A THEOLOGICAL DISPUTATION CONcerning the Oath of Allegiance, dedicated to the most Holy Father Pope PAUL the fifth, WHEREIN ALL THE PRINCIPAL ARguments which have hitherto been brought by Cardinal Bellarmine, Jacobus Gretzer, Leonard Lessius, Martin Becanus, and divers others, against the new Oath of Allegiance, lately established in England by Act of Parliament, are sincerely, perspicuously, and exactly examined By Roger Widdrington, an English Catholic. Translated out of Latin into English by the Author himself, whereunto he hath also added An Appendix, wherein all the arguments, which that most learned Divine Franciscus Suarez, hath lately brought for the Pope's power to depose Princes, and against the aforesaid Oath of Allegiance, are sincerely rehearsed, and answered. Thou shalt swear the Lord liveth, in truth, and in judgement, and in justice. jerem. cap. 4. seal of the Society of Jesus IHS' Permissu Superiorum. 1613. TO THE MOST HOLY, AND MOST BLESSED FATHER POPE PAUL THE FIFTH, ROGER WIDDRINGTON an English Catholic wisheth everlasting happiness. IT will doubtless seem strange unto your Holiness (most blessed father) how I so boldly durst adventure to take in hand this disputation concerning the Oath of Allegiance, which your Holiness hath already by your Breves declared to be clearly repugnant to the Catholic faith, and with all to dedicated the same unto your Holiness. But if your Holiness will be pleased to consider advisedly the true state of this controversy, both concerning the Papal authority to depose Princes, and also concerning the lawful taking of this oath of Allegiance, and carefully to observe the preposterous manner of proceeding, which my adversaries have used in impugning my doctrine, and in maintaining their own, and diligently to examine the reasons, which did move me to writ, I make no doubt, but that your Holiness will presently perceive, that I am free from all temerarious presumption, and that I am very clear from all those slanderous imputations, whereof some men have in public writings falsely accused me, and that with far greater reason I could return their calumnies against me, back upon themselves. 2 And first of all it was never my meaning, as heretofore a In the Preface to my Apologetical Answer num. 8. and in the Answer itself nu. 111. in the very same words I have declared, when I did set forth my Apology for the rightful power of Princes against Cardinal Bellarmine, to impugn the common opinion of Divines, which granteth to the Pope authority to depose Princes, as apparently false, and with invincible arguments to demonstrate the contrary opinion to be true; but whereas some very few later Divines, and especially Cardinal Bellarmine only in a later Edition of his works, yet bringing no other reason to prove the same, then in his former Editions he had brought, do so stiffly, and with such vehemency defend this authority of the Pope's Holiness to depose Princes, that they imagine to have most clearly convinced the same, and fear not to charge with heresy all those Catholics, who in this point do not run with them; this only was my intent, (to the end I might learn the truth in a matter of so great importance, as is to know what is heresy) to give at the lest a probable answer to the arguments of Cardinal Bellarmine (whom rather then any other writer I took upon me to confute, both for that he had out of all the best writers gathered all the chiefest arguments which to prove this authority were most forcible, & also for that he being now alive knew best how to maintain his own opinion, and being a question of such great moment, would also by all likelihood defend the same) and consequently I did only intent to show probably out of his own principles, and not invincibly to convince, that his arguments for confirming this authority were not so certain & insoluble that as they did evidently demonstrate, that those Catholics, who do not approve the said authority, are not to be numbered among the faithful, and true believers, or not to be admitted to the participation of holy Sacraments. Therefore the present controversy, which is at this time between me, and Cardinal Bellarmine is not concerning this absolute question or proposition, which the Divines do commonly defend, to wit, whether the Pope hath authority to depose Princes for heresy, but concerning this modal proposition, Whether it be so certain, and without all controversy, that the Pope by Christ's institution hath the said authority to depose Princes, as that those, who defend the contrary opinion to be probable, do expose themselves to manifest danger of heresy, error, or any other mortal sin. 3 By which it is evident, that I have not taken upon me to demonstrate, but only to answer probably; and therefore I can not justly be blamed, if I have not brought altogether demonstrative reasons, or answers; for it is sufficient for my purpose, if for the confirming of my opinion I have either brought at the lest wise probable reasons, or else have given only a probable answer to the reasons of Cardinal Bellarmine, or of any other who hath taken upon him his defence: for probability of one thing, and certainty of the contrary can not stand together, neither can there be alleged any probable answer to a reason which is truly demonstrative and invincible. But he that imagineth to overthrow my Apology for the right of Princes only with plausible, and probable arguments, is both himself grossly deceived, and will also very easily deceive his Reader; for he that will take upon him to demonstrate his opinion to be certain, & to be believed as a point of faith, and to convince the contrary to be heretical, & which can not probably be defended by any true Catholic, must of necessity produce either unanswerable authorities, or invincible reasons, and to which no probable answer can be given. And this is the true state of the question concerning the Pope's Holiness power to depose Princes. Now what profit this manner of disputing bringeth to Princes, I have showed in the end of my Apology b See also beneath cap. 3. sec. 2. nu. 4. , and this benefit Subjects do reap thereby, that, besides the knowledge of the truth in a matter of so great importance, as is to discern a probable doctrine from heretical, they shall most clearly perceive, that for the defending of opinions, which are only probable, they are not bound to cast away there whole temporal estate, to incur the high displeasure of their Prince, and to expose their whole posterity to danger of perpetual beggary. 4. Neither is the state of this controversy concerning the Oath of Allegiance, which doth greatly depend upon the former question of deposing Princes, unlike to the state of it. For they that are of opinion that the Oath may lawfully be taken, are for this cause moved thereunto, for that they are persuaded, that by the Law of God they are bound to obey the command of their lawful Prince, so long as it doth not appear, that he commandeth them any unlawful thing, or which exceedeth his authority to command. And therefore these men think it to be sufficient for them, if they do but make a probable answer to all the arguments which are drawn from the authority of holy Scriptures, councils, Canons of holy Church, your Holiness Breves, and from Theological reasons, or any other proofs, which do seem clearly to demonstrate, that the whole Oath, or any part thereof is repugnant to faith or salvation, or doth exceed his majesties authority to command. But they that will take upon them to convince that this Oath cannot be taken by any man with a probable, and consequently safe conscience, it is not enough for them to bring only either probable reasons, or probable authorities, but they must also bring such demonstrative, and invincible arguments, to which no probable answer can be given. But this they will never be able to do, for it is an easy matter to cite some texts of holy Scripture, whatsoever thou shalt lose, feed my sheep, If you have Secular judgements, etc. also some General councils, that of Laterane, that of Lions; and that of Trent, some Canons of Holy Church, Nos sanctorum, juratos, Absolutos, and three Breves of your Holiness, for the confirming of their opinion; But that this is the true meaning of the Scripture which they pretend, that this is necessarily concluded from the councils, Canons, and your Holiness Breves, which they would have, I do not say, only probably to persuade, but by a demonstrative argument to which no probable answer can be given evidently to convince this truly is a thing of too too great difficulty. And this is the reason, most Holy Father, which maketh me to be so confident against such learned Adversaries. For I am confident in the cause, which I am certainly persuaded to be most just, and not in my own learning which I acknowledge to be but very little. For it is sufficient for me to bring reasons, or answers, which at the lest are probable, which in a disputable matter is not very hard to do; but my adversaries, unless they bring demonstrative arguments, and which evidently do convince, and do clearly confute my answers as altogether improbable, they labour all in vain, and they will at length perceive, that they do not fight against that doctrine, which I have taught, but against that, which they themselves have feigned. 5 Secondly, the manner, which my adversaries have observed in confuting my Doctrine, & confirming their own, is too too exorbitant. For to that which hitherto I have written, two Doctors of Divinity have made an answer, to wit, Edward Weston, and Adolphus Schulckenius; (if Schulckenius, and not Cardinal Bellarmine himself, as D. Weston hath constantly averred to many, be the principal Author of that book;) but both of them so unsoundly, guilefully, bitterly, that they do plainly show, that they rather desire by imposing upon me that which I never said, and by reproachful speeches to disgrace my person, then by reasons, & arguments to confute my doctrine, & to defend their own. For either they charge me with those things which I never wrote, nor imagined; or those things which I have written, they do in such manner deprave, that they do altogether misconceive the true meaning of them, and so they do not impugn, what I have affirmed, but what themselves have invented, or else they do so couldly confirm their own opinion, that although with their clamours they fill the ears of the unlearned, yet the learned may plainly perceive, that they are clean overcome, and that they prosecute their cause not so much by arguments, as by reproachful speeches; and lastly they would willingly that their own uncertain inferences out of the holy Scriptures and councils, which we have heretofore fully satisfied, should be accounted infallible positions of faith; all which partly I have beneath briefly insinuated, jest that I should be more troublesome to your Holiness, than a supplicatory letter doth require, partly I will show hereafter, God willing, more at large. Wherefore if your Holiness relying upon the learning, and conscience of these men, or of others of greater place, and dignity, and giving credit to their false informations, should condemn my writings as heretical, or erroneous, as Doctor Weston, and Doctor Schulckenius, or if D. Weston be to be believed, Cardinal Bellarmine himself, have falsely and injuriously laid to my charge, what great wrong your Holiness should do me, & what occasion of no small scandal you should give to the adversaries of the Catholic Church, I remit to the judgement both of your Holiness, & also of the whole Christian world: Neither is it unknown to your Holiness how that certain books, which if need shall require, I will hereafter name, where some few years since, by a particular decree of the See Apostolic, and General Inquisition through the evil information, and importunity of some certain men, condemned as erroneous, and if I do not forget, as flat heretical, who nevertheless did afterwards, the matter being better examined, recall the former sentence by a new decree, which did not contain so severe a censure. 6 Now what manner they have held in impugning this Oath of Allegiance from the beginning hitherto, I will with as much brevity, as may be, sincerely declare unto your Holiness. It is well known, and public to the whole Christian world, and which I cannot but with grief rehearse, how that horrible, and infamous conspiracy of the Powder-Treason, plotted by certain Catholics upon a preposterous zeal to advance the Catholic religion, intending to blow up with Gunpowder the whole house of Parliament, together with the Kings and Queens most excellent Majesties, their Royal issue, & the three States of the Realm, & innumerable other persons of every state, and condition, was the principal occasion of devising & enacting this Oath of Allegiance. For in the next Session of Parliament after this detestable conspiracy was but newly discovered, it was thought convenient by all the States of this kingdom to frame the aforesaid Oath of Allegiance, and to ordain, that it should be tendered to all sorts of Catholics under most grievous punishments to all them who did refuse it, thinking this to be a most fit means for the better discovering hereafter of such like traitors, and preserving of his Majesty from such like future conspiracies. The Law being now enacted there was a great, and long consultation among Priests what Catholics aught to do in this case. At the last Master George Blackwell being then Arch-Presbyter of the English Priests was resolved to be of this opinion (which the greater part of Priests, who came then to London to know what was to be done in this so difficult a matter, did also follow) that this Oath, according to the plain and common understanding of the words, might with a safe conscience be taken by any Catholic. But this resolution of Master Archpriest was nothing pleasing to certain Jesuits, and some other very few Priests in comparison of the rest. And from hence all this stir and controversy concerning the taking of this Oath did first arise. For those Jesuits did vehemently oppose themselves against Master Archpriest, and did constantly affirm that they would reverse whatsoever had been concluded by him, & that they would procure a Breve from your Holiness to command all Catholics not to take the Oath. Which truly with very great expedition according to their promise they did perform. For, although a certain Priest not of the meaner sort did presently upon Master Archpriests resolution with all the speed he might writ to Master Nicholas Fitzherbert being then at Rome, and did sincerely relate unto him how all things had passed, earnestly requesting him, that either by himself or by means of some Cardinals he would effectually deal with your Holiness, that you would not be persuaded to sand hither at this time, and things standing as they do, any Breves to forbidden the taking of the Oath, jest that otherwise your authority, as well temporal to depose Princes, as spiritual to define infallibly without a General Council, were more strongly called in question by Catholics, then ever heretofore: (For at that time Master Blackwell did only intent to deny the lawful executing of your power to depose Princes, things standing here as they do, and not the aforesaid either spiritual, or temporal power itself) yet this answer he received from Master Fitzherbert, that these letters, although they came to his hands in a very short time, yet they came too late, for that it was determined at Rome, that your Breves should presently be sent hither to forbidden the Oath. Whereupon Father Parson's fearing lest our English Catholics would be drawn away by the authority of Master Archpriest, and of the other Priests, who followed his opinion, sent instantly hither his letters (the true copy whereof I will beneath ᶜ set down) which were certain forewarnings of your future Breves, wherein he gave English Catholics to understand, that there was at Rome a consultation of seven, or eight of the learnedst Divines that could be chosen, and all were of opinion, that this Oath under this form of words could not be taken by any man without denying the Catholic faith, for that the Pope's authority in chastizing Princes upon a just cause is de fide, and moreover that your Holiness gave the like answer to the same Father Parsons in the presence of Master Thomas Fitzherbert. But because very many Catholics with us (as will appear by this disputation) do not well perceive from whence any good inference can be made, that your authority to chastise Princes in general is in this Oath denied, they would gladly concerning this point be more fully instructed by your Holiness. 7 Not long after this letter of Father Parsons, your Holiness sent hither your first Breve, wherein you expressly declared, that this Oath, cannot lawfully be taken by any man, for that it containeth many things which are clearly repugnant to faith, and salvation. Some few months after it happened that Master Blackwel the Archpriest was apprehended, & being brought before the Magistrate he took the Oath being tendered him; whom Cardinal Bellarmine by private letters (about which time also your second Breve came hither) did sharply reprehend, as though he had abjured your Holiness spiritual primacy: But Master Blackwell by other letters (which by chance came into the hands of his majesties privy Counsel, and which were an occasion that he did more clearly explain his opinion concerning d For he was very unwilling for fear of incurring your holiness displeasure, to declare sincerely his opinion concerning the Pope's power to depose Princes. all the particular clauses of the Oath) did return an answer to Cardinal Bellarmine. Against your Holiness his Breves, and Cardinal Bellarmine's letters, the King's Majesty, concealing at the first his name, did writ an Apogie in defence of the Oath of Allegiance. To which Apology Father Parsons in English, and Cardinal Bellarmine, jacobus Gretzer, Leonard Coquaeus, Antonius Capellus, Martinus Becanus & divers others did answer in Latin: But all of them did so slenderly handle the question of the Oath, which was the principal controversy, that the English Catholics, who did before think the Oath to be lawful, were thereby more confirmed in their opinion, and the rest, who favoured the Jesuits, did not a little blush to see a matter of so great importance so weakly handled. For these Divines, otherwise doubtless most learned, do labour to prove, that in this Oath is plainly denied the Pope's Holiness spiritual primacy, his power to excommunicate, and to bind and loose, which nevertheless the defenders of the Oath, as will appear beneath, doth think to show sufficiently to be false. Neither is there scarce any (learned) Priest with us, the Jesuits only excepted, & those not all, who is of opinion, that there is any thing contained in this Oath, which is clearly repugnant to faith, as your Holiness in your Breves hath declared, and therefore neither dare they publicly defend the same, but lest that they should seem to be wholly discomfited, some of them fly to certain other arguments of lesser moment, which in their due places I will rehearse. Whereupon betwixt a certain jesuite, who was then prisoner in the Gatehouse, and some other Priests, who at the same time were prisoners in Newgate, (yet all of them very vehement against the Oath) there was by intercourse of letters a great contention concerning this matter; But at the last these Priests, who affirmed that the oath neither contained in it any heresy, or error, compelled the jesuite by force of disputation partly to silence, and partly to interpret his opinion in a milder sort. 8 And this is the reason (most holy Father) why very few Lay-Catholikes of any name, or worth with us do refuse to take the oath, being tendered them by the Magistrate. For while they advisedly call to remembrance, that this oath, before it was by your Holiness declared to be clearly repugnant to faith, and salvation, might with a probable, and consequently with a safe conscience be taken by any Catholic, by reason of the authority of so many learned, and virtuous Priests; and with all they do now not only consider, that your Holiness prohibition, being a mere declarative precept e See what is a declarative precept beneath cap. 1. sec 4. nu. 1. & 2. in the end. , can have no greater force to bind, than the reason wherein it is founded, and whereon it wholly dependeth, as beneath f Cap. 10. sec. 2. nu. 41. and the rest. out of the doctrine of Franciscus SuareZ shall be made manifest, but also they are probably persuaded, that your Holiness was by Cardinal Bellarmine, and Father Parsons wrongfully informed of the reason, for which you forbade them to take the oath, to wit, for that it containeth many things, which are clearly repugnant to faith, and salvation; seeing that neither your authority to chastise Princes, to excommunicate them, to inflict censures, or any spiritual authority which is certainly known to be granted by Christ to Saint Peter, and his Successors is in this oath denied, as Cardinal Bellarmine, whom Father Parsons, & divers others Divines of the Society of jesus do imitate, doth by fallacious inferences labour to deduce; they can not as yet sufficiently perceive, by what forcible argument they are bound with the perpetual temporal overthrow of themselves, and there whole posterity to obey your Holiness declarative command, which at the most is grounded upon a probable reason. Neither do they imagine that they aught therefore to be accounted rebellious to the See apostolic, for that they, reserving otherwise all dutiful reverence to your Holiness, do not in a matter which is so prejudicial unto them, obey your Holiness Apostolical letters, which either are written upon false information, or grounded only upon a probable opinion. For although they be most willing to lose all temporal goods, yea, and life itself for the Catholic faith, nevertheless for defending of opinions, although they be received almost by the Universal Church not as points of faith, but only as probable opinions (for they are not ignorant, that betwixt the Church firmly believing, and only probably thinking a great difference is to be made) to be deprived of all their goods, to be accounted Traitors to their Prince, and Country, and moreover to suffer their children, nephews, kinsmen, & their whole posterity which this our age doth so much labour to advance, to be brought to perpetual beggary without incurring any danger of denying the Catholic faith, or committing any mortal sin, they think it to be neither wisdom, nor charity. And therefore they both think themselves to be more hardly dealt with all, that having so long time endured so great calamities, there should be now so heavy a burden laid upon them by him, from whom they rather expected to have received some comfort, as that they should be enforced, to the utter ruin of their whole posterity, besides the perpetual loss of their own goods and liberty, and also, which is most grievous to them, with manifest danger to incur the high displeasure of their Prince, being otherwise very merciful, to defend opinions which only are probable, & may without danger of damnation be rejected by Catholics; and also they think themselves to be greatly wronged by some few of their countrymen, and those for the most part unlearned persons, as Tailors, Shoemakers, and especially ignorant women, who although they can scarcely read the Oath, yet they do so bitterly inveigh against it, and the defenders thereof, that they are not afraid publicly to avouch, that it is far worse to take the oath, then to go to the Protestants Churches, and to communicate with them in Religious service, and Sacraments. And doubtless if your Holiness were but rightly informed, how scandalously, and unsincerely some of those persons here with us, who would gladly in outward show be accounted vehement impugners of the Oath, carry themselves in, of whom, if it shall be necessary, I will hereafter inform your Holiness, truly I cannot tell, whether the tender bowels of your fatherly charity would rather be moved to take compassion of those Catholics, who without dissimulation do defend the Oath for causes which they think to be reasonable, or to take displeasure against their Adversaries. 9 I partly pitying the miserable state of these my Catholic Countrymen, partly moved at their earnest request, and partly alured with a fervent desire to learn certainly the truth in this so important a matter, as is the denying of the Catholic faith, and the dutiful reverencing of both the spiritual and temporal authority, have composed this Disputation of the Oath, faithfully putting down all the reasons, and and answers on both sides, and for that cause I have dedicated it unto your Holiness, that after you have carefully examined all the reasons, for which the English Catholics do think the Oath may lawfully be taken, your Holiness may provide both for their spiritual and temporal safety, as to your fatherly wisdom, and charity shall be thought most convenient. For as it is not fit that heretical opinions, which overthrow the Church of Christ, should be maintained by Christians for Catholic doctrine, so neither is it meet, that doubtful opinions, and which are only probable, and therefore not to be believed with supernatural, and Catholic belief, should be preached for undoubted assertions of the Catholic faith, and by some private Doctors be forced by violence upon Christian people to their exceeding great temporal prejudice, and to the notorious scandal of the Catholic Religion; but as the Catholic truth, which is necessary to Salvation, aught by all Christians to be found out, and maintained, so that doctrine, which is not Catholic, aught to be distinguished and severed from that which is Catholic. 10 And verily if this controversy had been of such a nature, that the treating thereof might without danger of doing other men wrong have been pretermitted, I would not doubtless by examining it have endangered myself to incur your Holiness high displeasure. But considering that it tendeth to the public good of our Country, to the just defending of my own innocency f For some do chief for that cause among the unlearned people tax my Apology, for that it seemeth to confirm the principal poins, for which your Holiness hath declared the oath to be unlawful. , and of divers others, and to the declaring of that obedience, which by the law of Christ we own both to the spiritual command of your Holiness, and also to the temporal precepts of our King's most excellent Majesty, I have great hope, and confidence, that your Holiness will not take in evil part, that I not with any obstinate mind, but to inform more fully your Holiness of the whole matter, whereof, as we think, you have not as yet been rightly informed, and to learn the truth in this so weighty a business, I have sincerely taken upon me this disputation, whereby we may at length be instructed, what authority we are bound to grant both to your Holiness, and also to his Majesty according to the principles of the Catholic faith. For both the spiritual and the temporal power we do reverence with all dutiful respect; to both of them we desire to tender those things, which are theirs, as well to Caesar, which are Caesar's, as which are Gods to God, what belongeth to either authority according to the grounds of Catholic faith, we intent to declare sincerely, uprightly, & without any flattery at all; being most certainly persuaded, that your Holiness will not take in good part, that any man, upon overmuch affection towards the See apostolic, should attribute to the Pope's Holiness more ample authority, as a thing to be certainly believed as a point of faith, than which by necessary, and evident consequence can be proved out of holy Scriptures, or some definition of the church to be granted him by Christ our Lord: For these men, as very well saith most learned Canus g Lib. 5. de loc. cap. 5. prope fine. , do weaken not strengthen, do overthrow not establish the authority of the See apostolic. For what will he in the end gain by disputing against heretics, when they perceive that he taketh upon him to defend the Pope's authority not by judgement but by affection, neither that he endeavoureth to find out the truth by force of his disputation, but to apply himself to another man's will and pleasure? Peter hath no need of our lying, he hath no need of our flattering. 11 This therefore (most Holy Father) is our most humble supplication to your Holiness, First, that your Holiness will be pleased to examine diligently the reasons, for which our English Catholics do think the Oath may lawfully be taken, and whereof they are persuaded your Holiness is not as yet rightly informed: Secondly, that after you have thoroughly examined them, you will vouchsafe in regard of your Pastoral carefulness to instruct them, which parts of the Oath are, (I do not say only according to a probable opinion of some Doctors, but according to Catholic doctrine, necessarily to be believed by all Christians) repugnant to faith and salvation, and therefore cannot be taken by any Catholic with a safe, and probable conscience: Thirdly, that if your Holiness shall find, that you have not been rightly informed of those reasons, for which our English Catholics do think, that the oath may lawfully be taken, and that therefore they have not in a matter of so great weight proceeded rashly, and unadvisedly, you will be pleased to receive them and their Priests into your ancient favour, and that if they, or any of them have, not through their own fault, but through the indiscreet zeal of others suffered any loss or detriment in their good name, or other ways, it may be restored again unto them in that best manner, as shall seem convenient to the charity, justice, and wisdom of your Holiness. And in the mean time they will not neglect to pray continually to almighty God that he will grant you a long, and happy life to the good of the Catholic Church, to the salvation of your own soul, and to the comfort of them who are wrongfully oppressed. From my Study the first of june 1613. THE authors ADMONITION TO THE READER. THere be four things, Christian Reader, which I thought good to admonish thee of. The first is, that if perchance thou art resolved to make an answer to this Disputation, which I have composed, thou must call to thy remembrance what is the true state of this present controversy. For it is not sufficient for thee, as I have before declared, to produce only probable arguments either against the whole oath, or any part thereof, or else against the Answers, which I, in the name of them who defend the oath, have alleged, but thou must bring arguments, which are plainly demonstrative, and to which no probable answer can be made; otherwise thou wilt never sufficiently demonstrate, that this oath cannot be taken by any man with a probable, and consequently with a safe conscience. 2 The second, is; that whereas not long since two Doctors of Divinity, Adolphus Schulckenius, (if he be the only Author of that book which is published in his name) and Edward Weston have seemed in some sort to answer my Apology for the Sovereignty of Princes, to whom at this time I being detained with other occasions, cannot commodiously return a full answer, which nevertheless thou shalt, God willing, ere it be long receive, I thought it convenient to propound unto thee at this present some things, which thou mayst observe in them. And first of all both of them have so guilefully dissembled the true state of the controversy, as though they would persuade the Reader, that I intended to bring evident, & demonstrative reasons against that doctrine, which defendeth the Pope's authority to depose Princes, and to dispose of their temporals, and to prove invincibly, that the reasons, and authorities, which Cardinal Bellarmine bringeth to confirm the said authority, to be altogether improbable; whereas contrariwise Cardinal Bellarmine pretendeth to demonstrate, and therefore is not afraid to charge those Catholics with heresy, who deny the aforesaid authority, and I, as both in my Apology, a Nu. 3. & nu. 463. and in my Apologetical Answer b In the places above cited in the epistle to his Holiness nu. 2. , I did purposely observe, intended only probably to show, that Cardinal Bellarmine hath not hitherto sufficiently demonstrated, either by the testimony of holy Scriptures, or tradition of the Apostles, or any definition of the Church, or by any Theological arguments, that the Pope hath by Christ his institution any authority at all, either directly, or indirectly, either absolutely, or respectively to the spiritual good to deprive Sovereign Princes of their temporal Dominions * By which it is manifest that I have not any way altered the state of the question from that I proposed in my Apology, as some do apprehended, but that they did not diligently observe the words, which both in the beginning of my Apology, nu. 3. and in the end, nu. 463 I did purposely and in express words set down. : and consequently, that those Catholics, who deny that authority, are not to be branded with any mark of heresy, or error, as Cardinal Bellarmine over rashly affirmeth, or also to be charged with any crime of temerity. Which observation if thou carefully wilt consider, thou shalt very easily perceive, that neither Doctor Schulckenius, nor Doctor Weston do in there Apologies set forth in defence of Cardinal Bellarmine, impugn that doctrine which I have taught, but which they themselves have invented. For neither do they demonstrate, that the reasons, or authorities, which Cardinal Bellarmine hath brought, are such, that no probable answer can be made unto them, neither that the Solutions which I have made unto them are voided of all probability. For if this doctrine concerning the Pope's power to depose Princes be necessarily to be held as a point of faith, as these Doctors following Cardinal Bellarmine will needs have it to be, it must of necessity follow, that either Christ, or the Apostles have delivered it to the Church by word, or writing, or else it must be gathered, I do not say, only by probable, but by evident, and necessary consequence from those things, which we have received from Christ, or the Apostles. But let them produce but one only authority out of holy Scriptures, but one only Apostolical tradition, but one only definition, but one only Theological demonstration, let them insist thereon, let them urge it as much as they are able, if I do not give thereunto a probable answer, I will instantly acknowledge myself to be vanquished: if they refuse to do this, it is manifest, that they seek evasions, and that they not for desire to found out the truth, but lest they should seem to be overcome, will rather with clamours, then with reasons yet contend: and moreover that they do great injury both to the faith of Christ, and the faithful, whiles they do not desist to thrust upon the faithful people, to their notable temporal prejudice, their own uncertain opinions for infallible assertions of the Catholic faith. 3. And verily if for desire to found out, and teach the truth, Doctor Schulckenius had been sincerely moved to writ, he would doubtless have been greatly ashamed both to delude his Reader so grossly, and also to charge me falsely with such manifest untruths. And first of all to make me odious to Secular Princes thus he writeth in his Dedicatory Epistle: c Not far from the end. An other thing there is that the same my Adversary (meaning Widdrington) who for his own advantage crieth out with open mouth, that the power of Princes is divine, that it is most holily ordained by God through the law of Nature, that Subjects by the law of God own obedience to Princes; the same my Adversary, I say, when so it fitteth his purpose, crieth out, that Subjects have power inherent in themselves, and due unto them by the law of God and nature, which they can never lose or transfer from themselves, over Kings, to judge them, to depose them, to choose others, to transfer Kingdoms, to change the manner of government: Thus writeth my Adversary. num. 439. and 460. 4. But truly I cannot but wonder that Doctor Schulckenius is not abashed to impose upon me so manifest an untruth. For I never affirmed, that Subjects have power over Kings, to judge them, to depose them, to choose others, etc. But this only I affirmed in that place, d Nu. 438. & seq. that whensoever Emperors do utterly forsake the Empire, neither will protect it any longer, but do leave the Kingdom to be spoiled by the enemies, and consequently will no longer reign over the people, nor be their Emperors, or Protectors (as, according to the opinion of Lupoldus Babenbergius, & Michael Coccinius, it happened when the people of Rome transferred the Empire to the Germane) in that case the Pope, Senate, and people of Rome by the virtual, at leastwise consent of all the other people of the West-parts, who were subject to the Empire, had full right, and authority (which by no custom, or translation of the Imperial Seat they could lose, it being connatural and due unto them by the law of nature e To wit, in that case when they had no Emperor, for than they were absolute of themselves, and subject to none. ) even according to the doctrine of Cardinal Bellarmine but now related, to appoint over themselves a new Emperor, and consequently to transfer the Empire, which the Grecians did only in name hold in the Western parts to Charles the great, and his Successors, or to any other, the Imperial See being in those parts at that time as it were vacant, or without any Emperor. 5. Secondly, f Pag. 561. ad nu. 567. the same Schulckenius towards the end of his book doth foully bely me as affirming an other thing, which is far more dangerous, and doth with more spiteful words aggravate the same. For, whereas I answering to the authority, which Cardinal Bellarmine had brought from the example of Queen Athalia, who by the commandment of joiada the high Priest was slain, did writ, that joiada the high Priest in killing Athalia did no other thing, than which every faithful Subject in the like case aught to have done; which for that cause I did affirm, as in the same place I did declare, for that joiada not of his own authority, but in the name of the King, and of the Common wealth did command that Athalia being an Usurper, and intending to raise a Conspiracy against the true and lawful King, and who by the Common wealth was acknowledged and received for such a one, crying out, in the temple to the people as the Scripture relateth g The fourth of the Kings chap. 11. and 2. Paralip. chap. 23. , Treachery, Treachery, Conspiracy, Conspiracy; Doctor Schulckenius doth so misconstrue my words, as though I should aver, that every faithful Subject, if he only think, that one hath by a bad title usurped the Kingdom, may, and not only may, but also aught to kill such a Prince. And at last he exclaimeth in this manner: Behold O Kings, and Princes, you have one who is careful of your security; So observant are they of your Princely Majesty, who do violate and calumniate the Pontificial authority. Every Subject, saith Widdrington, not only may, but also aught in such a case to do that, which joiada did. O miserable state of Princes, whose Kingdom, and life is subject to the judgement of every private man? If Cardinal Bellarmine had written such a thing, what tumults would not Widdrington make! what clamours would he not raise? 6. But where is your conscience O Schulckenius? where is your sincere and upright dealing? what hath so greatly blinded your mind, that you should not be ashamed to impose upon me so manifest a slander? Did joiada only think, and not also certainly know, that Athalia had by an unjust title usurped the Kingdom? Did he not also certainly know that King joas a child of seven years age, the true Heir to the King. doom, whom he himself had delivered from being murdered, was with him alive and safe in the house of God? Did not he, before he put joas in possession of his Kingdom, and caused Athalia to be slain, enter into league with the Centurions, who as the Scripture saith, went round about juda, and gathered together the Levites of all the cities of juda, and the chief men of the families of Israel, and they came into jerusalem: and all the multitude made a covenant in the house of God with the King: to wit, to put joas their lawful King, who was wrongfully detained from his Kingdom in possession thereof: and in the King's name, and by his authority to cause Athalia the usurper to be slain, especially if he should raise any conspiracy against the King: For joiada did not by his own authority, but in the King's name, and by the King's authority command Athalia to be slain. joiada, saith Abulensis, h 4. Reg. q. 20. nu. cap. 11. represented the King's person, it was lawful for the King to command Athalia to be slain; Therefore also it was lawful for joiada, who represented the King's person in all things. Tell me now, I beseech you, O Schulckenius, may not every faithful Subject lawfully, and aught not he also in the like case, that is, not by his own private authority, as you feign, but by the public authority of the true King, and who is certainly known to be true King, the Common wealth also consenting there unto, kill an usurper, not who is only reputed, but also certainly known to be such a one, and who plotteth treason against the true King? Neither doth this doctrine open the way to rebellions, and conspiracies, or expose the lives of Princes to the judgement of private men. But you in this very place do lay open a wide gap to rebellions, and revoltings, whiles too too unadvisedly you do affirm, that the consent of the people is sufficient to give away to an other, the rightful title to a kingdom from the lawful Heir, and who also hath no way offended. Athalia, say you, i Pag. 558. without doubt did tyrannically usurp the Kingdom, but having reigned peaceably six years, it is credible, that, the people by little and little giving their consent, she obtained a lawful right to the Kingdom. And nevertheless you knew right well, O Schulckenius, that joas, who by inheritance was the true and rightful King, was at that time safe and alive in the house of God. And this your seditious doctrine was perchance one cause among others, wherefore your book was publicly burnt in Paris. And therefore prudently Becanus, k Pag. 120. who in the first edition of his Controversia Anglicana did teach this very same doctrine, perceiving his error, did in his later corrected Edition cause that very same sentence to be clean blotted out. 7. Thirdly, the same Doctor Schulckenius, to disgrace me also with the See apostolic, as though I taught flat heretical doctrine, thus he writeth in the sixth Chapter of his Apology. The second Conclusion l Pag. 256. : It is heretical to affirm, that the Pope as Pope, and by the law of God hath not any power in temporals. This is against Widdrington, the Lutherans, and the Caluinists. The third Conclusion m Pag. 258. . It is heretical, that the Pope as Pope, and by the law of God hath not any power to command Secular Princes in temporal matters, at leastwise in order to spirituals. This is against Widdrington, the Lutherans, Caluinists, etc. And nevertheless all my writings do most manifestly teach the flat contrary. For I do not only by the way, but of set purpose, neither once or twice, but very oftentimes in express words teach, repeat, and inculcate, that the Pope hath power in temporals not indeed to dispose of them, but to command Secular Princes in temporals in order to spiritual good. With what face therefore dare Schulckenius avouch, that I deny that very thing, which in the very same express words not once or twice, but most frequently I do affirm? I omit now divers other slanders, which this Doctor doth very falsely lay to my charge, of which I will ere it be long, if God permit, most clearly purge myself. In the mean time let the prudent Reader judge, how little credit is to be given to these kind of men, and whether our English Catholics may safely repose their faith, there consciences, and all the temporal estate of themselves, and of their whole posterity, upon the writings of such men, who, to disgrace their Adversary, do of set purpose corrupt his sayings and sentences, in such an important matter as is the teaching of heresy. 8. Concerning Doctor Weston I will say little at this present, being also hereafter, God willing, to expostulate with him more at large (but modestly) concerning his dangerous doctrine, the bitterness of his stile and divers slanders wherewith he falsely doth charge me. He saith, n Pag. 463. that his months work Disputation is not a revengement of an angry mind against me, (and of that he calleth God to witness) but a courteous admonition rather of a friend, and brother; and that patience, o Pag. 156. and contempt of wrong doth moderate the sharpness of his stile; and that he is not willing to provoke me to anger, and to requited me with railing speeches. And nevertheless his book, or rather infamous libel is so stuffed with railing speeches, that his very friends are ashamed of the spiteful bitterness of this man. For behold the admirable patience of this writer, behold the courteous admonition of a friend, and brother. Impiety, pride, flattery, and also heresy almost in every other page he layeth to my charge. Thou liest O Widdrington, thy lies O Widdrington are familiar to him, he often calleth me enemy of mankind, a wicked man, a blasphemer, a profane Idolater of the Civil state, impious Apologist, impious flatterer, full of Caluin, and Luther, the vicar of Hell, and impious heretic is frequent in his mouth, and divers other reproachful speeches he is often times pleased to bestow upon me. But if this Doctor, when he is patiented, not angry, a contemner of injury, my friend and also loving brother could belch up such soul, and spiteful nicknames, what bitter, and venomous speeches, I pray you, if he had been angry, would he have cast out against me from his raging stomach? But I pity the weak judgement of this man, of what a weak judgement he is this his book doth plainly show, whereof also certain Doctors of Douai have given sufficient testimony, who for that cause would not permit, that his book should be printed at Douai with public approbation. His spiteful speeches do nothing hurt me, nor profit his cause; doubtless they do great harm to his own conscience. But in this he doth me exceeding great wrong, (and thereof I call God to be a witness, and revenger against him) in shameful affirming, that I conspired to take away his life. First of all, saith he, thou beginnest a tragedy against me which should have gloriously ended with my blood, if it had succeeded according to thy desire. God is my witness, that this is most false, which he chargeth me withal. For I never, I call the same God to witness, did even in thought plot any thing against the person of this man, neither did I ever wish to him any thing worse than to myself. That also which he saith, that I upon spleen against the Jesuits, wrote my Apology for the rightful power of Princes, and that he by private letters did admonish me of my impiety, and heresy, is most untrue; For neither upon any spleen against the Jesuits, whose Order I do reverence with all dutiful respect, whom this Doctor having now with the air changed also his mind, doth in his book egregiously flatter, I was moved to writ my apology; This only did very much dislike me, and which at the first caused me to writ, that some of these Religious men did so stiffly cleave to their own opinions, that they would needs have them to be followed by all Catholics to the exceeding scandal of the Church, and to the great temporal prejudice of our English Catholics. Neither did this Doctor sand his letters to me, or imagined that they should come to my hands, but by chance by means of a friend of mine I came to a sight of them. And verily, if both in the Western, and Northern parts of this Land it had not been reported by many, that a Doctor of Divinity had excellently confuted my Apology, and showed most clearly, that many heretical propositions were, forsooth, therein contained, I would never have answered such an idle Pamphlet. But seeing that he secretly, and treacherously accusing me of heresy, and Paganism did first assault me, the most just law of nature giveth me leave to have care of my credit and good name, in a matter of such moment as is the falling into heresy, and to free myself by lawful means from such a foul imputation. And if he in assaulting me hath by the blameless defending of my innocency received any scar, let him not attribute the same to my just defence, but to his wrongful setting upon me, who hath prepared for himself a pitfall, wherein be might be caught. I am a Catholic, and a child of the Catholic Roman Church; and if any man of what degree soever he be, shall wrongfully accuse me of heresy, let him know assuredly, that by the assistance of almighty God, I will by all those means, which God, and nature hath granted to innocent men to defend themselves, to the uttermost of my power clear myself of those slanders, until the Church being perfectly informed of my opinion, shall in plain, and particular words, (for no man can recall errors, unless he know particularly what they be) condemn the same. 9 The third thing, which I would admonish thee of (courteous Reader) is, that when this present Disputation was in the Press, I had a sight of the Apologetical Disputation of Leonard Lessius, wherein I found an objection alleged by him to impugn the Oath, which his English Recapitulator (fearing perchance that it would not be pleasing to our English Catholics) did make no mention thereof, whereas of the rest of Lessius his arguments against the said Oath, he doth not so much make an Abridgement, or Recapitulation, but rather relate them word by word. This Lessius therefore affirmeth, that the Kings of England are Feudaries to the Pope, and hold their Kingdom of the Pope as it were in free-farme, and consequently that no man can lawfully swear, that the Pope in no case whatsoever hath power to depose the King. And this objection, saith Lessius, he never saw well answered. The same exception also, although not in express words, yet in very deed is taken by Martin Becanus, who although in his English Controversy set forth by him this last year, he doth expressly affirm, p Pag. 102. that it is certain to him, that all the parts of the Oath are not false, if they be well declared: For these be true, 1. That King james is lawful King of England, Scotland, Ireland. 2. That in the same Kingdoms he is Sovereign, or supreme Lord in temporals; yet in the same his English Controversy corrected, and set forth by him again this present year, q For his former Edition was censured at Rome by a special command of his Holiness, as in the Censure it is expressed. he affirmeth with Cardinal Bellarmine, that the Kings of England are Feudaries to the Pope. And therefore whereas before he did writ, that it is certain to him, that King james is Sovereign Lord in temporals, now in his corrected Edition he leaveth out this word (Sovereign) or supreme, and only saith, that King james is Lord in temporals. 10. But to this objection Sir Thomas Moore once Lord Chancellor of England, whose authority both for his singular learning, and particular devotion to the See Apostolic is greatly to be regarded, doth very well answer r In the Supplication of souls, pag, 296 in these words. If he (the Author of the beggars Supplication) say, as indeed some writers say, that King john made England, and Ireland tributary to the Pope, and the See Apostolic by the grant of a thousand marks: we dare surely say again, that it is untrue; and that all Rome neither can show such a grant, nor never could, and if they could, it were nothing worth: For never could any King of England give away the Realm to the Pope, or make the land tributary, though he would. Seeing therefore that no King hath power to give his Kingdom to an other man without the consent of the Kingdom, which comprehendeth not only the Barons, but also the commonalty, neither doth Cardinal Bellarmine, or Becanus allege any one writer, who affirmeth that the commonalty consented to this gift, or donation of King john, or of any other King whatsoever, if that may be called a gift, which was not freely given, but rather extorted through fear (for Pope Innocent, as Matthew Paris s In the life of King john: the year of our Lord, 1212. and 1213. relateth, would not absolve, or make peace with King john, who was excommunicated, and forsaken almost by the whole Kingdom, and was by the King of France brought into great distress, unless he would resign his Kingdom into the Pope's hands: wherefore King john (as Matthew Paris saith t The year 1213. ) being brought into despair, did condescend to the persuasions of Pandulfus the Pope's Legate, and did grant not without grief the underwritten form of peace) I do not perceive, how the aforesaid objection doth sufficiently prove, either the kingdom of England to be tributary to the Pope, and the King to be his feudary, although we should also admit, that the King did give the Kingdom to the Pope by the consent of his Barons, or that the English Catholics may not probably persuade themselves, and this their persuasion confirm by Oath, that King james, and not the Pope is their Sovereign Lord in temporals, and that the Pope hath not by reason of this Sovereignty or supreme dominion in temporals any power to depose the King. 11. To conclude, I would gladly, that Becanus would sincerely declare unto us, for what cause he in his new corrected English Controversy, was moved to put out that word (lawful King) whereof in his former Edition he made no scruple, but was certain thereof. This very last year Becanus was certain, that King james is lawful King of England, and that he is Sovereign or supreme Lord of this Kingdom in temporals. This year it is lawful for us English men, according to Becanus opinion, to acknowledge King james to be King of England, but not lawful King, to be our Lord in temporals, but now our Sovereign Lord. What manner of Allegiance we may according to his opinion make the next year, seeing that certainties do so easily become to him uncertainties, we cannot know as yet. In very truth I am sorry, that such and so learned men do in a matter of so great importance upon slight reasons so easily change their opinions, and do by their inconstancy, and mutability seek to bring us English Catholics into so great calamities. And whether necessity compelleth us to oppose ourselves with all our might against this kind of doctrine, which especially here in England is both very scandalous to the Catholic Religion, and greatly prejudicial to the temporal estate of us English Catholics, I remit to the judgement of any indifferent man, who is both well affected to the See apostolic, and also to the King's Majesty. 12. The fourth and last thing, whereof I would admonish thee, is, that when the printing of this Disputation was almost fully finished, there was sent unto me an English book printed but lately, and entitled, A Supplement to the discourse of Master Doctor Barlowes Answer, etc. composed by F. T. Wherein this Author in the two first chapters maketh a long discourse to prove, that this Oath of Allegiance is altogether unlawful, and cannot with a safe conscience be taken by any Catholic. And this is the sum and substance of his whole Discourse. First of all he supposeth that in this Oath is denied the Pope's power not only to depose, but also to excommunicate Princes, if they shall deserve it, and the safety of souls shall necessarily require it. From whence he afterwards u Pag. 66. nu. 117. concludeth, that although the Oath doth not expressly affirm, the King's Majesty to be the supreme head of the English Church, nor in plain words deny the Pope so to be; yet it supposeth, and implieth both the one, and the other; and thereupon denieth the Pope's authority to excommunicate, and depose a temporal Prince. And howsoever the matter be otherwise coloured, it is evident enough, that the true reason, for which the said authority of the Pope is impugned in the Oath, is no other, but because the King's Majesty is held to be no way subject to the Pope, yea and to be himself supreme head of the Church of God in England. This being supposed, this Author endeavoureth to prove the Oath to be repugnant to the law of God, of nature, of Nations, to the Civil, and Canonical law. 13. Out of the old Testament he produceth that saying of Deuteron. 17. Si difficile & ambiguum, etc. If thou foresee the judgement to be hard and ambiguous etc. rise and go up to the place which the Lord thy God shall choose, and thou shalt come to the Priests of the Levites stock, and to the judge that shall be for the time, etc. And if any shall be so proud as not to obey the commandment of the Priest, that shall for that time minister unto the Lord thy God, by the sentence of the judge let that man die, etc. So that it belonged to the High Priest absolutely, to command the judge to give sentence of death against the transgressions of his commandment. Therefore the same authority have also the High Priests in the new Testament. He bringeth also out of the old Testament, certain other particular facts of Priests, and Kings to prove the same. Out of the new Testament he allegeth that saying of our Saviour to Saint Peter, whatsoever thou shalt lose, etc. Feed my sheep, the kill of Ananias, and Saphira, and some other such like examples. Out of the law of nature he showeth, x Nu. 69. that in all Societies an inferior is subject to the Superior, the less perfect to the more perfect, as the wife to the husband, the servant to his Lord, the scholar to his Master, the subject to his Prince, policy to Religion, temporals to spirituals, and he that hath care of temporals to him who is Superior in spirituals, and so the Common wealth must be subject to the Church. Out of the law of Nations he showeth, y Nu. 77. that in all Common wealths, even among the paynims, the Religious Society had the pre-eminence above the Common wealtb in all things that any way appertained to Religion. Out of the civil law he bringeth many Constitutions of Emperors, and the Statute laws also of this Kingdom to prove the Pope's Primacy in spirituals. And finally in the second chapter he only allegeth that decree of the Council of Lateran, which hath been so often urged, and answered. This is the substance and summary of his discourse. 14. But first of all, who knoweth not, but that one inconvenience being granted, many absurdities do presently follow, The Supposition of this Author for so much as concerneth the Pope's power to excommunicate Princes and his Primacy in spirituals, to wit, that they are denied in this Oath, as this Author supposeth as manifest, but proveth it with no reason at all, is very untrue, as in this Disputation we have abundantly showed. And verily it is exceeding strange, that learned men should not blush to affirm, with such confidence, that to be his majesties intention and meaning which he himself in public writings doth expressly profess not to be his meaning, and so often to inculcate without any proof that very argument, which both his Majesty himself, and many others have oftentimes very sufficiently confuted. 15. Secondly, how vain that consequence is, which this Author doth infer z Pag. 67. from that maxim of the Lawyers, Accessorium sequitur principale, The accessory followeth the principal, therefore the Church having power over the soul, hath consequently power over our bodies, and goods, unless it be understood of power to command corporal things, as they are referred to spirituals, every man of learning may easily perceive. For out of this principle we might also argue in this manner: The accessory followeth the principal, therefore he that is Lord of all horses, must be Lord of all bridles: The Pope hath power over the souls of Kings, therefore also over their lives. Let this Author explain unto us, what the Lawyers do understand by this word (accessory,) and what by this word (principal) in this their vulgar maxim, which hath many limitations, and by divers learned men, is diversly understood; in the mean time we deny his consequence. The like argument Lessius a In his Apologetical Disputation pag. 201. doth make: The Pope, saith he, hath power to excommunicate Kings, therefore he hath power to depose them; because he that can punish with a greater punishment, can also punish with a less. But if we may rightly argue from one thing to another which is of a divers nature, condition, and degree, we may also conclude thus: The Pope hath power to excommunicate Kings, therefore he hath also power to kill them; because he that hath power to do the greater, hath power to do the less b And that excommunication is a greater punishment, then corporal death, Cardinal Bellarmine expressly affirmeth lib. 3. de Ecclesia. cap. 6. & lib. 3. de Laicis cap. 21. and citeth for it Saint Augustine lib. 1. contra Aduersarium legis, & prophet cap. 17. as I observed in my Apology nu. 183. . A man hath power to understand, therefore also to fly. A Priest, who is no Bishop, hath power to absolute from sins, therefore also from debts. The same Priest hath by the means of the Sacraments power, to give the Kingdom of heaven, therefore also earthly Kingdoms. Be not these I beseech you, very fair arguments to persuade English Catholics to cast away all their goods, and to deny their dutiful allegiance to their Prince? 16. Thirdly, it is untrue which this Author affirmeth, that the doctrine concerning the Pope's power to depose Princes is in this Oath plainly abjured as impious and heretical: For only this doctrine is in this Oath abjured as impious, and heretical, that Princes which be excommunicated, or deprived by the Pope may be deposed, or murdered by their Subjects or any other whatsoever. Which position, as we will declare beneath, is according to the common sense of the words so to be understood, that it is in the free power of the Subjects, or any other whatsoever to depose, or if they will, to murder Princes, which he excommunicated, or deprived by the Pope, and therefore it may worthily be abjured as heretical. 17. Fourthly, whosoever will attentively read the discourse of this Author, will most clearly perceive, that he doth not forcibly prove any other thing from the law of God, or nature, then that the temporal power is in spirituals, and in temporals, as they become spirituals subject to the spiritual power of the Church to command, but not to punish by way of coercion c I said by way of coercion for the Church as I have often repeated in my Apology, and Apologetical Answer hath power to impose a temporal punishment by way of command if it be necessary for our soul's health, but not by way of coercion. So that if we will not obey the command of the Church imposing such a temporal punishment, she can only for our disobedience punish us finally with spiritual punishments, as by inflicting spiritual Censures, but not by depriving us of our lands, or lives. with temporal punishments, but only with spiritual. And so the light of reason doth teach us, that every Superior may chastise him who in subjection is his inferior with some punishments, to wit, which are proportionable to his Superiority, d As a Master may punish his scholar with whipping him, or expelling him his school, a father the son in like manner and by disheriting him, and thrusting him out of his family, a husband his wife almost in like manner, and so the spiritual Common wealth with spiritual, and the temporal with temporal punishments. that is, by depriving him of those goods, and privileges, which are proper to that community, whereof he is Superior; But that any Superior besides the supreme Governor of the Civil Commonwealth hath power to punish his inferiors, with punishment of death, depriving of any corporal member or of all temporal goods, cannot necessarily be deduced from the light of natural reason. 18. Fifthly, he that will diligently consider the under written sentences of Saint Augustine, and Cardinal Bellarmine will presently comprehend of what force is that text of Deuteronomie 17. e If this text had been a forcible argument to prove the Pope's power to dispose of temporals, doubtless it would not have been omitted by Cardinal Bellarmine in his Controversies, where he bringeth other places of the old Testament to the same purpose, which I have in my Apology answered. and other such like places of the old Testament, which is a figure of the new, to prove that the Pope hath power to depose, or kill Princes, because the High Priest of the old law had that power, although we should admit, which cannot be sufficiently proved, (as hereafter, God willing, we will show more at large) that the High Priest had that authority. Excommunication, saith Cardinal Bellarmine, f Lib. 2. de Ecclesia. cap 6. is now in the Church in steed of corporal death, which was in the old Testament, and which a common wealth hath in temporals. And Saint Augustine, g q. 39 in Deuteron. Excommunication doth now this in the Church, which killing did in the old Testament. In which place he compareth that saying of Deuteronomie cap. 24. He shall be slain, and thou shalt take away evil from among you, with that saying of the Apostle, 1. Cor. 5. Take away evil from among yourselves. And in his book de fide & operibus cap. 2. he saith, that the material sword, which Moses, and Phinees did use, was a figure of the degradations, and excommunications, which are to be used in the new law, seeing that in the Church discipline, saith Saint Augustine, the visible sword was to cease. 19 Sixthly, those places of the new Testament, Whatsoever thou shalt lose, etc. Feed my sheep, also the reason which this Author allegeth out of Father Parsons, to wit, that otherwise the Ecclesiastical Commonwealth should be imperfect, and not sufficiently provided for, I have heretofore in my Apology h Nu. 35. & seq. & nu. 203. & seq. satisfied. That corporal kill of Ananias, and Saphira, and the visible delivering of the fornicator into the hands of Satan, are to be referred to the grace of miracles. Neither do I think this Author will affirm to be in the Pope's power to kill wicked men with his only word. 20. seventhly, from the law of Nations this Author proveth no other thing, then that all Nations had ever Religion in most great estimation, and that they preferred Religion before policy, but that the Priests of the Gentiles, as Priests, had power to punish any man with pain of death, or loss of all goods, this did not proceed from the law of nature granting to Priests such an authority, but from the private, and peculiar positive laws of every Nation. Which Cicero i Pro domo sua. cited by this Author doth most clearly confirm, saying, that it was most notably, and divinely ordained by the ancient Romans, that the Bishops should have the chief command in matters that appertained as well to the Commonwealth, as to the Religion of the Gods. Out of the Civil law, this Author doth only prove that the Pope is supreme head of the Church in spirituals. 21. Lastly, to that decree of the Council of Lateran, which is by our Adversaries so often inculcated, I have given divers Answers in the Preface of my Apologetical Answer, Nu. 43. which this Author doth dissemble. One only of them he doth briefly insinuate, and most slenderly confute, to wit, that by those men, who there are said, not to have principal Lords over them, are not understood Emperors, Kings, and absolute Princes, but other petty Lords, who are subject to Kings, and absolute Princes: for that Fridericke the Emperor in the fifth year after this Council of Laterane, did make the same law in the self same words, changing only spiritual punishments into temporal, who could not by the name of them, who have not principal Lords over them, understand himself, and other absolute Princes. From whence I probably collected, that those words (who hath not a principal Lord) could not of themselves comprehend Kings, and absolute Princes, who unless they are expressly named, are not to be understood in penal laws. And to say, as this Author barely, and without proof affirmeth, that the Emperor did not indeed by those words comprehend Kings, but the Pope did comprehend them, is to say, not to demonstrate: considering that if that Council would in that decree have comprehended absolute Princes, it might as easily have specified them by the proper and peculiar names of Kings, and absolute Princes, as by those general words of Principal Lords, or who have not principal Lords over them, especially seeing that the same Council in other Decrees did expressly use the peculiar names of Princes. 22. Therefore until any one shall clearly demonstrate, I do not say probably only show, that the Answers, which I have given to that Lateran Council, are altogether improbable, there can no forcible argument be drawn from that Council to prove evidently and invincibly, that the opinion which holdeth the Pope to have power to depose Princes, is so certain that the contrary cannot be defended by Catholics without note of heresy, error, or temerity. And let this suffice for this present to show the weakness of this Authors more long then discourse, for that it may be, that we will hereafter more exactly examine all his arguments in particular, and show the weakness of every one of them. 23. Lastly, this Author urgeth greatly certain words of Saint Chrysostome, which I thought expedient in this English Edition to examine, for that I understand some of our Countrymen have of late made great reckoning of those words, as though they were clear for the Pope's authority to depose Princes. This Author therefore endeavouring to prove out of the law of Moses, that the spiritual power was then the supreme power on earth and commanded all temporal authority, and consequently might chastise temporal Princes, (he meaneth with temporal punishments) when it was necessary for the glory of God, and the good of the Church, he bringeth k Cap. 1. nu. 31.34. the example of King Ozias, * 2. Paralip 26. (to which nevertheless I have fully answered in my Apology l Nu. 354. & seq. ) whom AZarias the high Priest m Azarias was not the high Priest as this Author imagineth, but only a weekly Priest with 80. others. Genebrard in his Chronologie the year of the world 3408. with the assistance of 80. Priests, most valiant men (saith the Scripture) because he presumed to offer incense, and would not obey his admonition but threatened him and the Priests, and was therefore stricken by almighty God with leprosy, did not only command him to departed out of the temple, saying Egredere de Sanctuario, etc. Go out of the Sanctuary, etc. but also thrust him out of the same, festinatò expulerunt eum, they thrust him out in haste, and was forced by the sentence of the Priests (according to the prescript of the law, n levit. 13. ) to live in a house a part so long as he lived. And I cannot omit, saith this Author, o Nu. 34. etc. to touch here by the way, what Saint Chrysostome p Hom. 4 de verbis. Isaiae Vidi dominum. observeth further in this example, to wit, that whereas OZias being leprous did not only devil in the City (though in a house a part) but also reign still for some years even until he died, he aught to have been cast both out of the City, and also out of his Kingdom, and that Almighty God was so highly offended, because the same was not performed, that he withdrew the spirit of prophecy from Esay, and other Prophets during the life and reign of OZias. 24. Exivit, saith Saint Chrysostome, cum lepra, etc. The King went out of the temple with a leprosy, and yet they did not cast him out of the City, for the respect they bore to the Kingly diadem, but he still sat in his throne breaking again the law of God: what then? God being angry with the jews interrupted the prophecy. So Saint Chrysostome: And again a little after, speaking in the person of God. Ego, (saith he) quod mei numeris feci, etc. I have done my part (that is to say, I have strucken Ozias with a leprosy) and you are afraid to cast him being unclean out of the City: you bear reverence to his Kingly dignity violating the law of God, etc. I do therefore speak no longer to the Prophets, neither do I any more give the grace of spirit, etc. Silet spiritus, etc. The grace of prophetical spirit was silent or ceased, and God did not show himself, because under that unclean man there was no grace. Thus saith Saint Chrysostome upon occasion of these words of the Prophet Esay, q Isai. 6. Et factum est anno quo mortuus est Ozias Rex, vidi Dominum, etc. For where as all the Prophets used to declare the time and year of the King's reign when they prophesied, Saint Chrysostome noteth, that Esay here omitted that custom, and did not speak of the life and reign of joathan, in whose time he had his vision, but of the death of King OZias, during whose reign the spirit of prophecy had ceased for the causes before declared. 25. Well then hereby it appeareth that God was offended, not only because Ozias was not cast out of the City, but also because he was suffered still to reign. Consedit in solio, saith the holy Father, legem Dei rursum transgrediens, he sat still in his throne transgressing again the law of God, that is to say, r This (that is to say) of this Author as against that which Saint Chrysostome saith in this place. as he had broken the law of God before, in presuming to sacrifice, and threatening the Priests; so also did he again transgress, and violate the same in retaining his Kingdom being Leprous: and because the same was permitted, and more respect borne to his Kingly dignity, then to the execution of God's law, therefore saith Saint Chrysostome, God punished the whole state not permitting his Prophets to prophecy, as they were wont. 26. Whereupon I infer, that seeing the express law of God ordained, that the cause of Leprosy should be judged and determined wholly by the Priests, and that Ozias was subject to this law, it followeth that as he was expelled out of the temple by the Priests and forced by their sentence to live in a house apart, (though within the City) so aught he also to have been by their sentence cast out both of the City, and of his Kingdom. And if we consider but only that which was done by the Priests in this case of OZias, it cannot be denied but that they had a judicial power over his person, seeing that they both commanded him to go out of the temple before he was leprous, and afterwards thrust him out, yea & confined him to live in a house apart. For though the Scripture doth not express, that his confining and separation was ordained by them, yet it could not be otherwise: seeing that the law ordained s levit. 13. expressly, that every leprous man should be brought unto the Priest, and that ad arbitrium eius separabitur, he should be separated at his judgement, or arbitrement, which our Saviour himself t Matth. 8. Marc. 1. Luc. 17. acknowledged, when he remitted the leprous (whom he cured) to the Priests. Thus writeth the Author of this Supplement. 27. But I wonder that this Author would urge so vehemently for himself the authority of S. Chrysostome, who in this very place is so plain against his doctrine. First therefore this Author affirmeth, that Azarias and the other Priests did not only command King Ozias to departed out of the temple, but they did also thrust him out of the same, meaning as it seemeth, as we say, by head and shoulders, and by laying violent hands upon him, whereas Saint Chrysostome in that very place seemeth to affirm, that they did not thrust him out by violence, but only by their words, and commandment, and crying out against him as an unclean person, Et egressus est Rex, saith Saint Chrysostome, omnibus exemplum factus, purgatumque est templum & erectus est nemine propellente, quique sacerdotium sibi vellet sumere, & hoc quod habebat perdidit: Et exivit è templo. And the King went forth being made an example to all, and the temple was purged, and he was cast forth no man driving him forth, and whereas he would arrogate to himself the Priesthood, he lost that which he had: And he departed out of the temple. And the reason why the Priests aught not to lay violent hands on the King's person, Saint Chrysostome did a little before give in these words. But the King did not abide the admonition of the Priest, but being puffed up with arrogancy opened the Temple, and entered into the Sanctuary to offer incense. But what did God? After the Priest was contemned, and the Priestly dignity trodden under foot, nec quicquam praeterea potuit Sacerdos (Nam sacerdotis tantum est arguere, etc. Neither could the Priest do any thing more (For it is the office of a Priest only to reprove, and to give a free admonition, not to raise arms, not to use targetts, not to shake a lance, nor to shoot arrows, nor to cast darts, but only to reprove and to give a free admonition.) After therefore the Priest had reproved, and yet the King did not yield, but took weapons, shields, and spears, and used his power, than the Priest said to God, I have done that which belonged to my office, I can do no more, help thou the Priesthood, which is trodden under foot, etc. Thus Saint Chrysostome. By which you may perceive, how far was the apprehension of Saint Chrysostome from those violent and bloody courses, which some vehement defenders of the Pope's power to depose and kill Princes u Suarez especially, as shall appears beneath in my Appendix against him in the last Sec. of the first part. See also beneath cap. 5. sec. 3. nu 4. etc. do affirm, may belong by the law of God to Priestly function. 28. Neither can this Author sufficiently prove, that it belonged to the Priests of the old law to thrust out by violence a leper out of the City, but only by command, and by declaring that he was a leper, which declaration did appertain only to the Priests by the express appointment of almighty God, but that the Priests, after they had declared one to be infected with leprosy, and had charged him to departed, and the people to put their command in execution according as the law did prescribe, had any further authority (as they were Priests) to cast him out by violence, cannot be convinced out of the old law. Even as in the new law it belongeth only to the Clergy to declare whether one be infected with heresy, which was figured in the old law by leprosy, but after they have declared one to be infected with heresy, and have used against him Ecclesiastical Censures, and have delivered him to the Secular Magistrate, commanding or requesting him to proceed according to the equity of the law, they have no further power, (as they are Clergy men) to use any corporal violence against him, and if it shall please the temporal Prince to pardon his life, the Clergy cannot take it away, as out of Dominicus Bannes x Cap 7. sec. 2. nu. 17. in the end. I will show beneath. 29. Secondly, that other saying of this Author, to wit, that according to Saint Chrysostome God was offended not only because Ozias was not cast out of the City, but also because he was suffered still to reign, is also contrary to Saint Chrysostom's words, which have been related by this Author. And in the very next homile Saint Chrysostome declareth the whole matter more particularly in these words: I will only add one thing, saith he, y Hom. 5. de verbis Isaiae. which we demanded in the beginning, what is the cause, that seeing in prophecies all are wont to set down the time, wherein the Kings did reign, this Prophet Esay omitting that nameth the time, wherein OZias died, speaking in this manner, And it came to pass in the year wherein King Ozias died. And yet he might have expressed the time of the King, as all prophets usually did. But he did not so: For what cause did he not so? It was an ancient custom to cast a leprous out of the City, to the end that those who lived in the City might be the better, and that the leprous himself should not present to men, prove to give reproachful speeches an occasion of scoffing and derision: but that he abiding out of the city might have solitariness to be in steed of a vail, or cover, against the reproach of calamity. And this aught this King to have suffered after his leprosy, but he did not suffer it, those that were in the City reverencing him for his Sovereignty: but he remained at his house privately. This provoked God to wrath, this hindered the prophecy, and which came to pass in the time of Hely the word of God was precious, neither was there any commanding vision. Thus Saint Chrysostome, whereby it is manifest, that Saint Chrysostome doth not affirm, that God was offended, that Ozias was thrust out of his Kingdom, but only that he was not thrust out of the City, according as the law in Leviticus did ordain. 30. Wherefore the meaning of those former words of Saint Chrysostome, he sat in his throne breaking again the law of God, is clear by these later which I did now relate. For as before he being no Priest transgressed by presuming to offer incense, so now again he being leprous transgresseth by presuming to remain in the City, which the law did forbidden. Also this Author may perchance use some cunning in translating those words of Saint Chrysostome, Consedit in solio legem Dei rursum transgrediens, He sat still in this throne breaking again the law of God, as though Ozias had offended again by remaining still in his throne, or continuing to be King; wherefore this word still may be equivocal, and of purpose put by this Author to signify the sense aforesaid, whereas the words of Saint Chrysostome are only, He sat in this throne breaking again the law of God; not for that he sat in his throne, or which is all one, kept still his Royal dignity, although his son Ioa●han did administer it in his name, but for that he departed not out of the City, as Saint Chrysostome expressly declareth. 31. Now concerning the example itself of King Ozias, who for his leprosy was cast out of the temple, and perchance also out of the City, which Cardinal Bellarmine brought to prove that the Pope hath authority to depose Princes, I have in my Apology answered at large, neither hath Doctor Schulckenius, as hereafter, God willing, I will plainly show, convinced those answers to be improbable. The argument which Cardinal Bellarmine brought was in substance this: The Priests of the old law had authority to thrust a leper, who doth in the new law signify an heretic, out of the temple and out of the City, yea and if he were a King to deprive him of his Kingdom, or at leastwise of the administration thereof, as appeareth by this example of King Ozias, therefore the Priests of the new Testament have authority to deprive heretical Kings of their Kingdoms, or at lest wise to suspend them from the administration thereof. 32. Among other sufficient answers, which I gave to this argument, I denied the consequence; to wit, that although the Priests of the old Testament had authority to deprive a King, being infected with leprosy, of the administration of his Kingdom, so long as he remained a leper, (for that I do not think it to be scarce probable that they had authority to deprive him wholly of his Regal authority,) nevertheless it doth not therefore follow, that the Priests of the new law have the like authority. My reason was, for that the Priests of the old Testament had by the special law of God authority granted to judge and determine when any man was infected with leprosy, and withal there was a peculiar punishment appointed by the law against those who were infected with leprosy, to wit, that they should live extra castra out of the camp, that is, a part from the rest, (for then the Isralites were as an army of men marching forwards day by day, in the desert For if it should be so, that a King living out of the City, could not possibly govern his Kingdom, and in the old Testament Kings being infected with leprosy were by the law of God compelled to live out of the City, it followeth necessarily, that God gave leave to the Priests or to the people to deprive a leprous King, or to declare him deprived of the government of his Kingdom, so long as he remained a leper: But the Priests in the new Testament have doubtless authority given them by Christ to judge, determine and decide, what is heresy, and who is infected therewith, and also to punish with Excommunication and other Ecclesiastical punishments any one who is infected with heresy, which punishment of Excommunication (which as Suarez z Tom. 5. disp. 1. sec. 4. defineth it, is an Ecclesiastical Censure, whereby one is deprived of the Ecclesiastical communion of the faithful) was figured by that separation of the leper from the company of those who were in the camp: yet because the depriving a King of the administration of his Kingdom doth not by the law of God follow the sentence of Excommunication, which by the law of God only depriveth of Ecclesiastical communion, as in the old Testament it did follow the living of a King out of the City, and a part from the rest of the people, as our Adversaries do suppose, this example of King Ozias is of little worth to prove the Pope's power to depose heretical Princes. 33. Finally I cannot but observe, how well forsooth this Author, who is so vehement against the Oath, and for the Pope's power to depose Princes, doth agreed with Cardinal Bellarmine in urging this argument, which is taken from the example of King Ozias; For Cardinal Bellarmine affirmeth, that King Ozias was thrust out both of the City, and also deprived of his Kingdom, this Author averreth, that he was neither thrust out of the City nor out of his Kingdom: Others, as Abulensis, a Nurse 4. Reg. cap. 15. q. 4. do affirm that he lived indeed out of the City, wherein josephus also doth agreed, b Lib. 9 Antiquitat. cap. 11. A great Historiographer of the jews, and living before jerusalem was destroyed by the Romans, and therefore it is likely that he know all the particular facts of those Kings. So writeth Abulens. q. 9 in 15. cap. lib. 10. Regum. but not deprived of his Kingdom, but that he remained still true King not only in name but also by right, although by reason of his infirmity his son joathan did in his father's name and by his authority govern it: and reason doth confirm the same, for the depriving of dominion, as well observeth Suarez, when it is done, doth always continued, but King Ozias was only to live out of the City for the time of his leprosy, so that if he had been cured, he might have returned again to his palace within the City, and consequently to the government of his Kingdom, and therefore he could not be deprived of his Regal authority, but at the most as it were suspended, for the time of his leprosy, c Disp. 15. de Excommun. sec. 6. nu. 3. from executing thereof, neither is it strange, that a man may have right or dominion of a Kingdom, which he cannot govern as appeareth in children, who may be true Kings, although they cannot govern it. A Summarie of this whole Disputation. Chapter 1. Wherein certain general rules are prescribed out of the doctrine of Franciscus Suarez to understand how we are to interpret the words of any law. Chap 2. Wherein two arguments of jacobus Gretzer, and Leonardus Lessius, against the first branch of the Oath from the beginning to those words, And that the Pope etc. are examined. Chap. 3. Wherein five objections of Cardinal Bellarmine, Gretzer, Lessius, Becanus, Suarez, and of others against the second branch of the Oath, And that the Pope etc. to those words, And also I do swear from my heart etc. are at large discussed. Chap. 4 Wherein three arguments of Cardinal Bell. Gretzer, Lessius, Capellus, and of others against the third branch of the Oath, Also I do swear from my heart etc. to those words, And I do further swear etc. are propounded and solved. Chap. 5. Wherein three objections of Lessius, Capellus, and of others against the fourth branch of the Oath, And I do further swear etc. to those words. And I do believe etc. are answered. Chap. 6. Wherein five arguments of Cardinal Bell. Gretzer, Capellus, & of others against the fift branch of the Oath, And I do believe etc. unto those words: which I acknowledge by good etc. are satisfied. Chap. 7. Wherein five objections of Gretzer, Lessius & of others against the sixth branch of the Oath, which I acknowledge by good, unto those words, And all these things I do plainly etc. are thoroughly debated Chap. 8. Wherein two arguments of Lessius, & of others against the seventh branch of the Oath, And all these things I do plainly etc. unto those words, And I do make this recognition etc. are discussed. Chap 9 Wherein one objection of Father Parsons against the last branch of the Oath, And I do make this recognition etc. unto the end, is most clearly answered. Chap. 10. Wherein five arguments of Cardinal Bell. Lessius, and of others taken from the title of the Act, from the Pope's Breves and the authority of the Divines of these times, from the scandal, from the bad success of those Priests who have maintained the Oath, and from a certain Revelation to impugn in general the Oath, are at large examined Then followeth an Appendix wherein all the arguments, which Franciscus Suarez hath of late brought to prove the Pope's power to depose Princes, and to impugn the Oath of allegiance are sincerely related and answered. Lastly, there is adjoined the Preface to Widdrington's Apologetical answer, wherein he cleareth himself from four heinous crimes, heresy, error, scandal, & temerity, wherewith some have wrongfully charged his Apology which he wrote against Cardinal Bell. his reasons to prove the Pope's power to depose Princes. THE FORM OF THE OATH DIVIDED INTO EIGHT branches in that manner as it is treated of in this Disputation. 1. I A. B. do truly and sincerely acknowledge, profess, testify and declare in my conscience before God and the world, that our Sovereign Lord King james is lawful and rightful King of this Realm, and of all other his majesties Dominions and Countries pag. 13. 2. And that the Pope neither of himself, nor by any authority of the Church or Sea of Rome, or by any other means with any other, hath any power or authority to depose the King, or to dispose any of his majesties Kingdoms or Dominions, or to authorize any foreign Prince to invade or annoyed him, or his Countries, or to discharge any of his Subjects of their Allegiance and obedience to his Majesty, or to give licence or leave to any of them to bear Arms, raise tumult, or to offer any violence, or hurt to his majesties Royal person, State, or government, or to any of his majesties Subjects within his majesties Dominions. pag. 19 3. Also I do swear from my heart, that notwithstanding any declaration or sentence of Excommunication or deprivation made or granted, or to be made or granted by the Pope or his Successors, or by any Authority derived or pretended to be derived from him or his Sea against the said King, his Heirs or Successors, or any absolution of the said Subjects from their obedience: I will bear faith and true allegiance to his Majesty, his Heirs and Successors, and him and them will defend to the uttermost of my power against all Conspiracies and attempts whatsoever, which shall be made against his or their Persons, their Crown and dignity, by reason or colour of any such sentence or declaration or otherwise, and will do my best endeavour to disclose and make known unto his Majesty, his Heirs and Successors, all Treasons and Traitorous Conspiracies, which I shall know or hear of to be against him or any of them. pag. 52. 4. And I do further swear, That I do from my heart abhor, detest, and abjure, as impious and heretical, this damnable doctrine and position, That Princes which be excommunicated or deprived by the Pope, may be deposed or murdered by their Subjects, or any other whatsoever. pag. 68 5. And I do believe and in conscience am resolved, that neither the Pope nor any person whatsoever, hath power to absolve me of this Oath, or any part thereof. pag. ●8. 6. Which I acknowledge by good and full authority to be lawfully ministered unto me, and do renounce all pardons and dispensations to the contrary, pag. 128. 7. And all these things I do plainly and sincerely acknowledge and swear, according to these express words by me spoken, and according to the plain and common sense and understanding of the same words, without any Equivocation, or mental evasion, or secret reservation whatsoever. pag. 154. 8. And I do make this recognition and acknowledgement hearty, willingly, and truly, upon the true faith of a Christian. So help me God. pag. 160. A THEOLOGICAL DISPUTATION concerning the Oath of Allegiance. THis whole disputation we will for more perspicuity divide into ten several Chapters. In the first, we will set down certain general rules, which shall be very profitable for the better understanding of any law, and consequently of this Oath, which his Majesty by Act of Parliament hath enacted. In the next eight chapters, we will sincerely examine all the objections, which are commonly alleged by the impugners of the Oath against any particular clause thereof, which oath we will divide into 8. branches. In the tenth, and last Chapter, we will faithfully discuss, and weigh all the arguments, which are usually objected against the oath in general. CHAP. I Sect. I 1 FIrst therefore Franciscus Suarez a most famous Divine of the Society of jesus, (whom in this we have rather chosen to follow then others, for that his authority, both in regard of his singular learning, and also of the religious course of life, which he professeth, will not be so easily rejected by the chief impugners of the oath) doth distinguish a Lib. 6 de Leg. cap. 1. nu. 1. three sorts of interpreting laws: to wit, an Authentical, Usual, and Doctrinal interpretation. Authentical he calleth that, which is done by the authority of him, who hath power to make the law, and who consequently hath also full power to interpret the same, and to declare the true meaning of every word therein contained, according to that Decree of justinian the Emperor, b Leg vlt. Cod. de Leg § Diffinimus. Diffinimus autem, etc. We define, that all interpretation of laws, which the Emperors make, is to be accounted firm, and certain. For if it be only at this present granted to the Emperor to enact laws, it is also only meet for the Imperial crown to interpret laws. The second interpretation, which is called usual, dependeth only upon common use, and custom, which, according to that vulgar axiom of the Lawyers, c Cap. cum dilectus de consuetud. & leg. si de interpretat. ff. de leg. is the best interpreter of laws. For as custom hath the force of a law, and therefore is commonly called a law not written, so also it hath power to interpret the true and proper meaning of the law. 2 The third kind of interpretation by way of doctrine is only grounded upon the judgement of men skilful in the laws. For seeing that such is the condition of man, that he can scarcely declare his mind with such perspicuous words, but that ambiguities, and doubts may oftentimes arise, especially in human laws, which are delivered briefly, and in general terms, therefore in the applying of them to divers cases in particular, many doubts do usually arise, for the deciding whereof (sith the Lawmaker is not always at hand to declare his meaning) the judgement of learned, and prudent men, and a doctrinal interpretation is necessarily required. From which necessity proceeded the science of the Civil law; whose true end is to deliver the true sense, and understanding of human laws; and which without all doubt is greatly to be regarded, for that in every art the judgement of men skilful therein is of great moment, and causeth at the lest no small probability; I said, at the lest, for if it should so fall out, that all Interpreters should agreed in the expounding of any law, it would 'cause then a moral certainty, and (speaking regularly) it would also induce an obligation to understand the law according to their interpretation. But to find out by a doctrinal interpretation, in what sense the words of any law are to be taken, the same Suarez, d Cap. 1. cit. nu. 7. following herein the common doctrine of Divines, and Lawyers, doth assign many general rules, wherein three principal heads, upon which the true interpretation of every law doth chief depend, are to be observed; to wit, the words of the law, the meaning of the Lawmaker, and the reason or end, for which the law is made. Sect. II. 1. AS concerning the words, we say, that in every human law the property of the words, that is, the proper signification of them is first of all to be regarded, for from it the true interpretation of the law is chief to be gathered, and which, if there be no other impediment, is always to be preferred, as may be deduced by many texts of the Canon e Extra de translat. Episcopi cap. 2. & in cap. ad audientiam de decimis. , and Civil law f Leg. Non aliter ff. de legate 3. leg 1. §. si is qui navem ff. de Exercitoria actione: & in leg prospexit ff. qui, & à quibus. . And the reason is manifest, because in common speech words are to be taken in their proper, and usual meaning, unless by some circumstance the contrary may be gathered, therefore much more this is to be observed in laws, which aught to be clear, and not exposed to circumventions, and false interpretations: for otherwise nothing could be certain in laws, neither could men's actions be ruled, and directed by them, for that every one might according to his pleasure wrist them to improper senses. And in regard of this rule the ancient Fathers, and Divines do teach, that the words of holy Scripture, and which do deliver any doctrine of faith, or precepts of manners, are to be taken in their proper sense, unless by circumstances, or otherwise the contrary may necessarily be gathered. 2. But if it chance, that any word of the law hath together many proper, and usual significations, than we must use that rule, which in all ambiguous, or equivocal speeches is wont prudently to be observed: to wit, that the matter of the law, with other circumstances, be diligently considered, for by them the meaning of the words will easily be determined. And especially we must consider the beginning of the law, and with it to join the rest which followeth, for to the beginning, if there be no obstacle all which followeth, is to be applied. For in the beginning of every constitution the final cause, and which doth chief move the Lawmaker, is usually contained, and therefore, according to the common doctrine of the Lawyers, that most of all is to be regarded to understand the meaning of the law. Wherefore it is necessary, that every man, before he deliver his judgement, how any equivocal word of the law is to be understood, to peruse diligently the whole law from the beginning to the end, according to that principle of the Civil law, Inciuile est, g Leg. Inciuile ff. de leg. etc. It is an uncivil part to give his judgement, or answer concerning any one particular clause of the law, unless the whole law be first perused. Therefore by the antecedents, and consequents, together with the matter, and other circumstances, the equivocal signification of any word is to be determined. But if the words of the law should be so equivocal, that neither by the antecedents, nor consequents, nor by the matter, or reason of the law, the determinate sense of the law could be known, than it were no law, because not only it were not clear, but also it should not sufficiently express the meaning of the Lawmaker. Nevertheless it can hardly fall out, but that one sense be more agreeable to the matter, which is handled, and that is to be preferred according to that rule of the law: h Leg. Quoties ff de Regulis jutis. Whensoever the same speech hath two senses, let that especially be taken, which is more agreeable to the matter, which is in hand. Sect. III. 1. SEcondly, i Suarez cap. 1. cit. nu. 12. concerning the intention, or will of the Lawmaker, it is to be considered, that as well the substance, as the force of the law doth chief depend thereon, because the will of the Lawmaker is the soul of the law; whereupon as in a living creature, both the substance, and operation of life doth principally depend on the soul, so in a law on the will of the Lawmaker. And therefore although the Lawmaker doth pronounce words, k Suarez lib. 3. de leg. cap. 20. which of themselves are sufficient to command, and with all other things externally requisite to the making of a law, if he have no intention to command, and to enact a law, he doth not enact it, neither is it a true law. And in this manner are rightly understood those assertions of the Civil law, Quod Principi placuit, l Instit de jure nature. gent & Civili §. Sedet. etc. That which pleaseth the Prince hath the force of a law: because the whole law dependeth upon his will, and pleasure. And, Non dubium est, m Leg. Non dubium Cod. de leg & leg. contra legem ff. de leg. etc. Without doubt he offendeth against the law, who following the words of the law doth against the will thereof; verily for that the will, or intention is the soul, and as it were, the substance of the law. Therefore that is the true interpretation of a law, by which we follow the intention, and will of the Lawmaker, whereupon if by any means the will of the Lawmaker can be known, according to it especially the law is to be interpreted. 2. Nevertheless, that which we have said, is not so to be understood, as though the only internal will of the Lawmaker considered by itself without words, can be a sufficient rule to interpret any law, both for that no man can understand another man's mind but by his words, and therefore the meaning of the law, which consisteth in words cannot be taken from the will of the Lawmaker, seeing that the will itself cannot be made manifest unto us but by words; as also for that a law is not enacted by the Princes will, unless by the words of the law it be sufficiently expressed, seeing that the will alone is not of itself sufficient to bind; neither also is it sufficient, that it be privately known by some other way, but it is necessary, that it be sufficiently contained in the law itself; p See Suarez lib. 3. de Leg. cap. 15. and therefore the Divines define a law, to be a sensible sign, whereby the commanding will of a Superior is made manifest. But what we have said, is so to be understood, that whereas the words of the law, being taken barely by themselves, be oftentimes ambiguous, and may proceed from divers intentions, and wills, therefore by the things to it annexed, to wit, by the matter, and circumstances it must prudently be gathered, from what will, and intention they did proceed, and then the signification, and interpretation of the words must be accommodated to the intention of the Lawmaker, whereupon the substance, and force of the law doth chief depend. Wherefore it is true, that men do judge of the mind of the speaker by his words, and that a law is not made by the internal will, unless it be in the law itself sufficiently expressed; for that a law, being a rule of human actions, having force to bind, (wherein it differeth from a council, or any other admonition, which hath not force to bind,) it must by words sufficiently expressed in the law be propounded to them, whom it intendeth to bind. Nevertheless, that words may sufficiently express the intention of the speaker, and the will of the Lawmaker, they are not to be taken severally, and barely by themselves, but they must, and aught by all circumstances annexed be determined rather to this, then to that signification. 3. But to understand, what means, and conjectures, besides the naked force of the words, are to be used q Suar. cap. 10. cit nu. 17. to find out the will of the Lawmaker, the Lawyers do assign many rules. And among the rest, (for, to set down all at this present were over tedious) the matter of the law is chief to be regarded, for the words must especially be agreeable to the matter, according to that saying of S Gregory, r Lib 1. epist. 28 ad Aristobulum, & habetur in cap. propterea, extra de verborum significat. Plerunque dum proprietas, etc. Oftentimes when one attendeth to the property of the words, he loseth the force of their meaning, or, as in the Decretals we read, he loseth the true meaning of them. Wherefore if at any time the words taken in their proper signification should argue any injustice, or like absurdity to be in the mind of the Lawmaker, they must be drawn to a sense although improper, wherein the law may be just, and reasonable; because this is presumed to be the will of the Lawmaker, as hath been declared by many laws in ff. tit. de legibus. Name in ambigua voce legis ait lex, s Leg. in ambigua ff. de legibus. etc. For in a doubtful word of the law, saith the law, that sense is rather to be chosen, which is voided of all default, especially seeing that, the will also of the law may be gathered by this. Because it aught not to be presumed, that the Lawmaker did intent to command any absurd, or inconvenient thing, unless the contrary do evidently appear. And this rule the ancient Fathers do observe in expounding the holy Scriptures, and the Divines in declaring the precepts of nature: for which cause those words of our Saviour, I am a door, I am a vine, I am a shepherd, are by them transferred to improper, and metaphorical senses; so also that precept, thou shalt not kill, is to be understood of unjust kill; and, thou shalt restore to every one his own, aught not to be extended to restore to a mad man his sword. 4. In like manner, a benign, and favourable interpretation, if there be no other let, is always to be preferred, according to that approved rule of the law, t Leg. Benignius ff. de legibus. Benigniùs leges, etc. Laws are to be interpreted in the more favourable sense, that thereby their will, or meaning, may be conserved. And if any word of the law hath two senses equally proper; or if the things be any way equally doubtful, in punishments, u Salas disp. 21 de leg. sect. 3. § Octava regula. as also in all odious matters we must follow the milder part. But in benefits, and favourable causes, which are usually contained in last Wills, and Testaments, the larger interpretation aught to be made, so that thereby no man be prejudiced, according to that saying of the Canon law, x De regulis Juris in Sexto. Odia restringi, favores convenit ampliari. It is meet, that odious things be restrained, and favours to be enlarged. In judgements, if the matter be doubtful, the person accused is rather to be favoured, than the plaintiff; the possessor, rather than the suitor, and doubtful speeches are to be taken in the better sense, and which is more profitable to the speaker. y Sa verbo interpretatio. nu. 1. In a general speech the person, who speaketh, is understood to be excepted, z Salas regula 22. & Sa nu. 14. and to conclude, In laws the diversity of words, doth argue diversity of things, for otherwise the law should superfluously use variety of words. a Salas regula 7. ex Azorio, & Panormit. leg. si ●d●m codicilli. Cod. de codicillis. Many other observations are set down by Divines, and Lawyers, which may be seen in joan. Azor. b Tom. 1. lib. 5. cap 16. q. 9 & seq. joan. de Salas, c Disp. 21. de leg. sect. 3. Franciscus Suarez. d Cap. 1. cit. & seq. and the Summists, verbo, Interpretatio, where Sylvester, Angelus, Tabiena, Sa, and others, who treat of laws. Sect. four 1. LAstly, concerning the reason, and end of the law, which was the third of those three heads before rehearsed, which aught to be observed to find out the true meaning of the law by a doctrinal interpretation, it is first of all to be supposed, e Suarez lib. 3. de leg. cap. 14. that there be two sorts of human laws to be distinguished: the one is called a constitutive law; the other a declarative; the diversity of which laws is sufficiently known by the words themselves. For a declarative law, as it is declarative, doth impose no new command, but doth only declare, what is commanded, or forbidden to be done by some former ancient law: but a constitutive law doth of itself impose a new command, and obligation: so that betwixt these laws there is this difference, that a constitutive law is a rule to guide, and direct human actions by, and therefore it is extended only to future actions, and not to such as are already past, which, for that they are already past, can have no rule to guide them by: but a declarative law of itself is no such rule, but it doth suppose, and declare a former rule, neither doth it make a new obligation, but it supposeth an obligation already made; and therefore it comprehendeth not only future actions, but such also as are already past: for whiles it declareth a former law, it also virtually declareth, that all those actions, which have, are, or shall be committed against that law, were, are, or shall be evil. But some laws there are, which in part are declarative, and in part constitutive, for that partly they declare a former obligation, and partly they impose a new; of which kind are all human laws, which under pain of death do forbidden thefts, murders, and such like villainies, which are already forbidden by the law of God, and nature; which in respect of the punishment newly imposed, are constitutive laws, but in regard of the offence, which was before against justice, they are only declarative. Wherefore according to the common opinion of Divines, he that committeth theft, doth not commit two sins, one against the law of God, and nature; and another against the Prince's law, unless the Prince should forbidden that unjust action upon a motive of some other virtue, for than it were two sins and not one only sin. And so the Church, or civil common wealth in honour and reverence of Religion forbidding to shed blood in consecrated Churches; or to steal Church goods, and which are dedicated to God's service, causeth those actions, which otherwise would be only repugnant to the virtue of justice, to be now sacrilegious, and opposed to the virtue of religion; in regard whereof they are rightly accounted constitutive laws: and so he that robbeth Churches consecrated to divine service, or doth in the same give any man a bloody wound, doth commit not only injustice, but also sacrilege. 2. This supposed, Suarez f Lib 3. de leg. cap. 20. affirmeth, that the end, or reason of the law is far different from the will, or intention thereof: for without all doubt in the mind of the Lawmaker these two are distinguished, to wit, his will, or intention, whereby he intendeth to command, or bind his subjects; and the reason, which moveth him to make that command. For the will, or intention of the Lawmaker, whereby he intendeth to command, doth give force to the law, and it is the intrinsical form, and soul of the law, as before hath been said, but the reason is only the end, which moveth the Lawmaker to enact the law, & is as it were the personal reason of the Lawmaker himself; neither doth it substantially compound a constitutive law: As for example, in the precept of fasting, the macerating of the body, or mortification, or satisfaction for ones sins, and such like, which may move the Lawmaker, are not of the substance of the law, neither of themselves are necessary to the constitution of such a law, whereupon the same law may be enacted without these motives, and by one Lawmaker it may be enacted for one motive, and by another Lawmaker for another motive, whereas the law is the very same. Yea sometimes the Lawmaker may be moved for some private, or unreasonable g By the Printers fault it is in Suarez reasonable. motive, and yet the law shall be of force, if in regard of the matter, and object it be reasonable. I said according to Suarez, that the reason of the law doth not substantially compound a constitutive law; because, as Suarez in the same place h Nu. 10. doth well observe, if the law doth only declare a former law of God, or nature, than it only dependeth upon the reason, or, which is all one, upon the precedent law, for from it all the obligation thereof doth proceed. 3. Wherefore the end, or reason i Suarez lib. 6. cap. 1. nu. 19 of a constitutive law doth not sufficiently contain the mind, or will of the Lawmaker, both for that the reason of the law is not the text of the law, as also for that many things are decreed by human laws, rather because so it pleaseth the Lawmaker, then for any certain reason; and therefore, as we read in the Digests, k Leg. Non omnium, ff. de leg. Non omnium, etc. There cannot be yielded a reason of all things, which have been decreed by our Ancestors. For although a law must always be agreeable to reason, nevertheless the choosing, or electing of those things, which are reasonable, is oftentimes without reason; for one may choose that thing, which is in very deed reasonable, not moved thereunto for a reasonable cause, but for some unhonest end; and therefore the reason, which moveth the Lawmaker, cannot always be known, according to that saying of the Civil law, l Leg. Et ideo, ff. de leg. Et ideo rationes eorum, etc. And therefore the reasons of those things, which are decreed, aught not to be examined, otherwise many things, which are certain, would be overthrown. Wherefore the sole reason of the law doth not contain the will of the Lawmaker, because he might according to his pleasure not conform himself to it in all things, but only so far forth as he would, and hath declared himself by his words. Nevertheless, if the reason of the law be known, as commonly it is expressed in the forefront of the law, it much availeth to find out the intention, and will of the Lawmaker, especially that reason, which is expressed in the law: for after the words themselves it seemeth to have the second place of certainty, for then the reason of the law is in some manner a part thereof; for it is contained, and supposed therein. Whereupon it is necessary, that the precept, and will of the Lawmaker be agreeable to his reason, and consequently that the words, which signify the act commanded, if they be ambiguous, be determined by the reason therein expressed. 4. And therefore that reason which is expressed in the law, is morally a sure means to find out the will of the Lawmaker, yet it is not so infallible, but that also other circumstances are to be regarded; for the sense, and meaning of the reason itself may sometimes be ambiguous, and by other circumstances be made more perspicuous, and certain. And it may also fall out, that for the same reason the will may be moved divers ways, and to divers things, and therefore to know fully the will, which is the proper mind of the Lawmaker, the sole reason expressed even in the law itself, doth not suffice, but all circumstances are to be weighed, and diligently to be considered. But that reason; which is not expressed in the law, but invented by Expositors, although it may somewhat avail to find out the will of the Lawmaker, yet it is not a certain token, but only a probable conjecture; both because the reason is not always certain, but controverted among Doctors, and also because it is much more uncertain, whether that was the reason, which moved the Lawmaker, seeing that there may be other reasons, for which he might be moved, and consequently it is uncertain, to what reason the true meaning of the law is more agreeable. Many other observations, which now to rehearse would be over tedious, are set down by Doctors, to know how by a doctrinal interpretation laws may sometimes be extended, sometimes restrained, but these, which we have taken out of Suarez almost word for word, will give no small light to the better understanding of the true meaning of the oath, whereof we now do treat. CHAP. II. The first branch of the Oath. I A. B. do truly, and sincerely acknowledge, profess, testify, and declare in my conscience before God, and the world; That our Sovereign Lord King JAMES is lawful, and rightful King of this Realm, and of all other his majesties Dominions, and Countries. Sect. I 1. AGainst this branch two objections especially are usually made. And first jacobus Gretzer, a In Comment. Exeget. cap. 6. pag. 103. a famous Divine of the Society of jesus, doth against this clause [our Sovereign Lord] object in this manner. Whosoever affirmeth that King james, and not the Pope is supreme head of the Christians in great Britanny even in Ecclesiastical, and spiritual matters; denieth the Catholic faith; But he, that taketh the oath prescribed by King james, affirmeth that King james and not the Pope is supreme head of great Britanny even in spirituals, therefore he denieth the Catholic faith. The Minor I prove: because in the beginning of the oath he professeth, testifieth, and declareth swearing in his conscience before God, and the world, that King james is his Sovereign Lord, but according to the common use, and practise of England, this Sovereign Lordship, or Supreme dominion is referred not only to the Supreme civil, but also to the spiritual, and Ecclesiastical; for it is treason to deny or not to grant to the King this spiritual Supremacy. 2. To this objection it is answered by denying the Minor proposition. For first of all, although his majesties Subjects, according to the present laws of this kingdom, are sometimes under grievous punishments compelled to swear, that our most Noble Prince King james is Supreme Governor of this Kingdom as well in causes Ecclesiastical, as in temporal, nevertheless they are not compelled to acknowledge the aforesaid King's Supremacy, by virtue of his oath of Allegiance, whereof now we treat, but by virtue of another oath, commonly called, the oath of Supremacy. And therefore although this word Lord, or Dominus, may signify in general as well a spiritual, as a temporal Lord, yet when it is spoken of a temporal Lord, and its an oath of temporal Allegiance, it aught in common speech, and understanding, to which in this oath we are tied, to be limited by the matter, which is handled, and other circumstances annexed, according to the rules before b Cap. 1. sect. 2. related, to signify only a temporal Lord, or a Lord in temporal affairs. 3. Besides, if we must needs scan so strictly every word of the oath, first, in the oath itself of Supremacy, whereon Gretzer groundeth his objection, these words [Sovereign Lord are not so much as named, but only [Supreme Governor] that hereby it may appear, what a severe Censor Gretzer is, to condemn so rashly, and upon so weak a ground, for these words forsooth [our Sovereign Lord] this oath of Allegiance, as containing a manifest denial of the Catholic faith. 4. Secondly, sith that Gretzer will be so rigorous a Censor, that proposition, which he supposeth to prove his Minor, is also false. For I do not in this branch of the oath profess, testify, and declare swearing, that King james is our Sovereign Lord, as Gretzer doth falsely affirm, for so Sovereign Lord should be the predicate, and not the subject of the proposition, whereas true, and lawful King is the predicate, or, which is all one, is affirmed of our Sovereign Lord King James. 5. True indeed it is, that in this branch of the oath, we call King james our Sovereign Lord, by which name all Kings, what Religion soever they profess, are usually called by their Subjects, yet, if we will speak strictly, and in rigour, we do not in this branch properly affirm, or swear, as Gretzer feigneth, that King james is our Sovereign Lord (although we might truly, and lawfully swear the same:) but we do only here affirm, and swear, that our Sovereign Lord King james is lawful, and rightful King of this Kingdom. Now who seethe not, that betwixt bore calling, and swearing there is a great distinction? For jews, Infidels, or Heretics, who especially are subject to the Pope in temporals, will not be much afraid, if cause require, to call him their most holy Lord, because this name, or title is given him by all men; but to profess, affirm, and swear, that he is a most holy Lord, or, which is all one, that he is truly so called, they will perchance stand in some fear. As also those, who so vehemently impugn this oath, will not stick perchance to call it the oath of Allegiance, seeing that commonly it is so called, yet to profess, testify, and by oath affirm, that it is truly, and in very deed an oath of allegiance, as it is usually called, without doubt they will not adventure. Neither is this, which we now have said, for that cause affirmed by us, as though we do think it lawful, to call King james our Sovereign Lord, but not to acknowledge by oath, that he is our Sovereign Lord; but only to show how idly Gretzer from those words, our Sovereign Lord, doth take occasion to impugn this oath, as repugnant to Catholic faith. 6. If perhaps Gretzer had dedicated this his exegetical Commentary to King james, who now reigneth in great Britanny, (as he hath consecrated the same to his most holy mother, who now reigneth with Christ in heaven) he would greatly have feared to have called him most potent Lord, as he calleth him sometimes most potent King, jest that he should have seemed to acknowledge him to be a Lord in spirituals, seeing that this Lordship, or Dominion of the K. of England, if we may give credit to Gretzer, is according to the common use, and practise of England, to be referred not only to the civil, and temporal, but also to the spiritual, and Ecclesiastical Lordship, or Dominion. And we also do not a little marvel, how Gretzer durst adventure to call the King's Majesty so often in his book King of great Britanny, sith that betwixt a King, and a supreme Lord, or Governor, Gretzer can allege no great distinction; and, according to Gretzer, this supreme government, or Sovereignty, is referred not only to the civil, and temporal, but also to the Ecclesiastical, and spiritual Sovereignty. 7. But of a far different opinion are Martinus Becanus, and Father Parsons, both eminent Jesuits, who, concerning these words, our Sovereign Lord, are not so scrupulous. For Becanus c In controvers. Anglic. cap. 3. pag. 102. printed at Mentz an. 1612. writeth in this manner: And truly to me it is certain, that all the parts, and propositions of this oath are not false, if they be well declared. For these be true; 1. That King james is lawful King of England, Scotland, and Ireland. 2. That in the same Kingdoms he is Supreme Lord in temporals: And Fa. Parsons d In his book entitled, The judgement of a Catholic English man living in banishment, etc. part. 1. nu. 22. pag. 13. & 16. doth confidently affirm, that there is no man, who sticketh, or maketh difficulty to acknowledge our Sovereign to be true King, and rightful Lord over all his Dominions; for that every English Catholic will swear, and acknowledge most willingly all those parts, and clauses of the Oath, that do any way appertain to the Civil, and Temporal obedience due to his Majesty, whom he acknowledgeth for his true, and lawful King, and Sovereign over all his Dominions. Whereby it is apparent, that this violent exposition, which Gretzer wresteth from those words, our Sovereign Lord, is neither approved by Becanus, nor Fa. Parsons, nor by any other, that I have either read, or heard of, either of our own, or of any other nation. See also beneath f Cap. 4. sect. 3. somewhat appertaining to this objection. Sect. II. 1. SEcondly, Leonard Lessius, g In his Apologet. Disputation pag. 396, and in the English Recapitulation of his book, entitled, A brief and clear Declaration, etc. pag. 51 a most learned Divine of the Society of jesus, against these words [true, and lawful King] argueth in this manner: No man can lawfully affirm with an oath that thing to be true, whereof he hath no certain knowledge, for otherwise he should expose himself to danger at the lest of perjury: but no man can have any certain knowledge of the true, and lawful titles of Kings, sith that to them some things are required, which are hidden, and cannot clearly be known, therefore no man can lawfully swear, that such a one is a true, and lawful King. The like argument with far greater show of probability may be urged against Popes, and especially inferior Bishops; to whose true, and lawful Ordination some things are necessary, which by natural means cannot be certainly known; and especially the true intention, and inward mind of him, who ministereth the Sacrament, without which neither Baptism, which of necessity is supposed to the true Ordination of a Bishop, neither the Consecration itself of a Bishop, is of any force at all. 2. To this objection, which Becanus, and Fa. Parson's according to their principles but now related, must confess, to be but a mere Sophism, (seeing that, according to them, it is certain, that every man may by oath acknowledge, King james to be true, and lawful King of England, etc.) it may be answered two ways: First, that, according to the common opinion of Divines, every man may lawfully, and without any danger of perjury, swear that thing to be true, which he persuadeth himself to be morally certain, neither hath he any probable doubt of the contrary; although the thing, which he confirmeth by oath, be perchance in very deed not true: but of the true, and lawful title of our most noble Prince King james to this kingdom, we are morally certain, neither can we have any probable reason, to move us to any never so small a doubt to the contrary, especially seeing that his true, and rightful title to this kingdom hath been declared, and confirmed by the universal consent of the whole kingdom. 3. The second answer is, that the immediate object of this oath, or, which is all one, the thing immediately sworn, is not this proposition, King james is true, and lawful King of this kingdom, etc. but this, I do truly, and sincerely acknowledge, profess, testify, and declare in my conscience, that King james is true, and lawful King of this kingdom, etc. but of this my unfeigned, and sincere acknowledgement, profession, testification, and declaration I am not only morally, but also Physically certain, and therefore no man can incur any danger at all of perjury by taking this branch of the oath. So that Lessius untruly, and against the express words of the oath doth affirm, that this branch of the oath is of the thing itself, and not of my acknowledgement, profession, testification, and declaration: seeing that the words themselves do most clearly show the contrary, and Father Parsons, and Becanus (but now cited) do in express words suppose the same as certain. And this second answer is diligently to be observed for the better understanding of the next ensuing branch of the oath. CHAP. III. The second branch of the Oath. ANd that the Pope neither of himself, nor by any authority of the Church, or Sea of Rome, or by any other means with any other hath any power, or authority to depose the King, or to dispose any of his majesties Kingdoms and Dominions, or to authorize any foreign Prince to invade, or annoyed him, or his Countries, or to discharge any of his subjects of their Allegiance, or to give licence, or leave to any of them to bear Arms, raise tumults, or to offer any violence, or hurt to his majesties Royal person, State or government, or to any of his majesties subjects within his majesties Dominions. Sect. I 1. THis second branch of the oath is that rock of scandal, and stone of offence, whereat so many of this age, as well learned, as unlearned do usually stumble. For certain eminent writers of this age, to wit, Card. Bellarmine, jacobus Gretzer, Leonard Lessius, Martin Becanus, all Divines of the Society of jesus, and some others moved especially with the authority of these men, who, to defend his Holiness Breves, directed to the English Catholics, have taken upon them to impugn this oath of Allegiance, do chief rely upon the Pope's power to depose Princes, as a most sure and firm foundation to prove evidently the said oath to be unlawful, and to contain many things, which are flat contrary to faith and the health of souls, as his Holiness hath publicly, and in express words by his Breves declared. 2. The first therefore, and most principal objection, which is commonly made against this second branch, is framed by Martin Becanus a In Controversia Anglicana, cap. 3. q. 4 pag. 138. in this manner. No man can with a good conscience take that oath, wherein is contained any proposition, which he judgeth to be clearly false. But in the oath of Allegiance, which his Majesty hath propounded, there is contained a proposition, which Catholics judge to be clearly false, therefore Catholics cannot with a good conscience take this oath. The Mayor proposition is evident, because no man can with a good conscience affirm any thing without an oath, which he judgeth to be false, therefore much less with an oath; for if a simple lie be not lawful, much less perjury. The whole difficulty therefore is to prove the Minor proposition, which if it be once sufficiently confirmed, it will forthwith be evidently convinced, that this oath cannot with a good conscience be taken by any Catholic. 3. And first of all Card. Bellarmine, and Lessius, and which also Becanus doth insinuate, do openly profess, that it is not only false, but also clearly repugnant to Catholic faith, to affirm, that the Pope's Holiness hath not authority to depose Princes; and this they imagine to have demonstrated by the testimony of Scriptures, holy Fathers, Counsels, holy Canons, and by most evident reasons. But that Card. Bellarmine's arguments are not convincing, and demonstrative, I have in another place b In my Apology for the power of Princes, and in the Preface to my Apologet. Answer, nu. 33. & seq. abundantly proved, and therefore I think it needless to repeat them now again. 4. But Lessius (besides the authorities, and reasons, brought by Card. Bellarmine, to prove this doctrine of the Pope's power to depose Princes, to be embraced as a received principle of saith, which I have, as I said before, already answered, and besides certain other his reasons omitted by Card. Bellarmine, which I also have elsewhere c In the aforesaid Preface, nu. 52. & seq. alleged, and satisfied) produceth this argument, as a chief ground, to confirm the aforesaid doctrine to be certainly believed as a point of faith. Thus therefore he writeth: d In his Apologetical Disputation for the Pope's power, part. 2. sect. 3. pag. 396. But it is certainly to be held, that this doctrine [of deposing] is not ambiguous, that one may lawfully hold either opinion, but altogether certain, so that without injury to faith it cannot be denied. Which first I prove, for that these propositions are in express terms defined in a Roman Council under Gregory the seventh, That the Pope may lawfully depose the Emperor, That he may absolve the subjects of wicked men from their allegiance. This Council is to be seen in Onuphrius in the life of Gregory the seventh, and in Baronius in the year of our Lord 1076. But a definition made by the Pope with a Council appertaineth to faith. Therefore, etc. 5. I cannot in truth but greatly marvel, that so singularly learned a man should bring so weak, and unlearned an argument to prove a matter of so great importance, as is the dethroaning of Sovereign Princes; as though it were lawful for any man to play with the Crowns of Kings, and Emperors, First therefore we deny, that the aforesaid two propositions were defined in a Roman Council under Gregory the 7. although we will not deny, but that they were indeed openly maintained by Pope Gregory the 7. who was the first of all the Popes, as Historiographers do writ, * See beneath cap. 6. sect 3. nu. 16. that deposed the Roman Emperor. But that the Reader may fully perceive the truth of the whole matter, he must observe, that in the third tome of the Counsels betwixt the 55, and 56 epistle of the second book of the Epistles of Pope Gregory the seventh, are inserted twenty seven brief sentences, which are there called Dictatus Papa● among which the aforesaid two propositions related by Lessius are also contained. These brief sentences of Pope Gregory, Cardinal Baronius (belike to make them to carry more credit) affirmeth to belong to the Roman Council, held under Gregory the seventh the year 1076: but to prove the same he bringeth neither reason, nor authority, but we must, forsooth, give credit to his bore word, that these sentences are known to belong to the Roman Council. 6. If they be known to appertain to the Roman Council, Baronius should have showed, to whom this is known, and for what reason, authority, or conjecture they are known to appertain to the aforesaid Council. But Lessius proceedeth further, and very boldly affirmeth, that they were defined in that Council. But we beseech you, most learned Lessius, that you will also make known to us, how this, which you do so confidently aver, is known to you. In the Decrees of the Counsels these definitions are not to be found, and from Baronius you only have, that these sentences are known to appertain to the Roman Council. May not many things appertain to a Council, which nevertheless are not defined therein? Will you aver that all those things, which are known to appertain to the Council of Nice, of Laterane, of Vienna, of Constance, of Florence, and lastly of Trent, are defined in those Counsels? I think verily that you will scarcely admit this much. Besides, if those sentences were defined in the Roman Synod, how is it known to you, that they were defined, as propositions belonging to faith, or only as probable assertions. 7. But what kind of definitions those were, you might have gathered by the eighth, ninth, tenth, eleventh, and eighteenth sentence. For the eighth sentence is, that only the Pope can use the Imperial arms: The ninth, That all Princes do kiss only the Pope's feet: The tenth, That the Pope's name only is to be rehearsed in Churches: The eleventh, That there is but one only name in the world, to wit, the Popes: The eighteenth, That the Pope, if he be canonically ordained, is by the merits of S. Peter undoubtedly made a Saint, as witnesseth Ennodius Bishop of Pavia, to whom many holy Fathers do agreed as is contained in the Decrees of blessed Pope Symmachus. Will you now aver, that also these sentences were defined in that Council? Truly I do not think you william. And if it most clearly appear even in your own judgement, that these sentences were not defined in that Synod, how can it be known to you, that the former two sentences, rather than the rest, were therein defined? Be careful therefore, most learned Lessius, not to object against us such kind of definitions, invented first by yourself, which in these times it had been far better to have omitted, then to have urged, for that they call either your learning, or sincerity in question, and also do rather weaken, then confirm the Pope's power to define without a General Council, which you do so vehemently maintain, that you will scarcely have them to be accounted Catholics, who are not herein of your opinion. Neither would I, for reverence to the Sea apostolic, have made any mention of them at all, if you through inconsiderate zeal, and being moved thereunto by no sound and sufficient reason, had not adventured, to enforce timorous consciences, and to thrust by violence upon the Christian world doubtful positions for certain, and to coin new articles of faith, to the great obloquy of so famous Divines, who are not of your opinion, and also to the exceeding great temporal prejudice of all us English Catholics. 8. But be it so, let us grant you for disputation sake, which you cannot prove, that these brief sentences were defined in that Roman Council not only as probable assertions, but also as most certain positions of faith, yet we may, without injury to the Catholic faith, with the Doctors of Paris, and many others, whom we will beneath e Cap. 10. nu. 27 relate, deny your Minor proposition, to wit, that the Pope's definition only with a Provincial Council, as that Roman Synod was, doth of necessity make the doctrine, which it defineth, to be believed of all men as a point of faith, seeing that there are many Catholics both of singular doctrine, and piety, as I said before, who do constantly aver, that the Pope defining without a General Council may err, and be deceived. And I would willingly behold the shameless forehead of that man, who would not blush to traduce so great, and so worthy men of such eminent authority, learning, and piety, as being half Catholics, and enemies to the Sea apostolic, or to distain their honour with the reproachful infamy of heresy, error, or temerity. 9 Secondly, Becanus f In controvers. Anglican. cap. 3. in fine. for confirming the Minor proposition, only relieth upon the authority of the Council of Laterane, and the universal consent of the whole Christian world, so that he thinketh it to be most certain, that the Pope, if not by divine law, and the institution of Christ, yet at the lest by human law, and by the permission of the whole Christian world decreed, received, and approved in the Council of Laterane, hath power to depose disobedient Kings, and Princes. And at the last he concludeth, that it is all one to swear, that the Pope hath no authority to depose the King, and to swear, that the great Council of Laterane, and that all the Popes, Divines, and Lawyers, and all others, who do teach, that the Pope hath power to depose the King, have erred in this point. What Catholic man dare presume to swear this? Truly, it were all one, as if he should say, I swear in my conscience before God, that concerning this point I know more than all others: No man, as I think, is so arrogant. 10. To this objection of Becanus we answer in like manner, that we also do no less marvel, that a man so excellently learned (to impugn the oath of Allegiance) should so nakedly, and rawly produce the sole authority of the Council of Laterane, which I have already in the Preface of my Apologetical Answer fully satisfied, and abundantly showed, first, that the aforesaid Council hath neither defined, nor supposed as certain this doctrine of the Pope's authority to depose Princes. And secondly, that although it had supposed this doctrine as true, yet unless it had supposed it as certainly, and undoubtedly true, and not only as probably true, the contrary opinion may be maintained without any danger of faith, or any temerity at all. 11. But that you may perceive the weakness of your argument, tell us, I pray you, most learned Becanus, whether all those Divines, who with might and main do defend, that the blessed Mother of God was conceived without original sin, among whom are Alphonsus Salmeron, and Franciscus Suarez, both famous Jesuits, who, to confirm this doctrine, do allege the consent almost of the Universal Church, and the uniform assent of all Universities, must forthwith aver, that all other Catholics, who are not of their opinion, have erred in this point, or that they in this point know more, than all others, who embrace not their opinion? What Catholic dare presume to aver this much? No man, as I think, is so arrogant. May not in the Church of God many opinions be probably defended on both sides without impeaching, either of error, temerity, or any other crime? 12. Doth not joan. Maldonate, an excellent Divine of your Order, boldly affirm, g In Summula q. 12. ar. 7. vide etiam qu. 15. ar. 21. & 22. that neither the Pope, nor the whole Church hath power to dispense in the solemn vow of chastity, and that those Ecclesiastical persons, and Interpreters of the Canon law, who have taught the contrary, do seem to him to have had more regard of some examples of certain Popes, then of the holy scripture: For what Divinity would aver, that the Church can dispense in the law of God, and nature? But who, unless an heretic, will deny, that the vow of chastity doth bind by the law of God, and nature? And nevertheless I think you will scarcely affirm, that Maldonate therefore intended to condemn of error, or any other crime, so many Pope's dispensations, and all those Catholics, who be not of his opinion herein. Truly I am ashamed, that men of so great learning, and who above others profess religious perfection, should be so stiff in their own opinions, that they fear not upon sleight grounds both against the rule of Christian charity, and in reproach of Catholic Religion, to slander most learned, and virtuous Catholics, who cleave not to their opinions, with heresy, error, temerity, or any other grievous crime. And this may suffice for the satisfying of Becanus his argument, until he do demonstrate, that those answers, which I have made to the Council of Laterane, be altogether improbable. 13. Thirdly, Franciscus Suarez also a most learned jesuite, and one of the chief Professors of Divinity in this age, in his Treatise of laws, lately printed at Antwerp, hath alleged h Lib. 4. de Legibus cap. 9 certain arguments, whereby the aforesaid Minor proposition may be confirmed; to wit, that the temporal power is subject, and subordinate to the spiritual, and consequently that the Pope, for the spiritual good, hath power to depose Princes, and to dispose of all their temporals: for the indirect dominion, or authority, which the Pope hath over the universal world, from which the Divines do derive his power to depose Princes, is only grounded, saith Suarez, in the subordination of these two powers. And although the reasons, which Suarez bringeth, be trivial, and have long since been produced by Card. Bellarmine, and divers others, yet I thought it necessary to put them down in this place, for that his authority is of great moment with the best learned Priests of our nation, who with great expectation have long desired to see, what arguments he could produce to confirm this doctrine of deposing Princes by the Pope's authority, assuring themselves, that a Divine of so profound erudition now at the last, after so exact debating of this controversy, would bring the very best, and choicest reasons, which could be invented, to demonstrate the aforesaid authority. 14. Two therefore only arguments Suarez doth bring to prove the subordination of the Ecclesiastical, and Civil power, wherein (saith he) the indirect dominion in temporals, which the Pope hath over the universal world, is only grounded. The first and principal ground (as he saith) of this subordination is taken from the unity of the Church sufficiently signified in the Gospel, and declared by S. Paul, 1. Cor. 12. who saith, that we all are baptised into one body, etc. and, Rom. 12. we being many are one body in Christ, etc. and Ephes. 4. and many other places: which reason Suarez dilateth in this manner. 15. Seeing that Christ our Lord hath instituted his Church as one spiritual kingdom, wherein there should be also one King, and one spiritual Prince, it is necessary, that the temporal power should be subject to the spiritual, as the body is subject to the soul. For by this example doth Gregory Nazianzene i Orat. 17. ad populum timore perculsum. very well declare the subordination of these two powers: for as a man were not well compounded, unless the body were subordinate to the soul, so neither the Church should be conveniently instituted, unless the temporal power were subject to the spiritual, as Pope Boniface the 8, out of S. Bernard, hath well concluded, affirming, that the sword must be under the sword, and the temporal power must be subject to the spiritual. For where there is one body, it is necessary that there be one head, whereunto all the members must in some sort have recourse; otherwise neither peace, nor perfect unity could be in the body: But the Church of Christ is one body, therefore, although there be in it many powers, or Magistrates, it is necessary, that they have among themselves a subordination. For as much therefore as it were a perverse order, if spirituals were subject to temporals, it must of necessity be granted, that the temporal power is subordinate to the spiritual. Which subordination may also be confirmed by Pope Gelasius, k Dist 96 can. Duo sunt. who out of those words, Pasce oves meas, doth insinuate, that Kings and Emperors are subject to S. Peter. 16. But if thou answer, that Kings and Emperors are subject to S. Peter in his spiritual government: Against this answer Suarez replieth in this manner: For to make (saith he) the temporal government right, and honest, it must of necessity have a spiritual rule, therefore it is necessary, that the temporal power itself of governing be directed by the spiritual: and this is to be subject, and subordinate to it. And for this cause Popes are to tender an account for Kings, and Emperors, because it belongeth to them to correct, and amend in whatsoever they, not only as men, but also as Kings, shall in exercising their power offend. 17. The second argument, which Suarez bringeth to confirm this subordination, is this: because Christ our Saviour had not otherwise sufficiently provided for his Church, if he had not given her power, to keep Kings and Princes in due order at the lest, by using the spiritual sword. 18. To these arguments of Suarez I answer, that, to speak the truth, I am by them rather much confirmed in my ancient opinion, to wit, that the doctrine concerning the Pope's power to depose Princes is not certain, than any way withdrawn from the same. For he affirmeth nothing else, than what I will most willingly grant him, and which in my Apology for the rightful power of Princes, and my Apologetical answer, I have more at large declared. First therefore I admit, that the Church of Christ is one mystical body, and one spiritual kingdom, and that all Christians as well Kings, as Subjects, are members of this body. But we utterly deny, that this spiritual kingdom of Christ is compounded of the Ecclesiastical, and politic power; neither will Suarez, as I think, affirm the same, but the only politic, or temporal power doth compound earthly kingdoms, and of the sole spiritual power is compounded the kingdom of Christ, as I elsewhere l In Apolog. nu. 137. & seq. out of Card. Bellarmine's grounds have more plainly showed, and also Becanus m Aduersus Torturam Torti part. 2. cap. 3. arg. 3. in express words doth acknowledge the same. 19 Moreover, we grant with Pope Boniface the 8, that the temporal sword is under the spiritual, and that the temporal power is subject to the Ecclesiastical, not only in nobility, nor yet of it own nature, as Cardinal Bellarmine n Lib. 5. de Roman. pont c. 6. , and Becanus o De Primatu Regis Angliae cap. 1. nu. 4. do well affirm, but only accidentally, in that manner, which I have heretofore p In the place before cited. more fully declared, to wit, in regard of the sin, which Princes, when they abuse their temporal power, do commit: which in very deed is nothing else, then that a temporal Prince in spiritual matters is subject to the spiritual power of the Church. And this is the only meaning of S. Gregory Nazianzene, when he compareth the spiritual, and temporal power, to the soul, and body. Which similitude, as I have elsewhere q In the place but now cited, and in my Apologet. answer nu. 19 & seq. showed, doth rather weaken, then confirm the Pope's power to depose Princes, and to dispose of their temporals. For as the soul hath power to command the body to exercise all corporal actions, which are subject to the command of our free will, yet she hath not power of herself to exercise those actions, which are proper to the body, without the help and assistance of a corporal organ; so also the spiritual power of the Church hath authority to command the temporal power, or rather a temporal Prince, in whom the supreme temporal power doth reside, to do all those temporal actions, which are necessary to the preserving of the spiritual good, yet the spiritual power hath not authority of herself to dispose of temporal things, or which is all one, cannot of herself exercise those functions, which are proper to the civil power, without the aid and concurrence of the Secular Magistrate. But all this is nothing else, than that temporal Kings, and Princes in spirituals, or in temporals, as in regard of the sin annexed, which is spiritual, they are made spiritual, be subject to the spiritual direction, command, chastising, and government of the Ecclesiastical power. Neither doth Suarez in his Reply, when he affirmeth, that the very power of governing temporally, to make it virtuous, and honest, must be directed by a spiritual rule, prove any thing more than what we have said, unless he will contradict both himself, and most evident reason. 20. Nevertheless, I cannot deny, but that the aforesaid assertion of Suarez is very equivocal. For if by a spiritual rule he understand a supernatural, and Ecclesiastical rule, and by rectitude, and virtue he mean supernatural rectitude, and virtue, his assertion is most true: for, to make temporal governing to be good and virtuous supernaturally, it must of necessity be directed and guided by a supernatural rule. But if he speak only of moral rectitude, and virtue, it is most false, that to make temporal governing good and virtuous morally, it must of necessity be directed by a supernatural rule, but it sufficeth, if it be directed by the rule of moral rectitude and virtue: which moral rule, although in some sort it may be said to be spiritual, as also all moral virtues are, which are inherent in the soul, which is spiritual, yet it is not an Ecclesiastical, or supernatural rule. And thus much Suarez himself in the same Treatise doth suppose for certain. For he admitteth, as undoubted, that Infidel Princes have true, and full authority to enact just and honest laws, and yet it is manifest, that in making such laws they are only guided, and directed by moral rectitude, and honesty, and not by any Ecclesiastical, or supernatural rule. And by this the Reader may easily perceive, how weak, and unsound is the chiefest foundation for the Pope's power to dispose of temporals, which, as Suarez himself confesseth, is only grounded in the unity of the Church, and in the subordination of the temporal power to the spiritual. And thus much concerning Suarez his first argument. 21. His second argument also we do freely grant him. For we do willingly admit, that Christ hath left in his Church sufficient power to keep Kings, and Princes in good order, at the lest by using the spiritual sword. But from hence it cannot be certainly gathered, that the Church hath power to depose Princes, or to dispose of their temporals; for so he should have power to use not only the spiritual, but also the temporal sword. And the very same reasons, which our Adversaries can bring to prove, that the Church for the spiritual health of souls must of necessity have sufficient power and authority to depose Princes, will in like manner convince, that she must also have sufficient force and means to execute this her authority, and actual to thrust them out of their kingdom: for by the actually reigning of wicked Princes, more than by their right, and title to reign, the health of souls is chief endangered. By this therefore it is manifest, that Suarez is not in very deed contrary to our opinion, but that rather he may be rightly alleged for a favourer thereof; seeing that by his arguments no other thing can be gathered, then that the temporal power in regard of sin, which is spiritual, is subject to the spiritual direction, command, and chastising of the Church: which both I, and both the Barclaies, with all other Catholics, do freely acknowledge; and that Suarez doth not in very deed descent from our opinion, his manner of handling the question doth clearly show. For unless he would in express words have averred, what we affirm, what other thing could he have said, then that, which he, handling this question of set purpose, hath taught, and last of all concluded, that the Church must have a power to keep Kings and Princes in good order, at the leastwise by using the spiritual sword. 22. Wherefore to the principal objection, which is put down in the beginning of the Chapter against this second branch of the oath, it is easily answered by denying the Minor proposition, if it be understood of all Catholics, as without doubt it must be understood to make the argument to have any colour of probability. For many Catholics, whom heretofore r In my Apology nu 4. & seq. I have named, and some of them I will beneath s Sect 3. nu. 5. & seq. relate, do plainly hold, that the Pope hath no authority to deprive Supreme Princes of their kingdoms, and to dispose of temporal things. And therefore this doctrine of deposing Princes by the Pope's authority is not certain, and without all doubt, and much less to be believed as a point of faith as Card. Bellarmine, and Lessius, and before them Gregorius de Valentia do over rashly affirm, sith that the contrary opinion is probably defended by Catholics, and consequently may be maintained without danger of mortal sin. But this at this present we do suppose both out of that, which we have already abundantly disputed, and will hereafter t Against D. Schulckenius his Apology for Card. Bellarmine. dispute against the arguments which Card. Bellarmine hath gathered out of holy Scriptures, ancient Fathers, Counsels, and Principles of Divinity, and also out of john Barcklay, who hath very learnedly defended his father, Master Doctor Barcklay, against the Treatise of Card. Bellarmine for the Pope's power in temporals. Sect. II. THe second objection, somewhat different from the former, which is usually made against this second branch of the oath, and insinuated by Lessius u In Disput. Apolog. nu. 216. 217. , as his English Recapitulator x Pag. 52. § Fourthly. doth relate, may be framed in this manner. 1. Not Catholic can without danger of perjury swear that to be true, whose truth in the judgements of all Catholics is accounted at the lest to be doubtful, for so he should expose himself to danger of swearing an untruth, but whether the Pope hath power to depose Kings and Princes, is by all Catholics accounted at the lest to be a doubtful, and disputable question, as doth appear by the stream of Doctors, whereof some are of opinion, that this doctrine for the Pope's power to depose Princes is undoubtedly true, and no man doth condemn it as undoubtedly false: therefore no Catholic can, without danger at the lest of perjury, swear, that the Pope hath no authority to depose Kings and Princes. 2. To this objection two answers are usually made, and both of them do out of my Apology for the rightful power of Princes, and out of john Barcklay y In Vindicijs pro Regibus. suppose, that without any danger of heresy, error, or any other crime, it may by Catholics be probably defended, that the Pope hath not authority to depose Princes, or, which we now do take for all one, to deprive them of their lawful right, and title to reign: and consequently, that this question of depriving Princes by the Pope's authority, is not a doubtful thing, to wit, whereof no determinate assent can be had, but probable, and by Catholic Doctors controverted on both sides. For betwixt doubtful, and probable, or disputable, which two are cunningly confounded in the objection, there is a great distinction, as beneath z Cap. 10. sect. 2 nu. 9 & 19 out of the doctrine of Gabriel Vasquez we will show more at large. 3. This supposed, the first, and most principal answer is, that the thing, which in this branch of the oath we do immediately, directly, and properly swear, is not, that the Pope hath not authority to depose the King, as the objection doth falsely suppose, but, that I do truly, and sincerely acknowledge, profess, testify, and declare in my conscience, that the Pope hath not authority to depose the King, as the express words of the oath both in the first, and the last branch thereof do most evidently declare, and also a Cap. 2. sect. 1. nu. 7. Martinus Becanus, and Father Parsons, whose words we have before related, do freely confess: which my sincere acknowledgement, and declaration of my opinion, sith that it is in no sort doubtful, but physically certain unto me, I may lawfully, with a safe conscience, and without any danger of perjury confirm by oath. 4. The second answer is, that betwixt depriving, and deposing a King, there is a great distinction, if we will speak according to the express meaning of this oath, which betwixt these two doth make a manifest difference, as appeareth by those words contained in the fourth branch of the oath, Princes deprived by the Pope, may be deposed by their subjects, or any other whatsoever. For to deprive Princes, is by a juridical, or lawful sentence to take away their right, and just title to their kingdoms, which depriving is in the fourth branch of the oath referred to the Pope; but to depose Princes, is to execute this sentence, and to displace, or thrust them out of the possession of their kingdoms, which deposing is attributed to the subjects, or any other whatsoever. If therefore in this second branch of the oath it is only affirmed, that the Pope hath no authority to depose the King, that is, to thrust him out of the possession of his kingdom, than that proposition, (if we once suppose, that this his authority to deprive Princes, is not decided by the judge, nor certainly agreed upon by Catholics) is in my opinion morally certain, neither is it by any Divine, or Lawyer, whom I have read, called in question; seeing that the Pope hath no authority to depose the King, or to put him out of the lawful possession of his kingdom, so long as it is uncertain, not decided, and in controversy among virtuous and learned Catholics, whether he hath any such authority to deprive Princes, or not, as in the end of my Apology, out of the approved rules of the Canon, and Civil law I have sufficiently deduced, and also out of the known principles of Divinity, if need require, I will further confirm. Sect. III. 1. THirdly, against this second branch it may be objected, that although a learned and skilful Divine, who is able to search into the depth of this difficult controversy, and to examine exactly all the reasons and proofs, which are usually made against, and for the Pope's authority to deprive Princes of their kingdoms, may perchance have some sufficient ground prudently to persuade his conscience, that the Pope hath no such authority; yet an unlearned man, who for want either of natural capacity, or of sufficient learning, is not able to examine these deep Theological questions, cannot prudently, and without evident temerity frame unto himself a right dictamen of conscience, whereby he may lawfully persuade himself, that the Pope hath not this authority given him by Christ, which the greater part of Catholics, both Divines and Lawyers do constantly affirm to be given him by Christ his institution; therefore at the lest an unlearned man cannot without great temerity take this second branch of the oath, although he should only swear his opinion, persuasion, or declaration. 2. But this objection is easily satisfied: And first it may be answered, that although one rashly conceiving this, or that opinion, or having any bad intention to do evil, doth offend in this, that he judgeth rashly, or intendeth to do evil, yet the oath itself, wherein he truly averreth, that he hath this rash opinion, or wicked intention, may be without any offence at all. As if a Superior should command his subject to declare unto him sincerely his opinion concerning such a matter, the subject may lawfully, and without any temerity tell his opinion, and if need require, confirm it by oath, although perchance he conceived that opinion rashly, and unadvisedly. Wherefore from this objection it can not well be gathered, that this second branch of the oath cannot without temerity be taken by unlearned men, but at the most it may be inferred, that unlearned men cannot without some note of temerity persuade themselves, that the Pope hath such authority granted him to deprive Princes, albeit, if they have once, although rashly, conceived such an opinion, they may without any temerity swear this their temerarious opinion. 3. The second therefore, and principal Answer is, that also an unlearned man may with a safe conscience, and without any danger of temerity take this second branch of the oath, for that he may prudently, and upon sufficient grounds persuade his conscience, that the Pope hath no authority to deprive Princes granted him by Christ his institution. For as heretofore b In the end of my Apology. I have briefly insinuated, and will beneath c Cap. 10. sect. 2 nu. 10. repeat the same again, there be two sorts of principles, or grounds, whereby a man may be persuaded, that this, or that opinion is true, or false. The first are called intrinsical grounds, and do consist in the discussing, and debating of all the reasons and arguments, which may be alleged for, and against any opinion: And these kind of grounds do only appertain to learned men, who are able to discern what force the reasons, and answers on both sides have. The other grounds are called extrinsical, and they are only founded upon the bore authority of prudent, and learned men, upon whose authority in a matter disputable, and controverted among Doctors, any man may prudently, and without any note of temerity rely. And these grounds are common also to unlearned men, who, although they are not able to weigh exactly the reasons, or intrinsical grounds of this, or that opinion, yet they can easily learn, and discern, what opinion learned men do follow. And this is a sufficient ground for unlearned persons, to cleave unto the opinion of skilful, and prudent men, whose judgements, sith that they themselves be not able to discuss the controversy, may safely, and securely follow, although the contrary opinion be perchance the more probable, the more secure, and embraced by the greater number of Divines, as beneath d Cap. 10. sect. 2 nu. 11. & seq. out of the doctrine of Gabriel Vasquez, a most learned jesuite, I will show more at large. 4. As for example, in this case of usury there is a great controversy among Divines, whether in lending of money it be lawful to take interest ob lucrum cessans, that is, in consideration of the profit, or gain, which the lender might have made, if he had employed his money otherwise, some Divines affirming, and some denying it to be usury. Now, if a virtuous, prudent, and learned Divine do confidently tell an unlearned person, that the opinion, which affirmeth it to be no usury, is probable, and in practice secure, and which liketh him best, although many others, and perchance the greater, and better sort of Divines do follow the contrary opinion, which also without all doubt is the more secure, yet the authority of this learned Divine is, according to the truer, and more approved opinion of Divines, a sufficient ground for the unlearned man, whereby he may securely, and without any note of temerity persuade his conscience, that he may lawfully take interest for that respect, and reject in practise the more common, and the more secure opinion of other Divines, albeit he, sith that he is unlearned, be not able to examine the nature, quality, and conditions of usury. And the like may be applied to this present controversy of deposing Princes by the Pope's authority, and others such like disputable cases. But that the unlearneder sort of people may in part perceive, what sufficient extrinsical grounds, and authority of learned and prudent men they may have, to persuade their conscience securely, that the Pope hath not any power to depose Princes, and to dispose of their temporals, I will only produce some few authorities of so many, which I have heretofore e In Apolog. & Resp. Apologet. alleged. 5. The first authority is of john Trithemius an Abbot, of the Order of S. Benedict, and a man of singular learning & piety, who writeth, that in his time, to wit, in this present age, wherein nothing hath been newly defined either by Counsels, or Popes, concerning the Pope's authority to deprive Princes (for all the decrees of Popes, and Counsels, which by Card. Bellarmine are usually alleged to confirm the aforesaid authority, were long before Trithemius his time) this opinion which denieth the Pope to have any such authority, was probably defended by Scholastical Doctors. For so he writeth, f In Chronico Monasterij Hirsaug the year 1106. He indeed [Henry the 4.] was the first among all the Emperors, who was deposed by the Pope. The Scholastickes are at strife, and as yet the controversy is not decided by the judge, whether the Pope hath authority to depose the Emperor, or no; which question, seeing that it belongeth not to us, we will leave indiscussed. 6. The second testimony is of Albericus Roxiatus, a most famous Professor, as Trithemius g De Scriptoribus Eccles. ad annum 1340. writeth, both of the Canon, and Civil law, and a man excellently learned, who lived in the year 1340. For he calleth in question the four most principal Decretal letters of Popes, which favour their authority to dispose of temporals, (whereof one is that famous, and so often inculcated by our Adversaries, sentence of deposition, given against Frederick the Emperor by Pope Innocent the fourth, in the presence of the Council of Lions) and affirmeth, that they are not in his opinion, agreeable to law, but that they were made by Popes against the liberty, and right of the Empire. The Pastors of the Church (saith he h In Dictionario verbo, Electio. ) meddling with that, which belongeth not unto them, have made four Decrees; the one concerning the election of the Emperor, which beginneth, Venerabilem, and of this it is there noted by all men. Another is about the deposing of Frederick the Emperor, extra de sententia, & re iudicata, cap. ad Apostolicae in Sexto, where also of this it is noted by all men. Another is concerning the discord betwixt Henry the Emperor, and Robert King of Sicily, and the sentence of treason published by the Emperor against him, which Decree is in Clementina de sententia, & re iudicata, cap. Pastoralis. Another is in Clementina prima de jure iurando, that the Emperor is bound to swear allegiance to the Pope, and concerning the Pope's authority over the Emperor. Which Decrees, whether they be just, or not, God knoweth. For I (under correction) (and if it should be erroneous I recall it) do think that none of them be agreeable to law. Yea my opinion is, that they were published against the rights, and liberty of the Empire, and I think that by God they were instituted distinct powers. Whereof I have noted sufficiently lege prima, Cod. de Summa Trinitate, & fide Catholica. 7. The third authority is of joannes Parisiensis, a famous Divine of the Order of S. Dominicke, and, as Trithemius affirmeth, i De Scriptoribus Eccles ad annum 1280. most learned in the holy Scriptures, and who in the University of Paris was for a long time together public Professor, and left behind him many disciples; he flourished about the year 1280. This Doctor (therefore) although he be of that opinion k De potest. Regia, & Papali cap. 14. ad 20. , that if a King should become an heretic, and incorrigible, and a contemner of Ecclesiastical Censures, the Pope might do somewhat with the people, whereby he might be deprived of his Secular dignity, and be deposed by the people, to wit, he might excommunicate all those, to whom it belongeth to depose the King, who should obey him, as their Sovereign: Nevertheless he is of this opinion, that it belongeth not to the Pope to depose juridically Kings, or Emperors for any crime whatsoever, although it be spiritual, that is, by a definitive sentence to deprive them of their kingdoms, in such sort, that after the sentence be published, they should have no more power, and authority l Almainus de potest. Eccles. q. 2. cap. 8. . For he affirmeth, that Excommunication, or such like spiritual punishment is the last, which may be inflicted by a spiritual judge. For although (saith he) it belongeth to the Ecclesiastical judge to recall men to God, and to withdraw them from sin, yet he hath not power to do this, but by using those means, which be given him by God, which is by excluding them from the Sacraments, and participation of the faithful. Wherefore, although Parisiensis doth think, that the temporal common wealth hath in some cases of very great moment, authority to depose their Prince, with which question I do not at this present intermeddle, yet concerning the principal controversy, which is now betwixt me, and Card. Bellarmine, to wit, whether it be heretical, erroneous, or temerarious to affirm, that the Pope hath no power to deprive Princes of their Royal right, and authority, joannes Parisiensis doth most plainly, as we now have showed, contradict the opinion of Cardinal Bellarmine. 8. The fourth authority is of William Barcklay, a most learned man, and yet no more learned, then religious (howsoever some falsely, and unchristianly do calumniate him) who in times past was Counsellor to the Duke of Lorraine, and Master of Requests, and in the University of Mussepont Professor of the Canon, and Civil law, and also Deane. m Antonius Possevinus verbo Gulielmus Barclaius. This Doctor therefore in his book de Regno, printed at Paris in the year 1600, with privilege of the most Christian King of France, (which book Posseuine in his Bibliotheca relateth among other approved books, and taketh no exception against it) writeth n In lib. 4. de Regno cap. 4. in this manner: First of all we acknowledge, that all Kings are by the most straight bonds of nature, and religious oath obliged to keep God's commandments, to worship him religiously, and to use all care and diligence, that their subjects do not revolt from true Religion, and fall into Idolatry, judaisme; or heresy. But if they omit to do the same, or be negligent therein, they are to be judged by God alone, because only to God they are subject, I speak of temporal judgement, and subjection. For all Kings, as they are children of the Church, as they are Christians, as they are sheep of Christ his flock, aught to acknowledge the Pope S. Peter's successor, and Christ his Vicar, to be as much their Superior, as they are to every one of the people, that as they have authority to judge rebels, and traitors, and to deliver them to the executioner to be punished, so the supreme Prince, and universal Pastor of the Church, hath power to condemn with spiritual judgement Princes offending against God his law, and to deliver them to invisible tormentors to be punished with the rod of the invisible spirit, and with the two edged sword of Excommunication. And this his opinion he in his book published after his death, hath against Cardinal Bellarmine's reasons very learnedly, and elegantly maintained, whom his son john Barcklay hath with great learning, and elegancy defended against the most foul calumnies, which Cardinal Bellarmine endeavoured to lay to his father's charge. 9 The fifth testimony may be grounded upon the authority of Master George Blackwell o In his Examination , a virtuous and learned man, and not long since the archpresbyter of the English Priests, who even until death maintained this opinion, that the Pope hath not power to deprive Princes of their kingdoms: and also of Master William Barret p In his book de jure Regis. an English Catholic, and moreover of those thirteen English Priests, whose authority to confirm this opinion, I did heretofore q In the Preface to my Apologetical Answer nu. 26 allege in these words. 10. And the very same opinion are bound to follow, to make their fact to be lawful, those thirteen r D. William Bishop, john Colleton, john Much, Robert Charnock, D. john Bossevile, Antony Hebborne, Roger Cadwallader, Robert Drury, D. Antony Champney, john jackson, Francis Barnebey, Oswald Needham, Richard Button. Whereof three are Doctors of Sorbon, the rest are accounted by Catholics to be grave, virtuous, and learned men. English Priests, and all of them, two only excepted, at this present time alive (whose names, if before s In the end of Master Blackwel's Latin Examination. they had not been published, I would in truth have concealed) who, to give assurance of their loyalty to the late Queen Elizabeth, did by a public instrument protest, and made it known to all the Christian world t To wit, as much as did lie in them; for that they made a public instrument of this their protestation, to be published to the whole Christian world, when it should please the Magistrate; So that I wonder under what colour of probability any learned, or prudent man can object against those words [to all the Christian world] although they were not expressed in any part of the instrument, as in very deed they are in express words contained. , that she (being at that time excommunicated by name, and deprived by the sentence of Pope Pius the 5. of her Regal authority) had nevertheless as full authority, power, and Sovereignty over them, and over all the subjects of this Realm, as any her highness Predecessors ever had. And that notwithstanding any authority, or any Excommunication whatsoever, either denounced, or to be denounced against her Majesty, or any borne within her majesties Dominions, which would not forsake the defence of her, and her Dominions, they think themselves not only bound in conscience not to obey this, or any such like Censure, but also do promise to yield unto her Majesty all obedience in temporal causes. 11. Wherefore this their promise, and declaration doth not only belong to a matter of fact, but also to declare the lawful right, and authority of her Majesty to reign. For these Priests do not only protest, that Queen Elizabeth (being then by the Pope deprived of her Regal authority) did reign the facto, whereof there could be made no doubt, and do not only promise', that they will obey her Majesty de facto, but also they do acknowledge, and profess, that she at that time had as full authority, power, and sovereignty over them, and all the subjects of this Realm, as any her highness Predecessors ever had. Which their assertion truly is most false, if the Pope had power to deprive her of her Regal authority. To these our English Priests I could add many others both learned, & virtuous, who are of the self-same opinion, although to avoid his Holiness indignation against them, they are fearful publicly to profess the same, and therefore I think it not convenient to express their names. 12. Finally, the sixth authority, (which therefore, in the last place I have produced, for that it, as also the former authority of Master Blackwell, and those thirteen Priests, do confirm almost every clause of the oath) is grounded in a very substantial testimony of the kingdom of France. And first in a General assembly of the States of France, held at Paris in the year 1593., Cardinal Pelleve, and other Prelates, who then were present, would not receive certain Decrees of the Council of Trent, among which that of the 25. Session, chap. 19, wherein Kings are forbidden to permit single combat, was one. u In the Decrees of the Church of France, compiled by Laurence Bochellus, tit. 20 pag. 917. The Council of Trent (say they) doth excommunicate, and deprive a King of the city, or place, wherein he permitteth to fight single combat. This article is against the authority of the King, who cannot be deprived of his temporal dominion, in regard whereof he acknowledgeth no Superior at all. 13. Secondly, Petrus Pithaeus, a man, as Posseuine x In Apparatu verbo, Petrus Pithaeus. affirmeth, truly learned, and a diligent searcher of antiquity, in his book of the liberties of the Church of France, printed at Paris by the authority of the Parliament in the year 1594, doth out of a general maxim, which France y To wit, because the greater part of France, from which denomination is taken, did approve it. , as he saith, hath ever approved as certain, deduce this particular position. The Pope cannot give as a pray the kingdom of France, or any thing appertaining thereunto, neither hath he power to deprive the King thereof, or in any other manner to dispose thereof. And notwithstanding any admonitions, Excommunications, or Interdicts, which by the Pope may be made, yet the subjects are bound to yield obedience due to his Majesty for temporals, neither therein can they be dispensed, or absolved by the Pope. Which words if we diligently consider, as also that protestation of the thirteen Priests, we shall find, that the principal branches of this oath, against which Cardinal Bellarmine, Gretzer, Lessius, and Becanus do take so great exception, are in them comprehended: to wit, that the Pope hath not any power to depose the King, or to dispose of his temporal dominions, and that notwithstanding any Excommunication, or sentence of deprivation, I will bear faith, and true allegiance to his Majesty, and will defend him to the uttermost of my power, etc. and that from this the Pope hath no authority to absolve me, and therefore without all doubt I may renounce all pardons, and dispensations to the contrary. 14. If therefore that be true, which Navarre an excellent Divine, and most skilful in the Canon law, as Posseuine affirmeth z Verbo Martinus ab Alpizcueta. , doth writ, to wit, that although in the contentious, or external Court regularly many things are to be observed, that one may follow an opinion, which is in controversy among Doctors, yet in the Court of conscience to this effect that we shall commit no sin, it is sufficient to choose his opinion for true, whom for good cause we think to be a man sufficiently learned, and of a good conscience, how much the more may an unlearned man, according also to the doctrine of Gabriel Vasquez, which beneath we will set down, prudently persuade his conscience, that this branch of the oath, to wit, that the Pope hath not power to depose our King, is true, which not one only learned, and virtuous man, but very many do allow, and who also have diligently read, examined, and abundantly satisfied all the arguments, which their Adversaries have deduced out of holy Scriptures, ancient Fathers, Decrees of Popes, and Counsels, and other Theological reasons against the same? 15. And although very few, whose writings are now extant, in comparison of others, who defend this temporal power of the Pope, are to be found, who deny his authority to deprive Princes of their kingdoms, this nevertheless aught not greatly to move any man, sith that heretofore a In my Apology nu. 449. I have alleged many reasons for this purpose, which now to repeat again I think it not to be altogether superfluous. Thus therefore I wrote in the place before cited. Neither aught any man to marvel, that this opinion, which defendeth the Pope's temporal authority, hath taken so deep root in the minds even of the most learned; partly for that from the very beginning of this controversy the Pope wanted no flatterrs, (as neither at this day he doth want) who either for hope of gain, or desire of preferment, or for favour, or fear b For to say that so worthy men, among whom some also were Popes, did writ against their conscience in favour of Princes, or for fear of them, is to stretch forth his mouth into heaven. For contrariwise it might be said more probably that those Doctors, who do so unmeasurably advance the Pope's authority, do speak for fear, or favour of him, seeing that they are Ecclesiastical persons, who may by him get greater preferment. And especially, sith that they say (although not well) that the Pope doth graciously embrace them, who do amplify his authority, and depresseth them, who do speak against the same. Thus writeth joannes Parisiensis de potest. Regia, & Papali cap. 21. ad 41. of him, would advance his authority more than is fitting: partly for that the reasons, and arguments, whereon this temporal authority of the Pope, in regard of spiritual good is grounded, do make a great show of probability to them, who do not exactly consider the whole matter: partly for that, although there ever have been, and also at this present are, very many virtuous and learned men, who are of the contrary opinion, nevertheless, for fear of incurring the Pope's displeasure, or giving any occasion to wicked Princes to afflict the Church more freely, or to live more licentiously, who seemed with this temporal power of the Pope, as with a bridle, to be more easily kept in good order, they thought it more expedient to pass over this present controversy with silence, and jest they should give any scandal to the weak, only to conceal, but not to deny the truth: partly, for that Popes are not accustomed willingly to permit, that the facts, or opinions of their Predecessors, which do favour the Papal authority, should either be impugned, or called in question. 16. And therefore both the Pope himself, and other ordinary Bishops, and inquisitors against heretics are very careful, that no books, which do seem to derogate any way from the Pope's authority, be published; and if they be already published, that either they be altogether suppressed, or be read by no man without special licence, (and that obtained in writing) until they be corrected. And so it is a most hard matter especially in these days, either to find in Catholic books any one sentence, or clause, which seemeth any whit at all to call in question the Pope's temporal authority, or else to know certainly, what the Authors of books do think concerning the aforesaid authority, but rather what opinion the Correctors, and censors of books do follow, seeing that the Authors are oftentimes against their wills compelled to speak, and to deliver their opinion not with their own, but with these men's words. 17. And to confirm what I have said, day] y experience c See in what manner Aubertus Myraeus, a Canon of Antwerp, hath in Sigebert, an ancient writer, lately set forth by him & printed at Antwerp, especially in the year 773. and 1111. cut off, added, changed whole sentences concerning the electing of Popes, and the investing of Bishops, granted to the Emperors. And if in ancient writers these men dare presume to correct in this manner, how much the more may we imagine that they will do the same in modern writers? Through the Printers fault it is in my Latin copy by the Emperors. can yield innumerable examples, among which it shall at this time suffice one only to relate, concerning a very learned man, who sending to certain men an excellent work of his to be printed by their means, wherein he plainly signified, that he was of this opiinion, that the Pope by Christ's institution had neither directly, nor indirectly any temporal dominion, and therefore no authority to deprive Princes of their kingdoms: when his book, if it may be called his, which was so much changed from his, was printed, and sent him back again, he found it so chopped, and changed, as if now he should only affirm, that the Pope had no direct dominion in temporals, nor any direct power to dispose of Prince's dominions. And therefore it is no marvel, that this opinion, for the Pope's power to depose Princes, hath so many, and the contrary so few patrons, and Supporters. But if his Holiness would be pleased to give leave to learned Divines and Lawyers, to speak plainly their minds, without danger of incurring his displeasure, and would compel them, as Almain d De Authoritate Ecclesiae cap. 3. in principio, who taketh it out of Occam. saith, by oaths, and horrible threatenings to declare sincerely what belongeth to the fullness of the Ecclesiastical power, I do not doubt, but that a very great number of learned Catholics would forthwith show themselves, and in public writings would clearly teach, that this doctrine for the Pope's power to depose Princes is not certain, without all controversy, and to be held of faith, as Cardinal Bellarmine and some few others do vehemently affirm, but that the contrary opinion may without any danger of heresy, error, or any other crime be probably maintained. 18. But because their is small hope, as I am persuaded, to find out the truth by this way, I know no other remedy at this present, but humbly to request his Holiness, and those, whom it doth concern, that, until the Church hath clearly defined the matter, (for I do not think, that the uncertain collections of Card. Bellarmine, or of any other Doctor, although he be most learned, out of the holy Scriptures, Counsels, or Decrees of Popes, are to be accounted Ecclesiastical definitions) they will permit, that this most difficult, and weighty controversy, the ignorance whereof may breed either perpetual amity, or discord betwixt temporal Kings, and Clergy men, may modestly, peaceably, and without contumelious speeches, by learned Divines be with solid arguments disputed on both sides; and withal, that virtuous, and skilful Divines, who both for their singular learning are able to find out the truth, and being once found, will also for their true zeal, and love of God, without any human respect defend the same, will endeavour to have always before their eyes this notable sentence of most learned and devout Gerson e In his treatise De examinatione doctrinarum §. Secunda veritas. : The second truth, saith Gerson, is, that the Pope's sentence bindeth all men not to dogmatize the contrary, unless by them, or among them, who do perceive a manifest error against faith, and do know, that, unless they oppose themselves, there will by their silence arise a great scandal unto our faith. And if there be any prosecuting of censures, and punishments against them, let them know, that blessed are they, who suffer persecution for justice sake. 19 Nevertheless, I do not by this intent to aver, that this doctrine, for the Pope's power to depose Princes, is contrary to faith, or salvation; seeing that it is, and hath been defended by so many, and so worthy Divines; but this only I do now affirm, and I do constantly think it to be most true, that the opinion, which with such might and main doth maintain that the aforesaid doctrine, for the Pope's power to deprive Princes, is certain, without controversy, to be believed as a point of faith, and that it cannot be impugned by any Catholic, without denying the Catholic faith, (which is not the common opinion of Catholic Divines, but proper and peculiar to Cardinal Bellarmine, and some few others, and which with all their might, by right and by wrong, by arguments, and reproachful speeches they endeavour to maintain) is, I speak it alas with grief, a very great scandal to Catholic Religion, and will by all likelihood breed a great dissension betwixt the Clergy, and the laity, and that therefore it aught by every man, who desireth true peace, and unity betwixt the holy Church of Christ, and the earthly kingdoms of this world, with all diligence to be contradicted. Sect. four 1. FOurthly, it is objected by Lessius f Nu. 213. , as also we may perceive by his English Recapitulator g Pag. 44. , against those words [nor by any other means with any other] wherein all power to depose Kings is absolutely denied, and consequently it is virtually affirmed, that neither the Pope, nor the civil common wealth hath in any case whatsoever any authority to depose the King, which seemeth in many men's judgements to be repugnant to natural reason, and to the principles of moral philosophy. And therefore this question of deposing Princes by the authority of the commonwealth, being at the lest uncertain, and in controversy among Catholics, the very same arguments, which have been before objected against the former clause of this branch, concerning the Pope's authority to depose Princes, may in like manner be urged against this clause of the oath. 2. To this objection it is answered first, that concerning this question, which is rather a moral, and politic, than a Theological controversy, many learned Divines are of opinion, that the civil commonwealth hath no authority at all over their Sovereign Prince, and that a Supreme temporal Prince cannot be judged, and punished with temporal punishments, but by God alone, whose opinion to condemn as temerarious, and improbable, without doubt were great temerity. Seeing therefore that this question is probably disputed on both sides by Catholic Doctors, the very same Answers, which before were given to the former objections, concerning the Pope's power to depose Princes, may be also applied to this objection, concerning the power of the civil commonwealth to depose their Sovereign: to wit, that also an unlearned man may by extrinsical grounds, that is to say, by reason of the authority of prudent, and learned men, securely persuade himself, that the civil commonwealth hath no authority at all over their Sovereign & absolute Prince, and also that this his persuasion, acknowledgement, and declaration, he may with a safe conscience, if need require, confirm by oath: And so of the rest. 3. Secondly, it is answered, that in this second branch of the oath I do not absolutely acknowledge, testify, and declare, that the civil commonwealth hath no authority to depose the King; but if in those words [nor by any other means with any other] we must needs comprehend also the civil commonwealth, at the farthest I do acknowledge, that the Pope neither by means of the commonwealth, nor with the commonwealth, hath authority to depose the King; which proposition verily is most true, so that we suppose, that no authority hath been hitherto granted to the Pope to depose absolute Kings, and Princes. For otherwise we should also by these words expressly acknowledge, that the Pope hath authority to depose the King, which nevertheless we have before denied. As for example, this proposition, A stone by means of a man, or with a man, hath power to understand, is most false. For although a man be endued with the power of understanding, yet a stone neither without a man, neither with a man, neither by means of a man can understand. For this preposition by, or by means, doth signify a secondary, or instrumental cause, which supposeth a principal, as a man is said to see by means of his corporal eye: but this preposition with, doth import usually a concourse, or cooperation of two causes, as Socrates with Plato doth draw a boat. In like manner, although it were granted, that the civil commonwealth hath power in some case to depose their Prince; yet it doth not therefore follow, that the Pope either with the common wealth, or by means of the commonwealth, hath also authority to depose their Prince: for so the Pope himself, as a chief and principal cause, should also have power to depose a Prince, which nevertheless hath not been hitherto by any man sufficiently proved. As also no man can deny, but that this proposition is most true, A stone neither with the commonwealth, nor by means of the commonwealth, hath authority to depose a King. And although betwixt the Pope and a stone there is great difference in this, that a stone is not capable of such a power, and therefore neither hath, nor can have any power to depose Princes, yet if we speak only of the actual power to depose, it is manifest, that there is no difference at all betwixt them, if so be that we suppose, that the Pope hath not as yet any such authority granted him. Those therefore, that think this oath to be unlawful, by reason of the aforesaid words, do not seem, in my judgement, with any sufficient reason to be moved thereunto, for that neither the power of the commonwealth to depose the King is herein denied, neither can that opinion, which denieth such a power to be in the commonwealth, by reason of the authority of such famous Doctors, who do approve it, and for the reasons, which do move them to approve it, be for any sufficient ground drawn from the principles either of Philosophy, or Divinity, without great temerity, be condemned as temerarious, and improbable. Sect. V. 1. THe fifth, and last objection may be made against those words [or to authorize any foreign Prince to invade, or annoyed him, or his countries, or to discharge any of his subjects of their allegiance,] For it is well known, that the Pope is not only a spiritual, but also a temporal Prince, and that he hath other inferior Prince's subject to him in temporals: Therefore he hath as ample authority temporal, as any other temporal Prince whatsoever; but if a King doth any notable wrong to an other Prince, or his subjects, for repairing, or revenging of which wrong he may justly, and lawfully wage war against that King, the Prince wronged hath power to authorize other inferior Princes, who be his subjects, to bear arms, and to invade the countries of that King: Therefore the Pope, if he should receive any great loss and damage, by means of our King, which cannot be avoided, or recovered but by war, may authorize, and give leave to foreign Princes, who be his subjects, to annoyed him, and to invade his Countries; and therefore no Catholic can with a safe conscience take this oath under this general form of words. 2. To this objection it is easily answered, to wit, that the aforesaid clause of the oath, as also all the rest, which make mention of the Pope's power to depose the King, to discharge subjects of their allegiance, and to absolute from this oath, are, according to the usual and proper meaning of the words, and according to the express mind of the Lawmaker, to be understood of the Pope, as he is Pope, and the spiritual Pastor of our souls, and not as he is a temporal Prince. Neither doth the King, and Parliament in this oath intent to deny, that the same power to bear Arms, wage war, and invade Countries, which belongeth to all other secular Princes, is also granted to the Pope, as he is a secular Prince. 3. Lastly, against that clause [or to discharge any of his subjects of their allegiance, and obedience to his Majesty] I cannot see what other thing can be objected, than which before hath been objected against the former clauses. For it is most certain, as Cardinal Bellarmine h Intr●ct de potest. Papae contra Guliel. Barcla●um cap. 21. pag. 202. himself in express words acknowledgeth, that Subjects are bound by the law of God, wherein the Pope hath not authority to dispense, to bear true faith and allegiance to their lawful Prince; i Neither is it necessary to add with Cardinal Bellarmine that reduplication so long as he is Prince, for there is no man so ignorant as to imagine, that obedience is by the law of God due to a Prince, when he is no Prince. And therefore if it be lawful to acknowledge, profess, and declare, and this declaration to confirm by oath, that the Pope hath no authority to deprive a King, or which is all one, to make a King no King, it necessarily followeth, that the Pope hath not authority to discharge subjects of their allegiance, and obedience, which by the law of God and nature they own to their lawful King. CHAP. four The third branch of the Oath. ALso I do swear from my heart, that notwithstanding any declaration, or sentence of Excommunication, or deprivation made, or granted, or to be made, or granted by the Pope, or his successors, or by any authority derived, or pretended to be derived from him, or his Sea, against the said King, his Heirs, or Successors, or any absolution of the said subjects from their obedience, I will bear faith, and true allegiance to his Majesty, his Heirs, and Successors, and them will defend to the uttermost of my power, against all Conspiracies, and attempts whatsoever, which shall be made against his, or their persons, their Crown and dignity, by reason, or colour of any such sentence, or declaration, or otherwise, and will do my best endeavour to disclose and make known unto his Majesty, his Heirs and Successors, all Treasons, and traitorous conspiracies, which I shall know, or hear of, to be against him, or any of them. Sect. I 1. AGainst this branch three objections are commonly made. And first Card. Bellarmine a In Respons. ad Apologiam pro jutamento etc. printed at Collen 16 ●o. pag. 9 , Gretzer b In Comment. Exeget. cap. 6. arg. 1. 2. 3. 4. , and Lessius c Nu. 218. , as also his English Recapitulator d Pag. 5●. relateth, do object, that in those words [notwithstanding any sentence of Excommunication, I will bear faith, and true allegiance to his Majesty, etc.] is plainly denied the Pope's power to excommunicate even heretical Kings. For how a Catholic (saith Cardinal Bellarmine) swear lawfully, and justly not to obey the Pope excommunicating an heretical King, unless he believe that an heretical King cannot be excommunicated by the Pope? And Gretzer, without any proof at all, supposeth as manifest, that in the aforesaid words the Pope's power to excommunicate Kings is denied. But Lessius, foreseeing what may be answered to the aforesaid argument of Cardinal Bellarmine, preventeth the answer in these words: You will say, saith Lessius his Recapitulator, that the power to excommunicate is not here denied, but only a certain effect of excommunication, which is, that notwithstanding a Prince be excommunicated, yet shall not his subjects be released from the bond of their allegiance. But this effect doth necessarily follow the sentence of Excommunication, as the practice of the Church for the space of more than twelve hundred years doth show, which this Author [Lessius] hath evidently proved in other places of his book. 2. To this obiecton we answer, that the Pope's authority to excommunicate the King is not in the aforesaid words denied, but rather granted, and supposed, as also the Kings most excellent Majesty in his Premonition to all Christian Monarches doth in express words aver e Pag. 9 . For in this branch it is only virtually denied, that Excommunication, being a spiritual censure, worketh this temporal effect to deprive Princes of their temporal kingdoms, and dominions, or, which is all one, to make lawful Kings no Kings, and consequently to absolve subjects from their temporal obedience, which, according to the doctrine of Cardinal Bellarmine, is by the law of God due to all lawful Kings. The truth is, saith his Majesty, f In the place now cited. that the Lower house of Parliament, at the first framing of this oath, made it to contain, that the Pope had no power to excommunicate me; which I forced them to reform, only making it to conclude, that no excommunication of the Popes can warrant my subjects to practise against my person, or State; denying the deposition of Kings to be in the Pope's lawful power, as indeed I take any such temporal violence to be far without the limits of such a spiritual censure, as excommunication is. So careful was I, that nothing should be contained in this Oath, except the profession of natural allegiance, and civil, and temporal obedience, with a promise to resist to all contrary uncivil violence. 3. Now let us examine how sufficiently Cardinal Bellarmine replieth to this answer of his Majesty. For whereas his Majesty g In the Catalogue of the lies of Tortus, nu. 1. had charged Matthaeus Tortus, or Cardinal Bellarmine, whose book at that time went under Tortus his name, with lying, for that he had affirmed, that in the oath of Allegiance the Pope's power to excommunicate even heretical Kings, is expressly denied; Seeing that, saith his Majesty, the point touching the Pope's power in excommunicating Kings is neither treated of, nor defined in the oath of Allegiance, but was purposely declined: which his Majesty in his Premonition had before more at large declared, Card. Bellarmine h In his Apology chap. 15. in the first lie. to this answer replieth in this manner: 4. The Author of the book did not writ, that in the oath of Allegiance the question touching the Pope's power in excommunicating Princes is treated of, or properly defined; for he knew well enough, that in the tenor, or form of an oath there is no place to dispute Theological questions. But he affirmed, that in the aforesaid oath is denied the Pope's power to excommunicate even heretical Kings: And that this is true, it is evident by those words of the oath; Also I do swear from my heart, that notwithstanding any declaration, or sentence of Excommunication, or deprivation made, or granted, or to be made, or granted by the Pope, or his Successors, etc. I will bear faith, and true allegiance to his Majesty, his Heirs and Successors. But whosoever sweareth, that he will obey an heretical King, notwithstanding the Pope's Excommunication, doth not he together swear that he acknowledgeth not in the Pope, power to excommunicate heretical Kings? for otherwise it were not an oath, but sacrilege to swear, that he will not obey the sentence of excommunication made by the Pope against an heretical King, if he should believe, that the Pope had power to excommunicate heretical Kings. 5. But this answer of Cardinal Bellarmine, with reverence to so worthy a man, is of no force at all. For, (besides that he too rigorously wresteth that word, [treat of] as though his Majesty, affirming that the question concerning the Pope's power to excommunicate was not treated of in this oath, should understand a Theological Treatise, or Disputation, whereas it is most evident, that the true meaning, & intention of his Majesty, is, that nothing at all concerning the Pope's power to excommunicate, is either affirmed, or denied in this oath, but all mention of the aforesaid power was purposely declined) his answer is neither true, neither, if it were true, doth he thereby clear himself at all of that falsehood, wherewith his Majesty doth charge him. For why, I pray you? cannot one, either moved for hope of gain, or terrified with fear, swear that he will not obey a just excommunication, and by so swearing commit sacrilege, who nevertheless doth not deny the power itself to excommunicate? How therefore doth Cardinal Bellarmine out of those words, notwithstanding any Excommunication I will bear allegiance to his Majesty, or, to speak more plainly, notwithstanding a just Excommunication, I will not obey it, rightly deduce, that I therefore, so much as obscurely do deny the power to excommunicate? But Card. Bellarmine answereth, that whosoever sweareth in that manner, either denieth the power to excommunicate, or committeth sacrilege. Be it so. But if his Majesty would freely grant him this second, this nevertheless granted, I can in no wise perceive how he excuseth himself from falsity, in that he before not with any disjunction, but absolutely pronounced, In this branch the Pope's power to excommunicate even heretical Kings is expressly denied. 6. Secondly, neither is that true, which Cardinal Bellarmine, under the aforesaid disjunction, doth infer, to wit, that by swearing this branch, either the Pope's power to excommunicate is abjured, or sacrilege committed. For he that sweareth, that notwithstanding any sentence of excommunication to be made against the King, yet he will bear to his Majesty true faith, and obedience in temporals, although he doth swear, that he will obey the King though he be excommunicated, because Excommunication hath not power to deprive Kings of their temporal dominions, and to take away the temporal obedience of the subjects, as very learned Divine, whom heretofore i In my Apology nu. 346. I have cited, do affirm, yet he doth not swear, that he will not obey a just Excommunication, as Cardinal Bellarmine doth ill conclude. For although he believeth, that the Pope hath authority to excommunicate heretical Kings, yet he doth not believe, that Excommunication, being a spiritual censure, worketh this temporal effect, to deprive heretical Princes of their Regal authority, to make kings to be no kings, or to take away from subjects their natural and civil obedience, which by the law of God, according to Card. Bellarmine's k Before cap. 3. sect. 5 nu. 3. where also we observed, that the aforesaid reduplication added by Cardinal Bellarmine [so long as they remain King's] is superfluous. opinion, they own even to heretical Kings, so long as tney remain Kings, no whit less than to Catholics. 7. Finally, that, which Lessius affirmeth, that the absolving of subjects from the bond of their allegiance is an effect, which is necessarily annexed to the sentence of Excommunication, as the practice of the Church, for the space of twelve hundred years, and upwards, doth show, is altogether untrue. For by no practice at all of the Church can it be showed, that the absolving of subjects from the bond of their allegiance, which by the law of God is due to absolute Princes, is an effect of Excommunication, but at the most another punishment, although sometimes imposed together with Excommunication, as Suarez, Becanus, and many other Divines, whom herefore l In my Apology nu. 346. I have related, do in express words acknowledge; (concerning which punishment, whether it may for any crime be imposed by the Pope's authority upon absolute Princes, or only upon inferior Princes by the consent of absolute Princes, to whom they are subject in temporals it is now a controversy among Divines;) And very lately Becanus writeth m In controversia Anglicana cap 3. q 2. pag. 108. and in the same corrected pag. 122. in this manner: It is one thing to excommunicate a King and another thing to depose him, or to deprive him of his kingdom, neither is the one necessarily connected with the other. Many Kings and Emperors have been excommunicated, and yet not therefore deposed; and contrariwise many deposed, and yet not therefore excommunicated. Now that subjects cannot be absolved from their allegiance, unless the Prince be also deprived of his Regal authority, we have now but a little before clearly showed out of the doctrine of Cardinal Bellarmine, who expressly affirmeth, that to deny obedience to a Prince, so long as he remaineth Prince, is repugnant to the law of God, from which the Pope hath no authority to absolve. Behold therefore how well these most learned Divines of the Society of jesus do agreed among themselves in assigning the chiefest reason, for which this oath of Allegiance doth contain a flat denial of the Catholic faith. And whether we English Catholics for so weak and slender arguments, and wherein our most learned Adversaries do not agreed among themselves, are bound to hazard our perpetual liberty, and whole estate, with the utter ruin of our posterity, and withal to be accounted by our Prince no faithful subjects, I remit to the judgement of the pious, and prudent Reader. 8. Lastly, who doth not perceive, that the very same objection, which the aforesaid three Doctors have made against this third branch of the oath, to prove thereby, that this oath cannot be taken by any Catholic, without manifest abnegation of the Catholic faith, in the very self-same manner may in the same express words be alleged against those thirteen English Priests, and also against the kingdom of France, who, as we have seen before, n Cap. 3. sect. 3. nu. 13. do constantly defend, that the Pope hath not power to deprive the King of France of his kingdom, and that notwithstanding any Excommunications, which by the Pope can be made against the aforesaid King, yet the subjects are bound to yield obedience due to the King in temporals, neither can they in this be dispensed or absolved by the Pope. See also how those thirteen English Priests, whom also before o Cap. 3. sect. 3. nu. 10. we have cited, did protest, that they would yield all obedience in civil causes to Queen Elizabeth, notwithstanding any authority, or sentence of Excommunication denounced, or to be denounced against the said Queen. For in the very same manner, and for the self-same reason Cardinal Bellarmine might denounce against these, Here is clearly denied the Pope's authority to excommunicate Kings and Princes. Sect. II. 1. SEcondly, against that word [Successors] some object in this manner: It may sometimes fall out, that a Successor is not a lawful Heir, but an usurper. Seeing therefore that I am bound to take this oath according to the express words thereof, and according to the plain and common sense of the same words without any equivocation, as in the seventh branch is expressly signified: and this word [Successor] signifieth in general every Successor, either lawful, or unlawful; by virtue of this clause I am bound to swear to bear faith, and true allegiance to all his majesties Successors without limitation, and consequently to every his Successor, although he should be an usurper, therefore no Catholic can lawfully take this clause of the oath in these express words, unless to the word [Successors] this word [lawful] be added. 2. To this objection it is answered, that, although this word [Successor] doth in general, and being taken by itself signify every Seccessor either lawful, or unlawful, yet particularly, and properly, especially when it is placed in a law, it is commonly taken only for a lawful Successor, and who rightfully succeedeth. Wherefore according to that rule before p Cap. 1. sect. 3. nu. 3. alleged out of Suarez, and confirmed by the Civil law, to wit, that the words of a law must be taken in that sense, which is without default, this word [Successors] must in this oath established by his majesties law be limited only to lawful Successors, and who, according to the laws of the kingdom, do succeed. For, as according to law, id tantùm possumus, quod iure possumus: we can only do that, which we can do by law: so according to law, he only is accounted to succeed, who by lawful right doth succeed. Whereupon the Civil Lawyers do define Inheritance, q Leg nihil ff. de verborum signify. to be a succeeding to all the right of a party deceased, and an Heir, who succeedeth him in all his right; without adding lawful succeeding, or lawfully succeedeth, for that it is always so to be understood, and therefore being necessarily supposed, it is not expressed, but altogether omitted in the definitions of an Heir, and of Inheritance. And whensoever in the common, or Statute laws, or pragmatical decrees of this kingdom any mention is made of the King, and his Successors, this word [lawful] is but few times added, although always it aught to be understood: And therefore this word [Successors] in this branch of the oath is, according to the proper, usual, and civil, or legal signification of the word, to be taken only for lawful Successors. I said civil, or legal, because it may fall out, that some word by extension, restriction, parification, or fiction of the law, may have another even proper signification, than it had at the first imposition thereof, as death, son, and many like words, which in the law are also properly taken, for a civil death, and an adoptive son. Sect. III. 1. THirdly, some object against those words [And him, and them I will defend to the uttermost of my power, against all conspiracies and attempts whatsoever, which shall be made against his, or their persons, their Crown and dignity, etc. and will do my best endeavour to disclose, and make known unto his Majesty, his Heirs, and Successors, all treasons and traitorous conspiracies, which I shall know, or hear of to be against him, or any of them.] For, say they, according to the present laws of this Realms, it is Treason, and a Traitorous Conspiracy, and Attempt against his majesties Crown and dignity, to reconcile any man to the Pope, or to be reconciled, to be made a Priest beyond the Seas by the Pope's authority, and afterwards to return into this kingdom, and moreover to deny, that the King's Majesty of England is supreme Governor in his kingdom even in causes Ecclesiastical: Therefore by virtue of these words I am forced to swear to defend his Majesty against all such reconcilings, and returnings of such Priests into this kingdom, and to disclose all the aforesaid Treasons, and Traitors to his Majesty, which no Catholic by reason of his temporal, and civil obedience is bound to perform, and therefore this oath doth not contain only temporal allegiance, as his Majesty pretendeth, but many other things, which are flat contrary to Catholic doctrine. 2. To this branch also of the oath may be reduced that objection before r Cap. 2. sect. 1. nu. 1. & seq. rehearsed, which Gretzer made against those words [our Sovereign Lord] contained in the first branch: As also the principal ground, whereon Antonius Capellus in his book entitled, Against the pretended Ecclesiastical primacy of the King of England, doth chief rely s controvers. 1. cap. 2. pag. 30. & seq. , to prove, that the obedience, which his Majesty requireth of his subjects in this oath, doth to a Catholic exceed the bonds of civil obedience, invade the spiritual power of the Church, and is flat contrary to the Catholic faith, which by this argument he thinketh to demonstrate. Whosoever committeth felony, and treason, falleth from the allegiance, which is due to the King by the oath of Allegiance. But he, that will be reconciled to the Pope, he that will obey whatsoever authority the Roman Sea doth pretend, and to conclude, he that refuseth the oath of the King's Ecclesiastical Supremacy, framed in times passed by Queen Elizabeth, is guilty of felony, and treason: t He is not reputed guilty of treason, who refuseth the oath of Supremacy, unless after it ●ee three times tendered him, he shall refuse to take it. Therefore, he that will not be a perpetual enemy to the Pope, he that acknowledgeth whatsoever his authority, he that refuseth that impious oath of Supremacy, falleth from the allegiance due to the King by the oath of allegiance. 3. The Mayor proposition cannot be denied. The King himself proveth the Minor by his laws made in this very same Session of Parliament, wherein this oath is commanded. For first, the King ordaineth, that no subject of his shall departed the Realm to serve in the wars, unless he become bound by Obligation with two Sureties, not to be reconciled to the Pope, who doth otherwise, is accounted a Felon. Moreover, he is guilty of high treason, that shall cause, counsel, help, or be privy to, that any person be reconciled to the Pope, or Sea of Rome, or shall procure that any one promise' obedience to whatsoever authority of the Bishop of Rome. Neither will he have these to have their pardon, unless they shall first take two oaths, the one, of the King's Supremacy, the other this of Allegiance. 4. The King himself therefore hath by his law proved the Minor proposition to wit, that he committeth felony, and treason, who doth not swear perpetual enmity with the Pope, who will obey him in any sort whatsoever, who refuseth to take the oath of Supremacy. How therefore can Catholics with safety of the Catholic faith, which they believe, take this oath? If in this oath all friendship, all obedience, all power of the Pope be abjured, how can they take it without hurt to their souls? Wherefore it is clearly false, as I think, that only civil obedience is demanded of English men in this oath, and that the spiritual power of the Pope, or the Catholic faith is no way touched therein; and that it is truly said by Tortus, that therein is abjured the Catholic faith, and all power of the pope no less than in the oath of Supremacy. 5. Moreover, read the King's Apology, and every man shall perceive, that he bringeth the approving, confirming, and calling of Counsels to prove, that civil obedience is due to Kings. Wherefore, according to his Majesty, civil obedience doth comprehend these, which truly no Catholic doth believe to be civil things, or to belong to civil obedience. Wherefore his Majesty cannot deny, but that under the name of civil obedience he requireth of his Catholic subjects many things, which to a Catholic do exceed civil obedience. Thus far Capellus. 6. To this objection it is answered first, that, although this word, Treason, or Traitorous Conspiracy, hath of late years, according to the laws of this Realm, been extended in some sort to certain spiritual causes; yet according to the proper, formal, plain, and usual signification of this word [Treason] it only comprehendeth civil, and not spiritual causes. And although some spiritual causes be punished with the ordinary punishment of proper, and natural treason, and in that respect may be called treasons, nevertheless truly, really, and formally they are not natural treasons, neither can they in any other manner be called treasons, then may whatsoever Secular crimes, as thefts, murders, adulteries, if they be forbidden by the Prince under the punishment of true and natural treason. For true, proper, and natural treason is of the same nature in all places, in all countries, and among all nations, and is forbidden by the law of nature, and nations, although in divers Countries, according to the custom of every one it be punished divers ways, with what kind of punishment every outrageous crime, if the Prince shall so ordain, may be punished, and in that respect, taking it name from the effect, may be called Treason. 7. Secondly, and principally we answer, that, according to the rules before u Cap. 1. sect. 3. nu. 1. alleged, no human law can have greater force to bind, than the Lawmaker intendeth it shall bind, and the words of a law are to be taken in that sense, wherein the Lawmaker declareth they are to be understood. But both the King and Parliament do plainly declare, what treasons, and traitorous conspiracies they intent shall be comprehended under those names, whiles in express words they affirm, that in this oath they intent nothing else, than the profession of natural allegiance, and civil obedience, which by the law of God and nature is due to all lawful Princes, whatsoever Religion they profess, with a promise to resist, and disclose all contrary uncivil violence. So careful was I, saith his Majesty x In his Premonition p. 9 , that nothing should be contained in this oath, except the profession of natural allegiance, and civil, and temporal obedience, with a promise to resist to all contrary uncivil violence. And again in his Apology y Pag 46. , For as the oath of Supremacy (saith he) was devised for putting a difference between Papists, and them of our profession: so was this oath, which he would seem to impugn, ordained for making a difference between the civilly obedient Papists, and the perverse disciples of the powder Treason. And in the second Session of Parliament z Cap 4. holden the third year of his majesties reign, wherein this oath was devised, in the Preamble to the oath thus it is written: And for the better trial, how his majesties subjects stand affected in point of their loyalty, and due obedience, Be it also enacted, etc. Which loyalty, and due obedience in the fourth Session of Parliament a Cap. 6. in the beginning. , holden the seventh year of his majesty's reign, is in these words more clearly expressed: Whereas by a Statute made in the third year of your majesties reign, entitled, An Act for the better discovering, and repressing of Popish Recusants, the form of an oath to be ministered, and given to certain persons in the same Act mentioned, is limited, and prescribed, tending only to the declaration of such duty, as every true, and well affected subject, not only by bond of Allegiance, but also by the commandment of almighty God aught to bear to your Majesty, your Heirs, and Successors, etc. 9 Seeing therefore that his Majesty hath publicly and plainly declared, that he only requireth of his subjects the profession of natural Allegiance, and civil, and temporal obedience, with a promise to resist all contrary uncivil violence, and purposely for that cause would not, that the denying of the Pope's power to excommunicate him should be contained in this oath; and the Parliament in like manner doth only demand in this oath that obedience, which by the bond of allegiance, and the commandment of almighty God is due to his Majesty, it is most evident, that those Treasons, and traitorous conspiracies, which by virtue of this oath we are bound to disclose, and against which we are bound to defend his Majesty, are not spiritual reconcilings to the Pope, nor detecting of Priests, who do not plot any temporal conspiracy, or uncivil violence against his majesties royal person, Crown, or dignity; but only such civil, or rather uncivil treasons, and traitorous conspiracies are forbidden in this oath, and commanded to be disclosed to his Majesty, which the law of God and nature doth oblige subjects, what Religion soever they profess, not to attempt against their lawful Prince. 10. To comprehend therefore the whole matter in few words, two kind of Treasons, or traitorous conspiracies may be distinguished; the one, true, natural, and proper, which are forbidden by the law of nature, and nations, and are of the same nature in all Countries, and which are opposite to natural allegiance; the other metaphorical, positive, and improper, which are made treasons only by the positive decree of the Prince, and only for that cause are called Treasons, or Traitorous Conspiracies, for that they are punished with the punishment of true, and natural treason. The former treasons, and traitorous conspiracies his Majesty intended only to comprehend in this oath of allegiance: Concerning the later treasons, and traitorous conspiracies, which are forbidden by other laws, and oaths, his Majesty did not intent to ordain any thing at all in this oath. 11. From hence it is easy to answer to the objection of Capellus. For if his Mayor proposition be understood of true, proper, and natural treason, and of that natural allegiance, and civil obedience, which by the law of God and nature is due to every lawful Prince, what Religion soever he professeth, and which only, as hath now been showed, his Majesty intendeth to demand of his subjects in this oath, than we do willingly grant his Mayor; For whosoever committeth such treason, whosoever offereth such uncivil, or unnatural violence to his Majesty, whosoever attempteth such traitorous conspiracies, falleth from the allegiance due to his Majesty, by virtue of the oath of natural Allegiance: But then his Minor proposition is false; for he that will be reconciled to the Pope, he that refuseth the oath of the King's Supremacy in causes Ecclesiastical, etc. doth not commit natural, or rather unnatural treason, doth not offer unnatural violence to his Majesty, neither doth he attempt unnatural, or uncivil Conspiracies. For although the aforesaid reconcilings are by the later laws of this Realm adjudged Treasons, and are punishable as true, and natural Treasons, and therefore they may be called positive Treasons, yet they are not true, proper, and natural Treasons, which only by virtue of this oath we are bound to reveal, and against which only by virtue of this oath we are bound to defend his Majesty; neither are they contrary to that natural allegiance, which only the King and Parliament doth require of us in this oath. And so one may commit such treasons without falling from that natural allegiance, which is due to his Majesty by virtue of this oath of allegiance, wherein only natural allegiance is demanded of the subjects. 12. But if Capellus by the name of Treason doth in his Mayor proposition understand all sorts of treasons as well improper, and positive, as true, and natural treasons; then we deny his Mayor to be universally true. For one may commit such treasons without falling from that allegiance, which is due to his Majesty by virtue of this oath of allegiance, wherein only natural allegiance is required of the subjects, with a promise to resist all contrary unnatural violence, and to disclose all such unnatural treasons, and traitorous conspiracies, and to defend his Majesty against them to the uttermost of his power. 13. Therefore neither hath the King proved the Minor proposition by his law, as untruly affirmeth Capellus, neither hath Capellus proved it by argument, but as yet it remaineth to be proved: And therefore his Conclusion is evidently false: to wit, that in this oath all friendship, all obedience, all power of the Pope is abjured. For that only friendship, that only obedience, that only power of the Pope is denied in this oath, which cannot stand with that natural, and constant allegiance, which subjects by the law of God and nature do own to their Prince. And therefore neither is it truly said by Tortus, or Capellus, that in this oath is abjured the Catholic faith, and all power of the Pope, no less, then in the oath of Supremacy. 14. Wherefore, although we should grant to Capellus, that the King's Majesty, according to the principles of his Religion, which he embraceth, is of opinion, that many things do appertain to civil obedience, which according to Catholic doctrine do not appertain, (wherewith, as being impertinent to that, whereof now we treat, I will not intermeddle) yet we utterly deny, that his Majesty in this oath of Allegiance (for of other oaths there is no question at this present) doth require of his Catholic subjects under the name of civil obedience, anything, which to a Catholic doth exceed civil obedience: for that, as we have often said, he requireth of his subjects in this oath no other allegiance, then natural, and which by the law of God and nature all subjects own to their lawful Princes, whatsoever Religion they shall profess. 15. And truly, if this manner of arguing, which Capellus useth, were to be allowed for good and lawful, it might by the very like reason be proved, that it were not lawful for any Catholic (the present laws of this Realm standing in force) to take even that oath of Allegiance, which in times past, when the Kings were Catholics, was required of the subjects. For although Catholics should only swear in these general words, that they truly, and sincerely profess, testify, and declare, that King james is true, and lawful King of this kingdom, and of all other his majesties dominions, and that I promise' to bear unto him all true obedience and allegiance, which no man doubteth but that it is lawful to swear, as Fa. Parsons, and Becanus, before b Cap. 2. sect. 1. nu. 7. related, do affirm, yet the self-same argument of Capellus may in the very same words be also urged against this oath, as any man, though but meanly learned, may clearly perceive; which truly is a manifest sign, that the aforesaid argument of Capellus is in very deed fallacious, captious, and sophistical, as we also have sufficiently proved. CHAP. V The fourth branch of the Oath. ANd I do further swear, that I do from my heart abhor, detest, and abjure, as impious, and heretical, this damnable doctrine, and position, That Princes, which be excommunicated, or deprived by the Pope, may be deposed, or murdered by their subjects, or any other whatsoever. Cardinal Bellarmine a In editione Polita 〈◊〉 & in Coloniensi anno 1610. , and Capellus do read, may be deposed, and murdered. Sect. I 1. AGainst this fourth branch three objections are commonly made. And first some object against that word [abjure;] For, say they, this word [abjure] doth import a recalling, or recanting of a former doctrine, which one before hath maintained, and therefore this branch cannot lawfully be taken by him, who never maintained such a doctrine. Seeing therefore that all his majesties subjects indifferently, and without exception may be compelled by the Magistrate to take this oath, it is evident, that this branch cannot lawfully, and without perjury be taken by those, who never maintained this doctrine concerning the Pope's power to depose, or murder Princes. 2. To this objection it is answered, that although this word [abiurare, to abjure] be sometimes taken for to perjure b Abiurare creditum, to forswear his debt, apud Sallust. , or to forswear, yet though we turn over all the Dictionaries, we shall never find, that to abjure a doctrine, doth only signify, to recant a doctrine, which one before hath maintained; but to deny, condemn, or detest by oath any doctrine, whether before he hath maintained it, or not c Simancas in tit abiurare, nu 1 & 2. . And although in rigour of speech this word [to abjure] should signify to recant, or unsay by oath that doctrine, which before he hath maintained, yet according to the plain and common sense of this word, and according to the usual practice which is observed in abjuring heresies, or errors, this word [to abjure] doth signify to damn, deny, or detest by oath not only a doctrine, which before in very deed he hath maintained, but also which either he hath indeed maintained, or it is suspected d Simancas nu. 18. , that he hath maintained. And so the custom of the Inquisition is, that he who is either accused, or denounced before that tribunal for defending any heresy, must purge himself by abjuration, and he is compelled to abjure that heresy, whereof he is denounced, or suspected, although perchance in very deed he did never either by word teach it, or with heart believe it. Whereof we may see some examples in the great Council of Chalcedon. For in the eighth action Bishop Theodoret, who was suspected of heresy, was compelled publicly to anathematize Nestorius, and all heretics. And in the ninth, and tenth Action of the same Council, Bishop Iba, who being accused of certain errors, and found innocent, yet by reason of the suspicion, he was compelled to say e Act. decima, in fine. , I have anathematized Nestorius, and all his perverse f Dogmata. opinions, and I do now again anathematize him ten thousand times, and I do anathematize every one, who doth not hold, as this holy Synod doth. Now that the King and Parliament, by reason of that horrible Gunpowder-treason attempted by some Catholics, under pretence to advance Catholic religion, had great cause to suspect, that also other Catholics did maintain the same damnable doctrine concerning the murdering of Kings, at leastwise by the Pope's authority, which these Gunpowder-Traitors did defend, is alas, with grief I speak it, too too manifest. Sect. II. 1. SEcondly, against those words [as heretical] some Divines of this kingdom do vehemently, and almost only object, in so much that they are of opinion, that this only branch is sufficient to condemn the oath as altogether unlawful. For they persuade themselves, that out of the most certain principles of Logic it may evidently be convinced, that this branch of the oath cannot be taken by any man without manifest perjury. And this objection (which Leonard Lessius g Nu. 219. , as his English Recapitulator h Pag. 54. doth relate, Antonius Capellus i controvers. 1 cap. 1. nu. 3. pag 34. , and another Englishman, in his answer to a certain Proclamation published by his Majesty k Pag. 84. , do briefly insinuate) is more largely, and strongly urged by the Author of a certain English Dialogue, [entitled, The judgement of protestancy, and Puritanisme, both highly displeased at this passage in the oath] wherein this Author with great confidence, as it seemeth, persuadeth himself, to have clearly demonstrated, that no Protestant, or Puritan, according to the principles of their Religion, can, without manifest perjury, take this branch of the oath. And this his pretended demonstration may in the very like manner be urged against Catholics. This therefore is the sum, and substance of his demonstration, and of his whole Dialogue. 2. No man can without perjury abjure that position as heretical, which is not heretical, but this position, That Princes, which be excommunicated, or deprived by the Pope, may be deposed, or murdered by their subjects, or any other whatsoever, is not heretical: therefore no man can without perjury abjure it as heretical. The Mayor proposition he supposeth as manifest. The Minor he proveth. But first he supposeth two known grounds, and granted by all men. The first is, l Cap. 2. pag. 8. That an oath consisting of divers passages, parcels, or branches every one affirming, or denying some thing, it is impossible the whole oath should be true unless every one of the said passages, parcels, or branches be true, and lawful. For if any one parcel be false, before a man hath taken the whole, he must needs have sworn the falsehood contained in that part. And this undoubted truth is founded upon the common received principle, Bonum est ex integra causa, malum ex quocunque defectu; That which is good proceedeth of a whole and entire cause, evil proceedeth from the lest defect. 3. The second supposition is, m Pag. 13. That Heresy being an error against faith obstinately maintained in the understanding of him, that professeth Christ, it must needs follow, that nothing can be heretical, unless it contain some error against faith. So that although a position be repugnant to natural reason, yet it is not enough to make it heretical, unless it contain some falsehood against faith, and consequently to the express word of God; which according to the Protestants doctrine, is the sole and only rule of faith, and the only touchstone to try faith from heresy. Many positions are false, as that London is but a mile distant from York, but not heretical, because their falsehood is only repugnant to natural reason, and is not contained in the express word of God. These being supposed, he argueth in this manner. 4. Whensoever an affirmative proposition is heretical, of necessity it must either be against faith, and consequently against the express word of God, or else the contradictory negative must be a position of faith, and contained in the express word of God: But neither this affirmative position, That Princes, which be excommunicated, or deprived by the Pope, may be deposed, or murdered by their subjects, or any other whatsoever, is against the express word of God, neither the contradictory negative, to wit, That Princes being excommunicated, or deprived by the Pope, may not be deposed, or murdered by their subjects, or any other whatsoever, is contained in the express word of God. Therefore the former position, That Princes being excommunicated, or deprived by the Pope, may be deposed, or murdered by their subjects, or any other whatsoever, is not heretical. 5. And if perchance it should be answered, that, whereas it is written in the 20. chapter of Exodus, Thou shalt not kill: and 1 Reg. 26. Destroy him not, for who shall lay his hand on the Lord his anointed, and be guiltless? one part of the aforesaid position, to wit, That Princes may be murdered, is heretical, and against the express word of God, and therefore the whole position, in regard of this one part, may be abjured as heretical; yet this answer is not sufficient: For the position in hand to wit, That Princes being excommunicated, or deprived by the Pope, may be deposed, or murdered by their subjects, or any other whatsoever, doth not absolutely affirm, that Princes, after they be excommunicated, or deprived by the Pope, may be murdered by their subjects, or any other whatsoever, but with a disjunction, to wit, my be deposed, or murdered. And therefore, although the position were heretical, if it did only affirm, they might be murdered, yet not affirming this, but only that they may be deposed, or murdered, there is no show of heresy in it in regard of being contrary to the aforesaid texts of Scripture, to which it is nothing contrary at all. 6. For according to the most true and approved rule of the Logicians, to make a disjunctive proposition, or any thing affirmed under a disjunction, to be false and heretical, it is necessary, that both parts of the disjunction be also false and heretical, neither is it sufficient, that one only part be heretical. And therefore although the second part of the disjunction, to wit, That Princes may be murdered, be heretical, and against the express word of God, yet because the first part of the disjunction, to wit, That Princes, being excommunicated, or deprived by the Pope, may be deposed by their subjects, or any other whatsoever, is not heretical, nor contrary to the express word of God, the whole disjunction position cannot be in very deed heretical, and therefore by no Protestant, or Puritan can it be abjured, as heretical. And this is the sum and substance of the pretended demonstration of this Author, and also of his whole Dialogue. 7. The very self same argument, which this Author maketh against Protestants, and Puritans, may in the very like manner be alleged against Catholics, who hold, that the infallible rule of faith is the holy word of God delivered by Scripture, or Tradition, and the true sense, and right meaning thereof declared so to be by the Catholic Church, unto whom the infallible assistance of the holy Ghost, to declare the true sense and meaning of God his holy word, was promised by Christ our Lord. For neither out of holy Scripture, or Tradition, neither by any definition of the Church, or General Council, can it sufficiently be proved, that the Pope hath not authority to deprive Princes, or that after they be deprived by the Pope, they may not be deposed by their subjects, or any other whatsoever, but rather by the continual practice of Popes the contrary seemeth to be supposed for certain, which also Cardinal Bellarmine, both in his Controversies, and in his answer to Doctor Barcklay, doth endeavour (but in vain) to demonstrate. 8. Wherefore in this branch, saith Lessius, as his English Recapitulator n Pag. 54. 55. relateth, the doctrine of the Catholic Church is abjured as heretical, and impious: For the plain sense of the oath condemneth not only the opinion of murdering, but also of deposing, and he that taketh the oath, abjureth both the one, and the other. And were the sense ambiguous, yet could it not be taken, it being in a matter belonging to faith, wherein no equivocation, or ambiguous speeches may be used. Whereby it is evident, that no man can from his heart detest this Catholic doctrine as impious, and heretical, if he be not himself already fallen deeply into heresy, and impiety. 9 To this objection two Answers are usually made. The first, and principal answer is, that albeit the aforesaid proposition, Princes, which be excommunicated, or deprived by the Pope, may be deposed, or murdered by their Subjects, etc. doth seem by reason of that later conjunction [or] to be a disjunctive proposition, or rather a categorical proposition of such a disiunct predicate, as the Logicians term it, which virtually doth imply, or may be resolved into a disjunctive proposition (to the verity of which disjunctive proposition is only required, as it was said in the objection, that one part of the disjunction be true, and to make the whole disjunction false, and heretical, both parts of the disjunction must be false, and heretical, neither doth it suffice that one only part be false and heretical) Nevertheless, according to the common sense, and meaning of the words, it is in very deed, and according to our English phrase, equivalent to a copulative proposition, or rather to a categorical proposition of such a copulate predicate, which may be resolved into a copulative proposition, to the verity whereof, according to the Logicians rule, it is contrariwise required, that both parts of the copulation be true, and to make the whole proposition false, and heretical, it is not required, that both parts of the copulation be false, and heretical, but it sufficeth that one only part thereof be false, and heretical. Neither is it unusual, that a conjunction disjunctive be sometimes taken for a copulative, and contrariwise a copulative for a disjunctive, as we may see in leg. sape. ff. de verborum significat. Whereof read Felinus in cap. inter caeteras, extra, de rescriptis. joannes Azorius, tom. 1. Instit. lib. 5. cap. 25. and Salas disp. 21. de Legibus sect. 3. regula 26. 10. But if any one will needs contend, that the aforesaid proposition, Princes, which are excommunicated by the Pope, etc. by reason of that disjunctive conjunction [or] is indeed a disjunctive proposition, this notwithstanding being granted, the objection may easily be answered. For albeit we admit it to be a disjunctive proposition, nevertheless we affirm, that it is not an absolute disjunctive, whereof the aforesaid rule of the Logicians, to wit, that both parts of the disjunction must be heretical to make the whole disjunction to be heretical, is to be understood, but it is a conditional disjunctive, which importeth a free choice, or election of the will, or, which is all one, a free power to choose whether part of the disjunction we please; to the verity of which conditional disjunctive is required, that you may choose whether part of the disjunction you please; and if it be heretical to affirm, that it is in the free power of the will to choose whether part of the disjunction we please, the whole disjunction, or disjunctive proposition, implying such a condition, or free election, without doubt is heretical. 11. Now that this disjunctive conjunction [or,] being placed in the aforesaid proposition, doth in common sense, according to our English phrase, import a copulation, or such a disjunction, which leaveth a free power in the Subjects to choose whether part they will, that is, to depose the King, or if they please, to murder him, will most evidently appear, if both in common speech, and also in the laws of the Realm, we diligently consider the proper, and usual signification of this word [may] when there followeth the conjunction disjunctive [or.] And this may be showed by almost innumerable examples, whereof some of them we will here set down. As for example: You may stay here, or departed. You may eat, or drink, You may buy in such a place wine, or oil. You may have in the shambleses beef, or mutton. You may go to such a place by land, or by water. You may buy that land in fee-farm, or by lease. The King by virtue of an Act of Parliament may take of convicted Popish Recusants twenty pounds for every month, or the third part of all their lands. The Sheriff may presently hung a thief condemned to die, or delay his death for some small time. If any person hold any lands of any other Lord, then of the King, by Knight's service, he may give, dispose, or assure by his last will and testament two parts of the said lands holden by Knight's service, or of as much thereof as shall amount to the full yearly value of two parts. If a man by his last will and testament ordain, that his Executors may bestow twenty pounds upon the poor, or repair such a bridge, it is in the free power of the Executors to choose whether of those two they please. Finally, in clauses of revocation, where the words are, that one may by any deed in his life time, or by his last will and testament revoke the said uses, and limit new, it is in his free power and choice to do it by the one, or by the other, as he shall please. And in infinite such like examples the verb [may] implieth a free power to choose either part of the disjunction one pleaseth, neither can there scarcely be alleged any one example, wherein the conjunction disjunctive [or] immediately following the verb [may] is not so take. 12. Wherefore the plain and usual meaning of the aforesaid proposition, [Princes, which be excommunicated, or deprived by the Pope, may be deposed, or murdered by their subjects, etc.] or, which is all one, Subjects may depose, or murder their Prince, being excommunicated or deprived by the Pope, (for in this last the verb passive is only changed into the active) is, that it is in the free choice of the Subjects to depose such a Prince, or, if they will, to murder him. So that if it be heretical to affirm, as without doubt it is, that it is in the free power of the Subjects to depose, or murder such a Prince, because it is heretical, and against the express word of God to affirm, that they may murder him, the aforesaid position consisting of that disjunction is heretical, and therefore it may without any danger at all of perjury be abjured as heretical. 13. From hence it may be gathered first, that, according to the common, and usual understanding of our English phrase, there is a great distinction betwixt these two verbs [may] and [can.] For [can] doth usually signify a power in general, whether it be natural, or moral; but [may] for the most part importeth a moral power; to wit, if it be used alone without any conjunction following it, most commonly it signifieth a lawfulness to do the thing proposed: As, I may do this, signifieth, that it is lawful for me to do this: but if there follow it a conjunction copulative, or disjunctive, it implieth a choice, or free power to choose whether part of the disjunction, or copulation one william. 14. Seeing therefore that the Latin verb [possum] implieth power in general, whether it be natural, or moral, and according to the thing affirmed, or denied, it is limited to a natural, or moral power, as in this proposition, Ignis potest comburere: The fire hath power to burn, it signifieth a natural, and necessary power in the fire to burn; and in this, Potest homo eligere bonum, aut malum; A man hath power to choose good, or evil, it signifieth a free, and moral power: from hence it followeth, that this proposition, Subjects may depose, or murder their Prince, being excommunicated, or deprived by the Pope, is not so properly, and significantly translated into Latin by the verb [possum] Subditi possunt deponere, aut occidere suum principem excommunicatum, etc.] as by the substantive of [possum] or by the verb permittitur, to wit, in potestate est subditorum, or, permittitur subditis principem suum excommunicatum, vel deprivatum per pontificem deponere, aut occidere: It is in the power of subjects, or, it is permitted to subjects to depose, or murder their Prince, being excommunicated, or deprived by the Pope. And therefore the Latin translation of this oath, doth not by the verb [possum] sufficiently express the proper, and usual signification of the verb [may] contained in the aforesaid position, unless either the conjunction copulative [and] be put in place of [may] to wit, Principes per Papam excommunicati, vel deprivati possunt per suos subditos deponi & occidi, deposed, and murdered, as Cardinal Bellarmine, and Antonius Capellus have it in their books translated: or else there be understood a condition of the free will to choose whether part of the disjunction one pleaseth, to wit, possunt deponi per suos subditos, aut, si velint, occidi, be deposed, or if the subjects will, be murdered. 15. Secondly, from hence it is also gathered, that in a disjunctive proposition, wherein is implied a condition of the will, to choose freely either part of the disjunction, it maketh all one sense, whether the conjunction copulative [and] or the disjunctive [or] be used. For both of them do signify a free power to choose which part one pleaseth: and so the conjunction disjunctive hath in sense the virtue, and force of a copulative, and the copulative of a disjunctive. Wherefore the ancient Fathers, when they speak of our free will, and do affirm, that it is in our power to choose good, or evil, they use indifferently the conjunction disjunctive [or,] and the copulative [and,] sometimes affirming, that it is in our power to choose good, or evil: other times, that it is in our power to choose good, and evil. Yea Cardinal Bellarmine himself propounding in his Controversies the question concerning free will, doth confounded [or] with [and] and taketh them for all one. There is a controversy (saith he) o Tom. 4. lib. 5. cap. 13. betwixt Catholics, and heretics, whether a man in the state of corrupt nature hath free will to choose moral good, [and] to avoid evil, or which is all one, to observe, [or] break moral precepts. 16. Seeing therefore that in this proposition, Princes being excommunicated, or deprived by the Pope, may be deposed, or murdered by their subjects; or, which is all one, Subjects may depose or murder their Prince, being excommunicated, or deprived by the Pope, the verb [may] doth import a free power in the subjects to choose which part of the disjunction they please, that is, to depose him, or if they please, to murder him, it maketh all one sense, whether it be said, Princes may be deposed, or murdered by their subjects, or, Princes may be deposed, and murdered by their subjects; as Cardinal Bellarmine p In editione Politana, & Coloniensi, printed 1610. and Antonius Capellus q Pag. 12. putting the conjunction copulative [and,] do seem to have well observed, and to be of opinion, that the aforesaid disjunctive proposition is in very deed equivalent to a copulative, or such a conditional disjunctive, which virtually doth contain a copulative. And truly if this pretended demonstration of this Author were so evident an argument, as he imagineth it to be, to condemn this oath as sacrilegious, without doubt it could not have escaped the most quick understanding of Cardinal Bellarmine, who also would not have neglected to produce any reason, which might clearly have convinced the oath to be apparently unlawful. 17. Now from this which hath been said, it is easy to answer in form to the aforesaid objection, whose whole strength dependeth upon the nature, and quality of a disjunctive proposition. Wherefore to the Minor proposition it is answered, that it is heretical, and against the express word of God contained in the aforesaid two texts of holy Scripture, to affirm, that Princes, which be excommunicated, or deprived by the Pope, may be deposed, or murdered by their subjects, or any other whatsoever: or which is all one, that Subjects, or any other whatsoever, may depose, or murder Princes, which be excommunicated, or deprived by the Pope. For the plain and common meaning of this proposition is, as we have showed before, that it is in the free power of subjects, or of any other whatsoever, to depose such Princes, or if they will, to murder them, which proposition is flat heretical. 18. And whereas it is objected, that the aforesaid proposition, Princes, which he excommunicated, etc. is a disjunctive, but to the verity of a disjunctive proposition it is sufficient, that one part of the disjunction be true, and to make the whole disjunctive proposition to be false, and heretical, it is necessary, according to the most certain rule of the Logicians, that both parts of the disjunction be false, and heretical. It is answered first to the Mayor, that although in external sound the aforesaid proposition, Princes which be excommunicated, etc. seem to be disjunctive, yet in very deed, and according to the plain and common understanding of our English phrase, it is, as we have already showed, equivalent to a copulative, to the verity whereof it is necessary, that both parts of the copulation be true, and to make the whole copulative proposition to be false and heretical it sufficeth, that one only part of the copulation be false and heretical. Now that one part of the aforesaid proposition, to wit, that, Princes, which be excommunicated, or deprived by the Pope, may be murdered by their subjects, or any other whatsoever, is flat heretical, is too too manifest. 19 But jest we should seem to contend about the bore words, we answer secondly, and grant that the aforesaid proposition, Princes, which be excommunicated, etc. is a disjunctive: but then the Minor proposition is to be distinguished: For when the Logicians affirm, that to the verity of a disjunctive proposition it is sufficient that one part of the disjunction be true, and to make the whole disjunctive heretical, it is necessary that both parts of the disjunction be heretical, that approved rule of the Logicians is to be understood of an absolute disjunctive, to wit, which doth not virtually contain in it a condition, or free power in the will to choose whether part one pleaseth: For to the verity of this conditional disjunctive it is necessary, that both parts of the disjunction may be chosen, and if it be heretical to affirm, that it is in the free choice of any man to choose whether part of the disjunction he pleaseth, the whole disjunctive proposition is heretical. Now that it is heretical to affirm, that it is in the free power of the subjects to depose, or if they will, to murder their Prince, being excommunicated, or deprived by the Pope, no man can call in question. 20. Nevertheless, the Author of this Dialogue doth seem to deal somewhat cunningly, and endeavoureth not so much to impugn directly the affirmative proposition, which is expressly contained in the oath, and to prove directly, that the aforesaid position, Princes being excommunicated, etc. may be deposed, or murdered, not to be heretical, as the oath affirmeth; but he flieth from the affirmative to the negative, and endeavoureth to show, that the contradictory proposition, to wit, Princes being excommunicated, etc. cannot be deposed, or murdered, etc. is not certain of faith, nor contained in the express word of God; from whence he concludeth, that the former affirmative proposition, which is in express words contained in the oath, is not heretical; because in what degree or falsehood any position is false, in the opposite degree of truth the contradictory must be true. 21. But this Author by his manner of arguing seemeth desirous to shun the difficulty, and to impugn a proposition, which is more clear, and manifest, by another more obscure, and equivocal, which among Logicians is accounted a great defect in arguing, whose nature is to prove one thing less manifest by another more apparent. For the falsehood of this affirmative position, Princes, which be excommunicated, or deprived by the Pope, may be deposed, or murdered by their subjects, etc. or which is all one, Subjects may depose, or murder their Prince, being excommunicated, etc. is more clear and manifest in the common understanding of our English phrase, then is the truth of this negative, Subjects may not depose, or murder their Prince who is excommunicated, etc. by reason of that negative adverb [not] which, as the Logicians say, is of a malignant nature; for that it destroyeth, or denieth whatsoever followeth after it, making an affirmative to be a negative, and a negative to be an affirmative, an universal to be a particular, and a particular to be an universal r As this universal affirmative proposition, all men are sensible, is by putting not in the beginning, Not all men are sensible, made a particular negative. . So that the meaning of the aforesaid negative proposition is by reason of that negative adverb [not] made ambiguous, and may have this sense, that Subjects may neither depose, nor murder their Prince, being excommunicated, etc. which proposition so understood is not of faith, neither in very deed contradictory to the proper and usual meaning according to our English phrase, of the former affirmative which is abjured in the oath. And therefore no marvel, that this Author was desirous to fly from the affirmative propsition to the negative. 22. Supposing therefore, that contradiction, according to the approved doctrine of Aristotle s Lib. 1. de Interpret. cap. 4. is an affirming, and denying of the self-same thing in the self-same manner, we answer, that this negative position, Princes, which be excommunicated etc. may not be deposed, or murdered by their subjects, etc. is contradictory to that affirmative position, which is abjured in the oath, if the verb [may] be taken in the same manner, or sense in the negative, as it is taken in the affirmative: And then, that as the affirmative is heretical, so the negative is of faith. For as the sense of the affirmative is, as we have showed before, that it is in the free choice of the subjects either to depose their Prince being excommunicated, etc. or, if they will, to murder him, which is false, heretical, and against those express words of Scripture, Thou shalt not kill; Destroy him not, etc. So the sense of the negative contradictory must be, that it is not in the free choice of the subjects to depose such Princes, or if they please, to murder them; which proposition is most true, and contained in the express word of God, because it is not in their free power to murder them, as is manifest by the former places of Scripture. And this, which hath been said, is sufficient for any man, but of mean learning, to perceive both the weakness of this Author's pretended demonstration, or rather scarce probable argumentation taken from the nature and quality of a disjunctive proposition, and also how rashly, and without sufficient proof, Lessius, as his English Recapitulator relateth, so barely affirmeth, that in this branch the Catholic doctrine is abjured as heretical, and impious, and that the plain sense of the oath doth not only condemn the opinion for murdering Princes, but also for deposing them. 23 And thus much concerning the first and principal answer to this second objection. The four next numbers 24. 25. 26. 27. which are in the Latin Edition concerning the nature, and conditions of copulative, and disjunctive propositions, because they cannot easily be understood by the unlearneder sort; and also for that they are not very necessary to the full understanding of this first answer to the former objection, I have in this English Edition purposely omitted. 28. The second principle answer, which some of our countrymen do make to the aforesaid objection, is gathered from the doctrine of Cardinal Bellarmine t Lib 2. de Concil. cap. 12. , who expounding that sentence of Pope Gregory the first u Lib. 1. ep. 24. , I confess, that I do receive the four first Counsels, as the four books of the Gospel, affirmeth, that the adverb [as] doth import a similitude, and not an equality, as that Matth. 5. Be you perfect, as your heavenly father is perfect. For in like manner these do answer, that those words, I do abhor, detest, and abjure as heretical, etc. do not import an equality, but a similitude; and so in common speech do only signify, that I do exceedingly detest that doctrine. And so we usually say, I hate him as the Devil, I love him as my brother, not intending thereby to affirm, that the one is in truth a Devil, or the other my brother. 29. Now to omit that word [murdered] as though there were no mention at all made in the oath concerning the murdering of Princes, and to speak only of deposing them; these men affirm, that the aforesaid position, Princes, which be excommunicated, or deprived by the Pope, may be deposed by their subjects, or any other whatsoever, supposing that this question concerning the Pope's power to depose Princes is not yet decided, is in their judgements a false, and seditious proposition, and that it hath some similitude with error, and heresy; not for that they think it to be in very deed heretical, or erroneous, but for that they do constantly hold it to be of such a nature, that it may be condemned by the Church as an erroneous, and heretical proposition, if deposing be taken in that sense, as it is in this branch of the oath distinguished from depriving. For to deprive a Prince, is to take away by a lawful sentence his Regal authority, and in this branch is referred to the Pope, but to depose a Prince, is to thrust him out of the possession of his kingdom, and in this branch is referred to subjects, or any other whatsoever. The falsehood therefore of the aforesaid position may be gathered partly from holy Scripture, Tender to Caesar the things which are Caesar's; which precept is plainly understood not only of rendering to Caesar which is Caesar's, but also of not taking away from him that which is his, and which he lawfully possesseth: as also contrariwise the plain meaning of that precept of the Decalogue, Thou shalt not steal, is not only to take away unjustly that thing which is our neighbours, but also not to tender to him that which is his; and partly it may be gathered from the most true principles of the Divines, and Lawyers, to wit, that no man is to be put out of his lawful possession, until the right of the adverse part be sufficiently decided. Seeing therefore that this question concerning the Pope's power to deprive Princes, is not as yet sufficiently decided, for that as yet the judge hath not determined the controversy, as Trithemius x Cited before cap. 3. sect. 3. nu. 5. well affirmed, and we also heretofore have showed, so long as it is in question among Catholics, and probably disputed on both sides, whether the Pope hath such authority to deprive Princes, or not, they can not by virtue of any Excommunication, or sentence of deprivation made by the Pope against them, be deposed by their subjects, or any other whatsoever, or which is all one, be violently by their subjects, or any other thrust out from their kingdom, which they do rightfully possess. By this therefore which hath been said it is manifest enough, that according to both these answers, although many do like better the former, that the aforesaid position, Princes, which be excommunicated, or deprived by the Pope, may be deposed, or murdered by their subjects, or any other whatsoever, may truly, lawfully, and without any danger of perjury be abjured as impious, and heretical doctrine. Sect. III. 1. THirdly, some object against those words [this damnable doctrine:] for say they, no man can truly detest, abhor, and abjure, that which is not, but there is no such doctrine, which affirmeth, that Princes which be excommunicated, or deprived by the Pope may be murdered by their Subjects, or any other whatsoever (in which sense the aforesaid position, according to the first, and principal answer to the former objection, is understood) therefore according to that former answer no man can truly, and with a safe conscience take the aforesaid clause of the oath. 2. To this objection it is answered by denying both the Mayor, and the Minor proposition. For to detest and abhor a doctrine (which is all one with to abjure, if this detestation be confirmed by oath) being an act of the will, and not of the understanding, wherein truth, and falsehood do only reside, is not to affirm, that the doctrine, which I detest, is at that time defended by any, but it doth only signify, that I have a great dislike, and hatred (of which my dislike I call God to witness) to that doctrine, whether heretofore it hath been maintained, or hereafter may be maintained, or that time, when I abjure it, it is maintained, or else suspected to be maintained by any. Now, that it may justly be suspected, that this doctrine, to wit, that Princes, which be excommunicated, or deprived by the Pope, may be murdered by their Subjects, is maintained by Catholics, the late most wicked murders of the two Kings of France, together with that execrable Powder-Treason intended by certain Catholics do yield sufficient testimony. For if before any public Excommunication, or sentence of deprivation denounced by the Pope against the aforesaid three Kings, those Traitors thought it lawful to murder them, how much more would they approve this doctrine to murder Princes as lawful, if they should by the Pope be Excommunicated, deprived, and declared to be public enemies of the Church? 3. Besides, a Prince deprived by the Pope, according to the opinion of those, who defend the Pope's authority to deprive Princes, is not a true, and a lawful Prince, but a Tyrant, not only such a one, who governeth the Kingdom wickedly, and Tyrannically, but also who hath no authority to reign; but whether the doctrine of lawfully killing such a Tyrant, is at this time maintained by any Catholic, let the writings of joannes Mariana, Emanuel Sa, Gregorious Valentia, and other Divines, who treat of this question, give judgement. 4. Moreover, doth not Gregorius de Valentia, a most learned jesuite, most manifestly teach this doctrine, of kill Kings by the Pope's authority? For thus he writeth. By y 2.2. Disp. 1. q. 12. punct. 2. assertio. 2. the authority of the Church, and so also of the Pope, any man for the sin of apostasy, and forsaking of his faith, may be altogether deprived of his dominion, and superiority over his Subjects, etc. This assertion is proved first, and invincibly by all those arguments, whereby in the precedent question punct. 3. we have convinced, that Heretics, and Apostatates from the faith may by the authority of the Church be deprived even of their life. For if they may be deprived of their life, much more of all their goods, and therefore also of the Superiority over others, seeing that life doth overway all such kind of temporal goods, and it being taken away, all other things are with it taken away. The like also hath Martinus Becanus z Both in his English controversy, which was censured at Rome, cap. 3. q. 3. pag. 115. and in his corrected pag. 130. a Divine of the same Society of jesus, who from the authority, which the high Priests had in the old Testament to depose Princes, endeavoureth to prove, that the same authority was also given to the Pope in the new Testament; and withal in the same place he affirmeth, that the high Priest in the old Testament had authority to command that Kings should be killed, if they were rebellious, and would not obey his sentence, from whence he inferreth, that he might also deprive them of their Kingdom. The high Priest, saith he, might in the old Testament deprive Kings of their life, therefore also of their Kingdom. Of this no man doubteth. And who perceiveth not, that this argument was by Becanus produced for this end, to show, that as much authority was granted to the Priests of the new Testament over Kings, and Princes, as was given to the Priests of the old Testament. 5. And what shall we say of jasper Sciopius in that his railing Eccelesiasticus, which is stuffed with malapert reproachful speeches against our King's Majesty, who also in express terms maintaineth this doctrine of kill Kings by the Pope's authority. Christ, saith he, a Cap. 42. pag. 140. when now the Church, which is Christ's body was come to full age, hath armed her with an iron read, or with the secular sword, etc. to be revenged of the Heathens, and to rebuke the people, to bind their Kings in fetters, and their nobles in manacles of iron, that they may judge them as it is written, Psalm. 149. Or, that his Viceroys, to wit, Peter, and his Successors may judge them according to Kingly right, and by prescript of the law: that is, when they will not receive the law of Chrsst, and acknowledge him for their King, may deprive them of their Kingdom, and withal also of their life. See also the argument which heretofore in my Apology b Nu. 43 & seq. I urged to prove, that Kings, and Princes, if for the spiritual good, may by the Pope's authority be deprived of all their temporal goods, may in like manner for the same spiritual good be deprived of their life, which is also a temporal thing c The same doctrine of depriving Kings of their life by the Pope's authority, haht now lately published Doctor Schulckenius in his answer to Widrington, pag 413. & 490. and Doctor Weston, who affirmeth pag. 403. that the Pope hath authority not only to deprive Princes of their Kingdoms, but also to dispose of the bodies of Christians, although in other places they would gladly wind themselves out of this labyrinth: but all in vain, as hereafter, God willing, we will manifestly show. . CHAP. VI The fifth branch of the Oath. ANd I do believe, and in conscience am resolved, that neither the Pope, nor any person whatsoever hath power to absolve me of this oath, or any part thereof. Sect. I 1. AGainst this branch five objections are commonly made. First, Cardinal Bellarmine a In respons. ad Apolog. pag. 10 of the Collen edition 1610. objecteth against those words, [That the Pope hath not power to absolve me from this oath, or any part thereof,] in which words, saith he, the Pope's power to absolve, or lose is denied. For out of those words of our Saviour, whatsoever thou shalt lose upon earth, shall be loosed also in Heaven, all Catholics do gather, that it belongeth to the Pope's authority, not only power to absolve from sins, but also from Punishments, Censures, Laws, Vows, and Oaths, whensoever it is expedient to the glory of God, and the health of souls. 2. To this objection it is answered, that in this branch of the oath is not denied in general the Pope's power to absolve from oaths, as some unlearned Catholics do imagine, and Cardinal Bellarmine by urging this objection, seemeth desirous to persuade them to the same; but herein is only denied the Pope's power to absolve me from this oath, or any part thereof. Neither is this manner of arguing to be approved as lawful, but to be rejected as deceitful, and captious. The Pope hath not authority to absolve me from this oath, therefore he hath not authority to absolve from oaths. 3. All Catholics do acknowledge, that the Pope hath power to absolve from punishments, laws, vows, and oaths, but not from all: who will affirm, that he hath authority to absolve a Thief, or Traitor justly condemned by the Secular Magistrate to death, from the gallows? Very many Divines both virtuous, and learned do aver, that the Pope hath not power to absolve any man from the solemn vow of Religion, and that he hath not authority out of his own territories, to make a bastard so legitimate in temporals, that he shall have as much right to inherit as other lawful children have. And from oaths, if the absolving from them should tend to the temporal prejudice of a third person, many Catholic Doctors are of opinion, that the Pope hath no authority to absolve, unless he have temporal jurisdiction over that third person. 4. To that, whatsoever thou shalt lose, I answer, saith joannes Parisiensis b In tract. de potest. Regia, & Papali cap. 15 , according to Saint Chrysostome, and Rabanus, that by this is not understood to be given him any authority, but spiritual, to wit, to absolve from the bond of sins. For it were folly to understand, that by this is given authority to absolve from the bond of debts. And therefore this manner of arguing, from a particular to infer an universal, is not only deceitful, and captious, but being in a matter of so great importance, as to prove, that no Catholic can without flat denial of the Catholic faith take this oath, to the perpetual loss of his liberty, and of all his goods, and to the utter ruin of his whole posterity, it is, I speak it with grief, too too pernicious. And whether Cardinal Bellarmine by these his sophistical arguments giving cause to so great overthrow of Catholics, be bound to restitution, I leave it both to his own conscience, and to the virtuous, and learned Reader to examine. 5. Besides, what excessive, and almost illimitate power he giveth to the Pope, to absolve from punishments, laws, vows, and oaths, to wit, whensoever it is expedient to the glory of God, and the health of souls, (seeing that there can scarcely be assigned any certain limit of those things, which are expedient to the glory of God) and what great inconveniencies both to Princes, and Subjects by this doctrine may arise, I have in an other place c In my Apology nu. 52. & seq. partly insinuated, and partly the prudent Reader will easily comprehend. The truth of Catholic faith necessary to eternal salvation can be no whit prejudicial either to Pope, Princes, or Subjects, and therefore it aught by Doctors, and Pastors to be clearly, perspicuously, and without artificious colouring of words to be declared & propounded to the faithful people, who, as they are fearful to disobey the Pope, whom they acknowledge to be their supreme Pastor in spirituals, so also they are desirous to yield all obedience by the law of God, and nature due to their lawful Prince, whom they profess to be their sovereign Lord in temporals 6. Lastly, that the Reader may most clearly perceive, upon how weak a ground Card. Bellarmine, and the rest, who condemn this branch of the oath as unlawful, do rely, it is to be observed, that there are two kinds of oaths assigned by the Divines, d S, Thom. 22. q 89 ar. 7. & 9 Caiet ibidem. Petrus Aragona ibidem art. 3. 7 & 9 Greg. de Valentia 2. 2. disp. 6. q. 7. punct. 4. Sayrus lib. 5. Thesauri cap. 2. & 8. Sylvester verbo juramentum 1. & 5. nu. 2. & alii Summistae. the one they call an assertory oath, and the other, a promissory. An assertory oath is that which is taken for the affirming or denying of a thing present or past. As for example, I swear that I have ever been a most loyal Subject to King James. I swear, that I do truly, and sincerely acknowledge, and profess, that King james is my Sovereign Lord in temporals, & that he is lawful King of this Kingdom of England. I swear, that I do from my heart detest this impious doctrine, which teacheth, that Princes, although they be excommunicated or deprived by the Pope, may be murdered by their subjects, or any other whatsoever, and so of the rest. And this assertory oath can not be dispensed withal, neither hath the Pope power to absolve any man from the bond of this kind of Oath. The reason is, because the matter of this oath, or, which is all one, that thing which in this oath is affirmed or denied, being of an act present or past, is now made altogether necessary, and irrevocable, for that as soon as ever the Oath was made, it was either true, or false by reason of the truth or falsehood of the act, which now is past. Wherefore seeing that it is impossible, that the act, which is past, be not past, so also it is impossible, that the Pope's dispensation, or absolution can altar it, or recall it. For it is impossible, that the act of swearing, which is now, or hath been true, be not now, or hath not been true. 7 The Pope indeed hath power to absolve any man in the Court of conscience from the sin, or offence, if perchance by false, unjust, or inconsiderate swearing he hath offended, and being penitent doth confess the same: but this is not the plain & common meaning of this word [absolve] contained in this branch of the Oath, as some unlearned Catholics with us do imagine, who therefore are fearful to take this branch, suspecting that the Pope's power to absolve from sins in the Sacrament of Penance, is abjured herein. For to absolve from an Oath, is all one, with to dispense therein, or to release the obligation thereof; but no dispensation, or absolution can make, that the act of swearing, which is, or hath been false, is not, or hath not been false. And therefore according to the common doctrine of all Divines, dispensation, absolution, commutation, relaxation, irritation are not extended, neither do they appertain to assertory oaths, 8. A promissory oath is that, which is taken for the performing, or not performing of some future thing. As for example, I swear that I will always bear true faith and allegiance to King james, that I will to the uttermost of my power defend him from all conspiracies, and will do my best endeavour to make them known to his Majesty. But in this promissory oath, one thing I do affirm, to wit, that, when I do promise, I do sincerely, and unfeignedly promise'; the other thing I do promise, to wit, that I will truly perform what I do promise; or to use other words, which in sense are all one; in this promissory oath two kinds of truth are to be considered, one is already present, which doth consist in this, that he, who sweareth, do affirm the truth, which is, that he have a presennt intention, unless he will be perjured, to make that true, or, which is all one, to perform that, which he hath promised to perform; which act of swearing doth not differre from the nature and quality of an assertory oath and therefore is altogether invariable and indispensible: the other truth is future, which doth consist in this, that he make that true which he promised, by really performing that thing which he swore to perform, which thing to be performed, seeing that it is variable in such sort, that in some case the performance thereof may be unlawful or hurtful, therefore such a promissory oath may be dispensed withal, because such a dispensation & absolution is not from the act of swearing, but from the the thing which is sworn, in such sort, that as by obligation of the oath I was bound to perform that thing, which by oath I promised to perform, so by virtue of absolution or dispensation, I am freed from performing the same. For this is the effect of absolution and dispensation, that the thing, which before was a fit matter to be sworn, and to be performed, now upon just occasion is no fit matter to be sworn, or to be performed. As for example, if one should swear to fast, and afterwards he should be doubtful, that this fasting would be either evil, or an hindrace of greater good, he might also justly doubt, that it is now no longer a fit thing to be sworn, or performed: and therefore according to the common opinion of Divines, an absolution and dispensation therein may be justly demanded, and also granted by him, who hath authority to dispense in oaths. 9 Now in this oath of allegiance, which containeth many particular oaths, three only things I do promise to perform, all which are comprehended in the third branch of the oath, to wit, that notwithstanding any declaration, or sentence of Excommunication, or deprivation made, or to be made against the said King, his Heirs or successors, or any absolution of the said subjects from their obedience. First, I will bear faith, and true allegiance to his Majesty, his Heirs and Successors. Secondly, I will to the uttermost of my power defend him, and them against all conspiracies, and attempts whatsoever, which shall be made against His, or their Persons, their Crown and dignity, by reason or colour of any such sentence, declaration, or otherwise. And thirdly, I will do my best endeavour to disclose and mae known unto his Majesty, his Heirs and Successors, all Treasons and Traitorous conspiracies, which I shall know or hear of to be against him, or any of them. Seeing therefore that in this Oath I do promise to perform these three only things, and all the other parts of the oath are merely assertory, to which absolution and dispensation do not belong, it is evident, that neither Cardinal Bellarmine, nor any other can be moved with any show of reason to impugn this fifth branch as unlawful, to wit, that the Pope hath not power to absolve me from this oath, unless he will contend, that the Pope hath power to absolve me from some one of those three things which I have promised, to wit, either from bearing true faith and allegiance to his Maiesitie, or from defending him from all Treasons, or from disclosing them to his Majesty. 10. From whence it doth clearly appear, that the subjects cannot incur any more danger of perjury, by swearing that they believe, and are resolved in their conscience, that the Pope hath not power to absolve them from these three things, which they promise' to perform, then by swearing, that they do acknowledge, believe, and are resolved in their conscience, that the Pope hath not authority to deprive his Majesty. For this once supposed, it is most certain, that all subjects, by the law of God and nature, wherein the Pope hath not power to dispense, or to absolve any man from the bond thereof, are bound to bear allegiance, and true obedience to their lawful Prince, as also Cardinal Bellarmine▪ e In tract contra Barclaium cap. 21. p. 202. doth expressly aver, and consequently by the same law of God and nature they are obliged to defend him against all Treasons, and to make them known unto his Majesty. Wherefore supposing that the Pope hath not power to deprive his Maiestiq, or to make him no King, which is a controversy among the scholastics, and as yet the judge hath not decided it, as Trithemius f In Chron. monast. Hirsang. adannum 1106. affirmeth, I may truly, and lawfully swear, that the Pope hath not authority to absolve me from this oath, or any part thereof, without denying the Pope's power to absolve in general. As also the kingdom of France affirming that the Pope hath not power to absolve the King's subjects from their obedience due to him for temporals, do not therefore intent to deny the Pope's power to absolve in general. And although joannes Maldonatus, a famous Divine of the Society of jesus, doth confidently, as we have seen before g Cap. 3. sect. 1. nu. 12. , affirm, that neither the Pope, nor the whole Church hath power to dispense in the solemn vow of chastity, and that they, who say the contrary, do seem to him to have more regard of some examples of certain Popes, thou of the holy Scripture, yet no jesuite without all doubt will from thence conclude, that Maldonate doth thereby deny the Pope's power to dispense in general. Sect. II. 1. SEcondly, Gretzer h In Comment. Exeget. cap. 6. pag 106. against these very same words [That the Pope hath not power to absolve me of this oath, or any part thereof,] propoundeth two objections, which yet in substance are not much different, for that the later is contained in the former, as a particular proposition in an universal. The first objection, which in order is Gretzer's fifth argument, is this: Whosoever denieth, that the Supreme Pastor of the Church hath power to lose all that the losing whereof is evidently necessary to the preservation, and propagation of Christ his flock, denieth the Catholic faith; but he that taketh this oath, denieth this, therefore he denieth the Catholic faith. The Mayor proposition is certain out of that Mat. 16. I will give thee the keys of the kingdom of heaven. For what? unless to open, and shut, or which is all one, to lose, and bind, when evident necessity doth show, that there is need of opening, or shutting, losing, or binding. The Minor is proved; because in this oath the swearer denieth generally, that the Pope hath power to absolve subjects from their oath of allegiance, therefore he denieth that then also it may be done, when the preservation and safety of Christ's flock doth evidently require the same, because the oath is general, and without any exception. But this is contrary to that, whatsoever thou shalt lose upon earth, to wit, with reason, circumspection, prudence, and discretion, shall be loosed also in heaven. When, I pray you, is the losing of a bond more necessary, then when it appertaineth to the preserving of the Catholic, and apostolic Religion, and to the repelling of heresy? 2. The second objection, which in order is Gretzer's sixth argument, is this: Whosoever believeth, and in his conscience is firmly resolved, that the Supreme Pastor of the Church, or his Lieutenant, hath not power to absolve any man from the bond of the oath prescribed by King james, if either willingly, or for fear he took the same, denieth the Catholic faith: But he that taketh this oath believeth this, and in his conscience is firmly so resolved, therefore he denieth the Catholic faith. The Mayor is manifest out of that, whatsoever thou shalt lose upon earth, shall be loosed also in heaven. Wherefore under this [whatsoever] should not be comprehended this oath, which is so pernicious to souls, and to the Catholic Religion? Truly it were wonderful, if kingly power were so great, that it could make voided, or diminish that [whatsoever]. The Minor is apparent out of the aforesaid words of the oath. The Conclusion good. 3. These are the arguments of Gretzer, which are different from the objection of Cardinal Bellarmine 1. Sect. 1. nu. 1. & seq. , before related, and answered in this, that Card. Bellarmine out of that, whatsoever thou shalt lose, etc. doth for the ground of his reason deduce this proposition, to wit, that according to the doctrine of all Catholics the Pope hath power to absolve, not only from sins, but also from punishments, laws, vows, and oaths, whensoever it is expedient to the glory of God, and health of souls, whereby he maketh the Pope's power to absolute to be almost without any limitation. But Gretzer proceedeth more warily. For he out of those words, whatsoever thou shalt lose, etc. doth for the ground of his arguments only infer this proposition, to wit, that the Pope hath power granted him to lose, and bind every thing, when it is evidently necessary to the preservation, and safety of Christ his flock. Nevertheless this ground of Gretzer is in substance all one with the second, and fifth reason, which Cardinal Bellarmine in his Controversies brought to prove the Pope's authority to dispose of temporals for the spiritual good. And therefore out of my Apology, wherein I have out of Cardinal Bellarmine's own principles clearly showed the weakness of these his arguments, the answer to this ground of gretzer's will most easily appear. 4. Wherefore to the first argument of gretzer's it is answered, that to make his Mayor proposition to be undoubtedly true, those words, lose, and losing, are not to be understood of temporal, but only of spiritual losing, and only concerning such persons, over whom he hath spiritual jurisdiction. Otherwise out of that, whatsoever thou shalt lose, etc. one might infer, that the Pope hath power to bind the Devil from tempting men, and withdrawing them from the Catholic faith: For so the interlineall Gloss doth understand those words, k Matth. 18. whatsoever you shall bind, etc. with the bond, saith he, of Excommunication. And Suarez l Tom. 5. disp. 1. sect. 2. nu. 3. , a most famous Divine of the Society of jesus, writeth thus: But that, which is added, shall be bound also in heaven, doth sufficiently declare, that this power is not natural, but supernatural, and that bond to be spiritual, and of an higher order. And to the same purpose joannes Parisiensis, before m In this chapter sect. 1. nu. 4. related, citeth S. Chrysostome, and Rabanus. Now it is manifest enough, that to dispose of temporals, to deprive Kings of their temporal kingdoms, and lives, are not spiritual, but temporal loosings. 5. If therefore the sense of the Mayor proposition be that the chief Pastor of the Church hath power by spiritual losing and binding, to lose, and bind all that, whose losing and binding is evidently necessary to the preservation, and increase of Christ his flock, we grant the Mayor, otherwise we deny it. For out of this place, n Matth 16. whatsoever thou shalt lose, etc. and out of that other, o john the last chapter. Feed my sheep, no other thing can be certainly concluded, but that all spiritual power, which is necessary to the government of the Church, hath been given to S. Peter, and the Church, which as by Christ his institution is not a temporal, but a spiritual commonwealth, as I have heretofore p In my Apology nu. 83. & seq. declared more at large, so also it aught to have all authority, which is agreeable to the nature of a spiritual commonwealth. 6. Wherefore to the spiritual losing of the bond of an oath two things are principally required: the first, a power to dispense, or absolve from the oath: the second, a sufficient cause, for which the oath may be dispensed withal; to wit, that the dispensation, or absolution be granted with reason, circumspection, prudence, and discretion, when necessity, or great utility requireth. For otherwise if an oath be dispensed withal without a sufficient cause, although the dispenser or absolver have sufficient authority to dispense, or absolve, yet the dispensation, or absolution is rather a dissipation, neither before God, and in conscience is it of any force at all. Therefore reason, circumspection, prudence, and discretion, which Gretzer mentioneth, do suppose indeed authority to dispense, but they give not authority, and for that cause are required to dispensing, that he, who hath authority to dispense, or absolve, may rightly, lawfully, and without any sin at all exercise his authority. For although the Pope should, for example, dispense with any man in the solemn vow of chastity, and in so dispensing use never so much reason, circumspection, prudence, and discretion, nevertheless we could not from thence rightly conclude, that the Pope hath full and sufficient authority to dispense in that vow, seeing that according to the doctrine of Maldonate the jesuite, who followeth herein the opinion of S. Thomas, and other excellent Divines, that vow is not subject to the Pope's power of dispensing. And thus much concerning gretzer's Mayor proposition. 7. Concerning his Minor, we deny first, that to absolve subjects from their temporal allegiance, to thrust Princes out of their temporal Dominions, and to dispose of temporal things, are to be numbered among spiritual, but only among temporal loosings, and which therefore are not agreeable to the nature and condition of a spiritual commonwealth, which, as Pope john the eighth affirmeth, q Cap. Porro. 16 q. 3. knoweth not corporal weapons, and, as Pope Nicolas r Cap. Inter haec, 33. q. 2. writeth, hath no other sword then spiritual. 8. Secondly, we also deny, that to deprive Princes of their kingdoms, or life, to absolve subjects from their temporal allegiance, and to dispose of temporal things, are evidently necessary to the preserving, or increasing of Christ his flock, as heretofore s In my Apology nu. 182. & seq. out of Cardinal Bellarmine's grounds I have most clearly showed. The visible Pastors of Christ's flock in earth are bound by the law of Christ, to use all those means instituted by him, which are evidently necessary to defend his flock from the cruel assault of ravening wolves, and yet neither S. Peter, nor any other of those holy Popes of the Primitive Church, who lived under most cruel persecutors of the Church, ever used these means to depose Princes, and to absolve subjects from their temporal allegiance, which without all doubt they must, and would have used, if they had been necessary to the preservation of Christ his flock. And might not Gretzer, I pray you have brought the self-same argument for the murdering of wicked Princes, when there is no other way to depose them, or thrust them out of their kingdom? Might it not also by this argument be convinced, that Christ our Lord hath given to his Church, not only sufficient authority to deprive Princes, but also sufficient force actually to depose them, and to thrust them out of their actual possession, considering that the actual deposing of wicked Princes is for the most part more necessary to the preservation, and increase of Christ his flock, then is her sole authority to deprive them by a juridical sentence of their Regal authority? 9 To Gretzer's second argument, whose solution will more clearly appear by the answer to the next objection, it is answered by denying his Minor. For he denieth not the Catholic faith, who in heart & words doth acknowledge, believe, and firmly persuade himself, that the Pope hath not power to absolve him from the bond of this oath. For the bond of an oath, as well saith S. Thomas, t 2. 2. q. 89. ar. 7. with whom all other Divines do accord, is referred to some thing, which is to be performed, or omitted: wherefore it doth not appertain to an assertory oath, which is of a thing present, or past, but only to a promissory oath. Now in this oath, as I have said before u In this chapped. sect. 1. nu. 9 , three only things are promised, which the swearer is bound to perform, to wit, to bear faith, and true allegiance to his Majesty, to defend him to the uttermost of his power against all treasons and conspiracies, and to do his best endeavour to make them known to his Majesty, from the obligation whereof the Pope without doubt hath no authority to absolve his subjects, as we x In this chapped. sect. 1. nu. 9 have clearly deduced out of Cardinal Bellarmine's doctrines, before y Chap. 3. sect. 5 nu. 3. related, unless of a King he hath authority to make him no King; which authority, whether it be granted to the Pope, is not yet determined, but thereof not only the scholastics do dispute, and as yet the judge hath not decided it, as Trithemius affirmeth, but also the most noble kingdom of France, if any credit is to be given to Petrus Pithaeus, doth suppose the contrary to be certain. 10. Wherefore Gretzer doth without sufficient proof affirm, that this oath is pernicious to souls, and to the Catholic religion: For neither Gretzer, nor Cardinal Bellarmine, nor any other hath with any firm and solid reason hitherto proved, that in this oath is contained any thing, which is repugnant to Catholic faith, or the health of souls. And, to use gretzer's words, It were truly wonderful, if the Pope's power were so great, that it could make voided, or diminish that Regal power, which the law of God and nature hath granted to Princes, and that temporal allegiance which by the same law of God and nature is due to them. Neither is that [whatsoever] which Gretzer doth so often inculcat, to be taken generally, but with a convenient distribution, or limitation, as the Logicians speak, as he may perceive by Maldonate, and those other Divines, whom Maldonate doth follow. And I would to God that Gretzer, and some others, who are so vehement against the oath, would seriously consider with themselves, what great account they are to make in the dreadful day of judgement to the supreme Pastor and judge of all, for maintaining so stiffly their own opinions, and those not grounded upon any solid reason, but only upon sophistical deductions, will needs have the ignorant people, (who are not able to examine their sophisms, but do only rely on their authority, as being men of such singular learning) to believe them as an undoubted doctrine of faith, and which without danger of heresy or error, may not be impugned, and that in things of no small moment, but which, if they be not true, may tend to the great reproach of the Catholic faith, to very much disgrace of the Sea apostolic, to the infinite wrong of Sovereign Princes, and to the perpetual temporal overthrow of very many Catholics, and of their whole posterity. Sect. III. 1. THirdly, against the self-same words, [That the Pope hath not power to absolve me of this oath, or any part thereof] others object in this manner: In every oath, which is taken to confirm the performing of some future thing, which is otherwise commanded by the law of God and nature, two sorts of obligations may be distinguished: The first bond is natural, or civil, which is precedent to the oath, and which hath force to bind, before any oath to confirm the same be taken. The other is sacred, or religious, which either freely, and without constraint, or for fear is made to confirm the former bond, and wherein the bond, or obligation of an oath doth properly, and formally consist, and which being taken away doth not of necessity dissolve the former bond. Seeing therefore that, according to Catholic doctrine, there is given by Christ's institution authority to S. Peter, and his Successors to dispense, or absolve from oaths upon a reasonable cause, it cannot doubtless be denied, but that the Pope hath power to dispense, or absolve, upon just cause, from every oath, that is, from the sacred and religious obligation thereof, although perchance it be denied, that he hath authority to absolve from the precedent natural, or civil obligation. 2. Now that there is a just cause, which may move the Pope to dispense, or absolve from this oath, that is, from the religious obligation, wherein the substance of an oath formally consisteth, is too too manifest. For as all Divines, and Lawyers do confess, among other sufficient causes, which are required to demand, and grant an absolution from an oath, these two are the principal. The first is, if the oath be enforced, and extorted through fear: the other, to punish him to whom the oath was made, for some notorious crime by him committed: As to punish excommunicated persons, the oaths, which are made to them, are released, and their subjects are resolved from their oath of allegiance. can. Nos Sanctorum, and can. juratos 15. q. 6. and can. Absolutos, extra, de haereticis. But in regard of both these causes the Pope may absolve from this oath of allegiance. For first it is extorted from the subjects for fear of losing all their lands, goods, and liberty. Secondly, our King is no Catholic, but rather an adversary to Catholic Religion: and therefore in consideration of both these causes this oath of allegiance, that is, at leastwise the sacred obligation thereof may by the Pope's authority be released, if any credit be to be given to the Canons of holy Church: Therefore it is not lawful for any subject to swear, that the Pope hath not power to absolve him from this oath, or any part thereof, which at the lest, if we will speak properly, and formally, aught doubtless to be understood of the sacred, and religious obligation, wherein the substance of every oath doth formally consist. 3. To this objection, in solving whereof, for that some of our countrymen both grave, and otherwise learned, do make great reckoning thereof, I must be somewhat the longer; it is answered first, that the plain, common, and usual signification of this proposition, The Pop hath power to absolve me of this oath, is, that the Pope hath power to absolve me, not only from the thing sworn, with this reduplication, as it is sworn, but also absolutely from the thing itself, which is sworn; or which is all one, not only to absolve me from the sacred and religious bond, but also from the natural and civil obligation. Seeing therefore that a promissory oath, which only is subject to dispensation, or absolution, doth formally consist in this, that God his holy name is brought as a witness for the performing, or not performing of some future thing, as in this oath I do only promise' to perform these three things, to wit, that I will bear faith, and true allegiance to his Majesty, that I will defend him against all Treasons, and traitorous conspiracies, and that I will do my best endeavour to make them known to his Majesty, if they shall come to my knowledge; when it is affirmed, that the Pope hath not power to absolve me from this oath, or any part thereof, by this according to the common meaning of the words it is signified, that the Pope cannot give me leave either not to bear faith, and true allegiance to his Majesty, or not to defend him against all treasons, or not to disclose them to his Majesty. And this also is the usual practice of Popes, that when they release subjects of the oath of allegiance, they do not only absolve them from their allegiance as sworn, but simply, and absolutely from their allegiance itself, or from the natural bond of their obedience, as plainly may be seen in the canon, Nos Sanctorum, and the canon juratos 15. q. 6. before cited. And therefore this distinction of the sacred and civil bond of an oath, little availeth to prove this branch of the oath to be unlawful. 4. Besides, this also seemeth to be the mind, and chief meaning of the Lawmaker, which for the interpreting of the words of laws is principally to be respected. For I think his Majesty doth little regard, whether the Pope hath power to absolve his subjects from the sacred bond of this oath, so that he may be assured, that notwithstanding the releasing of the sacred bond, yet the civil and natural allegiance of his subjects, for confirmation whereof this oath is moreover added, do remain inviolable, and indispensible, neither by the Pope's authority may it any ways be dissolved, but that his subjects, after they be absolved by the Pope from the sacred bond of the oath, are nevertheless by the law of God and nature, obliged to bear faith and true allegiance to his Majesty. 5. Secondly, although we should grant, that the common meaning of these words, to absolve me from this oath, were to absolve me only from the sacred obligation, wherein the formal substance of an oath consisteth, yet supposing that the Pope not so much as indirectly, that is, in regard of the spiritual good, hath not authority to dispose of the temporals of Princes, and to deprive them of their kingdoms and dominions, which of necessity must be supposed at the lest as probable by him, who will take the oath: this, I say, supposed, it is answered, that any man may lawfully think, and safely persuade his conscience, and this his opinion, or persuasion confirm by oath, that the Pope hath not power to absolve him from his oath, that is, from the sacred and religious obligation thereof. For, according to the common opinion of Divines, the Pope hath not power to absolve from oaths, when the absolving from them tendeth to the temporal prejudice of a third person, unless either directly, or indirectly he hath power to dispose of the temporal goods of that persons. 6. From hence, saith Dominicus Sotus y Lib. 8. de just. q. 1. ar. 9 , a most learned Divine of the Order of S. Dominicke, do arise two other differences to be considered in the dispensing of vows and oaths. The first concerning those persons, who have power to dispense. For, although the Pope can dispense in a vow, which is greater, yet he cannot in an oath, which is less. For he hath not power to release an oath, which one hath made to another man, to pay him that debt which he oweth him. Neither doth this proceed from the less power of the Pope, neither from the worthiness of the oath, but from the nature of the contract, which by oath is confirmed. For, because the Pope is the Vicar of God, he hath power to change the vow, which is made to God, into that, which is more acceptable unto him. But because he hath not power to take from another man that which is his own, he cannot do him wrong in releasing the oath, which was made unto him. And contrariwise, although a private man cannot dispense in a vow, which is made to God, for that he is not his Vicar, yet he, to whom an oath was made, hath power to release the same; not for that he hath more ample power, than the Pope, but because he is Lord of his own goods, and therefore as he hath power to give them so also hath he power to release the oath made unto him concerning them. Wherefore this is not a dispensing, but a remitting, or releasing. The second difference is concerning the matter; that in changing and dispensing of vows that only must be regarded, which is more pleasing to God, but in releasing of oaths great caution must be used that no wrong be done to a third person. Hitherto Sotus, from whom Petrus Aragona z 22. q. 89. ar. 9 , and our countryman Gregorius Sayrus a Lib 5. Thesauri cap. 8. nu. 4. have taken the self-same words. 7. Seeing therefore, as oftentimes hath been said, that the Pope hath not power to deprive our King, or to dispose of his temporals, or of his subjects, from this supposal it doth evidently follow, that he hath not power to absolve his subjects from this oath, which they have taken for the performance of those three things before b In this chapped. sect. 1. nu. 9 rehearsed, which every subject by the law of God and nature is obliged to perform. And truly, according to the probable doctrine of S. Thomas, and his followers, who are of opinion, that the Pope, when he dispenseth in vows, and oaths, doth not dissolve the sacred and religious bond of the oath, (in that manner as many, saith Maldonate, do understand dispensation; for so, saith he, he should disannul, and altogether lose the law of God and nature, as commonly it is done in many dispensations, which is not to be a dispensator, but a dissipator) but doth only interpret the oath, to wit, by declaring, that the thing promised by oath, which before was a fit thing to be sworn, and therefore by virtue of the oath to be performed, so long as it remaineth so, is now by reason of some particular event or circumstance become hurtful, and an hindrance of a greater good, and therefore now no fit matter to be sworn, nor by virtue of the oath to be now any more performed: According, I say, to this doctrine of S. Thomas, which is also the more common of Divines, it is plain enough, that this objection of our countrymen, taken from the difference betwixt the sacred and civil bond of the oath, is of no force at all. 8. For whereas those three things before rehearsed, which by the law of God and nature are due to lawful Princes (whereof only there can be made any controversy concerning the Pope's power to absolve from this oath, considering that all the other parts of the oath are merely assertory, neither are they subject to absolution, or dispensation) are only in this oath promised to be performed by the subjects; as the precepts of nature, the same circumstances remaining, are immutable and indispensible, neither can God and nature command an unlawful or hurtful thing, or which is an hindrance to greater good, so in those three things, which, according to the doctrine of Cardinal Bellarmine oftentimes related, are due by the law of God and nature to lawful Princes, no interpretation or dispensation can be made. Neither can the Pope absolve from this oath of allegiance, unless he do withal declare, that our allegiance, which is due to the King by the law of God and nature, be unlawful, hurtful, or an hindrance to greater good, which he cannot in any wise declare, unless he hath power to make a King no King. For consequently he should also declare, that God and nature commanding subjects to bear true faith and allegiance to their lawful Prince, should enjoin them an unlawful or hurtful thing, or which is an hindrance to greater good. It is plain therefore that, according to the common doctrine of S. Thomas, and his School, the Pope cannot absolve from the sacred and religious bond of this oath of allegiance, unless also he do declare, that the natural bond of our allegiance be unlawful, hurtful, or an hindrance to greater good; that hereby it may easily appear, how weak is this objection of our countrymen to condemn this branch of the oath as unlawful. 9 Now concerning the two causes alleged in the objection, for which an absolution, or dispensation in an oath may be demanded, or granted by the Pope, to wit, either to punish him to whom the oath was made, or when the oath was extorted through fear; it is answered, that both these causes be sufficient, to move the Pope to dispense in those oaths, wherein he hath power to dispense. I say, wherein he hath power to dispense, because, as I insinuated a little before c Sect. 2. nu. 8. , there is a great difference betwixt the Pope's power to dispense in a vow, or oath, and a sufficient and just cause for which he may dispense therein. For a just and lawful cause to grant a dispensation, doth suppose in the Pope a power, but doth not give him a power to dispense. And therefore if the Pope hath no authority given him by Christ to dispense, for example sake, in the solemn vow of chastity (whereof, notwithstanding many examples of Popes, who have dispensed therein, there is a great controversy among Divines even to this day) than no urgent cause whatsoever, as the preserving of a kingdom from eminent danger of some notable temporal, or spiritual harm, can give a true and real power to the Pope to dispense in this vow. 10. Wherefore when Divines do affirm, that one sufficient cause, why the Pope may dispense in an oath made to a third person, is to punish that third person, this their assertion is to be understood of such third persons, upon whom he hath authority to inflict such a punishment. For otherwise a just cause to absolve from an oath, doth, as we now have said, suppose in the Pope a power to absolve, but doth not give him such a power. And so the Pope hath authority to absolve subjects upon a just cause from their allegiance, which they own to that Prince, over whom the Pope hath temporal jurisdiction, because he hath authority to punish such a Prince, if he deserve it, of whom he is a temporal Lord, with temporal punishment: But the Pope hath no authority to absolve subjects from their temporal allegiance, which they own to Sovereign Princes, who in temporals acknowledge no Superior beside God, unless either directly, or indirectly he hath power to deprive such Princes, and of Princes to make them no Princes, which as yet neither Cardinal Bellarmine, nor any other hath sufficiently proved. 11. In like manner when Divines affirm, that one sufficient cause, for which the Pope hath power to absolve from an oath, is, if that oath be extorted through fear, this their assertion is to be understood of such oaths, which are wrongfully extorted, as if one, for fear of death, should swear to give a thief a certain sum of money: for to absolve from such kind of oaths is injurious to no man; but it is not to be understood of such oaths, which are commanded by a just law, and a great punishment imposed upon the infringers thereof. If therefore this oath of allegiance, and the law, which commandeth it, be lawful, and contain no injustice, whereof there is now a controversy, and the contrary hath not hitherto been sufficiently proved, the fear of incurring the penalty appointed by the law against the infringers thereof, is not a sufficient cause, for which the Pope may dispense even in the sacred obligation thereof. For otherwise every oath of allegiance, though it be in all men's opinion never so just and lawful, if it be commanded by the Prince his law, and a severe punishment imposed upon the refusers thereof, may be said to be extorted through fear, and that the Pope in regard of this fear may absolve the subjects from such an oath, which no Catholics, no not our adversaries themselves, dare, as I suppose, presume to aver. 12 Lastly, to those three texts of the Canon law, mentioned in the objection, which seem to prove, that the Pope hath power to absolve subjects from their oath of allegiance, we answer, that the first canon, Nos sanctorum, is a decree of Pope Gregory the 7, wherein by Apostolical authority he absolveth those, who either by allegiance, or oath, are obliged to excommunicated persons, and most straightly commandeth, that they do them no loyalty, until they make satisfaction. The second canon, juratos milites, is of Pope Vrbanus the second, who was next Successor to Gregory, after Victor the 3, who reigned but six months, wherein he commanded the Bishop Vapicensis to forbidden the sworn soldiers to Count Hugo, to serve him so long, as he remained excommunicated. Who if they shall pretend their oaths, let them be admonished, that they aught rather to serve God, than men. For by no authority they are bound to perform their allegiance which they have sworn to a Christian Prince, who is contrary to God and his Saints, and contemneth their commandments. The third canon, Absolutos, is of Pope Gregory the ninth, wherein he declareth, that all those, who are obliged to manifest heretics, by any covenant strengthened with never so great security, are absolved from the bond of all allegiance, homage, and obedience. 13. But these Canons are not forcible to prove, that the Pope hath power to absolve subjects from their allegiance, which by the law of God and nature they own to Sovereign Princes, who in temporals acknowledge no Superior upon earth. And first, if they were of sufficient force, they would evidently prove, that the Pope hath power to absolve, not only from the sacred bond of the oath of allegiance, but also from the natural obligation thereof: and therefore they avail nothing to confirm our countrymen's objection, who endeavour to prove, that the Pope hath power to absolve from the sacred bond of the oath of allegiance, without releasing the natural obligation thereof. 14. Secondly, neither do these Canons make any mention of absolute and Sovereign Princes, who, unless they be specified by name are not to be comprehended in penal laws: and therefore either they have force only to bind in the territories of the Church, whereof the Pope is Sovereign Lord in temporals, who therefore hath authority to enjoin a temporal punishment, to which all Princes, who be his Vassals, shall also be subject: (For out of the temporal dominions of the Church the Pope hath not authority in mere temporal causes, as is the disposing, I do not say, the directing of temporal things for the spiritual good, to enact laws, which shall bind absolute and Sovereign Princes, who are not subject unto him in temporals: as by the like reason may be evidently gathered out of the doctrine of Franciscus Suarez d Lib. 3. de Legibus cap. 8. ) or else, as joannes Parisiensis e De potest. Regia, & Papali cap. 10. , out of Cardinal Hostiensis, doth answer to the Canon, ad abolendam f Extra de haereticis. , wherein the Pope ordained, that the goods of heretics should be confiscated, to wit, that he did not make this decree by his own authority, but by the consent of the Emperor, who then was present at Milan, and consented thereunto; So also it may be answered to the aforesaid three Canons, that those Popes not only by their own authority, but by the , and virtual at lest wise consent of the Emperor, and other Sovereign Princes, did ordain, that those subjects, who are obliged by any bond either sacred, or civil to inferior, and not to Sovereign Princes, should forthwith be freed from the same, if those Princes should either revolt from the Catholic faith, or for any crime be excommunicated. For otherwise, if absolute and Sovereign Princes be also according to our Adversaries comprehended in these Canons, they must of necessity acknowledge, which yet I think they dare scarcely affirm, that Kings and Emperors so soon as they either for heresy, or any other crime, do incur into the general Censures of the Church, are presently without any particular declaration, or sentence of deprivation deprived in very deed of their Regal authority, which is both against the continual practice, which Popes do use in deposing of Princes, and is also repugnant to the common understanding of all men. 15. Thirdly, although we should grant, that those Canons do also include Sovereign Princes, yet they may be answered in the same manner, as Cardinal Bellarmine g Lib. 4 de Rom. pont. cap. 14. answereth the decree of Pope Celestine the 3, of which Canon Alphonsus de Castro h Lib. 1. de haeres. cap. 4. maketh mention, and withal affirmeth, that he hath seen it in the ancient Decretals i In Can. Laudabilem de conuers. coniug. , wherein the Pope did decree, and as the same Alphonsus relateth, did define, that the bond of Matrimony is by heresy so dissolved, that it is lawful for the woman, whose former husband became an heretic, to marry another man; which doctrine now is flat heretical, and condemned in the Council of Trent k Sess. 24. can. 5. : I answer, saith Cardinal Bellarmine, that Celestine did determine nothing for certain concerning that matter, but did answer, what seemed to him more probable. It is true indeed, which Alphonsus affirmeth, that the epistle of Celestine was once among the Decretal Epistles, but from thence it cannot be gathered, that Celestine made thereof a clear Apostolical decree, and out of the Chair, seeing that it is manifest, that there be many other things in the Decretal Epistles, which do not make the thing to be of faith, but do only declare unto us the opinions of Pope's concerning that matter. In like manner we may also answer, that those three Decrees, o● Canons of the aforesaid Popes, do either declare those Pope's opinions, or are only grounded upon their private opinions. And truly unless we answer thus, we must be enforced to affirm with Philopater, that Sovereign Princes as soon as they revolt from the Catholic faith, are presently, before any sentence of the Supreme Pastor denounced against them, deprived of their Dominions, and of all Regal dignity and authority, and that all their subjects are by the law of God absolved from the bond both of their oath and also of allegiance, as out of the second decree of Vrbanus by evident consequence it may be deduced, which nevertheless these our countrymen, who do so urge these Canons, will not, unless I be deceived, easily admit. 16. Neither aught any man to marvel, that Pope Gregory the seventh, who was the first Pope that ever deposed the Roman Emperor, as Godfridus l In Chronico part. 17. ad annum. 1047. , Otho Frisingensis m Lib 6. cap. 35 , Trithemius n In Chron. Monast. Hirsaug ad annum 1106. , and Onuphrius o Lib. 4. de varia create. Rom. Pont. do writ, should also be of opinion, that he had power to absolve subjects from the bond of their allegiance. Nevertheless from this fact, or decree of Pope Gregory, as also from the two other decrees of his Successors, who followed his example, it cannot certainly be gathered, that they had indeed such authority to absolve subjects from their allegiance, but only that they were of opinion, and did suppose at leastwise for probable, that Christ had given them that authority. As also, although some Popes of this age following the examples of their predecessors, yea even of S. Gregory p Lib. 3. epist. 26 & habetur in can. pervenit. dist. 95. the great, should by their Decrees, Breves, or Apostolical letters, registered also in the body of the Canon law, ordain, that some eminent Priests, although they were not Bishops, should by the Apostolical authority have power to minister the Sacrament of Confirmation (as some such persons do in these days by the special grant of Pope's minister this Sacrament) nevertheless it could not from hence be certainly concluded, that the Pope hath authority to grant such licences, seeing that many learned Divines, notwithstanding the decrees of such Popes, do defend, that Christ hath not given to the Pope that authority. 17. In like manner, although some Popes, following the examples of their Predecessors, have dispensed in the solemn vow of chastity; yet from hence there cannot be drawn a firm and solid argument to prove, that in very deed such an authority hath been given them by Christ his institution, but at the most from hence it may be gathered, that those Popes did persuade themselves, and at the lest suppose as probable, that Christ did grant them such authority: which nevertheless doth nothing hinder, but that other Divines, who moved with probable reasons do hold the contrary, may lawfully reject the opinions of these Popes, and may, if need require, with a safe conscience swear, that they do profess, testify, believe, declare, and in their consciences are resolved, that by Christ his institution no such authority hath been given to the Pope. And therefore notwithstanding this objection, which some of our countrymen do so vehemently urge, I may with all dutiful reverence to the holy Canons lawfully swear, that I do furthermore believe, and am resolved in my conscience, that the Pope hath not power to absolve me of this oath or any part thereof. 18. But because some of our countrymen do wrongfully upbraid us with not bearing dutiful respect to the Canons of holy Church, in that we deny that the Pope hath power to absolve the subjects of Sovereign Princes from their allegiance, (from which imputation we have nevertheless both here, and elsewhere fully cleared ourselves by answering sufficiently to all the decrees of Popes, and Counsels) we thought it convenient upon so fit an occasion offered us, to admonish briefly the learned Reader, that with all due honour and respect we do reverence the Canons of the holy Catholic Church. Yet we must needs confess, that betwixt the Catholic Church, and the Pope, who is only the first and principal member thereof, betwixt some Chapters, or Decrees of the Canon law, and betwixt others, we make a great distinction; and nevertheless to every one in his degree and place we give dutiful but not equal credit. For in the vast corpse or great volumes of the Canon law are contained either sayings, and assertions of the ancient Fathers; or sentences, and decrees of Popes, or Counsels; and these are either doctrinal, and which are propounded as things to be believed by the faithful, or else moral, and which in the external discipline of the Church are commanded to be observed. 19 And first, the doctrine, which the ancient holy Fathers either in expounding the holy Scriptures, or in questions belonging to faith, have with uniform consent delivered, we also do undoubtedly believe, as being certainly persuaded, that it was inspired by the holy Ghost; following herein the sage, & pious counsel of that renowned ancient writer q For he wrote his book three years after the Council of Ephesus, the year 434. Vincentius Lirinensis in that golden book r Aduersus prophanas novitates, cap. 4. of his, whatsoever not one, or two only, but all (the ancient Fathers) together have with one, and the same consent plainly, frequently, constantly held, written, taught, that must we without all doubt believe. Yet the authority of many holy Fathers, if others, although the lesser do gainsay, we accounted to be no certain, but only a probable ground for Catholics in matters of faith safely to build upon. For, as well writeth Melchior Canus s Lib 7. de locis cap. 3. nu. 7. , as there is one brightness of the Sun, another brightness of the Moon, and another brightness of the Stars, for Star differeth from Star in brightness, 1. Cor. 15. So Ecclesiastical writers are approved, who having received light from the holy Ghost, have given light unto the Church. But yet there is one brightness of Matthew, another of Hierome; one of Isaias, another of Ambrose. For Canonical Authors, as high, celestial, divine, do keep a perpetual, and permanent constancy: But other holy writers are inferior, and human, and now and then are defective, and sometimes they do contrary to the convenient order and course of nature, bring forth a monster. 20. And in this sense is to be understood S. Thomas of Aquine t 1. Part. q. 1. art. 8. ad ●m. , when he affirmeth, that the authority of holy Scripture is alleged by Divines, as a necessary argument, but the authority of other Doctors of the Church as a probable. For, I know, saith S. Hierome u Epist. 62. ad Theophilum adversus joan. Hierosolym. , that I do otherwise esteem the Apostles, otherwise other writers, those as always speaking truth, these as men in some things erring. And again S. Austin x Tom. 2. epist. 19 ad Hieron. , I have learned, saith he, to give this reverence and honour to those only books of holy Scriptures, which are now called Canonical, that I do most firmly believe, that no one of them hath by writing erred any whit. But others I do so read, that, be they never so holy, and learned, I do not think it to be true, because they think so, but because, either by those Canonical Authors, or by probable reason, they have been able to persuade me, that it doth agreed with truth. 21. Secondly, although we make no doubt, but that the doctrine also of all the holy Fathers in things, which do not appertain to faith, may piously, and probably be believed by Catholics, yet we are also of opinion with Melchior Canus y Lib. 7. de locis cap. 3. nu. 9 , & other Divines, that it aught not of necessity to be followed, as certain, and infallible. For, as well writeth Vincentius Lirinensis * Aduersus prophanas novitates cap. 39 , we aught with great diligence to search out, and follow the ancient consent of holy Fathers not in all questions of the divine law, but only in the rule of faith. Those things are said to appertain to faith, which Christ, or his Apostles have delivered to the Church by word, or writing, and which from thence by certain, and evident consequence are deduced: But as the same Canus z Lib. 7. cap. 2. very well affirmeth, those things, which we neither have received from Christ, or his Apostles, neither are certainly and plainly inferred from those things, which we hold from the authority of Christ, and his Apostles, do not appertain to faith; and therefore they may without prejudice to faith, or piety be unknown not only to the unlearned, but also to the learned men, for that they are neither assertions of faith, nor manifestly derived from them. 22. Among questions, which do not belong to faith, Canus relateth these; whether the blessed Virgin was conceived in original sin, or no. Whether habitual grace, and other virtues as well Moral, as Theological are infused by God into our souls, and some others. And I also am of opinion, that among them is to be numbered this controversy concerning the Pope's power to deprive Princes, and to absolve Subjects from their allegiance. For although it be plainly said to Saint Peter, Whatsoever thou shalt lose upon earth etc. and feed my sheep, yet cannot it from these places be gathered by any necessary, but at the most by a probable consequence, that all manner of power to lose, and authority to chastise offenders with all kind of punishments is granted to Saint Peter, neither that this is the true meaning of those words, hath it hitherto by any certain definition been declared by the Church, as I myself, and both the Barclaies have heeeretofore abundantly proved. 23. Thirdly, we also do profess, that the definitions of general Counsels lawfully assembled, and confirmed by the Pope, wherein any doctrine is propounded to the whole Church to be believed by all men as of faith, are to be received by Catholics as infallible rules of faith; most certainly persuading ourselves with S. Austin, a Lib. 1. de baptismo contra Donatistas'. tom. 7. that the sentence of a General Council, to wit, in things which it determineth to be believed as of faith, is the consent of the universal Church. Nevertheless we do freely affirm, that those opinions, which in the said councils are defined or supposed only as probable, and those assertions, which either incidently, and by the way are inserted, or for better declaration, & proof of their decisions be produced, are subject to error, and may sometimes by Catholics without any wrong to the Catholic faith be rejected. For the Fathers, saith Canus, b Lib. 6. de locis cap. 8. in a question of faith do not always bring necessary, but sometimes credible reasons, which if they be not necessary, not to say, apt, probable, convenient, we must not greatly stand thereupon. For we do not strive to defend the reasons alleged by Popes, and councils, wherein sometimes they are deceived, as a point belonging to Religion. In the councils, saith Cardinal Bellarmine, c Lib 2. de conc. cap. 12. the greatest part of the Acts do not appertain to faith. For neither the disputations, which go before, nor the reasons, which are adjoined nor those things, which are brought to explicate and illustrate the matter, are of faith, but only the bore decrees, and those not all, but only such as are propounded as of faith: and sometimes the councils do define a thing, not as certain, but as probable. Was it not defined in the seventh general Council, d Tom. 3. Concil. part. 1. act. 5. that the Images of Angels might religiously be painted, and yet the reason of this decree, (which is there propounded by Tharasius, who took it from john Bishop of Thessalonia, and which the whole Council, saith Vasquez, e 3. Part. disp. 103. cap. 5. seemeth to approve) to wit, that the Catholic Church doth think that Angels have bodies, and can be circumscribed, is now by the Scholastic Divines judged to be false; and Bannes, & Zumel f 1. Part. q. 5. art. 1. are not afraid to censure it as temerarious, although they dare not reject the decree itself and conclusion of the Council, concerning the painting of the Images of Angels? 24. This nevertheless I would have thee to observe, good Reader, which I have oftentimes in other places signified, that although I, professing myself to be a child of the Catholic Roman Church, do most willingly embrace whatsoever general councils confirmed by the Pope, which do represent the Catholic Church, do propound to the faithful as necessarily to be believed of faith, and which certainly, and evidently is known to be the true sense, and meaning of the councils, yet I do not undoubtedly believe every doctrine, which either Cardinal Bellarmine, (speaking with due reverence) or any other Doctor, seeing they are not appointed by God to be an undoubted rule of the Catholic faith, do cry out to be Catholic Doctrine, to be the voice of the Catholic Church, to be the meaning of the Scriptures, and councils, especially if other Catholic Doctors do hold the contrary. Them truly, as it is meet, I do reverence with all dutiful respect, and I do much attribute to their authority, but that all those collections, which they in their judgements do imagine, may be evidently concluded out of holy Scriptures, or councils, (considering that oftentimes they are deceived, and do deceive, and what they have written, when they were younger, they may recall, when they grow elder) are to be accounted for undoubted assertions of faith, and the contrary opinion of other Catholics to be rather esteemed an heresy, than an opinion, this truly I cannot take in good part. 25. Fourthly, concerning the Canons or Decrees of General councils belonging to manners, and the external government of the Church, we are most ready, and willing to receive all those decrees, which in the places where we live are generally received. For these are properly called the Decrees or Canons of the Catholic or universal Church, which are by common consent admitted by the universal Church. Neither doubtless is any Catholic bound to admit those laws and precepts, which in the country where he liveth, are not observed by the people, according to that saying of Gratian g Dist. 4 can. in ill● § leges. recorded in the Canon Law. Laws are enacted, when they are proclaimed; they are established when by the practice of those, who use them, they are approved. And this opinion, saith joannes Az●rius h Tom. 1. nstit. lib 5. cap. ● the jesuite, with whom i In summa cap. 23. nu. 41. Navarrus, k Lib. 2. variar. resolute. cap. 16 nu. 6. Covarrunias, l Tom. 2. disp. 7 q. 5. punct ●. q ● Valentia, m Lib. 3. Thesau●i cap. 5. nu. 24. Sayrus, n Disp 13. de Leg. sect 1. Salas, o Lib 4. de Leg. cap. 16. conclus. 3. Suarez and others do accord, is agreeable to the Canon, and Civil law; to wit, that a Law both Ecclesiastical, and Civil, although it be enacted by lawful authority, and rightly proclaimed, is not of force unless by custom it be received. 26. And so the Kingdom & Prelates of France would not receive certain decrees of the Council of Trent, among which was that before p Cap 3. sec. 3. nu. 13. rehearsed, wherein Kings and Princes were forbidden to permit single combat under pain of forfeiting the City, or place where by their sufferance it was fought. This article, say they, is against the authority of the King, who cannot be deprived of his temporal dominion, in regard whereof he acknowledgeth no Superior at all. 27. And truly in my opinion those Prelates of France, who apprehended that the aforesaid decree of the Council did contain not only Princes, who were feudaries to the Church, but also absolute, and Sovereign Princes, as is the King of France, (in which sense also many others understand this place) would not for these causes receive that decree, either for that they thought it was enacted not absolutely, but upon presumption, and hope that Princes would ratify the same, and so conditionally if Princes would give their consent thereunto; or which I judge to be more probable, for that they supposed, that the Council in making that decree, did rely only upon a probable opinion, concerning the authority of the spiritual power to dispose of temporals for the spiritual good, which opinion, sith that it is only probable, and might tend to the great prejudice of the King of France, and of other Princes, the Prelates of France were not bound to follow. But what causes are to be accounted just, and lawful for the which any Kingdom or Province is not bound to admit the Canons, or decrees of a General Council, it is no fit time to examine at this present; it being now sufficient, that, according to all Divines, and Lawyers, although their may perchance, some fault be committed by them who at the first do not receive the decree of a Council after it be lawfully proclaimed, yet afterwards it hath no force to bind, if either by sufferance or contrary custom not punished it be not observed. 28. Lastly, what we have said concerning the definitions, and decrees of General councils may with far greater reason be proportionably applied to the definitions, and decrees of Popes, and Provincial councils; especially considering that many learned Divines, with almost the whole University of Paris, as in the Preface to our Apologetical answer, q nu. 27. et seq. we have already said, and beneath r cap. 10. sec. 2. nu. 27. we will repeat again, are of opinion, that the Pope's definitions, and decrees, if he define without a General Council, are subject to error; and that the infallible assistance of the holy Ghost was promised to S. Peter, and his successors, as he being head, doth in defining matters of faith concur with the whole body of the Church, which a General Counsel doth represent. And thus much concerning the answer to the third objection of our countrymen against this fifth branch of the oath. Sect. four 1. FOurthly, some object against those words, [nor any person whatsoever hath power to absolve me of this oath, or any part thereof] which words being general do seem to exclude all persons, and consequently the King himself. Wherefore according to these words I am bound to swear, that neither the Pope, nor the King's Majesty hath power to absolve me from this oath, or any part thereof, which doubtless is altogether repugnant to truth, for that the same authority, which hath power to make a law, hath also power to dispense therein, or to absolve one from the obligation thereof: therefore this clause cannot be taken without manifest perjury. 2. To this objection supposing that, according to the rules before related out of Suarez, the true and common meaning of the words of any law is to be gathered from the circumstances, Cap. 1. sec. 2. et seq. the end of the Law, and especially from the intention of the Lawmaker, it is answered first, that whensoever a Law doth bind in general words all persons whatsoever to observe the same, those words are in common speech to be understood only of such persons, which are subject to the Lawmaker, and not of other persons, who are not subject to him; nor of the Lawmaker himself, for that, according to the most certain, and approved rule of all Divines, and Lawyers, the power of commanding, or Lawmaking, is in a Superior towards his inferior, and consequently not towards himself, or his equal. In like manner also when any law in general words affirmeth, that no person whatsoever hath power to dispense at any time in that Law, or to absolve any man from the bond thereof, those words are in common speech only to be understood of those persons, who are inferior to the Lawmaker, and not of the Lawmaker himself, or his Successor, who is of equal authority with him. For both these, as they have authority to make the Law, and also to repeal the same, so also according to the common understanding of men they have authority to dispense in the same, or to absolve any man from the obligation thereof. Whereupon very well said Salas before t cap. 1. sec. 3. nu. 4. related in a general speech the person, who speaketh, is understood to be excepted. 3. Wherefore in this oath of allegiance, which is imposed by his majesties Law, those words [nor any person whatsoever hath power to absolve me of this oath] aught in common speech to be understood in this manner, that no person except the King himself hath power to absolve me from this oath. For otherwise if those words [nor any person whatsoever] were to be understood in their whole generality without any exception, from thence it might rightly be inferred, that by virtue of this clause we are bound to swear, that no person either human, or divine hath power to absolve me from this oath, or any part thereof; And yet, according to the approved doctrine of all Lawyers, whensoever the words of a law do sound in such sort that they may be taken in a good or evil sense, they aught to be applied to that sense, (although otherwise it be improper) wherein the Law containeth no injustice, or absurdity; for this is presumed to be the intention of the Lawmaker, whose meaning is to make a true Law, whereas an unjust, absurd, or unreasonable Law is to be accounted no true Law. Whereupon in a doubtful word of the Law, saith the law: u Leg. in ambigua F. de legibus. That sense is rather to be taken, which is not faulty, especially seeing that thereby the meaning also of the Law may be gathered. 4. Secondly, if we will interpret all the words of this oath, in such rigorous a manner, as these severe censors do wrist them, it is also lawful to swear, that as the King alone without the Parliament hath not, according to the usual custom of this Realm, power to enact Laws, so also neither hath he alone without the Parliament power to absolve from the Laws, but this power appertaineth only to the Lawmaker, who is the King & Parliament together. The penalty imposed by the Law doubtless he may remit, but the Law itself according to the custom of this Realm he cannot disannul. And so he hath power to absolve those, who refuse to take the Oath, from the punishment appointed by the Law, but from the obligation to perform those things, which one hath promised by this Oath, he together with the Parliament, or rather neither he, nor the Parliament, as shall appear beneath, x nu. 6. and. 7. hath power to absolve. Now by these words, nor any person whatsoever, are properly understood only singular persons, and not a community, or Parliament. As the ancient Divines of Paris do in this sort expound those words, The first See is judged by no man, to wit, that no particular person hath power to judge the first See, which nevertheless is no let, say they, but that a General Council hath authority to judge the first See. 5. I said a little before [according to the usual custom of this Realm] because I do not intent to affirm, or to deny any thing concerning his majesties absolute power, and prerogative, but only to satisfy this present objection I thought good briefly to insinuate what is the present custom of this kingdom in the establishing of laws. But whether this custom did first proceed from the King's free grant, or from the common wealth limiting the Regal authority, I leave to others to discuss. It may only at this present suffice to rehearse, what john Stow in his Chronicle hath written in this matter. y In the life of K. Henry the first in the. 16. year of his Reign, and of our Lord. 1116. This year, saith Stow, on the nineteenth day of April K. Henry called a Council of the States of this Realm, both of the Prelates, Nobles and Commons to Salisbury, there to consult for the good government of the Common Wealth, and the weighty affairs of the same, which Council, taking the name, and Fame of the French, is called Parliament. And this do the Historiographers note to be the first Parliament in England, and that the Kings before that time were never wont to call any of their commons, or people to Council, or Lawmaking, etc. Thirdly, it is evident, that those, who do so much insist upon this objection, do seek rather to cavil, then really to except against this clause. For that according to the common opinion of them, who are so vehement against this Oath, an Oath being a sacred, and spiritual bond, it belongeth only to the spiritual power, as to Bishops; to absolve or dispense therein, and to release directly the spiritual obligation, in which releasing these Doctors will have dispensing, and absolving from Oaths properly to consist. Therefore if we will speak properly and according to the common understanding of those, who do urge this objection, neither the King himself, according to their doctrine, hath power to absolve from this oath, that is, hath power to release directly the spiritual obligation thereof. He may indeed release an oath made unto him, by taking away the matter of the oath, as Parents may with the oaths of their Children, a Guardian with the oaths of his Ward, an Abbot with the oaths of his Monks, and every private man may remit an oath made unto him; but to dispense in oaths, or to absolve from them (taking dispensation, and absolution in that sense, wherein these impugners of the oath do take them) no temporal power hath authority. Wherefore the Divines do make a great distinction betwixt dispensing, and absolving from an oath, and betwixt annulling, or releasing of the same, and do affirm, that to annul, and release an oath, a temporal power may suffice, but to absolve, or dispense therein, a spiritual jurisdiction is of necessity required. 7. Fourthly, supposing that the common meaning of these words, [to absolve me from this oath] is not to dispense with me, that I shall not take this oath, but to absolve me from the obligation of performing those things, which I have sworn to perform, it may also be answered, that although it were granted, that the King hath power to absolve me from the bond of taking this oath, yet neither the King nor Parliament hath power to absolve me from this oath once taken, or which is all one, can give me leave not to perform those things, which I have by this oath promised to perform. And the reason is manifest, because there be three only things, as I have said before z In this chapped. sect. 1. nu. 9 , contained in this oath, which the swearer promiseth to perform, to wit, to bear faith, and true allegiance to his Majesty, to defend him from all Treasons, and to disclose them, when they come to his knowledge; but all these are by the law of God and nature commanded to subjects, therefore neither the King nor Parliament hath power to absolve me from the performing of the aforesaid three things; or which is all one, can give me leave not to bear true allegiance to his Majesty, not to defend him against treasons, and not to disclose them, when thereby great danger to his person or State may arise, seeing that they have no power to absolve me from the obligation of the law of God and nature. Sect. V. 1. THe fifth, and last objection, which is insinuated by Antonius Capellus, is against those first words of this branch, I believe, and in conscience am resolved, that neither the Pope, etc. which words do seem to signify a divine, and supernatural belief, with which belief nothing aught to be believed, but that, which is defined as most certain by the Catholic Church; but that the Pope hath not power to absolve me from this oath, doth not appertain to the Catholic faith, but rather the contrary, (if we will give credit to Cardinal Bellarmine, Gretzer, and Lessius) doth belong to faith, therefore I cannot without perjury swear, that the Pope hath not power to absolve me from this oath. 2. To this objection it is answered, by denying, that this word, I believe, is taken in this branch for supernatural belief, but only for moral credulity, and persuasion, whereof in common speech it is usually understood. And this partly may sufficiently appear by the whole scope and tenor of the oath, wherein is only exacted of us a true and sincere testification, acknowledgement, and declaration, how in our consciences we are persuaded concerning the Pope's authority to depose our King, to dispose of his dominions, to discharge his subjects of their obedience, and to absolve them from this oath, etc. partly it is manifest by the words following, [and in conscience I am resolved] which are a declaration of the former, and which were altogether superfluously, and vainly added, if they should import less, than the word, I believe; even as one should say, he is a man, and a sensible creature, I know it most certainly, and also I think it to be so. For as, according to our English phrase, not to be resolved in conscience to say, or do any thing, doth at the most signify an inclination of the mind to say, or do that thing mixed with some wavering, or doubt of the contrary, but not a full assent, or persuasion thereunto; so to be resolved in conscience to embrace such a doctrine, importeth only a full assent, and approbation of that doctrine, which approbation only requireth a moral credulity, and not a supernatural belief, or a clear demonstration of that doctrine. 3. Moreover, whensoever any word contained in a law hath a doubtful and ambiguous signification, to know in what sense it aught to be taken, many rules are assigned by the Lawyers, concerning which, as we have said before, * cap. 1. sec. 2. the end, and matter of the law, the circumstances precedent, and following, and the intention of the Lawmaker are to be considered. The end of this oath, established by the King's law, which is expressed in the Preamble thereof, as the ends of all laws are usually expressed, is to make trial how his majesties subjects stand affected in point of their loyalty, and due obedience, which their affection may sufficiently be made known by a moral credulity, to wit, if they believe, and without any doubt persuade themselves, or, which is all one, are resolved in their consciences, and this their sincere credulity, persuasion, and resolution they do confirm by oath, that the Pope hath not power to depose the King, to discharge his subjects of their allegiance, and to absolve them of this oath, or any part thereof, etc. The matter, or thing, which in this branch of the oath we are compelled to believe, to wit, that the Pope hath not power to absolve me from this oath, or any part thereof, doth not appertain to the Catholic belief, but that among Catholics there is a controversy hereof, the King and Parliament knew very well. And therefore according to the certain, and approved rule of interpreting laws, it is always to be presumed, unless the contrary do clearly appear, that the Lawmaker did not intent to bind us by oath, to believe that with supernatural faith, which with that faith is not to be believed, but that he only desired this, that he might be assured of our sincere persuasion, and firm resolution concerning this clause of the oath. Which general rule, to wit, that we must not, if it may be, interpret the words of the law in an absurd, or unlawful sense, all Divines and Lawyers do so understand, that if the words of the law, being taken in their proper signification, do contain any unlawful, or inconvenient thing, they aught to be transferred to an improper, and metaphorical sense, because it aught always to be presumed, as much as may be, that the Lawmaker did not intent to bind us to any unlawful thing. And truly, if those, who so vehemently impugn the oath, had diligently, and dutifully considered this rule, they might doubtless have made a more favourable construction of many words contained in this oath, against which it is too too manifest, that with more rigour, then is fitting, and with lesser solidity, then beseemeth so excellently learned men, they have excepted. CHAP. VII. The sixth branch of the Oath. WHich oath I acknowledge by good, and full authority to be lawfully ministered unto me, and do renounce all pardons, and dispensations to the contrary. Sect. I 1. AGainst this branch many exceptions are usually made, all which may be reduced to five principal heads. The first is, that the King hath no good, and full authority to command his subjects to take an unlawful and false oath; but this oath is unlawful, and doth contain in it many false propositions, as appeareth by the precedent objections, and by those which follow, shall also be made more manifest. 2. To satisfy this objection no other answer is required, but by answering all the arguments, which may be objected against any particular clause of the oath, to the greater part whereof we have already answered, and the residue, God willing, we will in due order satisfy. Sect. II. 1. THe second is, that our King hath no good, and full authority in spiritual matters, unless we will grant, that he is supreme head, and Governor of the English Church, as well in causes Ecclesiastical, as in temporal, but in this oath many spiritual things are contained: Therefore, etc. The Mayor proposition needeth no proof, but is supposed as certain, and granted by all Catholics. The Minor is by divers men divers ways confirmed. And first Cardinal Bellarmine proveth the Minor in this manner: Whosoever (saith he) a In Respons. ad Apolog. pag. 11. affirmeth, that this oath is lawfully ministered unto him by good, and full authority, doth also affirm, that the King, by whom this oath is proposed, hath supreme power in spiritual things, seeing that he acknowledgeth in him full authority to command, that the Pope's Excommunication, or declaration be contemned. The same objection Lessius doth insinuate, as we before b Cap 4 sect. 1. nu. 1. out of his English Recapitulator have related. 3. And to the same effect are those four arguments of Gretzer c In Comment. Exeget. cap. 6. pag. 102. & seq. , whereby he endeavoureth to prove, that in this oath is included a manifest denial of the Catholic faith. For his first argument is, that in this oath is denied, that the Pope hath any jurisdiction over the Churches of England, Scotland, Ireland. The second is, that therein is affirmed, that King james, and not the Pope is the supreme head of the Christians in great Britanny, even in Ecclesiastical, and spiritual causes. The third is, d Pag. 103. that therein is also denied, that the General Pastor of the Universal Church hath power to restrain, and punish wolves, who with ravening mouths do assault, disperse, and destroy the flock of Christ. Lastly, his fourth argument is, e Pag. 105. that in this oath is affirmed, that King james is universally without any exception to be obeyed in all things, which he attempteth, although they be joined with the overthrow of the apostolic and Catholic religion. 4. And truly if these assertions were contained in this oath, as Gretzer over confidently, to say no more, doth affirm, no man doubtless could deny, but that this oath, as impious, sacrilegious, and clearly repugnant to Catholic faith, aught to be condemned by all Catholics. But, fie for shame, these his four most false assertions he deduceth from principles partly clearly false, and partly greatly controverted, and which, if they were freely granted him, were not sufficient to infer these his four propositions. To wit, because in this oath (saith he) is affirmed, that the Pope hath no jurisdiction at all in any case over the king, or his subjects, so that he can neither depose, nor excommunicate the King, nor absolve his subjects from the bond of their allegiance, nor bind them to obey a just Excommunication, whatsoever at all he doth to the prejudice, yea and overthrow of the Catholic, and truly Christian, and apostolic faith. For this is the express intention of the oath, neither can it ever be so shadowed with any colourable show of words, but that it may clearly appear. 5. Truly I cannot wonder enough at the wonderful boldness of this man, otherwise learned, who with such confidence, & with so great vehemency of words is not afraid to avouch things, which are so evidently false. For this oath doth not affirm, as we have showed before f Cap. 4. sect. 1. , that the Pope hath not power to excommunicate the King, or that the Subjects are not bound to obey a just Excommunication, and much less, that they may lawfully contemn it, as Cardinal Bellarmine saith; betwixt which two, to wit, not to obey a just excommunication, and to contemn it, a great difference is to be made. But the oath doth only affirm this, that although the King be excommunicated, yet he is to be obeyed in civil matters, for that Excommunication, being only a spiritual Censure, hath not force to deprive Princes of their temporal kingdoms, and dominions, or, which is all one, of their Regal authority, and consequently not to take away the temporal obedience, which is due to Princes by the law of God and nature. Besides this it also affirmeth, that the Pope hath not power to deprive Princes, and therefore neither to discharge Subjects of their allegiance, or to absolve any man from this oath; But this is not to deny the Catholic faith, as we have partly here before g Cap. 3. & 6. , partly in other places h In Apolog. & Respons' Apolog. , and partly hereafter i Against Doctor Schulckenius. will more abundantly show. 6. Secondly, Gretzer in all his four arguments doth cunningly join deposition with Excommunication, as though whosoever denieth, that the Pope hath power to depose Kings, is consequently bound to deny, that he also hath power to excommunicate Kings, which Lessius, as we have seen before k Cap. 4. sect. 1. nu. 1. & 7. , doth over boldly avouch, whereas many very learned Divines, and two also very famous Jesuits, Suarez, and Becanus, do in plain words teach the contrary, and moreover many Catholics, who, although they dare not deny the Pope's power to excommunicate Kings, yet they are not afraid to deny his power to depose Princes, and to absolve subjects from their allegiance. And truly in my opinion it is greatly to be wondered at, that men, otherwise so excellently learned, in matters of so great importance as to establish new articles of faith, and to withdraw faithful subjects from taking an oath of allegiance, and that to the perpetual temporal overthrow of themselves, and their whole posterity, should not be fearful to bring such exorbitant, paradoxical, and sophistical arguments, which to every man but meanly learned do evidently seem to be most weak, in so much that our countrymen, who do not disallow the oath, are thereby rather confirmed in their opinion, and those, who disallow it, and are very desirous to devise some solid argument, which they may object against it, to see such childish collections, I speak with due respect, are greatly ashamed. 7. For what man is there of so mean understanding, who at the first fight cannot perceive the weakness of these inferences? In this oath is denied the Pope's power to excommunicate, and depose the King; therefore in this oath is denied, that the Pope hath no jurisdiction, even spiritual, over the Churches of England, Scotland, Ireland. Secondly, in this oath is affirmed, that the King cannot be excommunicated, that he cannot be deposed: therefore therein is affirmed, that King james, and not the Pope is the supreme head of the Christians in great Britanny, even in Ecclesiastical causes. Thirdly, in this oath is denied, that the King can be excommunicated, that he can be deposed: therefore therein is denied, that the universal Pastor of the Church hath power to restrain, and punish heretical Kings. Fourthly, in this oath is affirmed, that the King cannot be excommunicated, that he cannot be deposed, therefore in this oath is affirmed that King james must universally without exception be obeyed in all things, which he doth attempt, although they be joined with the overthrow of Catholic Religion. 8. For all the antecedent propositions, forsomuch as appertaineth to the power of excommunicating, are evidently false, as we before against Card. Bellarmine have manifestly proved. And if they were only understood of the power of deposing (besides that this power of deposing cannot be certainly confirmed with any proof) it is also too too apparent, that the consequents are not rightly inferred from the antecedents. For in Gretzer's first argument the consequent can no ways be deduced from the antecedent. For although one should aver, that by the peculiar privilege of God Kings are exempted from the coercive power of the Pope, yet from thence it would not follow, that the Pope had no spiritual jurisdiction over any of the King's Subjects. For the Pope cannot excommunicate an infidel Prince, nevertheless he hath spiritual jurisdiction over the Christians, who are subject to that Prince. How much the more will this inference be insufficient, if we speak only of the Pope's power to depose a Prince? Secondly, the consequence also of the second argument is no less false, especially if the antecedent proposition be understood of the power to depose. And although we should grant, that the antecedent proposition concerning also the Pope's power to excommunicate were true, yet it is not from thence rightly inferred, that the King, & not the Pope, is supreme head of the Christians in great Britanny, even in spiritual causes, as appeareth also in Heathen Princes, who cannot be excommunicated, and yet the Pope is the Supreme Pastor in spiritual causes of all the faithful, who are subjects in their dominions. Furthermore, in the third argument the antecedent proposition, for so much as concerneth the Pope's power to depose, doth not rightly infer the consequent: for it is a fallacious arguing from a particular to an universal. As, for example, the Pope cannot punish Kings with this punishment, therefore he cannot punish Kings. The Pope may indeed, according to Catholic doctrine, punish heretical Kings with spiritual punishments, but whether he hath power to punish them with temporal punishments is the very question which is now in controversy. Lastly, the consequence of the fourth argument, although we should grant both parts of the antecedent propositions, is so evidently false, and absurd, that I am almost ashamed to repeat it, in so much that it is a wonder, how so learned a man did not greatly blush to publish it to the whole Christian world for proving a thing of so great importance. I would willingly also, that Gretzer would sincerely answer us, whether the self-fame arguments, which he hath framed against this oath, he might not allege in the self-same terms against that doctrine of the Kingdom of France above l Cap. 3. sect. 3. nu. 13. related out of Petrus Pithaeus, that the Pope hath not power to deprive the King of France of his Kingdom, and notwithstanding any excommunications, and so forth, to condemn it as flat heretical, and containing a manifest denial of the Catholic faith, 10. Secondly, others prove the aforesaid Minor proposition by this argument. To determine, and define what the Pope can do, or cannot do in spiritual causes, what power he hath to depose Princes, to discharge Subjects of their allegiance, and to absolve from oaths, what force Excommunication hath, and what effect it worketh, & to conclude, what position is heretical, or not heretical, are all spiritual causes, but the King doth in this oath determine, & define all the aforesaid things, therefore many spiritual matters are contained in this oath. This argument is insinuated by that nameless Doctor, m Nu. 25. of his letter. who falsely chargeth my Apology with heresy, and Ethnicisme, but it is somewhat more largely urged by Lessius, n Nu. 220. o Pag. the last. § Sixthly. as appeareth by his English Recapitulator. 11. To this objection it is answered, by denying also the Minor proposition. For the King, and Parliament do not determine, and define, what spiritual power Christ our Lord hath granted to S. Peter, and his Successors, but they knew right well, that there is a great controversy among Catholics concerning the Pope's power to depose Princes, and to absolve Subjects from the oath of their allegiance: and that some do affirm, that the Pope hath power to depose Princes, and to discharge Subjects of their obedience, although it be confirmed by oath, and that others do utterly deny the same: that some also do affirm, that Excommunication, if not directly, at the least indirectly, and by consequence, hath this effect, to deprive Princes of their temporal jurisdiction, and that others, with the greater, and better part of Divines, do utterly deny the same. and because the former opinion was neither in practice, nor speculation known to the Primitive Church (as far as we may conjecture by the histories of those times) and besides that it hath given no little occasion of great tumults both in this Kingdom, and in other parts of the Christian world, the King and Parliament, who represent the whole body of the commonwealth, and every member thereof, thought it convenient for preventing of future tumults, and conspiracies, which they thought otherwise would probably ensue, that the later opinion should be followed, and embraced of all the King's Subjects, and that thereof a public, and sincere profession, testification, and declaration should with a solemn oath be made by all men. As also the Doctors of Paris, although they knew right well, that there was a vehement controversy among Catholics, whether the most blessed Virgin Mary was conceived in original sin, nevertheless they bond all the professors of Divinity under certain penalties proper to their community, that they should not publicly preach, nor teach, that she had contracted original sin, and yet they did not intent thereby to decide, and define that controversy, but only to declare their great liking of the one opinion, and their great dislike of the other. 12. This year 1501. saith Surius, p In Comment. brevi the year. 1501. the Theological faculty of the university of Mentz, imitating the decree of the Council of Basil, and also the Divines of Paris, and of Colen, did make this decree & ordinance, that it should be altogether held, that the most blessed mother of God was conceived without the spot of original sin, and that by a special privilege; and did strictly ordain, that none hereafter should in that University be promoted in sacred Divinity, unless he did before by oath make promise, that he would neither maintain in his mind, nor in any wise approve the contrary opinion. May we therefore from hence rightly conclude, that those Doctors intended to define that opinion as certain, which Pope Sixtus the fourth not long before had by a particular Bull q Dated the year. 1083. which is in the fourth to me of the councils after the life of Pope Sixtus the fourth. declared to be uncertain, and controverted, and that the contrary might be defended without mortal sin, and which also innumerable Divines of those times did think not to be so probable, as the contrary? 13. Secondly, these, who do urge this argument, will scarcely, as I think, deny, that the King and Parliament may, to avoid probable dangers of future Conspiracies, compel all his majesties subjects, to profess, testify, acknowledge and declare by oath, that the Pope is not by Christ his institution the direct Lord of this Kingdom, nor that our King is the Pope's Subject, Vassal, and Vicar in temporals, and nevertheless the Canonists do so vehemently defend this direct dominion of the Pope in temporals not only over this kingdom, but also over the universal Christian world, that some of them r Bartholus F. de requir. reis. leg. 1. §. 1. do think it flat heresy to deny the same. Yet from hence it cannot rightly be gathered, that the King should arrogate to himself spiritual power to define, what spiritual jurisdiction is by Christ his institution granted to the Pope. And from hence it doth evidently appear, that the denial of that Papal power, which is a sacred thing and given from above, and which no mortal man can take away or diminish is not denied in this oath, as Cardinal Bellarmine s In Respons. ad Apolog. p. 8. doth unworthily aver; for this power is expressly found in the word of God either written or delivered to the Church by tradition, or by evident consequence deduced from thence, & which therefore all Catholics do profess to appertain to the Catholic faith; but that only power of the Pope is denied in this oath, which without any prejudice of faith may by Catholics be lawfully denied. As also that power of the Pope, which the Canonists do with might, and main defend to be a sacred thing, and given from above, Cardinal Bellarmine t Lib. 5. de Rom. Pont. cap. 1. et seq. is not afraid to diminish, take away, and utterly deny as a profane thing, and not given from above, but invented by man. 14 Now concerning the last part of this argument, we answer, that it is not determined, or defined in this oath, what proposition is heretical, neither is this position, Princes which be excommunicated, or deprived by the Pope, may be deposed by their subjects, or any other whatsoever, abjured as heretical, but only by this oath we are compelled, as hath been showed before, u Cap. 5. sect. 2. to abhor, detest, and abjure this doctrine, and position as heretical, and heretofore defined, determined, and condemned by the Church, that it is in the free power of the subjects, or any other whatsoever, to depose, or, if they will to murder Princes, which be excommunicated, or deprived by the Pope. 15 And if any one reply, that it doth not belong to the civil power, to compel any man to abjure heresy, it being a spiritual offence, and therefore only belonging to the spiritual power. It is answered first, that although it doth not appertain to the civil power, to determine, and define what position is heretical, or not heretical, or to punish heretics with spiritual punishments (because these are merely spiritual causes) yet it can not be denied, but that it belongeth to Christian Princes, at lest wise as they are appointed by God to be protectors x 23. q 5. can. Principes. et Concil. Trident sess. 25 can. 20. de Reformat of the Church, to root out heresies by means of the temporal sword, which is proper to the civil power, to punish heretics, to defend the Church from all manifest wrongs either temporal, or spiritual, and to command, and procure all those things, which are necessary to her preservation, and nevertheless they shall not be said therefore to usurp the jurisdiction of the Ecclesiastical power. The Pope saith, Cardinal Bellarmine y Lib. 5. de Rom. Po●t cap. 7. in 5 ratione. may, and aught to command all Christians those things, to which every man is bound according to his state, that is, to compel all men, to serve God, as they are bound according to their state, but Kings are bound to serve God, by defending the Church, by punishing heretics, and schismatics, as Saint Augustine teacheth in epist. so. ad Bonifacium, Le● epist. 75. ad Leonem Augustum, et Gregorius lib. 2. epist. 61. ad Mauritium. Therefore that saying, which Alphonsus de Castro affirmeth of a Bishop, College, or Provincial council, may in like manner, observing the proportion of temporal punishments, be applied to temporal Princes. But although saith he, z Lib: 1: adversus haeres. cap: 8 a Bishop, College, or Provincial council hath not power to define matters of faith, in those things, which may worthily be doubted of, nevertheless in those things, which are already defined, or which by most evident testimonies of holy Scripture may without any tergiversation, or overthwarting be known, they may minister justice, and punish the obstinate maintainers of that assertion: for that is not to give sentence; but to execute the sentence before given. 16. Secondly, it is answered to the same Reply, that every sin, be it never so spiritual, yea and heresy it self, not as it is a spiritual thing, and against the spiritual health of our souls, but as it is a temporal wrong hurtful to the common peace of the citizens, and usually causeth great perturbations in the commonwealth, is subject to the jurisdiction of the temporal power, by whom it may be punished with temporal punishments: as also secular crimes, not as they are temporal, but as they are spiritual, and hurtful to the spiritual health of souls, are subject to the spiritual power, by whom they may be punished with spiritual punishments. And the reason hereof, I have heretofore a In my Apology nu. 94. et seq. et nu. 153. et seq. , where I handled the matter more at large, alleged out of Victoria, and joannes Parisiensis, because the temporal common wealth is a perfect common wealth, and hath in herself sufficient power, therefore she may by her own authority defend herself from the wrong of any whatsoever, and by the material sword repel the abuse of the spiritual sword, especially when it tendeth to the hurt of the common wealth, whose charge is committed to the King. 17. Marriage, saith Dominicus Sotus, b Nu. 4. dist. 29. 9 1. ar. 4. being a Sacrament in such sort, that it is also a civil contract, it nothing letteth, but that as in the former respect it belongeth to the Ecclesiastical Court, so in regard of the later it is subject also in some sort to the civil. Not that Princes can altar those things, which are of the substance of Matrimony, but that they may punish them, who contract Matrimony, when by contracting they shall offend against the public good: for against those crimes, whose judgement doth belong to the Ecclesiastical Court, they may also ordain punishments, as they disturb the peace of the Commonwealth. Which saying of Sotus may in the very like manner be applied to heresy, which being a spiritual offence in such sort, that also it disturbeth the temporal peace of the civil commonwealth, it nothing letteth, but that as in the former respect it belongeth to the Ecclesiastical Court, so in regard of the later, it is subject also in some sort to the Civil, not that Princes can determine, and define what is heresy, but that they may punish heretics, when by defending heretical propositions, they shall offend against the public good. For against those crimes, whose judgement doth belong to the Ecclesiastical Court, they may also ordain punishments, as they disturb the peace of the Commonwealth. And so the Christian Emperors have enacted many laws, c They are to be seen in the end of the Directory of the Inquisition among the Apostolical letters. pag. 18. 27. and 44. which contain grievous punishments against heretics, by virtue of which Laws the holy office of the Inquisition even at Rome doth proceed against them with capital punishments, as it may plainly be gathered by the Apostolical letters of Pope Innocent the fourth, Alexander the fourth, and Clement the fourth. d In the place last cited. For a King, saith Dominicus Bannes, * 2ae 2ae. q. 11. are 4. q. 1. in fine. doth punish heretics, as most seditious enemies against the peace of his Kingdom, which without unity of Religion cannot be preserved. And a little beneath, from whence, saith he, it followeth, that a Secular King hath power to pardon sometimes the loss of their lives, and to punish heretics in some other manner. Sect. III. 1. THe third head of exception against this fixth branch of the oath is, for that no human power hath good, and full authority over the internal actions of our mind, and therefore neither the King, nor Parliament hath good, and full authority to compel the subjects to think inwardly this, or that, or to punish any man for defending, or not defending in his mind this, or that opinion: but this oath doth compel the subjects, to believe, acknowledge, profess, and to be resolved in their conscience, that the Pope hath no power to depose Princes, to discharge subjects of their allegiance, and to absolve any man from this oath, and doth grievously punish those, who do not so acknowledge, profess, believe, and are so resolved in their conscience, therefore this oath is not lawfully ministered by good and full authority. 2. To this objection it is answered, that although the internal actions of our mind, directly, and as they are internal, are not subject to the command, and jurisdiction of human authority, (whereof nevertheless there is a great controversy betwixt the Divines, and Lawyers, whose names are set down by joannes Salas e Disput. 9 de Legibus, sect, 1. the jesuite) yet all Doctors do agreed in this, that internal actions of the mind, as they do cause external disturbance in the commonwealth, and do concur to external actions, whereof human authority hath, for the external good of human government, power to judge, and determine, may by consequence, and indirectly be subject to human authority, although by it they are not punishable, until by some external sign they be sufficiently made known. Wherefore, although the Church, as well saith our learned countryman Sayrus f Lib 3. Thesauri cap. 6. in fine. , whose words are in like manner verified also of the Civil commonwealth, hath not power over internal actions, if they be considered by themselves, without any reference to external, yet she hath authority over internal actions, if they be considered as conditions of external, and may be referred to external actions, whereof the Church hath for the end of human government, full, and perfect power to know, and determine. 3. Whereupon in this kingdom a firm purpose to plot any treason against the King's person, if it be made known by any external sign, is punished with the usual punishment of high Treason: And deadly hatred among citizens, although internal, as it may probably breed outward seditions, tumults, and perturbations in the commonwealth, may be forbidden by the Secular Prince, and if outwardly it be made known, may also be punished with temporal punishment: So likewise in my opinion it is manifest, that the internal maintaining of this, or that opinion, as it may prudently be judged to be either very necessary to preserve the public peace of the commonwealth, or to be a probable cause of future sedition therein, may by a temporal Prince be commanded, and forbidden under temporal punishments. Now, that internal maintaining of these positions, to wit, that the Pope hath power to depose Princes, to absolve Subjects from their allegiance, and to give them leave, not to bear true faith, and obedience to his Majesty, not to defend him against Treasons, and not to disclose them, when they shall come to their knowledge, and also that it is in the free power of the subjects, or any other whatsoever, to depose, or if they will, to murder Princes, which be excommunicated, or deprived by the Pope, will by all likelihood be a probable occasion of raising tumults in this kingdom and of plotting treasons, and traitorous conspiracies against his majesties person, Crown, and dignity, if the Pope should excommunicate, and deprive him, is so manifest to prudent men, who have but cursorily read the Stories of precedent times, that there can be alleged no colourable reason to make any doubt thereof. 21. Seeing therefore that the King and Parliament do not directly command in this oath the internal denying of the aforesaid positions, but do only compel the Subjects to make an unfeigned external profession, acknowledgement, and declaration of their inward dislike, and detestation of the said positions, in regard that they cannot be inwardly maintained with the safety of his Majesty, and the quietness of the weal public, no longer than it shall please the Pope's Holiness; truly in my opinion it is evident, that the King and Parliament have; according to the approved principles of Divines and Lawyers, good, and full authority to command the Subjects, to make a true and sincere external profession, acknowledgement, and declaration of their inward dislike, and detestation of the aforesaid positions, they being such, which may lawfully be disliked, and detested, and the dislike, and detestation thereof, all things prudently considered, being morally necessary to the outward safety of the King, and common wealth; considering that internal actions, as they are referred to external, and are causes, and occasions of them, are subject to the jurisdiction of the Civil power, although by it not punishable, until by some outward sign they be sufficiently made manifest. Sect. four 1. THe fourth head of exception against this sixth branch of the oath is, for that a Secular Magistrate hath no good, and full authority over Clergy men, because they are exempted from the jurisdiction, and tribunals of Secular Magistrates, therefore, although it were granted, that this oath in itself is lawful, and consequently may by the King's authority be imposed upon the laity, yet, by reason of Ecclesiastical immunity, the King hath no good, and full authority to compel Clergy men without the Pope's licence to take the same. 2. To this objection it is answered first, that all Subjects whatsoever, whether they be Ecclesiastical, or Secular persons, are bound to allegiance, and subjection in that degree of subjection, from which they are not exempted. Seeing therefore that Clergy men, although by the privileges of Princes, and Ecclesiastical Canons are in some degree exempted even in temporal causes from the tribunals of Secular Magistrates, and cannot be convented before them without the Bishop's licence, yet as they are true members, and parts of the Civil commonwealth, and also true Subjects, as well as Lay men, and are not exempted from true subjection, and allegiance due to the temporal Prince, and may as well as other subjects commit true treason against him, they are bound also to yield true allegiance to the Prince, and if just cause require, they may also, as other members of the commonwealth, and other Subjects, be compelled by the Prince, under temporal punishments, to make a sincere declaration of their allegiance, either by a bore promise, or by oath, as the Prince shall prudently judge to be more expedient for his safety. Neither is it sufficient, that Subjects do promise' only in general words their allegiance; for so they should not be tied to any certain form of swearing their allegiance, but they might choose, what form, or manner of swearing should be most pleasing unto them, which nevertheless reason itself, and the common practice of imposing such oaths of allegiance showeth to be false, and inconvenient; but they are bound to give such security of their allegiance, and to take such an oath for confirming the same, which, being in itself lawful, the Prince shall with mature deliberation judge to be necessary for preserving his own safety, and the quietness of the Commonwealth. 3. Wherefore if the King, and State, being moved with truly prudent, and probable reasons, shall judge it necessary, for preserving his own safety, and also the Commonwealths, to compel by oath all his majesties Subjects, even Ecclesiastical persons, as they are subjects, to give security to his Majesty of their true and constant allegiance, and subjection, it is lawful, yea and sometimes it may be necessary, upon certain incident occasions, to exact greater security of Clergy men, then of lay-men, if the Prince for reasons truly probable shall more vehemently suspect the fidelity of Clergy men. Neither doth the King impose this oath of Allegiance upon Clergy men, as they are Clergy men, but as they are Subjects, and true members, parts, and citizens of the temporal commonwealth. 4. As in like manner he compelleth Bishops to come to the Parliament, not as they are Bishops, but as by the King his privilege they are made Barons, and Peers of the kingdom. Because Bishops (saith joannes Azor g Tom. 1. Instit. lib. 5. cap. 14. in fine. the jesuite) are Peers, and Princes of the kingdom, it belongeth to Kings to command, that as they are such, and not, as they are Bishops, they meet together with others, for the common safety, and good of the Kingdom. Which if they refuse to do, or if they deny to take that Oath of Allegiance, which other Barons are bound to take, the King hath full, and lawful authority to deprive them, not doubtless of any spiritual jurisdiction, which they have received from Christ, but of that temporal dignity, which by his Princely Privilege they do enjoy. Whereupon we read, h Surius ad annum. 1545. that the Emperor Charles the fifth commanded the Archbishop of Collen, being a Prince of the Empire, to appear within thirty days before him, to answer to those accusations, which should be alleged against him; which in like manner did Pope Paul the third commanding him, as he was a Bishop, to appear before him within threescore days. 5. Secondly, it is answered, that although it were granted, that Clergy men are exempted in all causes whatsoever, not only from the command, and power of inferior Secular Magistrates, but also from the authority and jurisdiction of Kings (who unless they be expressed by name, are not to be ranked in the number of Secular Magistrates, as may be gathered by many texts of the Canon Law i Cap. Venerabilem de exceptionibus et c. ad abolendam de haereticis. ) nevertheless when the Prince hath no fit commodity to meet with the Spiritual judge to demand licence of him, that he may convent Clergy men before the Secular tribunal for treasons, or other enormous Secular crimes, or it is morally certain, that he will not grant any such licence, than the Secular Prince in case of necessity hath full, and sufficient authority granted him by the Law of God, and nature, to defend himself, and his kingdom from all present dangers, or which probably are like to ensue, and to procure not only by the way of defence, but also by authority, to use Victoria his word, all lawful means fitting the temporal power, which are necessary to the preserving of himself, and his Kingdom, and to prevent all probable dangers, which by means of any spiritual person may arise, as joannes Parisiensis, k de potest. Regia, et papali cap. 21. ad. 37. Victoria, l Relect. 1. de potest. Eccles. sect. 7. 6. Octava propositio. Covarrunias, m Pract quaest. cap. 35. and many others do plainly aver. Sect. V. 1. THe fifth and last head of exception against this sixth branch of the Oath, because it might be somewhat dangerous to the obiectours, is only by some muttered in corners, who do ground their objection in this, that for many years together, to wit, since the putting down of Catholic Bishops, there hath not been, as they imagine, any true, and lawful Parliament in this Realm: And they argue in this manner. Not laws, which be of force in this Kingdom, can be enacted but by the authority of a true, and lawful Parliament, but the Parliament, which enacted this law for the ministering of this Oath of Allegiance, was no true, and lawful Parliament, Therefore this oath is not lawfully ministered by good and full authority. The Mayor proposition is granted by all the Lawyers of this Realm, The Minor is proved: because every true, and lawful Parliament must consist of these three States, to wit, the Bishops, the Nobles, and the Commons, but the Protestant Bishops are not true, and lawful Bishops, therefore the Parliaments of these times are not true, and lawful Parliaments. For by whom were you consecrated, saith Becanus n M. controvers. Anglicana. c. 4. q. 9 nu. 6. pag. 170. speaking to the English Bishops? Whether by the King? But he hath not power to consecrated. Whether by the Archbishop of Canterbury, or such like? Neither that truly. For Thomas Cranmer, who under K. Henry the eight obtained the Archbishopric of Canturbury, was not consecrated by any Bishop, but thrust in violently, and designed only by the King alone, Therefore as many as were afterwards consecrated by him, were not consecrated lawfully, but by presumption. 2. They that urge this objection, to prove thereby that this Oath containeth in it a flat denial of the Catholic faith, are very desirous to fly to this controversy, to wit, whether the Protestant Bishops of this Kingdom be true, and Lawful Bishops or no. For at the lest by this way they think to demonstrate, that in this oath is evidendy contained not only civil obedience, but also other things which appertain to Catholic Religion, to wit, to the lawful ministering of the Sacrament of holy Order. But with this Controversy, whether the Protestant Bishops of this Kingdom have true Ordination, and consequently are true Bishops, or no; that is, whether from the beginning, and so successively from time to time, they were ordained by true Bishops, and whether those Bishops from time to time used that due form, and matter, which by Christ his institution is necessarily required to impress the Episcopal Character, considering that it is, both a question of fact, whereof I have not as yet any certain knowledge & also altogether impertinent for the satisfying of this present objection, I will not at this time intermeddle. 3. Yet before I come to answer the objection, I would have the Reader to be forewarned of two things. The first is, that betwixt a true, and lawful Bishop there is a great difference to be made. For that one be a true Bishop, it is only required, that he have true Ordination, whereby the Episcopal Character is impressed and which cannot be razed out, but always remaineth, whether he become a Turk, jew, or heretic. And so the Arrian Bishops, although they were heretics, yet because they were truly ordained, they were also true Bishops, neither were they reordained, when they returned to the unity of the Catholic Church. But that one be a lawful Bishop, besides true Ordination is also necessary lawful mission and jurisdiction, which by Christ his institution is only derived from the true, and Orthodoxal Church of Christ. 4. The second is, that Becanus very rashly and without any probable colour of reason, or authority, and against the plain records of this Kingdom doth affirm, that Cranmer was not consecrated by any true Bishop, but designed only by the King. For (besides that King Henry at that time, when Cranmer was made Archbishop, to wit, the twenty fourth year of his reign, had not altogether renounced the communion of the See Apostolic, by whose authority both the election of Cranmer to the archbishopric was confirmed, and to whom also he, when he was consecrated, swore obedience, which afterwards his adversaries did cast in his teeth; and therefore there can be made no doubt, that he was consecrated by other Bishops with all rites, and ceremonies according to the ancient Canons) this only argument may suffice to convince Becanus, that King Henry the very next year after, to wit, the twenty fifth year of his Reign, made a Law in public Parliament, that every Archbishop, and Bishop of this Realm should be presented and nominated by the King's Majesty, his heirs, and successors, but that he should be consecrated by one Archbishop, and two Bishops, or else by four Bishops appointed by the King, with all benedictions, and ceremonies required thereunto; which custom in electing & consecrating Bishops is used even at this present time. For first the King sendeth his letters to the Chapter of the vacant See, wherein he granteth them leave to choose a Bishop, and presenteth unto them one, or more to be elected, who being elected the King confirmeth the election, and afterwards he sendeth his letters to three Bishops at the lest, requiring them to consecrated him Bishop. Wherefore I marvel from whom Becanus, a man otherwise very learned, hath taken this so manifest a fiction, seeing that it is not credible, that he hath devised it out of his own brain. 5. These therefore being premonished, for satisfying of this present objection four things are to be supposed. The first is, that the custom, which any Kingdom hath to enact no laws without the counsel, and consent of the three States of the Realm, did originally proceed either from the King alone, who, to govern his Subjects more quietly, and peaceably, did freely, and of his own accord grant them this Privilege, that he would enact no laws without the counsel, and consent of the three States of the Realm: or it had it first beginning from the whole commonwealth, which at the first, when it was subject to no Sovereign, and absolute Prince, but the Sovereignty, or supreme power to rule was in itself, did choose their King with this condition and limitation, that he should not have authority to make laws, unless the whole commonwealth, which the Parliament doth represent, should also concur with him: But then we must of necessity confess, that King not to be altogether an absolute Prince, seeing that he hath not power to make laws, which all absolute Princes, according to the Doctrine of all Divines, and Lawyers doubtless have: or lastly it was first derived both from the King and Commonwealth together, by reason of some covenant agreed on betwixt them. 6. The second Supposition is, that no human law hath so strong force to bind, but that the Lawmaker, or his Sucessor, who hath equal authority with him, hath power to repeal, and disannul the same. And although the Lawmaker may perchance greatly offend by repealing without just cause a good, and profitable law, yet all Doctors do with uniform consent agreed in this, that the abrogating thereof is valide, and that the aforesaid law hath no longer any force to bind. And the reason hereof they allege, for that every thing is by the same causes dissolved, by which it is made, but the will of the Lawmaker, intending to bind his Subjects by his law, being the principal cause, yea and the soul of the law itself, may be altered, and revoked at his pleasure: And so the law is so long, and no longer a law, than the Lawmaker, or his Successor will have it to be a law: Neither is it in the power of the Lawmaker so to tie his Successor, but that he hath always free power, to abrogate the law, when he shall please, according to that no less true, then vulgar saying, Par in parem non habet imperium: Not man hath authority over his equal. For the Successor to the Prince hath not authority to make laws from the person of the Prince, whom he succeedeth, but from the office, wherein he succeedeth him. And what we have said concerning the repealing of laws, the same also is proportionably to be understood of the revoking of covenants, and contracts, to wit, that every covenant, or contract, may by the mutual consent of both parties be either in some part altered, or else wholly made void, and to have no effect at all. 7. The third Supposition is, that the very same civil power, and authority to enact laws, doth now remain in this kingdom, which it had, before this custom to enact laws with the counsel and consent of the Parliament did first begin. Neither can any alteration of Religion deprive a kingdom, or Commonwealth of that supreme Civil authority, which it received not from Religion, but from the law of nations, and nature. So that if any Christian kingdom should revolt from the faith of Christ, fall into heresy, or also Ethnicisme, yet she should have no less full, and sufficient authority to govern itself civilly, and to enact civil laws, then if it never had received the faith, and religion of Christ. The reason is, because as a temporal Commonwealth doth by the faith of Christ obtain no temporal dominion, kingdom, or jurisdiction, but only a right to attain by due means to the kingdom of heaven; so by the want of faith it only loseth the spiritual right, and not that temporal jurisdiction, which by the law of nations and nature is granted to all absolute Commonwealths, what Religion soever they do profess. 8. The fourth Supposition is, that in this kingdom two Houses, as we call them, of Parliament are distinguished, wherein all those, who have suffrages, do use to sit. The one is called the Lower house, which containeth those persons, who are elected by the people, or Commons: the other is called the Higher house, which comprehendeth the Peers and Barons of the kingdom, whether they be Archbishops, Bishops, Dukes, Marquesses, Earls, Barons, or by what titles soever they be called; Nevertheless all, and every one of the aforesaid Nobles have their voice in the Parliament by this only title, that by the King's privilege they are made Barons of the kingdom, and not in regard that they are Archbishops, Bishops, Dukes, Marquesses, or Earls. From whence it cometh to pass, that in this Higher house, which is only one composed of the Barons of the kingdom, and not two houses composed of the Lords spiritual and temporal, to the enacting of a law the suffrages of the Barons are indifferently numbered, without regard how many voices there be of spiritual, and how many of temporal Lords. Wherefore it may fall out, and sometimes also it hath so happened, that a law may be established by the authority of the King and Parliament, and by the whole kingdom be accounted a firm and forcible law, although every one of the Bishops, and Lords spiritual do repugn, so that the greater part of the Barons, whether they be Lords spiritual or temporal do give their consent. 9 From hence may easily be gathered a perspicuous answer to the aforesaid objection. For whether we grant, that this custom, privilege, or covenant not to enact any laws without the counsel and consent of the aforesaid three States of the Realm did first proceed from the King alone, or from the Commonwealth, or from them both, yet it cannot be denied, but that by the mutual consent of the King, and Commonwealth, it may either in part be altered, or wholly revoked. We grant therefore that no civil law, according to the present custom of this kingdom, hath force to bind, unless by the authority of a true, and lawful Parliament, (which doth consist of the Prelates, or Bishops, of the Nobles, and of the Commons) it be established. Nevertheless we also affirm, that as it is in the power of the King, and Commonwealth, which the Parliament doth represent, to ordain, that civil laws be enacted either by the King's sole authority, without the consent or suffrages of the Prelates, Nobles, and Commons, or with their consent, so also it is in the power of the King and Parliament to declare, what persons are to be understood by the names of Prelates, Nobles, and Commons, whose voices must be required to enact laws in the Parliament. And therefore as in times past Catholic Bishops, and also Abbots were by the King's privilege made Peers and Barons of the kingdom, and gave their voices with other Barons in the upper house of Parliament, so also the King's Majesty might in like manner give the same dignity, and authority to Deans, Archdeacon's, or to any other his Majesty Subjects. 10. Seeing therefore that the Protestant Bishops of this kingdom are by the authority of the King and Commonwealth made Lords spiritual, or Barons of the kingdom, and by the whole kingdom are accounted for such, there can be made no doubt at all, but that they have full authority with other Barons of the kingdom, to prescribe to the whole kingdom civil laws being confirmed by the King: especially seeing that they have not suffrages in the Parliament, as they are true Bishops in very deed, but as being by the King and Parliament esteemed for such, they are by the King's privilege made Barons, and have their place, and dignity in the Parliament with the other Barons of the kingdom: And that the Protestant Bishops are by the authority of the King and Commonwealth made Barons of the kingdom, it is manifest by an Act of Parliament holden the first year of Queen Elizabeth (which cannot be denied to be a true Parliament, seeing that the Catholic Bishops were present o As D. Harding witnesseth against Master jewels Apology part. 6. chap. 2. thereat, and gave their voices with the other Barons of the kingdom) wherein it was decreed, that whosoever hereafter shall by the Queen's Royal authority be preferred to the dignity of an Archbishop, and Bishop, and be consecrated according to the rites and ceremonies prescribed by the Act of Parliament in the fifth year of King Edward the sixth, shall have authoritre to do, and execute all those things, concerning the name, title, degree, & dignity of an Archbishop, and Bishop, which any Archbishops, and Bishops of this Realm did heretofore do, and execute. And although one only Bishop, as D. Harding p In the place before cited. relateth, gave his assent thereunto, yet this, as may appear by that, which we said a little before q Nu. 8. , nothing letteth, but that the voices of the other Barons being more in number, might, for the granting by the King's special gift, a temporal privilege, as is a temporal dignity, oversway, and prevail. And by this it is manifest, that the Parliaments of these times are true, and proper Parliaments, and consequently that the civil laws enacted by them, and confirmed by the King's Royal assent, are established by good, full, and lawful authority. And this now with far greater reason may be averred, seeing that at this day there are no Catholic Bishops, who can challenge any place, or suffrage in the Parliament house. 11. And this may suffice for the satisfying of all the arguments, which are usually alleged against the sixth branch of this oath. For against those last words [and I do renounce all pardons, and dispensations to the contrary] supposing, that the Pope hath no power to dispense with me in this oath, or any part thereof, of which we have before abundantly disputed, I cannot devise any thing of moment, which can be objected. For that, which some unlearned persons, hearing this name of pardons, do very unlearnedly imagine, that in this clause is denied the Pope's authority to grant Pardons, or Indulgences, is plainly frivolous, and very ridiculous: For that by the name of pardons, no other thing is signified in this clause of the oath, then that the Pope hath not power to dispense with me in this oath, or any part thereof, or to absolve me from the same, and consequently to grant me any licence, pardon, or dispensation, by virtue whereof I am not bound, to bear faith, and true obedience to his Majesty, to defend him to the uttermost of my power against all treasons, and traitorous conspiracies, and not to disclose them, when they shall come to my knowledge, which pardons, licenses, or dispensations that every Subject may lawfully renounce, supposing that which hath been said before, is too too manifest. CHAP. VIII. The seventh branch of the Oath. ANd all these things I do plainly, and sincerely acknowledge, and swear according to these express words by me spoken, and according to the plain, and common sense, and understanding of the same words without any equivocation, or mental evasion, or secret reservation whatsoever. Sect. I 1. AGainst this branch two objections are usually made. The first, which Lessius, a Nu. 216. as his English Recapitulator b Pag. 51. relateth, doth insinuate, is against that word [swear] comprehended in the first words of this branch, [And all these things I do plainly, and sincerely acknowledge, and swear] from which words it is plainly deduced, that I do not only acknowledge, but also swear all the former clauses, and parcels of the oath, and consequently that I do swear, that the Pope hath not power to depose the King, or to absolve his Subjects from their allegiance. Seeing therefore that no Catholic can without danger of perjury swear that to be true, whose truth is not manifest, but controverted among Catholics, and no Catholic can deny, but that at the lest it is uncertain, and controverted among Catholic Divines, whether the aforesaid positions do contain truth, or falsehood, doubtless no Catholic can without danger of perjury swear, that the Pope hath not authority to depose the King, and to absolve his Subjects from their allegiance, although he, who is of that opinion may, without any danger of perjury, confirm by oath the acknowledgement, profession, and declaration of his opinion. 2. To this objection it is answered first, that the true and proper meaning of those words, [I do acknowledge, and swear] is not, that I do not only acknowledge, but also immediately swear all the branches, clauses, parcels, and words, which are contained in this oath, for that the contrary concerning certain parts of the oath doth evidently appear, wherein I do immediately confirm by oath the true and sincere declaration of my opinion, as is manifest both by the former branch [which I acknowledge by good, etc.] and by the first words of the oath, [I A, B. do truly, and sincerely acknowledge, profess, testify, and declare, etc.] and by the fifth branch, [And I do believe, and in conscience am resolved, that neither the Pope, etc.] and also by the last branch [And this recognition, and acknowledgement I do make, etc.] For by these words it is evident, that the immediate object, or which is all one, that thing which is immediately sworn in many assertions contained in this oath, and especially in those positions, which are mentioned in the objection, to wit, that the Pope hath not power to depose the King, or to discharge his subjects of their allegiance, only a true and sincere profession, acknowledgement, and declaration of my opinion, so that I do not in this oath immediately swear the truth of the aforesaid positions in themselves, but a true and sincere declaration of my opinion; or which is all one, what is my opinion concerning the truth of them. 3. Wherefore the plain and proper meaning of these words [And all these things I do plainly, and sincerely acknowledge, and swear according to these express words by me spoken, and according to the plain and common sense, etc.] is, that all these things, which I do acknowledge, I do plainly, and sincerely acknowledge according to these express words by me spoken, etc. and all these things, which I do swear, I do plainly, and sincerely swear according to these express words, etc. so that these words [and swear] are not to be referred to those words [and all these things] as though I should swear all those things, which were before spoken by me, but to those words [plainly, and sincerely] signifying thereby, that all these things, which I do swear, I do plainly and sincerely swear according to the common understanding of the words, without any equivocation at all. And that this is the true and plain meaning of these words, any man, that will sincerely compare this branch of the oath with the other parts thereof, will clearly perceive: for otherwise they should most evidently contradict both the first, and the last, and also the middle clauses of the oath. And what Divine or Lawyer, I pray you, will, against the common and approved rules of interpreting laws, affirm, that if in any law, or decree enacted by public authority, there be contained any proposition, which hath two senses, whereof the one hath in it no absurdity or inconvenience, and the other is absurd, and evidently repugnant to other words, and sentences of the said law, the worse sense is to be preferred, and that, which containeth in it no absurdity is to be rejected? And this also is to be observed for answering to the two next objections. Sect. II. 1. THe Second objection is usually made against those words [according to these express words by me spoken, and according to the plain, and common sense of the same words, without any equivocation, etc.] For it seemeth, that whosoever sweareth these words must of necessity be forsworn; considering that in this Oath are contained many equivocal words, and many common senses of the same words: as for example, to depose the King, doth signify, to deprive him of his Regal authority, and also, to thrust him out of possession of his Kingdom; to absolve from this oath, doth signify; to absolve either from the thing sworn, or only, from the thing as sworn: A Successor doth signify, both a lawful, and also an unlawful Successor: As heretical, may be taken either for heretical indeed, or for heretical only in similitude: and so of the like: Therefore he that taketh the oath according to these express words, and sweareth the aforesaid equivocal speeches, must of necessity use some equivocation, and consequently be forsworn, seeing that he sweareth to use no equivocation at all. 2. To this objection it is answered first, that although in this Oath there be contained many equivocal words, and many common senses of the same words, if they be taken barely, and by themselves alone; yet as in this Oath they are joined with other words, and with them do compound a full and perfect sentence, they are not so equivocal, that all circumstances duly considered according to the rules before c Cap. 1. sect. 2. et seq. assigned for the interpreting of the words of Laws, they have according to the common understanding of men two senses equally proper, which properly is to be equivocal. 3. Neither is it unusual, that a word, taken by itself, be equivocal, which being placed in a sentence or proposition is not, all circumstances considered, equivocal. As this word [Dog] being taken nakedly by itself, hath many significations, yet if one talking with an other, in the time of the Dog days, of the intemperate season of the air, should say, I greatly fear the Dog, this word by the circumstance of the time, & other precedent words would be sufficiently determined to signify the celestial constellation, and not an earthly Dog. And although there were in this oath many common senses of the same sentence, or proposition, which nevertheless is not true, as by answering all the particular objections we have showed before, yet we might lawfully according to the rules before assigned, if there be no other let, choose that common sense, which is more commodious to us, so that it contain no absurdity, nor is repugnant to the mind, and will of the Lawmaker. 4. Secondly it is answered, that these later words [without any equivocation etc.] do only declare those former [And all these things I do plainly and sincerely acknowledge, and swear according to these express words by me spoken, and according to the common sense, and understanding of the same words] so that they only signify, that I do deal plainly, and sincerely without any fraud or guile, and that I do not take the words in an other meaning, than the common sense, and understanding of the same words do bear. And therefore although there be some equivocal words in this oath, if they be taken by themselves without considering all circumstances, as hath been said in the objection, yet it doth not therefore follow, that when I speak those words, I do equivocate, or use equivocation. For first it is one thing to use equivocal words, which may be called a material equivocation, and an other thing to equivocate, or to use formal equivocation. For to equivocate properly, or to use formal equivocation, as it is commonly understood in this Kingdom, is to use equivocal words, or some secret reservation, of purpose to delude the hearer, so that he who heareth the words, understandeth them in another sense, than he who uttereth them, and it doth import an unsincere manner of dealing. And therefore if any man ask us, tell me truly do you equivocate, or not, all men by this do usually so understand, tell me truly, whether you deal with me sincerely, and do not take your words in an other sense, then in common speech they are usually taken? And therefore it may be, that the King, and Parliament did chiefly for this end add those words [without any equivocation, etc.] that if perchance in this oath there were many common senses of the same sentence, or proposition, we should take it in that common sense wherein we thought the Lawmaker to understand it: for this is the principal meaning, and intention of the Lawmaker, that we should deal with him plainly, and sincerely d And so his Majesty understandeth these words in his Apology page. 51. nu. 14. without any fraud, guile, or secret reservation. 5. Moreover, although we should admit, that in this oath there were not only many equivocal words, but also many equivocal sentences, yet it doth not follow therefore, that in taking this oath we must of necessity use some equivocation; but rather it might from hence be inferred, that, if perchance in his oath there be contained many equivocal sentences according to the common understanding of the words, by virtue of this clause we are bound, to declare publicly before we take the whole oath, in what common sense we take that proposition, which we apprehended to be equivocal, so that our sense be not repugnant to the intention of the Lawmaker, and this is the most that the aforesaid objection can prove; wherefore if any one be persuaded that those words, to depose, Successors, as heretical, or any such like words be equivocal, he may openly declare, in what sense he taketh those words, and so he shall easily avoid all equivocation, and all danger of perjury, which otherwise by taking of this clause he may incur. CHAP. IX. The eighth, and last branch of the Oath. AND I do make this recognition, and acknowledgement hearty, willingly, and truly upon the true faith of a Christian, So help me God. 1. If this branch be compared with the first, and divers others before a Cap. 8. sect. 1. nu. 2. related, it will easily appear, what is the principal object of this oath, or which is all one, what is that thing which chief in this oath I do immediately swear; for it is my recognition, acknowledgement, and declaration of my opinion concerning the truth, or falsehood of almost all the positions, which are contained in this oath, and not the truth or falsehood itself of the same positions, as they are considered in themselves. So that I do not swear, that the Pope hath no authority to depose the King, or to discharge his Subjects of their obedience, & so of many other like clauses, but that I do acknowledge, profess, testify, believe, am resolved in conscience, and do declare that the Pope hath no such power to depose the King, to discharge Subjects of their obedience, and so of the rest. Sect. I 1. But against this branch some object in this manner. That oath cannot be said to be taken heartily, and willingly, which one taketh against his will, and is wrested from him through fear, but this oath is taken by most men against their wills, and if it were in their free power, and election, they would not take it, but it is wrested from them for fear of losing for ever all their temporal goods, lands, and liberty, therefore they cannot truly swear, that they do take it hearty and willingly. This objection is greatly urged by Father Parsons in his English book entitled, The judgement of a Catholic Englishman living in banishment for his religion, concerning a late book set forth and entitled; Triplici nodo: etc. or, An Apology for the Oath of Allegiance, in which book he much laboureth b Pag. 13. nu. 21. to prove, that in this Oath besides civil obedience are couched, and craftily conjoined also certain Ecclesiastical points, and which appertain indeed to Catholic Religion with no small prejudice to the same. And this important matter he confidently affirmeth, may easily be cleared by four several and distinct ways. 2. The first way, saith he, is taken from the plain express words, sense, and drift of the oath itself, for that besides civil obedience, and the acknowledgement of our Sovereign to be true, and rightful Lord over all his Dominions, and other such like clauses, whereat no man maketh difficulty, the said oath containeth further, that I must swear in like manner some points concerning the limitation of the Pope's authority, to wit, what he cannot do towards his Majesty, or his Successors in any case whatsoever, and consequently towards all Kings, for the like reason is also in others: that he would say, that the Pope hath not power to depose the King, and to absolve his Subjects from their allegiance, etc. Which question being brought from the particular Hypothesis, to the general Thesis, concerning all Kings, toucheth a point of Doctrine, and Catholic belief concerning the sufficiency of Pastoral authority left by our Saviour in his Church to S. Peter, & his Successors, for redressing of all inconveniences that may fall out, which I (being a Catholic) cannot in my conscience forswear without peril of everlasting damnation. And this is one way of cleared the question 4. But truly this way is not clear enough but very intricate, and encumbered with many difficulties. For this question concerning the Pope's power to depose Princes, and to absolve subjects from their allegiance, doth not appertain to Catholic doctrine, or belief, as heretofore c In my Apology. we have abundantly showed, (where d Nu. 203. & seq. also we have more particularly answered those reasons, which Fa. Parsons his Mitigation hath brought to this purpose) & hereafter against D. Schulckenius, we will, God willing, more distinctly prove the same: but this power may with a safe conscience be denied by Catholics without danger of denying the Catholic faith. All Catholics do indeed acknowledge that the Pope is the Pastor of the Catholic Church, and that he hath all sufficient, and necessary spiritual power to govern the flock of Christ, but whether this his spiritual power is to be extended to the deposing of Kings, and to the absolving of Subjects from their temporal allegiance, is a controversy, saith Trithemius, e In Chronico Monasterii Hirsang ad annum 1106. amongst the Schoolmen, and as yet it is not decided by the judge, whether the Pope hath power to depose the Emperor, or no. 5. The second way, saith he, to clear this question, is taken from the Pope's words in his Breves, wherein he declareth, that this oath containeth many things, which are clearly repugnant to the Catholic faith, and the health of souls. And this way is indeed, in some part, clear: for it is clear and manifest, that the Pope in his Breves did so declare, but nevertheless it is as yet unknown, and hidden from us, what in particular be those many things, which are clearly repugnant to Catholic faith, and the health of souls: which point, if Fa. Parsons had declared, and cleared, as English Catholics did expect he would have done, he had then doubtless somewhat clearly explained this question. But concerning the Pope's Breves we will beneath f The next chap. sect 2. treat more at large. 6 The third proof, faith Fa. Parsons, g Pag. 15. nu. 25. may be taken from Cardinal Bellarmine's letter, who having diligently considered with other learned men the nature of this oath, doth therefore hold it to be unlawful, for that it is so compounded by artificial joining together of temporal, and spiritual things, civil obedience, and forswearing the Pope's authority. But this way is no whit clearer, but rather more obscure, than the former: for although Cardinal Bellarmine doth indeed aver thus much, yet, as it is evident by that, which hath been said before, he proveth it with such weak, and silly reasons, that those, who are of opinion, that the oath is lawful, and that nothing is therein contained, which is repugnant to Catholic faith, are rather thereby confirmed in their opinion, than any whit averted from the same. See also what concerning this point we have said before in the 7. Chapter, Sect. 2. Num. 15. 7 The fourth way, which Fa. Parsons hath devised for a more full, and final cleared of this matter, is the framing of an other oath, to wit, to make this real offer on the behalf of every English Catholic for better satisfaction of his Majesty in this point, so much urged of their Civil, and Temporal obedience, that he will swear, and acknowledge most willingly all those parts, and clauses of the Oath, that do any way appertain to the Civil, and Temporal obedience due to his Majesty, whom he acknowledgeth for his true, and lawful King, and Sovereign over all his Dominions, and that he will swear unto him as much loyalty, as ever any Catholic Subject of England did unto their lawful King in former times, and ages, before the change of King Henry the eighth: or, that any foreign Subject oweth, or aught to swear to any Catholic Prince whatsoever at this day. 8. But first this way doth no whit clear this present question, whether the oath be unlawful, and contrary to Catholic belief, or no. For what, I pray you, doth it avail, to prove that in this particular Oath is contained, or not contained any thing more than civil obedience, for that all Catholics will swear in general words all those things, which appertain to Civil obedience? Secondly, all Catholics will forsooth swear in general words, that King james is their lawful King, and Sovereign Lord, and they will promise' unto him in general words Obedience, but in particular, for how long a time he shall be their Lawful King, and Sovereign Lord, and for what time they will promise' unto him Obedience, to wit, whether for ever, or only for a certain time, until the Pope depose him, and discharge his Subjects of their Obedience, all Catholic Subjects will not perchance adventure to swear. 9 Thirdly, the King's Majesty avoucheth, that in this particular Oath is contained nothing besides that civil Obedience, and temporal Allegiance, which every foreign Subject, if his Prince upon just cause shall demand it at his hands, may with a good conscience, and also aught to swear. Yea in very deed he in this oath requireth of his English Subjects no other thing, than which the Kingdom of France doth publicly profess to be due unto their most Christian King; to wit, that the Pope hath not power to deprive the King of France of his Kingdom, and that notwithstanding any monitions, Excommunications, or Interdicts, which may be made by the Pope, yet his Subjects are bound to yield obedience due to him for temporals, neither that they can therein be dispensed, or absolved by the Pope. Would Father Parsons, trow you, if he were now alive, also affirm, that this assertion is repugnant to Catholic Doctrine, and belief, for that it containeth some things concerning the limitation of the Pope's authority, or would he aver with Cardinal Bellarmine that this assertion is compounded of a spiritual thing to wit, of the denial of the Pope's authority? 10. Finally, the last argument, which Father Parsons doth as by the way bring to impugn this Oath of Allegiance, is that objection, which we have set down in the beginning of this Section, wherein he seemeth to please himself so much, that he thereupon, as you shall perceive, taketh occasion to triumph against his Majesty. 11. For the satisfying therefore of this objection, we must first of all suppose out of S. Thomas h 1. 2ae. q 6. are 6 , that according to Aristotle i Lib. 3. Ethic. cap. 1. , and Gregory Nyssene k Lib 5. de homine cap. 1. , Huiusmodi quae per metum aguntur, etc. Those things which are done for fear, are mixed of voluntary, or willingness, and involuntary or unwillingness: for that, which is done for fear, if it be considered in itself, is not voluntary, but it is voluntary in some case, to wit, to avoid the evil, which is feared. But if one do well consider, they are more voluntary, then involuntary; for they are simply voluntary, but involuntary in some sort. For every thing is said to have it being simply, according as it is in deed, and according as it hath it being in imagination, it hath not being simply, but after some sort. But that which is done for fear, being a particular action, hath it being in deed, according as it is done in this place, in this time, and with other particular conditions required to a particular action. And so willingness is in that, which is done for fear, according as it hath being indeed in this place, and in this time; to wit, according as in this particular case it is an hindrance of a greater evil, which was feared; as the casting of merchandise into the Sea in the time of a tempest is made voluntary for fear of danger: Whereupon it is manifest, that it is simply voluntary, and therefore the definition of voluntary doth agreed unto it, for that our inward will is cause thereof; But that the thing which is done for fear, be taken as having it being out of this case, as it is repugnant to the will, this hath only it being in imagination, and therefore it is involuntary in some sort, to wit, as it is considered to have it being out of this case. Thus far S. Thomas. 12. From hence it is easy to answer the aforesaid objection. For seeing that those things, which are done for fear, have more of willingness, then of unwillingness, and therefore simply they are to be called voluntary, or willing, both for that they are actually chosen by our will, and also for that all actions take their names chief from their end, but the end of these actions, which are done for fear, which is to avoid a greater evil, is more voluntary, and to be desired: therefore the actions themselves are simply, and absolutely to be called voluntary, according to that vulgar axiom, Denomination, or imposing of names, is taken from the greater part, or from, that, which is predominant. And so a law, which is made by the greater part of a Council, or Parliament, is absolutely said to be made by the whole Council, or Parliament. From whence it followeth, that although we should grant, that some Catholics, partly because they do not thoroughly perceive the lawfulness of the oath, and partly for some other human respect are for fear moved to take the same, and so in some sort are not willing to take it, to wit, conditionally, if the oath had not been imposed upon them by Act of Parliament, under such grievous penalties, yet the law being now made, and the oath being tendered unto them, which without great inconveniences they cannot refuse, they do in very deed at this present time, for the reason alleged by S. Thomas, take it hearty, and willingly. Yea, as it will beneath l Nu. 20. & seq. most manifestly appear, there is no man, who, if he please, may not take it most hearty, most willingly, and most freely, without any repugnance, displeasure, fear, or constraint at all. 13. Wherefore I cannot but greatly marvel, for what cause Father Parsons, although he grant, that the casting out of ones goods into the Sea in the time of a tempest for fear of drowning, is according to the doctrine of Catholic Divines involuntary in part, and simply voluntary, for that, all circumstances considered, he resolveth finally to be the best to cast out his goods, and save himself, nevertheless to reprehend those words of his Majesty, as having in themselves no great coherence, to wit, that very many of his majesties subjects, that were Popishly affected, as well Priests; as Laycks, did freely take the oath, dare presume to aver so confidently, that all Divines do agreed in this, that freedom is taken away by this constraint of the passion of fear. For that freedom requireth full liberty to both extremes, or objects, that are proposed; which is not in our case. For that the displeasure of the Prince, the loss of goods, and liberty, the ruin of his family, the terror, and persuasion of his friends, are heavy poises, and do mightily preponderate on the one side; and consequently the mention of this freedom might have been pretermitted, for so much as no constraint of human will can be greater, than this: And yet it is said in the Oath, that he must do it, both willingly, and hearty, and as he believeth in conscience. Let the discreet Reader consider, what coherence there is in their tale. Thus Father Parsons. 14. But first of all, unless we will grossly equivocate, it is both evidently false, and repugnant to the doctrine of Catholic Divines, and also erroneous in faith to affirm, that freedom is altogether taken away by the constraint of fear, for that, notwithstanding any fear, we have full and perfect freedom, m The Latin word is libertas, or perfectè voluntarium. and liberty, to choose which part we william. For otherwise, he that for fear should commit any unlawful act, should be excused from sin, considering that, according to Father Parson's doctrine, he hath not full and perfect freedom, or liberty, without which no grievous sin can be committed, as all Divines with uniform assent do acknowledge. 15. Four therefore kinds of freedom, or liberty, are commonly assigned by the Divines n See the Master of the Sentences in 2. dist. 25. & joannes Azorius tom. 1. Institut. lib. 1. cap. 2. . The first freedom, or liberty is, whereby a man is free from sin, of which the words of the Apostle o 2. Cor. 3. are to be understood, Where the spirit of our Lord is their is freedom, or liberty. And those of our Saviour Christ in the Gospel, p joh. 8. If the Son make you free, you shall be free indeed. And this freedom doth free us from the bondage of sin, as contrariwise, the bondage of sin doth make us free to justice, according to that of the Apostle, q Rom. 6.18. And being made free from sin, you were made servants to justice. And again, r vers. 20. When you were servants to sin, you were free to justice. And this freedom man did lose by sinning. The second freedom is whereby a man is free from misery, and pain. Whereof the Apostle s Rom. 8. writeth, The creature also itself, shall be freed from the servitude of corruption into the freedom of the glory of the children of God. And this freedom man had before he sinned, for that he was then free from all misery, and was troubled with no pain, or grief, and he shall have this freedom more perfectly in the kingdom of heaven, where he shall for ever be free from all misery. The third freedom is, whereby a man is free from necessity, which freedom doth consist in this, that he is said to do any action freely, when supposing all conditions required to do that action, he hath freedom to do it & not to do it: and this freedom is required to sin, and to every action, which deserveth blame, or commendation; punishment, or reward, according to that saying of Saint Augustine, t Tom. 1. de vera religione. cap. 14. speaking of man being tempted by Lucifer, If he had done that of necessity, he had been tied with no bond of sin. And this freedom is in all men both good and bad; and, as the Master of the Sentences saith, Our will both before sin, and after sin is equally free from necessity. 16. The fourth freedom is, whereby a man is free from violence, in regard of which freedom no creature either reasonable, or unreasonable is said to suffer violence in any action, unless that action do proceed from some external cause against the natural inclination of that creature: As, for example, the descending of a stone downward is free from violence, because it proceedeth from the inward, and natural weight of the stone: but the throwing of a stone upwards, is altogether violent, because it proceedeth from the outward impression of the thrower, against the inward, and natural weight, and inclination of the stone. 17. So likewise man, according to the doctrine of all Divines, and Philosophers, in all those actions depending on our will, which do not proceed from some external cause against our will, is said to be free from violence, or constraint. And this kind of violence, or constraint, seeing that it maketh the action not only in part, but altogether involuntary, cannot be found in voluntary, or free actions. Neither can our will in her own proper actions, as to will, or to nill any thing propounded unto her, be constrained with this violence; because at the same time, when she should be constrained to will any thing against her will, she should both will, and not will the same thing, which implieth a manifest contradiction. Nevertheless it is most certain, as well observeth joannes Azorius, u Tom. 1. Instit. lib. 1. cap. 9 ad finem. That man's will may be alured, enticed, or inclined by great prayers, persuasions, fearer, and threatenings, and then the will is vulgarly said to be drawn, and so also to be compelled, not because truly and properly she suffereth violence, but because the will would not otherwise will, but for these, and such like motives and impulsions. And these be the general acceptions of freedom, whereunto all other freedoms in particular, as to be free from sickness, from bondage, from fear, and a hundred such like may be reduced. 18. By this it may easily be perceived, that Fa. Parsons did without cause carp at those words of his Majesty, That very many Catholics had freely taken this oath, seeing that, although they had taken it only for fear of punishment, and incurring his majesties displeasure (in that manner as Merchants do in tempestuous weather cast out their goods into the Sea, for fear of being drowned themselves) yet, as we have showed before, it may be said most truly, that they did take it indeed hearty, willingly, and also freely (although this word [freely] be not in the oath at all) for that the fear doth not take away their freedom, and willingness, as free, willing, or voluntary is both by Divines, and in common speech usually taken. 19 And although in some actions to do a thing freely, doth signify all one, as not to do it for fear, yet this is not common to all actions, but proper, and peculiar only to some, as to gifts, and donations, to whose substance this peculiar condition is required, that they be done freely, liberally, without fear, compulsion, or any inward displeasure at all, in which sense freely doth only signify liberally, and so this word liberally is derived from the latin word libere, which in English we call freely: but the proper, and usual acception of freedom, as the Divines, and Philosophers take freedom, is no other, than those four which we have rehearsed out of Azor. Which freedom both from necessity, and violence or constraint (for the other two significations of freedom are impertinent to our purpose) although by fear it be somewhat diminished, yet it is not altogether taken away, nor so diminished, but that those actions, which are done for fear, have more of willingness, freedom, or liberty, then of the contrary, and therefore, according to the doctrine of Aristotle, and the Divines, as also Father Parsons himself doth witness, they are absolutely, and simply said to be done hearttily, willingly, and freely. Whereby it is manifest, that this first answer doth abundantly satisfy the aforesaid objection. But to satisfy this argument of Fa. Parson's superabundantly, and to show most evidently the weakness thereof, we will grant him for disputations sake, that the meaning of those words, [And this recognition I do make hearty, and willingly, let us add also, and freely] is that, which he desireth, to wit, that I do not take this oath for any fear of punishment; Nevertheless, secondly and principally (supposing that all the precedent clauses of the oath may lawfully, and with a safe conscience be taken, which at this present must be supposed, and which by fully satisfying all the aforesaid objections, hath in my judgement been sufficiently proved) it is answered, that there is no Catholic, that may not with a safe conscience take this branch of the oath, and consequently swear most truly, that he doth make this recognition, and acknowledgement most hearty, most willingly, and most freely, without any fear, repugnance, or displeasure at all, if he be sincerely moved to make the same not for fear of any punishment, but for the lawfulness, goodness, and honesty of the act itself. 21. May not any man, I pray you, observe God his commandments most heartily, most willingly, and most freely merely for his love, and not for fear of punishment, although most grievous punishments are ordained by God against the breakers of his commandments? Are we not bound by the law of God, to love him with all our heart, with all our soul, and with all our strength, that is, most heartily, most willingly, and most freely, and nevertheless almighty God hath prepared for them, who do not love him, the everlasting torments of hell fire, besides the losing of the kingdom of heaven? Is not the loss of a celestial kingdom, and to be thrust together with the Devils into the horrible prison of hell, there to be tormented everlastingly, far greater poises, then to be deprived for a little time of temporal lands, goods, or liberty? Why then cannot I take this oath, supposing it to be lawful, heartily, willingly, and freely, although it be imposed upon me by the King's command under pain of bodily imprisonment, and forfeiting all my temporal goods, as well, as, observing due proportion, I can love God, and keep his commandments most hearty, most willingly, and most freely, who nevertheless hath in the holy Scripture threatened far bitter punishments to those, who do not love him with all their heart, and strictly observe his commandments? 22. Wherefore there is no repugnance at all, whatsoever Father Parsons saith, but rather great coherence betwixt these two, to wit, that great punishments are by Act of Parliament ordained for those, who shall refuse the oath, and yet that any man may take it not for fear of those punishments, if so be that he be moved to the taking thereof, not for fear of any punishment, but only in regard of the lawfulness of the oath, not so much desiring to avoid, by taking the oath, those punishments, as to obey the just command of his lawful Prince, in those things, wherein he hath full and lawful power to command him. And this seemeth to be the chiefest end of the King and Parliament, in concluding the Oath with these words, heartily, and willingly, (the reason whereof we will allege beneath x Nu. 26. ) that although very grievous punishments be appointed for them, who do refuse the oath (as it is usual in all laws, which do command, or forbidden any thing of great importance) yet the Subjects should nevertheless take the said oath, not for fear of those punishments, but merely, and sincerely for the lawfulness of the oath itself, which his Majesty by Act of Parliament hath commanded, which every devout subject, and well affected to his Majesty, who thinketh the oath to be lawful, may lawfully, and is also bound to do. 23. For, as well observeth Gabriel Vasquez y 1. 2ae disp. 51. cap. 3. & disp. 73 cap. 7. & disp. 86. cap. 5. , and other Divines out of Aristotle z 2. Ethic. cap. 4 , to make an act of virtue, to be morally good, and virtuous, it is not only required, that it have a good, and virtuous object, but also it must be done directly for the goodness, and honesty of the virtue itself, and not for any other end, or motive. For otherwise if one do acts of virtue, as of justice, or temperance, not for justice, or temperance sake, but for some other end, as for lucre, vainglory, fear of punishment, or any other motive whatsoever, he shall do, saith Aristotle, just, or temperate actions, but he shall not do them justly, or temperately, neither shall he for doing those actions be reputed a just, or temperate man: which Aristotle declareth by this example. For it is one thing, saith he, to make a Grammatical construction, and another thing to make it Grammatically; for if one having no skill in Grammar, doth either by chance, or another prompting him, make rightly a Grammatical construction, he maketh doubtless Grammatical construction, but he maketh it not Grammatically; but if one make the same by art, he maketh both a Grammatical construction, and also Grammatically, because he maketh it by the art, and skill, which is in him. And as in arts the knowledge of the art is required, to do a thing artificiously, or according to art; so in virtues, according to Aristotle, a virtuous intention (for to virtues, saith he, knowledge doth little, or nothing avail) to do the act for virtues sake, is necessary, that the act be done virtuously, or according to virtue. 24. Wherefore, as well saith S. Thomas a 1. 2ae. q. 96. art. 5. , as the nature of a law doth contain two things, first, to be a rule of human actions: secondly, to have power to compel; so may a man in two manner of ways be subject to the law; first, as one, who is ruled, is subject to the rule, and in this manner all men, who are subject to authority, are subject to the law, which is made by authority: secondly, as one, who is compelled, is subject to him, who compelleth him, and in this manner only wicked men, and not the just and virtuous are subject to the law. As if he should have said, just and virtuous men are subject to the directive power of the law, but not to the coactive power; or, which is all one, the just do not observe the law for fear of punishment, as the wicked do, but for the love of virtue, wherein by force of the law they are directed, and not to the observing whereof for fear of punishment they are compelled; so that they are said to be in the law, not under the law. For, it is one thing, saith S. Augustine b Tom. 8. in illud Psal. 1. Sed in lege Domini etc. , to be in the law, another thing to be under the law. He that is in the law, secundum legem agit, doth according to the law, he that is under the law, secundum legem agitur, is drawn according to the law; as if he should say, is drawn, enforced, and constrained as a slave to keep the law. And this difference betwixt good men and bad men in observing laws, is well declared by the Poet in those verses: Oderunt peccare boni virtutis amore, Oderunt peccare mali formidine poenae. For virtues love the virtuous man from vices doth abstain. For fear of pain the wicked man from sinning doth refrain. 25. To conclude therefore this answer, it is false, which Father Parsons c Nu. 29. before cited. affirmeth, that there is no other freedom in taking this, than which a Merchant hath in a tempest, either to cast out his goods into the sea, for lightning his ship, or to be drowned himself: For the only motive, which causeth the Merchant to cast out his goods into the sea, is to escape that danger of drowning, which if it were not, he would be altogether unwilling to cast away his goods: but the only motive, why a loyal subject, and well affected to his Majesty, aught to take this oath, is not the fear of punishments, but the love and desire he hath to obey the just and lawful command of his Prince, whom he is ready to obey, although he should impose no punishment on them, who should transgress his law. The comparison of Father Parsons, betwixt the taking of this oath, and the casting of ones goods into the Sea, had been doubtless apt, and fit enough, if the Oath were in itself unlawful, for then the only fear of punishment, and of incurring his majesties displeasure, could move the subjects to take the oath: but unless this first be proved, which doubtless the former objections have not yet convinced, there can be no great coherence in Father Parson's discourse, neither doth the aforesaid objection against this last branch of the oath in any wise convince the oath to be unlawful. And if notwithstanding all this, which hath been said, there be any one, who doth not willingly take this oath, let he himself look to that; it is sufficient, that, if with an attentive eye he will read, and with an indifferent judgement consider what we have said, he may most evidently perceive, that this oath containeth in it no false, or unlawful thing, and consequently, that it may be taken heartily, willingly, and freely, without any fear of punishment, or any constraint at all. 26. Finally, the King's Majesty and Parliament had far greater, and more urgent reasons to command the subjects to take this oath heartily, and willingly, then to observe heartily and willingly the other laws of the Realm; because the principal end and intention of his Majesty in enacting other laws is, that they be only outwardly observed; neither doth he greatly care with what inward affection his subjects do fulfil his outward precepts; for that to the outward conservation of public peace and quietness in his kingdom, he thinketh it sufficient, that his precepts and laws be outwardly and publicly observed. But this Oath of Allegiance was principally devised for this end, to make trial, how his Subjects were inwardly affected towards his Majesty in those things, which appertain to their loyalty, that by that means he might have good assurance of their constant fidelity, and obedience, and, as much as may be, be made secure from danger of future conspiracies. For furious, and bloody opinions, as very well said his Majesty d In Praefat. Monitoria non long à principio. , do now and then bring forth also bloody conspiracies, as was that of the Powder-Treason. And therefore it was necessary that he should compel all his Subjects to take all the clauses of this Oath of Allegiance not only in outward words, but also sincerely, unfeignedly, willingly, and truly with all their hearts. And thus much concerning the principal objections, which are usually made against all the particular clauses of the Oath, it remaineth only that in like manner we diligently examine all the chief objections, which are commonly urged against the Oath in general. The tenth and last Chapter. Sect. I FIrst therefore Card. Bellarmine, a In respons. ad Apolog. pag. 7. et 23. and Lessius, b Nu. 2 15. as his English Recapitulator c Pag. 47. relateth, do object against the Oath in general, that even from the judgement, and confession of the King, and Parliament, and from the end, for which this oath was devised, it may be concluded, that it doth not only contain civil obedience, and temporal allegiance, as his Majesty pretendeth, and under colour whereof he imposeth it upon Catholics. And this is the whole force, and substance of their argument. 2. That oath can not in the judgement of those contain only temporal allegiance, and civil obedience, which by them was only invented for the discovering, and repressing of Popish Recusants, but this oath was by the King, and Parliament only invented for the discovering, and repressing of Popish Recusants, therefore this oath can not in the judgements of the King, and Parliament contain only temporal allegiance, and civil obedience. The Mayor proposition is evident: because that thing can not be judged an apt means to discover, or make known Popish Recusants, which is as well common to Protestants, as to Popish Recusants; for otherwise it were no fit means to discover the one, more than the other; but to swear temporal allegiance, and civil obedience, is as well common to Protestants, as to Popish Recusants, therefore to swear temporal allegiance can not be judged by the King, and Parliament, to be an apt means for the discovering of Popish Recusants. 3 The Minor proposition is manifest, both by title of the Act itself, wherein this Oath is commanded, which is; An Act for the better discovering, and repressing of Popish Recusants; and also by the King himself, who in his Apology for the Oath of Allegiance, doth seem, as shall appear by Cardinal Bellarmine, to affirm the same. We prove, saith Cardinal Bellarmine d In the place before cited. that this oath doth not only contain the Civil Obedience of Subjects towards their Prince in causes merely temporal, as the King in his Apology affirmeth. First by the King's Edict, wherein the form of this Oath is contained, and prescribed. For the title of the Edict is this, An Act for the discovering, and repressing of Papists. Wherefore is it not said, for the discovering, and repressing of Rebels? but for that the end, why this Oath was devised, is not the discovering of those, who deny Civil Obedience, which is proper to Rebels, but the discovering of those, who deny the spiritual Supremacy of the King, and acknowledge the spiritual Supremacy of the Pope, which is known to be proper to Catholics, whom you call Papists. I add lastly a confirmation e In the place before cited. pag. 12. hereof out of the words of this Author, to wit, the King's Majesty; for although he hath a thousand times repeated, that in this oath is only contained Civil Obedience, nevertheless in the 88 page f It is in the English Edition pag. 84. it escaped him unawares, that this Oath was devised to forbidden the people to drink so deeply in the cup of Antichristian fornications. For what do our Adversaries usually call Antichristian fornicatians, but the reverencing of the Pope's authority? Therefore not only Civil Obedience, but also the detesting of spiritual obedience is contained in this Oath. 4 This objection hath been long since so largely and fully satisfied in Tortura Torti, g By D. Andrews then Bishop of Cichester, now of Ely. p. 13. et seq. or in the Answer to Cardinal Bellarmine's book against his majesties Apology for the Oath of Allegiance then published under the name of Matthaeus Tortus, that I marvel, with what boldness learned Lessius, if he did see the aforesaid Answer, and especially the English Recapitulator of Lessius, (who, at that time, when this Answer came forth, living in this kingdom, did, as it is probable, both see it, and read it) durst presume to inculcate again so nakedly the self same objection. 5 The whole force therefore of this objection is only grounded on the bore title of the Act of Parliament, wherein the taking of this Oath is commanded. But if it had pleased Cardinal Bellarmine, and Lessius, to have perused, not only the title of the Act, but also the whole Act itself (which undoubtedly, according to the received rule of the Civil Law related in the first Chapter, h Sec. 2. nu. 2. they aught to have done, before they had delivered their judgement concerning the whole Oath, or any part thereof, for that it is an uncivil part, saith the Law, i Leg. Inciuile F. de legibus. to give an answer, or judgement, concerning any one particular clause of the Law, unless the whole law be first perused) they might most evidently have perceived, what was the end, and intent of the Parliament in framing this Oath of Allegiance, and that their objection taken from the end, and reason of the Oath, is vain, frivolous, and of no force at all. 6. For first it is manifest, that in this Act of Parliament are enacted many laws, and Cardinal Bellarmine himself numbereth fourteen, whereof the far greater part do not appertain to the taking of this Oath, but only to the discovering, and repressing of Popish Recusants for points of Religion; And therefore the Act might rightly be so entitled, by reason of the greater part of the Laws therein contained, according to that vulgar Maxim of the Philosophers, Denominatio fit ex maiori part. Denomination, or the imposing of names is to be made from the greater part. Wherefore no forcible argument can be drawn from the title of the Act to prove that the Oath, which is the lest part of the laws comprehended in that Act, was either devised to discover, & repress popish Recusants, or that it containeth more than the profession of civil obedience. 7. But if Cardinal Bellarmine, and Lessius had diligently considered not only the title of the whole Act, wherein, as we have said, very many laws are contained, but also the Preamble to this particular Law for taking the Oath, which Preamble doth virtually imply the title thereof, they might easily have perceived, what was the end, for which the Parliament framed this Oath: For the Preamble to the Law for taking the Oath, is by the Parliament expressed in these words: And for the better trial, how his majesties Subjects stand affected in point of their Loyalty, and due obedience, Be it also enacted etc. This therefore was the true end, and meaning of the King and Parliament in framing this Oath, to make a trial what Catholics were loyal Subjects, and who were disloyal. They had long before clear and manifest means by many laws established in this Kingdom, as by the Oath of the King's Supremacy in causes Ecclesiastical, by the Law for repairing to the Protestant Churches once every month, and by many such like, to discover Catholics, whom they call Papists, and Popish Recusants in points of Religion, without devising such an unfit, and altogether insufficient means, as is the taking of this Oath of Allegiance. 8. Secondly, that it may clearly appear how weak and unsound is this argument, which is drawn from the bore title of the Act, to prove that this Oath containeth in it more, then civil Obedience, be it so as these men say, that not only the title of the Act in general, wherein nevertheless many other laws appertaining to Religion are, as we said before, contained, but also the title of the Oath itself in particular be, for the discovering, and repressing of popish Recusants, yet what from hence can be rightly inferred to impugn the Oath, I cannot truly in any wise perceive. And if Cardinal Bellarmine do demand, if this Oath contain only civil Obedience, why then is the title thereof, an Act for the discovering, & repressing of popish Recusants, & not rather for the discovering of Rebels, and of such as deny civil Obedience, which is proper to Rebels? To this question both the Parliament itself, and also the King's Majesty have fully answered, as any man may easily perceive, who shall but slightly read over his majesties Apology, and the very next words of the Parliament, which do immediately follow the title of the aforesaid Act. And because the words of the Parliament are in effect all one with those which his Majesty hath published to the whole Christian world, it shall be sufficient at this time to rehearse his majesties words for the clearing of this matter. 9 And although, saith he, k In his Apology. pag. 2. num. 2. the only reason these Traitors gave for plotting so heinous an attempt, was the zeal they carried to the Romish Religion; yet were never any other of that Profession the worse used for that cause, as by our gracious Proclamation immediately after the discovery of the said fact doth plainly appear: only at the next sitting down again of the Parliament, were there laws made setting down some such orders, as were thought fit for preventing the like mischief in time to come. Amongst which a form of Oath was framed to be taken by all my Subeects, whereby they should make clear profession of their resolution, faithfully to persist in obedience unto me, according to their natural Allegiance; to the end that I might hereby make a separation, not only between all my good Subjects in general, and unfaithful Traitors, that intended to withdraw themselves from my obedience; but specially to make a separation between so many of my Subjects, who although they were otherwise Popishly affected, yet retained in their hearts the print of their natural duty to their Sovereign; and those, who being carried away with the the like fanatical zeal that the Powder Traitors were, could not contain themselves within the bounds of their natural Allegiance, but thought diversity of Religion a safe pretext for all kind of Treasons, and rebellions against their Sovereign. And in his premonition to all Christian Princes, This Oath, saith he, l Pag 9 was ordained only for making of a true distinction, between Papists of quiet disposition, and in all other things good Subjects, and such other Papists, as in their hearts maintained the like violent bloody Maxims, that the Powder traitors did. 10, Wherefore, we may freely grant to Cardinal Bellarmine and Lessius, that the intent of the King and Parliament in framing this Oath was, to discover Papists, or Popish Recusants, but such Recusants, who refused to give assurance of their allegiance due to his Majesty, such Popish Recusants, who maintained in their hearts those bloody Maxims, and opinions, that those barbarous Powder-traitours did, to murder the King's Majesty for advancement of Religion: such Popish Recusants, who do hold it not repugnant to Catholic faith, that it is in the free power of Subjects, or any other whatsoever to depose, or if they will, to murder Princes, which be excommunicated, or deprived by the Pope; such Popish Recusants, who do firmly believe, that Princes may by the Pope's spiritual power be thrust out of their temporal kingdoms, which they lawfully possess, and that this doctrine is so certain, that no Catholic can with a good conscience, and without denying the Catholic faith defend the contrary opinion, and by oath, if need require, confirm the same. And by this we may clearly perceive the meaning of his majesties words, which Cardinal Bellarmine hath wrongfully (I speak with reverence) retorted against his Majesty, yea and he hath shamefully controlled his majesties sentence, cutting off half the words of the whole sentence, which do evidently explain the meaning of the rest. For thus writeth his Majesty m In his Apology. pag. 84. . 11. And this Oath given upon so urgent an occasion, for the apparent safety of me, and my posterity, forbidding my people to drink so deeply o Observe those words of his Majesty, drink so deeply, but that, etc. in the bitter cup of Antichristian fornications, n Cardinal Bellarmine in his objection leaveth out those words, but that they may keep and so forth, which do plainly declare the meaning of the former. but that they may keep so much honey in their hearts, as may argue them still espoused to me their Sovereign, in the main knot of true allegiance. For his Majesty in these words doth not affirm any other thing, but what in other places he hath often repeated, neither did these words slip from him unawares, but he spoke them advisedly, and with mature deliberation, to wit, that this oath was devised, not to forbidden his Catholic Subjects, that they should not reverence at all the Pope's spiritual authority, but that they should not reverence it so excessively, o Observe those words of his Majesty, drink so deeply, but that, etc. but that, they may argue themselves still espoused to his Majesty in the main knot of true Allegiance; that they should not reverence it so excessively, that they should believe, that the Pope had authority to give them leave to bear Arms, and raise tumults against his Majesty, not to reveal treasons and traitorous Conspiracies against him, and finally to depose him, or if they will, to murder him, if he should be excommunicated or deprived by the Pope: that they should not reverence it so excessively, that they should imagine, that temporal obedience, and constant allegiance due by the law of God and nature to every lawful Prince, although he be an heretic, can not stand long together with Catholic Religion, and with spiritual obedience due to the Pope by Christ his institution. 12. To the objection therefore in form it is answered, by declaring the Mayor proposition, whereby also the sense and meaning of the Minor will be very easily made manifest. For although this oath which is common both to Protestants and Catholics, or Popish Recusants, can not be a fit means for the discovering of Popish Recusants in points of Religion, yet it may be a very fit means for the discovering and distinguishing of Popish Recusants among themselves in points of their loyalty, and how concerning their allegiance they are affected towards his Majesty, which was the chiefest, yea and only intent of the King and Parliament in devising this Oath, and not to distinguish Catholics from Protestants in points of Religion. And although to swear true allegiance to a temporal Prince, be as well common to Protestants as to Catholics, as being commanded by the law of God, and nature to all Subjects towards their lawful Prince, what Religigion soever he doth profess; yet, as in those things, which are required to Civil obedience, and true allegiance there may be great disagreement in opinions, both among Catholics themselves, and also among Protestants, as for example, whether civil obedience be due to a Prince, after he be excommunicated, or deprived by the Pope? Whether a spiritual power hath authority to deprive Princes not only of their kingdoms, but also of their lives? Whether the Pope be supreme temporal King, and direct Lord in temporals of all the kingdoms of the Christian world, and such like? So also there may be a great disagreement among them concerning those things, which Princes may command their Subjects to swear for confirming of their true Allegiance. 13 And undoubtedly a temporal Prince hath full power and authority, to require of his Subjects, an oath of allegiance, not only in general words, but also such an oath in particular, which supposing that it be in itself lawful, the King and State for the preventing of future conspiracies, and tumults in the Commonwealth, and for the discovering of those Subjects, who are not well affected in points of their loyalty, shall prudently and probably judge to be necessary. And because at that time, when this oath was devised, the King and State (by reason of that barbarous, and altogether inhuman conspiracy of the Powder-treason, but then newly discovered) had many, and strong reasons offered them, rather to suspect the loyalty of Catholics, who were the chief Captains, Authors and Actors of that most detestable treason, then of the Protestants, therefore the Act, wherein this oath is prescribed, might rightly be entitled, An Act for the discovering and repressing, not only of Rebels in general, nor yet of Protestant rebels, but for the discovering, and after they be dsicovered for the repressing, with grievous punishments, rebellious Catholics, whom they call Popish Recusants, because their loyalty, as hath been said, was then through out the whole Kingdom more suspected, than the loytie of Protestants. Sect. II. 1. THe second Objection against the oath in general, is taken especially from the authority of the Pope's Holiness, who by his Breves hath declared the oath to be altogether unlawful, which declaration the King's Majesty taking in evil part, did set forth an Apology for the Oath of Allegiance, at the first concealing his name, but afterwards he put it forth in his own name, adjoining thereunto a Premonition to all Christian Kings and Princes. Which his Apology gave occasion to Cardinal Bellarmine, and many other Divines to enueigh bitterly against the said Oath, and also the King's Apology, and to defend with might and main the Pope's Breves directed to the English Catholics. His Holiness therefore that now is, Pope Paul the first in his two Breves directed to the English Catholics, doth expressly forbidden them to take the said oath, for that, as he affirmeth, it must evidently appear unto them by the words themselves, that it can not be taken without prejudice to the Catholic faith, and the salvation of their souls, seeing that it contains many things which are clearly repugnant to faith, and Salvation. And in this third Breve directed to Master George Birket Archpraesbyter of the English Priests, he enjoineth, and commandeth him, and for this he giveth him special faculty, that he observing certain conditions in that Breve expressed, which we beneath p Nu. 60. will rehearse, do by the Authority of the Sea apostolic deprive and declare to be deprived all those English Priests, and every one of them, who have taken the said Oath, or have taught, and do teach, that it may lawfully be taken, of all faculties, and privileges granted to them, or to any of them from the said Sea apostolic, or by her authority from any other whatsoever. 2. From hence therefore this argument may be framed. In doubtful, and disputable matters, especially such, as do merely concern the Catholic Faith, and the eternal salvation of souls, every Catholic is bound in conscience to follow the surer part, to wit, that part, wherein there is no danger of sinning at all, or wherein less danger of sinning can be feared: But whether this Oath of Allegiance may lawfully, and without danger of denying the Catholic faith be taken, is at the lest wise a doubtful and disputable matter, and less danger of sinning can be feared by refusing it, then by taking it, therefore every Catholic is bound in conscience rather to refuse it, then to take it. 3. The Mayor proposition is evident out of that vulgar Maxim of the Canon Law, q In cap. ad audientiam, et in cap. significati 1. et. 2. de homocidio. et in cap. Jwenis de sponsalibus. & approved by all Divines, and Lawyers, that in doubtful matters the surer part is to be chosen. The Minor also is manifest enough to every Catholic. For first no Catholic can deny, but that at the lest it is a doubtful question, whether this Oath may lawfully, and without perjury be taken, seeing that not only the most eminent Divines of these days, as Cardinal Bellarmine, Gretzer, Lessius, Becanus, and many others, have in their public writings condemned the same, as impious, sacrilegious, and clearly repugnant to Catholic Faith, & the salvation of souls, but also the supreme Pastor of the Church, hath, as Lessius r Pag. ultima, & also his English Recapitulator p ultima. , and some others affirm by his Breves expressly defined the same, and that which no man can deny, hath strictly commanded all Catholics not to take the same, for that it contains many things, which are clearly repugnant to faith and Salvation. 4. Secondly, that there is either no danger at all, or at lest wise less danger of sinning by refusing it, then by taking it, is also evident out of the same Maxim, or principle. For according to all reason, that Catholic doth incur less danger of sinning, who in spiritual matters, and which belong to the eternal salvation of his soul, as what position is heretical, or not heretical, what Oath is lawful, or sacrilegious, when action deserveth God's wrath, or doth not deserve it, doth follow not only the direction and command of him, whom God hath appointed to be the spiritual Guider, Directer, and Governor of his soul, but also the universal consent of Catholic Divines, who do condemn this Oath, as impious, and contrary to Catholic faith, than he who followeth the counsel and command only of a temporal Prince, and Parliament, (who especially are no Catholics, and to whom although they were Catholics, the charge of souls is not committed by Christ, neither have they any authority in spiritual affairs) and the singular opinion of one, or two Catholic Priests, who also rather for fear, as being detained in prison, or for some temporal respect, as to please the Prince, in whose kingdom they live, or to deliver themselves from the troubles of the time, then for any sufficient reason do hold the Oath to be lawful, 5 Moreover, the danger of losing for ever the eternal kingdom of Heaven, is far greater, than the danger of losing for a time all temporal goods; but in taking this Oath their is great danger of perjury, and of denying the Catholic faith, and consequently of losing the Kingdom of Heaven, in refusing it there is only danger of losing all temporal goods, and liberty for a short time, this statute for taking the Oath being merely penal, therefore in taking the O th', there is far greater danger; then in refusing it. 6 This objection doth much trouble the consciences of the unlearnedder sort of people, who for want of sufficient skill in Divinity, are not able to discern, what opinion they may with a good conscience follow, when Catholic Divines themselves do not agreed in their opinions. And therefore for the fully satisfying of timorous consciences, I thought it necessary to examine this objection somewhat at large, and out of the Doctrine of Catholic Divines to set down certain general rules, by the which, if they be well observed, any Catholic man as well unlearned, as learned, may clearly perceive, how he may with a safe conscience, and without danger of temerity, or any other crime follow both in speculation and in practice, this, or that opinion, whereof there is disagreement among Catholic Divines. And in setting down these rules, I have for this especial cause chosen to follow before others that most learned Divine of the society of jesus Gabriel Vasquez, for that the chief impugners of this Oath, to wit, the Jesuits will not doubtless condemn the Doctrine of this famous Divine concerning this point as improbable, both in regard of his singular learning, and also for that he is one of their own society. 7 First of all therefore Vasquez s 1.2 disp. 62. c. 1. nu. 1. observeth, that among opinions, one is more secure, an other is less secure; it is called a more safe, or secure opinion, not for that it is more probable, but because he, that followeth it, can commit no sin: As if there be two contrary opinions concerning restitution, that, which saith that any thing is to be restored, is called the more safe or secure opinion, because in restoring there can be no offence: and the contrary opinion is said to be the less secure, because in not restoring there may be some sin committed, and so in other matters. Likewise disp. 66. c. 4. nu. 21. the more secure opinion is accounted that, wherein there would be the lesser sin, then in the contrary, when it is necessary to choose one of those two opinions, in both which there is sin. For whensoever two evils do so meet together, that of necessity one of them must be chosen, that doubtless is to be chosen, which otherwise would be the lesser evil, and consequently in choosing that there can be no sin at all. And the reason thereof is manifest, for considering that no man can in any case be so perplexed, but that he may choose one part without any sin, and if of two evils the one must of necessity be chosen, there is great reason, that we should choose the less, it followeth that we do not sin in the choosing thereof, and so that evil, which otherwise considered by itself, would be a sin, is in that case no sin, and therefore that part is the more secure, if it be chosen, when it occurreth with a greater evil, according to that vulgar Maxim, A lesser evil, in comparison of a greater, is a kind of good. And of this case you may read an example in Vasquez in the place last cited. 8. Furthermore, among opinions, one is more probable, an other is less probable. That is more probable, which hath the better grounds; that is less probable, which although it hath not better grounds, yet the grounds thereof want not sufficient probability. It may therefore fall out, that an opinion, which is less secure, to wit, wherein perchance there may be sin, be more probable, and contrariwise, that part wherein there can be no sin, to be less probable: as in the aforesaid example of making restitution, that part which saith that we aught not to make restitution, may be more probable, that is, may have better grounds, and yet it is the less secure; and contrariwise that part, which saith, that we aught to make restitution, which is the more secure, may have the weaker grounds, yea and sometimes it may be altogether improbable. 9 Secondly, he observeth, u Disp. 62. cap. 3. nu. 8. et disp. 79. cap. 3. nu. 13. 14. that to assent to any opinion, or proposition, is nothing else, then to perceive that there is a greater connexion, betwixt the subject and the predicate in one part of the contradiction, then in the other, or which is all one, to judge that opinion, or proposition to be true: To descent, is nohing else, then to perceive, that there is a greater disconuenience betwixt the subject, and the predicate in one part of the contradiction, then in the other; or which is all one, to judge that opinion, or proposition to be false; To doubt, or to be doubtful of either part, or opinion is neither to perceive, that there is greater connexion, nor greater disconuenience in one part of the contradiction, then in the other, or which is all one, neither to judge one part, or opinion to be true, nor false, but to suspend his judgement on both parts; which proceedeth from this, that neither the reasons for the one part, nor for the other are sufficient to show greater convenience, than disconuenience, or to show rather the truth, than the falsehood of either part: for then the understanding stayeth, or staggereth, and doth not assent more to the one part ihen to the other. As if to one, who knoweth not the number of the stars, this question should be propounded, whether the stars be odd, or even, he would stagger thereat, and remain doubtful, neither would he give his judgement thereof, for that he doth not perceive the predicate to agreed to the subject or to disagree, or which is all one, he doth not perceive whether part is true or false. 10. Thirdly, he observeth, x Disp. 62. cap. 3. nu. 10. that he, who doth assent to an opinion by proper, and intrinsical grounds, or, which is all one, judgeth that opinion to be true, although his assent, or judgement be only probable, (for sometimes the assent may be evident, when the proofs be evident, and sometimes only probable, when the proofs be only probable) cannot also assent to the contrary opinion by intrinsical and proper grounds, but he may well by extrinsical grounds judge the contrary opinion to be probable. Proper and intrinsical grounds we call the cause of the thing, or the effect thereof, or the absurdities, and impossibilities, to which they are driven, who hold the contrary opinion. For all these, and every one of them do show, that there is a proper connexion betwixt the subject, and the predicate in themselves, or, which is all one, do show that proposition, or opinion to be more true, than the contrary. extrinsical grounds, are only the authority of those men, who defend the contrary opinion, by reason of which, we do judge the contrary opinion to be probable. And as it is impossible for one at the same time to assent to two contrary opinions by intrinsical grounds, for so he should at the same time have two contradictory judgements of the same thing, which is impossible; so it is not impossible to assent to one opinion by intrinsical grounds, and by extrinsical grounds, to wit, by reason of the authority of those Doctors, who hold the contrary, to judge that part to be probable. For these two assents, or judgements, are not of the same thing, and therefore they are not contradictory: because the former assent by intrinsical grounds, is concerning the truth of the proposition in itself, or which is all one, concerning the absolute proposition; as in this, The Pope hath not power to depose the King: but the other assent by extrinsical grounds is concerning the probability of the proposition, or which is all one, concerning the modal proposition, as in this, It is probable, that the Pope hath not power to depose the King. And as this later proposition is not contradictory to the former, so also the assent to this later, is not contradictory to the assent of the former. 11. These rules being observed, Vasquez y Disp. 62. cap. 4. nu. 12. affirmeth first, that if a learned man, who hath taken no small pains in studies, and hath also thoroughly seen, and examined the reasons of the contrary part, shall judge against all other writers, who have gone before him, that his opinion is the more probable, he may, although it b● the less secure opinion, lawfully embrace it, and practise follow it. And this his doctrine he gathereth, as he saith, from the common consent of Doctors. And the reason is manifest; For if one hath a sharp wit, and a ripe judgement, and hath thoroughly seen, and diligently examined all the reasons of the contrary part, and judgeth them not to be sufficient, he doth not seem to commit any imprudence by following in practise his own opinion, because in moral matters, which are not certain, but exposed to opinions, he also judgeth with maturity. For we cannot deny, but that a company of Doctors do sometimes follow an opinion without any choice of reasons, or at the lest, not so exactly considering the reasons; against whom an other Doctor of great authority may afterwards bring into the Schools an opinion, which is by him with maturity invented. 12. But if any man upon some light reason, z Vasquez cap. 4. nu. 13. and without due consideration do against all other Doctors embrace an opinion, which is less secure, he sinneth doubtless, not for that he judgeth against his conscience, as some do think, but for that he judgeth rashly, and inconsiderately of that matter, as Navarre a Cap. Si quis de poenitentia dist. 7. nu. 50. 51 52. doth well affirm: But when it is to be accounted a rash judgement, and a light reason, it is left to the judgement of a prudent man. Neither is the opinion of one Doctor against all others in a doubtful and disputable matter to be accounted rash, or temerarious, if it be invented upon a mature ground, or reason. For as well observeth Corduba, b Lib. 1. question. 6. 17. q. 13. that opinion is absolutely to be accounted temerarious, not which is contrary to the common understanding of Scholastical Doctors, but which is invented without sufficient ground and reason: for many opinions were in the beginning invented, and brought into the Schools, which then were not common. Nevertheless in this matter, to wit, in inventing new opinions, great maturity, or consideration must be observed. 13. Secondly, he affirmeth and saith withal, c Cap. 4. nu. 14. that it is now, and hath been long since the common opinion in Schools, that it is lawful for a learned man to follow in practice against his own opinion, which he judgeth to be the more probable, the opinion of others, although there opinion be the more secure, and also in his judgement the more probable, so that it be not voided and destitute of all reason, and probability. Nevertheless, that one may lawfully follow in practise d Cap. 13. nu. 11 another man's opinion against his own, he must frame in his understanding a particular, and determinate judgement, or dictamen of conscience, by which determinate judgement he do believe, and persuade his conscience that it is lawful for him in that case to follow in practise the opinion of others; for otherwise if he should not have this determinate judgement, he should do against his conscience, which in no case is lawful. And this particular judgement, or dictamen of conscience no man can frame, or deduce from proper, or intrinsical grounds, if he persevere in his own opinion; because it is impossible, that with an universal judgement, wherewith one by intrinsical grounds believeth that such an action in universal is unlawful, he should also by intrinsical grounds have a particular judgement, by which he may believe, that particular action comprehended under that universal to be lawful. Therefore this particular dictamen of conscience, by which he persuadeth himself, that it is lawful for him in his time & place to follow an other man's opinion against his own opinion in universal, must of necessity be had by extrinsical grounds, to wit, for that he believeth the contrary opinion to be probable in regard of the authority of those men who do follow it. 14. And this assertion Vasquez e Cap. 4. nu. 14. proveth, because for this only cause that any opinion is probable, and defended by men skilful in that Art, and grounded upon probable reason, as we cannot justly be reprehended for defending it in Schools, so also with a safe conscience we may follow it in practice. For as in speculative things any man may f Medina 1a. 2ae q 19 ar. 6. without any note of error follow the opinion of other men, who are skilful in that Art against his own opinion, so also in moral, or practical things any man may without any spot of sin, or imprudency, follow the opinion of prudent men against his own opinion. 15. But to know, when the opinion of other men is probable enough, that a learned man may in practice follow it against his own (for if the opinion of other men be not probable, no man saith, that any man may in practice follow it) it is here by the way to be observed first, g Cap. 4. nu. 17. that it must not be a singular opinion, and of one only Doctor. For if I like not the proper, or intrinsical grounds of that singular opinion of one only Doctor, but of the contrary, and see it to be grounded only upon the authority of one Doctor, I aught not to accounted it probable to this effect, that I may prudently follow it in practice against my own, and the common opinion of all others. He said [to this effect, etc.] for although the contrary opinion may be probable to the Author thereof according to that, which hath been said before, h In this sect. nu. 11. yet to me, who believe the contrary opinion to be true, it aught not to be accounted probable, so that I may prudently follow it in practice. Secondly, it must be such an opinion, which a learned man may lawfully follow against his own, that it be not commonly thought to contain in it any error, but yet to have in it probability, and so that it be an opinion not utterly rejected, and hissed out of Schools. Thirdly, We may then at last with far greater reason follow the opinion of others against our own, when we perceive the Authors of the contrary opinion to have seen and considered all the grounds and reasons for our opinion, and that they have in some sort answered them, and that they were not convinced by them. For than we may justly think, that we may lawfully and prudently follow in practise the opinion of other men against our own: neither aught we to suppose, that our reasons are evident demonstrations, and which do make the contrary opinion to be voided of all probability. 16. Nevertheless it is greatly to be observed, saith Vasquez, l Cap. 4. nu. 18. that it may sometimes fall out, that the ancient Writers, whose opinions are now in controversy, did not consider some reason, law, or decree, which is of great force against their opinion, but contrariwise that the later Doctors, being convinced with that reason, or law, do now defend the contrary opinion. If therefore a learned man, seeing that law, or decree, or considering that new reason, doth defend the opinion of the later Writers against the ancient, he can not follow in practise the opinion of the ancient writers against his own opinion: because the opinion of the ancient, who have not seen or considered that decree or reason, aught not now to be accounted probable. But if some later Writers have observed the objection taken from that law, and decree against the opinion of the ancient, and have endeavoured to answer it, we aught not to judge the opinion of the ancient writers to be voided of probability, so that we may not lawfully follow it. In the same manner, if a learned man hath only considered some peculiar argument against the contrary opinion, which seemeth to him to be altogether insoluble, he aught not therefore to judge the contrary opinion to be improbable, so that he may not lawfully follow it, because he aught not by his own proper judgement to think the opinion of other men to be improbable. 17. And for the same reason, a learned man may lawfully follow in practise k Cap. 4. nu. 18. 19 the probable opinion of other men against his own, not only when he hath a determinate assent of his own opinion, but also if by intrinsical grounds he hath an assent of neither part, but remaineth doubtful of both. Yea, in this case he may with far better reason follow in practise the probable opinion of other men, on either part, as he shall please, although it be the less secure, so that by extrinsical grounds he have a determinate judgement or dictamen of conscience, that it is lawful for him to follow that opinion, because he seethe either part to have his learned and prudent Authors and Patrons, who do embrace it as probable. For if it be lawful to follow in practise the opinion of other men, against our own opinion, whereof we have a determinate assent, because we think the contrary opinion, by reason of extrinsical grounds to be probable, much more will it be lawful, when by intrinsical grounds we have no contrary assent, to follow in practise the opinion of other men. 18. Thirdly he affirmeth, l Cap. 5. nu. 25. that it is not necessary for a learned man to follow in practise his own opinion against others, or the opinion of others against his own, to have no fear of the contrary part, but he may lawfully follow in practise an opinion, having only a probable assent, although he hath some fear that the contrary part be true, and although he hath this fear not only by intrinsical grounds, but also by extrinsical. I purposely said with fear of the contrary part, and I did not say with doubt or staggering, because if any man were doubtful concerning any action, whether it were lawful, or not, he could not do that action with a safe conscience, for that he could not have a particular, and determinate judgement, and dictamen of conscience with an assent, but also he should have a doubt concorning that particular action, whether it were lawful, or not, but no man can lawfully do any thing with a doubtful conscience, as Vasquez doth show beneath m Disp. 65. , and all men do confess. 19 For the better understanding whereof the same Vasquez doth observe, n Disp. 62. cap. 5. nu. 26. that it is one thing to fear, and another to stagger and doubt; for to doubt and stagger, as also hath been said before, o In this sect. num. 9 is to be in suspense betwixt both parts, and to give to neither of them any determinate assent, for that neither part seemeth to be the truer, and with this staggering or doubtful conscience, no man can lawfully do any action, p Vasquez disp. 65. cap. 1. & disp. 66. cap. 1. unless he follow the surer part: for otherwise he should in his conscience expose himself to danger of offending God, and consequently he should in his conscience offend, according to that saying of the wise man, q Ecclesiasticus cap. 3. who loveth danger, shall perish therein. For as he, who doth any action, doubting in his conscience, whether it displeaseth his friend, or not, doth offend against the law of friendship, and seemeth to love more dearly that person, for whose sake he doth that action, than his friend, whom he doubteth it will offend; so also he that doth any thing doubting whether it be a sin, and consequently displeasing to God, offendeth against the law of friendship towards God, and seemeth to love him more dearly, for whose sake he doth that action, than God, whom he doubteth it will offend. 20. But to fear one part to be true, doth not exclude a determinate assent to the contrary part, but to fear consisteth in this, that one reflecting in his mind upon the reasons of that part, whereunto he assenteth, thinketh that they are not evident, but only probable, and therefore he also thinketh, that the contrary part may in very deed be true, although the reasons thereof do not yet show the same, So that to doubt doth include no assent at all, but to fear implieth two assents; the one, whereby he judgeth, that the opinion which he followeth is in very deed true; the other, where by he judgeth that it may in very deed be false, for that the reasons thereof are not convincing, but only probable. Seeing therefore that this fear of one part, although it be express, doth not exclude a determinate assent to the other part, and with every probable assent, which is not evident, there may be fear, it followeth, that any action may be lawfully done with this fear, considering that, according to the doctrine of all Divines, an evident assent, which in moral matters can hardly be had, is not always necessary to do lawfully any action. 21. And what hath been said concerning a learned man, that he may with a safe conscience do any action, although he fear it to be unlawful, the same also is for the same reason to be understood of an unlearned man, who perceiving that there is diversity of opinions among Doctors concerning the same matter, must of necessity have some fear, although he doth by extrinsical grounds determinately assent to one part without any doubt at all. Wherefore that vulgar Maxim of the Divines and Canonists, In doubtful matters the surer part is to be chosen, Vasquez doth understand of true doubts, whereof we have no determinate assent, or probable dictamen of conscience, for in disputable matters, and which are in controversy, which the vulgar sort do sometimes call doubtful, (taking doubtful for all that, which is not certain and evident) it sufficeth to follow that part, which is secure, or which is all one, a probable opinion, neither is it necessary to follow the surer part, or the more probable, or more common opinion, as out of the doctrine of Vasquez we now have showed. For as no man is bound, as well saith Bartholomaeus Fumus in his Aurea Armilla, r Verbo opinio num. 2. to do always that, which is better, but it sufficeth to do that which is good, so no man is bound to follow always the better opinion, but it sufficeth to follow that opinion, which some skilful doctors judge to be true. 22. Fourthly, and lastly he affirmeth f Disp. 62. cap 8. nu. 42. (in which also assertion the Divines do commonly agreed) that it is sufficient for an unlearned man, who is not able of himself to examine the reasons and grounds of those questions, which are in controversy among Catholic Doctors, to follow that opinion, which he thinketh to be probable, and which he seethe is taught by virtuous and skilful men in that art, although it be neither the more secure, nor the more common opinion. He purposely said, [by skilful men in that art] for as well observeth Michael Salon t 2 a. 2. q. 63. ar. 4. controvers. 2 conclus. 4. , That man's opinion is not forthwith to be accounted probable, for that he hath taken Degree in Divinity, or Canon law, because it happeneth sometimes, that also some of these are unlearned. The reason which Vasquez bringeth to prove this assertion, is, Because if a learned and virtuous man may safely follow his own opinion; although it be the less secure, against the opinion of others, why may not also an unlearned man, who aught according to reason trust to the learning, and honesty of that learned and virtuous man, follow in practise his opinion? For every man, although unlearned, doth well perceive that Doctor to be virtuous, and that with a safe conscience, he followeth that opinion in practice, and in giving counsel to others, therefore also the unlearned man may from thence frame a particular judgement, or dictamen of conscience, whereby he may believe, that it is lawful for him to do that, which he judgeth lawful for a virtuous and learned man to do. And from hence also Vasquez doth gather, That although that Doctor, whose counsel the unlearned man demandeth, doth affirm, that the opinion which he followeth and which he propoundeth to the unlearned man to follow, is against the common opinion, yet the unlearned man may lawfully follow in practise his opinion: For the reason before alleged doth also in this case prove the very same. And therefore most learned Navarre before u Cap 3. sect. 3. num. 14. cited, did very well affirm, That in the court of conscience to the effect of not sinning it sufficeth to choose for true, his opinion, whom for just cause we think to be a man of a good conscience, and of sufficient learning. 23. From this doctrine of Vasquez it followeth first, that if a learned man, and who hath for a long time studied Divinity, may lawfully, and with a safe conscience follow in practise his own opinion against the opinion of all other Divines, with far greater reason may he lawfully follow in practise his own opinion, when divers other learned men do agreed with him in the same opinion. 24. Secondly, it followeth, that it is one thing to defend an opinion, and to follow it in practice, thinking it to be true; and an other to defend an opinion, and to follow it in practice, thinking only that it is probable. For it may happen, that one may be truly doubtful, and by intrinsical grounds have no determinate judgement, or assent, that such an opinion is true, or false, and yet he may be morally certain, that the same opinion is probable, for that he seethe it to be defended by virtuous and learned men. 25. Thirdly, it followeth, that those learned Catholics, and others not so learned, who trusting to the learning and honesty of them, do follow in practise their opinion, are not forthwith to be censured of Heresy, error, or temerity, when they departed from the more common, the more probable, and the more secure opinion of other Catholic Doctors, yea although this common opinion seem to be grounded upon any Decree, Law, or Canon of Pope, or General Council; which Decree, Law, or Canon those learned Divines have seen, examined, and answered thereunto, although their answer doth not satisfy the contrary side. 26. Wherefore the same Vasquez a little beneath x Disp. 79. cap. 1. & disp. 86. , conformably to the doctrine, which here he teacheth, disputeth the controversy of infused habits two manner of ways: First, of the absolute question, to wit, whether according to his opinion there be certain habits infused in our soul by God alone; secondly, of the modal question, to wit, whether it be certain, or only probable, that such habits are infused in our souls by God alone, and he answereth, that it is a constant, without controversy, and undoubted opinion of the Schoolmen, which also he himself alloweth, that there be certain virtues which we call Theological, to wit, Faith, Hope & Charity, which of their own nature are infused by God alone; and nevertheless he affirmeth y Disp. 79. cap. 1. et disp. 86. c. 1 , that this opinion is only the more probable, although some Doctors do hold it to be certain, and of faith. And he in the same place disputing the same question concerning moral virtues affirmeth, z Disp. 86. cap. 1. that it is the more probable, and the more common opinion, and to which he also with the same Doctors doth subscribe, that there be also moral virtues, which of their own nature are infused by God alone; and yet he blameth certain Thomists, for condemning the contrary opinion as temerarious. But although, saith he, a Disp. 86. cap. 2. I think this opinion to be the more probable, and thereunto with the aforesaid Doctors I do subscribe, yet the severity, not to say, rashness of certain Thomists, doth much displease me, who do so adhere to this opinion, that they are not afraid upon sleight and weak grounds, to censure the contrary opinion as temerarious. From whence it is clearly inferred, that, according to Vasquez Doctrine, the constant, common, without controversy, and undoubted opinion of Scholastical Divines may sometimes without any note of temerity be impugned, seeing that the contrary opinion may now, and then be probable. 27 To come therefore nearer to the proposed objection, which doth consist of two principal parts, the first that his Holiness hath by his Breves condemned this Oath, as clearly repugnant to faith, and Salvation; the second, that also the chief learned men of these times have in their public writings censured it in the same manner, it is to be supposed first, that although it be in these days the more common opinion among Catholic writers, that the Pope is above a General Council, and that he can not err in his definitions, when he prescribeth to the whole Church any thing to be necessarily believed as of faith, for that in such definitions he is directed by the infallible assistance of the Holy Ghost, in so much that some Divines, among whom is Cardinal Bellarmine b Lib. 4. de Rom. Pont. cap. 2. in fine. , do over boldly avouch, that the contrary opinion is altogether erroneous, and most near to heresy, and almost of faith, and that it can not be excused from great temerity, and that they who defend it, do show themselves, to be scarce Catholics c Li. 2. de Concil. cap 17. , yet notwithstanding these too too severe censures, the contrary opinion is not voided of all probability, seeing that it is very vehemently maintained by most grave, most learned, most virtuous, and ancient Divines, and Lawyers, to wit, by Pope Adrian the sixth d In quaest de Confirmat. , by the Cardinal of Cambray e De authorit. Eccles. , by the Cardinal of Cusa f De Concord. Catholica lib. 2. cap. ultimo. , by Cardinal Panormitane g In cap. significasti extra de electione. , otherwise called Abbot Panormitane, by the Cardinal of Florence h Ibidem. master to Panormitane, by Alphonsus Tostatus i In cap. 18. Matth q 108. et in defensorio part 2. cap. 69. Bishop Abulensis, by john Gerson k In suis tractatibus de potest. Eccles. , john Maior l In suis tractatibus de potest. Eccles. , joannes Parisiensis m In suis tractatibus de potest. Eccles. , jacobus Almainus n In suis tractatibus de potest. Eccles. , and others. 28 But if any one reply, as I have heard one of our Countrymen answer, that indeed in times past this second opinion for the reason alleged was probable, yet now it being against the torrent of Scholastical Divines, it is altogether improbable, and can not be defended by any Catholic, without some note at the lest of temerity, Hear what Franciscus Victoria a religious man of the Order of Saint Dominicke, a most learned Divine of this age l For he died in the year of our Lord 1546 , and as Posseuine m Verbo Franciscus Victoria. the jesuite calleth him, a public, and indeed famous professor of Divinity in the University of Salamanca writeth concerning this matter: There are two opinions, saith Victoria n Relect. 4. de potest. Papae, et Concilij propositio 3 a. , concerning the comparison of the Pope's power; the one is of S. Thomas, and many his followers, and of other learned Doctors both Divines, and Canonists, that the Pope is above a Council; the other is the common opinion of the Divines of Paris, and also of many Doctors, both Divines, and Canonists, as of Panormitane, and others, contrary to the former, that a Council is above the Pope. It is no place at this present to dispute whether of them be the truer. I think that both of them is a probable opinion. See also what in the Preface of my Apologetical answer o Nu. 28. I related to this purpose out of Navarre a most famous Divine of this age. 29 Yea also Cardinal Bellarmine, in my judgement not much agreeable to himself herein, although he bringeth the Council of Florence, & of Laterane under Pope Leo the tenth to prove, that the Pope is above a General Council, which two Counsels are in my opinion the strongest arguments, which he bringeth to confirm this Doctrine, yet very clearly confirmeth that, which we have said, in these words: And although, saith he p Lib. 2. de Concil. cap. 13. , this question seemeth to be afterwards defined in the Council of Florence, and in the last Laterane Council, yet because the Council of Florence, hath not, so expressly defined it, and concerning the Council of Laterane, which hath most expressly defined it, some make a doubt, whether it were truly a General Council, therefore even to this day it remaineth a question also among Catholics. Truly it is not agreeable to Christian charity to impeach upon sleight grounds, virtuous and learned Catholics of manifest error, great temerity, and with this grievous censure, to be scarce Catholics. Our school, saith that most learned Melchior Canus, q Lib 8. de locis cap. 4 out of Tully Lib. 3. de Officijs. giveth us great liberty, that what soever seemeth to be most probable we may by our right defend, but it is not lawful for us to condemn rashly▪ and lightly those, who do hold, against us. 30 But this supposition we do not therefore here put down; for that we think it necessary to the full satisfying of this present objection, but to repress the rashness of some few of our English Catholics, who upon indiscreet zeal towards the See apostolic, are not afraid to the reproach of the See apostolic, & contempt of Catholic Religion, publicly to affirm, that every Pope's Breve doth define that thing, which it prescribeth, to be believed as of faith, & fear not to charge with inobedience, schism, yea, and also with heresy those Catholics, who for any cause, or for what pretext soever do not obey those Breves; and moreover to show, that from the authority of the Pope's Breves no sufficient or demonstrative argument, as also beneath it shall more plainly appear, can be brought to prove, that those things, which are therein declared, commanded, or forbidden, do belong to Catholic faith; and consequently that this oath is not for that cause repugnant to Catholic faith, for that the Pope hath by his Breves expressly declared, that it is flat contrary to faith, although we should also freely grant, that his Holiness did not only by his Breves declare his opinion, but also did out of the Chair define the same; seeing that many learned, and virtuous Catholics do probably defend, that the Pope's definitions are subject to error, if he define without a General Council; for that according to these Doctors, Christ hath not promised him the spirit of truth to prescribe infallibly any thing to the universal Church, unless he as head of the universal Church doth concur with the mystical body of Christ, or with all the memhers thereof, which a General Council doth represent, to propound to the universal Church any Doctrine to be necessarily believed as of faith: And that Christ praying for S. Peter, that his faith should not fail * Luc. 22. , did not pray for the person of Saint Peter, but for the universal Church, whom Saint Peter did represent r Petrus de Aliaco de Authoritate Eccles. part 3. ca 1. Maior de Author. Concilio parú a principio. Almainus de potest. Eccles. q 1. cap 16. , according to that saying of Saint Augustine s Tract. 50. in joan. ad ca 12. non long a fine, et serm. 15 de Apost. Petro, et Paulo. recorded in the Canon law, t 23. q. 1. Can. quodcunque. Peter, when he received the keys, represented the holy Church; And again, u In Psal. 108. Some things are said, which seem to belong to the Apostle Saint Peter, and yet they have not a plain understanding, but when they are referred to the Church, whose person he is acknowledged in figure to represent, for the Primacy, which he had over the Disciples, as is that, I will give to thee the keys of the Kingdom of Heaven, and if there be any of this like sort. 31 Secondly, it is to be supposed that the Pope's Breves (which, as Hugolinus x Part. 2. de Censuris cap. 6. in principio. noteth, are nothing else, than the Pope's letters, which are made only by his Secretaries, and are sealed by the Pope in read wax with the Fisher's ring y To wit, with a ring wherein is engraven the picture of St Peter fishing. , and they have the same force, which the Pope's letters have which are written in answer to other letters, and they are for that cause called Breves, because they are written briefly, and in few words; whereas the Pope's Bulls are so called, for that they are signed with a round piece of lead hanged on the parchment, * A round tablet hanged about children's necks for an ornament, is in Latin called Bulla. wherein the pictures of Saint Peter, z Rebuf. in prax. benif. 3. part. nu. 4. et sec. Archidiac. et G●n minia. in cap. quis nesciat. dist. 11. and Saint Paul are impressed) can not contain in them any thing of moment besides one of these three things. For first the Pope by his Breves doth either define something to be necessarily believed as of faith by them, to whom he writeth, or secondly, he commandeth them some thing, which they must observe; or thirdly, he only by the way of counsel exhorteth, and admonisheth them, and declareth his opinion, that such a thing is to be believed or observed by them. 32 And to begin with the first Breve, which was dated the three and twentieth of October in the year 1606, Cardinal Bellarmine a Li 4 de Rom. Pont. cap. 4. et 5. et lib 2 de Conc. l. ca 12. , Melchior Canus b Lib. 5. de locis cap. 5 q. 4. , and the rest of those Divines, who hold, that the Pope can not err in his public definitions, although he define without a General Council, do withal affirm, that to make the Pope's definitions in points of Doctrine to be infallibly true, and not exposed to error, two things chiefly are required; first, that the Pope's decrees, wherein he prescribeth any thing to be believed as of faith, be directed to the whole Church; the second, that he have an intention to bind all Christians undoubtedly to believe it, as a most certain doctrine of faith: and if either of these two be wanting▪ it is the constant opinion of all Divines, that the Pope's decrees or definitions are subject to error, and do not make the thing which he, decreeth, to be of faith. For in his particular judgements opinions, and decrees, which do not appertain to the whole Church, but to some private persons, Bishops, or particular Churches all Divines do acknowledge that the Popes may err. 33 We also grant, and that willingly, saith Canus c In the place cited. , that not forthwith, if any thing be contained in the volumes of the Canon law, it is to be believed as a doctrine of faith; But then especially when either the judges use words which declare their opinion, or when there answers are not directed to the universal Church, but to private Churches, and Bishops. For they are to be understood only in this case to pronounce of faith, when the sentence belongeth to all Christians, when it bindeth all. For infallibility is promised, and granted to them who are by God appointed to be judges of faith, not for private Churches, whereof every one may err, but for the Universal Church, which can not err. Therefore the Doctrine of Popes, and Counsels if it be propounded to the whole Church, if it be also propounded with an obligation to be believed, then doth their sentence concern a point of faith. Wherefore also in General Counsels, saith Cardinal Bellarmine d Lib. 2. de Concil. cap. 12. , the greatest part of the Acts do not appertain to faith. For neither are of faith the disputations which go before, nor the reasons which are added, nor those things which are brought to explicate, and illustrate, but only the bore decreees, and those not all, but those only which are propounded as of faith. 34 For in the Decrees of Popes, saith Canus e Lib 6. De locis cap. 8. ad 4. , two things are to be distinguished, the first is the intention, and conclusion of the decree, the other is the reason, and cause which the Pope giveth of that thing which he hath decreed. And in the conclusion the Popes can not err, if they define the question from the Apostolical tribunal. But if the Pope's reasons be not necessary, not to say, apt, probable, fitting, we must not make any regard thereof. For the Fathers do not always in a question of faith bring necessary reasons, but sometimes probable. And it is easy to discern (say the aforesaid Authors f Canus lib. 5. q. 4. et Bellarmine, lib. 2. de Ro. Pont. ca 12. ) by the words of the Council, or Pope, when any decree is propounded to all Christians to be believed as of faith: as if those who hold, or believe g I said, (Who 〈…〉 or believe) for it may fall out, that as well a General Council, as the Pope, may to avoid scandals, and schisms excommunicate all persons what soever, who do teach, or preach such a Doctrine, and yet not therefore, that they intent thereby to define that Doctrine to be certainly believed as of faith, or that those, who obstinately do teach, or preach the contrary be accounted heretics Whereof see Canus in the place before cited concerning the Doctrine of Caietane about the preparation to the receiving of the Eucharist and Suarez tom. 2. in 3. part disp. 3. sect. 6 in fine, concerning the Doctrine of those who should obstinately affirm, that either of those two opinions, to wit, that the B. Mother of God was preserved from original sin or was conceived therein, is of faith. the contrary should be excommunicated, or judged and reputed for heretics, or if any thing be affirmed expressly, and properly to be firmly believed by all the faithful, or to be received as a doctrine of the Catholic faith, or in other like words, to be contrary to the Gospel, and doctrine of the Apostles. Be affirmed I say, saith Canus, not by opinion, but by a certain, and firm decree: But when none of these things be affirmed, it is not certain, that it is a point of faith. 35 Now by the express words of these Breves it is evident, that it was not his Holiness meaning in these Breves to define, and determine by any public decree, as an infallible doctrine, and to be firmly believed by all Christians as a point of faith, that this Oath containeth in it many things, which are clearly repugnant to faith, and salvation; both because they are written only to the Catholics of this Kingdom, for which cause they are by joannes Eudoemon the jesuite h In praefatione Paraleli To●ti. rightly called private letters, and therefore according to the Doctrine of Cardinal Bellarmine they are subject to error, although they should contain an express, and manifest definition; and also for that there is no one word comprehended in those Breves, which can signify any such decree, or definition of faith. 36 And although in the first Breve, to which the other two have relation, the Pope forbiddeth all English Catholics to take this oath, for that it containeth many things, which are clearly repugnant to faith, and Salvation; yet notwithstanding this prohibition, it being not any decree of faith, whereof now we treat, but a precept belonging to manners, whereof presently we will speak, and moreover those words, [for that it containeth many things, which are clearly repugnant to faith, and salvation] being only the reason of this decree, (which reason according to the aforesaid Doctrine of Cardinal Bellarmine, and Canus even in those decrees of faith, which by a General Council are propounded to the whole Church, may be false, although the decree itself be certainly true, for that the Counsels may allege the reason of the decree according to their fallible opinion, but the decree itself of faith is grounded in their most certain judgement, and in the infallible assistance of the holy Ghost) it is most evident by the words of the Breve itself, that no infallible definition of faith is contained therein, although we should grant it to be most certain, and not only probable, that the Pope in his definitions can not err, and also that this Breve was written not only to the English Catholics, but also to the universal Church. 37. Concerning the second, to wit the Pope's command, whereby he forbiddeth all Catholics to take this Oath, for that it containeth many things, which are clearly repugnant to faith and Salvation, to know what force this precept hath to bind, it is also to be supposed first, that what we have already said concerning the Pope's definitions in determining matters of faith, and which are to be believed, is with like proportion to be understood of his decrees concerning manners, or of his precepts, and laws which he commandeth to be observed. And▪ first, that it is not an improbable opinion, which teacheth that the Pope may err in his definitions of Faith, or in those things, which he propoundeth to the whole Church to be believed of Faith, if he define without the approbation of the universal Church, or of a General Council, which representeth the universal Church, seeing that it is maintained by most grave, most virtuous, and most learned Divines: so also that is not an improbable opinion, which affirmeth, that the Pope can err in his decrees, laws and precepts of manners, which he prescribeth to be necessarily observed by the whole Church, if he enact laws without the approbation of the Universal Church, or of a General Council, which representeth the universal Church, seeing that most grave, most virtuous, & most learned Divines do defend this opinion. 38. Secondly, we do not therefore here put down this supposition, for that we think it necessary for the full satisfying of this present objection, but to repress the rashness of some few of our English Catholics, who are not afraid to charge with inobedience, schism, yea and also with heresy those Catholics, who do not obey every Pope's Breve, and moreover to show, that from the authority of the Pope's Breves, & from the Popes command no sufficient, or demonstrative argument can be brought to prove, that those Catholics, who either have taken the Oath, or think that it may lawfully be taken, are not to be accounted Catholics, although they should approve the Oath in that sense, wherein his Holiness hath condemned it, which nevertheless they do not, as more clearly it shall appear beneath, i Nu. 51. et seq seeing that many learned, grave, and virtuous Catholics do hold, and that not without probability, that the Pope may err as well in prescribing to the whole Church precepts of manners, as in propounding definitions of faith, if he define, or prescribe Laws without the approbation of the universal Church, or of a general Council, which representeth the universal Church. 39 But supposing for this present that this opinion for the Pope's infallible judgement, both in imposing to the whole Church precepts of manners, and also in defining matters of faith to be not only the more common, and the more probable opinion, but also to be certain, and most near to faith, as Cardinal Bellarmine, without sufficient ground doth affirm, yet according to the former doctrine of the said Cardinal Bellarmine, Canus, and other Catholic Divines, this is to be understood only in case he prescribe Laws to the whole Church: For in his particular judgements, and decrees of manners, which are imposed not upon the whole Church, but upon some private persons, or Churches, they grant that not only the Pope, but also a general Council, or the Church may through ignorance err, the Church may err, I say, saith Canus, k Lib. 5. de locis cap. 5. q. 5. concls 3. not only in her judgement of Facts, (as whither such a one is to be promoted to a Bishopric, or was rightly promoted, whither he committed such a sin, whither he hath lost his faculties, and such like) but also in her private precepts, and laws themselves. And the true and proper reason of this assertion is alleged by Pope Innocentius the third in a decree of the Canon Law. l Can. a nobis 2. de sent excom. The judgement (saith he) of God is always grounded upon truth, which neither deceiveth, nor is deceived, but the judgement of the Church is now & then led by opinion, which oftentimes doth deceive, and is deceived, for which cause it happeneth sometimes, that he who is bound before God, is not bound before the Church and he that is free before the Church, is bound by an ecclesiastical Censure. Wherefore I do not approve, saith Canus m q. 5. cit. concls. 2 , all Church-lawes, I do not commend all punishments, censures, excommunications, suspensions, Irregularities, Interdicts. I know that there be some such laws, which if they want nothing else, yet doubtless they want prudence, and discretion. 40 This nevertheless is diligently to be observed, that although it be most probable, that the Pope may err in his private judgements, laws, decrees and precepts, and both through ignorance and malice, saith Canus n In fine concl. 1 ae. , be deceived and abuse the power of the keys, yet to affirm forthwith without very great, and sufficient reason, that he hath erred in his private laws, and decrees is temerarious, scandalous and irreligious: As also there can be made no doubt, but that Secular Princes may now and then err in enacting temporal Laws, yet he that without very great and sufficient reason should affirm, that the Prince hath erred in enacting this, or that law, should justly be accounted a temerarious, scandalous, and seditious person. But supposing that the Pope cannot err in his definitions, laws and decrees, which he prescribeth not to the whole Church, but only to private persons, or Churches, if one moved with very great, and pregnant reasons should affirm, that he in defining, commanding, or forbidding this or that thing hath erred, and through ignorance, inconsideration, or evil information was deceived, he aught not therefore to be condemned of temerity, scandal, or any other crime. 41. Secondly, it is to be supposed out of the Doctrine of Suarez before o cap. 1. sect: 4. related, that every decree of the Pope, or Council belonging to manners, is either a mere constitutive precept, to wit, which of itself maketh the act, which it forbiddeth, to be unlawful for this only cause, for that it is forbidden by that precept, as is the eating of flesh in Lent, and the doing of Servile works upon Sundays, which if they were not forbidden by the Church-lawes, they would not be unlawful, or else it is a declarative precept, which doth not induce a new obligation, but only confirmeth a former, neither doth it make, but suppose the act which it forbiddeth to be otherwise unlawful; as being forbidden before by some other former Law. A constitutive precept of human power although it may sometimes bind with danger of some great temporal loss, as of goods, liberty, yea and now and then also of life; yet the Ecclesiastical Law setting aside scandal, and contempt, which are forbidden by the Law of God, and nature, doth seldom, or never bind with very great temporal harm. And therefore we are not bound to abstain from flesh in Lent, or not to do servile works upon the Sunday, which are commanded us by the Church— Laws, when we are like to incur any probable danger of some great temporal hurt thereby. 42. A declarative precept, as well noteth Suarez p In the place before cited. , dependeth only upon the reason, for which the act is commanded, or forbidden, and upon the obligation of the former precept: in somuch that if the reason for which the precept is imposed, be not true, and no former Law, or obligation, as in the declarative precept is affirmed to be, can be found, the declarative precept hath no force to bind at all. As for example, his Holiness forbiddeth all English Catholics to take this Oath, for that it containeth many things, which are clearly repugnant to Faith and Salvation; If therefore in this oath no thing can be found, which is repugnant to faith, or salvation, this declarative prohibition of his Holiness, which is founded in this reason, is according to the doctrine of Suarez of no force, neither doth it bind English Catholics to observe the same. 43 Nevertheless it is to be observed, that the Pope's reason, or declaration may be either definitive, whereby he intendeth to bind all English Catholics to believe certainly as a point of faith, that his reason, or declaration is true, and then we are bound to believe with the same certainty that his reason, and declaration is true, wherewith we are bound to believe that he hath power infallibly to define: or else it is only opinative, to wit, grounded in his opinion, for which he probably thinketh that the reason which he allegeth is true, and that in very deed there is such a former precept as he supposeth; and then his declarative precept, doth bind no more than his reason, & opinion can bind, & consequently we are more no bound to obey his declarative precept, than we are bound to follow his opinion, whereon his declarative precept doth only depend. 44. First therefore it is certain, that this decree of the Pope, wherein he forbiddeth English Catholics to take this Oath is a mere declarative precept, as it is manifest by the words of the first Breve, to which the other two have relation. For after that his Holiness had in his Breve related the whole Oath word by word, he writeth thus: Which being so it aught to be manifest unto you by the words themselves, that this Oath cannot be taken without hurt to the Catholic faith, and to the salvation of your souls, seeing that it containeth many things which are clearly repugnant to Faith, and salvation. Therefore we admonish you, that you altogether abstain from taking this, and the like oaths, which truly we do the more earnestly demand of you, for that we having had trial of your constant faith. etc. So that it is evident that the only cause for which his Holiness forbiddeth the taking of this Oath, is for that he thinketh it to be otherwise unlawful, and to contain in it many things, which are clearly repugnant to faith, and salvation, and consequently that this is not a constitutive, but a mere declarative prohibition. 45. Secondly, it is also certain, that it is such a declarative precept, which is founded not in any infallible definition of the Pope, whereby he decreeth, that the reason which he allegeth is most certain, and to be believed as a point of faith, as hath been showed before, q Nurse, 32. & sect but it is only grounded upon his opinative judgement, whereby he probably persuadeth himself, that his reason is true, and that the oath doth contain in it many things, which are flat contrary to faith and salvation. Which being so, it is most manifest, that we are no farther bound to observe this command of his Holiness, than we are bound to follow his opinion, whereon his Declarative precept doth only depend. Wherefore, if this oath be not of itself unlawful, nor doth contain any thing which is repugnant to faith or salvation, especially in that sense, wherein the English Catholics do take it, and wherein the words of the oath, according to their proper and usual signification are commonly understood, but only temporal allegiance, which every temporal Prince may, if need require, lawfully demand of his subjects, as by examining every clause of the oath I have, as I think, sufficiently proved, truly there can be made no doubt, but that every English Catholic▪ notwithstanding the Pope's prohibition, may with a safe conscience, and without any prejudice to the Catholic faith take the same. And this may suffice concerning the particular precept or command of his Holiness. 46. Now concerning that third thing, to wit, the Pope's judgement, opinion and advise, which besides his definition and command may, as we have said, be contained in a Breve, it is most certain, that no man is bound to follow his opinions, admonitions, counsels or exhortations. Every man may, if he will, follow his admonition and advise, so that he counsel him no unjust, or unlawful thing, but that we are bound to follow his counsel in lawful things, is against all reason, as evidently appeareth by the evangelical counsels, which are much superior to the Pope's counsels. The Pope's judgement, and opinion when it is contrary to the opinion of other learned Catholics, any man may lawfully reject; and especially if to follow his opinion, should be very prejudicial to himself, or others; and also if it be grounded upon slight reasons and false informations, as partly we have showed before how weak those arguments be, which are commonly objected against this Oath, and partly we will beneath r Nu. 51. & sect. by Father Parson's letters make it manifest, that his Holiness was not rightly informed concerning the true meaning of this Oath. And truly to dislike whatsoever the Pope's Holiness disliketh, and to approve whatsoever he approveth, and to grant him without due examination all that authority, which some Popes have claimed or may claim, doth seem to favour rather of over much flattery, then of moderate discretion, whereof the examples of many Popes do yield sufficient testimony; in so much that Cardinal Bellarmine in his Controversies, hath much ado to excuse many Popes, not only from believing, but also from teaching publicly flat heresies; and nevertheless he doth freely acknowledge that some Popes did publicly teach & maintain, although not manifest heresy, yet false doctrine. 47. Did not Pope Nicolas the first in a Decretal epistle, which is registered in the books of the Canon Law s De consecrat. dist. 4. can. à quodam judaeo. , and in the Tomes of the Sacred Counsels t Tom. 3. council in responsis Nicolai ad consulta Bulgavorum. cap. 104. , publicly teach, that Baptism given only in the name of Christ, without expressing the three Persons of the Trinity is valide and sufficient? Which doctrine Cardinal Bellarmine u Lib. 4. de Rom. Pont. cap. 12. affirmeth to be false, and therefore to excuse Pope Nicolas he affirmeth, that he did not by defining the question to be of faith, affirm that proposition, but only as a particular Doctor, declare by the way his opinion. Did not Pope Celestine the third, in a Decretal Epistle, which was once extant in the body of the Canon Law, among the Pope's Decretal Epistles, x In cap laudibilem de conuers. coniugat. publicly teach, and according to Alphonsus de Castro y Lib. 1. de haeres. cap. 4. did also declare as Pope, that Marriage was so dissolved by heresy, that the party, whose consort was fallen into heresy, might lawfully marry an other? Which doctrine is now flatly condemned in the Council of Trent z Sess. 24. de reformat can. 5. . And Cardinal Bellarmine to excuse Celestine doth affirm, That he did not define anything for certainty concerning that point, but did only answer what seemed to him more probable. And although, saith Cardinal Bellarmine a In the place before cited. , it is doubtless true, that this Epistle of Celestine was once among the Decretal Epistles, yet from thence it can not be gathered, that Celestine made a decree plainly Apostolical, and out of the Chair, seeing that it is manifest, that there be many other things in the Decretal Epistles, which do not make the thing to be of faith, but do only declare unto us the Pope's opinions concerning that matter. 48. Did not Pope john the 22. publicly teach, and if he had not been prevented by death, was resolved b Adrianus Papa in quaest. de confirm. circa finem, etc. Alphons. de Castro lib. 3. contra haeres. verbo Beatitudo. haeres. 6. & Bellarm. lib. 4. de Rom. Pont. cap. 14. to define, that the souls of the Blessed should not see God before the Resurrection? Did not Pope Boniface the eighth, writing to Philip the fair King of France affirm, c Nicolaus Vignerius ad annum 1300. that he doth accounted them for heretics, who do believe that the said King is not subject to him in spirituals and temporals? in so much that joannes Tilius Bishop of Meldime in his Chronicle of the Kings of France doth boldly affirm, that the impudency of Boniface was so wonderfully great, that he durst aver, that the Kingdom of France was a benefit of the Pontifical Majesty. I omit to rehearse certain later examples, for that they are not as yet so publicly known, neither would I, being desirous with Sem and japhet, to hide the imperfections of our parents, for reverence to the See apostolic have put in remembrance the aforesaid examples, although they be most public, if certain Catholics with over much bitter zeal, censuring both wrongfully, unchristianly, and inconsiderately their christian brethren, for such enormous crimes of disobedience, error, and denial of their faith, had not for their defence compelled me thereunto. 49. Now tell us, we pray you, would our Adversaries, if they had lived in those Pope's times, have so vehemently enueighed against all those Catholics, and have exclaimed against them, as being scarce Catholics and good believers, who had not approved the opinions, decretal letters, or Apostolical Breves of the aforesaid Popes? What they would have done, God he knoweth, that they aught not so to have done, it is too too manifest. Why then are they now so voided of Christian charity that they are not afraid to persecute learned and virtuous Catholics, and to condemn them of heresy, and of abjuring their faith, who upon forcible and sufficient grounds, and which their most learned Adversaries are not able with arguments to convince (and if they be able, we humbly request them, and by the tender passion of our Saviour Christ jesus, we conjure them, that they will endeavour rather with sound reasons to satisfy timorous consciences, then to enforce them with threatening, and reproachful speeches) in a matter of so great moment, belonging to their Allegiance, and tending to the temporal overthrow of themselves and their whole posterity, do not obey the Pope's letters, which are not founded in his public definition, but only grounded upon his private opinion, which therefore hereafter (as the aforesaid opinions of Pope Nicolas, Celestine, john and Boniface are now rejected) will peradventure be impugned, especially seeing that they labour by all probable means to excuse him with all dutiful reverence, and do not presume malapartly and unseemly to oppose against him? If they would have all Catholics to affirm without due examination whatsoever he denieth, let them hear, I beseech them, attentively (for the words do nearly concern themselves) what writeth Melchior Canus a religious man of the Order of Saint Dominick, a most learned writer of these times, Bishop of the Canaries, and not long since d For he wrote his book in the year 1562 chief Professor of Divinity in the University of Salamanca. Those, saith he, e Lib. 5. de locis cap 5. prope finem. who rashly and without election do defend every judgement of the Pope concerning every thing, do weaken, not strengthen, do overthrow, not establish the authority of the See apostolic. For what will he in the end gain by disputing against heretics, when they perceive that he taketh upon him to defend the Pope's authority, not by judgement, but by affection, neither that he endeavoureth to found out the truth by force of his disputation, but to apply himself to an other man's will and pleasure? Peter hath no need of our lying; he hath no need of our flattering. 50. To make therefore now at the last a compendious Answer to all the three Breves, and so also to the whole objection. To the first Breve, whereon the other two do depend, It is answered first, that although his Holiness thinking, and in his opinion supposing the oath to be of itself unlawful, and to contain many things which are contrary to faith and salvation, doth therefore by his letters or Breve forbidden English Catholics to take it, yet seeing that this his prohibition is only a declarative precept, and founded in the private judgement and opinion of his Holiness, as before f Nu. 44. et sect. we have showed, as we are not bound to follow the Pope's opinion against the probable opinion of other Catholic Divines (then especially when by following it, very great prejudice is like to come to ourselves, and many others; and when the reasons and grounds for his opinion, are for the most part by all men accounted to be very unsound, as are almost all those arguments, which our learned Adversaries have objected against the oath) so also we are not bound to obey the Pope's declarative precept, which is founded in his opinion, and in the reason, which he allegeth, which precept, according to the aforesaid doctrine of Franciscus Suarez, hath no greater force to bind, then hath his reason and opinion whereon this declarative precept doth wholly depend. 51. Secondly it is answered, that there is no English Catholic, who, if he be well instructed, will take the Oath, or approve it to be lawful in that sense wherein his Holiness, as we probably conjecture, hath condemned it. For it is probable, and in my judgement morally certain, that his Holiness did understand the words of the Oath in that sense, wherein the Divines of Rome did conceive them, and especially Cardinal Bellarmine, whose advice and opinion in this so weighty a Theological controversy, which must needs bring great good or harm to this Kingdom, his Holiness, as it is very probable, both demanded and followed, who therefore, according to his Holiness mind, and by his permission wrote in defence of his Breves against his majesties Apology for the Oath. But Cardinal Bellarmine understood the Oath in that sense, as though it denied the Pope's Primacy in spirituals, his power to excommunicate, to bind and loose, and also to dispense in oaths, in which sense, doubtless it can not be denied, but that it contains many things, which are flat contrary to faith and salvation: but no Catholic doth in this sense either take the Oath, or defend it to be lawful. 52. Moreover, that his Holiness did think, that in this Oath is denied his spiritual authority to inflict Censures, is plainly gathered by a letter of Father Parsons, who did greatly urge and solicit his Holiness to sand hither his Breves, as both some Jesuits here with us do freely confess, and also no man, who knoweth, how our English affairs at Rome were carried in his days, can make any doubt hereof. This therefore is the true copy of a letter, which Father Parsons, before any Breve was sent hither, wrote to one here in England, which letter he presently showed to divers, and gave them leave to take a copy thereof, and to impart it to other Catholics. 53. About some four or five months ago, it was consulted by seven or eight of the learneddest Divines that could be chosen, who gave their judgement of it. Their reasons are many, but all deduced to this, that the Pope's authority in chastising Princes upon a just cause, is de fide, and consequently can not be denied when it is called into controversy without denying of our faith, nor that the Pope, or any other authority can dispense in this. 54. For if the question were de facto, and not de iure, to wit, whether the Pope might justly in this or that occasion excommunicate or depose this or that Prince, upon these or these causes, or whether precedent Popes have don● well therein or not, than might some of those reasons, which you say your friends do allege, be admitted into consideration; to wit, whether it could be in aedificationem, or destructionem, do hurt or good, be profitable or improfitable; or whether the causes be sufficient or not, for without cause none holdeth that the Pope may depose; or whether the due form of admonition touched in your letters were observed. But forsomuch as the question is de potestate of the See apostolic power, what it may do upon any cause▪ or against any Catholic Prince whatsoever, these considerations of temporal hurt can not enter. 55 Besides these I have conferred the matter with Cardinal Bellarmine, and sundry others of great learning and conscience, and all are of one opinion in this case, that the form of the Oath as it lieth, is heretical, and no way may be admitted by him that will not deny the Catholic faith. 56. I had occasion twice to speak with his Holiness, the first in company of M. Thomas Fitzherbert, where we proposed certain manners of mitigation suggested by friends, etc. Whereto his Holiness answered, that as for any actual using Censures against his Majesty, he meant not, but rather all courtesy, but as for the Authority of the See apostolic (to wit, for using of Censures) he was resolved, and would rather lose his head then yield one jot. The second, he being informed that some Priests did seem to incline to the taking of the Oath, he answered, he could not hold them for Catholics, etc. 57 By which it is manifest first, that all the reasons why the Divines of Rome did hold the Oath to be unlawful, were deduced to this, that it is de fide, and consequently can not be denied without denying the Catholic faith, that the Pope hath authority to chastise Princes upon a just cause, and that neither the Pope, nor any other authority can dispense in this. Secondly, also it is manifest, that his Holiness did think that in this oath is denied his authority to use Censures, and that therefore he could not hold those Priests for Catholics, who is c●●●ed to the taking of the Oath. As though forsooth, the English Catholics who take the Oath do deny the Pope's power to use Censures, or to chastise Princes upon a just cause; whereas it is most clear that no such thing is denied in this Oath, as in my opinion I have plainly showed by answering Cardinal Bellarmine's arguments, unless perchance he would have us to approve for good and lawful, against the received rules of the Logicians, this manner of arguing from a particular to infer an universal; as for example, The Pope can not chastise Princes by depriving them of their temporal dominions, or of their life, Therefore the Pope can not chastise Princes. We grant that the Pope may chastise Princes by using Ecclesiastical Censures, which truly in this Oath is not denied, but we utterly deny, that to deprive Princes of their dominions, or of their life, are to be ranked among spiritual or Ecclesiastical Censures. 58 Wherefore Cardinal Bellarmine, Father Parsons, and those other Roman Divines using such sophistical collections to prove, that in this oath are contained many things which are flat contrary to faith, and salvation, were very grossly mistaken. And if his Holiness trusting to the learning and conscience of these men, was therefore emboldened to sand hither his Breves for the condemning upon that cause the taking of this Oath, how greatly he was deluded to no small reproach of the See apostolic, to the great scandal of Protestants, and to the utter temporal overthrow of very many Catholics, it is, alas I speak it with grief, too too manifest. For, to omit that protestation of those thirteen English Priests g Above chap. 3. sec. 3. nu 10. , who perceiveth not that from that position, which Petrus Pithaeus h Above chap. 3 sec. 3. nu. 13. affirmeth to be the approved Doctrine of the Kingdom of France, to wit, that the Pope hath not Power to deprive the King of France of his Kingdom, and that the Subjects, notwithstanding any Excommunications whatsoever which can be made by the Pope, are bound to yield obedience due to the King for temporals, neither that in this they can be dispensed, or absolved by the Pope, Cardinal Bellarmine, Father Parsons, and those other Roman Divines might in the very like manner infer, that therein is denied the Pope's Primacy in spirituals, his power to excommunicate, to bind and lose, to dispense, and absolve? And nevertheless they will doubtless be afraid to condemn therefore the Kingdom of France of heresy, and of denying their faith for constantly maintaining that the Pope hath not power to deprive the King of France of his Kingdom. Why then are they not afraid to censure English Catholics of heresy, and denial of there faith for acknowledging the very same concerning the not depriving the King of England of his Kingdom by the Pope's authority, which French Catholics without any danger of heresy, or error do constantly avouch concerning the not depriving of their King by the said authority of the Pope? And thus much concerning his Holiness first Breve. 59 In the Second Breve, which was dated the first of September in the year 1607, it is only declared, that the former letters of his Holiness concerning the forbidding Catholics to take the oath, (wherein, saith his Holiness, he strictly commanded the English Catholics that they should in no wise take the said oath) were not false and surreptitious, but written not only upon his certain knowledge, and by his own proper motion, and will (by which words nevertheless he doth not intent to deny that he in writing of them used the advise, & opinion of others) but also after long, & great deliberation had concerning all the things which are contained in them, and that therefore they were bound to observe them exactly, setting aside all interpretation which may persuade to the contrary. Which last words are so to be understood, that there must be made no frivolous interpretation of those letters, or no such interpretations, which should make any man to think, or make any doubt, that they were not written of his Holiness own knowledge, and by his proper william. For as joannes Salas i Disp 21. de leg. sec. 2. and Emanuel Sa k Verbo Interpretatio. nu. 5. , both of them Divines of the Society of jesus, do well observe, It is lawful for Doctors so inteprete all laws not indeed by a necessary, public or juridical interpretation, but by a private, and not binding interpretation, although the Prince should say, It shall be lawful for no man to otherwise interpret this our writing, for than he only forbiddeth frivolous interpretations, and which are expressly contrary to his mind. Which there Doctrine is with far greater reason to be understood of the Pope's declarative precept, which is only grounded upon presumption, and upon his own opinion, & private judgement, whereby he persuadeth himself, that the thing which he forbiddeth, is otherwise unlawful, as being forbidden by some former law: Whose opinion, and also command founded only in his opinion, when it is against the probable opinion of other Catholic Divines, may not only be interpreted, but also contradicted. Seeing therefore that this Second Breve is only an approving, and confirming of the former, it can have no more force to bind then the former hath, for confirming whereof it was written by his Holiness. 60 The third Breve being dated the first of February in the year 1608, was sent to Mr. George Birket, wherein his Holiness doth ordain, and substitute him Archpresbyter of the English Priests of the Pope's Seminaries in the place of Master George Blackwel; and doth i●●●●e, & command him, & for this giveth him special faculty, that by authority of his Holiness he do admonish all, and every one of those English Priests, who have taken a certain Oath (wherein many things are contained, which are clearly repugnant to faith and the salvation of souls) or have taught, and do teach that it may lawfully be taken, to repent them, and to abstain from such an error. And if within the time (extraiudicialiter notwithstanding) at his arbitrement to be prefixed unto them, they shall not do accordingly, that by the same authority he deprive, and declare deprived them, or him of all faculties, and privileges granted to them, or to any of them from the See Apostolic; or by her authority from any other whatsoever. 61 Concerning this third Breve five things are to be observed. The first is, that this Breve containeth partly a constitutive, and partly a declarative precept, or rather a declaration of a former precept. The declarative precept, or rather the declaration of a former precept doth consist in this, that his Holiness by this precept doth not make, but suppose, and declare the oath to be of itself unlawful. And although this declaration of his Holiness should virtually contain in it a precept, it is for that it supposeth, and presumeth that many things are contained in this Oath, which are clearly repugnant to faith and salvation. Which declaration, or virtual prohibition being only grounded on presumption, and on his Holiness opinion hath no more force to bind Catholics to believe that this Oath is of itself unlawful, and that it containeth many things, which are clearly repugnant to faith & salvation, then bindeth his opinion, when it is against the probable opinion of other Catholics, who can not perceive, that in this Oath is contained any thing, which so much as obscurely is against faith or salvation; especially in that sense, wherein they take the Oath, and think it to be lawful, and which sense they persuade themselves to be agreeable to the proper and usual signification of the words, and to the meaning of the Lawmaker. And therefore as we are not bound, according to that which hath been said before, to follow the opinion of his Holiness, when other learned Catholics do disagree from him, so neither are we bound to obey his Declarative precept, and much less a bore declaration thereof, when it dependeth only upon his opinion. 62 The constitutive precept of his Holiness doth consist in this, that he commandeth Master Archpriest, that he observing certain conditions, do deprive, and declare deprived of all faculties those Priests, who either have taken the Oath, or have taught, and do teach that it may lawfully be taken. And this precept being a mere penal constitution in respect of the Priests who have taken the Oath or have taught, and do teach that it may lawfully be taken, doth not of itself forbidden the taking of the Oath, but supposeth that it is before otherwise forbidden. And therefore no stronger, but rather a far weaker argument can be drawn from this Breve, then from the former to prove, that this Oath is unlawful, and containeth in it many things, which are clearly repugnant to faith, and salvation. But in respect of Master Archpriest it is not a mere penal constitution, but a true, and proper constitutive precept, and binding him (as it is manifest by those words, and we enjoin, and command thee) to observe all that which in this Breve is commanded him; so that he may as easily transgress his Holiness command by exceeding his commission, to wit, if he deprive of faculties those Priests, whom he hath no authority to deprive, as by neglecting to deprive them, whom by his Holiness command he is bound to deprive. 63 Secondly, it is to be observed, that although some of the unlearneder sort may perchance from this Breve take some occasion to imagine, that his Holiness did by a firm decree define, that this Oath containeth in it many things, which are clearly repugnant to faith and salvation, for that, if according to the rules before l Nu. 34. related out of Melchior Canus, & Card. Bellarmine the Pope's Holiness had excommunicated all those, who should teach that the Oath may lawfully be taken, it had been doubtless a manifest sign, m See there in the marginal note how manifest a sign it had been. that his Holiness intended to make a firm decree, and definition of faith, why then may we not now rightly infer, that in this Breve he hath defined the same, seeing that he inflicteth so grievous an Ecclesiastical Censure, and which is most near to excommunication, to wit, Suspension from jurisdiction or depriving of all faculties, upon all those English Priests, who do teach that the Oath may lawfully be taken. 64. But this objection is altogether frivolous. For first, there is a great disparity betwixt Excommunication, and Suspension, or taking away of faculties, for being a sign to know when any thing is by the Pope, or councils firmly decreed to be a point of faith. For when the Pope or councils do define any thing to be of Faith, they intent to accounted all those, who presume to believe the contrary, for heretics, and to exclude them from the company of the faithful and right believers, which separation from the Society of the faithful is very well expressed by Excommunication, but not by Suspension, for that one may be deprived of all faculties, and suspended from all jurisdiction, and nevertheless be partaker with the rest of the faithful in all those Divine rites, ceremonies, and spiritual graces, which are common to all Christians, and right believers. Wherefore no Divine, that I have read, did ever affirm, that depriving of faculties, or Suspension are sufficient signs to discern when the Pope or Council defineth any thing to be of Faith. 65. Besides although the Pope had not only taken away their faculties, but also had excommunicated those English Priests, who taught that the Oath may lawfully be taken, yet from thence it could not be rightly concluded, that he had by a firm, and infallible definition of Faith condemned the Oath, seeing that according to the Doctrine of Melchior Canus, and Cardinal Bellarmine before n Nu. 32. related, to make the Pope's definitions to be infallible, and to be believed as a point of Faith, it is necessary that they be propounded to the universal Church, and not to private Bishops, or Churches; for they are to be understood saith Canus, o Nu. 33. only in this case to pronounce of faith, when the sentence belongeth to all Christians, when it bindeth all. But this Breve is directed to one only Archpriest with an express command, not to excommunicate, or otherwise to punish all the Catholics even of one kingdom, but to deprive only those Priests, who have taken the Oath, or have taught, and do teach that it may lawfully be taken, of all those faculties, and privileges, which they have received from the See-Apostolike. And therefore to gather from this third Breve that his Holiness hath defined the Oath to be unlawful it is vain, frivolous, and altogether ridiculous. Wherefore his Holiness did not intent to bind English Catholics more by this Breve, but rather less than by the former not to take the Oath: for that in his former Breves he doth by a declarative precept expressly forbidden Catholics to take the Oath, but in this Breve no express prohibition is contained, but rather supposed, and a punishment inflicted not upon all English Catholics, but upon those Priests only, who have taken the Oath, or have taught, and do teach that it may lawfully be taken: therefore a far weaker argument to prove this Oath to be unlawful can be drawn from this Breve, then from the former. 66 Thirdly, it is to be observed, that it is not all one to deprive a Priest of his Faculties, and to forbidden him to say Mass, and others to be present with him at Divine Service, as some of the vulgar sort through ignorance do imagine, who think that if a Priest be deprived of his faculties, he is forthwith suspended from the Altar. For as there be many Priests beyond the Seas, who daily say Mass, and others are present thereat, and yet they have no faculties at all, nor authority to hear confessions, so also the taking away of their faculties doth not debar them from saying Mass, nor others to be present at it. But considering that no Priest by virtue of his ordination hath full authority to minister the Sacrament of Penance, or to exercise any other act of spiritual jurisdiction, as to excommunicate, to dispense in vows, or oaths, and such like, although he hath full authority to say Mass, no jurisdiction being required thereunto, as the giving of faculties doth consist in this, that full power, licence, and faculty is given to a Priest to minister lawfully, and with effect the Sacrament of Penance, or to exercise any other spiritual jurisdiction, according as he hath more or fewer, greater or lesser faculties granted him, so the taking away his faculties doth consist in this, that he is deprived of that spiritual jurisdiction, which by the privilege of the Pope or Church, he hath received; so that the depriving a Priest of faculties is a certain partial Suspension, as the Divines do speak, not from Order, and from exercising those functions which belong to Order, but from jurisdiction, and from exercising those functions which depend thereon. 67 Fourthly it is to be observed, that the Church doth not usually, and perchance cannot suspend, or excommunicate any man with Mayor suspension, or excommunication but for some mortal sin; for that these kind of censures are punishments, and medicines, which always suppose some precedent sin, and spiritual malady. And therefore it is a general, and certain principle, saith Suarez, p De Censuris disp. 4. sec. 4. that the fault for which the censure, is to be imposed, aught to be proportionable to the censure, because, according to Natural reason, the punishment aught to have equal proportion to the fault, and contrariwise. For it is against commutative justice to inflict a great punishment for a small fault. Wherefore it is certain, that a great censure, that is, which depriveth of goods of great moment and of itself causeth great harm: and therefore may aptly be called a greater, or Mayor censure, doth at the lest suppose a mortal sin, that it may justly be inflicted. Seeing therefore that the judgements and opinions of Popes, as well said Pope Innocentius q Above cited nu. 39 , are not always grounded upon truth, and therefore they may sometimes judge that to be a sin, which is no sin indeed, and one to have committed that crime, which in very deed he hath not committed, it may also sometimes fall out, that one is excommunicated or suspended in the outward face of the Church, who before God, whose judgement is not grounded on presumption, but upon truth, is not in very deed either excommunicated, or suspended. 68 Seeing therefore that the depriving one of faculties which is inflicted for a fault committed, and which truly, and properly is a punishment (for concerning an absolute revoking of a privilege, faculty, or jurisdiction granted there is not the same reason) is a certain Mayor suspension not from the use of his Order, but from the exercising of his jurisdiction, we may well suppose, that his Holiness had no intention to punish with so great punishment, as is the taking away of faculties, those Priests who have taken the Oath, or have taught, and do teach that it may lawfully be taken, but for that he certainly persuaded himself that they had committed perjury, so that if in very deed they have committed no such crime, we may justly presume, that his Holiness did not intent to deprive them of their faculties, and consequently that they are not in very deed deprived of them: although by reason of scandal they aught not (supposing that Mr. Archpriest hath lawfully, and according to his commission proceeded against them) to use their faculties publicly, and before them to whom their innocency is not yet sufficiently known, lest they should seem to contemn the keys of the Church; yet doubtless no man, who will confess that this taking away of faculties is inflicted upon those Priests properly as a punishment for some fault by them committed, can make any doubt, but that in very deed their Sacramental absolutions, their dispensations, and such like acts of jurisdiction are valide & effectual. 69 For, as Suarez r Disp 4. de censuris sec. 7. nu. 2. 4. 23. et seq. doth well affirm, a Censure, which in the only external Court, or in the face of the Church is just, (to wit, for that the crime, for which the Censure is inflicted, is probably presumed, and is in judgement sufficiently proved) hath no force in the court of conscience, or to take away or suspend in very deed his jurisdiction, who in very deed hath committed no such crime. Therefore Sacramental absolution given by such an Excommunicated, or suspended person is in this respect valide, and of force; and the same is to be understood of absolution from a censure, of dispensation in vows, and the like. Wherefore according to the common opinion of Doctors he may secretly, and without scandal, or in the presence of them to whom his innocency is known, exercise all the acts of his jurisdiction; s Suarez in the place cited. and therefore well said Navarre, t In Manuali cap. 27. nu. 3. that such a Censure, which in very deed is unjust, is of force a little more than nothing, unless in the external court, and to avoid scandal. 70 Fifthly it is to be observed, that the authority which his Holiness hath delegated to Mr. Archpriest to deprive the English Priests of their faculties, is not absolutely, and simply granted unto him, but with certain limited conditions, which if he neglect to observe he, doubtless exceedeth his commission, doth great wrong to these Priests, against whom he proceedeth, and all his sentences, or declarations, whereby he depriveth them, or declareth them deprived of their faculties, are for want of jurisdiction inualide, and of no force at all. Because a delegate judge, as well saith Suarez, u Disp. 3. de censures sect. 12. nu. 6. must not exceed the form, and commission granted him, otherwise he doth nothing, seeing that he hath no authority, but from the delegante, that is from him who doth delegate it unto him. Cap. dilecta de Rescriptis et cap. Pisanis de restitut. spoliat. 71 These being observed it is certain first, that Mr. Archpriest by virtue of this Breve hath only authority granted him, as also he himself hath acknowledged, to take away faculties only from Secular Priests, over whom he hath jurisdiction, and not from religious Priests, who are exempted from the jurisdiction of the Ordinaries, (that is the Bishops of the Diocese, or those who have Episcopal jurisdiction) and are immediately subject to the See Apostolic, and their own Superiors. For besides that in their privileges of exemption granted them by the Pope's Holiness it is usually specified, that he intendeth not to take away their Privileges, and to subject them to the Ordinaries by general words, it is also the common and approved custom of all Catholic countries, that whensoever the Pope's Holiness enjoineth the Ordinaries to punish with any extraordinary punishment by him appointed all those Priests, which shall commit such, or such a crime, Religious Priests, unless they be expressly named, are not comprehended, for that the punishment of them, unless he declare the contrary, he leaveth to their own Superiors. And this also is for the most part observed in General councils, that whensoever in any decree of Reformation they intent, that all Priests as well Religious, as Secular shall be comprehended, they do use these express words, Every Priest as well Religious as Secular, etc. And although the name Priest doth signify in general every Priest as well Regular, as Secular, and the Monk be common both to Abbots, and private Monks, and the name Deacon, and also Bishop may be taken for all Deacons, or Bishops as well Cardinals, as not Cardinals, nevertheless as in penal laws a Deacon and Bishop Cardinal are not usually comprehended under the bore name of a Deacon, and of a Bishop, nor an Abbot under the name of a Monk, so also in the same penal laws, especially in those whose execution is committed to the Ordinaries, from whose jurisdiction Religious men are exempted, Regular or Religious Priests are not signified by the bore name of a Priest. 72. Secondly, it is also certain, that by virtue of this Breve Mr. Archpriest hath authority granted him to take away faculties only from those Secular Priests, who have taken the Oath, or have taught, and do teach that it may lawfully be taken. So that two only sorts of Priests are comprehended in this Oath, first the takers of the Oath, and of these not all, but only those who have taken it, secondly, the teachers that the Oath may lawfully be taken, and of these not only who have taught, but also who do teach that it may lawfully be taken. Whereby it is manifest that his Holiness did more severely proceed against the teachers, that the Oath may lawfully be taken, then against the takers thereof. And truly supposing that his Holiness was fully persuaded that this Oath can not lawfully be taken, there want not probable reasons, whereby he might be prudently moved to punish more severely the teachers, than the takers of this Oath, and to give authority to Mr. Archpriest to take away all faculties from those Priests who have already taken the Oath [and do not repent them thereof] reserving the punishing of those who hereafter shall take it to himself, as hereafter in his wisdom he shall judge it to be most expedient. 73. And from hence thirdly it may also certainly be gathered, that, supposing in penal laws the words are not to be extended, but to be restrained, which is a most certain rule, and approved by all Lawyers, if any Secular Priest hath neither taken the Oath, neither hath taught, nor doth teach that it may lawfully be taken, although he should inwardly in his mind think it very probable, that the Oath may lawfully be taken, and for that cause he should outwardly carry himself negatively, and neither positively defend it, nor positively condemn it, Mr. Archpriest by virtue of this Breve hath no authority granted him to deprive this Priest of his faculties. The reason is evident, for that to teach the Oath to be lawful is positively to defend it, and outwardly to approve it, but this Priest doth outwardly neither defend it, nor condemn it, but outwardly he carrieth himself negatively, and therefore he doth not teach that it may lawfully, or may not lawfully be taken. 74. From whence also it followeth, that although such a Priest having diligently examined all the arguments, which are brought against the lawful taking of the Oath, and clearly in his own judgement perceiving the weakness of them dare not condemn of mortal sin those Catholics, who have taken the Oath, or do teach that it may lawfully be taken, and therefore in the Sacrament of Penance he absolveth them from all their other sins which they have confessed, and whereof they are contrite, not examining them whether they have taken the Oath, or taught it to be lawful (if he suppose they have no scruple thereof) but leaving them in this point to their own consciences, Mr. Archpriest by virtue of this Breve hath not authority granted him to deprive this Priest of his Faculties. For in property of speech beyond which words in penal laws are not to be extended it can not rightly be said, that this Priest doth teach that the Oath may lawfully be taken, considering that in this point he carrieth himself mere negatively, and doth not exercise any positive act of teaching, or maintaining. Wherefore betwixt preachers, teachers and believers of heresy, although this their inward opinion or belief be outwardly made manifest, there is a great distinction, as is evident by the Bulla Caenae, and the Expositor thereof: neither will any Divine or Lawyer affirm, that, if there be any punishment appointed against preachers or teachers of heresy, only believers, although they should express their mind by some outward sign, are also comprehended. Neither by any word at all of this Breve can it be gathered, that English Priests under pain of losing their faculties, are bound to condemn positively the taking of this Oath, although his Holiness in this Breve doth bind them not to teach, that it may lawfully be taken. 75. Fourthly, it is certain that Mr. Archpriest by virtue of this Breve hath not authority granted him to take away faculties from those Secular Priests, who have taken the Oath, or who have taught, and do teach, that it may lawfully be taken, unless he do before admonish all, and every one of them to repent them and abstain from this error, for these are the express words of the Breve. So that he must admonish not only all those Priests who have taken the Oath, or have taught, and do teach that it may lawfully be taken, but also every one of them. Wherefore it is the opinion of learned Lawyers, whose judgement hath been demanded of this point, that it is not sufficient for Mr. Archpriest to admonish all those Priests who have taken the Oath, or have taught, & do teach that it may lawfully be taken by a general admonition, but also he must admonish every one of them particularly, otherwise he goeth beyond his commission, and doth them very great wrong, and his sentence and declaration is inualide, and of no effect at all, if he deprive or declare them deprive of their faculties, being only in general and not in particular admonished. 76. Fifthly, to conclude; it seemeth to me also to be certain, that those Secular Priests, who have taken the Oath, or have taught, and do teach that it may lawfully be taken, are not by the sentence of Mr. Archpriest denounced against them by authority granted him by virtue of this Breve, deprived of their faculties, if he only declare them deprived, and do not in very deed deprive them of their faculties. For (as it is manifest by the command of his Holiness imposed upon Mr. Archpriest, and by the authority given him in this Breve, for that purpose) he must both deprive such Priests of their faculties, and also declare that they are deprived. Wherefore, considering that in penal laws, as hath been said before x Cap. 1. sect. 3. , words are not to be extended, but rather to be restrained, neither can a delegate judge, as well said Suarez y Above nu. 70 , exceed the form and commission granted him, otherwise he doth nothing, if Mr. Archpriest should only denounce or declare those Priests who have taken the Oath, to be deprived of their faculties, and should not in very deed deprive them of their faculties, he should both exceed the commission, which by his Holiness was delegated unto him, and those Priest's should not by virtue of such a declaration, either in the external Court, or in the Court of conscience be deprived of their faculties. And this is a main ground why certain Priests, who although they are thought by many to be deprived of their faculties by the sentence of Mr. Archpriest, yet they are not afraid to use them publicly, for that Mr. Archpriest, as they do avouch z See Master Warmington in his moderate defence of the Oath of Allegiance. pag. 159. & seq. , did never in very deed deprive them of their faculties, but only did publicly denounce or declare, that they were to be deprived, or at the most, that they were deprived of their faculties. 77. I omit to examine at this present what kind of publishing and notice either of his Holiness Breves, or of any declaration of his Holiness concerning any difficulty in the same Breves is necessary, that those Secular Priests, who have taken the Oath, or have taught, and do teach that it may lawfully be taken, are bound to give credit to such Breves, or to such declarations of them, wherein is granted a special authority and commission to any man to deprive them, or to declare them deprived of their faculties: to wit, whether it be necessary that some authentical copy, both of the Breves, and also of the declaration of the said Breves be showed unto them (for that as well the words of the Breves, as also of the Pope's declaration of them, may sometimes have difficulties, and may by divers men be diversely understood) or whether in such an odious matter, and of so great moment, as is the depriving of all faculties by a juridical sentence for some crime committed, either the aforesaid Priests, or Mr. Archpriest himself, or any other person are, to such great prejudice of Reverend Priests, bound to give undoubted credit to the bore word, or letter of some one or other Priest, either Secular or Religious living beyond the Seas, who writ that there is such a Breve, or such a declaration of the said Breve, without seeing any authentical copy both of the Breves itself, and also of the declaration thereof. And thus much concerning the former part of the obobiection, which was taken from the authority of his Holiness Breves. 78. To the second part of the objection, which is drawn from the testimony of the most learned writers of this age, it is very easily answered. For as before a Nu. 11. we have showed out of the doctrine of Gabriel Vasquez, a Nu. 11. and others, the multitude of Divines doth not make the opinion, which they follow to be undoubtedly true, and the contrary opinion of other Catholics, although they be far fewer in number, to be voided of all probability, unless the reasons and grounds, which they bring to confirm their doctrine, be so strong and convincing, that they make the contrary opinion to be altogether improbable. Now that the reasons and grounds, which these most learned Divines have brought to prove this Oath to be unlawful, and clearly repugnant to the Catholic faith, as his Holiness hath declared, and for which only cause he hath forbidden Catholics to take this Oath, are very weak, and in my opinion not beseeming the learning of such famous Divines, is manifest enough, both by the Answers which we have made unto them, & also by the Confessions of almost all our country men, even of those who do favour Cardinal Bellarmine's opinion, who do acknowledge not without a little blushng that his arguments are very weak and unsound. 79. Wherefore, even from the authority of the most learned Divines of these days may also on the contrary be drawn a probable argument to prove, that this Oath is not unlawful, and that it doth not contain many things, which are clearly repugnant to faith. For if in this Oath many things are contained which are flat contrary to faith, as his Holiness in his Breves hath affirmed, and these most learned Divines have in their books endeavoured to confirm, without doubtsome one among so many most learned men would have brought at the lest one thing among so many which are clearly repugnant to faith, but none of them hath as yet brought one only proposition contained in this Oath which is flat contrary to faith. Theresore it is a most evident sign, that these Divines did not rightly understand the true sense of the Oath, and did publish to the world their uncertain, not to say false collections for an undoubted doctrine of faith, and that some of them did both wrongfully inform his Holiness (who trusted to their learning and conscience) of the true and plain meaning of the Oath, and also did take upon them to impugn the Oath, rather upon affection, then moved with any sound reason, persuading themselves perchance at the first, as a certain jesuite here with us hath freely affirmed, that no Catholic either was able, or surely durst adventure to gain say, and writ against men of such singular learning, who were also armed with the supreme authority of the Pope's Holiness. But great is the truth, and it doth (in the end) prevail, it may for a time be assaulted, but it can never be overcome. 80. The Catholics therefore of England, who have taken the Oath, were moved from the beginning to take it, both for intrinsical and extrinsical grounds, that is, both for sufficient reason, and also probable authority, Their reason was, for that they were assuredly persuaded, that they were bound by the law of God to obey the just command of their lawful Prince, so long as they could not perceive that he commanded them any thing that was unlawful. But those Catholics could never perceive, that in this Oath is contained any heretical, erroneous, or improbable position, and afterwards seriously considering how sillily and insufficiently men of such excellent learning had impugned it, they were more strongly confirmed in their opinion. The authority was, for that very many, if not the greater part of the learned Priests of this Realm, and also M. Archpriest himself did then either approve the taking of the Oath, or durst not condemn it as unlawful. And although some of those learned Priests, who at the beginning before any Breve was sent hither for condemning the oath, did with all their might defend the lawfulness thereof, yet afterwards, when they saw it was forbidden by his Holiness, they seemed to draw back, nevertheless that very many Priests, not only who were prisoners, but also who were at liberty, did still continued in their former opinion, which for fear of incurring his Holiness displeasure they durst not openly defend, is so manifest here with us, that if need were, we could prove it by many witnesses, (whereupon a certain very learned Priest did aptly say, that his Holiness by his Breves had tied their tongues, but not satisfied their understanding) yet notwithstanding the Breves very many both virtuous and learned Priests, even now are not afraid either to defend publicly the lawfulness of the oath, or else although for fear of endangering their faculties, they dare not outwardly teach, that the Oath may lawfully be taken, howsoever in their hearts they are persuaded, yet they are nothing afraid openly to confess, that they will not positively condemn the Oath, & therefore they carry themselves in such sort, that they will neither positively persuade any man to take it, nor to refuse it, lest they should seem either to contradict his Holiness Breves, or else to be a cause that Catholics should for so uncertain, & disputable a question be utterly overthrown in their temporal state. 81 Furthermore, that which is avouched in the objection, that one only, or two Priests do approve the taking of the oath, & that rather for fear, then from their heart, as to please the Prince, and to free themselves from the troubles of the time, then for any sufficient reason, partly is most false, seeing that it is manifest by that which hath been said, that they were moved thereunto for strong and sufficient reasons, partly it belongeth rather to reproachful words, then to reasoning: and with the very same facility it may be retorted back against themselves. For to use the words of joannes Parisiensis b De potest. Regia et Papali ca 21. ad 41. , to say that so worthy men did writ or speak against their conscience in favour of Princes, or for fear of them, is to stretch forth his mouth into Heaven. For contrariwise it might be said more probably, that those Doctors, who do so unmeasurably advance the Pope's authority do speak for fear, or favour of him, seeing that they are Ecclesiastical persons, who may by him get greater preferment. And especially sith that they say (although not well) that the Pope doth graciously embrace them, who do amplify his authority, and depresseth them, who do speak against the same. 82 To make an end therefore now at the last of this Solution, and to answer in form to the foresaid objection, it is answered first, that the Mayor proposition, to wit, In doubtful, and disputahle matters the surer part is to be chosen, is equivocal. For if by a doubtful matter be understood that, to which our understanding giveth no assent, or descent at all, or which is all one, which we neither judge to be true, nor false, we grant the Mayor, for in such doubtful matters the surer part is to be chosen, as hath been showed before c Nu. 21. . But if by a doubtful matter be understood a disputable matter, to wit, which is not certain, but is by Catholics disputed probably on both sides, in which sense the vulgar sort do usually take doubtful, than we deny the Mayor: For in such doubtful matters, whose truth, although it be not certain, yet is probable, the surer part is not of necessity to he chosen, but, as we have showed, it is sufficient to follow a secure, or probable opinion, to wit, which prudent, and learned men do follow, although the greater part of Divines, and also the Pope's Holiness himself do defend the contrary: neither doth he, that followeth such a probable opinion against the more common, and the more probable opinion even of the Pope himself, expose himself to any danger of imprudence, temerity, or any other crime. 83 Secondly, the Minor also is easily answered; for the authority of the learned Divines of these days, who think that the Oath is unlawful, and that it containeth in it many things flat contrary to faith, and salvation, doth not make their opinion to be certain, or doubtful, but only to be disputable, & at the most to be more probable, than the contrary, if we regard only extrinsical and not intrinsical grounds, that is, if we do not regard reason, but only authority. Neither hath his Holiness defined by his Breves, but only declaring his opinion hath affirmed, that the oath can not lawfully be taken, for that it containeth many things, which are clearly repugnant to faith and salvation: for which cause he forbade Catholics to take it. But it is manifest by that which hath been said before, that the Pope's declarative precept, which is grounded on his own, or the probable opinion of others, is subject to error, and that it hath no more force to bind, then hath the reason, or his opinion, whereupon only it doth depend. Neither are Catholics bond to follow the Pope's opinion, although it be far the more probable, or to obey his declarative command, which is founded in his opinion, when it is repugnant to the opinion of other Catholics, although it be the less probable: and then especially, when to follow his opinion is very prejudicial to himself, or others as it happeneth in this Oath, seeing that the refusing, thereof, supposing that it containeth no unlawful thing, is very hurtful to Catholics, and greatly injurious to his Majesty. 84 The other parts of the objection, which seem to prove, that there is greater danger of sinning by taking the oath, then by refusing it, are of small moment: for greater, or less danger supposeth a danger, but, as before we have proved, there is no danger at all of incurring perjury, or any other crime by taking the Oath, it being commanded by the authority of our lawful King, and probably thought by virtuous and learned men to contain no unlawful assertion. And so this Statute for taking the Oath, is not a mere penal law binding only to punishment, and not to sin, but also a commanding precept, and which also bindeth in conscience the Subjects to fulfil the lawful command of their Prince, especially in those things, which are probably thought to appertain to temporal allegiance, which is due to all lawful Princes by the law of God, and nature. Neither do Catholics for that cause take the oath, or think it to be lawful, because Protestants do command it, and think it to be lawful, as though the Catholics, who take the Oath, do prefer the opinion of Protestants before the judgement of Catholics, and of the supreme Pastor over all the faithful, in things, which in some sort do belong to Religion, as is the Religious taking of an oath; But because the King's Majesty being our lawful Prince, and Sovereign Lord in temporals what Religion soever he be of, hath commanded all his Subjects to take this Oath of allegiance, which virtuous, and learned Catholics for probable reasons are of opinion that it is truly an oath of Allegiance, and that it containeth nothing, which is contrary to Catholic faith, or Salvation, therefore Catholics to obey the lawful command of their Prince do take this oath of Allegiance. 85 And doubtless, if the King and Parliament should command the Subjects, to acknowledge by oath, that the Pope is not direct Lord of this kingdom in temporals, and that he hath no direct power to depose our King, which (nevertheless according to the doctrine of the Canonists doth belong to the Pope's Primacy) and that notwithstanding any sentence of deprivation denounced or to be denounced by the Pope by virtue of this direct power against our King, they will bear faith and true allegiance to his Majesty etc. and that the Pope by virtue of this direct power in temporals hath no authority to absolve him from this oath or any part thereof, and so of the rest, and his Holiness following the Canonists opinion (who do with such vehemency defend this his direct power in temporals over the whole Christian world, that the contrary opinion they think to be heretical) should forbidden by his Breves this manner of oath, and declare that it containeth (as the Canonists do imagine) many things flat contrary to faith, and moreover the learned Divines of these days should for the same reasons condemn the aforesaid oath, The very same objection in the very same words, to wit, in doubtful and disputable matters etc. which we have alleged against the oath of Allegiance commanded by the King and Parliament, might also be brought against this oath, if the King and Parliament should command it to be taken. And nevertheless without doubt Cardinal Bellarmine, and those other learned Divines, who do utturly reject the Canonists opinion, would easily in the same manner, as we have now answered to this objection, satisfy also the other. Wherefore this present objection taken from the authority of his Holiness, and the other learned Divines of these days in a disputable matter, which is probably disputed by Catholics on both sides, can not even in the judgement of Card. Bellarmine be accounted a forcible, & convincing proof. And thus much concerning this second objection, in examing whereof I have been somewhat long, being desirous to give full satisfaction to timorous consciences, and also for that the unlearneder sort of persons might easily discern, how far the Pope's Breves, which are founded in his opinion, and also in the probable opinion of other Divines, can bind Catholics to observe them. Sect. III. 1 THe third objection against the oath in general. which is made by Leonard Lessius d Nu. 214. et seq. as also his English Recapitulator e Pag 46. & seq. doth rehearse, is taken from the great scandal, which may justly arise by the taking of this Oath. And although Lessius urgeth this objection in such sort, that he rather supposeth, than thereby proveth, the oath to be unlawful according to the common understanding of the words, and that the swearer doth by some mental reservation take the words in some true, and lawful sense, yet because, as we have said, this objection doth not prove, but suppose the Oath to be of itself unlawful, and sacrilegious, it may be further urged in this manner. 2 According to the doctrine of Saint Paul f 1. Thes. 5. we must refrain ab omni specie mala, that is, according to the English translation, from all show or appearance of evil: but no prudent man can make any doubt, but that the taking of this oath, the former objections being duly considered, hath some show, and appearance of evil, and of denying the Catholic faith, therefore we must refrain from the taking thereof. 3 To the first part of the objection, which Lessius urgeth, it is easily answered. For he supposeth, the Oath, according to the common understanding of the outward words to be unlawful, and to contain in it other things besides civil obedience, and that the swearer either by mental reservation, or public protestation doth take it so far forth as it containeth only civil obedience: Even as, saith Lessius g In the places before cited. and his English Recapitulatour g In the places before cited. , if to obey an Heathen Magistrate a Catholic should put incense before an Idol, although he did it not with the intent to worship the Idol, but to honour God, who is every where present, yet should this external action be accounted Idolatry, for that the circumstances of place, and time, and the person, that commandeth, being considered, it would be judged a worship done to the Idol, notwithstanding that he who offered the incense intended thereby some other matter. 4 But this example, and diverse others brought by Lessius to the same purpose do suppose the outward action of taking this Oath to be, all circumstances duly considered, of itself unlawful, and to contain in it some other thing then civil Obedience; and nevertheless it is evident by that which hath been said, that this external oath, whereof we treat, is not by any circumstances of words, time, place or persons made unlawful, or that it containeth any thing which is contrary to faith or salvation: and therefore this objection taken from this kind of scandal is altogether frivolous. Yea supposing that this Oath doth not contain in it any thing, which may not appertain to civil obedience, and that moreover it is under great penalties commanded by good authority of our lawful Prince, no man can make any question but that to refuse it, were very scandalous to Catholic Religion very injurious to the King's Majesty, and very pernicious both to the temporal, and spiritual safety of the refusers. 5 To the Second part of the objection taken from the authority of S. Paul it is answered first, that if those words be understood in that sense, wherein they seem to be taken in the objection, we might out of them evidently convince, that no man can lawfully follow in practise the more common, and the more probable opinion of Doctors, if the contrary opinion, which is less probable, be more secure, which notwithstanding, as we have seen out of Vasquez, is against the common opinion of Divines. The reason is manifest: for supposing that the opinion, which is less probable, but more secure, be not voided of all probability, it must needs be, that the Authors, who do follow it, have some probable reasons, which do show some appearance of evil to be in that part less secure which the common opinion of Catholic Doctors doth follow; and consequently, if this objection were of force, we must according to Saint Paul restrain from that part which is the more probable, but less secure, as having in it some show, and appearance of evil. As for example it is now the more common, and the more probable opinion o● Divines, although many Doctors especial Canonists do follow the contrary opinion, that it is not mental usury to lend money with hope and expectation to receive some profit, or gratuity thereby, so that this profit be expected not as due by justice, or by virtue of any civil contract or obligation, but as a free, and liberal gift upon mere benevolence, for that one good turn deserveth another, and yet according to this objection it were altogether unlawful to expect any such gratuity, or benevolence, seeing that therein is some show, and appearance of evil, as is manifest both by the reasons which are brought to impugn this common opinion, and also by those words of our Saviour, h Luc 6. Mutuum date nihil inde sperantes. Lend hoping for nothing thereby. 6 Besides, as the arguments which are brought against the Oath do show that there is some appearance of evil, and of denying the Catholic faith in taking thereof, so also the answers which have been made unto them do evidently show, that there is great appearance of evil, and of civil disobedience in refusing thereof, considering that the taking of the Oath is commanded by the just law of our lawful Prince, and therefore this text of holy Scripture may be alleged to prove the refusing of the Oath as well as the taking thereof to be unlawful. 7 Wherefore the aforesaid words of S. Paul, Refrain yourselves, ab omni specie mala, are to be understood one of these two ways; first, that we must refrain ab omni specie mala, that is, from all kind or sort of evil, as the latin word [species] is taken by the Logicians, and in which sense also it is sometimes used in holy Scripture, as in the first Chapter of Genesis i Vers. 12.21.24 25. And God made the beasts of the earth, juxta species suas according to their kind. And the 28. of Ecclesiasticus. Tres species, etc. Three things, or three sorts of men my soul hateth, a poor man that is proud, a rich man that is a liar, a foolish, and senseless old man; so that the meaning of the words of S. Paul may be this, Omnia probate, Prove, or try all things, to wit, which are doubtful, as S. Thomas expoundeth, for things that are manifest, need no trial: quod bonum est tenete, hold, or keep that which is good, Ab omni specie mala, abstinete vos, from all kind of evil, both in words, deeds, and writings, as well in things that belong to doctrine, as to manners refrain yourselves. And this exposition seemeth agreeable to that, which some of the ancient Fathers do writ upon this place, Probate, saith S. Hierome, Try whether that which is said be against the Law, if there, be any such thing refrain from it. And Theophylactus, neque enim hoc, etc. Neither doth the Apostle bid us to refrain from this, or that thing, but utterly from every thing, both from every false Prophet, and from all wicked deeds. 8 Or Secondly, the meaning of those words of the Apostle is, that for the avoiding of scandal we must refrain not only from all kind of evil, or from every evil thing, but also from all show, and appearance of evil, as S. Anselme, S. Thomas, the Gloss of Nicolas de Lyra, and other later writers do commonly interpret, and in our English Testament it is translated. And then the aforesaid counsel, or command of the Apostle is either so to be understood, that we must refrain from all show of evil, when in refraining there also appeareth no show of evil, and so by refraining no scandal can arise: for otherwise this text might be alleged both against the taking of the oath, and also the refusing thereof, for that not only in taking it, but also in refusing it there is, as we have said before, no little show or appearance of evil: or else that we must refrain not only from all evil, but also from all that wherein appeareth some show of evil, until it be declared that it is in very deed lawful, as the Gloss upon that place doth interpret these words. But that this Oath may lawfully be taken hath now been sufficiently declared to Catholics, both for that there be now very few lay Catholics, who if it be tendered them by the Magistrate, do refuse it, and where one refuseth to take it, almost twenty do take it, and do think that with a safe conscience they may lawfully take it: and especially because there can be alleged no one particular clause of this Oath, which containeth any thing which is clearly repugnant to faith, and salvation, as we have showed by examining every particular clause. As for Protestants, those frivolous exceptions, which Cardinal Bellarmine, Gretzer, and others do take against the Oath, do give exceeding great scandal unto them, who therefore are persuaded, that the doctrine which Cardinal Bellarmine maintaineth to be Catholic is a Seminary of treason, and that according to it no evil Prince, or who is not a Catholic, can be secure of the true, and constant allegiance of their Catholic Subjects, which whether this give just occasion of scandal, & be a cause that the Catholic faith doth not so much increase as otherwise it would, I remit to the judgement of the prudent Reader. 9 Lastly, and principally it is answered, that the aforesaid, and such like texts of holy Scripture, wherein we are forbidden to give any scandal either by word or deed which is evil, or hath in it show and appearance of evil, they are to be understood, as also we have insinuated elsewhere, k In my Apologet. Answer nu. 87. and in the Preface to the same nu. 21. not of passive, as the Divines do speak or received scandal, but of active, and given scandal: to wit, that neither by word, nor deed we give our neighbour any cause of offending: but if any one by our good deed will take scandal where it is not given, not we but himself is to be blamed therefore. Yet in this all do agreed that no action at all either belonging to doctrine or manners, which is commanded by a just Law, can be a true & sufficient occasion of scandal; & if any one perchance be thereby scandalised, it is accounted by the Divines to be a passive, not active, a taken not given scandal. 10 Wherefore Alphonsus Salmeron a very learned jesuite, and one of the first ten by whose help that Society was instituted, upon that place of the Gospel Matth. 15. Let them alone, they are blind, etc. writeth thus: By these words we are instructed, that scandals taken by proper malice, (which we call passive) are not to be regarded, and scandal is rather permitted to arise, than the truth of Faith, or of life, or of justice to be forsaken. For these sorts of scandals are, as we have said, called passive, which another man through his own frailty taketh by my good life, or by the faith and justice which I embrace. But the scandal of the weak, or of the little ones is to be avoided, as our Saviour Christ commanded, when he said, Whosoever shall scandalise one of these little ones etc. He also by his own example taught the same in this place; because by these words he taught that the scandal of the Pharisees is not to be regarded. Otherwise Christ should never have preached, nor the Catholic truth against heretics, who were scandalised, have been defined. But the multitude he called unto him, and instructed, and taught them that they should not be scandalised. But if now and then there be some, who are not so capable of the truth, then if the doctrine or action which doth scandalise be not necessary, or very convenient and profitable, we must yield somewhat to the weakness of the lttle ones. But if the great ones take this scandal, they are not to be regarded, for they are incurable, because they are blind, that is, they will not see, and understand what God inspireth in them, etc. 11. According therefore to this doctrine of Salmeron, which also is the common of other Divines, to make this argument, which is drawn from the nature of scandal, to have any force, (to wit, that although this Oath of itself be not evil, yet there is in it no little show and appearance of evil, and therefore according to the doctrine of the Apostle, we must refrain from the taking thereof) it must first be proved that the taking of this Oath, and the acknowledging of the doctrine therein contained, is neither necessary, nor very profitable to Catholics, which doubtless, supposing this Oath to be of itself lawful, and that it is imposed upon the Subjects by the command of the Prince, under very great penalties, our Adversaries will never be able to demonstrate. For what exceeding great dangers Catholics do incur if they refuse it, and what great scandal so weak a confuting thereof doth give to the Protestants, we have sufficiently showed before. 12. And truly, if we once suppose that this Oath, is not unlawful, nor doth contain in it any thing flat contrary to faith and salvation, I do not see with what show of probability this argument which is taken from the scandal, can be urged, seeing that now the greater part of Catholics do take it, neither can the taking thereof give to Catholics any other just cause of offending, than that other Catholics by the example of these who have taken the Oath, should also do the like, which if it be once granted to be lawful, can give to others no occasion of offending. But if any great ones interpreting the Oath in an evil sense, do take occasion of offending by their detractions, reproachful speeches and rash judgements, whiles they judge rashly, and are not afraid openly to avoch, and do with all their might endeavour to persuade the common people, that those Catholics, who have taken the Oath, have denied their faith, are revolted from their Religion, and are not to be accounted true Catholics, but Apostates, the cause of their offending in this sort, is not the taking of the Oath, but either their own ignorance, or malice, and therefore as Salmeron did very well say, as being blind, and incurable, they are not to be regarded. They hurt in deed greatly the good name, and credit of other men, but their own consciences they do wound more grievously, and they are to remember, that the sin is not forgiven unless restitution be made: and that according to the most certain rule of charity, and approved by all Divines, doubtful matters, and which may have a good interpretation, are not to be interpreted in the worse sense, and much less to be wrested to that sense which is most bad; which is now, I speak it with grief, very frequent among some of our country men, who as soon as they do perceive any man to oppose himself against their opinions or actions, and not to favour their proceed, they are not afraid to assault him with all their power, to speak of him reproachfully, to charge him with any wicked crimes, and to divulge them among the commong people, although they have their first beginning from some idle rumour, or from their own mere suspicion. These be the scandals, from which the Apostle warneth us to refrain, wherein there is not only a show or appearance of evil, but which in deed are most wicked evils, and clearly against the laws of charity and justice, whereby the Catholic Religion is laughed to scorn, and by our adversaries is greatly disgraced. Sect. four 1. THe fourth objection against the Oath in general is taken from the ill hap, and bad success which chanced to those Priests who took the Oath, & defended it to be lawful. For the first Captain of them Master Blackwell was taken away upon the sudden and unawares, and did also at the hour of his death, as some give out, recall his former error. An other also died suddenly: two others revolted from their faith; and the fifth liveth now in the house of the Bishop of Winchester, and what in the end will become of him, may with just cause be greatly feared, therefore by these examples other men may be forewarned, that they take heed how they take the Oath, or to defend that it may lawfully be taken. 2. To this objection it is answered first, that as it is not a sufficient argument to prove such a doctrine to be false, or such an action to be unlawful, for that it is defended by heretics, when especially true believers do also defend the same, seeing that no heretic doth in all points of faith dissent from true believers: So also it is not a sufficient argument to prove, that this Oath, or any other action is unlawful, for that it was maintained by certain Priests, who then were Catholics, but now are revolted from the Catholic faith, especially if other Catholics who still persist in the Catholic faith, do with all their might defend the same. 3. Secondly, if the bad success of some few Priests who have defended the Oath be a sufficient reason to condemn it as unlawful, by an argument from the contrary, as the Logicians term it, also the bad success of some Priests, who have been vehement against the Oath, is a sufficient cause to prove it to be lawful, but not only some few Priests who have taught that the Oath is lawful, but also who have exceedingly exclaimed against the oath, have had somewhat bad successes; as may appear by three Priests, to say nothing of Lay men, who lived in the North parts of this Realm: Whereof one being a man otherwise very healthy, was so suddenly stricken with a deadly disease, that scarce sixteen hours before his death he feared any sickness at all; an other falling down a pair of stairs, was bruised in such sort that he lived not long after * Another leaping in haste over an hedge fell into a pit, which was on the other side the hedge, and oh was cast away. : the third, who did the most vehemently of them all enueigh against the Oath, as soon as he was taken by the officers, and brought before the Magistrate to be examined, did not only refuse to take even the Oath of the King's Supremacy in Ecclesiastical causes, but also as it were in an instant before he was committed to prison, he did to the great admiration of all those who were present, utterly revolt from that Catholic faith, which for many years before he had professed. 4. Thirdly, if the evil success of some few Priests, who have defended the lawfulness of the Oath, be a sufficient reason to prove it to be unlawful, by an argument also from the contrary the good success of certain Priests, who have taught it to be lawful, is also a sufficient reason to prove that it may lawfully be taken. But our Adversaries will not, as I suppose, deny, but that Master Drury and Father Roberts the first a Secular Priest, and the other a Religious of the Order of Saint Bennet, made both of them happy ends; and nevertheless it is known to all men, that Master Drury as soon as the Oath was published, did even to the last gasp openly maintain the same, and this he did publicly protest at his Arraignment before the judge and all the standers by, whereof there was a very great multitude: And nevertheless he being desirous to dye for that cause, for which he was condemned by the judge, did himself refuse to take the Oath, even to save his own life, which was freely offered him by the judge, if he would take the same, being assuredly persuaded by the advise of some whom I could name, that neither he, nor any other Priest, (for concerning Lay-men he was of an other opinion) by reason of the diversity of opinions which were then freshly begun among Catholics, concerning the lawfulness of the Oath, was bound in conscience to take the same, although he thought undoubtedly and also avouched the same, that any man whatsoever might lawfully take it. 5. Likewise it is also certain, that although Father Roberts, did not publicly teach that the Oath was lawful, for that his Holiness by his Breves, had declared the contrary, and had commanded the English Priests, not to teach that it might lawfully be taken, nevertheless even until death, he persevered in this opinion, that there was nothing contained in the Oath, which was contrary to faith or salvation, neither would he put any scruple into the minds of his ghostly children concerning the refusing of the same. For two principal reasons (as he hath oftentimes acknowledged to myself and others) he was persuaded that the Oath might lawfully be taken; the first was, for that he could not yet perceive, that those learned men, who had written against it, had hitherto sufficiently proved, that it contained any thing, which was contrary to faith or salvation. The other was, that when he was at Paris, he craved the opinions of two most learned Divines of that nation, concerning the lawfulness of the Oath, and at length through his great entreaty, they gave him this answer, that they for their own parts had not hitherto observed in it any thing which might not be taken, and that scarce any subject of the King of France, as they thought, would stagger to take the like Oath, if it were by public authority, commanded them under so great penalties: And that this is most true, he hath divers times protested to me, and many others, and his own hand writing, which is kept even until this day, can, if need require, yield sufficient testimony hereof. 6. Fourthly, and lastly, to say somewhat in particular concerning those persons, who are touched in the objection, first of all it is false, that Master Blakwell did ever recall his opinion concerning the lawful taking of the oath; but, as it shall presently appear, did even to his last hour persist therein. His death may doubtless in some sort be called sudden, for that very few hours he lay sick in bed, neither did he expect any certain day or month when he should dye, before almost the very last hour of his departure. Yet because both in regard of his old age, his spirits almost exhausted, the unsound constitution of his body, and especially of an extraordinary shortness of breath, and diverse obstructions wherewith he was continually oppressed, he oftentimes and seriously avouched to me and others, that he should for the aforesaid causes be taken away suddenly, and therefore having death in continual expectation, his death although it may be called sudden, yet doubtless it came not unawares and unexpected. In this manner therefore he departed this life. Upon a Saturday l Being the 25. of january. 1612. in the after noon he went down from his chamber to make his confession, as usually he was wont to do, which after he had ended, and departing from the chamber of his ghostly Father, he perceived a great faintness, and a disposition to sowneing to grow upon him, but a little after he came into a more pure and open air, he found himself far better. After he was come to his own chamber, he fell into a sudden sown, but by the diligence of those Priests, who incontinently were present, he was brought to himself again, and after he had put off his clothes, and was laid in bed, he humbly craved those Ecclesiastical rites, which usually are given to those who are extremely sick, if they should judge it requisite. And being demanded by a certain Priest, what his opinion was now concerning the Oath, he answered, that he did that which seemed to him more probable, that he had done nothing against his conscience, and that even now he continued in the same opinion concerning the lawfulness of the Oath, which he had heretofore maintained. Afterwards divers Priests hearing of his sudden sickness came to his chamber, and then he earnestly requested the whole world and all them who were present, and especially one by name, with whom in former times he was in great controversy, to pardon him, if he had offended them in any thing, and protested, that he was a child of the Catholic Roman Church, and that he so intended to dye. And as for opinions, that he followed his conscience, and that which seemed to him just, and probable, yet if he had offended God in any thing, that he humbly asked him forgiveness. Which speech being ended, he falling into a sown again, so departed this life. By which ask God forgiveness can not be gathered, that he had any doubtful, but rather a pious and timorous conscience, it being the part of pious minds, as witnesseth Saint Gregory the great, there also in some sort to acknowledge a fault where there is no fault, and yet he did not absolutely acknowledge this fault, for that he found not himself guilty thereof, but conditionally if peradventure he had offended, he humbly requested God to cleanse him from his hidden sins. I omit to speak how religious, and without blame his conversation was after he had taken the Oath, for of this all those who have lived with him in prison, can give sufficient testimony. 6. Concerning Master jackson, it is true doubtless, as it is thought, that he died of the plague. But have not also very many holy men, as Saint Lewes King of France died of the same disease? But what if he did get that infection by doing some good and charitable work, as Saint Lewes did in that war against the Saracines, may we rightly from hence conclude, that action by reason of the ill success which followed, if it aught to be called evil, to be unlawful? He died indeed, as it is credibly thought, of that infection, but his death was not unexpected, for day by day he looked when he should departed this world, and being strengthened with all the Sacraments of holy Church, he prepared himself every minute of an hour to dye. 7. Concerning Mr. Warmington, so the case stands. After he had written a book in defence of the Oath, he was wholly deprived of that common Alms, which from the benevolence of some good persons, is sometimes sent to those, who are detained in prison: whereof he being deprived, and having no other thing to provide him necessaries for his sustenance besides the benevolence of pious men, he most clearly perceived, that if he should remain any long time in prison, he should be in danger to perish of famine; neither did he think it safe for him to go beyond the Seas (although perchance he might have obtained leave of his Majesty to departed the Realm) for that he was accounted by these vehement impugners of the Oath to be a schismatic, an heretic and an Apostata. He being therefore in this distress, and withal persuading himself, that by taking or defending the Oath he had committed no offence, he thought he had no other remedy to deliver him from extreme beggary, then to make humble petition to his Majesty, that out of his Princely commiseration, he would be pleased to bestow upon him something, whereby his extreme want might be relieved: especially, seeing that the chiefest cause of his misery and poverty was, for that he had publicly by word & writing professed himself to be a faithful and constant subject unto his Majesty. Whose petition his Majesty mercifully granting, wrote his letters to the Bishop of Winchester, that he would provide him in his own house those things which were necessary for his relief. Which answer Master Warmington having received, was exceedingly troubled, as he protested to all the Priests who were in that prison, doubting that his abode in the Bishop of Winchester his house, would give some scandal to weak Catholics. But after he had diligently considered the matter, and calling to his mind that ancient proverb, that beggars must be no choosers, lest that not being contented with that which is offered them, they get nothing at all, he thought it his best course of two evils to choose the lesser, and to accept of the condition which was offered him by his Majesty, and the Bishop, and by that means to preserve his life, which by lawful ways the law of nature doth give us leave to do, then by miserable famine, which is a continual dying, to pine away in prison, Assuredly persuading his conscience with the common opinion of Divines, that a thing of itself lawful, if it be necessary, yea and also according to Salmeron if it be very profitable, can be a just occasion of any scandal given. 8. Wherefore although that sentence of Saint Chrysostome, no man is hurt, but by himself, be most true, and every man aught rather to suffer whatsoever calamities, then to forsake his faith; nevertheless, if any mishap, either spiritual or temporal, hath afterwards fallen to them who have taken the Oath, it aught not to be imputed to the taking of the Oath, which being of itself lawful, can be no just cause of any spiritual ruin, but rather it is to be attributed to the immoderate detractions, backbitings, persecutions, and unchristianlike proceed of some, who are so vehement against those Priests, who have taken the oath, or taught it to be lawful, as to a more immediate cause. And truly if this argument drawn from the bad success of some Priests, be sufficient to prove the Oath unlawful, in the like manner it might be proved, that any just action whatsoever is evil and unjust, if one for it should be persecuted and brought into great miseries, and so at the length thereby to forsake his Religion, and become an Apostata. As for example, if a Catholic Priest, being wrongfully oppressed by his Bishop, should lawfully appeal to the Metropolitan, and coming to his court for redress, should not only find there no succour, and easing of his vexation, but also by reason of the potency of his Bishop, and the evil information which he hath given against him, should there be used far more hardly then before, should be cast into prison, be suspended from using his Orders, and enjoying his benefice, and at the last should be confined into some corner of the Land, and he seeing such bad dealing, should desperately forsake the Catholic faith, and become a runagate to the adversaries thereof, were it lawful, I pray you, to conclude from hence, that the appeal of this Catholic Priest, by reason of the bad success, was unjust, or that his revolting from his faith, is to be imputed to his just appeal, or rather to the iniquity of his Bishop unjustly oppressing him? The chiefest cause doubtless of his Apostasy, was either his own infirmity, or malice, but no small occasion also of his fall is to be ascribed to his unjust vexation, neither is his lawful appeal to be accounted any cause or occasion at all of revolting from his faith. And this very same may in some sort be applied to those Priests, who after they had taken the Oath, and taught it to be lawful, being exceedingly enueighed against, accounted no others than Apostates, and deprived of the common benevolence which relieved their wants, did at the length revolt from their faith. 9 Finally, all that which at the most can be gathered, from the bad success of some few Priests, who have taken the Oath, is this, that every one who hath, any doubt concerning the lawful taking of the Oath aught diligently to examine all, and every clause thereof, but doubtless no sufficient argument can be drawn from the bad success, and evil event to conclude the Oath to be unlawful, and that with a safe conscience it cannot be taken. Sect. V. 1 THe fifth, and last objection against the Oath in general is, that it hath been sufficiently proved that the Oath is unlawful, not only by the aforesaid reasons and authorities, but also the same hath been confirmed by divine revelations. For to omit some uncertain rumours, and which are scarce credible, of certain visions and apparitions, it is known to most Catholics, and it is also published abroad, that a Catholic young man, called Thomas Newton doth constantly relate, (which his relation he hath both oftentimes confirmed by word of mouth, & also for a perpetual memory thereof, put it down in writing) that the most blessed Virgin S. Mary did upon a certain night n To wit the fourth of Septemb. 1612. a little before midnight. appear unto him lying in his bed with a Protestant young man called Edward Sutton, & did expressly command him that he should not take the Oath. And that this apparition is very true it is proved also by the testimony of this Protestant young man, who with his loud crying out did awake the said Newton being a sleep, and did foretell him of the vision which was presently to appear unto him, & with all cried out pitifully, that he was damned only for that he had already taken the Oath. Seeing therefore that this doctrine, which defendeth the Oath to be lawful, hath been confuted by so many invincible reasons, impugned by so many most learned men of these days, condemned by his Holiness in his Breves, and now at the last expressly forbidden by the most blessed Mother of God, what Catholic, unless he be stark mad dare avouch, that notwithstanding all this it may with a safe conscience be taken by Catholics. Before I answer this objection, I thought it expedient to set down in this English Edition the true copy of the Relation word by word as it lieth, which is as followeth. A Relation of Thomas Newton Gentleman of Pickworth in the county of Lincoln concerning a vision appearing unto him, and to one Edward Sutton of Kellam, in the county of Nottingham Gentleman, this 4. of September. Anno. 1612. BEing in my journey towards London, in Standford in the county of Lincoln, about the space of five or six hours with Mr. Sutton in my company, I was upon the sudden in the street stayed by the Constables for having beaten an Irish boy which attended upon me, who said also, there was other matters to be laid to me; and my companion adjoining himself unto me, and expostulating the matter with them about my apprehension, we were both committed to the Town Hall upon Sunday the 29. of August, where we continued until Wednesday following, having no bed to lie upon, and for the space of four and twenty hours having no meat allowed us to eat; and upon the Wednesday we were both brought before the Earl of Excester, who finding no matter of accusation against us, we were both set at liberty. In the mean time searching the place where we lay, they found a primer and a pair of beads and thereupon the Friday following we were both again brought before my Lord, who first demanded of Mr. Sutton whether he was a Papist, to which he answered, he might as well prove him an Atheist as a Papist; than he asked him whose were the book and beads, to the which he answered, that they were his, and that he had kept them for the love of a Gentlewoman, which once gave him the book and beads, and that for her sake he had kept them; and then being demanded whether he would take the Oath of Allegiance, he desired at the first to be excused, for that he had taken it before, but in fine being urged again, he took it according to the statute, and the same being proposed unto me, I desired time to consider of it, because I never perused it, nor conferred with any Catholic about it, which was given me for the space of two days, whereupon I was committed to the Townehall again, and my companion with me, because he could not bring bail, as the Constables required, urging before my Lord, that we might both be bound to the peace. Being returned to the Townehall, and discoursing together with my companion, he demanded what we should have to Supper, I told him I was not wont to sup on Fridays, and that I would have nothing but a few pears, and a cup of water, to which he answered that he would take such part as I did; and so eating of those pears, and drinking water together, he told me that it was the most pleasing supper, that ever he had eaten; and he desired also to wash himself with that water which was brought up in a bucket for us. And entering into some discourse with my companion about the Oath, alleging my reason why I refused to take it, he answered that he had never considered of the matter, but that he had done as he saw others do; whereupon I betook myself to my devotions, desiring almighty God to direct me in my answer, when I should be called next before my Lord; and so spent about the space of three hours or more upon my knees commending myself to God, and to all the holy Saints of heaven, and in particular to the Blessed Virgin of whose glorious assumption in body into Heaven I suffered at that time some scruple & distraction in my prayers; and also another scruple I suffered about the prayers of Saints, whether they were available for me or not, which distraction I desired almighty God to put away from me, I finding myself troubled therewith in my prayers. Now my companion being gone to bed before me, after some few prayers that he had said (where he refused to make the sign of the cross as I had willed him) I went also to bed, and after I had commended myself to almighty God, I began to fall a sleep, which was about eleven of the clock, and within less than half an hour after I was in bed, my companion began to rise out of the bed, crying out he was a damned wicked wretch, only for taking the Oath, and how happy are you, said he, that are to receive such heavenly comfort by having only taken time to think of it, desiring me to pray for him. Then I willed him to make the sign of the cross, which he did willingly, and then crept down into the bed, saying that he durst not look up to behold the vision which was for me to look upon, but desired me to pray for him, saying that he was only to be a witness of the favour which God vouchsafed to do form; and so lifting up mine eyes I saw the room where we were shining with a most glorious resplendent light, and brightness, and with all the mystery of the blessed Trinity was represented to my understanding with great comfort; and after this there appeared the B. Virgin all shining in a white rob, and with an innite number of Angels about her, holding a crown over her head, singing in honour of the blessed Trinity, Alleluia, gloria in excelsis Deo, etc. Then I thought the blessed virgin spoke unto me in this manner, behold, see, and believe my assumption in body and withal said, take not the Oath, but rather endure all torments, for I will be with thee and assist thee in all, & will strengthen and preserve thee from all pains and torments with such consolations as thou now feelest. This vision of our Lady and the angels continued about the space of half an hour, and a little before they vanished away, there appeared also a multitude of holy Saints and Martyrs offering up as it were incense unto almighty God, which I conceived to be the fruit of those prayers wherewith I recommended myself unto them; and me thought they said unto me, double thy devotion unto the Saints, for nothing is more acceptable unto almighty God: New for the time of this vision both myself and my companion were without the use of our tongues, I looking upon the Blessed Virgin and the Angels and Saints then appearing, and he crouching down in the bed as fearing to look upon them; but the vision being ended our speech returned unto us, and I begun to cry with a loud voice Alleluia, gloria etc. which my companion did also in like manner, uttering those prayers which never in all his life he could say nor scarce understand, as I think before that time, saying unto me, that now he was taught how to pray, and so we continued the space of three hours or thereabouts, crying out with so loud a voice, that we were heard more than a furlong off from that place; and divers of the town hearing us came near unto us, and cried out against us using words unto us which I do not remember. Thus we continued for the space of three or four hours, so long as the light continued in the room, being not able in all this time to rise out of our bed: And in the morning the keeper with some others brought us again unto my Lord, telling him how we had cried out all that night, & called upon the Saints, & bringing with them a paper, which as soon as we were risen out of our bed, we had written of that vision, which appeared unto us, which I did by the persuasion of Master Sutton, who told me that he was a witness of all that had appeared unto us & that it appeared principally to me and to him also for his better instructions in Religion; as also of his fathers and friends, and that he might be a witness of the favour which God had showed me, and so appearing again before my Lord, and being demanded of the vision we both confirmed it, and as well he justified the truth of that Religion, whereunto he was called, and I also the like, confirming also the doctrine of prayer to Saints by many places of Scripture, as also the assumption of our Blessed Lady in body, to the which purpose I alleged the place in the apocalypse ca 12. signum magnum in coelo, the which place I never had seen, or heard before in all my life, but that time I uttered as readily as if I had seen it before mine eyes. Upon this I was delivered over to the Sheriff and by him brought to the Bishop and by him set at liberty. Master Sutton was delivered over to Protestants and ministers, who told him that he was mad, and that vision was from the Devil, and so by whipping his hands, and binding him, with want of sleep and such hard usage, and terrifying speeches of the Devil, and such like, he became distracted of his wits, and so remaineth for any thing that I know; though for two days after this vision upon my knowledge he was not only in perfect sense, but very civil and modest and much reclaimed from swearing, and other disorderly behaviour, and finding him about eight days after in Grantham, though otherwise he seemed distracted, yet to me he spoke very sensible, and desired to have private speech with me, which would not be permitted. 2 This vision may perchance somewhat move the ignorant people, and some other over credulous persons, who do use to make great reckoning of every idle rumour which may serve their own turn: but to prudent and learned men, who know right well what a hard matter it is to discern when any spirit cometh from God, and which apparition, although it be true, and not feigned, proceedeth from a good or evil spirit, who sometime transfigureth himself into an Angel of light, it is a very frivolous proof. For concerning visions, and apparitions, as it doth not belong to all men, saith Gerson o In tract. de probatione spirituum versus principium. , to prophecy, nor to all men to evangelize, nor to all men to interpret speeches, but to some by office until the end of the world, so it doth not be long to all men to try or prove the spirits if they be of God, but to whom it is given, as are spiritual persons, whom the unction teacheth of all things, also do judge of all things even between day, and who day. 3 First therefore although we grant an apparition to be true, not forged, real, not imaginary (for now and then they also that be awake, do through a vehement imagination think that to have happened in very deed, which was only done in imagination) yet by reason of the daily illusions also of spiritual persons p Martinus Delrius lib. 4. Disquit. Magi. cap 1. q 3. in principio. , it is a hard matter for him, that hath a revelation to know certainly whether it come from God, or the Devil, seeing that oftentimes the wicked spirit, when he intendeth under pretence of good to draw a man to evil, doth appear in the form of an Angel, or of an other Saint, yea, and sometimes which the ears do abhor to hear, also of Christ our Lord crucified, whereof many examples are related by Martinus Delrius q In the Book above cited ca 1. q. 3. sec. 5. a Divine of the Society of jesus, of which three only at this present I will rehearse. 4 The first is of Secundellus a Deacon, of whom Gregorius Turonensis q Lib. de Vitis Patrum cap 10. writeth thus: Saint Friardus with Secundellus the Deacon did remain in the Island Vindunita without ever departing from thence; yet both of them had there peculiar cells, but a goodwaie distant one from the other: And being fervent at their prayers the tempter appeared in the night to Secundellus the Deacon in the shape of our Saviour, saying, I am Christ whom thou dost continually pray unto: Thou art now a Saint, and I have written thy name in the book of life with the rest of my Saints: Departed now from this Island, and go do cures among the people. And he being enticed with these deceits departed from the Island, neither did he acquaint his companion therewith; nevertheless when in the name of Christ he did put his hands upon sick persons they were cured: neither did he perceive that he was deluded by the tempter until after a longtime when he was returned back to the Island, by the prayers, and admonitions of Saint Friardus he certainly knew the same. 5 The second example he relateth out of jacobus Vitriacus r Lib. 1. vitae B. Mariae Oeniacens. cap. 9 who writeth thus: One of her chief friends (to wit of B. Marry Oeniacenae) was one time by so much the more dangerously by how much the more craftily molested with a noon day Devil walking in the dark. For the crafty enemy transfiguring himself into an Angel of light did under show of godliness appear unto him familiarly in his sleep some times reprehending some faults of his, and also guilefully exhorting him to do some good deeds, that having first offered him a false show of godliness as a certain preservative against poison, he might afterwards more secretly by little and little pover in his poison, and having flatteringly put forth his tongue ointed with honey, he might afterwards fasten in his tooth, and at the last stretch forth his tail as a Cedar tree. For when now he was believed as one who telleth truth, than this traitor like a cozener, and deceiver did mix falsehoods with some truths, pretending treacherously by his mingling of good things some colour to his falsehoods. And at the last by his deceitful shifts, he drew that brother so far, that his proceed had come to a most wicked end, unless the handmaid of Christ, the holy Ghost revealing it unto her, had learned the deceits of this crafty beguiler, etc. s Ex annuis literis Iesuitarum provinciae Mediolanensis anno. 1590. 6 The third example he relateth out of Franciscus Beucius, who writeth, that in a village near to Arona the Devil appeared in the night to a certain maid in the likeness of Saint Ursula carrying before the banner of the cross with a troop of many Virgins, and thus spoke unto her: God seethe and loveth this thy purpose to keep thy virginity, but because it is a very hard matter to keep thy mind altogether undefiled in thy Father's house among so many dangers, which are oftentimes cast before thy eyes, he hath sent us to guide thee to a monastery of sacred Virgins, who having left all cares do serve him devoutly. Here the maid, God inspiring her, when fearing the deceits of the Devil she had made the sign of the cross drawing her right hand from her head to her breast, and presently from her left hand to her right, acknowledgeth herself to be most unworthy of such visions, and of so great an honour. Neither truly, saith she, do I greatly believe you, and I do fear feigned guile in your fair speeches. But if you are sent by God, do humble reverence to these Saints relics (for she had relics hanging about her neck.) It is wonderful to speak the evil spirits fell down upon their knees worshipping the Relics, and so much the more they urge her to hasten her departure. But it is not lawful for me, (saith she) to do any thing of importance without my Ghostly Father's leave, neither is it fitting for me to go unto him at this unseasonable time of night, go you unto him, and declare the commandment of God, when it is day I will go unto him and follow his advise. With this answer the Devils setting aside all dissembling did hide themselves in their darkness, raging against the maid, crying earnestly out against her with reproachful words, she laughing them to scorn that they did only fight with their tongues, & humbly giving thanks to almighty God. Hitherto Bencius. By which it is plainly gathered, how hard a matter it is even for spiritual persons, and much more for them who are little or nothing practised in spiritual life, to discern, whether an apparition be a revelation from God, or an illusion of the Devil, especially in these times: For in times past, as Delrius saith, t q. 3. cit. sec. 1. Divine visions were more frequent, because they were more necessary, now a days being not so necessary, they are less frequent, and therefore more to be suspected, that for just cause they aught both to be examined by the Ecclesiastical Magistrate, and also shunned by private men. Of which visions john Gerson u Loc. cit. et in tract de distinct verarum visionum a falsis. , Delrius x Lib. 4. c. 1. q. 3. and others cited by Delrius do largely treat, and do assign many rules to try spirits, if they be of God, of which I will set down some which are more chiefly to be observed. 7. One therefore, as saith Delrius, y q. 3. cit. sec. 1. either judgeth of his own apparition, or of an other man's, and there is more danger in the former case, in both he must be a spiritual & devout person, for the sensual man perceiveth not those things that are of the spirit of God z 1. Cor. 2. . And to discern ones own apparition there may be considered as it were two manner of ways: the one is experimental, which together with his own revelation is infused in him who hath the revelation; [which manner, as Gerson saith, is done by an inward inspiration, or an inward feeling and delights, or by an experimental sweetness, or by an enlightening from the heavenly mountains putting away all darkness of any doubt.] And this manner is rare, and granted to few, and they, to whom it is not granted, may not in their own revelations stand to their own judgements, and these to whom it is granted by God, may not use it to discern the revelations of other men; For as no man knoweth the things of the spirit, but the spirit himself, a 1. Cor. 2. so no man knoweth with an infallible certainty by this experimental feeling those things which are in an other man's mind. 8 The other way to discern spirits, which they call doctrinal, which also is in some part common to the discerning of other men's visions, is by a diligent, and pious using of the holy Scripture, which prescribeth rules to discern false Prophets from true, Also the reading of the holy Fathers, and Ecclesiastical Histories are very profitable to distinguish by peculiar signs, and marks illusions from revelations. To these if the observation of spiritual men, and experience be added, and in doubtful, and obscure things be asked the counsel of learned, and godly men, and who have made great progress in the way of the spirit, and have been long practised in fight against the treacheries of the Devil, there is hope that deceits will that way be perceived and avoided. Without doubt to this second manner of giving one's judgement only doctrine doth not suffice, but there must be added unto it ones own experience, that he be learned and contemplative, and that he hath not slightly learned the holy Scripture, and the rest of Divinity, and that he hath had experience in himself, saith Gerson, of the strife and combat of spiritual afflictions, as though now he ascended up to the heavens, and now descended into bottomless gulfs, and saw the wonders of God in the depth. For they that sail upon this mystical sea of diverse affections, as wavesbeating together, do declare the wonders thereof. But he that hath not had experience of such things, what knoweth he of them?] And to this there is not found a more necessary disposition then of humility, for as Moses doth say, as we read in Cessianus, this knowledge is given by God only to humble men. 9 Finally, we must not be too rash in giving our judgement, but we must first diligently commend the matter to God, and make many examinations in our mind, which Delrius confirmeth by the testimonies of many Saints, and especially of the most Blessed Mother of God, who before she made answer to the Archangel Gabriel, saluting her, thought what manner of salutation this should be, and that not lightly, but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 with mature and long deliberation she considered in her mind, whether that salutation was an illusion or not, & proceeded from God, or the Diaell, as Euthymius very well doth note. Verily when the thing is doubtful, it is far more safe to reject it with a godly humility, then greedily and confidently to admit it, and assent unto it, as the examples of holy Fathers do witness, who shunned this curiosity of visions and miracles, as a thing most pernicious and deceitful. As one Saint when the Devil transfiguring himself into the shape of Christ, said unto him, I am Christ come to visit thee personally, for that thou art worthy, presently with both his hands closed his eyes crying out, I will not here see Christ, it sufficeth if I shall see him in glory, and forthwith he vanished away. An other did with other words observe the like humility in the like illusion, Look, saith he, to whom thou art sent, I undoubtedly am not such a one, that am worthy here to see Christ. And the blessed Virgin Coleta answered even God himself, who was willing to reveal unto her many secrets, My Lord God it is sufficient for me to know only thee and my sins, and to obtain pardon for them from thee. b Stephanus juliacus in her life. ca 5. See also many other things which the aforesaid Doctors do observe for one to examine his own visions. 10. Concerning the examining of other men's apparitions, whether they come from a good or an evil spirit, many rules are prescribed by the same Doctors. If there come unto thee, saith Gerson c In tractat. de distinct. verarun visionum à falsis parum à principio. , any one who earnestly affirmeth that he hath had a revelation, as we know by the sacred history, that Zacharias, and other Prophets have had, what shall we do, in what manner shall we behave ourselves? If presently we deny or scorn, or reprove all, we shall seem to weaken the authority of divine regulation, which is now, as well as heretofore potent, for his hand is not shortened that he can not reveal. We shall also scandalise the simple who may say, that so we might calumniate or slander all d I think the word [nostris ours] is an error in Gerson, it is to be read [universis all] or [divinis divine.] revelations and prophecies, and accounted them to be idle fantasies or illusions. Therefore we will keep a mean betwixt both, and according to the admonition of the Apostle Saint john e 1. john. 4. 1. Thess. 5. , We will not believe every spirit, but we will prove and try the spirits if they be of God, and being obedient to the Apostle ᶠ Saint Paul, Let us hold that which is good. 11. First therefore the examiner of these visions aught to be a Divine, skilful in knowledge, and also in experience, not like to those, who always learning, never come to the knowledge of truth, as are babblers, men full of words, arrogant, contentious, etc. For to such persons every new divine revelation is so unknown and barbarous, that as soon as it is related unto them, with great laughter and derision they reject it, scorn it and reprove it. Others there be, I confess, that on the other side run headlong into the contrary vice, who do attribute to revelations even the superstitious, vain, and deceitful facts and dreams of maddoting men, and the idle fantasies of sick and melancholy persons. And perceiving that these have too light and credulous a heart to believe, and the other too untractable and harsh, I know that to be most certain which Ovid writeth, Thou shalt go most safe by keeping the mean. 12. And because there be very many signs and tokens, whereby a divine revelation may be discerned from a diabolical illusion, john Gerson g In tract. de probatione spirituum. (whose authority in such like things doubtless is great, saith Delrius h q. 3. cit. sec. 1. ) to avoid confusion, doth reduce them, as it were, to fix heads What is he who hath the revelation, what it containeth and affirmeth: for what end it is said to be: to whom it is disclosed for counsel: in what manner he is known to live: and from whence it is found to proceed. 13. First therefore he that will examine spirits, must have consideration of the person who hath visions, if he have a good & discrete judgement of natural reason, for that the brain being crazed, the judgement of his natural reason is disturbed. If for want of good health, abundance of melancholy humours, for over great want of food or lack of sleep, i Delrius sect. 2 cit. nu. 4. or by reason of a disordered imagination he be troubled with fantasies, there need no great inquiry to be made, from what spirit these melancholy fantasies and illusions do proceed, as appeareth in frantic and diverse sick persons, who being awake, think that they do see, hear, & taste, etc. that which those that be in a dream imagine they do. Besides every extreme passion hath her craziness, her drunkenness, and as Origen saith, her Devil. This is seen in those that be overcome with extreme love, in jealous, angry, envious and covetous persons, according to that of the Poet, They that be in love, feign dreams to themselves. For the Devil doth easily delude these kind of persons who have a crazy brain, and are too apprehensive and of a troubled, k Delrius loc. cit. and over vehement imagination, for that they do stiffly adhere and assent to the present representations of false things. 14 There must also be inquiry made l Gerson loc. cit. et Delrius nu. 7. , whither the person that hath the vision be a novice in the zeal of faith, and spiritual exercise, for that young fervour is easily deceived, if it want a governor, especially in young men, and women, whose fervour is over vehement, greedy, variable, unbridled, and therefore to be suspected. By this token Franciscus Picus m Sec. 2. nu. 7. saith Delrius, did at the first discover the falsehood of a certain revelation, & vision; and afterwards other signs did appear, as that the Devil in the shape of our Saviour Christ did counsel him certain vain things mixed with good. Also it behoveth much to consider of what quality the person is, and hath been, what learning he hath, to what things he is accustomed, with what things he is delighted, with whom he hath conversed, if he be rich or poor, in the first pride, or secret delight, in the second fiction is to be feared. Neither is the distinction of ages, and sexes be neglected. For if it be a falling, and decaying age, there is danger of dotage, if young, there is danger of levity, and some fantastical infirmity, for that boys have a more moist brain than is fitting, and do abound with vapours, which are easily moved. And therefore in times past the Devils were desirous to utter their oracles by them as more fit persons for their purposes, and also now a days they use to do the same in their apparitions in water, and Crystal. Concerning the feminine sex it is manifest that it is more to be suspected. 15 Above all things it is convenient to observe n Gerson loc. cit. , that there lie hidden no inward spiritual pride, which S. Bernard calleth, and that truly, a subtle evil: for that this doth arise from the humbling of one's self, from base apparel, and hair cloth, from fasting, and virginity, yea, and taketh beginning from his own death, and from his contrary, what therefore will be safe from pride, seeing that virtue itself is not safe from it? And there is a certain pride in the understanding when it will not be subject to an other man's judgement, but relieth only on his own, and a certain pride in the will, while it refuseth to obey, and this is sooner perceived then the first, and therefore more easily amended. 16 Secondly, in the examining of spirits, we must not only regard the person who hath visions, but also the quality of the visions; if all things even to the lest proposition be true, for that falsehood is not in the spirit of truth, but in the spirit of lying there be sometimes a thousand manifest truths, that in one only hidden falsehood he may deceive. For this cause Christ forbade those that were possessed with Devils, and Paul the wench that had a Pythonicall spirit to testify the truth. Moreover if in the visions there be that wisdom, which is from above, with those titles which james rehearseth, first, saith he, it is chaste, then peaceable, modest etc. 17 Thirdly, the examining of spirits requireth, that the person to whom these visions are disclosed, behave himself very prudently; and circumspectly: and especially in the beginning let him consider diligently for what end this person is moved to make known his secret: whereupon this consideration may be made. Be wary therefore whosoever thou be that art a hearer, or counsellor, that thou do not applaud such a person, nor commend him, or admire him as a holy man, and worthy of such revelations, and miracles; gainssay him rather, rebuke him sharply, revile him whose heart is so haughty, and eyes so lofty, that he walketh in great and wonderful matters above himself, that he seemeth to himself worthy not to work his salvation as other men do, to wit, by the doctrine of holy Scriptures and Saints, with the dictamen or judgement of natural reason. Admonish such a one not to be high minded, but to be wise unto sobriety, for that he spoke most truly that said, Pride deserveth to be deluded, and the Holy Ghost, who giveth himself to the humble, will not withdraw himself from any for using an act of humility. 18 Fourthly, in the examining of spirits we must consider the end for the which visions are said to be, and not only the immediate and manifest end, but also the remote and hidden end. The first end therefore may appear good and wholesome, devout, and to the edification of others, which at the length will grow to a plain scandal, whiles either the last shall not be answerable to the first, or else any other false or feigned thing shall be found to have been in those persons which was thought to have proceeded from sanctity and devotion. Moreover if a thing be done by human diligence, whether it be in manners or in doctrine, why is it needful either to seek or to expect, that God should speak from heaven? This truly is more like to the tempting then to the honouring of God. Wherefore if without any revelation, one may by human understanding attain to that, which is said to have been revealed, that revelation is to be suspected and superfluous, and not necessary Delrius sect. 5. Sect. 3. ᵃ consideratio. . Furthermore, we must also consider the end for which these visions are disclosed to an other person, whether for ostentation, or necessity, whether to give or to receive counsel, whether to one that is skilful or unskilful in such things. And if this person doth seem only to demand counsel for fear of being deceived, it must be considered whether he show himself to be ready to follow counsel, otherwise there will be scarce any hope of curing him, because, as john Climachus saith he needeth now no Devil to tempt him, for that he is become a Devil to himself. And doubtless if the vision came from God, it will not come to nought in one who humbleth himself for God under the judgement of an other, but it will be more strengthened and prevail. 19 Fifthly, in the examining of spirits we must consider of what manner of conversation the person is who saith he hath had visons, whether he converseth in secret, or in public, in an active or contemplative life, whether in over much devotion, which causeth a singularity in apparel and such like, or if his common conversation be conformable to those with whom he liveth. This especially is needful to consider if she be a woman, how she converseth with her Ghostly Fathers, and instructors, if she be given to continual talking, under pretence now of often confessing, other times of a long rehearsing of her visions, or of any other tattling. Believe them that have had experience, especially S. Austin and S. Bonaventure, there is scarce any contagion either of greater force to hurt, or more incurable. And if it had no other hurt then this so great a wasting of such precious time, it were abundantly enough for the Devil. 20. Sixthly, in the examining of spirits we must consider from whence the spirit doth come, or whether it doth go, and how he doth insinuate himself. For the evil spirit doth insinuate himself to them who go forward in virtue, harshly, unpleasantly, and violently, p Detrius' sect. 6. as it were with a certain vehemency as a shower of rain falling upon stones: but the good spirit doth insinuate himself to the same persons, softly, pleasantly, and sweetly, as water doth wet a sponge. But with them who go backward, experience teacheth that it falleth out quite contrary. Therefore S. Bernard doth witness, q Gerson. loc. cit. that he had not this gift given him to know this in himself, to wit, from whence the spirit cometh, or whether it goeth, who nevertheless humbly confesseth that he often times perceived the presence of the holy spirit by an inward motion of the heart or mind. Therefore perchance one will wonder, how a person of an inferior state can say, that he oftentimes doth discern, from whence the spirit cometh, especially seeing that Christ said to Nicodemus, r joan. 3. Thou hearest his voice, but thou knowest not whence he cometh, and whether he goeth. And moreover in divers spirits there is to be seen a great similitude in inspirations. For God is a spirit, a good Angel is a spirit, a bad Angel is a spirit, there is also a human spirit, both reasonable and sensual. And the like vision may be inspired by every one of these spirits, although in a different manner, but by reason of some similitude the difference can not easily be perceived by them, who are not skilful in such things, who neither of themselves by their sharpness of wit, neither by their learning in Divinity, or natural Philosophy, nor by the instruction from others do know how to distinguish them. Neither doubtless is it to be marveled at, seeing that we found very few men, who do perfectly know how to discern the cogitations and affections of their reasonable soul as it is reasonable, from those which are sensual, to wit, which are in the common sense, or in the organ of the fantasy. Whom, I pray you, will you find of those men who fear God, and flay from sin, who always and in all things doth clearly perceive, when temptations do abound, whether he hath only some sensuality in his imagination, or also some consent in his reason? So hard a matter it is to discern sensuality, or a sensual delight from consent. How much more difficult a matter is it to examine those four spirits before mentioned, to wit, when a vehement instinct, or inspiration cometh to our mind, whether it be from God, from a good Angel, or a bad, or from our own proper human spirit, of which also there are two parts or portions the superior, or reasonable, and the inferior or sensual part? The distinction of which two to discern perfectly, is only granted by that word of God which doth pierce even to the dividing of the spirit & soul, which division she found in herself, who cried out, My soul doth magnify the Lord, and then dividing the spirit from the soul, she added, and my spirit hath rejoiced in God my Saviour. 21. Lastly, to make trial whether this spirit cometh from God, s Delrius sect. 6 Sect. secundo. we must examine the cogitations, which went before, or followed the revelation. For from the imagination of former things may easily proceed a fantastical illusion. To one who is troubled and tossed with evil thoughts, the holy spirit or a true revelation doth never come: and nevertheless a true and divine revelation doth not always follow a good and holy thought. For in the very fervour of prayer, the Devil many times doth endeavour to creep in. After a true revelation good desires, and good effects do always follow, and sometimes accidentally, and for a time also good effects do follow an illusion, which nevertheless are by the Devil referred to a greater evil. That hath been observed before by Hucbaldus, who when he had related the visions of Saint Aldegundis, he addeth t In vita sua cap. 2. , In all these revelations the prudent Virgin did more, and more humble herself, she came nearer the kingdom of God, she did more fervently adhere to her heavenly spouse. This doubtless is the proper effect of true revelations, those effects which are contrary to this, do plainly show that it was an illusion, which went before. He that desireth to know more concerning this matter, may read Martinus Delrius, and john Gerson u In the places above cited. , who very well compareth x In tract. de distinct. verarum visionun a falsis. a divine revelation to a golden piece of money, and describeth five virtues which are like to the properties of gold, whereby this coin of divine revelation may be distinguished from the sergeant money of a diabolical apparition: to wit, if it have the weight of humility, without curiosity, and vain loftiness: if it have the flexibility of discretion, without a superstitious esteeming, or rejecting of counsel: if it have the durability of patience in adversities, without grudging and feigned emulation; if it have the configuration of truth, without any false or vain assertion; and finally, if it have the lively and pure colour of divine charity, without any dross of carnal sensuality. 22. By this which hath been said, it is manifest, that very great diligence is to be used, and much examining is to be made both by him, who is said to have had an apparition, and also by others who are to judge thereof, before we publish any vision as a divine revelation, especially if it be alleged to confirm any doctrine, lest that otherwise we broach a false or uncertain doctrine for an undoubted truth; for the precious coin of a heavenly vision, we fell hay, straw, and diabolical illusions, and under a fair show and colour of godliness, we throw headlong into dangerous errors devout people, who are over much given to believe pretended visions and miracles. Now what great diligence, and what means both Master Newton, who saith, that he saw this vision, and also those to whom he did disclose it, have used in examining thereof, to wit, whether it was a true apparition or a fantastical imagination, a divine revelation, or a diabolical illusion, it is not as yet known to me. But verily if that be true which is reported, they were too headlong in publishing thereof, seeing that both Master Newton, as himself affirmeth, did by the persuasion of his companion Master Sutton a Protestant, presently put it down in writing, and showed it to others, and also those to whom he did disclose it, doubted not forthwith, and without any more examing, to publish it as a true revelation. But howsoever it was, there are divers strong arguments drawn from the aforesaid rules, which do probably show, that it was not a heavenly revelation. 23. And first of all, although it may fall out, that one for lucre, vain glory, or for some other private, or in his judgement also public commodity may of set purpose forge false miracles and revelations, as it happened at Berna in Switzerland y Surius ad annum. 1509. , where certain chief Priests of a Religious Order were burnt for feigning of revelations to impugn the immaculate Conception of the blessed Mother of God, yet God forbidden, that I should have but the lest suspicion, that Master Newton being a Catholic man, would have committed so heinous a crime. Nevertheless I am undoubtedly persuaded, that according to the aforesaid doctrine many clear signs may be alleged, whereby we may make a probable conjecture, that this vision is either to be ascribed to the vehement imagination of a troubled brain, or else to be accounted a mere illusion of the Devil. 24. For first it is sufficiently known, that both of them were very young men, and that in prison, as in the relation we read, they were hardly used, and therefore both for want of food, and lack of sleep, they (having not eaten for twenty four hours any meat at all, nor steeped in any bed for many days) might easily suffer some harm and craziness in their imagination * Mr. Newton himself in his relation, attributeth the frenzy of Master Sutton to his hard usage, want of sleep, etc. Why then might not also Mr. Newton for the same causes be somewhat distempered in his imagination at the time of that pretended vision? . Secondly, the relation affirmeth that Master Newton was suddenly awaked out of his sleep by the outcries of his companion Master Sutton a Protestant, who cried out, that he was a damned wicked wretch, only for taking the Oath, and who also had before a weak, not to say, a crazy brain, (for not long after he was clean distracted of his wits, as Master Newton himself confesseth) and therefore it was a very easy matter for Master Newton, through a vehement apprehension of the vision, which Master Sutton did foretell him, being yet scarce fully awake, should instantly appear unto him, to imagine that he saw, and heard that, which in very deed he neither saw nor heard, which oftentimes happeneth also to them that be awake, as we before have noted. And doubtless it is evident by the relation itself, that the apparition was only imaginary, for as much as concerneth the words, which Master Newton affirmeth he did hear. For although he saith, that he saw the blessed Virgin, with an infinite number of Angels about her, and that there appeared unto him a multitude of holy Saints, yet when he repeateth the words that they spoke unto him, he doth not absolutely say, that they spoke this or that unto him, But I thought, saith he, the blessed Virgin spoke to me in this manner, Behold, see and believe my Assumption in body, and withal said, take not the Oath, but rather endure all torments, etc. And a little after, Me thought, saith he, the Saints said unto me, Double thy devotion unto the Saints, for nothing is more acceptable unto almighty God. So that all the certainty of this revelation dependeth upon the sole cogitation and imagination of a young man, who is neither a Saint nor learned, nor exercised in contemplative life; which kind of testimony, to know what authority it can bear for giving credit to a vision, I remit the Reader to that, which we have before related out of Gerson and Delrius. 25. But be it as it will, let this vision be real, let it be imaginary (for undoubtedly both ways Almighty God may appear to men, either immediately by himself, or by his Angels and Saints) nevertheless there be many probable signs, which according to the rules before set down, do plainly show, partly that this revelation may be justly suspected, and partly that it was no divine apparition, but a mere illusion. For first it is known that Master Sutton, who foretold Master Newton, that he should have an apparition, and so was the first man to whom the vision was revealed, was not only no Catholic, but also, as is gathered by Master newton's relation, was much given to swearing, and other disorderly behaviour. It is also manifest that Master Newton was not only a Novice in the course of spiritual life, but also not well confirmed in the Catholic faith, seeing that, as appeareth by his relation, he doubted of the Assumption of the blessed Virgin, and also of the lawful praying to Saints. 26. Besides, many things are in Master newton's relation, which do not seem to be agreeable to truth. And first those things do not hung well together, which are said of Master Sutton, to wit, that he was to be a witness of the favour which God vouchsafed to do far Master Newton, considering that Master Sutton did neither hear, nor see almost any thing of that apparition, whereof he could be either an ear or an eyewitness. For Master Sutton, as Master Newton in his relation affirmeth, crept down into the bed, saying, that he durst not look up to behold the vision, which was for me to look upon, but desired me to pray for him, saying that he was only to be a witness of the favour, which God vouchsafed to do for me, and so lifting up my eyes, I saw the room shining, etc. Now those things, which were spoken by the Blessed Virgin, and the holy Saints, unto Master Newton, he did not hear with his corporal ear, but with his inward imagination. I thought, saith he, that the blessed Virgin spoke unto me, Take not the Oath, etc. Me thought the Saints said unto me, Double thy devotion, etc. 27. Secondly, that also is false, which in this revelation Master Sutton affirmed, to wit, that he was a damned wretch only for taking the Oath, seeing that, as appeareth by the relation, he had committed many other youthful sins, for the which he deserved damnation. And although in some later copies that word [only] is now razed out, yet for certainty in the first copies, whereof many are yet extant, that word [only] is expressly contained. Thirdly, those words, Double thy devotion to the Saints, for there is nothing more acceptable to almighty God, spoken generally are not also agreeable to truth, for that it is evident, that charity, which is a Theological virtue, to speak nothing of other virtues, is more acceptable to God, than devotion unto the Saints. 28. Fourthly, that this apparition was not a divine revelation, but an illusion, is also proved by the effect thereof. For, besides that madness and phrensinesse do seldom follow divine consolations and revelations, as it happened to Master Sutton, (unless that one will say, that before that revelation he was distracted of his wits, from whence a far stronger argument may be drawn to disprove this revelation) Master Newton himself against the express prohibition of the Blessed Virgin did take the Oath, as the Bishop of Peterborow, who did tender it unto him, and many others, who were present, do constantly affirm. Neither is it probable, that the aforesaid Bishop either would, or durst release Master Newton, whom the Earl of Excester had committed to prison for that he refused to take the Oath, before he had taken the same. And doubtless the great silence, which Master Newton useth in passing over so slightly the manner, and conditions, upon which he was set at liberty, only affirming, that he was by the Earl of Excester delivered over to the Sheriff, and by him brought to the Bishop, and by him set at liberty, seeing that he is not negligent in rehearsing diverse other things of lesser moment, is no small argument, that some frailty lay hidden, which Master Newton was not willing should be known. 29. Lastly, that other miracle, which Master Newton related of himself, doth not seem to be very probable, to wit, that he before the Earl of Excester to confirm the Assumption of our Blessed Lady in body alleged the place in the apocalypse cap. 12. Signum magnum in coelo, the which place, as he saith, he had neither seen nor heard in all his life, but at that time he uttered it as readily, as if he had seen it before his eyes. For considering that the miraculous works of God are always perfect, it is not credible, that the holy Ghost would by the mouth of Master Newton, to prove the Assumption of the Blessed Virgin allege such a place of Scripture, which according to the doctrine of Catholic Divines is no convincing proof, but according to the common doctrine of Divines, the literal sense of that place is not to be understood of the Blessed Virgin, but of the holy Church, and no text of holy Scripture according to the mystical or allegorical sense thereof, unless by some other place of Scripture it be declared to be that sense, but only according to the literal sense, is a sufficient argument to prove a position or doctrine of faith. I omit, that in this relation of Master Newton, there doth not appear to be in him so perfect humility, as, according to the rules before set down, aught to be in one, unto whom almighty God doth truly reveal himself. as every one, who readeth the relation, may clearly perceive. 30, Wherefore if Bartholomaens Medina ᶻ a most learned Divine of the Order of Saint Dominicke, and diverse other Divines, in answering to those arguments which are drawn from the revelations of holy women, and Saints, and famous for working miracles, (commonly cited in Schools, and by the Pope's permission printed and published) to confirm the doctrine of the immaculate Conception of the Blessed Virgin, are not afraid to say, that those revelations are not authentic, and have not weight of authority, how much the more may one for the causes and arguments before rehearsed justly, and boldly answer, that this apparition is not authentic and of weight, it being founded in the sole authority of one young man, who neither is a Saint, nor a learned man, nor exercised in a contemplative life? 31. These be the answers which the defenders of the Oath do commonly bring to Master Newton's pretended revelation, which truly, for that it concerneth the facts of particular persons yet living, I was very loathe to have examined, had not Master Newton himself by his own hand writing making it known publicly to all men, altogether compelled me to show the weakness of this argument, which is drawn from his revelation, which nevertheless many have greatly urged to impugn the Oath, and have exceedingly gloried therein. From all which it may very well be concluded, that no sufficient argument at all can be taken, either from divine revelation, or from any other reason or authority whatsoever, which certainly and evidently is able to convince and demonstrate, that the aforesaid Oath of Allegiance can not be taken by any Catholic with a probable, and consequently with a safe conscience, or that those Catholics, who do take it are therefore to be excluded from the Society of the faithful, and right believers, or not to be admitted to the participation of the holy Sacraments. The Conclusion. BEhold now (most holy Father) all the chiefest arguments, which are usually alleged, as well against the Oath, as in favour thereof, by me faithfully and sincerely here laid down: in the examining of which I intent to affirm nothing of my own opinion, but only as representing the persons of them, who of set purpose do publicly maintain that the Oath either may lawfully, or may not lawfully be taken, leaving it to the fatherly care of your Holiness, that when you have been fully informed of the whole progress of the matter, & have diligently examined all the reasons, for which the English Catholics obeying the King's command, have taken the Oath, you will be pleased particularly to approve them, or to condemn them; that the Catholics in this so most weighty a matter, which doth so nearly concern the prerogative of your spiritual authority, and of his majesties Royalty, being fearful to resist your Holiness precept declared in your Breves, and also being desirous to obey, as much as with a safe conscience they may, his majesties command, may clearly perceive, which particular clauses of the Oath they are bound to admit, and which they are bound to reject, and may in plain and express terms, without any ambiguity of words be instructed by your Holiness in what manner they may satisfy their own conscience, your Holiness will, and also his majesties desire, concerning all the particular parts of the Oath. For as they are very ready to hazard their whole temporal estate, and also to lose their lives for the Catholic faith, which by the Church (to whom this office belongeth to define matters of faith, and not to private Doctors, who may deceive, and be deceived) is declared to be truly the Catholic faith, so doubtless they are unwilling to expose themselves, and their whole family to eminent danger of their temporal utter ruin only for opinions, although they be maintained by the greater & better part of Divines, so that others, although far fewer in number, do defend the contrary. But as they are desirous with all their hearts to obey your Holiness in spiritual matters, and in those things which can not be omitted without sin, so also they might justly think themselves to be more hardly used, than children are wont by their parents, if, especially in these times wherein by reason of the Catholic faith, which they profess, they have grievously incurred his majesties high displeasure, who is of a contrary Religion, they should without sufficient reason be forbidden to give that temporal allegiance to his Majesty, which by the law of Christ they think to be due unto him, having always before their eyes that command of Christ our Saviour, Tender to Caesar, the things that are Caesar's, and to God the things that are Gods. Whatsoever I have written in this Disputation, or else where, I humbly submit to the judgement of the Catholic Roman Church, if there be any thing escaped me through ignorance, which she doth not approve, I do disprove it, condemn it, and will not have it for written. ROGER WIDDRINGTON an English Catholic. FINIS. AN APPENDIX TO THE FORMER DISPUTATION, WHEREIN ALL THE ARGUMENTS, which that most learned Divine Franciscus Suarez hath lately in a Book of his alleged against this Oath of Allegiance, are sincerely related, and answered. IT was my fortune (Christian Reader) not long after my Latin Disputation of the Oath was printed, to have the viewing of a certain book lately published by that most learned school-divine Franciscus Suarez against his majesties Apology for the Oath of Allegiance a Entitled desensio fidei Catholicae, etc. printed at Conimbria this year 1613. , wherein he handleth this question of the Oath more largely, than any one man hitherto hath done before him. And although the arguments, which he bringeth to impugn the Oath, are in substance no other, than which I already in this Disputation have alleged and answered, yet for that the only noise, that such a famous learned man as Suarez is, hath written at large against the Oath, may perchance give occasion to suspect, that this question of the Oath hath not been by me sufficiently handled, and that I have not exactly set down all the reasons which can be objected against the same, I thought it necessary for the fully satisfying of all persons, to declare sincerely all the particular exceptions, which he hath taken against the Oath, that thereby it may clearly appear to all men, upon what grounds as well the impugners as the favourers of the Oath do chief rely. And this Appendix I will divide into two several parts. In the first I will sincerely examine all the arguments, which Suarez bringeth to prove the Pope's power to depose Princes, whereon all his particular exceptions against the Oath do chief depend. In the second I will faithfully relate, and answer all the particular objections, which he bringeth to convince, that the Oath is clearly unlawful. THE FIRST PART. Sect. I 1. FIrst therefore Suarez b Lib. 6. cap. 1. nu. 8. doth in part rightly propound the true state of this present controversy, which is, saith he, whether in this form of the Oath prescribed by his Majesty is only demanded of the Subjects civil obedience, and the profession of supreme Kingly power in it degree and place, or whether besides Civil obedience also Ecclesiastical obedience, and the Pope's spiritual Primacy, is any way either expressly or covertly abjured? The defenders of the Oath do affirm the first part, Suarez endeavoureth to confirm the second. 2. This indeed is the true state of the question, so that it be not understood, as I have also heretofore c In my Epistle to his Holiness. nu. 2. 3. 4. declared, of the absolute proposition, but only of the modal, that is, whether it can be demonstrated by invincible arguments, to which no probable answer can be given, that in this Oath is abjured the Pope's Primacy in spirituals, and more than civil obedience is comprehended? For no Catholic Divine, as I suppose, will contend with Suarez, that he can not bring some probable arguments to prove the Oath unlawful, and to contain more than Civil Obedience; but the only intent of those, who defend the Oath, is to show by probable arguments and answers, that the reasons, which Suarez, or any other hitherto hath brought to prove, that the Pope's spiritual Primacy, or any other unlawful thing is denied in this Oath, are not so clear, evident and demonstrative, but that probable answers may be made unto them, and consequently that Catholics may with a probable, and therefore with a safe conscience according to the doctrine of Vasquez before related take the same. And therefore I purposely said, that Suarez did in part propound the state of the question aright, understanding of the modal and not of the absolute proposition, as I have declared. 3. The true state of the controversy now being known, the chief & main ground, whereon all Suarez his arguments against the Oath do principally depend, is the Pope's authority to depose Princes, and to dispose of all their temporals, of lands, goods, bodies & lives. But this question also concerning this so absolute and unlimited power of the Pope to dispose of the kingdoms and lives of Princes, and of all that is theirs, is in like manner to be understood only of the modal proposition, to wit, whether there hath hitherto by Suarez, or any other been produced any authority, or reason so invincible and demonstrative, to prove this doctrine to be so certain, and without all doubt, that without note especially of heresy, error, or also of temerity, it can not be contradicted by any Catholic. Sect. II. 1 THis question concerning the Pope's authority to depose and kill absolute Princes, Suarez handleth in the 23. chapter of his third book. And although to prove this doctrine his only grounds in substance are those reasons, and authorities which Cardinal Bellarmine hath brought in his Controversies, and which have already been answered by myself, and since by Mr. john Barcley, to which answers Suarez maketh no reply, as though he never had seen any such books, yet for the Readers satisfaction I will repeat them, and answer them again, reserving a more full and perfect answer for a more convenient time. 2 First therefore Suarez supposeth, d Lib 3 cap. 23. nu. 1. that there is no Catholic Doctor, who ever denied this authority of the Pope to depose Princes, and to dispose of all their temporals; which supposition of Suarez, is very untrue; for that it hath always been contradicted by some Catholics, and I have cited many, both ancient, and later writers e In my Apology nu. 4. and some of them in this Disputation cap. 3. sect. 3 nu. 5. etc. , who have impugned the same, and I also have yielded sufficient reasons f In the same place nu. 15. , why there be so many Catholics of the one opinion, and so few of the other. And therefore that also which Suarez affirmeth, is very false, that only Marsilius of Milan, and other enemies of the Church do deny this temporal authority of the Pope. For although Marsilius was indeed of this opinion, as also he maintained almost all the chief points of Catholic Doctrine, which are not therefore to be disallowed, because he did maintain them, yet neither Suarez, nor any other can sufficiently prove, that either Marsilius, or his books were condemned by the Church, for defending this opinion. For he also held many erroneous positions, for which his books deserved to be censured, as first, that S. Peter was not head of the Apostles, g In defensorio part 2. cap 15.16.22. et 28. Secondly, that one Bishop was not superior to another, h Cap. 15. 16. et 22. Thirdly, that Ecclesiastical persons could not have the property of temporal lands and livings. i Cap. 13. 14. for he did not deny that they might possess lands although Castio and Prateolus do impute the same to him. Fourthly, that no Bishop, Priest, or particular community of them had authority alone to excommunicate any Prince, Province, or any other civil Community, or forbidden them the use of Divine service, but this authority to excommunicate did belong to the university of the faithful in that community k Cap. 6. et 26. . 3 Wherefore that which Suarez, l Lib. 3. cap. 23. nu. 9 affirmeth citing Azor m Tom. 2. lib. 4 cap. 19 in the margin, that Marsilius himself, as they say, durst not deny that the Pope had power to punish Kings and Princes especially heretics by the Ecclesiastical Censures of Excommunication, and also Interdict, but he denied that the Pope could proceed against them any further, is very untrue, and it plainly showeth that neither Suarez, nor Azor, did read Marsilius himself, but were content to believe what perchance they had read in some other Author concerning Marsilius his doctrine. Neither doth Aluarus Pelagius, Alphonsus de Castro, or Prateolus, who relate Marsilius his errors, note this for one, that he denied the Pope's power to depose Princes, which is an evident sign, that they did not apprehended this doctrine for the Pope's power to depose Princes, to be a point of faith, and the contrary to be heretical, for if they had, they would doubtless have noted it among Marsilius his errors for the defending whereof he chief wrote his book to Lewis the fourth Emperor, whom Pope john the 22. had deposed. 4. That also which Suarez n Lib. 3. cap. 23. nu. 1. doth seem to insinuate that only the enemies of the Church denied this temporal authority of the Pope, is altogether false; for both the Kingdom of France, as Petrus Pithaeus witnesseth, o See above c. 3 sec. ●. nu. 13. held it ever for certain concerning the King of France, and Albericus de Roxiato, and joannes Parisiensis, p In the same place nu. 1. & 7 who is greatly commended by Trithemius, (both of them living about the time of Marsilius of Milan, in the reign of Pope john the 22. and L●wes of Bavaria the fourth Emperor) did also hold the same opinion; and Abbot Trithemius, q In the same place nu 5. whom all men have hitherto accounted a learned and virtuous Catholic, doth expressly affirm, that it is a controversy among the School men, and as yet the judge hath not decided the question whether the Pope hath power to depose the Emperor, or no. And very many Doctors, (as john Gerson r De potest. Eccles. considerate. 4. , and jacobus Almainus s De dominio naturali, ciu. et Eccles. in probatione. 2. conclusionis. both learned, and virtuous Catholics do relate,) that the Pope by Christ his institution hath not so much as power to imprison, but only to excommunicate or to inflict some such like spiritual censure, and not to adjudge any man to be deprived of his temporal goods or life, to be whipped, banished, or imprisoned, but when the Ecclesiastical judge doth this, he doth it by the grant of Princes, as the Clergy by the great devotion of Princes hath received authority of temporal jurisdiction, which jurisdiction or censure is nevertheless called spiritual, as also the temporal goods of Ecclesiastical persons are called spiritual, because they are dedicated and applied to them who serve the Church, as also the breads of proposition, the first fruits, the tithes, also the vessels of the temple, the vestments and such like were in the old law called sacred, or holy, so also the new law doth observe the same. Thus Gerson. 2. Secondly, Suarez having sufficiently confirmed by Scriptures, and reason, that the Church and chief Pastor thereof, have authority not only to direct and command Princes in spiritual matters, but also to compel and punish them if they be disobedient at the lest with spiritual punishments, for that otherwise Christ had not instituted his Church a perfect and sufficient Commonwealth, if he had given her only power to command, and not to punish them who should not obey her just command, which doctrine for that it is approved by all Catholics, no Catholic Divine will contradict, he now cometh to the main point, and laboureth to prove that the Pope's authority to punish rebellious Christians, is also extended to all temporal punishments which the Pope in his discretion shall think expedient. And all his arguments to prove this doctrine are drawn from three heads, 1. from the authority of holy Scriptures, 2. from the practice of the Church, 3. from natural reason grounded upon holy Scriptures, and the authority of the Church. Sect. III. 1. TWo principal texts of holy Scripture, which are commonly alleged by the defenders of the Pope's power to depose Princes, Suarez produceth to prove this doctrine to be certainly true. The first place is that of Saint john, Feed my sheep. From whence he gathereth this argument p Nu. 9 . Our Saviour Christ hath given to Saint Peter, and his successors authority to correct, and punish all wicked christians, even also Kings, who also are Christ's sheep, but this power to correct and punish he hath not limited to Ecclesiastical censures, therefore it aught not to be limited by us, or any Prince of the Church, but it belongeth to the Pope to appoint, and determine the punishment, as occasion, and necessity shall require. The Mayor proposition hath before in the same chapter been by Suarez sufficiently proved. The Minor he proveth thus, For the words of Christ, Feed my sheep are indefinite, therefore, for as much as the power to correct and punish which is necessary in every shepherd is included in that word [Feed,] that power to correct is not determined to Censures, but it is left to be determined to this or that punishment, by prudence and equity. For every Shepherd hath power to correct his sheep, not according to any determinate manner in general, but as it shall be convenient and expedient for the sheep. 2. To this Objection I have at large answered in my Apology, it being the self same argument which Cardinal Bellarmine urged in the very like manner. But before I do here set down again the answer, which there I gave, I do earnestly request, and conjure Suarez, as he shall answer at the day of judgement for his doctrine and all his actions, that if he be pleased to reply to that which I have here written against his reasons, he will sincerely, unfeignedly, and without any equivocation, or mental reservation declare unto us two things. The first, whether in his conscience he be certainly persuaded, that both himself and all other Catholics are bound under pain of heresy, or error, from which by no probable reasons which can move them to the contrary they can be excused, to believe that this text of holy Scripture, or any other doth evidently convince the Pope's power to depose Princes: the second, whether with the same certainty all catholics are bound to believe, & embrace this doctrine which Suarez, affirmeth u Lib. 6. c. 3. nu. 20. to be true and certain, that the Pope hath also authority to kill Kings, and to give leave to others to kill them. For his reason out of this place of holy Scripture is indifferent both to deposing & killing, because Christ did not limit that power, which he gave to the Pope to correct and chastise, rather to deposing then to killing, but he left it to the Pope to appoint, and determine it according to prudence and equity, as occasion and necessity should require. Yea and that example of Ananias and Saphira which Suarez bringeth a little beneath, doth prove more strongly his authority to kill, as Saint Peter did Ananias, then to depose. 3. To the argument therefore I grant, that Christ by these words, Feed my sheep, did appoint S. Peter to be the spiritual Pastor of his Church, which is his mystical body, and not a temporal, but a spiritual Commonwealth, and consequently he gave him all spiritual power, which is sufficient and necessary for the government of this spiritual Commonwealth, and this is all that can be directly and clearly inferred from this place; but what authority is spiritual, and what temporal, what spiritual authority to punish is necessary and sufficient for the governing of a spiritual commonwealth, and whether it be limited to inflict only spiritual punishments according to the nature of a spiritual Commonwealth, (for that every commonwealth of her own nature hath authority to punish her subjects offending, by depriving them of the goods and privileges of that Commonwealth) or it is also extended to deposing, kill, and all other temporal punishments, can not be sufficiently gathered from these words, Feed my sheep, but it must be deduced from some other discourse grounded upon reason or other authorities. 4. My opinion is, that by no human discourse grounded either upon reason or authority, it can clearly and evidently be demonstrated by any invincible argument, to which no probable answer can be given, that this sufficient Pastoral authority to govern the mystical body of Christ doth by his institution extend to deposing, killing or inflicting temporal punishments by way of correction, but only to Ecclesiastical and spiritual censures, which are more agreeable to the nature, quality and condition of a spiritual commonwealth. And this I did probably prove in my Apology two manner of ways, first positively by alleging certain probable reasons and authorities, which might sufficiently persuade any man to think this opinion to be probable, and then negatively by alleging probable answers to all the arguments, which Cardinal Bellarmine brought to prove the contrary. Neither hath D. Schulckenius, howsoever to the world he would seem to make a show, so invincibly impugned either my reasons or answers, but that as yet they remain probable, as hereafter, God willing, I will sufficiently make manifest. By this thou mayest perceive (courteous Reader) that albeit our Adversaries do cry out against us, that we denying this authority of the Pope to depose Princes, do contradict the words of our Saviour, Feed my sheep, yet in very deed we embrace the holy Scriptures, as also the Sacred Counsels and Doctrine of the Catholic Church with as much reverence, speaking with all dutiful respect, as they do, but we only contradict as forthwith thou shalt better understand, the uncertain inferences and collections, which they out of holy Scripture endeavour to conclude. 5. First therefore in my Apology x Num. 239. & seq. I answered, that Christ by those words [Feed my sheep] gave to S. Peter, and his successors all sufficient Pastoral authority to feed, correct and punish his sheep, and to govern the Church which he instituted a spiritual and not a temporal Commonwealth. But considering that neither by these words, feed my sheep, nor by any words of holy Scripture, our Saviour Christ did in express terms extend this Pastoral authority of Saint Peter to punish with temporal punishments, which do belong to a temporal Commonwealth, he did in the very instituting of the Church, which he made a spiritual, and not a temporal commonwealth, and in the appointing of Saint Peter to be a spiritual and not a temporal Pastor or governor thereof, limit his spiritual authority to spiritual censures and punishments, which are agreeable to the nature, quality and condition of a spiritual commonwealth. Neither is that true which Suarez affirmeth in the end of his argument, that every Shepherd hath power to correct his sheep, not according to any determinate manner in general, but as it shall be convenient or expedient for the sheep. For inferior or under Shepherds have no more authority, than it pleaseth the chief Shepherd to grant unto them, as reason and experience do plainly show. And by this assertion of Suarez, it would follow that Kings and Princes, who are appointed by God to be Shepherds of men in temporal causes, had power to correct their sheep with spiritual punishments, if according to no determinate manner in general their power to punish were limited: and so Suarez bringeth a pretty argument to prove the spiritual supremacy of all Christian Kings over their christian Subjects. 6. There be therefore two kinds of Shepherds, which do govern unreasonable sheep, as I observed in that place, the one who are mere Shepherds and not Lords or owners of the sheep, as jacob, who fed his father in law Laban's sheep y Genes. ca 29. , the other who be both Shepherds and also Lords of the sheep they feed, as was Abraham and Lot. Betwixt these two Shepherds there is this difference, 2. Gec. 13. that the second kind of Shepherds have an absolute and unlimited power over their sheep, that if either they go astray, or be scabbed, or any way troublesome to the flock, they may either pin them up, or if they will, punish them otherwise, or also kill them, but this unlimited power to punish the sheep, these Shepherds have not merely as they are Shepherds, but as the Lords and owners of the sheep. But the second kind of Shepherds have indeed authority given them to feed and govern the sheep, but not in so absolute and ample a manner as the others have. For it is their office to feed the sheep and to keep them in good order, and consequently to provide them good and wholesome pasture, if they go astray, to recall them with their voice, with their staff, with their dogs; if they be infected with the scab, or have taken any other contagious disease, to shut them up and sever them from the rest, to cure them as conveniently as they may; and lastly to defend them from wolves, and all other devouring beasts. But to kill the sheep, if they offend, or any other way to punish them for any fault past, as it is past, they cannot without the owner's leave. Now when the Pope is resembled to a Shepherd of unreasonable sheep, this comparison, for as much as concerneth the kill of his sheep, or otherwise punishing them with temporal punishments, is to be applied to the first kind of Shepherds. 7 For God almighty, the chief Shepherd and Lord of all, both unreasonable, and reasonable sheep, hath appointed under him here in earth two sorts of Shepherds, or Governors of all mortal men, the one a temporal Shepherd, who in matters merely temporal, and as they tend to the outward preserving of temporal peace, are subject to no other Shepherd, or Superior in earth, and who have supreme power to direct, command, and punish all their sheep who shall offend and break their just command by means of the temporal sword, or which is all one, with temporal punishments, for that these are agreeable to the nature, quality, 1 Paralip. 11. and condition of a temporal commonwealth. Whereupon God said to King David, Thou shalt feed my people Israel, and thou shalt be a Prince over them. And of King Cyrus God almighty said, Isai. 44. I say unto Cyrus, Thou art my Shepherd: The other, a spiritual Shepherd, or Governor, to whom he hath given supreme authority to direct, command, and punish in all spiritual matters, and as they tend to the eternal salvation of souls, and to punish all his sheep, even Kings, and Princes, who transgress his just command with spiritual punishments, for that these are agreeable to the nature, quality, and condition of a spiritual commonwealth: Neither can it be proved by invincible arguments, that this mystical body of Christ, which is a spiritual Commonwealth, hath by his institution, authority to punish by way of correction with temporal punishments, but the excommunication, or some such like spiritual censure or punishment is the last which an Ecclesiastical judge by Christ his institution can inflict as out of Io. Gerson, & jacobus Almainus I showed a little before; Whereupon Pope Nicolaus a Cap. inter haec. 33. q. 2. affirmeth that the Church of God hath no other sword then spiritual: And Gratian b 2. q 7. can Nos 1. the compiler of the greatest part of the Canon laws, which is called the Decree, it belongeth (saith he) to Kings to inflict a corporal punishment, and to Priests a spiritual: and Petrus Damianus, c In epist. ad Firminum Diaconum. who lived when Pope Gregory the seventh, was Cardinal, affirmeth that the Kingdom and the Priesthood are so distinguished by their proper and peculiar offices, that a King may use wordly weapons, and a Priest is girded with a spiritual sword; and therefore very well said S. Austin, d In lib. de fide, et operib. c. 2. that in the Church of Christ the visible sword was to cease, and excellently S. Chrysostome, e Homil. 4. de verbis Isaiae. It is the office of a Priest only to reprove, and to give a free admonition, not to raise arms, not to use targets, not to shake a lance, nor to shoot arrows, nor to cast darts, but only to reprove, and to give a free admonition. And although under this word (reprove) be contained all Priestlike sort of reproving, as is to use Ecclesiastical censures, yet temporal coertions are expressly by S. Chrysostome denied to belong to the function of a Priest. And if it do not beseem Ecclesiastical mildness to use corporal weapons, for so Cardinal Bellarmine, Schulkenius, and Suarez do answer to such like places, affirming that Priests do not use such weapons, not for that they have not power to use them by Christ his institution, but for that it is undecent, and therefore forbidden by the positive Law of the Church, how can these Authors clearly demonstrate that Christ gave them such an authority which to exercise is not convenient or doth not beseem their function? 8 Secondly, in the same place I did observe, that betwixt unreasonable, and reasonable sheep there is this difference, that unreasonable sheep have no weapons whereby they may defend themselves from ravening wolves, nor any outward remedy to cure themselves of any disease, but all their safety relieth only upon the shepherds care and industry, but Christian souls, which are the sheep of the spiritual flock of Christ, have spiritual weapons, whereby they may fight and defend themselves against all the assaults of their enemies, and they have spiritual remedies to cure themselves of all diseases, yea they cannot be wounded or diseased unless they themselves be willing thereunto. And from hence I gathered, that in a spiritual Pastor, there is not necessary so great a power to govern his sheep, only for the salvation of their souls, which is the chief end of his authority, (seeing that they cannot be hurt unless they will, and if they will, they may cure themselves with spiritual medicines which God hath appointed in his Church,) as is necessary in an ordinary Shepherd to govern unreasonable sheep, whose safety doth chief, and almost only depend upon his care and diligence. And this distinction betwixt an ordinary Shepherd of sheep, and of souls, Saint Chrysostome doth well observe. f Lib. 2. de Sacerdotio ante medium. It is not lawful, saith he, to cure men with so great an authority, as a Shepherd doth cure his sheep. For here it is free to bind, to keep from pasture, to burn, and to cut, whereas there the power to take the medicine and to be cured doth not consist in him who applieth the medicine, but in him only who is diseased. 9 And afterwards he declareth the difference betwixt a Secular Magistrate, and a Pastor of souls: Secular judges saith he, when they do find wicked men to have offended against the Laws, do show themselves to be endued with great authority and power, and do constrain the same offenders, yea although they be unwilling, to change their manners; but here thou must only counsel not enforce, and by this way make him better whom thou takest upon thee to correct, for there is not so great a power given to us by the laws to constrain sinners. And this distinction of S. Chrysostom betwixt a Shepherd of unreasonable, and reasonable sheep, and betwixt a Bishop and a Secular Magistrate, also Cardinal Bellarmine doth approve. For the former, faith he, g Lib. 4. de Rom. pont. cap. 21. being exercised about natural diseases of sheep can cure his sheep although they will not, but this later being exercised about voluntary diseases of sheep cannot cure his sheep unless they will, and therefore this later hath a harder charge than the former. And likewise I say of the Secular power. For a Secular judge is exercised about outward actions, and therefore he can constrain a man, although he be unwilling, to change his manners, to wit, outward, but a Bishop is exercised about inward manners, which cannot be changed against the will of him who hath them. For although a Bishop can excommunicate, and inflict other punishments, h If he mean spiritual punishments we agrnt, if temporal it is the thing which is now in controversy. yet they will profit nothing, unless he will that is punished. And so I understand those words of Saint Chrisostome [for there is not so great a power given to us by the laws to constrain sinners.] For a Bishop hath not power to constrain a man to change his mind, as a judge hath to constrain a man to change his outward manners. Thus Cardinal Bellarmine. From whence we may gather a reason of that saying of S. Chrysostome before related, to wit, that it is not the office of Priests to raise arms, etc. but only to reprove, for that there is not required in a Bishop or spiritual pastor so great an authority over his sheep, whom he cannot compel against their wills to change their inward manners, which is the chief end of a spiritual Pastor, as in a Secular judge who can compel his Subjects to change against their wills, their evil outward manners, which is the chief end, & intent of a Secular Magistrate. And therefore from hence we may well conclude against the last part of Suarez argument, that a spiritual Pastor hath power to correct his sheep in that manner, as shall be convenient, and expedient for the sheep, but yet determined, and limited to the nature, quality, and condition of a spiritual flock, whereof he is appointed by Christ to be a spiritual, and not a temporal Pastor. Sect. four 1 THe second place of holy Scripture, Nu. 11. which Suarez allegeth to prove the Pope's authority to depose of the kingdoms, and lives of Princes, is that text so often inculcated, Whatsoever thou shalt bind in earth, shall be bound in heaven, and whatsoever thou shalt lose in earth it shall be loosed also in heaven, Matth. 16. from which words Suarez gathereth the same authority in this manner. For those words (saith he) are general and indifferent, and therefore they aught not to be limited by us. And if any one should say, that Mat. 18. they were declared, and determined to the bond of censures by those words: And if he will not hear them, tell the Church, & if he will not fear the Church, let him be to thee as the Heathen, and the publican, Amen I say unto you, what things soever you shall bind upon earth, etc. We answer, that it was there declared, that in that general power to bind was included the bond of excommunication, but that power was not limited only to impose that punishment, both because no such limitation can be gathered from that text, as also because although there be made mention in that place only of Excommunication, nevertheless other censures are comprehended under it, as interdict, suspension, and also other Ecclesiastical punishments: yea also the bond of precepts, and Laws are included in that power, and by virtue of those words, that power as it is a directive, or commanding power is not determined to this or that manner of directing, or commanding, which bindeth in this or that manner by a personal command, or a permanent Law, but doth without limitation comprehend all convenient directing, or commanding, therefore the same is to be understood of the coercive, or chastising power. And so Pope Innocent the fourth with the Council of Lions doth out of this text of Scripture gather this power to depose Princes. Thus Suarez. 2. To this text of holy Scripture I have also answered heretofore both in this Disputation, k Cap. 6. sec. 1. nu. 4. et sec. 2. nu. 3. etc. and in my Apology, l Nu. 35. et seq. that it is to be understood of spiritual binding and losing, to which it is limited both by the nature and condition of the Church itself, which by Christ his institution is a spiritual Commonwealth, & also by the former words [I will give thee the keys] not of an earthly kingdom, but of the kingdom of Heaven; And also Suarez m Tom. 5. disp. 1: sec. 2. nu. 3. himself by those words [shall be bound in heaven] gathereth this power to be supernatural, not natural, and that bond to be spiritual and of an higher degree. And whereas Suarez doth urge, that the Ecclesiastical power as it is directive, or commanding, is not determined to this, or that manner of direction, or commanding, which bindeth in this or that manner by a personal command, or a permanent law, but doth comprehend all convenient direction, therefore the same is to be understood of the coercive, or chastising power. We answer first, that as the commanding power of the Church is not limited to a personal, or permanent command; so also the coercive power to punish is not limited to a personal, or permanent coercion or punishment, for, as daily experience teacheth, the Pope may either as it were personally inflict an Ecclesiastical censure, or which shall continued for ever, and be permanent as a Law; and in this manner the similitude betwixt the not limiting of direction, and chastising is good. 3 Secondly, if that assertion of Suarez be so understood, that as the Ecclesiastical, or spiritual power to command is not limited to any certain manner of commanding, so that it be convenient, and beseeming the nature and condition of an Ecclesiastical or spiritual body, or society, so also the Ecclesiastical power of punishing is not limited to any certain manner of punishing so that it be convenient and beseeming the nature and condition of an Ecclesiastical or spiritual body, or Society, we also grant his comparison. But then we affirm, that as temporal coercion or punishing is only convenient, and proper to a temporal body or Society, so also only spiritual or Ecclesiastical punishments or censures are convenient and beseeming a spiritual, or Ecclesiastical body or society, as out of many Catholic Authors we have showed but a little before. 4 Wherefore there is a great difference to be observed betwixt the power to command, and to punish. For the Ecclesiastical power to command is as it were unlimited, and may be extended to all things both spiritual, and also temporal, but not as they are temporal, but as in regard of the virtue or sin therein contained they become spiritual: because the object of the Ecclesiastical directive or commanding power is virtue, or vice, which may be found in all things whatsoever as well temporal as spiritual: and so the Ecclesiastical power forbidding a temporal thing as it is a sin, doth not do any thing, which is not beseeming the nature and condition of a spiritual body or Society, but the depriving one of temporal lands, goods, liberty, or life are always temporal punishments for what crime soever, either spiritual or temporal they be inflictd, and therefore are not convenient or beseeming the nature and condition of a spiritual commonwealth, as I have showed before. 5 And this distinction betwixt the commanding & chastising power doth evidently appear in the Civil Commonwealth, which having for the object of her directive or commanding power public peace, and public disquietness, as the Ecclesiastical hath virtue & vice, may forbidden all things even Ecclesiastical matters as they are truly manifest wrongs to the Civil society, and unjust hindrances to the public peace, for that these unjust oppressions although principally and of themselves are spiritual, yet secondarily and by accident they are temporal wrongs, and in that regard may be punished by the Civil Magistrate, not with spiritual, but with temporal punishments, as before in this Disputation o cap. 7. sec. 2. nu. 17. I have showed out of those two most famous Dominicks, Sotus and Bannes, both of them most learned professors in Divinity in the University of Salamanca, and both of them Religious men of the renowned order of S. Dominicke. Whereby we may perceive that this manner of arguing, which Suarez useth in comparing the directive power with the corrective is not allowable, for otherwise we might in like manner conclude, that as the Civil power to command is not so limited, but that it may sometimes be extended to Ecclesiastical and spiritual matters, so also the civil power to punish is not so limited, but that it may sometimes be extended to punish with Ecclesiastical and spiritual punishments. 6 Now concerning that which Suarez in the end of this argument affirmeth, that Pope Innocent the fourth with the Council of Lions did out of this text gather the Pope's power to depose Princes, we have also answered heretofore p In my Apology nu. 251. etc. ; first, that the deposing of Fredrick the Emperor was not done by the Council of Lions, but in the Council, or rather in the presence of the Council, but without the Counsels consent: which we probably deduced from the very title of the Pope's Bull wherein Fredrick was deposed; which is this: Innocentius Bishop Servant of Servants, etc. the sacred Council being present to the perpetual memory hereof. And then beginneth the Bull, wherein this text of Scripture Whatsoever thou shalt lose etc. is alleged. For it is not usual, or scarce ever seen in any general Council, that when the Council decreeth any thing, those words are used. The sacred Council being present, but the sacred Council approving. And doubtless Pope Innocent being so notable a wise man as he was, and desiring to give satisfaction to the whole Christian World for deposing such a potent Emperor as Fredrick was, whereby great dissensions throughout all Christendom were like to arise, as indeed they did, in so much that Pope Innocent q Trithemius in Chronico Monasterij Hirsaugiensis ad annum 1244. was weary of his life, and wished that he had never thought of deposing him, if the whole Council had approved that deposition, he would not only have said, The sacred Council being present, but, the Sacred Council approving, as in all other decrees when the whole Council decreeth any thing it is usually said, especially seeing that immediately after in the very next decree this latter manner of speech is used, which argueth a great diversity in the making of these two decrees. Neither can Suarez in my opinion demonstrate, that this answer which I have given is not probable, for I will not deny, but he may bring probable reasons to prove that the aforesaid deposing of Fredrick was done by the consent of the whole Council, but that is not sufficient, we expect from him evident demonstrations, otherwise he will never prove his opinion to be certain. I added also another conjecture, which was, that the aforesaid sentence of deposition was denounced not without astonishment of all the hearers and standers by, as it is related in the Counsels, but there was not such great cause why all the Fathers of the Council hearing that sentence should be astonished, if before they had given their assent thereunto. 7 Secondly, how far the reasons not only of Popes, but also of general Counsels, which they allege for any decree can bind, we have showed before in this Disputation r Cap. 6. sec. 3. nu. 23. . Thirdly, if we should grant to Suarez, that not only the Pope but also the Council did hold it as a far more probable opinion that the Church hath power to depose Princes, and thereupon did proceed in giving that sentence, but that they did not hold it as a matter of faith, Suarez will never be able in my judgement with invincible arguments to demonstrate the contrary. 8 Lastly, as that s Matth. 16. What thing soever thou shalt lose etc. was spoken to Saint Peter, and his Successors, so also that t Matth. 18. , what things soever you shall lose etc. was spoken to the rest of the Apostles and to their Successors, and so not only the Pope, but also all Bishops have by Christ his institution power to deprive Princes of their Dominions, and lives, which whether it be convenient to affirm, I remit to the judgement of the discreet Reader: And that very same reason, which Almain u De potest. Eccles et Laica q. 1. ca 9 bringeth to prove that there is some likelihood that Christ gave not to the Pope that unlimited power, may with far greater reason be applied to other Bishops, for that, saith he, it would be an occasion, that the Pope by reason of this power would be puffed up with very great pride, and that fullness of power would be very hurtful to the Subjects, therefore it would be hurtful both to the Pope, and to the Subjects, and therefore it is not like, that Christ did give him such a power. Sect. V. 1 THirdly, Suarez x Nu. 12. proveth out of holy Scripture this unlimited power of the Pope to punish with all sorts of punishments, even death itself, by two particular facts of Saint Peter, and Saint Paul, wherein, saith he, this authority is imperfectly as it were in a shadow signified. For at Saint Peter's reprehension Ananias y Act. 5. , and his wife were slain, and Saint Paul z 1. Cor. 5. did not only excommunicate the fornicator, but also did deliver him to Satan for the destruction of the flesh, that the spirit may be saved in the day of our Lord jesus Christ. For those words [for the destruction of the flesh] do clearly show, that besides the spiritual censure he was also punished with some corporal vexation, and constrained to do penance that his soul might be saved, as the Fathers, Chrysostome, Theophylactus, Anselme, Pacianus, Ambrose do expound that place. Therefore according to the exposition of the Fathers we gather out of that place, that Ecclesiastical correction and punishment doth consist not only in spiritual, but sometimes also in corporal punishing, and therefore that the Pastors of the Church may use temporal punishment in order to spiritual good. 2 To this objection we answer, that those particular facts of Saint Peter, and Saint Paul did belong to an extraordinary power to do miracles, which was personally granted to the Apostles, and did not descend to all their Successors, and therefore they can not be rightly applied to prove the Pope's ordinary power to kill, or depose. And so the ancient Fathers affirm, that it was necessary that the Apostles should in the first planting of the Church have authority to do miracles, that thereby the Christians, and Christian faith might be had in greater reverence. Therefore we deny this consequence, Saint Peter and Saint Paul did by an extraordinary Apostolical power punish offenders with death, and other corporal afflictions and so the Fathers affirm, therefore there Successors may by an ordinary power inflict the like punishments. I omit that it is not certain that Ananias was slain by Saint Peter, as Lorinus upon that place declareth but immediately by God, or an Angel, or with a great passion of grief being strucken died suddenly as Saint Gregory insinuateth. And thus much concerning the arguments, which Suarez bringeth from the authority of holy Scripture. Sect. VI. 1 THe second head, from which Suarez a Nu. 14. 15. 16. bringeth a forcible argument in his opinion to prove this Doctrine concerning the Pope's power to depose, is the practice, as he saith, of the Church. And to this purpose he setteth down almost all those facts of Popes, who have deposed Kings, and Emperors, which in my Apology b Nu. 308. & seq. I have rehearsed, and answered. And all these and the like, saith he, were not done rashly, nor in corners, but some of them in most frequent Counsels, and sometimes in a General Council as in that of Lions, and in the sight of the whole Christian world by whom they were approved, and put in execution, therefore it is incredible, that they should be actions of an usurped, and not of a true authority. To these may be added that the Council of Lateran under Pope Innocent the third supposed this power saying Si Dominus temporalis etc. If a temporal Lord etc. From all which this argument is concluded. 2 The Universal Church can not err in those things, which appertain to faith, and manners, but the Universal Church did consent to these facts, and did approve them as agreeable to the Law of God and nature, and likewise doth approve the Canons imposing such punishments upon temporal Princes for enormous crimes, and obstinacy in them, and especially in heresy, therefore it is as certain, that the Pope hath power to chastise and punish temporal Princes with these kind of punishments, as it is certain, that the Church can not err in faith and manners. Thus Suarez. 3. To this Objection I have also heretofore c In my Apology nu. 442. & seq. answered in these words: that none of all those examples do prove that, wherein the principal controversy doth consist, to wit, that the Pope by Christ his institution hath authority to depose Princes, and to dispose of all their temporals, but at the most they do show, that the Popes have actually deprived Kings and Emperors of their Crowns, but that they did it by rightful power and authority, none of those examples do prove. And therefore the same Answer may be given to those examples of Popes, which Cardinal Bellarmine giveth to a certain argument, wherein it was objected, that Christian Emperors have oftentimes judged Popes, and deposed them. I answer, saith Cardinal Bellarmine d Lib. 2. de Rom. Pont. ca 30. ad 4 m. , that in deed these things were done, but by what right, let them look to it. And a little beneath, It is sufficiently known, saith he, that Pope john the twelfth was deposed by the Emperor Otho the first upon good zeal, but not according to knowledge, for this john of all the Popes, was the very worst: And therefore no marvel if a pious Emperor as was Otho, but not skilful in Ecclesiastical matters did judge that he might be deposed, especially seeing that many Doctors were of that opinion. 4. In the very like manner it may be answered, that certain Popes deprived Princes of their dominions, translated Empires, and disposed of the temporals of Christians, but by what right let them look unto it. For we must not draw arguments, saith joannes Parisiensis e De potest Regia, & Papali cap. 5. ad 5. , from such particular facts, which sometimes are done upon devotion to the Church, or for some other cause, and not by right of law. And Gregorius Tholosanus f Lib. 26. de Repub. cap. 5 nu. 11. , after he had repeated many examples of Popes, who deposed Princes, writeth thus: From these that only I do gather now, that it is a hard question whether Popes have power to depose an Emperor, or King, who once had power to created the Pope. Yea and there are found many deposings of Popes by the Emperors, no less than deposings of Emperors, by the Pope so that a very great interchangeable course is found in these. Whereupon it is ill to dispute of facts and examples of depositions. And a little beneath, By all which, saith he, the ambitious changers of Commonwealths, and the usurpers of Kingdoms, and Rebels to lawful Princes may gather first, that not every deposing of Princes is just, for that it is actually done, for all facts are not just; secondly, that from hence must not be made a consequence, that by that example the like is to be attempted. For it is one thing, saith Cardinal Bellarmine g In respons. ad Apologiam pro juramento pag. 126. Edit altera. , to relate the facts of Kings, I also may add of Popes, and another thing to prove their authority and power. Neither is it to be marveled, that some Popes partly moved with zeal, partly with probable reasons, and partly incited by the persuasions of some, who were of their counsel, did judge, that they had such a temporal power in order to spiritual good, especially seeing that very many Doctors were of that opinion. Thus I answered in my Apology. 5. I grant therefore, that these facts were not done rashly, but advisedly; not in corners, but in the face of the whole Christian world, and that therefore it is incredible, but that those Popes did probably think that they did them not by an usurped, but by a true authority; but that they were done by a true authority, which not only in opinion, but also in very deed was true, these facts, although never so publicly done, do not sufficiently demonstrate. Nevertheless, that which Suarez affirmeth, is untrue, to wit, that these facts or depositions were approved and put in execution by the whole Christian world: For if we run over the Stories of former times, from the time of Henry the fourth Emperor, who was the first Emperor that was ever deposed by the Pope, we shall find that they have always been contradicted by many Catholics. 6. And besides the authorities of those Catholic Doctors, which I have brought in my Apology, and some of them I have before h Nu. 4. et. seq. related, who hold that the Pope by Christ his institution hath no such authority to dispose of temporals, and to inflict temporal punishments by way of coercion, if that deposition of Frederick the second, which was done in the presence of the Council of Lions, had been approved by the whole Christian world, it is not likely, that Fredrick could have been able against the whole Christian world, to bring the Pope, and his Dominions into so great extremities. Fredrick saith, Trithemius i In Chroinco Monast. Hersang. ad annum 1244. , after he was deposed, came into Italy, and did afflict the Pope, and the people subject to him, with so great evils, that the Pope was weary of his life, and wished, that he had never thought of deposing him. Read also Otho Frisingensis k Lib. 6. cap. 36. , who relateth the great miseries that Pope Gregory the seventh suffered by the potency of Henry the fourth, whom he had deposed. It is true that the Popes do commonly, not to say always, when they depose any Prince, join deposition with Excommunication, and so the second may be approved by the whole christian world without approving the first: whereupon I have elsewhere * In the preface to my Apologet. Answer nu. 34. observed against Cardinal Bellarmine, that the Excommunication of Henry the fourth Emperor was approved by many Provincial Roman Counsels, which nevertheless make no mention at all of his deposition. 7. To the Council of Lateran, whose authority Suarez allegeth, I have heretofore l In the preface to my Apologetical answer nu. 43. et seq. see it beneath. sufficiently answered, as also to the reason which from all these authorities he concludeth, which almost in the same words, but more largely was before urged by Lessius, and therefore I remit the Reader thereunto. And truly it seemeth strange to me, that this authority of the Council of Laterane should now of late be accounted so strong an argument, which Cardinal Bellarmine in his Controversies clean omitting, whereas so many facts of Popes he particularly relateth, seemed then to make little reckoning thereof. Wherefore seeing that the Pope is not the Church, but a principal member thereof, there is to be made a great distinction between the facts and practice of Popes, and between the facts and practice of the Church, neither is the practice of many Popes to be accounted the practice of the Church, unless by the whole Church it be received, as that opinion of the Pope's power to depose Princes, and to inflict temporal punishments by way of coercion never was, and therefore that argument which Suarez, saith, is drawn from the practice of the Church, considering that this practice was never approved by the whole Church, is of little worth, and may rather be brought to scar simple people, then to persuade any prudent or learned man. And whereas Suarez affirmeth in the end of his argument, that the universal Church doth approve the Canons imposing such temporal punishments upon Princes, for enormous crimes and obstinacy in them, especially in heresy, those Canons which are commonly urged for this purpose are those three, Nos sanctorum, Inratos, Absolutos, which Suarez beneath allegeth, and to which in this Disputation I have already m Cap. 6. sec. 3 nu. 12. etc. answered. Sect. VII. 1. THirdly, Suarez n Num. 17. confirmeth this doctrine by reason; and this is the whole substance of his argument. Christ our Saviour hath given to Saint Peter, and his Successors, whom he hath appointed to be the supreme head, and Pastor of the Church, all authority which is necessary to the governing of his flock, but authority to depose Princes is necessary for the government of the Church, therefore Christ hath given authority to S. Peter and his Successors to depose Princes. The Mayor proposition is not in express words set down by Suarez; but it is supposed; for he only declareth the Minor for what cause, or by what title this authority is necessary. And he affirmeth o Nu. 17. , that for two causes, or by reason of two titles this authority to chastise Princes with temporal punishments is necessary: the first title is for the Emperors, Kings, or temporal Princes themselves, the other for the people, who are subject unto them. By reason of the first title this authority is necessary, that the Pope may either correct, or amend a rebellious Prince, or also punish him according to his deserts; for both of these do appertain to a Pastor: but oftentimes it falleth out, that only Censures are not sufficient to those effects, and daily experience doth sufficiently show, therefore of necessity we must also affirm, that Christ hath given this power to his Vicar, considering that he hath appointed him to be his Pastor, as well of Christian Princes, as of the rest of the people. 2. And this reason may be confirmed, Suarez nu. 18. because the Church hath power over other faithful persons, and Christians baptized not only to correct them by Censures, that they may amend their fault, but also to punish the offences committed by other temporal or corporal punishments according to the manner, which is agreeable to an Ecclesiastical judge and Pastor, therefore the lawful Prelates of the Church, and especially the Pope hath the same power even over supreme temporal Princes, 3. The Antecedent proposition is manifest by the perpetual practice of the Church. For the Canons do usually impose a pecuniary mulct sometimes to confiscation of goods: now and then also they do impose corporal punishments without danger of losing life or member, as is whipping, and sometimes sending to the Galleys, and when a capital punishment is necessary, although Ecclesiastical judges for decency of their Orders are not wont to give sentence thereof, yet they may commit the person offending to the Secular judge, commanding him to punish the offender according to the equity of the laws. All which may especially be considered in the crime of heresy. For Heretics are not only excommunicated by the Church, and punished with other spiritual punishments, but also are deprived of all their temporal goods, not only by the laws of the Emperors, but also by virtue of the Canons. And finally, if either he shall remain obstinate, or be relapse, he is by the laws of the Emperors punished with death, but by the Canons he is left to the discretion of the Secular judge, to receive punishment according to the condition of his fault, according to cap. abolendam de haereticis, with such like. 4. And that these punishments are just, the practice of the Church doth sufficiently convince, Suarez nu. 19 and Saint Austin doth very well defend epist. 48. & 50. & lib. 3. contra epist. Parmeniani cap. 2. And that this power is necessary in the Church of Christ, as it is instituted by him, reason doth convince. For if the Subjects of the Church could not be punished by these kind of punishments, they would easily contemn spiritual punishments, and they would very much hurt themselves and others. For as it is said, Proverb. 29. A child that is left to his own will doth confounded his mother. Wherefore the Christian Commonwealth were not conveniently instituted, neither were it sufficiently provided for, if she had not power to constrain rebellious persons, who would not obey Censures. Neither will he satisfy, who shall say, that it is sufficient, that temporal Christian Princes have this power, both for that these Princes may also offend and have need of correction (as I may say) and also for that the punishing of offences doth of itself only belong to Civil Magistrates, as they are contrary to the politic end, and to the peace of the Commonwealth, and to human justice, but to punish them as they are contrary to Religion and the health of souls, doth of itself belong to the spiritual power, and therefore to her chief aught to appertain power to use temporal punishments for such correction, either by inflicting them by herself, or by using the help of the Secular Magistrate, that all things may be done decently, orderly, and effectually. 5. It remaineth that we prove the former consequence, Suarez, nu. 20. to wit, that if the Church hath this power over the rest of the faithful of inferior degree, she especially in S. Peter and his Successors, hath it also over supreme temporal Princes. The consequence therefore is proved out of the principle before set down, that these Princes are as well Saint Peter's sheep as all other Christians, neither doth temporal dignity, or potency exempt them from that power or punishment, for neither by Christ's words, neither for any other ground or reason such a liberty, or rather licence to sin can be gathered. Yea rather this power is more necessary in the Church, to punish such kind of Princes than their Subjects, first, because they are more free, and therefore do more easily fall, and being fallen, are more hardly corrected. Secondly, for that Prince's sins, especially such which are contrary to Faith and Religion are more pernicious, for they do easily draw their subjects to imitate them, either by their example and by gifts and promises, or also by threatenings and terrors: whereupon well said the Wiseman Ecclesiasticus 10. An unwise King will destroy his people, for what manner of man is the Governor of a city, such also are the inhabitants therein. Finally, because Princes do more grievously offend then the rest, and therefore they aught also to be more grievously punished by their Pastors; as of Pastors themselves Saint Gregory said in his Pastoral part 3. cap. 5. and it is related by Pope Nicolas against Lotharius King of France, in an epistle to the same King, and it is rehearsed in cap. praecipue 11. q. 3. Suarez. nu. 21. 6. And from hence now at the last may easily be showed the other title of this power over Kings, to wit, for the defending of the Subjects. For it doth not only belong to a Pastor to correct the sheep that go astray, or to recall them to the sheepfold, but also to defend them from wolves and enemies, lest that they should be drawn out of the fold, and be destroyed. But a wicked King especially a schismatic, and heretic, doth put the subjects in great danger of perdition, as is manifest by that, which hath been said before, & therefore it belongeth to the Pope's office to defend the Subjects of an heretical or perverse Prince, and to deliver them from evident danger, therefore Christ, who hath done, and instituted all things well, hath given this power to Saint Peter, and hath contained it under that word feed, and under the power of binding and losing, therefore by it he may also deprive such a Prince of his Dominion, and hinder him that he hurt not the subjects, and absolve these from their Oath of Allegiance, or declare them to be absolved, because that condition is always understood to be included in such an Oath. Suarez nu. 21. 7. Which title Saint Thomas, and approved Divines think to be of such weight and force, that of itself only it sufficeth to deprive an infidel King of his kingdom and power over the faithful, although the former title of chastising and just punishing should cease. From whence the same Divines do gather, that the Pope can not punish a heathen King, who is not baptized for infidelity or other sins. And nevertheless if he have Christian Subjects, he may release them of their subjection, for moral and evident danger of subversion: as Saint Thomas teacheth 2. 2. q. 10. ar. 10. And it is gathered from Saint Paul 1. Cor. 6. For he reprehendeth the faithful, for that they had controversies before infidel judges, and to persuade them to this he saith, Know you not that we shall judge Angels? how much more secular things? Which words Saint Gregory allegeth lib. ●7. epist. 21. and doth from thence infer, Therefore is it not lawful for him to judge of the earth to whom power is given to open and shut heaven? God forbidden. Hereupon also may a faithful wife be separated from her husband, who is an infidel, if she can not devil with him without injury to the Creator, according to the doctrine of Saint Paul. 1. Cor. chap. 7. Suarez. nu. 23. And from the same root children baptized are freed from the power and company of their parents, who are infidels, lest that they should again be entangled with their errors, as is it said in the fourth Council of Toledo cap. 59 Therefore by the like, or with greater reason a Christian King, or who is subject to the Church, by reason of Baptism, may be deprived of his power and dominion over his vassals, therefore it is a title of itself sufficient that the Pope may punish these Princes, and deprive them of their kingdoms, and for this purpose use the sword of other Princes, that so the sword may be under the sword, that they may mutually help each other to defend the Church. 8. I might in this place declare, confirm and defend other titles, for which the Pope may upon just causes dispose of temporals, as he did in the translation of the Empire, and in instituting a new manner of choosing the Emperor, and in administering it when it is vacant, but the brevity of this work doth not permit to prosecute all these, neither are they necessary to our intent and purpose, and therefore I remit the Reader to other Authors who have most learnedly disputed hereof. 9 These be all the reasons which Suarez bringeth to prove this unlimited power of the Pope, to punish Christian Princes with all sorts of temporal punishments, which although I might have reduced to a more compendious form, for that in substance they are the very same reasons, which Cardinal Bellarmine hath brought in his Controversies to prove the Pope's power to depose Princes, and to dispose of all their temporals, and to which in my Apology * ᵃ Nu. 176. I have answered at large, yet lest that the Reader should imagine that by altering or displacing his words or sentences, I might change and altar the true sense and meaning of some sentence, and so the true force of his argument could not so easily be perceived, I thought it expedient to set his reasons down word by word as they are found in him. And although I have already in my Apology answered this argument of Suarez, yet for satisfaction of them who either have not seen or read my Apology, I will repeat in substance the same answer here again. Sect. VIII. 1. FIrst therefore to the Mayor proposition I answer, that Christ hath granted to Saint Peter and his Successors all sufficient and necessary power to govern his Church, and to bring the faithful to life everlasting, which is the principal end wherefore this power is given to the Church. But because the aforesaid proposition is equivocal, and may be understood two ways, neither is it so clear and manifest what things are required to this, that such a power may be said to be sufficient or necessary for such an end, if any one should strive to conclude an article or doctrine of faith from the aforesaid proposition, being taken so generally and without any further explication, might easily give occasion to those who are not skilful in Divinity, to fall into some error. 2. Wherefore a power to govern the Church, and to bring souls to heaven may be called sufficient or necessary in this sense, that the Church hath all sufficient and necessary power actually to bring souls to heaven, and actually to take away all the impediments which can hinder one from the attaining to the kingdom of heaven, which sense those words of Cardinal Bellarmine may aptly bear, although perchance it was not his meaning, which he hath in an answer of his to, a treatise of john Gerson of the validity of excommunication p In considerate. 11. , to wit, that the Pope can effect all that, which is necessary to bring souls to paradise, and to remove all impediments, which the world, or the Devil with all their strength, and subtleties can oppose: And this sense is clearly false, both for that the Pope hath no sufficient means to save an Infant in the mother's womb who can not be borne alive; for it is not lawful to open the mother's womb before she be dead, that the child may be Christened; or to save one who being in mortal sin is bereaved of his wits, until he return to them again, which to effect is not in the Pope's power; and also for that the Pope hath not power over the internal actions of the mind, which are most necessary to salvation and lastly for that there should be neither Turks, nor Infidels, nor heretics, without the Pope's default, if he had power to effect all that, which is necessary to bring souls to Paradise, and to remove all impediments, which may hinder one from the attaining to the same. 3 Secondly, it may be understood that the Church hath all sufficient and necessary power to govern the faithful, and to bring souls to Paradise, if we regard only the power itself, and not all those things, which are otherwise necessary to bring men to salvation. As for example the power of the Sun to give light may be understood to be sufficient either in regard of the power itself to enlighten, or in regard also of those things which are otherwise necessary for the Sun to give light, and which if they be not present will hinder the Sun from giving light. And although the Sun hath not sufficient power to take away all those things, which can hinder it from giving light, for so it should have power to draw the body which it hath power to enlighten towards it, that the body may be in a convenient distance, and also to make it perspicuous & capable of light, Which nevertheless to effect are not in the power of the Sun, and yet there is no man who will therefore deny, that the Sun hath all necessary, sufficient, and perfect power to give light. And in this sense the Mayor proposition is true: for the Church of Christ, which is a spiritual Commonwealth, hath all necessary, all sufficient, and perfect spiritual power to govern the faithful, and to bring them to the Kingdom of Heaven, for as much as is required on the behalf of the power itself, which power nevertheless doth suppose the subject to be otherwise apt, and sufficiently disposed. 4 For the spiritual Church of Christ hath power given her to give spiritual grace to men, whereby they may come to the Kingdom of Heaven; to Infants and persons not baptised by the Sacrament of Baptism, to men of discretion and who are baptized by other Sacraments, especially of Penance, by means whereof a Priest as the Minister of Christ by virtue of the Keys of the Kingdom of Heaven, which by his Ordination and lawful jurisdiction he hath received, doth absolve from sins, and giveth spiritual grace; Nevertheless to make this power to be effectual, and actually to bring men to the Kingdom of Heaven, are required certain dispositions, which are necessary on the behalf, or in respect of the persons who are to receive these Sacraments, which dispositions the Church hath not of herself always power to cause in the faithful, nor to take away all impediments, which every way doth hinder the working of this effect. Besides this power, which the Divines call power belonging to the Sacrament of Order, the Church hath also power, which they call of jurisdiction, to preach the word of God, and to govern the Church by making laws, and imposing commands, and to punish all offenders with spiritual punishments. For as the Church of Christ and the Ecclesiastical power is spiritual, so also Christ hath given her all sufficient and necessary spiritual means, for as much as belongeth to the power itself, to the effecting of that end, for which this spiritual power was granted her. 5 We grant therefore the Mayor proposition in that sense as we have now declared. Now concerning the Minor, if Suarez understand, that Christ hath given to his Church absolutely all spiritual authority without limitation to govern his Church, as he himself had a power, which Divines call of excellency, whereby he could miraculously, and as it were by force convert men from sin, and bring them to the kingdom of Heaven, which power in some part he gave to his Apostles, as to do miracles, to deliver men over to Satan, by whom they should sensibly be punished, that thereby they might be recalled from sin, to S. Peter to kill by word of mouth Ananias and Saphira, and Simon Magus, as Stories relate, we deny his Minor proposition. But if he understand that Christ hath given to the Church all sufficient and necessary power and authority, not temporal but spiritual, not absolute, but limited with such conditions as beseemeth the nature and condition of a spiritual commonwealth in such sort as it was instituted by Christ, and as the power is considered in itself, and not in regard of the means, which are otherwise necessary to the actual executing of this power, we grant the Minor: But then we deny that the authority to depose Princes, & to dispose of all temporal is necessary or convenient to a spiritual commonwealth in that sort as it is instituted by Christ, for as much as by Scriptures, Ancient Fathers, or the practice of the Primitive Church can be gathered. 6 Wherefore as before in this disputation q Cap. 6. sec. 2. nu. 6. I answered to gretzer's argument, that to dispense in an Oath, or vow two things are required, the one a power to dispense, the other a just and sufficient cause or title for which he may use that power to dispense, and without which that power to dispense shall work no effect at all, yet that just cause or title doth not give the Pope authority to dispense, but doth suppose authority to be given him, and therefore from a just cause, or title to dispense in a vow we cannot rightly infer a true authority to dispense. In like manner we answer now, that those two titles, which Suarez allegeth, are indeed sufficient causes, which may justly move the Pope to chastise Princes with temporal punishments, if he had authority to punish them in that kind, and without which causes, or the like, although he had such an authority to punish them, yet the exercising thereof would be unjust, nevertheless these causes do not prove, that the Pope hath such a temporal power to punish, but by other ways it must be proved, that Christ hath given to S. Peter and his Successors such a temporal power, which hath not hitherto been sufficiently convinced by Scriptures, or any other proof. It appertaineth indeed to a Pastor to punish, but according to the authority as is committed to him by the chief and supreme Pastor of all. Now whether Christ hath given to the Pope all that temporal authority to punish Princes in order to the spiritual good, which he hath given to Princes to punish their subjects in order to the temporal good, is the very thing which is in controversy: And therefore Suarez unless he will commit that fault in arguing which the Logicians call Petitio principij, which is to take that for proved, which he is to prove, must not suppose that the Pope hath power to correct & punish temporal Princes, not only with spiritual punishments which are proper to a spiritual commonwealth, but also with temporal, which seem only to belong to a temporal commonwealth, but he must also prove the same with invincible arguments, and and not only to bring certain causes, and sufficient titles for which the Pope may justly put in execution such an authority if he had it. 7 And whereas Suarez affirmeth, that only spiritual censures are not sufficient to correct and amend wicked and rebellious Princes, as daily experience doth sufficiently show, and therefore this power is necessary in the Church of Christ as it is instituted by him, for otherwise they would easily contemn spiritual censures, and would very much hurt themselves, and others. We answer, that spiritual censures being such grievous punishments as they are, and far greater than any corporal torment or death, as S. Austin r Lib. 1. contra Aduersatium legis, et prophet. cap. 17. affirmeth, are sufficient to correct, amend, and punish all Christians whatsoever, for as much as belongeth to the spiritual power itself of correcting: but if they be not so sufficient as actually to 'cause Princes to amend, this is not for want of sufficient power, but for want of sufficient disposition in those Princes, who are not terrified with those censures. Neither is it necessary that the Pope must have such a sufficient power to correct, and punish Princes, whereby they shall actually be brought to amendment, for so he should not only have all sufficient power to correct and amend, but also all sufficient means whereby this power must have effect, but it sufficeth that he hath sufficient authority to inflict such spiritual punishments, whereby any Christian Prince or Subject may be justly terrified, and for fear of such grievous punishments withdrawn for their wicked life. 8 If therefore wicked Princes shall contemn all Ecclesiastical Censures, the Pope hath performed his office, neither can he proceed to any further punishment, for that according to the opinion of very many Doctors, as I showed before, Ecclesiastical censures are the last punishments which an Ecclesiastical judge by Christ his institution can inflict: and therefore in this case, they are to be left, saith Abbot Wincet, s In velitatione contra Buccanum p. 180. to the judgement, and punishing of Almighty God, by whom only, saith Alexander of Hales, t 3. part. q. 40. memb. 5. q 4. ad 1m. 2m. 3m. they are to be punished with temporal punishments, and who wanteth not means, saith Gregorius Tholosanus, u Lib. 26. de Repub. cap. 5. nu. 25. by which he is able, when he shall please, either to take away these wicked Princes, or to amend them. And therefore in this case we must suffer patiently, saith Aeneas Silvius, x In lib. de ortu et authoritate Imperij Romani c. 16. who afterwards was Pope Pius the second what a Prince doth although unjustly, and we must expect either an amendment of his Successor, or the correction of the judge above, who doth not suffer violences and wrongs to be perpetual. 8 And the very like answer doth Cardinal Bellarmine make concerning a wicked Pope, who oppresseth the Church, and endeavoureth by his bad life, or deeds to overthtow it, and nevertheless according to his doctrine the Church hath no effectual remedy whereby to redress herself: It it no marvel, saith he, y Lib. 2. de Concil. cap. 19 ad 2 that the Church in that case remaineth without any effectual remedy of man, seeing that her safety doth not chiefly rely upon man's industry, but upon God his protection, for that her King is God. Therefore although the Church hath not authority to depose the Pope, yet she may and aught to pray humbly to God that he will bring some remedy. And it is certain that God will have care of her safety, who will either convert such a Pope, or take him away, before he destroy the Church. And the like answer in the very same words may be applied to temporal Princes, who persecute the Church. 9 Wherefore these temporal weapons, as power to depose, to kill, and such like are not so necessary for the spiritual government of the Church, she being principally protected by God, and by persecutions doth rather increase, then is diminished. For as the water of No his flood, saith Cardinal Bellarmine z Lib. 4. de Eccles. cap. 6. , did throw down the Palaces of Kings, but the Ark of No they did more and more lift up; so persecutions do easily overthrew temporal kingdoms, but the Kingdom of Christ, which is the Church, they do not only not destroy, but they do also illustrate. The same teacheth justinus Martyr, a In Tryphone Tertullian b Cap. ultimo Apologetici. and Pope Leo c Sermone. 1. de. ff Petro, et Paulo. the great. And therefore it is not absolutely necessary, saith the same Cardinal Bellarmine, d Lib. 1. de Concil. cap. 10. that the common enemy, as is the Turk, be resisted. For if the Church could continued (and rather increase then be diminished) under the most cruel persecutions of Nero, Domician, Decius, Dioclesian, why may she not also under the persecution of the Turks? Seeing therefore that the Church may be well governed, wicked Princes punished, and also amended, and the souls of the faithful saved without deposing of Princes, & using these temporal punishments, they are not necessary, as by the definition of necessary doth clearly appear, to the good government of the Church, to the punishing of wicked Princes, and to the salvation of souls, which is the chief, principal, yea and only end of all Ecclesiastical authority. 10 To the Confirmation, which Suarez bringeth, we answer as before, that the Church of Christ hath power to correct all Christians, and to punish all offences with those punishments which are agreeable to an Ecclesiastical judge and Pastor, as he is instituted by Christ: but whether these punishments which by way of coercion the Church can inflict, as she is instituted by Christ be only Ecclesiastical Censures, or also temporal punishments, is the main question which is now in hand, and of which I now do dispute with Suarez, always understanding of the modal, and not of the absolute proposition. 10 I said first by way of coercion, for I do willingly acknowledge, as oftentimes I have in other places affirmed, that by way of direction and command the Church may impose or inflict (for these two we now do take for all one) temporal punishments, if they shall be necessary for the health of souls, and so we grant, that by Christ his institution the Church may command one to be whipped, to be banished, to be sent to the Galleys, to pay such sum of money, yea and to be hanged according to the Laws, if these punishments shall be necessary to the salvation of his soul, but if the Church commading these punishments be not obeyed, to what then doth her power extend? Hath an Ecclesiastical judge, as he is Ecclesiastical, authority by Christ his institution to execute by himself these punishments, as to take away his money, to thrust him into the Galleys, to deprive him of his life, or only to punish the disobedience with Ecclesiastical censures? In this point remaineth the whole difficulty. My opinion is, that it is the doctrine of many Catholics, who are not therefore to be condemned of heresy or error, that the last punishments, to which the authority of an Ecclesiastical judge, as he is Ecclesiastical, can by Christ his institution be extended, are only Ecclesiastical censures. And so the common practice of the Church is, that when an Ecclesiastical judge imposeth any pecuniary mulct, or punishment, the executing thereof is commanded under pain of incurring Ecclesiastical censures. Wherefore in the provincial constitutions of England e Cap et venit de paenis. we have this Decree. We ordain, that Lay-men precisely by the sentence of Excommunication be compelled to perform all punishments as well corporal as pecuniary. But that those who do hinder that these punishments be not performed, be constrained by the sentences of Excommunication and Interdict. 11 I said secondly [by Christ his institutio] for I do not deny, but that Ecclesiastical persons by the grants, privileges, and positive Laws of temporal Princes, have authority to punish offenders with temporal punishments, not only by the way of direction, but also of coercion, as before I related out of Gerson and Almain. And therefore we grant to Suarez all which he bringeth to confirm the Antecedent proposition, to wit, that the Popes and Counsels do many times impose pecuniary mulcts & other corporal punishments, yea and death itself, as appeareth by the Canon in Synodo dist. 63. and cap. delatori 5. q. 6. although Suarez in those words, without danger of losing life or member, would dissemble the same: But this is that we stand upon, that if Suarez will needs have these temporal punishments to be imposed by the Canons not only by way of direction, but also of coercion, that either they are of force only in the temporal territories of the Church, or else they are a confirmation of the punishments before imposed by the Civil Laws, or else they are done by the consent of temporal Princes, or else they are a declaration what the Secular judge aught to do, or finally that they are not imposed by them as having power granted by Christ his institution, but as having such authority from the positive grants and privileges of Princes, according to the opinion of very many Doctors, who hold, as I related out of Gerson, and Almain, that an Ecclesiastical judge hath not by Christ his institution power so much as to imprison, but this proceedeth from a pure positive Law and grant of temporal Princes. 12 And so Cardinal Hostienis, who although he defend the Pope's direct power in temporals, yet to that Canon Ad abolendam, wherein the Pope decreeth that the goods of heretics are to be confiscated, he relateth an answer, which he doth not reject as improbable, that the Pope made this decree by the assent of the Emperor, who was then present, and consented. And the Gloss upon the can. Adrianus dist. 63. wherein the Pope commandeth the goods of them to be confiscated who do not observe his decree, and upon the Canon Delatori 5. q. 6. wherein he ordaineth that the tongue of a false promoter be pulled out, and the head of a convicted persons be strooken off, answereth thus: here the Pope doth teach what a Secular judge aught to do. 13 I said thirdly [always understanding of the modal proposition, for I will not deny but that Suarez hath made here a very plausible discourse, and that he hath brought many probable arguments out of Scriptures, and Counsels to prove the aforesaid temporal authority of the Pope; but that any one argument of his or of any other, doth clearly convince the contrary opinion to contain in it any heresy or error, this is that I utterly deny. 14 We grant therefore to Suarez, that it is necessary that there be in the Church authority to punish wicked Christians, and heretics with capital punishments, if by the Church we understand the whole congregation of the faithful including both the Clergy, & the laity, for we freely confess that Christian Princes have authority to put heretics to death, and that the Laws for punishing them in that sort are just; and this only S. Austin defendeth against the Donatists', as Parmentan, Petilian, and Gaudentius, who held that it was not lawful to deliver an incorrigible heretic to the Secular Magistrate to be punished capitally; but this is not the question which is now in hand, but the only controversy betwixt me & Suarez is, whether Churchmen as they are Churchmen, or which is all one, whether the spiritual power of the Church is by Christ his institution extended to punish heretics with temporal or capital punishments, without the concurrence of the Secular Magistrate. Whereby thou mayst perceive (courteous Reader) how cunningly Suarez proceedeth in alleging S. Austin for the approving of the Church laws for the Chastising of heretics with temporal and capital punishments, as though he would have his Reader to believe, that S. Austin approved the Pope's authority or Church-mens authority to inflict temporal, and capital punishments, whereas S. Austin never dreamt of any such authority, but his opinion was, as I have signified before, that in the Church of Christ the visible sword was to cease, and to capital punishments which were used in the old Law, excommunications and degradiations were to succeed in the new. 14 Wherefore if private men do contemn Ecclesiastical censures, they may easily be corrected and punished by the Secular power, who is bound by the Law of Christ to aid and assist the spiritual; but if a wicked Prince do not regard the censures of the Church, the Church having used the last punishment to which her power doth extend, as I have showed before, must instantly pray to Almighty God for the conversion of that King, & leave him to the judgement of the eternal King, who will ever protect his Church, and will amend or correct that King when it shall please him, in the self same manner as Cardinal Bellarmine affirmed, that the Church must proceed with a wicked Pope. And if a wicked Prince should not only contemn the Pope's sentence of Excommunication, but also of deprivation, I would gladly know of Suarez, what authority were then left in the Church, (I mean in Churchmen as they they are such) to punish this Prince, and to defend Christians from his tyranny. Truly if Suarez argument were good, it would prove that the Church should have power to do miracles, and either to kill him, as Saint Peter did Ananias, or else to deliver him to Satan, as Saint Paul did the fornicator, that being tormented by the Devil with corporal afflictions, he might be brought to repentance. And thus much concerning the first title, why the Pope may according to Suarez depose Prince. Sect. IX. 1. THe second part of Suarez reason, which is taken from the second title or cause for which the Pope, as Suarez saith, hath power to depose Princes, and to dispose of all temporals is easily satisfied in the self same manner, as the first part was answered. For if it could once be certainly proved, that the Pope had authority to depose Princes, etc. then doubtless this second title to defend the faithful people, were a sufficient cause, that the Pope might lawfully and without sin put in execution this his authority; but it doth no other way prove, that the Pope hath such a temporal authority granted him by Christ, than the former title did. Wherefore we willingly acknowledge, that it belongeth to the Pope's office to defend Subjects from an heretical or perverse Prince, but according to that limited authority which Christ hath given him, and by those lawful means, which by Christ his institution he may use; but whether this authority to depose, to kill, to use all other temporal means, which temporal Princes for the temporal good may use, be comprehended under these words, Feed my sheep, whatsoever thou shalt lose, etc. is the very question which is now in controversy. And although Saint Thomas and other approved Divines do hold, that the Pope hath power to depose Princes, and to absolve Christian Subjects of their allegiance which they own to infidel Princes, yet this is not a sufficient ground, as I have showed before f In this disputation cap. 18. sec. 2. to condemn of heresy or error those Catholic Divines, who hold the contrary opinion. And therefore what Saint Thomas, Suarez, or other Divines who be of the same opinion do by probable inferences gather out of these words, feed, whatsoever, or such like places, is not much material to our present controversy, unless their collections be so evident, as they are not, that no probable answer can be made unto them. 2. To that place of Saint Paul 1. Cor. 6. If therefore you have secular judgements, the contemptible that are in the Church, set them to judge. Doctor Barclaye g De potest. Papae cap. 21. , and I h In my Apology in 270. etc. have sufficiently heretofore, and since that his son Master john Barclaye i Cap. 21. § 2. hath in my opinion most learnedly answered to all the objections which Cardinal Bellarmine hath brought to impugn his Father's Answer. And although Suarez taketh notice of Cardinal Bellarmine's book which he highly commendeth, yet of the Answer which Master john Barclay hath made to Cardinal Bellarmine he taketh no notice of all, but urgeth the same text in such manner, as though it had never been answered as yet. Wherefore seeing that Suarez in his speeches to the King's Majesty doth profess sincerity, we desire him that hereafter he will take notice of these books, and either impugn the answers, or grant freely that they can not be convinced as improbable. 3. We answered therefore, that Saint Paul did not intent to command Christians to appoint Ordinary judges for the deciding of Secular causes, but only Arbiters, which might peaceably take up all matters betwixt them, without running to the tribunals of infidel Princes, by which the Christian Religion was brought into contempt by the Infidels, seeing them to be at variance among themselves. And so the strifes, & suits in law among Christians themselves, who began then to publish to the world a new Religion, was a great occasion to draw infidels from liking well of the Christian Religion. Wherefore because these debates, & suits in law among Christians themselves, were scandalous to the infidels, although not of themselves unlawful, Saint Paul counseled, or at the most commanded the faithful Corinthians that they should compound their suits among themselves, and appoint some arbitrary judges, who should take up all controversies, jest otherwise they should be compelled to go to infidel judges. And to persuade the Corinthians that Christians were men worthy to be Arbiters in Secular causes, he useth an argument à maiori ad minus, as as the Logicians call it, that is, from the greater to the less. For if Christians shall judge the Angels, much more aught they to be esteemed worthy to be Arbiters, and to take up in quiet and peaceable manner, not in rigour of justice, secular contentions and strifes among men. And this is all, that the words of Saint Gregory cited by Suarez do prove; for they that have power to open and shut inridically the kingdom of heaven, aught not to be accounted unworthy to judge earthly matters, and especially by way of Arbitrement. 4. That these judges, whom Saint Paul commanded the Corinthians to appoint over Secular causes, were not Ordinary judges, but only arbitrary (although not such, whom the parties themselves when they were at strife should elect, but such that should be chosen & appointed by the whole community to take uppeaceably all contentious quarrels which afterwards should arise) we proved from the authority of S. Thomas, and Lyranus upon that place, who writ thus: But that saying of the Apostle seemeth to be against that, which is written 1. Peter 2. Be subject therefore to every human creature for God, whether it be to King, as excelling, or to rulers as sent by him. To which it is to be answered, that the Apostle doth not here forbidden the faithful, who are under infidel Princes, to appear before them, when they are called to their tribunals, for this should be against the subiecton which is due to Princes, but he forbiddeth that they should not voluntarily k Note that word voluntarily. have recourse to infidel judges in those causes, which may be determined by the faithful. And this exposition Card. Bellarmine l Lib. 3 de Laicis cap. 12. himself seemeth to approve, saying, that by these words the Apostle doth admonish the Corinthians, that in those causes, wherein they were not bound of necessity m Note those words of necessity: and also among themselves, for Saint Paul speaketh only of contentions among Christians themselves, and not betwixt Christians, and infidels. to go to the tribunals of the Gentiles, they should appoint among themselves a judge. 5. Seeing therefore that, according to this Doctrine of S. Thomas, & Lyranus, the Apostle did not command the faithful Corinthians to appoint judges among themselves in such sort, that they should any way derogate to the obedience which was due to Princes, & that when they were summoned to appear in judgement, they were bound to appear, but only forbade them to have voluntarily, & of their own accord recourse to Infidel judges, but to take up peaceably all contentions among themselves, it followeth of necessity, that these judges were only Arbiters, although not to be appointed at the arbitrement of the parties who were at strife, but to be appointed by the whole community as Ordinary Arbiters to decide all future controversies among Christians themselves. 6 Wherefore, as I said in my Apology, S. Paul doth in this place admonish the faithful Corinthians, that they should not be at debate among themselves, but that rather they should take wrong, & suffer fraud. But if by reason of human infirmity there should chance at any time to arise any controversy among themselves, they should appoint certain arbitrary judges, who might peaceably without going to law before Infidel judges compound their quarrels, & that they should not voluntarily and of their own accord go to the tribunals of Infidel judges, who seeing Christians at debate among themselves would easily take occasion to contemn, revile, and oppress them, whom for their Religion they did not love; and also the Infidels themselves would more greatly be averted from the Christian Religion: But if it chanced that they were convented before the tribunal of the Infidels, than they must appear, otherwise they should do against the subjection which is due to Princes, which Saint Paul, according to Saint Thomas and Lyranus, would in no wise have them to do. 7 Therefore this is not a good argument: The faithful Corinthians might, & also aught, according to S. Paul's admonition, for the avoiding of scandal, appoint over themselves certain arbitrary judges to decide those causes, for which they were not bound to go to the tribunals of the Gentiles, therefore they might in like manner appoint over themselves new Kings, & Princes. For the first doth not derogate any way from the authority of Princes, but the second is against the subjection which is due to Princes, but the faithful Corinthians aught not to do any thing which is contrary to the subjection which is due even to infidel Princes, as S. Thomas & Lyranus have taught a little before. All this & more both the Barclaies, & myself have in effect answered heretofore, which our answer either Suarez hath not seen, or else he concealeth it, & urgeth this text in such sort as though it made clearly for him. 8 In like manner both I n In my Apology in 288. & seq. , and the two Barclaies o Doctor Barclay ca 23. . p john Barclay cap. 23. have fully answered to the first part of that argument, which Suarez bringeth in the last place, to wit, that a faithful wife may be separated from her husband, who is an infidel, if she cannot devil with him without injury to the Creator; and children baptised are freed from the power, and company of their parents who are infidels, jest that they should again be entangled with their errors, therefore by the like, or with greater reason, a Christian King may by reason of Baptism be deprived of his power, and Dominion over his vassals. For we made very apparent the insufficiency of this consequence by showing the great disparity betwixt these two separations. And first the marriage betwixt the infidel husband and the wife, who is become a Christian, is not dissolved by the Pope's authority, but by God himself, permitting, but not commanding the same, as Saint Austin q Li. 1. de adulter in coniugijs cap 19 expressly affirmeth, and therefore this similitude proveth nothing for the Pope's authority to depose, but rather that the faithful Subjects may depose their Prince who is an infidel, if they can not live under his subjection without injury to the Creator. 7 Secondly, if we speak of the deposing of Christian Princes, for whom principally, or rather against whom he handleth this question, this similitude is flat against himself. For a wife baptised cannot departed from her husband who also is baptised, and dissolve the bond of matrimony, although he should become an heretic or infidel, and that she can not live with him without injury to the Creator; therefore neither Subjects baptised can departed from the obedience of their Prince who is baptised, and by deposing him dissolve the bond of their allegiance, although he should become an heretic or infidel, and that they cannot live with him without injury to the Creator. 8 Thirdly, there is a great disparity in this similitude, for that a wife to leave her husband argueth no authority to be in the wife over her husband, but for the people to depose their Prince argueth a supreme authority and Superiority to be in the people over their Sovereign Prince, which supreme authority cannot be in the people, who are subject unto him. The most that this comparison can prove is, that as a faithful wife, who cannot live with her husband without offending her Creator, may leave his company, but not dissolve the bond of matrimony, and marry an other husband, so a Christian Subject, if he cannot without offending God live with the Prince in his Kingdom, he may departed the Land, because this argueth no authority to be in the Subject over his Prince, but only a mere right to keep himself from sin, but he cannot depose his Prince, and dissolve the natural bond of his Allegiance for the cause aforesaid. 9 Lastly Master john Barclay r §. 20. doth well observe, that when Saint Paul gave this admonition to the Christians, as Christian wives were by the bond of marriage subject to infidel husbands, so also some Christian men were by the bond of allegiance, and obedience subject to infidel Princes, & Lords, yea all Christians were at that time subject to infidel Princes▪ and yet the Apostle in no place in no case did grant the people leave to revolt from their Prince, or servants from their Lord. And why should not the Apostle have admonished faithful Subjects of their duty as well as faithful wives? for what cause should he have entangled their consciences? He teacheth that the bond of matrimony aught to be firm, and yet that in infidels it may be dissolved, if one of them embrace the faith of Christ: He teacheth again that Subjects, and servants aught to obey their Prince, and Lords or Masters for conscience sake, neither maketh he any exception of an infidel Prince or Lord (as he did of Matrimony) yea manifestly excludeth all exception, seeing that he then spoke expressly of infidel Princes, and of infidel Lords or Masters: therefore according to this doctrine it is not lawful for faithful people to cast off the subjection which they own to an infidel Prince. 10. To the second part of the argument I answer in like manner, that Children baptised are freed from the power and company of their Parents who are Jews or infidels, not by the authority of the Pope, but either by the authority of Christ, as christian wives are from their husbands, who are infidels, or else by the authority of the civil Magistrate, to whom those infidel Parents are subject in civil matters. For we must observe two obligations, wherein children are bound to their parents, the one natural and divine, which doth consist in this that children must honour and reverence their parents, as those from whom next under God, they have received life and being, and this bond no human power can release, the other civil, which proceedeth from the civil law, and which bond, according to the customs and laws of divers nations, is more or less strict: as that children are bound to live in company of their parents, and under their potection or guard, that they cannot marry or make any contrict without the consent of their parents, and such like; and this bond as it was made by the civil law, so it may, and oftentimes is by the same law in divers cases taken away. Wherefore if that fourth Council of Toledo, which Suarez allegeth, did only declare that the baptised children of jews, were by the law of God freed from the power and company of their parents, which forbiddeth all probable danger of falling into sin, this Council maketh nothing to prove the Pope's authority to free either children or Subjects baptised from the power of their parents, or Princes, who are infidels: but if Suarez will affirm that the Council exempted baptised children of infidel parents from all civil subjection due to parents by the civil law, we answer that it maketh also little to prove that Clergy men, as Clergy men, have power to absolve children from civil subjection, for that this decree was made by the consent of the temporal Prince, King Sisennand, as appeareth both by the first words of the Council, and many other decrees, especially concerning Jews, as in the 64. Canon beginneth, Our most excellent Lord and King Sisennand commanding, the sacred Council ordaineth, etc. and the 65. By the decree of the most glorious Prince, etc. and in the very next Canon before that which Suarez citeth, the Council speaking of the jews decreeth thus, Concerning whom (to wit, the jews) this Sacred Council, by the advice of our most pious and most Religious Lord King Sisennand hath decreed, etc. 11. Wherefore there is the same disparity in this similitude which is in the former, for that children baptised to be freed from the power of their infidel parents, argueth no authority to be in the children over their parents, but only a right to keep themselves from sin, but for Subjects to depose their Prince, argueth a supreme authority and superiority to be in the Subjects over their Prince. Therefore neither with far greater reason, nor with the like reason, or scarce with any reason at all doth Suarez convince by the aforesaid similitudes, that the Pope hath power to depose Princes. And nevertheless we do freely acknowledge that the sword must be under the sword, and that they must mutually help on the other to defend the Church; but this subjection of the temporal sword to the spiritual, and of the civil power to the Ecclesiastical, we do not understand in that manner, as Suarez doth, but as we before s Cap. 3. sec. 1. nu. 13. declared in this Disputation in answering to Suarez argument. 12. The other titles which Suarez saith, he could bring but doth not, as the translation of the Empire, remitting the Reader to other Authors who have most learnedly disputed thereof. I also have examined in my Apology, wherein I have abundantly showed, that Cardinal Bellarmine, even according to his own grounds, hath not sufficiently proved, that the translation of the Roman Empire from the Grecians to the Germans, was done by the sole authority of the Pope, but that the authority, consent and suffrages of the Roman people was concurring thereunto, and therefore that no sufficient argument can be drawn from that translation to prove, that the Pope hath by Christ his institution authority to translate empires, and to dispose of kingdoms, as Cardinal Bellarmine pretended to demonstrate, wherefore I also remit the Reader to that place. Sect. X. 1. THese be all the arguments (Courteous Reader) which Suarez bringeth to prove that the Pope hath authority to depose Princes, which is the sole foundation, whereon all his chief exceptions against the Oath do depend: which his arguments, if they be of force, do evidently prove, first, that if for the necessity of saving of souls, which is the principal end of all Ecclesiastical authority, this power to depose Princes is by Christ granted to the Pope, he should also have had given him sufficient means to execute this power, seeing that the actual deposing of them, and thrusting them out of their kingdoms, is for the most part more necessary to correct and punish wicked Princes, and to defend souls from danger to be drawn by their potency to perdition, then is the sole authority to deprive them by a mere inridical sentence. And Christ, if it had pleased him, might have given to the Pope such an effectual authority, that whensoever he should excommunicate any wicked Prince, he should either presently be miraculously slain, as Ananias was at the voice of Saint Peter, or the Devil should incontinently torment him with corporal afflictions, as the fornicator was by Saint Paul. 2. Secondly, they do also convince, that the Pope hath power not only to deprive Princes of their kingdoms, but also of their lives: For according to Suarez those words of our Saviour, Whatsoever thou shalt lose, etc. & Feed my sheep, are general, nor limited to this or that kind of punishment, and therefore they aught not, saith Suarez, to be limited by us, but are to be extended to all punishments, which the Pope in his judgement and discretion shall think convenient. Nevertheless Doctor Schulckenius, or rather Cardinal Bellarmine, as most men say, whom by force of argument I greatly urged to declare his opinion in this point, doth never in such plain and perspicuous words confess the same, (although in some places, especially pag. 413. 488. & 489. it may easily be gathered) but that he may alwaios have some sort of evasion. And therefore whereas I in my Apology did oftentimes upon occasion of Cardinal Bellarmine's arguments urge this objection, and did apparently convince, that those who defend the Pope's authority to depose Princes, must of necessity according to their grounds also maintain, that the Pope for the spiritual good of souls hath also authority to kill Kings by all those ways secret or public, by which a temporal Prince for the temporal good of the Commonwealth hath authority to kill any of his Subjects, for that, according to this doctrine of deposing, the Pope hath absolutely as ample authority over Princes in order to spiritual good, as Princes have over their subjects for the temporal good: yet for all this he doth never answer directly to this objection, or rather demonstration, but still runneth to that saying of S. Leo, Ecclesiastical levity doth avoid cruel revenging; Which either may be understood that Clergy men (as Clergy) can not by the law of Christ concur to the spilling of blood, or only by the law of the Church, wherein the Pope hath power to dispense. Moreover this Doctor doth ever seek to disgrace me, and to misinterpret my sincere cogitations, affirming that by urging this objection, I only intended to make the See apostolic odious to Princes, whereas, God is my witness, I never had or have any such intention, but my only meaning is and ever was plainly and sincerely to found out the truth, it is rather themselves, who endeavour to make the See apostolic odious and dreadful to Princes, by broaching such a scandalous and desperate doctrine, and we seek rather to take away such dreadful jealousies out of the minds of Princes. 3. But Suarez perceiving the necessary consequence of this argument doth deal more sincerely, and doth in express words affirm, that the Pope hath power to deprive Princes of their lives, and to give leave to others to kill them. For thus he writeth, speaking of the Pope's authority to depose r Lib. 6. cap. 4. nu. 18. , after a condemnatory sentence given by lawful authority, whereby a King is deprived of his kingdom, or which is all one, after a declaratory sentence of the crime, which hath such a punishment imposed upon it by the law itself, he who gave the sentence, or to whom he will give commission, may deprive the King of his kingdom, also by killing him, if otherwise he cannot, or if the just sentence doth also extend to this punishment. And a little beneath he writeth thus: And in the same manner, if the Pope depose a King, he can be put out or killed only by them, to whom he shall give commission. But if he command the execution to no man, it shall belong to the lawful successor in the kingdom, or if there be none to be found, s Nu. 20. to the kingdom itself: and a little after he saith, that this doctrine is true and certain. 4. Nevertheless this doctrine of Suarez is in my opinion not only uncertain, but it is also a new and very scandalous doctrine. That it is uncertain, it may appear by that which hath been said before, for if the doctrine for the Pope's power to depose Princes, and to inflict temporal punishments, by way of coercion, be uncertain, in so much that very many Doctors do hold, as Gerson and Almain do affirm, that the Pope by Christ his institution hath not authority so much as to imprison, much more it is uncertain that he hath power to kill, and punish by shedding of blood, which Ecclesiastical lenity doth so much abhor. That it is a new doctrine it is manifest, for that before these latter years it was never taught in the Church of God, and now there is scarce one or two who dare in express words avouch the same; And whether it be a scandalous doctrine or no that if a Prince be deposed by the Pope, the next successor hath authority to kill him, if he cannot depose him, and consequently that the next successor may give leave to any private man to kill that Prince who is by the Pope deposed, I leave it to the judgement of the discreet Reader. Besides if the Pope can give leave to any man to kill a Prince after he be deposed, as Suarez affirmeth, I do not see but that he may also according to his grounds give secret licence to any man secretly to kill him, before he be deposed, if he shall think his sentence of deposition will little prevail with him, but rather be a cause to hinder his kill for that such a Prince will be more careful thereby to prevent all future treacheries; For it is not necessary that the Pope must vnking him before he hath power to kill him, for that according to Suarez doctrine a Christian King remaining a King is subject to the Pope's power of correcting and punishing, and it is left to his discretion what punishment he will inflict upon him, for that Christ hath not limited his coercive power, and therefore neither aught it to be limited by us or by any Christian Prince. 5 Moreover I cannot perceive but that this doctrine giveth way to private men to murder Kings, not only with the Pope's express licence, but also with his virtual leave, and with presumption, that either he will not or aught not to be unwilling. Which consequence although Suarez doth deny; for that, saith he t Lib. 6. cap. 4. nu. 19 , t Lib. 6. ca 4. nu. 19 a judge condemning a private heretic or malefactor doth not presently give leave to all men to kill him, therefore neither the Pope condemning an heretical, or otherwise tyrannical King doth virtually and covertly give such a licence. For there can be no just cause alleged why this licence should be presumed rather against a Prince then against others. For prudence, and a just manner in the execution itself is always necessary, and there is greater danger of disturbance, and excess in punishing a king's person than others. 6 But this reason of Suarez although it may stand, if we speak of the kill of a King, as the kill of him is a punishment, yet it is not so sufficient, if we speak of the kill of a King, as the kill of him is a defence of many innocent souls from danger of damnation. For Suarez doth hold, as we have showed before, that the Pope hath power to deprive Kings of their kingdoms, and consequently of their lives by reason of two titles, the one is in regard of the King himself to amend him, or punish him, the other in regard of the Subjects to defend them from being oppressed, which also may be applied to a Subject who is a common robber by the high ways, and condemned to death, who although he cannot be killed by any man to whom the Magistrate hath not granted particular commission, as his kill is a punishment of his offence, yet as his kill is a defence of so many innocent men, it may probably be presumed that the Magistrate giveth virtual licence to any man to kill him, if he be condemned and cannot be apprehended, but continueth still in robbing. In like manner considering the kill of a King may probably be the safety of so many souls, why may it not with great reason be presumed, according to Suarez doctrine, that the Pope is willing thereunto, if without great disturbance or other bloodshed it can privately be done? Nay why may it not with great reason be presumed that the Pope is bound in conscience to be willing, and to give express leave, yea and to command private men, if they can commodiously kill such a King, whereby a whole kingdom may be free from his Tyranny, seeing that every private man is bound to prefer the common good and salvation of so many thousand souls, although it be with imminent danger of his own life? Now whether these collections which are probably deduced from the former doctrine of Suarez be scandalous, I think that there is no prudent man but will acknowledge. And whether all Kings have not great reason to oppose themselves against such a new, and desperate doctrine, whereby there lives are subject to the indiscreet zeal of every private man, who may probably pretend that the Pope's Holiness either is or aught to be willing thereunto, I remit to the judgement of any sensible man. This is the true, ancient and undoubted doctrine, Kill him not, u 1. Reg. 26. for who shall stretch his hand against the Lord his anointed and be guiltless? The second part. Sect. I 1 Having declared the chief ground and foundation, to wit, the Pope's power to depose Princes, and to absolve subjects from their Allegiance, whereon all the Principal objections which Suarez maketh against the Oath do depend, let us now consider what particular arguments he bringeth to prove, that this Oath is unlawful, and doth covertly at leastwise contain not only the profession of temporal Allegiance, but also a flat denial Ecclesiastical and spiritual obedience. 2 But first of all thou must observe (courteous Reader) that there are to be found two only supreme powers a Out of Pope Gelasius in his Epistle to Anast. Imperat. Pope Nicholas the first in his Epistle to Michael Imperat. and Innocent 3. in cap. solitae de Maiorit. whereby this world is principally governed, which are distinguished by their proper functions, offices, and dignities, to wit, the sacred Ecclesiastical authority instituted by Christ our Lord, and the politic Sovereignty or civil power ordained also by God himself by means of the law of nature; and as there are formally two only commonwealths of mankind, the Ecclesiastical, which is called the Church of Christ, which is governed by the Ecclesiastical or spiritual authority of spiritual pastors or Bishops, especially the chief Bishop who is the Pope, whose principal end is to bring souls to the kingdom of Heaven, and therefore hath for the formal object of her directive power virtue and vice, for which men deserve either heaven, or hell; and the civil common wealth which is governed by the civil authority of Kings, Princes and supreme Potentates, and whose principal end is to conserve outwardly public peace and quietness in human society and living together, and therefore hath for the former object of her directive power public peace and dsquietnes, and human justice or injustice whereby human society and conversation is preserved or disturbed; So all the actions of mankind must be reduced and do belong to one of these two powers and commonwealths to whom they are subjecteth, and by whom they must be directed, punished or rewarded, & likewise all obedience or subjection is reduced either to Ecclesiastical & spiritual oobedience, or to politic, temporal, & civil obedience or Allegiance: in so much that if it cannot be proved that such an obedience is civil, it must be Ecclesiastical, and if it cannot be proved that it is an Ecclesiastical obedience, it must needs be civil, for all obedience is either Ecclesiastical or Civil, & if it be the one, it cannot in the same respect be the other, for that these two obediences are distinguished of their own natures. 3 Spiritual Obedience is that which is due only to the Pope's spiritual authority, Civil obedience is that, which is only due to the civil authority of Kings and Princes, who in matters mere temporal acknowledge no superior in earth: so that to know what obedience is spiritual and due to the Pope, and what obedience is civil and due to temporal Princes, we must also know what authority the Pope hath, and what authority temporal Princes have. That spiritual authority only be longeth to the Pope which Christ hath given to S. Peter, and his Successors, as they are his Vicegerents, and Substitutes here in earth, therefore all other authority, which Christ hath not given to S. Peter is civil, and must belong to temporal Princes: wherefore with the same certainty that we believe Christ to have given or not have given to S. Peter such an authority, with the same certainty we believe that authority to be spiritual or temporal. So that if it be certain that Christ hath given to S. Peter and his Successors authority to inflict temporal punishments by way of coercion, it is also certain that this authority is spiritual, if it be only probable that Christ hath given to S. Peter and his Successors such an authority, it is also only probable that such an authority is spiritual, and consequently it is also probable that the aforesaid authority is not spiritual but temporal, for if any opinion or doctrine be only probable, the contrary opinion must also be probable. 4 From this we may easily understand the true meaning of that equivocal proposition which Suarez bringeth a little beneath; that to treat of the Pope's authority, b Lib. 6. cap. 2. nu 4. and to propound it to be sworn, or abjured, doth not appertain to the civil or temporal power of the King, or to civil obedience due unto him. For this proposition may be understood two manner of ways; first that to treat of the Pope's authority in such sort as to define and determine certainly what authority Christ hath given or not given to the Pope, and to propound that authority which doth certainly appertain to the Pope to be either abjured or sworn as only probable, doth not belong to he Civil or temporal power of a King, who hath not authority to decide what power Christ hath given to the Pope; and in this sense the aforesaid proposition of Suarez is true. Secondly, the meaning of that proposition may be, that to treat of that power of the Pope, which is probably judged not to be a spiritual power of the Pope but a temporal power of a King, and to propound it to be sworn as probable, so long as it remaineth probable, doth not appertain to the temporal power of a King; and in this sense his proposition is untrue; for otherwise it should not appertain to the civil power to treat of any authority which the Pope should challenge over temporal Kings, or which some few Catholics against the common opinion of others, should give & attribute to the Pope: & consequently a temporal King could not 'cause his Subjects to acknowledge by Oath, that the Pope is not King of the whole Christian world, & that he hath not a direct power & dominion in temporals over his Kingdom, which power nevertheless Card. Bellarmine himself doth vehemently impugn as an invention of man, and a usurpation of civil power. 5 Neither doth a temporal King, when he treateth of the Pope's power, which is probably thought not to belong to the Pope, but to temporal Princes, and therefore doth cause his Subjects to acknowledge by oath that it doth belong to him, and not to the Pope, (which considering that it is probable they may lawfully acknowledge) treat of the Pope's power as it is accounted a spiritual power, & therefore belonging to the Pope, but as it is probably accounted a temporal power, & therefore belonging to the King. For a temporal King may by temporal right treat, dispute, and maintain that authority, which probably is thought to be a temporal, and not a spiritual authority. In like manner temporal Kings may forbidden, and punish spiritual offences, not as they are spiritual but as they are temporal, wrongs, and disturbances of the public peace in a civil Commonwealth: and so they may punish heresies, and perjuries, which are evidently known to be such not as they are spiritual, but as they are temporal injuries, a I showed before c Cap. 7. sec. 2. nu. 17. out of Sotus, and Bannes. And for the same cause they may compel their Subjects by temporal punishments to abjure heresies, which are clearly known to be heresies, if such an abjuration upon prudent and probable motives be thought necessary to the preserving of public peace and quietness in the Civil Commonwealth. But to define what proposition is heretical, or to determine what authority is spiritual, and belonging to the Pope when it is called in question, doth exceed the limits of temporal or civil authority. I omit to examine at this present, whether the civil authority of Christian Kings may forbidden and punish with temporal punishments spiritual crimes as they are spiritual, and hurtful to the Church whereof they are by God appointed to be Protectors, considering that their office is to defend the Church, to root out heretics and schismatics, as Card. Bellarmine himself doth acknowledge. See above in this Disputation chap. 7. sec. 2. nu. 15. 6 Secondly, if thou wilt observe (courteous Reader) that protestation, profession and acknowledgement, which those thirteen reverend, learned, and virtuous Priests (of whom I made mention in this Disputation * Cap. 3. sec. 3. nu. 10. ) did make of their loyalty, and allegiance to our late Queen Elizabeth the fifth day of November in the year of our Lord 1602, thou shalt find great coherence to be betwixt their profession and protestation, and this oath of Allegiance, and that almost all the principal exceptions, which Suarez taketh against this oath, may in like manner be taken against their profession and protestation. And yet those learned and virtuous Priests were fully persuaded, that the profession of that civil obedience & allegiance, which they did make to Queen Elizabeth being at that time both excommunicated & deposed by the Pope, did no way derogate from that spiritual obedience, which they did own to the Pope's Holiness, and which also in that their profession they did in express words acknowledge. And because I would not have thee to rely upon my bore word, I thought it expedient to set down their profession and protestation word by word as it lieth, which is as followeth. Whereas it hath pleased our dread Sovereign Lady to take some notice of the faith, and loyalty of us her natural borne subjects Secular Priests (as it appeareth in the late Proclamation) and of her Princelike clemency hath given a sufficient earnest of some merciful favour towards us (being all subject by the laws of the Realm to death by our return into the Country after our taking the Order of Priesthood since the first year of her majesties reign) and only demandeth of us a true profession of our Allegiance, thereby to be assured of our fidelity to her majesties person, Crown, Estate, and Dignity, We, whose names are underwrittten, in most humble wise prostrate at her majesties feet do acknowledge ourselves infinitely bound unto her Majesty therefore, and are most willing to give such assurance and satisfaction in this point, as any Catholic Priests can or aught to give unto their Sovereigns. First, therefore we acknowledge, and confess the Queen's Majesty to have as full authority, power, and Sovereignty over us, and over all the Subjects of the Realm, as any her highness Predecessors ever had; and further we protest, that we are most willing and ready to obey her in all cases and respects as far forth, as ever Christian Priests within that Realm, or in any other Christian Country were bound by the law of God and Christian Religion to obey their temporal Princes; as to pay tribute, and all other Regal duties unte her Highness, and to obey her laws and Magistrates in all civil causes, to pray unto God for her prosperous and peaceable Reign in this life according to his blessed will, and that she may hereafter attain everlasting bliss in the life to come. And this our acknowledgement we think to be so grounded upon the word of God, as that no authority, no cause, or pretence of cause can or aught upon any occasion be a sufficient warrant more unto us then to any Protestant to disobey her M tie in any civil or temporal matter. Secondly, whereas for these many years past divers conspiracies against her majesties Person and estate, and sundry forcible attempts for invading and conquering her Dominions have been made under we know not what pretences and intendments of restoring Catholic Religion by the sword (a course most strange in the world, and under taken peculiarly and solely against her Majesty and her Kingdoms among other Princes departed from the Religion and obedience of the See apostolic (no less than she) by reason of which violent enterprises her Majesty otherwise of singular Clemency toward her Subjects hath been greatly moved to ordain, and execute severer laws against Catholics (which by reason of their union with the See apostolic in faith and Religion were easily supposed to favour these conspiracies and invasions) then perhaps had ever been enacted or thought upon, if such hostility and wars had never been under taken, We, to assure her Majesty of our faithful loyalty also in this particular cause do sincerely protest, and by this our public fact make known to all the Christian world, that in these cases of Conspiracies, of practising her majesties death, of invasions, and of whatsoever forcible attempts which hereafter may be made by any foreign Prelate, Prince or Potentate whosoever either jointly or severally for the disturbance or subversion of her majesties Person, Estate, Realms, or Dominions under colour, show, pretence or intendment of restoring the Catholic like Roman Religion in England or Ireland, We will defend her majesties Person, Estate, Realms and Dominions from all such forcible and violent assaults and injuries. And moreover we will not only ourselves detect and reveal any Conspiracy or plot which we shall understand to be undertaken by any Prelate, Prince or Potentate against her majesties Person or Dominions for any cause whatsoever as is before expressed, and likewise to the uttermost of our power resist them, but also will earnestly persuade, as much as in us lieth, all Catholics to do the same. Thirdly, if upon any Excommunication denounced or to be denounced, against her Majesty, or upon any such conspiracies, invasions or forcible attempts to be made as are before expressed, the Pope should also excommunicate every one borne within her majesties Dominions that would not forsake the aforesaid defence of her Majesty and her Realms, and take part with such conspirators or invaders in these and all other such like cases, We in these and all such like cases do think ourselves and all the Lay-Catholikes borne within her majesties Dominions not bound in conscience to obey this or any such like censure, but will defend our Prince and Country accounting it our duties so to do, and that notwithstanding any authority, or any Excommunication whatsoever either denounced or to be denounced as is aforesaid to yield unto her Majesty all obedience in temporal causes. And because nothing is more certain than that whilst we endeavour to assure her Majesty of our dutiful affection and allegiance by this our Christian and sincere protestation, there will not want who will condemn and misconstrue our lawful fact, yea and by many sinister suggestions and calumnies discredit our doings with the Christian world, but chief with the Pope's Holiness to the greatest prejudice, and harm of our good names and persons that may be unless maturely we prevent their endeavours herein, We most humbly beseech her Majesty, that in this our recognizing and yielding Caesar's due unto her, we may also by her Gracious leave be permitted for avoiding obloquy & calumnies to make known by like public Act, that by yielding her right unto her, we departed from no bound of that Christian duty which we own to our Supreme spiritual Pastor. And therefore we acknowledge and confess the Bishop of Rome to be the Successor of Saint Peter in that See, and to have as ample and no more authority or jurisdiction over us and other Christians then had that Apostle by the gift and commission of Christ our Saviour, and that we will obey him so far forth as we are bound by the laws of God to do, which we doubt not but will stand well with performance of our duty to our temporal Prince in such sort as we have before professed. For as we are most ready to spend our blood in the defence of her Majesty & our Country so will we rather lose our lives then infringe the lawful authority of Christ's Catholic Church. William Bishop. john Colleton. john Much. Robert Charnock. john Bossevile. Antony Hebborne. Roger Cadwallader. Robert Drury. Antony Champney. john jackson. Francis Barneby. Oswald Needham. Richard Button. Sect. II. 1. THese being observed, Suarez in his sixth, & last book examineth particularly all the chief branches of the oath, & after that in the first Chapter he hath set down the true state of the controversy, wherein we do agreed with him as I said before (always understanding the question of the modal and not of the absolute proposition as I also there declared) in the second Chapter he divideth the whole oath into four parts, or paragraphs. The first is from the beginning of the oath to those words, Also I do swear etc. The second to those words, And I do further swear. The third to those words, And I do believe, The fourth containeth all the other clauses unto the end. 2 First therefore Suarez, d Cap. 2. nu. 2. objecteth against those words [our Sovereign Lord King james] that although these words being sincerely propounded and understood do seem to contain expressly no other thing then the profession of a temporal Dominion and Kingdom, nevertheless according to the intention of the speaker in an other oath never as yet recalled, and which is sufficiently known by the public acknowledgement and writings of the King and according to the vulgar and received meaning in that Kingdom, those words [our Sovereign Lord King james] do signify that he is supreme or Sovereign simply, as well in spirituals, as in temporals; supreme, I say, positively in his Kingdom, because he is above all as well Ecclesiastical persons as Lay-men both in temporals and also spirituals, and negatively in respect of the whole world, or of the Church, because he acknowledgeth therein no Superior: Seeing therefore that in this form of the Oath the swearer is compelled to acknowledge in that manner the King as Sovereign Lord, he is compelled covertly to confess his Sovereign Primacy in great Britanny, and Ireland, and his exemption from all Superior power, & consequently he is compelled covertly to abjure the Pope's Sovereign spiritual power. So therefore in that only clause [our Sovereign Lord] is contained something more than civil, & temporal obedience. 3 To this objection we have already e Cap. 2. sec. 1. sufficiently answered, it being the very same which Gretzer urged. For neither the vulgar and received meaning of those words [our Sovereign Lord] is, that he is supreme in all causes as well Ecclesiastical as temporal, neither doth his Majesty understand them in that sense; neither would Suarez, if he had understood our English phrase, have urged this argument. For that according to our manner of speech we make a distinction betwixt Sovereign, and Supreme, although in Latin they are both expressed by the same word Supremus; and Sovereign is an Epitheton, as the Grammarians term it, to every absolute Prince, yea rather King, and Sovereign are a kind of Synonimies or words of the self same signification, therefore we usually say [our Sovereign] meaning thereby [our King] without adding King or Lord. Whereupon in the Oath itself of Supremacy it is not said, that the King is Sovereign Governor in all causes as well Ecclesiastical as Temporal, for those words do sound but harshly, but Supreme Governor in all causes, making a manifest distinction betwixt Supreme & Sovereign, Supremacy and Sovereignty. And although I do not deny, but that the King doth persuade himself to be supreme Lord in all causes, and hath confirmed the law wherein his Subjects were bound by Oath to acknowledge the same when it should be demanded at their hands, yet we deny that his Majesty did intent that his Subjects shoula acknowledge the same in this Oath, wherein he intended to demand nothing more than the profession of natural and civil allegiance, as we oftentimes have declared heretofore. Sect. III. 1 SEcondly, Suarez f Cap. 2. nu. 4. & seq. , excepteth mainly against those words [And that the Pope neither of himself, nor by any authority of the Church etc. hath any power or authority to the pose the King and so forth] For who, I pray you, can say that by these words is only demanded of the Subjects such civil obedience, which Subjects own to their Sovereign Princes? Truly other Kings of the Church are no less Supreme Princes in temporals then is the King of England, and yet they do neither exact such an obedience, neither do they believe that it is due to them from their Subjects. Therefore the King of England doth plainly show, that he speaketh and thinketh of himself as of such a Sovereign or Supreme Prince who hath in earth no Superior at all, and that by this oath he demandeth of his Subjects this profession. 2 Besides, by those words is not so much sworn obedience to the the King, as Pope's power is abjured, but to treat of the Pope's power, and to propound it to be sworn, or forsworn, doth not belong to the civil power, therefore those words do plainly exceed the bounds of civil obedience, both for that the words themselves as it is manifest by them, do signify some thing else besides civil obedience due to a King, and also for that the very exacting of such an oath and the imposing of an obligation to profess this or that concerning the Pope's power is an Act of jurisdiction more than civil, yea and superior or not subject to the Pope's authority; because it doth not belong to a civil power to prescribe limits to a spiritual, especially which is supreme. Two manner of ways therefore (to declare the matter with Theological terms) the King by those words doth exact more than civil obedience, first in actu signato, by propounding a matter not civil, secondly in actu exercito by using a power more than civil, and by compelling the Subjects to submit themselves unto it, and by their profession to acknowledge it. 3 Moreover g Cap. 2. nu. 4. , by those words is propounded a profession of a certain error against the Doctrine approved by the universal Church; for that it doth include this proposition, and the faith thereof, that there is not power in the Pope nor in the universal Church to depose a baptised King in any case, or for any cause, or crime: But how false this proposition is, how disagreeable to the principles of faith, to the practice of the Church, and also to all reason supposing the Pastoral office which Christ hath committed to his Vicar, it hath been sufficiently showed in the third book. 4 Lastly, of the same nature h Nu. 5. is another clause of this branch, wherein the King compelleth his Subjects to swear, [that the Pope hath not power to discharge any of his Subjects of their obedience and allegiance to his Majesty, or to give leave to any of them to bear Arms, to raise tumult, or to offer any violence or hurt to his majesties Royal Person, State or government, or to any of his majesties Subjects within his majesties Dominions.] Which clause is almost of the same nature with the former, & doth proceed from the same error, to wit, that the Pope hath no coercive power over a King by temporal violence, or other temporal punishments, which doctrine in the third book we have showed to be erroneous. Wherefore also in this clause there is propounded to be sworn more than civil obedience, and a spiritual power is usurped, and the Subjects are in the oath compelled to profess, and acknowledge it to be in the King. And lastly the power also of the Pope is abjured, and an error is sworn against the doctrine of faith. 5 Yea here are i Nu. 7. included new errors: one is that the Pope hath not power to release Oaths, although a just and reasonable cause doth concur, which is against the custom of the Church, and against the practice and approbation of General councils, cap. 2. de re iudicata in. 6ᵒ. and against the consent of Catholic Doctors, and against the power to bind and loose given to S. Peter and so declared by the practice and custom of all Christian people, and moreover it is also against reason. For in like Oaths there is always included either a secret condition, if the promise cannot be performed without notable hurt, and danger to the swearer, but especially when that danger or hurt proceedeth through the wrong and violence of him, to whom the promise is made; or else the right and power of the Superior it understood to be reserved, who can, notwithstanding the promise made by the subject, forbidden him to perform that thing which he promised, if a just and reasonable cause do occur, and consequently can release the Oath by forbidding the matter. Lastly this error supposeth the former. For if the Pope hath power to depose the King, of necessity he hath power to take away the bond of obedience and of the Oath, because obedience is not promised to james, as he is james, but as he is King, whereupon if he cease to be King, forthwith no obedience is due unto him, and presently the Oath doth not bind; for the matter of the Oath, being taken away, consequently the obligation of the Oath must of necessity be taken away. 6 An other new error is, k Nu. 8. for that not only the Pope's power to depose an heretical King is denied, but also to constrain his Subjects by such like punishments, as appeareth by those words [or to any of his majesties Subjects] For the sense of these words is not, that the Pope hath power to authorize at his pleasure and without a reasnable and just cause compelling him thereunto, any foreign Prince to invade or annoyed him or his Subjects, etc. But the meaning of those words is, that the Pope hath not power to offer any violence or hurt either to the King or to his Subjects, nor to give licence to any other to do any such like thing against the Subjects of the King of England, although they be Apostates and Rebels to the Roman Church, and sowers or favourers of Schisms, and Heresies, which is a great and new error, or doubtless the same of the King's Spuremacie explained. For what other thing is this then to profess the Subjects of the King of England to have no other Superior in earth besides the King himself, and that they can not be constrained or punished for their crimes by any other, although they be pernicious to other Catholics, and to the Church of Christ. Therefore by all these clauses either expressly enough, or at the leastwise covertly is denied and abjured the supreme power of the Pope & given to the King. Whereupon it is concluded that both it is false that there is nothing in this Oath demanded besides the profession of civil and temporal Obedience, and that contrariwise it is most true, that this Oath is mixed, and doth virtually contain whatsoever was propounded to be sworn in the former clauses. Neither do I see what can be answered to these reasons with any show of probability. 7 To this objection I have already sufficiently answered, by fully satisfying all the arguments which Suarez hath brought, to prove that the doctrine for the Pope's power to depose Princes is certain, whereon this whole objection of Suarez doth principally depend. For in this Oath is only demanded that Obedience, which is probably thought to be civil, and consequently to be due to all temporal Princes. And although at this time other Christian Princes do not demand it, for that they have not the like cause which his Majesty hath, yet considering that it is a thing probably due unto them, it being not as yet defined by the Church that it is a spiritual obedience and due to the Pope, but probably defended by many Catholics that it is a temporal Obedience, and consequently due to all temporal Princes, they may demand it of their Subjects, and compel them to acknowledge the same as probable, whensoever they shall prudently judge such an acknowledgement, being in itself lawful, to be necessary to the preservation of themselves and of their temporal State. What other Kings do think concerning this point can hardly be known, but that almost all absolute Princes have hitherto thought that he had no such power, when he would put it in execution, by deposing them, by all Stories it is evident. 8 Neither doth his Majesty in this Oath prescribe limits to the Pope's power, but doth only bind his Subjects to acknowledge that power to belong probably unto him, which by Catholic Doctors is thought probably to be his own power, and to appertain to him, and which his Subjects with a probable and safe conscience may acknowledge, and consequently he doth only compel his Subjects to acknowledge not directly, but indirectly and secondarily what limits are probably by Catholic Doctors prescribed to the Pope's power; For his Maiectie doth not treat of the Pope's power, as it is the Popes, without any reference to his own power, but he doth principally and directly treat of his own & all Regal authority as it is thought probably to be his own, and to belong to all temporal Princes, & secondarily, for that it cannot be both a civil and a spiritual power, and belong both to the Pope and also to temporal Princes, as I have showed in the first section, he treateth also of the Pope's power not positively what power doth belong to the Pope, but what power doth belong to temporal Princes, and so negatively what power doth not belong to the Pope. And truly to me it seemeth a paradox to affirm, that a temporal Prince cannot treat what power doth not belong to the Pope, for so a King could not compel his Subjects to acknowledge that the Pope is not King of his kingdom, nor direct Lord of his Dominions, & that he hath not authority to created Dukes, Earls or Barons in his kingdom, nor to give leave to any man to hunt in his Parks, and such like, for if he do treat of civil power he must of necessity negatively treat of spiritual, seeing that it cannot be in the same respect civil & spiritual. 9 Wherefore his Majesty doth no way in this Oath exact more than which is probably thought to be civil Obedience, either in actu signato, by propounding a matter, which is not probably thought to be civil, or in actu exercito, by using a power more, than which is probably thought to be civil, or by compelling his subjects to acknowledge any other power then which is probably thought to appertain to all temporal Princes. Neither can this doctrine of deposing Princes by the Pope's authority, or of releasing Subjects of their obedience, or of punishing them with temporal punishments by way of coercion, as due to the Pope by the institution of Christ, be proved to be certain, as by answering all Suarez arguments, I have sufficiently showed; Neither in this Oath doth the swearer acknowledge, that the Pope cannot release Oaths in general, but only this Oath of Allegiance, nor that he cannot punish at all wicked Princes or Subjects, but only that he cannot punish them with temporal punishments in that manner as I have declared, which profession and acknowledgement is neither repugnant to Scriptures, councils, Canons, or practise of the universal Church, as in the first part I have showed more at large. Neither is the swearer compelled to acknowledge the faith of this Doctrine, if Suarez mean a supernatural belief, but only to profess, testify and declare his opinion, and what with a moral credulity he believeth concerning the aforesaid doctrine. Wherefore by none of these clauses either expressly or covertly is denied the Pope's supreme power and given to the King which is certainly known to be the Pope's power, but only that power which is probably thought to belong to all Kings, and consequently not to the Pope is acknowledged and professed in this Oath: And whether these answers be probable or not, I remit to the judgement of any indifferent Reader. Sect. four 1 IN the second part of the Oath which beginneth from those words [also I do swear] Suarez l Cap. 3. nu. 1. affirmeth first, that there is almost nothing contained therein different from the former, but all those things concerning the Pope's power, which are abjured in the former, are in this second part more expressly declared, and abjured. And the sum of his discourse he concludeth m Nu. 3. with this; that by these words of the Oath is clearly demanded of the Subjects not only civil Obedience, but also the profession of this errors, that the Pope hath not power and jurisdiction to give sentence of deposition against the King for any cause whatsoever; and that therefore the Subjects do sin most grievously in taking this oath. For he that taketh this Oath doth either believe, or not believe that which he outwardly professeth, if he doth believe, he is in heart and deed a schismatic, and doth err in doctrine of faith, if he doth not believe that which he professeth, he sinneth against the confession of his faith, and against the religion of the Oath, whether he sweareth without intention or with intention to perform, that which he sweareth to perform, for that by the former way he is forsworn, and by the latter he maketh the Oath to be a bond of iniquity, and purposeth rather to obey men then God by promising to obey the King against the Pope's sentence and command. 2 And the like discourse he maketh n Nu. 6. concerning those words [notwithstanding any absolution of the said Subjects] For these words do also exceed politic obedience, because that a Pope can or cannot absolve from an Oath is not a matter of civil obedience, but it is an Ecclesiastical matter belonging to the interpretation of the power to bind and loose granted to S. Peter by Christ our Lord. And besides these words have connexion with the former, and do contain the same error. Because the obligation of obedience in any degree or state whatsoever doth so long endure in the subject, as the dignity or power and jurisdiction doth endure in the superior, for these are correlatives and the one dependeth on the other. So therefore if the Pope can depose the King, he can also absolve his subjects from their obedience, therefore at the lest there is equal error in abjuring every sentence of deposition given by the Pope's authority. I add also that there is a new error included in this later part, because the Pope without deposing a King from his kingdom may command the subjects not to obey a King, who is obstinate in any error or any public or scandalous crime, and to absolve them for that time from the Oath of obedience by way of suspending the obligation: o Cap. 6. nu. 13 which Suarez more fully doth declare beneath: For two manner of ways, a perverse and a rebellious King against the Church and Religion, may be deprived by the Pope of his Regal authority, & his Subjects absolved from their Allegiance, one way of the use only and by a manner of suspension, an other way of the propriety and dominion & by a manner of deposition. Suarez cap. 6. nu. 14. 3 The first manner of deprivation is intrinsically included in the bond itself of Mayor excommunication, as Pope Gregory the seventh doth teach in cap. Nos sanctorum. 15. q. 6. Where he saith: We keeping the decrees of our holy Predecessors do by Apostolical authority absolve those who either by Allegiance or Oath are obliged to excommunicated persons, and we altogether forbidden that they do them no loyalty until they come to make satisfaction. By which words Pope Gregory doth not so much make a new prohibition, as declare that, which is made by virtue of such a Censure. For that censure doth deprive not only of sacred but also of Civil communication in all those things & cases, which are not excepted by the Law, but in this there is not only made any exception but also the prohibition is declared. And that it is not an absolute deposition, but as it were a suspension it appeareth by the limitation there adjoined, [until they come to make satisfaction] for by this it is manifest that the aforesaid absolution is not perpetual, but during that obligation. But because those last words are said not to be in a Manuscript found in the Vatican, the like decision with that express declaration is made by Pope Paschalis the second in c. juratos. 15. q 6. quamdiu excommunicatus est, as long as he is excommunicated, and the like limitation is found in cap. ultimo de poenis. 4 Neither doth the King's objection make against this, (because excommunication is a spiritual censure, & therefore depriving of jurisdiction or of temporal power even by taking away the use and by a kind of suspending doth exceed the limits thereof) For we deny his consequence. For although Excommunication be called a spiritual censure either by reason of the principal matter and end thereof, or because it proceedeth from a spiritual power, yet as the power itself although it be spiritual is indirectly extended to temporals, so also the censure of Excommunication is in the same manner both spiritual, and is indirectly extended to temporals, for it doth deprive not only of Sacred but also of civil and human communication, as it is manifest by the institution thereof and by the practice of the Church approved by perpetual tradition and founded in Scripture. For 2. Io. 1. it is said, Neque ave ei dixeritis, Do not say unto him, God save you, and Paul 1. Cor. 5. with such a one not so much as to take meat. And the reason he insinuateth in the same place, when he saith, I have judged, etc. To deliver such an one to Satan for the destruction of the flesh that the spirit may be saved in the day of our Lord jesus Christ. So therefore by excommmunication a man is vexed also in temporals and corporals, that vexation may give understanding that he may leave off to disobey. Suarez. cap. 6. nu. 16. 5 But the other manner of privation by way of deposition from the kingdom, or from other temporal authority, and consequently with a perpetual absolution of the Subjects from civil Allegiance and obedience, is net indeed a proper and an intrinsical effect of Maior excommunication, if nothing else be added, but it is adjoined unto censures by way of a particular punishment, when the offences of Princes do compel Popes to use that severity, which use hath been sufficiently proved by us in the third book, p cap. 6. nu. 13. Seeing therefore that the Catholic Church doth teach both these kind of deprivations by virtue of excommunication and by sentence of deposition, and it is as certain that the Pope hath authority to depose as he hath authority to excommunicate, although an express abjuring of the Pope's power to excommunicate is not contained in this Oath, yet a hidden and virtual abjuring thereof is contained. 6 Here Suarez as you see hath made a long discourse to prove this second part of the Oath to be unlawful, and yet he confesseth that there is almost nothing contained in this part which is different from the former, but that all those things which are abjured in the former concerning the Pope's power, are more expressly declared and abjured in this part, and therefore the same answer which we brought to the former objection will in like manner satisfy this. For as it is no error inwardly to believe (speaking of a moral credulity and a probable persuasion) that the Pope hath no power to depose Princes, and consequently neither to absolve Subjects of their Allegiance, so also it is no error or offence outwardly to profess the same. Neither hath Suarez in his third book, to which he so often remitteth his Reader, sufficiently proved (as by the answers which I have brought to his arguments doth clearly appear) that it is either a point of faith or an undoubted doctrine, that the Pope hath by Christ his institution authority to deprive Princes of their Regal power and authority to reign, either for a time by virtue of excommunication, and by a kind of suspension (call it as you will) or by sentence of deposition for ever: and consequently neither is it certain, that he hath authority to discharge subjects of their Allegiance either wholly or for a time, seeing that, according to Suarez doctrine before related, a power in a Prince to command, and a duty in the Subjects to obey, or, which is all one, Regal authority, and submissive obedience are correlatives, neither can one be without the other: and therefore neither is he who holdeth this doctrine to be probable, (seeing that it is maintained by many learned & virtuous Catholics, as I have showed before) to be accounted a schismatic, or heretic, or to err in doctrine of faith, as Suarez too too rashly affirmeth, and which with demonstrative arguments he will never in my opinion be able to convince. 7 And although it doth not appertain to civil obedience, as I showed before, to acknowledge positively what power belongeth to the Pope, either concerning his power to absolve from Oaths or otherwise, (for that his power is spiritual and exceedeth the limits of civil authority) yet it doth appertain to civil obedience, to acknowledge that temporal power which belongeth to the King, and consequently to acknowledge what power doth not belong to the Pope, considering that the same power which is civil, and therefore belonging to the King, cannot be spiritual and belonging to the Pope. And so in this Oath the Subjects are not compelled to acknowledge that the Pope hath not power to absolve from Oaths in general, but only from the Oath of Allegiance, for that the acknowledging, denying and also the dissolving of temporal Allegiance is by Catholic Doctors thought it to be a temporal and not a spiritual cause. In like manner Suarez might affirm, that a temporal Prince cannot compel his Subjects to swear their temporal Allegiance, for that an Oath is an act of Religion, and consequently a spiritual cause, and therefore not belonging to temporal Obedience. But these and such like are narrow shifts: for no Catholic will deny, that although an Oath being taken precisely by itself be a spiritual act, yet as it is a confirmation of a civil contract, and of civil Allegiance, it is a temporal cause and maybe exacted by civil authority, and if it be broken, also punished by the civil Magistrate with temporal punishments. 8 Now concerning that new error which Suarez affirmeth to be contained in the later part of this branch, we affirm, that it is no error but a probable doctrine of many Catholics, that the Pope hath no authority by Christ his institution to depose Princes, and consequently neither to absolve Subjects of their Allegiance either for a certain time or for ever, either by virtue of Excommunication, or by sentence of deprivation, neither is that true, which Suarez doth so confidently aver, that in the bond of Maior excommunication is intrinsically included the discharging of Subjects of their Allegiance, as is manifest by the definition of excommunication, which he himself assigneth, q Tom. 5. disp. 8. sec. 1. which is this. Excommunication is an Ecclesiastical censure whereby one is deprived of the Ecclesiastical Communion of the faithful; wherefore Excommunication according to Suarez own definition doth intrinsically and of it own nature only deprive one of ecclesiastical participation, as of Sacraments and other holy rites, & not of civil conversation and much less of temporal Allegiance, which Subjects by the Law of God do own to their lawful Prince. And this is clearly signified by those words of holy Scripture, r Matth. 18. and if he will not hear the Church, let him be to thee as the Heathen and the Publican, for we are not forbidden by the Law of God to converse civilly with Heathens or Publicans, unless some spiritual danger, which by the Law of God and nature is forbidden, and which we are bound to avoid, should arise thereby. Neither did S. Paul when he forbade to keep company and to eat with a fornicator, a covetous person, a server of Idols, a railer, a drunkard or extortioner, nor S. john when he commanded, that we should not salute an heretic, as most Expositors do interpret, did excommunicate those persons, but only forbade that we should not converse with them, if our conversing with them were a scandal to the weak, an encouragement to them to continued still in their wickedness, or a danger to be ourselves perverted by them, as S. Thomas expoundeth that place: out of these three cases the holy Scripture doth not forbidden us to converse civilly with notorious sinners, yea although they be heretics. 9 But we must with all remember, that as the Apostles commanded, that we should not converse with notorious sinners, jest that we should seem to communicate in their wicked deeds, so also they commanded servants to obey their Masters, children their parents, and subjects their temporal Princes, although they were wicked, yea and infidels, (for then there were no Christian Kings at all.) Now I would gladly know of Suarez, whether if a master, father, or Prince be excommunicated, their servants, children and subjects are by the Law of God forthwith discharged of that service, obedience, and Allegiance which by the law of God they did own to them: Certain it is that according to his own doctrine, and according to that definition of Excommunication which out of him we did relate, they are not freed of that duty wherein by the Law of God they stand bound to them as to their superiors, and therefore he speaketh very improperly when he affirmeth, that discharging of Subjects of their Allegiance is intrinsically included in Mayor excommunication. It remaineth therefore that the discharging of Subjects of their Allegiance can only for that cause be said to be included any way in the sentence of excommunication, for that the Church excommunicating a Prince doth thereby take away from that Prince his regal authority, and consequently release the Subjects of their subjection, for as before s Cap. 3. sec. 5. nu. 3. we showed out of Cardinal Bellarmine, and Suarez also confesseth the same, obedience and subjection is by the Law of God due to every lawful Prince. So that here is no new error as Suarez affirmeth, but the same principal question remaineth which was before, whether the Church hath authority to chastise Princes with temporal punishments; for if she hath no such authority, she cannot by virtue of Excommunication inflict such a temporal punishment, considering that by the Law of God no such punishment is annexed to Excommunication, which being only a spiritual censure cannot of it own nature according to Suarez definition deprive one of civil but only of Ecclesiastical conversation: and this was the meaning of those words of his Majesty, whom Suarez hath not sufficiently confuted. For when his Majesty affirmed, that excommunication is a spiritual censure, he did not only mean that it proceeded from a spiritual power, and tended to a spiritual end, but that it is by the Law of God and of it own nature, as Suarez himself defineth it, a mere spiritual censure or punishment only depriving one of the Ecclesiastical communion of the faithful, & therefore doth not extend to temporal punishments as it is instituted by our Saviour Christ. 10 And if Suarez reply, that although by Christ his institution Excommunication hath only this spiritual effect to deprive one of the Ecclesiastical Communion of the faithful, yet Christ hath left in the power of the Church to annex unto Excommunication other temporal effects and punishments: We answer that this is very true, but with all that those effects or punishments must be such, which the Church hath authority to infict: but whether the Church hath power to depose Princes and to inflict temporal punishments by way of coercion, is the main question which is now in hand: I say by the way of coercion, for no doubt the Church hath power to command certain temporal things and so annex them to Excommunication, as not to eat, drink, salute, nor to have any civil conversation with excommunicated persons out of those cases wherein by the law of God they are not bound civilly to converse; and so the Church may command one to fast, to give alms and such like, when it is necessary for the salvation of souls, but if notwithstanding the command of the Church we do converse with such persons, we do not fast, we do not give alms and such like, what then can thy Church do? Many Catholic Doctors, as I related before out of Gerson and Almainus, do probably think that her power doth not extend to inflict temporal punishments, not not so much as to imprison, but that the last punishment which she by Christ his institution can inflict is Excommunication or some such like spiritual censure. I say, by Christ his institution, for seeing that temporal Princes have given to the Church either expressly or virtually many temporal privileges, all those punishments which depend on these, she may also annex to excommunication. But to command Subjects not so obey their temporal Prince, and to absolve them from that obedience which is due to temporal Princes by the law of God and Nature (for Regal authority in a Prince, and civil obedience in the Subjects are correlatives as Suarez before affirmed) the Church hath no authority, unless she hath power to depose Kings and to make them no Kings, which whether she hath any power to do, is the principal controversy which is now in hand. To those two Canons Nos Sanctorum, & juratos, which Suarez bringeth for his main ground to prove that the Pope may for a time at lest wise absolve Subjects of their allegiance, I have sufficiently answered heretofore t Cap. 6. sec. 3. nu. 12. & seq. , which answer may also be applied to that last Chapter de poenis. 11 And whereas Suarez affirmeth, that Excommunication doth deprive not only of Sacred, but also of civil and human communication, as is manifest by the institution thereof and by the practice of the Church approved by perpetual tradition, we grant that the Church by the way of command may as I said before borbid one to communicate civility with an excommunicated person, out of those cases wherein he is not otherwise bound by the law of God to communicate, and this Doctrine is founded in holy Scripture; but, that this civil effect is annexed to Excommunication by the institution of Christ or the Apostles, we utterly deny, and the definition of Excommunication, which Suarez himself bringeth, doth manifestly show the contrary. Neither is it the practice of the Church approved by perpetual tradition, that if a Prince be excommunicated he is forthwith deprived of all human Society, and his Subjects commanded to voided altogether his company, as appeareth when Pope Honorius excommunicated Arcadius the Emperor and Saint Ambrose Theodosius. We grant that of late years since some Popes have challenged to them power to depose Princes, and to discharge Subjects of their Allegiance, they have annexed to Excommunication the aforesaid effect, but neither this opinion nor practice hath ever been universally received, but always contradicted by Catholic Princes, Subjects and many learned men, and therefore it can not justly be called the practice or the perpetual tradition of the Church, as Suarez & others are pleased to style it, to make this opinion for the Pope's authority to depose Princes to be more plausible among the vulgar sort. 12 To conclude therefore, we deny first that the Catholic Church doth teach as a certain Doctrine that she hath authority to deprive Princes of their Regal authority either by sentence of deposition or by virtue of excommunication; and secondly, that it is as certain that the Pope hath authority to depose as it is certain that he hath authority to excommunicate; & I wonder that Suarez would adventure so rashly to affirm the same: For many Catholics have ever and do to this day deny the Pope's power to depose Princes, who, nevertheless do willingly grant that he hath power to excommunicate them, neither are the grounds to prove the one and the other a like, seeing that excommunication is a spiritual punishment, and therefore agreeable to the nature of a spiritual Commonwealth, but deposition is a mere temporal punishment and therefore not so beseeming the quality and condition of a spiritual or Ecclesiastical community. And therefore in this second part of this oath is neither expressly nor covertly abjured the Pope's power to excommunicate, nor any other his spiritual authority, which is certainly known to belong to him, as I have before declared; and of this opinion were those thirteen Reverend and learned Priests, who to Queen Elizabeth did make the like profession in those express words against which Suarez doth so greatly except. 13 Secondly, Suarez against those words of this second part of the oath [And I will do my best endeavour to disclose all Treasons which I shall know or hear of] maketh u Nu. 7. 8. two objections. The first is, that his Majesty by the name of [treason] doth understand not only that which truly and in very deed is treason, but also all that which in his judgement and according to the errors of the former clauses is judged treason. Therefore although the King should by the Pope be lawfully deposed, and the Subjects absolved from the bond of their oath, and of their Allegiance, yet the King will call every conspiracy of the Kingdom, or of the Commonwealth or of the Subjects to thrust out the King of his Kingdom, treason and a traitorous Conspiracy, whereas in very deed it is not so, but a just defence, or a just war or punishment. Understanding therefore treason in this sense, the exacting of such a promise is unjust, and it were dishonest and sacrilegious to swear it, both because it is not treason, as I have said, for in that case is rather to be kept promise to the Commonwealth or to the community of Subjects being oppressed by force, then to the Tyrant who doth unjustly oppress them, seeing that he is not now truly King; and also for that natural secrecy, under which the knowledge of such a conspiracy is had, doth at that time bind, because it is of a just thing and necessary to the common good of the community, who doth justly defend herself, and therefore a promise contrary to that secret doth neither bind nor can be honest, and therefore neither can it religiously be sworn, wherefore those words, being taken by themselves and solitarily to say so, may be without all suspicion, nevertheless as they are conjoined with the former, they are to he avoided, for that this later sense seemeth especially to be intended by the King. Suarez nu. 9 & 13. 14. But to this objection no other answer is required then to the former: for supposing that the Pope hath no authority to depose the King, nor to absolve his Subjects from their Allegiance, it necessarily followeth that all such conspiracies are true and proper treasons, and that therefore as I may lawfully acknowledge by oath, that the Pope hath no power to depose the King, so also I may promise' to reveal all treasons and conspiracies, which are grounded upon that false supposal that the King may truly be deprived of his Kingdom by the Pope. And in this sense also did those thirteen Reverend Priests understand plots and conspiracies, when they protested to detect all such like Conspiracies. 14 The second objection is, for that it seemeth that I do promise to reveal all treasons although I shall hear of them only by Sacramental confession, and that this is the intent of the King and of those who devised this form of swearing, may be gathered by this, that there is not among them any Sacramental confession, and they make no account of the secrecy of this Sacrament, neither do they make any difference betwixt that knowledge which is had by confession, and white is had other ways. And therefore seeing that the King doth exact of his Subjects a promise to reveal all treasons which they shall know of, Catholics may justly fear, yea and believe, that it is demanded of them without any distinction, whether they know it by confession or otherwise, and whether the disclosing of the treason be joined with the disclosing of the Traitor, or with moral danger thereof. In which sense that form doth exceed civil obedience, and doth include something against Catholic Religion. And therefore also for this cause the oath aught to be greatly suspected, and therefore Catholics and prudent men may demand a farther declaration thereof, although for other causes they are bound simply to refuse it. 15 To this objection we answer, that this manner of arguing, which the impugners of the oath do commonly use, is not to be approved: to wit, The King believeth that he is supreme Governor of this Kingdom in all causes as well Ecclesiastical as temporal, therefore he will bind his Subjects by those words [Sovereign Lord] to swear the same: Likewise, The King believeth that the Pope hath no power to excommunicate him, therefore he will bind his subjects to acknowledge the same in this oath. Moreover, The King believeth that those laws are just, wherein it is enacted that the coming into this Land of Priests made beyond the Seas by the Pope's authority, as likewise reconcilings to the Pope are treasons and to be punished as in cases of high treason, therefore it's this oath by the name of Treasons he will have his subjects to acknowledge are same. We deny therefore that the King in this oath will have his Subjects to acknowledge all that which he in his opinion thinketh to be true, or to do that which a good Catholic may not with a good conscience do; but the King and Parliament, as both of them have publicly declared, only demand the acknowledgement of that allegiance, which every faithful Subject, although he be a Catholic, may by the law of God and nature give to their lawful Prince. 14 Wherefore neither the King's Majesty nor the Parliament doth bind Catholic Priests to reveal what they shall know by confessions, but so far forth as by the law of Christ, and according to the undoubted grounds of Catholic Religion, they are permitted: and therefore purposely perchance the King & Parliament, to give as little occasion as may be to Catholics to except against the oath, do exact of the swearer a promise to reveal all treasons, and make no mention at all of the revealing of Traitors; for that all Catholic Divines do acknowledge, as Suarez himself confesseth * In this place. , that Priests are bound to reveal those treasons which they shall hear of in confessions, and this oath speaketh nothing of revealing the traitors, but how far Priests are tied to conceal the traitor, or not to reveal the treason when there is danger that the traitor shall be revealed, is an other question, of which the oath maketh no particular mention, Let Priests who are compelled to take the oath look to that, it is sufficient that this objection of Suarez doth nothing concern Lay-Catholikes, for whose cause principally I composed this Disputation, and therefore they notwithstanding this objection may lawfully take the oath; and doubtless those thirteen aforenamed Reverend Priests, who protested to Queen Elizabeth to detect all plots, conspiracies, invasions etc. knew right well in what account was the Sacrament and secrecy of confession among Protestants, and nevertheless they little thought by their protestation to derogate any jot from the Catholic faith which they professed. Sect. V. 1 COncerning the third part of the oath, which beginneth from those words [And I do further swear that I do from ray heart etc.] Suarez examineth y Cap. 4. nu. 1. three things. First, the Doctrine itself. Secondly, by what authority this part of the Oath is exacted of the Subjects. Thirdly, how much these words are repugnant to those, wherein his Majesty promiseth to show, that there is nothing contained in this Oath besides civil Obedience. Concerning the first, (after that Suarez hath made a long discourse about the doctrine of killing of Tyrants, wherein he teacheth a very perilous, scandalous, and desperate Doctrine, which I have before z Part. 1. sec. 10. nu. 3. related, to wit, that both the Pope may give leave to any man to kill a King after he be deposed, and that also the next lawful Successor may kill him, if otherwise he be not able to depose him, which he averreth to be a true and certain Doctrine) he affirmeth a Nu. 20. that it is manifestly convinced, that this part of the oath by reason of divers heads doth contain an excess of power, injustice against good manners, and an error against the true and Catholic Doctrine. The first I prove: for by what authority doth the King compel his Subjects to swear that proposition as heretical, which the Catholic Church hath not yet condemned? And if the King doth say, that it is condemned in the Council of Constance, where doth he read in the Council of Constance that particle, [Princess excommunicated or deprived by the Pope?] or that [by their Subjects or any other whatsoever?] Seeing therefore that these particles added to that proposition do make it & the sense thereof far different, that proposition by a fallacious & deceitful inference is attributed to the Council. But if the King doth condemn that proposition not by the authority of the Council but by his own authority, he exceedeth doubtless and abuseth the power which he hath not. And besides it is admirable, that he oftentimes contemneth the Pope's power to define matters of faith, and yet he dare arrogate it unto himself; for although he doth not this in words, yet in deed he professeth it. Wherein also he little agreeth with himself. For in an other place in his Apology he boasteth that he doth not coin new articles of faith after the manner of Popes. Finally seeing that he thinketh nothing to be of faith unless it be contained in holy Scripture, he aught to show us in what place of Scripture that proposition is condemned as heretical, or the contrary revealed by God, that it may be accounted for heretical. Truly although Paul did say, Let every soul be subject to higher powers, he did near add, let all men be subject also to powers excommunicated or deprived by the Pope, neither can one be gathered from the other, seeing that they are far different, not to say, as opposite, for a King deprived is not now a higher power. And from hence I farther conclude, that the profession of that oath concerning this part is a certain confession of Kingly authority & power both to condemn at his pleasure propositions as heretical, and also to propound to the faithful authentically what they aught to believe as a point of faith, or to detest as heretical, which in regard of the King is an excess and a usurpation of a spiritual power, and in regard of them who take the oath, is a certain virtual profession of a false faith. Suarez nu. 21. 2 Besides, by the words themselves it doth most clearly appear, that the King in this oath doth not only exact civil Obedience or the swearing thereof. For to detest by oath a proposition as heretical, doth plainly exceed civil obedience, which is of a far inferior degree than it Christian faith. Especially when such a precept is new in the Church, in such sort that the King doh not only compel a Christian Subject to detest a proposition otherwise condemned by the Church (which a Catholic King observing due manner may sometimes do) but also doth compel to detest a proposition which he newly again by his authority doth condemn, as now the King doth. Whereby it is also sufficiently proved, that this oath is unjust in regard of the King, because he doth many ways exceed his authority, and so it is a violent compulsions and a usurpation of an other man's jurisdiction: And in regard of the faithful it is unjust to accept thereof, both for this general reason, because they should swear either an unlawful thing or an untruth; for if they believe that proposition to he heretical only for the King's authority, for this only it is damnable, and much more because that proposition, which is so condemned, is most true and certain according to the true principles of faith, as hath been proved in the third book; but if they outwardly abjure that proposition, which inwardly they believe not to be heretical, they commit manifest perjury, as of itself it is evident: And besides this that proposition doth contain a peculiar and proper injury against the Pope, whose power and obedience for fear of man they do deny. 3 Lastly, by these it is easily understood, Suarez nu. 22. that this part of the oath doth also include an erroneous Doctrine. One error is that the Pope hath not autheritie to depose an heretical or schismatical King, and who doth pervert and draw his kingdom to the same schism or to the same heresy. For the profession of this error is principally and more directly made by those words then by others, as to every reader it will forthwith appear, and hath before been proved many ways: The other error which truly in words is less expressed, yet in the sentence itself lieth hidden and is virtually contained, is, that its these things, which do appertain to the doctrine of faith and detestation of heresies, a temporal King may exact of his Subjects their faith also by oath. Yea also that in this the opinion of the King is to be preferred before the opinion of the Pope. Which truly is a certain virtual profession of the King's temporal Primacy in spiritual or Ecclesiastical causes: for there is nothing greater in the Primacy of Saint Peter nor more necessary to the conversation and union of the Church than is a supreme authority, which the King of England doth in those words arrogate to himself, therefore the profession of such an Oath is a manifest profession of schism and error, therefore true Catholics are bound in conscience to refuse it. 4 To the first part of this objection I have before b Cap. 5. sec. 2. in this Disputation given two answers: The first was; that the position contained in this branch is heretical, to wit, that it is in the free power of Subjects, and of any one whatsoever to depose, or if they will, to murder Princes, who be excommunicated or deprived by the Pope: And that this is the true meaning of that position contained in this branch, That Princes which be excommunicated, etc. according to the common understanding of our English phrase I have declared in that place more at large. And to prove that position so understood to be heretical, I alleged these two texts of holy Scripture, Thou shalt not kill. c Exod. 20. Kill him not, d 1. Reg. 26. for who shall stretch forth his hand against the Lord his anointed and be guiltless? Neither do I think that Suarez (although he goeth too too far in this point of kill Princes) dare presume to aver that the Pope's sentence of Excommunication or deprivation denounced against a King can be a sufficient warrant for every man to kill that King; seeing that neither the sentence of Excommunication nor of deprivation (although we should grant that the Pope hath authority to depose Princes) depriveth a King of corporal life, but only of his right to reign. Neither is it necessary to make that proposition to be heretical that the Scripture should have added, thou shalt not kill Princes who be excommunicated or deprived by Priests or Bishops: It is sufficient that all killing either of private men or of Princes is unlawful, and is by this precept forbidden, which is not warranted either in other places of holy Scripture, or declared by the Church to be lawful, and to have sufficient warrant; now I would gladly know of Suarez, if he will affirm, as I think he will not, that the aforesaid position, Princes which be excommunicated, etc. is not heretical, where he findeth that the Church doth give sufficient warrant to every man to kill a Prince who is excommunicated or deprived by the Pope? 5 The scond answer was, that I do not swear the aforesaid position to be heretical, but as heretical in that sense as I did there declare, which answer doth also sufficiently avoid the difficulty which Suarez here doth make. Wherefore his Majesty doth not arrogate to himself authority to condemn at his pleasure propositions as heretical, which are not heretical, or to propound to the faithful authentically what they aught to believe as a point of faith, as Suarez wrongfully imposeth upon him, for this indeed were an excess of civil authority to attribute to himself power to define and determine any doctrine to be of faith, but he doth only compel his Subjects by temporal punishments, which are proper to the civil commonwealth, to abjure as heretical that position which by all Catholics is accounted as heretical, which a Christian Prince, as it is probably thought fit and necessary for the preservation of himself, and of the temporal peace and outward quietness in the commonwealth, may lawfully do, as before e Cap. 6. sec. 2. I have showed more at large. And so neither the King in this Oath doth transgress in exceeding his authority, neither the Subjects in making an express or virtual profession of a false faith. 6 And so the answer to the second point is also manifest, it being almost a repetition of the former. For neither doth his Majesty compel his subjects to abjure as heretical that which is not so, neither do they believe that it is so only for the King's authority, but for that almighty God in holy Scriptures hath revealed so, and by the common acceptance of the Church it hath ever been understood so: And that the Pope hath not power to depose Princes they believe with moral credulity, for that many learned Cotholikes do teach the same, and for that the contrary hath not as yet by any man, nor by Suarez himself in his third book been sufficiently proved to be certain, as by my answers to his arguments may sufficiently appear. 7 To the third point likewise wherein he scarce saith any thing which he hath not repeated before, we have already answered, that in this branch of the Oath is not abjured as heretical the Pope's power to depose Princes but only to murder them in that sense as we have before declared: Neither is it an error to affirm that a Christian King may under pain of temporal punishments exact of his subjects by Oath a profession of some points of their Christian faith, when upon prudent motives it shall be thought necessary to the preservation of the King's person & of his State, for that spiritual things not as they are spiritual but as they are temporal & necesssary to the keeping of outward peace in the commonwealth, are subject to the temporal power, especially of a Christian King, by whom they may be punished, & consequently commanded or forbidden, for that the coercive power in a Prince to punish supposeth the directive power to command. Neither do the Catholic Subjects prefer the King's opinion before the Popes, only because the King saith so, but because in a matter disputable they may follow a probable opinion against the Pope's opinion, although it be the more probable until the contrary be defined and determined by the Church. Seeing therefore that there is no heresy, error or any other unlawful thing contained in this oath every true Catholic may with a safe conscience take it. And although the Pope's Holiness hath forbidden the taking of the same, yet his precept being merely declarative and either grounded upon false information, or at the most upon a probable opinion, it is neither schism, nor sin to contradict it, as before f cap. 10. sec. 2. I have more at large declared. Sect. VI. 1 COncerning the fourth and last part of the Oath according to Suarez division, which beginneth from those words [And I do believe and in conscience am resolved and so to the end] Suarez affirmeth g Cap. 5. nu. 1. , that therein are contained almost all the same errors which are in the former, and that therefore scarce any thing remaineth to be added thereunto. But because the same errors are partly declared and exaggerated, partly also the unlawfulness of the Oath is more increased, all the particular points are briefly to be noted, and so to be declared that they may easily be understood by all men. First therefore the Pope's power is again abjured in these words [And I do believe, and in conscience am resolved that neither the Pope nor any person whatsoever hath power to absolve me of this Oath or any part thereof.] In these words is clearly affirmed this proposition, the Pope hath not power to absolve the Subjects of a temporal King from the Oath of Allegiance. For that which is affirmed of this Oath is not for any peculiar reason thereof, nor for the dignity which is greater in the King of England then in other temporal Kings, as of itself it is evident and the King himself in his Preface doth plainly profess. And when it is said, The Pope hath not power etc. It is understood simply, that is, in no manner, for no cause, in no case, for this is signified by those words according to the plain and common sense and understanding of them, in which sense the King himself a little beneath will have the words of this Oath to be taken. Besides that by the end of the Oath and by the first part thereof it is manifest enough that this is the King's meaning. 2 But so that proposition is heretical, Nu. 2. because it is against the power to bind and loose given to S. Peter as the Catholic Church hath always understood it and practised the same. For so the Subjects of every heretic whatsoever in that by a lawful sentence he is publicly denounced an heretic is forthwith absolved from the Oath of Allegiance by a decree of Pope Gregory the ninth in cap. ultimo de haereticis: and both the power and a most just reason of that punishment S. Thomas doth declare 22. q. 12. ar. 2. In like manner by Vrbanus the second in cap. ultimo. 15. q. 6. one is absolved from the bond of the Oath of Allegiance made to a Lord who is publicly excommunicated and denounced: and by Gregory the seventh with the Roman Synod in cap. Nos sanctorum ibidem. Where the bond of the Oath is not altogether and simply taken away, but as it were suspended for that time, wherein he being excommunicated doth remain obstinate in the censure. Which is otherwise, when a King or Prince is for heresy or other crimes deposed, and deprived of the dominion of his kingdom, for then the Oath is altogether taken away, & as it were made voided, the matter thereof being taken away. And in this manner Innocentius the fourth with the Council of Lions did absolve all the Vassals of the Emperor Fridericke from the Oath of their Allegiance, and other examples have been before set down, whereby the ancient and universal meaning of the Church, which is the best interpreter of Scripture, is showed. For if all laws do affirm that human custom is the best interpreter of human Laws, wherefore shall not the universal and most ancient custom of the Church, and the practice of such a power be also the best interpreter of Christ his Law, and of the power to bind and loose given to S. Peter? Which power the same Popes who have used it have with great authority and learning defended. Especially Gregory the seventh lib. 8. Registri epist. 21, and Innocentius the third in epist. ad. Ducem Caringiae in cap. Venerabilem de electione, and Bonifacius the eight in the Extravagant. unam Sanctam de Maiorit. ●t Obedientia. Suarez nu. 3. 3 But if the King doth not believe this proposition which is founded in Scripture, declared by authority of Popes and Counsels, and hitherto received by common consent, by what right or by what authority will he compel all his subjects to believe the contrary falsehood, and by word to affirm and by Oath to confirm the same? or how can they be resolved in conscience, as it is said in the Oath, to believe it and swear without any other reason or motive, unless they believe that the King with his Ministers hath greater authority to confirm his error and to exact the belief of the same, then hath the Roman and universal Church with the Roman Bishops, who by constant tradition and consent have taught the same? But if the King doth intent this, and doth bind his Subjects to this belief he must needs acknowledge, that he doth not in this Oath contend only for temporal jurisdiction, but for spiritual primacy. 4 The which also I do evidently declare in another manner. Nu. 4. For it is against natural reason to say, that any man cannot be absolved from a promise confirmed by Oath, by changing the matter, and taking away and as it were making voided the promise. For although one hath promised by oath to restore a pawn which he hath in keeping, if the other doth yield his right, he shall be freed from his oath. Whereupon if such a change should be made by a superior power, the obligation of keeping his promise will equally be taken away, which also Triphon the Lawyer did acknowledge in leg. bona fide ff. Depositi saying, if one hath received a pledge with a promise to restore it to the owner, and the owner afterwards be condemned by the judge, and his goods shall be confiscated, he that hath the pledge is freed from his promise to restore it to the owner, and it must be brought into the public treasury. Because as he saith beneath, the nature of justice doth require, that faithfulness, which is to be kept in a bargain, is not to be regarded only in respect of them who made the bargain, but also in respect of other persons to whom that which is done belongeth, which especially is true when the authority of a Superior and the public good do concur. Neither will the King, as I think, make any doubt to exercise the like power in his kingdom, by depriving, for example sake, a subject of his goods, who is found to have committed treason, and consequently by transferring to himself or to his treasure all the the actions and promises made unto him (that traitor) or doubtless by making them wholly and simply voided, or by pardoning or forgiving the debtor, by which it doth necessarily follow, that although they be confirmed by Oath, the debtor are absolved from the Oath. Therefore it cannot be denied, but that this manner of absolving from an Oath may be just and of validity, if in the absolver there be power to dispose either of the matter of the Oath, or of the right of the creditor, or owner, or to whom the promise was made. Therefore either the power to absolve vassals from an Oath made to a King, who is an heretic or pernicious to Christian Subjects, is most unjustly and against all reason denied to the Pope, or else it is denied upon no other ground, but for that it is not believed that he hath power to chastise and punish temporal Kings. And so this part is reduced to the former, and doth manifestly contain a profession of an error against the Pope's Primacy, and an heretical assertion concerning the King's Primacy, and of his absolute exemption from obedience to the Pope, especially for as much as concerneth his coactive power by temporal punishments. Nu. 5. 5 Lastly I will not omit to observe (because the King doth not speak generally of an Oath but of this Oath) that it may in a true and Catholic sense, but contrary to the King's meaning be said, that no man hath power to absolve the swearer from this Oath: because no man can properly be absolved who is not bound; but that Oath doth not bind the swearer, for that an Oath cannot be a bond of iniquity as that should be, and therefore no man can be loosed from it. Nevertheless he may be declared to be absolved or not bound, which the Pope can do by special authority, and he hath sufficiently done it, when he declared the Oath to be unlawful and contrary to eternal salvation. Whereupon also it cometh to pass, that in an other sense the Pope hath power to absolve from this Oath now being taken, that is, from the sin committed by taking thereof, so that sufficient repentance for the same, as a necessary disposition, doth go before. Nu. 6. 6 Secondly, in the same part is made a confession of a supreme kingly power in spirituals and of his exemption from the Pope in these words, [which I acknowledge by good and full authority, etc.] and afterwards in these words it is confirmed by Oath, [And all these things I do plainly and sincerely acknowledge and swear] For that the aforesaid confession is contained in those words, it is manifest first by those words [by full authority] for although the word [supreme] be purposely omitted lest that perchance it should terrify the simpler sort, yet the word [full] according to the King's meaning, which by the whole discourse is sufficiently understood, is put for equivalent: for that Oath is not for any other cause said to be ministered by full authority, but for that there is no authority among men, which is of force to hinder it, to forbidden it or to take it away, but this is a supreme power. Moreover seeing that the Oath itself is expressly against the Pope's power, when it is added, that it is by lawful authority fully ministered, it is clearly signified, that Kingly power ministering an Oath is superior or equivalent to the Pope's power. Therefore that which the King in other places doth expressly profess, here covertly and in the use itself of the power he doth include. Whereupon he that consenteth to such an Oath, doth plainly swear, that the act of an usurped power is the act of a lawful power, which is manifest perjury, and contrary to the confession of Catholic faith. And finally the king is convinced also by these words, that he doth not exact in this Oath only civil obedience, seeing that he demandeth a recognition and confession of his plenary power to determine against the Pope's power. Nu. 7. 7 Thirdly in the last words there is added a new Oath of this tenor; [And I do make this recognition and acknowledgement hearty, willingly, and truly upon the saith of a true Christian: So help me God.] Which is a new confirmation and repetition of the former errors, and not only of an outward, but also of an inward confession of the same, that the swearer cannot be excused either from mental infidelity, or from perjury. And furthermore I do weigh that particle [willingly] which doth include a manifest lie, which is sufficient that it cannot be taken by Catholics without perjury. For it is evident that they do not willingly, but constrained by threatenings and terrors take the Oath. Because as the King himself did say a little before, h In Apolog. pag. 5. that by refusing the Oath they are miserably thrown into danger of losing their lives and goods. How therefore can they truly swear that they take this Oath willingly? For that word [willingly] doth not signify there every will, or willingness, but that which is not constrained by great fear and potent, violence of man, and which the swearer would have, although he were not constrained; But Catholics do know that they have not such a will or willingness, and the King himself is not ignorant of this, therefore in regard also of this head the Oath is wicked, which doth in this include perjury and exact it. 8. These be all the objections which Suarez maketh against this last part of the Oath, & so consequently which he maketh against all the particular clauses which are contained therein, which although I might have put down in lesser words, seeing that they are for the most part a repetition of the same things which he hath so often inculcated, yet lest that the Reader should imagine, that by abridging or abbreviating his sentences, I should have diminished any way the force of his arguments, which he bringeth to prove the Oath to be unlawful, I thought good to set them down at large in the self same manner, as he in express words relateth them. His chief therefore and only ground, whereon all his principal exceptions against the Oath do depend, is, as the Reader by his whole discourse may easily perceive, that it is heretical and against faith to deny, that the Pope hath power to depose Princes and to absolve Subjects from their allegiance, and this he oftentimes repeateth that he hath sufficiently proved it in his third book. But that he hath not proved it by evident demonstrations, to which no probable answer can be given, I have also before by answering all his arguments sufficiently showed, and therefore all the inferences which he deduceth from this ground to prove any particular clause of the Oath to contain in it heresy or error, can be of no greater force than is the main ground itself whereon they do depend. Wherefore, seeing that heresy is an error contrary to God his holy word, either written or delivered by constant tradition, and so declared to be by the Catholic Church, not probably only thinking so, but firmly and certainly believing or defining it to be so, we earnestly request Suarez, as we have already in this Disputation requested the Reader, that he will bring but one only place of holy Scripture, or one only definition of the Church, or one only Theological argument drawn from the holy Scripture: or any definition or tradition of the Catholic Church, and that he will insist thereupon and urge it as much as he can, that Catholics may clearly, distinctly and particularly perceive the main ground whereon in this difficult controversy of the Pope's spiritual power to punish with all kind of temporal punishments by way of coercion, they are to build their faith upon: and if it be so convincing an argument, that I cannot give to it any probable answer, I will presently yield and recall whatsoever I have said or written to the contrary. I know that he is able to bring probable, plausible and colourable reasons grounded upon Scriptures or councils, but this is not sufficient, as he knoweth right well, to produce a divine and supernatural belief which is a most certain and undoubted knowledge. 9 Wherefore to his first objection we answer as before, that as in the former clauses of the Oath there is no heresy, error, or any unlawful thing contained, so neither is there in this part of the Oath any error declared or exaggerated, or the unlawfulness of the Oath more increased. For it is not heretical to hold, as we have often said, that the Pope hath no authority by Christ his institution to depose Princes, & consequently to absolve subjects of their Allegiance: Neither neither is this doctrine against that place of Scripture, Whatsoever thou shalt lose, etc. Wherein authority to bind and loose with spiritual bonds, and loosings is given S. Peter, as I have before declared. Also to those three Canons of Pope Gregory the ninth, i Part. 1. sec. 4. Vrbanus the second, and Gregory the ninth, and likewise to the decree of Innocentius the fourth made against Friderike the Emperor in the presence of the Council of Lions, not with the Council as Suarez affirmeth, I have also heretofore k Part. 1. sec. 5. nu. 6. sufficiently answered. 10 Moreover we grant, that as human custom is the best interpreter of human Laws, if it be a universal custom and not contradicted by many, for otherwise it doth not sufficiently interpret any human Law, so also the universal and most ancient custom of the Church concerning the practice of any power is a good interpreter of Christ his Law, if this practice be not by Catholics contradicted. But this power of the Pope to depose Princes, and the practice thereof hath not been so universally received, but that it hath been ever contradicted not only by the Princes themselves whom the Popes have deposed, who always have mightily opposed against such sentences, as any man may perceive by them who do writ of such Histories, but also by many learned Catholic Divines, who denied that authority. Was not the very first practise thereof vehemently contradicted by Henry the fourth Emperor, who was the first Emperor that was deposed by Pope Gregory the seventh, and by many learned Catholics in those days, and so hath continued even unto these times of Henry the fourth King of France, who was the last King against whom the Pope practised this authority? Was it not contradicted by Albericus a very learned Lawyer, who therefore excepted against many such practices, and especially that of Pope Innocentius the fourth in the presence of the Council of Lions. Was it not also contradicted by john of Paris, and those very many Doctors, as Gerson and Almain do relate, who held that the Pope by Christ his institution had not authority so much as to imprison? was it not contradicted by those Schoolmen of whom Trithemius maketh mention, who held that the Pope hath not power to depose an Emperor, and he himself affirmeth that the controversy is not yet decided by the judge? And hath it not ever been contradicted by the Kingdom of France if any credit may be given to Petrus Pitheus whom P●sseuine the jesuite doth greatly commend? 11 And whereas Suarez affirmeth, that this hath been a most ancient custom & practice of the Church, verily he might very well have omitted that superlative [most,] for as Otho Frisingensis, Godefridus Viterbiensis, Trithemius, and Onuphrius, before * Cap. 6. sec. 3. nu. 16. related do affirm, this practice of the Pope to depose Kings and Emperors began in Gregory the seventh his time k Gregory the seventh the first of all the Popes, did against the custom of his ancestors deprive Caesar of his Empire, saith Onuphrius lib. 4. de varia creatione Rom. Pontificis. about the year of our Lord 1077, and at that very time it was by Sigibert noted of novelty, not to say, of heresy, for these are the express words of Sigebert l In his Chronicle in the year 1088. : And although some very late writers, as Cardinal Baronius, Cardinal Bellarmine, & Schulckenius are pleased upon weak grounds to distain his good name with that filthy crime of schism, thinking perhaps thereby to diminish the credit of this ancient writer, who expressly doth contradict their opinions especially concerning the Pope's authority to depose Princes; yet informer ages he was not taxed of this crime, but was accounted a very venerable, learned, and religious writer; and of what reputation he was among all sorts of people both for his singular learning and virtue, Anselmus the Abbot of his Monastery who doth continued his Story, and the Author of the History of the Abbots of that Monastery do give sufficient testimony. 12 To that which Suarez affirmeth, that this Doctrine hath with great authority and learning been defended by Popes, especially by Gregory the seventh, Innocentius the third, & Bonifacius the eighth, we answer, that the authority, whereby the Popes have defended this Doctrine, was indeed great, as appeareth by the severe censures against the Emperors themselves, and those also who should obey them after they were deposed by the Pope: we grant also, that the learning of those Popes was great, but withal we must confess that those Catholics, who contradicted that power, were also men of great learning, and that the reasons which those Popes have brought are not so convincing, but that probable answers may be given unto them, as any man of learning who readeth there writings and decretal Epistles will easily perceive: And concerning that Epistle of Pope Gregory the seventh, Sigebert, who in former ages was accounted a man of great fame, learning and good estimation affirmeth, that he himself by strong arguments drawn from the authority of the Fathers did confute that Epistle of Pope Gregory the seventh which he wrote to the Bishop of Mets in reproach of Kingly power. Also we will not deny that Pope Innocent the third, and Pope Bonifacius the eighth, (of whose opinion, what joannes Tilius Bishop of Meldune in his Chronicle affirmeth I have before m Cap. 10. sec. 2. nu. 48. related) did think, that they had authority to depose Princes, but doubtless that reason which Pope Innocentius bringeth in that chapter Venerabilem, affirming that the Roman Empire was translated by the Pope from the Grecians to the Germans, is not forcible; because that translation was done indeed partly by the Pope's authority (as being the chief and principal member of the Empire in the Western parts, who at that time had only in name and not in deed any Emperor, as in my Apology n Nu. 413. etc. , I showed out of Lupoldus and Coccinius,) but it was not done only by his authority, but also by the consent, suffrages, and authority of the people, as out of Card. Bellarmine's own grounds I proved in that place: And concerning that which Pope Bonifacius in the aforesaid Extravagant averreth, we also do acknowledge, that the sword is under the sword, and that the temporal power is subject to the spiritual, and that all Christians are subject to the Pope, which is all that he in that place affirmeth, but this subjection is to be understood in that manner as I before o Cap. 3. sec. 1. nu. 13. declared in this disputation in answering an argument of Suarez, who doth there allege this authority of Pope Bonifacius. 13 Neither doth his Majesty compel his Subjects to believe with a supernatural belief, that the Pope hath no such authority to depose Princes and to absolve Subjects from their allegiance, but only to make an external profession of their inward moral credulity and persuasion, that the Pope hath no such authority, which being a thing credible, may by them with a safe conscience be acknowledged; and being with all probable, that this right, liberty, and freedom of absolute Kings, to wit, not to be dependant of the Pope in temporals, nor to be punished by him with temporal punishments is a temporal right granted to all absolute Princes by the law of God and nature, they have good and full authority to compel their Subjects to acknowledge the same, as the acknowledging thereof is thought prudently to be necessary to the preservation of themselves and of quietness in the Commonwealth. Neither do the English Catholics therefore believe (speaking of moral credulity) that the Pope hath no such authority for that the King with his Ministers do hold the same, but because it is in itself probable, and many learned Catholics for probable reasons and motives, which with invincible arguments cannot be convinced, are of that opinion. 14 Wherefore that declaration of Suarez concerning the absolving of oaths by way of irritation and taking away the matter is of no greater force, than what he hath said before, for that it is no error to hold, as often hath been said, that the Pope hath no power to punish Princes temporally by way of coercion. And so this part of the oath is reduced to the former, and doth not contain a profession of any error against the Pope's spiritual Primacy, or any acknowledgement of the King's Primacy in spirituals, or of his absolute exemption from all obedience to the Pope, but only in those causes and matters which probably are thought to be temporal and not to belong to the Pope's spiritual power, as is power to depose Princes and to absolve Subjects from their allegiance. 15 Finally, concerning that which Suarez in the end of this objection affirmeth, that the Pope hath power to absolve the swearer from this oath for two respects, the one for that the oath is unlawful, and so bindeth not the swearer, the other for that he can absolve from the sin committed, there needeth no other answer than hath been already alleged, for that the first supposeth the oath to be unlawful, which hath not been as yet sufficiently proved, and the other is not the true meaning of this word [absolve] in this oath, as in examining this clause we have in this Disputation before observed. 16 To the second objection we answer by denying that in this clause is acknowledged the King's supreme power in spirituals. For although that word [supreme authority] (which whether it was purposely omitted in the oath not to terrify the simpler sort is more than Suarez can know and prove) doth signify all one with [full authority] yet full authority is in this oath taken only for supreme authority in the degree of civil and temporal authority. And although the King doth believe that in his Kingdoms he hath supreme authority in all causes, yet Suarez will never be able to prove, that the King in this oath, I say in this oath, did intent to comprehend under those words [full authority] all authority, both in spiritual & temporal causes although, he thought & meant that it was so full & supreme an authority, that it was not subject temporally to any power under God, and that the Pope could not absolve any man from the performing of those things which in this oath the swearer promiseth to perform, as in the Disputation I have more at large declared. Neither is this oath expressly or covertly against that power of the Pope, which is certainly known to be given to him by Christ, but against that power which learned Catholics do probably think not to belong to him: And so the King's temporal power ministering this oath, although it be not superior to the Pope's spiritual power, yet in temporal causes it is not subject to it and in that respect may be said to be equal to it negatively, that it is not inferior to it in subjection, speaking only of temporal causes, as is the ministering of an oath of temporal allegiance, although in nobility it be far inferior to the spiritual power, to which also all powers among Christians are subject in spiritual causes. Neither doth the King determine or define any thing in this oath, which Suarez doth so often inculcate, but only he compelleth his Subjects, as also I have often repeated, to acknowledge and profess that which they may lawfully profess, and which he may compel them to profess, it being in itself lawful and probably thought necessary to his majesties safety, and to the outward peace and quietness in the Commonwealth. 17 To Suarez third objection I have at large answered heretofore p Cap. 9 sec. 1. (it being the very argument which Father Parsons urgeth) and I have sufficiently showed, that supposing the oath to be lawful and commanded by good authority, which every man must suppose before he resolve to take the same, there is no virtuous Catholic, and who is well affected to his Majesty, but may and aught to take the oath willingly, taking [willingly] also in that sense as Suarez will needs have it to be taken; and therefore it must first be proved, that some other part of the oath is unlawful before any just exception can be taken against this clause. Sect. VII. 1 THese be all the objections which Suarez bringeth against any particular clause of the Oath, but to prove in general that the oath containeth more than civil Obedience, he produceth the self same argument, which Cardinal Bellarmine and Lessius urged from the title of the Act of Parliament wherein this oath is commanded, which is, for the discovering and repressing of Popish Recusants, to which because I have already sufficiently answered q Cap. 10. sec. 1 , I remit uhe Reader to that Answer. Of this only I must admonish Suarez, that he was misinformed of that which he so boldly affirmeth, to wit, that in the same Act of Parliament, wherein this form of Oath which is now in question is contained, two oaths are distinguished by their proper titles, the one is entitled of the King's Primacy in spirituals etc. the other is entitled, Against the Pope's power over Christian Princes, which later oath is no other, saith Suarez, then that which the King now calleth the oath of Allegiance, therefore by the Inscription itself it is manifest, that this oath containeth rather an abjuring of the Pope's power over Kings, than the loyalty of Subjects towards their King. For that is directly intended as the Inscription doth show, & expressly declared by the words, and oftentimes repeated etc. Thus Suarez. But it is clear that Suarez in this point hath not been rightly informed: For there is no such oath entitled in that manner Against the Pope's power over Christian Princes, either in this Act of Parliament or in any other that ever I read or heard of, and therefore Suarez must be careful, how hereafter he giveth credit to every information in matters especially of so great moment. Wherefore neither doth his Majesty intent to deny in this oath, I say still in this oath the Pope's spiritual power which is certainly known to belong to him, but only to affirm his own lawful right and power, neither doth the oath itself contain any such denial, as I have in my opinion sufficiently made manifest: and therefore that distinction of Suarez r Cap. 6. nu. 6. of the intention of the King, who doth affirm that he only intendeth civil obedience, and of the intention or end of the oath itself which nevertheless containeth more than civil Obedience, cannot be rightly applied by him to this present matter, for both the intention of the King, and also the election of the means which he hath chosen in propounding this oath to his Subjects are civil, and do not exceed the bounds of temporal allegiance. 2 By this you may perceive (Dear Countrymen) upon what grounds both the impugners and also the maintainers of the oath do chiefly rely, and thereafter frame your conscience as God almighty with the grace of his holy spirit shall inspire your minds. And for this cause I have first set forth this my Answer to Suarez arguments in the English tongue, that you (my Dear Countrymen) whom the taking or refusing of this oath doth only concern, may fully understand what reasons can be alleged to prove or disprove the lawfulness thereof, not intending therefore but that in convenient time it shall also come forth in Latin, that Suarez, if it please him, may give us satisfaction in these difficulties, which we have here propounded. I was also the more willing to put forth in English this my answer to Suarez, that by this which I have said in this Appendix especially concerning the Pope's unlimmited power to depose Princes, to dispose of all temporals, and to punish with all kind of temporal punishments, as he in his discretion shall think convenient, that you who either have not read my Apology for the Sovereignty of Princes, or being ignorant of the Latin tongue cannot understand it, may in some part judge, whether it deserveth to be censured by Cardinal Bellarmine as containing any heretical or erroneous doctrine (from which his censure, ere it be long I will, God willing, most clearly free myself) for that in substance I have written nothing in that Apology, which in this my Answer to Suarez is not contained. The reverence wherewith I do honour the See apostolic, the duty which I do own to my Prince and Country, the desire to find out the truth in this difficult point which so nearly concerneth our due obedience to God and Caesar, and the utter temporal ruin of ourselves and our whole posterity, and not any hope of temporal gain or the lest spleen (God is my witness) against any person or Order, as some uncharitably, I beseech God forgive them, have laid to my charge, hath moved me to examine, with all dutiful respect to those whom I am bound to honour, this hard and dangerous question. And these reasons I hope will be sufficient to excuse me among indifferent men (for those who are carried away with particular ends of human respects it is impossible to satisfy) from all imputation of rashness or temerity for opposing myself in these times against this new s For although this doctrine for the Pope's power to depose Princes be not new, yet that it is a point of faith and the contrary heretical, and that the Pope may give leave to murder wicked Princes, is a new & scandalous doctrine. See above part 1. sec. 10. & scandalous doctrine. For alas what time can be imagined to be more convenient for us English Catholics to oppose ourselves against such new opinions, then at this time, when by reason of them our Sovereign otherwise most gracious hath taken high displeasure against us, our liberty, goods and lives are through them greatly endangered, and which if there were no other cause might only suffice, our Religion is thereby exceedingly graced. For what is now more frequent in the mouths of all sorts of people, then that we English Catholics cannot according to the doctrine of the chief pillars of our Church be true and faithful Subjects, yea and that is lawful for us if the Pope do give us leave to murder, I speak with horror, our dread Sovereign? And these reasons I hope will suffice for those who have fear of God's judgements not rashly to misconstrue at leastwise my secret intentions, which I protest before God as I hope to obtain mercy at his hands, are most pure and sincere; And as for those who are not afraid daily to misinterpret both my thoughts and actions to the infinite prejudice of my good name, I beseech God of his great mercy to pardon their rash judgements and speeches, and I request them to call to mind that if at the day of judgement we are to tender strict account of every idle word, how much more of heinous detractions? and with all to consider how dreadful it will be unto them at the hour of death to remember, that the sin of detraction, according to Saint Augustine's t In epist. 54. ad Macedonium. doctrine will not be forgiven, unless they do their best endeavour to make restitution of his good name, which they through their overlashing speeches have uncharitably taken away. The same submission, which in the end of this Disputation I made of all my writings to the censure of the Catholic Roman Church, I do here repeat again. ROGER WIDDRINGTON an English Catholic. THE PREFACE OF THE APOLOGETICAL Answer of ROGER WIDDRINGTON an English Catholic to a little pamphlet of a certain Doctor of Divinity. IT is not long since (Christian Reader) that I did set forth an Apology for the Sovereignty of Princes against the reasons of Cardinal Bellarmine, who endeavoureth to demonstrate, that his opinion for the Pope's power to depose Princes is certain as a point of faith, and to impugn the contrary opinion of certain Catholics as heretical. The which Apology (being made by me, God is my witness, not upon desire either to contradict or to traduce Cardinal Bellarmine, whom I do greatly honour, but only to found out the truth, and to free from that foul imputation of heresy some virtuous and learned Catholics, and who have very well deserved of the Catholic Church, who if they were living would nothing need the patronage of other men to defend themselves) is taken in very evil part by some, who both themselves do wonderfully exclaim against it, and withal do set on children, women, and also men especially who be unlearned and do scarcely understand a syllable thereof, to use all manner of reproachful and execrable speeches against it For they say, to omit slanders of less moment, that it is a temerarious, scandalous, and erroneous book, yea, and (flat heretical,) or wholly repugnant to the Catholic faith. 2 For what greater temerity, say they, can be imagined, than that one or two obscure Authors should oppose themselves against threescore and ten most famous Doctors, whose names cardinal Bellarmine doth relate, yea and as Cardinal Bellarmine himself affirmeth, a In praefat. contra Barcl. against all Catholic writer, as well Divines as Lawyers, and like an other Goliath dare adventure to provoke the whole camp of Catholics? Is it not also an incredible arrogancy not only not to yield to the common received opinion of so many most grave, most learned, and most holy men, but also to lay upon them an imputation of treason, as it is clear say they, that Widdrington hath done, who oftentimes in his Apology seemeth to aver, that all those who give authority to the Pope to depose Princes, do very great wrong to Sovereign Princes, and if there are Subjects do commit the detestable crime of treason? 3 And that this Apology of Widdrington is very scandalous, it is say they, too too manifest, seeing that he giveth licence to Secular Princes to forbidden books, which seemeth only to belong to the Pope's Holiness and other Bishops, and to those who are put in authority by them for that purpose; and also be giveth scope to the said Princes to persecute the Church of God, and freely to commit any wickedness whatsoever without being subject to any temporal punishment for the same: yea also to reject at their own pleasure such Preachers, who are sent by the Pope's holiness to advance the Catholic saith in their Dominions, from which doubtless no man can deny but that very great scandals will arise. And moreover he seemeth to reprehend very saucily Cardinal Bellarmine, the chief champion at this day of the Catholic Church against Sectaries, both by giving such an ignominious title to his Apology, and also by pretending to confute him by his own grounds, as having handled this so great a question with little sincerity, and also in many things contradicted himself, which assuredly not without great scandal seemeth to give too ample occasion both to Catholics, not to have his other books of Controversy in that good estimation, wherewith hitherto they have been respected by all men, and also to the adversaries of the Catholic Church not to return so speedily to the unity thereof whiles they see Catholics to be at variance among themselves, and to writ and speak so bitterly one against an other. 4 Lastly, that widdrington's book is flat heretical and wholly repugnant to the Catholic faith, or at leastwise erroneous, Cardinal Bellarmine doth evidently prove by nine councils approved by the Pope, whereof three of them were General councils: Neither can he doubtless be excused from heresy, or at leastwise from error, who contemneth to hear the voice of the Church, and wittingly and willing presumeth to contradict so many councils, which do manifestly declare what Catholic doctrine teacheth in this point. 5 These be princpal objections which these severe censurers out of overmuch heat of spirit do make against my Apology, which to confute and so to clear myself of these there slanders I think it to be a very easy matter. And if in cleared myself of these imputations I shall seem to be overlong, and to exceed the due proportion beseeming a Preface of so small a book, I humbly crave pardon of the Courteous Reader, for that having so fit an opportunity offered me at this present to clear myself of such most wicked accusations, I thought it not convenient to defer it any longer. 6 And to run over all the particular heads in the same order as they are propounded, and with as much brevity as may be, I will first of all take the definition of temerarious as it is now used by Divines (omitting divers other acceptions of temerity which they do allege) from Dominicus Ban●es b 2. 2. q. 11. are 2. a most learned Divine, and who very lately since Melchior Canus whom he citeth hath written of this matter: If, saith he, we do consider the definition of this word temerarious, every proposition which is heretical or erroneus, is too much temerarious, but yet more properly a temerarious proposition is said to be that, when one in a matter of weight doth without good authority affirm any thing against the common opinion of the Church or of Divines. Now whether this definition of temerarious, as it is taken properly, which Cardinal Bellarmine, as I suppose, will admit, or at the lest not reject as improbable, may rightly be applied to widdrington's Apology, it is to be examined. 7 The matter doubtless whereof we now do treat, I confess to be of very great weight, as being a thing which concerneth the supreme authorities of the Ecclesiastical and civil power, neither of this is there any controversy between us. Wherefore these two things remain only to be examined; the first, whether any thing is contained in widdrington's book, which is contrary to the common opinion of the Church or of Divines; the second, whether if there be any such thing contained therein it be affirmed without good authority. For if it containeth nothing which is contrary to the common opinion of the Church, or of Divines, or if therein any such thing be affirmed, it is not affirmed without good authority, he will doubtless avoid the aforesaid imputation of temerity, and by the Law of Talio he will with greater reason return it back upon his Adversaries. 8 But first of all thou must observe, Learned Reader, (for to thee especially I do direct my speech) what is the mark at which Widdrington in his Apology for the Sovereignty of Princes doth aim, and what is the state of the controversy betwixt him and Cardinal Bellarmine, for this once being known, thou mayst more easily judge whether justly or wrongfully the aforesaid crimes are laid to his charge. It is not therefore widdrington's meaning, as some do imagine, to impugn the more common opinion of Divines, which granteth to the Pope authority to depose Princes as apparently false, and with invincible arguments to demonstrate the contrary to be true, but whereas some very few later Divines, and especially Cardinal Bellarmine have so eagerly, and with such vehemency taken upon them to defend this authority of the Pope's Holiness to depose Princes, that they imagine to have most clearly convinced the same, and fear not therefore to charge with heresy all those Catholics, who in this point do not run with them, this only was my intent to give at the lest a probable answer to the arguments of Cardinal Bellarmine, and to free virtuous and learned Catholics from that execrable crime of heresy, whereof they are wrongfully taxed, and so to show out of his own grounds, not by convincing, but by probable reasons, that his arguments are not altogether so certain and invincible, as that they do evidently demonstrate, that those who deny such an authority, are not to be accounted of the company of the faithful, or to be excluded from the participation of Sacraments. 9 Wherefore the present controversy which is between me and Cardinal Bellarmine, is not concerning this absolute question or proposition, whether the Pope can or cannot depose Princes for heresy or not, but concerning this modal proposition, whether it be so certain, that the Pope by Christ his institution hath such an authority to depose Princes, as that those who defend the contrary opinion, do expose themselves to manifest danger of heresy, error, or of any other mortal sin. Whereupon although in my Apology I brought certain arguments drawn from inconveniences, which the Logicians call ad impossibile, to prove that Christ our Lord did not grant such an authority to the Pope, yet whosoever will diligently peruse my Apology, will presently perceive that my intent was not to bring convincing reasons, which do 'cause a firm & undoubtful assent, but only probable and such as are grounded upon credible principles, and which are able to 'cause a probable persuasion. 10 And from hence any man may plainly perceive, that Widdrington doth not oppose himself either against all Divines, or against the common opinion of the Church or of Doctors, but only against very few writers; considering that among those 70. Authors who are related by Cardinal Bellarmine, very few are to be found who (although they are perchance of opinion that the Pope by Christ his institution hath authority to depose Princes for enormous crimes) yet they do not so peremptorily adhere to that opinion, as to tax them with heresy who do maintain the contrary. And if Cardinal Bellarmine in the later Editions of his Books, yet bringing no new reason to confirm his former opinion had no condemned the contrary opinion of Catholics as heretical, but had suffered every man to persevere without danger of heresy in his own opinion which he should think to be the truer, he had not truly had Widdrington to be his Adversary, or to have attempted to overthrow his reasons as insufficient to demonstrate an undoubted point of faith. 11 Moreover, neither also is the opinion of Doctor Barclay to be reputed contrary to the common opinion of the Church or of Doctors: for a common opinion as it is taken in the definition of temerarious, is not that which is opposite to a less common, but which is opposite to a singular opinion. But it is evident that the opinion of Doctor Barclay is not a singular opinion of one ot two Auors only, whatsoever Cardinal Bellarmine so often repeating, one Barclay, only Barclay as an other Goliath against all Catholic writers doth affirm, seeing that I have in my Apology related many Authors who are of that opinion, and as very well writeth Trithemius c In Chronico monasterij Hirsang. ad annum 1106. , it is a controversy among Schoolmen, and it is not as yet decided by the judge whether the Pope hath authority to depose the Emperor or no 12 The testimony of many school-divines, saith Canus d Lib 8. de locis cap. 4. , if other learned men dot stand against them, is of no greater force to make men to believe them, then either their reason, or graver authority shall confirm. Whereupon in a School disputation a Divine aught not to be overborne with the authority of many, but if he have a few grave men of his opinion, he may doubtless stand against the opinion of very many. And passing well saith Navarre e In Manuali cap. 27. nu. 289. , It is not enough for an opinion to be called the common opinion (to this effect to prejudice an other) for that cause only that many do follow it, as in a company of birds one flying all the rest do follow. For I should think that opinion to be the more common to this effect, which six or seven Classike Authors who purposely handle the matter should approve, then that which is allowed by fifty, who are carried away almost only with the authority of those who have written before them. For an opinion is not made a common opinion by the number of them who follow it, but by the weight of authority: Yea and I do think that either of the opinions may to this purpose be called a common opinion, when either of them hath eight or ten grave Authors and who with judgement do embrace it f But this doctrine Navarre understandeth in the exterior Court, for in the Court of Conscience he affirmeth in the same place nu. 288. that to avoid sin it sufficeth to follow the opinion of one Docttor whom we think to be a virtuous and learned man. . Did not three or four Bishops in the General Council of Chalcedon in the cause of the Pope's Primacy oppose themselves against almost six hundred Bishops and the whole Council, which three or four doubtless Cardinal Bellarmine will constantly affirm are not therefore to be stained with any spot of temerity? Now if any man do diligently consider the first beginning and process of this opinion, which granteth to the Pope power to depose Princes he will easily perceive, that the later maintainers of this opinion were not so much moved to follow it by force of reason, as drawn thereunto by the authority of those, who held it before them. 13 Neither can it also be sufficiently proved that this opinion for the Pope's power to depose Princes is so common, as Cardinal Bellarmine doth suppose for certain. For it is not so clear, that those 70. Authors, whom he bringeth as so many armed soldiers in defence of his opinion (and doth artificially place them in the forefront of his book as it were in battle array, to 'cause a terror in his Adversary descrying at the first to many troops of armed men) do altogether favour his opinion. For to omit that most of them do vehemently impugn Cardinal Bellarmine's opinion for the Pope's indirect dominion or power in temporals, & with great applause do approve the Pope's direct power in temporals, which Cardinal Bellarmine doth greatly mislike: first, it is apparent that Alexander of Hales called the irrefragable Doctor (affirming g 3. part q. 40. membr. 5. q. 4. ad primum, secundum et tertium argumentum, see beneath in the Answer nu. 190. that Kings if they offend are by God alone [& not by the Pope] to be punished with temporal punishments) doth in express words impugn both the direct and indirect dominion or authority of the Pope in temporals, neither is it as yet apparent, as I have showed heeretofre h In my Apology nu. 122. , what was Almains own proper opinion. [And as for joannes Parisiensis it is evident i See above ca 3. sec. 3. nu. 7. that he did limit the Pope's chastising power to Ecclesiastical censures. 14 Besides, some of those 70. Authors do use such general words, to wit, that the spiritual power doth extend to temporals, that the temporal power is subject to the spiritual, and that the sword is under the sword, etc. as that they may very well be understood of subjection to be punished only spiritually not temporally, and of a power to command temporals, but not to dispose of temporals. Some others of the 70. Authors do not speak universally of Kings, but only and expressly of the Roman Emperor; Now whether there be altogether the same reason of other Kings, as there is of him by reason of some pact or covenant agreed upon betwixt the Pope & the Emperor, & by reason of a certain Oath of Allegiance which he sweareth to the Pope, it may doubtless be called in question. But what the Emperor doth promise to the Pope by virtue of that Oath, which the Council of Vienna doth declare to be truly an Oath of Allegiance, & in what that allegiance doth properly consist, it is not to our purpose to examine at this present. 15 Moreover, what hindereth, that very many of those 70. Authors, who teach that the Pope hath power to depose Kings and Emperors, may not be understood in that manner, as those Doctors related in my Apology k A nu. 404. together with the Gloss understood those plain words of Gregory the seventh, when he said, that Pope Zacharie did depose the King of France from his Kingdom, that is, say they, did consent to them who did depose him, or did declare him worthy to be deposed, or did counsel his deposition as lawful, and did approve it by his authority? So that very few of those 70. Authors except those who wrote of this matter in this present age do so expressly follow Cardinal Bellarmine's opinion, but that their words may very well be applied to some one of the aforesaid senses. 16 But be it so, let us admit this opinion of Cardinal Bellarmine to be commonly received by those 70. and also by other Doctors besides them, yet if one moved with good authority doth stand against the common opinion of the Church or of Doctors, he is not according to the aforesaid definition to be accounted temerarious. But whether Widdrington hath brought sufficient reasons to free those Catholics from temerity, who do not grant to the Pope power to depose Princes, the prudent Reader will easily judge by his Apology, wherein he doth utterly overthrow those pretended demonstrations of Cardinal Bellarmine, and also allegeth many authorities of holy Fathers, Popes and other Doctors, who do affirm, that the Ecclesiastical power hath only the spiritual and not the material sword, & that Sovereign Princes are to be punished with temporal punishments by God alone, and moreover he produceth against the aforesaid opinion of Cardinal Bellarmine, which is vulgarly called the common opinion, eight at the lest grave Authors (yea and the whole kingdom of France, if credit may be given to Petrus Pithaeus) who according to the doctrine of Navarre, before l Nu. 12. related, are sufficient to make that opinion which they follow to be accounted a common opinion to this purpose or effect, that we may lawfully and with a secure conscience follow it: & lastly he assigneth divers reasons, why this opinion which doth favour the Pope's power in temporals, is so common, and hath so greatly increased from the first beginning thereof unto these times, which reasons of his whosoever will duly consider, may doubtless have just cause to wonder, how that in any books of Catholic writers there is left any memory at all, whereby even obscurely it is signified, that this temporal power of the Pope was ever by School Divines called in question. 17 But my adversaries do object, that Widdrington neither hath evidenly convinced by his reasons, that the Pope hath not the aforesaid power to depose Princes, neither hath he faithfully related the authority of those Doctors whom he citeth for his opinion, for that some of them, and especially Gregorius Tholosanus, and Antonius de Rosellis do in express words affirm, that the Pope hath power to deprive heretical Kings of their Kingdoms. Nevertheless that these Objections are frivolous any learned man, who will attentively read his Apology, will manifestly perceive. For it was not widdrington's meaning to bring demonstrative arguments, which should evidently convince his own opinion, but his principal intent was only to answer probably Cardinal Bellarmine's reasons. But because the answering to arguments can not of itself produce a positive assent of the contrary opinion, although it doth in some sort prepare the understanding to yield assent, Widdrington thought it convenient not only to confute Cardinal Bellarmine's reasons, but also to produce against the common opinion certain probable arguments drawn both from extrinsical, and also intrinsical grounds, which although they do not altogether convince the understanding, yet they do probably incline it to yield assent. 18 And for this cause he alleged Gregorius Tholosanus, & Antonius de Rosellis against Cardinal Bellarmine's opinion, for that he intended to produce not only such authors, who do expressly follow the contrary opinion, but also who do favour it. Now it is manifest that the aforesaid Doctors are most plainly against Cardinal Bellarmine in this, that they are of opinion, that the Pope hath not authority to depose Sovereign Princes for mere secular crimes, which nevertheless are very prejudicial to the spiritual good of souls. Besides that Antonius de Rosellis doth doubtfully and under a disjunction affirm, m In sua monarchia. part. 1. ca 63. that the Pope can either deprive the Emperor of his Empire, or declare him to be deprived, so that he seemeth to incline to the opinion of joannes Parisiensis, who granteth power to the Commonwealth, but not to the Pope to depose Princes. 19 To conclude that second crime of temerity, which they object against Widdrington, to wit, that he accuseth those Doctors of treason, who maintain the Pope's power to depose Princes, is a mere slander, and imposture. For Widdrington in his fifth reason, n Nu. 63. of his Apology. which these men do calumniate, doth only affirm, that there cannot be assigned any sufficient reason, for which any man can put the necks of Sovereign Princes under the yoke of any other power without doing those Princes very great wrong, and doth confidently and freely aver what seemeth to him more probable, that such plots and attempts against the Sceptres of Princes are in themselves and of their own nature unlawful, and exceedingly injurious to Sovereign Princes: and thereupon he affirmeth, o Nu. 471. of his Apology. that he cannot as yet sufficiently understand, by what way those Subjects can be freed from treason (what opinion soever they do speculatively maintain concerning the Pope's power in temporals) who practically under colour perchance of Religion and devotion to the Sea apostolic, not weighing with equal balance their bond duty to Sovereign Princes, should notwithstanding any sentence of Excommunication or deprivation denounced by the Pope attempt to thrust their lawful Prince out of the possession of his kingdom, so long as this question concerning the Pope's power to depose Princes remaineth undecided. 20 And this very same opinion are bound to follow to make that fact of theirs to be lawful, those thirteen English Priests, p D. William Bishop. john Colleton. john Much. Robert Charnocke. D. john Bossevile. Anthony Hebborn. Roger Cadwallader. Robert Drury. D. Antony Champney. john jackson. Francis Barnebey. Oswald Needham. Richard Button Whereof three are Doctors of Sorbon, the rest are accounted by Catholics to be grave, virtuous, & learned men. and all of them, two only excepted, living at this present, (whose names in very truth I would have concealed, if they had not been before published to the world) who to give assurance of their loyalty to the late Queen Elizabeth, did by a public instrument protest, and made it known to all the Christian world, that she (being at that time excommunicated by name, and deprived by the sentence of Pope Pius the fifth of her Regal authority) had nevertheless as full authority power, and Sovereignty over them, and over all the Subjects of this Realm, as any her highness Predecessors ever had. And that notwithstanding any authority, or any Excommunication whatsoever either denounced or to be denounced against her Majesty, or any borne within her majesties Dominions, which would not forsake the defence of her, and her Dominions, they think themselves not only bound in conscience not to obey this, or any such like Censure, but also do promise to yield unto her Majesty all obedience in temporal causes q This profession of Allegiance is extant in the end of Master George-Blackwells examination in the latin Edition. . 21 Now that we have cleared ourselves of this first imputation of temerity, let us come to the second accusation which is of scandal. There be some now adays who are so addicted to their own opinions, that whatsoever they have once determined with themselves to be unlawful, they would presently have all men even with their great temporal detriment also to condemn it as unlawful. And if they be demanded a reason which moveth them to condemn with such confidence that action as unlawful, seeing that other men of the contrary opinion do not think it to be forbidden by any Law natural or divine, Ecclesiastical or civil, they presently, if they can give no other reason, do fly to scandal, and do commonly cry out, it is a Scandal, it is a Scandal. 22 Scandal is an evil word or deed which giveth occasion to an other man to fall, as the Divines r S. Hieronym. in c 15. Matth S. Thom. 2. 2. q. 43. ar. 1 etalijs Theologi. ibid. do define it: yet in declaring the sense of this definition they labour much, and in assigning all the conditions which are required to make an action to be scandalous they do not as yet agreed among themselves, But all do accord in this, that no action at all which is commanded especially by the Law of nature can give a true occasion of ruin or offending; and if one thereby do take occasion to sin, it is a scandal not given, but taken, as all Divines do confess. Whereupon to give to every man his right, to Caesar those things which are Caesar's, and to God those things which are Gods, can give occasion to no man of offending, but rather to take away from Princes their right, which the Law of nature doth give them is very scandalous, and greatly repugnant to the Law of God and nature. 22 And upon this ground all the imputation of scandal, which these severe Censures do lay to widdrington's charge, may easily be retorted upon themselves: For it is agreed upon by all Divines, that the civil Commonwealth hath sufficient authority to punish vices, to provide for the peace of the citizens, to preserve herself, and by means of the temporal sword, which is agreeable to a temporal power, to defend herself from all present wrongs, and to revenge those wrongs which are already done her. From which principle, even most evident by the light itself of nature, it doth most clearly follow that the civil commonwealth may, under pain of temporal punishments, forbidden all sorts of seditious books, s Of this we have a late example in the King of Spain that now is who under great temporal punishments did prohibit the eleventh tome of Cardinal Baronius his Ecclesiastical Story until it were corrected. as they are seditious, & do wrongfully infringe the lawful rights of Princes, (as also the Pope, under spiritual punishments, may prohibit the same books as they are prejudicial to the spiritual health of souls) and also that she is not bound to admit into her dominions turbulent preachers, and who are truly enemies to her temporal State, and who do unlawfully disturb the temporal quietness of the Common wealth by other unlawful practices, then by the pure preaching of the Gospel, which being performed in due manner is injurious to no man: neither can these in my judgement without very great scandal be called in question. 23 Neither doth Widdrington give more scope to princes to persecute the Church, or to live more licentiously, then do those other Doctors whom he citeth in his Apology, and especially Alexander of Hales a man of singular virtue and learning (whose doctrine was approved as not disagreeing in any thing from the Catholic truth by Pope Alexander the fourth, & threescore and ten Divines t Posseuine in the word Alexander Holensis. See beneath in the answer nu. 190. in the margin. ) who in express words affirmeth, that Kings if they do offend, can with temporal punishments be punished by God alone: From which doctrine if perchance any Princes should take occasion to offend, that is not to be imputed to any fault of the Doctors, but to the human frailty of those Princes. Lastly, to defend innocent persons, to uphold the truth, which is as it were by main force beaten down, and to free from that most wicked crime of heresy, virtuous and learned Catholics, and those who being now dead cannot defend their innocency, although their accusers do thereby suffer perchance some detriment in their good name, can give no just occasion of offence. 24 As concerning the title, which Widdrington gave to his Apology for this end, that it might be sought after more greedily, and read more attentively, seeing that it is agreeable to the end, scope, and subject of the book, it cannot be no more displeasing, then is the book itself. But if I have offended the most Illustrious Cardinal Bellarmine in any thing, I am hearty sorry for it: for truly I did not writ any thing, God is my witness, with purpose to wrong any man, but with desire to find out the truth, and to free innocent men of all imputation of deadly sin. And although both Cardinal Bellarmine, and many other Divines have by their writings marvelously enlightened the Christian commonwealth (for which all Catholics are bound to give them exceeding great thanks) yet I do not imagine that there can be found any Catholic Doctor, of what learning or dignity soever he be, who, considering that he is a man and subject to human ignorance, would have all other men without further examination to give undoubted credit to every one of his opinions: but rather it would be very scandalous, and an occasion of no small error to those persons, who should without farther search build their faith, which is necessary to eternal salvation, upon the bore word of any Doctor whatsoever as upon a most firm and sure foundation. 25 Neither can it be any scandal either to Catholics, or not Catholics, to dispute probably of those things, which are in controversy among School men, and as yet the judge hath not decided the question; but rather it is too too scandalous, and greatly against Christian charity, to which scandal is flat opposite, to condemn the probable opinions of Doctors as heretical. Our School, saith Canus, u Lib. 8. de locis cap. 4. giveth us doubtless great liberty, that whatsoever seemeth to be most probable we may by our right defend, but it is not lawful for us to condemn rashly and lightly those, who do hold against us. And let this suffice to free my Apology from all suspicion of scandal; neither will I at this present retort upon the books of other men a deserved blame of scandal, returning back the same measure to them wherewith they have measured me. 26 Lastly, to purge myself of those last, but of all the most heinous crimes of heresy and error, it is a known and common principle among Divines, that error is distinguished from heresy in this, that heresy is repugnant to Divine faith, the certainty whereof doth depend wholly upon Divine revelation, but error is repugnant to a Theological conclusion, the certainty whereof is partly grounded upon divine revelation, and partly upon the light of natural reason; yet all Divines do with one consent agreed in this, that as both a Theological conclusion, and supernatural faith are certainly and evidently true, so both error and heresy do contain an undoubted and manifest falsehood: So that if this doctrine concerning the Pope's power to depose Princes cannot be convinced of manifest falsehood, it cannot justly be taxed with heresy or error. 27 Now therefore let us examine what certainty can be gathered from the Counsels, to prove this authority of the Pope to depose Princes. All the Counsels as well provincial as General, which are confirmed by the Pope, I do honour with all dutiful reverence, nevertheless I do not think that equal honour and credit is to be given to them both. For all Catholics do confess, that General Counsels being assisted by the holy Ghost cannot err in their definitions: but that provincial councils are as well in decrees of faith as of manners subject to error, very grave Divines do constantly aver. And although some very learned men do affirm, that this opinion, concerning the superiority of the council above the Pope, and of the Pope's fallible judgement if be define without a General Council, doth sound ill in the ears of Catholics, in so much that it is commonly accounted to be erroneous & very near to heresy, and is only tolerated by the Church, yet in my judgement their speeches are very equivocal, neither do they plainly enough declare what by those words they do understand. For that this opinion doth both sound ill in the ears of some Catholics, to wit, the Romans, and also that it doth sound well in the ears of other Catholics, to wit, the Divines of Paris, and that it is not accounted in all places, and by all men erroneous or near to heresy, it is too too manifest. 28 For Navarre a writer of our time, and a famous Divine and most skilful in the Canon Law x Posseuine verbo Martinus ab Azpilcueta. doth most plainly teach, that this question is probably disputed by the Divines of Rome and of Paris, neither doth he more incline to the one side then to the other. There is, saith he, y Iu. cap. Novit de judicijs notab. 3. nu. 84. a great contention betwixt the Romans & them of Paris, to whom the Ecclesiastical power was more principally given by Christ, whether to the whole Church, or else to S. Peter himself. For the Romans hold that this power was given to S. Peter and to his Successors, and that therefore the Pope is above a Council, but these whom Gerson followeth, do affirm that it was given to the whole Church, although to be exercised by one, and that therefore at leastwise in some cases a Council is above the Pope. The opinion of the Romans is approved by S. Thomas, Thomas a Ʋio, who more deeply & more profoundly than any other, doth endeavour to demonstrate the same: But the other opinion is approved by Panormitane, who standeth for them of Paris, z That is, the Canonists. whom ours do more commonly follow, as Decius affirmeth. Which opinion jacobus Almainus a Divine of Sorbone doth eagerly maintain, who hath answered Thomas a Ʋio in a book of a competent bigness, & john Maior, who doth the like, affirming that it is not permitted at Rome for any man to hold the opinion of those of Paris, and of Panormitane, and again that the University of Paris doth not suffer that the contrary opinion be maintained there. 29 And although he, who maketh the additions to Navarre, doth labour to draw Navarre (who is wavering and very doubtful of this question whether the Pope be above a Council) to be of the opinion of the Romans, yet he writeth far more temperately, and although he thinketh the opinion of the Romans to be the more probable, yet he leaveth the opinion of them of Paris as probable. But far more plainly and modestly writeth most learned Victoria, There are two opinions, saith he, a Relect. 4. de potest. pap●e et Conc. propositio. 3. concerning the comparison of the Pope's power, the one is of S. Thomas and many his followers and of other learned Doctors both Divines and Canonists, that the Pope is above a Council; the other is the common opinion of the Divines of Paris, and also of many Doctors, both Divines and Canonists, as of Panormitane, and others contrary to the former, that a Council is above the Pope. It is no place at this present to dispute whether of them be the truer. I think that both of them is a probable opinion: and because either of them hath great followers, we must not proceed in this question which is in hand only according to one of these opinions, but we must determine what is to be said what opinion soever of these two we do follow. 30 I could therefore wish, that these severe censors would in plain and express words declare their opinion, and that they would not with cunning ambiguity of words keep the Reader in suspense, but sincerely & perspicuously explain their minds, and answer directly, whether those that defend the opinion of the Doctors of Paris as probable, are in that manner tolerated by the Church as harlots, usurers, and such like notorious sinners are sometimes for the avoiding of greater scandals tolerated or permitted in the commonwealth, who although oftentimes they are not punished with ordinary punishments ordained by the laws, yet they are altogether excluded from the participation of Sacraments so long as they persist in their wicked life; or whether those who are resolved to follow the opinion of the Doctors of Paris may enjoy the benefit of Sacramental absolution? For if they will admit this last, they must of necessity confess, that the opinion of the Doctors of Paris is not only tolerated by the Church, but also allowed by the Church as probable, and which may be maintained without any danger of heresy, error or any other deadly sin. 31 Now that those Doctors, who defend the opinion of the Divines of Paris, are admitted to the Sacraments of the Church, the practice of the Church of France (which practise no man without great temerity and scandal can condemn as temerarious or scandalous) doth give apparent testimony. Wherefore it seemeth in my opinion to be far more agreeable to Christian charity, that virtuous and learned Catholics should as much as may be, be freed from error and heresy, and more beseeming the sincerity of Christ his Gospel, that Catholic Doctors should plainly and perspicuously, without so many ambiguities of words, declare to Christian people what every Christian is bound to believe concerning those things which appertain to the Catholic faith, and that they should not so easily thrust upon the faithful people doubtful and uncertain opinions, and which may be defended without prejudice to faith, for a certain and undoubted doctrine of the Catholic faith. And from hence it is evident, that the authority of no Provincial Council, although it be confirmed by the Pope, if it be taken solely by itself b I said solely by itself, for if it be approved by consent of the whole Church it bindeth in that manner as a General Council doth, as it is insinuated in the next number. , can be such a sufficient argument to Catholics, to give undoubted credit to her definitions, but that without note of heresy or error they may be contradicted. 32 Neither is that objection of the adverse part of any great moment: if the Pope, say they, defining without a General Council doth not make that doctrine, which he defineth to be certain of faith, but that he may err, there could no certainty have been had concerning many opinions which were taught in the three first hundred years, wherein many heresies were put down by the Pope, as it is evident in the errors of the Priscillianists, of Vigilantius, of jovinian, of the Manichees, and of many others. For according to the doctrine of the Divines of Paris, the aforesaid opinions of the Priscillianists, and of the rest before mentioned, are not to be accounted heretical for that cause precisely, because they were condemned only by the Pope or by Provincial Counsels, but because the whole Church received and approved their condemnation, which at this present for brevities sake may suffice to have insinuated to the learned, being likely hereafter, if need shall require, to declare it more at large. 33 Now let us briefly examine what certainty can be gathered from Counsels for the Pope's authority to depose Princes. Six Provincial Counsels and three General are produced by Cardinal Bellarmine to confirm this his opinion. And although Provincial Counsels, according to the probable opinion of many, as we now have seen, do not make the doctrine which they define to be certain of faith, and therefore no convincing argument can be drawn from them to condemn any doctrine of heresy or error: yet that the truth may the better appear, let us grant for disputation sake that they cannot err in their definitions, and let us see how sound Cardinal Bellarmine doth by them confirm his doctrine to be certain of faith. 34 The first Council which is alleged by Cardinal Bellarmine is a Roman Council holden under Gregory the seventh, in the year 1080, wherein Gregory with the consent and applause of all, as Cardinal Bellarmine saith c Contra Barclai. pag. 29. , did publicly and with a solemn rite and ceremony excommunicate and deprive Henry the fourth Emperor of his Empire and Kingdom. I have read indeed that Gregory did depose Henry the fourth in that Roman Synod, or rather d Bertoldus in anno 1080. et tom. 3. Concil. part. 2. in the end of the absolution of the Synod did annex the deposition of Henry, but that he was deposed by that Synod, or that all the Fathers gave their consent and applause I have not read as yet. In the other five Counsels, to wit, at Beneventum under Pope Victor, at Placentia under Vrbanus, an other at Rome under Paschalis, at Collen under Gelasius, and at Rheims under Calixtus I find not so much as one word of the deposition of Henry, unless we will confounded deposition with Excommunication. And although the Emperor had been deposed not only in, but also by those six aforesaid Counsels, yet from hence no certain doctrine of faith can be concluded, seeing that the aforesaid deposition of Henry, was not a matter of faith but only of fact, wherein as well those Popes, as those Fathers of the Counsels following their own opinions might err, as a little beneath e Nu. 50. in the like answer to the Council of Lateran I will declare more at large. 35 Three General Counsels are alleged by Cardinal Bellarmine, of Claramont, of Lateran, and of Lions. To the Council of Lions I have answered sufficiently in my Apology f See also above in the Appendix to Suarez etc. part. 1. sec. 4. nu. 6. , to wit, that it cannot be effectually proved, that the deposition of Fredrick was done by the Council, but only by the Pope in the Council, neither the Council approving it, but only being present at the same. 36 From the Council of Claramont Cardinal Bellarmine argueth in this manner: Pope Vrbanus the second in a most frequent Council at Claramont did excommunicate and deprive Philip the first King of France of the crown of his Kingdom, for having put away his lawful wife and married an adulteress, and being admonished thereof did refuse to obey, as Sigebert doth testify in his Chronicle in the year 1095, and more plainly Matthew Paris relateth the same in the life of William the second in the year 1095. 37 But neither out of this Council can be concluded any thing for certain for the Pope's power to depose Princes. For be it so, that Pope Vrbanus, as Sigebert, and Matthew Paris do affirm, did in the Council of Claramont excommunicate Philip for the aforesaid cause, or rather, as Papyrius Mass●nius d Lib. 3. in Philippo primo. saith, did debar him from coming to Church and Mass (although Andrea's an ancient Historiographer, as Paulus Aemilius e Lib. 38. in Pnilippo primo. relateth, affirmeth that it was done before the Council & Aimonius f Lib. 5. de gestis Francorum partim cap. 48. in principio partim 49. in principio. insinuateth that it was done after the Council of Claramont) yet by what convincing argument can it be proved, that Philip was in that Council deprived by Vrbanus of the crown of his Kingdom? 38 But that together with Excommunication was joined the depriving also of his Royal dignity, may be understood saith Cardinal Bellarmine, by suo Carnotensis who in his 46. Epist. to Pope Vrbanus the second speaketh in this manner. Those persons who will not come unto you in the evening of their wit, and the smoothness of their tongue have promised the King to procure from the See apostolic pardon for his offence, and will use partly this persuasion, that the King with his Kingdom will departed from your obedience unless you restore his crown, and absolve him from excommunication. The same also may be gathered from Historiographers, who do testify, that Pope Vrbanus did prohibit, the Kingly diadem to be set on Philip's head being excommunicated. See the Chronicle of joannes Nauclerus generat. 37. in Rege 38. Papyrius Massonius Annal. lib. 3. Add also that which is written in the Summarie or compendium of the French Histories of Nicholas Vignerius, that for all the time that Philip lived in Excommunication they did not use in public writings as the manner was, in the reign of Philip * But Cardinal Bellarmine was greatly overseen in citing these words of Vignerius, for Vignerius speaketh of Philip the second who lived in the time of Pope Innocent the third above a hundred years after this Philip the first, who was excommunicated by Vrbanus. , but in the reign of Christ, because the people held Philip being excommunicated for no King. Thus Cardinal Bellarmine. 39 Nevertheless I cannot sufficiently understand, how Cardinal Bellarmine doth effectually prove from hence, that Philip was either by the Council or in the Council deprived of his Kingdom. For first of all supposing, but not granting, that Philip was deprived of his Crown by Vrbanus, yet it doth not therefore necessarily follow, that this sentence of deprivation was denounced in the Council of Claramont, seeing that in the decrees of that Council there is made no mention of this sentence, and the Pope might by some particular decree either before or after the Council denounce this sentence of deposition. 40 Besides, to omit that almost all the Bishops of France did oppose themselves against Ivo, those words of Ivo, [unless you restore his Crown] may be understood in a commodious sense, to wit, that unless you restore his Crown, which some perchance of the people, especially of the ruder sort did imagine was either wholly taken away, or in great part diminished only by the sentence of Excommunication: for the people, saith Cardinal Bellarmine, held the King excommunicated for no King: and moreover the excommunication of the King might give no small occasion to the people who are prove to rebellions to stir up in some sort the Kingdom against the King. And that the words of Ivo may have this sense, juretus in his observations upon Ivo his epistles doth sufficiently insinuate. It is also probable saith he g Expounding the aforesaid words of Iuo. , that the Prince being excommunicated some of the Subjects did refuse to do him honour and homage, others did honour him and obey him, and so the diversity of opinions may be composed. And therefore no marvel that in public Ecclesiastical h For so be the words of the Author of the Chronicle of S. Dennis apud juretum lo co iam citato. writings it was not written, in the reign of Philip, lest that Ecclesiastical persons should seem that way to participate with the King being excommunicated, but in the reign of Christ [both for the reason alleged and also] for that the people held not the King being excommunicated for King, to wit, altogether absolute, and with whom they might as before lawfully converse in all affairs. 41 But that Ivo himself, and the greater part of the people were of that opinion, that Philip by that excommunication was not deprived of his Regal authority, it is manifest, both for that the people did willingly obey the King i France under a King not welliked of did keep his Majesty so entire that she did not degenerate from the sanctity of her ancestors. So writeth Paulus Amelius lib. 3. in Rege 38. speaking of King Philip after he was excommunicated by Vrbanus. and also for that Bishop Ivo himself in his letters k Epist. 22.28. which he wrote to the King being excommunicated, he calleth him most pious and magnificent King of France and he calleth himself, an humble Clerk of his Highness; and to an other letter written in the year 1095, as Baronius witnesseth l In that year. , at that time when Philip was excommunicated, he maketh this superscription m Epist. 56. . To Philip by the grace of God the most Noble King of France Ivo his humble Priest greeting, & as to his Lord & King faithful service: from which kind of titles Juo would doubtless have altogether refrained, if he had thought that Philip had by Vrbanus been deprived of his Regal honour and dignity. 42 And whereas it is objected by Cardinal Bellarmine that the Bishops of France were forbidden by Pope Vrbanus, or rather by his Legate only that they should not set the Royal Crown upon the heads of the King and new Queen, this objection doth not prove that the King was deprived of his Royal right or authority, but this crowning did appertain to the solemnity of the King's marriage, and to a certain Religious ceremony, which was used upon that day when the King's marriage was solemnized n For the King was long before crowned with great solemnity and was in peaceable possession of his Kingdom; and so that ceremony was rather in honour of the Queen then of the King. See Paulus Aemilius and others who writ the French Histories. , and which usually was done at the time of Mass; which religious ceremony, because it did seem to confirm the marriage betwixt Philip and his new wife Bertrada, might justly be prohibited by Pope Vrbanus or his Legate. 43 Now it remaineth only to answer to the Council of Laterane, which is the principal ground, which my Adversaries do now urge to prove the Pope's power to depose Princes. For Cardinal Bellarmine o In tract. contra. Barclai. pag. 30. out of this Council frameth this argument. In the most famous Council of Laterane under Pope Innocentius the third there is made a Canon which is the third in order containing these words: We do excommunicate and anathematize all heresy which doth extol itself against this holy Orthodoxal Catholic faith which we before have declared etc. and beneath: But if the temporal Lord having been admonished by the Church shall neglect to purge his territory of heretical filth, let him be excommunicated by the Metropolitan and other Bishops of that province. And if he shall contemn to give satisfaction within a year, let this be signified unto the Pope, that from thence forth he may declare all his Vassals to be absolved from their fidelity to him, and expose his territory to be possessed by Catholics, who having thrust out the heretics may possess it without contradiction, and conserve it in purity of faith, saving the right of the principal Lord, so that he make no obstacle or oppose any impediment unto this; the same law notwithstanding being observed concerning those who have no principal Lords. What would Barclay say to this? If this be not the voice of the Catholic Church, where I pray you shall we find it? and if it be, as most truly it is, who shall contemn to hear it, as Barclay hath done, shall be not be accounted as a Heathen and a Publican, and in no sort a Christian and a pious man? 44. But this objection is easily answered: First therefore I do think that by those words a Principal Lord, or who hath no Principal Lord, are not understood Emperors, Kings, and Sovereign Princes. And that I gather from this that the Emperor Fredrick, whose Ambassadors were present at that Council of Lateran, did, five years after the Council was ended, make the very same constitution in the same express words, only changing spiritual punishments into temporally but it is not likely that the Emperor did intent to comprehend in that decree himself, who is not subject to the Law p F. de Legibus leg. Princeps. , and much less other Kings who are not subject unto him. Moreover in penal laws Secular Princes, according to the rules of the Lawyers, are not comprehended under those general names of temporal Lords, Magistrates, and judges, as neither an Abbot under the name of a Monk, nor a Bishop under the name of a Priest, nor a Pope under the name of a Bishop: seeing that according to the rules of the Law in Sexto in penalties the more favourable part is to be chosen, and it is meet that severities be made less and favours be enlarged. And if the Council had intended to comprehend Sovereign Princes in that Decree, it might as easily have named them by their proper names of Princes, as by those general names of principal Lords, or who have no Principal Lords, especially seeing that the same Council in other Decrees doth use the proper names of Princes. 45 But against this answer my Adversaries do first object: If the Council of Lateran did not in that decree comprehend Emperors, Kings, and Sovereign Princes, than what persons are those who there all called chief or principal Lords, or who have no chief or principal Lords? And I demand of them again, what persons are those, who in the Emperor frederic's decree may justly be called principal Lords, or who have no Principal Lords? For the answer, so it be , which they shall make to my question, will fully satisfy their own objection. Nevertheless my opinion is, that neither the Council nor the Emperor did by principal Lords, or who have no principal Lords understand Emperors, Kings, and absolute Princes who have no Sovereign above them in temporals, but only those Lords who do hold of Sovereign Princes some territories, provinces, or perchance also some kingdom in royal, or as it were royal fee harm; q As with power to hung and draw and with other such like princely Royalties. by reason of which tenure they are made vassals to such Sovereign Princes, although themselves by virtue of the same tenure have also Vassals under them, whose Lords they are, and by how the more or less these Lords are exempted from the jurisdiction of Sovereign Princes, by so much the more or less they may be called principal Lords. But let this suffice to have briefly touched this for the present. 46 Secondly they object; Be it so, that Kings and Sovereign Princes are not chief and principally included in that decree of the Council, yet that secondarily and by consequence they are, or at leastwise might have been therein comprehended it is very evident, for if the Pope hath power to deprive for the crime of heresy the subjects of other Princes of their temporal dominions without the consent of their Princes, there can no sufficient reason be assigned why he may not also for the same cause deprive Sovereign Princes themselves of their dominions. 47 To this objection I did briefly in my Apology give many answers, which I think it not amiss to repeat here again word by word. The first was, r Nu. 454. that as well the Popes as councils do oftentimes ordain many things (the ordaining whereof doth belong rather to the civil then to the Ecclesiastical power) by express or consent of Sovereign Princes, who are present either in person or by their Ambassadors; or upon presumption or hope at leastwise that Princes will ratify the same. And this the expositors of the Canon law do affirm, saith joannes Parisiensis, * De potest. Regia et Papali cap. 10. For in cap. ad abolendam extra de Haereticis, wherein the Pope's Holiness doth command the goods of heretics to be confiscated, Cardinal Hostiensis maketh this question; what is this to the Pope concerning temporals? And he answereth with his Master Pope Innocentius: that in very truth it is nothing to him; but he did this by the consent of the Emperor, who being then present at Milan gave his consent: Thus joannes Parisiensis. 48. The second answer I made in these words: s In the same place. An other exposition the Gloss doth give upon the canon, Adrianus dist. 63. where the Pope commandeth the goods of those persons who do infringe his decree to be confiscated, and upon the Canon Delatori 5. q. 6. where he decreeth the tongues of false promoters to be pulled out, and the heads of convicted persons to be strooken off: For the Gloss doth answer, that the Church in these places doth teach what a Secular judge aught to do. Which answer of his may be applied to other such like decrees, wherein the holy Canons do impose temporal punishments: And this answer those words of Sylvester t In summa verbo paena nu. 9 do favour, who writeth thus: joannes Andrea's following Hostiensis is of opinion that a Bishop cannot impose a pecuniary mulct upon a lay man who is not subject to him temporally, but he must 'cause it to be imposed by the Secular judge. 49 To these answers may be added, that whensoever the Pope doth by a general Decree ordain any temporal thing which doth prejudice an other man's right, who is not his Subject in temporals, that decree, as some do probably affirm, doth only extend, unless the contrary be expressed, to the territories of the Roman Church, or to the patrimony of Saint Peter, wherein as Pope Innocentius saith, u Cap. per venerabilem qui filij sint legitimi. he doth exercise both the authority of the chief Bishop, and execute the power of a Sovereign Prince; Whose opinion the Gloss upon that chapter pervenerabilem doth seem to favour, who saith, that the Pope's Holiness cannot legitimate any man who is not subject to his temporal jurisdiction in such sort as that he may as a lawful heir by right succeed in an inheritance, for this were to put his sigh into another man's harvest, and to usurp an other man's jurisdiction, and to deprive a man of his right to succeed, which he aught not to do, and therefore in the Secular court he cannot legitimate unless the Prince shall permit him. But if the Pope can not make one legitimate who is not legitimate, or give one right or deprive one of right to succeed: I cannot perceive by what authority he can make a lawful heir and a lawful Prince to be unlawful, and to have no right, or to deprive one of that inheritance which he doth lawfully possess. 50 My third answer was, that the aforesaid decree of the Council of Laterane did not contain a matter of Faith but only of fact; wherein as well the Pope as those Father's following their own opinions might err, and that the Council did not determine that the aforesaid future sentence of deposition which the Pope should denounce against principal Lords, etc. did proceed either from authority which without all doubt was in itself lawful, or from the sole Ecclesiastical power without the consent of Sovereign Princes. And therefore the opinion of those Fathers doth make no more certainty for the Pope's authority to depose Princes, then if they had declared their opinion out of the Council: seeing that this only can be gathered from the undoubted doctrine of the Catholic Church, that the infallible assistance of the holy Ghost is only promised by Christ our Saviour to the definitions and not to the facts and probable opinions of Popes or Counsels. 51 I omit now that those words [that from thence forth he may declare his subjects to be absolved from their Allegiance to him] do contain some difficulty, for if we will strictly rely upon these words, they seem only to signify, that it belongeth only to the Pope to declare the subjects to be already absolved, and not truly and in very deed to absolve them from their Allegiance. 52 But against this third answer my adversaries do vehemently object: That doctrine, say they, doth appertain to faith, which the Popes, councils and Doctors do either propose or suppose as a certain and undoubted ground and foundation of their decrees and sentences: but this doctrine for the Pope's power to depose Princes and to absolve subjects of their Allegiance, is either proposed or supposed by the Popes, councils and Doctors as a foundation of many Canons and judicial sentences, therefore this doctrine doth appertain to faith. 53 Moreover, if a General Council should expressly define that the Church hath this authority, no Catholic could make any doubt but that this matter did appertain to faith, but seeing that the Council doth suppose it as a sure and certain foundation of her decrees and sentences, she is thought no less to affirm the same, therefore it aught to be accounted no less certain. 54 Lastly, it is a point of Faith, that the Church cannot err in doctrine and precepts of manners, by teaching generally any thing to be lawful which is unlawful, or to be unlawful which is lawful, or also by commanding any thing which of itself is unlawful. For such an error is no less pernicious to the faithful than is an error in faith; but if the Pope should not have that authority to deprive temporal Princes of their dominions the Church should err in doctrine of manners, and that in matters of very great moment. For she teacheth that after a Prince is deposed by the Pope's authority all his subjects are absolved from their obedience, and that his dominions may be possessed by an other, as is manifest by the councils. Also that after a Prince is publicly excommunicated all his subjects are absolved from their Oath of Allegiance: in so much that they are not bound to obey him until he be reconciled, yea and she doth forbidden them to obey him if the censure be denounced. All which things should be false, and not only false, but also pernicious; for that thereby the Subjects should be incited to rebellions and perjuries, yea and against their wills be compelled thereunto: therefore the Church doth err in doctrine of manners, and doth command rebellions & perjuries, and by her censures doth compel men thereunto; but to affirm this is heretical, therefore that also from whence this followeth is heretical, to wit, that the Church hath not power to absolve subjects from the bond of their Oath, and from their obedience. 55. These be the principal objections against this third answer, wherein our most learned adversaries do greatly triumph, thinking that by them it is most evidently convinced, that it is so certain, that the Pope by Christ his institution hath authority to depose Princes: that the contrary cannot be defended without note of heresy, or at leastwise of manifest error. But let these Doctors, who are otherwise doubtless most learned, take heed lest that they presume to impose upon the unlearned people their private and uncertain collections for universal and undoubted conclusions of the Catholic faith; for truly that these arguments are not so forcible, as they imagine it may by the practice of the Church and the decrees of Popes very easily be proved. 56 And first of all, is not the due administering of Sacraments a matter of great moment, and chiefly belonging to the Pope's office, and is not an error concerning it to be accounted most pernicious? But the Pope hath oftentimes given leave to a priest who was no Bishop to minister the Sacrament of confirmation x As it appeareth bp S. Gregory lib. 3. epist. 26. and it is related in cap. pervenit dist. 95. & many Abbots at this day have also this faculty. , whereas it is a great controversy among Divines, whether the Pope can give leave to such a Priest to minister this Sacrament. Seeing therefore that to the Sacraments of the new Law, as the Council of Florence y About the end in the decree of Pope Eugenius. doth teach, are required three things, the matter, the form, and the Minister, of which if any one be wanting, it is not a true and perfect Sacrament, and that it is a very great sacrilege, that the due and lawful matter and form of a Sacrament should be seriously applied by an unlawful minister; if the Pope, in whom only according to these Divines the whole Ecclesiastical power & authority to define infallibly matters of faith doth principally remain, cannot grant authority to a Priest who is no Bishop to minister this Sacrament, as very learned Divines z Pope Adrian in 4. in q. de conf. ar. 3. Durandus in 4. dist. 7. q. 3. et 4. Bonaventura ibidem. Alphonsus de Castro in lib. de haeresibus verbo confirmatio. Petrus Soto lect. 2. de confirm. & others. without any note of error or heresy do hold, is it not a very great error to grant such licences whereby there is danger that most heinous sacrileges, to wit, the invalide administrations of Sacraments should be committed? 57 Moreover, Pope Sixtus the fourth did in honour of the immaculate conception of the blessed Virgin Mary make a decree a It is to be seen in the fourth tome of the Counsels after the life of Pope Sixtus the fourth. for celebrating the feast of her conception, to the end that all faithful Christians should give thanks and praise to almighty God for the wonderful conception, which also he calleth immaculate, b In the second decree. of the immaculate Virgin, and notwithstanding it is uncertain and disputed by Divines on both sides, without any note of heresy, error or deadly sin, whether the Blessed Virgin was conceived in riginall sin, or by the special providence of God preserved from the same. Is it not therefore from hence manifest, that that doctrine which is either proposed or supposed by the Pope as a foundation of an Apostolical constitution and decree, and which belongeth to the Religious service of God, is not of so certain and undoubted a truth, but that without danger of deadly sin it may be impugned? 58 Lastly, some Popes have oftentimes dispensed with Princes to contract matrimony who have made a solemn vow of Chastity in approved Religions, as it is recorded by Historiographers of Constantia daughter to Roger King of Sicily, of Casimirus King of Poland, and of Ramirus King of Aragone, and of Nicholas justinian a noble Venetian c See Azorius tom 1. lib. 12. cap. 7. q. 1 : but if the Pope hath no authority to dispense in the solemn vow of chastity, whereof there is a great controversy among Catholic Doctors d For S. Thomas and almost all the Thomists and many others whom Zanchez the jesuite relateth lib. 8. de matrimonio dis. 8. do deny that the Pope hath such a power and Zanchez also saith that this opinion is probable. , doubtless such dispensations would 'cause very many heinous sins, and do great wrong also to other princes, who by such dispensations should be unjustly deprived of their rightful inhericance, and just title to their kingdoms. 59 May we not therefore according to our adversaries grounds argue in this manner? That doctrine doth appertain to faith, which the Pope, (in whom only according to these Doctors e For they grant that the Pope alone without a Council hath authority infallibly to define, and the Council without the Pope hath no authority at all infallibly to define, so that all such authority is only in the Pope and dependeth only on the Pope. all authority to define matters of faith doth reside) doth either propose or suppose as a sure ground of his decrees and sentences, but this doctrine that the blessed Virgin was not conceived in original sin, that the Pope can dispense in the solemn vow of chastity, and give leave to a Priest who is no Bishop to minister the Sacrament of confirmation, is proposed or supposed by Popes as a ground and foundation of many their decrees, dispensations and judicial sentences, therefore this doctrine doth appertain to faith. 60 Moreover, if the Pope should expressly define, that the Church hath such a power f To wit, to dispense in the solemn vow of chastity, and to give leave to a Priest who is no Bishop to minister the Sacrament of confirmation. , no Catholic (those especially who do hold that the Pope defining without a General Council cannot err) could make any doubt but that this matter doth appertain to faith, but seeing that the Popes do suppose it as a sure ground and foundation of their decrees and sentences they are thought no less to affirm the same, therefore it aught to be accounted no less certain. 61 Lastly, it is a point of faith, as our adversaries do suppose, that the Pope cannot err in doctrine and precepts of manners, by teaching generally any thing to be lawful which is unlawful, or to be unlawful which is lawful, or also by commanding any thing which of itself is unlawful. For such an error is no less pernicious to the faithful than an error in faith, but if the Pope should not have authority to dispense in the solemn vow of Chastity, or to give leave to Priests who are no Bishops to minister the Sacrament of confirmation, the Pope should err in doctrine and precepts of manners, and that in matters of very great moment. For he doth teach that the Sacrament of confirmation ministered by a Priest who is no Bishop is a true Sacrament: Also, that if a Prince by the Pope's dispensation do marry a professed Nun, that such a marriage is lawful and valide, and that their children are lawfully begotten and aught to succeed in the Kingdom. And notwithstanding that the next of the blood Royal should for want of the lawful issue of this Prince pretend right to the Crown, yet the Pope may without doubt, according to our adversaries doctrine, command the Subjects, and by censures compel them to acknowledge the issue begotten by that marriage wherein he did dispense to be their true, undoubted, and lawful Prince; all which things would be false, and not only false but also pernicious, for that thereby the Subjects should be incited to do injuries and against their wills should be compelled thereunto, and Princes should obtain free liberty to commit incests, and sacrileges. The Church therefore doth err in doctrine of manners, and doth council sacrilege, and command injustice, and doth compel by censures thereunto; but to affirm this it is heretical, therefore that also from which it followeth is heretical, to wit, that the Pope hath not power to dispense in the solemn vow of chastity, and to give leave to a priest who is no Bishop to minister the Sacrament of confirmation; And nevertheless neither of these are heretical or erroneous according to the doctrine of those Divines but a little before cited. Let our adversaries therefore solve these difficulties, and I will forthwith by their own solutions untie those former knots which they imagine cannot in any wise be solved. 62 To conclude, are not the reasons, for which the councils are induced to define any thing of faith, as it were certain grounds, which are by them proposed or supposed as foundations of their definitions and decrees, and nevertheless no Divine, as I suppose, will affirm, that those reasons are to be believed by Catholics with the same certainty wherewith the definitions themselves are to believed. In the councils, saith Cardinal Bellarmine, g Lib. 2. de Concl. cap. 12. the greatest part of the Acts do not appertain to faith. For neither the Disputations which go before, nor the reasons which are added, nor those things which are brought to explicate and illustrate, are of faith, but only the bore decrees, and those not all, but only those which are proposed as of Faith. 63 Wherefore betwixt the voice, doctrine, and consent of the Church firmly believing, or defining any thing to be of faith, and of the same Church probably, only thinking there is doubtless to be made a great distinction. For no Catholic maketh any doubt but that whosoever contemneth to hear the voice of the Church firmly believing, doth fall into heresy or error, but Catholic Doctors, whose authority our most learned adversaries will not easily reject, do in express words affirm, that he who being moved with sufficient reason doth not embrace the doctrine of the Church only probably thinking, doth not expose himself to any danger of heresy, error, or temerity. For Alphonsus Salmeron, and Franciscus Suarez who are doubtless most learned Jesuits do allege the practice and consent almost of the whole Catholic Church to prove the immaculate conception of the Blessed Virgin Mary, and nevertheless they do expressly grant, and without a grievous sin they cannot deny, but that the contrary opinion may be defended without any danger of mortal sin. We, saith Salmeron h Ad Rom. 5. dis. 51. 6. Deinde. , do bring (for the aforesaid immaculate Conception) the consent almost of the Universal Church, and the uniform opinion of all Universities. And Suarez i Tom. 2. dis. 3. sec. 5. , The second ground saith he; is to be taken from the authority of the Church, and first the universal consent almost of the whole Church. And especially for these two hundred years almost all Ecclesiastical writers, Bishops, all almost Religions, and universities have subscribed. 64 But concerning these matters let this suffice. For by that which we have already said, what little force the aforesaid objections of our Adversaries have the learned Reader will very easily perceive. And these are the principal things, which my Adversaries do object against my Apology out of those Counsels cited by Cardinal Bellarmine, whose book against Doctor Barclay I have diligently read and read again, which nevertheless, to speak truly, doth so little satisfy my understanding, that it rather confirmeth me in my old opinion, than any whit averteth me from the same, to which also I was long since determined to have made an answer k Master john Barclay who hath now very learnedly answered that book. if that, as I am credibly informed, an other man whom it did more concern had not taken upon him to answer the same and therefore I am resolved to defer my anwere, until his Reply to my Apology, which our Countrymen do daily expect be printed and published l For I have seen the copy of a letter of cardinal Bellarmine's, wherein he writeth that he hath finished and printed his Answer to my Apology and that he deferreth to publish it for just causes: therefore most men think that it is that Answer which now goeth under D. Schulk●nius his name. . 65 Last of all our Adversaries do object a certain book which is entitled, An Apologetical Disputation for the Pope's authority composed, as they say, by Leonard Lessius doubtless a very learned man, wherein as they report, he hath clearly, perspicuously and evidently demonstrated out of holy Scriptures, ancient Fathers, Counsels and 13. invincible reasons, that the Pope hath power to depose Princes, and that this true Doctrine is not only a Theological conclusion, which is contrary to error, but also expressly defined to be of faith, in so much that the contrary opinion cannot be defended without manifest heresy. 66 Truly I have often heard this book to be marvelously commended by some men, and I cannot deny if it be true as they do say but that it is written by a very learned man. Nevertheless if this book doth so clearly demonstrate, as these men do brag, why doth it not come to light, but, as a business walking in darkness m Psal. 90. , is suffered to be seen by few, and those only who are thought will applaud it? Whether these be tokens of a good work, or rather manifest signs that you have a great diffidence in your cause, I appeal to the judgement of yourself, most learned man, who is the Author of this book. Your English forerunner, who for this whole year ago did promise' such great matters of this your book, and did make a compendious abridgement thereof, but so compendiously that no man can clearly perceive any one of those yours so clear demonstrations, is suffered by you to be seen by all Catholics. And yet the book itself, which your Forerunner promised would fully satisfy wavering minds, can be neither gotten for love nor money, neither can it be seen indifferently by all men, but only by very few, and that with a solemn promise' not to show it to others. 67 Are you perchance afraid to publish among Catholics, and those especially whom you certainly believe to err in their belief, such a book, which doth most clearly demonstrate a doctrine which is to be believed of faith, and which therefore is necessary to eternal salvation? You do suffer other books which are as dangerous as this is, and which by the Laws of this Realm are forbidden with capital punishments, to come indifferently into the hands of all Catholics, and do you so greatly fear to publish this so necessary a book, which doth clearly demonstrate, as you pretend, a doctrine to be necessarily believed of faith, and in such things which do concern the authority of the Pope's Holiness and of Sovereign Princes? But I fear me that the matter goeth otherwise then some among us here do brag. For if that be true which I do hear (besides that you seem to confounded to command temporals with to dispose of temporals, and that Subjects are in your opinion by virtue only of Excommunication freed from the bond of their allegiance, and that the Pope's Breves directed to some one province, which by Eud●mon-Ioannes k In Praefat. Parali Torti. are called private letters, and wherein there is not one word concerning the deposing of Princes, yet do define that doctrine to be certainly believed as a point of faith) some of your examples, which you bring out of the ancient Fathers, to show that this your doctrine of the Pope's power to depose Princes was known to the ancient Church, do seem not so much to tend to the deposing of Princes by the Pope's authority, as that they may be deposed, yea also and by private authority murdered by the people. But I will no longer exaggerate this matter, it is now high time, that I turn my speech to my nameless Doctor, who chargeth my Apology w●●h heresy and Ethnicisme, to whom truly, if he had brotherly admonished me of any error which he had thought have been therein contained, I should have given him therefore most hearty thanks. But seeing that he hath not set any known name, which I should have respected unto his letters, which by great chance came unto my hands, and hath also not publicly and openly, but secretly and treacherously accused me among Catholics of such heinous crimes, and laboured to take away my good name for ever, if I in defending my innocency shall handle him somewhat roughly, and shall writ against him somewhat eagerly, let him thank himself for provoking me wrongfully, and let him hereafter be more wary, how he condemn so easily of heresy and Ethnicisme those Catholics, who do hate heresy and Ethnicisme not one jot lesser than himself. FINIS. Faults Escaped. In the Epistle nu. 2. line 33. read, as that. nu. 6. against line 81. put in the margin c Cap. 10. sec. 2. nu. 13. nu. 7. l. 39 read, do think. In the Admonition nu. 8. l. 44. read, shamefully. nu. 27 l. 15. eiectus. nu. 29. l. 36. was not thrust. In the Disputation pag. 31. lin. 22. read, actually l. 23. actual. p. 60. l. 31. Realm. p. 78. l. 20. of [●r]. p. 103. l. 6. absolved. p 105. l 9 hath authority. p. 174. l. 19 this oath. p. 181. l. 35. 36. ●urtold. p. 186. l. 13. what action. p. 192 l. 19 in this. p. 207. l. 1. that as it. p. 209. l. 12 can err. p. 211 l. 11. no more. p. 214. l. 35. enormous. p. 229. l. 35. name Monk. p. 232. l. 1. Expositors. p. 240. l. 35. utterly. p. 241. l. 30. appearance. p. 243. l. 16. refrain. p. 255. l. 18. no just. p. 260. l. 15. 16. infinite. p. 262. l. 27. day and day. p. 266. l. 33. Cassianus. p. 288. in the last line of the margentread and 21. p. 293. l. 16. coercion p. 296. l. 25. coercion. pag. 399. l. 4. in the margin grant. and lin. 31. dispose. p. 302. l. 34. coercive. p. 334. l. 19 contract. from the page 341. to 349. put above in the first line Against the Oath of Allegiance. p. 345. l. 28. read the last of january. p. 366. l. 11. forbidden. p. 370. l. 28. this Disp. p. 371. l. 10. do make. p. 374. l. 35. will not. p. 375. lin. 13. to himself. In the preface. nu. 10. read had not. p. 404. l. 2. Censurers. p. 410. l. 3. will come. p. 416. l. 39 original. The other faults I beseech the courteous Reader to correct.