The rule of Reason, containing the Art of Logic, set forth in English, by Thomas Vuilson.  
An. M.D.LI   

¶ To the most excellent Prince, and our most redoubted sovereign Lord Edward the sixth, by the grace of God King of England, France, and Ireland, defender of the faith, and of the Churches of England, and Ireland, in earth the supreme head, your most faithful and obedient subject Thomas Wilson wisheth long life with most prosperous Reign.  
IF my power & ability were answerable to my good will, most excellent Prince and sovereign Lord, this token of mine humble duty which I now offer unto your Majesty, should be as great & precious, as by reason of the contrary, it is base and slender. wherefore I most humbly beseech your Majesty in no worse part to accept this little offer, then as the present of a true faithful subject, which would have brought better, if his power had been thereafter. But following the example of poor men in the ancient Histories of plutarch, and other writers much commended: I offer unto you● highness part of such fruits as have grown in a poor students gardin. This fruit b●ing of a strange kind (such as no English ground hath before this time, and in this sort by any tillage brought forth,) may perhaps at the first tasting, seem somewhat rough, and harsh in the mouth, because of the strangeness: but after a little use, and familiar accustoming thereunto, I doubt not but the same will wax every one day more pleasant than other. But in simple and plain words to declare unto your Majesty, wherein my wit and earnest endeavour hath at this season travailed: I have assaie● through my diligence to make Logic as familiar to Thenglishe man, as by diverse men's industries the most part of the other the liberal Sciences are. For considering the forwardness of this age, wherein the very multitude are prompt & ripe in all Sciences that have by any man's diligence been set forth unto them: weighing also that the capacity of my country men the Englishnation is so pregnant and quick to achieve any kind, or Arte● of knowledge, whereunto wit may attain, that they are not inferior to any other: And farther pondering that diverse learned men of other countries have heretofore for the furtherance of knowledge, not suffered any of the Sciences liberal to be hidden in the Greek, or Latin tongue, but have with most earnest travail made every of them familiar to their vulgar people: I thought that Logic among all other being an Art as apt for the English wits, & as profitable for there knowledge as any the other Sciences are, might with as good grace be set forth in Thenglishe, as the other Arts, heretofore have been. And therefore I have so far as my slender practice hath enabled me, enterprised to join an acquaintance betwiene Logic, and my countrymen, from the which they have been hitherto barred, by tongues unacquainted. notwithstanding I must needs confess, that the Printer hereof your majesties servant provoked me first hereunto, unto whom I have ever found myself greatly beholding, not only at my being in Cambrige, but also at all times else, when I most needed help. But as touching the thing self though I have not done it with so good perfection as the worthiness of the Art requireth, or as some other better learned could do: yet I hope that whereas now it is dedicated unto your highness, and so made commune to all: my good will shall want no favourers in that I have first laboured to bring so noble a mistre●se, both of reason, and judgement, acquainted with so noble a country, & here to be made of a stranger a free denisen: wherein I take not upon me so cunningly, & perfectly to have written of the said Art, as though none could do it better: but because no Englishman until now hath gone through with this enterprise, I have thought meet to declare that it may be done. And yet herein I profess to be but as a spur or a whet stone, to sharp the pens of someother, that they may polished, and perfect, that I have rudely & grossly entered. And albeit I do herein take upon me no more but to be as a poor mean man, or simple person, whose charge were to be a lodesman to convey some noble princess into a strange land where she was never before, leaving the entertaining, the enriching and the decking of her to such as were of substance and furniture according: yet if this work may now at the first entrance have the safe conduct and protection of your most Royal Majesty, I trust it shall in process appear, and prove, that I have not altogether in vain taken upon me this strange labour, but rather to very good purpose and effect attempted the same. I know your grace for your own study little needeth any help of such an English treatise, being so well travailed both in the Greek & in the Latin for the same purpose, through the help of those right worthy men Sir John Cheke, and Sir Antony Cook, your majesties teachers and Schoolmasters in all good literature. But to feed & to satisfy the thirst and desire of such Englishmen as for default of the said tongues could otherwise not come to the knowledge of Logic: I have judged it labour worth to give the precepts and Rules thereof in English, that all men according to the gift that to every one is measured, may be the more provoked to follow the examples of your Majesty aswell in studiousness & desire of knowledge, as also in the exercise of all virtue, and princely worthiness, wherinto your grace hath made a goodly entry. In which most godly trade if your grace shall continue together with the fear of God, and the most reverent observation of his most holy commandments, and Gospel, (wherein at this day all England to their incomparable joy and comfort doth see and find your majesties chief delight to be) it cannot be doubted, but that the same shallbe to the wicked a terror, to the godly a comfort, to this Realm of England, a perpetual defence and sauegarde● and to all Christian Kings, either now living or hereafter to come, an example of Kingly worthiness, and a mirror of Princely governance. And where as to the most noble Kings of Israel and juda, the lord for their sundry virtues gave sundry gifts of his grace (as to David his darling, puissance and might against his enemies' to Solomon, wisdom and richesse: to Aza, innocency of life, and pureness of Religiō● to josaphat, prudence of Kingly regiment to set good ministers, and officers under him: to good King josias, the advancement of Gods true service, and the roting up of Idolatry: to joathan, a long and prosperous Reign in all godly rest & quietness:) all these noble gifts of Regal excellency, shall the lord your guide & governor vouchsafe to power upon your highness, to endue you with all, in whom are now planted such graffs of his heavenly grace, as the fruit hereafter is most like to be incomparable. Which thing that it may so be, your Majesty hath, and perpetually shall have, the daily, and incessant prayers of all us your most faithful loving subjects, for the long and prosperous Reign of your highness' to the glory of God, the honour and Princely dignity of yourself, & the wealth of your Realms and dominions, long to endure, Amen.   

GVALTERUS HADDONUS Cantabrigiensis, Legum Doctor.  
Grammatice, lingua nos est affata Britanna,  
Curreret ut Latiis lingua Latina rotis.  
Nunc 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ●enit, & nostris se vocibus effert,  
Vt ratio nostros possit habere sonos●  
Ant●, peregrinis linguis instructa fuisti  
Anglia, nunc propria discere voce potes.  
Grammaticen laudant omnes, quia verba polivit:  
Qualis erit 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 nos ratione regens?  
Attulit hàc, nostras Thomas wilsonus ad aures  
Vtilis & patriae sic suit ille suae.   

The Art of Logic.  
Logic is an art to reason probably on both parts, of all matters that be put forth, so far as the nature of every thing can bear.  

The division of Logic.  
THis Art is divided into ii parts. The first part standeth in framing of things aptly together, in knitting words, for the purpose accordingly, & in Latin is called judicium. 
judicium   
The second part consisteth in finding out matter, and searching stuff agreeable to the cause, and in Latin is called Inuentio. 
Inuentio.  For you must understand, that when one goeth about to prove any thing, he must first invent somewhat to prove his cause, the which when he hath done: he must use judgement, both in framing the same reason so invented, & also to see, whether it serveth for the purpose or not.  
¶ And now some will say, that I should first speak of the finding out of an argument, before I should teach the way how to frame an argument. Truth it is that naturally we find a reason or we begin to fashion the same. And yet notwithstanding, it is more meet that the ordering of an argument should be first handled: forasmuch as it shall no more profit a man to find out hi● argument, except he first know how to order the same and to shape it accordingly (which he doth not yet perfectli know) than stones or Timber shall profit the ●●a●on or Carpenter, which knoweth not how to work upon the same. A reason is easilier found then fashioned, for every man can give a reason naturally and without art, but how to fashion and frame thesam●, according to the art, none can do at all, except they be learned. Therefore, because every man's wit can give lightly a reason of divers things without any learning at all, even by the instinct of nature, & yet not be able to set the same in order Scholarlike, either to prove or to confute: I purpose first to show the manner of making an Argument, as which is more needful: next after that ye shall learn the manner of finding of an Argument. And the places where all Arguments do rest, and last of all ye shall know the captious or deceitful Arguments, as they be in Aristotle.  

A brief declaration in metre, of the seven, liberal arts, wherein Logic is comprehended as one of them.  
Grammar doth teach to utter words.  
To speak both ape and plain,  
Logiquely art sets forth the truth,  
And doth tell 〈◊〉 what is vain.  
Rhetoric at large paints well the cause,  
And makes that seem right gay,  
Which Logic spoke but at a word,  
And taught as by the way.  
Music with tunes, delights the ear,  
And makes us think it heaven,  
Arithmetic by number can make  
Reconinges to be ●auen.  
Geometry things thick and broad,  
Measures by L●ne and Square,  
Astronomy by stars doth tell,  
Of foul and eke of fair.    

¶ The difference between Logic and Sophistry.  
Logic otherwise called Dialecte (for they are both one) is an Art to try the corn from the chaff, the truth from every falsehood, by defining the nature of any thing, by dividing the same, and also by knitting together true Arguments and untwining all knotty subtleties that are both false, and wrongfully framed together.  
¶ Sophistry is ever occupied either in proving the truth always to be false, or else that which is false to be true, so that euermore● one part of the argument is either false, by using some ambiguous word, or by not well applying it to the purpose, or else not framing it according to the Rules: so that a skilful artificer● may the sooner put the vain Sophister to silence by opening the fraud, & declaring the craft of his invention. Whereas otherwise an argument made by the rulers of Logic cannot be avoided, but must needs be true, whosoever say nay. And so much more is Logic to be preferred before Sophistry, as he is the more to be esteemed that telleth a true tale, them he which telleth a lie. And even as a Grammarian is better liked, that speaketh true and good Latin, than he is that speaketh false: Even so Logic of itself is good, when Sophistry on the otherside is nought. And well may we say, that Sophisters are like those which play with false dice, and would make other believe that they are true, or else properly to term them, they be like those that go for honest men and are none.   

The difference between Logic and Rhetoric.  
Both these Arts are much like saving that Logic is occupied about all matters, and doth plainly and nakedly setforth with apt words the sum of things by the way of Argumentation. Again of the other side Rhetoric useth gay painted Sentences, and setteth forth those matters with fresh colours and goodly ornaments, and that at large  
insomuch, that Zeno being asked the difference between Logic and Rhetoric, made answer by Demonstration of his Hand, declaring that when his hand was closed, it resembled Logic, when it was open & stretched out, it was like Rhetoric.   

The Office of Logic.  
Logic professeth to teach truly, orderly & plainly. And here we may see how universal this commodity is, and how largely it extendeth, not only to know worldly affairs: but also to know God, and all his heavenvly works, so far as nature may comprehend.  
There be four parts of this office or duty whereunto Logic is bound. That is. To define the nature of every thing, to divide, to knit true arguments, and unknit false,   

Of Questions.  
THIS same manner of knitting words in a due order, being one of the parts of Logic, or rather Logic itself, showeth the manner of all Questions, called otherwise either Propositions, or several words.  
A question is either a word or sentence put forth, as when I ask what such a thing is, & would know an other man's advise therein, as thus, What is man? What is truth? What is ambition?  
Every Question is either Single or double. A single question resteth in a single word, as thus. What is friendship? What is Philosophy? A double question standeth not in one word, but in ii several sentences, as thus. Is the study of Philosophy praise worthy, or is it not?  
Likewise a proposition, which is a sentence uttered in plain words expressly signifying either truth or falsehood, is either single or double. A single Proposition as thus: Wicked men cannot abide to read the word of God. Of the which you may make a double proposition by adding somewhat thereunto as thus. Wicked men not only can they not abide to read the word of God, but also they seek by all means possible to over throw the same.   

¶ Of the ●iue Predicables, otherwise called the five common words, which are spoken of other  
WHen we go about to expound any matter, first we must begin with the definition, to know the very nature of the thing, the which we cannot do, except we first learn the predicables, for they show the largeness and the narrowness of words, how far they do extend, and how much they comprehend in them. As when I see one afar of come unto me, first I know that he is a man, then when he cometh nigher, I know whether he be of mine acquaintance or no. Likewise, when I go about to declare what one is, & to open the nature of any thing, I use the largest words, & so it must needs be, that I begin with the Predicables, because they show how much every word doth comprehend in itself, and how large or narrow it is. They be called Predicables because some one thing is spoken of an other. And they are (as a man would say) marks or notes of words that are spoken of many, showing how & by what manner the same words are attributed to other.  

They be .v. in number.  Genus 
The general word.  Species 
The Kind  Differentia 
The difference.  Proprium 
The property.  Accidens 
The thing chancing or cleaving to the substance   
GENUS is a general word, 
Genus  the which is spoken of many that differ in their kind: as when this Question is asked, What it is. As Animal. A living creature. Ars an Arte. Virtus, Virtue. Gemma. A precious stone. Or else thus. Genus, is a general word, under the which divers kinds or sorts of things are comprehended, as under a living creature are comprehended men & beasts. Under art, are comprehended, Logic, Grammar, rhetoric. etc. Every general word, hath divers kinds, & is spoken evermore, of them al. As Gemma. A precious stone. comprehendeth in itself, A sapphire, A Ruby, A Crystal, A Turkas. As thus. Saphirus est gemma. A sapphire is a precicious stone. And so of other.  
¶ Every general word is two ways considered, and commonly called the chief general, in latin, Genus ●●mum. and the middle general, in latin, Genus intermedium.  
The chief general is so● that where as it is the head of all & above all, it can never become inferior, to be of any kind or sort in things. As the Substance the quantity, the quality, are ever chief general words, and cannot be comprehended under any other.  
The middle general, is the same that being comprehended betwixt the chief general, and the lowest kind or sort in things, may be also some kind or form itself, as a body, a living creature: the which two being compared with their inferiors, are general words: being referred to their superiors, they are Species. That is to say, shapes, kinds or sorts in things.  
Species, seu fo●ma, the kind, or sort of any thing comprehended, under a word more universal, is the same of whom the general word, is spoken, when the question is asked, what it is. As when I ask, What is justice? I answer a Virtue. Therefore in this proposition (justice is a virtue) justice is the Species, and virtue is the general word, which comprehendeth the said justice, and is spoken of the same  
Or thus, Species ● is a common word that is spoken of many which differ only in number, as man is spoken of Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, and of every proper name belonging to any man. As Socrates is a man. Plato is a man. Aristotle is a man.  
Every Species or kind in things is of two sorts. The one is called the lowest kind, which is always spoken of every proper name, & ever is Species neither can it at any time be Genus, although sometime it bear the name of genus. The other is called Species intermedia, that is the kind placed betwixt the highest and the lowest, which at divers times and by divers considerations may both be Genus, and Species For that which is under the general Word that same may be called Species or Kind, that which comprehendeth other, may be called the general word.  
¶ A Noun proper is that whereof the kind is rehearsed. As Cato est Homo. Cato is a man: in this proposition, Cato is the Noun proper, which belongeth to one man only, and Man, is the kind, which is more large, and comprehendeth all men.   

THis Table showeth the Order of every substance and kind as they are appointed by nature, what are the chief general words, what are the middle general, what are the lowest kinds in every thing, and what are the kinds betwixt both.  
with body A Substance. Without body. as 

God  
Angels  
Spirits.  
The soul of man.   Compounded of divers elemented A body. Without mixtur as the iiij. elements. Fire. air. Water. Earth heaven and all the planets. Being a living thing A body compounded With out life as 

Stones.  
Metals  
Liquores.   having the sense of feeling A body living. Without Sense or feeling at all as 

a Tree.  
a Shrub.  
an Herb?   Endued with reason. A living creature. Without the gift of reason as Beasts, birds or fish, some living. 

upon the land.  
in the Water.  
in the Air or in both.    A man. as. 

Scipio.  
Socrate●  
Alexander and every several man living.     

Di●●erentia.  ¶ Differentia, that is to say the difference, is the same that is spoken of many which differ in form and kind, when the question is asked, What manner of thing it is, as when we say. Quale quid est homo? What manner of thing is man? we must answer, He is endued with reason. If the question be asked what is a man, we must answer by his Genus, or general word, he is a living creature. If the question be asked what manner of thing a beast is? We may say, He is without the gift of reason. Every difference that is most proper to every thing, is naturally and substantially joined to the kinde●●hiche is comprehended under the general word,  

Proprium.  PROPRIUM, That is to say a property, is a natural pro●e●es, & manner of doing, which agreeth to one kind and to the same only and that evermore. And also may be spoken of the same kind, and by conversion, the same kind may be spoken of him also. As to speak & to have power to laugh, doth only agree to man, & to none other creature earthily. And as I may say, Whosoever is a man hath power given him of nature to speak: So may I also say by conversion backward, whoso ever hath power given him of nature, to speak, that same body is a ma●. To bark is proper to a Dog, and only proper and evermore proper. Ergo whosoever hath power or rather an inclination given of nature to Bark, that same is a dog. And again, Whatsoever creature is a dog, that same hath power or rather an inclination to bark. To go upright is proper to a man, & only to a man, & to none other living creature. Notwithstanding, you must mark one thing, that although many men go crooked & some also cannot speak●: yet both to go upright & to speak are proper to all men generally, and therefore this rule serveth to avoid such objections. Verba in definitionibus posita, non actum, sed potentiam significant. which is as much to say, that wor●●s vied in definitions, do not signify the very act in deed, but the power, the apines, or the inclination of nature thereunto: as when I say, it is proper for every man to speak I mean to be able or to be apt by Nature to speak, is proper to every man.  
¶ Note further that Proprium is not always taken after one sort, but it is four ways considered.  

First the property is that which agreeth to some kind only, although not to every person comprehended under the same kind. As it is proper to a man only to be a Poet, or to be a Physician, and yet not proper to every man.  
Secondly, the property is that which agreeth to every singular person, and yet not only to man.. As to have two feet agreeth to every singular person, and yet not to man only.  
Thirdly, the property is that which agreeth to every man, and to man only and yet not always nor for evermore. As to have hoar hears in the old age agreeth to man only, & yet not always, but for the most part men have hoar hears in their old age.  
Fourthly, the property is that which in deed is most aptly and chief called Proprium, when any thing doth agree to every man, to man only and always to man. As to be able to Speak, to laugh, to go upright, agreeth to every man, to man only, and always to man   
This diversity many have made betwixt the difference & the property, that the difference is one part of Man's substance, and is the part that maketh up man. As to have the gift of reason doth signify the mind, which is one part of man, for man himself is compact of body and mind.  
A property doth signify a certain thing, Which is attributed to Man when he is made, and as a man would say, doth come after, when man is holy made, as to be able to speak, to laugh, to go upright.  
Accidens (that is to say, a thing cleaving, or chancing, or coming to a substance) is that which doth not stand by himself, neither is the part of a substance, but rather is after such sort in the substance, that it may both be away, and be there, sometimes more and sometime less, without destruction or loss of the Subject, or substance, as mirth, sorrow, to run, to sit, to be well coloured, all these may be away, & yet the man may be on live in whom they ware before. So that the lack of them in their quantity, or greatness, is not the loss of the Substance. And all though no Substance at any time doth altogether forsake his Accidents, Yet this we see, that one & the same Substance, doth some time alter his Accidents, forsaking some, and taking other. As water being set on the fire, altereth the coldness, & taketh heat, so that we may judge by this, that coldness in the water is not a Substance, but an Accident.  
An Accident is two ways considered, for either it may be separated, or it may not● some may be separated from their Subject as cold may be taken from water, and knowledge from the mind. Other are inseparable, because they cannot be taken away all together, as ●●ature or brodenes, cannot be taken from man. Heat cannot be taken from fire, nor moisture from water, the which notwithstanding they are not separat from their substance, yet the quantity or greatness is changeable in every one of them, for some time it is more, and some time it is less. And we see heat in other things to be separated from the Subject. Where upon we judge that the heat is an other thing than the very Substance of fire. Therefore this is worthy to be known, that the Substance is one thing, and the Accident an other thing, and meet it is to make a difference betwixt them, as thus. The soul is one thing, the fear of God is an other thing. Man may be without the fear of God (as many one is at this day the more pite) Therefore the fear of God is an Accident, the soul is a Substance.   

¶ The use and commodity, which we hau● by these five common words called otherwise Predicables.  
THere be four especial commodities. First they show the largeness, and the narrowness of the most general words, called otherwise predicaments, which hereafter follow: so that here by, you may perceive how much every word comprehendeth in itself, and how far it may be applied. The second profit is, that every thing is defined by these five common words, forasmuch as all things the more narrow they be, are always defined by words that are more large. As by the general word, by the difference, and the property. Thirdly, they are good to judge the knitting of words, and to see what thing may truly be joined to other. for there is no Proposition, nor yet joining together of any sentence (according to the common order of nature) but they always agree to these above rehearsed Predicables: so that either the kind is spoken of the singular or proper name (which is ever some one person, as thus Cicero est homo. Cicero is a man) Or else the general word, the difference, the property, or the accident, are all spoken either of the kind, or of some one person● as thus Homo, vel Cicero● est animal ratione praeditum, loquendi facultatem habens, album, longum, latum. A man, or Cicero, is a living creature, endued with reason, having aptness by nature, to speak, being, white, long, and broad. So that no proposition can be, but the parts of the same are comprehended with in these .v. common words. fourthly, the general word, the kind, the difference, & property are joined together necessarily, so that when you name one, all tother follow. Therefore when a proposition is made from the kind, to the general, to his difference, or property: it is evermore an undoubted true proposition, as this. Homo est animal ratione praeditum, loquendi facultatem habens. A man is a living creature endued with reason, having aptness by nature to speak. A man can not he except he be a living creature, endued with reason and having aptness of nature to speak. The accident not withstanding is not necessarily spoken of the subject, but is there casually, & may be changed, as thus. Homo est albus. Some man is white. This proposition may be afterward false, for he may be black, or alter his complexion some other way, so that the accident is often altered, & an other succeedeth in his ronme. Therefore it is good to be known, when you have a Proposition, whether it be undoubted true, for evermore, or else may be false at any time.   

¶ Of the predicaments, called in English General words.  
A Predicament is an order of single words, wherein things of one kind, are couched and comprehended under one word, which is most general.  
A Predicament is nothing else in English, but a showing or a rehearsing what words may be truly joined together, or else a setting forth of the nature of every thing, & also showing what may be truly spoken and what not. and for this cause arts were invented, because that the truth might be known, & every thing uttered with his proper words. For when I say, A man is a creature, I know this proposition hath his proper words, and that like as Man is a Substance, so is the creature, which is the general word unto him, which both are in one Predicament, and the order in this Proposition is observed according to the Art, for we must always begin at the lowest and go upwards, which order agreeth also to nature, when things less known, are declared by things that are more known, as shall more plainly hereafter appear.  
The predicaments are divided in to the Substance, and the Accident. The first, is both called the Substance and is a Substance in deed. The other are Accidents, as not being of the Substance, but cleaving thereunto.  
The commodity of these predicaments is great. First, where as they be divided into the Substance & Accident, it is a good lesson to know evermore the substance, from the thing which is Accidental. Again, of these most general words ariseth this profite● that if you will define any thing, or show the nature thereof, you may know in which of all these store houses the word resteth, which should express the nature of another.  
Thirdly, if one will bestow a little diligence herein, searching where every word is settled, & knowing to which of all these most general words he may best refer it: he shall faithfully know the nature of all things, no man better, than the which, nothing is more necessary. and this difference is betwixt the .v. commune words otherwise called the Predicables, and these most general words called predicaments, that the Predicables, set forth the largeness of words, the predicaments do name the very nature of things, declaring (and that substantially) what they are in very deed.   

¶ A note of certain things diligently to b● observed before the rehearsal of the most general words.  
Considering ambiguity breedeth error, most wareness ought to be used, that the doubleness of no one word deceive the hearer. The cause of all controversy, is either the not well understanding, or else the wily using of words that in sense have double meaning. Aristotel the schoolmaster to all scholars, giveth good warning that all men be right ware in any wise to have the right understanding of every several word.  
There be words that under one & the same title, comprehend the nature of many things, as these words following.  

as a Crown.  
as a Bear.  
as Time.  
as Sage.  
a noble   
A crown signifieth the crown of a man's head, & also signifieth a crown of gold, such as is current, or else such as Kings wear at the day of their coronation. A bear, signifieth a brute beast that is baited with dogs, & also signifieth the coffin where in a dead man is carried to his burial. Time noteth both the space of hour, day and year, and yet we call an herb by that name, which groweth in gardens. Sage also betokeneth an herb, & yet we call wise men, sage men: so that every one of these words have a double meaning, and joined only together by fellowship of name, by nature, and in very deed, do veri much dissent. Therefore this aught evermore to be marked that all words be well noted according to their natures, that the rather we may escape error. Those are only to be received and used, for the maintenance of all truth whose name, and nature is all one, or the which are ever more to be taken and understanden after one sort. As homo a man, signifieth none other thing but man. Arbour, a tree signifieth none other thing in all the world but a tree only, and so of other. If any word be used that hath a double meaning, restrain the largeness thereof, and declare how you will have it taken, by means whereof, the fraud shall sooner be avoided, and the truth bette● known.  

The predicaments are in number .10.  
1 Substantia. 
The Substance.  2 Quantitas. 
The quantity.  3 Qualitas. 
The quality.  4 Relativa. 
The Relation.  5 Actio. 
The manner of doing.  6 Passio. 
The Suffering.  7 Quando. 
When.  8 Vbi. 
Where.  9 Situs. 
The Settelling.  10 Habitus. 
The appareling.   
Svbstantia, the Substance, or being which Cicero calleth Nature, is a thing which standeth by itself, and needeth no help of an other, but hath his proper being and substance naturally, or thus.  
The substance is a thing which hath his proper being of himself, and containeth accidents which happen thereunto, neither can any substance be seen, saving only the accidents, as the colour, the greatness, and such like qualities of man are seen, but the very substance cannot be seen.    

¶ The division of the Substance.  
THe substance is divided into the first, and second. The first substance is called every singular person or proper name as Socrates, Plato, Virgil, Homer.  
¶ The second substance comprehendeth both the general word, and the kind also of every singular person, as thus Tully, Caesar, Hannibal with other. Likewise this word (a living creature) being a substance and general word to every proper name containeth all things particularly that have life.  
It is profitable to mark the order of substance, set forth in a table a little before, for we may by the same, divide severally every substance, of all things in this world the which when we know, and remember in our minds, we perceive evidently, the difference, between God, and his creatures, & seeing the thing created of God and the properties there with all, we rest upon the same, and learn the use, and proper commodity of many things here in earth. We may define many things, by the same table: as we may define God, man, heaven, earth, beast stone, & any thing else that is a substance.   

¶ Of quantity.  
THe quantity, is the greatness of a thing, or the number. And proper it is to this most general word, to be divided, as greatness, is divided into several parts, and numbers into every several number.   

¶ quantity is ii ways considered.  
The one is called Continua quantitas, that is, when the question is asked, how great, or broad any thing is● and therefore the length, the latitude, and the deepness of bodies artificial, are herein observed: the use whereof, is most seen in Geometry.  
The other is called discreta quantitas, when the question is asked, how many things there be, and is occupied altogether in numbering. The use of this is perceived in Arithmetic.   

¶ Of qualit●e.  
THe quality, is a form, or shape of the body, or mind, whereof some name is derived, as of wisdom, men are called wise, of justice, men are called just.  
There be three manner of qualities, whereof the first doth contain the habit, otherwise called, the perfect having of any thing. The other is, a forwardness in any thing, gotten by labour and travail, not given by nature's goodness, or else we may call it, the half attaining of that, which we go about to have, wanting perfection, for lack of full time, and is called in Latin dispositio, as to have mean knowledge, & not to be fully instructed in the practise of justice, is dispositio. Again to be fully learned, to have accomplished all things, due to righteousness and justice, is called in Latin, habitus, as who should say, the absolute attaining, and strong hold of the same. The pith of this word habitus, can hardly be uttered with one word in this our tongue. notwithstanding it may in more words be opened, for the better understanding of it. For even as wax chafed with the hand, is made softer, even so some parts of man are made by us more apt to compass any thing. He that useth oft to speak French, shall by continuance, obtain perfection: he that useth much to write, at length shall have a ready hand, and this is called habitus. So that no man hath knowledge, or perfect skill in any thing, except he get it by labour, & acquaint nature with travail. notwithstanding, I must needs confess, that all natures be not like apt, to receive knowledge. Some are given to one thing and some to another. Therefore 〈◊〉 which by nature have a promptnes●e● shall so●er attain perfection, than any other can do, if by labour and earnest travail, they will stretch to attain that whereunto they are apt, and with good endeavour, filip nature forward. God giveth some one man a passing gift, to search the influence of the stars, to another he granteth, a natural inclination to Music, and all heavenly harmonies. So that if either of these two, would seek to follow their natural aptness, it were most like they should excel. Other that do not find nature so favourable, can never come to any such perfection.  
The full attaining of any thing, by long time, is two ways considered, for either it is of the body, or else of the mind. Perfection, gotten b● help of the body, is when men can by much use, leap, wrestle, or cast the bar, better than any other, or else do excel in any handy craft, above the common sort.  
The habit of the mind, that is to say, that constant hold of any thing, which is in the mind, either consisteth in knowledge, or else in practice. In knowledge, are comprehended all arts as Grammar, Logic, Astronomy etc. and all other learning, whereunto wit can attain. That habit of the mind, which is in practice, and by good advisement is chosen, standeth in the will of man. As all virtue, and all vice do. just dealing evermore, manhood in suffering all harms stoutly for honesties sake, and temperance of life, in forbearing lust, and ●ilthie gluttony. These virtues though their offspring be from God, yet time maketh them perfect, in the eyes of man. Other virtues are given of God wholly, and altogether without man's labour to attain them. As faith, hope, charity, & all other like gifts of the holy ghost.  
The second form, is called the power strength, or proneness of nature, in latin Naturalis vis. And the contrary hereunto, is called the weakness of nature, when she hath denied her power, to any one thing, in Latin it is called Imbecillitas naturae.  
The natural strength, is an aptness of nature, given either to the body, or to the mind. To the mind, as the aptness to learn, the promptness of memory of the body (in man) to be apt by nature to wrestle, for a horse, to be quick and stirring, for a bird, to be apt to fly, for fish, to live in the water, (the which man cannot do) for an Ass to be slow, for a stone to be hard. etc. Natural weakness, is when nature diminisheth her gift, as when she denieth aptness to learning, as we see many dull wits for learning, & much unfit that way. Nature hath denied some men, health of body, that they are never well at ease, some men are so sick in their brain, that they are never wise, some are capons by kind, and some so blunt by nature, that no art can whet them An Ass will never be swift, a stone will never be soft of nature. All qualities be instruments of nature, where by the worketh, as heat, is the instrument of fire. The heat and cold, in the juice of herbs are instruments, whereby men either are healed, or else past healing, for this world.  
The third kind comprehendeth, the affections of man, called in Latin, pe●turbationes, and also those passions which tarry but for a little while.  
A perturbation, or else affection, is a sudden change of the mind, and also of the body.  
There be. iii●. perturbations principal, which are in the mind, whereof all other have their offspring.  
Libido, seu cupidi●as. 
Lust or desire.  Leticia. 
Mirth.  ●g●●tudo. 
Grief.  Metus. 
Fear.   
The which are stirred up, by some motion of the mind, either desiring any thing earnestly, or abhorring the same  
There be five perturbations of the body, which move the senses, and are c●lled things offered to the senses● as colours, either whiteness, blackness, or any like, move the eyes. All sounds and ●oyses that be made● move the hearing, as coughing, speaking, bra●yng of a D●ere●●lowyng of a Cow, or neighing of an horse. Savours move the smelling, as perfumes, sweet odours, the strong smell of ordure, and such filth. Sauces move the taste, as bitterness, tartness, sow●rnes. Such qualities as are touched, move the sense of touching as hardness, softness, roughness, plains.  
The affections, called Patibiles' qualitates, (the passions that abide but awhile) differ from perturbacio●s, for as much as they tarry not long, but suddenly come, and suddenly go, as blushing in a man's face, sudden fear, suddenly to change colour, and ware pale. The other tarry longer, as en●ie, ambition, love, continual fear, greediness, with such other.  
The fourth comprehendeth● the figure, and form of any thing. The figure comprehend●th the shape of things that have no life, as the fashion of the Elements of trees, of floods, of an house, a ship, a cote, and such like.  
The form containeth the portraiture of all living things, as the very lively image of man, of an horse, or a lion, as we call a man well favoured, or hard favoured.   

¶ The table of quality.  

The quality.  Of the mind.  Of the body.  Of the mind Given by nature, as the natural inclination to any thing. Gotten by study. Gotten by ●●udy tarrying still with a man, and hardly going away.  Going ●one away, as the affections.  tarrying still with a man.  As knowledge, which either consists by practised skill.  Or else by speculation, and by the only observation of things natural.  Practised skill.  Either of virtue.  Or else of unce.  Of virtue.  As justice.  Fortitude.  Temperance.   Temperance or just dealing of every singular person. As Ca●o, Socrates, Plato.    

¶ Of Relatives.  
Relatives are those, which are comprehended with other, or the which are named, one with another, and (as a man would say) have a mutual respect, one to another.  
The other predicaments before rehearsed, were absolutely spoken, so that we may understand by one, and the same word, what it meaneth. As we may perceive what a man is, although we join nothing to him, we know what justice is, although we compare him with none other thing. But these Relatives, cannot be so well understanden, except we join some thing to them. As when I say a father, I can not so call him, except I understand a son that he hath. So that every body is called a father, in respect that he hath a son, or else not. Again, no body can be called a School Master, except he have scholars. There is no husband except he ha●e a wife.  
Therefore we may see, that Relatives are referred evermore to another, neither can they be taken absolutely, without having respect, to some other word. There is no word, but we may consider the same to be a Relative, if we refer it to some other thing, and therefore we may go throughout all the predicamentes, with this one place, and find relation in every one of them.  
Those that are referred to some thing, are of two sorts. First they are properly so called, as the father, and the son, the master, and his servant, neither can they be considered, except they be compared with some other, for when one is called father, he is properly so called, because he hath a son, and thereof hath he his proper being.  
Again relatives, unproperly so called, are those several words, which are known, & have their being, even when they stand alone: and yet considered with other, they have diverse respects. as love, is the love of the thing loved. Or thus, love beholdeth the thing loved. Faith beholdeth that thing, whereunto it leaveth. And therefore where as Paul saith, we being justified by faith, have peace before God, it is asmuch to say, that we are not received for the worthiness of the quality, but for his sake, that is the son of God. For I pray you, whereunto leaveth faith, or what thing doth it else behold? Saving only our Lord jesus, that died freely once for al. Or else thus, Relatives are so called, (and yet unproperly) which are not according to their proper being, but according as they are so named, whereof the uj predicaments that follow, bear the name. As he that doth any thing, is referred to a thing done, wherein the two places that follow are declared, which signify, to do, and to suffer. By the place (ubi) where, one neighbour is compared with his ne●t neighbour. By the place quando, when, A child of uj year old, is compared with a child of the same years. He that lieth upright, is compared with him thate lieth down grovelling. In all these the proper being, is not declared, for a child may be six years of age, although he be not compared with another, and therefore it is called relatio secundum dici improprie. But a man can never be a father, saving o●ely in consideration of his son And yet note this one thing, it is proper to all Relatives, always to be true, even by conversion. And thus whosoever is a father, the same hath a son, whosoever is a son, the same hath a father. Who soever hath faith, that same man leaneth to Christ only. Whosoever leaneth to Christ only, that same man hath faith. Here are two things to be marked in relation. The ground of every thing, and the end whereunto it hath respect, or consideration. As a father is the ground, in that he doth beget, and hath respect to his son, in that he is begotten. The son is the ground, in that he is begotten, & hath respect to his father, which did beget him. And thus likewise in all other.   

The table of the Relatives.  
 By nature. As by the cause and the effect, the father, and the son, are considered.  By some manner or way used. The magistrate, and the Mace, the King, and his sword carried before him are compared together.  By degrees in calling. The lord, and his servant, the advocate, and his client.  By kynted. The brother and Sister. Relatives are compared one with an other. By marriage. The son in law, the mother in law.  By covenant. The granter of a lease, and the tenant.  By accidental, happening. A poet, to be a liar, a physician, to be a man queller, or a lawyer, to be a thief.  By natural kind. A man, a woman.  By years. A young man, an old man.  By condition of life. A poor man, a rich man, a freeman, a bond man.   

¶ The manner of doing, in latin called. Actio.  
A Gere, seu facere, is when we are said to be occupied in a matter that is before us, or when our labour is extended upon a weaker or less thing, and in this place, are contained all verbs actives, as to write, to dispute, to banquet, to beget, to increase, to diminish, or to change, and to speak at a word, all those are contained in this place, which answer to this question, what doth he, or what doth it, excepted alway verbs pertaining to the senses or affections, as to hear, to taste, to see, to envy, all which have the passive signification.  
Every action is either natural, or voluntary. That is called natural, which is done by the might of nature, as to beget, or to bring forth, to increase, or decrease, to alter by quality, as to be moist, dry, cold, or hot, to move from place, to place. That is called voluntary, which doth betoken any thing done freely, as to teach, to write, to read, to play the merchant man, or to do any other action. And hereunto may be referred every man's duty living.   

¶ Perpessio called in English a suffering.  
PAti, fieri, seu accipere, to suffer, to be done, or to take, is the effect of the action, and to make it ●lai●e, it is a verb passive, even the ●ame, which the grammarians use, as to ●e taught, to be increased, to be diminished, all these are passives, and are referred to this predicament.   

Vbi. Where.  
VBi is an order, or predicament, which comprehendeth the description of places, wherein some ●hyng is reported either to be done, to ●aue been done, or else hereafter, to be ●one. As to be at London, to be at Cā●rydge, to be at home, to be in a cham●er, to be above, beneath, on the right hand, left hand, before, or behind, and what soever is answered to this question, when I ask where any thing is, or where any thing is done. This place well serveth for conjectures, either ●n praising or dispraising.   

Quando. When.  
THis Predicament Quando, containeth the difference, & diversity of times, as. Nunc, Now Heri, yesterday, noctu, in the night time, Interdiu, in the day time. This place also giveth light to confirm causes. As to prove that one is painful, I may say such a one studieth day, and night, so much as nature can bear. Therefore he is a painful man.   

Situm esse, to be settled.  
Situm esse, is than considered, when a man's body is in any wise place, a● to lie a side, to stand upright, to sit, to lean, to lie grovelling, to lie wide open.   

Habitus, the araiing or clothing.  
SOme call this Predicament Habitus, integumentum, that is a covering or appareling of any body, as to have a coat to wear a gown, to be harnessed, to have a jack, a 'sheart of mail, a cote armour. Also to go gorgeously, as to wear chains of golde● to have bracelets, rings, ouches, & stones, to hau● asceptre or mace in his hand. Thirdly to possess gold, silver, land, wife, and children, or to contain any thing, as the hogs head doth hold wine, the barn holdeth corn. etc.   

¶ The use and commodity of these predicaments.  
IF you will define any word, & know the proper nature of the same, ye must needs know these ten predicaments. As for an example, if ye will know what a man is, ye must have recourse to the place ●f Substantia, and there ye shall learn ●y the same place that man is a living creature endued with reason If ye will know what virtue is, ye must go to the Predicament Qualitas, and there ye shall see, that virtue is a constant habit of the mind, making them praise worthy in whom it is. If ye will define the nature of a father, seek for Relativa, and there ye shall learn that he is a father, that hath a son, he is a master, that hath a servant, and so forth in the realte. Therefore ye must needs have these predicaments ready, that when so ever ye will define any word, or give a natural name unto it, ye may come to this store house, and take stuff at will.   

Of a definition.  
THere is nothing in all this whole art of logic more necessary for man to know, than to learn diligently the defifinition, and division of every matter that by reason may be comprehended. For he that first well understandeth what he doth go about, (knowing fully the nature of every cause propounded,) shall less err in the whole discourse following, and easy shall it be for him to avoid false arguments, if he can learn first to see the very nature, & substantial propriety of every thing.  
A definition is ii ways considered, for either it is a definition of a word, or of a substance. A definition of a word, is any manner of declaration of a word, as, a Realm, is so called by cause it is by a king ruled, and merrily to say it, A woman hath her name so given her, by cause she bringeth woe unto man.  
A definition of the substance, is a speech, which showeth the very nature of the thing, & every perfect definition is made perfect by the general word, and his difference joined together.  
So that what soever is defined, it is ●l ways the kind or sort of some ●hyng, as thus. Man is a living creature endued with reason: man, is the ●hyng defined, and the other (that is, a ●●uing creature endued with reason) ●●s the definition.  
There be four rules to be observed ●n every perfect definition. first ●hat the definition contain no more than the thing defined, nor yet that the thing defined, contain any more than ●he definition doth. Again we must ●ake heed, that the definition express ●he very nature, and substance, of the ●hynge defined, or else it is no good definition.  
Thirdly, we must see that the definition be plain, and open, without ambiguity, not having any obscure or ●ar fetched words.   

O● a division.  
IT is an old saying. Qui bene distinguit, bene docet. He that doth well divide, doth teach well. And Socrates in Phedro Platonis praising much the manner of dividing saith at length, that if he kne● a man which could well divide, and severally set every thing in his place, he would follow him as thought he should follow god himself. In what miserable blindness ware we, if we knew not the difference betwixt the law, and the gospel, the which only we do know by the benefit of division. There be many fond people which have much dispraised all temporal laws, & civil laws, thinkyng● it meet that all common weals should only have the gospel, and none other ●awe at all. This may seem to some a gay saie●ge, where as in deed it is both foolish, and wicked. For there is a difference betwixt Political laws, and the gospel: For the political law doth cause an outward discipline to be observed even of the wicked, so that they dare not offend outwardly for fear of corporal punishment. The magistrate which hath this charge is ordained of god, and first his charge is to set forth the ten commandments given to Moses, in the stony ta●es, and to cause the same to be observed universally, punishing the offen●urs for their evil deeds corporally. ●fter this he must enact other particular laws, as occasion shall serve ●hich do not dissent from these ten considering these laws are general, and therefore particular things may be slawen out of them. As where it is s●●d. Thou shalt do no theft, the ma●●trate saying falsehood in bargay●yng, and much deceit used to de●aude one, an other, strait causeth ● to be proclaimed that all such as v●● deceit in bargaining, commit ●efte, a●d shallbe attainted thereupon ●● felc●s, the which man in so doing h●th fulfilled gods commandment. Now again, as for the preaching of the Godspell, it is an other manner of thing, for thereby sins are forgiven. ●e inheritance of life everlasting ●●aunted, and an ever living Church ●f mankind gathered to be God's ●●osen people, and also the true knowl●ge of God, perfit righteousness, and the hope of life everlasting, is kindled in the hearts of all godly through the power of gods holy ghost. But there be few that will obey willingly, and with all their hearts, the words of the gospel in such wise.  
Neither can any Law be able violently to force the inward thought of man. Therefore the outward magistrate though he cannot bind men's consciences from the thing that is evil, yet doth he much to with draw them from doing evil, and in deed if laws ware, not men could not live. Therefore the political regiment, and the gospel are two diverse things. This short distinction giveth a light to many weighty matters, the which thing when men know not, they wander in great darkness, and for lack of light, fall in to error.   

What a division is.  
A Division is a dividing of that which is more common, into those which are less common. As a definition therefore doth declare what a thing is, so the division showeth how many things are contained in the same.  
A division, is either the dividing of a word, or of a thing. A division first of a word, is when any word that signifying diverse things, is divided into every several signification that he hath, as if I would divide this word, Canis, into a dog, a fish of the sea, and a star in the Element, thus might I say, Canis is either a dog that liveth upon the earth, or else a star in the element.  
A division of the thing is three ways considered, for either it is when the general is divided into his kind, the whole into his parts, or else when the substance is divided into his accidents. The general is divided into his kind thus, as an Element is divided into the fire, the air, the water, and the earth. A common weal is divided into the state of people which bear rule, & also into that power where the best, and wisest have the governance, and thirdly into ones hand which alone beareth the stroke and is chief magistrate. Of living creatures some are endued with reason, some are with out reason.  
The whole is divided into his parts as thus. The body is divided into the head, bailie, hands, & feet. A man is divided into body, and soul, & this kind of dividing is properly called Partitio. And the very difference betwixt divisio, and partitio is, that in a division where the general, and the kind are, the general word is spoken of the kind itself, as. justitia est virtus. justice is a virtue, where as it cannot be so, when the whole is divided into his parts, that the whole should be spoken of his part, as I can not say, Caput est homo. the head is man. For the head is not man, nor yet the belly, all though they both be parts of man. We have evermore need of this Partition in all matters. The law of Moses is divided into three parts, for either it is Moral, judicial, or Ceremonial, neither is this Partition necessary for Moses common weal only, but for all other regiments that be. The moral law standeth for ever, and is not altered at any time but is received from time, to time, even as Moses received the same of God in stony tables. The judicial law is next, the which although we be not bound to observe as the Israelites ware, yet must there be acts of parliament made for the reformation of things that be amiss, and Magistrates appointed to punish such as break the ten commandments, called the moral law, and even so may we judge of the Ceremonial Law. that although it appertain nothing to us to keep such Ceremonies as Moses, and Aaron have enacted, yet it is needful that there be an order in all our doings and that we resort together to the temple reverently, and that the Parents appoint their children a time to learn at school, and for their servants a time to do their true service.  
The substance is divided into his accidents, as thus, of men, some are free, some are bo●de.  
¶ An other manner of dividing there is contrary to this, as when the accidents are divided into there substances, as thus. Of good things some are of the mind, some of the body, and some of fortune. Also there is a division when accidents are divided into accidents, as of good things, some are honest, some profitable, and some pleasant.   

¶ Rules necessary to be observed in every division.  
FIrst it must be provided that the division as much as may be (for it cannot always be so) ought to be made with two contrary differences, fully containing in themself the whole compass or wideness of the general word, or that which is divided, for it is a fault to forget any thing, or let slip any part.  
Again the differences which divide the general word, being joined both together, must be equal to the said general word, and the parts coupled together, must be asmuch as the hole, or else the division is not good. A living creature is divided into his two differences, as into a thing having reason, and a thing that hath no reason. Now what so ever is a living creature, the same is a thing that either hath reason or else that lacketh reason. And again every thing that is endued with reason, and without reason, that same is a living creature. So that in every division, the membres, or parts that do divide, by conversion are turned with the thing divided, even likewise it is with partition, as I have spoken before of division. Where as logic hath two parts, judgement and finding o●t of things, even as I say logic is nothing else but judgement, and finding out of things, so of the other side, judgement, and finding out of things, is nothing else, but logic itself. Whereby appeareth a plain● conversion, that what so ever the one is, the same is the other, which thing must diligently be observed in every division. Fo● if the membres that do divide, be either more or less than the thing divided: straight way the division is not good, for according to a Precept that we have in latin. Memb●a dividentia semper cum diviso converti debent. The parts that do divide must always be equal with the thing divided, and turned by conversion with the same, or else the division is not lawful.   

¶ The manner of handling a single Question, ●nd the ready way how to teach and set forth any thing plainly, and in order, as it should be, in latin Methodus.  
IN handling of any single question, the precepts and rules given before in the common words, in the most general words, in the definition, and division, do very good service, and help towards the ordering of every such matter. The whole nature of such questions are thoroughly seen by using of this order. Every single question is eight ways examined, first to ask whether the thing be, or no. As thus. Is there any one man that may be called wise? Is there any law? Is there any friendship upon earth? This question is often proved, either by experience, or else by authority of the wise. Therefore in questioning what the thing is, we must declare the very nature● as if I shall speak of friendship, I will first be at a point of what friendship I must speak. For friendship is of two sorts. The one is true & perfect friendship, which cometh from the heart for virtues sake, and is only among good men: the other is fay●ed favour, when one for lucre beareth a fair face outwardly, and feedeth inwardly a malicious stomach. And this is the common friendship, whereof the wicked only are partakers. The second question is, to ask what a thing is. And this cometh from the definition, which is of two sorts. either of the substance of any thing, or else of the name. Of the name as thus, a realm is that country which is ruled by a king. Of the substance thus. A realm is a gathering of people together, being able to live, and withstand other for preservation of themselves, abiding several. The law is an ordinance which commandeth things in order, to be done, and forbiddeth the contrary. The third question is, when the parts, and every several kind is considered, & for this question the division and partition do much good. As the law of the Gospel and the political law. The fourth question is to ask what are the causes, and especially what is the efficient cause, and what is the final cause, or the end of any thing. The efficient cause of all good laws, is God, and his minister. The final cause, or the end, is to live uprightly in the fear of God, and to walk all the days of our life in the observation of his holy will. The fift question is, when the effect, the office, or proper working is examined. As the effect of the law is, to conserve the state of man to continue peace universally, to increase wealth, and make love betwixt all. The sixth question is when things be asked that hap after, or the which have great affinity, or likelihood together. As if laws be kept and followed, we see our children's children wax to wealth. We see much neyghbourhode and good will to help the needy, & so forth. The seventh is to ask what are disagreeing. As from the law, dissenteth rebellion, stubbornness, pride, with other. The eight question is to bring in witness, & to show by whose authority the law taketh place. The scripture teacheth that God gave the law to Moses, and Poule with Peter also, and Christ himself commanded every man to obey the higher power in all things, that are not directly repugnant from the will of God. Thus ●he question is eight ways examined, and the manner taught thereby to frame it in dew order, so that he which keepeth well this trade, can not fail in any cause that he taketh in hand. And because they may the rather be remembered, I will set them altogether.  
As touching the law .8. ways. 

1● whether it is or no  
2. what it is●  
3. what are the parte●.  
4● what are the causes.  
●. what are the effects or proper working.  
6 What are next adjoining, what are like, what hap therbi  
7 What do disagree, or what are contrary.  
●. What example there is, or authority to prove it.    
And this lesson ought diligently to be learned of all, that evermore they begin from the general, and come to every several part. As in declaring what virtue is, first to tell the nature of it generally, and after to handle every virtue by itself. And this order both Tully hath followed in his book de officijs, and also Aristotle in his ethics hath done the like, to the great admiration of all those that be learned.   

¶ Of a proposition.  
Even the very order of nature requireth that first of all we should speak of several words, and as a man would say, teach one his letters, and teach him the manner of spelling, before we teach him to read, and afterward join sentences together, & frame propositions by knitting several words in order, for it is the very office of the mind first to know, and then to knitte● neither can any child utter a sentence, before he learn to speak a word. Again, when nature hath taught several words, than the mind joineth together, divideth, and afterward giveth a judgement whether they be well or no. For a man ware little better than a brute beast, if he could but only apprehend several words, having no gift, or aptness to join them in order, and to judge how things are joined together. But seeing God hath kindled th●s light in man, that he can both join, and judge, we will now speak of the knitting together, & the joining of words in a proposition.   

¶ What a Proposition is.  
A Proposition is a perfit sentence spoken by the Indicative mode, signifying either a true thing, or a false, without all ambiguity, or doubtfulness. As thus, every man is a liar.  
There be two parts in a proposition, the one is called Subiectum (that is to say that where of somewhat is spoken,) the other is attributum, commonly called predicatum, that is to say, that which is spoken of any thing, as in the above rehearsed proposition. Every man is a liar, Man, is that whereof this saying (to be a liar) is spoken, and this same saying (to be a liar) is that which is spoken of man.  
Every proposition is two ways divided, either it is a single sentence, standing of one perfect sentence, as justice is a virtue, or else it is a double sentence having two propositions in it, as thus. If justice be a virtue, it is a good thing praise worthy.  
That proposition is called false, the which either natural reason proveth to be plain false, or the experience of man declareth to be untrue, as thus. The stone doth feal. the soul of man is mortal. Experience showeth the soul to be immortal, and nature teacheth us that no stone hath the sense of feeling.   

The second division of a Proposition.  
Again Propositions do either affirm, or deny, as this proposition. Pleasure is a good thing, doth affirm that pleasure is good. Again, pleasure is not a good thing, doth deny that pleasure is good. That Proposition doth affirm, when any thing is reported to be in any thing That Proposition doth deny, when any thing is denied to be in any thing.   

¶ The third division of a Proposition.  
THirdly all Propositions are either, general, particular, indiffinite, or singulary Those Propositions are called general, or universal, the which have a general sign joined to the first part of the Proposition, as thus. Every covetous man is poor. No man both loveth, and is wise. No man is evermore happy. General signs are these Omnis, Nullus, Quilibet, Nemo. Every body, nobody, all the world, not one in all the world.  
Particular propositions are these, where a particular sign is added to the former part of the Proposition, which doth not contain all but a part or a few, as thus. Some men fear God. Some men are to much desirous of glory. The particular signs be these. Quidam, Aliquis, Plerique, Plerunque. A certain man, some body, all men for the most part, oftentimes.  
The Propositions are called Indefinite (that is to say, uncertain) where the former part of the Proposition is a general word without a sign, as thus. The soul is immortal. Manhood is a virtue. One man is better than an other. Old men are covetous. And note this diligently, that those Indefinite Propositions (whose last rehearsed part is necessary, and is so spoken of the former part, that it doth alway agree to the same, and to the whole nature of the same) do imply as much as a general propositino, as in the above rehearsed Proposition. The soul is immortal. this word (to be immortal) which is spoken of the soul, agre●h not to one man, or to certain, but to every man living. when the Accidents are spoken of the former part, it implieth as much as a particular Proposition doth. as● Homo homini prestat ingenio, virtute, doctrina. (Some man is better than an other in wit, learning, and virtue,) is no more to say, than Quidam homo homini prestat. Some one man is better than an other.  
A singular Proposition, is when a proper name of a man is contained in a Proposition, and is the former part of the same, as. Cicero est Orator. Cicero is an Orator. Alexander est bellicosus. Alexander is a warrior.   

The repu●naunce of Propositions  
Repugnancy, is the diversity of two propositions, which have both one subiectum, (called the former part,) & one attributum, which is the rehearsed part, and in sense spoken of the former.  
There be four in number, called in Latin. Contrariae, Subcontrariae, Contradictoriae, and Subalternae.  
General contrary Propositions, are those, whereof the one doth affirm, & the other doth deny, as thus. Omnes homines gloria ducuntur, All men are moved with glory. Nulli homines gloria ducuntur, No men are moved with glory.  
Particular contrary, are two Particulars, whereof the one doth affirm, the other doth deny. Aliqui homines gloria ducuntur, Some men are moved with glory. Aliqui homines gloria non ducuntur, Some men are not moved with glory.  
Contradictory Propositions are, when the one is Universal affirmative, and the other Particular negative. or else when the one is Universal negative, and the other Particular affirmative, as thus. Omnes homines gloria ducuntur● All men are moved with glory. Aliqui homines gloria non ducuntur. Some men are not moved with glory, and likewise backward.  
Subalternae are those, which be either Universal affirmative, & Particular affirmative, or else universal negative, and particular negative.   

¶ A single Proposition, is three ways denied.  
PRopositio Categorica (other wise called a single Proposition) is divided into, true and false Propositions.  
They are true Propositions, which agree to the matter, and are either necessary, or else such as may be either true, or false, called in Latin fortuitae or contingentes.  
Necessary Propositions, are assuredly true, and known so to be either by nature, or else by experience.  
Of those that necessarily be knit together are these. The proper name, the kind, the general word, the difference, the property, the definition, the causes, the proper work of causes, and some Accidents that ever tarry, as thus, Cicero est homo, Cicero is a man. Homo est animal ratione praeditum, aptum ad risum, A man is a living creature, endued with reason, apt to laugh. Dies est necessario, quoniam Sol exoriens est, It must needs be day, because the Son is up. Ignis calidus est, Fire is hot.  
Those Propositions are changeable, which may be true, or chance to be so; as. Pecunia est bonum, Money, is a good thing. & wheresoever the Accident is spoken of that which containeth him: every such Proposition is called chanceable or that which may be true, as: Water is made hot; here we see that it chanceth to water (contrary to her nature) to be warm, and therefore it is called chanceable as the which may chauncey or be changed.  
The Table of repugnant Propositions.  
HEre we must be diligent that in all such repugnancy of Propositions, there be no doubtfulness in any word, and that always there be one manner of words that go before, and also one manner of words that end the sentence, plainly and without double understanding. This diversity of Propositions is very necessary to discern, the truth, from that which is false, for when we join two Propositions that are dissonant, we shall easily try the chaff from the corn, the which when we have done, we may the better, stick to the truth with full assent, the contrary being once disclosed and rejected.   

¶ De Conuersione, of the turning of Propositions.  
Conversion, is the changing or altering of words in a Proposition, when the former part (whereof any thing is rehearsed) and the hinder part (which is rehearsed of the former) are changed, the one, into the others place.  
There be three manner of Conversions, Simplex, per Accidens, per Contrapositionem.  
A plain Conversion is, when both the Propositions are like in all things, both in signs, and also in affirmation, or negation, saving only that of the last rehearsed, is made the former part of the sentence, & the former part, is made the last rehearsed part.  
Such Conversion is made, when both Propositions be either Universal negatives, or else particular affirmatives, for the first thus. Nemo timens Deum, contaminat se adulterio. Ergo, Nemo contaminans se adulterio timet Deum. No man that feareth God, de●ileth himself with adultrie● therefore, no man that defileth himself with adultery, feareth God. Here we may see the Conversion plain, as the rule above rehearsed teacheth. For ij. particular affirmatives, this shallbe an example. Quidam aulici, boni sunt. Ergo quidam boni, aulici sunt. Some courtiers are honest, Ergo some honest men are courtiers.  
A Conversion by Accident, is when the former part of the sentence, is made the last rehearsed part, and the last rehearsed part, made the former part, both the Propositions affirming, or denying, saving only that the signs be changed, that is the one being Universal, the second being Particular. First a Conversion is made of two affirmatives, thus. Omnis virtus est laudanda, Ergo laudandum aliquid, est virtus. All virtue is to be praised, therefore some thing to be praised is a virtue. A conversion of two negatives, thus. Nemo malus foelix, foelix igitur (sapiens cum sit) non est malus. No evil man is absolutely happy. Therefore an absolute happy man (considering he is wise) cannot be evil. This kind of Conversion is very profitable for him that will dispute. for where as we reason often from the general word, to the kind, we must needs use this manner of Conversion, as thus. If all exercise be good, than this exercise is good, and so of other.  
A Conversion by contraposition, is when the former part of the sentence is turned into the last rehearsed part, and the last rehearsed part, turned into the former part of the sentence, both the propositions being universal, and affirmative, saving that in the second Proposition there be certain negatives interlaced, as thus.  
Omnis homo avet aliquid videre, audire, scire.  
Ergo quod non avet aliquid videre, audire, scire, non est homo.  
Every man desireth to see, to hear, or to know somewhat, therefore what soever he is that desireth not to see, to hear, or to know somewhat, that same body is not a man. This Conversion is profitable, and serveth well to reason by. thus reasoneth Christ by this Conversion against the jews in the viii. Chapter of Iohn● Qui ex Deo est, verba Dei audit, vos igitur cum non audiatis, ex Deo non estis. He that is of God, heareth the words of God, You therefore because you hear not, be not of God. This Conversion co●futeth the jews plainly, & proveth that they are not of God. If, we will reason from the general word to the kind, or from the greater, to the less, we may use this Conversion very well. Omnis homo est animal, Ergo quodcnnque non est animal, id nec homo est. Every man is a living creature, therefore what soever thing is not a living creature, that same is not a man. Take away the general word, and there can no kind remain at all. From the superior universal, to the inferior, thus we may reason. All pure gold looketh yellow, therefore what soever looketh not yellow, that same is not pure gold. This Conversion serveth well to make an Argument in the second figure, as I will declare hereafter, the which ought diligently to be observed.   

Propositio Hypothetica, that is to say a double Proposition.  
PRopositio Hypothetica, is a sentence with two single Propositions knit together always, with some Conjunction, as thus. Si justitia est virtus, est laudabilis. If justice be a virtue, it is praise worthy.   

¶ There be iii manner of double Propositions.  
A Double Proposition stands of three parts, whereof the one is a conditional Proposition, affirming a thing to be either true or false, with an (if.) As thus. If faith be upon the earth, some men fear God. If the world continue still as it doth, wallowing in most abominable sin, God will at length punish the offenders very sore. All which Propopositions are ever true, when the parts are so knit together: that the latter part, must needs follow upon that, which goeth before. The second part is, when a Proposition hath a disjunctive, which knitteth the sentence up, as thus. Either it is day, or else it is night. Such Propositions are true, when both the parts are true, & the same also are false, when either of the parts are false. The third part is, when conjunctions that do deny are joined together, as thus. Battle being not lawful, is not to be desired.  
By all which double Propositions we may reason formally in diverse causes, is thus by the first. If faith be upon the earth, some men fear God, but no man feareth God, therefore faith is not upon the earth. Again, if we fear God, we are in charity, but we are not in charity. Therefore we fear no● God. By the second thus. Either it is day, or else it is night, but it is day, Therefore it is not night. covetous men either be the servants of God, or else of the Devil, but they are not the servants of God: Ergo, they are the servants of the Devil. By the third thus. Battle being not lawful, is not to be used, but battle is lawful Therefore it is to be used.   

Of making an Argument.  
I Have rehearsed hitherto all single words, what the nature is of every one, & in what general word they may be found. I have set forth the nature of a definition, and a division. I have taught also to join these several words into a proposition, and to make the same a perfect sentence. Now therefore by god's grace, I will show the manner how to join sentences together, and to prove a matter by knitting propositions handsomely in an argument, or else to confute any thing that a man list, by placing the propositions accordingly. Therefore there ought good diligence to be used in this behalf, for as much as it is the clerkliest part of all, and the hardest piece of work, to frame an argument aptly, & to know the very reason, why things are so knit together.   

¶ What an argument is.  
An argument, is a way to prove how one thing is gathered by another, and to show that thing, which is doubtful, by that which is not doubtful.   

¶ To find out the reason, that shall prove, (in Latin) called medium, (in English) the double repeat.  
After this sort we may find the reason, whereby to prove our matter. When we have a question or sentence, that we would either confirm, or confute, Ask the cause of ourself, why, and wherefore that thing, which is spoken of the former part in any sentence, should be so applied to the same. And to make the matter more plain, I will make this question. Est ne avarus pauper? Is a covetous man poor or not? I may thus reason with myself. why should a covetous man be called poor, what affinity is betwixt them two? marry in this point, they both agree, that like as the poor man, ever lacketh and desireth to have: so the covetous man ever lacketh, wanting the use of that which he hath, and desirereth still to have, being never content though god give enough. Then seeing it is even so, that both do lack, and both do desire to have: this same reason is the only cause, whereby mine argument is made perfect. For thus I may frame mine argument aptly.  
Whosoever lacketh, & desireth evermore to have, that same man is poor.  
A covetous man lacketh, & desireth evermore to have.  
Therefore a covetous man is poor.  
Thus this argument is made perfect by asking this question, wherefore a covetous man is poor? As hereafter I will show it more at large, by other examples, ●o make the thing more plain.   

¶ There be four kinds of arguments.  
Syllogismus 
a perfect argum●  Enthymema, 
an unperfect argum●  Inductio, 
an induction.  Exemplum. 
an example.   
SYllogismus, is an argument whereby the last sentence, which we would prove, is confirmed by other propositions, and sentences, more universal, and better known, than the thing which is proved: containing in themselves the reason, why the last sentence is true, and why they are applied to the same. This kind of argument, is from the general word, to the kind, as thus. If I will prove theft worthy of punishment, I must first ask the question, why? & that thing that cometh to my mind, more universal than theft, comprehending the offence of theft in it, may serve to make the argument. As I may thus reason, that theft should be punished, because it is a vice, or a mischievous deed, and then thus I knit up mine argument.  
Every vice or mischievous died is to be punished.  
Theft is a vice, or a mischievous died.  
Therefore theft is to be punished.  
Here we see three propositions, or sentences, whereof the first is called Mayor, that is to say, the proposition at large. the second is called Minor, that is to say, the several proposition. the third is called conclusio. that is, the lapping up of all. And here we must note, that like as there be three Propositions, even so there be three diverse endings, called in Latin, Termini, of the which, th'one is called the term at large, in the first proposition only, and afterward is referred, to the former part of the conclusion, called subiectum conclusionis. The second term is called the several, which is in the second proposition, & this is the word whereof the question is made, & is spoken of in the conclusion. The third is called the double repeat, which is twice rehearsed, before the conclusion, and therefore it is twice rehearsed, because it is the knitting together, of the ij. propositions, and the cause, why the former part of the proposition, (whereof a thing is said,) and the last rehearsed part, (being attributed to the part going before,) are joined together in the conclusion. As to make the thing plain by the former argument, I will prove this conclusion. Theft is to be punished. Theft is called the former part whereof this word (punished) is spoken, and this word (punished) therefore is called the last rehearsed part, because it is spoken of theft, which went before. Now to make my argument, and to prove this sentence true, I must seek a word, which is more general than that, which is proved. And that word that cometh to my mind, & is pertaining to the cause, being more universal: (for every thing that is proved, is proved by a thing more known) that same word or reason, is called the double repeat. whose property is twice to be rehearsed in an argument, and that in the first and second proposition, never entering into the conclusion, as thus. Every vice is to be punished, (vice) is the double repeat, which must be rehearsed in the second proposition, (for I said before) it must be twice rehearsed because it may be evident, that the former ●art of the conclusion, is in very deed comprehended, under the former part of the first proposition. And then the argument is made as followeth.  
Every vice is to be punished  
Theft is a vice.  
Ergo it is to be punished.  
Here we see the double repeat (which proveth the matter) is twice rehearsed in the first, and second proposition, and entereth not into the conclusion. The term at large, is in the first proposition, and the term several, is in the second proposition, and enter both into the conclusion. So that we may see that, which proveth the thing, doth not enter into the conclusion, but is twice rehearsed in the two propositions, and so the conclusion followeth, by reason that these two words, vice, and theft, agree in a third altogether, and whatsoever is said of the one, is said of the other, and nothing can be comprehended under the general, but all the kinds have the same contained in in them, which in this proposition, are referred to the general. (All vice is to be punished, unto vice, is referred this word punished) therefore, whatsoever is comprehended under this word, vice, as theft, adultery, wrong dealing, murder, this word punished, is rehearsed of them all: because it agreeth to the general, & is rehearsed of the same. Therefore I reason thus. All vice is to be punished.  
Therefore 

Adultery are to be punished  
Wrong dealing. are to be punished  
Murder. are to be punished    
For if that, which is general, is to be punished, than the kinds, or sorts in things, are also to be punished. According to this saying. whatsoever is truly, and altogether rehearsed, of the general, that same also is rehearsed of the kind, which is included in the general.   

¶ There be. v●i. Rules, especially to be observed, for the making of ●n argument called Syllogismus.  
FIrst, that in every Syllogismus, the first proposition be universal I call that proposition universal, when there is omnis, that is to say, all: or else nullus, that is to say, none, in the proposition. As for example. Every vice is to be punished, this proposition is universal, because it hath omnis, in it, which signifieth all, or every one. Likewise I call it particular, when the proposition hath quidam, or aliquis, that is to say certain, or some body, quidam aulici sunt honesti, some courtiers be honest.   

¶ The se●ond rule.  
If one of the propositions be particular, or negative, the conclusion is particular, or negative, I call that proposition negative, when nullus, or nemo, (that is to say) none, or no body, is in the proposition. As nullus Christianus est foenerator, no Christian is an usurer.   

¶ The third rule.  
In a Syllogismus, both the propositions, can neither be negatives, nor yet particulars togethers, for even as of two negatives, there followeth nothing, so of two particulars, there followeth nothing. Therefore, when any such argument is made, we may boldly say it is not lawful, because it is in no mode, as it is very plai●e to see in making of this argument following.  
Some Courtiers are rich.  
I will be a Courtier.  
Therefore I shallbe rich.  
Or this.  
Some bishops are good.  
Such a one is a bishop.  
Therefore he is a good bishop.  
This argument is not lawful, first, because by my rule I am taught, that of pure particulars, nothing doth follow, as Quidam (some) is a particular Ego, I, is a singular word, or signifying asmuch as a proper name, & again it is in no figure as hereafter I shall show. Thirdly it is meet that the first part of the second proposition should be included in the first proposition, whereof some what is rehearsed or else it is no good argument, in the first figure.  
Some Kings be righteous.  
Nero is a King.  
Therefore Nero is righteous.  
This is no good argument, because that Nero (which is the first word in the second proposition of whom some thing is rehearsed) is not comprehended under the former part of the first proposition, which is Kings, for this former part (some kings) doth not speak of Nero, nor comprehend such as he is, but honest, and godly disposed governors. And yet in weighty causes such arguments have been used, even of those that would have drawn us from the obedience of gods holy word, and persuaded some that we ware free from the observation of any one thing comprehended in Moses laws. As thus.  
The law of Moses is abolished from the Gentiles.  
The law of the ten commandments is the law of Moses.  
Ergo the law of the ten commandements is abolished from the Gentiles.  
Where as this first proposition comprehendeth not all the laws of Moses, but the laws ceremonialle which ware as figures ordained in declacla●ation of Christ's coming, and therefore the scripture saith until John, the law was, and the Prophets, signifying that in Ihons' time he was come, in whom the old ceremonial laws ware fully verified and fulfilled, which at his coming began to cease, seeing he himself was the fulfilling of the law, not that we should not observe the moral laws of the heavenly precepts commanded by God, for Christ himself repeateth the observation of them, yea and bindeth us to a more straightness, that not only we should do none evil, but that also we should consent to none evil, therefore this first proposition, is not general, but particular, and so though the ceremonial law be gone, yet the moral law tarrieth still according to Christ's holy will.  
Medius terminus, called the double repeat (which is a word rehearsed in both propositions) must not enter into the conclusion, because the other two parts, called termini, be proved by this, and brought to the conclusion, by reason they agree with this third, the which two otherwise could not enter into the conclusion, if this double repeat were not mentioned in both propositions, and kept out itself from the conclusion, as is evidently to see by an argumentation.   

¶ The fift Rule.  
In an argument, called Syllogismus there ought not to be doubtful words, or more words in the conclusion than was before rehearsed. For more things to be in the conclusion, this example shall serve which An●honius maketh in the first book of Tully de oratore.  
Unprofitable things are not to be taught.  
In Philosophy are unprofitable things.  
Ergo philosophy is not to be taught  
This argument is to be denied, because there is more in the conclusion, than was rehearsed in the two first propositions. For this should have been the conclusion. Some unprofitable things which be in philosophy, are not to be learned, not that philosophy itself is to be rejected, for else we might make this argument likewise.  
drunkenness is not to be allowed.  
In drinking is often times drunkenness.  
Therefore drinking at any time is not to be allowed.  
Therefore we must frame our argument so, that nothing be more in the conclusion, than was in the other propositions. As thus.  
drunkenness is not to be al-alowed.  
In some drinking is oftentimes drunkenness.  
Therefore some drinking is not to be allowed.   

¶ The sixth Rule.  
There ought not to be more terms in an argumentation than three, for otherwise there is no good argument.  
Every political Magistrate ought to keep under disobedient persons, with corporal punishment.  
Peter is an Apostle.  
Therefore Peter should punish the disobedient.  
In this argument, is no joining together of the first proposition, and the second: for the political magistrate, & an Apostle, are two manner of things. Therefore it hangeth together like germans lips as we use to say.   

¶ The seventh Rule.  
The double repeat, which is twice mentioned in both propositions, aught to be no doubtful word, for doubtful words make four several terms which should not be, as thus.  
No bondman is free.  
All that believe the Gospel truly, are free.  
Ergo none that believe the gospel truly, are bond men.  
This argument is false, and must be de●ied at the first, because, there be four terms, for in the first proposition, freedom, is taken for such a liberty as men do use in common weals, to make servants, and apprentices free, in the second proposition, freedom is taken for delivering the soul from the wrath of God, from sin, and from death everlasting, as we read in the scripture. Whom the son hath made free, they are free in very died, not that this freedom taketh away all orders in the common weal, that no man shall have an apprentice, or a bond man. For although the father in heaven hath made them free from sin, from death, and from the wrath of God, yet are they still apprentices, and bond by a political law● therefore we may see that there be four endings or terms, considering he speaketh of one liberty in the first proposition, and of an other in the second, so that the argument is not good. A like argument there is, which one made to Diogenes.  
That which I am, thou art not  
I am a man.  
Ergo thou art none.  
Here is ambiguity in this verb (I am) far if it be understanded in the first proposition that this word (I am) is not considered according to the general substance, but according to the quality, or rather proper being, speaking of the diversity of men, as when I live, I have mine own body, my flesh, and mine own bones, thou hast thine also proper unto thee, and not that I am thou, nor thou art I. Then it is well said, that which I am, thou art not. But if I understand this word (I am) in the first proposition as a substance universal, or rather general copulative, to be rehearsed of the inferiors, them it is not good. For as I may say, Diogenes is a man, Aristotle is a man, so I may say of all men. Whereby we may see here also four parts, or endings, and therefore the argument must be denied at the first, giving this reason that I have showed before.  
Now that I have set forth the precepts which are to be observed in an argument, I will declare how to seat be & place an argument, that any body may give a reason, why every word is set in an argument, in this, or that place. First therefore we must consider, there be four figures, which serve for the making of an argument, & modes also, which teach the ordering of propositions whether they shallbe universal, particular, affirmative, or negative. I will define them both after this sort.  
A figure is a lawful placing of the double repeat, in the two propositions, and even as the double repeat is placed, so we may judge with ease in what figure the argument is. The first figure is such an order of propositions in an argument, that the double repeat must be the former part in the first proposition, and the last rehearsed part in the second proposition, where upon the conclusion doth follow. And the reason that it must be so, is because that where as in this figure the argument is evermore made from the general, to the kind universally, (for the first proposition evermore in these two figures must be universal, either affirmative, or negative) and because of the general word, there is somewhat rehearsed of the kind: one of the propositions must be so placed, that it may evidently appear that the kind is included in the general. And therefore the general is spoken in the second proposition of the kind.  
A mode, is a lawful placing of propositions in there due quality, or quantity. I call that in the proposition a quality, when it doth affirm or deny. I call it a quantity, when it is either universal, or particular. Unto the first figure belong four modes, which may be perceived by these four words.  

Barbara.  
Celarent.  
Darij.  
Ferio.   
THese four words must not be forgotten if we will make an argument truly in the first figure, for every argument that is made in this figure, is in one of these four modes, or else it is no argument of the first figure. If the double repeat be the former part in the first proposition, and the last rehearsed part in the second proposition, it is in the first ●igure, notwithstanding, except it be in mode also, it is no argument. Therefore we must learn to place an argument in mode also. And for the better knowledge of this thing, note that in these words there be four vowels to be considered, and marked. That is to say, A, E, I, &, O. And where we see A in Barbara thrice, we must consider that these three AAA in this one word, declare unto us three universal propositions affirmative, E, declareth a proposition negative universal. As in Celarent we see twice. E, whereby we are taught that the argument (if we make it in this mode) must have two universal negatives, and one universal affirmative, by reason of A, which is in the midst of Celarent. I doth signify a particular affirmative. O. doth signify a particular negative, as in Ferio, the first must be a negative universal, the second an affirmative particular, the third a negative particular. That these things may be more evident to make an argument, both in figure, and mode, I will give examples for every mode of this figure, that one may plainly see the whole matter as though it were in a glass, remembering always, that these modes serve for this figure, which figure is known (as I said before) when the double repeat is the former part of the first proposition, and the last rehearsed part of the second proposition. And where as I said before that certain arguments were in no mode, although they were in the first figure, and therefore not good because they were not both in one mode, and figure, these shallbe to understand, they were not in one mode, because the first proposition must be universal ever, or else it is not good. Now therefore here follow examples of the first figure and of the modes thereof.  
Bar 
All honest things are to be embraced.  ba 
All law made by a christian magistrate are honest.  ra 
Therefore all laws made by a Christian magistrate are to be embraced.  Ce 
No contemner of the magistrate is a christian.  lafoy 
All anabaptists are contemners of the magistrate.  rend 
Therefore no Anabaptiste is a Christian.  Da 
Whatsoever deserveth the favour and grace of god, the same only doth justify.  ri 
Faith only deserveth the favour and grace of God.  f 
Ergo faith only doth justify.  Fe 
No extortioner is godly.  ri 
Some rich man is an extortioner.  o 
Ergo some rich men are not godly.   
The second figure is, where the the double repeat is the last, rehearsed part in both propositions, after this sort following, and there be four modes belonging to the same figure, as it shall appear, which all they have these iiij. vowels in them. A.E.I.O. so that they make the proposition to be universal, or particular, affirmative, or negative, as it was before.  
Note that the conclusion is always negative, for asmuch as the first, and the second, are always repugnant, neither do they agree in the double repeat, called Medius terminus. And therefore the conclusion is negative by contraposition, whereof I spoke before when I entreated of the conversion or turning of propositions.  
Ce 
No just man, before god hath an unquiet, and doubtful conscience.  sa 
All they that trust to be justified by their works, have unquiet consciences.  re 
Therefore none trusting to his works, is just before God.  Ca 
The christian righteousness, is the pureness of the mind.  most 
To wear a tipete, a cowl, a shaven crown, is not the pureness of the mind.  tres 
Therefore the outward attire is not the christian righteousness.  Fes 
No true divine contemneth philosophy.  ti 
Some English preachers contemn philosophy.  no 
Ergo some English preachers are no true divinest  Ba 
All christians refuse to get goods ungodly  ro 
Some usures refuse not to get goods ungodly.  co 
Therefore some usurers are no christians.   
The three figure is, where the double repeat is the former part in both propositions. And there be uj modes of the same figure. Note also that the conclusion must needs be particular, in this figure where ye●ormer part in both propositions is the double repeat, for like as we reason in the first figure from the general word, to the kind, that is from the universal, to the particular, so in this figure we reason from the kind (which is less) to the general word which is more universal, but so not withstanding, that the conclusion be particular. and therefore this kind of argument is very good. For the Species, or kind, being once put, the general, must needs follow.  
Da 
Every common weal hath need of armour, and laws.  rap 
Every common weal is god's ordinance.  ti 
Therefore laws, and armour, are god's ordinance.  Fe 
No virtue should be eschewed.  lap 
All virtue hath her woe with her.  ton 
Therefore some woe should not be eschewed.  Di 
Mercy only forgiveth sins.  sa 
All mercy is purchased by faith.  miss 
Therefore by faith only forgiveness is obtained.  Da 
All those that think them selves holy by their beads, by our ladies fast, and by we aring a hairy shirt, are neither wise nor godly.  ti 
Some priests in England think no less.  si 
Ergo some priests are neither wise, nor godly.  Bo 
Some battle is not to be eschewed.  car 
Every battle is full of moche misery.  do 
Ergo some misery is not to be eschewed.  Fe 
None that bear any deadly malice, fear God.  ti 
Some bear their neighbours deadly malice.  son 
Therefore some fear not God.   
It is very necessary that there should be three figures, as I have showed already. for in every argument that hath the shape of a Sillogismus (for the induction & the example have it not, neither be they in mode & figure) evermore we reason from the general, to the kind universal, making the conclusion universal, or else we reason from the kind, to the general, making the conclusion particular, or else there is a repugnancy of the term at large, and the several, when they do not agree with the double repeat, or last of all we join many causes, and many effects together, whereof is made an argument, called Sorites, or coaceruatio, that is to say, a heaping together of things  
When we make an argument, and proceed from the general word, to the kind, it is in the first figure. and even by our reason we learn this, that if the greater be not, the lesser cannot be. As thus, if one be no living creature, how can he be a man, if he be a living creature, he must either be a man or a brute body.  
When we proceed from the kind, to the general, making the conclusion particular, the argument is in the third figure. And this is for ever true, that when the kind is rehearsed, the general must needs follow.  
But when there is a repugnancy in an argument of the term at large, and the several, so that they agree not ●ith a third word, it is ever in the second figure. And this is plain to see that such an argument must needs be well concluded, when we go about to co●●ute any thing, seeing: that. i●. kinds which are repugnant, must needs be dissevered, and so the conclusion to be made upon the same. As it is easy to see in the arguments of the second figure. Therefore it is good reason that both there should be two figures, and also that the argument doth well proceed being made in any of them.  
Some times an argument is made when we couple many causes together & the very effects of the same, as thus  
Overmuch gormandize hindereth digestion in the stomach.  
By evil digestion in the stomach, corrupt blood is engendered in the liver.  
When evil blood is breed in the liver evil humours are spread through out all the bodye●  
Evil humours spread through out the body, cause a distemperature in the body, and after that bring the dropsy.  
Therefore overmuch gormandize causeth dropsy.   

Of an half argument called Enthimema.  
AN half argument, is an argument unperfect, the which is, when one proposition is rehearsed, and the conclusion strait brought in there upon, as thus. That is not good which bringeth a man to mischief. Therefore money is not good● The bible teacheth a man his duty towards god, and his neighbour, Ergo it is necessary to be known, & read of every body. Pleasure bringeth endless pain after it, Ergo pleasure is to be eschewed. These arguments behalf arguments, wanting one proposition evermore, the which if we add a perfect argumentation followeth thereupon, as thus.  
Whatsoever bringeth endless pain after it, that same is to b● eschewed.  
Pleasure bringeth endless pain after it.  
Ergo pleasure is to be eschewed.  
These half imperfect Arguments called Enthymemata, consist partly of likelihoods, and partly of infallible reasons.  
Likelyhodeses, are those, that often hit the truth, & yet are not always so, as thus.  
Such a youngman talketh often, and that alone also, with such a young maid.  
Ergo he is in love with her.  
This may be true, and this may be false. for although the conjecture have some probabilite with it, yet is it not for ever true. The other called infallible reasons, or rather necessary Arguments, must by all reason be evermore true, as thus.  
Such a woman is brought in bed.  
Ergo she hath had the company of a man.   

¶ An other.  
The Sun is risen,  
Ergo it is day.  
Therefore in all communication, good heed ought to be taken, that likelihoods of things, be not used for necessary reasons   

¶ Of an Argument, called Syllogismus Expositorius.  
THis kind of Argument hath evermore a noun propre, to be as the double repeat in both Propositions: contrary to the manner of all other Argumentes● and it may be referred to the third figure.  
Paul doth allege godly sentences of the Ethnicques,  
Paul was a preacher.  
Ergo, a preacher may allege godly sayings of the Ethnicques.  
For what so ever is truly gathered of particular things, the same also is proper to things general, & what soever agreeth to the proper name, the same also agreeth to the kind, to the difference, or property, of the said noun proper.   

Inductio.  
AN Induction, is a kind of Argument when we gather sufficiently a number of propre names, and there upon make the conclusion universal, as thus.  
Rhenyshe wine heateth,  
Maluesey heateth,  
Frenchewine heateth, neither is there any wine that doth the contrary:  
Ergo all wine heateth.   

¶ An other Example.  
Dathan for dis●obience against the superior power, ended his life wretchedly.  
Likewise Abiron,  
Likewise Chore,  
Likewise S●mei.  
Neither is there any example to the contrary.  
Therefore all rebels, and traitors to their Prince, & King, shall die wretchedly.   

¶ An other Example.  
Nembroth although he was a jolly hunter, yet he lived like a wretch in great misery.  
Laban also lived wretchedly,  
Pharaoh was sore plagued,  
Amalech, Madian, Abimelech,  
Herode, with other ware scourged grievously for their wickedness, neither is their any example to the contrary,  
Therefore the end of wicked men is wretched.  
This kind of Argument is called Inductio, because that showing diverse proper names, it induceth at length, and moveth the mind to make a general conclusion. Therefore necessary it is, that in such Arguments all the examples which are induced be like, for if any be found contrary, the Argument is of no force, as thus, 
Athanasius lived unmarried,  
Ambrose lived unmarried,  
Basilius had no wife & a great many more.  
Ergo all Bishops heretofore were unmarried.   
The Argument is not Lawful, forasmuch as diverse have been married in the primative Church, as Spiridion, Hermes, Hilarius, Polycrates, Tertullianus, and divers other. for it was the manner in the primative church that honest married men were chosen to be Bishops, and had the charge of Christ's flock. The Apostles also (as Egnatius wittenesseth) had wives aswell as other men, and as I think used them, as other men do their wives, or else asked their leave, and consent to forbear them.   

De Exemplo.  
AN example, is a manner of Argumentation, where one thing is proved by an other, for the likeness, that is found to be in them both, as thus. If Marcus Attilius Regulus had rather lose his life, than not keep promise with his enemy, them should every man being taken prisoner keep promise with his enemy. If cities have been destroyed for breaking of wedlock, than adulterers must needs be punished. If Alexander dawned a weak soldier when he was almost frozen for cold, and did set him in his own chair against the fire: then should all captains, and men of war, be tender over there poor warriors and base soldiers.  
E●er more take heed that in this kind of Argument the causes be like of both sides, or else the Argument proveth not, as thus.  
Peter killed Ananias taken with an open lie.  
Therefore spiritual ministers, may punish open offenders, with temporal sword.  
The examples are not like. Peter did kill Ananias with the word, & power of the holy Ghost-therfore preachers must not kill the body, but only excommunicate men, accounting them unworthy to be in the congregation. The sword is lawful for the temporal Magistrate only, & for none other.   

¶ Sorites.  
SOrites, vel coaceruatio, is a heaping together of causes, one, upon an other. A kind of Argument when the last rehearsed word of the first Proposition, is repeated in the first part of the second Proposition, necessarily agreeing there unto, and so going still forth in like manner, till at the length the last rehearsed word be added unto the first word, called Subiectum of the first Proposition. And it is a kind of Argument much used, when we ascend upward from the lowest, to the highest. or else when we go from the causes, to the next thing done. which things done, are the occasion of other things besides, as thus.  
A man is a living creature,  
A living creature is a lively body  
A lively body is a substance,  
Ergo a man is a substance.  
Where the Law is, there is transgression,  
Where there is transgression, there is fear,  
Where there is fear, there is remorse of conscience.  
Therefore, where the Law is, there is remorse of conscience.   

¶ An other.  
justification is not without faith  
Faith is not without a repentant heart,  
Therefore, justification is not without a repentant heart.  
No Arguments be made negatively by this kind of Argumentation, as thus.  
The Gospel is not the Law,  
The Law teacheth us the fear of God.  
Therefore the Gospel doth not.   

¶ Or thus.  
Christ the son, is not in person, God the Father,  
God the father is ever living.  
Therefore Christ is not everliving.  
But these, and such like be as wise as this that followeth.  
john is not jacke,  
jacke is a good boy.  
Therefore john is none.  
And the reason is: No Arguments are made negatively by this kind of reasoning, neither is the consequent good, when words that agree not necessarily, are joined together.  
Of evil manners are made good laws,  
Good laws are things worthy to be praised,  
Things worthy praise, are to be desired.  
Therefore evil manners are to be desired.  
This knitting is not lawful, for evil manners of themselves, are not the occasion of good laws, but the godly mind of good Magistrates is the very chief cause● as the disease, is not the cause of healing, but rather the Physician, and his Medicines, and man's nature, which resisteth the poison of sickness is the very cause. Again in every heaping up of Arguments after such sort, learn, and mark, how they proceed, and you shall easily see false packing.   

¶ Thus merry fellows reason when they are at ale.  
He that drinks well, sleeps wel●  
He that sleeps well, sins not,  
He that sins not, shallbe saved.  
Therefore let us drink well, and we shallbe saved.  
Mark the proceeding and you shall easily avoid the error, for although in sleep, we sin not, yet by drinking we cause sin, & no one man, at one time both drinketh & sleepeth: therefore though in sleeping he offended not, yet in drinking he passeth measure.   

¶ A horned Argument, called Dilemma.  
DIlemma, otherwise complexio, vel cornu●us syllogismus, called a horned Argument, is when the reason consists of repugnant membres, so that what so ever you grant, you fall into the snare, and take the foil. As if I should ask whether it were better to marry a fair woman, or a foul. If you say a fair. Then answer I, that is not good, for they commonly say, she willbe common. If you say it were good to marry an hard favoured woman, than I answer, she will be loathsome, and so ye fall into an inconvenience. notwithstanding if either of the parts may be turned into the adversaries neck again, or both of them, it is a faulty Argument. and you may confute the same by inversion, that is to say, turning his tail clean contrary, as thus. If I shall marry a fair woman, I shall have great pleasure, and comfort in her: if I marry a brown woman, she shall not be common to other, for few men will seek after her. Therefore, I shall have comfort both ways.   

De Consequentiis.  
IF profiteth not a little, after the rehearsal of such Arguments briefly to show the knitting of Propositions, and to declare the manner of a short Argument uttered by two Propositions, which are said to stand upon the Antecedent and the Consequent: as the Logicians use to term them.   

¶ The f●rst rule.  
From the universal to the particular, the argument goeth well, but not contrary, as thus.  
This officer doth his duty.  
Ergo all officers doth their dutie●  
But this is true.  
All officers do their duty,  
Ergo this officer doth his duty.   

¶ The second rule.  
From that, which by nature is in any thing, to that which happeth casually, or cometh by some misevill, the reason is not good. As thus.  
Sober diet is good:  
A fever causeth sober diet.  
Ergo a fever is good.  
Another argument used by the romish bishop.  
Sin doth not beget man.  
The work of lust begetteth man.  
Therefore lust otherwise called concupiscentia, is not sin.  
The second proposition is not true, for wicked concupiscence, came in by man's folly, and hath much defaced that, which nature first ordained. Therefore nature itself through god, giveth increase, which is much contrary to the wicked lust of concupiscence.   

¶ ●●e third rule.  
Things disagreeing, are not considered both one way, and with one respect.  
The Gospel willeth us to make no difference of meats.  
The Phisicens' appoint us a diet, and forbidden us this and that.  
Ergo the Gospel, and the phisicens teach things contrary  
These do not disagree, considering their ends are diverse. The scripture forbiddeth superstition, in the observation of days: the Phisicen hath respect to the state of a man's body.   

¶ The fourth rule.  
The argument is good, when substances are set, according to their proper differences. But when they are set, the one against the other, according to the accidents, which are convenient to both, the argument is not good. As thus.  
It is lawful for you, not to drink wine.  
Ergo to drink wine, is unlawful.  
Where as this word lawful, is common to both, aswell to drink, as not to drink.   

¶ The .v. rule.  
Every thing, the more that other things are through it, the same is always the more itself. As thus.  
The water is hot through fire.  
Ergo the fire is more hot.  
Another.  
Some love to marry for goodest  
Therefore they love goods best of all.  
Some arguments made, according to this rule, are nothing true. & therefore it is good to give warning of them.  
It is well said, and wisely, this rule holdeth in causes, that are next adjoining, and the which wholly compass a matter● not in those causes, that are fetched far of, and being but half causes, partly and by the way, give only the occasion. As thus.  
ovid came to be a Poet by his Master.  
Therefore his master was the greater Poet.  
The argument is not good in those causes, that are but half causes, for Ovid is not a Poet, only because he learned Precepts of his Master, but also because he had a great aptness by nature, and a wonderful wit, to do better than another.  
Some hold fast upon a saying of. S. Augustine, and build wonders upon that text. I would not believe the Gospel saith Augustine, except the catholic church did persuade me. And hereupon say they.  
The Gospel is believed, for the church sake.  
Ergo the Church is of more authority.  
And here they heap a number of mischiefs. Therefore (say they) the church may make laws, appoint traditions whatsoever they be. But I answer thus, the Antecedent is false. For I chief believe the Gospel, considering God is the author: and seeing the wonders that he hath done, I give credit to it for his sake. I grant we do believe the Gospel, for the church sake, but yet principally, for that GOD is the chief author, that persuadeth us to receive his word, and after the church (as the second cause) telleth us that the Gospel is the truth of God. Therefore if they will make this such an argument, as they seem to say it is, than this that followeth, is of as good force, for in all things it is like.  
This child is a good boy, gramercy rod.  
Ergo the rod is better than the boy.    

Of the second part of Logic, called Inuentio, that is to say, the finding out of an argument.  
Hitherto we have treated of the former part of logic called in latin juditium, that is to say, judgement, or skill, to declare the nature of every word severally, to set the same words in a perfect sentence, and to knit them up in argument, so that hereby we might with ease espy, the right frame in matters, how they agree being lapped up in order. Now therefore the other part shallbe set forth which is called Inuentio, whereby we may find arguments, and reasons, meet to prove every matter where upon question may rise. This part is the store house of places wherein arguments rest, unto the which if we confer the matter which we intend to prove, there will appear diverse arguments to confirm the cause. Like as they therefore that dig for gold in the ground, do search narrowly the veins of the earth, and by diligent marking the nature thereof, at length find out the mine, which once being found, they straight bring to light, for the only behove of man: So he that will reason wisely, aswell for the common profit of other, as for his own private gain, must be a very diligent labourer. and considering matters are put to the proof, wherein often resteth doubt, his part must be evermore to mark the nature of his cause and to seek confirmation thereof in every part. First by the definition, the cause, the effect, and proper office. Again to see what is contrary, what is like, and what things be incident thereunto, the which all when he hath done● he shall see at length that some one argument above all other, serveth best to confirm his cause, the which when with travail, he hath found out, he may bring to light and use, according to his will.  

¶ What a place is.  
A Place is the resting corner of an argument, or else a mark which giveth warning to our memory what we may speak probably, either in the one part, or the other, upon all causes that fall in question. Those that be good hare finders will soon find the hare by her form. For when they see the ground beaten flat round about, & fair to the sight: they have a narrow guess by all likelihood that the hare was there a little before. Likewise the hontesman in hunting the fox, will soon espy when he seeth a hose, whether it be a fox borough, or not. So he that will take profit in this part of logic, must be like a hunter, and learn by labour to know the boroughs. For these places be nothing el● but coverts or boroughs, wherein if any one search diligently, he may find game at pleasure. And although perhaps one place fail him, yet shall he find a dozen other places, to accomplish his purpose. Therefore if any one will do good in this kind, he must go from place to place, and by searching every borough, he shall have his purpose undoubtedly in most part of them, if not in all. We see that every proposition doth either affirm a thing to be true, or else denieth, that it is true. Therefore when any thing is constantly saide● it needeth somewhat evermore to confirm it. As for example. The Sacraments are necessary in the church of God. I may prove this saying true, by reasoning from that place which is called the end of every thing. As thus.  
To give testimony of our faith, and to nousell ourself in the practice thereof, is very necessary.  
The Sacraments give testimony of our faith. etc.  
Ergo the Sacraments are very necessary.  
When any proposition doth deny, it is needful to have a third word which may agree with one part of the proposition. As if one should thus say. Man is not justified by his works. The place of repugnant words that do altogether disagree giveth just matter. And therefore I may say, man is not justified by his works, because he is justified by his faith only. For if mercy come by grace, and that freely, than works cannot save us. Paul proveth the first, therefore the second is for ever true.   

¶ The division of the places, which are. xxii●●. in number.  

Some are inward places called loci interni & they are 

Partly in the very subst &c. a● 

Definitio  
Genus  
Species  
Proprium  
totum  
parts  
Coniugatae    
and partly incident to the substance as 

Adiacentiae  
Actus  
Subiectum.      
Either kult●e with a nigh affinity, called Cognata of the which 

some are causes as 

Efficiens  
Finis,    
Some are those, which spring of the causes called Euenta. as 

Effectae●  
destinata      
Some are outward places. called Externi, that is not in the substance or nature of the thing, but without it and these are. 

¶ Or else applied to the thing, not King the cause thereof, but only giving a name thereunto, called Applicita. As 

Locus.  
Tempus.  
Connexa    
Or else they be accidents, whereof there be .v. 

Contingentiae.  
Pronunciatae  
Nomen r●i,  
Comparate.  
Similia.    
Or else they are repu●nancies, as 

Opposita.  
Differentia.        

¶ Of the definition.  
There be seven places, which are in the substance, or nature of the thing 

The definition.  
The general word.  
The kind.  
The property.  
The whole.  
The parts.  
The yoked words.    
A Definition is a perfect sentence whereby the very nature of the thing itself, is set forth and expounded. You may reason from this place, both affirmatively, and negatively, as thus. Fortitude is a virtue, that fighteth in the querel of right I may reason thus from the definition to the thing defined, if I will prove fortitude praise worthy.  
Da 
Whatsoever is a virtue, fighting in the quarrel of right, the same is praise worthy.  ri 
Fortitude is a virtue, fighting in the quarrel of right.  i 
Therefore fortitude is praise worthy.   
If I will define a good thing, and prove that money is ●ot good, I may reason thus.  
Ce 
No such thing is good, that is desired for respect of another end  sa 
All money is desired, for respect of another end.  re 
Therefore no money is good.    

¶ The general rule.  
To whom the definition doth agree to the same also doth the thing defined belong. And contrary wise, both affirmatively and negatively.   

¶ The manner of reasoning  
If Socrates be a living creature endued with reason, then is he a man, if he be a man, he is a living creature endued with reason. If he be not a living creature. etc. then is he no man. If he be no man, then is he no living creature, endued with reason.   

¶ The use.  
The nature of every thing, is known by the definition, and therefore this place above all other is most necessary   

Of the general word.  
The general word, is spoken of many, that differ either in kind, or else differ in number, when the question is asked, what it is, we may reason negatively, from this place thus.  
Ce 
No wastfulness is a virtue.  sa 
Liberality is a virtue.  re 
Therefore no wastfulness can be called liberality.   
Or thus.  
No virtue may be called wastfulness.  
Liberality is a virtue.  
Therefore liberality may not be called wastfulness.   

¶ The general rule.  
If the general word be taken away, the kind tarrieth not. If the general word do remain, it shall not strait follow, that the kind shall ensue. For it is no good argument, if I see a tree a good way from me, to say, it is a tree, therefore it is an Apple tree. I may say thus well negatively, it is no tree. Therefore it is neither apple tree nor other.   

¶ The manner of reasonyg.  
If every creature by nature love itself, than man doth love himself. If every virtue be praise worthy, then in thadministration of justice, to give every man his own, it is praise worthy.   

¶ The use.  
The general word, declareth the largeness of any thing, so that where the general taketh no place, the other that be inferior cannot be. As if there be no living creature, in some one house, than there must needs be no manner of man in the same house.   

Of the kind.  
The kind being reckoned among the places, is taken to be any one thing that is less general than an other, and by this shift even proper noumes or names of things shall serve for the kind, and go in stead thereof. Therefore as we reason from the kind to the general, so may we reason from nouns proper, to their kinds.   

Of the kind  
From the kind to the general, an argument is made affirmativelye, as thus. if justice is to be desired, than virtue is to be desired. Such a man is a slanderer, ergo he is a naughty man.   

The general rule.  
To whom the kind doth agree, to the same also the general doth agree.   

The manner o● reasoning.  
If sobriety be praise worthy, than virtue is praise worthy. If dronckenes be devilish, then surfeiting is devilish.   

The use.  
The kind is general to every proper name, and therefore in describing the nature of every noun proper, we have much need of this place, to know under what kind every several thing i● comprehended. Again what soever is defined, that same is the kind of some one thing, so that hereby we learn how far this word stretcheth being ordained to set forth the nature of every proper name.   

Of the difference and propr●tye.  
From the propriety, and difference arguments are derived both affirmative, and negative. he can reason a matter artificially, therefore he is a good logicien. Aesop could not utter his mind at large, but did stammer, and stay much in his speech, therefore he was no Orator.   

The general rule.  
When the propriety, or difference is granted, than the kind strait followeth, take away the same, and there remaineth no kind at all.   

The manner of reasoning.  
Whosoever is endued with reason, the same is a man   

The use.  
The difference, and the property declare natures working in all things living, and therefore they h●lpe well to show what every thing is by his proper gift.  
we spoke before of a method, or direct order to be used in all our doings: and herein we may well see the use thereof. for hitherto we handled those places which do nothing else but comprehend the nature of a perfect definition. now whereas the place followeth of the whole and his parts, it is nothing else but the right manner of a perfect division. the places that follow ●fter, declare the causes, the effects, what be incident, what be disagreeing from the matter, showing example and testimonies of the ancient.   

Of the whole and the parts.  
The whole is that same which consisteth of his parts, and is divided two manner of ways. first there is the whole in substance, which standeth of such parts, that if one betaken away, the whole decayeth strait, neither can it afterward keep his name, as it did before. For an example. A man is divided into body, and soul. Take away the body, who counteth the soul to be that man, which before had his body joined thereunto? we say the soul liveth when the body is deed, but no man saith the soul is the very man, even as we called him before, when he was compact of both.  
Again there is the whole absolute with his parts, which serveth to make the whole perfect, adding such things that although they be away, yet the whole notwithstanding remaineth, and hath his name still, as when a man is made of body, and soul, (which are the parts of his substance, and cannot be away) yet hath he other parts, which although they be away, the whole notwithstanding keepeth his name stil. As if a man lose his hand● his arm, or one of his feet, yet is he called a man, and these be called parts integrales, that is to say, the parts which finish the whole, and make it perfect, after that it hath those parts which make the substance.   

The general rule.  
If the whole be, the parts of the substance must needs be. As if a man be alive, the body, & soul, both live.   

The manner of reasoning.  
If philosophy be good, than it is good to know the nature of things, the way of ordering man's life, and the skill how to reason probably, for philosophy itself is divided into these three parts.   

The use.  
Here by we learn to examine the whole by the parts, that if we cannot obtain our purpose to have the whole granted, to examine it by the parts, and force our adversary to assent to some member.  
The integral parts, which make perfect the whole, and cause the bigness thereof, are called parts like, or not like.  
Parts like, are those which are always like, and divided evermore into like. As the flesh, bones, sinews, fire, water, gold, iron, wine, wood, stone. Every part of all these, is called as much as the whole. as a piece of flesh, is called flesh, a piece of wood, is called wood a drop of water, is called water, as well as a gallon of water is called water. They be called in latin Similares parts, because they are named like unto the whole, for a piece of flesh is aswell called flesh, and asmuch hath it the name of flesh, as a great brawn hath. The parts which have not like names to the whole, are partly principal, & partly not principal. the principal parts are those which in no wise may be away without loss of the whole itself: as the parts of man's body which contain life, cannot be away without loss of the man. As the head, the belly, the heart, & the entrails. Ye● notwithstanding the parts of these cannot be called like to the whole, for no man saith that a piece of the heart, is a heart, or a piece of the head, is a head, & so in the other.  
Those which are not principal parts, may be away: and the whole not withstanding remain still, as the hands, the feet, the legs, & the arms.   

The general rule.  
When the chief parts are taken away, the whole needs decayeth: the chief parts being brought altogether, the whole needs must follow.  
Such a man hath learned moral philosophy, natural, and logic, therefore he is a Philosopher.  
Badius can neither write well, speak well, nor yet recite authors accordingly. Therefore he is no grammarien. This man is no rethoricien, because he cannot place his things in good order. For where as five things be required ●n an Orator, first, to invent, aftre to place things invented, thirdly, to set forth the matter in good words, four, to remember all these, and last of all to utter the same distinctly, and with a clear voice. If one lack any of these five, he cannot be called an orator. Therefore I may say, such a one hath an evil memory. Ergo he is no orator. or such a one hath no utterance. Ergo he may not be called an orator. In the negative part, it is enough to take one part away, for the disallowing of any thing. But if I will affirm any thing by the parts, I must take all the parts, and not one, or two parts. For he is not an orator that can invent only, or place things in good order only, except he can do the whole as it is required. Again he is no good orator that can teach only, or delight, but he is absolute that can both teach, delight, and also persuade.   

¶ The manner of reasoning.  
We reason from the part to the whole affirmatively, and negatively. Thus. Such a one can neither judge the knitting of words together, nor frame them in order according to the art, nor avoid any subtleties. Ergo he is no logician.   

¶ The use.  
The parts set forth the whole, and are a great beautifying to the same, being severally handled, and in their natures set forth at large.   

¶ Of words yoked together.  
Yoked words which being derived of one, are changed in the speaking. As of Sapiens, sapientia, sapienter. A wise man, wisdom, wisely. Here we see that of a wise man, is derived wisdom. I may reason from this place both affirmatively, and negatively, If one be not wise, he hath no wisdom, if one be wise, he hath wisdom. If one do circumspectly, he is called a circumspect man. If it be no misery to die, than death is not miserable. Such a one is a philosopher, therefore he hath studied philosophy. Arguments derived from hence have great force, if the only yoked words be joined together without addition of an other, or else they are not strong. As thus. Preachers be evil livers. Ergo preaching is evil.   

¶ The general Rule.  
When one of the yoked words is added, or put away, the other also is added, or put away.   

¶ The manner of reasoning.  
Such a one is a priestly minister, Ergo he is a priest. Such a man hath served the king nobly. Ergo he is a noble man. The preacher handled his matter learnedly. Ergo the preacher hath learning.   

¶ The use.  
We may learn by this place to know what things are, being considered in other. For if I would know whether it be good, or no, to be a man of honour, and to have rule in the common weal: I may learn by them that do rule, what it is to be a man of honour, and how dangerous a calling they have, that are placed in high estate.   

¶ Of words adjoined to the substance and yet not of the substance.  
Words adjoined are called those accidents whereby the singular word, or proper name, hath an other name than of the very substance, as unto Cato, (which of his substance is a man) wisdom doth happen, whereby he is called wise. Unto Cicero also (which by his substance is a man) there happeneth eloquence, whereby he is called eloquent. So that he hath an other name then his substance giveth, which is to be eloquent, and this is the word adjoined. All quantities, qualities, and those that are comprehended in the predicament of relation, are referred to this place, when they are considered to be comprehended in a substance. Virtue referred to the mind which containeth it, is a word adjoined: compared with vice, it is a contrary: referred to justice, it is a general word. Words adjoined are perceived. either by the senses (as those which are subject to the senses) or else by understanding. As swiftness may be considered to be in a man, although we see him lie a long. And so we say such a lacquie runneth well, although we do not then presently see him run, but we remember that he hath run, saying now as we have seen before in deed. Again some words adjoined are by nature in the thing which contain them, as heat is naturally in fire. And because we see that the same heat, although it never go away, yet at all times it is not of like strength: but at some time less hot, then at an other, we judge the same heat to be an accident. Some words adjoined are not naturally cleaving, but by some other way are joined to the thing containing them, as heat in water set upon the fire.   

¶ The general Rule.  
I fone of the words adjoined be in the subject or thing containing, the other also is like to be there, which followeth upon the first. As thus. Cato is a man worthy praise, because he is aware sober, and full of experience. Praise followeth virtue, as the shadow doth the body. Therefore whosoever hath modesty & great knowledge of things, the same man of necessity winneth praise, and fame, that cannot die. Again if the words adjoined be, the subject that containeth them must needs be also, as thus. If God be all goodness then there is a God.   

¶ The manner of reasonynng.  
Christ came to this world being gentle and mild. Ergo Christ came not to destroy the lost sheep, but to save them. Scholars be godly, virtuous, and occupied in learning. Ergo it is a gracious deed to help such of them as have need.   

¶ The use.  
We may by this place either praise, or dispraise, setting forth the nature of men, & judging them by their works.   

¶ Of deeds done, or suffered to be done, called Actus.  
THe manner of doing, or suffering is, when we are supposed to be occupied, or affected any manner of way, either in doing, or in suffering. There be so many manner of doings, as there be adiacentes, or words adjoined. And of these adiacentes, fear, sorrow, travail, rest, heat, cold, are derived these: to fear, to be sorry, to travail, to rest, to be hot, to be cold. And generally all those words that are referred unto the two predicaments called the manner of doing, and the suffering, are compassed with in this place, if the same words be considered as Accidents which cleave to the substance, & may both be present, & also be a way without loss of the substance. For if things done, be weighed according to their proper manner of doing, they are referred to the two places above, called the difference and the property. For where as we say. Such a one speaketh, Ergo he is man (for nothing else can speak naturally but man only) although in this case (to speak) be a manner of doing, yet it is not referred to this, but rather to the property, because it belongeth to man alone, & always to man.   

¶ The general rule.  
If the manner of doing, or suffering be, the thing containing is also, and the words adjoined also (whereof doing, and suffering have their of spring) follow upon the same.   

¶ The manner of reasoning from this place.  
If one breath, the same man hath life in him. If julius Cesar came into England, then there was such a man called julius Cesar. If Richard the third played the tyrant here in England, then there was such a man in England.   

¶ The Use.  
This place much helpeth either for praise, or dispraise. Some officers bribe the poor, rob their Master, and wayst their own. Ergo such are worthy death.   

¶ Of the thing containing.  
The Subject, or the thing containing, is a substance being the stoorehouse of Accidents, & the very prop to hold up deeds done: for neither wisdom, strength, health, nor Policy can be at all, except they be contained with in some one body.   

¶ The general rule.  
Take away the thing containing, and there remaineth neither adjacent, nor yet deed done.   

¶ The manner of reasoning.  
There is fie●, Ergo it is hot. Christ was a very man, Ergo Christ died, and sufferde the pangs at his departing.   

¶ An other.  
Why dost thou say that I own the a crown, whom I know was never yet worth a groat. Melanchthon liveth and readeth. Therefore there is great learning to be had where he is.   

¶ The Use.  
By naming a worthy person, his praise is sufficiently set forth, even when his name is once uttered. For what learned man hearing the name of Cicero, doth not remember thereby, the full practice and the absolute skill of all eloquence? These places therefore help aswell for the amplifying of matters, either in praise or dispraise, as they do for the steadfast proving of any cause.   

¶ Of outward places being not in the substance, but only touching the substance, and without the nature of it.  
THe first are called, the causes of things, and the things coming of causes, which only are joined t● the thing necessarily, where as the other places following are not coupled necessarily, but are only joined together by a certain alliance to the present matter.   

¶ The division of cause's.  
Some causes, are called the very causes of things, even by their own nature: other causes are happening causes, the which may perhaps bring forth the effect, lastly there be causes without the which, things can not be done, and yet are they not any cause to force the effecte●  
The very cause of things, is such a one that if it be practised in very died, and set forth with other natural causes, the effect must needs follow: and again if it be not put in practice, although the other be put, yet the effect shall not follow. As for example, although one have a cloth, yet can he not have the use of it, except the tailor cut it out. And although the milner grind, yet we are like to dine without bread, except the baker, do his part also in the batch.  
The happening cause, is such a one that although it be put in practice in very died, yet it shall not strait way so be, that the effect must needs follow. As an ague may be the happening cause, that some one man keepeth good diet, & yet not any forcing cause: for then all sick folk might be counted for sober men. The cause without the which, things cannot be done, as thus. The Surgeon cannot heal a wound, except the dead flesh be cut out. The waiefarer shall hardly come to his journeys end, except he have some money in his purse. In time of war, it is evil traveling without a pass port, & this is called in Latin, Causa sine qua non, that is to say, the cause without the which we can not, and yet it is not the cause of our journeying.   

¶ The definition of a very cause.  
A cause in very deed, is a mean, by whose force some thing doth follow.  
¶ There be four such causes.  

The efficient cause.  
The end.  
The matter.  
The shape.   
The efficient cause, is the working cause, by whose means, things are brought to pass.  
Of those that are working causes, some by nature bring things to pass, some by advisement, and by afore purposed choice. Things work by nature (and that necessarily) which lack knowledge to choose this, or that, & have no judgement, to discern things. As the Son, the fire, herbs, precious stones. The son, even by nature, giveth light to the day, and cannot other wise do. the fire burneth naturally Herbs keep their virtue of necessity. The Adamant draweth Iron, even by nature. And so the blood stone, stoppeth blood. Some of these causes work by the force and violence of nature, some by an outward power, being strained thereunto. They work by the force and violence of nature, whose beginning, is within themselves: being aided by none other outward thing. As fire burneth, even by the natural force of heat, which is in the substance thereof. They work by an outward power, which are strained to work by another mean. As water set upon the fire, waxeth hot, & yet is not hot by her own nature, but is made hot by the nature, and might of fire, of whom the water taketh heat. In like manner boulettes of lead, shot out of a gun, an arrow out of a bow, a stone out of a sling: all these fly not into the air, by their twne power or might, but by force, & violence of him that casteth them   

¶ The general rule.  
From the natural working cause, the effect must needs follow, as thus. If the Son shine, the day must needs be, which is the effect, or workmanship of the Sun. Such a man hath eaten Hemlock: Ergo he is poisoned, and in danger of death. Fire is in the Chimney, or in the top of the house, therefore it must needs burn. Take away the cause, and th'effect can not be at all: for if there be no fire, there can be no flame, nor burning neither.  
The second working cause, is when things are done by advisement, and by choice, not by any necessity at all, for things may aswell not be done, as be done, as if there be a Shoemaker, there may be shone made, and contrary, if there be no Shoemaker, there can be no shone at all.   

¶ The ●enerall rule.  
When the voluntary cause in put, the workmanship, or the thing done may follow. As if there be a Carpenter, a house may be made. If one read good authors, and hearken to the reading of learned men, he may come to good learning.   

¶ The manner of reasoning.  
Such a one hath drunk poison, ergo he will die shortly. Christ hath reconciled mankind to his father, by suffering death upon the Cross, Ergo such as believe in this saving health, shall live for ever.   

¶ Another division of cause's efficient.  
Some efficient causes, are commanding causes. As the King is the commanding cause to his subject, to do this or that. The Master of works, is the commanding cause, to all the labourers. The other efficient causes, are obedient causes, when the servant worketh at his masters commandment.   

¶ Another d●uis●on of causes efficient.  
Of such efficient causes as do obey, some do their work, as the Mason worketh upon the stone, the Carpenter upon wood. Other efficient causes that are obedient, are but instruments of doing, as hatchet●es, hammers, pike a●es, with other. In battle, the captain is the efficient commander: the soldiers the efficient obeyer: guns darts, bows, and bills, the instruments of doing. Good heed ought to be had, that in all causes we make a difference, not confounding one with another, that the nigh causes, & the farther causes, be not taken all for one. A cause far fetched, is this. Such a one fell out with his neighbour: Ergo he killed him. Falling out bringeth chiding, chiding bringeth hatred, hatred causeth fighting, fighting giveth blows, blows soon dispatch, soon dispatching, is ready death. Therefore, I might more probably reason thus. Such a one gave his neighbour a deadly wound: Ergo he hath killed him. And thus the argumeist is made from the nighest cause.   

¶ Another division.  
Some causes are principal causes, as the holy ghost working all Godly motions, and stirring our nature, evermore to the best. Other causes, are the inclinations in man, that are either good or evil Thirdly, there are helping causes, which are means the rather, to further us in all virtue. As learning, practising of honest behaviour, acquainting our nature, evermore with the best. The principal cause, that joseph forbore, to company with another man's wife: was the holy ghost, that stirred his mind with the fear of God. The second cause, was his own mind, that remembered the word of God, and the punishment dew for sin. The third cause was, that he accustomed himself, ever to live uprightly, and not only to avoid sin, but also to avoid the occasion of sin. There be other divisions, but I leave to rehearse them, for fear I should be over long.   

¶ The end, called. Finis.  
THe end is, for whose cause any thing is done, and is two ways considered. For there is an absolute end, whereunto all other are referred, being called the perfection, and chief property in any thing: as the chiefest end in any man, is to be perfectly endued with reason, and to attain everliving felicity. The chiefest property in a horse, is to be of a very good courage, & to want no stomach: the chiefest perfection in fire, is to be very hot, and very dry. There is another end, called a helping end, which serveth to an higher end, and is only ordained for this purpose, that we might attain thereby, the perfect end of all. As meat, drink, apparel, and other necessary things, are helping ends for man, to attain the chiefest end. For without these ends, man could not live. To live honestly in this life, to be upright in dealing, with all persons, is an helping end, (as the philosophers take it,) and a testimony to the world of our faith (as the Christians take it) for man to live, world without end. To marry a wife, is a helping end, for a man to avoid fornication. The poor man laboureth, and wherefore? To get his living. Wherefore getteth he his living? That he may the better be able to serve God. The soldier fighteth at his prince's commandment, chief because God commandeth him, next after for love of the king and his country: thirdly and last of all that he might live the rather, in quiet at home with his wife, and children. So that of one, and the same thing, there may be many ends, being orderly considered.   

¶ The general rule.  
Whose end is good, or evil, the same thing is good, or evil, as a sword is good, because it is good for a man, to defend himself. Faith in Christ jesus is good, for by faith we are saved. To undo my neighbour, with lending for gain, is most ungodly: therefore to be an usurer, is most ungodly. To desire another man's wife, is ungodly, because adultery, is ungodly. Battle is good, because it bringeth peace. For all men should fight, for this end, that we might live in quiet, with our neighbours. If thou wilt be honesty and esteemed for a godly person, do the actions of virtue, and thou shalt be well reported of, especially of the honest. It is good to learn, because learning itself is good, which is th'end of our study.   

¶ Of th● mat●r or substance, called, Materia.  
THe substance called materia, is ready to be framed of the workman, as him liketh, by the which substance, either things natural, or else things artificial are made. As first a man, which is a natural thing, is made of body, & soul. An Image, which is an artificial thing, is made by the handy work of man, & is graven out of stone, or melted in gold, or in brass. From this place are made arguments, that both do affirm, and also deny. As thus, if a man have cloth, he may have a garment made if it like him. But if a man have no cloth at all, how can he have a gown, or a coat? If the Baker lack meal, how can he make bread. The matter is considered. ●●. ways. Fir●● it is a substance, that tarrieth still, as when a house is made of stone, wood, & plaster, or an Image of gold, brass, or silver: Here the substance tarrieth still, although the form be altered. Likewise when a house is taken down, the stone, & tymbre remain still, and k●pe their substance, and serve as they did before, either for erection of the same house again, or else other wise, as it shall please him that is the awner. Again, the substance is that, which changeth into another nature, and cannot be the same, that it was before: as of meal and water, bakers make their bread: now they cannot resolve the same bread, again into Meal, and water, which was the former substance.   

¶ The general rule.  
When the substance is at hand, the workmanship may follow, and the effect may appear: But when the substance is taken away, there can be nothing made at al. As if a man lack silver, how can he make an Image of silver? There is no stone, wood, nor plaster: Ergo there is no house. But if I reason thus by the substance, that changes into another nature, and cannot be the same, that it was before: I reason then amiss, as thus. There is no meal or flower, ergo there is no bread: but I should say rather, there was no meal nor flower, ergo there is no bread.   

¶ The manner of reasoning  
The Shoemaker hath no Leather, how can he then make a Shoe? The Printer hath no paper, ergo he cannot set his men on work.   

The shape called Forma.  
The shape, or fashion of any thing, is a cause whereby the thing that is made hath his name, as leather, when it is m●de, or fashioned for the foot, is called a shoe. Such a man wearenth a livery coat guarded with Velvet, and all the Yeoman servants have but plain coats, ergo he is one of the gentlemen. He hath a silver pot guilt, and wrought with goldsmiths work, Ergo it is better than a pot, wrought with plain silver, being of the same quantity or bigg●enes.   

The general rule.  
When the shape or form is made: th'effect, or thing ●oen may follow: take away the shape, & the use also is taken away. A cup is made, ergo a man may drink in it: break the cup, and how shall you drink of the same cup. The element goth compass wise, because it is round. Reason is called the shape of man. Therefore I may say, such a one lacketh the gift of reason, Ergo he is a fool.   

Things coming after the causes, called Euen●a.  
Those which come of causes, are two ways considered, for either they are called things that in due time follow the cause that went before, or else things ordained to some certain end.  
Those things which come after the cause, and are made of the same, are called effecta. And every argument is either derived from th'effect of the matter, of the form, or of thefficient cause.   

¶ From the effect of the matter or substance, called Materia, thus ye may reason.  
He hath a Sword made of Iron, Ergo he hath iron. Here is a house, Ergo here is stone, and wood.   

From the effect of the form.  
A bowl being turned, rouleth, Ergo it is round.   

From the effect of the efficient cause.  
It is bright day, Ergo the son is up.   

The general rule.  
When the effect is come forth, it must needs be, that either his proper cause is then, or else that it hath been before.   

The manner of reasoning.  
If slaughter be not to be borne in a common weal, than these pike quarrelers, these roisters, and fighters, are not to be suffered to go unpunished.   

The thing appointed for some ●nde.  
That which is appointed for some certain end, and use: is called destinatum, as a house is builded to dwell in. Armour is provided for man to defend himself. Medicines are helping means, for man to recover health. I showed before that there was an●ende, which was a helping end, & a mean to come to the perfect, & most absolute end, for without this appointed mean and provision of God, man could never live, much less could he come to any perfection in this life, as touching the actions, & worthy feats required of man. Thus we may reason from this place. Seeing it is lawful for man, to defend himself, it is lawful for man, to wear a weapon. If war be lawful, than money is necessary, without which, no man can go forward, or set forth an army.   

The general rule.  
Those things that agree to that which is appointed to the end, agree also to the end itself.   

The manner of reasoning lawfully.  
If a man may lawfully buy the great bible in English, he may then also even without asking leave, read it at his pleasure.   

The v●● of all these causes.  
The commodity of these causes is so great, that in setting forth the use of them, a man might sooner lack words, than want matter. First we know that nothing is done without a cause, and therefore seeing this world framed as it is, every thing proportioned in his due order, we may truly gather that there is one above all, that ruleth all, whom the Christian calleth God. In praising or dispraising, how can a man better proceed, than by rehearsing the end of every thing. Again in examining and searching out the profit or disprofit, by th'end we know what is gainful: by the efficient cause we know what may be done. For whatsoever is profitable, the same is profitable for some end, and whatsoever we would have done, we may soon perceive by the efficient, if it may be done. yea in causes of judgement, we may judge, what will some one man had to do this or that, when we consider, to what end he did this or that. Last of all, we know hereby, that God hath ordained nothing in vain, and that every thing is ordained for some one end. The end of Christ's death was, to merit man's redemption. The end of man's life is, to trust wholly in Christ's passion, and to live thereby for ever.   

Of things outwardly applied, called Applici●a.  
They are called things outwardly applied to a matter, which are not the cause of the same matter, and yet, give a certain denomination to it. There be iij of this sort.  

The time.  
The place.  
Things annexed, or knit together.   
And these three are nothing else, than the three predicaments or general places, which I rehearsed before.  
Vbi. 
Where.  Quando. 
When.  Habitus. 
The arraying.    

The manner of reasoning.  
If one list to reason from the place, called in latin Locus, he may thus say. Such a one is in the country, Ergo he is not in the City. If I will prove that a man being accused of murder unjustly, did not offend: I may reason both from the time, and the place. The man was killed in the fields, about iij. of the clock in the after none, all which time this other man came not abroad. No, he looked not out of his house all that day. Ergo this man did not kill him. Clodius was accused at Rome that he had made a spoil of the relics in the temple of Bona Dea, where as he at the same time when this deed was thought to be done, was at Interamna, a village in the country beside Rome. Quintilian saith thus. Thou hast killed an adulterer, which the law doth permit, but because thou haste killed the same man in a brothels house, thou art worthy to die thy self. notwithstanding these. i●. places are rather used of the Rethoriciens, than among the logiciens, for when a man is taken of suspection we go about to prove him faulty by diverse conjectures. As if he ware about the same place, at the self same time, when a man was slain, and also had his sword about him: we conjecture that he might have killed him. Again if we perceive one to be a riotous fellow, ready to fight with every body, accompanying with naughty packs, and evermore at one end of all frays, waxing pale when he is apprehended, shaking for fear, or running away, when he should be taken, we suspect such a one that he is not altogether cliere. Therefore Orators do use to mark things that go before the fact, as whether he hated the man or no, or what gain he might have by his death, and also observe things joined with the fault, as changing of hew, when he is apprehended, or his sword to be bloody, or any part of his apparel, and thirdly they note what followeth. that is, if he ran away, if he cannot tell his tale plainly, and so they conclude as they are led by suspection. Some Arguments are necessary, some probable, as thus, from the consequent. Such a woman is brought in bed with a child, Ergo she hath had the company of man. Such a man had a bloody sword in his hand strait after the death of his neighbour, even in the same fields where his neighbour was slain, Ergo it is like this man hath slain him. All which arguments are derived from the place called Contingentia as I will show it hereafter.   

¶ Of words annexed, or knit to the substance, called Connexa.  
AS touching words knit, ye may understand, that they are joined outwardly to the Subject, and give a name unto him, according as they are. As Richesses are joined to a rich man. For where as Crassus is called a man by his own substance, yet not withstanding by his richesses, he is called a rich man.  
So he that hath a wife, is called a husband. He that hath a master, is called a servant. He that hath a father, is called a son. Words knit, are divided diversly, for some are called such as are nigh, & touching the substance. As to be full of fish, is agreeing to the water, to be full of grass, is annexed or agreeing to the earth, to be cloudy is annexed or agreeing to the air. Again words knit, are called those things, that a man weareth, as to wear a cote, a jack, a harness, to have shoen, to be merry, to be dusty, and all such as are casual to man. Some are called, annexed or agreeing, which are knit to man, and things not worn upon his back, but farther of, and rather perceived by vnderstandyng● then known by eiye sight. As nobility, power, fame, authority. To be an Officer, a Mayour, a Sherieve, lord chancellor, comptrollour, or any other officer in the common weal, all these are annexed to their inferior, over whom they have authority. In this point differ words knit, called annexed, from words adjoined, called adiacentia, that all adiacentes, or words adjoined cannot be with out the subject, as heat, cold, whiteness, or any other like cannot be, except they be comprehended with in some Subject. For it is proper to every Accident, to be in some one thing containing him. If there be nothing containing, than the Accident cannot be. Not withstanding, words knit, are so placed, that one is without the other, & may be, either of them severally, if the one happen to perish: as a husband is without the substance of his wife, and although his wife die, yet the husband may be onlive, saving that he loseth his name to be called husband, but if a wise man die, wisdom must de●a●e also, because it must ne●es be in some one subject, or else it cannot be.   

¶ Of Accidents.  
THose are here called Accidents which both themselves, and the thing also, may be together, one● with another, & also may be away, the one, from the other.  
¶ There be v. of this sort.  

Things chancing.  
The name of a thing.  
Sentences of the sage.  
The likeness.  
Things compared together.    

¶ Things chancing called Contingentia.  
THose accidents are called things chancing, which chance about a thing so, that whether these things chance, or no, the thing itself may be, or though the thing be not, these may so ●●aunce to be. As paleness, which thing may chance before sickness, & the same also may chance though a man be not sick. And a man also may be sick, and yet nothing pale at all. Likewise love and fear. A man may love, although he fear not, a man may again fear, although he love not.   

¶ The diversity of three diverse places.  
Words adjoined, words knit to another, & words chancing to a thing differ thus, that in words adjoined called adiacentia, the cause why things are so named, is ever in the subject neither can the words adjoined continue, except they be comprehended within some one substance. Words knit, are of such sort that by naming one, the other is straight known. As when I name a Schoolmaster, I signify scholars also, although I do not expressly name them. But in words chancing called Contingentia, we must at the lest compare ii together, that we may better know them to be of this place. Therefore if I name this word (craft) by itself, without any further consideration, than it is an adjacent, or a word adjoined. If I name this word (servant) craft is referred to the place called a word knit, considering craft is mentioned in respect of the servant. If I say thus (a crafty servant) than these two are considered to be in this place called Contingentia, which is a place of words chancing to a thing so, that whether they chance or no, the thing itself may be notwithstanding. As a servant may be, & yet not crafty. Again one may be crafty, & yet not a servant.   

¶ The division of things chancing.  
Some go before the thing, some are joined with the thing, some follow after the thing.  
Things chancing before. As thus. The sky was very red this morning. Ergo we are like to have rain or night.  
Things joined with the matter at the very instant. As thus. Anger is in old men. oft fetching of wind declares a sickness of the lungs. If the bequeather or maker of any will, be onlive, the will taketh no place, and may be void. Such a one goeth ga●● in his apparel, spendeth with the bes●, & yet hath nothing to maintain his charges. Ergo it is like that he cometh by his goods naughtily.  
Things happening after. Such a one is well learned. Ergo he hath gone well to his book heretofore.   

¶ The name of a thing, or the interpretation of a word.  
THe interpretation or name of a thing is a word made by the agreement of men, to signify this, or that. As P●ilosophus is y● man whatsoever he be, that hath a desire, and a love, to the knowledge of wisdom. Therefore if ye will expound what a philosopher is, you may reason thus, from the interpretation of the word. Whosoever he be that hath an earnest love to philosophy, and seeketh knowledge thereof, that man is a philosopher.  
Cato hath an earnest love to philosophy, and seeketh knowledge thereof.  
Ergo Cato is a philosopher.  
Again the interpretation of a thing is then thought to be, when a metaphor or translation is used, & the meaning thereof taken. As when this word Ignis (fire) betokeneth love. Where as of the own nature it signifieth fire, as we read in ovid, thus.  
Quis enim celaverit ignem  
Lumine qui semper proditur ipse suo  
Who can keep close the fire, or hide the burning heat.  
That doth betray itself alway with light of flame so great.  
Wherein is nothing else signified but love, which is so hot of itself that it must needs break out into flames, and show itself at one time, or other.   

¶ The general Rule.  
To whom the interpretation of a noun doth agree, to the same also the noun itself agreeth.   

¶ The manner of reasoning.  
Such a child is called dawson, And he may well be so called, for his father is but a daw.   

¶ Of the place called authority, otherwise named sentences of the sage.  
ALL such testimonies may be called sentences of the sage, which are brought to confirm any thing, either taken out of old authors, or else such as have been used in this common life. As the sentences of noble men, the laws in any realm, quick sayings, proverbs, that either have been used heretofore, or be now used. Histories of wise philosophers, the judgements of learned men, the common opinion of the multitude, old custom, ancient fashions, or any such like. Testimonies, are two ways considered. For either they are such as pertain to God, or else to man. Those authorities which come from God, and are spoken by the holy ghost, are undoubtedly true, neither can they be false: therefore we ought most reverently to receive the word of God, & agree to such texts as are written & spoken, even as though we heard God himself speak, with lively voice unto us. Man's authority hath no such great force, although noble men, learned Philosophers, and stout captains have pronounced many things most wisely. For although Aristotle saith that the world neither had beginning, nor yet at any time shall have ending: I may reject this saying, (if any man bring me it for his confirmation,) although this great philosopher did pronounce the same. For except I be persuaded by reason, it is in my choice, either to admit, or to refuse such authorities. Not withstanding we should not forsake wise men's words rashly, but with a modest answer desire the adversary not so much to stick to his authority, as to prove the same by some good reason. In profane things ye may reason affirmatively very well, as thus. The best things are first to be learned, for so doth Quintilian teach. Nusquam tuta fides. It is hard trusting any body. For so saith Virgile. But I can not reason negatively, when I bring mine authority out of profane authors. For I reason amiss if I say. There is no such disease called the French pocques, because Galene the chief of physicians never maketh mention in all his books of any such disease. For this evil hath crept in, sense his time, through the naughtiness of men. And although it were then, yet may it be that he never heard of it. Hereunto might be added all such sentences as by the law of nature are graffed in man. As these following. Do as thou wouldst be done unto. Be thankful to him, that doth the a pleasure. Honour thy father, & thy mother. Know there is a God. He that hath not these opinions naturally fastened in his heart, he may justly be thought rather a beast, than man endued with reason.  
In matters of scripture I may reason both affirmatively, and negatively, Christ saith to his disciples. Rege● Gentium dominantur, vos autem non sic. kings bear rule over countries, but you must not do so. Therefore no ministers should have any temporal power, because Christ saith so. Ye may reason negatively thus, we read not in all the scripture from Genesis to the revelation of saint John, that ever there was friar, monk, nun, or canon, ergo let them go from whence they came. We read not in the scripture that worshipping of images, was ever allowed to be Lay men's books. Therefore, take down such idols, and let them serve for other uses.  
The general rule for profane authorities. That which is allowed by all wise men, or at the least by the better part: no man ought rashly to gain say it, or thus. Every cunning man must be believed in his own art.   

¶ The manner of reasoning.  
Aristotle thought best that drunkards should have double punishment. therefore they deserve it. By texts of the scripture we may better reason the matter, as thus. Cursed be he that doth the work of the lord guilefully, saith the Prophet. Ergo evil Bishops, or loitering pastors are accursed of God.   

¶ Of the similitude, or likeness.  
A Similitude, is when ii things or more, are so compared together, that even as in the first there is one property, so in the other there is a like property, according to both their natures severally observed. For like as water by continuance weareth a stone, so there is nothing so hard, but by time it may be compassed, or brought to pass. As spiders make their own copwebbes without any other help: so some good fellows can bring up news & tell stranng tales without any hearing, when there is not one word true. As the palm tree being overlaid with weights, riseth higher, & buddeth upward more freshelye: so a noble stomach vexed with much adversity is evermore the s●outer. And this aught diligently to be observed that the thing which is brought to make the Similitude, be like unto that which is proved.   

¶ The manner of finding out a similitude.  
In every cause that we do purpose to handle at large, we must observe diligently, what things are spoken by translation, that is, from the proper signification, to a meaning that is not proper. As speaking in the praise of a King, and callyug him the bright son of the earth, I may gather a similitude by this word (son) and make it thus. Even as the son only geuet● light to all the whole earth: so there aught to be in a commune weal one king that should be ruler over all.   

¶ The gen●rall rule.  
Of similitudes there is like judgement, that is, even as we think of the one, so we may think of the other.   

¶ The manner of reasoning.  
As a dog standing at the table● side, eateth that up by and by which his master hath cast to him, and ever looketh for more, & more: So some when they have received a living for which they hoped before, by and by they are ready, to take another, and although they be full, yet still they are hungry.   

¶ Of things compared.  
Things are compared together in one third word, whereunto they both do agree, as thus. If theft be worthy death, than murder is worthy no less. Here ye see that theft, & murder are compared together in one third word, which is death.  
Comparations are divided two manner of ways, for either they be equal, or not equal. They are equal in this wise. if the father have authority over his son, he hath also authority over his daughter.   

¶ The general rule.  
Where things are equal, there must needs be equal judgement. Comparations are unequal, when I reason either fro● the greater to the less, or else from the less, to the greater. From the greater to the less, ye may reason thus. If a Captain with his whole company be not able to sack a town, much less one base soldier can be able to do it. The schoolmaster cannot understand the Greek, or the Hebrew tongue, much less can the scholar, which never learned either of them.  
From the less, to the greater, ye may reason affirmatively, as thus. Children can suffer much cold, and cannot young men bear a frost? Custom beareth swinging, and shall reason take no place? Women have died for there country, therefore may not men be ashamed to fear death? Noble men are desirous to have a good horskeper that can keep their horses well, and they spare not to give great stipends to such, & shall they not much more be desirous, to have a good scholmaster, that might Godly bring up their children, in virtue and wisdom? If a horse be not well broken, the awner will see that he may be made gentle: & shall not a man seeing his natural child, evil brought up, take pains, and see him brought to some good order? We can see a spavain, a splint, a ring bone, or such other disease in a horse, and shall we not be as ready to look, that there be no faults in our children, or in the teacher, to whom we give the charge, to bring them up in learning, and good manners?   

¶ The general rule.  
If that which seemeth to be the greater, be not added, neither shallbe added, that which is the less. Again, if that, which is less be added, that which is greater, shallbe added also.   

¶ The manner of reasoning.  
The scholar understandeth Latin, ergo his schoolmaster also hath knowledge in the same tongue. Negatively thus. If God will not allow a vow, made by the daughter, without the knowledge of her father, although the vow be but for one day: how much less shall that marriage take place, when young folk make privy contracts, without the good will obtained of their parents.   

¶ The use.  
This place helpeth much to exhort especially, when we reason from the less, to the greater, or contrary. Neither can any one that teacheth, want those hereof, if they purpose, that their sayings shall take place.   

¶ Of repugnancy.  
A repugnance, is such a disagreeing state of things that no one thing can be the same, that tother is, by one nature, or substance, as thus. Man, and virtue, the one cannot be the●ame, that the other is.   

¶ The ●euision.  
Things repugnant, are divided in to discordantes, and into words differing one from another, by any manner of means.   

¶ Of discordantes, called Opposita.  
Discordantes, are when only one word or sentence, is contrary to another, so that the one cannot be the same that the other is, nor yet both at one time, can be in one, & the same subject, as hot, and cold, the father & the son, sight, & blindness, night and darkness.   

¶ There be four of th●● sort.  

Contraries.  
Relatives.  
Privation.  
Contradiction.   
COntraries, are such discordantes, as cannot be, at one, and the same time in one substance: notwithstanding, they may both severally be, in two subjects, or substances● at one, and the same time. As whiteness, blackness, virtue, and vice, wisdom, and foolishness. Contraries are two ways considered, for some be such that if one be not, the other must needs follow, and they are called in Latin, Contraria immediata, that is to say, contraries, where nothing cometh betwixt: as thus. A wise man, a fool. Virtue, vice. Faith, unbelief. All these are such, that if the one be not in a man, the other must needs be. As thus. Such a one is wise, ergo he is no fool. If a man be not wise, it must needs be, that he is foolish. We are saved by faith: ergo we are condemned by unbelief  
Again, other contraries be so, that though the one be away, yet the other followeth not therefore of necessity. For black, and white, be contrary, and yet they be not so contrary, that if the white colour be not, the other must needs be. For a man may be high coloured, or sallow coloured, and yet not black. Therefore in such contraries, where some thing may be put betwixt the extremes, it is no good reason to say, that if the one be not, the other must needs be. Note further, that all discordantes are not contrary, according to their general word, or common accidents, but according to their proper difference● For if we reason thus.  
Fire is an Element.  
Ergo water is none.  
The argument is not good, for fir● and water are not contrary, according to their general word, which agreeth to them both, but according to their proper differences, as in that, fire is hot and dry, it is contrary to water, which is cold and moist. Thus some, that maintained counterfeicte chastity, were wont to reason against Marriage.  
virginity is good.  
Therefore marriage is not good.  
Whereas virginity, and marriage, are not contrary, according to their general word, which is (good) but according to their proper difference. As thus.  
virginity is a single life, without knowledge of carnal act.  
Therefore marriage is not so.  
Therefore this word (good) in the above rehearsed argument, doth signify a thing granted of God, and allowed by his will, which doth aswell, comprehend marriage, as it doth virginity therefore this argument, is of no more force, then if I should say.  
justice is good.  
Ergo temperance is not good.  
And yet there is no man, but will say, that both these two virtues are good Or thus merrily.  
Gentlemen have souls.  
Ergo poor men have none.  
Whereas God hath given, both high and low, rich and poor, the spirit that s●all live ever. But this I speak, to set forth more at large, the fondness of the other argument, concerning Marriage.   

¶ The general rule.  
But away one of these contraries, where nothing cometh betwixt, called immediata contraria, and tother must needs follow, which is not true in those contraries● where some thing cometh betwixt them, called contraria mediata.  
Relatives are those, which are compared among themselves, or else referred to some other. As a father, a son. A master, a servant. A king, a subject.   

¶ The general rule.  
If one of the relatives be, the other must needs be: if the other be not, the other cannot be neither.   

¶ The manner of reasoning  
Thou art my servant, why doo●●● thou not know me, to be thy master? Thou art a subject, and wilt thou take in han●e to rule?  
Privation, is the absence of tha● thing from a substance, which by nature, might have been there●  
The habit, is the having of that thing, in the substance, which nature hath granted to be there.   

¶ The general rule.  
Every privation, is the destruction of that, which by nature was.   

¶ The manner of reasonyg.  
Such a man is blind:  
Ergo he cannot se.  
Blindness, is called privation, because it is the absence of that thing, which either by nature was, or might have been, in the substance. Neither doth any mann●, call a stone blind, because nature hath utterly denied, the gift of seeing to all stones.  
Sin is called privation, because it is the destruction, of that great goodness, which God powered in man. And therefore God justly punisheth those, that have forsaken his grace.   

¶ Sentences gainsaying, otherwise called, contradiction.  
Sentences gainsaying, are two propositions, the one denying that, which the other affirmeth: as thus. Christ is in the Sacrament really: Christ is not in the Sacrament really. It cannot be, but one of these two propositions, must needs be false.   

¶ The general rule.  
If one of the two propositions, be granted to be true, the other must needs be granted to be false. Neither can it be, by any means possible, that both of them should either be true or false, at one, and the same time. Always provided, that there be no doubtfulness in the words: for if one word signify diversely, then may both propositions, be either true, or false, at one, and the same time. As thus.  
The flesh of Christ, profiteth greatly.  
The flesh of Christ, profiteth nothing at all.  
In these two propositions, there is no contradiction, or gainsaying, but that they both may be true, at one an● the same time, considering they are both diversely taken. Christ's flesh eaten and chewed, with our tethe, profiteth nothing, Christ's flesh torn upon the cross, profiteth much, as the which purchaseth to all believers, life for ever   

¶ The manner of reasoning.  
If we be justified freely, through the only merits of jesus Christ: Then this is false, that we are not justified, only through the merits of jesus Christ: but the other is true: ergo this is false.   

¶ The use.  
Of Privation, Contradiction, and of contraries that immediately follow: conditional arguments are made, with the addition of some one conjunction, of the which, when the one is true, the other must needs be false, as thus. Either the soul is immortal, or else it is not immortal, but the first is true: ergo the second is false.   

¶ Of words differing.  
THen have we the use of this place, when we reason & prove that one thing is not the same. that another is, as thus. King Lud is not the same, that julius Cesar, or Brutus was: King Lud builded London, of whom the city had his name, being called Lud'S town, and afterward, by alteration of letters, called London. Ergo neither Cesar, nor Brutus, builded the same. Discordantes called opposita are not the same that words differing are, called differentia. For asmuch as where discordantes be● one thing only is set against another one. As for example. Nothing can be set against brightness, as discordant, but only darkness, nothing can be set against heat, but only cold, and so in other. But in this place, there may many things differ from some one thing, and whatsoever is not the same that another is, may be called a word differing, in Latin, differens, or disparatum. Socrates is a man, ergo he is not an ore, a stone, a horse or any other thing else.  
Things differ four ways, either by numbering. As every singular man, differeth one from another. james is one, and John is another. Other differ in th●ir kind, when they are comprehended under diverse kinds, as Be●uuis of Hampton, & Arundel his horse: or else Alexander, and Bucephalus. Other differ by the general word, when they are comprehended, under diverse general words, as Baptism, & matrimony, th'one comprehended under a Sacrament of God, the other under a certain ordinance of God. Lastly, words differ by their most generals, when they are placed in diverse predicamentes A king, manhood, th'one is placed among the relative, is the second in quality.   

¶ The general rule.  
We cannot make things, that do much differ, to be of one nature.   

¶ The manner of reasoning.  
We reason from words differing, negatively altogether.  
From such as differ in number, we reason thus.  
Such a one is called Thomas, therefore he is not the same, that John is. Peter is not Paul, nor yet Paul is Peter. Faith is not works, nor yet works are faith.  
From such as differ in kind, thus,  
I am a man, therefore I should not be used like a brute beast.  
From such as differ by the general word.  
I did borrow plain cloth of thee, & why dost thou require raised velvet of me?  
From such as differ in predicament.  
Virtue is a quality of the mind, therefore it is no substance.  
AFter knowledge attained, exercise is most necessary. And happy shall he be, that unto skill, addeth practise, for then learning is best confirmed, when knowledge is put in ure.  
Therefore considering, I have set forth the places, I think it necessary after knowledge of the same, to describe matters by every one of them, as they lie in order: that other may likewise, when any question cometh in controversy, go thorough the places themselves with it, and examine every word, by every several place.  
And to make this thing more plain, I will go through the places with one certain word, and look what help I shall find there for knowledge of the same. The word shall be (a king) or (a Magistrate.)   

The definition.  
The definition of a magistrate. Every King, or magistrate, is the minister of god, for a good end, to the punishing of naughty persons, and to the comforting of godly men.   

The general rule.  
The Minister of God.   

The kind.  
Either a tyrant, or a godly king, th'one ruleth according to his lust, the other according to right, and justice.   

Words yoked.  
The officer, the office, to bear an office, if the office can not be spared, the officer can not be spared.   

Adiacentes necessarily joined.  
Wisdom, earnest labour, cunning in sciences, skilful both of war, and peace, these all must needs be in every Magistrate.   

Adiacentes adjoined casually.  
To be liberal, to be frugal, to be of a temperate life, all these happen to be in good magistrates.   

deeds necessary.  
To defend Religion, to enact godly laws, to punish offenders, to defend the oppressed, all these are necessary in a king, and are never found in any tyrant.   

The thing containing.  
Moses, David, Solomon, Ezechia●, josias. Charles the Emperor. Edward the vi of that name. King of England.   

The efficient cause.  
God himself, or else the ordinance of God.   

The second efficient cause.  
Unquiet people, rebels, disobedient people, are the cause why magistrates are ordained.   

The end of a magistrate.  
This end he must needs observe that always the people live in quietness, and in honest conversation pass their whole life.   

The effect, or else things done by a Magistrate.  
Peace is made, the realm enriched, all things plenteous, but where a tyrant ruleth, all things are contrary.   

The authority.  
The xiij to the Romans, let every soul be subject to the powers i Peter two Be subject to the king.   

Things incident.  
The sceptre is a token of justice, even as the sword is a sign of revengement, or wrath paying of Subsidies, taxes, tributes, rend, or any such like, yeomen of the guard, and all other walters, soldiers in war, the obedience of the subjects, the honour given unto him, triumphs made, running at the tilt, fighting at the Barriers fighting at the tourney. All these are contingentia to a king, that is, although these things be not in a common wealth, yet may there be a king, yea and although there be no king in some common weal, yet these things may be every eachone of them, as it was in Athenes where the people had the rule of the common weal, and all was referred to their judgement.   

¶ Similitudes.  
That which the shepherd is to the sheep, the same is the magistrate to his subjects. That which the master of the ship, is to the ship, or the master of an household, to his house, or the head to the whole body: the same is the magistrate to his subjects.   

¶ Things compared.  
Servants must be obedient and subject to there masters with all reverence, as we read in the scripture: how much more than should the subjects be obedient to their king and sovereign lord, which by the ordinance of God, is appointed to rule, and to have governance over them.  
Ye may see by this one example, that the searching of places, ministereth arguments plentifully. For if ye will prove a magistrate necessary, ye may reason from the definition, from the causes, from the authority, from the thing containing, from the adiacentes, from the similitude, and make good reasons for the purpose. Not withstanding, I think it not necessary that ye search all the places at every time, and for every matter: but that ye search most part of them. And although we cannot find a good argument in every one of them, yet it is well if we may gather but three or four good arguments. As when we go into a garden, we shall not find all herbs growing there, although we search every corner: so when we look in all that places of invention for the proof of ou● matter, we shall not find in every place a good argument for our purpose. Not withstanding it is most necessary, either when we will prove a matter ourself, or else try an others labour, which is set forth at large most eloquently: to bring the whole some of his long tale to these places, & make an argument in three lines of that, which he dilateth, into three shietes.  
And for ourself, if we will reason a matter earnestly, it shallbe profitable to see our own arguments before hand derived out of the places, the which shall make us more bold to speak, when we shall evidently perceive our own reasons surely grounded. And the better able we shallbe to confirm our own cause, & to avoid all objections, when we know surely by this art, whereunto we may leave. For although other shall empece our doings, and wrest our words, yet we shallbe able evermore to keep our own, when we plainly perceive whereof our argument hath his ground Many speak wisely which never read logic, but to speak wisely with a judgement, and to know the very fountain of things: that can none do, except they have some skill in this art.  
Therefore what diversity there is betwixt a blind man, & him that seeth, the same difference is betwixt a wise man unlearned, and a wise man learned. Ye have seen the commodity of this art by this one word (magistrate) which I did apply to every place, that might give any light for the making of an argument. Now ye shall have a question set forth, and both the parts of a proposition referred to the places of invention, that thereby ye may know wherein the places do agree, & wherein they do not. For where as the places agree (that is to say, all things are referred to the one, that are referred to the other) there the proposition is good, and the latter part of the proposition, is truly spoken of the first. But where the places do not agree (that is to say, some things are referred to the one word, that are not referred to the other) there the things themselves can not agree. I will use this question for an example. whether it be lawful for a priest to marry a wife or no. And first of all I will examine a Priest, and apply him to all the places. Next after that we will refe● a wife to all the places, & see when we have done, where in these two do agre, and wherein they do not agree.   

¶ From the definition.  
A Preacher is a clerk or shepherd which will give his life for his sheep, instructed to set forth the kingdom of God, and desirous to live virtuously: a faithful, and a wise steward whom the lord doth set over his house, that he may give the household servants meat, in due time.   

¶ From the general word.  
A minister a servant, a holy man, a gospeler, the minister of God should be upright in his living, faithfully bestowing the words of truth.   

¶ From the kind.  
Peter, Paul, John Baptist, isaiah, Esdras, and Stevin, Ambrose being a temporal man was after that a minister of the Church. Chrisostome became of a lawer, an earnest preacher of god's word. yea Peter & Andrew both aware fishers, therefore temporal men may be called, if they be worthy, and desire this spiritual function.   

¶ From the Property.  
To be meet to teach, to be godly wise, to do, and to teach all things that they are commanded. Saint Jerome is his Epistle to Nepotianus, as touching the life of Preachers, saith thus. I will not have the plead causes, & to be abrabbling ianglar without all reason, but I will have the to be a faithful minister of the Sacraments, and very skilful in the laws of the Lord.   

¶ The whole.  
To be brought up in the scripture● even from his youth, to be godly in conversation, and wholly to be instructed with all things, necessary for a preacher. whoso ever is thus armed, is worthy to be a minister, in the Church of God. This Argument is derived from the whole.   

¶ The parts.  
To invent matter out of the scripture, according to the aptness of his hears, to deck his doings handsomely, to place his sentences in order, to remember what he speaketh, and to utter his words distinctly, plainly, and with loud voice.   

¶ Things yoked together.  
A preaching, a Preacher, to do the work of a Preacher. Timoth. iiij. He that by his preaching edefieth, the same man is a preacher.   

¶ Things cleaving, or adjoined to the substance.  
Labour, diligence, wit, knowledge, sobriety, gentleness, virtue, marriage, an earnest desire to bring up his children well, with other such. A bishop must be without fault, the husband of one wife, watchful, sober, modest, herberous, apt to teach, no great dryuckar of wine, no fightar, not given to filthy lucre, but upright, void from brawling, from covetousness, etc. i. Timoth. two.   

¶ deeds done.  
To feed Christ's flock, to put his life in danger for the flock committed to his charge, to bring up his flock & famuly in the fear of God, in the knowledge of his word, and in due observing of the same.   

¶ The thing containing.  
Jerome in his first book of the Commentaries which he made upon the Galathians i cap. Let us not think that the Gospel resteth in the words of Scripture, but in the sense, not in the outward rind, but in the very heart, not in the leaves, but in the very root of reason. Let the words of Christ dwell plenteously in you, with all wisdom. Collos. iii.   

¶ The matter.  
The word of God. The old Testament, & the new. Hieremie the first. Behold, I have given my words in to thy mouth.   

¶ The shape, or form.  
The shape may be taken of the conversation, speech, spirit, or the manner of the preachers living.   

¶ The efficient cause.  
God himself, the Scripture, good preachers, Evangelists, the Lord will give his word, to those that preach, plentifully. Psalm lxvii. I have graffed, Apollo hath watered, but God giveth increase.   

¶ The end.  
The end of preaching is, that the wicked might be converted to repentance, and the just man kept in his upright living. Ezechiel, iii.   

¶ Things done by virtue of the cause.  
To win men to Christ, to make men's consciences quiet, to move them to prayer. When Peter made a sermon, out of hand there was about three thousand converted to the faith of the gospel, that self same day.   

¶ What is appointed to him, and proper to this reasoning.  
To stude earnestly, and search the scriptures that he may prove a true minister of God, to live a good life, & seek to keep a household, that he may be herberous.   

¶ The place.  
The church, the pulpit, the vestiarie, the chancel. I spoke openly to in the synagogue saith Christ, and in the Church, to all the jews that came thither, & I spoke nothing in corners.   

¶ The time.  
A young man, and elderly man, and old man, to preach early and late i Timothy four Let no man contemn thy youth.   

¶ Things annexed.  
To have some stipend for his preaching. worthy is the labourer to have his wagies. Matth. x.  
The other places following, because they are not absolutely considered, but referred to some other, & ever having respect to the next word, which is rehearsed in the question of that which went before, they cannot severally handle any one word: and therefore ye must mark the whole question, and in one Argument comprehend aswell the wife, as the minister. Now therefore ye shall have this word, uxor (a wife) described through out the places.   

¶ The definition.  
A wife, is a woman that is lawfully received into the fellowship of life, for the increase or getting of children, and to avoid fornication.   

¶ The general word.  
A wife, is a woman.   

¶ The kind.  
A chaste wife, a learned wife, a mannerly wife, or else ye may use the proper names of women, for the kyn●● itself, as Lucretia, Cornelia, Portia, Hipsicratea, &c.   

¶ The property.  
To bring forth children.   

¶ The whole.  
The whole woman herself altogether.   

¶ The parts.  
The head, the breast, the arms, the back, the thigh, the heart, the veins, blood, and flesh.   

¶ Words joined.  
Housewifely to do the work of a wife. She doth the duty of a good wife: Ergo she is a wife. She haudleth all things housewifely: Ergo she is a good housewife.   

¶ Words adjoined.  
The love in marriage, care over the family, keeping of herself to one husband, be obedient unto him, love of her children, loss of her children.   

¶ deeds done.  
To be obedient, to be shrew shaken, to bring up her children well, to live in marriage with her husband both at bed, and at board, according to the will of God.   

¶ The thing containing.  
The woman herself.   

¶ The matter, and form.  
The body, and soul, or the woman and the man, are the matter of marriage, the consunction itself is the form of it.   

¶ The efficient cause.  
God himself, the Scripture, let a man be the husband of one wife. They shallbe ii in one flesh. The cause that one woman is married to a several person, and liketh him before all other, and the man her in like wise: is god himself first, that kindleth such affections, next after, their consent, and full agreement doth enseve.   

The end.  
To bring forth children, and to keep h●m sanf, and to avoid sin.   

The effect.  
Children godly instructed, the house well ordered.   

Things appointed for some end.  
To please her husband, to live a good life, to provide things necessary for the furniture of her household.   

The place.  
The house, the chamber of wedlock, the hall, or parlour.   

The time.  
A young woman, or an old. Aristotle saith, it is meet for men to mary at xxxuj for maidens to marry at xviij but then was then, and now is now, all things in this world are ripe before there time. I mean not that honesty itself is so, for I never knew it ripe as yet, but ever raw. But thus ye see the time of marriage was not so hastily looked for, as it is now. In this world a child shall scant be out of his shell, but he shallbe sure to one or other, the which I doubt, whether it may be called a marriage or no: for those that be of ripe years, no man doubteth, but if they can agree both, & have there friends good will (for that aught to be sought for, and also obtained) the marriage is allowed before God.   

Words anne●●d or knit together.  
Marriage is referred to this place, for a wife is so called, because the hath a husband, neither can any woman be called a wife, except she have an husband, therefore she is placed among the words annexed, that is, where one thing is knit to an other, so that the one cannot be, except the other be also.  
Now that we have drawn these words, the preacher, and the wife, after this sort, through out the places, so far as we could: we should compare them together, and se wherein theido agree, and wherein they vary. Let us compare the definitions together, and we shall find somewhat even there, where these words be (desiring to live virtuously) which shall give light for an argument, as thus.  
Whosoever desireth to live virtuously, must marry a wife.  
Every true preacher of god's word, desireth to live virtuously  
Ergo every true preacher must marry a wife  
Now if mine adversary will deny the proposition at large, called the mayor, then can I do no good with it, except I find somewhat in the definition of a wife, which is agreeing to this above rehearsed proposition. I find in this word (wife) that she is married for the increase of children, and to avoid fornication. Then I reason thus for the confirmation of my purpose by the argument called Sorites.  
Whosoever desireth to live virtuously, desireth to avoid fornication.  
Whosoever desireth to avoid fornication, desireth marriage.  
Ergo whosoever desireth to live virtuously, desireth marriage.  
Again the general word of both these definitions giveth light for an argument. Every wife is a woman, every preacher is a man, and nature hath ordained that man and woman may live in marriage, (if they be so disposed) of what degree, condition, or state, so ever they be, nothing in all the scriptures to the coutrarye. Therefore I may reason thus.  
What soever is a man, that same may marry a woman by gods ordinance.  
Every preacher is a man.  
Ergo every preacher may marry a woman by gods ordinance.  
Even as I have done in these places, comparing one to an other, so ye may do in the residue, and where ye see any thing serveth for your purpose, that they agree together on both parties, ye may use the same: if they do not agree in some places, ye may refuse them, or else so mollify the thing that such repugnauncies may not harm your cause at all. As where it is in the words adjoined that a woman is often ●imes overthwart, froward, disobedient careless over her children forasmuch as these be no causes of marriage, they shall not hinder marriage, for a godly man will bear all adversity, and suffer such evil hap, and not therefore eschew marriage, because these incommodities chance in marriage. Now I will entre into the other places which do not severally handle one word, but have respect evermore to an other, and so by the knitting together of two things, or setting the one against the other, the truth of our purpose is espied, and the cause confirmed.   

From the similitude.  
As he is not to be counted a good gardener, or a good orchard keeper that is content with such fruit as he hath already, only cherishing his old trees, and hath no ●are neither to cut down the old, nor yet to fet new graffs: so that man is to be counted no diligent member in the common weal, which being content with the present company of men, hath no mind to increase the number of people.   

From authority.  
If the great workman of things god almighty himself after the flood being reconciled to man made this law (as we read in scriptures) that men should not live single, but increase and be multiplied, that the earth might be filled: and seeing also that Christ himself sense that time hath allowed marriage by a miracle of changing water into wine, which miracle was the first that he did upon earth: and saying Paul also biddeth every man that cannot live chaste, to marry, and that it is better to mary, then to burn in filthy desires, and besides this willeth a bishop should be the husband of one wife: it must needs be that preachers may lawful mary, aswell as any other temporal men.   

From comparison of the less, to the greater.  
It is a shame to see brute beasts obey the law of nature, and man, especially a learned man, and a preacher, like a stout giant to strive with nature, & do contrary to her bidding.   

From the greater to the less.  
If the daughters of Lot doubted nothing at the matter to lie with the● own father when he was drunk, thinking it better to provide for increase ●y filthy lust, than that mankind should decay: shall not than a preacher which should have regard for the increase of mankind, and also a desire to avoid fornication, mary, if he be disposed, or other wise cannot live chaste?   

Of discordantes.  
Ye may reason from the contrary thus, if virginity be a thing given to angels and almost above man's reach, than marriage is a thing propre to man.   

From the Privation.  
If the lack of children be a thing hateful to man, than the having of children is a thing joyful to man.   

From the rela●ion.  
If a Bishop be allowed by the scriptures to be a husband, then is he allowed to have a wife, and by the scriptures we read that he is allowed to be a husband, for Paul saith. Let a Bishop be the husband of one wife, Ergo he is allowed to have a wife.   

¶ From words differing  
That word is called a differing word, whatsoever it is, which is not the same, that an other is. As thus. A preacher is a man. Ergo he is no God. Priests be men as other men be, and that some married men ●re now have well known. Therefore he may marry a woman, if he cannot live chaste, considering there is nothing in all the scriptures to the contrary.  
As I have done for the office of a Prince, and the marriage of a priest, so may I also go thorough out the places with any other matter, that is now in controversy.  
As faith, works, penance, the sacrifice of the mass, baptism, the law, the gospel, sin, slander, rule, preaching, and every other thing that man is bound to know.  
What is faith? faith is a trust and full persuasion, whereby only we d● assure us that our sins be forgiven us, and we accepted as just be●ore god, thorough the merits of Christ.   

Or thus.  
Paul in the Epistle to the hebrews. Faith is a sure confidence of things which are hoped for, and a certainty of things, which are not seen.   

¶ The general word.  
A sure confidence, and a certainty of things.   

¶ The kind.  
A faith, which is occupied about things both corporal, and also spiritual, believing that Christ was both God and man, by whom salvation is attained.   

¶ The difference.  
Things which are hoped for, & the which are not seen.   

¶ The property.  
To believe assuredly, and trust the promises of God.   

¶ The parts of faith.  
The true faith hath no parts. All beit faith is diversely taken in the scripture, for there is an historical faith. As I do believe that William Conqueror was king of England. There is also a justifying faith, wherbi I look assuredly to be saved. There is a faith, when one man faithfully promiseth an other, to do this or that, and will stand to his word. There is also a faith of miracles, whereby the Apostles did cast out devils, and helped oft the diseased persons.   

¶ Things adjoined to faith, and also things annexed to ●ayth.  
Hope, charity, to be good to the poor, to forbear from wicked attemtes, to speak well of all, to eschew excess.   

¶ The thing contemning.  
The mind of man, or the soul of man.   

¶ The efficient cause.  
The word of God, or the holy ghost, stirring the heart of man, and consorting him in the merits of Christ's passion.   

¶ The end of faith.  
Life everlasting, which is given freely to every believer that confesseth in his heart, jesus to be Christ, and assuredly trusteth to be saved by the only merits of his passion.   

¶ Contraries.  
Unbelief, desperation, whereby man falleth from God, to his utter damnation for ever.    

¶ The places of false conclusions, or deceitful reasons.  
Now that I have declared, what an argument is, what the places of invention be, how they serve for the confirmation of any matter, how every thing is made, in his due mode, and figure, and also showed the observation of many things, where by any one, shall both be assured, that his argument is true, (if it be made according to the rules) & also may know that it is false, if it be not made according to the same rules: I will from hence forth, set out the manner, of deceitful arguments, called in Latin, reprehensiones, or fallaces conclusiunculae, even as Aristotle hath set them forth Albeit, there is no argument so deceitful, but they all may easily be avoided, if the rules be marked, that are rehearsed before, concerning the true making of an argument. For according to the old saiyng● Contrariorum eadem est doctrina. That is to say, of contraries, there is one manner of doctrine, for he, which can handsomely set forth a lion. in his shape & portraiture, may judge with reason a Lion evil favouredly painted, and can with little difficulty, show the faults in every part. so in like manner, if one can make an argument, according to the rules above rehearsed, in his due form and mode, he can tell also, when an argument is other wise made then the rules can bear  
To some men, these places of craft that follow, may seem strange, and yet even in weighty matters, the wicked have derived their subtle defences, from these deceitful corners. Therefore, because such places, may the rather be avoided, and better known, I will both set them forth at large, and also teach aswell as I am able, how to confute them. And first to confute, is nothing else but to judge false packing, and to unlose by reason, things knit together by craft. Therefore the Logician, if he will do his part, must not only fence himself, for confirmation of his own cause, but must also overthrow, the assertion of other, and also by reason, prove their sayings to be false, which by deceit, would inveigle the weak.  

¶ The manner of confutation two ways considered.  
For the first, either we purpose by disputation, to answer fully to the matter, or else secondly (if power want to compass that) we seek some other means, to satisfy the man, and that three manner of ways, either by making the objection seem less than it is, or by bringing some other example against it, or else by seeking some means, to go from the matter.  
We make the argument appear slender, when we receive it laughyngly, and declare by words, even at the first, that it is nothing to the purpose, and so abash the opponent.  
Again, we turn another argument in our adversaries neck, when we bring another example against him. Or else when we charge him, with a like fault, and lay some greater matter in his dish. Lastly, we shift away, from the violence of our adversary, by making some digression, or giving occasion of some other talk, whereby the adversary, either is driven to forget his argument, or else being blinded with to much matter, is forced either to go no further, or else to think himself content. In all which manner of confutation, when we purpose to put a man to silence, I would wish great moderation to be used, and as little advantage taken by such means, as may be possible. For although it be a poor help (as in deed it is none other) yet many a man loseth his estimation, by much using of such fashions. It is a world to see the subtle brain, of many bragging bodies which with bold countenance, bear an outward shadow of wisdom, having only the masking visage, & lacking the natural face. They will stand stoutly in maintenance of an untruth, and with countenance seem to show it: yea, and by their bold bearing it out almost persuade the hearers, that they only have the true part, and that other, are altogether deceived. They will say, that no wise man, would once think that for shame, which their adversary, uttereth without all shame, yea, they will say, he speaketh too too babishly, and so dash him out of countenance, that he shall not well know what to say, and last of all, they will trifle and toy merely, and so with impudent laughyng● make the other past speaking. I will not put any in this memento, as though they ware guilty: but their own doings, shall put in themselves, on God's name, for me. notwithstanding, I would gladly wish (as I said before) that there ware a measure used, and then such doings, might better be borne.  
We answer to the matter, ij. ways, either generally, or particularly. A general answer is made three ways. First, when the fault is in the matter, that is to say, in the words of either proposition, when they signify diverse things, or be diversly applied, to show it plainly: & either deny it a● foolish, or else dissolve it, as doubtful. As thus, the libertives reason.  
What soever is natural, that same is not evil.  
To sin is a thing natural.  
Ergo to sin is not evil.  
The several or second proposition is not true. And therefore the argument i● false, in the matter itself. For God did create the nature of man, pure and clean, and said, that all was good, which he made, at the first creation. Neither was it God's will, that man should alter his commandment, and serve from the path, of his appointed laws, but rather the suggestion of the devil, and the weakness of our flesh, brought man to hell, death and damnation.  
Again, when the fault appeareth in the form, and manner of making an argument, we must declare that it is not framed● according to the rules, which require that every argument, should both be in mode and figure, as I have before sufficiently declared. As thus.  
All Magistrates do reuenge●  
Every bold hardy man doth revenge  
Ergo every bold hardy man, is a Magistrate.  
This argument, being made in the second figure, is of no force, considering it is in no mode, of the same figure. For in this figure, all the propositions, do not affirm altogether, but one of them ever doth deny, as it appeareth plainly, to him that list to se.  
Thirdly, when the fault is both in the matter, & in the manner of making, we must refuse the argument, & show the faults plainly. As thus.  
Every slaughter, is sin.  
Every adultery is sin.  
Ergo every adultery is slaughter  
First the fault is, that slaughter is not well defined. For in war time, it is lawful to kill, and every man may stand in his own defence, against violent robbers, and rather kill then be killed. Thirdly, the argument is in no mode● although it be in the second figure  
The particular avoiding of an argument, is .v. ways used, either by declaring in what deceipfull subtlety, it is contained, or from which of the places, it is wrongfully derived, or to show the wrong framing, in every mode and figure, or to make an argument, with a like reason, and so to avoid the cause, or last of all, to use the strange deceitful places, which shallbe last rehearsed.  
And now will I tell particularly, every deceitful argument, that when such a subtle argument shallbe used, either in disputation, or private talk: any one may espy the fault out of hand and show in which of these captious reasons, the subtlety resteth.  
And first, a false conclusion, is a deceit used in an argument, whereby one under the colour of truth, goeth about, to inveigle the hearer, or thus, a false conclusion is an argument, appearing to the ignorant, as though it were true, and yet is nothing true at all. Aristotle doth divide them into two parts. Some be called deceitful arguments, when a doubtful word is used, or the kind of speech is strange, and may be taken two ways, and that the fault is rather in the kind and manner of speaking, then in the matter or very thing itself. Therefore those that be good grammarians, and know the properties of words, and are skilful in the tongues, can gaily well solute such errors as be made by the mistaking of words, or by false understanding of phrases, whereof in very dead many heresies, and much false doctrine have had there first beginning. There be again some crafty subtleties which are not in the word, but rather spring either of the evil knitting together of the propositions, or else of the confusion of things, that is to say, when one thing is falsely appointed for an other, as in this proposition, a man may easily espy false packing which is in the second figure.  
Fes 
No sin doth beget a man.  ti 
Concupiscence doth beget a man  no. 
Ergo concupiscence is no sin   
The second proposition although it may deceive a man, that is not ware, yet is it altogether false, because nature which is a thing ordained of god, doth beget man, not the wicked impotency or rather the destruction of nature, which afterward followed. Here it is plain that a mingle mangle is made of things, when generation which should be attributed to nature, is referred to the concupiscence, because it is in nature, and next adjoining unto it.  
Now for the number and dividing of these deceitful arguments, it is to understand, that there be xiij whereof six are called subtleties in the word, or manner of speaking, and the other vij are called subtleties, without the word, when things be confounded, and one taken for an other.   

¶ Deceitpfull arguments.  
In the word are these following.  

1. The doubtfulness of a word.  
2. The double meaning of a sentence●  
3. The joining of words that should be parted.  
4. The parting of words that should be joined.  
5. The manner of speech.  
6. The Accen●e.   
ALl these names be comprehended under this one word (doubtful) notwithstanding Aristotle setteth forth diverse ways, that he may show the difference of these doubtful things. For some arguments have the doubt in a word signifying diversly, some in the property o● the phrase, some in the joining together of words, and some other in the dividing, and displacing of the same, as it shall appear more plainly in the handling of these places severally. Homonumia, which may be called in english, the doubtfulness of one word, when it signifieth diversly, is a manner of subtlety, when the deceit is in a word that hath more significations than one. And the reason is, that such arguments are not good, because there are four terms in the two propositions, for the double repeat, signifieth one thing in the first proposition, and an other thing in the second proposition. Therefore nothing is proved in the conclusion, when such doubtful words are placed in a proposition. And therefore when such a subtlety is espied, a man may deny the cō●equente, giving this reason that it is a subtlety drawn from ●his place of doubtfulness.   

¶ An example.  
Da 
Every arm is a substance made of flesh, blood, bones, sinews, and veins.  ●i 
God the father hath an arm.  i. 
Ergo God the Father is one that hath a substance of flesh blood, bones, sinews, and veins.   
I answer: This knitting is not good, and therefore I deny the whole. The reason is, because it is a subtlety of a doubtful word●, for in the first proposition, the arm is considered to be such a one, as a man hath, but in the second Proposition it is not so meant, for ●t signifieth by a Metaphor the power, strength, or might of God.   

¶ An other example.  
Fe● 
There is none evil in the City, saith the Prophet, which the Lord hath not done,  si- 
There be many sins and horrible evils in the City:  o. 
Ergo God is the author of sin.   
I deny the consequent. Because their is doubtfulness in this word evil: for in the first Proposition evil doth signify, the evil of punishment, as we call commonly all calamity, evil, and all punishment evil, which are not sin: & in the second Proposition, evil doth signify offence, & all naughtiness that is committed. Therefore the second Proposition is not agreeing with the first, and therefore the argument is not good.   

¶ The second subtlety, called Ambiguitas.  
The ambiguity, is, when the construction bringeth error, having diverse understandings in it, as when the words be placed doubtfully, as thus. Croesus' halim penetrans magnam pervertet opum vim. Croesus' going over the flood halim, shall overthrow a great empire. Here is not mentioned, whether he shall overthrow his own, or an other man's. By the which Oracle in deed, he being deceived, lost his own kingdom, when he thought to subdue his enemies, and bring them under subjection. Therefore when sentences be spoken doubtfully, that they may be construed two manner of ways, they are referred to this place. Notwithstanding the use of this place is very rare, and seldom happeneth, therefore I willbe the shorter, and only show two versies in Latin which by cause they be very prettier and may be ij ways taken, I think it not amiss to set them forth here.  
Laus tua, non tua fraus, virtus, non copia rerum,  
Scandere te fecit, hoc decus eximium.  
In English thus:  
Worthiness, not wiliness, godliness, not goods, brought the hereunto,  
Richesse great, and mu●● authority, with wordly honour to come to.  
These verses being red backward either in English or in Latin, beginning at the last word, have a clea●e contrary understanding, as thus.  
To come to honour wordly, with authority much, and gre●t richesses,  
Hereunto, brought thee, goods, not godliness, wiliness, not worthiness.  
These two verses were written to the Pope, as worthy such a one, and set upon Pasquillus in Rome, even for very love, as I take it: not of thee Pope, but of God's holy word.   

¶ The third dece●pteful argument.  
COniunctio distrahendorum ● a joining together of those things which should be dissevered, and either to be applied to the things that go before, or to the things that follow after.  
Da- 
Whosoever knoweth letters, now hath learned them,  ri- 
A Grammarian knoweth letters  i● 
Er●o a Grammarian now hath learned them.   
Here this adverb (now) if it had been referred to the first point which is as ye see in this word (letters) & the point afterward made, when this word (now) had been put to it, all had been well: but because the word (now) is other wise placed, and referred to the next sentence, (which is now hath learned them) it is a false Argument, because this word (now) should be referred to the first point, as thus.  
Whosoever knoweth letters now, hath learned them,  
A Grammarian knoweth letters now  
Ergo a Grammarian hath learned them.  
And so this Argument is good being thus placed but though this subtlety seem childishe● yet old babes have used it, even in the weightiest cause of our redemption, and thought therein to foil the godly, reasoning in jest after this sort, & yet meaning good earnest.  
Faith, without works, doth justify  
Faith, without works, is a dead faith:  
Ergo a dead faith doth justify.  
Here, one may see a false packing, for in the first Proposition, faith is several, and referred to the last word of the same Proposition, which is (doth justify) in the second Proposition faith is referred to the two words (without works.) so that the same faith is not meant in the second Proposition, that is meant in the first, and the reason is, that words are joined together, which should not be so joined, for now there are four terms, whereas by the rules of Logic, there should be but three, (faith) is one, (doth justify) is the second, (faith without works) is the third, (a dead faith) is the fourth term. And the reason that there be four is, that faith is first severally considered, which never wanteth works following her, as fruit declaring what the tree is, not that the fruit doth purchase justification, but rather giveth a token that by faith itself, where of such works do spring, justification is attained. In the second Proposition, there is mentioned a dead faith, a faith without works, which faith the devil himself hath, where as if the Argument ware true, there should be none other faith considered in the second Proposition, than was rehearsed, and mentioned in the first Proposition. I have laboured the rather at large, to make this matter more plain to the ignorant, not that it so much needed, for the evasion is easy of itself, and this Argument is of no greater weight, than the other above rehearsed were.   

¶ Of parting words that should be joined together.  
DIsiunctio coniunctorum, is a dividing of things which should be joined together, & a making of words several, or else a dissevering of two parts, which should be but one. for like as by the other place, words are joined together which should be divided, so now by this place, that thing is divided, which should be all one.  
The Law and the Gospel are two diverse things.  
The word of God is the Law and the Gospel.  
Ergo, the word of God is two diverse things.  
In this Argument (the word of God) being a whole thing of itself, is divided, and where respect should be had to the two parts ioy●tely considered together, which are nothing else but the whole: the parts are severally understanded, and referred to the whole, not both together as they should be, but severally with their properties, as they should not be. For the word of God is not the Law only, or the Gospel only, although it stand of these two, but is the Law and the Gospel both joined together: for where as a man is made of body and soul, the body is not man, nor yet the soul neither, and yet they both joined together, make up a perfect man.   

¶ An other example.  
The articles of our faith, are twelve in number,  
To believe in God the Father, and in jesus Christ his only son, are the articles of our faith.  
Ergo to believe in God the Father, and in jesus Christ his only son, are twelve in number.  
This Argument is to be denied, because the doubtfulness riseth of the division, for, to believe in God the Father, & in jesus Christ his only son, are the Articles of our faith, and yet they two are not the whole twelve in number. Therefore they two being of the twelve are wrongly placed if they be divided into twelve again there be four ends, or terms. for in the first Proposition, this part (the articles of our faith) comprehend the twelve in number, but in the second Proposition this part (to believe in God and in jesus Christ) do not comprehend all the articles, but two only, therefore it is an evil Argument.  
This kind of Argument is used often times of those, which by reporting an other man's labour, and his well doing, deprave the same, either by adding, or diminishing the same, as by taking a piece of a sentence out of some Doctor, & applying it for there purpose, or by adding more than they find, as both divines & layers often times full ungodly have done, not regarding the whole course, & order of the thing, but taking out patches and pieces to serve their ungodly purposes, which in deed, made nothing for them, neither they themselves do understand, what they bring, when they do not mark the whole course of the matter. The romish, reason thus.  
If thou wilt enter to heaven, keep the commandments:  
Therefore keeping the commandments, purchaseth heaven.  
This Argument is false by leaving the best out, for the doctrine of the gospel must first be had, our faith must be fastened, and Christ must sanctify our doings, before they can be good. Neither is any thing good because we do it, but because it pleaseth god so to accept it. It is true, he that doth well, shall have well, but who is he? even the same body, which first believeth in Christ, & apprehendeth mercy by faith, whose works God accepteth for good, other wise he shall never come where God is. Therefore espy the subtleties of the vugodlie, and fly there fraud.   

¶ The fift place.  
FIgura dictionis ● called otherwise in good Latin Forma orationis, the manner of the speech, is when the phrase breedeth error, and the property of the tongue not well known, engendereth ambiguity, as in the eight Chapter of Math. When Christ bade those which were healed of the leprosy: Go & show themselves to the Priest, our forefathers applied this saying to confession, thinking that every one was bond in conscience under pain of damnation, to confess his sins to the priest every year ones, whereas Christ's meaning was nothing so, & therefore they ware much deceived in the manner of speaking. This order was in the old law as we may read in Leviticus, that lepers came not into the town, but if any happened to be whole, and amended, he was first commanded to show himself to the priest, that the curate seeing his body clean, might be a witness to the parish of his amendment, and so the man after that, might the rather be suffered to go abroad, and be in company with other men.  
But even as they have fondly wrested this place to confession, even so might light women, and evil disposed wives, abuse their husbands fondly, expounding saint Paul's words in the vij of the first, to the Corinthians, where he saith. The wife is bond to the law, as long as her husband liveth, but if her husband sleep, she is at liberty to marry with whom she will. God forbid, women should take this advantage of their husbands sleeping, as the Romish folk have abused all men waking. sleep in this text, signifieth nothing but death, and yet, might women aswell abuse this text, as other men have abused Christ's saying, for the maintenance of confession. Therefore the property of every speech, and the manner of speaking aught always to be observed: we say in English some time, to some one with whom we are offended, Ah sirrah ye are an honest man indeed, and yet we do not mean that he is honest indeed, but think rather that he is a naughty fellow. So likewise, Christ when he should be taken of the jews said to his Apostles, Dormite & requiescite, sleep one sirs, and take your rest, not that he would they should so do, but to their rebuke and shame he spoke it, because they were careless, and took there rest. So Paul rebuking the Corinthians, because they made heathen men their judges, and pleaded there causes under them, said, if there be no body among you to hear your own causes, make vile persons and abjects, to be judges amongst you. Not that he would it should so be, but to their shame, he spoke it, as he saith himself. Also unto this place may be referred the kind of phrase proper to every tongue. As where it is in the gospel. Non exibit, donec ultimum quadrantem soluerit, he shall not go out, until he hath paid the las●e farthing, this sentence doth not signify a condition, but it signifieth that he he shall never come out at al. Therefore those that be ignorant in the tongues are easily deceived: Likewise in matthew we read. Qui dixerit verbum adversus spiritum sanctum non remittetur ei, neque in hoc seculo neque in ●uturo. He that shall speak a word against the holy ghost shall not be forgiven neither in this world, nor yet in the world to come, that is to say, he shall never be forgiven. Although the papists refer this place to purgatory, most vainly and unlearnedly. The accent causeth ambiguity, by reason of the affinity in words, as when one hath lost all the money in his purse, and for lack of coin is fain to hold the candle: for an other man when he seeth the same body do his duty with his cap of, to his better, to say merely by the way of a suit to the worthiest person: I pray you sir let this good fellow be covered, he is bare, where as bare signifieth a bare purse: aswell as a bare head, and is properly so said. Again and moste aptly this subtlety taketh place, when sentences be evil pointed, and the sense thereby depraved, as some that maintain justification by works, have strangely abused a text of saint Augustine, making the point plain, whereas it should be an interrogative, and hath been of late years so found in an old written hand. The sentence is this. Qui fecit te sine te, non potest servare te, sine te? he that made the without thee, can not he save thee, without thee? whereas, making it a plain point in latin, it hath a clean contrary understanding, and maketh much for the maintenance of false religion. for it is asmuch, as who should say: he that made thee, without thee, cannot save thee, without the. Moreover, words spoken by imitation, that is to say, when one rehearseth that which an other man saith, must diligently be observed. Paul writing to the Colossians showeth the naughtiness of some men that will keep simple folk in subjection with there traditions, and trouble the consciences of the weak, saying, do not touch, do not taste, do not handle meat, which Paul reciteth, in rebuke to the hypocrites & obstinate Pharisees, and yet some notwithstanding fond have misconstrued th● same, persuading themselves that Paul gave such commandment. Therefore those things which ar● spoken by imitation following an other man's speech, must otherwise be understanded, than these words which a man speaketh of himself, and giveth instruction certainly thereby. Thus far have I handled these subtle arguments, which are in the words, now will I rehearse all such false conclusions as are in the matter. And first this is to be noted, that the faults of every argument are either in the wrong defining, and not well se●tyng forth the nature of any thing, or else in not aptly dividing, or lastly not advisedly weighing the causes of things, but heaping them up with out order or reason. The other subtleties above rehearsed may either be avoided by well marking the true definition, or else having respect to the division, by declaring severally how large every word may be taken, and what error may rise by the false understanding of some one word: The subtleties following contain such absurdities, which rise not upon the nature of some one word, but take their ground of the matter and thing itself.   

¶ There be vii in number.  

●. From the accident.  
●. From that, which is partly and after a sort so, to be full and wholly so.  
3. The mistaking of sentences gainsaying.  
4. The consequent.  
5. The cause that is not, put for the cause.  
6. The cuckoos song● or by things doubtfully to prove thygnes that are as doubtful.  
7. Many questions asked for one thing.    

¶ The first deceit.  
FAllacia accidentis, the deceit fullness of the accident, is when diverse things are joined together, in one subject, that is to say, when one, and the same thing, is referred both to the substance, and also to the accident, or else, when the accidents (which are not of the very substance of man, but may be away, the man living still,) are not well joined together, or else, when we make our argument ab eventis, that is to say, by that thing, which happeneth to a man casually, and pronounce the same, to be the very proper cause, why, and wherefore, this or that is so. Of the first, this may be an example.  
That same which flesh is, bread is not.  
Flesh is food,  
Therefore bread is none.  
In the first proposition, I understand the substance of flesh, and in the second proposition, I mean the accident or property, which is in them both, and therefore mine argument is not lawful. because I referred, both the substance and the accident, to one, and to the same subject. For although flesh and bread, be not all one in substance, because flesh is one thing, and bread is another, and either of them hath their proper being, & distinct substance: yet they agree both in their accident, that is to say, in food, to serve for the sustenance of man.  
No sin must be committed,  
Wicked men, even when they execute justice, do sin.  
Therefore, wicked men must do no justice, being set in authority.  
The first proposition is true, and the second also, for what soever is not of faith, the same is sin. Neither can any thing be well, how soever it seemeth in our eyes, except our faith be first fastened upon the free mercy of Christ. Therefore the jews, how soever ●he● live, keeping order, observing laws, forbearing riot, yet all their doings, are nothing but sin, whatsoever they do, seem it never so honest, or Godly, to the sight of man. And yet this argument is not truly lapte up. For in the first proposition, (sin) is not considered by himself, and therefore it is truly said, that no sin must be committed. In the second proposition, where execution of justice, is reported to be sin, it is not so of itself, but because the person is evil himself, which executeth the Law, and therefore the offence cometh casually, and as the Logicians say, per accidens, where as sin before was considered, according to the substance. And therefore, though the officer being nought, offendeth when he ministereth justice, (because faith maketh all works good) yet must he do justice, because it is so commanded, even as he must assuredly believe, that jesus is the Messiah, and the promised saviour sent of God. And though the doing be evil to him, yet it is good to other.  
Again, thus reason some.  
By faith we are justified.  
Faith is a work.  
Ergo by works we are justified.  
This proposition is false, considering that faith, in the first proposition, is the same, through which we are justified, not by the worthiness of our believing, but through the free mercy of Christ, the which we apprehend thorough faith. And therefore we must in this saying consider, that faith is referred by relation to Christ, through whom only, all mercy is attained, and that grace cometh, not because faith is a work, but because mercy goth before, and receiveth freely all believers, without worthiness either of believing or else of doing any other work. Therefore in the first proposition, faith being not so taken, as it is in the second, we may say well, it springeth from this deceitful place, & is therefore not lawful   

¶ Another argument.  
This man is a witty fellow,  
This same man is lame,  
Ergo this same man hath a lame wit.  
This is evident false, because the accidents of the body, are referred to the substance of the mind, as by this last argument, ye may see that lameness, which is of the body, is attributed to the mind, and the reason is vain.  
The third deceit is, when many things are referred to one subject, we make that to be the very next and chief cause, which is a casual thing, and cometh by hap unto any body as thus.  
David is a blessed man.  
David is an adulterer.  
Ergo adulterers are blessed men  
I deny the consequence, because it is a deceitful argument, by that, which is the accident. For when many things chance to one man, we must see what are the very causes of that thing which we attribute to the subject. David is a blessed man. And wherefore? Not because he was an adulterer, for that happened to him casually, but because he was chosen of God, and had the fear of God before his eyes, and although this happened by the instinct of the devil, yet he called for grace, repented sore, and trusted in God's mercy, as the Psalms plentifully be are witness, and this was the cause, why ●e was blessed.  
Ye must observe, that in this deceitful argument, although many things, are referred to one subject, yet are they not after one sort, comprehended in the same subject, but diversly considered, as when I join accidents, both of body, and mind together, as thus.  
This fellow is a singing man,  
This fellow is blind.  
Ergo he is a blind singing man.  
Here ye may see the accidents of the mind and body, joined together, which should not be so.   

¶ The anabaptists reason thus.  
That which is nothing, deserveth no punishment.  
Sin is nothing.  
Ergo sin deserveth no punishment.  
In the first proposition, that thing is meant, which is not at all, but is clean gone from nature, or else never was with in the nature of things. In the second proposition, (sin) is to be reported to be nothing, because itself being nothing worth, spoileth a man of his other virtues, and so overthroweth nature, asmuch as it can. When we see a man blind, we judge that he hath lost his sight, herein we esteem the sight, to be a gift given of God, and blindness to be the taker away of that, which was given of God. In like case, sin is the destruction of that, which was, being of itself nothing. And so in this case, to do well, is a thing, the want whereof, is nothing, the which, is sin.   

¶ Another.  
Whatsoever increaseth sin is not to be taught.  
The Law of Moses encrea●seth sin.  
Ergo the Law is not to be taught.  
I answer, the law increaseth not sin, by the own nature, but casually. For when man himself, is corrupted with vice, than the Law maketh his sin appear heinous, and increaseth the knowledge of sin in him. So that i● the first proposition, the nature of increasing sin, is considered: in the second proposition, the casual happening is rehearsed when things are evil not of themselves, but made evil through the wickedness of the offendor. All such arguments, must be avoided by distinction, that is, ye must declare the double meaning in the two propositions, & then ye have soluted the subtility   

¶ The second.  
FRom that, which is partly and after a sort so, to be full, and wholly so, and by colour of the part, to give judgement of the whole.  
Wine is evil for those, that be sick of an ague.  
Ergo wine is all together evil.  
Red wine bindeth.  
Ergo all wine bindeth.  
This argument is from the particular, to the universal, the which is easy to be avoided. Therefore errors do often chance, when we comprehend the whole, speaking only of the part, or when we make the sign, to be the very self thing, and although ye have had childish examples before, only to make the matter plain, ye shall see that in weighty matters, this deceitful argument hath been used.  
We hear many now a days cry out and say, the lawyers are nought, they mean no truth, but only seek for lucre, where as no man I think condemneth all lawyers, although he have just cause to accuse some wretched lawyers. Some say again that priests have left fornication gaily wel● and are never suspected now a days for adultery being yoked in lawful marriage: But some spare not to say again, that they have made an exchauge, leaving up whoredom, and following covetousness, the devil and all: marry God forbid that all priests should so do. And in deed if any one should so reason, I would reckon his argument to be comprehended within the compass of this false conclusion. Thus reason the anabaptists.  
Unrighteousness is altogether reproved.  
In every kingdom is much unrighteousness used.  
Ergo every kingdom is altogether reproved.  
By this means we shall have no kingdom, no law, no political order, no trade, no discipline, no judgement for offenders. But this argument is to be rejected, because it is derived from the part, to the whole. For although many things be amiss in a political body, yet the whole therefore must not be dissolved, the laws must not be abrogated, nor yet good order abandoned: for the chief thing that is in every empire is a thing, ordained of God, and a righteous thing, as for an example. Political order, laws, statutes, judgement, execution, and punishing offenders, and therefore they reason amiss, that say there is an abuse in a political order, therefore we shall have no order at all in any common weal, & again ye shall perceive, that there is more in the conclusion, than was rehearsed in the two former propositions. Therefore we ought diligently to note the circumstance of the thing, if we will avoid this subtlety, and when a thing is spoken in part, we must not thereby judge the whole: or measure the universal, by that which is comprehended under the general.  
A man may forsake an adulterous wife.  
Ergo he may forsake his wife.  
This is from the inferior to the universal, which is not well gathered, as it standeth here: for although a man may forsake his wife, being nought of her body, yet may he not forsake an honest woman, when it liketh him to change. for this word (wife) in the first proposition, is hedged with her circumstance, that is to say, adultery, which causeth divorcement. Neither is this argument good, the King may put to death every evil man, Ergo the king may put to death every man. Again if we will reason negatively, as we did before affirmatively, we shall frame our argument amiss. As thus.  
No wife should be put away.  
Ergo neither a naughty wife should be put away.   

¶ Again.  
No wine is evil  
Ergo no mingled wine is evil.  
This is from the universal, to that which is inferior, and as ye would say hedged with his circumstance, & compassed with that, which before, was neither in wife, nor yet in wine. For a wife so long as she keepeth herself to her husband only, she is no adulteress. Wine that drinketh of itself, is not mingled, and therefore the argument is not good because that thing is in the less, or inferior, which was not in the general.  
There is a figure in Rhetoric, called Hyperbole, that is to say, when a thing is spoken beyond measure uncrediblie, and yet is not so largely meant. As when I will praise a man for his strength, I will say, he passeth Hercules in manhood, meaning that he excelleth in manhood and valiantness. If we know one that runneth well, either dog, man, or horse, we use to say, he is as swift as a swallow, he flieth like an arrow out of a bow, meaning only that he is exceeding swift. Therefore we must diligently take heed, when such speeches are used, that we take not them as they be spoken, but as they are meant, neither take the whole for the part, when the whole is expressed in words, and the part meant in understanding. jeremy saith. 
Scio domine quod non est hominis via eius.  
I know Lord that man hath not his way.  
Therefore man hath no fire will at all, no advise, no choice, to deliberate either this way, or that way.  This consequent is not good, for jeremias saying, must be understand exclusively. The way of man, that is to say, the calling of man, is not only ruled or led by the power, strength, or force of man, neither can he do any thing of himself alone, without the help or grace of god. Sennacherib that wicked king, thought by his own power and wisdom, to win his spurs against jerusalem, but he trusted so much to himself, & his own wisdom, that he lost his boots & all, at length. The chief and principal cause of all godly actions, proceed from God, but so not withstanding do they proceed, that man hath choice, will, and liberty, to do what him liketh, being assisted with the grace of God. As Christ praiseth the labourer and saith. To him that hath, shallbe given. And Chrisostome saith very well. God draweth unto him, but he draweth the willing. For god will have our good will, to be joined with his calling. Therefore Plato in his four book where he framed his common weal, doth well mitigate this Hiperbola, in this sentence which seemeth credible (God doth all things, & orders every action) saying, I do well allow this sentence, that God ruleth all things, but so not withstanding I allow it, if it be well understand. For it ware best to ground it so, that man's will, labour, and diligence, must be joined thereunto, as we see in sailing upon the sea, Shipmen call to God for help, and God will help them, but so not withstanding, if they help themselves. According whereunto there is in the fables of Esope a tale of one, whose cart stood fast in the mire, which man seeing his cart laid fast, cried to Hercules for help, and prayed that he might come from heaven: answer was made, that he should first help himself, & then call upon Hercules, or else his cart were like to stick fast stil.   

¶ An other argument.  
The church doth not err.  
The Phariseis are the church.  
Ergo the Phariseis do not err.  
The deceit is, from the particular to the universal. As who should say, some do not err in the church, Ergo no body doth err at all, that be of the church: which is false, for the church is as well of the evil as of the good. The good men that are trained in the truth of God, and taught the true love of God, by oft reading and following his word, have the true light & err not: Other that be slouhtfull, careless, drowned in ambition, and all wordly lust, both can err, and do err, from time to time. Therefore where as I say, the church doth not err, it is called Synecdoche, that is to say, when the part is used for the whole.   

another argument made by the anabaptists.  
To the just, there is no law set.  
The riotous son after his conversion, is just.  
Ergo unto him there is no law set.  
This argument is from the part to the whole: he is delivered from the law, for somuch as pertaineth to his condemnation, but he is not free for so much as belongeth to the due obedience, which he oweth unto God: for this order standeth for ever most steadfastly, that every creature be obedient to God the creator. Again for as much as in every just man that is converted from his evil ways there remaineth a wicked inclination, the same must always be bride led and kept in, even with the terror of the law, as though it ware with a mouserolle.   

¶ The sign is often times turned into the thing itself, as I rehearsed before.  
This is the picture of saint George  
Ergo it is saint George himself.  
This argument men have used, when they have seen a man painted in a wall, or graven in a stone, as thus. This is saint Christopher, this is saint Loy. This is the picture of Christ, Ergo it is Christ. This is an Image of our Lady, Ergo it is our Lady, and here she will work wonders. more than in an other place, as she did at walsingham, at Boston, at Lincoln, at Ipswiche, and I cannot tell where, when priests gathered money, & poor folks ware mocked. here, ye must deny the consequent, because the sign is not the thing signified, neither is god bound to any place, to the which he hath not bound himself by his word, nor yet and saint neither. This rule overthroweth all manner of Idols which have been in all ages from time to time. In this kind of subtlety, ye must diligently observe four circumstances, the parson, the time, the place, and the manner of comparing things together, all which are false & deceipteful reasons.   

The p●rson.  
A noble man of the parliament house may hunt in the kings parks by authority.  
Ergo every man ma●e.   

The time.  
It is not lawful to walk in the streets of London after the watch is set.  
Ergo it is not lawful to walk in London at all.   

The place.  
It is not lawful to give a blow within the court gates,  
Ergo it is not lawful at all in mine own defence.   

The manner of comparing.  
It is an Image of a man,  
Ergo it is a man.  
Compare these two together, & mark the accident adjoined to a man, and ye shall perceive that it taketh away all substance, and leaveth only the shadow: for this word painted, restraineth the other & compasseth him with in his bounds, so that a painted man can no more be called a man, than an adulterous wife can be called a wife: for so long is a woman called a wife, as she keepeth herself within the bounds of matrimony, other wise she is no wife, although men use to call them wives.   

The iii deceit.  
SEcundum non causam, ut causam, that is, when a cause that ●s not able to prove the mat●er, is brought in as thought it ware of force and strength, but the ground being considered, the fault is easily espied.  
drunkenness is evil,  
Ergo wine is nought.  
Wine is not to be reproved altogether, although some abuse the same, for it is a good thing ordained of God for the sustenance of man.   

another argument.  
Some young men, when they come other lands, fall to unthriftiness.  
Ergo riches are not good.  
In all such arguments, wherein good things are reproved, because evil bodies abuse the same, the evil will and the naughty inclination of the man which abuseth such things is to be rebuked: and therefore when it is otherwise, it may be said, that a cause which is not, is put for a cause. As some abuse Paul's meaning, when they go about to deprave philosophy.  
Paul warneth that we should not be deceived by philosophy.  
Ergo Philosophy is nought, say some.  
The argument doth not follow, for a good thing may be much abused, and yet the thing itself may not be altogether rejected as nought: therefore Paul doth not condemn demonstrations and principles which are assured truths, taught by the sciences, as in arithmetic four and four make eight In philosophy. The whole is greater than the part, do as thou wouldest be done unto, but he reproveth the abuse of sciences, when there is made a mingle mangle of them, and one confounded with an other, as some have said that philosophy will teach a christian, asmuch for his profession, as all the Prophets and the whole Bible besides will do: this made Paul bid men take heed, that they be not deceived by philosophy.  
Now a days they will say. I cannot tell, here is is much preaching, much teaching of gods word, but I see few followers of it, it was a better world when we had not half so many preachers, heresies were never more ripe, naughtiness never more abounded, therefore give us the old learning again, and take you the new.  
This reason is not worthy a straw, The wickedness of the Preachers cometh not of their learning, but of their vicious natures, and naughty desires: for out of one and the same flower the Bee sucketh honey, and the spider draweth poison. By these and such other like examples, ye may easily espy, wherefore the Argument is not good, if ye mark whether the true cause be in the former Proposition, or some counterfeit reason, which seemeth to prove, and yet in died doth not prove the matter at al. for if I reason thus.  
johson and Robson looked through an hedge, & the one saw the other:  
Ergo they two are both nigh of kindred:  
What man seeth not, that doth see any jot at all, that this gear hangeth together like a broken pot sheerd, and that the Antecedent doth nothing at all, prove the Consequent: and yet the other Arguments above rehearsed (if they be narrowly marked,) are as foolish, & as worthy to be laughed at, as is this foolish fond reason, and madly invented argument.   

¶ An other Argument.  
Fear not the signs of the Element:  
Ergo they signify none evil to come.  
The Consequent is false, for Christ doth forbid his Disciples, to fear the signs, not by cause they signify none evil to come, but by cause that where as they signify harm, & punishemen● to the world, & wicked persons: yet he willbe a present succour to his church, and never leave it comfortless. As when the godly hear this (fear not death) it doth not follow, but that death is an horrible thing, and much repugnant to man's nature. This deceitful Argument is much used in this our life, and made a buckler for diverse matters. As when I am loath to be of a quest, or that any such business should trouble me, being sent for, I feign myself sick, because I would not gladly come. Or when one that is rich should help a poor man, to say: God help you sir. I have a great charge myself, I can not do for you. Or when a bishop should be desired to teach or preach, to say: he is sick. Or when a lawyer being desired to help a poor man, and proffered there upon, a little money, even so much as the poor man can not well spare, and yet not half so much as the lawyer would have: straight to say, I am sorry, I can not do for you, if I were not called upon otherwise by diverse men, I would not fa●l to do you good. This is as they say in English, better a bad excuse, than none at all, in Latin it is called, non causa pro causa posita. And the using of such excuses among the Rhetoricians, is called, translatio, that is to say, a shifting, or putting of the fault from one, to an other. As we read that Demades used a wonderful good shift, when it was laidesore to his charge that he had written a very naughty decree and unhonest, for the obtaining of the peace at Alexander's hand: He answered that the same Decree was not written with his own writing pen, but with Alexander's warring spear, which is asmuch to say, fear did drive him to take such, and such conditions of peace. We read a notable History of a young child in Rome, called Papirius, which because both it is pleasant, & much to be wondered at, and also serveth for this purpose right aptly, I think it meet to be rehearsed in this place. This Papirius being a young lad of ten or twelve years old, and son to one of the Senators in Rome, which were then, as noble men be now in England, lords of the Counsel, went every day with his father to the parliament house, and hard from time to time all matters that were debated there. His father evermore charged him that he should not utter any thing, which he hard, to any body living. It happened afterward that upon urgent causes & weighty affairs, the Counsel did sit much longer than they were wont, and continued so, for the space of a seven-night. Every body marveled what this matter should be. This boy Papirius knew all. His mother being most of all desirous to know what it should be, when she could not attain the knowledge thereof by her husband, she called the boy to confession, & having the instrument of absolution by her, that is, a very good birchen rod, charged her son truly to tell her every whit that was debated in the Parliament house, or else he should smart for it surely: for, what with the secretness of the thing, and what with the silence of her son, she was wonderful with child, till she had got some what of the boy. The boy himself, first remembering his father's commandment, and considering how he should be paid at his hand, if he told all things in died as they were: and again of the other side, seeing present pain before him, the rod at hand, his mother with child till she were somewhat satisfied, thought it better, prettily & by the way to mock his mother, and so to stop her mouth with some forged tale: then falsely to bewray his father, his friends, and all his country. and therefore thus he began craftily to shape his tale: Mother if you will promise me to keep that close, which I shall disclose unto you, and tell it no body living, you shall hear the whole matter, even as it is. She answered, she would not tell it again whatsoever it were. Then said he, Mother the matter wholly concerneth marriage, and the Counsel have long debated, whether it were better for one man to have two wives, or one wife to have two husbands, and as yet the matter hangeth in suspense. When she hard this, her heart burned & her stomach was overcharged wonderfully, that except she had laid it in one of her neighbour's laps, it was like she would have braced. Out she goeth, & maketh as much speed with her tongue, as she doth with her feet, & telleth it immediately to her next neighbour, and from one, to an other, till at length a number knew it, where upon they agreed wholly to go all together to the Counsel house, to entreat the Senators to sit no longer upon this matter, but clearly to determine with one assent and consent, that it were best, & most expedient for every woman to have two husbands, and not otherwise for no worlds good, any thing heretofore to the contrary notwithstanding. By this example ye may see the subtlety of this deceit. For when the mother asked her son, what the cause was of their long sitting, he told her a clean contrary thing, which the Counsel never thought nor yet once minded, this is, non causa pro causa posita. A cause that is not, put for a cause   

¶ The four deceit.  
FAllacia consequentis, when the consequent, that is to say the latter proposition, is evil gathered by the antecedent, which goeth before. And the way to know the fault of this deceitful argument, is to examine the argument, with the precepts of Logic, above rehearsed.  
Evil deeds purchase death.  
Ergo good deeds purchase life.  
The argument is not good, first considering, we cannot fulfil the law, by ourselves. Again, works are wicked, that are done without faith, so that first we must be in the state of grace by faith, and assured through faith, to live ever, before our works shallbe accepted for good, neither can our doings be perfect, in any part, to fulfil God's will, and his commandments, and therefore, though evil deeds deserve death, yet good deeds can never purchase life, so long as we be not able, to fulfil the Law, as God knoweth, we shall never be: scripture, our consciences, the world, and all, bearing witness against us. Of signs that be not proper, neither tarry long, no strong argument is made, as thus.  
He is pale in countenance.  
Ergo he is in love.  
Paleness may come of study, of care and thought, of abstinence, of watching of some distemperature in the body, and many other ways besides.  
Again, there is an other rule. A posse ad esse, non est bona consequentia. Because a thing may be, it shall not therefore follow that it is. As the Catholics have served us, for the Sacrament, saying, that because God is omnipotent, and may be in the Sacrament, by his power really: Ergo he is there really. For so may I say. God may feed every christian, both in body & soul, with the might of his word. Ergo he doth so. The prophet saith, I never saw a just man forsaken of god, nor his seed begging his bread. And yet god doth not feed all christians with his word only, but useth his appointed will generally. Likewise in the Sacrament, God feedeth us spiritually, because the flesh eaten, profiteth nothing, and they that eat the Sacrament in faith, tarry in God● and God in them spiritually & have life everlasting, whereas other that eat it without faith, have it not at all, for lack of faith, considering God is in no wicked man. But in thold world, many wonders were wrought, and because things might be● all things should be, as they would have it, & yet I cannot be persuaded to think that because all priests may be honest, therefore they all be honest.  
From the general, to the inferior, affirmatively, is no good argument made.  
He is a man.  
Ergo he is a good man.  
He may notwithstanding, be an evil man, yea, & sooner evil, then good, for none can tell almost now a days, where the good men dwell. Or if they have dwelling places still, yet few can find them at home. Again, to make an argument, from those things, which happen to a man, and may be away: the reason cannot of necessity follow.  
This old man goeth gaily, and like a young man.  
Ergo he is in love with some woman.  
In this reason, a likelihood is made necessary, as though it could not other wise be, but that he was in love, because he went in fresh apparel, young man like. But for this whole captious cause, I think it best, that ye mark the rules, above rehearsed, and ye shall not fail to espy the fault, for the deceit is soon seen, if ye call the argument to account.   

¶ The .v. deceit.  
PLures interrogationes, many questions, that is, when I go about to deceive one, asking him this & that, & he thinking not to what end I ask him, at length is brought to an inconvenience, by his former granting, of things particularly. And it is two ways considered: First when we ask of many things, one: and again, when we ask of one thing, many things, & put forth diverse questions, before we come to the purpose. For the first, this may be an example.  
Is water and wine hot or no?  
The question is asked, so that he must answer to them both, which he can not do at one time, and give one resolute answer directly, according to the demaunders will. But this is a trifle, and one that hath but a sponfull of wit, may answer to this question, v●yng a distinction, and several showing the qualities, of both wine and water, otherwise he cannot be able, to make any reasonable answer, as the question is propounded.  
Is worshipping of saints, and praying to god himself, allowed among Christians, or no?  
Here ye see, that for two diverse things, one certain question is directly required, whereas no man can justly answer at a word: and therefore the question being vain made jointly, must severally be soluted.  
I will merrily add another, which agreeth to the second manner of asking, & I will add the same, rather to give matter of laughing, then that there is any great weight in it. A lawyer took pains in a matter of law, for a certain gentleman, that was some time a scholar. The gentleman promised him a horse for his labour, the lawyer after pains taken, requireth his horse, the gentleman denieth his debt, although the lawyer had witness. And thus the gentleman reasoned merrily for himself: sir qd he, all horses be not of one colour, but of diverse colours, some black, some white, some bay, some daple: if I own you any by promise, I own you no more of one colour, than I do of another, considering, I did promise you no more of one colour, than I did of another, and I may be discharged of my promise, as well in delivering one certain coloured horse, as another. Therefore, either I own you horses of all colours, or else I own you none at all: but I do not owe you horses of all colours, (considering I promised you but one) therefore I own you none. Yea, serve you me so, qd the Lawyer, marry this school point, much passeth all our law points. Well sir as it pleaseth you, qd he, if you be at that point. When the gentleman saw him so reasonable, and heard him say so, he gave him according unto his promise, considering, he referred the whole matter so gently, to his pleasure.  
For this second manner of asking, when of one thing, many are asked, one may easily be inveigled and brought to an inconvenience, before he be ware, & of this kind of asking, there is also a notable example in Tully, where he speaketh in his book De inuentione, of this figure inductio, which is by things not doubtful, to prove that thing true which is doubtful. Socrates showeth that Aspasia had this talk with zenophon, and his wife, in manner and form following, after other communication had before. And tell me in faith, (quod Aspasia) if thy neighbour had more precious jewels than thou now haste, whether wouldst thou wish to have hers, or thine own? She answered. I would have hers, what if she had more costly garments, more fine apparel, wouldst thou not have it also, ye marry would I, (quoth she.) Ah well I say, what if thy neighbour had a better husband than thou now hast, whether hadst thou rather keep thine own still, or hers? With that she blushed. Then Aspasia when opportunity served, spoke to zenophon likewise, and said merely unto him, he not knowing of this that was spoken before. I pray the tell me zenophon, What if thy neighbour had a better horse than thine is, hadst thou rather have thine own or thy neighbours? I would have his saith he. what if he had better land than thou hast, wouldst thou have ●is, or thine own? I would have his saith he. What if he had a better wife than thou hast, wouldst thou change or no? Here zenophon said never a word. Then spoke Aspasia. For asmuch as both of you only hath not answered me, in that point, which I most desired to know: I myself will show what both you think. For you being a woman, first you desire a very honest man to your husband: and zenophon being a man, desireth to have a right honest woman. Therefore except you both shall so behave yourselves, that there may be found, neither man, nor woman, more honest und earth, than you two be: undoubtelie you both will evermore most earnestly desire that, which you think pri●cipale and best of all, both that thou being a husband, might have a right honest wife, and you also being a womā● might be married to a right honest husband.   

¶ The sixth deceits.  
PEtitio princip●, the cuckoos song, that is, a repeating of that wholly in the conclusion, which before was only spoken in the first proposition: or else by things doubtful, to prove things that are as doubtful.  
Every slanderer must be banished the court.  
Such a man is a slanderer.  
Ergo every slanderer must be banished the court.  
The conclusion is not well gathered, for it should not be universal, but particular, & therefore seeing the same is repeated that was spoken before, with out any good probation: in my mind it may be called the cuckoos song. Again, when an unknown thing is proved by a thing, that is as much unknown, as the other is.  
In purgatory, sins be forgiven to the dead.  
Ergo we must say mass still for the dead.  
This wise reason, fond preachers heretofore have made, that therefore we must have mass for the dead, because in purgatory sins be forgiven the dead. And yet doubt I as much of this place purgatory, as I mistrust this foolish massing, & to say truth it is sin to like either of them both, & as for purgatory, I think there was never none such, but only invented to fear the simple, as children have been made afraid with a visar, or else found out to pike men's purses. An other.  
Thus many hundred years have men used to ●raie to saints departed.  
Ergo they do not amiss, that pray to the dead still.  
I answer, whoredom hath been used these many hundredth years, Ergo it is lawful both to have the stews and to go to the stews still.  
Every man may see how foolish this argument is, and yet it is as good as the other, every inch of it. For although men have prayed, men have gone on pilgrimage thus long, and thus long: yet it is not therefore true, that the people did well therein. For we english men know (not only by hear say, but also by good experience) that custom is the mother, and the suck giver unto all error. And therefore, when such arguments are made, we say. Dubium per id quod aeque dubium est, confirmatur. That which is doubtful, is proved by that which is as doubtful, and so we do not allow the argumennt.  
Thirdly, when that thing is taken to prove, as though it ware undoubted, and every body agreed thereunto: where as yet it is in controversy.  
The anabaptists have the holy ghost the teacher of all things.  
Ergo they need not to here the gospel, nor yet be bound to follow it.  
Who knoweth not, that hath any knowledge of the truth, that the first may lawfully be doubted, and rather denied, then granted.  
Fourthly, this deceit is then used when that which followeth, proveth that which goeth before, as though the cart went before the horse, for often times that thing which is proved, is more assured than that which doth prove, as thus.  
Infants have faith.  
Ergo they must be baptized.  
The consequent is undoubtedly true, for as much as we fi●de it so in the scripture that in the primative church whole families were baptized, children and all: for we read not that they were excepted: and yet some doubt, & that of the greatest clerks, whether children have faith or no.   

The vii deceit.  
IGnoratio elenchi, (that is the mistaking of contradictory propositions) is a disceiptful argument which comprehendeth in itself all other above rehearsed subtleties Aristotel notwithstanding hath compassed this deceit with in his bounds. First when respect is not made to one and the same thing, but diversely applied.  
To eat flesh is good for health sake.  
To eat flesh is not good when offence may follow.  
Ergo to eat flesh is good and not good.  
Truth it is & yet shall it not follow, that whosoever eateth, the same man doth offend: considering to eat is lawful, and is none offence to God at all, being once allowed by the magistrate, in whose hand lieth the whole ordering of this matter.  
Again, this deceit is used when contradiction is made according to diverse respects, as thus.  
The law is to be followed in moral precepts, and not in ceremonials, nor yet always in judicials neither.  
Ergo the law is to be followed and not to be followed.  
It is even so, and yet not true neither, that the law is always to be rejected, and to be followed, as it pleaseth our fantasies.  
Thirdly, this subtlety is fashioned, when a contradiction is used, and yet not used of like sort, so that the latter part doth not deny the former in one manner of understanding, as thus.  
I know the word of God, and I do not know it.  
Those that live licentiously, & fear not the general resurrection, may justly be here included, and the two sentences which seem to gain say, may both be true in them: for some know that the scriptures are of God, or at least, they know that the scriptures are commonly taken for the word of god, and yet they themselves, know not one word of gods will, nor yet pass a whit for it. Or we may say that those poor souls in the Pope's reign knew the word of god o●ly by here say, when they heard the ghosphell red in latin, & could not tell one word what it meant.  
Fourthly, the time, may alter things, and make two diverse things to be both true, thus.  
To work upon the Saboth is forbid, and yet, not to work upon other days, is also forbid.  
Ergo to work, & not to work, are both forbid.  
It is an easy matter to avoid all such deceipts. Therefore there is a rule in logic that two contradictions can never be both, either false or true, at one and the same time, and that in one respect, as thus.  
All true believers shall attain salvation.  
Some true believers shall not attain salvation.  
These two propositions can never be both together either true or false. Now the other which were made before, may be both true, at one and the same time, & therefore they are not contradictories, because they are not considered in respect of one, and the same thing, at one and the same time, but diversly applied and considered, as thus.  
To preach in the congregation is meet for a man, and not for a woman.  
Ergo to preach is meet and not meet.  
All this is true being diversly considered, first, a woman may not preach, & yet a man may, & so the sentence is true, and it may well be said to preach is meet and not meet, with out any contradiction at all, because of the diverse respects, which be had both to the man, and to the woman. if the rule of contradictory propositions before rehearsed, be well marked, all these deceipts may easily be avoided.   

Of particular avoiding false arguments which are derived from the places.  
WHen I see an argumrnt derived from these subtle places, or else from the places of invention, which I have before at large declared: I ought to observe diligently the general rules & precepts there given, for if one reason thus from the general word, such a man followeth naughtiness, Ergo he is a thief, the argument is not good, and the error appeareth the rather, by this general rule, From the general to the kind, the argument is not good. for though one be nought otherwise, yet may he live naughtily long, and be no thief at all, as he may be an adulterer, a swearer, or such like.   

False ●casons made through the evil framing of an argument.  
THe wrong framing, may with ease be espied, if the rules be ones learned, that are before set forth for the same purpose. And again all other kind of arguments, have rules especial, and proper to themselves whereby the true ordering of an argument is better known.   

Of objections made to an argument.  
Objections are then used, when we do not dissolve the argument by the rules of logic, or directly avoid the danger, but bring an other thing, as an example, to overthrow that which was spoken before, and this manner is four ways used.  

By taking occasion of the self same. thing, that is put forth, and wresting it otherwise.  
By v●yng the like example in an other matter,  
By making clean contrary example.  
By standing to authority, or using sentences of the sage.   
For the first, this example may serve, richesses are good, because they bring pleasure. nay marry, richesses are evil, because they bring wo.  
Of the second, thus. Such a one is an honest man for I saw him once give almose to the poor, I answer, such a one is no dronckarde, for I saw him once sober.  
Of the third, thus. Such an honest man hath once received a great displeasure of his friend and neighbour, Ergo he may hate him deadly for ever. Nay not so, for the wicked man will sometimes forgive, receiving displeasure, and therefore the goodman must much more forgive.  
Of the fourth, thus. forgive him, because he is a child, nay not so, for Solomon biddeth, that the rod should not go from the child, therefore it is good to beat him, when he offendeth.  
I have travailed thus far, to disclose untruths, and to open cloaked errors, wherein though sometimes the examples be but slender, yet in great matters the same deceit hath taken place. Therefore though to the English ear, they may seem strange, yet I hope they willbe better taken, when this is known and fully seen, that they give light to greater matters, and that logic by good order, & perfit reason's doth rule all and espieth faults which otherwise would breed offence: for look what false argument is used, the s●me may with ease be found in some one of these deceipteful corners, or elsewhere in the places of invention, and therefore may by art easily be avoided. especially, if the other rules above rehearsed, be one's well digested. for the rules are touch stones to try untruths, and to frame matters right. And generally good heed ought to be had, that the matter, & form of every argument be true according to the rules● for by these two points, all errors are espied. The fault is in the mat●er (called in latin Materia,) when words are doubtful, and may diversly be taken, & also when the pith, or substance of the matter is confounded, & strangely used by words joined together, & things not orderly placed: in all which kind of arguments, ye must use either a flat denial of the proposition, or else use a distinction to show how the argument may be true, and how it may be false, according as it is understanded. We use a denial when of two propositions in the Argument, we deny either the proposition at large, or the several by showing the fault to be in the definition, in the division, in the causes, or some other place, as thus.  
Such a one is a very honest man,  
For I had good cheer at his house.  
Here the fault is in the definition, for if I would go about to define an honest man, every body would la●gh me to scorn, if I would thus define him. That man what soever he be that maketh me good cheer at his house, is a very honest man: but I must rather say thus. What so ever he is that doth as he would be done unto, and wrongeth no body, but liveth still vprightly● godly, and continently, that same is an honest man, or else not. For virtue is gotten by long practise, and by well doing of many good things, not by making a good dinner, and therefore the other above rehearsed definition, by cause it is not lawful nor agreeing with the rules of a definition, it is utterly to be denied, this reason applied there unto that the definition is not lawful. Albeit I knew one in my life, & that no small bird, which was better learned then wise, and yet not so well learned indeed, as he thought himself in his own opinion, wise, and used the like reason. For where as it chanced by occasion of talk, that one in his compaigny inveighed against the same man's friend, speaking things nothing toothsome, & otherwise then he would gladly hear, although not greatly missing the quishyne in reporting truth, he took the matter very hot, and like a friend spoke earnestly in his friends cause, testifying for his honesty with most constant words, and to persuade him the better he used this sore reason. Thou art to blame, quoth he to deprave such a man's estimation, for by god's mother he is a very honest man, for he is my special friend, I would thou shouldest know it, & therefore cease thy railing: with that, other came to part them. for they fell to reasoning with Arguments, that were neither in figure, nor in mode, but stood in plain buffeftes, which is a subtlety, that is not mentioned with in the compass of this book, and therefore dangerous, neither can it be avoided, except one have a headpece, or some weapon in his hand to bear of, such deceit, & so to save himself harmless. Some call such rough dealing, Carters Sophistry, when the fist reasoneth a matter by buffites, which the tongue should prove by Arguments. Again for the division when it is not well made, it is to be denied in like manner, the cause showed why and wherefore, as thus.  
●uery man is either wasteful or covetous,  
Cicero is man:  
Ergo Cicero is either wasteful or covetous.  
This division is not good, for many men offend in neither, but live moderately● content with there own, be it never so little. Moreover when no true cause is applied, but a false reason forged, ye may avoid danger by denying it, as thus.  
Money maketh unthrifts,  
Ergo money is nought.   

¶ Or thus.  
Five burneth houses,  
Ergo what shall we do with it.   

¶ Or thus.  
Water drowneth whole Cities,  
Ergo water is nothing profitable  
In all such Arguments the true cause is omitted, and a counterfeit cause used. for neither money, nor ●ire, not yet water, do harm of ourselves but the naughtiness of nature which abuseth them, & the negligence of man which foreseeth not to them, is the very true cause of their evil doing: and yet in weighty matters such fond reasons have been used, as for the reading of God's word, for women to be learned, for Rhetoric to be taught, or the temporal law at this day in this our realm to be frequented, or occupied.  
A distinction must be used, when any word is doubtful, and may be taken diuersly● As thus.  
Time healeth sick folk,  
Ergo it is very good.  
Here a distinction must be used, for time aswell signifieth an herb, as it signifieth the space, which is of an hour, day, or year. A friend of mine was called Harris. one not well knowing his name, called him Harrisonne. I deny the son (qd he) not meaning the second person in Trinity, but the addition of this word (son.)  
A learned man & a Physician (some know whom I mean) having at a certain time a coat of Velvet, that was much worn, and bare at the breast, being then also poor withal, & having a thyn●e purse, sitting at a table, and laying his hand upon his breast, said thus merrily to his friend: well (qd he) for all this hard world, at the worst I am thus much worth, even in bare Velvet. Thesame man afterward, sitting at a Table, not having elbow rowine, but being troubled, & his cote somewhat arrayed, which was dressed at the Shermans, not past two or three days before, said merrily: I pray you my Masters be good to my coat, for I promise you, within these two or three days, it hath scaipt a scouring.  
A young man of Cambridge, standing in a Galarie over the water, and looking on his book: having the water on the one side, and a garden on the other side, wherein as it chanced then, were diverse maidens of the town (for it was about Easter, at what time maidens gadded abroad, after they had taken their maker, as they call it) he being thus beset, one of his fellows being abroad, and seeing him there, bade him come to him. He answered, I can not come. The other demanded why? Marry (quoth he) because I am compassed with fire, and water. Meaning the maidens to be fire, and a provocation to lust, burning worse than fire: and ●o all good authors have used this word fire. As Terence. Accede ad ignem hunc, iam calesces plus satis. Come to this fire, saith Parmeno to Phedria, meaning Thais the harlot, and you shallbe as hot, as coals by & by. Therefore where such speech is used, it is always called in latin metaphora. That is to say, a turning from the proper signification to that, which is not proper, wherein the old Philosophers, have wonderfully excelled, as Diogenes, Socrates, and in our time sir Thomas More, a man for his wit, very singular.  
The fault that is in the form, or manner of making, as we call it, may be dissolved, when we show that the conclusion, is not well proved, by the former propositions, and that the argument, is either not well made, in figure or in mode, or in both: for of true things, none other thing can be concluded but truth, if the due form of concluding be observed, and the just placing or setting of the terms, called in Latin, termini, as ye hard before, be truly ke●t, as the rules before have taught notwithstanding of false propositions an undoubted truth, may well enough be concluded, as thus.  
Every sin, may be suffere● in a common weal,  
Every execution done by a law is sin,  
Ergo every execution, do●n by law, may be suffered in a common weal.  
The two first propositions are manifestly false, and yet the conclusion is very true. So that ye may see, after two false propositions, a true conclusion may follow, and not contrary wise, of two true propositions, a false conclusion can be made. For as we say in Latin. Ex veris, nil nisi ue●ū sequitur, that is to say, of true sayings, nothing doth follow but truth. Therefore when the conclusion seemeth not good, ye may justly suspect the other two propositions, although they seem never so true, for undoubtedly, the fault is either in the evil knitting, (when the argument is not in his mode, and figure accordingly,) or else in the confounding of words either not well placed, or evil applied or else in the doubtfulness of some word 
All riot is an offence.  
No covetousness is riot,  
Ergo no covetousness is any offence.   
Thus we see a false conclusion, made of two undoubted true propositions, and yet I said before, of true sayings, nothing doth follow but only truth. But abide, ye must examine this argument with the rules, & then ye shall see, that the fault is in the form, or manner ●f making an argument. For it is in no mode of the first figure, although it be an argument of the first figure.  
Some time the fault is only in the matter, & not in the manner of making an Argument, whereof there are diverse examples above rehearsed Sometimes the fault is both in the matter, ●nd in the manner of making an Argument, as thus.  
The earth is profitable, and causeth much plenty,  
Men are in the earth.  
Ergo men are profitable, and cause much plenty.  
First, it is in no figure, because the double repeat in the first Proposition is the substance of the earth, and in the second Proposition, is the being in the earth, and so there ●e four terms, in the two Propositions. Again it is in no mode, because the first Proposition in the first figure is not universal. And this may suffice which hitherto I have rehearsed for the soluting of an Argument, for asmuch as he that can divide, define, and make his Argument in mode and figure, according to the rules before mentioned, and diligently mark doubtful words: shall soon espy the faults in an evil Argument, for asmuch as it cannot otherwise be, but that he which knoweth the best, shall easily judge, and with out difficulty espy the worst.  
And now the rather to delight the reader, I will add here certain witty questions and arguments, which can hardly be avoided, and yet pleasant, & therefore not unworthy to be known.  
¶ They are called trapping Arguments, because few that answer unto them, can avoid danger, and thu● they are named in strange words.  

Crocodilites.  
Antistrephon.  
Ceratine.  
A●is●aton.  
Cacosistaton.  
Vtis.  
Pseudomenos.    

¶ Crocodilites.  
CRocodilites, is such a kind of subtlety that when we have granted a thing to our adversary being as●ed before what we will say: the same turneth to our harm afterward: and causeth an inconvenience thereupon to ensue. Authors do feign that the Crocodile being a monster in Egypt did take a woman's child from her, and spoke with the mother in this wise: Woman I will give the thy child again, if thou wilt say truth to me, & tell me assuredly, whether I will give the thy child again or no? She answered, I know assuredly thou wilt not give me my child again, and therefore it is reason I have my child again because I have said truth. Nay, said the Crocodile, I will not give the thy child again because thou mayst be seen to have said truth, less that if I give the thy child again, thou shouldst have made a lie: neither yet would I have given the thy child again, if thou hadst ●aid otherwise, because then thou hadst not said truth. And hereof this Argument hath his name, called Crocodilites. notwithstanding Luciane telleth this tale after an other sort, & maketh Chris●ppus to ask an other man what he would say, in case he should be asked such a question of the Crocodile, as I have before rehearsed.   

¶ Antistrephon.  
ANtistrephon, is nothing else, then to turn a man's saying into his own neck again, and to make that which he bringeth for his own purpose, to serve for our purpose, in Latin it may be called, Inuersio. Aulu● Gellius hath a notable example of Pythagoras, a noble Sophiste, & Euathus scholar to the same Pythagoras. This Euathus was a very rich young man, and glad to learn eloquence, and to plead causes in the common place. This young man therefore considering Pythagoras to be a singular man in this behalf, & a meet Schoolmaster for his purpose, desired to be his scholar, and promised to give him a great some of money, for his pains, even asmuch as he would ask, and gave him upon agreement half in hand before he learned, and covenanted their upon that he should have the other half even the first day that he stood at Bar●e, and by pleading, got the overhand in judgement of his adversary. After this, when he had been a good while Pythagoras scholar, and profited very much in the Law, & yet notwithstanding came not to the Bar, but still shifted him of● and tracting the time (of like because he would not pay the residue of his money) Pythagoras taketh advisement as he himself thought, very subtly, & chargeth him with his promise, having an action of debt against him, and therefore he called him to the Law. Where when he had hi● before the judges, he beginneth his tale in this wise.  
Here I have the now (saith Pythagoras) and learn, therefore foolish fellow as thou art, & mark this point for thy learning: whether the judgement be given with thee, or against thee, I shall have my money every groat of it. If thou art cast in the law, I have won by virtue of the law, if thou art not cast, but gettest the ouerha●de by judgement of the●e men, yet must I have it nevertheless, because our bargain was so made, when I first began to teach the. Euathus hearing this, answered as ye shall hear. I could easily sir avoid this your crooked subtlety, and be without all danger, if I would not stand at the bar myself, but get some advocate to stand for me, for by such means, you could not charge me with any debt, considering I myself pleaded no cause. notwithstanding I like it better a thousand fold, that I myself am here personally, and speak in mine own cause: seeing that not only, I will get the overhand of you in this our matter, wherebi I shall be discharged of debt, but also even in this argument I will turn your own words into your own neck again, and so triumph both ways. And therefore learn you again as wise as you are, and mark this point for your learning, whether the judgement be ●euen with you, or against you, I shall save my money, every groat of it. For if you be cast in the law, I have won by virtue of the law, a●d so I own you nothing. If you be not cast, but get the overhand of me, by the judgement of these men: then according to my bargain, I shall pay you nothing, b●cause I have not gotten the overhand in judgement. The judges seeing the matter so doubtful, & so hard to determine for either party: fearing to do amiss, left the matter raw without judgement for that time, & differred the same to an other season. Thu● ye see that the yongin● being the scholar, gave his master a bone to gnawe● and bet him with ●is own rod, which the master had made for his scholar's tail.  
There is in Aristophanes a wonderful pretty talk, betwixt the father and the son, which serveth well for this purpose. For where as the son had beaten the father contrary to all order and honesty, yet not withstanding the son, thought he had as good authority to beat his father if he did am●sse ●s the father to beat him. And therefore he sayde● wherefore should my father beat me? His father made answer. Marry (quoth he) because I love thee, and would thou shouldest do well. Marry therefore (quoth the son) will I beat the to, because I love the also good father, and would thou shouldest do well: and with that laid on strokes surely, till he made his father grant that it was as lawful for the son, to beat his father, as for the father to beat his son.   

Ceratinae.  
CEratin●● argumentationes, are called horned arguments, the which are so dangerous to answer unto, for both parts proponed, that it willbe hard to escape a foil. Even as when ye see a bull, & would catch him by the horns, ye see as much danger in the one horn, as in the other● and so you fear to take him on either side: In like case, when these horned arguments are proponed, a man uneath can tell what to answer. As we read in the gospel of Matthew the xxij. Chapter, when the Phariseis did send their disciples (which did pretend holiness, & bore a face of true religion) to take Christ in a snare. And therefore first they came, giving him a name of authority, & called him master flatteryngly, as though he might speak his mind freely to them, because there was none but his Scholars, and such as sought unfeignedly to be edified in the truth: secondly, they praise him for his goodness, that he is true in all his dealings, and useth no dissimulation, and again they say, that not only he is true, but also teacheth the way ●f truth, and then thus they begin to question with him, and to feel his mind what he will say (for truly they thought to take him in a trip, whether he held his peace, or spoke) and therefore they said. Sir may we lawfully pay tribute to Cesar, or no? Or how thy●ke you, doth it stand with God's word●, that we may pay, or no? Here Christ was beset two ways, first it was dangerous for him, to hold his peace: for than he might seem by so doing, to have respect to the person of men● and for fear not open the truth, in such a weighty matter, and so slain the glory of God. Of the other part, if he should answer it ware a dangerous piece of work, in like manner, for they thought, he would either speak on Caesar's side, & allow paying of Tribute, and so incur the hatred of all the people, whereby they might more boldly afterwards put him to death: or else they thought, he would speak against Cesar, and so he should commit treason, and be apprehended thereupon, as a Traitor. But jesus knowing their naughty purpose, and plainly seeing where about they went, disapoyncted them of their will, that they could take none advantage of him at al. And therefore he said, because he would publish their falsehood, what tempt you me ye hypocrites? Show me the coin of the tribute, and they took him a penny, and he said unto them: whose is this Image and superscription They said unto him, Caesar's. Then said he, give therefore unto Cesar the things which are Caesar's, and unto God those things which are gods. Christ did not at the first when they propounded their question unto him, plainly say, give unto Cesar the things, which are Caesar's, but when he had asked them whose coin it was, and that they by their own confession, had granted it to be Caesar's, whereby they bare witness of themselves that they ware subject to Cesar, he said, for asmuch as you grant yourselves by the virtue of this coin to be tributaries, pay on god's name to Cesar the things that pertain to Cesar, & unto God those things that are gods.   

Cacosistata.  
CAcosistata are such arguments that being propounded, between two persons, they serve aswell for the one part, as the other, as thus. You must forgive him, because he is but a child, no marry, therefore will I beat him, because he is a childe● or thus. This man should not be judged to die, by any temporal law, because he is a priest. yes marry therefore should he be judged to die, because he is a priest, and hath offended, which should have given good example to other of well living.   

Asistata.  
ASistata are such arguments, as are impossible to be true, as when a child of two years old, should be accused of adultery, as though it were like, that he could offend in such filthiness.   

Vtis.  
VTis is nothing else, but when one goth about to prove a thing, and maketh that which should prove, to be as uncertain, as that thing, which is proved, as thus. In Purgatory sins are forgiven, by virtue of the Mass, ergo we must say Mass still. Whereas I think there is no godly wise man, but doubteth asmuch that Purgatory is, as he may justly say, that the mass saveth no man.   

¶ Pseudomenos.  
THis is called a lying argument, for what so ever ye shall say, ye must needs sa●e ami●●e. Epimenides a man borne in Crete said that the people borne in Crete, were liars, said he true, or no? if ye say that he said truth, I may well say●●hat can not be well said, for if the people in Crete be liars, than lied Epimenides, because he was a man their borne, and one of Crete, and said they ware l●ers. Again if ye judge that Epimenid●s said false, and that the people there, be no liars, than Epimenides said truth even when he said, the people of Crete are liars, because he himself was a man of Crete. But this subtlety is thus avoided, if ye will say that where as mention is made of the people in Crete, yet all are not comprehended under the same, neither is the Proposition universal but indefinite, that is to say, not comprehending all but certain, as thus. The people of C●ete are liars, truth it is, that many of them be liars, & y●t Epimenides may be excepted, & be a true man of his word, notwithstanding. As also he that was warned in his sleep not to give credit to any dreams, did not think that dream vain, although he judged many other to be little esteemed, and small heed to be taken to them. For by this dream he was warned not to believe greatly other dreams, and yet not withstanding he was warned to believe this dream.  
NOw that I have brought this rude work to some end, and for this time framed it, so well as I could, I desire of all men th●re favourable help, to support my weakness, or at the least, to give me none evil report, for my well meaning, & then I shall think myself sufficiently rewarded. But if offence should breed through labour sustained, and no favour gotten, when gentleness had been offered, it had been as good (in my mind) to play and lose nothing, as to take pains, and lose all. But my trust being stayed upon the honest and godly affected, I have travailed without fear, hoping well that my doings shallbe taken without blame. And therefore this obtained, I shall desire all men for the love of God to embrace the truth, and not to wed themselves to any opinion without some stay or sure foundation of god's truth. And where as God is the author of peace and concord, and loveth them, that unfeignedly call upon him in truth: I shall heartily pray to God that all we may draw after one line, and seek one uniform and sound doctrine, to the praise of God, and the comfort of our souls. And because some heads are very bold to entre farther, than wit can retch, or el● have a mind vainly to question, of things not needful: I thought it not amiss to set forth here Aristoteles mind, as touching things that should not be brought in question. There be four things (saith he) which should not be examined by reason. And first no man ought to argue of those things wherein if any one put doubt, he deserveth punishment. As to reason whether there be a God or no. And therefore Tully sayeth very well, it is a wicked and an ungodly custom, to dispute or talk against God, either in earnest, or yet in sport. Again it is fondness, to reason of those things which our senses judge to be true. As to know by reason, whether fire be hot, or no. the which were madness to ask, and surely, if any one should so reason with me, I would bid him put his finger in it. thirdly, it is evil to reason of those things, which can not be known by man's wit. As to know what God the father is in person, what the holy ghost is, how they sit and are placed in heaven, or of what making the soul of man is. fourthly, to talk and dispute of those things, which are undoubtedly true. As in Arithmetic iii and three are six. In Philosophy. The whole is greater than the part. In all which matters to move any earnest question, or to doubt overmuch in things nothing doubtful, is either stark madness, or else plain foolishness. Therefore I wish of GOD, that all our reasoning might be fastened upon such m●tters, as are necessary both for the bearer to learn, and also good, for the godly reasoner, to teach. Wherein though I have done nothing so well myself, as my good will was thereunto, yet I trust all honest hearts, will testify with me, that I have most earnestly minded the glory of God, and the setting forth of his holy name, throughout the whole course of this my rude and simple book: the which once done and knowen● I hope the gentle reader will bear with me in other things, and pardon such faults, as through ignorance have escaped, or else for lack of time could not well be altered. God be praised.    

An admonition to the reader for faults escaped in the Printing.  
SO it was gentle and loving reader, that I wrote this book in such a time, as when I had not so convenient leasour for the good placing and true examining thereof, as sense I came to the printing of the same I wished that I had. And the manner of imprinting being such, that whatsoever is not made perfit before it cometh to the print, cannot without the great loss and hindrance of the printer, be then altered or amended. By reason whereof, certain sentences herein are passed much sleyghter, then with advisement, either they should, or that I would have suffered, if other wise I might have remedied them. And therefore most humbly and hertely I desire thee, whatsoever thou be to read this work friendly and favourably, and where cause of imperfection is found, to set to thy amending hand, considering that no one thing that ever was wrought by man, was made perfect at the first, and then shall I have no cause to fear, but that these my labours shallbe accepted in good part, howsoever either by ignorance or by negligence, any thing shall seem to be omitted, or not done accordingly. And thus most heartily far well.   

Imprinted at London by Richard Grafton, printer to the Kings Majesty. Anno. M. D. LI.  
Cum privilegio ad Imprimendum solum.