the contrary, and that I deserved not at their hands such uncharitable words and deeds, for the love and pains I have taken for their sakes. The Preface to the Reader. Wherein Mr. fitzherbert's Preface is confuted, the matter, which Widdrington handleth, and the manner how he proceedeth therein is declared, and his doctrine proved to be truly probable, and to be neither prejudicial to his majesties service, nor to the consciences of Catholics, and the exceptions of D. Schulckenius against that rule of the Law brought by Widdrington, In dubijs melior est conditio possidentis, In doubts, or disputable causes, the condition of him who hath possession, is to be preferred, are confuted. The first Part. wherein The authorities, and testimonies of those learned Catholics, which Widdrington in his Theological Disputation brought against the Pope's power to depose Princes, (and which Mr. Fitzherbert cunningly passeth over, and for answer to them remitteth his English Reader to D. Schulckenius a Latin writer) are briefly and perspicuously examined, and the Replies, which Doctor Schulckenius maketh against them, are confuted. Chap. 1. Wherein the authority of john Trithemius an Abbot, and famous writer of the order of S. Benedict, is examined, and the exceptions, which D. Schulckenius taketh against it, are overthrown. Chap. 2. Wherein the authority of Albericus Roxiatus, a famous Lawyer, and Classical Doctor, is examined, and the exceptions of D. Schulckenius, against it, are confuted. Chap. 3. Wherein the authority of joannes Parisiensis, a famous Doctor of Paris, is examined, and the exceptions of D. Schulckenius against him are proved to be insufficient. Chap. 4. Wherein the authority of Mr. Doctor Barclay, a famous and learned Catholic, is briefly examined. Chap. 5. Wherein are set down the authorities of many English Catholics, who have publicly declared their opinions, as Mr. George Blackwell, Mr. William Warmington, Mr. john Barclay, Mr. William Barret, Bishop Watson, Abbot Fecknam, Doctor Cole, both the Harpesfields, Mr Edward Rishton, Mr. Henry Orton, Mr. james Bosgrave, Mr. john Hart, M. james Bishop related by Mr. Camden, and those thirteen learned, and virtuous Priests, and most of them, as yet living, whose names I related in my Theological Disputation, and whose protestation, which I set down verbatim in my Appendix to Suarez, must needs suppose, that the Pope hath no power to depose Princes, as out of Suarez I convince in this chapter. Chap. 6. Wherein the authority of the Kingdom and State of France is largely debated, the exceptions which D. Schulckenius taketh against Petrus Pithaeus and Bochellus are confuted, and Sigebert is defended from Schism, of which he is wrongfully taxed by Card. Baronius and D. Schulckenius. The second part. wherein All the principal arguments, which Card. Bellarmine bringeth to prove the union and subordination of the temporal and spiritual power among Christians, whereon Mr. Fitzherbert, and all the other vehement maintainers of the Pope's power to depose Princes, do chiefly ground that doctrine, together with the Replies, which are brought by D. Schulckenius to confirm the same union and subordination, are exactly examined. Chap. 1. Wherein the true state of the question concerning the union of the temporal and spiritual power among Christians is declared. Chap. 2. Wherein the argument of Card. Bellarmine taken from those words of S. Paul, We being many are one body in Christ, to prove, that the temporal & spiritual power among Christians do make one total body, or commonwealth, whereof the Pope is head, is answered, and Card. Bellarmine convinced of manifest contradiction. Chap. 3. Wherein the authority of S. Gregory Nazianzene comparing the temporal and spiritual power among Christians to the body and soul in man (which is so often urged by Card. Bellarmine to prove, that the temporal and spiritual power among Christians do make one total body, as the body and soul do make one man) is declared, and clearly proved by Card. Bellarmine's own grounds to make nothing for his purpose. Chap. 4. Wherein the true state of the question concerning the subjection and subordination of the temporal power among Christians to the spiritual is propounded, and the different opinions of Catholics concerning this point are rehearsed. Chap. 5. Wherein the first argument of Card. Bellarmine taken from the ends of the temporal and spiritual power, to prove, that the temporal power among Christians, as it is temporal, is subject to the Ecclesiastical, as it is Ecclesiastical, is propounded, Widdringtons' answer to the same related, and D. Schulckenius Reply thereunto clearly confuted. Chap. 6. Wherein Card. Bellarmine's second argument to prove the same, taken from the union of Kings and Bishops, Clerks and Laikes in one Church is rehearsed, the Answer of Widdrington, of Mr. D. Barclay, and of Mr. john Barclay thereunto is related, and Card. Bellarmine's Reply to the same is most clearly overthrown. Chap. 7. Wherein Card. Bellarmine's third argument, to prove the same, taken from the obligation, by which Christian Princes are bound to change their temporal government, if it hinder the spiritual good, is related, Widdringtons' answer to the same rehearsed, and D. Schulckenius Reply threunto proved to be unsound, fraudulent and repugnant to his own grounds. Chap. 8. Wherein Card. Bellarmine's fourth argument, taken from the authority of S. Gregory Nazianzene comparing the temporal and spiritual power among Christians to the body and soul in man, is clearly convinced to be no fit similitude to prove, that the temporal power among Christians is per se subject to the spiritual, and that the Pope hath power to dispose of temporals, and to depose temporal Princes, but that is rather a fit similitude to prove the flat contrary. Chap. 9 Wherein the fift argument of Card. Bellarmine taken from the authority of S. Bernard, and Pope Boniface the eight, affirming that in the Church are two swords, and that the sword is under the sword, is rehearsed, Widdringtons' answer thereunto related, D. Schulckenius Reply confuted, and clearly proved that S. Bernard doth nothing favour, but expressly impugn the Pope's power to use the temporal sword; and that Pope Boniface did challenge a direct temporal Monarchy over the whole world, and that Extravagant unam Sanctam, was reversed by Pope Clement the next Successor but one to Boniface; and withal that Pope Boniface his words may be understood in a true sense. Chap. 10. Wherein Card. Bellarmine's sixth and last argument, taken from the authority of Pope Innocent the third, comparing the spiritual and temporal power to the Sun and Moon, is answered. Secondly Card. Bellarmine's reasons, which moved him to recall his opinion touching the subjection of S. Paul to Caesar, and of Clergy men to temporal Princes, are confuted, and some of them by his own grounds; whereby it is clearly proved, that without just cause he hath departed from his ancient, and the common doctrine of the School Divines to follow the Canonists, and also that not without some note of temerity he hath condemned as improbable the common opinion of the School Divines, who also follow therein the Ancient Fathers. Thirdly, the true state of the question concerning the power of spiritual Pastors to exempt clergymen from the authority of temporal Princes, is declared, whereby it is made apparent, how weak or strong an argument can be drawn from the Pope's power to exempt Clergy men from all subjection to temporal Princes, to prove his power to deprive temporal Princes of their Regal authority. The Adjoinder. Wherein first it is clearly showed, that Widdrington hath truly charged Mr. Fitzherbert with falsity in two respects. 2 widdrington's first exposition of that clause of the oath [Also I do from my heart abhor, detest and abjure as impious & heretical, this damnable doctrine and position, That Princes which be excommunicated or deprived by the Pope may be deposed or murdered by their Subjects or any other whatsoever] is proved to be sound and sufficient, and to be void of all absurdity, or contradiction, as is convinced by those four examples of propositions, which Mr. Fitzherbert bringeth to confute the same. 3 Mr. Fitsherberts fraud and ignorance are discovered, and the causes of his error are declared. 4 The two usual significations of the word heretical among Catholics are laid open, whereby it is made manifest, that not only the doctrine of murdering, but also of deposing Princes may be truly abjured for heretical. 5 widdrington's second exposition of the aforesaid clause is proved to be sound, and agreeable to the common sense and understanding of the words, and Mr. fitzherbert's exceptions against the same are proved to be insufficient, and not agreeable to the approved rules assigned by Divines and Lawyers for the interpreting of the words of every Law. 6 Lastly, Widdrington from the premises draweth four conclusions clean opposite to the four conclusions, which Mr. Fitzherbert from his premises collecteth: and finally he concludeth, that neither this clause, nor any other is sufficient to make the oath unlawful, or to move any Catholic to refuse the same, adding withal, what little hope of sincerity, and sufficiency the Reader may expect from the rest of Mr fitzherbert's Replies, seeing that in this (of which nevertheless he and his favourers do so greatly brag) he hath showed such great want of learning, and sincerity. TO ALL ENGLISH CATHOLICS, who are of opinion, that the Pope hath power to depose temporal PRINCES, ROGER WIDDRINGTON their Brother and Servant in CHRIST wisheth true zeal, knowledge, and felicity. 1I Have written here a Treatise in answer to Mr. fitzherbert's Reply, touching the POPE'S power to depose PRINCES, and the new oath of Allegiance, which I thought fit to Dedicate to you, Dear Countrymen, those especially, who have taken upon you a charge to teach, and instruct others, for that the matter, which here is handled, doth as much concern your souls, and consciences, or rather much more, than my own. Do not you imagine, that when there is a controversy betwixt his Holiness, and your Sovereign, concerning your spiritual, and temporal allegiance, you may safely, and without danger of deadly sin adhere to his Holiness, and forsake your Sovereign, unless you duly examine the right, and title which either have: for that by the law of GOD, and Nature you are bound to give to GOD, and Caesar that which is their due; that is, spiritual obedience to your spiritual Pastors, and temporal allegiance to your temporal Prince. Wherefore if the Pope should challenge, and exact from you not only spiritual obedience, which is due to him, but under colour of spiritual obedience, should demand also temporal allegiance, which is not due to him, but only to your temporal Prince, you should in obeying the Pope therein yield him that obedience, which is due only to your temporal Prince, and so transgress the law of GOD and nature, and consequently it being a matter of so great moment, you should, according to the approved doctrine of all Divines, by yielding such obedience incur a most heinous deadly sin. 2. For as there are but two only supreme powers on earth, to which all Christian subjects do owe obedience and subjection, to wit, spiritual, which doth reside specially in the chief spiritual Pastor, who in things spiritual is supreme, and temporal power, which doth reside in temporal Princes, who in things temporal are supreme, and subject to none but God; So also there be only two subjections, and obediences answerable thereunto, to wit, spiritual and temporal: So that if such a power, or obedience be not spiritual, it must of necessity be temporal, and with the same certainty or probability, that one is persuaded such an authority not to be spiritual, he must be persuaded that it is temporal. That authority is spiritual, and due only to the Pope, which Christ hath given to his Church, and the spiritual Pastors thereof; All other supreme authority is temporal, and due only to temporal Princes. And therefore if it be probable, as in very deed it is, and as you may see it in this Treatise clearly convinced so to be, that the Pope hath no authority given him by Christ to depose Princes, it is consequently probable, that the aforesaid authority (if there be any such authority on earth to depose Princes) is not spiritual but temporal, and that therefore, whosoever granteth it to the Pope, doth give to him that obedience, which is due to temporal Princes, and consequently he doth against the express command of Christ, not render to God and Caesar, that which is their due. 3. Well then thus you see, that if the Pope should challenge that obedience as due to him by the institution of Christ, which Christ hath not given him, and which consequently is due only to temporal Princes, he should usurp that authority, which he hath not, & in so doing he should transgress the law of God and Nature, and those subjects, who should adhere to him, and yield him that pretended spiritual obedience, should also transgress the law of Christ, and be not only pretended, but true Traitors both to God and their Prince, in not acknowledging their Prince to be their true Sovereign, by yielding that obedience, which is due to him to an other, and so by taking from him his supreme power, or sovereignty, and giving it to an other Prince, which in very deed is to take the Diadem, which doth signify his supreme authority, off from his head, and place it upon the head of an other. 4. Now there is none of you, as I suppose, of so mean understanding, that can imagine, that the Pope is so infallible in his opinion, judgement, or any declarative command grounded thereon, as that he can not possibly err therein, and challenge that authority as due to him by the institution of Christ, which nevertheless Christ hath not given him, but it belongeth only to temporal Princes. This you may see by experience in Pope Boniface the eight, who pretended, that Philip the fair the most Christian KING of France, was subject to him in spirituals and temporals, and declared them to be heretics, who should believe the contrary: and that he was a temporal Monarch of the Christians world, and therefore that the kingdom of France by reason of the disobedience, and rebellion of Philip their King, was fallen into the hands of the See Apostolic: for which cause Pope Boniface was taxed by many learned Catholics of great impudency, pride, and arrogancy: and his extravagant, unam Sanctam, which he made to curb the said King of France, declaring that the temporal sword is subject to the spiritual, and temporal power to spiritual authority, was reversed by Pope Clement the fift, the next Successor but one to Pope Boniface, who declared, that by the definition, and declaration of Pope Boniface in his extravagant, unam Sanctan, no prejudice should arise to the King, and kingdom of France: and that by it neither the King, kingdom, or inhabitants of France should be more subject to the Church of Rome, than they were before, but that all things should be understood to be in the same state, wherein they were before the said definition, as well concerning the Church, as concerning the King, Kingdom, and Inhabitants of France. The like temporal authority Pope Sixtus the fift, if he had lived, would also have challenged, for that as I have been credibly informed by divers jesuits of good account, who then lived at Rome, he did intend to suppress Card. Bellarmine's first Tome of Controversies, because he did not with the Canonists grant to the Pope this direct temporal Monarchy over the whole Christian world. 5 So that the only controversy now is, whether the Pope hath de facto erred or no, in declaring the oath of allegiance to be unlawful, and to contain in it many things flat contrary to faith and salvation, upon this supposal, that it is a point of Faith, that the Pope hath authority given him by Christ, to depose Princes, which is the substance of the oath, as Fa: Suarez a Lib 6 Defence. Fidei fere ●er totum. acknowledgeth, and the main question betwixt my Adversaries and me, as M.r. Fitzherbert b In the end of his Preface. in express words confesseth. Now you may see, if you please to read, that I have clearly proved in this Treatise, that it is probable, that the authority, which the Pope claimeth to depose Princes, is not true, but usurped, not granted him by Christ, but given him by men contrary to those express words of CHRIST, c Math. 22. Render the things that are Caesar's to Caesar, and the things that are Gods, to God. And therefore consider, I pray you, in what danger you stand, of doing great injury to your Sovereign, and committing flat treason against his Royal person and Crown, if you rashly, and without due examination follow the Pope's opinion, judgement, or also declarative command grounded thereon, who, under pretence of demanding of you a profession of his spiritual authority, and your spiritual obedience, exacteth in very deed not spiritual allegiance, but that obedience which is probably thought by many learned Catholics to be a mere temporal allegiance, and due only to your temporal Prince. 6 But observe, dear Countrymen, a more manifest, and dangerous gulf, into which for want of due consideration you may easily cast yourselves. For if once you grant, that it is probable, that it is a controversy, that it is a disputable question, as in very deed it is, and as I think very few of you, who have studied this question, are persuaded to the contrary, that the right, title, power, and authority, which the Pope challengeth to depose Princes, is no true title, but pretended, a mere temporal, and not a true spiritual authority, although I should grant you also for Disputation sake, of which as yet I do not dispute, that it is also probable, that the said title is good, and that the Pope hath such an authority to depose Princes given him by Christ, yet there is none of you so simple, but if you will duly consider, will presently perceive, that this title, so long as it is in controversy, is titulus sinere, a mere title, which so long as it is disputable, and debated on either side, can never be put in practice by any man; what opinion so ever he follow in speculation, without doing the Prince, who is deposed by the Pope, manifest wrong, and if he be a subject, by committing that detestable crime of treason in a most high degree. 7 For if any one of you should be inlawfull possession of a house, jewel, or any other thing, whereunto an other man pretendeth a title, and claimeth a power to dispose thereof, and perchance it is also probable, that his title is in very deed the better, and his Lawyers do bring strong reasons, and evidences to confirm the same, would not you think, that it were a manifest wrong, as in deed it were, and against the known rules of justice grounded upon the light of reason, that your Adversary, or any other in his behalf, notwithstanding the probability of his title, should put you out of possession, and take it away from you by violence, before the judge had decided the controversy? 8 And if any one should Reply and say, that the Pope is our Sovereign's judge; to whom also all Christian Princes are subject, and that he hath decided this controversy betwixt him and our Prince, and defined, that this his title to depose our Prince and all other Christian Princes, is a true and not only pretended, a spiritual, and not a temporal title, he is manifestly deceived. For neither is the Pope the judge of temporal Princes in temporal causes, wherein they are supreme, and subject to none but God; neither hath the Pope as yet decided this controversy, or defined by any General Council, or any other authentical instrument (for I will not at this time contend what authority the Pope hath to define matters of faith without a General Council) that this title, and authority which he challengeth to depose Princes, is a true spiritual title, and an authority granted him by the institution of Christ. For concerning this point Popes, and Emperors have ever been at great variance, as well said Fa: Azor, d Tom. 2. lib. 11 cap q. 5.8. and it is in controversy among Catholic Doctors, as I have convinced in this Treatise, and as yet the controversy is not decided by the judge, as Abbot Trithemius e See beneath part. 1. cap. 1. doth well affirm. 9 And if any one should perchance imagine, that his Holiness that now is, hath by his late Breves decided the controversy, and defined, that he hath authority to depose Princes, he is also most grossly mistaken; both for that there is not so much as one word mentioned in any of his Breves concerning his authority to depose Princes, but only in general words he declareth, that Catholics ought not to take the oath, for that it containeth many things flat contrary to faith and salvation, but what those many things be he doth not express (and perchance he might imagine at the first sight, as Card. Bellarmine did, that the Pope's power to excommunicate, to bind and loose, to dispense in oaths is denied in the oath, and that it was framed to make a distinction betwixt Protestants and Catholics touching points of Religion, all which how untrue they are I have clearly showed in my Theological Disputation) but especially for this reason he is foully mistaken, because there is not in the Breves any one of those words, which, according to the doctrine of Card. Bellarmine, and other Divines related by me in the aforesaid Disputation f Cap. 10. sec. 2. nu. 32. & seq. are required to make an infallible definition, and final decision of a point of faith. Neither is every Breve, or Apostolical letter of the Pope, although it be registered in the body of the Canon Law among the Pope's Decretal letters, a sufficient instrument to define matters of faith, for that in them is commonly contained only the Pope's opinion concerning some doubtful case, or question, and not a final decision or definition, which all Catholics are bound to follow. Otherwise it must needs be granted, that Popes have defined in their Breves false doctrine, and also heresy, as may be seen in the Decretal letters, and Breves of Pope Celestine the first, Pope Nicolas the third, and Pope Boniface the eight, as also I observed in the aforesaid Disputation g Cap. 10. sec. 2 nu. 47.48. 10. Yea both the very manner of his Holiness proceeding in condemning the oath in such general words, for that it containeth many things flat contrary to faith and salvation, not declaring any one of those many things, although he hath been in some sort urged thereunto by his Majesty, h In his Apology pag. 7. num. 5. & we also his Catholic subjects, whom it most concerns, have most humbly and most earnestly requested it at his hands, i Disput. The olog. in the Epistle to his Holiness. and the forbidding of my books also in such general words, not declaring whether they are forbidden, for the matter which they handle, or for the manner, or in respect of the persons against whom they are written, or for some other cause, but especially, and which is more strange, and contrary to the practice of all tribunals, the commanding of me to purge myself forthwith, and that under pain of Ecclesiastical Censures, without signifying any crime at all, either in general or particular, whereof I should purge myself, are manifest signs to a prudent man, that latet anguis in herba, and that they themselves do distrust their own cause. Can any prudent man imagine, that if his Holiness, or the most Illustrious Cardinals of the Inquisition, were fully persuaded, that the Pope's power to depose Princes is a point of faith, & defined by the Church so to be, as Card. Bellarmine, and some few other especially jesuits would enforce the Christian world to believe, and that they were able to convince the same either by holy Scriptures, Apostolical traditions, decrees of sacred Counsels, or any other convincing reason, they would forbear to signify the same, especially being so greatly urged thereunto? 11. Besides the manner also of my Adversaries handling this controversy, in corrupting my words, perverting my meaning, concealing my answers, altering the true state of the question, confounding the Readers understanding with ambiguous words and sentences, and being requested to insist upon any one place of holy Scripture, authority of sacred Council, or any other Theological reason, which they shall think to be most convincing, that thereby the controversy may quickly be at an end, their flying from one place of holy Scripture to another, from one Council to another, from one Theological reason to another, their fallacious arguing from the facts of the Apostles, yea also and of those Prophets, who were no Priests, which were done miraculously, and by an extraordinary power, or by the special command of Almighty God, to prove the like ordinary power to be in spiritual Pastors, from the practices of certain Popes, who were resisted therein both by Christian Princes and people to infer the practice of the Church, which is a congregation of all the faithful etc. from the opinion of very many Doctors, or also of the Church only probably judging or thinking, to conclude the faith of the Church firmly believing or defining, from the Pope's power to command temporals, to gather the Pope's power to dispose of temporals, from the Pope's power to impose temporal punishments to deduce a power in the Pope to inflict or use temporal punishments, or which is all one, to constrain with temporal punishments, & from a power which is granted to the Church, as the Church is taken for the Christian world consisting both of temporal and spiritual power, to conclude the said power to be in the Church, as the Church is taken for the spiritual Kingdom of Christ, which consisteth only of spiritual power, and such like pitiful shifts to confound thereby their Readers understanding, & at the last, in regard either of their presence or pre-eminence in the Court of Rome, to cause by their evil information his Holiness to consent to the forbidding of their adversaries books, that thereby neither their legerdemain and fraudulent dealing may be laid open to the view of the world, nor the Reader may see what we allege against them, or in defence of ourselves, but in that lame and corrupt manner, as they shall please to deliver it, doth evidently show, that they are not desirous to satisfy men's understandings, and to search and find out the truth by a sincere debating of this dangerous and difficult controversy, but rather that they themselves do suspect their own cause, which because they have once taken in hand to defend, they will per fas & nefas, by fraud and violence seek still to maintain. But truth will never be overthrown, it may for a time by fraud and violence be suppressed, but maugre all the sleights of the impugners thereof, it will in the end prevail. Whereas my plain, sincere, and perspicuous handling this question, and requesting my Adversaries, that they will insist upon any one text of holy Scripture, which shall seem to them to be the most pregnant place, whether it be, whatsoever thou shalt lose, etc. Feed my sheep. If you shall have Secular judgements etc. or any other; or upon any one decree of Popes, or general councils, whether it be, can: Nos Sanctorum, juratos, Absolutos, or any other, whether it be the Council of Trent, of Lions, of Laterane, (which now of late is so greatly urged by some, whereof in former times was made so small account for the proof of this point,) or upon any one Theological reason, which shall seem to them to be the most unanswerable, whether it be taken from the subordination of the temporal power to the spiritual, or from the necessity of defending the Church, repressing heresies, punishing wicked Princes, defending innocent people, or from the promise which Christian Princes make to the Church, either in Baptism, or at their Coronation, or any other which shall like them best, protesting withal, k In Resp: Apologet. nu● 1. that if any man shall show by any convincing reason that the doctrine for the Pope's power to depose Princes is a point of faith, and consequently the contrary not probable; I will presently yield, neither shall any hope of gain, or fear of punishment withdraw me from embracing forthwith and publishing also the truth, do sufficiently demonstrate, that my only desire is to find out, and follow the truth in this controversy, which doth so nearly touch our souls and salvation and our obedience due by the law of Christ to God, and our temporal Prince. 13 Wherefore my earnest request at this time, and vehement desire only is, Dear Countrymen, that you will be pleased to examine diligently your spiritual, and temporal obedience, your duty to GOD & CAESAR, and that you will be led and guided by true reason, and not carried away by blind affection, hope of preferment and credit, or fear of disgrace and want, and not to be desirous so to please the Pope, as to neglect your duty, and obedience, which by the command of Christ, and under pain of eternal damnation you own to your temporal Prince. Be not deceived, God is not mocked. Coeca obedientia, blind obedience in this case is dangerous, and damnable, and your ignorance herein, you having now so just cause to doubt, and therefore, according to the doctrine of all Divines, are bound to examine the truth, will be affected, gross, wilful, and culpable, like to that, whereof the Prophet spoke, l Psal: 35. Noluit intelligere ut bene ageret, he would not understand that he might do well. For although it be lawful, and also very commendable to obey your Superiors command, without examining what authority he hath to impose upon you such a command, when by obeying, you incur no danger of disobeying God, of wronging your neighbour, whom by the law of God you are bound not to wrong, or of disobeying another Superior, whom by the law of God you are bound also to obey, yet this is also certain, that when there is a controversy, that your obeying an earthly Superior is a disobedience to God, or a rebellion against another supreme Superior, whom God hath commanded you to obey, unless you duly examine the matter, and in what manner by obeying that earthly Superior, although it be the Pope, you do not disobey God, nor commit rebellion against your Prince, whom God commandeth you to obey, no pretence of advancing Catholic Religion, of devotion to the See Apostolic, or of any other good end whatsoever can excuse you from committing a mortal sin. 14 The pretence of furthering the common good, of advancing Catholic Religion, of depressing heresies, of punishing wicked Princes, of defending innocent people, and such like, may be colourable cloaks to excuse many damnable and devilish attempts, many wicked backbyting, slander, and other wrongs both by words and deeds, as by late experience may be seen in the execrable murders of the two most Christian Kings of France, in the abominable Conspiracy of the Powder Traitors, in the uncharitable proceed against the Appellants, and those who favoured them, and and now against those Catholics, who do any ways favour the Oath, (to omit many other exorbitant dealings under this pretence of furthering the common good, which if it were needful I could make manifest) but assure yourselves that neither good ends are sufficient to excuse bad practices, nor the zeal of the person is a sufficient warrant to justify all his actions, nor injustice is to be done to any man be he never so wicked. 15 Call to mind, I beseech you, the doctrine of the ancient Fathers, and the practice of the primitive Church, observe the causes of the beginning and increase of this practice, and doctrine for the Pope's power to depose Princes, and the continual contradiction thereof, and you shall find, that no man of any learning can persuade his conscience, that this doctrine is certain, and of faith. For the zeal of Pope Gregory the seventh, the wickedness of Henry the fourth Emperor, the discord of the Germane Princes, the riches of the Countess Mathildis, the warlike forces of the Nortmen, and the desire of all men that the Emperor might be restrained from doing such evils, were the first occasions, m See beneath part: 1. cap: 6. nu: 24. that this doctrine began first to be practised by the said Pope Gregory, and afterwards, it being in regard of the strangeness thereof, so greatly contradicted, justified by him to be lawful, for which cause it was by Onuphrius n See in the place above cited. called, a thing not heard of before that age, and by Sigebert a learned, and virtuous Catholic, and no Schismatic, as I will prove beneath o Part: 1. cap. 6. num. 20. & seq. , it was taxed of novelty, not to say of heresy, and confuted by him at large. 16 Secondly, the advancing of them, who did maintain this doctrine, the depressing of those, who did impugn it, the suppressing of Books, and the threatening of Ecclesiastical Censures, which nevertheless if they be unjust, are not of force in the p Suarez de Censuris Disp. 4. sec. 7. nu. 2. 4. 23. & seq. Court of Conscience, and the indiligence of temporal Princes to maintain their Sovereignty (the causes whereof I dare not presume to examine) besides the former reasons, and pretence of advancing Catholic religion etc. were the chief causes, why the defenders of this doctrine, did so increase in number from the time of Pope Gregory the 7. in comparison of those who did impugn it. But if temporal Princes would yet be pleased, to use hereafter those means to defend their right, and Sovereignty, which Popes have heretofore, and do continually use to maintain their pretended temporal authority over Kings and Princes, to depose them, to dispose of their temporals etc. in order to spiritual good, I do not doubt, but that the stream of Doctors would quickly turn backward, and my Adversaries would have small cause to brag (considering especially the weakness of their grounds, and that their doctrine is overswaied by authority, and not by reason) that so many Author's favour the Pope's power to depose Princes, and so few the right of Princes not to be deposed by the Pope. 17 Nevertheless it is also manifest, that it hath ever been contradicted by Christian Princes and people, and notwithstanding the foresaid motives, and also the fear that some might have, lest wicked Princes might be in some sort encouraged to persevere in evil by impugning that doctrine, which seemed to be a bridle to restrain their bad purposes) it hath continually been impugned, disproved, and confuted by learned Catholics, as I have clearly proved in this Treatise. And therefore remember, into what danger of soul, body, and temporal fortunes, you (for want of reading and due examining,) do throw headlong yourselves, and many innocent men, who do follow your example and counsel, for the which at the day of judgement you are to make a most strict account, where no favour of Man can help you, and wilful ignorance will not excuse you, but condemn you, and it will be too late to say then Non putaram, unless you do now, abstracting from all human affection & respects, examine duly what duty you bear God and Caesar, what obedience you own to the Pope, and your temporal Prince. 18 But perhaps some of you will demand, how can you by reading examine this controversy, seeing that the Books, which treat thereof are forbidden by the Pope? In answer to this I will only propound at this time to your prudent considerations, whether if there should arise a controversy betwixt the Pope, and a temporal Prince concerning the title to any kingdom, especially which that temporal Prince hath in his possession (as there is betwixt the Pope, and the King of Spain touching the Kingdoms of Naples, and Sicily) the Pope hath authority to command that temporal Prince, and his Subjects not to read, and peruse those evidences, which do make in favour of his own title, but only those evidences, which do prove the Pope's title? 19 Now if the reason, why my books are forbidden by the Pope, (or rather by the evil information, importunity, and judicial sentence of Card. Bellarmine, against whom, as my principal Adversary in this cause, I did write both my Apology for the right of Princes, and also my Theological Disputation concerning the oath of Allegiance, which two books are only forbidden, and who therefore was pleased to be an Accuser, Witness, and judge, in his own cause) be, for that they do favour the oath of Allegiance, and impugn the Pope's power to depose Princes, (as all my Adversaries confess, that for this cause they are forbidden to be read) than you may clearly perceive, that therefore my books are forbidden, for that they do show, and declare the evidences, which do make for the right and title of temporal Princes, and their right not to be deprived, or thrust out of their kingdoms by the Pope's pretended authority, but especially of our Sovereign, whose case concerning this point is more singular, and concerneth him more nearly, considering the opposition betwixt him, and the Pope's Holiness, with whom he is not linked in unity of religion and friendship, than it doth concern other Christian Princes, who have not the like reason to fear tumults, rebellions, and Powder-treasons, under pretence of restoring Catholic religion in their Country, and of having the Pope's express or virtual licence for the same; which prohibition of the Pope to forbid such kind of books, how far it can bind either those Princes, to whom it belongeth by the law of God and nature to defend their Sovereignty, or else their Subjects, who also by the same Law of God and nature are bound to examine the reasons and evidences of their Prince's title, authority, and Sovereignty, lest that for want of due examination they should deny to God, or Caesar, that which is their due, I remit to the prudent consideration of any judicious Catholic man. 20 Lastly, consider, I pray you, the manifold wrongs, which for the love and pains I have taken for your sakes, I have received from diverse of you, whom I could name, if it were needful, both in reproachful words, and uncharitable deeds, not beseeming, I will not say, Religious Priests, but moral honest men. For long before I did put pen to paper, I had thoroughly examined this controversy, and all which in my judgement could be objected on either side, and for my own part I was fully settled in my opinion; but perceiving all men to be silent in a matter of such importance, and necessity as this is, and which also concerneth us all, the zeal, affection, and duty, which I bore to Catholic Religion, to the See Apostolic, and to my Prince and Country, with a vehement desire, that the truth in this important controversy, which concerneth our obedience, which by the command of Christ, we own to GOD and Caesar, to the Pope's Holiness, and to our temporal Sovereign, compelled me first to write, and now also to continue, for which although I shall hereafter suffer, as hitherto I have done, reproach, infamy, disgrace, loss of friends, and other evils, yet I will still pray for my persecutors, and remit my cause to GOD above, assuring myself, that in time convenient he will in this world, or the next, or both, be a just judge revenger, Protector, and rewarder of the Innocent. THE PREFACE TO the Reader. Wherein Mr. fitzherbert's PREFACE is confuted, the matter which WIDDRINGTON handleth, and the manner how he proceedeth therein, is declared, and his doctrine proved to be truly probable, and neither prejudicial to his majesties service, nor to the Consciences of Catholics. 1. IT is not unknown to thee, Courteous Reader, the great controversy hath been of late years, especially among us English Catholics, concerning the new oath of Allegiance, which his Majesty by Act of Parliament hath ordained to make trial how his Catholic Subjects stand affected towards him in point of there loyalty, and due obedience. For although his Holiness, by the instigation and importunity no doubt of others, hath by three several Breves declared the said oath to be unlawful, and to contain in it many things clearly repugnant to faith and salvation, and many learned men, especially jesuits, as Card. Bellarmine Fa: Gretzer, Lessius, Becanus, and now lastly Suarez, have by public writings endeavoured to convince the same, nevertheless since that Mr. George Blackwell then Archpraesbiter, and many other learned Priests did from the very first publishing of this oath defend it to be lawful, and not to contain in it any thing, which either expressly, or covertly is contrary to Catholic faith or salvation, the said oath hath been maintained as lawful by many learned Catholic Priests, and hath been taken by the most part of those Lay-Catholikes, to whom it hath been tendered; assuring themselves that his Holiness command for the refusing thereof, being only a declarative precept, and not grounded upon any infallible definition, but at the most upon a probable opinion, that the Pope hath power to depose Princes (which is the main substance of the oath, as my Adversary here a In the end of his Preface. confesseth, and Fa: Suarez, b Lib. 6. defence. a cap. 2. also before him expressly acknowledgeth, is not, according to Suarez doctrine, of force to bind them, especially with so great prejudice to his Majesty and themselves, to embrace an uncertain and doubtful opinion, or to obey the Pope's declarative precept grounded thereupon. 2 I therefore with other Catholics considering how greatly this oath doth concern our allegiance, and obedience due to God and Caesar, and the great harm both spiritual and temporal, which may ensue by breach thereof, thought it our best course, to set down sincerely all the chiefest arguments, which have been hitherto by any Author, or which might in our judgements be objected by any against the said oath, together with the answers, which have been, or might be brought to the same Objections, and withal dutiful submission to propound them to his Holiness, humbly requesting him, that he would be pleased diligently to peruse them, and in regard of his Pastoral Office would vouchsafe to instruct us in the Catholic faith, satisfy the difficulties, which do perplex our consciences, & to make known unto us, what clauses of the oath are, I do not say, according to the opinion of Card. Bellarmine, or some other Catholic Doctors, who are no necessary rule of the Catholic faith, but according to Catholic doctrine necessarily to be believed by all men, repugnant to faith and salvation, as his Holiness affirmeth in his Breves. And this I performed in my Theological Disputation, partly at the request of many Catholics, whose case I greatly pitied, but chiefly for the duty I owed to God, Religion, my Prince and Country: Neither did I intend in that Disputation to affirm any thing of myself, but as representing the persons of those, who were persuaded, that the oath may, or may not be lawfully taken. And because when the said Disputation was in the press, & almost finished, there came to my hands an English book composed by F.T. and entitled a Supplement to the Discussion etc. wherein this Author endeavoured to prove the said oath to be repugnant to all laws both human and divine, and therefore justly condemned by his Holiness, in that it doth exempt temporal Princes from Excommunication and deposition by the Pope, I thought good to touch briefly in an Admonition to the Reader, both the substance of this Author's discourse, and of the chiefest arguments which he brought against the oath, and also the answers, which might be made to them; to the end his Holiness, might be fully informed of all the reasons, which are alleged as well against as for the taking of the oath. And this was the cause, that I writing in Latin, did to inform his Holiness briefly set down what he had written in English against the aforesaid oath. 3 But the said Author F. T. who now hath turned backward the first letters of his name into T. F. and is known, acknowledged, yea and boasted of by his favourers to be Mr. Thomas Fitzherbert now an English jesuite (for which cause I was the more bold to express his name) hath of late set forth a Reply in English in defence of his arguments, c In the preface nu. 2. which I briefly answered in Latin, to the end, saith he, that our Countrymen, whom it most importeth to understand well the quality, and state of this controversy, may discover my weakness, and avoid the danger of their souls, whereto they may be drawn by the false fame, and opinion, that many have conceived of my sufficiency. But howsoever my Adversary, or any other be conceited of my weakness or sufficiency (for time will make known the weakness or sufficiency of us both) I do not doubt (God willing,) but notwithstanding all his vaunting brags, to discover clearly the weakness and insufficiency of his Reply, albeit he hath been furthered with the former writings of many learned men, especially Card. Bellarmine, Fa: Lessius, & now lastly of Suarez (from whom he borroweth the chiefest Replies he bringeth to my answers, yet concealing their names) to omit the many other helps I want, which he may have in the place where he liveth, both by the conference of learned men, & the commodity of all sorts of books, wherewith that place is furnished. And although he useth very spiteful, and slanderous speeches against me (for the which I pray God to forgive him) thinking thereby to magnify himself, disgrace me and promote his own cause, but in the end he will find that such exorbitant and irreligious courses will tend to his own disgrace and not mine, and he greatly prejudicial both to his cause and conscience, yet I will abstain from such uncharitable and unjust proceed, and with all modesty I will defend my own innocency, by answering all his objections, and by clearing myself of all those imputations, which he hath falsely laid to my charge: and if in defending myself I lay open his fraud, and ignorance, and return his slanders back upon himself, I ought not therefore to be taxed of calumniation, seeing that, to detect the slanders of the Adversary is not, d Cap. 5. Apologiae. to use Card. Bellarmine's own words, to be accounted a defaming. Now to draw near unto the matter. 4. Before my Adversary come to examine my Answer to his arguments, he thinketh it not amiss to say somewhat concerning me, the matter which I handle, and the manner how I proceed therein. First then touching me he affirmeth, e In his Preface num. 3. that whereas I call myself by the name of Widdrington, it is well known to many, that M. Roger Widdrington, under whose shadow I shroud myself, is far different from me in quality, habit, and profession. And albeit f Num. 3. he is not ignorant what my true name, and quality is, yet he forbeareth to declare it for just respects, and will only say of me for the present, that whereas our Adversaries have heretofore levied, and priest many soldiers of their own profession to maintain their quarrels against us, they have now in this late quarrel of the oath priest one of ours (I mean saith he, this Author) who so much presumeth of his own skill and strength, that albeit the proverb saith, Ne Hercules contra duos, yet he feareth not to encounter ten at once, yea hopeth, as it seemeth, to wrest the club out of Hercules his hand, and to beat him with his own weapon. For he taketh upon him to overthrow Card. Bellarmine with his own arguments, to batter the fortress of the Catholic Church with her own Canons, and constitutions etc. 5. But first, whether Roger Widdrington be the true or supposed, the sole, or joint Author of that Disputation, it little availeth to the matter, which is now in controversy: and when my Adversary shall name more plainly that person, whom he forbearing, as he saith, to name, yet cunningly nameth, I doubt not, but that he will not be afraid to answer him more fully; neither will all my adversaries clamours, and threatenings discourage him from defending the truth, his Prince, and Country, for the love whereof, & not for any hope of temporal lucre or preferment, or for to show his wit as my Adversary falsely affirmeth, he will not be ashamed to be priest on to write against Mr. Fitzherbert, or any other such like Author, who living in other Countries, and out of danger to lose any thing, but rather in hope to obtain preferment by their writings, would press English Catholics to defend with danger of losing all they have, and of incurring his majesties high displeasuer that doctrine for the Pope's power to depose Princes to be of faith, which the State of France hath accounted scandalous, seditious, damnable, and pernicious. In the mean time let this suffice, that he is a child of the Catholic Roman Church, and as good a Catholic, if not better than Mr. Fitzherbert is, if we will duly consider the true nature and definition of a Catholic, and that he is no true Catholic, who with true Catholic and supernatural faith believeth doubtful, disputable, and uncertain opinions, and which consequently are subject to error, to which true Catholic faith cannot in any wise be exposed. 6. Secondly, it is untrue, that I do presume so much of my own skill and strength, that I dare adventure to wrest out the club of Hercules his hand, as my Adversary affirmeth or to encounter upon equal terms with Card. Bellarmine, or any one of those learned writers, whom I named in my Disputation, accounting myself to be far inferior to every one of them in skill and strength (only excepting this my Adversary, whose skill and strength I do not greatly fear, it being well known of what sufficiency he is, and that his skill in Philosophy, or School Divinity is not great, although he hath pretty skill in making use of other men's labours, and answering in English, what other men have before replied in Latin) but if Hercules will leave his club, and fight with a bulrush, it is no great mastery for a weaker man to withstand him; if Card. Bellarmine instead of the express words of holy Scripture, and the true meaning thereof so declared to be by the ancient Fathers, or the universal Church, or undoubted definitions of General Counsels, or necessary inferences deducted from them (which are the only weapons wherewith Catholic doctrine can be convinced) will fly to over wrested similitudes, false, or at the most probable suppositions, doubtful and uncertain collections, to prove an infallible doctrine of the Catholic faith, as he, and the rest, who follow him in this controversy for the Pope's power to depose Princes have done, it is an easy matter for one, who hath less skill and strength than they have, to withstand them, yea and to vanquish them, and a hundred such others being so weakly armed. 7. And therefore very false, and frivolous is that, which my Adversary affirmeth g Num 4. and 5. that Widdrington (for so still I will call myself) taketh upon him to batter the fortress of the Catholic Church with her own Canons, and constitutions, and to undermine the immovable rock of S. Peter with his own instruments, and all this he doth with such art and sleight, that whiles he fighteth against the Church, he pretendeth to be a friend and child of the Church, and albeit he impugn the Pope's authority, yet he dedicateth his book to the Pope, laughing upon him, whiles he woundeth him, and betraying Christ with a kiss, as judas did. But how vainly he laboureth in all this, he may easily see, if he call to mind, what he hath learned in the Catholic Chucrch, to wit, how inexpugnable is the rock, and seat of Peter, which the proud gates of hell cannot overcome. For I do not batter the fortress of the Catholic Church whom I reverence and love as my dear mother (and to whose Censure I ever have and do also now most humbly submit myself and all my writings) but the private opinions of some few Catholics, especially jesuits, who will needs enforce upon the Christian world, doubtful, disputable and uncertain opinions, for infallible grounds of supernatural faith, which only is the fortress of the Catholic Church. Neither do I undermine that immovable rock of S. Peter, whereon Christ hath built his Church, but those scandalous, seditious, damnable and pernicious positions (for so the State of France doth call them) of murdering Princes, and thrusting them out, contrary to the rules of law and reason, of the lawful possession of their kingdoms, by an authority which is only doubtful and questionable: Neither do I impugn that authority of the Pope, which is certainly known to be granted him by Christ, but that new doctrine of some few writers, which doth attribute to the Pope that authority, as certainly given him by Christ, which at the most is disputable, whether Christ hath given it him or no. 8. I do honour and reverence in good truth Card. Bellarmine, as also many other learned men of his Society, and their singular learning I do greatly admire, but that their learning or authority ought to be so greatly esteemed of by Catholics, that whatsoever they think to be a point of faith, it is presently to be taken for a divine Oracle, and the contrary opinion of other learned Catholics, who have seen and examined all their grounds, reasons, and authorities, is not to be accounted an opinion, but an heresy, and that in a matter of such importance, which concerneth the dutiful obedience of every Christian to God and Caesar, this is that which I cannot take in good part. And might not, I pray you, the Canonists, who do vehemently defend the Pope's direct power to dispose of all temporals against Card. Bellarmine and others, whom they are not afraid to call impios politicos wicked politicians, h Alexander Carerius. pretending thereby to strengthen the fortress of the Catholic Church, to confirm the immovable rock of S. Peter, and to maintain the Pope's authority, retort the very same invective, which my Adversary hath borrowed of Card. Bellarmine, i Against Barclay cap. 1. and in the Epistle Dedicatory of his Schulckenius against me. upon Card. Bellarmine himself, who doth vehemently impugn the aforesaid direct authority, which the Canonists do yield unto the Pope, and with the same facility cry out with my Adversary, that he taketh upon him to batter the fortress of the Catholic Church with her own Canons, and constitutions, and to undermine the immovable rock of S. Peter with his own instruments, and all this he doth with such Art and sleigth, that whiles he fighteth against the Church, he pretendeth to be a friend and child of the Church; and albeit he impugn the Pope's authority, yet he dedicateth his book to Pope Sixtus the fift, laughing upon him whiles he woundeth him, and betraying Christ with a kiss, as judas did etc. And thus much concerning me. 9 Now as touching the matter which I handle, and the manner of my proceeding therein, k Num. 6. Widdringtons' special purpose (saith my Adversary) in this his late work is to defend the new oath of allegiance, and to confute all the chief arguments, that have been made by any against the several clauses thereof; which nevertheless he meaneth no other ways to perform (as he himself often protesteth) but only by showing probably, that the said Oath may be taken by Catholics, and that nothing hath been hitherto, or can be objected against it, which hath not been or cannot be probably answered. And from hence my Adversary gathereth certain admonitions to the Reader, which, as he saith, are worthy to be noted. 10. But before I come to set down his worthy admonitions, I think it fit, to put thee in remembrance (Courteous Reader) what is the true state of the question betwixt us concerning the Pope's power to depose Princes, and what was my chief intent in making that disputation of the Oath. The main question therefore betwixt me, and these my Adversaries, as my Adversary T. F. also confesseth, l In the end of his Preface. is touching the Pope's power to depose Princes, which specially is denied in this new oath: to wit, whether it be a point of faith, and not to be denied by any Catholic without note of heresy, or error, that the Pope hath by Christ his institution power to deprive temporal Princes of their Kingdoms for any crime whatsoever. For whereas some very few late writers especially Card. Bellarmine and other jesuits, could not be content to defend this doctrine for the Pope's power (call it temporal, or spiritual as you will) to depose Princes in a moderate manner, but would needs take upon them to make it a point of the Catholic faith, and clearly to demonstrate by the testimony of holy Scriptures, of sacred councils, and by invincible reasons, that Christ hath given to S. Peter, and his Successors such a temporal power over Sovereign Kings and Princes (a doctrine neither practised, nor known by the Fathers of the Primitive Church, and which hath been a chief occasion, why this Kingdom is departed from the obedience to the See Apostolic) and to condemn all those Catholics of heresy, who do not run with them in this their violent course, when I seriously considered with myself, what scandal this new doctrine maintained with such violence brought to Catholic Religion, what danger to our Prince and Country, and what great calamities and disgrace English Catholics do daily suffer thereby, as not being accounted true, and loyal Subjects to their Prince, even according to the doctrine of those, who are esteemed to be the chief pillars of the Catholic Church, but so long only as it shall please the Pope, I thought myself bound by the duty which I do owe to the Catholic Religion, & to my Prince & Country, to take away as much as lieth in me (notwithstanding the manifold slanders, which I foresaw some persons would therefore raise against me) the aforesaid scandals, dangers and disgraces, and to answer probably all the arguments which Card. Bellarmine hath from the chiefest Authors, who have handled this question collected, to demonstrate that it is a certain and infallible doctrine, and the contrary, not so much an opinion, as an heresy, that the Pope hath by Christ his institution authority to deprive Sovereign Princes of their temporal Kingdoms and dominions. 11 Wherefore the present controversy betwixt me and my Adversaries is not at this time concerning the absolute proposition, to wit, whether the Pope hath or hath not power to depose, (the reason why I do not dispute of this absolute proposition I will declare beneath m Num. 78.79 ) but concerning the modal, whether it be certain, without controversy, and a point of faith, that the Pope hath power to depose, as this Author T. F. following Card. Bellarmine and some few jesuits, will needs have it to be, and I with other Catholics, and the Kingdom of France, as Petrus Pithaeus witnesseth n In Cod. libert. Eccles. Galli●. , do utterly deny the same, And from hence it evidently followeth, that although Card. Bellarmine should allege an hundred Catholic Authors, who do affirm, that the Pope hath power to depose Princes, yet if they do not also affirm that it is certain, and to be believed as a point of faith, that the Pope hath such a power, they neither confirm his opinion, nor gainsay mine concerning the present controversy, which is now in hand. And thus much concerning the matter and manner of my Apology for the right of Princes. Now touching my Theological Disputation concerning the oath of Allegiance, although in very deed hitherto I have not seen any sufficient reason to condemn the said oath as unlawful, and from the doctrine which I taught in my Apology it doth necessarily follow, that with a probable and safe conscience it may be taken by any Catholic, considering that the Pope's power to depose Princes, as my Adversary here confesseth, is the main question betwixt him and me, and which is specially denied in this oath, nevertheless I did not intend in that Disputation positively to defend the said oath, but sincerely to propound unto his Holiness, who as I am fully persuaded, was neither truly, nor thoroughly informed of the reasons, why English Catholics thought the said oath to be lawful, all the arguments on both sides, which might be urged against or for the oath, affirming nothing of myself, but as representing the persons of those, who either impugned or approved the said oath; humbly requesting his Holiness, that after he had diligently examined the reasons on both sides, he would be pleased to satisfy those difficulties, which we propounded, and to make known to us English Catholics, those many things, which he in his Breves had affirmed to be in this oath clearly repugnant to faith and salvation. 12 Now let us see those worthy admonitions, and those things, which my Adversary saith, are worthy to be noted. First therefore, saith he, o num. 10. Widdrington doth not account his own opinion and doctrine in this point to be certain and assured, but only probable, neither yet condemneth our doctrine as manifestly false, or repugnant to faith, or to the salvation of souls: beside that he confesseth also elsewhere, p In Epist. Delicate. & in Disp. Theolog. cap. 3. num. 1. that his Holiness in three several Breves declared the contrary doctrine contained in the oath to be repugnant to the Catholic faith q Num. 11. whereupon I infer, that it were no less than most dangerous temerity, and extreme folly to reject our doctrine, and to adhere to his; for if it be wisdom in doubtful matters to take the surest way, it cannot with reason be denied, but that albeit his opinion seem probable to him, yet the contrary is much more to be embraced, seeing that by his own confession it is at least probable, and therefore may be embraced without danger, whereas his is not only doubted of, but also declared to be contrary to the Catholic faith, both by his Holiness, & also by very many learned Catholics (as he himself also confesseth: r Vbi supra. ) besides that he acknowledgeth also afterwards, that there are very few Authors extant, s Cap. 3 s●● 3. num. 15. which do deny our doctrine in comparison of those that teach and defend it; whereto I also add, that it is altogether conform to the practice of the Church, confirmed by diverse general Counsels, as I have showed particularly in my Supplement; so as no man, that hath care of his soul, Supplem. cap. 2. ●●o. 76. 〈◊〉 can have any reason to venture it upon his opinion, impugned and condemned by so great authority, when our doctrine may by his own confession be securely followed without doubt or danger. 13. But mark (Courteous Reader) how many frauds, and falsehoods my Adversary hath here committed. And first how cunningly he would deceive thee by not distinguishing the absolute proposition concerning the Pope's power to depose Princes, which is not now in question, from the modal, which only is now in controversy. For although I do not take upon me at this present to condemn that opinion for the Pope's power to depose Princes as manifestly false, or to defend the contrary as certain and without controversy, yet it is untrue, that I do not assuredly account that opinion and doctrine, which affirmeth it to be a point of faith, that the Pope hath power to depose Princes, and the contrary to be heretical, to be absolutely false, and to use the words of the Parliament of Paris against Suarez doctrine, to be scandalous, seditious, damnable and pernicious. 14. Secondly, it is also untrue, that I do acknowledge that there are very few Authors extant, which do deny their doctrine concerning the modal proposition, in comparison of those, that do teach and defend it: for although I affirmed, that very few Authors, whose writings are now extant, in comparison of others, who defend this temporal power of the Pope, are to be found that deny his authority to depose Princes, (the reasons whereof which I alleged in that place and before in my Apology, because they clean overthrow the common argument taken from the multitude of Authors, who do cleave to their opinion touching the absolute proposition, both my Adversary, and D. Schulckenius also do altogether conceal,) yet touching the modal proposition I confidently averred, that there were very few writers, and those for the most part jesuits, who do hold this doctrine for the Pope's power to depose Princes to be a point of faith. For behold my express words. u In Pres. Resp. Ap●log. nu. 10. And from hence any man may plainly perceive, that Widdrington doth not oppose himself either against all Divines, or against the common opinion of the Church, or Doctors, but only against very few writers, considering that among those seventy Authors related by Card. Bellarmine very few are to be found, who (although they are perchance of opinion, that the Pope by Christ his institution hath authority to depose Princes for enormous crimes) do so peremptorily adhere to that opinion, as to tax them with heresy, who do maintain the contrary. And if Card. Bellarmine in the later Editions of his books, yet bringing no new reason to confirm his former opinion, had not condemned the contrary opinion of Catholics as heretical, but had suffered every man to persevere without note of heresy, in his own opinion, which he should think to be the truer, he should not doubtless have had Widdrington to be his Adversary, or to have attempted to overthrow his reasons as insufficient to demonstrate an undoubted point of faith. 15 Thirdly, it is also untrue, that confess the Pope's Holiness to have declared in his Broues, that the doctrine, which denieth his power to depose Princes, is contrary to the Catholic faith: I only confess, that in his Breves he hath declared the Oath to be unlawful, for that it containeth in it many things flat contrary to faith and salvation; but what these many things be, his Holiness doth not express in his Breves, neither as yet hath he been pleased to signify it unto us, although we have both by private letters, and also public writings most humbly and instantly requested it at his hands. I did indeed confess, that his Holiness was by all likelihood misinformed of those many things, which he thought in this oath to be flat contrary to faith and salvation, by Card: Bellarmine, who hath publicly in his books declared, that the Pope's spiritual Primacy, his power to excommunicate, and to bind and loose are plainly denied in this Oath, and the King's spiritual Supremacy is therein acknowledged, but how untrue this is, I have sufficiently showed in my Theological Disputation, and beneath I shall have occasion to repeat again. And albeit his Holiness had in his Breves particularly declared the doctrine for his power to depose Princes to be of faith, and the contrary to be heretical, (as likewise Pope Celestine the 3. did in a Breve, or Decretal letter of his, which was in times passed for almost two hundred years together extant in the Canon Law, declare, that Marriage was so dissolved by heresy, that the party, whose consort was fallen into heresy, might lawfully marry another, which doctrine is now flatly condemned in the Council of Trent) yet this declaration of the Pope being no infallible definition, but only a signification of his opinion, as I proved abundantly in the foresaid book, no Catholic is bound in conscience to follow it neither to obey his declarative precept grounded thereon as out of Suarez doctrine I showed in that place x Disp▪ Theolog. c●p: 10. s●●. ●. . 16 Fourthly, it is also untrue, that I confess the contrary doctrine of theirs touching the absolute proposition to be at least probable, and that it may be securely followed without doubt or danger; for touching practice I do utterly condemn that doctrine as absolutely false, impious, damnable, seditious, yea & in some sort heretical, as shall appear beneath y In the Adjoinder num: 106. & seq. , and for speculation, I do neither approve it as probable, nor condemn it as improbable, because with the probability or improbability of the affirmative part of this question, I do not at this time intermeddle. That only, which I affirm, is touching the negative part of the question, to wit, that it is probable, that the Pope hath not power to depose Princes, but whether it be probable, that he hath power to depose Princes I neither confess nor deny, but only for Disputation sake I do grant, that although it be probable, that the Pope hath such a power, yet it doth not therefore follow, that it is certain and of faith, and the contrary heretical, improbable, and not to be embraced by any Catholic without note of heresy, error, or temerity. And by this you may also easily perceive, another fraud, and cunning of my Adversary. For whereas he affirmeth, that my special purpose is to show probably, that the said oath may lawfully be taken by Catholics, he doth here turn cunningly the question an other way, affirming, that it is also probable, yea & the more probable opinion, that the oath may lawfully be refused by Catholics, with which question I do not intend at this present to intermeddle, but only to prove by true probable arguments, that the oath may lawfully be taken by Catholics. For be it so for Disputation sake, that it is probable, yea and the more probable opinion, that Catholics may lawfully refuse the oath, (by reason that so many learned men, yea and the Pope himself, do think it to be unlawful) which nevertheless I will not at this time either affirm, or deny, for the reason I will allege beneath z Num: 7 〈◊〉 , yet can it not from thence be rightly concluded, that therefore it is not probable, that the oath may lawfully be taken, or that it is a most dangerous temerity and extreme folly, as my Adversary seemeth to insinuate, to follow an opinion which is truly probable against the more probable opinion of the Pope, and other Divines, as out of the doctrine of Vasquez affirming it also to be the more opinion of Divines, I did in my Theological Disputation a Cap. 10 s●●. clearly convince. It is sufficient for my purpose at this present, that Catholics may lawfully take the oath, but whether they may also refuse it, I at this time will neither affirm nor deny. This only I will say, that if Catholics may lawfully take the oath, and so avoid his majesties indignation against them, and also their own temporal overthrow, and will not, they may thank themselves, & such like violent spirits, as my Adversary is, who by sleight and cunning endeavoureth to perplex their consciences, & guilefully to persuade them, that it is the more safe and the more probable way to suffer all temporal miseries and disgraces, which he himself in my opinion, if he were in their case would not suffer, then to do that which with a safe and probable conscience they may do. 18 Fiftly, it is also untrue, that the doctrine for the Pope's power to depose Princes is conform to the practice of the Church, although it be indeed conform to the practice of divers Popes since the time of Gregory the seventh, who was the first Pope, that trusting to the power and riches of other men, contrary to the custom of his Ancestors, contemning the emperors authority, deprived him of his Empire, a thing before those times not heard of, saith Onuphrius b De varian 〈◊〉 Rom: Pont: lib. 4. which practice nevertheless was then, and hath been ever since contradicted by Catholic Princes and subjects. As also it is untrue, that this doctrine is confirmed by any one General Council, that it is a point of faith, or the contrary doctrine heretical, or improbable, as I have partly showed in the Preface of my Apologetical Answer, where I answered all those nine councils, which Card: Bellarmine in his Answer to D. Barclay brought to prove his doctrine in this point to be of faith, and the contrary not Catholic, and partly I will show beneath, when I shall answer to the Replies, which have been made by Fa: Lessius, masked under D. Singletons' name, (from whom my Adversary borroweth the third part of his book, to wit, eight whole Chapters which he consumeth in defence of the Council of Lateran) to the answers I made to that Decree of the said Lateran Council, whereon this new doctrine of faith according to these men is chiefly grounded. 19 Wherefore unless my Adversary be able to convince, as without doubt he is not, that the opinion, which denieth the Pope's power to depose Princes, is altogether improbable, and the State of France, besides many other Doctors, as thou shalt see beneath, to be extreme fools, he will never be able to demonstrate, that it is most dangerous temerity, and extreme folly to adhere to that opinion, (which my Adversary to persuade his Reader, that it is a singular opinion of one only Author, and as he untruly saith, of no one Catholic, ever calleth it my opinion) considering that according to Vasquez doctrine, which is, as he saith c 1●. 2●. disp. 62. cap: 4. , the common doctrine of the School men, it is neither folly nor temerity, to follow a probable opinion against the more probable, the more common, and the more sure opinion of the Pope and other learned men, although they should pretend to convince their opinion by the authority of holy Scriptures, declarations of General councils, the practice of the Church, and other Theological reasons, which seem to them invincible. For it is usual in a controversy among Catholic Doctors, to allege for confirmation of both opinions the aforesaid authorities and proofs, which nevertheless doth not discourage either part from maintaining their opinions, as it is manifest in the question concerning the superiority of the Pope and General councils, the conception of our B. Lady in original sin, and many questions concerning the Pope's authority to dispense, and now of late in the question touching grace, and free-will, betwixt the Dominicans, and the jesuits. 20 Therefore it is rather great temerity, and extreme folly, that you, my Catholic Countrymen, should venture your souls and whole estates upon this my adversaries writings, whose knowledge in Divinity, is known to be but small, and his desire to ease your griefs, as you shall perceive beneath d Num: 81. 82. , is also no whit less: beside he handleth this controversy, which doth so greatly concern your spiritual, and temporal good or harm, and your obedience due to GOD and CAESAR, so unsincerely, and corruptly, that either he concealeth my answers, or perverteth the true meaning of my words, rather thereby to disgrace me with the Reader, and to make him to have a prejudicate conceit of what I wrote, then really and sincerely to find out the truth, and by a clear and moderate debating of the controversy to satisfy his Readers understanding. And this very argument taken chief from the Pope's Breves, which this man to terrify, and perplex the timorous conscience of the devout Catholic Reader urgeth here, I have so largely answered in my Theological Disputation e Cap. 10 sec. 2. , wherein I fully satisfied this objection taken from the authority of the Pope's Breves, and of so many learned men, who condemn the oath as containing in it many things clearly repugnant to faith and salvation, that I thought he would have blushed to repeat the same argument here again so nakedly, which I myself urged there more plainly and strongly, without making any Reply, or taking any notice of the answers I made in that place thereunto. For there I showed the difference according to Vasquez doctrine between a doubtful and disputable question, and that there is neither doubt nor danger of any imprudence, temerity, disobedience, or of any other sin not to obey the Pope's declarative command, when it is grounded upon an opinion, or doctrine which is not certain, but disputable, for that divers Popes have in their Breves, or Decretal letters declared and taught false and also heretical doctrine, and that the Pope's declarative command hath no greater force to bind, then hath the doctrine or opinion whereon it is grounded, as Suarez, whom I related in that place, doth expressly affirm. And thus much concerning my adversaries first Admonition. 21 Secondly, whereas Widdrington, saith my Adversary s Num. 12. professeth not to give for his opinion any assured, and certain proofs, which may breed in the hearers, or Readers a firm and doubtless assent, but only probable reason drawn from credible principles, which may induce a probable persuasion, he showeth evidently, that his meaning is not to seek out the truth, but rather to obscure it by wrangling and cavilling, to show his wit, labouring to maintain paradoxes with some show of probability, knowing right well, that as Cicero saith, there is nothing so incredible, but it may be made probable by discourse etc. And what else may this man be thought to intend, but to show his wit, seeing that he pretendeth to produce no other proof of his opinion, but only probability, and withal acknowledgeth, that the contrary doctrine is, and hath been professed, and held by almost all the learned Catholics that ever have written, at least whose works are now extant. Is it likely then, that he meaneth to establish the truth, or to quiet men's consciences by the discussion thereof? No truly. But rather that he seeketh, as I have said, to obscure it, and make it doubtful, when he can not overthrow it, which is the most devilish devise, that any man could invent to impugn any point of the Catholic faith; to wit, not to do it all at once, but by degrees, seeking to shake the foundation of it, first calling it in question, and then teaching it to be but probable, and consequently doubtful, to the end that the minds of men hanging in suspense, may be disposed to admit, as well the error, as the truth. 22 But whether I or my Adversary doth intend to establish the truth, or rather to obscure it by wrangling and cavilling, seeing that he still persisteth in misinterpreting the meaning of my words, and in dissembling the true state of the question concerning the modal proposition, which is the main controversy betwixt him, and me, (wherein although he showeth in deed in some part his wit, yet verily he showeth no sincere and upright dealing) I leave to the judgement of the indifferent Reader. For first it is untrue, that I profess, (as my Adversary affirmeth) to give for my opinion no assured and certain proofs which may breed a firm and undoubted assent, which the Reader would quickly have perceived, if my Adversary had been pleased to have entirely related my words, which are these: wherefore the present controversy between me, and Card. Bellarmine is not concerning this absolute question, or proposition, whether the Pope hath, or hath not power to depose Princes for heresy or no, but concerning the modal proposition, whether it be so certain, that the Pope by Christ his institution hath such a power to depose Princes, as that those, who defend the contrary opinion, do expose themselves to manifest danger of heresy, error, or of any other mortal sin. Wherefore although in my Apology I brought certain arguments drawn from inconveniences, which the Logicians call, ad impossibile, to prove that Christ our Lord did not grant such an authority to the Pope, which is the son then can my Adversary have to tax me, for not bringing any assured or certain proofs, but only probable, to prove that it is probable, that the Pope hath not power to depose Princes. 26 Wherefore to establish and confirm this doctrine, that it is not a point of faith, that the Pope hath power to depose Princes, or that it is not improbable, that he hath no such power, it is sufficient to answer probably all the reasons and authorities to the contrary, and to bring probable proofs, which may cause a probable persuasion, that he hath no such authority: considering that according to the approved ground of all Philosophers, and Divines, certainty of one part of the contradiction cannot stand with probability of the other, taking probable in that sense, as the Divines do take it, and not for that, which hath only a show of probability, and is not truly probable; for if it be certainly true, that the Pope hath power to depose, it is certainly false, and therefore not probable, that he hath not power to depose. And therefore my Adversary rather, seeketh to obscure the truth, and to entangle men's consciences by wrangling and cavilling, whiles first he requireth evident demonstrations, to prove a probable doctrine, and secondly dissembleth the true state of the question, confounding the absolute proposition and the proofs thereof with the modal, which distinction doth express the true state of the question, and discovereth both his fraud and weakness, not only in this, but almost in all the rest of his Replies, and thirdly he concealeth the answer, which I gave to this argument taken from the authority of the Pope's Breves and of other learned men, and also the reasons, why so many learned Catholics whose books are now extant, have from the time of Pope Gregory the seventh defended this opinion for the Pope's power to depose Princes. And thus much concerning my adversaries second admonition, the weakness whereof will also presently more clearly appear by my answer to his third and fourth admonition. 27 Therefore it is to be considered for the third point, saith my Adversary, h Nu. 15. what Widdrington meaneth by a probable opinion, or a probable answer, which no doubt, he understandeth so, that whatsoever he saith, must be held for probable, how absurd so ever it be; for otherwise he could not challenge to himself such a privilege of probability as he doth, his arguments and answers being so weak and impertinent, as you shall find them to be; in which respect he is feign to dissemble the answers already made by some to his former arguments, and authorities in his Apology, whereto he now remitteth his Reader very often, without taking so much as any knowledge of the confutation thereof, as though the same had never been answered, or that every assertion or position of his, being once laid down, must needs stand for an eternal law, or were a decree of the Medes and Persians, i Dan 6. quod non licet immutari. 28 But not to return these bitter speeches of my Adversary back upon himself, which with the same facility, and with far better reason I might do, first, It is very untrue, that I take probable for whatsoever I do say how absurd so ever it be, as this man, if it were lawful for me to use his absurd word, very absurdly affirmeth, that without doubt I do; Neither do I take probable for that, which hath only a show of probability, as Cicero took probable in his Paradoxes, but I take probable, as Philosophers and Divines do take it, as it is distinguished from demonstrative and fallacious, to wit, for that, which is approved by wise and learned men in the art, which they profess, which therefore as in speculation may be embraced without any imputation of error or folly, so in practice it may be followed without any note of imprudence, or sin: As in a matter of Physic, that is accounted probable, which is approved by learned Physicians, of Law by learned Lawyers, and of Divinity by learned Catholic Divines. Secondly, it is also untrue, that I have in my Theological Disputation dissembled the answers made by some to my former arguments and authorities in my Apology, whereto I remit my Reader oftentimes, considering that my Theological Disputation was wholly finished, and in the press, before the Replies of D. Schulkenius, and of D. Weston, and also my adversaries Supplement were published, so that I could take no notice of them in my Disputation; for which cause I was constrained to touch them briefly only in an Admonition to the Reader. But my Adversary himself to make his own Replies to seem the more probable, and my answers absurd, foolish, impertinent, ridiculous (for so he is pleased to call them) is not ashamed to dissemble in many points the true state of the question, and also the answers, which in my Theological Disputation I made to his chiefest Replies, especially those whereby he laboureth to terrify the timorous consciences of unlearned Catholics, with the pretence of his new Catholic faith, with the authority of the Pope's Breves, and the testimonies of so many learned men, who have condemned the oath, as containing in it many things flat contrary to faith and salvation. 29. Now let us see his fourth consideration, by which the Reader may perceive, how insufficiently he declareth what is a probable argument, or opinion, and how little he satisfieth the understanding of unlearned Catholics, who by his obscure, and confuse description of a probable argument, cannot perceive, what argument or opinion is probable. k Num. 17. Fourthly, saith he, it is to be considered, that to make an argument, or proof probable, it sufficeth not that it seem good and true in it self, but it must also be able in some sort to counterpoise the arguments and proofs of the contrary opinion: for often it falleth out that the reasons of one part are so pregnant, that they seem to convince, and yet when they are weighed with the reasons of the other part, they are neither pregnant, nor so much as probable: for according to the old proverb, one tale is good until an other be heard. 30. To which purpose it is to be considered, that many heretics, and namely the Arians (of whom there are many even at this day) both do, and may well pretend a far greater probability for their opinion, than Widdrington doth or can for his, considering their abundant allegation of Scriptures, their subtle shifts in answering the arguments and objections of the Catholics, the great multitude of learned men of their Sect in times past, and their dignity in the Church, the Conventicles assembled, and held in their favour, and finally the ample propagation of their opinion and Sect, especially in the time of Constantius the Emperor. For which respects their followers, at this day, do hold their doctrine not only for probable, but also for infallibly true, and condemn the contrary for pernicious heresy: whereas Widdringtons' grounds and proofs of his opinion seem to himself so weak, that he dare not affirm them to be more than probable. 31. Therefore as there is no good Christian that doth now hold the arguments of the Arrians to be so much as probable, considering the potent reasons, and proofs of the Catholic doctrine in that point, so albeit the arguments and authorities, which Widdrington produceth, were they far more plausible and pregnant than they are, yet no Catholic could esteem them to be any way probable, being compared and balanced with the irrefregable proofs of the other part; I mean the arguments, and necessary consequences drawn from the holy Scriptures, the authority of almost all the learned Doctors and Divines that have written of that point, and the practice of the Church for some hundreds of years confirmed by nine or ten councils, l S●e Supplem. chap. 2. num. 76. 77. whereof some have been the greatest that ever were in God's Church; and therefore I say that all this being well weighed, no Catholic man of sound wit, or judgement can imagine this man's arguments (which he himself holdeth but for probable) to have any probability in the world, or to prove any thing else but his weakness, wilfulness, and folly in propounding and maintaining them. 32. For albeit he teacheth out of Vasquez m Disput. Theolog. cap. 10. sec. 2. num. 7. usque ad num. 21. , and others, that of two opinions the less probable and less safe may securely be followed, and that the opinion of a few, yea of one approved Doctor, sufficeth sometimes to make an opinion probable, though many hold the contrary to that one Doctor (to which purpose he filleth above a dozen pages of his book with Vasquez his doctrine and text) yet he is absurd in applying the same to this our case; for although Vasquez do teach n 1 a. 2 a. disp. 62. cap. 1. nu. 1. that a man may in doubtful cases or questions securely follow the opinion of a few learned Doctors, though the same be less safe, and probable, than the contrary opinion held by many, yet he is to be understood to speak only of such disputable questions, as my Adversary Widdrington himself allegeth o Ibidem num. 26. for example sake out of Vasquez, to wit, whether there are any habits infused by God alone, concerning which question Vasquez saith, p Vbi supra disp. 79 cap. 1. & disp. 86. that albeit Pope Clement the fift did determine expressly in a Council held at Vienna, that there opinion who held that there are such habits, is more probable, than the negative, yet it was never either by that decree, or any other of Pope, or Council determined to be more than probable, in which respect he doth not condemn the contrary doctrine for heresy, notwithstanding that he, and the far greater part of learned men do hold the other to be certainly true. 33. So as Vasquez is to be understood to speak of questions and opinions altogether undecided, and not of such a doctrine as ours, touching the Pope's power to depose Princes, which, as I have said, hath not only been taught by the learnedst men of many ages, but also is grounded upon the holy Scriptures, and confirmed by the practice and decrees of divers Popes and councils, as well General as Provincial, as (to omit the other mentioned in my Supplement q Cap. 2. num. 76. 77. ) it is evident by the decree of the famous Council of Lateran, which expressly ordained the practice of it in some cases, and did therefore necessarily suppose, and firmly believe the verity of the doctrine, as I will clearly prove r Cap. 15. nu. 6. 7. 8. hereafter in this Reply, and withal show the ridiculous absurdity of Widdringtons' arguments and instances against the same, yea and convince him s Ibidem num. 9 11. 12. even by his own testimony to be fallen (to use his own words) into error or heresy, for not believing this doctrine, which that famous General Council believed, and ordained to be practised. 34. In the mean time he is to understand, that whereas to show the probability of his doctrine, he bringeth many Authors, partly in his Theological Disputation, and partly in his Apology, I remit him to D. Schulckenius; who hath answered particularly to every one of them, and proved clearly, that diverse of them do make flatly against him, and many nothing at all for him (being truly understood) and that some others are worthily rejected, being either so absurd, that they are easily confuted by the circumstances of the places alleged, or else Heretics (as it appeareth by their doctrine in other things) or known Schismatics, who living in the time of the Emperors or Kings that were deposed, wrote partially in their favour, of which sort nevertheless there are very few; so as of all the Authors, that he hath scraped together to make some show of probability in his doctrine, he hath no one clear and sufficient witness to justify the same. 35. And therefore seeing that all his pretended, probability consisteth partly in the authority of the Authors, and partly in the sufficiency (as he supposeth) of his answers to our grounds, arguments, and authorities, which answers I shall have occasion to confute in this Treatise, and to show them to be so far from probability, that they are wholly impertinent, and sometimes ridiculous for their absurdity; therefore I conclude, that he cannot any way clear or excuse himself from the note of great temerity and gross error (yea flat heresy if he be obstinate) in impugning our doctrine grounded upon such assured and solid foundations as I have here signified, and will more particularly and manifestly declare hereafter; as also I will put thee in mind (good Reader) oftentimes by the way to note how probably or rather (to say truly) how absurdly he argueth and answereth, to the end thou mayest the better judge, how dangerous it will be for thee to venture thy soul upon his pretence of probability, which is no other but such as any heretic may have for his doctrine. 36. For all Heretics do think themselves and their follows as good and sufficient Doctors to make an opinion probable, as he either is, or esteemeth his Authors to be; and they never want Scriptures and Fathers that seem to them to confirm their opinions, and do make as probable answers to our objections out of Scriptures and Fathers as he doth, and many times much more probable, than he, yea and they may either with his arguments and instances, or other as probable as they, impugn the authority of any decree of a General Council, be it never so express against them, saying that the fathers who made it followed, but a probable opinion, and so might err, as you shall hear t Infra chap. 13. num. 1. he answereth to the decree of the Council of Lateran. 37. And so you see, that if is pretended probability be admitted against the common doctrine, practice and decrees of the Church, any heretic will not only easily defend, but also establish his heresy: and any point of Catholic faith may easily be called in question & made only probable, and consequently doubtful, obnoxious to error, and to be rejected by any man that list to embrace the contrary: which truly I leave (good Reader) to thy consideration, whether it be not the right way to overthrow Catholic Religion, and to introduce all Heresy and Atheism. 38. This is my adversaries fourth admonition, the substance whereof although I could have comprised in few lines, yet I thought good to set it down entirely word by word as it lieth, to the end the Reader may more plainly perceive his fraudulent, uncharitable, and insufficient proceeding therein. And first he declareth, what is requisite to a probable argument. Secondly, he affirmeth, that Vasquez doctrine, which I related in my Theological Disputation, for following of probable opinions is to be understood to speak only of questions & opinions altogether undecided, & not of such a doctrine as theirs is touching the Pope's power to depose Princes, which hath been taught by the learnedst men of many ages, is grounded upon the holy Scriptures etc. Thirdly, he inferreth, that any heretic, and namely the Arrians may pretend as great, yea and far greater probability to prove their heresy, than I do, or can do to prove my doctrine. Fourthly, he averreth, that all my pretended probability consisteth partly in the authority of those Authors, which I bring in my Theological Disputation and also in my Apology, and partly in the sufficiency, as I suppose, of my answers to their grounds, arguments and authorities; for confutation of the first my Adversary remitteth his Reader to D. Schulckenius, and for the second he himself promiseth to show them to be so far from probability, that they are wholly impertinent, and sometimes ridiculous for their absurdity, and that therefore I cannot any way clear or excuse myself from the note of great temerity and gross error, yea, flat heresy, into which he will, forsooth, convince me even by mine own testimony to be fallen, for not believing this doctrine touching the Pope's power to depose Princes, which that famous General Council of Lateran believed, and ordained to be practised. But how vain are the brags of this glorious boasting man, and who in very deed is the impertinent, ridiculous and absurd, thou shalt have (good Reader) a taste by my answer to this his admonition, and by my answers to the rest of his Replies thou shalt more fully perceive, as also that I am free from all note of temerity, error or heresy, and how dangerous it is for thee to venture thy soul and whole estate upon the credit of this unlearned and uncharitable man, who as he is known to be a man of no great learning, so also both here and in the greatest part of his Replies showeth great want not only of learning, but also of charity, sincerity, and also of Christian modesty, as partly thou hast seen already and hereafter shalt most clearly understand. 39 First therefore consider (Courteous Reader) whether Mr. Fitzherbert by his description of a probable argument intendeth to quiet and satisfy, or rather to disturb and perplex the timorous consciences of unlearned Catholics, who cannot understand what he meaneth by those words, in some sort, and how an argument, which is far the less probable, can by those words be distinguished from an argument, of the contrary opinion, which is by much, the more probable. For although it be true, that probable arguments for one opinion must be able in some sort to counterpoise the arguments of the contrary opinion in the judgement of those, who think that opinion to be probable, and are able to weigh and balance the intrinsical grounds, or arguments on both sides, yet unlearned men, who are not able to judge & examine the intrinsical grounds of any opinion, but are only led by authority, can not easily discern, how far this, in some part, which hath so great a latitude, is to be extended. Neither is my Adversary, as I suppose, so ignorant in philosophy, although perchance he hath spent small time in the study thereof, as to imagine, that probability, is in the thing itself, as truth and falsehood are, according to that saying of the philosophers, ex eo quod res est vel non est, propositio dicitur vera vel falsa: a proposition is said to be true or false, for that the thing itself, which is affirmed or denied is, or is not. 40 For probability is not in the thing itself, but in the understanding of him, who approveth the opinion or doctrine, in so much that although an opinion, which once is true, can afterwards never be false, nor which once is false, be afterwards ever true, yet an opinion, which once was probable, may afterwards be improbable, and contrariwise, which was once improbable, may afterwards prove probable, according as it shall be approved or disproved by men skilful in the art which they profess: yea an opinion, which to some Doctors is improbable, and also heretical, to others may be probable, yea and approved as the more true opinion: And this proceedeth from the diversity of men's judgements and opinions, where oftentimes are seen, according to the vulgar saying, quot capita tot sententiae, as many heads so many opinions. That is probable, say the Philosophers, taking it from Aristotle u 1. Top: cap. 1. , which is approved by wise and skilful men in the art, which they profess: so that what argument or opinion learned men do approve, is a probable argument or opinion. And this description of probable is not obscure and intricate, but clear and perspicuous even to ignorant men, who can easily discern, what opinion or argument learned men do approve. And therefore well said Armilla x Verbo opinio nu: 2. , whom I cited in my Theological Disputation y cap: 10. sec. 2. nu: 21. , that a man is not bound always to follow the better opinion, but it sufficeth that he follow that, which some skilful Doctors judge to be true: and learned Navarra, whom I also related in that book z cap: 3. sec: 3. nu: 14. , for the quieting of scrupulous consciences affirmeth, a in Manuali cap: 27. num. 288. that in the Court of Conscience, to the effect of not sinning, it sufficeth to choose for true his opinion, whom for just cause we think to be a man of a good conscience, and of sufficient learning. 41 Wherefore when my Adversary affirmeth, that to make an argument probable, it sufficeth not, that it seem good and true in itself, but it must also be able in some sort to counterpoise the arguments of the contrary opinion, if he mean, that it must always be able in some sort to counterpoise the arguments of the contrary opinion, in the judgements of those who are not of the contrary opinion, and do not approve the argument for good, this, if it were lawful for me to use my adversaries undecent words, is absurd and ridiculous, for that oftentimes it falleth out, that some Doctors do think an opinion to be improbable and heretical, which other Doctors of the contrary opinion do think not only to be probable, but also to be the more true opinion, as it is evident in the question touching the superiority of the Pope and councils. For the ancient Doctors of Paris, as joannes Maior, & jacobus Almainus, Maior de auctorit: Ecclesiae circa finem. Almainus de authorit: Ecclesiae cap: 7. Card: Camerac. de authorit. Eccles. part. 3. cap: 4. Gerson in libello contra Petrum de Luna. artic: 22. & alibi. who wrote against Cardinal Caietane concerning this question, thought the opinion, which held the Pope to be above a General Council, to be improbable, yea and other Doctors, as Cardinalis Cameracensis, and john Gerson, thought it to be erroneous and heretical, which nevertheless Cardinal Caietan defended to be the more true opinion. 42 But if my Adversary mean, as needs he must, if he will speak with reason, that to make an argument probable, it must always be able in some sort to counterpoise the arguments of the contrary opinion, in the judgements of those, who either are not of that contrary opinion, or else do not reject the argument as improbable, this is most true: for in the judgements of those, who do not only reject the argument as improbable, but do absolutely approve it for good, and for the more probable, it doth not only in some sort counterpoise, but it doth also in some sort overpoyse the arguments of the contrary opinion, as any man may plainly perceive by Vasquez doctrine, which because it fully cleareth this present difficulty, and is able to quiet the conscience of any man, be he never so ignorant, I related word by word in my Theological Disputation, b Cap: 10. sec: 2. which doctrine because my Adversary knew right well, that it did amply declare what is a probable opinion, and how far forth both unlearned, and learned men may follow a probable opinion against the more common, the more probable, and the more secure opinion of Catholic Divines, he cunningly concealeth, as you shall see, the chief and principal point thereof, and yet he carpeth at me for filling above a dozen pages of my book with Vasquez doctrine and text, affirming withal, that I am absurd in applying Vasquez doctrine to this our case, but who is the absurd, you shall forthwith perceive. 43 For whereas Vasquez doth teach, that if a learned and skilful man, who hath taken no small pains in studies, and hath also thoroughly seen and examined all the reasons of the contrary opinion, shall judge against all other writers, who have gone before him, that his opinion is the more probable, he may although it be the less secure opinion, lawfully embrace it, and in practice follow it, whose opinion also an unlearned man, who ought according to reason, saith Vasquez, give credit to the learning and honesty of a learned and virtuous man, may lawfully follow, my Adversary affirmeth, that Vasquez is to be understood to speak of questions and opinions altogether undecided, as is that, which I cited there out of Vasquez, concerning the infusing of habits by God alone, and not of such a doctrine, as is this concerning the Pope's power to depose Princes, which hath not only been taught by the learnedst men of many ages, but also is grounded upon holy Scriptures, and confirmed by the practice, and decrees of divers Popes and Counsels etc. But whether I be absurd in accounting that doctrine to be probable, undecided, and questionable among Catholics, about which the Schoolmen are at strife, and as yet the controversy is not decided by the judge, saith Trithemius c In Chron: monast: Hirsaug: ad annum 1106. , and which very many Doctors do defend, saith Almainus d De dominio not: civ: & Eccles. in probal: 2. concls. , and which the Kingdom of France hath always approved for certain saith Pithaeus e in Cod. libert. Eccles. Gallic. , and which the late proceeding of the Parliament of Paris against the contrary doctrine taught by Suarez, Card: Bellarmine, and others hath clearly confirmed (to omit the form of oath lately propounded by the tiers' Estates,) and that Card: Peron himself doth not reject it as improbable, I remit to the judgement of the indifferent Reader. 44. Yea my Adversary himself, although he untruly and unlearnedly, as you shall perceive beneath, chargeth me with heresy, for defending the aforesaid doctrine as probable, or to use Cardinal Perons' word, as problematique, dare not avouch, that the doctrine is defined by any General Council, which nevertheless, as I showed in my Theological Disputation f Cap: 10. sec. 2. num. 32. out of Card: Bellarmine, and Canus, is necessary that a decree of a General Council can make a point of faith, and the contrary doctrine to be heretical, but with mincing terms only affirmeth, that it hath been taught by the learnedst men of many ages, is grounded upon holy Scriptures, and confirmed by the practice and decrees of divers Popes and councils, especially of the great Council of Lateran, which expressly ordained the practice of it in some Cases, and did therefore necessarily suppose, and firmly believe the verity of the said doctrine. But besides that here is no speech of any definition, which only can make any doctrine to be of faith, and the contrary to be heretical, and also it is usual among Divines to affirm, that their doctrine hath been taught by the learnedst men of many ages, is grounded upon holy Scriptures, is not only confirmed by the practice, but is also expressly defined by the decrees of General councils, which nevertheless doth not terrify other learned men from impugning their doctrine and opinions, I will show beneath g In the third part, chap. 9 and the rest. , that the Council of Lateran did neither ordain the practice of that doctrine, nor necessarily suppose or firmly believe, especially with divine and supernatural belief, the verity thereof; and I will answer all the Replies, which my Adversary hath taken out of Fa: Lessius (masked under D. Singletons' name) against my answers, and hath filled not only a dozen pages, but well near four dozen pages of his book with Fa: Lessius his doctrine & text, yet concealing his name, belike to make his Reader believe what a learned Divine he is now become, and that those Replies were not the fruits of other men's wits, but the subtle inventions of his own fertile brain, whereas it is well known, what small skill Mr. Thomas Fitzherbert hath in Theological learning. 45 But if my Adversary had been resolved sincerely to handle this question, and really to find out the truth, he might easily have gathered out of Vasquez doctrine, the answer to this his Reply. For when Vasquez affirmeth, that if a learned man, who hath thoroughly seen, and examined all the reasons of the contrary part, shall judge against all other writers, who have gone before him, that his opinion is the more probable, he may although it be the less secure opinion, embrace it, and in practice follow it, his assertion is general, whether it be concerning any doctrinal point, which is thought to belong to faith, or any text of holy Scripture, or any decree or definition of Pope or General Council, which are in controversy among Catholics. Yea according to Vasquez doctrine, it is lawful for other men, who hold the contrary opinion to be the more probable, without any note of temerity, to embrace it, and in practice follow it, unless it be a singular opinion and of one only Doctor (as this doctrine which denieth the Pope's power to depose Princes is not singular and of one only, but of many, as I will show beneath:) for then, saith Vasquez, if it be a singular opinion, and of one only Doctor, although it may be probable to that Doctor (who is not therefore so easily to be condemned of temerity) yet to him, who liketh not the proper and intrinsical grounds of that singular opinion, and of one only Doctor, and seethe it to be grounded upon the authority of one only Doctor, he ought not to account it probable to this effect, that he may prudently follow it in practice against his own, and the common opinion of all others. 46 But if it be not a singular opinion and of one only Doctor, although the learned men of the contrary opinion do urge for their doctrine some law, decree, or definition, which the contrary part hath seen and examined, and hath in some sort answered thereunto, it is lawful for any learned man according to Vasquez, to follow in practice that other less secure and less common opinion, against his own opinion, albeit it be the more secure and common opinion. For when we perceive, saith Vasquez, that the Authors of the contrary opinion have seen, and considered all the grounds and reasons for our opinion, and have observed that objection taken from that law or decree, and have endeavoured to answer them, and that they were not convinced by them, we may justly think, that we may prudently and lawfully follow in practise the opinion of those other men against our own, neither ought we to suppose that our reasons are evident demonstrations, and which do make the contrary opinion to be void of all probability. 47 And this doctrine of Vasquez is evident in the question concerning the superiority of the Pope above a General Council, which hath been so long debated betwixt the Doctors of Rome and Paris. For both of them affirm, that their opinion is grounded upon holy Scriptures, is confirmed by the practice and decrees, yea and definitions of General Counsels, and yet both of them, because they are approved by learned Catholic Divines, are probable, although, as Navarra, h In cap. Novit de judicijs notab. 3. nu. 84. out of joannes Mayor a learned Divine of Paris relateth, that the opinion of the Parishioners is not permitted to be defended at Rome, nor the opinion of the Romans to be defended at Paris. And therefore into what fowl terms, trow you, would my Adversary break, if the Doctors of Paris, who do resolutely hold, that the Pope is inferior to a General Council, should argue against Card. Bellarmine and others of his opinion, in the same manner, as this fowl mouthed man, who hath still in his mouth absurd, ridiculous, impertinent, foolish, impudent, temerarious, impious, heretical, or erroneous, that their doctrine hath not only been taught by the learnedst men of many ages, but also it is grounded upon holy Scriptures, confirmed by the practice and decrees of divers Counsels, but especially of the famous Council of Constance, which did not only ordain the practice of it in some cases, and therefore necessarily suppose and firmly believe, but did also expressly define, and consequently command all Christians to believe the verity of that doctrine, and that therefore Card. Bellarmine is fallen into heresy, for not believing that doctrine, which that famous General Council, believed, defined, and ordained to be practised and also to be believed. 48 By this it is apparent, that Vasquez doctrine is to be understood generally of all cases, questions, and opinions, which are in controversy among learned Catholics, although one or both parts do pretend their doctrine to be of faith, and to be grounded upon the authority of holy Scripture, or some decree of Pope, or General Council, and that learned Catholics ought not, according to Vasquez, to be easily condemned of temerity, and much less of error or heresy, who do not follow the more common, the more probable, and the more secure opinion of other Catholic Doctors, although this common opinion seem to some followers thereof to be an undoubted doctrine, and to be confirmed by some Decree, Law, or Canon of Pope, or General Counsel, which Decree, Law, or Canon those learned Catholics have seen, examined, and answered, although their answers do not satisfy the contrary side. And conformably to this doctrine did Vasquez, as I observed in my Theological Disputation, dispute that question, whether there be any habits, which are infused by God alone. For although he expressly affirmeth, that it is the constant, without controversy, and undoubted opinion of the Schoole-divines, that there be certain virtues called Theological, Faith, Hope, and Charity, which of their own nature are infused by God alone, and that some Doctors, as Andrea's Vega, do hold this doctrine to be of faith, and the contrary to be heretical, or erroneous, endeavouring to prove the same, not out of the Council of Vienna, which did only declare it to be the more probable opinion, but out of the Council of Trent, yet Vasquez would not condemn the contrary opinion not only of heresy, as my Adversary would cunningly persuade the Reader, but not so much as of temerity. From whence I inferred, that, according to Vasquez doctrine, which my Adversary fraudulently concealeth, the constant, without controversy, and undoubted opinion of Schoole-divines, and which some of them think to be a point of faith, may sometimes be rejected without any note, not only of heresy or error, but also of temerity, which doctrine doth clearly satisfy the common argument drawn from the authority of learned men, who hold the doctrine for the Pope's power to depose Princes to be a point of faith, and consequently the oath to be repugnant to faith and salvation. And thus much concerning the first and second point of my adversaries fourth Admonition. 49 As touching the third point it is apparently untrue, and very injurious to Catholics, and to Catholic Religion to affirm, that the Arrians, or any other heretics may well pretend a far greater probability for the establishing of their heresies, then may I and those other Catholics, who hold it probable, that the Pope hath not power to depose Princes. For (besides that the Arrian heresy was expressly condemned in the first eight General Counsels, and afterwards in many others, and the Arrians have ever been accounted heretics by ancient Fathers and all other Catholics, whereas there cannot be alleged so much as any show or colour of any one definition of a General Council, wherein the doctrine which denieth the Pope's power to depose Princes is condemned for heretical, but all the proofs that my Adversaries allege, that the Pope hath such a power, are only over-wrested similitudes, facts, examples, inferences, and supposisitions of their own, drawn from the authority of holy Scriptures, Popes, or Counsels) when the Philosophers and Divines do affirm, that the authority of learned and skilful men sufficeth to make the doctrine or opinion probable, which they approve, they understand of learned and skilful men approving a doctrine belonging to the art, which they profess, according to that vulgar maxim, unicuique in sua arte perito credendum est, we must give credit to every man skilful in his art. 50 So that in a point of Law, the authority of skilful Lawyers, and not of skilful Physicians, in a point of Physic the authority of skilful Physicians and not of Lawyers, and in a point of Catholic Religion, the authority of learned Catholics, and who are skilful in points of Catholic Religion which they profess, and not of heretics, and who do not profess Catholic Religion, doth make the opinion, or doctrine which they approve to be probable. And therefore my Adversary very insufficiently (not to use those fowl words absurdly & ridiculously, which he so often useth against me) argueth from the authority of learned Catholics to the authority of heretics, whose doctrine according to the definition of probable, can never make the opinions, which they approve in points of Catholic Religion, which they do not profess, to be probable. Neither by this can any point of Catholic faith, which is known to all learned Catholics to be a point of Catholic faith, be easily called in question, and made only probable, for that no learned Catholic will call in question any doctrine, which is clearly known to be the Catholic faith, and as for heretics their authority can never make any doctrine belonging any way to Catholic Religion, which they do not profess, to be probable. 51 But if there should arise any controversy among learned Catholics, whether this or that doctrine be of faith, and in what sense the words of such a text of holy Scripture, or of such a Canon, or Decree of Pope or Council are to be understood, there is no doubt, but that the authority of learned Catholics may in those cases make their opinion probable although other Catholics would be so stiff in their own opinion, as to condemn the contrary part of heresy, error, or temerity. A manifest example hereof we have in the Council of Constance, wherein according to john Gerson and other learned men, who were present at that Council, it was expressly defined, that the Pope is inferior and subject to a General Council lawfully assembled, and therefore the contrary to be flat heretical, but since that other Catholics, especially Roman Divines have called that Decree in question, and have endeavoured to answer thereunto, affirming that it was only meant of Popes in time of Schism, or that the aforesaid Decree was not confirmed by Pope Martin in the end of the Council, which answers nevertheless do not satisfy the Doctors of the contrary opinion, I do not think, but that my Adversary will confess, that the opinion of the Romans may be accounted probable, and that the calling of that Decree in question was not the right way to overthrow Catholic Religion, and to introduce all heresy and Atheism. 52. But if it should perchance fall out, that some Catholics would be so self opinative, as to affirm without any definition at all of the Church, although under pretext of zeal and devotion to the See Apostolic, any doctrine to be of faith and the contrary to be heretical, and other Catholics although the far fewer in number should deny the same, especially in a matter which concerneth our obedience due to God and Caesar, if the first part only should be permitted to write freely what they please, and to tax the other part of heresy, to omit error, temerity, folly, ridiculous absurdity and such like, and this other part should be forbidden to defend their good names, and to answer for themselves, I leave (good Reader) to thy consideration, whether this be not the right way to overthrow Catholic Religion and the undoubted grounds thereof, and to introduce uncertain opinions for an infallible doctrine of the Catholic faith, which is to open a wide gap to heresy, Atheism, and evident injustice, and to make among Christians a perpetual dissension betwixt the Clergy, and Laity, the temporal and spiritual power. Now that this doctrine for the Pope's power to depose Princes is not by any definition at all of the Church declared to be true, my Adversary cannot deny, and that it ever hath been and is impugned by learned Catholics, and the contrary hath ever been, and is by them approved, and therefore it is truly probable, and not only hath a pretence of probability I will show beneath, where I will both relate the Catholic Authors, who deny this authority of the Pope to depose Princes, which only is sufficient to make their doctrine probable, and also I will discover the insufficiency of those Replies, which my Adversary hath made against my answers. And thus much concerning the third point. 53. For the fourth and last point, consider, Catholic Countrymen, whether Mr. Fizherbert intendeth to declare unto you plainly and sincerely this present controversy, and by a clear explaining of the question to quiet your consciences, or rather by wrangling and cavilling to obscure the difficulty, and blind your understandings. The question betwixt him and me at this present is, whether it be a probable doctrine, that the Pope hath not any power by the institution of Christ to deprive Sovereign Princes of their temporal power, and Regal authority: And there are two only grounds to persuade any man, that this or that doctrine or opinion is truly probable. The one are called intrinsical grounds, to wit, the arguments and reasons, which are drawn from holy Scriptures, sacred Canons, Theological reasons and such like, to prove that doctrine or opinion: and these grounds are proper only to learned men, who are able to weigh and examine the arguments on both sides; ●●e other are called extrinsical grounds, which do only consist in the authority of those learned men, who do hold that doctrine or opinion, because according to that which hath been said before, that doctrine is truly probable, which is approved by wise and skilful men in the art which they profess; and by these only grounds unlearned men can be persuaded, that any doctrine or opinion is truly probable. 54. Now my Adversary seeing, as he saith, that all my pretended probability consisteth partly in the authority of those Authors, which I have brought in my Theological Disputation, and in my Apology, and partly in the sufficiency, as I suppose, of my answers to their grounds, arguments and authorities, yet he taketh upon him in this Reply only to confute some of my answers to their intrinsical grounds, and for the confutation of the authorities which I bring, he remitteth his Reader, to D. Schulckenius, who, as he saith, hath answered particularly to every one of them. Seeing therefore that there is no sufficient way to satisfy the understandings of unlearned men, that the doctrine, which holdeth the Pope to have no authority to depose Princes, is not truly probable, but by showing that no learned Catholics do approve the same, for that unlearned men are not able to examine the intrinsical grounds of any Theological question, but are only led by authority, and extrinsical grounds, and if they once perceive, that learned Catholics do approve any doctrine they will presently also perceive that doctrine to be truly probable, is there any likelihood, that Mr. Fitzherbert intended to give satisfaction to his unlearned Countrymen, by replying to some of the answers, which I made to their arguments, and intrinsical grounds of their doctrine, which intrinsical grounds unlearned men cannot examine, and for an answer to the authorities and extrinsical grounds which I brought, which only grounds unlearned men can understand, to remit his English Readers, and who for the most part understand not Latin to D. Schulckenius a Latin writer. 55. Besides, from my Adversaries own words the Reader may easily perceive a great fraud of his. For my Adversary confesseth, that I have brought many Authors partly in my Theological Disputation, and partly in my Apology, which is very true; for in my Theological Disputation of set purpose I chose out certain Authors named in my Apology, which I thought did speak more plainly, and against which no just exception could be taken; whereunto also I added certain other Authors which in my Apology were not named at all: And yet my Adversary remitteth his Reader for an answer to them all, to D. Schulckenius, who hath only answered (but how insufficiently you shall see beneath) those authorities which I brought in my Apology: for my Theological Disputation he could not at that time see, it being then but in the PRINTERS hands. But the plain truth is, that unless my Adversary would have showed apparently to wrangle and cavil, he could take no just exception whereby his Reader might be fully satisfied, against those Authors, which I brought in my Theological Disputation, and therefore he thought it his best course cunningly to shift them of, and not to meddle with the answering of them at all, lest the Reader perceiving so many learned Catholics to join with Widdrington in denying this doctrine for the Pope's power to depose Princes especially to be a point of faith, should presently observe both the fraudulent proceeding of my Adversary, who laboureth to persuade his Reader, that only Widdrington doth impugn this authority of the Pope to depose Princes, and also that the contrary doctrine being approved not only by Widdrington, but also by so many learned Catholics is, and aught to be accounted truly probable, and therefore may according to Vasquez doctrine without any note of temerity be embraced by any Catholic. But of these authorities I will treat more at large beneath. And thus much concerning my adversaries fourth Admonition, and all the four points thereof. 56. Now to come to my adversaries fift and last admonition, which indeed, as he truly saith, is worthy to be noted, but not for any truth therein to be observed, but for the manifest fraud and falsehood therein contained: The first and last consideration shall be, saith my Adversary, * Num. 25. & seq. that Widdringtons' doctrine is dangerous and pernicious not only to the consciences of Catholics, (as I have showed) but also to his majesties service, which he pretendeth to further and advance thereby; for he cannot deny, but that the contrary opinion being probable (as he confesseth it to be) may be lawfully embraced by all men; whereupon it followeth, that any man may not only refuse the oath lawfully, but also hold, that his Majesty may be deposed by his own subjects upon a sentence of Excommunication and Deposition, and that consequently they may lawfully take arms against his Majesty in that case; and this being so, what security hath his Majesty, or advancement of his service by this man's doctrine? For albeit many do now take the Oath, and swear that they think in their conscience, that the Pope cannot depose the King; yet for as much as it is, and always will be probable, in the opinion of some learned men, that they have sworn a thing, which is false, and consequently that their Oath is inualide, it followeth (according to the grounds of his doctrine) that they may break their Oath, seeing that they may always probably persuade themselves, that they promised and swore a thing false and unlawful, and that therefore they are not bound to observe it. 57 Furthermore, if his Holiness should at any time dispense with them particularly for their Oath, or excommunicate and depose his Majesty, discharging his Subjects of their bond of fidelity, and all others of Allegiance, this man cannot deny, but that it is probable at least, that then they are free from the Oath, and consequently that they may (even according to his doctrine of probability) concur to the deposition of his Majesty: and therefore seeing that his doctrine doth not give any security to his Majesty, and that according to his opinion any man may as lawfully condemn and refuse the Oath, as approve and take it, it is evident, that his said doctrine is not only vain and fruitless to his Majesty, but also dangerous and pernicious, no less impugning the authority of his Majesty commanding it to be taken, then of his Holiness forbidding it. 58. Whereupon I infer three things; the first, that he is neither so good a subject to his Majesty, as he pretendeth, nor such an obedient child to the Church as he professeth to be. The second is, that his books deserve to be prohibited no less in England then Rome; and therefore truly wise men in these parts do greatly marvel how it can stand with the wisdom of his majesties Council to permit them to be printed and published in England as we see they are. The third is, that he is one of those, whom God threateneth in the Apocalyps, Apoc. 3. to spit out of his mouth, saying of such indifferent men as he, utinam esses aut calidus, aut frigidus etc. I would thou wert either hot or cold, but because thou art lukewarm, I will begin to vomit thee out of my mouth. 59 And this shall suffice, good Reader, for the present, touching those advertisements and considerations, which I meant to give thee concerning Widdringtons' doctrine in general: and therefore I will now pass to the examination of his answers to me in particular, and lay down in order as much of the text of his Admonition, as concerneth me, to the end that he shall not have occasion to say, that I have concealed or dissembled any thing that he hath said against me; as also that thou mayest see, how probably he hath answered me, and thereby the better judge of the probability, as well of his answers to other men, as of his whole doctrine in his Theological Disputation, which as I understand, thou shalt shortly see fully confuted in Latin to his confusion, Besides that, I doubt not, but thou shalt also, even in this my Reply, see a clear confutation of the chief grounds of his doctrine, and of his principal arguments and answers touching the Pope's power to depose Princes, which is the main question betwixt him and us, and specially impugned, and abjured in the new oath. 60. But what strange paradoxes and positions void of all probability Mr. Fitzherbert dare adventure to maintain, yea and to persuade his Majesty, and the wisdoms of his most honourable privy Council, that it is dangerous to his majesties safety, to have this doctrine for the Pope's power to depose his Majesty, to be so much as called in question in his Dominions, thou mayest, good Reader, clearly perceive by this his last Admonition, wherein thou shalt observe the manifest fraud and falsehood of this man. For if Mr. Fitzherbert had either sincerely, or entirely related my opinion and doctrine, or else had put in mind his Reader against what kind of Adversaries I do oppose, any man of mean understanding would presently have perceived (as I observed elsewhere, i In the Admonition to the Reader before my English Purgation sent to his Holiness. which my words I think it not amiss to set down here again) that it is too too apparently and shamefully untrue, that my manner of handling this question probably can be dangerous or pernicious to his Majesty, as my Adversary endeavoureth to persuade his Majesty, not for any love that he is known to bear unto the State, but to the end by all likelihood, that he and such like violent spirits may write more freely of this subject, and without being controlled or contradicted by Catholics, who, as he is persuaded, do little regard the writings and opinions of Protestants concerning this or any other doctrine. 61. For it may be dangerous to his Majesty to handle a question probably against one Adversary, which will be nothing dangerous to handle it probably against another. As for example, if it were agreed upon by all Catholics, that the Pope hath no power to depose his Majesty, than it would be dangerous to his Majesty, that any Catholic should call this in question, and dispute it probably: but if on the contrary side all Catholics should agree in this, that it were certain, unquestionable, and a point of faith, that the Pope hath power to depose his Majesty, and to absolve his Subjects of their Allegiance, to command them to take arms against him etc. then if a Catholic should call this in question, or which is all one, dispute it probably, and maintain, that it is not certain, that the Pope hath such an authority, but that it is questionable, and probable that he hath it not, no man of any sense or understanding can affirm, that such a manner of disputing this question probably against those Adversaries, who hold it for certain and unquestionable, can be any way dangerous or pernicious to his Majesty. 62 Now behold the manner, which I have taken in handling this controversy. Card: Bellarmine, Fa: Gretzer, Lessius, Becanus, Suarez, and some other Divines, especially of the Society of jesus, whom Mr. T. F. in every step, as though he were their creature, (as now he is become one of their company,) doth follow, have laid this for a sure and undoubted ground, that it is a point of faith, and to be believed as certain, and under pain of eternal damnation by Catholics, that the Pope hath power to depose Princes, to absolve Subjects from their allegiance, and thereupon to command them to take arms, and raise tumults against their Prince so deposed. So that you see, that these men have already laid the danger and undoubted overthrow to his majesties Person and Crown, if the Pope should perchance depose him, in that they affirm, that all Catholics are in that case bound in conscience to forsake him, and to fulfil the Pope's command to the destruction of his majesties Person and State. This doctrine, to wit, that it is a point of faith, and an undoubted principle of Catholic Religion, that the Pope hath power to depose Princes, and to inflict all temporal punishments by way of coercion, and that all Catholics are bound in conscience to forsake his Majesty, and to take arms against him, I have taken upon me for two principal reasons to impugn, and do not doubt clearly to maintain the same, against the clamours of Mr. T. F. or any other whatsoever. 63 My first reason was, for that it is against the truth and purity of the Catholic Church, She being a pillar and ground of truth, that doubtful opinions, and which among Catholics are only in controversy, and by the Parliament of Paris have been condemned as scandalous, seditious, damnable, and pernicious, should be enforced upon English Catholics, as an undoubted doctrine of the Catholic faith, to the utter overthrow of themselves, and their whole posterity, by men who are in no danger to lose, but rather to gain temporal advancement by their writings. My second reason was to assure his Majesty, that all English Catholics may, if they will, according to the grounds of Catholic Religion be true and constant Subjects to his Majesty, and that notwithstanding any sentence of Excommunication or deprivation denounced, or to be denounced against his Majesty by the Pope, whereby his Subjects should be absolved from their Allegiance, or commanded not to obey him in temporal causes, they may with a safe conscience, & also in practice (mark well what I say) they are bound to adhere to his Majesty, to obey him in temporal causes, as still remaining their true and lawful Sovereign, and to resist any such sentence of Excommunication or deprivation. 64 The reason wherefore I affirmed, that Catholics may with a safe conscience adhere to his Majesty, and resist the Pope's sentence of deprivation, was, for that it is a probable opinion, and which with a safe conscience, and without danger of heresy, error, or temerity may be embraced by Catholics, that the Pope hath no authority to depose Princes, nor to inflict any temporal punishments by way of coercion, but that the last punishment, to which the coercive power of the Church doth extend, are only Ecclesiastical and spiritual Censures. Wherefore that which my Adversary affirmeth, that I confess, it to be probable, that the Pope hath power to depose Princes, and that the oath cannot lawfully be taken, is very untrue, unless he mean that I confess it for Disputation sake, or, as we usually say, Dato, sed non concesso, it being admitted, not granted, for that it maketh nothing for, or against the question which is in hand. Therefore positively I neither confess it, nor deny it, approve it, or condemn it, nor with that part of the contradiction, whether it be probable, that the Pope hath power to depose Princes, and whether it be probable, that the Oath may not be taken, do I at this time intermeddle, but whereas my Adversaries do so violently maintain, that it is certain, and an undoubted doctrine of faith, that the Pope hath power to depose Princes, and that the oath is repugnant to faith and salvation, and therefore can not lawfully be taken, I at this present do affirm the contrary, to wit, that it is probable, that the Pope hath not power to depose Princes, and that the oath may lawfully be taken. 65 But the principal reason, which I brought for the securing of his Majesty (which Mr. Fitzherbert fraudulently concealeth) that English Catholics not only may for the reason aforesaid, but also in practice are bound to adhere to his Majesty, and to resist the Pope's sentence of deprivation, was, for that supposing it to be speculatively uncertain, whether the Pope hath any such power to depose a King or no, it is an undoubted rule k De regulis juris in 6●. among the Lawyers, and grounded upon the light of nature and principles of Divinity, that in causa dubia sive incerta melior est conditio possidentis, In a doubtful or disputable case, the state of him that hath possession is the better. And again, Cum sunt iura partium obscura, favendum est Reo, potiùs quàm Actori, when it is unknown whether of the parties who are in suit, hath right, the defendant is to be preferred or favoured before the plaintiff. Seeing therefore that from the very first beginning of this controversy, concerning the authority of Popes, and Sovereignty of Kings, that is, from the time of Pope Gregory the seventh, who was the first Pope, that challenged unto him this temporal power over Kings (call it temporal or spiritual as you please, for sure it is that the effect is temporal) hath been uncertain, disputable, and ever contradicted by Catholics both Kings and Subjects, and therefore it can not be said, that the Pope was ever in possession of this authority (although we should grant, that power, right, or authority may be said to be possessed) it consequently followeth, that what opinion soever any Catholic follow in speculation, concerning the Pope's power to depose Princes, yet in practice, until this Controversy concerning the Pope's power to depose Kings, and the right of Kings not to be deposed, shall be decided, as yet it is not, he can not with a good conscience endeavour to thrust out a King so deposed from the Kingdom or Dominions which he lawfully possesseth. 66 Whereupon in the end of my Apology I inferred this conclusion, whereof also in my Epistle Dedicatory to his Holiness I made mention: And therefore if either Pope, Prince, or any other of a foreign country should attempt to thrust an heretical Prince out of the kingdom, which he possesseth, this controversy concerning the deposition of Princes being undecided, he should contrary to the rules of justice do that Prince most manifest wrong. And much more a Subject can not be excused from manifest treason, what soever opinion in speculation he doth maintain concerning the Pope's temporal power, who should in practice, under pretence perchance of devotion to the See Apostolic, not duly also considering the bond of his Allegiance towards his Sovereign, endeavour to thrust his lawful Prince out of his kingdom, which he possesseth, notwithstanding any Excommunication or sentence of deprivation denounced against him by the Pope. 67 But because D. Schulkenius, hath endeavoured to confute that reason, which I out of the aforesaid rule of the Law, In causa dubia melior est conditio possidentis, I brought to prove, that no man in practice can with a safe conscience obey the Pope's sentence of deprivation, so long as this controversy concerning the Pope's power to depose Princes remaineth undecided, I will briefly declare, how insufficiently he objecteth against that reason. First therefore he affirmeth l Cap. 15. ad nu. 468. pag. 629. & pag. 633. ad nu. 470. , that this doctrine to depose Princes is not doubtful or in controversy among Catholics, but it is certain and of faith, and none but heretics and schismatics do defend the contrary, and therefore that rule In causa dubia etc. In a doubtful or disputable cause the condition of the possessor is the better, can not be applied to the Pope's power to depose Princes, But how untrue this is, and also how slanderous and injurious it is to many learned Catholics especially to the most Christian Kingdom of France, I will clearly show beneath, in so much that for this cause only if there had been no other, his book was deservedly burnt publicly at Paris. 68 Secondly, D. Schulkenius would seem to affirm that the aforesaid rule, In causa dubia, etc. In a doubtful, or disputable cause the state of him, who hath possessions is the better, is not a rule of the Law, for that saith he, I find not in the rules of the Law, In a doubtful, or disputable cause, but, In a like or equal case the state or condition of him, who hath possession is the better. But it D. Schulkenius will cavil about the words, and not regard the sense, I may likewise say, that he findeth not in the rules of the Law, In an equal or like case but in an equal and like cause the state of him, who hath possession is the better. But because cause and case, like, equal doubtful, uncertain, and disputable have all one sense, for that if two causes or cases be doubtful, uncertain, or disputable, they are like or equal in that, therefore I regarding the sense, and not the words, did rather use the words, doubtful, uncertain and disputable, then like, or equal, both for that the former words do declare the sense of the rule more plainly, and also because Divines in alleging that rule of the Law do commonly use the word doubtful, as it may be seen in Dominicus Sotus, m Lib. 7. de instit. q. 3. ar. 2. joannes Azor, n Tom. 1. lib 2. Instit. cap. 18. joannes Salas, o Dis. 1. sec. 9 de Legibus. and Gabriel Vasquez, p Prima secundae disp. 65. cap. and therefore Vasquez citing the aforesaid rule taketh like and doubtful for all one, The aforesaid rule, saith he, q Disp. 66. ca 7 In dubijs, seu in pari causa etc. In doubts, or in a like cause the state of the possessor is the better etc. 69 Wherefore D. Sculckenius perceiving, that this exception of his against the aforesaid rule is only verbal, will not absolutely deny the rule, but answereth thirdly, that if there be such a rule of the Law (as without doubt in sense there is both in the Canon, r De Regulis juris in sexto. and Civil Law, and in express words the Divines and Lawyers do cite it so) it doth make for the Pope, s ff. De regulis juris regula 170. In pari causa etc. who hath been for many hundred years in possession to judge and depose Seclar Princes, especially in a cause belonging to faith. But this answer of D. Sculckenius is very insufficient. For first, although we should grant, that right, power, or authority may be said to be possessed, in that sense, as Possession is taken in Law, (whereas according to the Lawyers, as Molina the jesuite observeth, t De justitia tract. 2. Disp. 12. possession properly is only of corporal things, and right, power, and such like spiritual things are only said to be as it were possessed, yet supposing that it is a doubtful, uncertain, and disputable question, whether the Pope hath power to depose Princes or no, as the Pope is said to be in possession of his right to depose Princes, so Princes may be said to be in possession of their right not to be deposed by the Pope; and therefore in this cause is like, or equal, doubtful or disputable, as well for Princes right not to be deposed, as for the Pope's right to depose them; and on the other side Princes are not only in possession of their right not to be deposed by the Pope, but also in quiet, peaceable, and lawful possession of their Kingdoms and temporal Dominions, which only are properly said to be possessed, in respect whereof this rule favoureth only Princes, and not the Pope, and therefore in this doubtful and disputable case of the Pope's power to depose Princes, the state and condition of Princes, who are in lawful possession, not only of their right not to be deposed by the Pope, but also of their Kingdoms and Dominions which they possess, is, according to the aforesaid rule, to be preferred. 70. Moreover, that the Pope's right, power, or authority to depose Princes may be said to be possessed, (if possession properly be of rights) it is necessary, that he exercise that power to depose Kings, they knowing thereof, and bearing it patiently and without contradiction, as may clearly be gathered out of u Tract. 2. de Instit. disp. 14. Molina, and x Lib. 2. cap. 3. dub. 11. Lessius: And the reason is evident, for otherwise if any man should challenge a right, be it good or bad, and should exercise that pretended right, the contrary part contradicting, he may nevertheless be said to be in lawful possession of that right. And so if temporal Lords should pretend to have a spiritual jurisdiction over temporal and spiritual persons, and should exercise that pretended spiritual jurisdiction over them, they contradicting and excepting against the same, they might nevertheless be said to be in possession of that spiritual jurisdiction. But Christian Kings from the time of Henry the fourth Emperor, who was the first Emperor, that ever was deposed by the Pope, until the time of Henry the fourth most Christian King of France, who was the last King, whom the Pope deposed, have ever resisted and contradicted this authority of the Pope to depose them. And therefore although Popes have for as many hundreds of years, as have been since the time of Pope Gregory the seventh, challenged this authority to depose Kings, yet they cannot be said to have been for one year, or one day in possession of that authority over Kings, seeing that Kings have ever gainsaid and contradicted it. And although there should perchance have been some one, or other Christian King, who for some private, or public respect hath not resisted the Pope's sentence of deprivation denounced against him, but rather yielded thereunto, yet this cannot be a sufficient warrant to prejudice his Successors, or that the Pope may be said to be in possession of his pretended authority to depose Kings in general, but at the most to depose that King in particular, who did not resist or gainsay, but rather acknowledged the authority, which the Pope claimed to depose him. 71. Fourthly, and lastly D. Schulckenius answereth, that the aforesaid rule is to be understood, when the controversy is betwixt two inferior parties who are in suit, and not betwixt the judge, and the party accused, or if we will apply it to the judge, and the party accused, the judge is to be preferred before the party accused, but the Pope is judge over all Christian Kings and Princes, and therefore this rule, saith he, is in favour of the Pope. But how unsound and insufficient is also this Reply of D. Schulckenius, it is very apparent. For First, although the Pope be judge over all Christian Kings and Princes in spiritual causes and punishments, yet in temporal causes and punishments they have no judge, or Superior besides God, the supreme judge of all both Kings and Popes; and therefore well said our learned Countreiman Alexander of Hales, y 3 part. q. 40. mem. 5. q. 4. expound those words, A King is to be punished by God alone, with material punishment: And again, A King hath no man, who may judge his facts to wit, to inflict corporal punishment: And again, A king doth excel, as it is written 1. Pet. 2. it is true, in his degree, to wit, to exercise corporal punishment, with which punishment, if he offend, he hath none to punish him but God alone. 72. Yea rather contrariwise the Roman Emperors were in times past judges in temporal causes of all the Roman Empire and of every member thereof both Clergy and Laity: but the deposition of Kings is a temporal cause and punishment, for what crime soever whether temporal or spiritual a King be deposed: and therefore the controversy about deposing Kings betwixt the Pope challenging to himself that authority, and Kings, who are supreme judges in temporals denying it, is not betwixt the judge and the party accused, but at the least betwixt two equals in temporal causes, whereof the Pope, who first challenged this power to make Kings no Kings is the plaintiff, and Kings who defend their ancient right, and prerogative not to be deposed by the Pope, are the defendant: and so also that second rule of the Law, Cum sunt iura partium obscura etc. When 〈◊〉 is not clear whether of the parties, who are in suit, have right, the defendant is to be preferred before the plaintiff, favoureth, Kings, and not the Pope, who only from the time of Gregory the seventh claimed this authority to make Kings no Kings. 73. Secondly, I do not think, that any Lawyer will affirm, that if a judge, who is only known to have authority in civil matters, as civil is opposed to criminal, should challenge a jurisdiction in criminal causes, and condemn a man to death, before he showed that he had sufficient warrant from the Prince so to do, the party condemned is bound to obey that judge, or that the aforesaid rule, In a like or doubtful cause he that hath possession it to be preferred, should favour the aforesaid judge, and not the party condemned, who is not only in possession of his life, but also hath right to defend his life, until the judge show sufficient warrant, or it is otherwise publicly known, that he hath authority to take it away. Neither is it a sufficient warrant for the judge, that it is known, that he is a judge in civil matters, unless it be also known that he is a judge also in criminal causes, as likewise it is not a sufficient warrant for the Pope to deprive Kings of their temporal kingdoms, that it is clear that he is a judge in all spiritual matters, unless also it be clear, as yet it is not, that he is also a judge in temporal causes, and to inflict temporal punishments by way of coercion, as without doubt are the taking away of temporal kingdoms, for what crime soever they be taken away. 74. Wherefore that Dialogue, which D. Schulckenius maketh betwixt the Pope, and a convicted heretic, whose goods are without any controversy confiscated both by the Civil and Canon Law, is unaptly applied to the deposing of Kings, which hath been, and is at this present in controversy among Catholics. Besides, that this Dialogue also supposeth, that the Pope is in possession of his authority to depose Kings, and that Kings are not in possession of their right not to be deposed by the Pope; and that the Pope is a judge of temporal Kings in temporal causes, and to punish them with temporal punishments by way of coercion: and also, that the aforesaid rule favoureth the judge, and not the person convented before the judge, when the authority of the judge over the person convented is not sufficiently known, all which, as I have showed before, are very untrue. And by this thou mayest perceive, good Reader, how insufficient are the exceptions, which D. Schuclkenius bringeth against my argument grounded in the aforesaid rule of the Law, as in very deed are all the rest of his Replies against my Apology, as God willing ere long, (for I cannot answer fully and exactly as I intent all my Adversaries at once) I will most clearly show. 75. Consider now (do are Countrymen) first, the unsincere dealing of this my Adversary T. F. who concealeth the chiefest part of opinion and doctrine for the securing of his Majesty of the constant loyalty and allegiance, wherein all his Catholic Subjects are in conscience bound unto him, that thereby he may cause his Majesty to be jealous of my fidelity, and to account me no good Subject, as this man slanderously affirmeth, that I am neither a good Subject, nor a good Catholic, or child of the Church, as I profess myself to be, but that I am fallen into flat heresy, from which I cannot any way clear or excuse myself, for impugning that doctrine for the Pope's power to depose Princes, which is grounded upon such assured and solid foundation, as this man (forsooth) here hath signified but how guilfully and unsoundly you have partly seen) and he will more particularly and manifestly declare hereafter, where also his particular frauds and falsehoods I will more particularly and manifestly lay open to his own shame and confusion. But for all his slanderous words, I trust in God, that it will appear to all men, that insurrexerunt in me testes iniqui, z Psal. 26. & mentita est iniquit as sibi; that false witnesses have risen up against me, and that wickedness hath be lied herself: and that I will ever prove myself to be both a good Subject to his Majesty, and also a good Catholic, and a dutiful child of the Catholic Church, as partly I have proved here already, and will more particularly and manifestly declare hereafter. In the mean time let Mr. Fitzherbert examine well his Catholic faith, and consider what a kind of Catholic he is, who so stiffly maintaineth uncertain opinions for the Catholic faith, which, if it be truly Catholic, cannot be exposed to any falsehood or uncertainty, as this doctrine for the Pope's power to depose Princes, which with Catholic faith he pretendeth truly to believe, may in very deed be false, and without all doubt is uncertain and questionable among Catholics. 76. Secondly consider, how untruly Mr. Fitzherbert affirmeth, that my manner of disputing this question probably concerning the Pope's power not to depose Princes, and the lawful taking of the Oath, doth not only give no security to his Majesty, but is also dangerous and pernicious to his majesties safety, and how unlearnedly he argueth from speculation to practise. For although I should admit not only for Disputation sake, as only I do, but also positively confess, that in speculation it is probable, that the Pope hath power to depose Princes (whereas with that affirmative part of the question, to wit, whether it be probable that the Pope hath power to depose Princes I do not intermeddle, but I do only handle the negative part, and do affirm, that it is probable he hath no such power, which manner of disputing against such Adversaries, who hold it not only probable, but certain, that he hath such a power, can in no sort be dangerous or pernicious to his majesties safety, as I clearly showed before) nevertheless this my Adversary very unsoundly from hence inferreth, that because in speculation it is probable, that the Pope hath power to depose Princes, therefore in practise it is lawful to concur to: the actual deposing or thrusting them out of the possession of their Kingdoms, or for Subjects notwithstanding any sentence of deposition to bear arms against them, so long as this question concerning the Pope's power to depose Princes remaineth disputable and undecided. Wherefore my firm, resolute and constant opinion is, that the Pope hath not power to dispense or absolve any of his majesties Subjects what opinion soever in speculation they follow concerning the Pope's power to depose Princes, from any promissory parts of the Oath, which only do belong to practise, and as for the assertory parts of the Oath, which belong to speculation, they are not subject to the Pope's power of dispensing, as I showed at large in my Theological Disputation a Cap. 6. sec. 3. . 77. Now whether this my doctrine doth not only give no security to his Majesty, but is also dangerous and pernicious to his majesties safety (as this my Adversary to procure his majesties displeasure against me falsely and unlearnedly affirmeth) if the Pope should denounce any sentence of deprivation against him, I leave to the judgement of any sensible man. Neither is it unusual that an opinion or doctrine may in speculation be probable, which yet in practise it is not lawful to follow, as may be seen in the ministering of corporal physic, and of those Sacraments which are necessary to salvation. For although it be probable, that such a medicine will cure such a dangerous disease, for that learned Physicians are of that opinion, although other learned Physicians think the contrary to be true, or that such a matter or form be sufficient to the validity of the Sacrament, for example sake of Baptism, because learned Divines hold it to be sufficient, although other learned Divines be of the contrary opinion, and so in speculation both opinions be probable, yet in practice we are bound by the law of charity to apply to our neighbour those remedies either spiritual or corporal, which are out of question and controversy, and to leave those that are questionable, if certain and undoubted remedies can be had: So likewise although it be probable, that such a house or land doth not by a lawful title belong to him who is in lawful possession thereof, for that learned Lawyers are of that opinion, although other learned Lawyers think the contrary to be true, and so in speculation both opinions be probable, yet in practice we are bound by the rules of justice not to dispossess him by violence of that house or land, before the judge hath decided the controversy. 78 Thirdly, consider the reason, why this my Adversary T. F. is so greatly offended, that I for this present do only take in hand (by answering probably all the arguments which are objected on the contrary side) to show, that it is probable, that the Pope hath no authority to depose Princes; and consequently that any man may with a safe and probable conscience take the Oath; for that the doctrine concerning the Pope's power to depose Princes, is by this my Adversaries own confession, the main question betwixt him & me, and the chief ground wherefore the Oath is judged to be unlawful. His reason therefore is, for that he saw right well, what great advantage I had against him, and what little advantage he had against me in arguing or rather answering in this manner; and therefore he calleth it in heat of his zeal, as you have heard, The most devilish device that any man could invent. And truly if I should at this first beginning have treated of this controversy in any other manner, then by handling it probably in that sense as I have declared, I might worthily have been taxed of great imprudency in giving my Adversary more advantage against me then was needful. For this is the state of the question, whether it can be clearly convinced by the authority of holy Scriptures, ancient Fathers, General councils, or by necessary inferences from any of them, as my Adversaries pretend to convince, that it is an undoubted doctrine of faith, and the contrary not to be maintained by any Catholic, that the Pope hath power to depose Princes, and consequently that the Oath can not lawfully be taken. This is the question. 79 Mark now the advantage I have. For first I am not to prove, but only to answer, to defend, not to oppose. Secondly, it is sufficient for me, that my Answers be only probable, but their Replies must not be only probable, but also convincing, and which can not with any probability be answered. So that if I should go about at the first to prove my opinion to be most true, which my Adversaries contend not to be questionable, I should, as it is evident, greatly disadvantage myself. For in such controversies as are so violently maintained by the Adversary, that he will not grant the contrary part to be questionable, it is necessary to proceed by degrees; first, to make the thing questionable and disputable, which the adverse part will not have to be called in question; and after this is once agreed upon, then to examine whether opinion be the truest. For perchance it may fall out, that as the opinion for the immaculate conception of the Blessed Virgin, before Scotus did oppose himself herein against S. Thomas and his followers, was scarce accounted probable, yet afterwards it was daily more and more embraced, so that it is now esteemed to be by far the more true opinion, and as Alphonsus, Salmeron b in Rom: 5. Disp: 51. § deinde. , and Franciscus c Tom. 2. Disp: 3. sec. 5. Suarez do affirm, agreed upon by the consent almost of the uninuersall Church, and of all Ecclesiastical writers, Bishops, Religious Orders, and Universities: And as that opinion, which holdeth, that the Pope can not dispense in the solemn vow of Religious chastity, neither in any lawful marriage before it be consummate, is accounted by very many learned men to be the truer opinion, notwithstanding the practice of many Popes to the contrary; So it may fall out, that in process of time, this opinion, which denieth the Pope's power to depose Princes, may be accounted by the greatest number of learned men to be by far the more true opinion, and may be agreed upon by the consent almost of the Universal Church, and of all Ecclesiastical writers, Bishops, Religious Orders, and Universities, notwithstanding the practice of many Popes, and the vehement opposition of the jesuits at this present time to the contrary. 80 Fourthly consider, how little beholding are English Catholics to this my Adversary T. F., who will needs enforce them even with the temporal overthrow of themselves, and of their whole posterity, to defend that doctrine to be of faith, which the State of France accounteth scandalous, seditious, damnable and pernicious, and also endeavoureth to persuade his Majesty, that no Catholic can, according to the grounds of Catholic Religion, be a true and loyal Subject to his Majesty, but at the Pope's pleasure, or which is all one, so long only as the Pope shall not depose him, which he may do at his pleasure. But we have great affiance in his majesties singular wisdom, and element disposition, whereof we have had both by his majesties gracious Proclamation, public books, and effectual deeds, sufficient trial, that he will not be drawn by the false suggestion of this my Adversary (who would have all his Catholic Subjects to be of the same violent spirit as he is) to have all his Catholic Subjects in the same degree of jealousy, but that he will ever make a distinction betwixt them, who are his true hearted Subjects, and most loyal in all temporal affairs, and will adventure all that they have, and are, in defence of his majesties Royal Person and dignity, against any sentence of deprivation whatsoever, which shall be denounced against him by the Pope (assuring themselves that it is conformable to the grounds of Catholic Religion which they profess, and not repugnant to that spiritual obedience wherein they stand bound to the supreme Pastor of the Catholic Church) and those other Catholics, who thinking it to be a point of faith, that the Pope hath authority to dethrone Sovereign Princes, and to make temporal Kings private men, will only defend his Majesty, and yield him temporal obedience, until the Pope after his sentence of deprivation shall command them the contrary. 81 But what small relief are English Catholics to expect from Mr. fitzherbert's hands, if it were in his power to relieve them, you may (Catholic Countrymen) conjecture by this, that towards the end of Queen Elizabeth her reign (when those four Reverend Priests were at Rome to seek redress of Pope Clement the eight, to whom they and other of their brethren had appealed, for the manifold wrongs and slanders wherewith they were charged both at home and abroad, at which time this my Adversary running from Cardinal to Cardinal to inform against them, made no scruple of conscience to disgrace and slander them, as Schismatics, Spies, Rebels, and disobedient persons to the See Apostolic etc. as now in his public writings he handleth me) he and some others upon whom he depended, fearing lest that her Majesty should show some favour, and give some sort of toleration to such her Catholic Subjects, whom for their constant loyalty she might securely trust (for out of her Princely and merciful disposition She had already showed over great favour to those oppressed Priests, considering the present laws of the Realm made against them) had so little commiseration of the continual calamities of distressed Catholics, that he was not ashamed to advise then his Holiness in a little Treatise, or Pamphlet written in Italian, that it was not good, or profitable to the Catholic cause, that any liberty or toleration of Religion should be granted by the State to the Catholics of England. 82 And that this is most true he can not for shame deny, and I have also heard diverse virtuous Priests, and lay-men, who were then at Rome, protest upon their salvation, that they did both see and read the aforesaid Italian Pamphlet, affirming withal, that it was thought then by diverse at Rome, that this my Adversary T. F. was in that business only an agent and instrument for others, upon whose command and beck he wholly depended, who feared, lest that if her Majesty should have granted which they then greatly suspected, any toleration or mitigation of the Law to those her Catholic Subjects, who would give sufficient security of their true, unfeigned, and constant loyalty, it would have been the ready way to have thrust all the jesuits quite out of England. Now what designments this my Adversary can have, and what construction you may make of such his proceed, and whether he sincerely intendeth so much your good, as his private ends, and of those upon whom he now dependeth, and how diligently you are to examine his words, deeds, and writings, who dare adventure with such palpable fraud to delude his Holiness, his Majesty, and yourselves, as partly you have seen in this his Preface, and more fully you shall see beneath, I leave, Catholic Countrymen, to your prudent considerations. 83 Lastly, the applying of those words of the Apocalyps, I would thou wert either hot or cold, etc. to me being but a slanderous calumny affirmed without proof, needeth no confutation. And with the same facility might Carerius, and the Canonists apply them to Cardinal Bellarmine and others of his Society, for which cause he calleth them wicked politicians, who are so lukewarm, that they will not grant with the Canonists, that the Pope is not only a spiritual, but also a temporal Lord of the whole Christian world. True it is that I am not of so fiery a spirit, as under pretence of zeal to approve Gunpowder plots, or that desperate doctrine, from whence such furious attempts do proceed, neither under colour of fervent devotion to attribute to the Pope an authority over the Kingdoms, bodies, and lives of temporal Princes, which is not known to be granted him by Christ, and which is more scalding, to brand those Catholics with heresy that have not the like fervour: Neither am I so cold as to deny either to Pope or Prince, that authority which is known to be due to them, all extremities I hate, virtue consisteth in a mean, neither to take from Caesar, and give it to God, nor to take from God, and give it to Caesar, but to render to God and Caesar, that which is their due. 84 And this shall suffice (Dear Countrymen) touching those advertisement & considerations, which Mr. Fitzherbert hath given you concerning my doctrine in general, and therefore I will now pass by degrees to the examination of his Replies to me in particular, and I doubt not to discover also herein so plainly his manifold frauds & falsehoods, that you have just cause not to hazard your consciences and whole estates upon such his fraudulent words and writings, as partly you have already seen in this his Preface, how unsincerely and guilefully in every one of his advertisement and considerations he hath proceeded, and more clearly you shall see beneath in this Treatise, which Treatise to the end you may more plainly understand the chief grounds of this controversy touching the Pope's power to depose Princes, which is the main question, as my Adversary confesseth, betwixt him and me and specially impugned in the new oath of allegiance, I will divide into three principal parts. In the first I will set down those Authors, which I brought in my Theological Disputation to prove, that any Catholic might by reason of extrinsical grounds, and the authority of learned Catholics probably persuade themselves, that the Pope hath not by Christ his institution any power to depose Princes, together with a confutation of the Replies, which Card. Bellarmine masked under D. Schulkenius his name, to whom my Adversary here remitteth his English Reader, hath made against them. In the second I will examine all the principal arguments which Card. Bellarmine hath brought to prove the union and subordination of the temporal power to the spiritual, which subordination my Adversary here supposeth to be a chief foundation, whereon the doctrine for the Pope's Power to depose Princes doth depend, and also the Replies which D. Sculckenius hath made to confirm the said pretended union and subordination. In the third and last part I will discover in particular the insufficiency or Mr. fitzherbert's whole Reply, in the same manner, order, and number of Chapters, which he hath observed in replying to my Answers. The first part, Wherein THOSE AUTHORITIES AND testimonies of learned CATHOLICS, which Mr. FITZHERBERT cunningly passeth over, and for answer to them remitteth his English Reader to D. SCHULCKENIUS a Latin writer, are briefly, and perspicuously examined. BEfore I come to examine the particular points of my adversaries Reply, and to make manifest his immodest, insufficient, and also unsincere proceeding therein, I think it not amiss, first to set down the testimonies of those Catholic Authors, which I brought in my Theological Disputation to prove, that the doctrine for the Pope's power to depose Princes is not a point of faith, and the contrary heretical (as Mr. Fitzherbert following the steps of Card. Bellarmine, and some few others of his Society would gladly enforce English Catholics even with incurring their Sovereign's high displeasure, and with the utter overthrow of their temporal estates to believe) to the end the Reader may thereby clearly perceive both the silly and shuffling answers of D. Schulckenius, and also the insufficient and crafty dealing of Mr. Fitzherbert, who taking upon him in this his Reply to satisfy English catholics, those especially that understand not the Latin tongue (for otherwise he would doubtless have replied in Latin, as he by me was answered in Latin) and to make them see, as he saith, a In the Preface, num. 28. a clear confutation of the grounds of my doctrine, and of my principal arguments and answers touching the Pope's power to depose Princes, which is the main question betwixt him and me, and specially impugned and abjured in the new oath, nevertheless he clean omitteth to answer my chief, principal, yea and only grounds, which I brought to persuade unlearned men, that the doctrine for the Pope's power to depose Princes is not a point of faith to wit, extrinsical grounds, drawn from the testimony of learned Catholics, who maintain the contrary doctrine, by which unlearned men are chiefly, if not only, lead, and for confutation of these grounds he remitteth his English Reader to D. Schulckenius a Latin writer, and wrangleth only about intrinsical grounds, the strength, or weakness whereof unlearned men cannot comprehend, as though, forsooth, M. Fitzherbert, who hath taken out of Fa. Lessius masked under the name of D. Singleton, a whole Treatise touching the decree of the Council of Lateran, and put it here in his english Reply, as though it were the invention of his own wit, would have spared to have borrowed also of D. Schulckenius the answers, which he made to those Catholic Authors by me alleged, if he had thought that those answers would by English Catholics have been so greatly applauded. The first CHAPTER, Wherein the authority of john Trithemius a famous man of the Order of S. Benedict, is examined. 1. THe first authority, which I brought in my Theological Disputation, and also in my Apology, was of john Trithemius a famous Abbot of the Order of S. Bennet, and a man of singular learning and piety, who writeth, that in his time, to wit in this present age, wherein nothing hath been newly defined either by Popes, or councils concerning the Pope's power to depose Princes (for all the Decrees of Popes or councils, which by Card Bellarmine and others are usually alleged to confirm the aforesaid authority, were long before Trithemius his time) this question touching the Pope's power to depose the Emperor was in controversy among the Schoolmen, and as yet not decided by the judge. His words are these: b In Chronico monast. Hirsaug. ad annum 1106. He indeed (Henry the fourth) was the first of all the Emperors, who was deposed by the Pope. The Schoolmen, or Scholastikes c Scholastici. are at strife concerning this point, and as yet the controversy is not decided by the judge, whether the Pope hath power to depose the Emperor, or no, which question for that it belongeth not to us let us leave undiscussed. d Pag. 127. ad num. 33. 2. To this authority D. Schulckenius answereth in this manner. If Trithemius by Schoolmen, or Scholastikes understand those, who treat of Divinity scholastically, as S. Thomas, S. Bonaventure, Aegidius, Durandus, and others, he is manifestly deceived, neither is it any marvel if he be deceived, seeing that he was not skilful in that learning. But if he call Schoolmen, Grammarians, Historiographers, Poets, he saith something. For truly this point is in controversy among Grammarians, as Valla, Historiographers, as Sigebert, Poets, as Dantes. But although it be in controversy among them, and in their opinions the judge hath not as yet decided the question, yet it is not in controversy among learned Divines, and Lawyers, who are not ignorant in holy Scriptures, and in the venerable councils of the holy Church. For although among these there be a controversy about the manner, how the Pope can do it, yet there is no question whether he hath power to do it. And what need is there to ask advise of Trithemius, who oftentimes hath erred in the history, which he professeth, as Antonius Possevine hath noted in his Apparatus, seeing that we have the common opinion of Doctors, and decrees of councils, which do make the matter clear. Thus answereth D. Schulckenius. 3. Mark now how many shifts, and shufflings be in this answer. If Trithemius, saith he, by Scholastickes, or Schoolmen understand those, who treat of Divinity scholastically, as S. Thomas etc. he is manifestly deceived: As though forsooth only scholastical Divines and scholastical Divinity were to be had in estimation, and positive Divines, who do not handle those subtle Schoole-quirks, but do treat of holy Scriptures and other questions of Divinity after a plain and positive manner, as they were wont to be handled by the ancient Fathers, before Peter Lombard, the Master of the sentences his time, were not to be regarded. True it is, that Trithemius by the word, Scholastic, doth commonly understand, not only those, who profess Scholastical, or School-divinity, as it is now adays distinguished from positive Divinity, but by Scholastikes he understood Schoolmen and Students in general, whether they professed Positive or Scholastical Divinity, as it may evidently appear by his Treatises de Scriptoribus Ecclesiasticis, and de viris Illustribus, where he hath this word, Scholastike, above an hundred times, and useth it for a schoolman , student, scholar, or scholar like in general. 4. And although Trithemius by the word, Scholastikes or Schoolmen, had understood not only Students in Divinity in general, but particularly those, that profess Scholastical Divinity, as it is distinguished from positive, yet that he had been therein manifestly deceived, as D. Schulckenius so boldly affirmeth, is manifestly untrue. For jacobus Almainus, a famous Doctor, and Schoole-divine of Paris, and according to Fa. Azor the jesuite e Lib. 2. Instit. cap. 14. , a Classical Doctor, who flourished in Trithemius his time, doth also affirm f In Lib. de Dom. not, ciu. & Eccl. in pro. 2ae. concls. as I observed in my Apology, g Num. 122. that very many, or most Doctors, among which some no doubt were Schoole-divines, are of opinion, that the Pope by the institution of Christ hath not power to inflict any temporal punishment, as death, banishment, privation of goods, much less of Kingdoms, nay nor so much as to imprison, but that the power, which he hath by the institution of Christ, is only extended to Excommunication, or some such spiritual punishment, and that his using of other punishments doth proceed merely from the positive Law, and privileges of Princes. It belongeth, saith he, to the nature of the Laike power, to have authority to inflict (he meaneth by way of coercion and constraint) temporal punishment, as are death, exile, privation of goods &c. but the Ecclesiastical power by the institution of God can inflict no such punishment, yea cannot so much as imprison, ut plerisque Doctoribus place●, as very many or most Doctors (for so much the word, plerique, doth signify) are of opinion, but it is extended only to spiritual punishment, as Excommunication, and the other punishments which it useth, are from the pure positive Law. And a little before he affirmed, that the Ecclesiastical and Lay power of jurisdiction in the external Court are so distinguished in respect of the punishments, which can be inflicted by either of them, that by one only a corporal punishment, and by the other precisely a spiritual can be inflicted. Now what words can be more clear than these, to which nevertheless D. Schulckenius giveth no answer, and yet my Adversary after his usual manner very boldly affirmeth, that D. Schulckenius hath answered particularly to every one of the authorities; which I brought either in my Apology, or Theological Disputation. 5. The like words hath john Gerson, another famous Classical Doctor, and Schoole-divine of Paris, who lived before Trithemius, & Almains time. There are, saith Gerson, h De potest. Eccles. consider. 4. who do affirm, that this punishment of Excommunication is the last which the Ecclesiastical power of jurisdiction by the only first institution of Christ can inflict; so that it is not extended to imprisonment, or that any man be adjudged to death or corporal whipping, but when the Ecclesiastical judge doth this, he doth it by the grant of Princes, as the Clergy by the devotion of Princes hath received much authority of temporal jurisdiction, which jurisdiction or Censure is nevertheless called spiritual, as also the temporal goods of Ecclesiastical persons are called spiritual, because they are dedicated & applied to them, who serve the Church, as also the breads of proposition, the first fruits, the tithes, also the vessels of the Temple, and such like were in the old Law called sacred or holy, so also the new Law doth observe the same. 6. Secondly, it is no marvel, saith D. Schulckenius, that Trithemius be deceived, if by Schoolmen he understand Scholastical Divines, seeing that he himself was not skilful in that science. As though, forsooth, none can know, when men of any profession be at variance touching any difficult question belonging to that Science, but those only, that be skilful in the same profession. Physicians may easily know, when learned Lawyers are at strife concerning a point of Law, and so both of them may easily know, when learned Divines are at contention about a Theological question; and writers of histories may also know, when Divines or Lawyers are at debate about any point of Divinity or Law, and may also, without passing the bounds of their profession relate the same to others. And therefore it is no marvel, that Trithemius being not only a mere Historiographer, but also a learned positive Divine, as by his manifold works it doth clearly appear, might easily perceive, that it was at that time a controversy among Scholastical Divines, whether the Pope had authority to depose the Emperor or no. Neither is it necessary, that the controversy should be made known by printed books, but it sufficeth that it be made manifest by word of mouth, and public opposition and contradiction in Schools, as all men, who frequent the Schools, may by daily experience most clearly perceive. 7. Thirdly, but if Trithemius, saith D. Schulckenius call Schoolmen, grammarians, Poets, Historiographers, he saith something. For truly this point is in controversy among Grammarians as Valla, Historiographers as Sigebert, Poets as Dantes, and in their opinions the judge hath not as yet decided the question. Mark now the fraud and cunning of this man. For who would not by this his answer imagine, but that those three Authors were mere Grammarians, Historiographers, Poets, and not Divines? where as it is manifest, that although for Grammar, Histories, and Poetry they were singular, and inferior to none of their times, yet they were all of them also learned Divines, as Trithemius in his book de Ecclesiasticis Scriptoribus doth sufficiently witness. Laurentius Valla, saith he, i In verbo Laurentius Valla. a noble man of Rome, the Prince by far of Grammarians of this age, a Philosopher, Rhetorician, and a most excellent Divine etc. Dantes, saith he, k In verbo Dantes. by Country a Florentine, a most great student in his time of all men, as well in Divine Scriptures as Secular learning, and very learned, a Philosopher, and a Poet inferior to none of that age. Sigebert, saith he, l In verbo Sigebertus. a monk of the order of S. Benedict, a most great student from his youth in Divine Scriptures, and very learned, and in secular learning inferior i●none of his time. And yet D. Schulckenius would cunningly persuade his Reader, that Valla was a mere Grammarian, Dantes a mere Poet, and Sigebert a mere Historiographer. Moreover, Trithemius could not by Schoolmen only understand Valla, Dantes and Sigebert; for that his words are of the present tense and time; He doth not say, It hath been a controversy among the Schoolmen, but it is a controversy among the Schoolmen, & adhuc, and as yet, till now, hitherto, to this present time, the question is not decided by the judge. Therefore Trithemius his words are not so to be understood, as D. Schulckenius expoundeth them, that in the opinion of Valla, Dantes and Sigebert, who all lived above a hundred m For Sigebert lived in the year 1111 Dantes in the year 1321. Valla in the year 1420. and Trithemius in the year 1519. years before Trithemius his time, but according to his own opinion the question is not at this present decided by the judge. 8 Fourthly, But what need is there, saith D. Schulckenius, to ask advise of Trithemius, who oftentimes hath erred in the history, which he professeth, as Antony Possevine hath noted in his Apparatus; But first, be it so, that Trithemius giving credit to the relation of others, hath erred sometimes in his history (for all those oftentimes Possevine doth in particular reduce only to three) must therefore no credit be given to other his relations; especially, when other Doctors of the same age do relate the same? And doth not Card: Bellarmine himself confess, as appeareth by his Recognitions, that he hath oftentimes erred in points of Divinity, which depend not so much upon relation, as upon judgement? must therefore no credit be given hereafter to his judgement in other points of Divinity? or will he like it well, that his own words, which he useth here against Trithemius, be retorted back upon himself, what need is there to ask the advise of Card: Bellarmine, who, as he himself confesseth, hath oftentimes erred in points of Divinity, which he professeth. 9 Secondly, observe good Reader, how palpably and grossly, not to say shamefully, both Possevine, and D. Schulckenius also, giving credit to Possevine, have themselves erred, in reprehending unworthily Trithemius his errors. For three particular things Possevine relateth n In verbo joannes Trithemius. , wherein he affirmeth Trithemius to have erred in his history. The first is, in that Trithemius affirmeth o In verbo Laurentius justin. Laurentius justinianus to have been of the Order of the Celestines. And nevertheless Possevine himself a little after in the word Laurentius justinianus doth in express words affirm, that he was of that Order. Laurentius justinianus, saith Possevine, a Venetian, of the Order of the Celestines, the first Patriarch of Venice etc. The second is, in that Trithemius affirmeth one Hugo a Dominican and Cardinal to be Barchionensis, and doth not make mention whether he was of Barcilona in France or in Spain. But although Trithemius was not so exact in distinguishing those two places, yet considering that every error includeth a falsehood, and Trithemius in the aforesaid relation affirmed no falsehood or untruth, he can not justly by Possevine be therefore taxed of error. 10 The third error, wherewith Possevine chargeth them, is, in that he affirmeth Abbot joachim to have been condemned in a general Council, where as the Council, saith Possevine, did not condemn the man, but the doctrine, which was against the Master of the Sentences. But truly I can not but greatly marvel, how Possevine could be so grossly mistaken, unless he would of set purpose forge something, whereby he might disgrace Trithemius. For if he had but briefly run over that place of Trithemius, which he citeth, he could not but have seen, that Trithemius did only affirm joachims' doctrine, and not his person to be condemned in the Council. Tractatus autem quem scripsit etc. But the Treatise (saith Trithemius p In verbo joachim Abbas. in the place cited by Possevine) which Abbot joachim wrote against Peter Lombard Bishop of Paris, is condemned in a General Council, as appeareth in the beginning of the decretals, Damnamus. 11 Wherefore to return back D. Schulckenius his words, what need had D. Schulckenius to ask advice of Possevine touching Trithemius his errors, seeing that Possevine himself hath therein not only grossly erred, but also in other his relations, as in affirming john Gerson Chancellor of Paris to be of the Order of the Celestines (wherein also Card: Bellarmine in his late treatise of Ecclesiastical writers hath erred with him) yea and sometimes which is less excusable, when of set purpose he pretendeth to recall and amend his former error; as in verbo Durandus à S. Porciano, whom in his former Edition, as he saith (for I never saw it) he affirmed to be Bishop of Melda, as truly he was, and of the Order of S. Dominike: and now, forsooth, in his corrected Edition he will needs have him to be Bishop of Liege, and to have lived in the year 1035. and that Hermannus Contractus, who lived in the year 1054. maketh mention of him, and yet he will also have him to be of the Order of Dominike: And nevertheless Possevine himself a little before q In verbo Dominicus Guzmannus. affirmed, that S. Dominike died in the year 1221. which was two hundred fourteen years after Durandus flourished. Now let D. Schulckenius, or any other, who maketh so great account of Possevines Apparatus, either accord these two, that Durandus à S. Porciano was according to Possevine of the Order of S. Dominike, and yet that according to the same Possevine he lived well near 200. years before S. Dominike did institute his Order, or else not to give hereafter so great credit to all that Possevine affirmeth, seeing that he hath so grossly erred both in falsely taxing Trithemius of those errors, and also (which is more gross) when purposely he endeavoured to amend his own error. 12 Lastly, we have, saith D Schulckenius, the common opinion of Doctors, and decrees of councils, which do make the matter clear. And therefore although among learned Divines and Lawyers there be a controversy concerning the manner how the Pope may do it, yet there is no question whether he hath power to do it. But first we have the authority of Trithemius, that it is a controversy among the Schoolmen, and as yet not decided by the judge, not only in what manner the Pope may depose the Emperor, but whether he hath any power at all to depose him. Then we have the authority of Almain a learned Schoole-divine, and a Classical Doctor, that it is the opinion of very many Doctors, that the Ecclesiastical power by the institution of Christ can only inflict spiritual Censures, and not any temporal punishment, as death, exile, privation of goods, much less of kingdoms, nay nor so much as imprisonment. And therefore although it be the more common opinion of Doctors, that the Pope hath power to depose Princes, especially of Lawyers, who as Pope Pius the fift did plainly confess to that famous Lawyer Navarre r in Comment. super cap: Non liceat Papae. 12. q. 2. § 3. num: 6. , do attribute more authority to the Pope than is sufficient (for that the greatest part of those Authors cited by Card: Bellarmine, who in express words affirm, that the Pope hath such a power, are Lawyers, men also for the most part unskilful in Divine Scriptures, and the law of God, as Dominicus Sotus affirmeth z In 4ᵒ. dist. 18. q. 1. ar. 1. ) yet it is not the more common opinion of Doctors, that it is a clear and certain doctrine not to be called in question by any Catholic, that the Pope hath such a power. 13. Few only Divines there are, & for the most part jesuits who of late years have by might and main endeavoured without sufficient grounds to make the matter clear, and to be an undoubted point of faith. But until they bring more clear decrees of councils, or more pregnant proofs from holy Scriptures, than hitherto they have brought, they will never make the matter clear, but still it will remain a controversy among Catholics, not only in what manner the Pope may, but whether he hath any power at all to depose the Emperor or no, as it was in Trithemius and Almains time, since which time no clear decree of any Council hath been made to that purpose, for all the decrees of councils, which by Card. Bellarmine are urged to prove that doctrine, and have been answered by me and others, and shall beneath be answered more at large, were long before their time. And thus much concerning the first authority of Trithemius, and Almain. Chap. 2. Wherein the authority of Albericus Roxiatus a famous Lawyer is briefly debated. 1. THe second testimony, which I brought in my Theological Disputation, and also in my Apology to prove this doctrine for the Pope's power to depose Princes not to be certain, a In verbo Albericus Roxiatus. without controversy, or a point of faith, was of Albericus Roxiatus, a most famous Professor, as Trithemius writeth, of the Canon and Civil Law, and a man excellently learned, and according to Fa. Azor b Lib. 2. just. cap. 14. , a Classical Doctor, who lived in the year 1340. above a hundred years since the Council of Lateran, which is now so greatly urged. For this Author calleth in question four of the most principal Canons or Decrees of Popes registered in the Canon Law, which do seem most to favour their authority to depose Princes, and to dispose of the temporals, especially of the Roman Emperor (among which one is that famous, and so often inculcated by my Adversaries, sentence of deposition denounced against Frederick the Emperor by Pope Innocent the fourth in the presence of the Council of Lions) and he affirmeth that none of them are in his opinion agreeable to law, or right, but that they were made by Popes, against the rights, and liberty of the Empire. 2. The Pastors of the Church, saith he, c In Dictionario verbo Electio. putting their sickle into others harvest, have made four Decrees, or decretals. The one concerning the election of the Emperor, which beginneth, Venerabilem, and of this it is there noted by all men. An other is about the deposing of Friderike the Emperor, extra de sententia & re iudicata cap. Ad Apostolicae in sexto, where also of this it is noted by all men. An other is concerning the discord betwixt Henry the Emperor, and Robert King of Sicily, and the sentence of treason published by the Emperor against him: which Decree is in Clementina de sententia & re iudicata cap. Pastoralis. Another is in Clementina prima de jure iurando, that the Emperor is bound to swear allegiance to the Pope, and concerning some authority of the Pope over the Emperor. Which decretals, whether they be just or no, God he knoweth. For I without prejudice to sounder advice do believe (and if it should be erroneous I recall it) that none of them be agreeable to right. Yea I believe that they are published against the rights and liberty of the Empire, and I do think that by God they were instituted distinct powers, whereof I have noted sufficiently lege prima Cod. de Summa Trinitate & Fide Catholica. Thus Albericus. 3 Observe now, good Reader, how slightly D. Sculckenius would shift of this authority, which is so plain and manifest. Albericus, saith he, speaketh wavering and altogether doubtful, and he addeth, and if it should be erroneous I recall it: and he is convinced of error by Azor lib. 10. cap. 6. q. 3. These be all the exceptions that D. Schulckenius taketh against this authority. But first this word doubtful or wavering, as out of Vasquez I observed in my Theological Disputation d Cap. 10. sec. 2. nu: 18. 19 20. & 81. , may be taken two manner of ways, either when one is so doubtful, that he hath no determinate assent of either part, but remaineth perplex betwixt both, judging neither part to be either true or false, in which sense that word, altogether doubtful, which D. Schulkenius useth here, if he will not speak improperly, can only be taken; and when we are thus doubtful concerning any matter, we are always bound to choose the surer part; neither is it lawful to do any thing with a doubtful conscience, taking doubtful in this sense: Or else the word, doubtful, may be taken, when we have a determinate assent or judgement that one part is true or false, but yet we are not certain, and therefore have some fear of the contrary, which fear doth not exclude a determinate assent and judgement that one part is true, for every assent, judgement or opinion, which is only probable, doth always imply a fear; but fear consisteth in this, that he who is fearful, or judgeth with fear, hath two assents or judgements, the one direct, whereby he judgeth determinately, that one part is true, the other reflex, whereby he judgeth, that although he thinketh it true, yet in very deed it may be false, for that it is not certain, but Disputable and in controversy among Doctors, and therefore only probable: and when we are thus doubtful or fearful concerning any matter, we are not bound to choose the surer part, but it is sufficient to choose that which is probable, neither is it unlawful to do any thing with such a doubtful, or fearful conscience, as in that place I declared out of Vasquez. 4. Now if D. Schulckenius by those words, wavering and altogether doubtful, understand, as of necessity he must, if he will speak properly, that Albericus had no determinate assent, judgement, or opinion concerning the unjustice of those decretals, this is manifestly false, and those words, I do believe that they are not agreeable to right, and I do believe that they are published against the rights and liberty of the Empire etc. do clearly convince D. Schulkenius of apparent untruth. But if D. Schulckenius by those words wavering and altogether doubtful, do only mean, that Albericus was indeed of opinion, that those decretals were unjust, yet he did not hold his opinion for certain, and without all controversy, and therefore was not obstinate in his own opinion, but was ready to recall it, if it should prove to be erroneous, and that he would not condemn other men, that should think the contrary, (as now adays it is too frequent to condemn other men) this is very true; for so much only do import those his words, and I do believe under correction, or without prejudice to sounder advise, and if it should be erroneous I recall it; this nevertheless doth not hinder, but that we have the opinion of a man excellently learned, and of a Classical Doctor, that the sentence of deposition denounced against Fredrick the Emperor by Pope Innocent the fourth in the presence of the Council of Lions, and three other famous Decrees of Popes registered in the Canon Law touching the Pope's power to dispose of temporals, were unjust, and made against the rights and liberty of the Empire. 5. Secondly, but Albericus is convinced, saith D. Schulckenius, of error by Azor. But besides that this letteth not, but that Albericus is of opinion, that the Pope hath no power to depose Princes, this also is even as true, as that which D. Schulckenius said before concerning the errors, which he said Possevine had observed in Trithemius his history. For besides that all the arguments, which Azor bringeth to prove in general, the Pope's authority over the Emperor in temporals, are but trivial, and have been already answered partly by D. Barclay, partly by myself, and now of late very exactly by Mr. john Barclay, to whom as yet no answer hath been made, one only argument in particular Azor urgeth against Albericus, which is this, that the Roman Emperor was instituted by the authority of the Church, by whose grant also the Roman Empire was translated from the Grecians to the Germans or Frenchmen, and that he is created as a Patron, defender, Protector, and Tutor of the Church, from whence he inferreth, that the Pope did not put his sickle into another man's harvest, but did use his own right, when he made that Canon concerning the election of the Emperor, and when he exacteth an oath of the Emperor. 6. But that this is no convincing proof, I showed clearly in my Apology c Num 404. & seq. . For the Roman Empire was not instituted by the authority of the Roman Church, seeing that he was instituted before there was any Roman Church at all, and continued for a long time together the Sovereign Lord in temporals of the Roman Church. Neither was the Roman Empire translated from the Grecians to the Germans or French men by the grant of the Roman Church, if by the Roman Church be meant only the Clergy of Rome, but it was translated by the grant, suffrages, and authority also of the Laity, who in the west parts were subject to the Roman Empire. True also it is, that all Catholic Princes ought to be Patrons, defenders, and protectors of the Roman Church (but the Roman Emperor more specially) they being children and members of the Catholic Roman Church, and every member is bound to defend each other, but especially to defend the head. And therefore I will easily grant, that the Pope may exact, if need require, not only of the Roman Emperor, but also of all other Catholic Princes an oath of spiritual allegiance, but that Catholic Princes are subject to the Pope in temporals, and that the Pope may exact of them an oath of temporal allegiance, this is that I utterly deny, neither will Card. Bellarmine, or any other be able by any sufficient argument to convince the contrary; wherefore it cannot with any show of probability be denied, but that we have the testimony of Albericus, a man excellently learned, and a Classical Doctor, that the Pope hath no authority to depose Sovereign Princes, and to dispose of their temporal dominions. Chap. 3. Wherein the authority of joannes Parisiensis, a famous Doctor of Paris, is examined, and the exceptions of D. Schulckenius against it are proved to be insufficient. 1. THe third authority, which I brought in my Theological Disputation a Cap. 3. sec. 3. num. 7. and also in my Apology b Num. 121. , was of joannes Parisiensis. a famous Divine of the Order of S. Dominike, and as Trithemius relateth c In verbo joannes Parisiensis. , most learned in the holy Scriptures, and who in the University of Paris was for a long time together a public Professor, and left behind him many Disciples. He flourished about the year 1280. which was 65. years after the great Council of Lateran, which is now adays so greatly urged by our Adversaries. This Doctor therefore although he be of opinion, that if a King should become an heretic, and incorrigible, and a contemner of Ecclesiastical Censures, the Pope may do somewhat with the people, whereby the King may be deprived of his Secular dignity, and be deposed by the people, to wit, he may excommunicate all those, to whom it belongeth to depose the king, who should obey him as their Sovereign: Nevertheless he is clearly of this opinion, that it belongeth not to the Pope, to depose iuridically Kings or Emperors for any crime whatsoever although it be spiritual, or which is all one to deprive them d Almainus de potest. Eccl. q. 2. cap. 8. of their kingdoms by a definitive sentence, in such sort, that after the sentence be published they shall have no more regal power and authority. For he affirmeth, e De potest. Regia & Papali cap. 14. ad. 20. that excommunication, or such like spiritual punishment is the last, which may be inflicted by a spiritual judge. For although, saith he, it belong to an Ecclesiastical judge to recall men to God, and to withdraw them from sin, yet he hath not power to do this, but by using those means, which be given him by God, which is by excluding them from the Sacraments, and participation of the faithful. Wherefore although Parisiensis be of opinion, that the temporal commonwealth hath in some causes of great moment authority to depose their Prince (with which question I do not intend at this time to intermeddle) yet concerning the principal controversy, which is betwixt me and Card. Bellarmine, to wit, whether it be heretical erroneous, or temerarious to affirm, that the Pope hath no power to deprive Princes of their Royal right and authority, joannes Parisiensis doth most plainly, as I have now showed, contradict the opinion of Card. Bellarmine. Thus I wrote in my Theological Disputation. 2 Mark now, good Reader, with what fraud and falsehood D. Schulckenius endeavoureth to pass over this authority. joannes Parisiensis, saith he f Pag. 64. 65. 66. ad num: 4. , is not for the contrary opinion. For although he giveth less to the Pope, than he ought, yet he giveth as much as sufficeth for our purpose. For what doth it appertain to the question which is in hand, whether the Pope do depose immediately by his sentence, or that he may by his right withdraw his subjects from their obedience and cause them to depose? But who would not admire the wonderful boldness of this man? For the only question betwixt me and Card. Bellarmine is, and ever hath been, whether the Pope hath authority to deprive Princes of their Kingdoms immediately by his sentence, in such sort, that after his sentence of deprivation be denounced, they, who before were Kings and had true Regal authority, are then no more Kings, and have no true and lawful right to reign; and yet now he being pressed with the authority of joannes Parisiensis, blusheth not to affirm, that it doth not appertain to the present question, whether the Pope may depose immediately by his sentence, which nevertheless is the only question betwixt him and me, or by commanding and causing the temporal Commonwealth to depose their Prince, with which question I have sundry times in my Apology affirmed that I would not intermeddle. For most certain it is, even according to Card: Bellarmine's own doctrine g in Tract: contra Barcl. cap. 21. pag. 202. , that the Pope can not withdraw, discharge, or absolve subjects from their obedience immediately by his sentence, unless he have authority to deprive immediately & by his sentence their Prince of his Princely power and authority, for that authority in a Prince, and obedience in subjects are correlatives, and one dependeth on the other, and the obligation of obedience doth so long endure in the Subject, as the dignity, power, or jurisdiction doth endure in the Superior, saith Suarez h in Defension fides etc. lib. 6. cap: 3. nu. 6. , and to deny obedience to a Prince so long as he remaineth Prince, and is not deprived of his Princely power, is clearly repugnant, saith Card: Bellarmine i in Tract: contra Barcl: cap. 21. p. 202. , to the law of God, and nature. 3 This therefore is the opinion of Parisiensis touching the Pope's authority to dispose of the temporal goods, or dominions either of Kings, or private men. And first concerning the goods of private men he affirmeth k De potest. Regia & Pap. cap: 6. 7. , that the Pope is not a Lord, to whom the property of Church livings doth belong, but only a dispenser of them, but of the goods of lay-men he is not so much as a dispenser; unless perchance in extreme necessity of the Church, in which necessity also he is not a dispenser, but a declarer of the law. And because in extreme necessity of faith and manners, all the goods of the faithful, yea and Chalices of Churches are to be communicated, the Pope, who is supreme not only of the Clergy, but of all the faithful, as they are faithful, hath authority, as he is general informer of faith and manners, in case of extreme necessity of faith and manners to dispense in this case the goods of the faithful, & to ordain them to be exposed, as it is expedient for the common necessity of faith, which other wise would be overthrown by the invasion of Pagans', or other such like accident. And this ordination of the Pope is only a declaration of the law, to which he may by Ecclesiastical Censures compel the faithful. But in cases not of necessity, but of some special utility, or when it is not apparent, that the goods of Lay-men do help such utility, or necessity, the Pope hath not authority to compel any man, but concerning this he may give indulgences for giving aid to the faithful, and no other thing is granted him in my opinion. Thus writeth Parisiensis. wherefore in his opinion the Pope hath no authority to deprive a Lay-man of his goods, or any part thereof, even in necessity of faith and manners, but only to declare, that he is bound by the law of God to give such part of his goods, as the necessity of the Church shall require; which if he neglect to do, the Pope hath no other authority to compel him thereunto, then by Ecclesiastical Censures, which are the last punishments, which the Ecclesiastical power by the institution of Christ can inflict. 4 In the very like manner Parisiensis discourseth of the disposing of Kingdoms, and of deposing temporal Princes, as I before related out of him. For first he affirmeth, that the Pope hath no authority to depose a King iuridically, or, which is all one, to deprive him by a juridical sentence of his right to reign; and secondly, that the people, or temporal commonwealth may, and in some exorbitant cases are bound to depose their Prince; and so the Pope not by a juridical sentence of deprivation, but by declaring what the people are by the law of God bound to do, and by Ecclesiastical Censures compelling them thereunto, may according to Parisiensis, concur to the deposing of a Prince by means of the people, which if the people, notwithstanding the Pope's Censures neglect to do, the Pope hath no further power to depose him, for that Ecclesiastical Censures are, according to him, the last punishment, which the Ecclesiastical power can inflict. 5 Wherefore two things are affirmed by Parisiensis, the one, that the Pope hath no authority to deprive Princes immediately by his sentence of their Princely power, and this is that only, which is in controversy betwixt me and Card: Bellarmine: the other, that the people, or temporal commonwealth have that authority in some exorbitant cases: and this is only a philosophical question, and wherewith I would never intermeddle, as being impertinent to the question concerning the Pope's authority to deprive him. And although many Catholic Doctors do agree with Parisiensis in this point, yet many other learned Catholics, whom I cited in my Apology l Num. 411. , do dissent from him herein, to which opinion do incline very many of the ancient Fathers, who expounding those words of the King and Prophet, m Psal: 50. I have sinned to thee alone, do affirm, that Sovereign Princes, for that they are inferior to God alone, to wit, in temporals, can be punished with temporal punishments by God alone. And therefore D. Schulckenius may be greatly ashamed to affirm so boldly, that Parisiensis doth not make for my opinion, and that it doth not appertain to the question which is in hand, whether the Pope may depose Princes immediately by his sentence, or by means of the people, seeing that the only question betwixt us is, whether the Pope hath power to deprive Princes of their Royal power immediately by his sentence, and not what authority the commonwealth hath to deprive them. 6 But D. Schulckenius perceiving, that this his answer to the authority of Parisiensis was but a mere shift and evasion, hath reserved but not in this place another answer, whereby he imagined to clean overthrow the authority of this famous Doctor and Schoole-divine. For he beneath n Pag. 394. ad num. 201. replying to the answer, which I made to those words of S. Bernard urged by Card. Bellarmine to prove the Pope's power to depose Princes, Quid tu denuo usurpare gladium tentas etc. whereof beneath o Part. 2. ca 9 I will treat more at large, in confirmation of which my answer I cited the authority of joannes Parisiensis, D. Schulckenius writeth thus: There is no great regard to be had of the authority of joannes Parisiensis whatsoever he saith, for that other his errors are condemned by the Church in the common Extravagant Vas electionis: and also in the 14. chapter of the same Treatise he mingleth many errors. The like answer, but more biting maketh Fa: Lessius in his Singleton. It is to little purpose, saith he, p Pag. 29. what joannes Parisiensis doth say, because he allegeth very many other false citations and histories, as being a Schismatic. Another censure but more temperate Card. Bellarmine giveth of him in his book of Ecclesiastical writers. joannnes Parisiensis, saith he, q Pag. 380. of the Order of the Preachers, was famous about the year 1296. He wrote upon the four books of the sentences, and diverse Quodlibets: but especially of Kingly and Papal power, and because it was his hap to live in trouble sometimes by reason of the discord between Pope Boniface the eight, and Philip the fair, King of France, and he lived and taught at Paris, he seemeth to be more inclined towards the King, than the Pope. 5 But truly it is strange, that men of such singular learning, and religious profession should so rashly and without sufficient grounds be so transported, as, contrary to the rules of Christian Charity and justice, to defame and slander learned and virtuous men, and those especially, who being dead cannot defend themselves. For first it is an apparent and too too manifest slander, which Fa: Lessius, speaking with all dutiful respect to his reverence, doth affirm that joannes Parisiensis was a Schismatic; neither can he out of any approved Author, or by any probable reason prove any such thing: and therefore what great account he hath to make at the dreadful day of judgement, for unjustly taking away, as much as lieth in him, the good name of so famous a man, and in so fowl and heinous a crime as Schism is, I remit to the examination of his own conscience. Besides, that Parisiensis mingleth many errors in the 14. chapter of his Kingly and Papal power, as D. Schulckenius affirmeth, and that he allegeth many false citations and histories, as Fa: Lessius saith, is also untrue, and it had been fitting for them to have alleged some one of them, that thereby some credit might have been given them for the rest. Unless whatsoever is not agreeable to D. Schulckenius his doctrine, which he thinketh to be certain must be accounted an error, and whatsoever Fa. Lessius hath not seen. or read must be esteemed a false citation or history. True it is, that Parisiensis in that 14. chapter doth teach, that the Pope cannot judge of temporal causes, but in regard of the sin, and that he cannot depose Princes by his sentence, and that the last punishment, which an Ecclesiastical judge can inflict, are spiritual and Ecclesiastical Censures which indeed are no errors, whatsoever these severe censors say to the contrary. True also it is, that Parisiensis citeth a place out of Hostiensis, at which Fa. Lessius doth indiscreetly carp, r Pag. 30. affirming, that he findeth no such thing in Hostiensis, yea & that Hostiensis hath not written upon the chapter Ad Abolendam tit. de Haereticis, as Widdrington judgeth, as neither upon other texis. But nevertheless I found in Ostiensis upon the chapter Ad abolendam that which joannes Parisiensis cited out of him; and to say that Hostiensis did not write upon that chapter Ad abolendam, is so manifest an untruth as I observed in another place s In my Latin Appendix against Fa: Suarez part. 1. sec. 7 num. 14. , that I wonder how F. Lessius, who is reputed to be a man of so great reading, could be ignorant thereof. 6 Moreover, that Parisiensis seemeth to be more inclined to the King then to the Pope, he then living and teaching at Paris, is indeed affirmed, but not proved by Card. Bellarmine. And if this manner of censuring learned men and excepting against their authority, as men partial, may be approved, it is the ready way to overthrow the testimony almost of all the Authors on both sides. For it may in the same manner be answered, that as such Authors wrote partially in favour of Kings, so others wrote partially in favour of Popes; And therefore Parisiensis himself foreseeing this objection replieth thus: For to say, saith he, t De potest. Regia & Papali c. 21. ad 41. that so worthy men, among whom some also were Popes, did write against their conscience in favour of Princes, or for fear of them, is to stretch forth his mouth against heaven. For contrariwise it might be said more probably, that those Doctors, who do so unmeasurably advance the Pope's authority, do speak for fear or favour of him, seeing that they are Ecclesiastical persons, who may by him get greater preferment. And especially sith that they say (although not well) that the Pope doth graciously embrace them, who do amplify his authority, & depresseth them, who do say the contrary. 7 Furthermore, neither can D. Schulckenius in my opinion sufficiently prove, that joannes de Poliaco, whose errors were condemned by Pope john the 22. in that Extravagant Vas electionis, was this joannes Parisiensis, who made the Treatise of Kingly and Papal power, but some other Doctor of Paris, who was called by that name, and lived about that time. And my conjectures are these. First, for that the errors, which joannes de Poliaco maintained concerning confessions made to the mendicant Friars, were against the privileges which were granted to the mendicant Friars, and therefore it is not like that he who wrote the Treatise of Kingly and Papal power, and was himself of the order of the preaching Friars, would preach and teach against the privileges granted to his Order. Secondly, if this joannes de Poliaco had been of the Order of the preaching Friars, as all Authors affirm that joannes Parisiensis, who wrote the Treatise of Kingly and Papal power, was, it is very like, that Pope john the 22. who condemned his errors, would have named him so to be in his Extravagant as he did, in his other Extravagants name of what Order those Authors were, whose errors he condemned, as Michael of Cesena, William Occam, Henricus of Cena, and others: who nevertheless are in some sort excused from error by D. Sanders u De visib. monarch lib. 7. num 161. . 8. Thirdly, there is no Author that I have read, who saith, that joannes de Poliaco, whose errors were condemned, was of the Order of the preaching Friars, neither doth Prateolus, who usually setteth down, of what Order those Authors whom he relateth, are, affirm, that this joannes de Poliaco was of that Order, whereas most Authors, who speak of joannes Parisiensis, that wrote the Treatise of Kingly and Papal power, do affirm, that he was a Dominican Friar. Fourthly, neither is, there any Author that I have read, who doth affirm, that joannes Parisiensis, who made the Treatise of Kingly and Papal power, was called joannes de Poliaco. Lastly joannes Parisiensis was famous in the year 1280. according to Trithemius, and Kisengremus, and according to Card. Bellarmine in the year 1296. both which may very well be true, for that it may very well fall out, that the same man may be a famous Teacher and Preacher for sixteen years together, but it is very unlike, that one man should for one and forty years together at the least be a famous Reader and Preacher, which we must grant to be true, if joannes de Poliaco, whose errors were condemned, and he in person recalled them before the Pope and Cardinals in public Consistory at Avignon in the year 1321. and was commanded to teach and preach in the Schools, and pulpit the contrary doctrine, was our joannes Parisiensis, who wrote the Treatise of Kingly and papal power, and was famous in the year 1280. 9 But to conclude this point, be it so, that our joannes Parisiensis, and joannes de Poliaco were one and the self same man, which yet, as I have showed, hath no great likelihood, nevertheless the maintaining of those errors doth little repair the authority of joannes Parisiensis in this point, but rather from hence a forcible argument may be drawn to prove, that it is no erroneous doctrine, to hold, that the Pope hath no authority to depose Princes by his sentence. For besides that it was no great blemish either to the learning or virtue of joannes de Poliaco, to hold that doctrine concerning confessions, which was condemned in that Extravagant, seeing that both many other learned men at that time as Henricus de Ga●dano x quodl. 2. q. 26. & quodl. 10. q. 1. a famous Doctor of Paris, Durandus a S. P●rtiano y In 4. dist. 17. q. 1. a great Schoole-divine, yea and the whole University of Paris, as witnesseth joannes Maior z In 4. dist. 17. q. 6. , a famous Doctor of the same University, did maintain the same; and also that he was ready at the first condemnation thereof to recall it, and to preach the contrary; if at that time the Pope and Cardinals had also been persuaded, that it was an erroneous doctrine to affirm, that the Pope hath no power to depose Princes by his sentence, and that it belongeth to the Pope to recall men to God, and to withdraw them from sin by no other coercive means, then by excluding them from the Sacraments and participation of the faithful, and that Excommunication, or such like spiritual punishment is the last, which may be inflicted by the spiritual judge, all which joannes Parisiensis in his treatise of Kingly and papal power did publicly maintain, without doubt the Pope, if he had thought this doctrine to be erroneous, would also have compelled him to recall it, it being so greatly prejudicial to his own Pontifical authority. And therefore notwithstanding all the exceptions, which Card. Bellarmine and Fa. Lessius do take against joannes Parisiensis, we have the testimony of this learned Catholic, and famous Schole-divine, that the Pope hath no authority to depose Princes by his sentence, which is the only question at this time between me, and Card. Bellarmine. Chap. 4. Wherein the authority of M. Doctor Barclay a famous and learned Catholic is briefly examined. 1. THe fourth testimony, which I brought both in my Theological Disputation a Cap. 3. sec. 3. num. 28. , and also in my Apologieb, was of Mr. Doctor Barclay a most learned man, and yet no more learned than religious, (howsoever some falsely and unchristianly do slander him) in his book de Regno printed at Paris in the year 1600. with privilege of the most Christian King of France, where he affirmeth, that Kings, who do omit, or are negligent, to keep God's commandments, to worship him religiously, and to use all care and diligence, that their subjects do not revolt from true Religion, and fall into Idolatry, judaisme, or heresy, are to be judged by God alone, because only to God they are subject, speaking of temporal judgement and subjection, although the Pope, being the supreme Prince, and universal Pastor of the Church, hath power to condemn with spiritual judgement all kings and Princes, offending against God's law, as they are Christians, and children of the Church, and to deliver them to invisible tormentors to be punished with the rod of the invisible spirit, and with the two edged sword of Excommunication. 2. But Card. Bellarmine in his book against D. Barclay c Per totum. little regardeth his authority; and now in his Sculckenius he affirmeth, d Pag. 110. ad num. 28. that Catholics will make no more account of Barclay, than they do of Marsilius de Padua, and of myself (an easy answer to shift off the authority of any learned Catholic) And again, who doth not marvel, saith D. Schulckenius, that seeing Card. Bellarmine hath in this point clearly and sound after his accustomed manner confuted Barclay, Widdrington durst not only adventure to write against him without sufficient ground, but also to oppose the said Barclay, as a testimony of truth against Card. Bellarmine. 3. But notwithstanding this glorious brag of D. Schulckenius so highly commending himself, and his clear and sound confuting of Barclay after his accustomed manner, it cannot be denied, but that Doctor Barclay was a very learned man, and lived and died like a virtuous Catholic, and 〈◊〉 he was in times past, as Possevine also relateth, e In verbo Gulielmus Barclaius. a Counsellor to the Duke of Lorraine, and Master of Requests, and in the university of Mussepont a Professor of the Canon and Civil Law, and also Deane, and that his book was printed at Paris with a special privilege of the most Christian King of France, and is by Possevine related among other approved books, and no exception taken by him against it. And therefore who doth not marvel, that D. Schulckenius durst adventure so boldly to affirm, f Part. 1. cap. 2. num: 2. that Catholics will make no more account of D. Barclay, a famous and learned Catholic, then of Marsilius of Padua, a known and condemned heretic, although not for this point touching the Pope's power to depose Princes, but for other his assertions which I related in my Appendix against Fa. Suarez Wherefore although perchance some Catholics do with Card. Bellarmine make small account of Doctor Barclaies authority, as also they would make of the authority of any other Catholic, were he never so virtuous or learned, that should write against them in this point, nevertheless other Catholics do greatly regard his authority for the aforesaid cause, and they are also persuaded, that they have as probable reasons to think, that he did not write partially in favour of Princes or any other person, as that Card. Bellarmine did not write partially in favour of the Pope, and some other of his followers in favour of him, and their Order. 4 Neither hath D. Schulckenius in very truth any great cause so greatly to vaunt of his clear and sound confuting of D. Barclay, for that both his son Mr. john Barclay a learned Catholic hath most clearly showed the said confutation to be very unsound, to whom as yet no Reply hath been made, and yet his book was printed at Paris by the King's Printer three years since; and also the Bishop of Rochester, a learned Protestant, hath out of Catholic grounds convinced D. Schulckenius his brag, of the clear and sound confuting of D. Barclay, to be but vain. wherefore let Card: Bellarmine first make a clear and sound Reply to the aforesaid Answers, and then he may have some cause to boast, that he hath clearly and sound confuted D. Barclay. In the mean time it can not be denied, but that notwithstanding all the clamours of our Adversaries, this doctrine, which doth now so vehemently maintain the Pope's power to depose Princes is, and hath ever been impugned by virtuous and learned Catholics. Chap. 5. Wherein the authorities of Mr George Blackwell, and of many other English Priests are at large debated. 1. THe first testimony, which I brought in my Theological Disputation a Cap. 3. sec. 3. num. 9 , (to which D. Schulckenius doth not answer) was of Mr. George Blackwell a virtuous and learned Catholic Priest, and once the Archipraesbyter of the English Seminary Priests, who maintained even until death (for not half a quarter of an hour before he died he confirmed the same) the oath to be lawful, and that the Pope hath not power to depose Princes to which also (besides Mr. William Warmington in his moderate defence of the Oath, Mr. john Barclay in his book against Card: Bellarmine in defence of his Father, printed at Paris by the King's Printer; and Mr. William Bars in his book de jure Regio, and many other learned Catholics of this Kingdom both Priests and Lay-men, whose names for just causes I forbore to set down, for that they had not showed themselves by public writings) I added the testimony of those thirteen Reverend and learned English Priests (with whom twice thirty others would have joined, if their protestation had not been made so suddenly) who, to give assurance of their loyalty to the late Queen Elizabeth, did by a public instrument, written in parchment, profess, and made it known to all the Christian world, that She, being at that time excommunicated by name, and deprived by the sentence of Pope Pius the fifth, of her Regal power and authority) had nevertheless as full authority, power, and Sovereignty over them, and over all the Subjects of the Realm, as any her highness Predecessors ever had. And that notwithstanding any authority, or any Excommunication whatsoever, either denounced, or to be denounced by the Pope against her Majesty, or any borne within her majesties Dominions, which would not forsake the defence of her, and Her Dominions, they thought themselves not only bound in conscience not to obey this, or any such like Censure, but also did promise to yield unto her Majesty all obedience in temporals. 2 Now it is evident, that this their protestation, which I did at large set down in my Appendix to Suarez b Part. 2. sec. 1. , can no way be justified, but upon supposal, that the Pope had no authority to depose the Queen. For if he had authority to depose her, She being then by the Pope's sentence deprived of all her Regal authority, power, and Sovereignty, could not have, as they professed, as full authority, power, and Sovereignty over them, and all the Subjects of the Realm, as any of her Predecessors ever had before: Neither also could they (although She had not been then deposed) lawfully promise, as out of Suarez I will convince beneath c Num: 7. 8. , that notwithstanding any authority, or any Excommunication whatsoever, either denounced, or to be denounced against her Majesty, or any borne within her majesties Dominions, they would nevertheless yield unto her Majesty all obedience in temporals, thinking themselves bound in conscience not to obey this, or any such like Censure, unless they did suppose, that the Pope had no power to depose her Majesty, or to absolve her Subjects from their obedience. 3 And if perchance any of those Priests should now be of opinion, that the Pope hath power to depose Princes, and to excuse his former protestation, should answer, that he only intended to acknowledge her Majesty to be at that time Queen, and to reign de facto, but not the iure (besides that he should show himself to be an egregious dissembler, equivocatour, and deluder both of her Majesty, and also of his Holiness, and should therefore deserve to be greatly punished, both for deluding the State in a matter of so great weight, and also for bringing Catholic Religion in obloquy among Protestants by such detestable dissimulation, not to call it flat lying and cozening, which ought to be abhorred of all men, ●●●t especially Catholic Priests, who both by their words and deeds ought to be a pattern to others of Christian sincerity) this Answer can not stand with the words which he protested. 4 For first mark the Preamble to their Protestation, which clearly confuteth the aforesaid answer. Whereas (say they) it hath pleased our dread Sovereign Lady to take some notice of the faith and loyalty of us, her natural borne Subjects Secular Priests (as it appeareth in the late Proclamation) and of her Princelike clemency, hath given a sufficient earnest of some merciful favour toward us (being all subject by the laws of the Realm to death by our return into the Country after our taking the Order of Priesthood since the first year of her majesties reign) and only demandeth of us a true profession of our Allegiance, thereby to be assured of our fidelity to her majesties Person, Crown, Estate, and dignity, We, whose names are underwritten, in most humble wise prostrate at her majesties feet, do acknowledge ourselves infinitely bound unto her Majesty therefore, and are most willing to give such assurance, and satisfaction in this point, as any Catholic Priests can, or aught to give unto their Sovereigns. First therefore we acknowledge the Queen's Majesty to have as full authority, power, and Sovereignty over us, and over all the Subjects of the Realm, as any her highness Predecessors ever had; and further we protest etc. 5 Now were it not an intolerable deluding and mockery, for any of those Priests (this Preamble considered) to affirm, that by the aforesaid words, he did only intend to acknowledge her Majesty to be Queen, and to reign de facto, but not the iure? was this the notice, that her Majesty took of the faith of Secular Priests, rather than of jesuits? and did her Majesty by those words (and only demandeth of us a true profession of our Allegiance, thereby to be assured of our fidelity to her majesties person, Crown, Estate and Dignity) demand of them, that they should acknowledge her to be Queen only de facto, but not the iure? And can Catholic Priests of other Countries give to their Sovereign's no other assurance of their loyalty, then only to acknowledge them to be their Kings, and to reign over them de facto, but not the iure, as these Priests did acknowledge themselves to be most willing to give such assurance and satisfaction in this point unto her Majesty, as any Catholic Priests can or aught to give unto their Sovereigns? No man could make doubt, but that she was Queen, and did reign the facto, and so much the whole Christian world, and her sworn enemies could not but acknowledge. So that, according to this shameless answer, those Priests did give no other assurance of their loyalty to Queen Elizabeth, than any man might give to a known and manifest usurper, and by those words to have as full authority, power and Sovereignty as any her Predecessors ever had) did acknowledge her to have no other power and authority, than any known usurper hath, and which her known enemies, and who accounted her no lawful Queen, would also acknowledge her to have, that is to be Queen, and to reign de facto, but not the iure. 6. Secondly, although one may truly acknowledge an usurper to be King, and to reign de facto, for that this doth only imply an act, fact, or possession, which may be without any right at all, yet no man can truly acknowledge, that an usurper, or who is King de facto only, and not the iure, hath authority, which doth import a rightful and lawful power, to reign, and much less, to have as full authority and power, as ever any his Predecessors ever had, who were Kings, and reigned not only de facto but also the iure, or, which is all one, did both actually reign, and also had full power and authority to reign. 5 Thirdly, not only the aforesaid acknowledgement, that her Majesty, being at that time deprived by the Pope, had nevertheless as full power and authority, as any her Predecessors ever had before, doth necessarily suppose, that the Pope had no authority to deprive her, but also, although she had not been at that time deprived by the Pope, the other clause of their protestation, which contained a promise to obey her in all temporal causes, and to defend her &c. accounting it their duty so to do, notwithstanding any authority, or any Excommunication whatsoever denounced or to be denounced against her Majesty, or every one borne within her majesties Dominions that would not forsake the aforesaid defence of her Majesty etc. thinking themselves not bound in conscience to obey this or any such like Censure, doth necessarily suppose and imply the same, to wit, that the Pope had no authority to depose her, which Fa. Suarez arguing against the like clause contained in the new Oath of Allegiance doth most clearly convince, whose argument therefore I will set down word by word, only turning his speech to the Priests, which he apply to the King's Majesty. 8 For to take away all manner of evasion, saith Suarez, d In Desens. lib. 6. cap. 3. I demand, whether those Priests do understand, that the sentence of the Pope deposing a baptised Queen for crimes may be just, or they believe that it is always unjust. The first they will not in my opinion affirm, for otherwise they should promise a most wicked thing, to wit, not to obey a just sentence, which implieth in it a just command. For if the sentence be just, the command also, which enjoineth subjects to observe it, must also be just, seeing that otherwise it cannot be put in execution. Also if the sentence of deposition denounced against a Queen may be just, it will also be effectual, therefore it hath the effect of that punishment which it imposeth. Wherefore seeing that the punishment imposed by the sentence of deposition from her Kingdom, is to deprive her actually, or effectually of her dominion and property to her Kingdom, a just sentence doth effectually deprive her of her Kingdom, therefore it is against justice and obedience due unto the Pope to resist that sentence, and to defend the Queen's person against the execution of that sentence, therefore he that believeth the first, and nevertheless promiseth this second, doth promise a thing clearly unjust and wicked. 9 And besides it implieth a contradiction to be willing to yield obedience and allegiance, as thinking thyself bound so to do, to one whom thou knowest to be by a just declaration and sentence effectually deposed from her Kingdom. As if the Pope himself should exact of Christians a promise, that notwithstanding any sentence or declaration of deposing him for any crime even for heresy denounced by whatsoever general Council, they will defend him in his See, and will yield him the same obedience and allegiance, their promise were wicked, for that it were a wicked thing, and against the Church & Faith. Such therefore is the promise of those Priests, if the aforesaid sentence against the Queen be supposed to be just. This therefore those Priests without doubt will not admit, neither also are they, as I think, so inconsiderate of their affairs, that if they grant the Pope's sentence denounced against a Queen may be just, nevertheless they will deny that against the Queen of England it may have the same justice. For what greater immunity or innocency can they allege in the Queen of England, then in other Princes, who have been rebels to the Roman Church, or forsakers and impugners of the faith. Or although they do not acknowledge, that the Queen for that time had not committed any thing worthy of deposition, how do they know, that for the time to come she cannot? and yet their promise is absolute, notwithstanding any authority, or any sentence of Excommunication denounced or to be denounced against the Queen, or every one borne within her majesties Dominions. etc. Wherefore there is no doubt, but that the ground of this promise and profession is, that such a sentence cannot be just. Wherefore from hence we evidently conclude, that those Priests by the aforesaid words do profess, that the sentence of deposition against the Queen can neither be valid nor just. For in very deed this they do profess, when they promise not to obey, nor to observe such a sentence. 10. Whereupon we do moreover conclude, that those Priests do profess, that the Pope hath not power to denounce such a sentence, seeing that for no other cause they do believe the sentence to be unjust, but for that it is given without power and jurisdiction in the Pope to depose a Queen. Neither can those Priests allege in such a sentence any other cause of injustice, which is perpetual, and may be a ground of this part of their profession. for their profession doth not speak of a sentence already denounced, but absolutely of a sentence denounced or to be denounced against the Queen: therefore it doth comprehend every sentence, whether it be given the party being heard, or not heard, whether for disagreement in religion, or for any other crime, or cause whatsoever. Wherefore the injustice which those Priests do suppose to be in that sentence and whereupon they ground their profession is no other, but for that they believe, that it cannot proceed from a lawful power and jurisdiction. And therefore I conclude that they profess, that the Pope hath not power and jurisdiction to give a sentence of deposition against the Queen for any cause. Thus argueth Father Suarez. So that it is evident, that those thirteen reverend Priests must of necessity suppose, if they will have their protestation and promise to be just and lawful, that the Pope hath no power to deprived Princes of their Regal right and authority. 11. And by this fift testimony it is also apparent, that not only M. Doctor Barclay, and Widdrington, as Card. Bellarmine in his book against Barclay, and now in his Sculckenius against me, untruly affirmeth, but many other English Catholics (to omit those other learned Catholics of other Countries, of whom I have spoken before, and the Kingdom and State of France, of which I will speak beneath) g In the next Chapter. are of opinion, that the Pope hath no authority to deprive Sovereign Princes of their temporal Kingdoms and dominions. Which also may moreover be confirmed by the petition, which some English Catholics did exhibit to Queen Elizabeth deceased after the discovery of Parries' conspiracy, wherein these express words are contained: In consideration of all which necessary points, we do protest before the true living God, that all and every Priest and Priests, who have at any time conversed with us, have recognised your Majesty their undoubted and lawful Queen tam de iure, quam de facto. who nevertheless was at that time and long before deprived of her Princely power, right and dignity by the public sentence of Pope Pius the fift. 12. And to these authorities we may add the testimonies set down in the end of Mr. Blackwells' Latin examination, of Bishop Watson, Abbot Fernam, Doctor, Cole, john Harpesfield, and Nicolas Harpesfield) all of them very famous and learned Catholics) who upon the publishing of the Bull of Pius Quintus against Queen Elizabeth, being examined by the Magistrate in the year 1578. and demanded, whether notwithstanding the aforesaid Bull, or any other sentence of the Pope denounced or hereafter to be denounced against the said Queen, they did think, that she was their true and lawful Queen, and that they, and all other English and Irish men did as Subjects own to her Majesty obedience, faith, and loyalty, as to their lawful and true Queen, and Sovereign Prince, they did all with uniform consent acknowledge, and confess, that notwithstanding the aforesaid Bull, or any other sentence or declaration of the Pope already denounced, or hereafter to be denounced against the said Queen, she was their true, and lawful Queen, and that they did owe unto her obedience and allegiance as to their lawful Prince. And Nicholas Harpesfield answered more plainly and distinctly, that notwithstanding the aforesaid Bull, sentence and declaration of the Pope, or any other already denounced, or hereafter to be denounced by the Pope's authority, he did acknowledge her to be his true Queen, and was to be obeyed, as a true Queen, and had as ample and full Regal authority in all civil and temporal causes, as either other Princes have, or her most noble progenitors ever had. The like also M. Edward Rishton, and M. Henry Orton both learned Priests did answer. 13. But M. james Bosgrave a learned jesuite in his declaration made in the year 1582. did more plainly and fully set down his opinion concerning the power itself to depose, that he did think and that before God, that the Pope hath no authority, neither de facto, nor de iure, to discharge the Subjects of the Queen's Majesty, or of any other Christian Prince of their allegiance for any cause whatsoever, and that he was inwardly persuaded, in his conscience, that the Queen's Majesty both is his lawful Queen, and is also so to be accounted, notwithstanding any Bull or sentence, which the Pope hath given, shall give, or may hereafter give, and that he is ready to testify this by Oath, if need require. Mr. john Hart also a learned jesuite in his conference with M. Rainolds in the tower in the year 1584. and in his Epistle to the indifferent Reader did answer as effectually: As for that, saith he, which M. Rainolds affirmeth in one place, h Chap. 7. diuis. 7. that I have told him, that my opinion is, the Pope may not depose Princes, indeed I told him so much. And in truth I think, that although the spiritual power be more excellent and worthy than the temporal, yet they are both of God, neither doth the one depend on the other. Whereupon I gather as a certain conclusion, that the opinion of them, who hold the Pope to be a temporal Lord over Kings and Princes, is unreasonable, and unprobable altogether. For he hath not to meddle with them or theirs civilly, much less to depose them, or give away their Kingdoms: that is no part of his commission. He hath in my judgement the Fatherhood of the Church, not a Princehood of the world: Christ himself taking no such title upon him, nor giving it to Peter, or any other of his disciples. And that is it which I meant to defend in him, and no other sovereignty. 14 Mr. Camden also relateth In Annalibus rerum Anglic. etc. pag. 327. ad ann. 1581. , that when Fa: Campian, and divers other Priests were demanded by the Magistrate, whether by the authority of the Bull of Pius Quintus her majesties Subjects were absolved from their oath of allegiance in such sort, that they might take arms against her Majesty? whether they did think her to be a lawful Queen? whether they would subscribe to the opinion of D. Sanders, and Bristol touching the authority of that Bull? whether if the Pope should make war against the Queen, they would take his or her part? Some answered so ambiguously, some so headily, others by wrangling k ●●rgiuersando , or by silence did shift off the questions so that divers plain dealing Catholics began to suspect, that they harboured some treachery: and one james Bishop a man devoted to the Pope of Rome did write against these men, and did sound show, that Constitution, which is obtruded in the name of the Council of Lateran, (whereon all the authority to absolve Subjects from their Allegiance, and to depose Princes is grounded) was no other than a decree of Pope Innocent the third, and never received in England: yea and that Council to be none at all, nor any thing there decreed at all by the Fathers. By all which it is evident, that few English Catholics were of opinion, that the Pope hath power to depose Sovereign Princes, until these later jesuits, and such as adhered to their opinions, began to defend so eagerly the Bull of Pius Quintus, and to maintain with such vehemency his aforesaid authority to depose Princes, as a point of faith, which doctrine how prejudicial it hath been, and is at this present to Catholics, and Catholic Religion, I leave, Catholic Reader, to thy prudent consideration. Chap. 6. Wherein the authority of the Kingdom, and State of France is at large discussed. 1. THe sixth and last testimony which I brought in my Theological Disputation a Cap. 3. sec. 3. num: 12. , and also in my Apology b Num: 30. & seq. and which only, if there were no other, would suffice to prove that the doctrine for the Pope's power to depose Princes is not a point of faith, was taken from the authority of the most noble, and most Christian Kingdom and State of France, which ever held the contrary to be the more true, sound, and assured doctrine. And first to omit the authority of jacobus Almain, a famous Schoole-divine of Paris, whereof I spoke before, who affirmed, that very many, or most Doctors were of opinion, that the Pope hath not by the institution of Christ authority to inflict temporal punishments, no, nor so much as to imprison, much less to deprive Princes of their Kingdoms or lives) in a general Parliament, or assembly of all the States of France held at Paris in the year 1593. the Cardinal de Pelleve, and other Prelates, who then were present, took exceptions against certain decrees of the Council of Trent, which Laurentius Bochellus relateth, among which that of the 25. session, chap: 19 wherein the Council forbiddeth Kings to permit single combats, was one. The Council of Trent, say they, doth excommunicate and deprive a King of the City or place, wherein he permitteth to fight a single combat. This article is against the authority of the King, who can not be deprived of his temporal Dominion, in regard whereof he acknowledgeth no Superior at all. 2 Secondly, Petrus Pithaeus, a man, as Possevine the jesuite relateth, truly learned, and a diligent searcher of antiquity, in his book, of the liberties of the Church of France, printed at Paris by authority of the Parliament in the year 1594, doth out of a general maxim, which France, as he saith, hath ever approved as certain, deduce this particular position: That the Pope can not give as a prey the Kingdom of France, nor any thing appertaining thereunto, neither that he can deprive the King thereof, nor in any other manner dispose thereof. And notwithstanding any admonitions, Excommunications, or Interdicts, which by the Pope may be made, yet the subjects are bound to yield obedience due to his Majesty for temporals, neither therein can they be dispensed, or absolved by the Pope. 3 Mark now, good Reader, what silly shifts D. Schulckenius hath found out to repel the aforesaid authorities. To the first he answereth, c Pag. 121. ad num: 31. that it is not credible, that the Cardinal of Pelleve, and the other Prelates should affirm that, which Bochellus relateth. For the Council of Trent, saith he, doth not decree, that Princes are absolutely deprived of the City and place, wherein they shall permit single combat, but with a restriction, that they are deprived of the City, fort, or place, which they hold of the Church, or which they hold in fee farm. Therefore the Council doth not speak of the King of France, or other absolute Kings, unless Bochellus will have the Kingdom of France to be given to the Kings by the Church, or that the King is not a direct Lord, but a feudary. Therefore it had been great imprudence and malignity, to deprave so spitefully the words of the sacred Council, as Bochellus hath depraved, which ought not to be presumed of the Cardinal of Pelleve, and of the other Prelates. 4 But truly it is not credible, that Bochellus durst presume to commit so great, and public a forgery, as to falsify the Records of the highest Court of Parliament, and assembly of the three States of the Land, especially printing his book at Paris, where without doubt he should not want men both to find out easily, and also to punish severely so great a forgery, and withal affirming, that those articles were extracted out of the Register of the assembly held at Paris in the year 1593., and putting down such particular circumstances, as naming not only the day of the year, but also of the month, to wit, the 19 of April, when the Lord Abbot of Orbais did on the behalf of the Lord Cardinal of Pelleve bring a copy of them etc. and setting down all the articles in French, whereas the main corpse of his book was Latin. 5 Neither is the reason, which D. Schulckenius bringeth, to make this testimony seem incredible, of any great moment. For first it is untrue, which he saith, that the Council did not speak of the King of France, and other absolute Kings. The words of the Council are clear to the contrary. The Emperor, saith the Council, Kings, Dukes, Princes, Marquesses, Earls, and temporal Lords by what other name soever they be called, who shall grant a place for single combat in their Countries among Christians, let them be excommunicated, and understood deprived of the jurisdiction and Dominion of the City, fort, or place, which they hold from the Church, wherein, or whereat they shall permit single combat, and if they be held in fee farm, let them forthwith be taken for the direct Lords: but they that shall fight the combat, and they that are called their Patrimi, let them incurre ipso facto the punishment of Excommunication, and forfeiture of all their goods &c. So that it is plain, that the Council speaketh of Emperors, and of other absolute Kings and Princes. 6. Secondly, although it be clear, that those words [let them be deprived of the City, Fort, or place which they hold from the Church] be spoken with a restriction and limitation only to those Cities, Forts, or places, which be held from the Church, yet the words following [and if they be held in fee farm, let them forthwith be taken for the direct Lords] may absolutely, and without the aforesaid restriction be understood of those Cities, Forts or places, which be held in fee farm either from the Church, or from some other Sovereign Prince, as from the direct Lord of them. So likewise the punishment of the confiscation of goods may be understood as well without the territories of the Church, as within the Pope's dominions, and may also be understood to comprehend absolute Princes, if perchance they should either be Patrimi, or fight themselves in single combat. And so by consequence it might be inferred, that, if the Council hath authority to deprive absolute Kings of those dominions, which thy hold in fee farm from other absolute Princes, or to confiscate their goods, or else the goods of their subjects without their consent, the Council also hath authority to deprive for the same cause absolute Princes of their Cities, Forts and places, whereof they are absolute Lords. And so the Cardinal of Pelleve, and other Prelates of France might understand the Council in that sense, as also D. Weston in his Sanctuary d q. 28. doth understand them, and thereupon urgeth those words of the Council of Trent as a principal argument to prove, that the doctrine for the Pope's power to depose Princes is a point of faith, and decreed by the Council of Trent, who little thought, that he should therefore have been censured of imprudency and malignity, as D. Schulckenius censureth the Prelates and Parliament of France, if they should understand in that manner the Council of Trent, as Bochellus relateth, and D. Weston expoundeth it. 6. To the second testimony of Petrus Pithaus, D. Schulckenius answereth in as shuffling a manner. First, I answer, saith he, e Pag. ● 24. that Antony Possevine commendeth Petrus Pithaeus for a learned man, and a diligent searcher of antiquity, and relateth all his works, and also his death, and yet he maketh no mention of this book, and I confess I never saw it. But although neither Possevine, nor D. Schulckenius ever saw that book, yet I have seen it, and read it, and it was printed at Paris by the authority of the Parliament in the year 1594. and it hath those maxims and positions which I related in my Apology. And therefore we have the testimony of a very learned Catholic, and a diligent searcher of antiquity, by Possevines confession, that France hath ever held this position for undoubted, that the Pope hath no authority to deprive the King of France of his Kingdom, and that notwithstanding any admonitions, Excommunications etc. his subjects are bound to obey him in temporals. 7. His second answer is, that whosoever is the Author of that book, it is clearly false, that France hath always approved that doctrine for certain. Mark now the reasons, which D. Schulckenius bringeth to convince this very learned man, and diligent searcher of antiquity of manifest falsehood. For first it is repugnant, saith he, to the Council of Claramont, wherein Philip the first was excommunicated and deprived of his Regal Honour and Crown by Pope Vrbanus the second, whereof see Ivo Carnotensis in his 28. epistle to Vrbanus. But it is most clearly false, that Philip was in that Council deprived of his Regal Honour and Crown, as both I f In Prefat. ad Resp. Apol. nu. 36. & seq. , and Mr. john Barclay g In Prolegom. num. 75. have clearly showed heretofore, for that no Historiographer writeth, that he was deposed in that Council, but at the most only excommunicated, for that he had forsaken his lawful wife Berta, and had married Bertrada, who was also wife to another man. For Sigebert, Aimonius, Matthew Paris, Nauclerus, Paulus Aemilius, Robertus Gaguinus, Papirius Massonius, the Author of the fragment of the history of France published by Petrus Pithaeus with Glaber, Genebrard, and Vignerius do relate that Philip was excommunicated by Vrbanus, and as some of them say, in the Council of Claramont, but none of them make mention, that he was deposed or deprived of his Royal honour and Crown. 8. Neither can it any way be proved out of Ivo, that Philip was deprived by Pope Vrbanus of his Royal Honour and Crown, for that Ivo at that very time, when Philip was excommunicated, did in express words account him his Lord and King, and offered him his faithful service, as to his Lord and King: This only can be gathered out of Ivo, that King Philip was desirous to honour his new Queen, or rather Concubine Bertrada, by putting the Royal Crown or Diadem on both their heads in a public solemnity, which for that it was a religious ceremony, and usually done in the Church at the time of Mass, by the Primate of the Land, and Philip was at that time excommunicated and deprived of all holy rites and ceremonies of the Church, Pope Vrbanus fo● bade all the Bishops of France to crown in that sort the King, and his new supposed Queen, for Philip himself was long before crowned King of France, and this solemnity, which Pope Vrbanus forbade, or the want thereof did not give or take away from King Philip any jot of his Royal power and authority. 9 Secondly, it is repugnant, saith D. Schulckenius, to the examples of Gregory the great, of Zachary, and of other Popes. But to those examples both I have answered at large in my Apology, h Num. 382. & seq. & num. 404. & seq. and also since that Mr. john Barclay i Ca 40. & 42. , to whom as yet no Reply hath been made, and first, that those words of S. Gregory, k Lib. 2. epist. post. epist. 38. honore suo privetur, let him be deprived, or I would to God he may be deprived of his honour (for both ways it may be Englished, as that the verb privetur may be of the Imperative, or of the Optative mood) do not contain a juridical sentence, command or decree, as likewise neither those words, which are spoken in the like manner by S. Gregory, & cum Iuda traditore in inferno damnetur, and let him be damned in hell, or, I wish he may be damned in hell with judas the traitor, but only either a zealous imprecation l See Baronius ad annum 1097. num 51. against them, who should infringe his privilege, if they did not repent, or else a declaration, that they were worthy for their contempt, to be deprived of their honour, and to be condemned to hell fire with judas the traitor: from whence it cannot be inferred, that the Pope hath authority to deprive by a juridical sentence those Kings who infringe his privilege of their Regal Honour, or to condemn them by a juridical sentence to hell fire. 10. So likewise to that example of Pope Zacharie I answered, m Num. 404. & seq. that he did not by any juridical sentence of deprivation deprive Childerike of his Kingdom, and create Pipin King, but only gave his advise, counsel, and consent, or at the most command to the Peers of France, that they ought, or might lawfully (the circumstances which they propounded to Zacharie being considered) deprive Childerike of his kingdom, and create Pipin king: but this argueth no authority in the Pope to depose Princes by any juridical sentence of deprivation, but at the most an authority in the common wealth to depose their King in some cases of great moment, which is not the question, which we have now in hand. And therefore the Gloss n In cap. Alius 15. q. 6. with other grave and learned Authors cited by me in my Apology o Num. 404. & seq. do expound those words of Pope Gregory the seveth: Zacharie deposed Childerike, thus, Zacharie gave his advise and consent to those who deposed him: and those words, which some Chronicles have, Childerike was deposed by the authority of Pope Zacharie, Lupolbus Bambergensis, joannes Parisiensis, and Michael Coccineus do expound in the like manner, that Childerike was deposed by the authority of Pope Zacharie not deposing Childerike, and creating Pippin King, but only declaring, that he might be lawfully deposed by the Peers of France, whereof they were in some doubt, for that they had sworn to him allegiance, and therefore they craved the opinion, and advise of Pope Zacharie to be resolved by him of that doubt, for that the University of Paris did not flourish at that time, saith joannes Maior, p In 4. dist. 24. q. 3. circa sinen. de potest. Regia & Papal. c. 15. and so Pipin was anointed King by the election of the Barons, saith joannes Parisiensis, and by the authority of the Pope declaring the doubt of the Barons, which also they might have done without the Pope's consent upon a reasonable cause. 11. But because Card. Bellarmine will never cease to inculcate still the same authorities, which by me, and others have been so often answered, I think it not amiss to add something here concerning that, which I did in general words insinuate in my Apology, q Num. 382. and is more expressly touched by Nicholas Vingerius in his History of the Church of France, and more particularly urged by the Bishop of Rochester in his answer to Card. Bellarmine's Treatise against Barclay; to wit, that the privilege which is said to be granted by S. Gregory to the Monastery of S. Medard, and which is so greatly urged by Card. Bellarmine, and others, is not so authentical, as Card. Bellarmine, and others suppose it to be, which may be proved by many probable conjectures; as by the style, and phrase, which is not agreeable to S. Gregory's, and also by the date of the year of our Lord, which is not agreeable to the manner of dating of those days, but principally by the persons, who are subscribed for witnesses to that privilege. For S. Austin Bishop of Canterbury, and Mellitus Bishop of London, and Theodorike King of France, are subscribed for witnesses to that privilege, and yet neither S. Austin, nor Mellitus, were Bishops, nor Theodorike King at that time, which Card. Baronius also doth in express words affirm r Ad annum 893. num. 85. . But I confess, saith he, that the subscriptions of the Bishops, and of Theodorike King of France do not agree to these times: for many Bishops, who are found subscribed, are known to be created some certain years after, as to speak nothing of the rest, Augustin Bishop of Canterbury, and Mellitus of London, who, as it is manifest, were neither at this time Bishops, nor gone for England; neither at this time did Theodorike reign in France, but Childebert, and Gunthramn. Wherefore my opinion is, that the subscription was afterwards adjoined. Thus Baronius. But considering that Theodorike not only in the subscription, but also in the privilege itself is named King, at whose instance S. Gregory saith he granted that privilege, Baronius might with the same reason have affirmed, that not only the subscription, but also the privilege itself was afterwards made, and adjoined to S. Gregory's Epistles, which without doubt Baronius would quickly have acknowledged, if it had not been for those words honore suo privetur, which he thought made greatly for the Pope's power to depose Princes, seeing that upon far weaker grounds he sticketh not to deny oftentimes privileges, and antiquities, which never before were called in question. 12. And although Pope Gregory the seventh in his Epistle to the Bishop of Metz doth not cite this privilege, of S. Gregory granted to the Monastery of S. Me●ard (which is no small conjecture, that this privilege was not extant in those days among the Epistles of S. Gregory, for otherwise it bearing so great a show of being authentical by the subscription of 30 Bishops, and the King and Queen of France, who were witnesses thereunto, it would by all likelihood have been cited by Pope Gregory the seventh) but an other privilege granted to an other Monastery by S, Gregory in his Epistle to one Senator Abbot s Lib. 11. epist. epist. 10. wherein S. Gregory did not say honore suo privetur, let him be deprived of his honour, but potestatis, honorisque sui dignitate careat, let him want, or, I desire he may want, not his honour, but the worthiness of his power and honour, which words are not so forcible to prove the Pope's authority to deprive Kings of their princely honour and power, but at the most to declare them to be unworthy of it for some crime committed by them, and to be worthy also to be damned in hell with judas the Traitor, for that many a one may be a true King, and have princely power and honour who is unworthy thereof. Nevertheless, (besides that the aforesaid words do contain no sentence of deprivation, but only a curse, or imprecation, which kind of imprecations even containing anathema was frequent in the privileges granted by Lay-men, yea and upon sepulchres, that men should be fearful to violate them, as Baronius t Ad an. 1097. Num. 51. relateth) also this privilege mentioned in S. Gregory's epistle to Senator, is not so authentical, both for that it hath neither date of any year, or day when it was written, nor subscription of any witness, which by likelihood it would have had, if there had been any authentical copy thereof, and also for that the Author of the book entitled de unitate Ecclesiae who is thought to be Venericus Bishop of Vercellis, and lived in Pope Gregory the seventh his time, answering that epistle of Pope Gregory the seventh to the Bishop of Metz doth boldly affirm, that those words, potestatis honorisque sui dignitate careat, let him want the worthiness of his power and honour, were not in those days extant among the works of S. Gregory. Whereby the Reader may easily perceive, what weak demonstrations and authorities Card. Bellarmine doth so often inculcate to convince this doctrine for the Pope's power to depose Painces to be a point of faith. 13 Thirdly, it is also repugnant, saith D. Schulckenius, to those most famous French writers, whom I related before. But although it be true, that the most part of those seventeen French writers related by Card: Bellarmine in his book against Barclay, and now in his Schulckenius against me, are of opinion, that the Pope hath power to depose Princes, this nevertheless may also be true, which Petrus Pithaeus affirmeth, to wit, that France, understanding thereby the State of France, hath ever held, the the Pope hath no authority to deprive the King of France of his Kingdom. May it not truly be said, that the Kingdom, and State of England hath from the first year of Queen Elizabeth's reign, even to this present time, held, that the Catholic Roman Religion is not the true Religion, notwithstanding that not only seventeen, but seventeen thousands there have been of English Catholics, since the first beginning of her reign, till now, who have held the contrary. wherefore when Petrus Pithaeus affirmed, that France hath ever held, that the Pope hath no authority to depose their King, by France he did not understand every particular Frenchman, but the State and temporal Governors of the Kingdom of France, which his assertion is also confirmed by the State and Parliament of Paris, first in the censuring of Card: Bellarmine's book against D. Barclay, then in burning his Schulckenius written against me, afterwards in condemning Suarez book against his majesties Apology for maintaining so stiffly this doctrine for the Pope's power to depose Princes, and to dispose of all their temporals, which they call a scandalous, and seditious, a damnable, and pernicious doctrine, and now lastly, by the decree of the Parliament of Paris the second of januarie of this present year 1615, wherein it is ordained, that it shall not be held for problematique; and also by the new oath of allegiance like unto that of ours, (but that ours is more sweet, and more modest, as the Cardinal du Peron u Pag. 100 affirmeth) which those of the lower house of the general assembly of all the States of France, (whom the same Cardinal du Peron, in his speech to them, confesseth to be Catholics x Pag. 96. ,) endeavoured to have made for a fundamental Law. 14 Lastly, it is also repugnant, saith D. Schulckenius, to reason, it is repugnant to the principles of the Catholic faith. For if the Subjects of the King of France be bound to obey their King being excommunicated, and that they can not be absolved from this obedience by the Pope, it followeth that either the King of France can not be bound by Christ his Vicar with the bond of Excommunication, or that his Subjects can not be loosed from the bond of their allegiance and obedience. Both are repugnant to the words of Christ, who said to his Vicar, whatsoever thou shalt bind upon earth, shall be bound also in heaven, and whatsoever thou shalt lose upon earth shall be loosed also in heaven. Neither did Christ except the King of France, or his Subjects, and who hath excepted them I can not tell. This I know, that no man could by right except them. and whosoever will not be subject to the keys of the Church, I know, and with a clear voice I do pronounce, that he will neither be a Christian, nor can ●●e appertain to the kingdom of Christ. 15 Great words to small purpose. For although it be true, that Card: Bellarmine, Suarez, and some few others are, or seem to be of opinion, that it is against reason, and against the principles of the Catholic faith, to hold, that the Pope hath no authority to depose Princes, yet it is also true, that other learned Catholics are of opinion, that it is neither against reason, nor against the principles of the Catholic faith to hold, that the Pope hath no such authority. Must the opinion of Card: Bellarmine, or of Suarez, or of any other learned Catholic, be a rule of reason to all other learned Catholics, or to be accounted by all Catholics the principles of the Catholic faith? All Catholics do confess, that the Pope hath authority to excommunicate a Christian King, and that Subjects are not bound to obey an excommunicated King in those things, which the Censure of Excommunication of it own nature, and by the institution of Christ doth forbid; but to absolve Subjects from their temporal allegiance either by virtue of Excommunication (which being a spiritual Censure hath neither of it own nature, nor by the institution of Christ such a temporal effect) or by the sentence of deprivation, this many learned Catholics, with the State of France do affirm not to belong to the Pope's spiritual authority to bind, or lose. 16 True also it is, that all Christians are subject to the keys of the Church, but these keys are spiritual, not temporal, of the kingdom of heaven, and not of earthly kingdoms; neither is any Christian excepted from that authority, which Christ gave to S. Peter by those words, whatsoever thou shalt lose etc. But those words are not to be understood of temporal, but only of spiritual bindings and loosings, as I have often showed; neither did any of the ancient Fathers ever extend the keys of the Church, to the absolving of Subjects from their temporal allegiance, or to the depriving of Kings and Princes of their temporal lives, liberty, kingdoms or goods, as by some Catholics of these latter ages, contrary to the true meaning and institution of Christ, and to the understanding and practice of the primitive Church, they have been violently wrested. To that whatsoever thou shalt lose etc. I answer, saith joannes Parisiensis, according to S. Chrysostome & Rabanus, that by this is not understood any power to be given but spiritual, to wit, to absolve from the bond of sins. For it were foolish to understand, that by this is given a power to absolve from the bond of debts, and much less from that great and high debt of temporal allegiance. 16. These be all the exceptions which D. Schulckenius taketh against those authorities, which I brought in my Theological Disputation: Now let any indifferent Reader judge, whether he hath sufficiently answered those authorities, or rather by cavilling and shuffling laboured cunningly to shift them off, and whether Mr. Fitzherbert might not blush to affirm so boldly, that D. Schulckenius, to whom he cunningly also, as you have seen, remitteth his English Reader, for his answer to those authorities, hath answered particularly to every one of them, and proved clearly, that diverse of them make flat against Widdrington, and many nothing at all for him (being truly understood) and that some others are worthily rejected, being either so absurd, that they are easily confuted by the circumstances of the places alleged, or else heretics (as appeareth by their doctrine in other things) or known Schismatics, who living in the times of the Emperors or Kings that were deposed, wrote partially in their favours, of which sort nevertheless there are very few, so that of all the Authors, that Widdrington hath scraped together to make some show of probability in his doctrine, he hath no one clear and sufficient witness to justify the same, which how true it is, or rather most clearly false, I remit to the consideration of the indifferent and judicious Reader. 17. For the testimony of john Trithemius, a learned and virtuous Catholic, who expressly affirmeth, that it is a controversy among Schoolmen, & as yet not decided by the judge, whether the Pope hath power to depose the Emperor or no, partly he rejecteth, partly that word Schoolmen he ridiculously expoundeth to be Historiographers, Grammarians, Poets, as Sigebert, Valla, Dantes, who nevertheless are by Trithemius himself related to be also excellent Divines, and partly to repel his testimony he falsely, grossly, and unadvisedly taxeth him with errors committed in his history, and for proof thereof he remitteth his Reader to Possevine, who, as you have seen, both in that, and also other points of history hath shamefully erred himself: and nevertheless, that which Trithemius affirmeth, jacobus Almain a famous Schoole-divine, and classical Doctor of Paris, who lived also in those days, confirmeth to be true, whose words D. Schulckenius doth cunningly pass over without any answer at all. Albericus, a Classical Doctor of the canon and civil Law, for that he delivereth his opinion with submission, & is ready to recall it, if it should prove erroneous, as every good Catholic ought to do, he will have to speak wavering, and altogether doubtful. joannes Parisiensis, a most learned Schoole-divine partly he will have to make nothing for my opinion, and yet he confesseth that Parisiensis is of opinion, that the Pope hath no authority to deprive a Prince of his Kingdom by a juridical sentence of deprivation, which nevertheless is the main and sole point, which I contend to prove: and partly to clean overthrow his testimony he taxeth him without sufficient ground of many errors, which errors nevertheless although he should have maintained, do clearly confirm this doctrine against the Pope's power to depose Princes. The testimony of Mr. D. Barclay a famous, learned and virtuous Catholic he no more regardeth then of an heretic. To M. Blackwell and those other English Priests he answereth nothing. The Records of the general assembly of the States of France related by Bochellus with such particular circumstances, that no man can misdoubt of them, for a frivolous reason he accounteth incredible, The testimony of Petrus Pithaeus, a very learned Catholic, and a diligent searcher of antiquity by Possevines confession, affirming that France hath ever held for certain, that the Pope hath no authority to depose their King, also for frivolous reasons he utterly reieiecteth, which nevertheless the late proceeding of the Court of Parliament against his, and such like books hath sufficiently confirmed. And if this manner of answering authorities is to be admitted, who may not easily shift off any authorities whatsoever, especially when they shall have their trumpeters to extol all their writings and answers to the sky, and to depress their adversaries, and who shall seem to make against them, whether they be living or dead, even to the pit of hell, appeaching them of heresy, error, schism, and such like heinous crimes? 18. Many other authorities I brought in my Apology, which do clearly contradict Card. Bellarmine's doctrine (which only I took upon me to confute) whereof some of them do expressly affirm, that the Church of Christ hath only a spiritual, and not a temporal sword; Others, that temporal Princes are in temporal affairs next under God, and to be punished with temporal punishments by God alone, and that the temporal power is independent of the spiritual: Others, that neither Childerike was deposed, nor the Roman Empire translated from the Grecians to the Germans, or French, by the Pope's sole authority, but by the consent, suffrages, and authority also of the people, which nevertheless are principal authorities, which by Card. Bellarmine and others are brought to prove the Pope's power to depose Princes: Finally others, although they be of opinion, that the Pope hath authority to depose Princes for heresy, or, which is a far different question, to declare them to be deposed (for so writeth Antonius de Rosellis) yet they deny that for other temporal crimes or for insufficiency in government a Christian Prince can be deposed by the Pope, whereas Card. Bellarmine doth not limit his authority to any crime or cause, but doth absolutely, in ordine ad bonum spirituale, in order to spiritual good extend this pretended authority. 19 Neither is it true, that I brought the authority of any heretic for proof of my opinion, as M. Fitzherbert without any shame or conscience untruly affirmeth: I omitted of set purpose to name Marsilius of Padua, for that not only his book, but also himself is placed among heretics in the Catalogue of forbidden books. And although I had urged his authority in that sort, as I did urge it in my Appendix against Fa. Suarez, yet it had been in my judgement a forcible proof; not for that I think the authority of an heretic, barely considered by itself, to be of any force to prove affirmatively any doctrine to belong to faith, but for that Marsilius, writing a book of purpose to defend the right and Sovereignty of Emperors and Kings against the Pope's power to depose them, wherein here and there he scattereth many heresies, he should by Catholic Authors, who writ of heresies, as Castro, Prateolus, D. Sanders and others, be particularly taxed of those heresies, and yet his doctrine against the Pope's power to depose Princes, which was the principal subject of his book, should not be censured by them as heretical or erroneous, for this is a forcible argument, that those Catholic writers did not account his doctrine in that point to be heretical or erroneus, although they thought it perchance to be the less probable doctrine. 20. True also it is, that in my Apology I alleged Sigebert for my opinion, for that he vehemently impugned this pretended doctrine for the Pope's power to depose Princes, both against Pope Gregory the seventh, and also Paschalis the second, calling it a novelty, not to say an heresy, and answering, as he saith, with strong arguments of the Fathers the Epistle, which the said Gregory wrote to Hermannus Bishop of Metz in reproach of Kingly power. But Sigebert, saith D. Schulckenius, was a Schismatic, and his books against Gregory the seventh, and Paschalis the second are condemned by the Catholic Roman Church. But truly it is strange, and greatly to be lamented, to see some Catholics now adays, especially who profess sanctity of life, and pretend to have a tender and timorous conscience so easily to defame, and slander other Catholics, who dislike their opinions or proceed, with such enormous crimes, as are Schism, heresy, and Apostasy. What reason had Card. Baronius, of whom D. Schulckenius hath taken the same, to call Sigebert a Schismatic (he being by no other Author, that I have read, before Baronius, charged with that heinous crime, but was ever reputed a learned, virtuous, and religious Catholic) truly I cannot in any wise perceive. Schism is a rebellious separation from the unity of the Church, or a refusing to obey the Pope, as he is the visible head of the Church, and Christ his Vicegerent on earth. 21: For observe diligently, saith Card. Caietane y 2a. 2a. q. 39 ar. 2. in resp. ad 2m. that to refuse to obey the Pope's command may happen three manner of ways. First, in regard of the thing commanded. Secondly, in regard of the person commanding; and thirdly in regard of the office of the judge, or commander. For if one doth even with obstinacy contemn the Pope's sentence, to wit, for that he will not fulfil that, which the Pope hath commanded, as to abstain from such a war, to restore such a State etc. although he should most grievously sin, yet he is not for this a Schismatic. For it falleth out and that often, that one will not fulfil the command of his Superior acknowledging him nevertheless to be his Superior. For if one upon a reasonable cause hath the Pope for a person suspected, and therefore doth not only refuse the Pope's presence, but also his immediate judgement or sentence, being ready to receive from him not suspected judges, he neither incurreth the crime of Schism, nor any other crime. For it is natural to shun hurtful things, and to be wary of dangers. And the Pope's person may govern tyramnically, & so much the easier, by how much he is more potent, and feareth no revenger on earth. But when one refuseth to obey the Pope's command or sentence in regard of his office, not acknowledging him to be his Superior, although he do believe he is, then properly he is a Schismatic. And according to this sense are to be understood the words of S. Thomas and such like, for even obstinate disobedience doth not make Schism, unless it be a rebellion to the office of the Pope, or of the Church, so that he refuse to subject himself unto him, to acknowledge him for Superior etc. Thus Card. Caietane. 22. Now what Author ever said, that Sigebert refused to obey in this sort Pope Gregory's command, or that he acknowledged Guibert the Antipape, and not Gregory, to be the true and lawful Pope. True it is that Sigebert was blamed by some, as Trithemius z In verbo Sigebertus. relateth, for that he adhering to the Emperor Henry being a persecutor and rebel to the Roman Church, wrote letters and treatises against Pope Gregory the seventh, which did not become his profession, but that Sigebert did departed from the unity of the Church, or that he refused to obey and subject himself to Pope Gregory, as not acknowledging him to be his Superior, which is necessarily required to make one a Schismatic, or that he adhered to the Emperor Henry in his rebellion to the Roman Church, and in deposing Gregory, and creating Guibert Pope, neither D. Schulckenius, nor any other is able to prove out of any ancient or modern writer. 23. True also it is, that Sigebert was of this opinion, that the Pope had no authority to depose the Emperor, and therein he opposed himself to Pope Gregory, and answered, as he saith, all his arguments with strong testimonies of the Fathers, and upon this ground he adhered to the Emperor, acknowledging him to still remain the true and lawful Emperor, and refused to obey Pope Gregory's command, wherein he strictly ordained, that no man should account Henry the fourth to be true and lawful Emperor: But considering that the doctrine for the Pope's power to dethrone temporal Princes, and the practice thereof, was then new in the Church of God, and never heard of before, for which cause it was called by Sigebert a novelty, not to say an heresy, and since that time there hath ever been a great controversy, saith Azor a Tom. 2. lib. 11. cap. 5. q. 8. , concerning this point, betwixt Emperors and Kings on the one side, and the Bishops or Popes of Rome on the other, and the Schoolmen are at variance about the same, and as yet the judge hath not decided it, saith Trithemius, and very many Doctors are of opinion that the Pope hath no such authority, saith Almainus, and the State of France hath ever maintained the same for certain, saith Pithaeus, and the late practice of the Parliament of Paris (to omit all the authorities of our learned Countrymen) doth most clearly confirm the same, it is neither reason, nor conscience to charge Sigebert with Schism, for impugning that new doctrine and practice, which was never heard of before in the Church of God. And therefore many complained, saith Az●● in the same place, that Gregory the seventh did depri●e Henry the fourth of the administration of the Empire. 24 For although the Bishops of Rome, (saith Onuphrius, a man, as Possevine confesseth, of exceeding great reading, and whom Paulus Manutius calleth a devourer of Histories) were before honoured, as the heads of Christian Religion, and the Vicars of Christ, and the Successors of Peter, yet their authority was not extended any farther, then either in declaring or maintaining positions of faith. But yet they were subject to the Emperors, all things were done at the emperors back, they were created by them, and the Pope of Rome durst not presume to judge, or decree any thing concerning them. Gregory the seventh, the first of all the Bishops of Rome, being aided with the forces of the Nortmen, trusting in the riches of Countess Mathildis, a woman most potent in Italy, and being encouraged with the discord of the Germane Princes, who were at civil war among themselves, contrary to the custom of his ancestors, contemning the authority and power of the Emperor, when he had gotten the Popedom, did presume, I do not say, to excommunicate, but also to deprive the Emperor, by whom, if he was not chosen, he was at the least confirmed, of his Kingdom and Empire. A thing not heard of before that age. For the fables which are carried abroad of Arcadius, Anastasius, & Leo Iconomachus, I do nothing regard. Thus Onuphrius b Lib: 4. de varia create. Rom: Pont. . 25 Lastly, it is also true, that Sigeberts' books in answer to the letters of Pope Gregory, and Pope Paschalis are put in the Catalogue of forbidden books, but that they are forbidden or condemned by the Catholic Church, or the Catholic Roman Church, as D. Schulckenius affirmeth, unless by the Catholic Church, or Catholic Roman Church he understand those few Cardinals, and Divines of Rome, who are appointed by the Pope for the examining, permitting and forbidding of books, (which were a very strange and over-strict description of the Catholic Church) is altogether untrue. Neither is it known, for what cause those books of Sigebert are put in the Catalogue of forbidden books; as likewise two books of mine written especially against Card: Bellarmine, have of late by a special decree of the aforesaid Cardinals, and especially of Card: Bellarmine, who hath been pleased to be a judge, witness, and accuser in his own cause, been prohibited, and I under pain of Ecclesiastical Censures commanded to purge myself forthwith, but the cause wherefore they are forbidden is not therein expressed, neither as yet have they given me to understand, of what crime either in particular, or in general, I am to purge myself, although in my purgation written to his Holiness long ago c The 24. of june 1614 , I have most humbly and instantly desired it, and have protested to be most ready to purge myself of any crime whatsoever I shall know to have committed, which their strange proceeding doth clearly argue, that they have no small distrust in their cause, and that the doctrine for the Pope's power to depose Princes is not so clear a point of faith, as Card: Bellarmine, and his followers would have the Pope's Holiness and the Christian world with out sufficient grounds to believe. 26 Seeing therefore that there be many causes, wherefore books may be forbidden, and which in general are reduced to these two heads, either that they are repugnant to faith, or else to good manners, which the late instructions for the correcting of books published by the commandment of Pope Clement the eight, do in so large, yet doubtful a manner extend, that scarce any book can be found which treateth of the Pope's authority, but some Corrector or other may easily except against it, (as those books are to be corrected, which are against Ecclesiastical liberty, immunity, and jurisdiction, so that if a Canonist be the Corrector, he will have that blotted ou●, which denieth the Pope's direct power in temporals, and that Clergy are not exempted by the law of God and nature from the coercive power of Princes etc.) unless it can be proved, that Sigebert books were put in the Catalogue of prohibited books, for that they impugned the doctrine for the Pope's power to depose Princes, no good argument can be drawn from that Catalogue, to impeach Sigeberts' credit for the impugning of that doctrine. Neither can Card: Baronius, nor Card: Bellarmine be excused from grievous detraction, in charging Sigebert, who both in his life and after his death was accounted a learned, virtuous, and religious Catholic, with that execrable crime of schism, for which at the day of judgement they shall render an exact account, unless they can prove, that he did separate himself from the unity of the Church, or disobey the Pope's command, as not acknowledging him to be the true visible head of the Church, and the Successor of S. Peter. 27 I omit now to declare how Catholics ought to carry themselves in times of Schism, when more than one pretend to be the true and rightful Pope, and whether those, who adhere to a false Pope, persuading themselves for probable reasons, that he is the true and lawful Pope, are to be condemned of Schism, and to be accounted formal Schismatics; concerning which question read john Gerson in his Treatise thereof. This only at this present I will demand, that if to reject the testimony of Sigebert, or any such like Author, it be sufficient without any other proof, to say, as Mr Fitzherbert answereth, that they living in the time of the Emperors and Kings that were deposed, wrote partially in their favour, why may it not with the same facility be answered to the authorities of many others of the contrary side, that they living in the time of the Popes, who took upon them to depose Kings and Emperors (for this hath ever been a great controversy, saith Azor, betwixt Kings and Emperors on the one side, and the Bishops of Rome on the other) wrote partially in their favour? May not Popes have their flatterers, and who do attribute unto them more ample authority, then is fitting, as of the Canonists Pope Pius the fift affirmed to that learned Navarre d in cap. Non liceat. 12. q. 2. § nu: 6. , as well as Kings and Emperors? See above cap: 3. nu. 6. what Parisiensis saith of this flattering. 20 Wherefore to make an end of these Authorities, I will only request the judicious Reader, that he will be pleased to consider these two things: first, the reasons which I brought both in my Apology e Num. 449. , and also in my f Cap. 3. sec. 3. nu. 15. & seq. Theological Disputation, which D. Schulckenius passeth over with silence, why there are to be found so few Authors at this present, whose writings are now extant, who deny the Pope's authority to depose Princes in comparison of those, who do maintain the same, which being duly considered, the Reader will easily perceive, that it is a great marvel to find in any Catholic book any one sentence or clause, which seemeth any way to call in question this temporal authority of the Pope: and nevertheless there are at this present, and ever have been, as I have clearly showed before, many virtuous and learned Catholics, who notwithstanding all the clamours, and threatenings of our overviolent Adversaries, are of this opinion, that the Pope hath no such authority to deprive Kings and Princes of their temporal dominions. 21 The second is, that if the doctrine of that learned Navarre, an excellent Divine, and most skilful in the Law, (saith Possevine) of Bartholomaeus Fumus in his Aurea armilla, of Gabriel Vasquez g See the Preface. nu. 40. 43. and of other Divines be true, that in the Court of conscience it be sufficient to this effect, that we shall commit no sin, to choose his opinion for true, whom for good cause we think to be a man sufficiently learned, end of a good conscience, and that no man is bound to follow always the better opinion, but it sufficeth to follow that opinion, which some skilful Doctors think to be true: how much the more may our Catholic Countrymen prudently persuade themselves, that the Pope hath no authority to depose Princes, which doctrine not only one learned, and virtuous man, but very many with the State of France do approve, and who also have diligently read, examined, and abundantly answered all the reasons, arguments, and authorities, which their learned Adversaries have objected to the contrary? And this I hope may suffice for the first part, and for clearing all those authorities, which I brought in my Theological Disputation from all the exceptions, which D. Schulckenius hath taken against them. Now we will examine the reasons, and intrinsical grounds of this doctrine for the Pope's power to depose Princes. THE SECOND PART Wherein ALL THE PRINCIPAL ARGVments, which Card. Bellarmine bringeth to prove the union and subordination of the temporal and spiritual power, together with the Replies, which are brought, by D. Schulckenius to confirm the same, are exactly examined. Chap. 1. The true state of the question concerning the union of the temporal and spiritual power is declared. 1. BEcause my Adversary Mr. Fitzherbert, and all the rest, who do so vehemently maintain the Pope's power to depose Princes, do much rely upon the union, and subordination of the temporal power to the spiritual, as upon a principal proof grounded upon the light of reason, before I come to examine the particular points of his Reply, I think it not amiss for the better understanding of what shall be said hereafter by either of us concerning this subordination, or union, to declare, in what sort these two powers are among Christians united and subordained, and what a weak ground this subordination is to prove, that the Pope hath power to depose Princes, to dispose of temporals, and to punish temporally by way of coercion or constraint. And to proceed orderly herein, and that the Reader may clearly perceive, what is the true state of the question, betwixt me and Card. Bellarmine and not be carried away with a confuse concept of I know not what kind of union and subordination, I will first set down that which is certain, and out of question, and then what is in controversy between us concerning this union and subordination. 2. First therefore I agree with Card. Bellarmine in this, that the civil or temporal power of it own nature, and being considered precisely by itself, is a distinct power from the spiritual, and no way subject or subordained to it (as in my Apology a Num. 132. & seq. & nu. 150. 153. 154. I affirmed out of Card. Bellarmine) but they are two several, distinct, and disunited powers, and not depending one of the other, and have distinct ends, distinct functions, distinct laws, distinct punishments, distinct, Magistrates and Princes. And this is very apparent partly in infidel Countries, where there is true civil or temporal power (saith Card. Bellarmine b Lib. 5. de Rom. Pont. c. 6. ) without any order or reference to any true Ecclesiastical or spirit all power: and partly in the time of the Apostles, who had true and perfect spiritual power without 〈◊〉 true supreme temporal or civil authority. And from hence it followeth, that as the supreme spiritual Prince, or Pastor is subject to none in spiritual ●o also the supreme temporal Prince is subject to none in temporals. 3. Secondly, we do also agree in this, that although among Christians the temporal, and spiritual power do still remain two distinct supreme powers, for that the Mediator betwixt God and men Christ jesus hath also by proper actions, and distinct dignities distinguished either power, as Pope Nicholas the first doth well affirm c In epst. ad Micha●lem Imp. Cum ad verum dist. 96. , yet they are so united, and conjoined together among Christians, that temporal authority and spiritual authority, temporal authority, and spiritual subjection, temporal subjection and spiritual subjection (to omit spiritual authority and temporal subjection) may be united and conjoined, at one or diverse times, in one and the self same Christian man: by reason of which union and conjunction the same Christian man may be both a temporal, and also a spiritual Prince, as we see in the Pope, who by the institution of Christ is the supreme spiritual Pastor of the Church, and by the consent of Christian Princes and people is become also a temporal Prince: the same Christian man may be both a temporal Prince, and also a spiritual subject, as are all Christian Princes, who, as Princes, are supreme in temporals, and as Christians, are subject in spirituals to the spiritual Pastor of Christ's Church; the same Christian man may be both a temporal, and also a spiritual subject, as are other Christians whatsoever; and whether the same man may be a spiritual Prince, and yet a temporal subject, dependeth on that question, whether and in what manner our Saviour Christ hath exempted Clergy men, and especially the Pope from subjection to temporal Princes. But the question betwixt me, and Card. Bellarmine is, whether this manner of union and conjunction of these two powers, or subjections in the same Christian man, be sufficient to make the whole Christian world to be formally one complete and total body, or common wealth, consisting of spiritual and temporal power, whereof the Pope is the supreme visible head, or else, notwithstanding the aforesaid union and conjunction, the temporal and spiritual common wealth among Christians do still remain formally two total and complete bodies or common wealths, the one consisting only of spiritual, and the other only of temporal power, although materially, and accidentally united in one subject, in that manner as I have now declared. 4. Thirdly, I do also make no question, but that, as the world containing both Christians and infidels, and therefore consisting of spiritual and temporal power, may be called one complete, and total body or kingdom, whereof God only is the chief head and King, although in the same total body or kingdom, but not of the same total body or Kingdom, there be many supreme visible heads and Governors, and consequently being supreme, they do not depend one of the other, in so much that neither the temporal power of Infidel Princes is subject to the spiritual power of the Pope, nor the spiritual power of the Pope is subject to the temporal power of Infidel Princes, but both of them are subject immediately to God alone the invisible head and King of them both, in regard of whom they make one total body or kingdom, although the temporal power alone being compared to the visible heads on earth, doth actually make diverse total and complete earthly kingdoms: So also I make no question, but that the whole Christian world, consisting of temporal and spiritual power, being compared to Christ the invisible head thereof, who, at least wise as he is God, is King of Kings, and Lord of Lords both temporal and spiritual, doth make one total body, Kingdom, or Commonwealth, containing in it both the earthly kingdoms of Christians, and the spiritual kingdom of Christ; neither of this can there in my judgement be made any question. 5 But the question betwixt me and Card: Bellarmine is, whether the temporal & spiritual power among Christians, or the Christian world consisting of both powers, not as they are referred to Christ, who, at least wise as he is God, is the invisible head of both powers (I say at least wise as he is God, for that it is a controversy betwixt the Divines and Canonists, whether Christ as man be only a spiritual, or also a temporal King) but as they have relation to their visible heads here on earth, do make one total and complete body, or commonwealth, consisting of temporal and spiritual power, whereof the Pope is the supreme visible head, and Christian Kings are not supreme, but depending on him not only in spirituals, but also in temporals; or whether the temporal and spiritual power among Christians do truly, properly, and formally make two entire and complete bodies, Kingdoms, or Commonwealths, to wit, the earthly kingdoms of this Christian world, consisting only of temporal power, whereof temporal Princes are the supreme visible heads, and therefore in temporals subject to no other visible head here on earth, and the spiritual kingdom and mystical body of Christ, consisting only of spiritual power, whereof the Pope only is the supreme visible head, Prince, and Pastor, and consequently in spirituals subject to no other visible head or Superior on earth. This is the true state of the question. 6 Concerning which question there is a great controversy betwixt the Canonists, and Divines. For the Canonists supposing Christ our Saviour to be, not only a spiritual, but also a temporal King, and to have directly and properly both temporal and spiritual power, over the whole world, and that he gave this power to his General Vicar here on earth S. Peter and his Successors, do consequently affirm, that the whole world, but especially which is Christian, consisting of spiritual and temporal power doth make one entire or total body, whereof the Pope, being by the institution of Christ not only a spiritual, but also a temporal Monarch, is the supreme visible head, to whom all Princes, especially who are Christians, are subject not only in spirituals, but also in temporals. But contrariwise the Divines, who do hold, that Christ as man, was not a temporal, but only a spiritual King, and although he had directly both temporal and spiritual power, yet that he gave to S. Peter and his Successors only the keys of the kingdom of heaven, and not of earthly kingdoms, and only spiritual not temporal authority, are consequently bound to maintain that the temporal and spiritual power, as they are referred to the visible heads here on earth, do not truly, properly, and formally make one total and entire body, or kingdom, whereof the Pope is the supreme visible head, but two total and entire bodies or kingdoms but united in subject, as I declared before, to wit, earthly kingdoms, consisting only of temporal authority, whereof temporal Princes only are the supreme visible heads, and the spiritual kingdom, the mystical body, or the Church of Christ, consisting only of spiritual power, whereof the Pope is the supreme visible head, Prince, and Pastor. 7 Now what is the opinion of Card: Bellarmine touching this point, for that he speaketh so contrary to his own principles, truly I can not tell. For although he adhereth to the Divines, and impugneth the Canonists, in that they hold the Pope to be not only a spiritual, but also a temporal Monarch of the world, and to have directly power in temporals, yet contrary to this his doctrine, as you shall see in the next chapter, he doth in express words, whatsoever his meaning is, affirm, that the temporal and spiritual power do make one total and entire body, Family, City, Kingdom, or Commonwealth, whereof the Pope is the supreme visible head: yea he is so confident in this his assertion, that he feareth not to aver, d in his Schulckenius cap. 5. pag. 195. that it is against the Catholic faith to say, that the Ecclesiastical and civil power are not parts of one and the same Commonwealth, but that they make altogether two commonwealths, unless this distinction and explication be added, to wit, that the Ecclesiastical and civil power do make one total commonwealth (which e Cap. 7. p. 287. & pag. 340. afterwards he calleth, the family, city, Kingdom, mystical body, and Church of Christ) and two partial, which are indeed distinct by acts, offices, dignities, and ends, but connected between themselves, and one subordained to the other. But how weakly and contrary to his own principles Card: Bellarmine proveth this union and subordination of the temporal and spiritual power, you shall forthwith perceive. Chap. 2. Wherein the argument of Card. Bellarmine taken from the authority of S. Paul Rom. 12. we being many are one body in Christ, is examined. 1. ANd to begin first with the union; Card. Bellarmine bringeth two arguments to prove, that the civil and spiritual power do make one body or commonwealth among Christians. The first is taken from the authority of S. Paul Rom: 12. and 1 Cor: 12. where he affirmeth, that we being many are one body in Christ: from whence Card: Bellarmine concludeth, a Lib. 5. de Rom. Pont: cap. 7. that Kings and Bishops, Clerks and Laikes do not make two commonwealths, but one, to wit, the Church. 2 To this argument I answered in my b Num: 83. 89. 165. Apology, that the meaning of S. Paul in those places is, that all Christians, both Kings and Bishops, Clerks and Laikes, as they are by Baptism regenerate in Christ, do truly, properly, and formally make one body, one house, one city, one community or commonwealth, to wit, the spiritual kingdom, the mystical body, or the Church of Christ, which Card. Bellarmine defineth c Lib. 3. de Ecclesia cap 2. to be, a company of men united together by the profession of the same Christian faith and Communion of the same Sacraments under the government of lawful Pastors, and especially of one Roman Bishop Christ his Vicar in earth. But S. Paul doth not say, that the temporal and spiritual power do make one only body, community or commonwealth, and not also two, or that Kings and Bishops, Clerks and Laikes, not considered as Christians or regenerate in Christ by baptism, but as by their natural birth or civil conversation they are subject to temporal Princes, which subjection Baptism doth not take away, do not also truly, properly and formally make also another politic body, another city, another community or commonwealth, to wit, the earthly Kingdoms of the Christian world. 3. Wherefore it is not true, that Kings and Bishops, clerk and Laikes considered diverse ways do not make diverse kingdoms or commonwealths, but one only, as Card. Bellarmine concludeth out of S. Paul? for as by Baptism they are regenerate in Christ, and subject in spirituals to Christ his vicegerent in earth, they make one body, or commonwealth, which is the spiritual kingdom and Church of Christ, and this only doth signify S. Paul by those words, we being many are one body in Christ, but S. Paul doth not deny, that all Christians, as by their natural birth or civil conversation they are subject to Secular Princes in temporal causes, which subjection Baptism doth not take away, do also truly, properly and formally make another body or commonwealth, which are the earthly kingdoms of the Christian world. Clergy men, saith Card. Bellarmine himself, d Lib. de Clericis cap. 28. besides that they are Clergy men; are also citizens and certain parts of the civil commonwealth, and again, e Ibid. cap. 30. if one, saith he, consider the company of Lay-men, not as they are Christians, but as they are Citizens, or after any other manner, that company cannot be called the Church, and consequently they must be another commonwealth, and therefore the civil and Ecclesiastical power, or Clerks or Laikes, in whom the Ecclesiastical and civil power do reside, being considered diverse ways, do not truly, properly and formally make one only body, but two distinct & several bodies or commonwealths, although materially and accidentally united in that manner as I declared before, f Cap. 1. nu. 3. and presently will declare more at large. 4. And whereas Card. Bellarmine affirmeth, that although the temporal and spiritual power do make two partial commonwealths, yet they do also make one entire and total commonwealth, which is the Church of Christ, whereof the Pope is the supreme visible head, and to affirm the contrary, is, saith he, against the Catholic faith, he doth herein both speak contrary to his own principles, and to that which he knoweth to be the Catholic faith, and he must also of necessity fall into the Canonists opinion, which he before g Lib. 5. de Ro. Pont. a cap. 2. pretended to confute concerning the Pope's spiritual and temporal Monarchy over the whole Christian world. For if the Church of Christ be one total body or commonwealth compounded of Ecclesiastical and civil power, as a man is compounded of soul and body (for this is that similitude which so much pleaseth Card. Bellarmine, and is therefore so often inculcated by him) it must necessarily follow, that the Pope as Pope, in whom, according to his other grounds, all the power of the Church doth reside, must have truly, properly, and formally both temporal and Ecclesiastical power, as a man who is compounded of soul and body, hath truly, properly and formally in him both the soul and body, and all the powers and faculties of them both: And what else is this, I pray you, then to maintain with the Canonists, that the Pope as Pope is both a temporal and spiritual Monarch, and that he hath truly, properly and formally both civil and spiritual authority: And yet Card. Bellarmine in other places doth expressly affirm, that the Pope as Pope hath only spiritual and not temporal power. 5 The Divines, saith he, h In his book against D. Barclay ca 12. pag. 137. do give to the Pope temporal and spiritual power only in the Dominions of the Church, which power in the patrimony of S. Peter Pope Innocent in cap. per venerabilem doth call a full power; over other Christian Provinces they do give to the Pope only a spiritual power, which of itself and properly doth regard spiritual things, but temporal things it doth regard as they are subordained to spiritual. And therefore when we speak properly, we say that the Pope hath power in temporals, but not that he hath temporal power, as he is Pope. Now how these two can stand together, that the spiritual and temporal power among Christians do make one entire and total body, whereof the Pope is the supreme visible head, as the body and soul do make one man, and yet that the Pope, as Pope, shall have no temporal power, which in itself is temporal, but only spiritual, athough in some cases extended to temporal things, seeing that these two powers do truly compose the Church of Christ, and consequently both of them are truly and really in the Church which they compound, and so likewise in the Pope, in whom all the power of the Church doth reside, I remit to the judgement of any sensible man. 5. Besides what a more flat contradiction can there be, than this, to say, that the civil and spiritual power among Christians do compound indeed two partial, but one entire and total commonwealth, which is the Church of Christ, or Christian commonwealth, as he here affirmeth, i In his Schulckenius cap. 5. pag. 195. and withal, that the Church of Christ or the Christian commonwealth is compounded only of spiritual authority, as a little beneath he affirmeth in these words: d In his Schulckenius cap 5. p. 203. That which my Adversary Widdrington saith, that the mystical body, Church, or Christian commonwealth is compounded of spiritual authority alone, is true in this sense, that to compound the Christian commonwealth there is not necessary a power, which is formally civil, but yet there is necessary a power, which is so formally spiritual, that it is also virtually civil etc. For how can the Church of Christ be compounded of civil and spiritual power, which are formally two distinct powers, and yet the Church not have power which is formally civil, but only spiritual? Nevertheless I do not intend to deny, that the spiritual or Ecclesiastical power among Christians may in this sense be called virtually civil or temporal, because it may for the spiritual good command, and compel spiritually temporal Princes to use their temporal power, for this were only to contend about words, but that the Church of Christ, whereof the Pope is head, is truly, properly and formally compounded of civil and spiritual power, this I say is both untrue, and also flat contrary to Card. Bellarmine's own grounds; but whether the spiritual power of the church may be called virtually civil or temporal, for that it may also constrain and punish temporal Princes temporally, or use temporal and civil authority, in case the temporal Prince for the spiritual good will not use it, this is the main question betwixt me and Card. Bellarmine. 7. To conclude therefore, this answer I do freely grant: that Kings and Bishops, Clerks and Laics, as by baptism they are regenerate in Christ, do truly, properly, and formally, make one entire and total body, which is the spiritual kingdom, and Church of Christ, whereof the Pope is the supreme visible head: but I utterly deny, that this spiritual kingdom, or Church of Christ is compounded of spiritual and temporal, but only of spiritual, or Ecclesiastical power: or that Clerks and Laics, as they are citizens, or by their natural birth are subject in temporal affairs to temporal Princes do compound this Church of Christ, but only the earthly kingdoms of the Christian world, which are only compounded of civil and temporal authority. In which Christian world, or Christian commonwealth, (taking them for an aggregatum per accidens, including both the spiritual kingdom of Christ, whereof the Pope is head, and also earthly kingdoms, whereof Christian Princes are the only visible heads, for the Church of Christ is seldom times taken in this sense) there is but one total or entire Catholic Church: yet there be many entire temporal kingdoms or commonwealths, as of English, French, Spanish, which have their several Princes, Laws, and governments, and have no other communion then in friendship and amity: Yea, & the Catholic Church is one total body, or commonwealth in Christian and Infidel kingdoms. And also in one particular Christian kingdom there be two distinct total bodies, or commonwealths, to wit, the temporal, consisting of civil power, and the Ecclesiastical, consisting of spiritual: wherein as there be two distinct communions, the one spiritual in things belonging to grace, and the other temporal in things belonging to nature. So also their be two excommunications, the one in spirituals; wherein those that be excommunicated by the Church, do not participate, and the other in temporals; whereof those, who be excommunicated, or made outlaws by temporal Princes, are not partakers; in so much that they, who are deprived of one of these communions, are not thereby deprived of the other, for an outlaw may be a member of the Church, and be partaker of spiritual communion: and he, who by Excommunication is deprived of Ecclesiastical communion, may be a member of the civil commonwealth, as Heathens and Publicans were, and not therefore to be excluded from civil society and conversation. 8. Wherefore although the temporal and spiritual power among Christians, as they are referred to the visible heads thereof, do truly, properly, and formally make diverse total bodies, or commonwealths, which nevertheless ought both to conspire in league & friendship, to bring both Princes and subjects to life everlasting: yet they are not like to two confederate Cities or Kingdoms, which are only united in league and amity, and have no civil communion one with the other, neither is the same man a citizen of both Cities, or a subject of both Kingdoms; but the temporal and spiritual power are so united among Christians, that the same man, who by civil conversation, or natural birth is a citizen, part, and member of the temporal City, Kingdom, or Commonwealth, and consequently subject to her Laws, is also by baptism or spiritual regeneration made a citizen, part, or member of the spiritual City, Kingdom, or Commonwealth, which is the Church of Christ, and consequently is also subject to her Laws. So that although the union, and communion of earthly Kingdoms, and the spiritual kingdom of Christ be greater among Christians, then of two confederate Cities or temporal kingdoms, yet this union and communion being only material, accidental, and in subject (as Music and Physic are united in one man, by reason whereof the same man is both a Musician and a Physician, and consequently subject to the precepts and directions of either art) is not sufficient to cause them to make truly properly, and formally one total body, kingdom, or commonwealth, whereof the Pope is head: as neither the union of two accidents in one subject is sufficient to cause them to make truly, properly, and formally, one entire & total accidental compound. Nevertheless I do not deny, as I observed before but that the temporal & spiritual power, earthly kingdoms, and the spiritual kingdom of Christ, as they are referred to Christ: who, at leastwise as God, is the head of them both, do make one total body, whereof Christ only is the head, which may be called the Christian world, consisting of civil and spiritual power: but in this manner neither the Pope nor temporal Princes are the head, but only parts and members of this total body, as beneath l Cap. 1. nu. 4. I will declare more at large. Chap. 3. Wherein the authority of S. Gregory Nazianzen, comparing the temporal and spiritual power to the body and soul in man, is declared. 1. THe second argument, which Card. Bellarmine bringeth to prove, that the civil and spiritual power among Christians do make one total body, or commonwealth, is taken from the authority of S. Gregory Nazianzene, who compareth the spiritual and temporal power among Christians to the soul and body of man. From which similitude Card. Bellarmine argueth in this manner a Lib. 5. de Rom. Pont. c. 6. . These two powers in the Church, saith he, are like to the spirit and body in a man. For the body & the spirit are as it were two commonwealths, which may be found divided and united. The body is found without the spirit in beasts, the spirit is found without the body in Angels, the body and spirit are both united in man, and do make one person. So likewise, the civil and spiritual power are sometimes found divided, as long since in the Apostles time, sometimes united as now, and when they are united they make one body, or common wealth. 2. To this argument I answered in my Apology b num. 139. 140. , that from the words of S. Gregory Nazianzene only these two things can be gathered. The first, that the spiritual power is more worthy, and more noble than the temporal, and that therefore the temporal must in worthiness yield and give place to the spiritual. The second is, that Christian Princes, although in temporals, and in things belonging to civil government they are supreme on earth, and therefore subject to none, yet in that they are Christians, they are subject in spirituals, and in things belonging to Christian Religion to the command of spiritual Pastors of the flock of Christ. For these be the express words, which he used to the Christian Precedent: For the law of Christ doth make you also subject to my power and authority, for we also have authority to command, I add also, a more noble, and more perfect, unless it be meet, that the spirit do submit her power to the flesh, and heavenly things do give place to earthly. From which words this only can be inferred, that the spiritual power is more noble, than the temporal, and that all Christian Princes and Magistrates, as they are the sheep of Christ, are in spiritual things subject to the spiritual Pastors of the Church, which all Catholics will freely grant. But that the temporal and spiritual power among Christians, as they are referred to the supreme visible heads here on earth, do make one total body or common wealth, as the soul and body do make one man, or that the temporal power among Christians, as it is temporal (for this much doth signify the temporal and spiritual power taking them in abstracto) or which is all one, that temporal Princes are in mere temporal causes subject to spiritual Pastors, cannot with any show of probability be gathered out of those words of S. Gregory Nazianzene. 3. Wherefore the union of the temporal and spiritual power among Christians is nothing like to the union of the body and soul in man, for that the body is a substantial matter, and the soul a substantial form, and therefore being united they make one substantial compound, which is called man; who therefore hath in him actually, properly, and formally both body and soul, as every compound hath in him the parts, whereof it is compounded, but the civil and spiritual power are not among Christians united, as two parts, compounding really and actually one total body, which is the Church of Christ, whereof the Pope is head, for that, according to Card. Bellarmine's own doctrine, the Church of Christ, whereof the Pope is head, is compounded only of spiritual power, and not of civil power, as civil is distinguished from spiritual, but civil and spiritual power, civil power and spiritual subjection, civil subjection and spiritual subjection, (to omit now spiritual power and civil subjection) are only united among Christians, as two accidents, for example, Music and Physic, are united in one man, which union, being only accidental, and in subject, is not sufficient to cause the temporal and spiritual power to make truly, properly and formally one body, whereof the Pope is bead, but only to make the same man, either to have in him both temporal and spiritual power, or temporal power, and spiritual subjection, or both temporal subjection and spiritual subjection, (to omit now spiritual power and temporal subjection) and consequently, the same man to be guided, directed, and governed in temporal things by the laws, precepts and directions of the temporal power, and in spiritual things by the laws, precepts, and directions of the spiritual power: As the union of Music and Physic in one man, although it be only material, accidental, and in subject, yet it maketh the same man to be both a Musician, and a Physician, and as he is a physician, to be guided and directed by the laws and precepts of Music, and as a Physician by the rules & precepts of physic, but it doth not make Music to be guided and directed by Physic, or a Musician, as he is a Musician, to be guided and directed by a Physician, as he is a Physician: So likewise the aforesaid union of temporal and spiritual power, of temporal power and spiritual subjection etc. in one man, doth not make the temporal power to be subject to the spiritual, or a temporal Prince, as he is a temporal Prince, or which is all one, in temporal causes, to be guided, directed, and governed by the spiritual power, as it is spiritual: But of this similitude of the soul and body we shall have occasion to treat again beneath c Cap. 8. . 4. Pardon me, good Reader, that sometimes I repeat the same things somewhat often; it is not to make my book the bigger, and to fill it up with idle repetitions of the same things, as my Adversaries, to disgrace me, are pleased to lay to my charge, not considering that they themselves do often times commit the like, but it is only to clear thy understanding, and to make thee thoroughly comprehend the difficulty, and in what manner the temporal and spiritual power are united and subordained among Christians, considering that my Adversaries, to prove the Pope's power to depose Princes, to dispose of all temporals, and to punish temporally by way of constraint, do so often inculcate this union and subordination, as a principal ground, whereon the Pope's power in temporals doth depend. And thus you have seen, how weakly Card. Bellarmine, and disagreeably to his own principles, hath laboured to prove, that the temporal and spiritual power among Christians do make one total body, or common wealth, whereof the Pope is head: now you shall see, how weakly also, and not conformably to his own doctrine, he endeavoureth to prove, that the temporal power among Christians is subject and subordained to the spiritual. Chap. 4. Wherein the true state of the question, concerning the subjection and subordination of the temporal power among Christians to the spiritual is propounded, and the different opinions of Catholics touching this point are rehearsed. 1. FIrst therefore, that you may perceive the true state of the question, and wherein I do agree with Card: Bellarmine, and wherein we differ, I do agree with him in this, that Christian Princes, in whom the supreme temporal power doth reside, being the sheep of Christ, no less than inferior persons, are subject to the supreme visible Pastor of the Church of Christ: but the question is, in what things, and also in what manner they are subject. Secondly, we also agree in this, that Christian Princes are in spiritual things, or which do belong to Christian faith and Religion, subject not only to the directive, or commanding power, but also in spiritual punishments to the coercive or punishing power of spiritual Pastors, in such sort, that Christian Princes are not only bound to obey the command of their spiritual Pastors, in things which do concern Christian faith and religion, but also, if they be disobedient, they may with spiritual punishments he punished and compelled thereunto. Thirdly, we do also agree in this, that Christian Princes are bound to obey the commanding power of spiritual Pastors, not only in those things, which of their own nature are Ecclesiastical or spiritual, but also in things temporal, when by accident they become spiritual; in so much that a spiritual Pastor hath authority to command a temporal Prince to use or not use his temporal power, when it is necessary or hurtful to Catholic faith and religion, but this is nothing else, than that temporal Princes in things spiritual (for whether they be per se, and of their own nature, or only by accident spiritual, it little importeth) are subject to the commanding power of spiritual Pastors, as likewise all temporal causes and crimes, whether of their own nature, or only by accident they become temporal, are subject to the commanding and coercive power of temporal Princes. 2 But the controversy betwixt me and Card: Bellarmine is concerning two things; the first is, concerning the commanding power, to wit, whether temporal Princes are subject to the commanding power of spiritual Pastors, not only in things spiritual, and in temporal, when they become spiritual, but also in mere temporal things; for this is properly temporal power (taking temporal power in abstracto) to be subject to the spiritual For as a Musician can not truly be said to be subject, as he is a Musician, and in all things belonging to Music, to a Physician as he is a Physician, for that Music is not per se, and of it own nature referred to Physic, and if Music were per se, and of it own nature subject to Physic, a Musician, as he is a Musician, and in all things belonging to Music, should be subject to a Physician, as he is a Physician: for which cause a Shipwright, as he is a Shipwright, hath intrinsical reference to a Navigator, for that the Art of making ships is per se, and of it own nature ordained for navigation; So also if the temporal power among Christians be per se, and of it own nature subject to the spiritual power, it must follow, that temporal Princes, who are Christians, are, as they are temporal Princes, and in all things belonging to temporal power, subject to spiritual Pastors, as they are spiritual Pastors: And if temporal Princes, who be Christians, are not subject, as they are temporal Princes, to spiritual Pastors, as they are spiritual Pastors, the temporal power among Christians is not per se, and of it own nature subject to the spiritual power. 3 The second thing, which is in controversy betwixt me, and Card. Bellarmine, is concerning the coercive power of spiritual Pastors, to wit, whether temporal Princes are subject to the coercive power of spiritual Pastors in such sort, that spiritual Pastors, (especially the Pope, who is the supreme Pastor of all Christians) have by the institution of Christ authority, to deprive temporal Princes of their Kingdoms, to dispose of all their temporals, and to punish them temporally, or with all kind of temporal punishments, in case they will not obey their just command. And this is the main point, and principal scope, at which both the Canonists, who hold that the Pope hath directly power in temporals in habit, although the use they have committed to temporal Princes, and also the Divines, who hold that he hath only indirectly, that is, in order to spiritual good, power in temporals, do chief aim. Now concerning these two points, there be three different opinions of Catholics. 4 The first opinion is of the Canonists, who holding, that the Church of Christ, whereof the Pope is the supreme visible head, doth consist both of temporal and spiritual power, do consequently hold, that all Christian Princes, not only as they are Christians, but also as they are temporal Princes, are in all temporal causes subject to the commanding power, and in all temporal punishments subject also to the coercive power of the Pope, whom they make the supreme, both temporal and spiritual Monarch of the world, and to have directly both temporal and spiritual power, although the use, exercise, and execution of his temporal power, he hath out of the territories of the Church, committed to Secular Princes, as to his Viceroys, Vicegerents, or Deputies: and this doctrine some Lawyers held to be so certain, that they were not afraid to condemn the contrary as heretical, for which they are worthily taxed by Coverruvias d In Regula, peccatum. 2. part. Relect. §. 9 num. 7. of great temerity; But with this opinion, for that it is commonly rejected by all Divines, and confuted also by Card: Bellarmine himself e Lib. 5. de Rom. Pont. a cap. 2. , I will not at this time intermeddle. 5 The second opinion is of many Schoole-divines especially of these later times, who although they seem greatly to mislike the Canonists opinion, in that the Canonists hold the Pope, as Pope, to have directly, not only spiritual, but also temporal power, and to be both a temporal Monarch, and also a spiritual Prince and Pastor of the whole Christian world, yet in effect they do give as full and ample authority to the Pope over Christian Princes, as the Canonists do; for whatsoever the Canonists affirm, that the Pope can directly effect by his temporal power, the same do the Divines affirm, that he can effect indirectly, and in order to spiritual good by his spiritual power: And therefore, although they will not grant, that the Pope hath formally temporal power, but only spiritual, yet they grant, that this spiritual power of the Pope is virtually, and in effect temporal; and that therefore the Pope by his spiritual power can in order to spiritual good deprive temporal Princes of their kingdoms, dispose of all their temporals, punish them with all kind of temporal punishments, and finally whatsoever temporal Princes can by their temporal power do for the temporal good, they affirm that the Pope by his spiritual power can do for the spiritual good. Yea some of them do so extend this spiritual good and spiritual harm, taking spiritual harm, not only for spiritual crimes, as heresy, Apostasy, and such like, but also for all temporal crimes, as are drunkenness, fornication, and the like, that they give a more ample power to the Pope, to deprive Princes of their kingdoms, then by temporal laws is usually granted to temporal Princes to deprive their subjects of their lands, who for whoredom, drunkenness, and many other temporal crimes, can not usually by the laws of any Christian kingdom be deprived of their lands and possessions. 6. The third opinion is of many other learned Catholics both Divines and Lawyers whom I cited before, f Part. 1. per totum. who although they agree with the second opinion in this, that the Pope hath power to command temporal Princes in spirituals, but not in mere temporals, and to punish them with spiritual punishments, when they refuse to obey his just command, yet that the Pope hath any coercive power (call it spiritual or temporal, for in effect it is truly temporal) to inflict temporal punishments, to dispose of temporals for the spiritual good, or to deprive temporal Princes of their temporal dominions, they utterly deny, affirming, that only Excommunication, or some such like spiritual punishment, is the last, to which the Popes coercive power can extend: And this their doctrine, which Card. Bellarmine, and some few others of his Society, have presumed to condemn as altogether improbable, yea and wholly repugnant to Catholic faith, I have taken upon me to maintain, as neither repugnant to Catholic faith or religion, nor prejudicial to eternal salvation, and that therefore it may be defended by any Catholic without any note of heresy, error or temerity. 7. These be the different opinions of Catholics concerning the subjection of the temporal power to the spiritual, whereby you see, that although all Catholics do grant, that temporal Princes, who are sometimes called temporal powers, are subject to the spiritual Pastor in things spiritual, and in temporal when they become spiritual, yet all do not grant, that the temporal power itself, even among Christians, is per se, and of it own nature subject to the spiritual, nor that the Pope, as Pope, hath any coercive power to constrain and punish with temporal punishments, but only with spiritual; Neither doth it follow, that because Christian Princes are subject to the Pope, therefore they are subject in all things, and in all manner of subjection, but only in that sort, as Christ hath given him power both to command & punish: As children are subject to their Parents, servants to their Masters, wives to their husbands, yet they are not bound to obey them, but in those things, wherein they have power to command, nor to be punished by them, but in that sort, as the temporal commonwealth, whereof they are members, hath expressly or covertly given them leave to punish; and the reason is, for that they are not Superiors in an absolute and indefinite, but only in a limited and determinate manner. 8. Now what opinion Card. Bellarmine doth follow, whether of the Divines, or of the Canonists, truly I cannot as yet well understand. For although he seem to disallow the Canonists doctrine, which at large he confuteth in his controversies, yet to prove the Pope's power to depose Princes, and to dispose of temporals in order to spiritual good, he layeth such grounds, concerning the union and subordination of the temporal and spiritual power among Christians, which do clearly confirm the Canonists doctrine. For concerning the union of these two powers, he affirmeth, as you have seen, that the temporal and spiritual power, the kingdom of Christ, and the kingdoms of this world, when they are Christian, do make one total body, which is the Christian commonwealth and Church of Christ, whereof the Pope is head; from whence it necessarily followeth, that the Pope, in whom all the power of the Church doth reside, must have truly, properly and formally both civil and spiritual power, which is the Canonists opinion, and not only spiritual power, which is not formally, but only virtually civil, which the Divines, and also Card. Bellarmine in places do affirm. And now concerning the subjection and subordination of these two powers, he affirmeth, that the temporal power among Christians, not only as it is Christian, but also as it is temporal, is subject to the Ecclesiastical, as it is Ecclesiastical, or which is all one, that the temporal power itself among Christians is per se, and of it own nature subject to the spiritual: from whence it clearly followeth as before I showed by the examples of Music and Physic, Christian Princes not only in spirituals and in temporals, when they become spirituals, which is in order to spiritual good, but also in mere temporal causes, are subject to spiritual Pastors, which is the Canonists opinion, and which Card. Bellarmine in other places doth disprove. 9 But how unsoundly Card. Bellarmine, and not conformably to his own grounds laboureth to prove, that the temporal power itself among Christians, as it is temporal, is subject to the spiritual, as it is spiritual, you shall anon perceive. For six principal arguments I do find in Card. Bellarmine, by which he endeavoureth to convince, that the temporal power itself among Christians, as it is temporal, is subject and subordained to the spiritual, as it is spiritual, or, which I take for all one, that the temporal power among Christians is per se, and of it own nature, supposing the institution of Christ, subject and subordained to the spiritual; which arguments of Card. Bellarmine I think it fit to examine in this place, together with the Replies, which he either in his book against D. Barclay, or in his Schulckenius against me hath brought to confirm the same, that thereby the Reader may fully understand, in what manner the temporal power is subject to the spiritual, and how strong or weak a proof is the subjection or subordination of these two powers, which is by Mr. Fitzherbert supposed to be so invincible a ground, to conclude from thence, that the Pope, as Pope, hath power, in order to spiritual good, to dispose of all temporals, to depose temporal Princes, and to punish by way of coercion with all kind of temporal punishments. Chap. 5. Wherein is examined Card. Bellarmine's first argument taken from the ends of the temporal and spiritual power. 1. THe first argument, which Card. Bellarmine affirmeth a Lib. 5. de Rom Pont. c. 7. to demonstrate, that the temporal power among Christians, not only as it is Christian, but also as it is civil, or temporal, is subject to the Ecclesiastical, as it is Ecclesiastical, is taken from the ends of both the powers. For a temporal end, saith he, is subordained to a spiritual end, as it is manifest, because temporal felicity is not absolutely the last end, and therefore it ought to be referred to eternal felicity: but it is apparent out of Aristotle, 1 Ethic. cap. 1. that faculties, or powers are so subordained, as their ends are subordained. 2. To this argument I answered in my Apology b Num. 162. & seq. , that not every temporal end is per se, and of it own nature ordained, or subordained to a spiritual end (speaking of create ends, and not of God almighty, who is the beginning and end of all things) but it is only by accident, or accidentally by man, who worketh for an end, ordained to a spiritual end. And therefore although temporal good, or felicity be not absolutely the last end of man, yet it is the last end of the temporal power itself, which is in man. For every power, as it is a power, hath for her last end, her act or work, as every science hath of it own nature for her last end the knowledge of her object, and every art the effecting of her work, (as the last end of natural philosophy is to know the secrets of nature, and of Physic to cure and preserve the body from diseases) although man himself, in whom that power, art, or science doth reside, doth intend a farther end. Whereupon S. Austin doth well affirm, that the will to see hath no other end then seeing: The will, saith he, c Lib. 11. de Trin. cap. 6. to see hath seeing for her end, and the will to see this thing hath for her end the seeing of this thing: The will therefore to see a scar doth desire her end, that is, the seeing of a scar, and no further doth appertain to her. Wherefore, as the Philosophers do distinguish betwixt the last end of any art or work, and the last end of the artificer, or worker, so we also ought to distinguish betwixt the last end of the power itself, and of him, in whom the power doth reside. It is called the last end of the work, for that the work is in that lastly ended, and not the last end of the worker, for that the worker doth not refer all that is his to that end, as a thing to be desired and loved above all things. 3. I grant therefore that the end of a Christian Prince, who hath temporal power, is spiritual and eternal felicity, to which Christians ought to refer all their actions, and the use not only of the Ecclesiastical, but also of the civil power, but withal I affirm, that the last end, which the civil power hath per se, and of it own nature, is only temporal peace and quietness, in the getting and conserving whereof of it own nature it doth lastly rest. And therefore for this reason it is not necessary, that the civil power itself be per se, and of it own nature subordained to the Ecclesiastical, but only accidentally and by the intention of him, who referreth temporal peace to eternal felicity in that manner as I have declared. To that assertion of Aristotle, powers are so subordained as their ends are subordained (although in that place he rather saith, that ●●ds are subordained, as powers are subordained) I answered, that it is to be understood of those ends, which powers have of their own nature, and not of the ends of the men, in whom the powers do reside. Thus I answered in my Apology. 4. Now you shall see how insufficiently Card. Bellarmine in his Schulckenius replieth to this answer. I answer saith he, d Pag. 329. ad num. 162. that not every temporal or corporal end is subordained per se, and of it own nature to a spiritual end, my Adversary Widdrington doth say, but he doth not prove. But first, who knoweth not, that it doth not appertain to the Answerer to prove, for to this the opponent only is tied, and for the Answearer it sufficeth by granting, denying, or distinguishing for him to answer. 5. Secondly, I did not conceive, that this assertion, being so clear and manifest of itself, needed any proof at all, and therefore I little thought, that any learned man would ever deny the same: for that, according to the known principles of Philosophy and Divinity, no natural thing can intrinsically, and of it own nature be referred to a thing, which is supernatural and above the course of nature; and therefore betwixt natural and supernatural things, there can be no natural subordination. Now that temporal peace in a temporal commonwealth is a natural thing, and eternal felicity, which consisteth in the clear vision and fruition of almighty God, is supernatural, and goeth beyond the bounds, limits, and order of nature, no man can make any doubt; and therefore temporal peace cannot of it own nature be referred to eternal felicity; but only by the will and intention of man, who by the help of supernatural light and grace doth refer it, direct it, and elevate it to that supernatural end. 6. And for this cause also it is very clear, that temporal power cannot of it own nature be referred to true spiritual and Ecclesiastical power, for that it is supernatural, and given only by God, as he is the Author, not of nature, but of supernatural grace. Yea out of Card. Bellarmine's own grounds it may be clearly convinced, that the temporal power among Christians is not of it own nature subject, and subordained to the spiritual power, and consequently, that temporal peace, which is the end of temporal power, is not of it own nature referred or ordained to eternal felicity, which is the last create end of the spiritual power, for that according to Aristotle e Lib. 1. Ethic. cap. 1. , ends are so subordained, as their powers are subordained. His first ground is, for that in his Controversies he affirmeth f Lib. 5. de Rom. Pont. cap. 6. , that in Infidels there is true civil power without any order, or relation to any true spiritual, or Ecclesiastical power, and consequently in Infidels the civil power is not subject or subordained to the spiritual, for where there is no order, or relation, there can be no subjection, or subordination, for that subjection and subordidation doth necessarily imply an order, relation, or reference to that, to which any thing is subordained. 7. Seeing therefore that Christian Religion doth not take away true civil power, as Card. Bellarmine himself also in another place affirmeth g Lib. 2. de Rom. Pont. cap. 29. , neither is the true nature, or any intrinsical property of the civil power changed or altered, for that it is in a Christian, or an Infidel, in this subject, or in that, it necessarily followeth, that if true civil power be not of it own nature subject, or subordained in Infidels to true spiritual, or Ecclesiastical power, it is not also in Christians per se, and of it own nature subject or subordained to true spiritual or Ecclesiastical power. This only alteration hath civil power for being in this subject, or in that, in Infidels, or in Christians, that Christians ought, according to the true grounds of Christian Religion, refer it by the aid of true supernatural faith to a true supernatural end, to which Infidels, who want true supernatural faith, cannot refer it: but this alteration is extrinsical or accidental, not intrinsical or essential, neither doth it proceed from the nature of the civil power itself, but from the will & intention of him, in whom true civil power doth reside. As likewise the nature or intrinsical properties of other accidents, as of Music, Physic, and such like, are not altered, or changed by the changing or altering of their subjects, & for that they are in Christians, or in Infidels, although a Christian Musician will refer & ordain his Music to the true worship of God, & an Infidel to the honour of his Idol. 8. The second ground, which Card. Bellarmine layeth to prove, that the temporal power among Christians is not per se, and of it own nature subject to the spiritual power, is, for that in his Schulckenius he affirmeth h Pag. 276. ad nu. 140. , That among the Heathen Romans, the civil power was subject to the spiritual power of a false religion: and a little beneath, if the civil power, saith he, be joined with a false Ecclesiastical power, that is of a false Religion, as it was in the Heathen Roman Commonwealth, than it is actually subordained to a false Ecclesiastical power, and if it be joined with a true Ecclesiastical power, as in the Christian and Catholic Church, than it is actually subordained to a true Ecclesiastical power. Now what Philosopher, or Divine will affirm that a true civil power is per se, and of it own nature actually ordained, subordained, or referred to a false Ecclesiastical power, that is of a false Religion, or to the worshipping of false Gods. Therefore this subjection, subordination, or relation of true civil power to the spiritual, proceedeth from the intention of him, in whom the civil power doth reside, who according to his faith and religion (be it true or false) referreth his true civil power to a true or false Religion, to a true or false worshipping of God, and not from the nature, or any intrinsical property of the true civil power itself which, as it is the same in Infidels and Christians, or in whatsoever subject it be so also of it own nature hath the same end as well in Infidels as in Christians, to wit, temporal peace, to which of it own nature it is always referred. And therefore I do not only say: but also I do clearly prove, and that out of Card. Bellarmine's own grounds, to which nevertheless I being only an answerer, and not an opponent, was not tied, that neither the civil power, being only a natural power, nor the end of civil power, which is temporal peace, being only a natural end, is per se, and of it own nature subject, or subordained to a true supernatural power or end, but only by the intention of him, in whom the civil power doth reside. 9 Now you shall see how well D. Schulckenius proveth the contrary. But we prove the contrary, saith he, i Pag. 329. ad nu. 162. because the end of the spiritual commonwealth is everlasting salvation, which is the last end; the end of the temporal commonwealth is the peace of the City, or Kingdom, which is not the last end, but a mediate end. But all ends are subordained per se, and of their own nature to the last end, and in virtue of it they do move, as all efficient causes are subordained per se, and of their own nature to the first efficient cause, and in virtue of it they work whatsoever they do work. See S. Thomas 1●. 2●. q. 1. ar. 6. 10. But to this argument I answered before, that the last create end of the spiritual commonwealth, which is a company of men united by Baptism, in that manner as I declared before, is eternal salvation, to which they ought to refer all their powers both temporal and spiritual, and all their actions both in general and particular: but I denied, that the last end of the temporal power itself, although it be conjoined in one & the self same subject with true spiritual power, is eternal salvation, but only temporal peace in the commonwealth, to which of it own nature it is only referred, as to her last end, although by the intention of him, in whom true civil and spiritual power doth reside, it ought to be referred to eternal salvation, as to the last end of a Christian man, but not as to the last end, which the temporal power itself hath per se, and of it own nature. Neither hath D. Schulckenius proved the contrary, but rather in his Reply to my answer he in express words confirmeth what I have said. For in his answer to the authority, which I brought out of S. Augustine, he affirmeth, That the last end of one particular will, power, or science is their act or operation, and therefore it cannot of it own nature be referred to eternal salvation, as to the last end, unless D. Schulckenius will admit, that the same particular power hath of it own nature two last ends, or a later end than the last, which implieth a manifest contradiction; but it must only be referred extrinsically to eternal salvation by the intention of him, in whom the particular power doth reside. 11 True it is, That all create ends are subordained per se, and of their nature to that end, which is simply and absolutely the last end, and do move in virtue thereof, as all efficient causes are subordained per se, and of their own nature to that, which is simply and absolutely the first efficient cause, and in virtue thereof they do work whatsoever they do work: But this efficient and final cause of all created things is not the eternal salvation of men, but God a mighty, who is Alpha & Omega, principium & finis, the beginning and end of all created things, both natural and supernatural, both unreasonable and reasonable, of accidents and substances, of all powers and of all things wherein powers do reside, and who is glorified not only by the eternal salvation, but also by the eternal damnation of men. God alone is simply and absolutely the last end of all created things, to whom all natural things are of their own nature lastly referred, as to the first Author and last end of nature, and supernatural things, as to the first Author and last end of grace and glory: Neither can natural things of their own nature be referred to any supernatural create end, as is eternal salvation, but only by the will and intention of him: who by the help of supernatural grace shall refer and elevate them above their nature to a supernatural end. Neither doth S. Thomas in that place affirm the contrary, but rather most clearly confirmeth, what I have said: for there he only disputeth, how every man by his will, intention, and desire, referreth all good things, which he desireth to the last end. 12. Mark now, I beseech you, D. Schulckenius his second proof, which is no whit better than the former. Moreover is not the body, saith he k Pag. 330. , per se, or of it own nature for the soul? why then are not corporal things, per se, or of their own nature for spiritual things? And whereas my Adversary Widdrington seemeth to say, that every temporal end is per accidens, or accidentally referred to a spiritual end: as by man, who worketh for an end, it is ordained to a spiritual end, it is altogether false. For oftentimes wicked men do ordain spiritual things to temporal, of whom the Apostle saith, whose God is their belly: and by this a temporal end is per se, and of it own nature always ordained to a spiritual end, but by accident and against nature by the wickedness of human intention sometimes a spiritual end is ordained to a temporal. 13. The reason why the body is per se, and of it own nature for the soul or spirit, and yet the temporal power, or the end thereof, is not per se, and of it own nature referred to the spiritual power, or the end thereof, I did declare in my Apology l Num: 140. , which D. Schulckenius also did relate a little before, m Pag. 275. because the body and soul do compound one substantial thing consisting of two essential parts, whereof the body is the matter, as the Philosophers do call it, and the soul the form; and this is the reason, why the body is per se, and of it own nature, for the soul and subject are subordained to it; for that all Philosophers do grant, that every matter is per se, and of it own nature for the substantial form, wherewith it maketh one essential compound; but the temporal and spiritual powers do not make one total body or commonwealth, whereof the temporal power is instead of the matter, and the spiritual instead of the form. And therefore D. Schulckenius had small reason to make that interrogation, seeing that he himself did a little before set down this my reason, which doth fully satisfy the aforesaid demand. 14 Neither did I say, as D. Schulckenius here affirmeth me to say, although a little before, as you have seen n Num. 4. , he related my words otherwise, that every temporal end is per accidens, or accidentally referred to a spiritual end, but I only affirmed, that not every temporal end, and in particular temporal peace among Christians, which is the last end of the civil power itself, is not per se, and of it own nature ordained to eternal salvation, which is the last end of the spiritual power, but only per accidens, or accidentally, as by the will and intention of a Christian man, it is ordained to eternal salvation, which is a supernatural end, and therefore not proportionate to the nature of any civil or natural power. And although I had said, that every temporal end is per accidens referred to a spiritual end, yet D: Schulckenius could not but perceive by the whole scope of my words, that my meaning was to say, that every temporal end, which is referred to a spiritual end, is not per se, and of it own nature referred to that spiritual end, but per accidens, and extrinsically by the will and intention of man, who referreth it to that spiritual end, for no man can be so ignorant as to imagine, that Christians do always refer and ordain all temporal ends to the eternal salvation of their souls. 15 True it is, that all natural things belonging to man are of such a nature, as that by the intention of man they may be ordained to good or bad ends, and temporal peace, which is a natural end, may by the will of man, being aided with supernatural grace, be referred and elevated to eternal felicity, which is a supernatural end; and this is agreeable to reason, and to the nature of man, as he is a reasonable creature, or led by reason, to ordain, refer, and elevate all natural things, which are in his power, when by the help of grace he is able so to do, to true supernatural ends, and to eternal felicity, for which he was created, and to do otherwise were against reason, and against the nature of man, as he is endued with reason: But that natural powers, or ends, should be per se, and of their own nature actually referred, and elevated to supernatural powers or ends, much less supernatural powers or ends, should be referred and depressed to natural powers or vicious ends, but only by the good or wicked intention of a man, in whose power it is to ordain a good thing to a bad end, a natural power to a supernatural, and contrariwise, this truly I think no man of any learning can conceive, and before I have clearly proved, that it is altogether false. 16 Lastly, to those words, which I alleged out of S. Austin, and to the rest which follow in my Answer, D. Shulckenius replieth in this manner: I answer first, saith he o Pag. 332. , It is true, that the last end of one particular will, power, or science is their act, but it is not true, that the last end of one particular will, power, or science is not referred per se and of their own nature to that end, which is simply the last end, but only by accident by the intention of him, who hath that will, power, or science. And this not only S. Thomas in the place cited doth teach, but also S. Austin in the place alleged by Widdrington, to wit, lib. 11. de Trinit. cap. 6. All these, saith S. Austin, and such like wills have first their ends, which are referred to the end of that will, whereby we are willing to live happily. Thus S. Austin, who, when he subjoineth, the will therefore to see a scar doth desire her end, to wit, the seeing of a scar, and farther doth not appertain to her, he signifieth indeed, that the seeing of a scar is the last end of the will to see a scar, but he doth not deny, that the seeing of a scar is per se, and of it own nature referred to a higher end of a higher will, and that to an other, until we come to that end, which is simply the last end. For all good ends are of their own nature referred to that end, which is simply the last end, and as ends are of their own nature subordained one to an other, so also it is necessary, that wills, powers, or sciences be subordained. As for example, (to persist in S. Augustine's example) a man hath many wills, one to see a scar, an other, by seeing the scar to find the wound; the third, by finding the wound, to convince and correct him, who did inflict the wound; the fourth, by correcting him to heal the wound of his soul; the fift, by this act of charity to merit life everlasting; it is certain, that every one of these wills have their proper end, neither any thing farther doth appertain to them, but it is also certain, that the end of the first will is referred to the end of the second will, and the first will itself subordained to the second, and so in order. Thus D. Schulckenius. 17 But truly in my opinion D. Schulckenius doth in this Reply both plainly contradict himself, and also clearly confirm my Answer. And first no man can make any doubt, but that all wills, powers, sciences, ends, and things whatsoever are per se, and of their own nature referred to that, which is simply the last end; but that, which is simply the last end of all things, is not the eternal felicity of any creature, but God almighty, who alone is simply the efficient and final cause of all things, and made all things, both heaven and hell, for himself, Proverb. 16. and who is glorified not only in the eternal salvation, but also in the eternal damnation both of Men and Angels: And this D. Schulckenius can not deny, and he might have seen the same confirmed by S. Thomas in the same question cited by him ar. 8. but more expressly 1a, part. q. 44. ar. 4. where he proveth, that because God almighty is the first efficient cause of all things, he must of necessity be also the last end of all things: and by S. Austin also in infinite places. 18. Secondly, whereas D. Schulckenius affirmeth, that the last end of one particular will, power, or science is their act, and withal, that this last end is per se, and of it own nature referred to a further create end, (whereof only he speaketh) and consequently that particular will or power must also be referred to that farther end, and so it must be referred to a farther end than to the last, he clearly contradicteth himself. For how can any act be per se, and of it own nature be the last end of one particular will, power or science, and yet this last end be per se, and of it own nature referred to a farther end, seeing that according to the approved grounds of philosophy, which kind of arguing the Logicians call Sorites, or à primo ad ultimum, an argument from the first to the last, every particular will, power or science, which is per se, and of it own nature referred to any particular end, is also referred to all those ends, to which that particular end is per se, and of it own nature referred? As for example, if any particular will be per se, and of it own nature referred to the seeing of a scar, and the seeing of a scar be per se, and of it own nature referred to the finding out of the wound, and the finding out of the wound be per se, and of it own nature referred to the correcting of him who did inflict the wound etc. then à primo ad ultimum, from the first to the last, the will to see a scar must per se, and and of it own nature be referred to the correcting of him, who did inflict the wound etc. Wherefore if the seeing of a scar be the last end of the will to see a scar, as D. Schulckenius here affirmeth, it cannot per se, and of it own nature be referred to a farther end, unless he will grant, that the same will shall have per se a farther end, than the last, which is a flat contradiction; but if it be referred to a farther end, it is only by accident, and extrinsically by the intention of the seer, who referreth the seeing of a scar to a farther end, than it hath of it own nature. Neither doth S. Thomas, or S. Austin affirm the contrary, but confirm what I have said. 19 For although S. Austin doth affirm, that all these & such like wills have their proper ends, which are referred to the end of that will, whereby we desire to live happily, and to come to that life, which is not referred to any other thing, but it doth of itself satisfy the Lover, yet he doth not say, that these proper ends, are per se, and of their own nature referred to everlasting happiness, but he doth rather in express words say, that they are by some particular will, or intention of man referred to everlasting happiness. And therefore he concludeth, that all wills are well connected together, if that will be good, whereunto all the rest be referred, but if that be bad, all the other wills are bad. So that S. Austin cannot be so understood, that all those wills are per se, and of their own nature referred to a good, or to a bad will, for that a will, which of it own nature is good can not of it own nature be referred to a bad will, or to a bad end. And therefore when S. Austin saith, that the will to see a scar hath for her proper end the seeing of a scar, and no farther appertaineth to her, he understandeth of the last end, which the will to see a scar hath per se, and of it own nature, and when he saith, that it may be referred to a farther end, good or bad, he understandeth of a farther end, not which it hath of it own nature, but which it hath by some other will or intention, which may be good or bad, according as it referreth all the other wills to a good or bad end. 20. Moreover those examples, which D. Schulckenius bringeth in the end of his Reply, do most clearly confirm my answer, and confute his own Reply. For if a man have many wills, one to see a scar, another by seeing the scar to prove the wound, the third by proving the wound to correct him who inflicted the wound and so forth, it is certain, that the seeing of the scar is not per se, and of it own nature referred and ordained to prove the wound, and to correct him, who did inflict the wound, but only by the will and intention of the seer, who referreth it to those ends, in whose choice it is to refer the seeing of a scar to other ends: neither is their any natural or necessary connexion betwixt the seeing of the scar, the proving of the wound, and the correcting of him, who did inflict it: for that a scar may be seen for many other ends, and not at all for those. Besides, it is repugnant to the course of nature, that the seeing of a scar, which is a natural thing, should be per se, and of it own nature referred & ordained to the everlasting happiness of man, which is a thing above nature, and beyond the course of natural things, and therefore it is only by accident, and extrinsically by the intention and will of man referred and ordained to that supernatural end. And thus you see, that I have not only clearly answered to this first argument of Card. Bellarmine, which had been sufficient for me, who took upon me only to answer, and not to prove, but also have clearly proved, that although eternal felicity, be the last create end of man, yet temporal peace, and not eternal felicity is the last create end, to which temporal power even among Christians is per se, and of it own nature referred. 21. Nevertheless, I will go a little farther with Card. Bellarmine, and grant him for Disputation sake, which hitherto he hath not in my judgement so much as probably proved, that thereby the weakness also of this his first pretended demonstration may the more easily appear; to wit, that not only the Ecclesiastical, but also the civil power among Christians is per se; and of it own nature, and not only by the will and intention of Christian men referred to the true eternal salvation of man, as to the last end not only of man, but of the civil power itself, yet it can not therefore from hence by any necessary consequence be inferred, that the civil power among Christians is per se; and of it own nature subject and subordained to the spiritual power, or that the end of the civil power is subordained to the end of the spiritual power, but at the most, that both of them have one & the self same last end, to wit, the eternal felicity of man, to which the spiritual power leadeth Christian men by spiritual means, to wit, by spiritual directions, laws, and punishments, and the civil power by civil means, directions, laws, and punishments: And therefore there is no subordination of ends, betwixt the ends of the spiritual and temporal power, and consequently no subordination of powers, but they have both one last end, to wit, everlasting happiness, although diverse ways, or means to attain thereunto, not much unlike diverse lines in a circle, which do end all in one centre, and yet one line is not subordained to another, although all of them ●e tend by diverse ways to the same centre. And therefore by this first argument Card. Bellarmine hath not sufficiently proved, that the civil power among Christians is per se, and of it own nature subordained to the spiritual, or the proper end of the civil power, which is her act tending to temporal peace, subordained to the proper end of the spiritual power, which is also her act tending lastly to everlasting happiness; although I should grant him, that both of them have per se, and of their own nature one and the self same last end, which is the eternal salvation of man, in whom those powers do reside. And therefore D. Schulckenius perceiving belike the sufficiency of my answer, and the weakness of his own Reply, flieth to a second Reply, which nevertheless is as insufficient as the former. 22. But although we should grant, saith he p Pag. 333. , to Widdrington, that the end of the civil power is not referred per se, and of it own nature to the end of the spiritual, but only by the intention of the Prince, in whom the civil power doth reside, yet the argument which Card. Bellarmine brought from the subjection of the temporal power to the spiritual, to prove that the spiritual Prince could not only command temporal Princes, but also dispose of temporals in order to spiritual good, would be most strong and good. For a Christian temporal Prince ought to refer the public peace, which is the end of civil power, to the eternal peace and felicity of himself and of his people, which is the end of the spiritual power. And therefore he ought to subject and subordaine the end of his power to the end of the power of the spiritual Prince. But as he ought to subject and subordaine end to end, so also power to power. Wherefore he ought not to take it in ill part, if he be truly a Christian Prince, that the Pope by his spiritual power direct, and correct the civil power, and that so the sword be under the sword, and in the Christian common wealth there be order, peace, and quietness, whiles Superiors do rule inferiors, and inferiors be subject to Superiors. 23. But in this Reply there lie hidden some cunning equivocations, and the most that it proveth, as oftentimes heretofore I have signified, is, that the temporal power or sword, or rather temporal Princes who have temporal power, and bear the temporal sword, are in spiritual causes) whether of their own nature, or by some accidental circumstance they become spiritual) to the spiritual or Ecclesiastical power, by which they are to be directed & corrected, not in mere temporals, but only in spirituals, not by temporal laws, or with temporal punishments, which do belong only to the temporal power, but only by Ecclesiastical laws or directions, and with Ecclesiastical or spiritual punishments or corrections, which only do appertain to the Ecclesiastical or spiritual power. 24. True it is, that eternal salvation is the last create end not only of the spiritual, but also of the temporal power among Christians, seeing that all Christian Princes are bound by the law of Christ to refer their temporal power, and the use thereof, not only to temporal peace in the common weath, which is the last end, which temporal power hath per se, and of it own nature, but also to the eternal peace and felicity of themselves, and of their people; And therefore there is here no subordination of ends betwixt the temporal power and the spiritual, and consequently in this respect no subordination of powers, as D. Schulckenius doth here from thence infer, but aswell the civil power among Christians, as the spiritual, have one and the self same last end (whether it be intrinsical to one power, and extrinsical to the other, or intrinsical to both as I declared before) to which the temporal power by temporal laws, directions, and corrections, and the spiritual power by spiritual laws, directions, and corrections or punishments are by the law of Christ bound to direct, and lead all Christians. 25. Whereupon S. Thomas, or whosoever be the Author of that book de Regimine Principum doth well affirm, q Lib. 1 c. 14. that the end which a King ought principally to intend in himself, and in his subjects, is eternal happiness, which doth consist in the seeing of God, and because this seeing of God is the most perfect good of all, it ought to move exceedingly a King and every Lord, that their subjects may attain to this end. Therefore, when Kings, saith S. Austin, r Tom. 2. epist. 50. in the time of the Apostles did not serve our Lord, than impieties could not be forbidden by laws, but rather exercised. But afterwards, when that began to be fulfilled which is written, s Psal. 71. And all the Kings of the earth shall adore him, all nations shall serve him, What sober minded man can say to Kings, Do not you regard by whom the Church of your Lord is defended or impugned in your kingdom, that it doth not appertain to you, who will be religious or sacrilegious in your kingdom, to whom it can not be said, that it doth not appertain to you, who will be chaste, or wanton in your kingdom. 27. Wherefore if a Christian Prince should by his laws, or otherwise, withdraw his subjects from the attaining to eternal salvation, should impugn not defend the Church, command not forbid impieties, he should greatly offend God and the Church, and ought not to take it in ill part, that he should be therefore corrected by the chief Pastor of the Church, to whom he is subject in spirituals, with Ecclesiastical and spiritual punishments, which only do belong to the spiritual power. But if the Pastor of the Church should take upon him to correct such a Prince by way of coercion and constraint with temporal punishments, which kind of correction doth pass the limits of his spiritual power, than the Prince may justly take it in ill part, for this were to usurp temporal jurisdiction, which is proper only to a temporal Prince, and not to observe due order, but to make a confusion betwixt sword and sword, betwixt the spiritual and temporal power, which temporal power is only in spiritual corrections, and not in temporal punishments subject to the constraint of the temporal power. 28 And therefore well said our most learned Countryman Alexander of Hales t 3. part. q. 40. memb. 5. q. 4. cited by me before, that the subjection of Kings and Emperors to the Pope is in spiritual not corporal punishment, according as it is said 2a. q. 7. that it belongeth to Kings to exercise corporal punishment, and to Priests to use spiritual correction. Whereupon S. Ambrose did excommunicate the Emperor Arcadius, and did forbid him to enter into the Church. For as an earthly judge not without cause beareth the sword, as it is said Rom: 13. so Priests do not without cause receive the keys of the Church; he beareth the sword to the punishment of malefactors and commendation of the good, these have keys to the excluding of excommunicated persons, and reconciling of them who are penitent. Expound therefore; A King is to be punished only by God, that is, with material punishment, and again, A King hath no man to judge his doings, that is, to inflict corporal punishment▪ and a little beneath, A King, saith Alexander, doth excel, 1. Pet: 2. true it is in his order, to wit, to inflict corporal punishment, with which punishment, if he offend, he hath none to punish him but only God▪ what can be spoken more plainly. 29 And by this you easily see the weakness of D. Schulckenius his argument, and how cunningly with general and ambiguous words he would delude his Reader. A temporal Prince, saith he, aught to refer public peace to the eternal peace and fol●estie of himself and of his people, which is the end of the spiritual power. And what then? And as he ought to subject temporal peace to eternal peace, so he ought to subject his temporal power to the spiritual power. But how, in what manner, in what causes, in what punishments temporal power ought to be subject to spiritual power D. Schulc. cunningly concealeth. Temporal power to be subject to spiritual, if we will speak properly, and in abstracto, doth signify, that a temporal Prince is in all temporal affairs subject to the spiritual power of spiritual Pastors. And if by those general words D. Schulckenius meaneth this, he falleth into the Canonists opinion, whose doctrine in this point learned Victoria u in Relect. 1. de potest. Eccles. num. 2. & 3. is not afraid to condemn as manifestly false, and who being poor themselves in learning and riches to flatter the Pope gave him this direct power and dominion in temporals. For the truth is, that temporal Princes in temporal affairs are not subject to any besides God alone, which is the received doctrine of the ancient Fathers. The sense therefore of that proposition must be, that temporal Princes are in spirituals, but not in temporals subject to the spiritual power of the Pope. But what then? wherefore he ought not to take it in ill part, if he be truly a Christian Prince, that the Pope by his spiritual power direct, and correct the civil power etc. Still you see he speaketh ambiguously, and in general words, the sense whereof if he had declared, you would presently have perceived the weakness of his argument: for if he mean, that therefore a temporal Prince ought to be directed in spirituals, and in things belonging to Christian Religion, and corrected with spiritual punishments by the Pope, this I easily grant him, and so he proveth nothing against me, but if he mean, that therefore a temporal Prince ought to be directed by the Pope in temporals, and corrected by him with temporal punishments, this consequence I utterly deny, for this were to confound all good order, and to usurp temporal jurisdiction, as I declared before. And thus much concerning Card: Bellarmine's first argument, my answer, and D. Schulckenius his Reply to the same. Chap. 6. Wherein is examined the second argugument taken from the union of Kings, and Bishops, Clerks and Laikes in one Church. 1. THe second argument, which Card: Bellarmine bringeth a Lib. 5. de Rom. Pont. cap. 7. to prove, that the civil power among Christians not only as it is Christian, but also as it is civil, is subject to the Ecclesiastical, as it is Ecclesiastical, is this: Kings and Bishops, Clerks and Laikes do not make two commonwealths but one, to wit, one Church. Rom: 12. & 1. Cor. 12. but in every body the members are connected, and one dependeth on the other, but it can not rightly be said, that spiritual things do depend upon temporal, therefore temporal things do depend upon spiritual, and are subject to them. 2 To the Mayor proposition of this argument I answered before b Cap. 2. , that Kings and Bishops, clerk and Laikes, being diverse ways considered, do make two total, and not only one total body or commonwealth. For as they are referred to the Ecclesiastical or spiritual power of the chief visible Pastor, to whom all Christians are subject in spirituals, they make one total body or commonwealth, to wit, the Catholic Church, which is the spiritual Kingdom and mystical body of Christ, but as they are referred to the civil power of temporal Princes, to whom all inferior Clerks and Laikes are subject in temporals, as all members are subject to the head, they make another body or commonwealth, to wit, earthly kingdoms, as before I declared more at large. And this is sufficient to show the weakness of this second argument, the Mayor proposition thereof being clearly false. 3. But to declare more fully the insufficiency thereof, and to show most plainly, that not only his Mayor proposition, as I have proved before, but also his Minor is apparently false, I answer secondly with D. Barclay to his Minor, that although in every body the members are united and connected either immediately, or mediately to the head, upon whom they all depend, yet that in every body all the members do depend one upon the other, there is no man so ignorant that will affirm: for neither one foot doth depend upon the other, nor one arm upon the other, nor one shoulder upon the other, but they are connected to some third either immediately by themselves, or to other members, to which they adhere. May it not, I pray you, by the same manner of arguing, and by the very same argument be concluded thus: The arms or every man are members of one body, but in every body the members are connected, and depending one upon the other, but it cannot rightly be said that the right arm doth depend upon the left, therefore the left arm of every man doth depend upon the right, and is subject unto it. Who would not scorn such foolish arguments? 4. To this answer Card. Bellarmine c In Tract. contra B●rcl. cap. 14. replieth in this manner. That which I said, that the members of the same body are connected, and that one doth depend upon another, I understood of members of a diverse kind, as is a finger, a hand, an arm, a shoulder and a head, and not of members of the same kind, as are two hands, two feet, two eyes, two ears. For the civil and Ecclesiastical power, whereof we speak, are of a diverse kind, as it is manifest, and words are to be understood according to the matter, which is treated of, otherwise there could not be any demonstration so certain, against which there could not be brought some cavil. Therefore Kingly power, which is principal in his kind, if it compound one body with the Ecclesiastical power, which also in his kind is principal, must of necessity be either subject, or superior, lest that in one body there be two heads; and seeing that it is manifest enough, that the Pope is head of the Church in steed of Christ, it doth plainly follow, that a King must either be no member of this body, or else he must be subject to the Pope, and in the same manner the civil power, which doth chiefly reside in the King, must either be subject to the spiritual, which doth chiefly reside in the Pope, or else it must remain out of the Church; in that manner as a finger cannot be in the body, which doth not depend upon the hand, nor a hand, which doth not depend upon the arm, nor an arm, which doth not depend upon the shoulder, nor a shoulder, which doth not depend upon the head. 5. But that, which Barclay saith a little after, that the spiritual and civil power are as two shoulders in a body, whereof neither is subject to the other, but both of them are subject to one head, which is Christ, is not only false, because those powers are not of the same kind; that they may be compared to two shoulders, but also it appertains to the heresy of this time. For what do the heretics of this time more endeavour to persuade the people, then that the Pope is not the visible head of the body of the Church, unto whom all Christians, if they will be saved, must be subject? But this Barclay of his own accord doth grant them, who nevertheless in all his book doth make himself a Catholic: Therefore the spiritual and civil power are not well compared to two shoulders, but they ought either to be compared to the spirit and flesh, as did S. Gregory Nazianzene in the place often cited compare them, or else to the shoulder and head, to wit, principal members, whereof nevertheless the one, although of itself very strong and potent, aught to be directed and governed by the other, which is superior. 6 But this Reply of Card: Bellarmine, although at the first sight may seem especially to the unlearned to have in it some show of probability, yet to the judicious Reader, who will be pleased to examine it more exactly, it will clearly appear, to be in very deed very unsound and fallacious, to D. Barclay very injurious, to Catholic religion very scandalous, and in very truth to have in it no probability at all, d Cap. 14. §. 2ᵒ. as Mr. john Barclay in his answer to Card. Bellarmine hath most clearly convinced. And first, whereas Card. Bellarmine affirmeth, that when he said, that members of the same body are depending one upon the other, he understood of members of a divers kind, as is a finger, a hand, an arm, a shoulder, a head, and not of members of the same kind, as are two hands, two feet etc. Mr. Barclay replieth, that it is untrue, that members of a diverse kind are depending one upon the other, as the hand doth not depend upon the foot, the liver upon the lights, the spleen upon the shoulders, etc. 7 And as for those examples, which Card. Bellarmine doth bring, he useth therein great deceit, for neither doth the finger for that cause depend upon the hand, nor the hand upon the arm, nor the arm upon the shoulder, for that they are members of one body, but for that by order of nature the finger cannot consist, or be of itself without the hand, nor the hand without the arm, nor the arm without the shoulder; Nevertheless many members of the same body also of a diverse kind can well consist one without the other, as the eye without the ear, the shoulder without the foot, the nose without the eye etc. as likewise these two members, whereof we now treat of the Christian commonwealth, not only may, but also did actually, as Card. Bellarmine himself confesseth, e Lib. 5. de Rom. Pont. c. 6. in the A-Apostles time consist one without the other. And if this proposition of Card. Bellarmine be true, that the members of one body, if they be of a diverse kind must depend one upon the other, he must acknowledge, that in one kingdom the Musician must depend upon the Physician, or the Physician upon the Musician, the Shoemaker upon the Tailor, or the Tailor upon the Shoemaker, the Lord Chamberlain upon the Lord Treasurer, or the Lord Treasurer upon the Lord Chamberlain, to omit infinite other such like trades and dignities, all which are members of the same body or Kingdom, whereas it is too too manifest, that they are not subject, or depend one upon the other, but either immediately upon the King, or upon those Magistrates, whom the King shall appoint. 8. Secondly, whereas Card. Bellarmine affirmeth, that it is manifest enough, that the Pope is head of the Church in place of Christ, from whence it doth clearly follow, that a King must either be no member of this body, or else he must be subject to the Pope, Mr. Barclay replieth, that Card. Bellarmine doth cunningly equivocate in that word, [Church]. For the Pope indeed is head of the Church, that is of Ecclesiastical things, or of Christians, as they are Christians, in so much that a King cannot be a member of the Church being taken in this manner, but he must be sub●ect to the Pope. But if by the Church he understand both powers, civil and Ecclesiastical, which are among Christians, both Lay-men and Cleargiemen, who are joined by one link of faith, he i● altogether deceived. For the Pope is not the head of civil things: and therefore in vain doth Card. Bellarmine affirm, that Kingly power must of necessity be either subject or superior, lest that there be two heads in one body. For taking the Church in that sense, as it comprehendeth civil and spiritual power, the Church hath Christ only for the head, and the Pope and Kings for chief members, who also in an other respect are ministerial heads under Christ, the King of civil government, and the Pope of spiritual. Besides, Card. Bellarmine doth now change his medium, as the Logicians call it: His argument, which he took upon him to defend, was this: They are members of one body, therefore one dependeth upon the other; now his argument proceedeth thus; Members do depend upon the head, the Pope is head of the Church, therefore Kings, who are members of the Church, do depend upon the Pope, which are two distinct arguments, yet both of them fallacious, and insufficient to prove, that the temporal power itself, or which is all one, that temporal Kings in temporal causes are subject to the Pope, as you have seen before. 9 Thirdly, whereas Card. Bellarmine affirmeth, that the assertion of D. Barclay comparing these two powers to two shoulders of the Church, which are connected to one head, who is Christ, doth appertain to the heresy of this time, which affirmeth, that the Pope is not the visible head of the Church, and that D. Barclay doth of his own accord grant thus much, M. john Barclay answereth, that Card. Bellarmine doth in this both slander D. Barclay, and also maketh the Church and Pope odious to Princes. For what Protestant reading this may not with very good reason conclude, that Catholics, according to Card. Bellarmine's doctrine, when they say, that the Pope is the visible head of the Church, and that this is a point of Catholikefaith, do understand, that he is head and Governor not only in Ecclesiastical, but also in civil causes? what wise men of this world will not relate these sayings to Princes? and what Prince can without indignation here them. Neither did D. Barclay ever make any doubt, but that the Pope Christ's Vicar in earth was head in Ecclesiastical causes, neither did Catholic faith ever teach, that he was head in civil causes. Only Christ is head of Popes and Kings, the chief head I say of the Church. Whereupon S. Austin doth affirm, f In serm. de remiss pec. & refertur 1. q. 1. can. eui denter. that an excommunicated person is out of the Church, and out of the body, whereof Christ is the head. 10. And therefore that similitude between the soul and body compounding one man, and the spiritual and civil power compounding one Church, or rather one Christian common wealth, or Christian world, is no fit similitude, and it is wrongfully ascribed to S. Gregory Nazianzene by Card. Bellarmine, as I showed before g Cap. 3. , for that the soul is as the form, and the body as the matter, compounding one essential thing, which is man, but the civil power is not as the matter, nor the spiritual as the form compounding one essential body, which is the Church of Christ: but if we will have them to compound one total body, which is the Church, taking the Church for the Christian world consisting both of the temporal and spiritual power, which are in Christians, whereof Christ or God, and not the Pope is the head, they are only integral, to use the terms of Philosophers, and not essential parts, neither do they compound one essential; but only one integral compound, in which kind of compound it is not necessary, that one part doth depend upon the other, as hath been now convinced; but all must of necessity depend upon the head, although in an essential compound one part must of necessity depend upon the other, for that in such a compound one part must be as the matter and the other as the form, as I declared before. 11. Wherefore the spiritual and civil power in the Church, taking the Church for the Christian world containing in it both powers, or which is all one, for the company of all Christians, in whom are both powers, or both subjections, are not like to the soul and body, which are essential parts of man: but they are as two shoulders, or two sides, which are only integral parts of man's body: both which powers, although each of them in their kind be a visible head, the one of temporals, the other of spirituals, and in that respect do formally make two total bodies, to wit, earthly kingdoms, whereof temporal Princes are the head, and the spiritual kingdom, or Church of Christ, whereof the Pope is the chief visible head, yet they are connected to one celestial and invisible head which is Christ, in which respect they make one total body, whereof Christ only and not the Pope is head, which may be called the Christian world, consisting of earthly kingdoms, and the spiritual kingdom, or Church of Christ. 12. Neither is it true, that these two powers be of so diverse a kind, that they cannot be well compared to two shoulders, for both of them are powers, and in that respect of the same kind, and as powers they are compared to two shoulders. And why may they not be aptly compared to two shoulders, seeing that there is nothing more strong and more near to the head in the Christian commonwealth? Neither is it material, that one is a more strong shoulder then the other; for in man's body the right arm is stronger than the left, and yet one is not more an arm then the other. May not, I pray you, two pillars of a diverse kind, one of brass, the other of marble, be aptly compared one with the other, in that both of them are pillars. The temporal and the civil power, or Kings as Kings, and having temporal authority, and Bishops as Bishops, and having spiritual power, are as two visible pillars which do sustain the edifice of the Christian world, or commonwealth, the one in temporals, the other in spirituals, they are as two shoulders, which as in man's body are next under the head, and all the other inferior members do depend upon them; so also they are next under God the head of both, and all other inferior members of the Christian world do depend upon them; nay being compared to the inferior members of the Christian world, they are also as two visible and ministerial heads; from whence, as from the head of man's body, which is the root, beginning, and foundation of all sense and motion in all the inferior parts, all spiritual and temporal directions, Laws, and punishments do proceed. 13. And truly if D. Barclay must be taxed of heresy, for comparing the temporal and spiritual power in the Church, or Christian world (for now the Church and Christian world which consisteth of both powers, is taken for all one) to two shoulders, and for affirming, that Christ only is the chief celestial and invisible head of both these powers, and that Kings and Popes are two ministerial heads thereof (although both of them are also principal in their own kind, and in the nature of a visible head) then must Hugo de S. Victore be taxed of heresy, when he compareth i Lib. 2. de Sa●ram. p. 2. ca 3. these two powers to two sides, affirming, that Lay-men, who have care of earthly things are the left side of this body, and Clergy men, who do minister spiritual things are the right, and that earthly power hath the King for the head, and the spiritual hath the Pope for head: Lo here two sides (and consequently two shoulders) and two visible heads, whereof Christ is the principal and invisible head. 14. Then must Thomas Waldensis our learned Countryman be taxed of heresy, when after he had related the aforesaid words of Hugo, he concludeth thus k Lib. 2. doctr. fid. art. 3. ca 78 : Behold two powers, and two heads of power: and beneath Likewise, saith he, neither Kingly power, which by the ring of faith or fidelity is espoused to the kingdom, is reduced to any man authoritatively above the King besides Christ: and therefore the Pope is not head of the King, or Kingdom in temporals. Then must S. Fulgentius be taxed of heresy, when he affirmeth l In lib. de veritate praedest. & gratiae. , that in the Church none is more principal than a Bishop, and in the Christian world none more eminent than the Emperor. Then must S. Ignatius be taxed of heresy, when he affirmeth m In Epist. ad Smyrnenses. , That no man is more excellent than a King, nor any man is like to him in all created things, neither any one is greater than a Bishop in the Church. Then must S. Chrysostome, Theophylact, and Oecumenius be taxed of heresy, when they affirm n Ad Rom. 13. , That whosoever he be, whether he be a Monk, a Priest, or an Apostle, he is according to S. Paul subject to temporal Princes; as likewise Pope Pelagius the first, who affirmeth o Apud. Bininum tom. 2. Concil. pag. 633 , That Popes also according to the command of holy Scriptures were subject to Kings. 15. Then must the ancient Gloss of the Canon Law p In cap. Adrianus dist. 63. , related and approved by Cardinal Cusanus q Lib. 3. de Concord. Cath. cap. 3. , (which Gloss Card. Bellarmine r In Tract. x Barcl. ca 13. 16 , with small respect to antiquity, doth shamefully call a doting old woman, and which perchance is abolished for overmuch old age) be taxed of heresy, affirming, That as the Pope is Father of the Emperor in spiritually; so the Emperor is the Pope's Father in temporals. Then must Pope Innocent the fourth be taxed of heresy, when he affirmeth s Super ca Noverit de sent excom. , That the Emperor is Superior to all both Churchmen and Lay-men in temporals. Then must Hugo Cardinal related by Lupoldus of Babenberg be taxed of heresy, when he affirmeth t De iure regni & Imperij cap. 9 in principio. , That the Emperor hath power in temporals from God alone, and that in them he is not subject to the Pope. Then must joannes Driedo be taxed of heresy, when he affirmeth u Lib. 2. de libert. Christiana cap. 2. , That the Pope, and the Emperor are not in the Church as two subordinate judges, so that one receiveth his jurisdiction from the other: but they are as two Governors, who are the Ministers of one God deputed to diverse offices, so that the Emperor is chief over Secular causes, and persons for the peaceable living in this world, and the Pope over spirituals for the advantage of Christian faith and charity. Then must many of the ancient Fathers be taxed of heresy, when they affirm, x Expounding those words of the 50. Psalm. Tibi soli peccavi. that Kings and Emperors are next under God, and inferior to God alone; as likewise infinite other Catholic writers, who with Hector Pintus do affirm, y In cap: 45. Ezech. that Kings in temporals have no Superior, although in spirituals they are subject to Priests. 16 But to these and such like pitiful shifts and extremities are sometimes driven men otherwise very learned, when they are not afraid by clamours, slanders, and threatenings, rather then by force of reason, to thrust upon the Christian world their own uncertain opinions for infallible grounds of the Catholic faith, and rather than they will seem to have been too rash in their Censures, or not so sound in their judgements, they care not, although with palpable sophisms, so that they may in regard of their authority any way blind the eyes of the unlearned Reader with their cunning and ambiguous speeches, to maintain what they have once begun, and with no small scandal to Catholic religion, and great hurt to their own souls, and which also in the end will turn to their own discredit, to impeach those Catholics of disobedience, heresy, or error, who shall impugn their new pretended faith and doctrine, as being no point of the true, ancient, Catholic, and Apostolic faith, nor grounded upon any one certain authority or argument taken either from the testimony of holy Scriptures, ancient Fathers, decrees of councils, practise of the primitive Church, or any one Theological reason, whereupon any one of the most learnedst of them all dare rely. 17 For which cause they are so often enforced to use so great equivocation and ambiguity of words in their arguments and answers, not declaring in what sense they take such ambiguous words: as in this question, concerning the temporal power compounding the Church, and being subject thereunto, in one proposition they will seem to take temporal power formally and in abstracto, signifying temporal Princes formally, as they have temporal power, and in an other they will take it materially, and in concreto, for temporal Princes, who indeed have temporal power, but not as they have temporal power; In one proposition they will seem to take the Church formally, as it signifieth the spiritual kingdom of Christ, and consisteth only of spiritual power, and in an other they will take it materially for all Christian men, or for the Christian world, as it is compounded both of temporal and spiritual power, and containeth both the spiritual kingdom of Christ, and the earthly kingdoms of the Christian world. So likewise they will not insist upon any one authority of holy Scriptures, any one decree of Pope or Council, or any one Theological reason, as upon a firm, sure, and infallible ground of their new pretended faith, which if they would do, this controversy would be quickly at end, but from one place of holy Scripture they fly to an other, from the new Testament to the old, from one Council to an other, and from one Theological reason to an other, and when all their arguments be answered, then with clamours, slanders, and forbidding of the books which are written against them, but not declaring why, or for what cause they are forbidden, or what erroneous doctrine is contained in them, they will make the matter clear. But truth and plain dealing in the end will prevail, neither will violence, but reason satisfy men's understandings, and this their violent, shuffling, and unsincere proceeding doth plainly show, that they distrust their cause. And thus much concerning the second argument. Chap. 7. Wherein the third argument, which is taken from the changing of temporal government, when it hindereth the spiritual good, is examined. 1. THe third argument, which Card. Bellarmine bringeth to prove, that the civil power among Christians, not only as it is Christian, but also as it is civil, is subject, and subordained to the Ecclesiastical as it is Ecclesiastical, is this: Thirdly, saith he, a Lib. 5. de Rom: Pont. cap: 7. if the temporal government hinder the spiritual good, the Prince, according to the opinion of all men, is bound to change that manner of government, even with the hindrance of temporal good, therefore it is a sign that the temporal power is subject to the spiritual. 2 Neither doth he satisfy, that should answer, that a Prince is bound to change that manner of his government, not for the subordination to the spiritual power, but only for order of charity, by which we are bound to prefer greater goods before losser. For in regard of the order of charity, one commonwealth is not bound to suffer detriment, that an other commonwealth more noble do not suffer the like detriment. And one private man, who is bound to give all his goods for the conservation of his own commonwealth, is not bound to do the like for an other commonwealth, although the more noble. Seeing therefore that the temporal commonwealth is bound to suffer detriment for the spiritual common-weatlh, it is a sign that they are not two diverse commonwealths, but parts of one and the same commonwealth, and one subject to the other. 3. Neither also is it of force, if one should say, that a temporal Prince is bound to suffer detriment for the spiritual good, not in regard of any subjection of the temporal commonwealth to the spiritual common wealth, but because otherwise he should hurt his subjects, to whom it is hurtful to lose spirituals for temporals. For although those men, who are not his subjects, but are of an other kingdom, should suffer any notable hurt in spirituals, for the government in temporals of some Christian King, he is bound to change his manner of government, whereof no other reason can be given, but that they are members of the same body, and one subject to the other. 4. By this argument Card. Bellarmine, as you see, laboureth to prove two things, the one is, that not only Lay-men, and clergymen do make one total body, which is the Church of Christ, whereof the Pope is head, for of this no Catholic maketh any doubt, but also that the temporal & spiritual power themselves, or which is all one, the temporal and spiritual common wealth, as they consist of temporal and spiritual power, are parts or this total body called the Church of Christ, whereof the Pope is the supreme visible head. The second is, that not only temporal Princes are in spirituals subject to the supreme spiritual Pastor, but also, that the temporal power itself, as it is temporal, is among Christians subject to the spiritual power, as it is spiritual, and consequently, that temporal Princes not only in spirituals, but also in all temporals are subject to the spiritual power. But neither of these can be rightly concluded from this argument, as I showed in my Apology b Num. 160. & seq. , where I denied the consequence of this third argument, speaking of subjection and subordination per se, and of it own nature. For if temporal government do hinder spiritual good, the temporal Prince is bound to change that manner of government even with detriment of temporal good, not for that the temporal power is per se, and of it own nature subject to the spiritual, as though of the temporal and spiritual power were made formally one politic body, but for both the reasons alleged by Card. Bellarmine, which he did not sufficiently confute in his Replies. 5. The first reason is for the order of charity, by which we are bound to prefer greater goods before lesser. To the Reply, which Card. Bellarmine made to the contrary, I answered thus, that although for the order of charity one common wealth is not bound to suffer detriment, that an other common wealth more noble do not suffer the like detriment, yet in case that both common wealths be subject to one Prince, or that the Prince of the less noble common wealth be also a subject of the more noble, than that Prince is bound for order of charity, all other things being alike, to prefer the more noble commonwealth before the less noble. And although one private man, who is bound to give all his goods for the conservation of his own commonwealth, be not bound to do the like for an other commonwealth, although the more noble, yet in case that the same private man should at the same time be a Citizen of both commonwealths, if he be bound to give all his goods for the conservation of the less noble common wealth, whereof he is a Citizen, he is much more bound for the same order of charity, to give all his goods for the conservation of the more noble common wealth, to which also he is subject. And this is the very case in this present question. For the spiritual and civil power, and the common wealths which they compound, are so united and connected among Christians, that every Christian is a Citizen of both common wealths, and both common wealths may be subject to the same Prince, as appeareth in the Pope, who is the spiritual Prince or Pastor of the whole Christian world, and also a temporal Prince of some Provinces thereof. 6. The second reason, for which a temporal Prince is bound to change the manner of his government in the aforesaid case, is, for that otherwise he should hurt his subjects, to whom it is hurtful to lose greater goods for the lesser, that is spiritual goods for temporal. To the Reply, which Card. Bellarmine made to the contrary, I answered, that the reason wherefore a temporal Prince is bound to change his manner of government, if it be greatly hurtful to the spiritual good not only of his own subjects, but also of the subjects of another Kingdom, is not for that the temporal power is per se, and of it own nature subject to the spiritual, or for that both of them are parts of one, and the same total common wealth, but because both the King, and also those subjects of an other temporal kingdom, are also members of the same mystical body of Christ, and Citizens of the same spiritual Kingdom, and therefore that King lest that he should greatly prejudice in spirituals the kingdom of Christ, whereof he is a Citizen, by his temporal government, is bound to change that manner of government. Thus I answered in my Apology. 7. Now you shall see how cunningly D. Schulckenius would shift of this answer. To the first part of my answer he replieth thus: c Pag. 339. H●ere I see nothing that needeth any answer saving that [as though of the temporal and spiritual power were formally made one politic body] For my Adversary Widdrington doth grant the antecedent▪ of Card. Bellarmine's argument, and denieth the consequence, and for this cause he doth deny it, for that of the temporal and spiritual power is not made formally one politic body, and therefore one power is not per se subject to the other. But what man that is well in his wits did ever say, that of the temporal and spiritual power is made formally one politic body? For although Clergy men are Citizens of the civil common wealth, as they live together with the Citizens of that common wealth, and do buy, sell, and do other things according to the laws of that commonwealth, yet because they are exempted from the power of the politic Prince, and do observe his laws not by force of the law, but by force of reason, they cannot properly and formally, but only materially be called parts of the civil commonwealth. 8. Add also that if the Ecclesiastical and civil power should make one politic body, the Ecclesiastical should either be superior, or subject to the civil, superior it could not be, for that the King is head of the politic body, neither could it be subject, for that a superior power ought not to be subject to an inferior. And beside (as it hath been said) Clergy men are exempted from the power of a politic Prince, and therefore the Ecclesiastical and civil power do not make properly and formally one politic body. But my Adversary doth feign absurd opinions, which he may refel. That which Card. Bellarmine saith, is, that the spiritual and temporal power, that is, Bishops, Kings, and their subjects, Clerks and Laikes do make one Church, one Christian commonwealth, one people, one kingdom, or mystical body of Christ, wherein all things are well ordered and disposed, and therefore superior things do rule inferior things, and inferior things are subject to superior things. Let my Adversary Widdrington overthrow this, and then let him deny the consequence of Card. Bellarmine's argument. Thus D. Schulckenius. 9 But how unsound, cunning, and insufficient, is this Reply of D. Schulckenius, and also repugnant to his own grounds, you shall presently perceive. And first when I denied, that the spiritual and temporal power do make formally one politic body, by a politic body I did not understand, as it distinguished and contradivided to a spiritual body, but as it is distinguished from a natural body, and comprehendeth in general all politic governments, whether they be temporal, spiritual, or mixed, in which sense not only earthly kingdoms compounded of temporal power, but also the spiritual kingdom, mystical body or Church of Christ consisting only of spiritual power is a politic body. Wherefore by the name of a politic body I understood a commonwealth in general, whether it were temporal, spiritual, or mixed of both, as any man, who is not desirous to cavil, may easily perceive by all those answers and assertions, which I did so often inculcate concerning the union and conjunction of these two powers. So that my meaning in that place only was to deny, that the temporal and spiritual power, as they are referred to the visible heads and subjects of both powers, do make formally one total commonwealth, but only materially, for that the same Christian men, who have temporal power or temporal subjection, do make one spiritual Kingdom or Church of Christ, but not formally, as they have temporal power, or temporal subjection, for so they make only temporal and earthly kingdoms, but formally as they have temporal and spiritual power, temporal and spiritual subjection, and are referred to the visible heads thereof, they make two total bodies or commonwealths, as before I have declared more at large. 10. Secondly, although it be true, that temporal and spiritual power, that is, Kings and Bishops, Clerks and Laikes, as D. Schulckenius expoundeth those words (which nevertheless is a very improper acception of those words, for that temporal and spiritual power in abstracto doth signify Kings and Bishops, Clerks and Laikes as they have temporal and spiritual power) do make one Church, one Christian commonwealth, one people, one kingdom or mystical body of Christ, yet this was not all that, which Card. Bellarmine affirmed, for Card. Bellarmine affirmed another thing, which I pretended to impugn, and which D. Schulckenius cunningly concealeth, to wit, that Kings and Bishops, Clerks and Laikes do not make two commonwealths, but one; This was that which I impugned, [not two commonwealths, but one] I never denied that they did make one commonwealth, to wit, the Church of Christ, but withal I affirmed, that they did make also two, to wit the earthly kingdoms also of this Christian world: So that I did not invent, or feign absurd opinions to confute them, as D. Schulckenius untruly affirmeth, but I have clearly showed, and that out of Card. Bellarmine's, or D. Schulckenius his own grounds, as before you have seen more at large, d Cap. 1. 2. 3. that the temporal and spiritual power do make formally two total bodies or commonwealths, and that Kings and Bishops, Clerks and Laikes diverse ways considered are parts and members of them both. 11. Thirdly, although I had taken a politic body for a temporal commonwealth, as in very truth I did not, but only for a commonwealth in general, as a politic body is distinguished from a natural body, yet I might be very well in my wits, and nevertheless have affirmed, that the temporal and spiritual power do in the like manner, and for the same cause make formally one temporal commonwealth, for the which D. Schulckenius doth here affirm, that temporal and spiritual power do make formally one spiritual body or commonwealth. For the reason why he affirmeth, that the temporal and spiritual power do make formally one Ecclesiastical or spiritual commonwealth, is, for that Kings and Bishops, Clerks and Laikes are members of the spiritual kingdom of Christ, and subject to the spiritual power of the supreme spiritual Pastor, which reason, if it be of force, doth also conclude, that the temporal and spiritual power may in like manner ●e said to make formally one temporal commonwealth, for that Kings and Bishops, Clerks and Laikes, are also true members and parts of the temporal commonwealth, and therefore they are either temporal Princes themselves, or subject in temporals, to the temporal power of temporal Princes. And therefore the reason, why D. Schulckenius doth here affirm, That the temporal and spiritual power do not make formally one politic or temporal body, is, as you have seen, for that the Clergy are exempted from the power of a politic Prince, and do observe his Laws not by force of the Law; but by force of reason, and therefore, saith he, they cannot properly and formally, but only materially be called a part of the politic commonwealth. From whence it clearly followeth, that if a man may be well in his wits, and yet affirm, that Clergy men are true parts, members, and subjects of the temporal common wealth, and consequently are not exempted from temporal subjection; but do own true fidelity and allegiance to temporal Princes, he may also be well in his wits, and yet affirm according to D. Shulckenius his reason, that of the temporal and spiritual power, that is, of Kings and Bishops, Clerks and Laikes is made properly and formally one politic body, or temporal commonwealth. 12. And dare D. Schulckenius, trow you, presume to say that S. Chrysostom, Theophylact, Oecumenius, * Ad Rom. 13. and those others whom partly I did cite before e Cap. 6. , and partly I will beneath f Cap. 12. , were not well in their wits, when they affirmed, That whether he be a Monk, or a Priest, or an Apostle, he is according to S. Paul, subject to temporal Princes. Or dare he presume to say, that Dominicus Sotus, Franciscus Victoria, Medina, Sayrus, Valentia, and innumerable other Divines cited by Sayrus g Lib. 3. Thesaurie. 4. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. 16 , and also by Salas h Disp. 14. de Legibus sect. 8. the jesuite, whose opinion he approveth and withal affirmeth, That some few modern Divines do hold the contrary, were not well in their wits; when they taught, that Clergy men are directly subject to the civil Laws, which are not repugnant to their state, nor to Ecclesiastical Laws, or Canons, and that Kings are Lords of Clergy men, and that Clergy men are bound to come at their call, and as Subjects to swear allegiance and obedience to them, as Salas in express words affirmeth; and that Clergy men are not exempted from secular power concerning the directive, or commanding force thereof, in civil Laws, which are profitable to the good state of the common wealth, which are the express words of Gregorius de Valentia, tom. 3. disp. 9 q. 5. punc. 3. 13 And to conclude, dare D. Schulckenius presume to say, that Cardinal Bellarmine was not well in his wits, when he wrote, i Lib. 1. de Clericis c●p. 28. propos. 2a. That Clergy men are not in any manner exempted from the obligation of civil Laws, which are not repugnant to holy Canons, or to the office of their Clergy, although in the last Editions of his Book, he hath left out those words [in any manner] not alleging any cause wherefore. And therefore although Clergy men are by the Ecclesiastical Laws, and privileges of temporal Princes, exempted f●om the tribunals of secular Magistrates, and from paying of certain tributes, and personal services: yet to say that they are exempted wholly from temporal subjection, and that they are not subject to the directive power of the civil Laws, nor can truly and properly commit treasons against any temporal Prince, for that they own not true fidelity, allegiance, and civil subjection to any temporal Prince (as some few jesuits of these latter times have not feared to a verre, whose opinion Card. Bellarmine now, contrary to his ancient doctrine, which for many years together he publicly maintained, doth now seem to follow) is repugnant in my judgement both to holy Scriptures so expounded by the ancient Fathers, to the common opinion of the School Divines, and once also of Card. Bellarmine himself, at which time I think D. Schulckenius will not say, that he was not well in his wits, and also to the practice both of the primitive Church, and of all Christian Kingdoms even to these days, and it is a doctrine newly broached in the Christian world without sufficient proof, scandalous to Catholic Religion, injurious to Chrian Princes, and odious to the pious ears of all faithful and well affected Subjects. 14. The other reason, which D. Schulckenius allegeth, why Kings and Bishops, clerk and Laics do not make properly and formally one politic body or temporal commonwealth, (for to say that temporal and spiritual power in abstracto do make formally either one temporal, or one spiritual commonwealth, is very untrue and repugnant to his own grounds, as I have showed before, unless we will speak very improperly) to wit, for that Clergy men are superior and not subject, is as insufficient as the former; for that temporal Princes are in temporals superior, and have pre-eminence not only over Lay-men, but also over Clergy men. And therefore the temporal, and spiritual power, or Kings and Bishops, clerk and Laikes, as they are referred to the visible heads here on earth, do neither make one politic or temporal body, nor one spiritual or Ecclesiastical body, nor one total commonwealth consisting of both powers, whereof the Pope is head, but they do make formally, and properly two total bodies or commonwealths, to wit, the spiritual kingdom of Christ, which consisteth only of spiritual power, and the earthly kingdoms of this Christian world, which consisteth only of temporal and civil authority, both which bodies are commonly signified by the name of the Christian world, or Christian commonwealth, wherein all things are well ordered, and rightly disposed, and therefore superiors are above inferiors, and inferiors are subject to superiors; but in temporal causes temporal power, whereof temporal Princes are the head, hath the pre-eminence not only over Lay-men, but also over Cleargymen, and in spiritual causes the spiritual power, whereof the Pope is head, is superior, and to confound these two powers, were to break all good order, as before I also declared. And therefore for good reason I granted the antecedent proposition of Card. Bellarmine's argument, and denied his consequence. 15. But four observe, good Reader, another palpable untruth, which D. Schulckenius in this place affirmeth. Card. Bellarmine, as you have seen, endeavoured by his third argument to prove, that the temporal power as it is temporal, is among Christians subject to the spiritual power, as it is spiritual; and his argument was this: If the temporal government hinder the spiritual good, the Prince is bound to change that manner of government, even with the hindrance of the temporal good, therefore it is a sign that the temporal power is subject to the spiritual .. The antecedent proposition I did grant, and I denied his consequence. Now D. Schulckenius affirmeth, that for this cause I denied his consequence, for that of the temporal and spiritual power is not made formally one politic body, which is very untrue. For although I should acknowledge, as in very deed I do, that the temporal and spiritual power, as they are referred to Christ the invisible and celestial head, do make properly and formally one total body, or commonwealth, consisting of both powers, which may be called the Christian common wealth, but more properly the Christian world, yet I would and do deny his consequence: and the reason hereof I alleged before, for that they are not essential parts of this total body, as the body & soul are of man, but integral parts, as two shoulders, two sides, hands, feet, eyes, ears, etc. are integral parts of man's body, and do not make an essential, but an integral compound, in which kind of compound it is not necessary, as I showed before k Cap. 6. nu. 6. 10. , that one part be subject to an other, but it sufficeth that both be subject to the head. And although I should also grant, as I do, that temporal and spiritual power do make formally one politic body, or temporal common wealth, taking temporal and spiritual power in that improper sense, as is declared by D. Schulckenius, to wit, for Kings and Bishops, Clerks and Laikes, who diverse ways considered, do make properly, and formally not only a spiritual, but also a politic body or temporal commonwealth: yet I should and do notwithstanding deny his consequence, for those two causes, which Card. Bellarmine did in his Replies allege, but, as you have seen, not sufficiently confute. 16 And truly if this argument of Card. Bellarmine were of force, it would in my opinion convince, that not only the temporal power among Christians is subject to the spiritual power of the Pope, but also that the temporal power among infidel Princes is also subject to the Pope's spiritual authority, which nevertheless Card. Bellarmine doth deny; for if the temporal government of an infidel Prince do hurt and hinder the spiritual good of Christian Religion, he is bound to change that manner of government even with the hindrance of temporal good, therefore I might conclude with Card. Bellarmine, that it is a sign that the temporal power of an heathen Prince is subject to the spiritual power of Christian religion. And therefore as the changing of temporal government among infidels, when it hindereth the spiritual good of Christian religion, is no probable sign of any subjection per se of their temporal power to the Pope's spiritual authority, but only of a bond of charity, whereby all men are by the law of God and nature bond not to hinder true spiritual good for a temporal commodity, so also among Christians it is no probable sign of any subjection or subordination of the temporal power to the spiritual, but at the most of a greater bond of charity, whereby Christians not only by the law of God and nature, but also by the bond of Christian religion, which they profess, are obliged not to hinder the spiritual good thereof for a temporal commodity. 17 Now you shall see, how insufficiently also D. Schulckenius replieth to those two answers, which I made to Card. Bellarmine's Replies, wherein are alleged the causes, why I denied the consequence of his argument, and why a temporal Prince is bound to change the manner of his temporal government, when it hindereth the spiritual good. And first to my first answer D. Schulckenius replieth thus: l Pag. 341. that by my answer it is clearly gathered, that I say nothing in this place, which maketh to the overthrowing of Card. Bellarmine's argument. For I confess, saith he, that a Prince of a less noble commonwealth is not bound to suffer any detriment only for the order of charity, that an other commonwealth more noble do not suffer the like, unless either he be subject to the Prince of that noble commonwealth, or unless one hath both the common wealth's subject to him. Therefore I am constrained, saith he, to confess, that the principal reason, why a temporal Prince ought to suffer detriment in temporals, lest that the spiritual good be hindered, is not the order of charity, but the subjection of the temporal common wealth to the spiritual, when they concur to make one Christian commonwealth, or one mystical body of Christ. Therefore I have not, saith he, confuted Card: Bellarmine's argument, but have yielded up the bucklers, yea and also have confirmed it. 18 But truly it is strange to see, with what boldness, men otherwise learned, dare adventure to avouch such gross and palpable untruths, and when their answers are clean overthrown, to brag not only of the victory, but also that their Adversary hath granted, and confirmed their answers. For observe, good Reader, how untrue and fraudulent this answer is. I affirmed, as you have seen, that the reason, why a temporal Christian Prince is bound to change his manner of government, if it hinder the spiritual good, is not, for that the temporal power is per se, and of it own nature subject to the spiritual, as Card. Bellarmine pretended, but because he being a Christian Prince, to whom especially, more than to a Heathen, it doth belong to have care of true spiritual good, which Christian Religion ought chief to intend, is by the order of charity, and not for any intrinsical subjection, or subordination of the temporal power to the spiritual, bound to prefer, caeteris paribus, the spiritual good before the temporal. And whereas Card. Bellarmine replied, that for the order of charity one common wealth, although the less noble, is not bound to suffer detriment, that an other common wealth more noble do not suffer the like detriment; and one private man, who is bound to give all his goods for the preservation of his own common wealth, is not likewise bound to do the like for an other common wealth although more noble; Seeing therefore that a temporal commonwealth is bound to suffer damage for the spiritual, it is a sign, that they are not two diverse commonwealths, but parts of one and the self same common wealth, and one subject to another. 12. To this Reply I answered, by showing the disparity betwixt one temporal commonwealth compared to an other, and a temporal commonwealth compared to the spiritual common wealth: because the same Prince, or subject of one temporal common wealth is seldom, or never, a Prince or subject of the other, and therefore the order of charity requireth, that both the Prince and subject aught to prefer the temporal good of their own common wealth, before the temporal good of an other more noble common wealth: As also a man less noble aught in charity to prefer, if other things be alike, his own temporal good before the temporal good of an other man more noble. But if it should so fall out, that the same man were Prince of both common wealths, or the same private man were a part and member of both common wealths, in this case the order of charity would require, that he, who is member, or hath charge of both commonwealths, should prefer, if other things be alike, the temporal good of the more noble common wealth before the temporal good of the less noble, not by reason of any subjection of one common wealth to the other, but because both commonwealths are subject to the same Prince, or the same private man is subject to both common wealths, and therefore they ought with due respect and order of charity to have care of both, and to prefer the more worthy common wealth before the less worthy. 20. As likewise if one man hath diverse trades, one more noble, an other less noble, one more profitable, and other less profitable, if in case he should be compelled to lose, or prejudice one of his trades, the order of charity would require, that he should rather lose, or prejudice the less noble, than the more noble, the less profitable, than the more profitable trade, neither from hence could it be gathered, that one trade were subject, or subordained to another, but only that both trades were subject to one man. So likewise if a man were constrained to lose either his eye or his finger, the order of charity would require that he should prefer the eye before the finger, for that the eye is a more noble, a more necessary, a more profitable part of the body then the finger, and yet from hence we cannot well conclude, that therefore the finger is subject or subordained to the eye, but that both are parts and members of the body of the same man, who therefore by order of charity ought with due order and respect to have a care of the whole body and every part thereof, and to prefer the more worthy, necessary or profitable before the less worthy, necessary or profitable member. And this I said was the plain case of the temporal power among Christians compared to the spiritual, for that the Ecclesiastical and civil power, temporal power and spiritual subjection etc. are among Christians so united in one subject, that the same Christian man is a part, member, and Citizen both of the temporal, and also of the spiritual common wealth, and both common wealths may be subject to the same Prince, as appeareth in the Pope, and therefore the order of charity doth require, that every Christian man ought to prefer the spiritual good, and spiritual common wealth, before the temporal good and the temporal commonwealth, not for that the temporal power, or common wealth is subject to the spiritual, but for that all Christian Princes and people are parts, members, and Citizens of both common wealths, and the spiritual is far more noble, and worthy, and therefore if other things be alike, to be preferred before the temporal, by them who are parts and members of them both. 21. Now D. Schulckenius would cunningly forsooth make the Reader believe, that I say the very same that Card. Bellarmine doth, and that I do not by my answer overthrow, but confirm Card. Bellarmine's Reply: for that I am enforced, saith he, to confess that the chief cause, why a temporal Prince ought to suffer damage in temporals, lest the spiritual good should be hindered, is not the order of charity, but the subjection of the temporal power to the spiritual, when they make one spiritual common wealth, or mystical body of Christ, which nevertheless, as you have seen, is apparently untrue. For although I do indeed allege subjection for a cause, why the order of charity doth require, that a temporal Christian Prince ought to prefer the spiritual good before the temporal, by which word [subjection] D. Schulckenius taketh occasion to delude his Reader, yet I do not allege that manner of subjection, which Card. Bellarmine doth, as D. Schulckenius untruly affirmeth, to wit, the subjection of the temporal power to the spiritual, or of the temporal common wealth to the spiritual, taking temporal commonwealth properly as it consisteth of temporal power and temporal subjection, but the subjection of both commonwealths to one Prince, or the subjection of all Christians to both common wealths, to be the cause, why the order of charity requireth, that a Christian Prince is bound to change his manner of government, when it hindereth the spiritual good. 22. Belike D. Schulckenius would infer, that because the Pope is Lord of Ancona, and Ferrara, and aught to prefer caeteris paribus the good of the one before the other, therefore the State of Ancona is subject to the State of Ferrara, or contrariwise, or because the King of Spain is King of Naples and Duke of Milan, therefore the State of Milan is subject to Naples, or because a man hath two trades, and aught to prefer the one before the other, therefore the one is subject to the other, or because one man is a Citizen of two cities, therefore one of those cities is subject to the other, or because the eyes and ears are parts and members of the same body of man, who ought therefore by order of charity to prefer the good of the more worthy and necessary member before the good of the less worthy and less necessary, therefore the ears are subject to the eyes or contrariwise. I ever affirmed, that the temporal power among Christians is not per se, and of it own nature subject to the spiritual, and that they do not properly and formally, as they are referred to the visible heads here on earth, make one total, but two total commonwealths, although the same Christian man being considered diverse ways, is a part and member of both commonwealths, and as in spiritual causes he is subject to the Ecclesiastical power, which only doth properly and formally make the spiritual, or Ecclesiastical commonwealth, so in temporal causes he is subject to the civil power, which only doth properly and formally make the remporall or earthly kingdoms of this Christian world, and because the spiritual commonwealth and good thereof is the more noble and more worthy, therefore the same Christian man, being a member and citizen of both commonwealths, aught to prefer, if other things be alike, the spiritual good before temporal, and not for any subjection of the temporal power, or commonwealth to the spiritual. But when men are not disposed to deal sincerely for truths sake, but are resolved to defend per fas & nefas, what they have once taken in hand to maintain, and do not fight for truth, but for credit, they little regard what they say, so that with cunning & smooth words they may colour their sayings in such sort, as that they may blind, dazzle or confound the understanding of the Reader. And thus much concerning Card. Bellarmine's first Reply. 23. Now to the answer, which I made to Card. Bellarmine's second Reply, by which he pretended to prove the subjection of the temporal power to the spiritual, D. Schulckenius m Pag. 343. replieth in this manner. I answer that my Adversary Widdrington saith nothing, which doth weaken Card. Bellarmine's argument. That which Card. Bellarmine did assume, to wit, that a temporal Prince is bound to change his manner of government, not only, lest that he should hurt in spirituals his own subjects, but also lest that he should hurt other Christians, my Adversary Widdrington doth grant. And in this assumption, or antecedent proposition all the force of Card. Bellarmine's argument doth consist. Besides, when Widdrington denieth, that the temporal power is per se subject to the spiritual, or that both of them be parts of one, and the self same Christian commonwealth, and afterwards granteth, that a temporal King, and those, who are civilly subject unto him, are members of the mystical body, and Citizens of the same spiritual Kingdom, he doth manifestly contradict himself. For what else is this, that Christian Kings and their Subjects are members of the same mystical body of Christ, and Citizens of the same spiritual Kingdom, I say, what else is this, than that Christian Kings, and their Lay-Subiects are parts of the Christian commonwealth? For the Christian commonwealth, and the mystical body of Christ, and the spiritual Kingdom of Christ are altogether the same: of which commonwealth Kings with Laikes, Bishops with Clerks are parts, as oftentimes hath been said. In which Christian com-wealth, and mystical body, and Kingdom of Christ all things are so well disposed and ordered, that temporal things do serve spiritual, and civil power is subject to Ecclesiastical, which conclusion my Adversary Widdrington hath many ways attempted to overthrow, but he was not able. And he was not able not only to overthrow the conclusion, but also he hath not been able to weaken at all with any probable answer the first argument which Card. Bellarmine brought to prove this conclusion, which the Readers will easily perceive, if without perturbation of mind they will consider that which hath been said by us. 24 But this Reply of D. Schulckenius is as fraudulent, and insufficient, as the former: for in effect it is only a repetition of his former Reply, to which I have already answered, besides some fraudulent dealing, which he hath used herein. And first it is very true, that I granted the antecedent proposition of this second Reply of Card. Bellarmine, but that all the force of Card. Bellarmine's argument doth consist in the antecedent proposition, or assumption, as D. Schulckenius affirmeth, is very untrue, and I wonder, that D. Schulckenius is not ashamed with such boldness to affirm the same. The Antecedent proposition was, that a Christian Prince is bound to change the manner of his temporal government, if it hurt the spiritual good, not only of his own Subjects, but also of the Subjects of other Christian Princes, and this proposition I did willingly grant him, but the force of his argument did not consist only in this antecedent proposition, as D. Schulckenius untruly affirmeth, but in the consequence, which he inferred from this antecedent proposition, or if we will reduce his argument to a syllogistical form, in his Minor proposition, or assumption, which was this, but of this, to wit, that a Christian Prince is bound to change the manner of his temporal government in the case aforesaid, no other reason can be given, but that both powers are members of the same body, and one power or body subject to the other. And this consequence, assumption, or Minor proposition, wherein the whole force of his argument did consist, I utterly denied, and I alleged, as you have seen, an other plain and perspicuous reason, why a Christian Prince in the case aforesaid is bound to change the manner of his temporal government, to wit, not for that temporal power is per se subject to the spiritual, or for that they make one total body, or commonwealth, consisting of temporal and spiritual power, but for that all Christians, both Princes and subjects, are parts and members not only of the temporal, but also of the spiritual commonwealth, for which cause a Christian Prince is bound to change the manner of his temporal government, when it is hurtful to the spiritual good of the Church, or spiritual kingdom of Christ, whereof he is a true part and member, as I declared before. 25. Secondly, it is very untrue, that I do any way contradict myself, as D. Schulckenius affirmeth, first in denying that temporal power is per se subject to the spiritual, or that both of them are parts of one and the self-same Christian commonwealth or Church of Christ, and afterwards in granting, that temporal Kings, and their subjects, are members of the same spiritual kingdom or Church of Christ. For these propositions, temporal power is not per se, subject to spiritual power, and temporal Princes are subject to spiritual power, are not repugnant or contradictory one to the other, as neither these propositions are contradictory, Temporal power and spiritual power, are not parts of the spiritual kingdom or Church of Christ, and temporal Princes are parts of the spiritual kingdom or Church of Christ. For contradiction according to Aristotle n Lib. 1. de Interp. cap. 4. , is an affirming and denying of the same thing, and in the same manner: But there is no man so ignorant that will affirm that the same thing, and in the same manner is affirmed and denied in the aforesaid propositions: for the subject of the first propositions, is temporal power in abstracto, and it is taken formally, and in the second propositions it is temporal power in concreto, and it is taken only materially, and hath this sense, that temporal Princes, who have both temporal power, and also spiritual subjection, are indeed subject to the spiritual power, and are parts and members of the spiritual kingdom of Christ, but not formally, as they have temporal power, but only materially, who have temporal power, but formally as they have spiritual subjection. But D. Schulckenius doth manifestly contradict himself, as I plainly showed before o Cap. 2. , first affirming, That the Church of Christ is compounded of temporal and spiritual power, which are formally two distinct powers, as he himself also confesseth, and afterwards in denying, that it is compounded of temporal, or civil power, which is formally civil. 26. But mark now good Reader, what fraud D. Schulckenius useth in proving, that I do manifestly contradict myself. He would seem to his Reader to prove, that I affirm and deny one and the self same thing: for this he taketh upon him to prove, and yet he proveth nothing else, but that which I have always affirmed, and never denied, to wit, that Christian Kings, and their subjects are parts and members of the Church, and subject to the spiritual power thereof, but the contradiction, which he pretended to prove, he doth not prove at all, nor make any show of proof thereof, to wit, that it is all one to say, that Christian Princes and their subjects are parts and members of the Church, and subject to her spiritual power, which I always granted, and that the temporal and spiritual power do compound the Church, or that the temporal power itself is per se, subject to the spiritual power of the Church, which I ever denied, and out of Card. Bellarmine's own grounds have clearly proved the contrary, and have plainly showed, that temporal power doth only compound a temporal or civil body or commonwealth, whereof the King is head, as D. Schulckenius doth here expressly affirm, and that the Church of Christ his mystical body, and spiritual Kingdom, or Christian commonwealth (taking the Christian commonwealth for the Church only, and not for the Christian world, as it containeth temporal and spiritual power) is compounded only of spiritual, and not of temporal power. In which Church of Christ, and also Christian world, all things are so well ordered and disposed, that temporal things ought by the intention of good Christians, to serve spiritual things, and temporal Princes, although in spirituals they are subject to the spiritual power of the Church, yet in temporals, or as they have temporal power, they are not subject but supreme, and consequently the temporal power itself speaking properly and formally, is not subject to the spiritual, nor doth compound the spiritual kingdom or Church of Christ. And therefore I have not only weakened, but also quite overthrown, and that out of his own grounds this conclusion of Card. Bellarmine, and all those three arguments, which he brought to confirm the same, as any judicious Reader, who will duly examine both our writings, will easily perceive. Chap. 8. Wherein is examined the fourth argument, taken from the authority of S. Gregory Nazianzene, comparing the temporal and spiritual power among Christians, to the body and soul in man. 1. THE fourth argument, which Card. Bellarmine bringeth to prove this subjection of of the temporal power among Christians, to the spiritual power of the Church, is taken from the authority of S. Gregory Nazianzene, who compareth the temporal and spiritual power among Christians to the body and soul in man: yea, and also affirmeth, that temporal Magistrates are subject to spiritual Pastors. And this similitude doth so greatly please Card. Bellarmine's conceit, that when he hath any fit occasion, he spareth not to inculcate it, as a very strong argument, and fit similitude to prove, that the temporal power among Christians is per se, and of it own nature subject to the spiritual, as the body in man is per se, subject to the soul. For as the spirit and flesh, saith he a Lib. 5. de Rom. pont. cap. 6. , are in man, so are the spiritual and temporal power in the Church. For the spirit and flesh are as it were two commonwealths, which may be found separated, and also united. The flesh hath sense and appetite, to which are answerable their acts and proper objects, and of all which the immediate end is the health & good constitution of the body. The spirit hath understanding and will, and acts and proportionate objects, and for her end the health and perfection of the soul. The flesh is found without the spirit in beasts, the spirit is found without the flesh in Angels. 2 Whereby it is manifest, that neither of them is precisely for the other. The fl●sh also is found united to the spirit in man, where because they make one person, they have necessarily subordination and connexion. For the flesh is subject, the spirit is superior, and although the spirit doth not intermeddle herself with the actions of the flesh, but doth suffer the flesh to exercise all her actions, as she doth exercise in beasts, yet when they do hurt the end of the spirit, the spirit doth command the flesh, and doth punish her, and if it be needful, doth appoint fastings, and also other afflictions, even with some detriment, and weakening of the body, and doth compel the tongue not to speak, the eyes not to see, etc. In like manner if any action of the flesh, yea and death itself, be necessary to obtain the end of the spirit, the spirit hath power to command the flesh to expose herself and all hers, as we see in Martyrs. 3 Even so the civil power hath her Princes, laws, judgements etc. and likewise the Ecclesiastical hath her Bishops, Canons, judgements. The civil hath for her end temporal peace, the spiritual everlasting salvation. They are sometimes found separated, as long since in the time of the Apostles, sometimes united as now. And when they are united, they make one body, and therefore they ought to be connected, and the inferior subject, and subordained to the superior. Therefore the spiritual power doth not intermeddle herself with temporal affairs, but doth suffer all things to proceed, as before they were united, so that they be not hurtful to the spiritual end, or not necessary to the attaining thereunto. But if any such thing do happen, the spiritual power may and aught to compel the temporal by all manner, and ways, which shall seem necessary thereunto. 4 Thus you see, that Card: Bellarmine hath made here a plausible discourse, but truly more beseeming, as I will most clearly convince, a cunning orator, who with fine, and witty conceits seeketh rather to please curious ears, than a sound Divine, who with substantial arguments, and forcible proofs should endeavour to convince the understanding of judicious men, especially in such points, as are pretended to belong to Catholic faith, and eternal salvation. For neither is the temporal and spiritual power among Christians well compared to the body, and soul of man, either in union, or in subjection, and beside, although it were in all things a fit similitude, yet it doth not any way prove that, which Card. Bellarmine pretendeth to prove thereby, but it doth clearly and directly, as you shall see, convince the flat contrary. 5 For first, as I showed before b Cap. 2. 3. out of Card Bellarmine's own grounds, the temporal and spiritual power, as they are referred to their visible heads here on earth, do not make properly and formally one total body, or commonwealth, which is the spiritual kingdom, or Church of Christ, but they do make properly, and formally two total bodies, or common wealths, to wit, earthly kingdoms, or a temporal, and civil body, whereof the King is head, as D. Schulckenius expressly affirmeth c Pag. 339. , and the spiritual kingdom, mystical body, or Church of CHRIST, whereof the Pope is head, and which as D. Schulckenius also affirmeth, d Pag. 203. is only compounded of spiritual power. Seeing therefore, that the reason why Card. Bellarmine affirmeth, that temporal power among Christians is subject to the spiritual, is for that they do make one total body, or commonwealth, as the body and soul do make one man, and consequently the temporal power must be subject to the spiritual, as the body is subject to the soul of man, and as I have clearly proved, there is no such union of the temporal and spiritual power to make one total body consisting of both powers, which is the spiritual kingdom or Church of CHRIST, it is manifest, that Card Bellarmine's argument drawn from this similitude of the soul and body, being grounded upon this union of the temporal and spiritual power, compounding one total body, hath no sure ground, or foundation at all. 6 Secondly, although I do willingly grant, as you have seen before e Cap. 1. , that not only the temporal and spiritual power among Christians, as they are referred not to their visible heads here on earth, but to CHRIST the invisible head of them both, do make one total body, or commonwealth, consisting actually of both powers, which may be called the Christian world (in which sense the Christian common wealth is usually taken, but the Church of CHRIST, and especially the spiritual kingdom of CHRIST is seldom taken in that sense) but also the whole world, consisting of Christians, and Infidels, may in that manner be called one total body, whereof CHRIST, at least wise, as he is GOD, is the invisible, and celestial head, nevertheless this similitude of the soul and body united in one man doth nothing avail to prove the subjection of the temporal power to the spiritual, both united in one total body, whereof CHRIST only, and no earthly creature is the head. For the reason, why the body in man is subject to the soul, is because the body and soul do make one essential compound, as the Philosophers do call it, whereof the body is the matter, and the soul is the form, and consequently the body must of necessity, and by a natural sequel, be subject to the soul, as every matter is per se and of it own nature subject to the form, with which it maketh one essential compound, but the temporal & spiritual power or earthly Kingdoms, and the spiritual kingdom of Christ, as they make one total body, whereof Christ only is the head, do not make one essential compound, whereof one is as the matter, and the other as the form, but they do make one integral compound, as the Philosophers do call it, in that manner as the body of man is compounded of eyes, ears, tongue, hands, feet, which are called by the Philosopher's integral, and not essential parts of man's body; but in an integral compound, it is not necessary, as I showed before f Cap. 6. nu: 10. , that one part be subject to another, although all must be subject to the head, as it is apparent in the eyes, ears, tongue, hands, and feet of man's body, whereof none is subject one to the other, although all be subject to the head. Seeing therefore that the temporal and spiritual power are only integral parts of the total body, whereof Christ only is the head, it is evident that from hence no probable argument can be drawn to prove, that the temporal power is subject to the spiritual, but that both of them are united and subject to Christ the invisible head of them both. 7. Thirdly, although I should also grant, that this were a fit similitude in all things, and that the temporal power is subject to the spiritual in that manner as the body is subject to the soul of man, yet this manner of subjection would nothing avail to prove, that the spiritual power could either directly, or indirectly dispose of temporals, deprive temporal Princes of their temporal lives or dominions, use temporal punishments, or exercise any temporal action, but it is rather a very fit similitude to convince the flat contrary. For as I will easily grant, that the soul hath power to command, or forbidden the body to exercise any corporal action, when it is necessary or hurtful to the end not only of the soul but also of the body, (which last clause Card. Bellarmine cunningly omitteth, for that it favoureth, as you shall see, the Pope's direct power to command temporals) as to see, to hear, to speak, and such like actions, which are subject to the command of man's will, I say, which are subject to the command of man's will, for that there be many corporal actions, which are not in the power of man's will to command, as are all the actions of the nutritive, vegetative and generative powers; But if the body by any let, or hindrance can not, or (if it were possible) would not do that corporal action, which the soul would willingly have the body to do, as to see, to hear, to speak, or to go, the soul hath no power of herself either directly, or indirectly, that is, either for the good of the body, or for the good of the soul, to do that corporal action, as to see, hear, speak, or go, without the concurrence of the body itself. 8. Neither hath the soul any power to inflict any corporal punishment by way of coercion or constraint, that is, to punish actually with corporal punishment any member of the body without the concurrence of some one or other member thereof, but only by the way of command, that is, to command some one member to punish itself; or an other member, as the hands, feet, or head, to put themselves into fire or water, or the hands, to whip the shoulders, to close thy eyelids, to stop the ears, not to put meat into the mouth, and such like, which if the bodily member by any let, or hindrance can not, or, if it were possible, would not do, the soul hath done all that is in her power to do, for that she cannot of herself do any corporal action, without the concurrence of some corporal member, but the most that she can do concerning any corporal action or punishment, is to command the body to concur with her to the doing of that corporal action, or punishment. I said [if it were possible] for that there is such a natural, necessary, and intrinsical subjection of the body to the soul, that the body cannot resist the effectual command of the soul in those things which are subject to her command, and therefore I said, that if it were possible, that the body could resist the command of the soul, yet the soul of herself hath not power to exercise any corporal action without the concurrence of a corporal organ; which manner of subjection is not between the temporal and spiritual power, for that this subjection being in diverse persons having free will, is free and voluntary, and therefore the command may be resisted, but the former being of the body to the soul, making one only person, who hath free will, is necessary and natural, and therefore can not be resisted. 9 In the like manner I will easily grant, that the temporal power is subject to the spiritual, or rather that temporal Princes, who have temporal power, but not as they have temporal power, are subject to spiritual Pastors, who have spiritual power, in such sort, that the spiritual Pastor hath power to command the temporal Prince to do those temporal actions belonging to his temporal power, which are necessary to the end of the spiritual power, and to forbid him those actions belonging to his temporal power, which are repugnant to the end of the spiritual power, which is eternal salvation, which if he refuse to do, and will not obey the command of the spiritual Pastor, the spiritual Pastor can not by virtue only of his spiritual power exercise any temporal; or civil action, belonging to the temporal, or civil power, without the consent, or concurrence of the temporal power: Neither can the spiritual Pastor inflict any temporal, or civil punishment by way of coercion, constraint, or compulsion, that is, punish actually with any temporal, or civil punishment without the consent, & concurrence of the temporal, or civil power, but only by the way of command, that is, he hath power to command the temporal Prince, who only hath supreme temporal authority, to punish himself, or his subjects with temporal, or civil punishments, if they use their temporals to the hurt? and prejudice of the spiritual power, or the end thereof? although I do willingly grant, that the spiritual Pastor hath power to punish the temporal Prince, or his subjects, with spiritual punishments, not only by the way of command, but also of coercion and constraint that is, to punish them actually, whether they will or no, with spiritual punishments, when they shall refuse to obey his just command, for that this manner of punishing by way of coercion doth not exceed the limits of the spiritual coercive power. 10. Now if my adversaries demand or me, why the spiritual power may of herself command temporal actions, and yet neither directly, nor indirectly, that is, neither for temporal, nor spiritual good, exercise temporal actions, may command civil punishments, when they are necessary to the end of the spiritual power, and yet neither directly, nor indirectly punish actually with civil punishments without the concurrence of the spiritual power, I answer them by their own similitude, which pleaseth them so much; for the same reason, that the soul hath power of herself to command bodily actions, and yet neither directly, nor indirectly, that is, neither for the good of the body, nor of the soul, to do of herself alone any bodily action, hath power to command bodily punishments, and yet of herself hath not power to inflict any bodily punishment, without the concurrence of the body itself. And thus you see, that this similitude, of which Card. Bellarmine, and his followers do make so great account, is no fit similitude to prove their doctrine, but rather to confirm ours, and that from this similitude no probable argument can be drawn to prove, that the spiritual Pastor hath power either directly or indirectly to dispose of temporals, to depose temporal Princes, or to punish temporally by way of coercion or constraint. 11. But four, although the temporal and spiritual power were aptly compared by Card. Bellarmine to the body and soul, yet it would prove two things more than he, as I suppose, would willingly admit; The first is, that: the temporal power can exercise no temporal action without the concurrence and assistance of the spiritual power, as the body can do no corporal action, unless the soul also, as an efficient cause thereof, do concur thereunto; For this is a clear and approved principle in philosophy, that the soul is cause of all motions in the body, according to that common definition or description of the soul assigned by Aristotle g 2. De Anima tex. 24. ; Animaid est, quo vinimus, & sentimus, & movemur, & intelligimus primò. The soul is that, whereby we first or principally live, and have sense, and are moved, and do understand. 12. The second is, that the spiritual power may command or forbid the civil power to exercise civil actions, not only when they are necessary, or hurtful to the end of the spiritual power, which is the health of the soul, but also when they are necessary or hurtful to the end of the temporal power, which is temporal peace, as the soul hath power to command or forbid the body to exercise bodily actions, as to see, hear, speak etc. not only when they are necessary, or hurtful to the end, and good of the soul, which is spiritual life and health, but also when they are necessary or hurtful to the good of the body, which is bodily health and life. And therefore Card. Bellarmine declaring this similitude of the spirit and flesh doth only affirm, that the spirit doth command the flesh, when her actions are hurtful to the end of the spirit, but cunningly omitteth, that the spirit also dorh command the flesh, when her actions are necessary, or hurtful to the end of the flesh, lest the Reader should presently perceive thereby the disparity of this similitude, or else from thence infer, that in the same manner the spiritual power may command the temporal power not only in order to spiritual good, but also in order to temporal good, which is the Canonist, doctrine, and which Card. Bellarmine doth at large impugn. 13. Lastly, in what manner S. Gregory Nazianzene did compare the temporal and spiritual power, or rather temporal and spiritual Princes to the body and soul, I have sufficiently declared before h Cap. 3. to wit, not in the manner of their union or subjection, but only in nobility, and in that temporal Princes are in as excellent and worthy manner subject to temporal Princes, as spiritual things are more excellent and worthy then temporal. So that neither from the authority of S. Gregory Nazianzene, nor from the similitude itself of the body and soul, as it is declared and urged by Card, Bellarmine, can it with any probability be gathered, that the spiritual power can of herself exercise any temporal action belonging to the civil power, without the concurrence of the civil power, although it be necessary to the end of the spiritual power, as the soul cannot of herself without the concurrence of the body exercise any bodily action, although it be necessary to the end, not only of the body, but also of the soul. And therefore I marvel, that Card. Bellarmine could be so much overseen, as to urge and repeat so often this similitude of the soul and body to prove the Pope's power to depose, and to dispose of all temporals, which is so flat against him, and which, if it were a fit similitude, doth rather confirm the doctrine of the Canonists, whom Card. Bellarmine taketh upon him to confute, than his own opinion. But the truth is, that it confirmeth neither, for that, as I declared before, i Cap. 2.3. the temporal and spiritual power, or the temporal and spiritual Commonwealth are not parts compounding one total Body or Commonwealth, as the body and soul do compound a perfect man. Chap 9 Wherein the fift argument to prove the subjection of the temporal power to the spiritual, taken from the authority of S. Bernard and Pope Boniface the eight, is examined. 1. THe fift argument, which Car. Bellarmine bringeth a Lib. 5. de R●m Pont. c. 7. to prove the subjection of the temporal power among Christians to the spiritual, is taken from the authority of S. Bernard Lib. 4. the considerate and Pope Boniface the eight, in the Extravagant, unam Sanctam, who doth imitate, saith Card. Bellarmine, S. Bernard's words. The words of S. Bernard to Pope Eugenius are these. Why dost thou again attempt to usurp, or use b usurpare. the sword, which once thou wast commanded to put up into the scabbard? which nevertheless he that denieth to be thine, doth seem to me not sufficiently to have considered the speech of our Lord saying, Return thy sword into the scabbard. Therefore it is also thine, to be drawn forth perchance at thy beck c Nutu tuo. , or direction, although not with thy hand. Otherwise if also it doth in no manner appertain to thee, when the Apostles said, Behold to swords here, our Lord had not answered, It is enough, but it is too much. Therefore both the spiritual, and the material sword do belong to the Church, but the material is indeed to be exercised, or drawn forth for the Church; but the spiritual also by the Church: the spiritual with the hand of the Priest, the material with the hand of the Soldier, but indeed at the book, or direction, of the Priest, and at the command of the Emperor. 2. The pricipal words of Pope Boniface, besides those which he doth imitate out of S Bernard are, That in the Catholic, and Apostolic Church, whereof Christ is the head, and S. Peter his Vicar, and in her power there be two swords, the spiritual, and the temporal, as we are instructed by those words of the Gospel, Behold here; that is in the Church, two swords, etc. And that the sword must be under the sword, the temporal authority subject to the spiritual power. For the spiritual, the truth so witnessing, hath to instruct the earthly power, and to judge if it be not good. So of the Church, and of the Ecclesiastical power, the prophesy of jeremy is verified, behold I have appointed thee this day over nations and Kingdoms, and the rest which follow. Therefore if the earthly power goeth out of the way, she shall be judged by the spiritual power, but if the inferior spiritual power goeth out of the way, she shall be judged by her superior, but if the supreme goeth out of the way, she can be judged by God alone, and not by man, according to the testimony of the Apostle, That the spiritual man judgeth all things, and he is judged by none. From all which Card. Bellarmine, who only relateth S. Bernard's words, and affirmeth, that Pope Boniface doth imitate the same, doth conclude, that the meaning of S. Bernard, and Pope Boniface was to affirm, that both the temporal and spiritual sword are in the power of the Pope, & that the Pope hath per se, and properly the spiritual sword, and because the temporal sword is subject to the spiritual, therefore the Pope may command, or forbidden a King the use of the temporal sword, when the necessity of the Church doth require it. 3. Thus you see what S. Bernard and Pope Boniface do affirm, and also that Card. Bellarmine inferreth, and concludeth from their words. And although to this, which Card. Bellarmine inferreth from their words, there needeth no answer at all, for that I do willingly grant all that, which he doth infer, to wit, that the temporal sword is subject in some cases to the commanding power of the Pope, and that the Pope may command, or forbidden a King the use of the temporal sword, when the necessity of the Church shall require it: seeing that the question between me and Card. Bellarmine is not concerning the Pope's commanding power, and whether the Pope may command a King to use the temporal sword in the necessity of the Church, as I have oftentimes in all my Books expressly affirmed, but concerning the Popes coercive power, and whether if a King will not use the temporal sword at the Pope's command, the Pope hath power to use it himself, and may constrain a King not only with spiritual, but also with temporal compulsion, and punishment to fulfil his just command; Nevertheless, because Card. Bellarmine hath now in his Schulckenius, taken some exceptions against the answer, which I made in my Apology to the authority of S. Bernard, and consequently of Pope Boniface, who, as he saith, doth imitate S. Bernard's words, I think it not amiss to set down my answer, and also his Reply, that so the Reader may clearly perceive, whether S. Bernard doth favour, or disfavour Card. Bellarmine's opinion concerning the Pope's power to use the temporal sword, in case a temporal King will not use it at the Pope's command, and whether D. Schulckenius hath sufficiently confuted the answer, which I did make to the aforesaid authority of S. Bernard. 4 Thus therefore I answered in my Apology d Nu. 196. & seq. , that the words of S. Bernard do only signify, that both the material, and the spiritual sword do belong in some sort to the Church, and are subject unto her, not for that the civil power is per se, and of it own nature subject to the Ecclesiastical, or that the Church, hath by the law of God any power to use the material sword even in order to spiritual good, but because Christian Princes, being children of the Church, are bound (and consequently the Church may command them, and by Ecclesiastical Censures compel them thereunto) in defence of their holy mother the Church, to use the temporal sword. Wherefore although the Church, when she hath present need, hath power to command, or forbidden the use of the material sword, or rather without any positive, or constitutive command of the Church Secular Princes are bound in that case to use it, yet it doth not therefore follow, that the Church herself hath dominion, right, or power to use the corporal sword, seeing that to command the use thereof, and to use it herself are far different things, as I have showed before c Num. 99 yea and the very words of S. Bernard do plainly show as much. For otherwise if the Church, that is, as she consisteth of Ecclesiastical power, should have the dominion of the material sword, and might use it in order to spiritual good, it might by the law of God be drawn forth and used, not only for the Church but also by the Church, not only with the hand of the soldier, but also of the Priest, which nevertheless S. Bernard doth affirm to be against our saviours command, who commanded S. Peter to put up his sword into the scabbard. 5 Wherefore I do not mislike that very exposition (if it be rightly understood) which Card: Bellarmine himself gathereth from those words of S. Bernard, who in this very place, as you have seen, doth affirm, that S. Bernard, and Pope Boniface did by those words signify, that the Pope hath per se, and properly the spiritual sword, (as a temporal Prince hath per se, and properly the material sword) and because the temporal power is subject to the spiritual (not per se, but per accidens to command temporal things in order to spiritual good, but not to punish temporally by way of coercion, but only spiritually as I have often declared) therefore the Pop-hath power to command or forbid a King the use of the temporal sword, when the necessity of the Church doth require it. 6 Therefore the temporal sword according to the opinion of S. Bernard doth belong to the Pope, and is called his sword, for that, when the necessity of the Church doth require, it is to be drawn forth for the Church, but not by the Church, with the hand of the soldier, but not of the Priest, at the beck indeed, or direction, of the Priest, but at the command of the Emperor. By which last words S. Bernard doth signify, that the Emperor in using the temporal sword for the necessity of the Church is indeed to be directed by the Pope (for that the Pope ought to declare, when the Church hath necessity, but the use itself of the sword doth immediately depend upon the Emperor's command, to whose command the soldiers in using the temporal sword are immediately subject. 7 But what if the Emperor shall refuse to use the temporal sword at the Pope's beck, or direction? Hath therefore the Pope, according to S. Bernard's opinion, power to draw it forth himself, or can the Emperor by the Pope's authority be deprived of the dominion thereof? No truly. But because he doth not keep that promise, which he hath given to the Church, and contrary to the law of God he doth not relieve the necessities of the Church, the Church hath power to punish him with Ecclesiastical and spiritual punishments, as I have often said. Wherefore these words of S. Bernard do nothing favour the Pope's temporal power, or his power to use the temporal sword, but rather do directly concontradict it. And this very answer hath joannes Parisiensis * in Tract. de potest Regia, & Papali cap. 1●. in express words etc. Thus I answered in my Apology. 8 Now you shall see, how well D. Schulckenius replieth to this my answer. I answer, saith he f Pag. 386. ad num. 196. , that which my Adversary Widdrington first doth say, that both the swords do belong to the Church, he saith well, but that which he addeth, that both the swords are subject to the Church, he saith not well. For the spiritual sword to be subject to the Church, doth signify no other thing, then that the Pope's power is subject to the Church, which is manifestly false, whereas contrariwise it is to be said, that the Church is subject to the spiritual sword, or to the power of the Pope, unless perchance Widdrington be of opinion, that the Shepherd is subject to his sheep, and not the sheep to the Shepherd. 9 Mark now, good Reader, the cunning, not to say, fraudulent proceeding of this man. Hitherto he hath, as you have seen, taken the Church, the Christian commonwealth, the mystical body, or spiritual kingdom of Christ to be all one, and to be one total body, consisting both of temporal, and spiritual power, and compareth her to a man compounded of body and soul; And may it not, I pray you, be rightly said, that all the powers both of body and soul are subject to man? and why then may it not also be rightly said, that the spiritual sword or power is subject to the Church? But now forsooth this Doctor, that he might take an occasion to charge me with a manifest falsehood, will not take the Church, as he took it before for the whole mystical body of Christ, which total body includeth both the Pope, and all other inferior members thereof, in which sense I did take the Church, when I affirmed, that not only the spiritual, but also the temporal sword is in some sort subject to the Church, but he will take the Church for one part only of this mystical body, to wit, for all the members of the Church besides the Pope, in which sense the Church is indeed sometimes taken, as when the Church is compared with the Pope, and it is said, that the Pope is head of the Church; but when the Church is compared with Christ, and is said to be the mystical body and spiritual kingdom of Christ, the Church doth include both the Pope, and all other inferior members thereof, who jointly make one total body, whereof Christ is the head. And the very like is seen in the body of man; for when the body is compared with the head, the body doth not include the head, but when the body is compared with the soul, & said to be subject to the soul, & that of the body & soul is made one man, than the body doth also include the head. 10. Wherefore taking the Church, as it doth signify the whole mystical body of Christ, in which sense both Card. Bellarmine himself, and also S. Bernard in this very place do take it, when they affirm, that the material sword is to be drawn forth for the Church, and the spiritual by the Church, it is truly said, that the spiritual sword is subject to the Church: Neither doth this signify, that the Pope's spiritual power, is subject to the Church, for now the Church is taken, as it excludeth the Pope, but rather that all spiritual power, which is in any member of the Church, is subject to the whole body of the Church, and consequently to the Pope, in whom all the power of the Church according to Cardinal Bellarmine's opinion, doth reside. And would not D. Schulckenius think, that I did cavil, if I should say of him, as he saith of me, that he spoke not rightly, when in this very place he affirmeth, that Christ gave to the Church both the swords. For the spiritual sword to be given to the Church doth signify no other thing, to use his own words, then that the Pope's power was by Christ our Saviour given to the Church, which in Card. Bellarmine's opinion is not only manifestly false, but also an erroneous doctrine. 11. I omit now, that the ancient Doctors of Paris, (who hold, that the whole body of the Church taken collective, and not including the Pope, which a general Council lawfully assembled doth represent, is superior to the Pope) would not think to speak any falsehood at all, if they should say, that Christ gave all the power, which the Pope hath, also to the Church, and that the Pope's power is subject to the Church, and that it doth not therefore follow, that the Pastor is subject to the sheep, or the superior to the inferior, but rather contrariwise. But in very truth this was not my meaning, when I affirmed, that both swords are in some sort subject to the Church, for by the name of Church I understood also the Pope, as I declared before 12. Secondly, when Widdrington affirmeth, saith D. Schulckenius, that the civil power is not per se subject to the Ecclesiastical, he doth corrupt the text of S. Bernard, and of Pope Boniface the eight. For when S. Bernard saith, that the material sword is the Popes, and is to be drawn forth at his beck, and direction, he clearly confesseth, that the material sword is subject to the spiritual sword, which Pope Boniface doth declare more plainly, when he saith, that the sword must be under the sword, and temporal authority subject to spiritual power. 13. But how shamefully D. Schulckenius accuseth me of corrupting the text of S. Bernard, and Pope Boniface, let the Reader judge; seeing that I neither add, nor diminish, nor alter any one word of their text, but do say the very same words which they do say. For S. Bernard doth say, that the material sword is the Popes, and doth belong to the Pope, but with this limitation, in some sort, to be drawn forth for the Church, but not by the Church, with the hand of the Soldier, not of the Priest, at the beck, or direction, of the Priest, but at the command of the Emperor: and I also say the very same. But S. Bernard doth not say, that the material sword is subject to the spiritual sword per se, but only in some sort, to be drawn forth for the Church, not by the Church etc. From which words it is plainly gathered, that the material sword, or temporal power is, according to S. Bernard, subject to the spiritual, not per se, but per accidons, in spirituals, not in temporals, to be commanded in some case by the Priest, as he is a Priest, but not to be drawn forth, or used by a Priest as he is a Priest, but as he is a temporal Prince, or a public, or private soldier. In like manner I say with Pope Boniface, that the sword is under the sword, and the temporal power is subject to the spiritual, but Pope Boniface doth not say, that the sword is per se under the sword, and the temporal power is per se subject to spiritual authority, and therefore, seeing that he doth imitate S. Bernard's words, as Card. Bellarmine here affirmeth, he is to be understood in that sense, as S. Bernard understood them, to wit, that the sword is under the sword, in some sort, and the temporal power subject to the spiritual in some sort, to be drawn forth, or used for the Church, but not by the Church etc. as I now declared. 14. Thirdly, when Widdrington, affirmeth, saith D. Schulckenius, that the Church hath not by the law of God power to use the material sword even in order to spiritual good, he speaketh too ambiguously. For the law of God doth not command Ecclesiastical men to use with their own hand the material sword, neither doth it so forbidden them, but that his lawful for them in some cases to use it also with their own hand: But nevertheless according to S. Bernard's opinion Christ gave both the sword to the Church, and by this he gave her power to use the material sword in that manner, as doth beseem her, to wit, by the service, or hands of others, in directing Secular Princes, that they draw it forth, or put it in the scabbard, as it is expedient to the honour of God, and the salvation of Christian people. 15. But my words are very plain, and no whit ambiguous I say, that the Church, taking the Church, not materially, for all the members of the Church, but for Churchmen, formally as they are Churchmen, or which is all one, for the Church, as it consisteth of Ecclesiastical power, are according to S. Bernard's doctrine commanded not to draw forth, or use with their own hands the material sword even in order to spiritual good. For S. Bernard's words are plain, why dost thou again attempt to use the sword, which thou wast once, not only counseled, but commanded to put up into the scabbard etc. But if the Pope become a temporal Prince or a Priest do lawfully become a Soldier, to fight either in his own defence, or in the defence of others, which Christ did not forbid, although the Church in some cases hath forbidden it, neither I, nor S. Bernard do deny, that the Pope, as he is a temporal Prince, or a Priest, as he is a lawful Soldier, hath power to use with their own hands the material sword. Neither did S. Bernard ever grant, that the Pope, as he is Pope, or a Priest as he is a Priest, or, which is all one, by his spiritual, or Priestly authority, hath power to draw forth, or to use with his own hands the material sword, although the Pope by his spiritual power may direct and command a temporal Prince to draw it forth, and use it, when the necessity of the Church shall require, which only D. Schulckenius in this paragraph doth affirm. 16. Fourthly, that is false, saith D. Schulckenius, g Pag. 387. which Widdrington affirmeth, that the material sword in that only sense doth belong to the Church, because Secular Princes being children of the Church are bound to fight in defence of the Church their mother. For S. Bernard doth grant much more to the Ecclesiastical Prince, when he saith, Therefore it is also thine, to wit, the material sword. And beneath, Therefore both the spiritual and the material sword are the Churches, but the material sword is to be drawn forth for the Church, and the spiritual also by the Church, the spiritual with the hand of the Priest, the material with the hand of the Soldier, but truly at the beck, or direction of the Priest, and at the command of the Emperor. Where S. Bernard doth not only signify, that Soldiers or Princes are bound to draw forth the sword for the Church, but also at the beck, or direction of the Priest, that is, with subordination to the Ecclesiastical power, as Soldiers ought to use the sword with subordination to the command of the Emperor. 17. But any man who readeth over but slightly my answer in that place, will easily perceive, that this is a mere cavil, and also a plain untruth; for that in express words I do affirm, that Secular Princes and Soldiers are, according to S. Bernard, to draw forth, and use the material sword for the necessity of the Church, at the beck, counsel, direction, yea, and command of the Priest, which is as much, as D. Schulckenius here affirmeth S. Bernard to say; although S. Bernard did expressly distinguish betwixt beck and command, at the beck, saith he, of the Priest, but at the command of the Emperor; whereby it is manifest, that S. Bernard did not account beck and command to be all one, and consequently, he did not approve the same subordination to be betwixt Secular Princes, and the Priest in using the material sword, as is betwixt Soldiers, and the Emperor. For albeit S. Bernard by the name of beck did not only understand advise and counsel, which Christian Princes in all their weighty affairs concerning the Law of God and Christian Religion ought to demand of learned Priests, and who are skilful in the Law of God, and Christian Religion, but also a command to fight, and use the material sword in defence of the Church and Christian Religion, & to the observing of which command, Christian Princes may, as also I said, by Ecclesiastical censures be compelled, yet this command being a declarative command, which doth only declare a former command of God, and nature, and doth not make a new bond, but only declare and signify a former obligation, may rather be called a beckoning, and signifying, that Christian Princes are by the Law of God bound in that case to draw forth, fight, and use the material sword, than a true, proper, and constitutive command, which doth not only signify. but also induce a new bond or obligation. 18. And in this sense not only joannes Parisiensis, whom I cited before, h Num. 8. doth understand those words of S. Bernard (at the beck indeed of the Priest) but also our learned Countryman Alexander of Hales, There is, saith he, i 3. Par. q. 34. memb. 2. ar. 3. an authority to command, and an authority to beckon; in the authority to command it doth follow, he doth that thing by whose authority it is done, but in the authority to beckon this doth not follow. The authority to command wicked men to be slain is in the Emperor, but the authority to beckon is in the Pope and Priests. And this beckoning as hath been said, is a preaching of the Law of God, and an exhorting, that Princes will obey the Law of God, Whereupon S. Bernard showeth how both the material and spiritual sword are the Churches, and do belong to the Church, not for as much as concerneth use or command, but for as much as concerneth beckoning: whereupon he speaketh in this manner to Eugenius, he that denieth the material sword to be thine, seemeth to me not to regard sufficiently the word of our Lord saying, Return thy sword into thy scabbard, and so forth as it followeth in S. Bernard. 19 Wherefore, according to S. Bernard, the material sword is subject to the spiritual, not absolutely, but in some sort to be beckoned, but not to be used or commanded, as beckoning is distinguished from command, by the Priest, as he is a Priest. And therefore that Gloss, which D. Schulckenius maketh of those words [at the beck indeed of the Priest] that is, saith he, with subordination to the Ecclesiastical power, as Soldiers ought to use the sword with subordination to the command of the Emperor, is very untrue, & expressly against S. Bernard's words; both because the Emperor hath power to command the soldier to use the material sword, but the Priest according to S. Bernard hath only power to beckon, but not to command the use thereof, and also because if the Soldier will not use the material sword at the emperors command; the Emperor, as Emperor, may use it himself, and with his own hand, which the Priest, as Priest, or, which is all one, the Ecclesiastical power, according to S. Bernard, cannot do; and moreover because the Emperor, as Emperor, may compel the soldier with temporal punishments to use the material sword, and not only deprive him of his power and right to use the same; but also of his temporal life, which the Priest, as Priest, or the Ecclesiastical power, cannot do. 20. And therefore who would not marvel to see D. Schulckenius so boldly, and in such public writings to affirm, That the question is not, whether the spiritual Prince hath dominion, right, or power to use the material sword: but only, whether the sword be under the sword, and whether the temporal power be subject to the spiritual. And whereas Widdrington, saith he, in this place confesseth, that the Church hath power to command, or forbidden in time of necessity the use of the material sword, from thence we do gather that the sword is under the sword, and the temporal power is subject to the command, and prohibition of the spiritual power, which only Card. Bellarmine in that his second argument did intend. Wherefore Widdrington doth seem to decline of set purpose the principal question. For, as we have often said, the question is not concerning the dominion, or use of the material sword, but concerning the power to direct it, and concerning the subjection of the material sword to the spiritual. But these in the option of S. Bernard are most manifest. And for as much as appertaineth to the use of the material sword, we assent altogether to S. Bernard, that it doth not beseem Ecclesiastical men to use the material sword, but only the spiritual, and thus much only those words of our Saviour do signify, Put up thy sword into thy scabbard, and those of S. Bernard, Why dost thou again attempt to use the sword, which once thou wast commanded to put into the scabbard? For here it is not meant of the Law of God, by which Ecclesiastical men are absolutely forbidden to use the material sword; seeing that it is manifest, that in some cases, and especially in defence of themselves, and of their Country: this is lawful, but of the command of God, by which Clergy men are instructed, and taught, that their vocation is not to fight with the material, but with the spiritual sword. Thus D. Schulckenius. 21. But it is strange to see, how far affection will carry the pens of learned men; In very truth I should never have imagined, that D. Schulckenius, or any other learned man, who hath read my Apology, would ever have been so bold, as to affirm, That the question betwixt me, and Card. Bellarmine is not, whether the Pope hath power to use the material sword, but only whether the sword be under the sword, and the temporal power subject to the command, and prohibition of the spispirituall power, and that this only was intended by Card. Bellarmine in his second argument. For first concerning the question betwixt me, and Card. Bellarmine it is evident, that I have oftentimes declared in my Apology, and D. Schulckenius also setteth down my words, that the true state of the question betwixt me and Card. Bellarmine, is not concerning the Pope's power to command, but to dispose of temporals, nor whether the sword be in any manner whatsoever under the sword, or the temporal power in any sort subject to the spiritual, but in what manner the sword is under the sword, and after what sort the temporal power is subject to the spiritual. For I have often granted, that the spiritual power, or the Pope as Pope, may command temporals, and the use of the material sword, and punish disobedient Princes with Ecclesiacall censures: but what, which I utterly denied, was, that the spiritual power, or the Pope as Pope may dispose of temporals, use the material sword, or punish disobedient Princes by taking away their lives, kingdoms, or goods. 22. Secondly, it is also manifest, that Card. Bellarmine in his second argument did not only intend to prove, that the temporal power is subject to the command, and prohibition of the spiritual power, as D. Schulckenius affirmeth, but also, that the spiritual power may use, and dispose of temporals, depose temporal Princes, and institute others, and constrain or punish with temporal punishments. For mark, I pray you, his second argument: In the first part thereof he argueth thus. The power to use and dispose of temporals (and consequently of the material sword which is a temporal thing) is necessary to the spiritual end, because otherwise wicked Princes might without punishment favour Heretics, and overthrow Religion, therefore the Church hath also, this power. And yet D. Schulckenius doth not blush to affirm, that Card. Bellarmine in his second argument did only intend to prove, that the temporal power is subject to the command, and prohibition of the spiritual power. And in the second part of his argument he concludeth thus: Therefore much more the spiritual commonwealth, hath power to command the temporal commonwealth, which is subject unto her, and to constrain her to change her government, and to depose Princes, and to institute others, when she can not otherwise defend her spiritual good. And in this manner are to be understood the words of S. Bernard, and Pope Boniface, etc. Thus Card. Bellarmine. So that according to Card. Bellarmine, S. Bernard's words do prove, that the Pope hath power not only to command the material sword, but also to use it, unless the material sword is not to be comprehended under the name of temporals. And therefore not I, but D. Schulckenius doth of set purpose decline the difficulty, and also untruly affirmeth, that Card: Bellarmine did not intend to prove in his second argument, that the Pope hath power to use the material sword, but only that the material sword is subject to the command and prohibition of the spiritual power, seeing that Card: Bellarmine's second argument doth most clearly show the contrary. 23 But mark now how clearly D. Schulckenius doth either contradict S. Bernard's words and himself, or else foully equivocate, and confirm the answer which I gave to the authority of S. Bernard. I affirmed, that S. Bernard's words are so to be understood, that it is lawful for Ecclesiastical men, as they are Ecclesiastical men, to command in some cases the use of the material sword, but that to use the material sword themselves, as they are Ecclesiastical men, they are forbidden by the express command of Christ. Now D. Schulckenius affirmeth k Pag. 390. , that for as much at appertaineth to the use of the material sword, he assenteth altogether to S. Bernard, that it doth not beseem Ecclesiastical men to use the material sword, but only the spiritual; and thus much only those words of our Saviour do signify, Return thy sword into the scabbard; and those of S. Bernard, why dost thou again attempt to use the sword, which once thou wast commanded to put into the scabbard? For here it is not meant of the law of God, by which Ecclesiastical men are absolutely forbidden to use the material sword, seeing that it is manifest, that in some cases, and especially in defence of themselves and of their country, this is lawful, but of the command of God, by which Clergy men are instructed, and taught, that their vocation is not to fight with the material, but with the spiritual sword. Thus D. Schulckenius. 24 But if D. Schulckenius mean that Ecclesiastical men are only for decency, which implieth no command, not to use the material sword, he plainly contradicteth S. Bernard, to whom nevertheless he affirmeth altogether to assent, who expressly averreth, that the Pope in S. Peter was not only counseled, but commanded not to use the material sword. And therefore S. Bernard's words can not otherwise be understood, but that Ecclesiastical men, as they are Ecclesiastical men, and the Pope, as Pope, are by the command of Christ absolutely forbidden to use the material sword; for S. Bernard did not intend to affirm, that Ecclesiastical men, if they become temporal Princes, or being considered, as they are private men, or citizens, and parts, or members of the temporal commonwealth, are by the command of Christ forbidden to use the material sword, and to fight in defence of their own persons, or of their Country. 25 Wherefore those last words of D. Schulckenius, to wit, that S. Bernard's saying is to be understood of the command of God, by which Clergy men are instructed, and taught, that their vocation is not to fight with the material, but with the spiritual sword, are somewhat equivocal. For if D. Schulckenius do only understand of such an instruction, which implieth no command of Christ, but only a certain decency, counsel, and advise, for that it doth not beseem the perfection of those men, who have a spiritual vocation, to fight with the material sword, he plainly contradicteth himself, and also S. Bernard himself, for that he acknowledgeth a command of God, whereby Clergy men are instructed &c. but this instruction supposeth no command of God; S. Bernard also he contradicteth, who expressly speaketh of a command, whereby Ecclesiastical men are by the law of Christ, and not only of the Church forbidden to use the material sword, which command of Christ, as I said before, can be no other, than that Ecclesiastical men can not, as they are Ecclesiastical men, use the material sword; for that although the Ecclesiastical power doth according to S. Bernard and the truth, extend to the beckoning, or declarative commanding of the material sword in some cases, yet it doth not extend to the using thereof, but this power to use the material sword doth proceed from the law of nature, or the civil power, who do give authority to every man, whether he be a Clerk, or Laike in case at least wise of necessity, to use the material sword in defence of his own person, or of his country. And if D. Schulckenius only intend to signify thus much by those last words of his, which in very deed can not be otherwise understood, unless we will make them repugnant to themselves, he doth favour, not contradict, confirm and not impugn my answer. 26 Fiftly, observe, good Reader, how cunningly D. Schulckenius would shift off the last, and principal Answer, which I made to the authority of S. Bernard. I granted, as you have seen before, that the Pope, as Pope, hath, according to S. Bernard, power to beckon, or command the Emperor to use the material sword, when the necessity of the Church shall require and to punish him with Ecclesiastical punishments, if he shall refuse to obey his just command, or beck, and I affirmed, that this is the most, that can be gathered from those words of S. Bernard. But if the Emperor should refuse to use the material sword at the Pope's command, or beck, I affirmed, that it could not be inferred from that authority of S. Bernard, that the Pope, as Pope, could use it himself, or deprive the Emperor of his temporal dominion, or power to use the material sword, for this were to use, and to dispose of temporals, and implieth a power to use, and draw forth the material sword itself, which S. Bernard expressly denieth to the Pope: and that therefore S. Bernard's authority doth nothing favour, but clearly contradict the Pope's power, I do not say, to command temporals, but to dispose of temporals, and to use temporals, as joannes Parisiensis, and Alexander of Hales, l Num. 18. did before affirm. Now to this my answer D. Schulckenius replieth m Pag. 393. in this manner. 27. Thou didst run well, who hath hindered thee so soon not to obey the truth? For now thou dost not follow S. Bernard, but William Barclay, as thy Master. If that the Emperor shall refuse to use the sword at the beck of the Pope in great necessity of the Church, it is not indeed fitting for the Pope to use the material sword, but he hath power to constrain the Emperor, first with Ecclesiastical punishments, and afterwards also by depriving him of the sword, as in the like case the Council of Lateran often cited doth teach, which one Council is to be preferred before all the Barclays, or johns of Paris, all men do think, who are not mad. 28. Is not this think you a trim answer? The question betwixt me, and Card. Bellarmine in this place was not concerning the Council of Lateran, whereof I will treat beneath, * Part. 3. cap. 9 & seq. and plainly show, that, notwithstanding all the clamours of my Adversaries, the said Council hath neither defined, or supposed for certain, nay or supposed at all, that the Pope hath power to depose Sovereign Princes, as D. Schulckenius doth here collect from thence, but the question was only concerning the authority of S. Bernard. And I proved clearly out of S. Bernard's words, that although the Pope, as Pope hath power to command, or forbidden in some cases the use of the material sword, yet that he hath power, as he is Pope, to use it himself, or to deprive the Emperor of the use thereof, which implieth a power to use it himself, this I said could not be proved, but rather the contrary out of those words of S. Bernard, who doth not only say, that it is not fitting for the Pope to use the material sword, as D. Schulckenius would mince his words, but that it is forbidden the Pope to draw forth, or use the material sword. Now D. Schulckenius passeth over S. Bernard, and flieth to the Council of Lateran to prove, that if the Emperor refuse at the Pope's command to use the material sword, he may by the Pope's authority be deprived of the use thereof, whereas the present question was only concerning the opinion of S. Bernard, and not what was the doctrine of the Council of Lateran in this point, whose authority I do as much respect either as Card. Bellarmine, or any other Catholic is bound to do. But it is an easy matter to wrest the words of the Council of Lateran, or any other to their purpose, contrary to the true meaning of the Council, and then to cry out o the Council of Lateran, which is to be preferred before all Barclays, and widdrington's etc. whereas we do as much respect the authority of the Council of Lateran, or any other, as they do, although we do not so much respect their over wrested collections, which they to serve their own turns, do gather from any Council, or text of holy Scripture, contrary to the plain, proper, and true sense and meaning of the words. But to such shift, and windings even learned men are sometimes brought, when they will make their uncertain opinions, and private expositions of holy Scriptures, or councils to be infallible grounds of the Catholic faith. 29. Lastly but the foundation, saith D. Schulckenius, of Widdringtons' error is, for that he thinketh, that the Pope hath authority to constrain the Emperor by reason of the faith, and free promise, which the Emperor gave, and made to the Pope, according to the similitude, which a little before he put concerning one, who promised an other to spend his life, and all his goods in defence of him. But this foundation is false, because the authority of the Pope over Christian Princes doth not proceed from their only promise, or faith, which they have given, but from the law of God, by which law the Pope is made by Christ the Pastor of all his stock, the chief of all his family, the head. of all his body, and the rector of all his Church, Wherefore it is no marvel, if from false foundation he conclude a falsehood to wit, that S. Bernard's words do not only, not favour the Pope's temporal power, but are flat contrary to it. What I beseech you, could be spoken more clearly for the Pope's temporal power, then that which S. Bernard said, that the temporal sword is the Popes, and that both swords are the Churches, and that the temporal sword ought to be drawn forth at the Pope's beck? And as for joannes Parisiensis there is no great reckoning to be made of him whatsoever he saith, both for that he is repugnant to the Council of Lateran, and many others, and also that other his errors are condemned by the Church in the common Extravagant, Vas electionis, and lastly, for that either he denieth only the Pope's direct power in temporals, or else he doth plainly contradict himself. 30. But truly it is strange, that learned men, and who pretend to maintain nothing but truth, dare adventure to avouch so boldly, and in such public writings so manifest untruths, and which they themselves in their consciences can not but see to be plain, and palpable untruths. I very often, and that of set purpose did affirm in my Apology, and D. Schulckenius doth also set down my words, that the Pope, as Pope, hath power to command temporal Princes in temporals in order to spiritual good, and yet this man to make his Reader believe, that I do teach flat heresy, blusheth not to affirm in an other place, n Pag. 256. that I deny, that the Pope, as Pope, hath power to command temporal Princes in temporals in order to spiritual good. So likewise, I did oftentimes in my Apology affirm, o Num. 90.91.181.223.341. and D. Schulckenius doth also set down my words, that the Pope, as Pope hath power by the law of God, and for that he is appointed by Christ to be the supreme spiritual Pastor of the Catholic Church, to constrain and punish all disobedient Christians both Princes and people, with spiritual and Ecclesiastical punishments; and yet now this man to persuade his Reader, that I teach here a manifest error, is not ashamed to affirm, that I am of opinion, that the Pope hath authority to constrain the Emperor in regard only of the free promise, which the Emperor hath made to the Pope. And therefore D. Schulckenius neither dealeth truly nor sincerely, and both deludeth his Reader, and also wrongeth me, in affirming, that to be my doctrine, which I expressly impugn, and that to be the foundation of my opinion (which he is pleased to call an error) which I in express words, and that oftentimes have denied. 21. For as I do willingly grant, that although a temporal Prince hath power to command, and with temporal punishments to compel, if need require, his temporal subjects to make, and swear an express promise of that true faith, loyalty and temporal allegiance, which by the Law of God and nature they do owe to their lawful Prince, yet I do not affirm, that a temporalll Prince hath power to constrain his rebellious subjects by virtue only of the promise, which they have made, but by virtue of his supreme temporal power which he hath, as he is a supreme temporal Prince by the Law of God and nature; So also I do willingly grant, that although the Pope hath power to command, and with spiritual punishments to compel, if need require, all Christian Princes and people to make and swear an express promise of that the true faith, loyalty and spiritual allegiance, which as they are Christians and members of the mystical body of Christ, they do owe by the Law of God to the supreme spiritual Pastor and visible head of this mystical body and Church of Christ, and the Emperor at his coronation taketh such an oath, nevertheless I do not affirm, that the Pope hath power to constrain and punish disobedient Princes, and people by virtue only of the promise, which they have made to the Pope of their spiritual obedience, but by virtue of his supreme spiritual power, which he hath by the Law of God, and his Pastoral authority given to him by our Saviour Christ jesus. 32. True it is, that the Reader might the better understand, that to command one to use a temporal thing, and to use it himself, to command one to dispose of temporals, and to dispose of them himself, are very different things, and that the one doth not necessarily follow from the other, I brought a familiar example of one, who either, by promise, or by some other obligation (and yet D. Schulckenius taketh hold only of the promise, and clean omitteth the other obligation) is bound to dispose, and give his goods, or life at anthers' command, who notwithstanding this promise, or other obligation, doth still keep the property, dominion and right over his goods and life, in such sort, that the other cannot be virtue of his commanding power, which he hath over him and them, take them away and dispose of them without his consent, but if he will not dispose of his goods at the others command, according as by virtue either of his promise, or of some other obligation he is bound to do, the other may complain to the Magistrate, that he will punish him for his offence, or cause him to perform his promise, so far forth as the coercive power of the Magistrate doth extend. From which I concluded, that considering to have the power to command the use of the temporal sword, and to have a power to use it, or to deprive of the use thereof, are two different things, neither doth one necessarily follow from the other, although the Pope, as Pope, hath according to S. Bernard, power to command the Emperor to use the temporal sword, yet it doth not therefore follow that if the Emperor will not use the temporal sword at the Pope's command, the Pope, as Pope, can use it himself, or deprive the Emperor of the use thereof, which implieth a power to use the same, but only, that the Pope, being a spiritual Prince or Pstour, may punish the Emperor for his contempt with spiritual punishments, which only do belong to the coercive power of the supreme spiritual Prince & Pastor of the spiritual kingdom & Church of Christ. 33. Thus therefore you have seen, that S. Bernard doth nothing favour, but it is rather flat contrary to the Pope's power to use the temporal sword, neither could he scarce speak more clearly against the same, than he hath done. For although it be clear, that the temporal sword is, according to S. Bernard, the Popes in some sort, and doth belong to the Church in some sort (which words [in some sort] D. Schulckenius here cunningly omitteth) and that in some cases it must be used at the beck, direction or declarative command of the Pope, yet the aforesaid limitations of S. Bernard that it is the Popes, and belongeth to the Pope in some sort, that it is to be used for the Church, but not by the Church, with the hand of the Soldier, and not of the Priest, at the beck indeed of the Pope, but at the command of the Emperor, and that our Saviour commanded, and not only counseled S. Peter to put up his sword into the scabbard, do plainly show, that, according to S. Bernard, the Pope as Pope, cannot use the temporal sword, nor constrain a temporal Prince by, using temporal punishments, which doth imply a power to use the temporal sword. 34. And for D. Barclay, and john of Paris (to omit our learned Countryman, Alexander of Hales, whose words I related before) p Num. 18. who do give the very same answer, which I have given to the aforesaid words of S. Bernard, of whose authority although Card. Bellarmine, here doth make very small reckoning, yet I do plainly confess, that in this controversy concerning the Pope's authority to use the temporal sword, and to dispose of all temporals in order to spiritual good, I do more regard their authority, than I do Card. Bellarmine's, speaking with all dutiful respect, for that in my opinion they have handled this question more sound, more clearly, and more sincerely than he hath done. Neither is their doctrine repugnant to the Council of Laterane, but only to the particular exposition, which some few especially of late years (who have scraped together all the authorities of Fathers, councils, Scriptures, facts, and decrees of Popes which may seem any way to favour the Pope's temporal authority) have wrested out the words of the said Council, contrary to the plain sense of the words, and the common understanding of all ancient Divines, who never urged this authority of the Council of Laterane, although it hath been so long publicly extant in the body of the Canon Law. But it is now adays a common fault even among Catholic Divines, and those also, who, not perceiving their own error, do accuse others of the same, to allege, in confirmation of their opinions, the holy Scriptures, and sacred Counsels understood according to their own private spirit and meaning, and then to cry out against their brethren, who mislike their opinions, that they have the holy scriptures, and sacred Counsels on their side, and that therefore their doctrine is of faith, and the contrary heretical, and that their Adversaries do oppose themselves against the holy Scriptures, and decrees of the Catholic Church, whereas we do regard, with all dutiful respect the holy Scriptures, sacred Counsels, and decrees of the Catholic Church (the authority of which consisteth in the true and authentical sense, & not in the letter, or in the exposition of any private Catholic Doctor, which exposition others do contradict) and do oppose ourselves only against their uncertain opinions, and expositions of holy Scriptures, or sacred councils, grounded upon their private spirit and understanding, contrary to the true, proper, and plain meaning of the words. 35. And although this joannes Parisiensis, or rather another john of Paris living at the same time, and surnamed de Poliaco, as I said before q Part. 1. ca 3. nu. 7. & seq. , was compelled to recall in open Consistory, at Avignon before Pope john the 22. certain errors, which he maintained concerning confession, and absolution (of whose authority nevertheless Card. Bellarmine in the latter Editions of his controversies; notwithstanding those his errors, maketh some reckoning, seeing he citeth him as a Classical Doctor in favour of his opinion r Lib. 5. de Rom. Pont. cap. 1. ) yet this rather confirmeth me in my opinion. For if his doctrine, which denieth that the Pope, as Pope, hath power to deprive iuridically, and by way of sentence, temporal Princes of their dominions, and to use the temporal sword, had been thought in those days to have been heretical, or erroneous, as now Card. Bellarmine, and some few other jesuits will needs have it to be, it is like, that he should also have been compelled to recall that doctrine, and that those learned Authors, who writ of heresies, as Alphonsus de Castro, Prateolus Genebrard, D. Sanders, and others would for the same have taxed him, and Marsilius of Padua (as also Albericus, and those many Schoolmen and Doctors, related by Trithemius and Almain, who did defend the same doctrine) with some note of heresy, or error, which seeing they have not done, it is a manifest sign, that they did not account that doctrine for heretical, or erroneous, & that the decree of the Council of Lateran, which was long before any of these men's days, and which was also so public and registered in the corpse of the Canon Law, was not in those times understood in that sense, as Card. Bellarmine now of late (for before in his controversies he made small reckoning of that authority, for that he clean omitteth that decree: yet bringing many particular facts of Popes, yea & of Pope Innocent the third, in whose time, and by whose authority that Council was held) and some few others without sufficient proof, as I will show beneath s Part. 3. ca 9 & seq. , will needs have that decree to be understood. 36. Neither is that true, which D. Schulckenius affirmeth, that joannes Parisiensis (in acknowledging. That when the Pope doth beckon, the Emperor ought to exercise the jurisdiction of the secular power for the spiritual good. But if he will not, or if it doth not seem to him expedient, the Pope hath no other thing to do, because he hath not the material sword in command, but only the Emperor, according to S. Bernard) doth either speak of the direct power of the Pope to use them material sword, or else contradict himself, when afterwards he writeth, that the Pope may per accidens, depose the Emperor, by causing the people to depose him. For joannes Parisiensis in that his Treatise, de potestate Regia & Papali, doth expressly impugn both the direct, and indirect coercive power of the Pope to punish by way of sentence, and iuridically with temporal punishments, affirming, as D. Schulckenius also himself here relateth, that Excommunication, or some such like spiritual punishment is the last, which an Ecclesiastical judge can inflict. For although it belongeth to an Ecclesiastical judge, to bring men back to God, and to withdraw them from sin, yet he hath not this, but according to the way or means given him by God, which is by excluding from the Sacraments and the participation of the faithful. 37 Neither doth joannes Parisiensis therefore contradict himself in affirming, that the Pope may depose per accidens by means of the people. For although he be of opinion, as I showed before t Part. 1. ca 2. , that the people have in some cases a coercive power over their Prince and in some cases may depose him, and consequently the Pope may in those cases, if it be necessary to the good of the Church, command the people, and with spiritual punishments compel them to use their coercive power, and so the Pope may be said to depose a Prince per accidens by means of the people, with which philosophical question I will not at this time, as I often said, intermeddle, yet concerning the Popes coercive power to use himself the temporal sword, or to depose the Emperor by way of juridical sentence, (which is not repugnant to his authority to depose by means of the people, if the people have any such authority to depose, which many learned Divines, to whose opinion the ancient Fathers seem to assent as I have signified heretofore do deny,) u in my Apology nu. 411. and here part: 1. cap. 3. nu. 5. joannes Parisiensis is clean opposite to Card. Bellarmine's opinion, and expressly affirmeth, that the Pope hath no power to deprive iuridically, or by way of sentence, temporal Princes of their kingdoms, but only to inflict by way of coercion or constraint Ecclesiastical or spiritual Censures. And thus much both concerning my answer to S. Bernard's authority, and also the Reply, which D. Schulckenius hath made thereunto. 38 Now to the authority of Pope Boniface the 8. I answer first that his words are to be understood in that sense, as I expounded S. Bernard, whom he, as Card: Bellarmine affirmeth, did imitate, to wit, that the temporal power is in order to spiritual good, or, which is all one, in spiritual things subject to the command of the spiritual power, and that she is to be instructed by the spiritual, not absolutely in temporal government, but in Christian faith and religion, and that if she go out of the way, or err in things belonging to Christian faith and religion, she is to be judged by the spiritual, but with spiritual not temporal punishments. And in this sense it is very true, that the sword is under the sword, and the temporal power is subject to the spiritual, but by this it is only signified, that temporal Princes are in spirituals, but not in mere temporals, subject to the spiritual command, and spiritual correction of spiritual Pastors. 39 Secondly, although Pope Boniface should understand those words in this sense, that temporal Princes are, not only in spirituals, but also in temporals subject to the Pope's power both to command, and also to punish temporally, yet his authority herein, as he is Pope, (for as he is a private Doctor, it is no greater than of other Doctors) is not of any great weight; considering first, that, as well observeth D. duval x De suprema Rom. Pont. potest. part. 2. q. 4. pag. 262.263. a learned Schoole-divine, & one of the King's Readers in the College of Sorbon, although Pope Boniface doth make mention both of the spiritual, and temporal sword, and in the progress of his Constition doth say, that the temporal sword is under the spiritual yet in the definition or conclusion (which chiefly as in the decrees of councils is to be regarded, seeing that this only bindeth to believe) this only he pronounceth in general, but we declare, say, define, and pronounce, that it is necessary to the salvation of every human creature to be subject to the Bishop of Rome. But in what manner all men must be subject, it is not expressed in this definition; and therefore not to contradict this definition it is sufficient to affirm, that all men must in spirituals be subject to the Pope's power to command, and to punish s; piritually. 40 Secondly, for that this Extravagant was recalled by his Successor Pope Clement the fift, in cap. meruit, de privilegijs, wherein he declareth, that no prejudice shall arise to the King of France by that Extravagant of Pope Boniface, but that all things shall be understood to be in the same state, as they were before that definition, as well concerning the Church, as concerning the King, and Kingdom of France, Thirdly, for that all the authorities, which he bringeth from holy Scriptures to prove, that the Pope hath both the temporal and spiritual sword, do prove only, that the Pope is the spiritual Pastor of the Church, and hath spiritual power to bind, and lose, to judge and punish spiritually, as, whatsoever thou shalt bind on earth etc. and a spiritual man doth judge all things, and he is judged by none, which place some Catholic writers expound of public and authentical judgements: For all the other places of holy Scripture, which Pope Boniface allegeth, are either taken in the mystical, and not in the literal sense, as those behold two swords here, and put up thy sword into the scabbard, but from the mystical sense no forcible argument can be drawn, as all Divines do grant, to prove any doctrine, unless to have that mystical sense it be declared in other places of holy Scripture, or else they make nothing to the purpose, as are those words, which God spoke to the Prophet jeremy, Behold I have appointed thee this day over the Gentiles, and over Kingdoms, that thou mayest pluck up and destroy, and waste and dissipate, and build and plant, not to destroy nations, and kingdoms, and raise up others, but by his preaching to plant virtues, and destroy vices, as S. Hierome expoundeth, and by foretelling the destruction of Kingdoms and Nations, if they do not repent, and their increase and salvation if they will be converted. Neither is the Pope S. jeremies' Successor in the spirit of prophesy, neither do we read, that jeremy destroyed any kingdom, although he fulfilled all that, which he was appointed to do by Alm: God. 41. It is the same, saith Andrea's Capella upon this place, to appoint him over the Gentiles, and to give him a Prophet in the Gentiles; as he said before. I give thee power and authority, saith God, to declare and foretell in my name, as my Prophet, the ruins and wastings of the Gentiles and of Kingdoms. That thou threaten my enemies, whom in their Countries I have planted, placed, confirmed, erected that I will abolish them with captivities, unless they will repent. And contrariwise, that I will build them, and plant them again, that is, restore to their ancient state, them whom I shall destroy and abolish if they will acknowledge their sins. And in these words all the charge of jeremy is comprehended, and the matter of this whole book is declared. For it is a prophecy of the destruction of the City, and temple, and of the captivity of the people, and of their return from captivity, and of the re-edifying of the temple and City, and of the overthrow of other nations, and kingdoms. Thus Capella. And the same exposition of these words hath the Gloss upon this place Besides Pope Boniface in this Extravagant allegeth for Scripture that, which is no Scripture, to wit, for the truth testifying the spiritual power hath to institute or instruct the earthly power, and to judge it if it shall not be good, which words are not to be found in the holy Scripture. 42. Lastly, there is no more account to be made of the authority of Pope Boniface the eight for this his doctrine in this point, touching the Pope's temporal authority over temporal Princes, if we take him, as a private Doctor delivering his opinion, then of an other Doctor, as well learned as he was, who holdeth with the Canonists, that the Pope is direct Lord & King of the world not only spiritual, but also temporal; for that Pope Boniface was of this opinion, that the Pope hath direct power not only in spirituals, but also in temporals. Whereupon he wrote to Philip the fair, King of France, that he was subject to him in spirituals and temporals, and that all those, who should hold the contrary he reputed for heretics: and that the kingdom of France by reason of the King's disobedience was fallen to the Church For which words Pope Boniface is taxed by joannes Tilius x In Chron. ad annum 1302. Bishop of Meldune, by Robertus Guaguinus y Lib. 7. in Philippo Pulch. , by Platina z In vita Bonifaci● octavi. , and others, of great pride, impudency and arrogancy. Whereupon Paulus Aemilius (who doth otherwise greatly favour Pope Boniface) writeth thus: * In Philippo Pulchro. Pope Boniface did add, at which all men did marmaile, that the King of France ought to reverence the Pope not only in sacred manner, and by Episcopal right, as a Father of our souls, but he ought also to acknowledge him, as his Prince by civil jurisdiction, and in profane matters and dominion. All this being considered, as also, that all the words of that Extravagant are so general, that they may be understood as well, if not better, of the Pope's direct dominion in temporals, as of his indirect power to dispose of temporals, which is only in order to spiritual good, what great reckoning is to be made of this constitution of P. Boniface, it being withal reversed by P. Clemens the 5. who next but one succeeded him, I remit to the consideration of the judicious Reader Chap. 10. Wherein the similitude of Pope Innocent the third, who compareth the spiritual and temporal power to the Sun & Moon, is examined. 1. THe sixth, and last argument, which Card. Bellarmine bringth to prove the sbiection of the temporal power to the spiritual, is taken from the authority of Pope Innocent the third, who in cap. Solitae de maioritate & obedientia doth well, saith he, a In tract. contra Barcl: c. 13. in fine. compare the spiritual & temporal power to the Sun & Moon. Therefore as the moon is subject to the Sun, for that she receiveth light from the Sun, & the Sun is not subject to the Moon, for that the Sun receiveth nothing from the Moon, so also a king is subject to the Pope, & the Pope is not subject to a king 2. But first this similitude doth not prove, that the temporal power itself is subject to the spiritual, or, which is all one, that a temporal King is subject to the Pope in respect of his temporal power, which he doth not receive from the Pope, but in respect of the light of faith, which a temporal King receiveth from the spiritual power. And therefore as the Moon, when she is eclipsed, & in opposition to the Sun, doth not lose that little light, which, according to the doctrine of the Philosophers and astronomers, she hath of her own nature, and not derived from the Sun, so temporal Princes, when of Catholics or Christians they become heretics, or infidels, and are in opposition to the Pope, do not lose their temporal power, and the light of natural reason, which they receive not from the Pope, but only the light of faith and grace, which they did receive from the spiritual power. 3. Secondly, that, which Card. Bellarmine affirmeth, that the Pope receiveth nothing from temporal Princes is very untrue, and therefore in this point also that part of the similitude is not fitly applied. For the Pope hath received from temporal Princes all his temporal dominion, jurisdiction, and temporal sword, and the whole patrimony of S. Peter, wherein, as the same Pope Innocent affirmeth, b In cap. per venerabilem qui filii sint legitimi. he doth now exercise the power of a supreme temporal Prince. Neither is it only true, that temporal Princes are in spirituals subject to the spiritual power of spiritual Pastors, from whom they receive spiritual light, and supernatural directions by the holy Scriptures & Ecclesiastical laws, by which they may see how to live like good Christians, and to attain to life everlasting, but it is also true, that spiritual Pastors, as inferior Bishops and Clergy men are in temporals subject to the temporal power of temporal Princes, from whom they receive the increase of natural light, and civil directions by civil and temporal Laws, by which they may see, how to converse civilly among themselves and other men, and to attain to temporal peace and quietness in the civil commonwealth. 4. Whereupon well said S. Ambrose, c Lib. 10. in Lucan. cap. 20. If thou wilt not be subject to Caesar, do not have worldly things, but if thou hast riches, thou art subject to Caesar. For all men, saith Astensis, d In summa. lib. 2. tit. 39 are subject to the Emperor, Lay-men in temporals, and Clergy men, who do receive from him temporals. And Gratian the Compiler of the first and most ancient part of the Canon Law, called the Decree, writeth thus: e Causa 11. q. 1. cap. 11. Clergy men by their office are subject to the Bishop, by the possessions of farms or manours they are subject to the Emperor. From the Bishop they receive unction, tithes and first fruits, from the Emperor they receive possessions of farms or manours. Therefore because by the Imperial Law it is made, as he proveth out of S. Austin, that farms be possessed, it is manifest that Clergy men by the possessions of farms are subject to the Emperor. See also above f Cap. 6. nu. 13. 14. 15. & cap. 7. nu. 12. 13. many other Catholic Authors who do affirm that Clergy men are subject to the directive power of temporal Princes. Neither doth Pope Innocent in the aforesaid Chapter deny, but in express words affirm, that the Emperor is superior to those, who do receive from him temporals; And therefore this similitude of the Sun and Moon doth not prove, that the temporal power is subject to the spiritual, or, which is all one, that temporal Princes are in temporals, or as they have temporal power, subject to spiritual Pastors, but it rather proveth the flat contrary. 5. Yea and Card. Bellarmine himself, g Lib. 2. de Ro. Pont. cap. 29. did for many years together hold with Albertus Pighius, h Lib. 5. hierach. Eccles. cap. 7. that it is the more probable opinion, that S. Paul, (& consequently the rest of the Apostles) was subject in temporals to Caesar, not only de facto, but also de iure: from whence supposing another true & undoubted principle granted also by Card. Bellarmine, i Lib. 2. de Rom. Pont. cap. 29. & lib. 5. cap. 3. that the Law of Christ doth deprive no man of any his right or dominion, it necessarily followeth, that if infidel Princes have rightful power and dominion, or jurisdiction over Clergy men, there is no repugnance, but that they may keep the same power, and jurisdiction over Clergy men, although they become Christians. But Card. Bellarmine hath now forsooth in his Recognitions recalled that opinion. I do not now approve, saith he, k Pag. 16. that which I said with Albertus Pighius, that S. Paul did appeal to Caesar, as to his lawful Prince. And therefore I do persist in the former answer, that S. Paul was subject to Caesar de facto, not de iure, and did appeal to him, not as his own Superior, but as to the Superior of the Precedent of jewry and of the jews, by whom he was wronged. For otherwise he could not free himself from that unjust judgement and danger of a most unjust death, but by having recourse to their Prince and judge, which he himself did signify Acts 28. when he saith, I am constrained to appeal to Caesar. 6 If Card. Bellarmine hath upon sufficient ground recalled either this, or any other of his former opinions, he is truly therefore much to be commended, as likewise is S. Austin, for making his book of Retractations. But if she should without sufficient ground not only recall this opinion, which he for above twenty years together in public print, and for many years before in public writings had defended for the more probable, but also condemn it for improbable, it being also the common opinion of Divines, any man might justly imagine, that affection, not reason moved him thereunto. I do not approve, saith he, l Pag. 16. in his Recognitions, that which I said in that place with Albertus Pighius, that S. Paul did appeal to Caesar as to his lawful Prince. But in his book against D. Barclay he goeth much farther. I have admonished, saith he, m Cap. 21. pag. 206. in the Recognition of my writings, that the opinion of Pighius, which in times past I did follow, is improbable, and that with better Doctors it is to be affirmed, that the Apostles were exempted de iure from all subjection to earthly Princes. 7. But truly I cannot but marvel, that Card. Bell. could be so much overseen, as to affirm, that he did admonish in his Recognitions, that the opinion of Pighius is improbable, seeing that he only saith there, I do not approve the opinion of Pighius, etc. But he doth not say, that it is improbable, unless, forsooth, what opinion C Bellarmine doth not approve, although it be approved by other learned Catholics, must forth with be accounted improbable. Besides I would gladly know, who be those better Doctors, whom Card. Bellarmine saith are to be followed against the opinion of Phighius. For my own part I do not know what better Doctors there be (abstracting from the ancient Fathers, and Doctors of the Church) if we speak only of the Doctors themselves, and not of the doctrine which they teach; then among the Thomists, john of Paris, Dominicus Sotus, Victoria, Bartholomaeus, Medina, Bannes; among the Scotists, Richardus de Media villa, joannes, Medina, joseph Angles; and among the jesuits, Salmeron, Molina, Valentia, Richeome, Salas, and many other Divines, whom Salas citeth, who do hold, that Clergy men are not by the law of God & nature, but only by the Ecclesiastical Canons and privileges of Princes exempted from the coactive power of Secular Magistrates, and not at all from their directive power, but that they are subject to the directive power of Secular Princes in those things, which do not repugn to the Ecclesiastical Canons, and their state, and consequently, that Clergy men in the time of the Apostles, and long after were subject to the coactive power of temporal Princes. Yea and the ancient Fathers, especially S. Chrysostome, Theophylact, and Oecumenius do in express words affirm, n Ad Rom. 13. that whether he be a Monk, a Priest, or an Apostle, he is according to the doctrine of S. Paul subject to Secular powers. Only the Canonists (& yet not all of them, as Pope Innoc: Navarre, and Coverruvias) whom now Card: Bellarm: leaving the Divines, & his ancient opinion upon very weak grounds, as you shall see, doth follow, do vehemently defend, that Clergy men are by the law of God and nature, exempted from all subjection to Secular Princes. 8 Now you shall see, for what reasons Card: Bellarmine was moved to recall his former opinion, and to condemn it as improbable. For if the reason, saith he o In his Recognitions, pag. 16. , of the exemption of Clergy men be for that they are ministers of Christ, who is the Prince of the Kings of the Earth, and King of Kings, truly they are exempted de iure not only from the power of Christian Kings, but also of Heathen Princes. If Card. Bellarmine mean, that the reason, wherefore the Ecclesiastical Canons, and Christian Princes have exempted Clergy men (I do not say from all subjection, for notwithstanding their exemption they still remain subjects to temporal Princes, but from paying of tributes, from the tribunal of Secular Magistrates and such like) be, for that they are Ministers of Christ in spiritual, but not in Secular matters, I will not contradict this reason, but from hence it doth not follow that therefore Clergy men in the time of the Apostles, when there were no such positive laws of their exemption, were not in temporal causes subject de iure to infidel Princes. 9 But if Card. Bellarmine mean, that the reason, why Clergy men are not only by the Ecclesiastical Canons and laws of Princes, but also by the law of GOD and nature exempted from all subjection to temporal Princes, is, for that they are Ministers of Christ, who is the King of Kings, this reason doth not prove, but suppose, that which is in question, to wit, that Clergy men are by the law of GOD, and nature, exempted from all subjection to temporal Princes, which the common opinion of Divines doth constantly deny, whose opinion to account improbable, or temerarious for such a weak reason, which doth not prove, but suppose the question, were in my judgement to exceed the limits of Christian prudence, and modesty. Neither is there any repugnance in natural reason, but that the Ministers of Christ, who, as it is probable, was, according to his humanity, only a spiritual, and not a temporal King, (and although he was also a temporal King, yet Secular Princes are his Ministers in temporals, and the Apostles & their Successors are his Ministers in spirituals) might in temporal causes be truly, and de iure subject to temporal Princes, as the Apostles themselves, who are Christ his chief Ministers in his spiritual kingdom, and Church, were, according to the express doctrine of the ancient Fathers, as they are parts, members and citizens of the temporal commonwealth subject to temporal Princes, in their temporal kingdoms, and in temporal affairs. Neither do those words of Saint Paul p Act. 28. I am constrained to appeal to Caesar, signify, that he was subject to Caesar only de facto, and not the iure, more, then if a Priest, being unjustly oppressed by his Ordinary, should appeal to the Pope, and say, that he was constrained, for that he had small hope to find justice at his Ordinaries hands, to appeal to the Pope, signify thereby, that he was not subject de iure, but only de facto to the Pope. 10. An other reason, which moved Card. Bellarmine to recall his former opinion, and to affirm, that Saint Paul did not appeal to Caesar, as to his own lawful judge but as to the judge of the precedent of jewrie and of the jews, who did unjustly oppress him, was saith he q In tract. contra Bard. cap. 3 pag. 51. , for that the cause of which they did accuse him being spiritual, to wit, concerning the resurrection of Christ, and the ceremonies of the law of Moses, could not by right appertain to a Heathen Prince. See the Acts of the Apostles chap. 21. 22. 23. 24. & 25. 11. But truly it is strange, that Card. Bellarmine durst so confidently remit his Reader to those chapters of the Acts of the Apostles, to prove, that the cause, whereof Saint Paul was accused by the jews to the Tribune, and Precedent of jewrie, and wherefore he appealed to Caesar, was spiritual, and not appertaining by right to a Heathen Prince, unless he will have the raising of sedition, and tumults, and the committing of a crime worthy of death, not to belong to a Heathen Prince. For it is clear by those chapters, that the jews accused him of sedition, and that he had offended Caesar, and endeavoured to have him therefore put to death. We have found, saith one Tertullus r Act. 24. , who went to accuse S. Paul before the Precedent Felix, this man pestiferous, and raising seditions to all the jews in th● world, etc. And afterwards, s Act. 25. the jews before the Precedent Festus objected against S. Paul many, and gre●uous crimes, which they could not prove, but they might easily have proved, that S. Paul did preach the Resurrection of Christ, for that he confessed the same before both the Precedents, and King Agrippa: Whereupon King Agrippa said to S. Paul t Act. 26 , A little thou persuadest me to become a Christian. And before u Act. 25. S. Paul made answer to the Precedent Festus, that neither against the law of the jews, nor against the Temple, nor against Caesar, have I any thing offended; which signifieth, that he was accused that he had offended against Caesar. And a little after saith S. Paul to Festus, The jews I have not hurt as thou very well knowest. For if I have hurt them, or done any thing worthy of death, I refuse not to die, but if none of those things be, whereof they accuse me, no man can give me to them, I appeal to Caesar. 12▪ By all which it is very clear, that the jews sought to have S. Paul put to death, and that all the crimes which they objected against him, were false, and consequently that he was not accused merely for preaching the resurrection of Christ, which S. Paul would never have denied, but for raising sedition and tumults in the people, and for doing wrong to Caesar. Whereupon S. Chrysostome x Hem. 51. in Act. commendeth S. Paul, that he would be judged before him whom he was accused to have wronged. And Card. Bellarmine himself, not agreeable to this his reason, did before in his Controversies affirm y Lib. 2. de Rom. Pon●. cap. 19 , which as yet he hath not recalled, that S Paul did for good and just cause appeal to Caesar, when he was accused for raising sedition and tumults in the people. And in that very place of his Recognitions, where he recalleth his opinion, he doth very plainly insinuate, as you have seen, that the cause whereof he was accused, was criminal, for which he was in danger saith Card. Bellarmine, of a most unjust death. 13 True it is that S. Paul did preach to the jews the resurrection of Christ, according to the predictions of the holy Prophets, and for this cause they accused him of sedition, and to be a man worthy of death, and therefore he appealed to the tribunal of Caesar, not that Caesar should judge, whether Christ was risen from death to life, for this indeed had been a spiritual cause, but whether to preach to the jews the resurrection of Christ, according to the predictions of the holy Prophets, were sedition, and a crime worthy to be punished with death by the Secular Magistrate. Wherefore Festus the Precedent of jewrie, and King Agrippa, after that S. Paul had discoursed about the resurrection of Christ z Act. 26. , and King Agrippa had said to S. Paul, A little thou dost persuade me to become a Christian, they all rose up, and going aside they spoke among themselves, saying, that this man hath done nothing worthy of death, or bonds; which answer also made Lycias the Tribune to the Precedent Foelix before in the 23. Chapter. 14 A third reason, which moved Card. Bellarmine to recall his former opinion, and that S Paul did not appeal to Caesar, as to his lawful judge, is, for that, saith he a In tract. contra Barclaium. cap. 3. pag. 49. , it doth seem to be altogether repugnant to the Gospel, that Christ did not free expressly, and by name S. Peter, and the Apostles from the obligation, wherein they stood bound to Heathen Princes. For Christ Mat. 17. did pay the didrachmes for himself and Peter, to avoid scandal. For that otherwise neither himself, nor Peter were bound to pay that tribute, he did demonstrate by those words: The Kings of the earth, of whom do they receive tribute or cense? of their children, or of strangers? And Peter answering, of strangers, jesus said unto him, therefore the sons are free: by which words he declared, that he was free from all tribute & cense, for that he was the son of the King of all Kings, and because when the son of a King is free, also his family is reputed free, therefore Peter, and the Apostles, who by the gracious favour of Christ did appertain to his family, ought also to be free. 15 But this reason is neither sufficient, nor agreeable to Card. Bellarmine's own principles. For first Card. Baronius affirmeth b Ad ann. Christi 33. nu. 31. , that this didrachme, which was exacted from our Saviour in this place, was not a tribute due to Caesar, but only to God for the use of the Temple, according to the law of God decreed in the 30. chapter of Exodus: And therefore from this place no sufficient argument can be drawn, according to Card. Baronius doctrine, that the Apostes were exempted from paying of tributes, or any other temporal subjection, due to temporal Princes. Yea, and which is more, Card. Bellarmine himself in the latter Editions of his Controversies approveth this Exposition for most true. There be two interpretations, saith he c Lib. 1 de Clericis cap. 28. in propos. 4. , of this place: Therefore sons are free. The former is of S. Hilary, who affirmeth, that this place is only meant of the tribute, which God did impose upon the Children of Israel, Exodus 30. to the use of the temple, which tribute was properly called a didrachme; and according to this Exposition, which seemeth to us to be most true, this is the force of the argument. The Kings of the earth, do not exact tribute of their sons but of strangers, therefore the King of heaven will not exact tribute of me, who am his proper and natural son. The second interpretation, which is of S. Hierome, who expoundeth those words of the tribute which was to be paid to Caesar, seemeth to be the less probable, because the tribute which was to be paid to Caesar, was not a Didrachme, but a penny, as it is plain by Math. 22. Show me the tribute coin: and they offered him a penny. Neither can it be demonstrated by any found reason, that the tribute of the Didrachme was wont to be paid to Caesar, but after the Ascension of Christ into heaven. For josephus lib. 7. de bello judaico cap. 26. doth write that the tribute of the Didrachme, which all the jews did pay to the temple every year, should afterwards be brought into the capitol. Thus Card. Bellarmine. 16 Wherefore it is strange, that he should now be so forgetful, as to bring this text of holy Scripture for a reason, why he changed his former opinion, and which reason also he saith doth demonstrate, that Christ our Saviour did expressly, and by name free S. Peter and the Apostles from the obligation wherein they stood bound to Caesar, whereas Card. Bellarmine himself, as you have seen, expoundeth this place not of any tribute to be paid to Caesar, but only due to God for the use of the temple. And therefore small reason had Card. Bellarmine for the aforesaid reasons, which are so weak, and repugnant to his own doctrine, as you have seen, to recall his former opinion, which for so long time he had in public Schools, and writings, with the common opinion of Divines, taught and maintained against the Canonists: but truly he had no reason to condemn for such weak reasons the contrary opinion of the School Divines, of whose profession he himself also is, as improbable. 17 Far more agreeable to reason, and also to Card. Bellarmine's profession, he being a School Divine, were it for him in my judgement to return to his ancient opinion, which the School Divines do generally maintain, and rather to recall some other his opinions, wherein he plainly contradicteth his own doctrine, as I have showed before: As that our Saviour by those words, therefore sons are free etc. Math. 17. did expressly, and by name free S. Peter and the Apostles from the obligation, wherein they stood bound to Heathen Princes, which is flatly repugnant to that, which he taught in another place, that these words are not meant of any tribute, which was to be paid to Caesar, but only of the tribute, which God did impose Exod. 30. upon the children of Israel to the use of the Temple. And besides that, the cause whereof the jews did accuse S. Paul, and for which he appealed to Caesar, was spiritual, d In tract. contra Barcl. cap. 3 pag. 51. which is clearly repugnant to that, which he taught in another place, e Lib 2. de Rom. Pont. cap. 29. that S. Paul did for good and just cause appeal to Caesar, and did acknowledge him for his judge, when he was accused of raising sedition, and tumults in the people. And moreover, (to omit sundry other his contradictions) that the Church of Christ is compounded f See above cap. 2. of spiritual and temporal power, as a man is compounded of soul and body, and that the temporal and spiritual Commonwealth do make one total body whereof the Pope is head, as a man is compounded of b●dy and soul, which is clearly repugnant to that which he taught in other places, that the Church of Christ is compounded only of spiritual power, and that the Pope, if we will speak properly, hath only spiritual and not temporal power. 18 But secondly although we should grant, that those words of our Saviour, therefore sons are free etc. were meant of the tribute which was to be paid to Caesar and not to the temple, yet Card. Bellarmine himself did in the former Editions of his Controversies give thereunto a very sufficient answer, and which in his latter Editions he hath not confuted. For thus he writeth g lib. 1. de Clericis Cap. 28. : I answer first that this place doth not convince: for otherwise he should exempt from tributes all Christians, who are regenerate by Baptism. Secondly I answer, that our Saviour doth speak only of himself. For he maketh this Argument: The sons of Kings are free from tributes, because they neither pay tribute to their fathers, for that the goods of the parents and children are common, nor to other Kings, because they are not subject to them, but I am the son of the first and chiefest King, therefore I own tribute to no man. Wherefore when our Saviour saith, therefore Sons are free, from thence he meant only to gather this, that he himself was not bound to pay tribute: of other men he affirmed nothing. 19 Thus answered Card. Bellarmine in times past, when he followed the opinion of the Divines, concerning the exemption of Clergy men against the Canonists, who urged this place of holy Scriptue to prove, that Clergy men are exempted from paying of tributes by the law of God. But now, forsooth, he forsaketh the Divines, and this very text, therefore sons are free, which then he brought for an objection against his opinion, and clearly answered the same, he bringeth now for a chief ground to prove his new opinion, and (which is very remarkable) he concealeth the answer which he then made to the said objection: only he addeth this: that when the sons of Kings are exempted from tribute, not only their own persons, but also their servants and Ministers, and so their families are exempted from tributes. But it is certain that all Clergy men do properly appertain to the family of Christ, who is the son of the King of Kings. And this our Lord did seem to signify when he said to S. Peter, But that we may not scandalise them, finding the stater take it, and give it for me and thee. As though he should say, that both he, and his family, whereof S. Peter was a chief governor, aught to be free from tributes. Which also S. Hierome doth seem to have understood in his Commentary of that place, when he saith, that Clergy men do not pay tributes for the honour of our Lord, and are as King's children free from tributes: and S. Austin lib. 1. qq. evang. q. 23. where he writeth, that in every earthly Kingdom, the children of that Kingdom under which are all the Kingdoms of the earth, aught to be free, (not are free, as Card. Bellarmine affirmeth S. Austin to say,) from tributes. 20 Thus you see, how Card. Bellarmine runneth up and down from the words of holy Scripture, by which it is demonstrated, saith he, that S. Peter was not bound to pay tribute to Caesar, to the sense which he himself disproveth, and then from the sense to his private collections, and inferences, that if S. Peter was free, all the Apostles were free, and if all the Apostles, all Clergy men. But if it had pleased him to have also set down the answer, which in the former Editions of his books he made to this objection, the Reader would easily have perceived, that from this place of holy Scripture no sufficient reason could be gathered to cause him to recall his former opinion, although we should grant, that those words of our Saviour were meant of the tribute, which was to be paid to Caesar, of which nevertheless Card. Bellarmine will not have them to be understood, but only of the tribute which the children of Israel were by the law of God, Exod. 30. commanded to pay for their souls unto the use of the tabernacle of testimony, for at that time the temple was not built. For first, saith he, if this argument did convince, not only Clergy men, but also all Christians, who being regenerate by baptism are the children of Christ, and also do properly appertain to his spiritual family, or Church, of which, S. Peter and the rest of the Apostles under him were chief governors, should be exempted from paying tributes. Secondly, our Saviour, saith he, doth speak only of himself, who was the son of the first and chiefest King, and that he himself was not bound to pay tribute: of other men he affirmeth nothing. 21 Thirdly, to the authority of S. Hierome, he answereth, that S. Hierome did not intend in that place, to prove out of the Gospel, that Clergy men are free from tribute, but only he doth bring a certain congruence, wherefore they are freed by the decrees of Prince's: for therefore he saith, that they do not pay tributes as the children of the Kingdom, and he addeth an other cause, to wit, the honour of Christ: for he saith, that for his honour Clergy men do not pay tributes. Therefore not the law of God, but the decrees of Princes made for the honour of Christ, have exempted Clergy men. Thus Card. Bellarmine. 22 Fourthly, to the authority of S. Augustine he answereth, that although jansenius (whom Salmeron and Suarez do follow) doth affirm, that S. Austen by the children of the supreme kingdom did understand the natural children of God, and that he spoke in the plural number to observe the manner of our saviours speech, so that the meaning of S. Austen was, that all the natural sons of God if it were possible that God could have more natural sons then one, should be exempted from paying of earthly tributes: yet Card. Bellarmine doth not like well of this answer, and therefore he thinketh the answer of Abulensis to be the more probable, that S. Austen did not understand natural children, but Clergy men and Monks, who, as also S. Hierome affirmeth, in Cap. 17 Mat., were and are free from tributes, as those who appertain to the family of Christ. Neither doth it therefore from hence follow, that Clergy men are by the law of God free from tributes. For first, that which S. Austen saith, is not in the words of our Saviour, but it is only gathered by a probable consequence, For our Saviour doth only speak of the true and natural children of Kings, as S. Chrysostome doth expound that place. Secondly, our Saviour himself doth also properly command nothing in this place, that it may be called the law of God, but doth only show by the use and custom of men, that the children of Kings are free from tributes. Thus Card. Bellarmine answered in his former Editions, which answer in his later editions he altogether concealeth, but for what cause I remit to the judgement of the prudent Reader. 23 By all which it is apparent that our Saviour did only speak of himself, and of the natural children of Kings, when he used those words, therefore sons are free; and of the servants, or family, either of Kings, or of the children of Kings he saith nothing at all; and therefore from an other consequence drawn from the use, and custom of men, and not from the words of our Saviour, can it be gathered, that those who are servants, or of the family of the children of Kings, are exempted either from subjection to the inferior magistrates of the kingdom, or from the paying of tributes. But by no probable consequence it can be deduced, that those who are either servants, and of the family of kings children, or also servants, and of the family of the King himself, are by the custom of any nation either exempted from subjection to inferior Magistrates, and much less to the King himself, or also from paying tributes, unless the King upon some other special consideration doth grant to any of them such a privilege. 24 To those words of our Saviour, But that we may not scandalise them etc. it is easily answered according to the first exposition of that didrachme, which Card. Bellarmine thinketh to be most true, that it was a tribute due to the temple or tabernacle, and not to Caesar: For I do willingly grant, that S. Peter, who was appointed by Christ to be the chief governor of his Church and temple, was exempted from paying tribute to the temple. But although we should admit, that the aforesaid didrachme was a tribute due to Caesar, and not to the temple, yet from those words of our Saviour, no sufficient argument can be drawn to prove, that S. Peter, and especially the rest of the Apostles, were by the law of God exempted from paying tributes, and much less from temporal subjection to Heathen Princes. 25 First, for that we may probably answer with jansenius, and Abulensis, that Christ did speak to S. Peter in the plural number, [but that we may not scandalise them] not for that S. Peter was bound to pay tribute only by reason of scandal, but either because our Saviour did speak of his own person, using the plural number for the singular, as it is usual, especially among great persons; we are wont, saith S. Epiphanius h In the heresy of the manichees. , to speak singular things plural, and plural singular. For we say, we have told you, and we have seen you, and we come to you, and yet there be not two who speak, but one who is present: or else because the scandal, which Christ should have given, would in some sort have redounded to S. Peter, as being a mediator in that business. And therefore, as well affirmeth jansenius i In Concord. evang. cap. 69. in Mat. 17. , our Saviour did pay tribute for himself only to avoid scandal & for S. Peter to honour him as with a certain reward for his faith, obedience, and diligence, as a mediator of this business, and an executor of the Miracle of finding the stater in the fishes mouth, or as Barradius the jesuite, and others do affirm k In cap 17. Mat. ●om. 2. Lib. 10. cap. 32. , to honour him above the rest, as the Prince of the Apostles, and the head of the Church. See Abulensis, q. 198. 199. and 200. in cap. 17. Mat. and Barradius upon this place. 26 Secondly, although we should grant, that our Saviour did for some special cause exempt S. Peter from paying tribute to Caesar, either by a personal privilege, or else real, and descending to his successors, it doth not therefore follow, that he did exempt him from all civil subjection to temporal Princes, as neither doth it follow, that because the Children of Kings, for that their goods and their fathers are common, or any of the kings servants are by special privilege exempted from paying tributes, they are therefore exempted from all civil subjection and allegiance to the King. 27 Thirdly, for that there is no probability in my judgement, that either Christ did by those words intent to exempt the rest of the Apostles, seeing that there is no mention at all made of them in that place, or also that this privilege of exemption is extended to S. Peter, and the rest of the Apostles, in regard only that they were of the spiritual family, or Church of Christ (I say of the spiritual family, for that I will not deny, but that as they were of his corporal family, and lived with him here on earth, and had no corporal goods but such as belonged to Christ, they were exempted from paying tributes, but not from civil subjection to Heathen Princes) because the exemption of servants with their Master, or of those, who are of the family of kings Children with the kings Children themselves, is not grounded in the law of nature, but only in a certain congruity, and custom of men, from which custom this argument to exempt the Apostles, for that they were of Christ's family, is drawn: but there is no such custom among nations, that the servants or family of kings Children or of the King himself, are exempted from paying tributes, although the children of Kings having no other goods, than which are their fathers, be exempted, as Card. Bellarmine a little above affirmed. But howsoever, neither the servants to kings children, nor the kings children themselves, are exempted from civil subjection, or from the directive, or coercive power of the King. 28 And therefore neither Fa. Suarez, who handleth this question at large, dare affirm, that from those words of our Saviour it can certainly, but only probably be gathered, that this exemption was extended to the rest of the Apostles. I answer, saith he l In defence. fid● Ca●●o & 〈◊〉 lib. 4 cap. 8. in sine. , that it is true, that Christ did not say plainly, that the family is exempted with the children, neither doth it follow by any evident, or necessary consequence, and therefore the aforesaid opinion, for as much as belongeth to this part, is neither of faith, nor altogether certain. Nevertheless it is most likely, that this extension to the rest of the Apostles is according to the intention of Christ, 29. But truly, although there may be alleged some probable congruities, wherefore our Saviour might grant some special prerogative, and privilege of exemption to S. Peter, whom he had chosen to be the first and principal head and governor of his Church, rather than to the rest of the Apostles, as likewise the Divines do yield probable congruities, wherefore God almighty might give to the B. Virgin Mary, whom he had chosen to be the mother of his immaculate Son, a special prerogative and privilege of exemption from original sin, but whether he did grant that privilege or no, it cannot certainly be proved, nevertheless for my own part I do not see any probable likelihood, that our Saviour should give to the rest of the Apostles, and much less to all Clergy men, any special privilege of exemption from all civil subjection to temporal Princes. And therefore the most part of the School Divines, yea also and of the jesuits themselves do hold, that Clergy men are directly subject to the civil laws of temporal Princes, in all those things, which are not repugnant to their state, nor to the Ecclesiastical Canons, and consequently that they are not exempted from all subjection and obedience, and from the directive or commanding power of Secular Princes, but that they are bound not only by force of reason, but also by virtue of the law, and of their due obedience, to observe such civil laws. 30 A fourth reason which Card. Bellarmine bringeth m In tract. contra Barcl. cap. 3. pag. 50 wherefore he recalled his former opinion, and why the Apostles were not the iure subject to temporal Princes, is because they are appointed by God Princes over all the earth, as we read in the 44. Psalm. For although that principality was spiritual, not temporal, yet it was true principality, and far more noble than temporal principality. But this reason is not sufficient, for as I observed in my Apology, n nu. 68 & seq the same man being considered diverse ways may be subject, and superior; subject in temporals, and supreme in spirituals, and contrariwise; neither is temporal subjection repugnant to spiritual authority, nor temporal authority repugnant to spiritual subjection: neither from hence doth it follow, that either temporal authority itself, is subject to spiritual power, or spiritual power subject to temporal authority, but only that the same man, who is superior in temporals, is subject in spirituals, and who is superior in spirituals is subject in temporals, as the same man who is a Musician may be subject and servant to a Physician, or contrariwise, and yet it doth not from hence follow, that Music itself is subject to Physic, or contrariwise. 31 And if Card. Bellarmine do answer, as he doth in his Schulckenius n Pag. 172. , that when the powers are equal, it may perchance fall out, that the same compared diverse ways may be subject and superior, but if the powers be unequal, and one subordained to an other, as are spiritual and civil power, it cannot fall out, that the same man be subject to him who is his superior, this answer is also as insufficient as the former. First, for that the temporal power itself is not subordained to the spiritual, as I have showed before: for otherwise temporal Princes should not only in spirituals, but also in mere temporals be subject to spiritual Pastors, as if Music itself be subject to Physic, a Musician, as he is a Musician, and in all things belonging to Music, should be subject to Physic, and consequently to a Physician, as he is a Physician. Secondly, for that it is the common opinion of the School Divines, and also of the jesuits, that Clergy men are subject to the directive temporal power, or command of temporal Princes. 32 Thirdly, for that there is no repugnance, but rather a necessary consequence, that spiritual Princes, not as they are spiritual Princes, but as they are true parts and members of the temporal common wealth, should be subject in temporal affairs to temporal Princes, for every member, says Card. Bellarmine, o Li● de Monachis. cap. 19 aught to be subject to the head, and Clergy men, besides that they are Clergy men, are also citizens and parts of the civil common wealth, as Card. Bellarmine affirmeth in an other place p Lib. de Clericis. cap. 28. , and the King is head of the politic or civil body, as also in his Schulckenius, he expressly affirmeth q Pag. 339. . Fourthly, for that Card. Bellarmine is also now of opinion, at least wise he was when he wrote against D. Barckley, that it is probable, that the Priests of the old law, who had true spiritual power, and were true spiritual Princes, were subject to Kings, and therefore for this reason to recall his former opinion, and especially to condemn it as improbable, were both to contradict himself, and also to condemn of temerity the learnedst School Divines of this age, and also of his Society. 33 These be all the principal reasons, which I can find in Card. Bellarmine, for which he was moved to recall his former opinion, and to condemn it as improbable, which how probable they be, or rather very insufficient to move such a learned man, as Card. Bellarmine is, to forsake the School Divines, and to fly to the Canonists, who as pope Pius the fift sincerely confessed, r Navar. super cap. non liceat Papa● 12. q. 2 55. 3●. nu. 6 do attribute to the Pope more authority than is fitting, and to censure so rigorously, and rashly the learnedst Catholics of this age, and also of his own Society, of temerity, I remit to the judgement of the discreet Reader, as also to consider, whether reason, or affection to advance the Pope's authority moved him not only to recall his former opinion, but also to condemn it as improbable. 33 Lastly, that the Reader may have some knowledge of the true state of the question concerning the authority of spiritual Pastors to exempt Clergy men from the power of Secular Princes, for that some Divines are of opinion, that from the exemption of Clergy men a strong Argument may be drawn to prove that a spiritual Prince or Pastor hath power to depose or deprive a temporal Prince, who is subject to him in spirituals, of his temporal Kingdom and Dominions. First therefore the true state of the question betwixt me and my Adversaries is, not concerning the exemption of Clergy men by way of command, for I do willingly grant, that a spiritual Prince, or Pastor as he is a spiritual Pastor, hath power to command a Christian Prince, who is subject to him in spirituals, not to exercise his temporal power in some cases, if the necessity of the Church, or Christian Religion doth require it, over the persons of Clergy men, who are his temporal Subjects: so that if a secular Prince should disobey the lawful command of his spiritual Pastor, he should offend against the virtue of Religion, for the which offence his spiritual Pastor might punish him with Ecclesiastical censures: and of this manner of exemption by way of command, and spiritual coercion, all the Canons and Decrees of Popes and councils. which do signify. imply, or suppose that Clergy men may by the authority of the Church without the consent of temporal Princes be exempted from secular powers, either touching their persons or their goods, may be very well understood: I said if the necessity of the Church doth require it; for at this present I will not enter into particulars, what manner of necessity is required, that a spiritual Pastor may impose such a command upon his temporal Prince. 34 But the controversy betwixt me and my Adversaries betwixt those Catholics who are so vehement for the Pope's power to depose Princes, and those on the contrary side is, whether spiritual Pastors, as they are spiritual Pastors, or by virtue of their spiritual power, have not only by way of command, and spiritual coercion, but also by way of sentence authority to exempt without the consent of Prince's Clergy men, who before were subject to them in temporals, from the directive, and coercive power of secular Princes, in such sort, that after the sentence of such exemption be given, Clergy men are no more the subjects of that secular Prince, for that his spiritual Pastor doth deprive him of that civil power, which before the sentence he had over Clergy men: And what is said of particular Bishops, in respect of Princes who are their spiritual children, is to be understood of the Supreme spiritual Pastor in respect of all Christian Princes, who are subject to him in spirituals. This is the true state of the question. 35 So that the Reader may clearly perceive, that although from the first manner of exemption, by way of command, and spiritual coercion, no good argument can be drawn, to prove, that the spiritual power can depose Princes, and deprive them of their Regal authority, by way of sentence, yet there is great coherence betwixt these two questions concerning the power of spiritual Pastors to depose Princes by way of sentence, and their power to exempt by way of sentence Clergy men from all subjection to Secular Princes. For the first question is whether the spiritual power can by way of sentence deprive temporal Princes of all their temporal power, and absolve all their Subjects from their temporal allegiance: and the second is, whether it can deprive them of some part of their temporal power, and absolve some of their subjects from their temporal allegiance. And therefore those Catholics who do grant the second, will easily grant the first, and who do grant the first, must of necessity grant the second, for that there can be no sufficient reason alleged, why the spiritual power can in order to spiritual good deprive Princes of some part of their Regal authority, and not of all, and absolve some subjects from their temporal allegiance, and not all; and if it can deprive o● all, i● must needs follow that it can also of some part. And contrariwise those Catholics, who affirm, that the spiritual power cannot exempt, ot absolve Clergy men from their temporal allegiance and subjection to temporal Princes, must consequenily affirm, that it can not exempt or absolve all subjects from their temporal allegiance: and who affirm, that it can not absolve, or exempt all subjects from their temporal allegiance, nor deprive a temporale Prince of all his Regal authority, will easily affirm, that it cannot exempt or absolve Clergy men from their temporal allegiance and subjection, nor deprive a temporal Prince of any part of his Regal authority. 36 But some do greatly urge this objection: If the spiritual power can command temporal Princes not to exercise their temporal power over the persons or goods of Clergy men, without the consent of their Ecclesiastical superior, it doth consequently follow, that a temporal Prince doth offend, if he transgress the just and lawful command of his spiritual Pastor, and therefore it seemeth, that a temporal Prince hath no power over the persons or goods of Clergy men after such a command, supposing it to be lawful, unless we will grant, that a temporal Prince hath power to commit sin, and to transgress the lawful command of his spiritual Pastor. 37 To this objection (wherewith I have known divers men of learning to be somewhat perplexed) those Catholics, who deny that the spiritual power can deprive by way of sentence, a temporal Prince of his Regal Authority, either wholly or in part, may easily answer in this manner: that if a temporal Prince doth excercise his temporal power over the persons or goods of Clergy men against the lawful command of his spiritual Pastor, he sinneth indeed against Religion, and the general virtue of obedience, in that he useth his power contrary to the lawful command of his spiritual Pastor, but he doth not sin against the special virtue of legal, or moral justice, in using his authority over them, who are not his subjects, and over whom he hath no temporal power and Authority, in that manner as another man, who is not their Prince, should offend. Neither is it unusual for a man to commit a sin in doing that which in respect of justice he hath power and authority to do. 38 As for example, it is a sin against the virtue of liberality for one to give away his goods prodigally, although if we respect justice he hath true and full power to give them away, for that he giveth nothing but that, which is his own: and therefore that prodigal gift, although it be unlawful, yet is not unjust, as justice is taken, not as it comprehendeth all virtues in general, but in particular for a special virtue, and one of the four Cardinal virtues. So also it is a sin against the virtue of temperance to give money to commit an unhonest act, and yet the gift is not unjust for that he giveth nothing but his own, and which according to justice he hath power to give. So likewise if a Ghostly father command his penitent to give a certain part of his goods to the poor in satisfaction of his sins, if the penitent do bestow them otherwise then he was commanded, he sinneth against the virtue of Religion and Sacrament of penance, in transgressing his Ghostly father's lawful command, but he committeth no injustice, because he giveth that which is his own, and which, if we regard the virtue of justice, he hath power to give: neither doth the command of his Ghostly father deprive him of the right, dominion, property and power, which he had before over those goods. 39 Lastly, if the Pope should upon just cause suspend a Priest from the Altar, or a Bishop from his Episcopal function, and consequently forbid the Priest to consecrate, and the Bishop to give orders, if they should disobey the Pope's lawful command, they should sin against the virtue of Religion, in using their power unlawfully, but they should not sin for doing that which they have no power to do, as he who is no Priest or Bishop should in consecrating or giving orders offend, for that the power of a Priest to consecrate and of a Bishop to give orders, cannot either wholly or in part be taken away from them by the Pope. So likewise although a spiritual Pastor should for just cause forbidden a temporal Prince, who is his spiritual child, and subject, to excercise his Regal power and authority over Clergy men, if that temporal Prince should herein transgress the command of his spiritual Pastor, supposing it to be lawful, he should indeed offend against religion, in using his Regal power and authority contrary to the lawful command of his spiritual Pastor, which command was imposed for the motive of Religion, nevertheless he should not offend against justice, in doing that which he hath no power and authority to do, in that manner as another man, who is not their Prince, should by depriving them of their goods, or punishing their persons if they transgress the laws, offend. For that it is not in the power of a spiritual Pastor to deprive a temporal Prince either wholly or in part of his Regal power, and temporal Sovereignty. 40 Wherefore if we respect the power itself, and the virtue of legal or moral justice, a temporal Prince hath full, ample, and supreme royal power and authority over Clergy men, notwithstanding that his spiritual Pastor should for just cause command him not to exercise his Regal power upon the persons of Clergy men, who do offend his laws: but if we respect the use and execution of the power, and the virtue of religion, the use indeed of his power in the aforesaid case is so limited by the lawful command of the spiritual Pastor, that the Prince using his power over Clergy men, sinneth against Religion, for that he disobeyeth the lawful command of his spiritual Superior, which was imposed for the motive of religion, but not against justice for that he doth not excercise his Regal power but upon those who are his Subjects, and do owe unto him true loyalty and temporal obedience. 41 And truly if the aforesaid objection were of force, that the temporal Prince hath no power or authority over Clergy men, who are subject to him in temporals, against the lawful command of his spiritual Pastor, because he hath no power to sin, it would likewise follow, that a suspended Bishop, or Priest, have no power to give orders, or to consecrate, because they have no power to sin; and a penitent hath no lawful right, or power to sell, or give away his goods against the lawful command of his Ghostly Father, because he hath no power to sin; and a man hath no power, or right to give money to a dishonest end, or to give away his goods prodigally, and consequently they should be restored back again, because he hath no power to sin. I will say nothing at this time, how far Clergy men, either by the privileges of Christian Princes, or by the Ecclesiastical Canons are de facto exempted both in their goods, and in their persons from civil powers, but only I thought good at this time to set down the true state of the question among Catholics concerning the authority of spiritual Pastors to exempt Clergy men from the temporal power of Christian Princes, that thereby they may clearly perceive, what kind of argument may be drawn from the exemption of Clergy men, to prove the Pope's power to depose Princes, and by way of sentence to deprive them wholly of their Regal authority. 42 Thus you have seen in what manner temporal things are subject to spiritual, temporal ends to spiritual ends, temporal power to the spiritual power, the temporal sword to the spiritual sword, the flesh to the spirit, the Moon to the Sun, and temporal Princes to spiritual Pastors; and that from the subjection and subordination of the temporal power to the spiritual, no good argument can be brought to prove, that the Pope, by virtue of his spiritual power can dispose of temporals, depose temporal Princes, or punish temporally by way of coercion, but only that in order to spiritual good he can command temporals, and punish temporally by way of command, but by way of coercion only with spiritual, and not with temporal punishments. And by this which hath been said, the Reader may easily understand the true sense and meaning of a certain proposition, which Card. Bellarmine in his Schulckenius doth often inculcate (as though there were some great mystery lie hidden therein) to prove the Pope's power to depose temporal Princes, to wit, that a Christian Prince is a child of the Church, and subject to the Pope, not only as he is a Christian man, but also as he is a Christian Prince; and the same he affirmeth of a Christian ●awyer, of a Christian Soldier, of a Christian Physician, and so of the rest. 43 For all these three propositions, A Christian Prince, as he is a Christian Prince, is a child of the Church, and subject to spiritual Pastors: A Christian Prince as he is a Christian is a Child of the Church, and subject to spiritual Pastors: and a Prince as he is a Christian, is a Child of the Church and subject to spiritual Pastors; have one and the self same sense; and so likewise of a Christian Lawyer, of a Christian Soldier, of a Christian Physician etc. For the true meaning of them all is, that Christianity, and not Regal authority, or the knowledge of law, warfare, or Physic, is the cause why a Prince, a Lawyer, a Soldier, a Physician, and all other men of what trade soever they be, are Children of the Church, and subject to spiritual Pastors; and that therefore they are to be directed and instructed by spiritual Pastors, not precisely in the rules of civil government, in the rules of law, warfare, or Physic, but only in the rules and principles of Christian doctrine, and how they ought to govern civilly, and use their knowledge and trades according to the rules and precepts of Christian Religion: which if they refuse to do, they may be corrected and punished by spiritual Pastors, with spiritual or Ecclesiastical punishments. 44 But from hence it doth not follow, that either temporal power, the knowledge of the law, warfare, or physic, are among Christians per se subject to the spiritual power, but only per accidens, as I have often declared, and in those things, which do concern or belong to Christian Religion, or that spiritual Pastors can by virtue of their spiritual power correct, or punish Christian Princes, Lawyers, Soldiers, Physicians etc. by depriving them by way of sentence of their Regal authority, of their skill and knowledge in the laws, in warfare, or Physic, which they did not receive from the spiritual power, but only by depriving them of the Sacraments, and such like spiritual benefits, of which they are made partakers by being Christians, and by means of the spiritual power and authority of spiritual Pastors. And thus much concerning the union and subjection of the temporal and spiritual power, and also of the second part. AN ADJOJNDER to the first and second Part, wherein Widdringtons' Interpretation of that Clause of the Oath, wherein the Doctrine (that Princes, who are excommunicated or deprived by the Pope, may be deposed or murdered by their Subjects) is abjured as impious and heretical, is proved to be sound, and sufficient, and is cleared from all absurdity or contradiction, even by Mr. fitzherbert's examples, and that it may without any Perjury be sworn by any CATHOLIC. Perceiving, Courteous Reader, that this my Answer to Mr. fitzherbert's Reply doth arise to a greater bigness, then at the first I imagined: for that I am compelled not only to answer him, but also D. Schulckenius, to whom he remitteth his Reader for the confutation of many of my Answers: I thought good for divers reasons to divide it into two Books, and to conclude the first Book with the first and second Part; only adjoining, by way of an Appendix, for thy better satisfaction, the Answer which I made to Mr. fitzherbert's fourth Chapter, wherein he excepteth against those words of the Oath (as impious and heretical Doctrine) for against no other clause of the Oath doth he make any particular objection, besides his general discourse in favour of the Pope's power to depose Princes, and to dispose of all temporals. Which his Doctrine, seeing that I have already by extrinsical grounds, and the authority of learned Catholics (for to all the intrinsical grounds which my Adversary bringeth, I will answer in the next book, which, God willing, ere it be long thou shalt receive) proved not to be so certain, but that the contrary hath ever been, and is at this present approved by learned Catholics, and consequently may without any danger of heresy, error, or temerity, be maintained by any Catholic: and considering also that Mr. Fitzherbert taketh no particular exception against any clause of the Oath, but only against those words (as impious and heretical Doctrine) it is evident that any man of judgement may from that which I have already said and proved, easily conclude, that the Oath may lawfully, and with a safe Conscience be taken, if my adversaries objections against those words of the Oath (as impious and heretical Doctrine) be once clearly confuted. 2 First therefore Mr. Fitzherbert in the beginning of his fourth Chapter, seemeth to take it very ill, for that I fall, saith he, upon him very foul, charging h●m with flat falsity at the first word. But truly he doth in this exaggerate the matter somewhat more than is needful, as also in that he saith, that for a while I made myself merry with Fa. Lessius. For besides that the word flat is added by himself, I did neither cog, scoff, gibe, or make myself merry with Fa. Lessius: but after I had brought those four instances to confute Fa. Lessius his antecedent proposition, whereon he grounded his consequence, I only demanded, not by way of scoffing, cogging, gibing, or making myself merry, as this man in this, and his former Chapter untruly affirmeth, but rather out of pity, compassion, and complaint, whether those, and such like were not trim Arguments to move English Catholics prodigally to cast away their goods, and to deny their allegiance to their Prince. And as for charging my Adversary with flat falsity, my words were only these: Thirdly it is false which this Author F. T. affirmeth, to wit, that the Doctrine concerning the Pope's power to depose Princes, is plainly abjured in ●his Oath, as impious and heretical, for this doctrine only is abjured in this Oath as impious and heretical, that Princes being excommunicated or deprived by the Pope, may be deposed or murdered by their subjects or any other whatsoever: which position, as I will declare beneath, hath this sense, that it is in the free power of Subjects to depose, or (if they will) to murder their Prince, being excommunicated, or deprived by the Pope. 3 In the very first beginning I affirmed, and Mr. Fitzherbert in his first Chapter related my words, that the supposition, which he made, to wit, that the Pope's power to excommunicate Princes is denied in this Oath, is most false and then he took no exception against this word, most false: and now after he hath so often fallen very foul upon me, with charging me with being absurd, ridiculous, foolish, malicious, impudent, impious, with cogging, scoffing gibing, heretic, and being no good Child of the Catholic Church, and using many such like slanderous, and disgraceful terms against me, he taketh it very ill for that I only affirm his assertion to be false, which word nevertheless is usual in Schools among Disputers and Answerers, and is not taken for any disgraceful term, being in sense all one with untrue, or I deny the assertion or position. But because I perceive Mr. fitzherbert's patience cannot brook the very lest of those so many foul, disgraceful, and slanderous nicknames he is pleased to bestow upon me, and doth so easily see a little mote in my eye, not perceiving the great beam in his own: I will hereafter abstain from that word false, and in stead thereof use untrue, as in the English Edition I did translate it: neither can he have any colour to be distasted with this word untrue, unless he do take it ill that I do not forsooth approve all his opinions, and applaud whatsoever he shall say to be true. 4 But to the matter. Mr. Fitzherbert in his fourth Chapter endeauoreth to prove two things: the one that I have falsely charged him with affirming, that the Doctrine for the Pope's power to depose Princes, is manifestly abjured in the Oath, as impious and heretical, which he denieth to have affirmed, although he granteth withal, ●hat it is true if he had affirmed it. The second is, that my interpretation of that clause of the Oath, wherein the aforesaid Doctrine and Position, That Princes being excommunicated or deprived by the Pope, may be deposed or murdered by their Subjects, is abjured as impious and heretical, is absurd according to my own grounds. 5. As touching the first. Mr. Fitzherbert affirmeth, a Cap. 4. nu. 1. that he saith nothing at all touching his own opinion, whether the doctrine of deposing Princes be abjured in the Oath as impious and heretical (and much less that it is manifestly abjured as I say he doth) but he affirmeth only, that the Oath is wholly repugnant to a Canon of the great Council of Lateran by reason of two clauses therein. And for proof thereof, he repeateth b Nu. 2. the words of his Supplement, which are these? Fourthly, it appeareth also hereby, and by all the premises, that this Oath of pretended allegiance is an unlawful Oath, and not to be taken by any Christian man, seeing that it flatly contradicteth the said Council, and Canon, not only because it denieth that the Pope hath any power or authority to depose his Majesty, or to discharge any of his Subjects of their allegiance, and obedience to his Majesty, but also because it bindeth the takers of it in express words to swear thus. And I do further swear, that from my heart I do abhor, detest, & abjure, as impious and heretical, this damnable doctrine, and position, that princes excommunicated or deprived by the Pope may be deposed, which position was by that Canon expressly ordained to be practised in some cases, yea and executed by the councils order upon Reymond Earl of Tolosa. Thus say I in my Supplement. 6. Now I report c Nu. 3. me to the indifferent Reader, whether I affirm any more, then that these two clauses of the Oath are flatly against the Council of Lateran, because the Pope's power to depose Princes (which the said Council acknowledgeth and approveth by an express Canon) is denied therein; and this is manifest as well by all my precedent discourse, as by that which followeth; for all that which I amply debated before, touching the Council of Lateran, concerned only the Pope's power to depose Princes, without any one word whether the abjuration or denial thereof be heretical; and my conclusion of the later clause confirmeth the same: for I add immediately these words, which position, (to wit, that Princes being excommunicated or deprived by the Pope may be deposed) was by that Canon expressly ordained to be practised in some cases; yea and was executed by the Counsels order, upon Reymond Earl of Tolosa. 7. Whereby it appeareth, d Nu. 4. that whereas the clause mentioneth two things; the one the doctrine and position, that Princes excommunicated, or deprived by the Pope may be deposed; and the other, that the said doctrine is abjured, as impious and heretical; I treat only of the former, and speak not one word of the later. So as my Adversary Widdrington charging me to have falsely affirmed, that the Pope's power to depose Princes is manifestly abjured in this Oath, hath charged me falsely, and therefore may take his imputation of falsity to himself. Thus M. Fitzherbert. 8. But in truth I cannot but wonder, where Mr. fitzherbert's memory was, when he wrote these words, that he could not perceive, that he himself here saith as much as I affirmed him to say: and therefore if he can find no better a shift and evasion, then to deny with so bold a face that very same thing, which he himself in this very place doth so plainly affirm, the untruth, I dare not say falsity, wherewith I charged him, will still remain with him, and will not be taken from him by me, besides the disgrace for a man of his fashion, quality, and profession, to deny so boldly that he affirmeth that thing, which every Child who understandeth English, may perceive that he doth affirm. For mark his words. The Oath, saith he, bindeth the takers of it in express words to swear thus: And I do further swear, that I do from my heart abhor, detest, and abjure, as impious and heretical, this damnable doctrine and position, that Princes excommunicated or deprived by the Pope may be deposed. Now let any man judge, whether he that affirmeth, that the Oath bindeth the takers of it in express words to swear, that he doth abjure as impious and heretical this doctrine, that Prince's excommunicated or deprived by the Pope m y be deposed, doth not affirm, that the doctrine concerning the Pope's power to depose Princes is plainly, manifestly, or in express words abjured in this oath as impious and heretical. 9 But observe how cunningly M. Fitzherbert, belike to return the imputation of falsity upon me would delude his Reader. Whereas the clause of the oath, saith he, mentioneth two things; the one the doctrine and position, that Princes excommunicated or deprived by the Pope may be deposed; and the other, that the sai● doctrine is abjured as impious and heretical, (Lo here again he granteth as much, as I said he did affirm, to wit, that the doctrine, which holdeth that Princes excommunicated or deprived by the Pope may be deposed, is abjured in this oath as impious and heretical) I treat only of the former, and speak not one word of the later; and all that which I amply debated before touching the Council of Lateran concerned only the Pope's power to depose Princes, without any one word, whether the abjuration, or denial thereof be heretical. 10. Belike this man would make his Reader believe, that I did say, that he had amply debated, treated, or made some discourse of this point, and that he had endeavoured to prove, that the oath is unlawful, and against the Council of Lateran, in regard it bindeth the takers of it to swear, that they do from their heart abhor, detest, and abjure as impious and heretical this doctrine and position, that Princes excommunicated or deprived by the Pope may be deposed; whereas I say no such thing, but only that Master Fitzherbert doth barely affirm, that the oath bindeth the takers to abjure, or, which is all one in sense, that in this oath is abjured as impious and heretical this doctrine, and categorical proposition, ex part praedicati, that Princes excommunicated or deprived by the Pope may be deposed. And thus much he himself, as you have seen in this very place, doth twice affirm: which his assertion I said is not true, for that it only bindeth the takers to abjure a impious, and heretical, this doctrine and hypothetical proposition ex part praedicati, that Princes excommunicated or deprived by the Pope may be deposed or murdered by their subjects, or any other whatsoever, which hath a far different sense from the former, as I will show beneath. So that he may still take to himself that imputation of falsity, or untruth, wherewith I did truly charge him, and hereafter be more wary, if he have any care of his credit, not to maintain such palpable untruths, which every Schoolboy may easily perceive so to be. And thus much for the first point. Now you shall see how learnedly he proveth the second. 11. Nevertheless I would not, saith he, e Nu. 5. have Widdrington to think, that because I deny, that I have said so in my Supplement, therefore I do, or will deny, that it is so: for it is evident in that clause, that the taker of the oath abiureth this doctrine as impious and heretical, to wit, that Princes excommunicated or deprived by the Pope may be deposed, or murdered by their subjects, or any other, whereby not only the Pope's power to depose Princes is denied, but also the doctrine thereof is abjured as impious and heretical: And this, I say, is evident, notwithstanding the frivolous evasion, which my Adversary Widdrington seeketh by his extravagant interpretation of that clause, when he saith, as you have heard, that the sense and meaning thereof is no other, but that it is heretical to affirm it to be in the free power of subjects or any other to depose, or (if they list) to kill Princes that are excommunicated or deprived by the Pope. 12. Whereby f Nu. 6. he giveth to understand, that the doctrine, and position abjured in that clause, containeth two members, the one concerning the deposition of Princes, and the other concerning the murder of them; and that it is abjured as heretical in respect of the later only: as who would say, that it is an heretical doctrine to teach, or affirm, that Princes excommunicated by the Pope may be murdered. So that albeit there be mention also of the deposition of Princes (as that they may be deposed or murdered) yet the doctrine of deposition is not abjured in that clause as heretical, except it be joined with the murder of them; in such sort, that a man may freely choose whether he will depose, or murder them. 13. But that the Reader may more fully understand, whether Master fitzherbert's Reply be a mere shift, or my answer an absurd frivolous, and extravagant evasion, and contention de lana caprina (such foul terms, and far worse it is not foul for him to use against me, and yet if I do only say, that he affirmeth that which is false, or not true, I fall very foul upon him) I will set down entirely, what I answered in my Theological Disputation, and not in that lame manner, as he relateth my answer. It was objected by the Author of the English Dialogue between the two sister's protestancy and Puritanisme, that this clause of the oath. (And I do further swear, that I do from my heart abhor, detest and abjure, as impivos and heretical, this damnable doctrine and position, That Princes which be excommuicated or deprived by the Pope, may be deposed or murdered by their subjects, or any other whatsoever) cannot be taken without perjury: And this was his argument. 14. Whensoever an affirmative proposition is heretical, of necessity it must be either against faith, and consequently against the express word of God, or else the contradictory negative must be a position of faith, and contained in the express word of God. But neither this affirmative position, That Princes which be excommunicated or deprived by the Pope, may be deposed or murdered by their Subjects, or any other what soever, is against the express word of God, neither the contradictory negative, to wit, that Princes being excommunicated or deprived by the Pope, may not be deposed or murdered by their subjects, or any other whatsoever, is contained in the express word of God. Therefore the former position, that Princes being excommunicated or deprived by the Pope, may be deposed or murdered by their Subjects, or any other whatsoever, is not heretical. 15 And if perchance it should be answered, that whereas it is written in the 20. Chapter of Exod. Thou shalt not kill, and 1. Reg. 26. Destroy him not, for who shall lay the hands on the Lords anointed, and be guiltless? One part of the aforesaid position, to wit, that Princes may be murdered, is heretical and against the express Word of God, and therefore the whole position, in regard of this one part, may be abjured as heretical; yet this answer is not sufficient: For the position in hand, to wit, That Princes being excommunicated or deprived by the Pope may be deposed, or murdered by their Subjects or any other, doth not absolutely affirm, that Princes, after they be excommunicated or deprived by the Pope, may be murdered by their subjects, or any other, but with a disiuction, to wit, may be deposed, or murdered. And therefore although the position were heretical, if it did only affirm they might be murdered, yet not affirming this, but only that they may be deposed, or murdered, there is no show of heresy in it, in regard of being contrary to the aforesaid texts of Scripture, to which it is nothing contrary at all. 16. For, according to the most true and approved rule of the Logicians, to make a disjunctive proposition, or any thing affirmed under a disjunction to be false and heretical, it is necessary, that both parts of the disjunction be also false and heretical; neither is it sufficient, that one only part be heretical. And therefore although that the second part of the disjunction, to wit, That Princes, being excommunicated, or deprived by the Pope, may be murdered, be heretical and against the express word of God; yet because the first part of the disjunction, to wit, that such Princes may be deposed by their Subjects, or any other, is not heretical, nor contrary to the express word of God, the whole disjunctive position cannot be in very deed heretical, and therefore neither can it be abjured as heretical. 17. To this objection I gave two answers. The first and principal answer was, g Cap. 5. sec. 2. nu. 8. et seq. that albeit the aforesaid proposition, Princes which be excommunicated or deprived by the Pope, may be deposed or murdered by their Subjects etc. doth seem by reason of that later conjunction [or] to be a disjunctive proposition, or rather a categorical proposition of such a disiunct predicate, as the Logicians term it, which virtually doth imply, or may be resolved into a disjunctive proposition (to the verity of which disjunctive proposition, it is only required, as it was said in the objection; that one part of the disjunction be true: and to make the whole disjunction false and heretical, both parts of the disjunction must be false and heretical: neither doth it suffice, that one only part be false and heretical) Nevertheless according to the common sense and meaning of the words, it is in very deed, and according to our English phrase, equivalent to a copulative proposition, or rather to a Categorical proposition of such a Copulate predicate, which may be resolved into a copulative proposition, to the ve ity whereof, according to the Logicians rule, it is contrariwise required, that both parts of the copulation be true; and to make the whole proposition false and heretical, it is not required that both parts of the copulation be false and heretical, but it sufficeth that one only part thereof be false and heretical. Neither is it unusual, that a conjunction disjunctive be sometimes taken for a copulative, and a copulative for a disjunctive, as we may see in Leg. saepe. F. de verb●rum significat. Whereof read Felinus in Cap. inter caeteras de rescriptis. joannes Azorius tom. 1. Instit. Lib. 5 Cap. 25. and Salas, disp. 21. de Legibus, sect. 3. regula 26. 18. But if any one will needs contend, that the aforesaid proposition, Princes, which are excommunicated or deprived by the Pope etc. by reason o● that disjunctive conjunction [or] is altogether a disjunctive proposition; this notwithstanding being granted, the objection may easily be answered. For albeit we admit it to be a disjunctive proposition, nevertheless we affirm, that it is not an absolute disjunctive, whereof the aforesaid rule of the Logicians, to wit, that both parts of the disjunction must be heretical, to make the whole disjunction to be heretical, is to be understood, but it is a conditional disjunctive, which importeth a free choice, or election of the will, or which is all one, a free power to choose whether part of the disjunction we please, to the verity of which conditional disjunctive is required, that you may choose whether part of the disjunction you please; and if it be heretical to affirm, that it is in the free power of the will to choose whether part of the disjunction we please, the whole disjunction, or disjunctive proposition implying such a condition, or free election, without doubt is heretical. 19 Now that this disjunction [or] being placed in the aforesaid proposition is in common sense, according to our English phrase, equivalent to h The Latin word aequipollet in this place of my Theolog. Disputation is not well translated into English it doth import, it should be, it is equivalent. a copulation, or such a disjunction, which leaveth a free power in the Subjects to choose whether part they will, that is to depose the King, or if they please, to murder him, will most evidently appear, if both in common speech, and also in the laws of the Realm, we diligently consider the proper, and usual signification of this word [may] when there followeth the conjunction disjunctive [or]. And this may be showed by almost innumerable examples, whereof some of them we will here set down. As for example: you may stay here, or departed. You may eat or drink. You may buy wine or oil. You may go to such a place by land, or by water. You may buy that land in fee-farm, or by lease. The King by virtue of an Act of Parliament may take of convicted Popish Recusants twenty pounds for every month, or the third part of all their lands. The Sheriefe may presently hang a thief condemned to die, or delay his death for some small time. If any person hold any lands of an other Lord, then of the King, by Knight's service, he may give, dispose, or assure by his last will, and testament, two parts of the said lands holden by Knight's service, or of as much thereof as shall amount to the full yearly value of two parts. If a man by his last will and testament ordain, that his Executors may bestow twenty pounds upon the poor, or repair such a bridge, it is in the free power of the Executors, to choose whether of those two they please. Finally in clauses of revocation, where the words are, that one may by any deed in his life time, or by his last will and testament revoke the said uses, and limit new, it is in his power and choice to do it by the one, or by the other, as he shall please. And in infinite such like examples the verb [may] implieth a free power to choose either part of the disjunction one pleaseth, neither can there scarcely be alleged any one example, wherein the conjunction disjunctive [or] immediately following the verb [may] is not so taken. 20. Wherefore the plain and usual meaning of the aforesaid proposition, Princes, which be excommunicated, or deprived by the Prpe, may be deposed, or murdered by their Subjects, or, which is all one, Subjects may depose, or murder their Princes being excommunicated, or deprived by the Pope (for that in this last only the verb passive is changed into the active) is, that it is in the free choice of the Subjects to depose, or if they will, to murder such Princes. So that if it be heretical to affirm, as without doubt it is, that it is in the free power of Subjects to depose, or murder such Princes, because it is heretical and against the express word of God to affirm, that they may murder them, the aforesaid position consisting of that disjunction is herepicall, and therefore it may without any danger at all of perjury be abjured as heretical. 21. From hence it may be gathered first, that according to the common, and usual understanding of our English phrase, there is a great distinction betwixt these two verbs [may] and [can]. For [can] doth usually signify a power in general, whether it be natural, or moral, but [may] for the most part importeth a moral power, to wit, if it be used alone without any conjunction following it, most commonly it signifieth a lawfulness to do the thing proposed: As, I may do this, signifieth, that it is lawful for me to do this: but if there follow it a a conjunction copulative, or disjunctive, it implieth a choice, or free power, to choose whether part of the disjunction, or copulation one will. Seeing therefore that the Latin verb [possum] implieth a power in general, whether it be natural, or moral, and according to the thing affirmed or denied, it is limited to a natural or moral power: as in this proposition, Ignis potest comburere, The fire hath power to burn, it signifieth a natural and necessary power in the fire to burn: and in this, potest homo eligo●e bonum, aut m●lum; A man hath power to choose good or evil, it signifieth a moral and free power: from hence it followeth, that this proposition, Subjects may depose or murder their Prince, being excommunicated or deprived by the Pope, is not so properly and significantly translated into Latin by the verb [possum] Sabditi possunt deponere aut occidere suum Principem excommunicatum etc. as by the substantive of [possum] or by the verb [permittitur] to wit, in potestate est subditorum, or permittitur subditis Principem suum excommunicatum, vel deprivatum per Pontificem, deponere aut occidere. It is in the power of Subjects, or it is permitted to Subjects, to depose or murder their Prince being excommunicated or deprived by the Pope. And therefore the Latin translation of this Oath, doth not by the verb [possum] significantly express the proper and usual signification of the verb [may] contained in the aforesaid Position, unless either the conjunction copulative [and] be put in place of [or] to wit, Principes per Papam excommunicati vel deprivati possum per suos Subditos deponi & occidi, deposed and murdered, as Cardinal Bellarmine, and Antonius Capellus have it in their books translated, or else there be understood a condition of the free-will to choose whether part of the disjunction they please, to wit, possunt deponi per suos Subditos, aut (si velint,) occidi, be deposed, or (if the Subjects will) be murdered. 23 Secondly from hence it is also gathered, that in a disjunctive proposition, wherein is implied a condition of the will to choose freely either part of the disjunction, it maketh all one sense, whether the conjunction copulative [and] or the disjunctive [or] be used: For both of them do signify a free power to choose which part one pleaseth: and so the conjunction disjunctive hath in sense the virtue and force of a copulative, & the copulative of a disjunctive. Wherefore when the ancient Fathers speak of our free-will, and do affirm, that it is in our power to choose good or evil, they use indifferently the conjunction disjunctive [or] and the copulative [and] sometimes affirming that it is in our power to choose good or evil; other times that it is in our power to choose good and evil. Yea Card. Bellarmine himself propounding in his Controversies the question concerning free-will, doth confound [or] with [and], and taketh them for all one. There is a controversy, 1 Tom. 4. Lib. 5, Chap, 13, in principio. saith he betwixt Catholics and heretics, whether a man in the state of corrupt nature hath free-will to choose moral good, [and] to avoid evil, or which is all one, to observe [or] break moral precepts. 24. Seeing therefore that in this proposition, Princes being excommunicated, or deprived by the Pope, may be deposed or murdered by their Subjects, or, which is all one, Subjects may depose or murder their Prince being excommunicated or deprived by the Pope, the verb [may] doth import a free power in the Subjects to choose which part of the disjunction they please, that is, to depose such Princes, or, if they please, to murder them, it maketh all one sense, whether it be said, Princes may be deposed or murdered, by their subjects, or Princes may be deposed and murdered by their Subjects, as Card. Bellarmine, and Antonius Cappellus, putting the Conjunction copulative [and] do seem to have well observed, and to be of opinion, that the aforesaid disjunctive proposition is in very deed equivalent to a copulative, or such a conditional disjunctive, which virtually doth contain a copulative. And truly, if this pretended demonstration of this Author were so evident an argument, as he imagineth it to be, to condemn this oath as sacrilegious, without doubt it could not have escaped the most quick understanding of Card. Bellarmine, who also would not have neglected to produce any reason, which might clearly have convinced the oath to be apparently unlawful. Now from this which hath been said, it is easy to answer in form to the aforesaid objection, whose whole strength dependeth upon the nature and quality of a disjunctive proposition. Wherefore to the minor proposition it is answered, that it is heretical and against the express word of God contained in the aforesaid two texts of holy Scripture, to affirm, That Princes, which be excommunicated or deprived by the Pope may be deposed or murdered by their Subjects, or any other, or, which is all one, that Subjects, or any other may depose or murder such Princes. For the plain and common meaning of this proposition is, as I have showed before, that it is in the free power of subjects, or of any other, to depose such Princes, or, if they will, to murder them, which proposition is flat heretical. 26. And whereas it is objected, that the aforesaid proposition, Princes which be excommunicated etc. is a disjunctive, but to the verity of a disjunctive proposition, it is sufficient, that one part of the disjunction be true, and to make the whole disjunctive proposition to be false and heretical, it is necessary according to the most certain rule of the Logicians, that both parts of the disjunction be false and heretical. It is answered first to the Minor, that although in external sound the aforesaid proposition, Princes which be excommunicated etc. seem to be a disjunctive, yet in very deed, and according to the plain and common understanding of our English phrase, it is, as I have already showed, equivalent to a copulative, to the verity of which it is necessary, that both parts of the copulation be true, and to make the whole copulative proposition to be false and heretical, it sufficeth, that one only part of the copulalation be false and heretical. Now that one part of the aforesaid proposition, to wit, that Princes which be excommunicated or deprived by the Pope, may be murdered by their Subjects, or any other, is flat heretical, it is too too manifest. 27 But lest we should seem to contend about bare words, I answer secondly, and grant, that the aforesaid proposition, Princes, which be excommunicated, etc. is a disjunctive; But then the Minor proposition is to be distinguished. For when the Logicians affirm, that to the verity of a disjunctive proposition it is sufficient, that one part of the disjunction be true, and to make the whole disjunctive to be heretical, it is necessary that both parts of the disjunction be heretical, that approved rule of the Logicians is to be understood of an absolute disjunctive, to wit, which doth not virtually contain in it a condition, or free power in the will to choose whether part one pleaseth: For to the verity of this conditional disjunctive it is necessary, that both parts of the disjunction may be chosen, and if it be heretical to affirm, that it is in the free choice of any man to choose whether part of the disjunction he pleaseth, the whole disjunctive proposition is heretical. Now that it is heretical to affirm, that it is in the free power of Subjects to depose, or if they will, to murder Princes being excommunicated or deprived by the Pope, no man can call in question. Nevertheless the Author of this Dialogue doth seem to deal somewhat cunningly, and endeavoureth not so much to impugn directly the affirmative proposition, which is expressly contained in the Oath, and to prove directly, that the aforesaid position, Princes being excommunicated etc. may be deposed or murdered, not to be heretical, as the oath affirmeth it to be; but he flieth from the affirmative to the negative, and indeavoureth to show, that the contradictory proposition, to wit, Princes being excommunicated &c. cannot be deposed or murdered etc. is not certain of faith, nor contained in the express word of God; from whence he concludeth, that therefore the former affirmative proposition, which is in express words contained in the Oath, is not heretical, because in what degree of falsehood any position is false, in the opposite degree of truth the contradictory must be true. 29. But this Author by his manner of arguing seemeth desirous to shun the difficulty, and to impugn a proposition, which is more clear and manifest, by an other more obscure and equivocal, which among Logicians is accounted a great defect in arguing; whose nature is to prove one thing less manifest by an other more apparent. For the falsehood of this affirmative proposition, Princes, which be excommunicated or deprived by the Pope may be deposed or murdered by their Subjects, or which is all one, Subjects may depose or murder such Princes, who be excommunicated etc. is more clear and manifest in the common understanding of our English phrase, then is the truth of this negative, Subjects may not depose or murder such Princes, who be excommunicated etc. by reason of the negative adverb [not] which as the Logicians say, is of a malignant nature; for that it destroyeth, or denieth whatsoever followeth after it, making an affirmative to be a negative, and a negative to be an affirmative, an universal to be a particular, and a particular to be an universal. k As this universal affirmative proposition, all men are sensible, is by putting not in the beginning, not all men are sensible, made, a particular negative. So that the meaning of the aforesaid negative proposition, is by reason of that negative adverb [not] made ambiguous, and may have this sense, that Subjects may neither depose nor murder such Princes, who be excommunicated or deprived by the Pope: which proposition so understood, is not of faith,, neither in very deed contradictory to the proper and usual meaning of the former affirmative, which is abjured in the Oath. And therefore no marvel that this Author was desirous to fly from the affirmative to the negative. 30. Supposing therefore, that contradiction, according to the approved doctrine of Aristotle, l Lib. 1. de interpretat. Cap. 4. is an affirming and denying of the self same thing, in the self same manner, I answer, that this negative position, Princes which be excommunicated or deprived by the Pope, may not be deposed or murdered by their Subjects, is contradictory to that affirmative position, which is abjured in the Oath, if the verb [may] be taken in the same manner, or sense in the negative, as it is taken in the affirmative: And then as the affirmative is heretical, so the negative is of Faith. For as the sense of the affirmative is, as I have showed before, that it is in the free choice of Subjects either to depose such Princes who be excommunicated or deprived by the Pope, or if they will, to murder them, which is false, heretical, and against those express words of Scripture, Thou shalt not kill, Kill him not &c. So the sense of the negative contradictory must be, that it is not in the free choice of Subjects to depose such Princes, or if they please, to murder them; which proposition is most true, and contained in the express word of God, because it is not in their free power to murder them, as is manifest by the former places of holy Scripture. 31. And thus much concerning the first and principal Answer, which I thought good to set down at large, both for that the Reader may the better judge of my Answer, and also of M. fitzherbert's Reply, who taketh no other particular exception against the Oath, besides the general Doctrine concerning the Pope's power to depose Princes, which he will needs have to be a point of faith, and therefore not to be denied by any Catholic, and also for that there be some Catholics, who although they be of opinion, as was the Author of that English Dialogue, that there is nothing against faith contained in the oath, and that the Doctrine for the Pope's power to depose Princes is not a point of faith, but in Controversy among Catholics, notwithstanding the Pope's Breves, or any other decree of Pope or Council, which are urged to the contrary, yet they can hardly be persuaded, but that by reason of that word [heretical] that clause of the Oath is unlawful and cannot be taken without perjury, as the Author of that Dialogue did by the aforesaid Argument pretend to demonstrate. 32 Now you shall see what exceptions M. Fitzherbert taketh against this my Answer. First he saith, m nu. 10. that I contend de lana caprina, and labour in vain to prove, that the English word [may] in a disjunctive proposition implieth a freedom to choose whether part we list of the disjunction, wherein also by the way he saith, that I abuse strangers in seeking to persuade them, that the Latin verb [possunt] in the Latin Translation of the Oath, doth not sufficiently express the nature of the English word [may] in this clause, Principes per Papam excommunicati vel deprivati possunt per suos subditos, vel alios quoscunque, deponi aut occidi: Princes being excommunicated or deprived by the Pope may be deposed or murdered by their Subjects, or any other whatsoever. 33 But first who seethe not, that this question, to wit whether this proposition, Princes which are excommunicated or deprived by the Pope, may be deposed or murdered by their Subjects, or any other, be such a disjunctive proposition which implieth a free election in the Subjects or others, to choose whether they will depose or murder such Princes, is both a question of great moment, and not the lana caprina, & also that I have not laboured in vain to prove, but by the common understanding of the words in usual speech and in the laws of our Realm, sufficiently proved that the verb [may] in an affirmative disjunctive proposition, when there followeth the conjunction disjunctive [or] implieth a freedom to choose whether part of the disjunction we list, as by many examples both in common speech, and by the laws of our Realm I have clearly convinced; neither can there scarcely be alleged any one example, wherein the conjunction disjunctive [or] immediately following the verb [may] in an affirmative proposition doth not imply a free election to choose which part of the disjunction we please. 34. Secondly, it is not true, that I have abused the Latin Reader in seeking to persuade him, that the Latin verb [possunt] in the Latin Translation of the Oath, doth not sufficiently express the proper and usual signification of the verb [may] contained in the aforesaid position, unless either the conjunction copulative [et] be put in place of [aut], as Card. Bellarmine, Anton. Capellus, & now last F. Suarez have it in their books translated, or else there be understood a condition of the free will to choose in that clause [deposed or murdered by their Subjects] which part of the disjunction the Subjects please: But M. Fitzherbert rather abuseth his English Readers, who understand not Latin in affirming the contrary. For the Latin verb [possum] doth by his proper signification, as I have said, import a power in general, whether it be natural or moral, and according to the matter it is limited to a natural or moral power: but the verb [may] is by his proper signification limited only to a moral or free power: free I mean, not as free is all one with moral, but if there follow the conjunction copulative or disjunctive, to choose whether part of the disjunction we please: and if the verb [may] do sometimes signify a natural power, as in this, the fire may burn wood or straw, it is by reason of the matter, or of the thing affirmed, or denied, and not by virtue of the proper and usual signification of the verb [may]: And howsoever, when the verb [may] goeth before the conjunction disjunctive [or] it doth properly and usually signify a choice, freedom, or indifferency to take either part of the disjunction. 35. But mark here the cunning (I dare not say fraud, and falsehood of my Adversary, for that he checked me before for falling very foul upon him in saying that he affirmed that which was false, as though forsooth all that he affirmeth, I must take for true) in abusing both me and his Reader. For whereas, saith he, the great mystery of [may] is no other, as Widdrington himself expoundeth it, but that it signifieth in that clause a moral or lawful, and not a physical, or natural power, who is so senseless, if he be a Latinist, that doth not understand so much by the word [possunt] in the Latin translation of that clause, I mean that it signifieth a moral and not a natural power? Yea and that according to the axiom of the law, Hoc possumus quod iure possumus, we may do that, which we may lawfully do? To what purpose then doth he abuse his Latin Reader with such a long, and impertinent discourse, as he maketh here, touching the difference betwixt [possunt] in Latin, and [may] in English, as if in this case and question there were some great diversity. 36. See now his sleight: For when I did affirm, that the difference betwixt the English word [may] and the Latin [possum] was, that [possum] doth properly signify a power in general, whether it be natural or moral, and [may] doth properly signify a moral and free power, I spoke of a moral power in general, and that briefly without any such long discourse, as you have seen, but when I spoke of this clause of the oath, [may be deposed or murdered] I did not speak of a moral or lawful power in general, but in particular of such a moral or lawful power, which implieth a freedom to choose which part of the disjunction we please. And therefore Master Fitzherbert saith untruly abusing therein both me and his Reader, that I do make no other mystery of [may] in this clause of the oath, but that it signifieth a moral or lawful, and not a physical or natural power. For I make this mystery of [may] that whensoever there followeth it the conjunction [or] as it doth in this clause of the oath, it doth signify not only a moral, or lawful power in general, but in particular such a moral, or lawful power, which implieth a free choice to take which part of the disjunction we list. Which if my Adversary will likewise grant of the Latin verb [possum] we shall quickly be at an agreement concerning this clause of the oath, to wit, that I may truly and lawfully abjure as heretical this damnable doctrine, and conditional disjunctive position, That Princes, which be excommunicated, or deprived by the Pope, may be deposed, or murdered by their Subjects, or any other whatsoever, although one part only of the disjunction be heretical. 37. But the truth is, that Master Fitzherbert will not seem directly, and in express words to admit, (although by those examples of propositions which he himself beneath doth bring it may clearly be gathered) that the word [may] doth in this clause of the oath signify such a moral, or free power, which implieth a free choice to take which part of the disjunction we please: and therefore he maketh a long discourse (I dare not say impertinent) and which hath been already answered by me in my Theological Disputation, whereby he would seem to overthrow my answer; and thereupon he called that disjunction, which I made betwixt a conditional disjunctive proposition, which implieth a freedom and condition of the will to choose which part of the disjunction we list, and an absolute disjunctive, which implieth no such choice, a frivolous evasion, and an extravagant interpretation. 38, Observe now, good Reader, how insufficiently this man doth impugn my answer. But let us see, saith he, n Nu. 11. What Widdrington proveth by all this. He hath told us, that the conjunction [or] is sometimes taken for the copulative [and] especially when it followeth the verb [may] because then the proposition is not absolutely disjunctive, but conditional, including a free election of either part of the disjunction, whereof he allegeth some examples out of the Fathers, yea out of Card. Bellarmine himself. But what is this to the purpose? Will he say, that because [or] is used in those places for [and] ergo it is always so used? me thinks he should be ashamed so to argue; for besides that his argument would be most vicious, he might be convinced by infinite examples of propositions, wherein the disjunctive conjunction [or] is not taken for the copulative [and] although the verb [may] goeth before it, yea though there be also freedom of election to choose either part of the disjunction, as if we should say, It is impious and heretical to hold, that God may be denied, or blasphemed by his creatures. It is not lawful to teach, that a Priest may eat or drink before he say Mass. It is folly for a man to think, that he may travel by Sea or Land, without money. It is a shame for a Soldier to say, that he may yield or fly upon small occasion. 39 In these and infinite other such propositions o Nu. 12. (which might be added if it were needful) [or] is not taken for [and] but is an absolute disjunctive conjunction, notwithstanding that [may] goeth before it, and that there is also free election to choose whether part of the disjunction a man will; yea (which is specially to be observed for our purpose) whatsoever is affirmed of the one part, is also affirmed of the other; as for example, It is impious and heretical, whethersoever a man hold that God may be denied, or blasphemed; It is as unlawful to teach, that a Priest may drink, as that he may eat before he say Mass; it is no less folly to think, that a man may travel by Sea, then by land without money; It is no less shame for a Soldier to say, that he may yield, then that he may fly upon small occasion: And the very like we say also of the proposition now in question, to wit, that [or] in the words deposed or murdered, is no copulative, but a mere disjunctive conjunction, and that the doctrine of deposing Princes is abjured therein as impious and heretical, no less than the doctrine of murdering them, notwithstanding that the word [may] doth go before [or] and that a man may choose whether part he will of the disjunction. 40. So as you see, p nu. 13. that neither his examples of propositions, wherein the disjunctive is taken for the copulative, nor his distinction of absolute disiunctives, and conditional do prove any more, but that sometimes [or] is taken for [and] and that in some disjunctive propositions, wherein the word [may] goeth before [or] the affirmation is not referred alike to both parts of the disjunction: and therefore against us he hath proved nothing at all, unless he can make good this inference, It is sometimes so, ergo it is always so, which I am sure he will not say for shame. And as for the Latin translation of the oath in Card. Bellarmine and Capellus, in the which we read deponi et occidi, where the conjunction copulative [and] is used for the disjunctive [or] it little importeth, for that it was an error of him, that translated the same out of the English, which they understood not, and therefore must needs take it, as it was given them. Thus M Fitzherbert. 41. But what sincerity can the Reader expect from this man's hands, when in a controversy of such great moment, as is this concerning our obedience due to God and Caesar, he dealeth so corruptly? For first he would make his Reader believe, that I affirm, the conjunction disjunctive [or] in this clause of the oath not to be a mere, and absolute disjunctive conjunction, but a copulative, and that the conjunction [or] is taken for [and] as though I should affirm, that the proposition is not in very deed a disjunctive, but a pure copulative proposition; and that unless [or] be taken for [and] the said proposition, Princes, which be excommunicated or deprived by the Pope, may be deposed or murdered by their Subjects or any other, would not be heretical: Whereas I mean no such thing; neither did I ever say, that [or] in this proposition is taken for [and] or that this proposition is not a true, and proper disjunctive proposition. 42. But that which I affirmed was, that [or] in this proposition is equivalent to [and,] and that although the proposition by reason of that conjunction [or] may seem to be such a pure and absolute disjunctive proposition, to the verity whereof, according to the Logicians rule, is only required, that one part of the disjunction be true, and to make the whole proposition false and heretical both parts of the disjunction must be false and heretical, yet according to the common sense and meaning of the words it is not in very deed, and according to our English phrase such a pure and absolute disjunctive proposition, but it is a conditional disjunctive, which importeth a free choice to take which part of the disjunction we please, which conditional disjunctive proposition is equivalent to a copulative, or which is all one, followeth the nature and conditions not of an absolute and common disjunctive proposition, whereof the Logicians treat, but of a copulative proposition, to the verity whereof according to the Logicians rule, it is contrariwise required, that both parts of the copulative, or conditional disjunction, be true, and to make the whole proposition false and heretical it sufficeth that one only part be false and heretical: And that therefore in this conditional disjunctive proposition it maketh all one sense, for as much as concerneth the truth or falsehood of the proposition, whether the conjunction copulative [and] or the disjunctive [or] be used, although the force of the proposition be by the vulgar sort more easily perceived, if the conjunction copulative [and] then if the disjunctive [or] be used. 43. Wherefore I do not affirm, that the conjunction disjunctive [or] in this clause of the oath is not an absolute disjunctive conjunction (for I do not make two sorts of disjunctive conjunctions, to wit, absolute and conditional) or that [or] in this clause is taken for [and] as my Adversary would persuade his Reader; but that which I say is, that the proposition is not an absolute disjunctive proposition, but a conditional disunctive, and which implieth a free power to take which part of the disjunction we please, and that therefore, for as much as concerneth the truth or falsehood of the proposition, it is equivalent to a copulative proposition, and followeth the nature and condition of a copulative, and that it hath the same sense, whether the conjunction copulative [and] or the disjunctive [or] be used. 44. Secondly, it is too too clear, that I did not argue in that absurd & childish manner, as my Adversary would make his Reader believe I do, It is sometimes so, therefore it is always so; or thus, the conjunction disjunctive [or] is sometime taken for the copulative [and] therefore in this clause of the Oath it is taken so. But I argued thus: The conjunction disjunctive [or] when it followeth the verb [may] is not only sometimes, but usually and commonly (I did not say taken) but equivalent to the conjunction copulative [and] for that then the proposition according to the common sense and understanding of the words is not an absolute disjunctive, but a conditional disjunctive proposition, which includeth a free condition of the will to choose either part of the disjunction, and therefore hath the same sense, whether the conjunction disjunctive, or the copulative be used: therefore in this clause of the oath, Princes may be deposed or murdered by their Subjects, it ought so to be taken, for that by an express clause we are bound to take the Oath and every part thereof plainly and sincerely, according to the common sense and understanding of the words. That it is in common sense a conditional disjunctive proposition, implying a free election to take either part of the disjunction, and consequently equivalent to a copulative proposition, I proved by very many examples both in common speech, and in the laws of this Realm: and in the end I added, that in infinite such like examples the verb [may] implieth a free power to choose either part of the disjunction we please: neither can there be scarcely alleged any one example (speaking of affirmative propositions) wherein the conjunction [or] immediately following the verb [may] is not so taken. 45 From whence I inferred, that in a disjunctive proposition, wherein is implied a condition of the will to choose freely either part of the disjunction, it maketh the same sense, whether the conjunction copulative, [and] or the disjunctive [or] be used: for both of them do import a free election to take which part one pleaseth, and so the conjunction disjunctive hath in sense the virtue of a copulative, and the copulative the virtue of a disjunctive. And this I confirmed both by the authority of the ancient Fathers, and also of Card. Bellarmine himself, who do confound [and] with [or] and [or] with [and] in propositions which do imply a free election to choose which part they will. What good dealing then is this of my Adversaries to frame my argument in that absurd, and ridiculous manner, it is sometimes so, ergo it is always so, and also to corrupt my words and meaning, as you have seen he hath done? 46. And albeit I do remit the Reader to Felinus Azor, and Salas, where they may see some examples, that a conjunction disjunctive, even in absolute disjunctive propositions is sometimes taken for a copulative, and a copulative for a disjunctive, it was not to draw an argument from thence, that therefore either always, or in this clause of the Oath, it was so to be taken, but it was only to show, that seeing it is not strange, even in absolute disjunctive propositions, whereof those Authors did chiefly treat, that [and] should not only be equivalent, but be also taken for [or] and [or] for [and] therefore they ought not to marvel, that in conditional disiunctives [or] should be, I do not say taken, but equivalent to [and] and [and] to [or]. But the argument, which I brought to prove, that in this clause of the Oath, the conjunction disjunctive [or] is equivalent to the copulative [and] was taken from the plain and usual sense of our English phrase, and from the common understanding of our English laws, wherein the conjunction disjunctive [or] following the verb [may] doth commonly imply a free election to take which part of the disjunction we please, and which consequently is equivalent to a copulative, therefore in this clause of the Oath, which I am bound to take according to the common sense of the words, it ought so to be taken: This was my argument. 47 Thirdly, observe how inconsiderately M. Fitzherbert bringeth here four examples of propositions to confute my answer, which nevertheless do most clearly confirm the same. For in all of them the conjunction [or] is equivalent to the copulative [and] and it maketh all one sense whether [and] or [or] be used. As for example, God may be denied or blasphemed by his Creatures. A Priest may eat or drink before he say Mass. A man may travel by Sea or by land without money. A Soldier may yield or fly upon small occasion. In all these four examples, wherein my Adversary himself granteth a freedom of election to choose whether part of the disjunction a man will, to be implied, the conjunction disjunctive [or] for as much as concerneth the truth or falsehood of the Propositions, is equivalent to the copulative [and], and the propositions have all one sense: whether the conjunction [and], or the conjunction [or] be used: And so it is all one sense whether we say that God may be denied or blasphemed by his Creatures, or that God may be denied and blasphemed by his Creatures, that a Priest may eat or drink before he say Mass, or that a Priest may eat and drink before he say Mass, and so of the rest: For the sense of them all is, that they may choose this part or that part of the disjunction, or this part and that part of the disjunction, as they will: And so the sense of the first proposition is, that it is in the free power and choice of Creatures to deny, or blaspheme God, or to deny God and also to blaspheme him if they will: and of the second that it is in the free power of a Priest to eat or to drink, or to eat, and, if he please, to drink before he say Mass, and so of the rest. By which it is evident, that in all of them it maketh the same sense, whether the conjunction [and] or the conjunction [or] be used: and so in all of them the conjunction disjunctive is equivalent to a copulative, and the copulative to a disjunctive. 48 last albeit that which M. Fitzherbert doth specially observe for his purpose, be true, to wit, that in all those four examples, which he hath brought, whatsoever is affirmed of the one part of the disjunction is also affirmed of the other, notwithstanding that there be also free election to choose which part of the disjunction a man will: as for example, it is impious and heretical whether soever a man hold that God may be denied, or that he may be blasphemed by his Creatures, it is as unlawful to teach that a Priest may drink as that he may eat before he say Mass, and so of the rest: from whence he would infer the like, that also in this clause of the Oath, the doctrine of deposing Princes is no less abjured as heretical than the doctrine of murdering them: nevertheless this his observation maketh nothing at all for his purpose, unless it be to bewray his own ignorance, and want of Logic, whiles he doth not perceive what is truly affirmed of both parts of an hypothetical proposition by virtue of the form, and what by virtue only of the matter. For although in all those four propositions, which he hath brought, it be true that the same impiety, heresy, unlawfulness, folly or shame, which is affirmed of the one part of the disjunction, be also affirmed of the other, yet this is not true by virtue of the form of the proposition consisting of a disjunctive conjunction, which implieth a choice to take which part of the disjunction a man will; but it is true by reason only of the matter, for that the same thing which is affirmed of the whole or entire disjunctive proposition, may be also affirmed severally of either part of the disjunction: For it is heretical to hold, that God may be denied by his Creatures, and likewise it is also heretical to hold, that God may be blasphemed by his Creatures, and so or the rest. But let him alter the matter, and keep the same form, that is the same disjunctive conjunction, which implieth a free choice to take which part of the disjunction a man will, and then he will quickly perceive how foully he is mistaken, and how insufficiently he hath confuted my Answer. 49 As for example, let us alter the matter of his four propositions, and keep the same form, that is keep the same disjunctive conjunction implying a choice to take which part of the disjunction one will, & say, that it is impious and heretical to hold, that God may be honoured or blasphemed by his creatures. It is not lawful to teach that a Priest may sleep or eat before he say Mass. It is folly for a man to think that he may travel by Sea or by Land with the like danger. It is a shame for a Captain to say, that he may fight or fly, when his Band is assaulted by the Enemy. All these and infinite other such propositions (which might be added if it were needful) are true by reason of one only part of the disjunction: And the reason is general and common to all conditional disjunctive propositions: for that a disjunctive proposition which implieth a free election to take which part of the disjunction one pleaseth, is, I do not say sometimes, but always equivalent to a copulative, and followeth the nature of a copulative, to the verity whereof, as I have showed before, it is required that both parts be true, and to make the whole or entire proposition to be false and heretical, it sufficeth, that one only part be false and heretical: and that therefore it doth not follow by force of the form, nature, and conditions of a conditional disjunctive proposition, but only by reason of the matter, that whatsoever is affirmed of the one part of the disjunction is also affirmed of the other. 50 Seeing therefore that this proposition, Subjects may depose or murder their Prince being excommunicated or deprived by the Pope, implieth a free election to choose which part of the disjunction we please, and it is heretical to affirm, that Subjects may murder such a Prince, I may truly, lawfully, and without any perjury abjure that proposition as heretical, although the doctrine only of murdering such Princes should be heretical, and not the doctrine of deposing them, whereof nevertheless we will treat beneath q Nu. 106. & seq. . So as you see, that none of all M. fitzherbert's examples maketh for him, but all are flat against him, and that it is not true, that I do argue in this ridiculous manner, It is sometimes so, therefore it is always so, or therefore it is now so, which were to argue ex puris particularibus, from pure particular propositions, which kind of arguing all Logicians account to be very vicious: But I argue thus: The words are commonly taken so, therefore I, who am bound to take the oath, and every clause thereof according to the common sense of the words, am bound to take this clause of the oath so, which manner of arguing to be good, I am sure he will not deny for shame. 51. But my Adversary little perceiveth, how he himself falleth into that vice of arguing, whereof he untruly accuseth me to wit, It is sometimes so, therefore it is always so, or therefore it is now so. For he pretendeth to prove, that because in those four conditional disjunctive propositions, and many such like, whatsoever is affirmed of the one part of the disjunction, is also affirmed of the other, notwithstanding that there be also free election to choose whether part of the disjunction a man will, which is only true in some particular propositions, and that only by reason of the matter and not by virtue of the form and quality of the conditional disjunctive proposition, therefore in this clause of the oath, because heretical is affirmed of the doctrine to murder Princes, it must also be affirmed of the doctrine to depose them, which is to argue ex puris particularibus, from pure particular propositions, and is all one to say, it is sometimes so, therefore it is now so. But my manner of arguing is from a universal proposition to infer a particular, to wit, that because in every conditional disjunctive proposition implying a choice, etc., by virtue of the form, it is sufficient to make the whole proposition false and heretical, that one only part of the disjunction be false and heretical, and consequently it is sufficient, that heretical be affirmed of the one part, and not of the other, although sometimes by reason of the matter it may be affirmed of both, therefore in this particular disjunctive proposition, Princes being excommunicated or deprived by the Pope may be deposed or murdered by their Subjects or any other, it is sufficient to make the whole proposition heretical, that one only part of the disjunction be heretical, and that therefore the doctrine to murder such Princes may be abjured as heretical, without abjuring as heretical the doctrine to depose them. 52. And what man is there so simple, who may not presently perceive, that in the very same manner, and by the same four examples which my Adversary bringeth to impugn my interpretation of those words [deposed or murdered] he might argue, if the words were, [deposed and murdered] and in those his four examples of propositions [or] were changed into [and] whereby they would be made copulative, and not disjunctive propositions? For then also whatsoever is affirmed of the one part, would also be affirmed of the other: As it is impious and heretical to hold, that God may be denied and blasphemed by his creatures. It is unlawful to teach, that a Priest may eat, and drink before he say Mass, and so of the rest: And yet if he have any skill in Logic, as in truth I think he hath but little, he will be ashamed to infer from thence, that therefore in copulative propositions, whatsoever is affirmed of the one part is also affirmed of the other: for that in a false and heretical copulative proposition, it sufficeth, according to the Logicians rule, that one only part be false and heretical: which plainly showeth how viciously he confuteth my interpretation of those words [deposed or murdered] ex puris particularibus, from some particular examples of propositions, which are only true by reason of the matter, not regarding what is generally, and always required by virtue of the form, and nature of the conditional disjunctive proposition to make the whole proposition true, or false, of faith or heretical, howsoever truth, falsehood, or heresy may be affirmed severally of one only, or of both parts of the disjunction. 53. And whereas M. Fitzherbert affirmeth, that Card. Bellarmine, and Capellus were in the translation of those words [deposed and murdered] deceived by the error of him, who translated the Oath out of English into Latin, I am content to take it at this time for an answer, for that I do not rely upon their authority in this point, but upon the common understanding of all men, who in a conditional disjunctive proposition make [or] equivalent to [and] and [and] to [or]. Nevertheless this I must needs say, that it might be perchance an error of the Printer, which also if it had been, me thinks that Card. Bellarmine, Capellus, or Fa. Suarez would have noted it among the errors, if they had accounted it for any great error, or to have clean altered the sense of the proposition, as this man would make it; but that it should be an error of the Translator I can hardly be persuaded. And my reason is, because it seemeth, that there was but one only translation of the Oath out of English, which is extant in public writings, from which all those writers, who have set down the oath in Latin, have taken it, as first the Pope in his Breve, then Card. Bellarmine, Fa. Gretzer, Capellus, and now lastly Suarez. For that in none of all these Writers the translation of the Oath is in any point different, either so much as in any one word, or the placing of a word, except in those words [deposed or murdered] which is morally impossible, if there had been divers translations. Now in the Pope's Breve, and likewise in Gretzer, and in one Edition of Card. Bellarmine's book against his majesties Apology, we read [deposed or murdered] but in other Editions of the same book, in Capellus, and now lastly in Suarez, we read [deposed and murdered] which is a sign, that is was an error rather of the Printer, then of the Translator, & also that the error was not great, & much regarded by them, for that the sense of the proposition is all one whether we read [deposed or murdered] or [deposed and murdered] it being a conditional disjunctive proposition, implying a free choice to take both parts of the disjunction, which therefore for as much as concerneth the truth or falsehood of the proposition, hath the same sense, whether the conjunction copulative [and] or the disjunctive [or] be used, as I have showed before. 54 But now forsooth M. Fitzherbert will clear all this difficulty, and make it manifest out of my own grounds, that the doctrine of the deposition of Princes, is abjured in the Oath as impious and heretical, no less than the doctrine of murdering them; for hitherto he hath so cleared the difficulty, as you have seen, that I could not have desired more clear and fit examples of propositions, to confirm my interpretation of those words [deposed or murdered] then which he himself hath brought to impugn it. Thus therefore he writeth. r Nu. 14. 15 16. 55. But to clear all this difficulty, and to make it manifest, that the doctrine of the deposition of Princes is abjured in the Oath as impious and heretical, no less than the supposed doctrine of murdering them, I shall need no other testimony or proof thereof, than such as may be taken from the Oath itself, considered even according to those rules, which Widdrington himself hath laid down for the interpretation of it in the very first chapter of his Theological disputation, s Nurse 7. where he professeth to approve, & follow the doctrine of Suarez t Lib. 6. de leg. cap. 1. in that point, as being conform to the common opinion of Lawyers and Divines. Now than he teacheth there out of Suarez, that if there be any doubt or question concerning the sense of a law, or any part thereof, three things are specially to be pondered for the exposition of it, to wit, the words of the Law, the mind or intention of the Lawmaker, and the reason or end of the Law; and the same he saith are also to be considered for the clearing of any difficulty or doubt in the Oath. 56. As for the words of the Law (and consequently of the Oath) he saith, that they are to be understood according to their proper, and usual signification; and the reason is, saith Suarez, because words are so to be used in common speech, and much more in Laws, which ought to be clear; but it is evident, that the words of the clause now in question, being taken in their usual and proper signification, do make clearly for us, wherein I dare boldly appeal to the judgement of any discreet Reader; for albeit such a sense, as Widdrington imagineth, may be picked or rather wringed out of th●se words, yet no man at the first sight will, or can reasonably conceive any thing else thereby, but that either part of the disjunctive clause is abjured alike. 57 For although the conjunction [or] is sometimes taken for a copulative, yet it is commonly a disjunctive, and hath that signification divers times even in this oath; as any man may see, that list to observe it: As for example (to omit all the rest which might be urged to this purpose) the very next words before deposed or murdered, are excommunicated or deprived, wherein it is clear, that [or] hath the ordinary and proper signification of a disjunctive, giving to understand, that whether Princes be only excommunicated, or deprived also of their right to their States by the Pope, it is impious and heretical doctrine to teach, that they may be either deposed or murdered. Also the same is to be noted in the words immediately following, to wit, by their Subjects or any other, wherein it is signified, that neither Subjects, nor yet any other may depose or murder Princes excommunicated or deprived by the Pope: and the like may be exemplified in the other clauses of the Oath, at least thirty times, for so often I do find the conjunction [or] therein, and always used properly for a disjunctive, as also I dare say it is used in like manner, and in the same sense, above a hundred times in the same Statute. Thus M. Fitzherbert. 58 Now you shall see how well he hath cleared this difficulty. His Argument if it be reduced to a syllogistical form is this. The words of every law (and consequently of this Oath) are according to Suarez, whose doctrine I approve herein, to be taken in their proper and usual signification, but those words, [deposed or murdered, etc.] according to their proper and usual signification do signify, that the supposed Doctrine of murdering Princes, and of deposing them, is abjured alike, therefore in the aforesaid clause, I abhor, detest and abjure, etc. the doctrine of deposing, and of murdering Princes which be excommunicated, etc. are both abjured as heretical. The Minor he proveth two ways, first by appealing to the judgement of every discreet man, who at the first sight can reasonably conceive nothing else, but that either part of that disjunctive clause is abjured alike. Secondly for that although the Conjunction [or] be sometimes taken for a copulative, yet it is commonly a disjunctive, and hath the ordinary and proper signification of a disjunctive, and in this oath; wherein it is found at least thirty times, and in the same statute above a hundred times, it is always used properly for a disjunctive conjunction. 59 But first observe, good Reader, those words of my Adversary, [the supposed doctrine of murdering Princes:] For a little beneath ᵘ he affirmeth, that murder implieth always an unlawful act, yea and a mortal sin, whereby he doth seem to insinuate, that the Oath speaketh only of murder in this sense, and supposeth that some Catholics do teach, that it is lawful to murder Princes, as murder implieth an unlawful act, whereas no Catholic can be so ignorant as to imagine, much less to teach, that it is lawful to do an unlawful act, or to commit a mortal sin, seeing that God himself cannot give authority to murder any man, as murder implieth an unlawful act, or a mortal sin: Neither did his Majesty, and the Parliament take murder only in this sense; but by the word [murdered] they understood, that all kill of Princes excommunicated or deprived by the Pope, was directly and absolutely an unlawful act, and they did suppose, that some Catholics taught this doctrine, that the Pope, in order to spiritual good, might give leave to take away the lives of wicked and heretical Princes by all those ways either public; or secret and unawares, by which temporal Princes, in order to temporal good, have authority to take away the lives of rebellious subjects, who either cannot at all, or at lest cannot without great prejudice to the public good of the State, be publicly apprehended or condemned. 60 And I would to God that this doctrine, were only a supposed doctrine, and had never been taught or approved by any Catholic. But alas it clearly followeth from the doctrine and grounds for the Pope's power to deprive Princes of all their temporal right and authority, as I most evidently did demonstrate in my Apology x nu. 43. & seq. , to which my Argument D. Schulckenius y Pag. 144 I answer (saith he) that so many words are needless, for whither all these do tend every man seethe, neither is it hard to solve the Arguments, let them pass as not making to the matter. only answereth with a transeat, or let it pass as impertinent to the matter; and the same is sufficiently confirmed by the same D. Schulckenius z Pag. 413. 4●0. in other places of his book, and before him by Gregorius de Valentia a Secunda secundae Disp. 1. q 12. ●unc. 2. assertio secunda. , Schioppius b In his Ecclesiasticus cap. 42. pag 140. , and now lately by Suarez, c In defies. fidei lib. 6. cap. 4. nu. 18. 20. , for which cause principally his book was by a solemn decree of the Parliament publicly condemned and burnt at Paris by the hangman, as containing damnable, pernicious, scandalous and seditious propositions, tending to the subversion of States, and to induce the subjects of Kings and Sovereign Princes, and others, to attempt against their sacred persons; neither is that Decree which was published and printed by the King's authority, as yet recalled, or Suarez book permitted by authority to be sold at Paris, howsoever some favourers of the jesuits do not stick to affirm here among the common people. Yea and M. Fitzherbert himself, although he will not (forsooth) meddle with the lives of Princes, yet boldly affirmeth, d Cap. ●. nu. 15. 16. 17. that the Pope hath power to take away my life, and hath power over the goods and lives of all Christians, which words being general, and including all Christians, and consequently Christian Princes, according to his doctrine, as you shall see beneath, e Part. 3. cap. 9 10. do clearly show what his opinion and judgement is in this point, touching the killing also, or murdering of Christian Princes. 61. Now to his argument. First therefore his Mayor proposition I do willingly grant, to wit, that if there be any doubt or question concerning the sense of any law, or any part thereof, (and consequently for the cleared of any difficulty, or doubt in this oath) three things are specially to be pondered for the exposition of it, the words of the law, the mind or intention of the lawmaker, and the reason or end of the law; and that the words of the law, and consequently of this oath, are to be understood in their proper and usual signification, as also by a peculiar clause it is expressly ordained therein; And of this his Mayor proposition no man maketh doubt. 62. But his Minor proposition I utterly deny: and to his first proof thereof, I answer as easily, but more fully with the like words, which he himself useth. For I affirm, that the contrary is evident, and that the words of this clause now in question do make clearly for us, wherein I dare boldly appeal to the judgement of any learned and discreet Reader, for that no man of any learning or judgement, who knoweth the difference betwixt an absolute and conditional disjunctive proposition, which implieth a free choice to take either part of the disjunction, I do not say, at the first sight, but after mature diliberation, and a diligent examination of all the words of this clause, and of the natures of an absolute and conditional disjunctive proposition, will, or can reasonably conceive, that in a conditional disjunctive proposition, which implieth a freedom to choose which part of the disjunction one will, as is the proposition which is now in question, both parts of the disjunction must be abjured alike, for that to make the whole conditional disjunctive proposition to be heretical, or to be abjured as heretical, it sufficeth that one only part of the disjunction be heretical: as I may truly and lawfully abjure this proposition as heretical, God may be honoured or blasphemed by his creatures, or, which is all one, it is in the free choice of creatures, to honour or to blaspheme God, wherein one only part of the disjunction is heretical, and the other of faith, and so both parts of the disjunction are not abjured as heretical, although the whole, and entire proposition be heretical, and may therefore be truly abjured as heretical. 63. What any learned man, but especially the vulgar sort of Catholics (considering the different grounds of Catholics, and Protestants in points of Religion, and that the oath was made by a Protestant Parliament, and that the title of the Act, wherein the taking thereof is commanded, is for the better discovering and repressing of Popish Recusants, and such like reasons) may at the first sight conceive of the lawfulness thereof, as also what they may at the first sight conceive of the sense of this clause, which is now in question (considering that the conjunction disjunctive [or] doth more usually make an absolute disjunctive, than a conditional disjunctive proposition, for that where once it followeth the verb [may] and consequently maketh a conditional disjunctive proposition, which is equivalent to a copulative, above a hundred times at least it doth not follow the verb [may] but maketh an absolute disjunctive proposition, and withal not examining the difference betwixt an absolute and a conditional disjunctive proposition) may, I say, at the first sight conceive of the esens and meaning of this clause of the Oath, is no sufficient Argument to prove that this clause or any other of the Oath, is, according to the true, proper, and usual understanding of the words in very deed unlawful. For many things may seem to be so at the first sight, which after a second review, and a more diligent examination of the matter do seem to be far otherwise. 64 My Adversary following therein Card, Bellarmine, Gretzer, Lessius & Suarez, did at the first sight conceive, that the Pope's power to excommunicate the King was denied in this Oath, but at the second sight, and upon better consideration, he hath, as it seems, perceived his error and over sight, for that being charged therewith by me, he hath passed it over altogether with silence. Many also of our English Catholics did at the first sight conceive, that the Pope's power to absolve from sins, to grant Pardons and indulgences, and to dispense in oaths, was denied in this oath, taking some colour or pretence from those words, absolve, pardons and dispensations, but after the second sight they saw that there was no such thing, as at the first sight they conceived. Many such like exceptions I could allege, which at the first sight some conceived against the Oath, which upon the second review, and after a more diligent consideration appeared to have no firm ground to rely upon. 65 But if any learned or discreet Catholic man will make a second review, and a more diligent examination of the Oath, and of all the clauses and words contained therein, and will also duly consider (which I observed in my Theological disputation f Cap. 4. sec. 3 ) the difference betwixt the opinion, and the intention of his Majesty, and that although his Majesty, and the Parliament be of opinion, that the Pope hath no power to excommunicate his Majesty, ye● they did not intend to bind catholics to acknowledge so much in this Oath, and that although the title of that Act, wherein many laws were enacted against Catholics touching points of Religion, for the which it might well be called an Act for the better discovering and repressing of Popish Recusants, even for points of Religion, yet the Preamble or Title to the particular Act, wherein the Oath is established, is, to make a better trial how his majesties Subjects stand affected towards his Majesty concerning points of their loyalty, and due obedience: And that his Majesty and the Parliament did also publicly declare, that they only intended to exact of Catholics by this oath a profession of that temporal allegiance, and civil obedience, which all Subjects do by the Law of God and nature own to their temporal Prince: And to make a distinction, not betwixt Catholics, and Protestants, touching points of Religion, but betwixt Catholics & Catholics touching points of opinion; and betwixt civilly obedient Catholics and of quiet disposition, and in all other things good Subjects, and such other Catholics, as in their hearts maintained the like bloody maxims, that the Powder Traitors did: And that therefore the particular Act concerning the Oath itself, might very well have been entitled, although it was not, An Act for the better discovering and repressing of Popish Recusants, not in general, but of such, as were carried away with the like fanatical zeal, and bloody maxims that the powder Troitors were. If any man, I say, will duly consider these things, and the other objections and answers, which I propounded in my Theological disputation, and in my Appendix to Suarez, I dare boldly appeal to his judgement herein, for that no man will, or can reasonably (the premises considered) conceive any forcible or convincing reason, for which English Catholics are bound in conscience to refuse the Oath. 66 And as for this clause which is now in question, it is evident (the difference betwixt an absolute disjunctive, and a conditional disjunctive proposition being duly considered) that the words being taken in their proper and usual signification, do make clearly for me, wherein I dare boldly appeal to the judgement of any discreet Reader. For albeit such a sense as this man imagineth, may be conceived at the first sight, for the reason aforesaid, yet no man after due consideration, and who observeth the difference betwixt an absolute, and a conditional disjunctive proposition, and perceiveth, that to make a conditional disjunctive proposition, which followeth the nature of a copulative, to be heretical, and to be abjured as heretical, it is sufficient that one only part thereof be heretical, and that therefore both parts of the disjunction are not of necessity to be abjured alike, will or can reasonably conceive, that both parts of that conditional disjunctive clause [may be deposed or murdered] are by virtue of the disjunctive conjunction [or] to be abjured alike. 57 To the second proof of his Minor proposition I answer, that he contendeth, to use his own words, de lana caprina, and laboureth in vain to prove that, which I do not deny. For I make no question, but that [or] in this clause of the Oath [deposed or murdered] is a disjunctive conjunction, and hath the ordinary and proper signification of a disjunctive conjunction, But that which I affirm is, that although in this clause of the oath it be truly and properly a disjunctive conjunction, yet because it immediately followeth the verb [may] it maketh such a disjunctive proposition, which implieth a free choice to take either part of the disjunction, and which consequently being not an absolute, but a conditional disjunctive proposition, is equivalent to a copulative, and not to an ordinary, or absolute disjunctive proposition. 68 And although the conjunction disjunctive [or] doth also more commonly, as I observed before, make an absolute disjunctive, than a conditional disjunctive proposition, for that where you shall find it once to follow the verb [may] and so to make a conditional disjunctive proposition, you shall find it above a hundred times not to follow the verb [may] and so not to make a conditional, but an absolute disjunctive proposition, and in this very Oath, where the conjunction [or] is found to be taken affirmatively about sixteen times, and not to follow the verb [may] (for almost in all other places of the oath it is taken negatively, and is all one with [nor] or [neither] yet once only or twice at the most it followeth the verb [may] and maketh a conditional disjunctive proposition: Nevertheless this I say is certain and not to be called in question, that whensoever the conjunction disjunctive [or] doth make a conditional disjunctive proposition, which implieth a free choice to take which part of the disjunction we please, as it doth in this clause of the oath, neither doth my Adversary deny, but rather as you have seen, supposeth the same, it is equivalent to a copulative proposition, and followeth the nature of a copulative, to the verity whereof, according to the approved rule of the Logicians, it is required that both parts be true, and to make the whole proposition to be false and heretical, it sufficeth that one only part be false and heretical, which contrariwise falleth out in an absolute, or ordinary disjunctive proposition. 69, Unless therefore my Adversary can prove, either that the conjunction [or] when it immediately followeth the verb [may] doth not commonly and usually make a conditional disjunctive proposition, implying a free choice to take which part of the distunction one please, which hitherto he hath not proved, but rather supposed both by those four examples of propositions, and also in this clause of the oath, as you have seen, that the conjunction [or] implieth such a choice, or else that a conditional disjunctive proposition which implieth such a choice, doth not always follow the nature and condition of a copulative proposition, for as much as concerneth the truth or falsehood thereof, which he will never be able to prove, for that a conditional disjunctive proposition, implieth a free choice to take, if we please, both parts of the disjunction, and every Logician knoweth, that the word [uterque, both] supposeth distributively, and is resolved by the conjunction copulative, as, to take both, signifieth to take this and that, and not only this or that; it is evident that he saith nothing to the purpose, neither doth he impugn my answer, but fighteth in vain with his own shadow. 70. Wherefore M. Fitzherbert perceiving at last, that this second proof of his Minor proposition was little to the purpose, and did not confute my answer concerning the conditional disjunctive proposition, he would now seem to say something to the purpose, (but in very deed saith nothing as you shall see) and to clean overthrow that distinction, which before he called a frivolous evasion, and an extravagant interpretation, and now he calleth it a shift, which nevertheless by his former discourse, and examples of propositions, as you have seen, and now again he doth clearly confirm. For thus he writeth. g Nu. 17. And if Widdrington doth fly here to his former shift, and say, that in the other clauses [or] is an absolute disjunctive, and that in the words [deposed or murdered] it is a conditional, because the verb [may] going before it, doth denote or signify a free election to choose either part, he is to understand, that the same may also be said of other clauses in the Oath, wherein nevertheless it is manifest, that [or] is a pure disjunctive, and that whatsoever is affirmed of one part of the disjunction, is also affirmed of the other: As for example etc. 71. But observe good Reader, first how this man still harpeth upon the same string, to make thee believe that I affirm the conjunction disjunctive [or] in the words [may be deposed or murdered] not to be a pure, or absolute, but a conditional disjunctive conjunction, whereas I do make no such distinction of an absolute, and conditional disjunctive conjunction, but only of an absolute, and conditional disjunctive proposition. For that which I affirm is, that although the conjunction [or] in those words [may be deposed or murdered] be a pure, true, and if we may call it so, an absolute disjunctive conjunction, yet in them, and whensoever else it immediately followeth the verb [may] it maketh, as I have often said, according to the common and usual signification of our English phrase, such a disjunctive proposition, which implieth a free choice to take both parts, or either part of the disjunction if we please, for which cause I call it a conditional disjunctive proposition, which in very deed, for as much as concerneth the truth or falsehood of the proposition, followeth the nature of a copulative proposition, and not of the common disjunctive proposition, whereof the Logicians treat, which therefore I call an absolute disjunctive proposition, for that it implieth no such freedom of election, or condition of the will, to choose, if we please, either part of the disjunction: the nature and condition of which absolute, or common disjunctive proposition, is such, that to the truth thereof, according to the received doctrine of the Logicians, it is sufficient, that one only part of the disjunction be true, although the other be most false and heretical, and to make such an absolute disjunctive proposition to be false and heretical, it is necessary that both parts be false and heretical: As for example, this disjunctive proposition, God is just, or unjust, is a most true and certain proposition, although the former part of the disjunction only be true, and of faith, and the second part be false and heretical. 72 But contrariwise it happeneth in a copulative proposition, for to make it true, both parts must be true, but to make it false and heretical, it sufficeth that one only part be false and heretical; and therefore this proposition, God is just, and unjust, is a most false and heretical proposition, although the former part of the proposition be most true, and of faith. And if perchance both parts of the copulative proposition be false and heretical, as in this, God is unjust, and unmerciful, this is not by reason of the form, or by virtue of the conjunction, uniting both parts in one entire proposition, but by reason only of the matter, for that both parts of the proposition being taken severally by themselves in two entire propositions are false and heretical, as this proposition being taken it by itself, God is unjust, is an heretical proposition, and so likewise is this, God is unmerciful. 73 Now, as I have often said, a conditional disjunctive proposition, which implieth a free choice to take both parts of the disjunction, if we please, although it be a true disjunctive proposition, by reason of the disjunctive conjunction [or] yet, for as much as concerneth the truth or falsehood of the proposition, it followeth the nature & quality of a copulative, and not of a common disjunctive proposition, for which reason, I affirmed that although it was a disjunctive proposition, yet by reason of the choice, freedom, or indifferency to take either part of the disjunction, it was equivalent to a copulative proposition. And therefore this proposition, God may be just or unjust, speaking of external justice, or injustice, or which is all one, it is in the power of God, or God hath free power to do external acts of justice or injustice, is a most false and heretical proposition, although the former part of the disjunction be true. And if perchance it happen that both parts of the disjunction be false and heretical, as in this, God may be unjust or unmerciful, this is not by virtue of the form, and by force of the disjunctive conjunction implying an indifferency to both parts of the disjunction, but by virtue of the matter, for that both parts of the disjunction being taken severally by themselves in two entire propositions, are false and heretical. So that you may see a manifest difference betwixt an absolute, and conditional disjunctive proposition, and betwixt these two disjunctive propositions, God doth works of justice or injustice, and God may do works of justice or injustice: for the first is true, and the second false, the first is an absolute disjunctive, and the second a conditional, and followeth the nature and condition of a copulative, and not of a pure or common disjunctive poposition. 74 Secondly observe how unlearnedly M. Fitzherbert doth insinuate, that in a pure disjunctive proposition whatsoever is affirmed of the one part of the disjunction is also affirmed of the other. For if he had but any small skill in Logic, he would quickly have perceived how grossly he is mistaken, and that according to the common and approved rule of the Logicians, the most true and necessary disjunctive proposition is, when the one part of the disjunction is contradictory to the other, as this proposition, God is just, or not just, is a most true and necessary proposition, and yet the first part of the disjunction is of faith, and the second heretical. And if perchance he do say, that he meant only of such disjunctive propositions, in which both parts of the disjunction are false, and consequently the whole disjunctive proposition is false, this also is manifestly untrue. 75 For although to make a pure, absolute, and ordinary disjunctive proposition to be false, it is necessary, that both parts of the disjunction be false, yet it is not necessary, that both parts be false in the same degree, or with the same kind of falsehood; as in these examples, either God is unjust, or Card. Bellarmine is unlearned, both parts of the disjunction are false, and yet the first is heretical and impossible, the second not heretical, nor impossible, but contingent: either London is not, or Jerusalem was not, both be false, yet the first is only repugnant to human truth, and the second also to divine. Likewise either S. Peter was not head of the Apostles, or he was a direct temporal King of the whole Christian world, both are false, but not in the same degree of falsehood. So that in these, and infinite others which might be alleged, it is not true, that whatsoever is affirmed of the one part of the disjunction, is also affirmed of the other. And therefore no marvel, that in conditional disjunctive propositions, which follow the nature of copulatives, and not of pure, or absolute disjunctive propositions, whatsoever is affirmed of the one part, is not by virtue of the conjunction affirmed of the other; I say by virtue of the conjunction, for that both in absolute, and also in conditional disiunctives, as likewise in copulative propositions, it may fall out, that by reason of the matter or of the thing affirmed or denied, the same falsehood which is affirmed of the one part, is affirmed also of the other: but this is not, to use the Logicians phrase, vi forma, or vi coniunctionis, by virtue of the form, or by force of the conjunction, but vi materiae, by reason or virtue of the matter, as I declared before. So that you see the more M. Fitzherbert meddleth with these dialectical questions, which are clean out of the sphere of his knowledge, the more he discovereth his unskilfulness. 76 But yet he will still go on to bewray his ignorance, and want of Logic. For mark how unlearnedly he goeth about to prove, that what I said of that clause of the Oath, [deposed or murdered] to wit, that it is a conditional disjunctive proposition, and did signify a free election to take either part of the disjunction, may also be said of other clauses of the Oath, wherein nevertheless it is manifest, that [or] is a pure disjunctive, and that whatsoever is affirmed of the one part of the disjunction, is also affirmed of the other: As for example, the Oath bindeth the takers thereof to swear, that the Pope hath no power or authority to depose the King, which is as much in effect, as that the Pope may not lawfully do it: Therefore let us make the proposition so, and lay it down with the other disjunctive clauses, which follow immediately; and to make the whole like to that clause that is now in question, let us conceive it thus. 77. I abjure h nu. 18. this doctrine as false, that the Pope may depose the King, or dispose of any his majesties kingdoms, or dominions; Or authorise any foreign Prince to invade, or annoy him; Or discharge any of his subjects of their allegiance to his Majesty; Or give licence to any of them to bear arms, raise tumults, or to offer any violence to his majesties Royal person, etc. 78. Here now i Nu. 19 it cannot be denied that [or] is disjunctive in all these several sentences in such sort, that which of them soever any man doth teach, he teacheth (according to the intent of this oath) a false doctrine, notwithstanding that the word [may] goeth before [or] and mplieth a free election to choose any one of them; in so much that if a man should say only, that the Pope may authorize a foreign Prince to invade his Majesty, he is condemned by the oath, to speak no less untruly, then if he should say, that the Pope may depose his Majesty; or give licence to any to offer violence to his person. 79. Therefore k Nurse 20. if Widdrington apply the words [impious and heretical] in the other clause to the doctrine of murdering only, and not also to the doctrine of deposing Princes, why may not he, or any man else do the like in the foresaid example, and offirme, that the last member, and part thereof (which denieth the Pope's power to give licence to offer violence to his majesties person) is only abjured as false, whereby the former parts, or clauses concerning the Pope's power to depose his Majesty, or, to dispose of his kingdoms, or to give licence to foreign Princes to invade, or annoy him (which are principal points of the oath) would be superfluous, and to no purpose. So as it is manifest, that the words of the oath [deposed, or murdered] being considered according to their proper, and usual signification in the clause where they are, and compared also with the other clauses, parts, and circumstances of the oath, cannot admit Widdringtons' interpretation, who apply the note of heresy to the Murder, and not also to the deposition of Princes. Thus much concerning the words of the law, or oath. 80. Behold now, how unlearnedly Mr. Fitzherbert (and yet his ignorance is the less excusable, for that he might have seen the weakness of his argument in my Theological Disputation, where the Author of the aforesaid English Dialogue objecteth the like argument, but in a contrary manner) argueth from the truth of a conditional disjunctive proposition, which is negative de dicto, to the falsehood of a conditional disjunctive, which is affirmative de modo, and frameth an oath of his own invention far different in sense from the oath prescribed by his Majesty, which nevertheless he pretendeth to have the same sense and signification with his new devised oath. For the oath prescribed by his Majesty is a negative proposition de dicto, to wit, that the Pope hath not any power or authority to depose the King, or to dispose of any his majesties Kingdoms or Dominions, or to authorize any foreign Prince to invade or annoy him, or to discharge any of his Subjects of their allegiance and obedience to his Majesty, or to give licence to any of them to bear arms, raise tumults, or to offer any violence to his majesties Royal person, etc. And all this I must acknowledge to be true, and therefore I called this whole proposition, negative de dicto, and affirmative de modo. And the sense of this oath is clear, to wit, that the Pope hath not any lawful power to do any one of these things, so that if the Pope hath power to do any one of them, the whole, and entire disjunctive proposition consisting of those particular clauses is by virtue of the form of words, and of the conjunction disjunctive [or] or rather [nor] not true, but false, I say by virtue of the form of words, for that the negation [not] going before, and having a power to distribute, to use the Logicians phrase, or to deny all that followeth it, maketh all those disjunctive conjunctions [or] which follow, to be equivalent to [nor] or [neither,] which, as I say, being a distributive sign, is to be resolved, as every Logician knoweth, by the conjunction copulative [and] and not by the disjunctive [or] for which cause some Grammarians do also hold, that the conjunction [nor] or [neither] is not a disjunctive, but a copulative conjunction. 81. But the oath, which Mr. Fitzherbert hath framed, is a proposition negative de modo, and affirmative de dicto, to wit, that the Pope may, or, which according to his own exposition, is all one, that it is in the Pope's free and lawful power to depose the King, or to dispose any of his majesties Kingdoms, or dominions, or to authorize any foreign Prince to invade or annoy him; or to discharge any of his subjects of their allegiance and obedience to his Majesty; or to give licence to any of them to bear arms, raise tumults, or to offer any violence to his majesties Royal person, etc. and this whole, or entire disjunctive proposition consisting of all these particular branches M. Fitzherbert will have to be abjured as false. Now he that hath but any small skill in Logic may easily perceive a great difference betwixt the sense and meaning of these two oaths, or propositions. For in the oath prescribed by his Majesty we may by virtue of the words, and from the force and signification of the disjunctive conjunction [or] which, as I have showed before, is by reason of the precedent negation [not] equivalent to [nor] necessarily infer, that the Pope hath neither power to depose the King, nor to dispose of any his majesties Kingdoms or Dominions, nor to do any other of those things there mentioned; and therefore he that granteth, that the Pope hath power to do any one of those things there mentioned, must consequently grant, that the whole, or entire oath, or proposition consisting of all those particular clauses is false. 82 But in the oath invented by my Adversary, although indeed by virtue of the matter, we may well conclude, that the Pope hath neither power to depose the King, nor to dispose of any his majesties kingdoms or dominions, nor to do any other of those things there mentioned, for that all and every one of those things which are denied to the Pope in that total oath, or proposition, may also be denied to him in several oaths, or propositions, yet by virtue of the words, and from the force and signification of the disjunctive conjunction [or] which, as M. Fitzherbert himself doth grant, maketh there a conditional disiumctive proposition, implying a free choice to take which part of the disjunction we please, we cannot rightly conclude, that the Pope hath neither power to depose the King, nor to dispose of any his majesties kingdoms or dominions etc. 83 For what man can be so ignorant, as to imagine, that these two propositions make the same sense, or that the first doth rightly infer the second. It is false, that it is in my free and lawful power to do this or that, therefore it is true, that I may lawfully neither do this nor that. My Adversary can not deny, but that it is false▪ that he had lawful freedom to deal sincerely, or corruptly in this his Reply, therefore by his own manner of arguing he must grant, that it is true, that he had lawful freedom neither to deal sincerely nor corruptly in his Reply. Likewise he cannot deny, but that it is false, that it is in the free and lawful power of creatures to honour or blaspheme God, of Priests to eat or sleep before they say Mass, of Soldiers to fight or fly when their Country is invaded by the enemy, and (to exemplify in our own matter) of the Pope to depose or murder Princes, as murder is taken for an unlawful Act: Will he therefore infer from thence in that manner as he argueth here, that it is therefore true, that creatures may lawfully neither honour nor blaspheme God, that Priests may lawfully neither eat nor sleep before they say Mass, that Soldiers may lawfully neither fight nor fly, when their Country is invaded, and that the Pope may lawfully neither depose Princes nor murder them, as murder is taken for an unlawful act? Wherefore if my Adversary will but keep still the same form, and the same disjunctive conjunction [or] and altar but a little the matter, by adding only to the end of the affirmative oath, framed by himself, this clause, [or to murder his Majesty] he will quickly perceive his error, and he will not deny, but that the oath with that addition is very false; and nevertheless he dare not from thence conclude the truth of the negative, or that therefore it is true, that the Pope hath not any power neither to depose the King, nor to dispose etc. for that he granteth, that the Pope hath lawful power to depose the King, and to dispose etc. only he denieth, that the Pope hath power to murder him, as murder is taken for an unlawful act. 84. But the causes of M. fitzherbert's error are manifest. First, for that he for want of Logic doth not, as it seems, consider the difference betwixt the form, and the matter of an hypothetical proposition, and what is required to the truth or falsehood of a disjunctive, or copulative proposition, as well by virtue of the form, as of the matter. For to make a pure, or absolute disjunctive proposition to be true, it is sufficient, by virtue of the form, that one part of the disjunction be true, but to make it false, both parts must be false. Contrariwise it falleth out in a copulative proposition, for to make it true, both parts of the copulation must be true, and to make it false, it sufficeth by virtue of the form, or by force of the copulative conjunction, that one only part be false, although by reason of the matter both parts also may be false, but this is impertinent to the form. Secondly, he doth not consider, that a conditional disjunctive proposition, which implieth a free choice to take which part of the disjunction we please, followeth the nature of a copulative, and not of a pure, common, or absolute disjunctive proposition. Thirdly, he doth not consider, that whatsoever is taken, or to use the Logicians phrase, supposeth distributively, as every negation doth distribute, and deny whatsoever followeth that negation, is to be resolved by a copulative, and not by a disjunctive conjunction. 85. Fourthly, he doth not consider, that to make a copulative proposition, or such a disjunctive, which is equivalent to a copulative to be heretical, it sufficeth that one only part be heretical. Fiftly, he doth not consider, that although to make a pure, common, or absolute disjunctive proposition to be false, it is necessary that both parts of the disjunction be false, yet it is not necessary that both parts be false in the same degree of falsehood, for that the one part may be impossible, the other not, the one part heretical, and the other not, and that therefore the same kind of falsehood which is affirmed of the one part, is not necessarily affirmed of the other. Lastly, he doth not consider, how vicious a kind of arguing it is, from the falsehood of an affirmative conditional disjunctive proposition to conclude the truth of a negative, whereby he would make his affirmative oath, invented by himself, to have the same sense with the negative oath prescribed by his Majesty. And his ignorance herein is the less excusable, for that the insufficiency of this his argument he might have seen declared in my Theological disputation, where I clearly showed, as you have seen before, how unsoundly the Author of that English Dialogue urged the like argument, which my answer to that argument is also here altogether concealed by M. Fitzherbert. And therefore I will give him this charitable advise, that if he have any care of his credit and reputation, he do not hereafter so boldly adventure to meddle with these questions belonging to Logic, except he have the help and furtherance of some of his company more skilful herein then himself, least that by granting one inconvenience, he fall, according to the ancient proverb, into a thousand absurdities. 86. By this it is evident first, that although the Oath ordained by his Majesty, and the Oath framed by M. Fitzherbert contain the same disjunctive clauses, and so they do both agree in the matter, yet they differ greatly in the form, and in the sense and understanding of the disjunctive conjunction [or.] For in the Oath, prescribed by his Majesty, that which by virtue of the form, and by force of the conjunction [or] which in all those particular sentences is equivalent to [nor] I do acknowledge to be true, is, that the Pope hath not power to do any one of all those things mentioned in those disjunctive clauses, and that which I acknowledge to be false, is, that the Pope hath power to do any one of all those things, as either to depose the King or to dispose of his Dominions, and so forth: And therefore although to those clauses were added also this clause [or to murder his Majesty] yet my Adversary cannot affirm, that it would change at all the truth, or falsehood of the whole oath, or entire proposition, but if the oath were true before, it would also be true now, and if it were false before, it would also be false now. 87 But if the oath, which M. Fitzherbert hath framed, that which by virtue of the form, and by force of the conjunction [or] which as he himself confesseth, implieth a free election to choose any one of those several sentences or clauses, I acknowledge to be true, is, that the Pope hath not power to do all those things mentioned in those clauses, or, which is all one, to do which of all those things he shall please, and that which I acknowledge to be false, is, that the Pope hath power to do all those things mentioned in those clauses or which is all one, to do which of all those things he shall please. And therefore if to those clauses of M. fitzherbert's new devised oath, should be added also this clause [or to murder his Majesty] he cannot deny, but that his oath, or entire disjunctive proposition, which before in his opinion was false, is now by adding that clause made true, and therefore that it is false, that the Pope hath power to murder his majesty. The adding of which clause doth clearly show the manifest difference betwixt the form of these two oaths, and the different signification of the conjunction [or] in both of them, albeit in the matter of all the particular clauses, and propositions, they do both agree. 88 Secondly, by this also it is easy to answer the demand, which M. Fitzherbert propoundeth, to wit, wherefore the word [heretical] in the doctrine and position of his majesties oath, may be referred to the doctrine of murdering Princes, and not of deposing them, and the word [false] may not with the like reason in the oath or entire disjunctive proposition, which my Adversary hath framed, be referred to the last member, and part thereof, which denieth the Pope's power to offer violence to his majesties person, and not to the former concerning the Pope's power to depose his Majesty. For if we regard the form of both propositions, and the virtue, or force of the disjunctive conjunction [or] which implieth a free choice to take which part of the disjunction we please, and therefore to make the whole disjunctive proposition to be false and heretical, it sufficeth, that one only part thereof be false and heretical, as they both agree in the form, and in the sense of the disjunctive conjunction [or] as it is sufficient by virtue of the form, to make that affirmative position, Princes being excommunicated or deprived by the Pope may be deposed or murdered by their Subjects, or any other, to be heretical, so also to make this affirmative proposition, which my Adversary hath framed, The Pope may, or which is all one, it is in the Pope's free and lawful power to depose the kings Majesty, or to offer violence to his Royal person, to be false, it sufficeth, by virtue of the form, and by force of the disjunctive conjunction [or] that one only part of the disjunction be false: But the only difference is in the matter. And therefore if the doctrine of deposing Princes, be not so clearly and properly heretical, as is the doctrine of murdering them, the word [heretical] may with better reason be referred to the doctrine of murdering, then of deposing: But because the doctrine which teacheth, that the Pope may depose his Majesty, as also that he may offer violence to his Royal person, are false, (although perchance the latter be false in a more high and manifest degree of falsehood, then is the fotmer) therefore the word [false] may, by virtue of the matter, but not by force of the conjunction disjunctive [or] in the oath, framed by my Adversary, be referred to both. 89. I say, in the oath framed by my Adversary, for as these two particular propositions are set down in the oath ordained by his Majesty, both of them are, not only, by virtue of the matter, but also by reason of the form, and by force of the conjunction [or] which is equivalent to [nor] affirmed to be false, as I declared before. So that it is manifest, that these words of the oath [may be deposed, or murdered] being considered according to their proper and usual signification in the conditional disjunctive clause where they are, and compared also with the other clauses, parts, and circumstances of the oath, may very well admit the interpretation, which I have made; and the application of heresy (taking heresy in a strict sense) may be applied only to the murder, and not also to the deposition of Princes, although it may also in a proper sense, and wherein many learned Catholics do take the word heresy, be applied to both, as I will show beneath. l Nu. 106. et seq. And thus much concerning the words of the law, and oath. 90 Now for his majesties meaning, or intention in that clause (which was the second rule assigned for the interpretation of the oath) the same, saith M. Fitzherbert, m Nurse 12. according to the doctrine of Suarez, which Widdrington approveth, is to be gathered principally by the words, and which, as you have seen, being to be taken in their proper and common sense, do show, that his majesties meaning was no other, but to ordain the abjuration of both parts of that clause alike, that is to say, as truly impious and heretical. 91 But contrariwise I have clearly showed before, that according to the proper and usual signification of the words, the common understanding of men, and the received doctrine of the Logicians, to make a copulative proposition, or a conditional disjunctive, which followeth the nature of a copulative, to be heretical, it sufficeth that one only part thereof be heretical. Seeing therefore that his majesties meaning only was to bind his Catholic Subjects, to take this clause of the Oath in that sense, which the words according to their true, proper, and usual signification do bear, and that according to the true and common sense of the words, it sufficeth to abjure this clause of the Oath, as heretical, if one only part thereof be heretical, it is manifest that his majesties meaning was not to ordain that both parts of this clause should be abjured alike, unless from the common sense and understanding of the words it can be rightly gathered, as I have proved it cannot, that both parts must of necessity be abjured alike. 92 But if it be well considered, saith M. Fitzherbert n nu. 21. , what reason Widdrington hath to condemn the aforesaid doctrine, as truly heretical, in respect of one part of the clause (to wit, that part which concerneth violent attempts upon the persons of Princes) it will easily appear, that his Majesty pretendeth as much, if not more reason, to condemn it in like manner in regard of the other part, which concerneth the deposition of Princes. For whereas Widdrington hath no other reason for his conceit, but because he thinketh that all doctrine prejudicial to the lives of Princes is repugnant to the holy Scriptures (whereby he consequently holdeth it for heretical) his Majesty is persuaded also that he hath the same reason to condemn the doctrine of the Pope's power to depose Princes for heretical, as it may evidently appear by the manifold places, and texts of Scripture, which he allegeth for the proof of his own Ecclesiastical Primacy, and the obligation of his Subjects to yield him civil obedience, whereon he groundeth the lawfulness of the Oath, and the abjuration of the doctrine condemned therein. 93. And therefore omitting o Nu. 23. to examine, how well the Scriptures alleged by his Majesty, serve for the proof of the matter in question, as also to note, how impertinently Widdrington applieth the precept, non Occides, to his purpose, by occasion of the word murder in the oath (which precept being indeed understood of murder, and consequently implying always an unlawful act, yea a mortal sin, was never held by any to be lawful, and therefore doth not in that sort and sense belong to our question, as Widdrington knoweth well enough) but omitting, I say, to speak further of this, that which here I affirm is, that his Majesty allegeth much more Scripture to condemn the doctrine touching the deposition of Princes, than Widdrington doth for the condemnation of violent attempts against their persons; Whereby it is manifest, that he hath no reason to say, that his Majesty meant, that the latter part of that clause should be abjured, as heretical, and not the former, especially seeing that the express words of the oath, (according to their most usual, and proper signification) together with the circumstances thereof, do prove both alike, as it appeareth by the premises. And this I hope may suffice for the confutation of his first, and best answer. 94. But first, as it appeareth also by the premises, the express words of this clause (according to their most usual, and proper signification) together with all other circumstances, do clearly prove, that both parts of that disjunctive proposition are not of necessity to be abjured alike, for that to make a conditional disjunctive proposition, as is the doctrine, and position abjured in this clause, to be heretical, it is sufficient, that one part of the disjunction be heretical, and that therefore both parts of the disjunction are not of necessity to be abjured alike, as by the form of my Adversaries own examples I have evidently convinced: and therefore his premises do no way prove his conclusion in this point. 94 Secondly, that his Majesty had far greater reason to be more vehement against the practice of murdering Princes being excommunicated, or deprived by the Pope, then of deposing, or thrusting them out of the possession of their kingdoms, and to have the former being the more heinous, impious, damnable and detestable crime, and more plainly and expressly forbidden in holy Scriptures, to be abjured in a more high and eminent degree, than the latter, it is plainly convinced by the great and manifest inequality of the crimes, by the irrecuperable, and not recompensable damage, which proceedeth from the former, and not from the later, and yet the former being the more easily and suddenly to be performed then the latter, (for that the latter cannot be accomplished but by a mighty power, which also may fail, the event of war being uncertain, but the former by the adventurous boldness only of one villain may be effected) together with the known practices of the late murders of the most Christian Kings of France, and the execrable conspiracy of the Pouder-Traytors, which was the chief occasion of the ordaining of this Oath. And therefore his Majesty hath neither more reason, nor as much reason to condemn that part of this clause, which concerneth the deposing of Princes being excommunicated, or deprived by the Pope, for heretical, taking heretical for that which importeth a plain, manifest, and confessed heresy, or falsehood clearly repugnant to holy Scriptures, as either he himself, or I, or any man else may have to condemn that part for heretical, which concerneth the murdering of such Princes. 95. But to reduce Mr. fitzherbert's whole discourse to a compendious form of arguing; That, which he chiefly laboureth to prove against me in this chapter▪ is, that this position, Princes which be excommunicated or deprived by the Pope may be deposed or murdered by their Subjects or any other whatsoever, ●s by the oath condemned for heretical, in regard as well of the deposition of such Princes, as of the murdering of them. And this he endeavoureth to prove by two ways: first by the common sense, and understanding of the words, which do signify, saith he, that both parts a●e abjured alike, to which purpose he bringeth four examples of propositions, which, as you have seen, make nothing for him, but are flat against him, and he frameth an oath of his own invention, to parallel it with the oath ordained by his Majesty, which nevertheless is far different from it in sense, as I have showed before. 96. Secondly, he pretendeth to prove the same by his majesties meaning, or intention, which was, saith he, that both parts should be abjured as heretical. And this also he pretendeth to prove by two ways. First, by the proper and common sense of the words, by which his majesties intention is principally to be gathered. But this proof is all one with the former, and therefore with the same facility it is denied, as it is affirmed; for that the proper and usual sense of the words do not import, that both parts of the disjunction are of necessity to be abjured alike, by reason of the conditional disjunctive proposition, as I have often repeated before. Secondly, he would seem to prove the same by this argument. His Majesty is persuaded, ●hat the doctrine, not only which alloweth the practice of deposing Princes being excommunicated or deprived by the Pope, but also which speculatively maintaineth, that the Pope hath power to depose Princes, is heretical, and repugnant to the holy Scriptures, as may evidently appear by the manifold places, and texts of Scripture, which he allegeth, etc. yea, and he talledgeth much more Scripture, to condemn the doctrine touching the deposition of Princes, than Widdrington doth for violent attempts against their persons, therefore it is manifest that according to his majesties intention both parts of that clause should be abjured as heretical. 97 But first, this consequence of my Adversary: (His Majesty is persuaded, that not only the doctrine which teacheth, that the Pope hath power to murder Princes, but also to depose them, is heretical, therefore his majesties meaning, or intention was, that in the aforesaid clause of the oath, both parts should be abjured, as heretical, taking heretical in that strict sense, whereof I will speak beneath p Nu. 106. et seq. ) M. Fitzherbert might have seen, if it had pleased him, in my Theological disputation q Cap. 4. sec. 3. , to be very insufficient; where I did clearly show, that there is a great difference to be made betwixt his majesties persuasion or opinion, and his meaning or intention. For his Majesty doth, according to the grounds of the Protestant Religion, defend divers opinions, which nevertheless he doth not intend to bind his Catholic Subjects by this oath to defend and profess. 98 As for example. His Majesty is persuaded, that he is the supreme Lord and Governor, in all causes, as well Ecclesiastical, as temporal, and yet he doth not intend that his Catholic Subjects shall by those words of this oath [our Sovereign Lord King james] profess and maintain the same. Neither doth he ground the lawfulness of this oath, and the abjuration of the doctrine condemned therein, upon his Ecclesiastical Primacy, as my Adversary here seemeth to insinuate, for that the Oath of his Ecclesiastical Supremacy, as his Majesty himself affirmeth, r In his Apology pag. 46. was devised for putting a difference between Papists, and Protestants, but this oath was ordained for making a difference between the civilly obedient Papists, and the perverse disciples of the Powder-treason. 99 Also his Majesty is persuaded, that the Pope hath not power to excommunicate his Majesty, and yet he doth intend by those words of the oath [notwithstanding any sentence of excommunication etc.] too bind English Catholics to profess the same; s See my Th. Disp. cap. 4. sec. 1. howsoever Card. Bellarmine, Gretzer, Lessius, and Suarez without sufficient proof, and M. Fitzherbert without any proof at all, do affirm, that the Pope's power to excommunicate is denied in this oath. For although the lower house of Parliament, as his Majesty also affirmeth t In his Premonition pag 9 , at the first framing of this oath made it to contain, that the Pope had no power to excommunicate his Majesty, yet his Majesty did purposely decline that poi●t, u In the Catalogue of the lies of Tortus. nu. 1. and forced them to reform it, only making it to conclude, that no excommunication of the Popes can warrant his Subjects to practise against his person, or state, as indeed taking any such temporal violence to be far without the limits of such a spiritual Censure, as Excommunication is. 100 Likewise his Majesty is persuaded, that all reconcilings of his Subjects to the Pope, and all returnings of English Priests made by the Pope's authority, into this Realm etc., are truly and properly treasons, although not naturally, and forbidden by the law of nature, unless they be repugnant to true, natural, and civil allegiance, yet positive and forbidden by the laws of the Realm, nevertheless by those words of the oath [to disclose all treasons etc.] he did not intend to bind his Catholic Subjects to reveal and disclose such kind of treasons, unless they be truly and properly unnatural treasons, and repugnant to natural allegiance. For that his Majesty was careful, as he himself also writeth x In his Premonition pag. 9 natural. , that nothing should be contained in this oath, except the profession of natural allegiance, and civil, and temporal obediednce, with a promise to resist all contrary, unnatural, and uncivil violence. 101 Wherefore seeing that his Majesty doth bind the swearer to take this oath according to the plain and common sense and understanding of the words, although his Majesty be persuaded, that it is heretical to hold, that the Pope hath power to depose princes, yet from thence it cannot rightly be concluded, that therefore by this oath he intended to bind his Catholic Subjects to acknowledge and profess the same, unless the words of the oath, according to their proper and usual signification do imply the same. Considering therefore, that as I have clearly convinced, to make that proposition, Princes which be excommunicated or deprived by the Pope may be deposed or murdered by their Subjects, or any other, to be heretical, it is sufficient, according to the common sense of the words, and the approved doctrine of Logicians, that one only part of the disjunction be heretical, as without doubt the latter part of this disjunction is, it is evident, that his majesties mtaning was no other, then to bind the swearer to that sense, to which the words being taken in their proper and usual signification do bind. And thus much concerning the consequence. 102 Now touching the antecedent proposition, although it be true, that his Majesty is persuaded, that not only the doctrine, which alloweth the practice of deposing Princes, which be excommunicated or deprived by the Pope, but also the speculative doctrine, which teacheth, that the Pope hath power to deprive Princes, is a false doctrine, and repugnant to holy Scriptures, and consequently heretical, taking heretical for that which implieth an untruth, contrary to the word of God revealed in holy Scriptures, in which sense also all those Catholics, who do hold this doctrine of the Pope's power to deprive Princes of their kingdoms, to be false, do hold also, that it is contrary to the word of God, and consequently also heretical; yet if heretical be taken for that which importeth a known and manifest untruth repugnant to holy Scriptures, and so acknowledged also to be by the common consent also of Catholics, my Adversary will hardly prove, that his Majesty is persuaded, that the speculative doctrine, which holdeth, that the Pope hath power to deprive Princes, or to depose them by a juridical sentence, is heretical in this sense, or repugnant to holy Scriptures in the opinion of all, or of the most part of Catholics, albeit he be persuaded that the speculative doctrine, which approveth the Pope's power to murder or to take away the lives of Princes, be in this sense heretical, as in very deed it is: And therefore all those Priests, who then were Prisoners in Newgate, and the Gatehouse, and now are in Wisbeech, being examined by his Maiestses Commissioners upon certain articles, and did directly answer to the questions which were propounded, did agree in this, that it was directly and absolutely murder for any man to take away the life of his Majesty, and that the Church could not define it to be lawful for any man to kill his Majesty, although for the point of deposing, some of them answered otherwise, some others declined the question, and many of them did insinuate, that as yet this point touching the Pope's power to dedose Princes is not defined by the Church. 103 And although his Majesty doth allege much more Scripture to condemn the doctrine touching the deposition of Princes, than I do for the condemnation of violent attempts against their persons, yet it cannot be denied, both that his Majesty might have brought more plain and pregnant places, against the doctrine of murdering Princes, if he had thought it needful, and not supposed it to be a manifest untruth, and condemned by the common coesent also of Catholics, and also that all those places, which his Majesty bringeth to prove, that Subjects own civil obedience to temporal Princes, and against the Pope's Ecclesiastical power to deprive Princes of their temporal kingdoms, do more forcibly conclude against violent attempts against their sacred persons, and against the Pope's Ecclesiastical or spiritual power to murder kill, or deprive them of their lives, which bloody punishments Ecclesiastical mildness doth so much abhor. 104 Neither do I take the word [murdered] in that clause of the oath, as it doth formally signify an unlawful act, and a mortal sin, and in that sense apply the precept, Thou shalt not kill, to this clause of the oath, as my Adversary would persuade the Reader, but I take murdered in that clause, as it doth denote materially the kill of Princes, which be excommunicated or deprived by the Pope: And I affirm, that the kill of such Princes is directly and absolutely a mortal sin, and is that murder, or killing, which is forbidden by the law of God, and nature, revealed to us in the holy Scriptures, and especially in those two places which the Author of the English Dialogue, whose objection against that clause of the oath I took upon me to answer, did allege. The first place 1, Reg. 26. Kill him not, for who shall extend his hand against the Lords anointed, and be innocent? doth more particularly belong to Princes. The second place Exod. 20. Thou shalt not kill, is common also to private men, and therefore much more to be ayplyed to the kill of Princes. 105. Neither is it necessary as I observed in my Appendix y part 2. sec. 5. nu. 4. against Suarez, to make that position contained in the Oath to be heretical, and repugnant to God's commandment, that the Scripture should have added, Thou shalt not kill Princes which be excommunicated or deprived by the Pope. It is sufficient that all killing both of private men, and much more also of temporal Princes, (who have in their hands the material sword itself, and supreme power to kill or save) is unlawful and forbidden by this precept, which is not warrantable either by other places of holy Scripture, or declared by the Church to be lawful, and to have sufficient warrant. Now it is manifest, that neither the Church, nor any one Catholic Doctor ever taught, that the Pope's sentence of excommunication or deprivation, although we should grant, that the Pope hath power to deprive Princes by way of sentence, doth give sufficient warrant or authority to Subjects to kill their Prince, for that the Pope's sentence of deprivation doth at the most by the consent of all Catholics, deprive a Prince of his right to reign, but not of his corporal life, or of his right to live. And thus much concerning the antecedent proposition. 106 last to say something also concerning the consequent, although as you have seen, I do utterly deny, that to abjure this doctrine and position as heretical, That Princes which be excommunicated or deprived by the Pope may be deposed or murdered by their Subjects or any other, it is necessary by virtue of the form of words being taken in their proper and usual signification, and by force of the conjunction disjunctive [or], that both parts of the disjunction be abjured as heretical, nevertheless I do willingly grant, that by virtue of the matter both parts of that disjunctive proposition may be truly abjured as heretical, if we take the word heretical, as by many learned Catholics it is taken in a true, proper, and usual signification. For the better understanding whereof we must observe out of Alphonsus de Castro z Lib 1. advershaerese cap 8. , Didaecus Coverrwias a Lib. 4. varian. resolute. cap. 14. , and others, that although the Catholic Church can determine of heresy, yet an assertion is not therefore heresy, because the Church hath defined it, but because it is repugnant to Catholic faith, or which is all one, to that which is revealed by God. For the Church by her definition doth not make such a position to be heresy, seeing that it would be heresy, although she should not define it; but the Church causeth this, that by her censure she maketh known, and manifest to us, that to be heresy, which before was not certainly known, whether it might justly be called heresy, or no. 107. For the whole Church (excluding Christ her principal head) hath not power to make a new Ariicle of faith which nevertheless she might do if she could make an assertion to be heretical: But that the Church hath not power to make a new Article of faith, it is convinced by manifest reason. For every assertion is therefore called Catholic, for that it is revealed by God: therefore that divine revelation doth not depend upon the approbation, or declaration of the Church, the declaration of the Church doth not make that Catholic, which is revealed by God. The Church therefore doth determine that this is revealed by God, but she doth not make that which is revealed by God to be true: for if such a verity be called Catholic, for that it is contained in holy Scriptures, seeing that such a verity to be contained in holy Scriptures, doth not depend upon any human will, but upon God alone, the Author of those Scriptures, it is manifest by this reason, that the Church can do nothing at all, that such a truth doth belong to faith: For the holy Scriptures have this of themselves that we are bound to believe them in all things. Wherefore the Church defining any thing to be of faith, although she doth certainly define, and cannot err, yet by her definition she doth not make that truth to be Catholic faith. For she did therefore define that truth to be Catholic, because that truth was Catholic, and if it had not been Catholic, the Church defining it to be Catholic should have erred, therefore it was Catholic and revealed by God before the Church defined it. Wherefore the Church cannot make a new Article of faith, but that which before was true faith, but not certainly known to us, the Church by her definition maketh it known to us. 108 In like manner we have this from the Church, to know certainly which is divine Scripture, and we are bound to account that to be divine Scripture, which the Church hath defined to be divine. And although she doth certainly define, and cannot err, yet she doth not make by her definition, that Scripture to be divine: for therefore she hath declared it to be divine, because it was truly divine, and if it had not been before divine Scripture, the Church would not have declared it to be divine. Wherefore although that assertion which is condemned by the Catholic Church to be contrary to Catholic faith, and to b●e accounted heresy, was also heresy before the definition of the Church, yet before the Church did define it, the maintainers of that opinion were not called heretics, because it was not known, whether that opinion was contrary to Catholic faith: but now after the definition of the Church they shall be called heretics, whosoever shall approve and maintain that opinion, not for that their opinion was not before false, contrary to Catholic faith, and heresy, but because this name of heretics being infamous, and appertaining to that most heinous crime, doth require a certain pertinacy, and rebellion departing from the definitions of the Catholic Church, which could not truly be accounted at that time, when it was doubtful and disputable, and the Church had not defined, whether that opinion was repugnant to Religion and faith. 109. In this sense therefore it may be said, that the Church hath power to declare an assertion to be Catholic, and to appertain to Catholic faith, to this effect, that after the definition of the Church, the said assertion is so manifestly of faith, that he is to be accounted an obstinate heretic, who defending the contrary shall departed from that definition, although before the definition of the Church, the said assertion albeit was most true and Catholic, yet by reason of the doubt, and controversy touching that point he could not justly be called an heretic, who should allow, and follow the contrary position. And what hath been said, if there be any doubt, or controversy touching any text of holy Scripture, and the true sense thereof, is proportionally to be understood, if there be any doubt, or controruersie touching any definition of the Church, and the true sense thereof; as we see there is now a controversy betwixt the Divines of Rome, and Paris, touching the definition of the Council of Constance concerning the Superiority of the Church, or a General Council above the Pope, and among many other Catholics touching the decrees and declarations of diverse other General councils, and now lately touching the sense of those words of the Council of Lateran, Si vero Dominus temporalis, etc. But if the temporal Lord, etc. Which some Catholics of late have greatly urged to prove the Pope's power to depose Princes, whereof beneath b Part. 3. cap. 9 & seq. we will discourse at large. 110. From this doctrine, which neither Mr. Fitzherbert, nor any other can prove to be improbable, it clearly followeth, that heresy being a falsehood repugnant to holy Scriptures, or divine revelation, with the same certainty, or probability, wherewith one is persuaded, that such a doctrine, or position, is false, and repugnant to holy Scriptures, or divine revelation, with the same certainty, or probability he may abhor, detest, and abjure that doctrine for heretical; And consequently it followeth, that if it be lawful to abhor, detest, and abjure for impious, damnable, and false doctrine repugnant to truth contained in the word of God, this Doctrine and position, That Princes which be excommunicated or deprived by the Pope may be deposed or murdered by their Subjects or any other, (which position for that it concerneth practise, and not only speculation, is in very deed false, impious, damnable, and repugnant to truth contained in holy Scriptures, and aught so to be accounted, not only by those, who are of opinion that the Pope hath not power to deprive Princes, but also, so long as this question remaineth undecided and in controversy, by those who do speculatively think that he hath authority to deprive them) it is lawful also to abjure it for heretical. And this I hope may suffice for the defence of my first, and principal answer, and for the confutation of M. fitzherbert's Reply thereunto. 111. The Second answer, which I have heard many Catholics give to the aforesaid objection of the Author of that English Dialogue against the word [heretical] contained in this clause of the oath, and which Answer Mr. Fitzherbert laboureth in vain to overthrow, I related c Cap. 5. Sec. 2. nu. 28. 29 in these words. The second principal answer, which some of our Countrymen do make to the aforesaid objection, is gathered from the doctrine of Card. Bellarmine, who expounding d Lib. 2. de Concil. cap. 12. that sentence of Pope Gregory the first e Lib. 1. epist. 24. I confess, that I do receive the four first councils, as the four books of the Gospel, affirmeth, that the adverb [as] doth import a similitude, and not an equality, as that of Matth. 5. Be you perfect, as your heavenly Father is perfect. For in like manner these catholics do answer, that those words, I do abhor, detest, and abjure as heretical, etc. do not import an equality, but a similitude, and that in common speech they do only signify, that I do exceedingly detest that doctrine. And so we usually say, I hate him as the devil, I love him as my brother, not intending thereby to affirm, that the one is in truth a Devil, or the other my brother. 112 Now to omit the word [murdered] as though there were no mention at all made in the oath, concerning the murdering of Princes, and to speak only of deposing them; these men affirm, that the aforesaid position, Princes, which be excommunicated or deprived by the Pope, may be deposed by their Subjects, or any other, supposing that this question concerning the Pope's power to depose Princes, is not yet decided, is in their judgements a false, and seditious proposition, and that it hath some similitude with heresy, not for that they think it to be in very deed heretical (taking heretical in that strict sense, as some Catholics do take it) but for that they do constantly hold it to be of such a nature, that it may be condemned by the Church for an heretical proposition (and then the maintainers thereof to be properly heretics) if deposing be taken in that sense, as it is in this branch of the oath distinguished from depriving. For to deprive a Prince, is to take away by lawful sentence his Regal authority, and in this branch is referred to the Pope, but to depose a Prince is to thrust him out of the possession of his kingdom, and in this branch is referred to Subjects, or any other whatsoever. 113. The falsehood therefore of the aforesaid position, may be gathered partly from holy Scripture, f Mat. 22. Render to Caesar the things which are Caesar's: which precept is plainly understood, not only of rendering to Caesar that which is Caesar's, but also of not taking away from him that which is his, and which he lawfully possesseth: as also contrary wise the plain meaning of that precept of the Decalogue, Thou shalt not steal, g Exod. 20. is not only that we must not take away unjustly, that thing which is our neighbours, but also that we must render to him that which is his own. And partly it may be gathered from the most true principles of the Divines, and Lawyers, to wit, that no man is to be put out of his lawful possessions, until the right of the adverse part be sufficiently decided. 114 Seeing therefore that this question concerning the Pope's power to deprive Princes is not as yet sufficiently decided, for that as yet the judge hath not determined the controversy, as Trithemius h In Chron. Mon●st. H●rsa. ad annum 1106. well affirmed, and we also above i Cap. 3. sec. 3 have showed, so long as it is in question among Catholics, and probably disputed on both sides, whether the Pope hath such authority to deprive Princes or no, they cannot by virtue of any Excommunication, or sentence of deprivation, made by the Pope against them, be deposed by their Subjects, or any other whatsoever, or, which is all one, be violently by their Subjects, or any other, thrust out from their Kingdoms which they do rightfully possess. By this therefore which hath been said it is manifest enough, that according to both these answers, although many do like best the former, that the aforesaid position, Princes which be excommunicated or deprived by the Pope, may be deposed by their Subjects, or any other whatsoever, may truly, lawfully, and without any danger of perjury be abjured as impious and heretical doctrine. Thus I answered in my Theol. Disputation. 115 Now against this Answer M. Fitzherbert objecteth thus: Th●s second answer saith he k Cap. 4. nu. 25. , is sufficiently confuted by the words of the law or oath, which as I have signified aught to be taken, & understood in th●ir most proper & clear sense; in which respect the adverb [as] being joined to impious and heretical, must needs denote and signify, not a similitude, nor yet an equality, (by the way of comparison) but a reality of impiety, and heresy in that doctrine, for so, no doubt, doth every man take it that readeth the said clause. 116. But to this it is answered, first, that M. Fitzherbert abuseth his Reader in corrupting and concealing those rules, which I related out of Suarez, and others, for the understanding of the words of every law, and consequently of this oath. For neither did those Authors affirm, that the words of every law ought to be taken, and understood in their most proper, and most usual sense, but only in their proper and usual sense, taking proper, as it is opposed to improper, or metaphorical, and not to that which is somewhat the less proper, and usual, as it is opposed to unusual, and not to that which is somewhat the less usual: Neither did they also affirm, that the words of every law, are always to be understood in their proper and usual signification: but the matter also of the law, the will of the lawmaker, and other circumstances are to be regarded. Wherefore if at any time, saith Suarez l Lib. 6. de Leg. cap. 1. nu. 17. , the words taken in their proper signification should argue any injustice, or like absurdity in the mind of the Lawmaker, they must be drawn to a sense although improper, wherein the law may be just and reasonable, because this is presumed to be the will of the Lawmaker, as it hath been declared by many laws in ff. tit. de legibus. For in a doubtful word of the Law, saith the Law, that sense is rather to be chosen, which is void of all default, especially seeing that by this the will also of the Lawmaker may be gathered. For it ought not to be presumed, that the Lawmaker did intend to command any absurd or inconvenient thing, unless the contrary do evidently appear. 117 But if it chance, saith Suarez m Cap. 1. nu. 11. , that a●y words of the Law have together many proper and usual significations, than we must observe that rule, which in all ambiguous and equivocal speeches, is wont prudently to be observed, to wit that the matter of the Law with other circumstances be diligently considered, for by them the meaning of the words will be easily determined. For the words must especially be agreeable to the matter, according to that rule of the law, o Leg. Quoties ff. de regulis juris. whensoever the same speech hath two senses, let that especially be taken, which is more agreeable to the matter. And therefore if the words be ambiguous or doubtful, they must be drawn to that sense, as I said before, which containeth no injustice or absurdity: And a benign and favourable interpretation, if there be no other let, is always to be preferred, according to that approved rule of the law, p Leg. Benignius ff. de legibus. Laws are to be interpreted in the more favourable sense, that thereby their will and meaning might be conserved: and doubtful speeches, as Emanuel Sa. affirmeth, q Verbo Interpretatio nu. 17. are to be taken in the better sense, and which is more profitable to the speaker. This, and much more to the same purpose did I there at large relate, which my Adversary here concealeth, and which if he had set down, would plainly have satisfied his chiefest exception, by which, contrary to the aforesaid rule, he laboureth to draw the words of this oath, which he may favourably, and commodiously expound, to contain in his opinion, an unlawful, and inconvenient sense. 118. And from this, which I have now related, it is answered secondly, that the adverb [as] being an adverb of similitude, doth most properly, most commonly, and most usually denote a similitude, or some equality by way of comparison, and not an identity, or reality: and it sometimes it doth signify an identity, or reality, as many times it doth, although seldom in comparison of the other, this is by reason of the matter, & not by virtue of the word, or by force of the adverb of similitude [as.]. Wherefore to know, when the adverb [as] doth signify a similitude, and when a reality, or identity, we must regard the matter, to which it is applied. Seeing therefore that this doctri●e or position, That Princes which be excommunicated or deprived by the Pope, may be deposed, or thrust out of the possession of their kingdoms by their subjects or any other, so long as this doctrine concerning the Pope's power to deprive Princes remaineth questionable, and not decided, is truly impious, and although it be not truly heretical, taking heretical for that, which to maintain maketh one a formal heretic, yet it hath a great affinity, and similitude with this heretical, for that it is a false, impious, and damnable doctrine, repugnant to moral justice, injurious to Sovereign Princes in a most high degree, and contrary also to the word of GOD revealed in holy Scriptures, which therefore may by an authentical definition of the Church be declared to be properly and strictly heretical, for this cause it may well be said, that according to the aforesaid rule, that doubtful or ambiguous words of a law are to be taken in the more favourable sense and wherein they contain no injustice, or untruth, the adverb [as] being, according to his most proper, and most usual signification, an adverb of similitude, may in the word [impious] by reason of the matter, and not by force of the word, denote, and signify an identity, or reality of impiety, and in the word [heretical] only a similitude, or some equality of heresy by the way of comparison, taking heresy in the aforesaid rigorous manner: Neither aught any man that readeth the said clause, the aforesaid rules being observed, understand the adverb [as] in any other sense, especially which is thought to be false, or inconvenient. 119. But besides that this difference may be noted, saith Mr. Fitzherbert r 1 Nu. 6. , betwixt the examples, which Widdrington giveth, and this clause of the oath, that in the examples, to wit, I love him as my brother, and, I hate him as the Devil, and such like, the word [As] hath relation to two diverse subjects, and therefore must neede● be understood comparatively, whereas in the clause of the oath, there is speech only of one subject, to wit, of the doctrine, and heretical being an adjective is affirmed also of the said doctrine, as praedicatum de subjecto, and therefore the word [as] being referred to heretical, which is affirmed of the doctrine only, cannot be understood comparatively (as it is in the examples where there are two different subjects) but must needs denote a reality of heresy in the doctrine. 120. But first it is untrue, that in the examples, which I brought, the adverb [as] must of necessity have relation to two diverse subjects, or persons? for it may be referred to one and the same subject or person; as if one should be blamed for not loving his brother, or for not hating the Devil, he might very well answer, and say, in truth I love him as my brother, or I hate him as the Devil: where the adverb [as] by reason of the matter doth signify a reality of brotherhood, and a true Devil, and not only a similitude, or an equality by the way of comparison. And therefore to know when the adverb [as] doth denote a reality, and not a similitude, we must regard the matter, to which it hath relation, for that most commonly, and according to the most proper signification, and force of the word, it being an adverb of similitude, doth denote only a similitude, and if perchance it doth signify a reality, it is not by force of the word, and by the most common signification thereof, but by reason of the matter, to which it is applied. 121. Secondly, it is also untrue, that the adverb [as] when it connecteth the predicate with the subject, or the adjective with the substantive, doth always devote a reality, and not only a similitude, or an equality by the way of comparison, as by infinite examples contained in the holy Scriptures I could convince. As Psal. 37. Ego autem tanquam surdus non audiebam, etc. and I as deaf did not hear, and as dumb be opened not my mouth. Isa. 53. Et nos putavimus eum quasi leprosum. And we accounted him as leprous. Isa. 57 quia tacens et quasi non videns. For I holding my peace, said almighty GOD, and as not seeing. Isa. 59 palpavimus sicut c●●i parietem. We as blind groped the will. job. 12. errare eos faciet quasi ●brios, he will cause them to err as b●ing drunken. Mat. 28. Et facti sunt velut mortui. And they became as dead. Mar. 9 Factus est sicut mortuus. He became as dead. 1 Cor. 15. tanquam abortivo visus est et mihi. And he appeared to me also as an abortive. 2 Cor. 11. ne quis me putet insipientem, alioquin velut insipientem accipite me, Let no man think me to be foolish, otherwise take me as foolish. Apocalyp. 1. Cecidi adpedes eius tanqu●m mortuus. I fell at his feet as dead. 122. In these, and infinite other examples, which might be alleged, there is speech only of one subject, and the adverb [as] doth connect the adjective or predicate, with the substantive or subject, and yet it doth not denote a reality, but only a similitude. And if perchance any one should reply, and say, that in those examples, although one only substantive or subject be expressed, yet there may be understood not the same substantive or subject, but an other: as I fell at his feet as a dead man, take me as a foolish man, and so of the rest: so likewise we may say that in this clause of the Oath there may be also understood an other substantive or subject, as, I abhor, detest and abjure as impious and heretical doctrine, this doctrine and position etc. Wherefore whether there be one subject or two, whether the adjective be affirmed of the substantive, as predicatum de subject, or no, the adverb [as] by the proper signification, and force of the word being an adverb of similitude, doth most commonly, and usually denote a similitude, and if at any time it signify a reality, or identity, it is not so much by force of the word, as by virtue of the matter, to which it is referred. 123 And this is the reason, why the adverb [as] being referred to impious in this clause of the Oath, doth denote a reality, and truth of impiety, and being referred to heretical doth only denote a similitude of heresy, taking heresy in that strict sense before declared: because although it being an adverb of similitude, doth by virtue and force of the word only denote a similitude, both in the word heretical, and also in the word impious, yet by reason of the matter, to which it is referred, for that the doctrine contained in this clause is truly impious, and it is heretical only by simili ude and comparison, taking heretical in that rigorous sense before mentioned, therefore according to the aforesaid rule, that the sense of the words of every law is to be understood according to the matter, and that the sense and meaning of the words of every law, (and consequently of this oath established by a public law) ought to be drawn to that sense, if there be no other let, which containeth no untruth, injustice, or absurdity, and that the adverb [as] in common sense, and understanding of men, to which common and usual sense his Majesty doth in express words bind the takers of this oath, doth only denote a similitude and not a reality, unless the matter which is treated of doth enforce us thereunto, there is great reason, that the adverb [as] should in the word impious, by virtue of the matter, and not by force of the word, being taken in his most proper and usual signification, signify a reality, and in the word heretical, taking heretical in that rigorous manner so often repeated, should denote only a similitude, or some equality by the way of comparison. 124 And by this which hath been said, that also which M. Fitzherbert lastly addeth, is easily answered. Furthermore, saith he s nu. 27. 28. , it is evident, that the adverb [as] being considered as it is joined with the word [impious] doth clearly imply the reality whereof I speak, signifying that the said doctrine is truly impious, and wicked, and not only to be esteemed so by the way of similitude, or comparison, as it is manifest by the words before and after, which are, I do from my heart abhor, detest, and abjure, as impious and heretical, this damnable doctrine, etc. Whereby it is clear, that his majesties meaning was to cause the takers of this oath to condemn that doctrine to be truly impious, seeing that he will have them to swear, that they abhor and detest it from their heart, and calleth it also a damnable doctrine. 125 And this being so, I would gladly know of Widdrington, what reason he can have to take the adverb [as] in one sense as it is referred to heretical, and in an other, as it is joined with impious, seeing that is referred to both alike with a copulative conjunction, the one immediately following the other: will he say that it is to be taken properly in the one, and improperly in the other? How can that stand with his former rules out of Suarez touching the clear and perspicuous sense, which is required in Laws and Oaths (especially in this oath, wherein there is an express clause afterwards to exclude all equinocatio●?) therefore he must needs grant, that if the doctrine be abjured as truly impious, it is also abjured as truly heretical, or else he must make such a Gallimaufry, as was never made in any law or oath, within the compass of four words only. 126. But this is easily answered by that which I have already said. For first, if the word [heretical] be taken in that sense, as Alphonsus de Castro, Coverrnuias', and many other learned Catholics do take it, for every false doctrine, which is repugnant to the word of God, or divine revelation, which is a proper, and usual signification of the word [heretical] and in which sense also, as I conceive, his Majesty, and other Protestants do take that word, and not for that doctrine which is made heretical by the definition or declaration of the Catholic Roman Church, than the adverb [as] both in the word impious, and also in the word heretical doth by virtue of the matter, and other circumstances, denote a reality of impiety, and heresy, although not by force of the word being taken in the most proper and usual signification, which being an adverb of similitude, would only denote a similitude both of heresy, and also impiety, unless the matter, with other circumstances, did imply the contrary. 127. But if the word [heretical] be taken for that doctrine, which is made heretical by the Church, and which before the declaration; or definition of the Church is not accounted heretical, although it be in very deed a false doctrine, and contrary to the word of God, revealed to us in the holy Scriptures (which signification of the word, heretical, whether it be the more proper, and the more usual than the former, or no, I will not now contend, it being sufficient, and over sufficient for my purpose, that the former sense is proper and usual among Catholics, and not metaphorical and unusual) then the reason, which a little above I alleged, is very sufficient, and my Aduersarie's demand is clearly satisfied, to wit, why the adverb [as] should by virtue of the matter, and by the approved rules of Divines and Lawyers, for the interpretation of the words of every Law, being referred to impious, signify a reality of impiety, and being referred to heretical, should only denote a similitude of heresy, taking heresy in that rigorous sense (although by virtue of the word, and proper signification of the adverb [as] it being an adverb of similitude, both in the word impious, and also in the word heretical, doth only signify, as I have said, a similitude of impiety, and heresy) Neither than should the adverb [as] be taken properly in one, and improperly in the other, as my Adversary would seem to infer, but it is taken properly in both, for that the adverb [as] doth properly, and usually, by reason of the matter sometimes denote a reality, and sometimes a similitude, although most properly and most usually, it being an adverb of similitude, doth by force of the word denote only a similitude. 128 Secondly, to that which M. Fitzherbert objecteth touching equinocation, which by an express clause is excluded in this oath, I answered also in my Theological Disputation t Cap. 8. Sec 2. , that his Majesty by those words [without any equivocation] did not understand and mean, that in the oath, no equivocal word, or sentence was contained, for this is almost impossible, seeing that most words are equivocal, and have diverse, yea and sometimes also proper and usual significations: But his majesties meaning was, that the swearer should not equivocate, that is, deal unsincerely, but he should deal plainly, and sincerely, without any fraud or guile, nor take the words in an other sense, than the common meaning and understanding of them do bear. And so those words [without any equivocation etc.] are only a declaration of those former words [And all these things I do plainly and sincerely acknowledge and swear etc.] For it is one thing to use equivocal words, which may be called a material equivocation, and an other thing to equivocate, or to use formal equivocation. For to equivocate properly, or to use formal equivocation, as it is commonly understood in this Kingdom, is to use equivocal words, or some secret reservation of purpose to delude the hearer, so that he, who heareth the words, understandeth them in an other sense, than he who uttereth them; and it importeth an unsincere manner of dealing. If therefore in this oath there be perchance many common senses of the same word, sentence, or proposition, all circumstances duly considered, we ought to take it in that common sense, wherein we are persuaded his Majesty would have us to take it, for this is his principal meaning and intention, that we should deal plainly and sincerely with him, without any fraud, guile, mental evasion, or secret reservation whatsoever. 129 And if it should so fall out that we cannot be assured of his majesties meaning and intention, when any difficulty concerning the sense of any word or sentence contained in the oath shall arise, than we must recurre to those general rules, which Divines & Lawyers assign for the interpreting of the words of every law, for this we may with just reason presume to be the general intention of his Majesty, as also of every lawmaker. And if perchance there be any Catholic so scrupulous, that by applying the aforesaid general rules to any ambiguous and doubtful word, or sentence in the oath, he cannot yet quiet his conscience, yet he may avoid all danger of equivocating, by publicly declaring in what sense he taketh that word or sentence, which hath divers proper and usual significations: as by declaring in what sense he taketh the adverb [as] both in the word impious and also in the word heretical, and likewise in what sense he taketh the word heretical, and so of others, and this declaration will both avoid all danger of equivocating, and also without doubt satisfy the Magistrate, so that his declaration be not known to be against his majesties meaning and intention. 130 And truly it is strange, that whereas the oath is by his Majesty, and the Parliament propounded, and expressed in such manner of words, that according to the approved rules assigned by Catholic Divines and Lawyers for the interpreting of laws, it may be expounded in a true, lawful, and commodious sense to the swearer, which sense also is agreeable to the proper and usual signification of the words, yet M. Fitzherbert, and other impugners of the oath, (for which English Catholics are to give them little thanks) will needs have them, contrary to the aforesaid rules, understand in that sense, which they account to be false, unlawful, and to be an utter ruin to the refusers of the oath, whereas, according to the aforesaid rules, they ought to draw the words, to a metaphorical and improper sense, if the proper sense should argue in the law, (and consequently in the oath ordained by a public law) any falsehood, injustice, absurdity, or other inconvenience. 131 Seeing therefore it cannot be denied, that the proper and usual signification of the adverb [as] it being an adverb of similitude, is to signify a similitude, and often times also by reason of the matter, but not by force of the word, being taken in the most proper and most usual signification, a reality: and of the word [heretical] as it is taken by many Catholic Divines, for every falsehood repugnant to divine revelation, it is manifest, that whether we affirm, that the adverb [as] doth signify only a similitude, or also a reality both in the word impious, and also in the word, heretical, or a reality in the first, and a similitude in the second in the manner before declared, it is no gallimaufre, but a true, and plain declaring of the common sense, and understanding of the words according to the approved rules prescribed by Catholic Divines and Lawyers for the interpreting of doubtful and ambiguous words in every Law. And thus much concerning the second Answer, and M. fitzherbert's Reply against the same. 132 Now then to make an end of this Chapter, upon these premises I will draw four conclusions contrary to those which M. Fitzherbert here collecteth. First, saith he u nu. 29. , whereas Widdrington chargeth me to have affirmed falsely, that the doctrine of the Pope's power to depose Princes, is manifestly abjured in the oath, as impious and heretical, he chargeth me falsely in two respects, the one because I affirmed no such thing, and the other for that albeit I had said so, yet I had said truly, as it evidently appeareth, not only by the plain words, substance and circumstances of the oath, but also by his majesties meaning and intention therein. 133 But contrariwise I conclude, that whereas I charged him to have falsely or untruly affirmed, that the doctrine of the Pope's power to depose Princes is manifestly abjured in this oath, as impious & heretical, I charged him truly in two respects: the one because it is true, that he affirmeth so much as I have clearly convinced by his own words, and I wonder that he is not ashamed to affirm such a palpable untruth: the other for that this assertion of his is false, as evidently appeareth both by the plain words, substance, and circumstances of the oath, and also by his majesties meaning and intention therein, which is to be gathered principally by the words, which, as you have seen, being taken in their proper and common sense, do clearly show that both parts of that disjunctive proposition, Princes which be excommunicated or deprived by the Pope may be deposed or murdered by their subjects, are not of necessity to be abjured as heretical, although by virtue of the matter, if heretical be taken for every false doctrine which is repugnant to truth, containe● in holy Scriptures, whether the Church have declared, or not declared it to be so, both parts of that posi●ition, which alloweth the practice of deposing or murdering Princes which be excommunicated or deprived by the Pope, may be truly abjured as heretical, as I have abundantly showed before. 134 Secondly, it appeareth, saith M. Fitzherbert x nu. 30. , how different Widdringtons' doctrine & belief concerning the Pope's power to depose Princes, is from his Majesties, yea from the whole substance of the oath, seeing that according to Widdringtons' opinion, the said doctrine is probable, (and consequently may be held, taught, and sworn) whereas his Majesty by this oath condemneth it for detestable, damnable, impious, and heretical, whereby it may appear also what good service he doth to his Majesty with this his probable doctrine, See Preface nu. 25. 26. & 27. as I have noted before in the Preface. 135. But whether my doctrine, and belief concerning the Pope's power to depose Princes be different from his Majesties, or no, (which my Adversary, if he had been pleased to have diligently perused my writings, might quickly have perceived) it is impertinent to the present question conncerning the lawfulness, or unlawfulness of the oath; and therefore I need not at this time to speak more expressly thereof, for not giving my Adversary occasion to wrangle about impertinent questions, and to decline the chief point, which is controversy about the lawfulness of the oath. For to prove the oath to be lawful, or unlawful, we must not so much regard what his majesties belief, or opinion is, touching any point of controversy, which may seem to be any way insinuated in the oath as it appeareth by his opinion concerning his Primacy in spirituals, and the Pope's power to excommunicate him, and such like, which nevertheless he doth not intend, that his Subjects shall be bound to affirm or deny in this oath; we must not I say, so much regard his opinion, as his intention, and what is the true sense, and meaning of the oath according to the plain and common understanding of the words, to which his Majesty doth bind the taker, and what by virtue of the words we must acknowledge, profess, detest, and abjure in this oath: Now it is evident, as I have showed before, that my opinion is not different from the substance of the oath, nor from that which his Majesty intendeth to bind the swearer to acknowledge, or abjure in this oath. 136. For I affirm two things, which are the whole substance of the oath; The first, is that any Catholic may lawfully, and with a safe conscience declare, testify, and acknowledge, before God, and in his conscience, that the Pope hath no power to depose his Majesty, nor to dispose of any his kingdoms, or Dominions, and so of the other clauses, which do follow from this doctrine. And my reason is, for that the doctrine for the Pope's power to depose Princes, I will not say at this present, is a false doctrine, and repugnant to the holy Scriptures, and to the ancient Fathers, but it is not certain, and a point of faith, (as Master Fitzherbert, and some others of his company will needs have it to be) and the contrary is probable and consequently may with a safe and probable conscience be acknowledged and maintained by any Catholic. But whether it be probable, that the Pope hath power to depose Princes or no, I do not at this present dispute, neither do I either grant it, or deny it, or meddle at all therewith, as being unnecessary to prove the oath to be lawful. That which I affirm at this time is, that it is probable, that the Pope hath no such power. Let us first agree about this point, that it is probable, that the Pope hath no such power, and then we will dispute, how probable it is, that he hath such a power. In the mean time all Mr. fitzherbert's cunning, turning, and winding shall not draw me to so great a disadvantage, as to take upon me to prove that to be certain, which he, and the rest of my Adversaries will not grant to be so much as probable. 137. The second thing, which touching practice I do affirm, is, that this doctrine and position, That Princes, which be excommunicated or deprived by the Pope, may be deposed by their Subjects or any other, to omit now the word [murdered] is an impious and damnable doctrine, and in what sense it may be called heretical, as also whether by virtue of the words both parts of that disjunctive position contained in the oath are abjured alike, and whether there be the same reason, that the deposing, and murdering of Princes should be abjured alike, I have sufficiently declared before. Whereby it may also appear, that my doctrine bringeth no danger at all to his Majesty, as that of my Adversaries doth, but giveth great security both to his majesties person and State, as also I have noted before in the Preface y nu. 61. & seq. , which the Reader would quickly have perceived, if Mr. Fitzherbert had not guilfully, to disgrace me with his Majesty, concealed the chiefest part of my answer and doctrine touching the security, which it gave to his Majesty, for which cause he hath laboured so much to have my books forbidden, that the Reader may not see my answers and doctrine, but after that mangled, and lame manner, as he is pleased to curtal and disfigure them. 138. Thirdly, it is evident, saith Mr. Fitzherbert, z nu. 31. that neither Widdrington, nor any man that followeth his doctrine, can lawfully swear this clause of the oath, whereof we treat: for no man can with safe conscience abjure, as impious and heretical, any opinion, which he holdeth to be probable, as Widdrington granteth our opinion to be. 139. But on the contrary part I say, that it is evident, that any man who followeth my doctrine, may lawfully swear this clause of the oath, whereof we treat: for any man may with safe conscience abjure, as impious and heretical, that doctrine and position, which is truly as impious and heretical: Neither do I grant, that the doctrine and position contained in this clause of the oath, which, as you see, belongeth to practise, is probable, as my Adversary untruly affirmeth, but I acknowledge, that it is a false, damnable, impious, and heretical doctrine, and that therefore it ought by all Catholics to be abhorred, detested, and abjured so from their hearts, as I have clearly proved before: and as for the speculative doctrine of deposing Princes. I neither grant, nor deny it to be probable, nor meddle at all therewith, as being impertinent, as I have often said, to prove that the oath may lawfully be taken. 140 Lastly, I conclude, saith M. Fitzherbert a nu. 32. , that albeit there were no other thing in the oath to make it unlawful, yet this only clause might suffice to do it yea and aught to move all Catholics to refuse it. For surely he must be a Catholic of a strange conscience, that can persuade himself to detest, abjure, and abhor from his heart, a doctrine that is taught by the best Catholic writers, ancient and modern, and confirmed by the practice of the Catholic Church, and the authority of divers General and Provincial councils, as experience hath showed for many hundreds of years. So as thou seest, good Reader, what Widdrington gaineth by his wrangling, seeing that the further he goeth, the further he entangleth himself still in an inextricable labyrinth of absurdities, whiles he seeketh to entangle the consciences of Catholics in the snares of his pretended probabilities. And this shall suffice for this point. 141. But contrariwise I conclude, that this clause is not sufficient to make the oath unlawful, or to move any Catholic to refuse the same. For surely he must be a Catholic of a strange conscience, and carried away with the like fanatical zeal and bloody maxims that the Powder-Traitors were, that can persuade himself, that the murdering of Princes, being excommunicated or deprived by the Pope, and the doctrine thereof, which is a part of that conditional disjunctive proposition, abjured in this clause of the oath, ought not to be detested, abhorred and abjured from his heart: Neither was this doctrine ever taught before in the Church of God by any Catholic writer, ancient or modern, or confirmed by the practice of the Catholic Church, or authority of any General or Provincial Council. 142. And although the doctrine for the Pope's power to depose Princes by way of sentence hath been taught by many Catholic writers, and also practised by divers Popes, only since the time of Pope Gregory the seventh, who was the first Pope, saith Onuphrius, that contrary to the custom of his ancestors, durst, I do not say excommunicate, but also deprive Caesar himself (by whom if he was not chosen, he was at least confirmed) of his Kingdom and Empire: A thing not heard of before those times b See above part 1. cap. 6. nu. 24. , yet considering that this doctrine hath not as yet been defined by the Church, and consequently is not a certain and decided point of faith, but hath ever been, and is even to this day vehemently impugned by many learned Catholics, truly that Catholic must be a man either of a strange conscience, or of a weak understanding, who considering the question touching the Pope's power to depose Princes, to be disputable, and as yet not decided by the Church, for that there hath ever been, saith Azor c Azor. , a great controversy betwixt Emperors and Kings on the one part, and the Bishops of Rome on the other, touching this point) can persuade himself, that it is lawful to depose, or thrust a King out of his Kingdom, which he lawfully possesseth, so long as the controversy betwixt the Pope, and temporal Princes, touching this point remaineth undecided. 143. For it is manifest, according to the known, and approved rule of the law, which is also grounded upon the light of reason, that no man can lawfully be thrust out from the possession of that thing, which he rightfully and lawfully possesseth, until the controversy betwixt him and his Adversary touching that thing be decided by the judge. And for this reason, as I conjecture, Card. Bellarmine, and some few others of his Society have of late years been so vehement to make this doctrine for the Pope's power to depose Princes to be a Point of faith, and not to be called in question by any Catholic, foreseeing belike that if they granted it to be disputable, and a thing in controversy among Catholics, they must consequently grant, that the Pope's power to depose Princes, is only titulus sinere, and can never be lawfully put in practice, much like to the title which one hath to a fair Palace, whereof an other man is in possession, which nevertheless he shall never by dispossessing the other lawfully enjoy, until the judge hath decided his title. And therefore the practice not only touching the murdering of Princes excommunicated or deprived by the Pope, but also touching the deposing them, or thrusting them out of the possession of their kingdoms, and the doctrine thereof, may and aught by all good Catholics to be detested, abhorred, and abjured from their hearts, although by virtue of the words, and by force of the disjunctive conjunction [or] following the verb [may] it sufficeth, as I showed before, to abjure the whole disjunctive position, as heretical, that one only part of the disjunction be abjured as heretical. 144. So as thou seest, good Reader, both that the probability, which I maintain, is not only pretended, but true and real, and also to render back Mr. fitzherbert's words, what he gaineth by his wrangling, and concealing the chief points of my opinion and doctrine, seeing that the further he goeth, the further he bewrayeth his want both of learning and sincerity, & entangleth himself still in an inextricable labyrinth of absurdities, whiles he seeketh to entangle the consciences of Catholics in the snares of his pretended new Catholic faith; which for that it is, end ever hath been even from the very first broaching thereof, impugned by learned Catholics, as a new invented doctrine, prejudicial to the Sovereignty of temporal Princes, and not acknowledged by any one of the ancient Fathers, clearly convinceth, that it is not Catholic. Neither can that man be accounted a true Catholic, who with Catholic faith, which cannot be subject to error, believeth that doctrine, which is doubtful, disputable, uncertain, and not Catholic, as is this, which teacheth that the Pope hath power to depose Princes. And truly if I should perceive my Catholic faith to rely and depend upon so weak a ground and foundation, as is the Pope's authority to depose Princes, or any other such like disputable question, I should scarce think myself to be a true Catholic, and to have a true Catholic and supernatural, but only a pretended Catholic, and supernatural faith. 145. By which also the judicious Reader may easily conjecture, what manner of exceptions Mr. Fitzherbert can take against the other clauses of the oath, seeing that these objections, which he hath made against this clause, which he only impugneth, notwithstanding that he vaunted in the beginning of this chapter, that he would prove my explication of this clause, to be a frivolous evasion, an extravagant interpretation, and also absurd even by my own grounds, I have evidently convinced to be weak and unsound, and himself by handling the matter so insufficiently, guilfully, & bitterly, as he hath done (but far more spitefully itself former chapters, charging me with ●cogging, scoffing, 〈◊〉 gibing, for being absurd ridiculous, foolish, malicious ●●●pious, impudent, heretic and no good child of the Catholic Church, and using such like slanderous and disgraceful terms) to be void of learning, sincerity, charity, and also Christian modesty. And this may suffice also for this point. FINJS. Faults escaped. IN the Epistle, num. 9 l. 20. there. p. 14. l. 37. I confessè p. 19 l. 24. writ. p. 20. l. 23. reasons. p. 39 l. 4. Parisioners, p. 55. l. 20. Secular. & l. 34. the cause. p. 67. l. 9, laws. p. 78. l. 12. to none. p 80. l. 34. S. Dominick. p. 90. l. 4. Eisengrenius. p. 100 l. fift. p. 140. l, 5, had had. p, 144, l, 25, although. p. 145. l. 31. put out the comma. p. 148. l. 13. add in the margin ᵐ cap. 6. p. 158. l. 22. that Christian. p. 164. l. 25. intention. p. 175. l, 14. subject to the. p. 179. lin. 10. 11. the spiritual power. In the Adjoinder p. 13. l. 26. heretical. p. 38. against the 18. line, add in the margin. ⁿ num. 23. p. 41. l. 29. sense. p. 57 l. 21. but in the. p. 76. l. 35. may be. COurteous Reader, In the Appendix to my Supplication to the Pope's Holiness. Pag. 123. L. 15. I affirmed M. Wilson, who made the English martyrologue, wherein Fa. Garnet, and Fa. Holdcorne, are put for Martyrs, to be a jesuit: for that I was so informed by two credible persons. But because I have heard since that one confidently aver, that although he doth wholly depend upon the jesuits, and is directed by them, yet he is not as yet a jesuite in habit, I desire that the word [jesuite] in that place thou wilt account for not written, and I have caused it to be blotted out in the Book which I sent to his Holiness. But wherefore the jesuits are desirous to have certain persons, who either by vow, or promise do wholly depend on them, and are at their dispose, not to take their habit for a time, but to live in the world like Lay-men, or Secular Priests, I shall perchance have occasion to declare hereafter.