THE FIRST PART OF THE DISQVISITION OF TRUTH, CONCERNING POLITICAL AFFAIRS.  
HANDLED In two several Sections.  
The first whereof (by way of certain questions probleme-wise propounded and answered) consisteth of fourteen Chapters.  
Written by Henry Wright.  
LONDON, Printed by NICHOLAS OKHS. 1616.   

TO THE RIGHT HONOURABLE, SIR JOHN JOLLES, Knight, Lord Mayor of the City of LONDON. AND To the Right Worshipful the rest of the Aldermen his Brethren, etc.  
Right Honourable & Right Worshipful,  
ALthough I very well know, that no man (almost) in handling any politic discourse, could ever satisfy the expectation of such as were skilful, or unskilful in the exercising, acting, and managing of such affairs: the one, because they could not understand: the other, for that they were (most what) to curious, never regarding any thing more, than the use thereof for serving the time present: yet for the great respect I have ever borne to the Honourable City of London (wherein I have had the most part of my living and abiding,) and (in particular) to your Honour, and Worships the worthy governors thereof (whom I know to be judicious, yet free from curiosity) I have adventured to propound to the world my private conceits touching that subject. May it please your Honour and Worships therefore (till better grow) to accept these first fruits of my barren-braine, and by your favourable approving of them, to protect & defend them against the snarlings of black-mouthed Momists, who are ever more ready to carp at other men's writings, then to amend them, or to suffer any of their own once to view the light. The matter I borrowed (as you may perceive) out of the best and most approved Authors and Historiographers: the form, frame and disposition of the work is mine own, which (such as it is) together with my best services, I commend to your Honour and Worships, and yourselves to the grace of God, and so rest,  
By your Honour, and Worships ever ready to be commanded, Henry Wright.   


SECT. 1. CHAP. 4. Of a Kingdom: How it may be got, how kept, how it may be increased, how made lasting and durable; and lastly, how it may be lost, or overthrown, by hatred, contempt, etc.  
SECT. 1. CHAP. 5. Of Council, Councillors, and the choosing of them: Of running middle courses. The great good which redoundeth to a Prince being well-advised, and how he may discern good counsel from bad advice.  
SECT. 1. CHAP. 6. Of Example: the use and abuse thereof in a Commonwealth.  
SECT. 1. CHAP. 7. Of wits, manners, and dispositions of divers Countries, Nations, and Cities, as well free as servile.  
SECT. 1. CHAP. 8. Of benefits, and when to be bestowed: of ingratitude, and how a friend may be purchased, that a man may trust to.  
SECT. 1. CHAP. 9 Of estimation and credit: of authority public and private: of Severity, strictness of government, Constancy, Piety and Providence.  
SECT. 1. CHAP. 10. Of glory and renown, the desire thereof, profitable to the Commonwealth. Of power and greatness, and the acquiring thereof. Of ambition and unlawful desire of reigning. Of eminent places, and their being free (for the most part) from practices of treasons, etc.  
SECT. 1. CHAP. 11 Of Studies, dispositions, etc. and whence the diversity thereof may proceed. Of learning, etc. how necessary for a Prince. Of intelligence, and the use and benefit thereof.  
SECT. 1. CHAP. 12. Of peace, and the conditions thereof. Of the state and affairs of Princes. Of Embassages, Ambassadors, etc.  
SECT. 1. CHAP. 13. Of discord and faction, whereof they take their beginnings, and of the nourishing, or not nourishing of them in a commonwealth.  
SECT. 1. CHAP. 14. Of Sedition, mutiny, and defection of the greatest part of the people in a State, and of standing Neutral, or partaking.    

The chief Authors whom I have followed in compiling of this work, Alphabetically set down.  

A  
AVgustine.  
Aristotle.  
Amianus.  
Attius.  
Aulus Politicus.  
Aristophanes.   

B  
The Bible.  
Petrus Bembus.   

C  
Quintus Curtius.  
Philippus Cominaeus.  
Capitolinus.  
Marcus Tullius Cicero.  
Cladianus.  
Philippus Camerarius.   

D  
Dant an Italian Poet.  
Dio Cassius.  
Diodorus Siculus.  
Demosthenes.   

E  
Euripides.   

F  
Valerius Flaccus.   

G  
Franciscus Guicardinus.  
Aulus Gellius.   

H  
Horatius.  
Herodotus.   

I  
Iwenall.  
josephus.   

L  
Lactantius.  
Lucretius.  
Lucanus.  
Titus Livius.   

M  
Machiavelli.  
Valerius Maximus.   

O  
ovidius.   

P  
Plaro.  
Plutarch.  
Phavorinus, Philosophus.  
Polybius.  
Plautus.  
Plinius.  
Pindarus.  
Pacuvius.   

Q  
Quintilianus.   

R  
Henricus Ranzovius.   

S  
Salustius.  
Stobaeus,  
Seneca,  
Suetonius,   

T  
Tholozanus,  
Thucydides,  
Cornelius Tacitus,   

V  
Velleius,  
Vegetius,   

X  
Xenophon,   

Z  
Zimera Problem.    

❧ THE FIRST PART OF THE DISQVISITION OF TRUTH, Concerning Political Affairs.  

SECT. I. CAP. I.  
Of Religion, and the force thereof: whereupon, and how it cometh to pass that there be such, and so many, diversities, and differences, of Opinions, concerning the same.  

1  
It may be demanded wherefore the wisest 
a Lycurgus. Solon. Epaminondas, Numa, Xenophon.  lawgivers did ever conclusionally determine, that the care of Religion, and all holy things should belong unto the Prince?  
WAs it because they thought it fit, that that which was 
b Diogenes apud Stobaeum.  best, and most worthy to be had in honour, should be honoured of the best, and him who bore the chiefest rule in the Monarchy, or State? Or was it rather, because they wisely considered, that 
c Xenophon Paedia Cyri. l. 8.  if their Subjects feared God, they would be the more loath to do any thing which might redound to the hurt of one another, or attempt any thing against the Prince? Or was it not for these causes alone, but rather likewise, 
d Arist. Rhet. ad Alex.  for the augmenting and enlarging of their Empire and Dominions, as though the Divine Powers were more prone, propitious, and favourable, towards those that serve them, then unto any others? Or to conclude, was it for the general good of a Commonwealth, as a certain 
e Lactantius de ira Cap. 12●.  Divine plainly protested, who held that Religion, and the Fear of God, were the surest bands for conserving of human Society?   

2  
It may further be demanded, how far a Prince ought to take care of matters concerning Religion?  
ought he (as some do think) to take care for the examination of the truth or falsehood of that Religion which he professeth, and in all Ecclesiastical matters to take upon him to be chief judge and Determiner of them, according to his own municipal Laws? Or ought he rather (as others imagine) to be a defender only of that Religion which formerly hath been received, or afterwards is propounded or obtruded unto him?  

f The opinion of all Princes and States not subject to the Pope.  This latter may be thought an unjust limitation, that any Prince, or State, should be so kerbed: and as touching the former, 
g The opinion of the Church of Rome and her adherents.  others think that a Prince hath no free power, or authority, to constitute or determine Ecclesiastical business, but that by bare permission only, he may have a mere inspection into them: Which monstrous Opinion, in a Treatise (almost ready to come forth) I have resuted: Evidently proving that the Church, being a part of the State, it cannot be without apparent danger to the same, to admit of foreign jurisdiction in managing matters Ecclesiastical, but that such affairs ought always to be ordered by those who bear the Sovereignty, or some other, by their appointment, within the same State.   

3  
It may be further demanded, wherefore the 
h Liu. lib. 7. hist. Rom.  Romans always confessed and acknowledged that they were more obliged and indebted to Numa then to Romulus.  
THis question (Right Honourable) out of the Romans own History is thus resolved: Affirming that Romulus (though founder of their City) left little or nothing unto them, but their names to be called Romans: But Numa (being the chief bringer in of Religion) perpetuated the same, and seemed to give unto them their very essence and being, and (as it were) to cause the prosperous success of their State. For Romulus (saith the History) brought in the form of a Common wealth, which was likely not to be durable, but might end with himself: But his Successor Numa, upon the bringing in the continual practice and exercise of Religion, did in such wise form and frame the Commonwealth, that though himself should shortly die, yet there was left an evident mean and way to make it durable for many ages.   

4  
To the same purpose it may be demanded, wherefore the 
i Liu. lib. 10. Hist. Rom.  Romans did make more account of Religion than all other Nations?  
WAs it because they plainly saw, that the settling Religion in the State, was the firmest prop they could rely upon, for the upholding, conserving, and perpetuating of their Commonwealth, and that it would serve most fitly for the bringing in of Military Discipline, and Arms, to which they were most addicted, and without which they judged their State could not stand? Or was it rather, for that they under this pretence (as those who knew how to (make use of Religion) did practise it over fortunately, and with better success than others, to retain and keep those which were good in their allegiance and obedience, and to curb and restrain those who were ill disposed from committing evil, or persisting and continuing in their lewd courses: as likewise to 
k Liu. lib. 3. Circa legem Terentillam.  pacify the seditious, 
l Liu. lib. 3. circa creationem tribulorum plebis consulari dignitate.  reconcile such Subjects as were justly offended and grieved, with the Rulers and the government, 
m Liu. lib. 5.  retain their Military Discipline, and keep their Soldiers in good order, 
n Liu. lib. 10.  get credit and authority to their Commanders: enterprise wars, and to bring them to a happy end?   

5  
Again, it may be demanded to the same purpose, wherefore the Romans, even in their greatest straits and difficulties did rather use the pretext and colour of religion, to expedite and help themselves, than any other means whatsoever.  
WAs it because 
o Francise. Guicciardin.  they were persuaded that the Common-people did rather judge by the shadows then the substances of things? Or was it not for that cause alone, but rather for that they found by experience, that men are more thoroughly moved, and think themselves faster tied upon an 
p Liu. lib. 3.  oath taken (which hath his dependency upon Religion) then by any Laws or Statutes whatsoever?   

6  
It may further be demanded wherefore in former times men (generally) were more religious than they are in these days?  
WAs it because that in those elder times there was not that contempt of Religion, and neglect of God & his service, as is now in these modern days? Or was it rather, because in those more happy times, it was held altogether unlawful for any man to make what construction he list of an oath when he had taken it, and thereout to frame rules of living to himself, according to his own liking; but to fashion his life and manners rather to such laws as were given, and imposed upon him to observe?   

7  
It may finally be demanded, wherefore (seeing there is but one truth) there are at this day so many and sundry opinions about Religion, even among Christians themselves.  
IS it because the Clergy themselves in divers points disagree, being distracted into factions, and writing and disputing one against another; which the rude and ignorant multitude once seeing, do thereby take upon them to dispute of Divinity, to establish their fond and foolish opinions in matters of Religion, which in no wise belonged unto them to meddle withal? Or may it be, for that sometime young Scholars, either in years, learning or discretion taking upon them to preach, teach, or write, do propound false or unsound Doctrine to the people: whose corrupt opinions once set abroach (as though it were a shame for them to change them upon more mature deliberation into better) do continually bestir themselves, and employ their wits, rather to confirm, then amend their errors? Or is this the reason rather, for that the followers of any Sect whatsoever, study to tread in their first Teacher's steps, and observe such courses and customs as formerly have been prescribed unto them?    

SECT. I. CHAP. II.  
Of the best form of a Commonwealth.  

1  
It may be demanded, wherefore according to many men's opinions, the Monarchy, or sole rule of one, aught to be preferred before other forms of government?  
IS it because that 
a Cic. de legibus lib. 3. justinus H●storicus lib. 1 in initio.  Monarchy is the most ancient kind of government, seeing that the name of Monarchy and Empire was first in the world? Or is it because this kind of government best agreeth to 
b Sallust in Epistolis.  nature, as is to be seen by all, or the most of all other creatures, in whom this image and shadow of one to rule over the rest may plainly appear? Or is it because it is most agreeable to 
c Tacit. 1. Annal  reason, that the body of an Empire being but one, should likewise be swayed by the discretion of one sole Ruler? Or is this rather the reason, because that neither in a 
d Tacit. 4. Annal  popular estate, where many govern, nor in an Aristocracy, where a few sway the sceptre, there can be possible any long concord and agreement among them? Or is it because that both in 
e Tacit. 1. Annal Liu. lib. 5.  Democracies and Aristocracies it hath been ever observed, ever great store of good wits, which may be fitted and accommodated to all times and occasions, better than other forms of government? Or might this rather be their reason, because they observed that this form of government was not so subject to 
n Arist. Polit. 5.  alteration, or to grow into tyranny? For to speak as they would have the thing to be, 
o The opinion of Machiavelli, lib. 1. Disputat. Cap. 5.  though these few of the Clarissimi who sway the government, be naturally ambitious; notwithstanding when they see and consider that all the authority is in their own hands, and by reason thereof that they surpass and excel the rest of their people, they content themselves (for the most part) with this prerogative, and so raise no tumults, or stir up any troubles whereby the Commonwealth might be vexed or disquieted for their ambitious humours.  
And thus (Right Honourable) you see how that as every one most fancied and affected this, or that kind of government: so they yielded reasons for the maintaining of their opinions? Wherein (in my conceit) they have missed the Cushion, and upon good grounds (as I hope) I may argue against them all. And thus for Argument sake I reason against their Monarchy.  
Every Monarch is either tied to rule, according to the laws of the kingdom he possesseth, or he is not; If he be not bound, than all men will confess with me, that that Monarchy may easily degenerate, and grow into tyranny. But if the Monarch be tied to observe laws, nothing letteth (notwithstanding) but that form of Commonwealth may not be durable, especially when the kingdom cometh by succession. 
p Dantes Poeta Ital●●.  For very seldom falleth it out, that to a wise and godly Father, a Son of that stamp, and endowed with like virtues, should succeed. Now, whenas by the perverse, careless, or bad carriage of the Monarch toward his people, the manners of his subjects are once corrupted, it must of necessity follow, that either the laws are of small force, or none at all. And so farewell to that form of government.  
Against their Democracie, I this aver, or (rather) finally determine, That if any good Counsels or Decrees come from the people, they proceed from them rather by mere chance, and accidentally, then for any prime or principal intention of the counsellors. For the people being driven by some extreme necessity, to run such and such courses, or put in practise those or these counsels, or being furthered by some memorable accident falling out in the nick (as we say) may oftentimes decree things well and wisely, otherwise it is impossible for them so to do? For they know not (for the most part) what they would have, they ask what they know not, and when they have obtained what they asked, by and by they spurn, kick at it, and despise it: so that the proverb in them, and of them, is true, and ever will be verified; The people is a beast of many heads, wavering and envious. So that I may very safely conclude, that this form of government is worst of all.  
Against the State Aristocratical, I this affirm, that experience hath made it manifest to the world, that those, who for a while have justly and uprightly governed the Commonwealth, not long after have abused their power and authority to the gathering of riches, and getting possessions of lands into their hands, insomuch that they have grown ambitious, earnestly thirsting after private revenge, and the fulfilling of their own filthy lusts and appetites, as appeared plainly in the Aristocracy of the Romans, when after they grew weary to be governed by Consuls, and had set up the Decemvirate, in the beginning of the second year of their government, they were enforced to change that state into a Democracie, because the Decemviri ruled so villainously. Again, it is recorded by antiquity, that the sons of virtuous parents, who were, and did succeed in divers governments, became extreme insolent, common lechers, and spendthrifts of those patrimonies which their careful parents had left unto them: Upon which grounds I conclude, That the Aristocratical government cannot stand long firm, and stable, much less to be permanent and durable.   

4  
These things then being, as I have said, and considering that every form of government is so subject to change & alteration, it were welworth the labour to make a true Disquisition of this nice point, to wit, what form of government were fittest for every Kingdom and Country, whereby the welfare thereof might be procured and continued.  
TO determine this question (Right Honourable) were a very hard task to be undertaken and performed of any man, yet because I have taken upon to discourse of this subject, I will in brief show your Lordship my opinion therein.  
And first, I am verily persuaded, that this, or that form of government, whether already established, or to be brought in, and established, in any Kingdom or Country, doth chief depend upon the nature and disposition of that Kingdom or Country, into which it hath been already, or is to be brought: For it would be a very hard matter to bring a free form of government into that Country, who have been used to live under a Monarch, as contrariwise, to reduce that people, to live under the obedience and command of one absolute Ruler, who have used to live free of themselves, & to be governed by their own Laws. The Eastern Countries not enduring to brook the Aristocratical or democratical State, were ever devoted to live under one sole Monarch. On the other side, no form of government would please the Athenians and Helvetians (whom at this day we call Swissers) but a Democracy: None the Lacedæmonians but an Aristocracy. The Syracusians affected a tyrannical form of government: Neither could any of these people ever be persuaded to forsake that form of government which they had once chosen: Nay, which is more, they did with such deadly and implacable hatred, prosecute all those who erected, or set up any other kinds of Policies to be governed, and to govern by, that wheresoever, and whensoever, they became Conquerors, they altered and abrogated, that form of Government, and brought in their own form.  
Secondly, I utterly deny all right forms of commonwealths, as the Monarchy, Aristocracy, and Democracy, to be absolute and perfect: much less do I hold that any goodness can be in a Tyranny, Oligarchy, or Ochlocracy; For these last related, by reason of the multitude of evils which accompany them, are of, and in themselves always evil, the Magistrates never regarding the common-good but their own ends: The former likewise, although in themselves they are good (for that in all of them, the chief good of the Commonwealth, or State, either is, or aught to be sought) yet accidentally, they many times become evil; as well for that they last not long, as that they so easily degenerate.  
To conclude therefore, I hold that form of Commonwealth to be best, which is compounded of the temper of all these, or at leastwise is so mixed of a Monarchy and Aristocracy, that one (indeed) for the Majesty of the State should be the chief Commander, but his power should be governed, and his Counsels ordered by the decrees and wisdom of the Senate: For by this means, the Prince should retain his splendour and dignity, the Senate their power and authority, and the people their lawful liberty.    

SECT. I. CHAP. III.  
Of the Prince, Court, and Courtiers, etc.  

1  
It may be demanded why private men, can never well and rightly judge of the affairs of Princes?  
IS it because they exactly 
a Guicchardine.  know not the matters of State, the ends of Princes, or how far this, or that business, effected, or neglected, doth concern them? Or may this rather be the reason that 
b Idem.  forasmuch as the counsels, purposes, and designs of Princes, differ so far from the drifts and courses of private men, it is impossible that the self-same projects should be available to them both? For it (most what) so falleth out, that although matters of State, determinations of businesses, and the commodities or discommodities which may be expected to arise thereof, should be known as well to private men, as to Princes themselves, their applications, censures, and judgements, notwithstanding touching the premises, would be divers, as their first ends and intentions were, which they had propounded to themselves.   

2  
In the next place it may be demanded, wherefore, as we commonly read in Histories, as out of Tacitus and others, that that man, whose aid and help a Prince hath made use of bring him to the Crown, within a while after is neither liked nor loved of that Prince, but either is fed with the smoke of innovation, or made shorter by the head?  
IS it because that some Princes being naturally suspicious, do esteem the faith of those to be fickle to them, which they have proved to have been to the damage of others? Or is not that the reason, but this rather, that the very sight of them whose help they have used to their rising, groweth idious unto them, for that it seemeth to upbraid them with the baseness of their former mean fortunes? Or may it not be so neither, but for that it is 
c Philipus Cominaeus.  grievous unto some Princes to remember that they own any thing, or that they are any ways beholding to their Subjects?   

3  
It may further be demanded, how that Prince, who hath bereaved another of his Kingdom, might behave himself to enjoy his new-got Empire with safety?  
SShall he effect this, if he 
d This was the error of Servius Tullius King of the Romans, whom Tarqvinius Superbus slew.  affect him whom he hath so spoiled, with new favours and benefits, endeavouring thereby to reconcile him, and bind him fast unto him? But it is to be feared, that old injuries will hardly be forgotten, by collating and bestowing of new benefits upon the wronged, especially if the greatness of the injuries, exceed the rate of the benefits, as it falleth out commonly in the case of Kingdoms. Or shall he bring this about the rather, if he 
e This was the practice of Selimus, the Turkish Emperor, who being but a younger brother, poisoned Bajazet his father, made away Corcut and Acomat his two brethren, etc. So dealt Rich. the 3. with his two nephews the sons of Edward the 4. with the Duke of Buckingham likewise, and others.  murder, and kill, all those whom he imagineth to stand in his way, or whom he standeth in doubt of, least in time they may become his enemies? But if he take these courses, he must needs fall into some great mischief; for he shall engulf himself in the vast Ocean of the people's hatred, and thereby weaken his own power against the time he should have most occasion to use it.   

4  
It may further be demanded, why it so much importeth Princes, and great men, to be cautelous that they do not injury, or reproach any man?  
IS it for that he who is wronged of those who are in 
f Philipus Cominaeus.  eminent place, and authority, perceiving himself to be daily and hourly shot at, and noted for the same, grieveth the more thereat, and so sets up his rest to take a sharp revenge? Or ought they to be cautelous for this cause likewise, 
g Cominaeus.  lest if the wronged having formerly retained unto them, or made any dependency upon them, should upon any trust committed unto him, pay them home, in neglecting, or utterly overthrowing their chiefest businesses?   

5  
It may further be demanded, why it greatly importeth a Prince, to be Virtuous, Honourable of his word, just, and of good Example among all men, as well Foreigners, as Domestiques?  
IS it for that he may be thought unfit 
h Xenophon in Paedia Cyri.  to govern, who is not better every way then those who are to be governed? Or is it not for that cause only, but for that 
i Sen. 1. de Clementia.  his good name and fame likewise at home, and abroad is greatly blemished and stained, if the course of his life and dealings be not currant? Or ought he to be such an one for the better stablishing of his Kingdom also? 
k Sen. Thyestes.  For where there is no shame, care of doing of justice, Sanctity, Piety, & keeping of promise, thatkingdom must needs be unstable, and the State tottering.   

6  
It may be the same purpose further demanded, why a Prince ought to be just, to make special reckoning of the administration thereof equally to his Subjects, ay, to do justice upon himself, if he desire to be held for a good Prince?  
IS it for that 
l Plato in Polit.  a Lawless principality, and lose government is irksome to every one (especially of the better sort) so that they do not delight, or have any desire to live under it? Or is it for that the constant and strict observation, and administration of justice, doth 'stablish and strengthen a Kingdom, as the 
m Cic. Parad.  Orator well perceived, who said that justice and Equity were the true conservators of commonwealths and Cities? Or is it not only for that justice doth 'stablish a Kingdom, but for that it doth truly make a kingdom to be a Kingdom, giving unto it his very essence and being, whereby it is, that which it is? For take away justice, and what are Kingdoms but great Robberies? as well said the 
n August. de Civil. Dei lib. 4.  learned Divine.   

8  
It may further be demanded, why many Princes are very fearful, suspicious, and jealous of their estates?  
IS it because that 
o Attius.  Kingdoms are commonly subject to treacheries? Or is this rather the reason, for that the 
p Sen. Oedip.  nature of most Princes is prone to fear, and be jealous of their Estates? as well said the Poet, 
q Sen. in Agam.  Kingdoms and Marriages brook no rivals.   

9  
It may further be demanded, wherefore all credit, countenance, honours, and authority in Court, are for the most part slippery, and not to be trusted unto?  
HAppeneth it thus by reason of the Fates uncertainty (as it pleaseth the 
r Tacit. 3. Annalium.  Historian to set down) who averreth, that Court-favours, even by decree of the destinies, are not always lasting? Or might this rather be the reason, for that 
s Tacit. 17. Annalium.  Courtier's credits are (commonly) upheld by others, and not by their own strengths? Or not so neither, but for that these things thus fall out through the fault of the Princes, their Masters, whom they serve, whose wills and pleasures as they are 
t Sallust. jugurth.  vehement for the time, so they are very changeable, and oftentimes contrary to themselves?   

10  
Seeing that the 
u Sen. in Hippolito.  Court is so slippery a place, that a man shall hardly get fast footing: It may fitly be demanded, by what Compass a Courtier should sail, that he may be without all danger of shipwreck, whereby either his life may be hazarded, his goods diminished, or his honour blemished?  
SHall he attain unto those ends, if he show himself dutiful, obsequious, and respective of his Prince, as it pleased the 
x Tacit. 1. Annal.  Historian to affirm? For by how much the servant in the judgement of his Master, shall be held more desirous and ready to please him, than another shall; by so much the more he shall be advanced to honours and riches? Or may he compass his desires the better, if he be 
y The saying of Constantine the Great.  serviceable likewise, and not like the moths, and caterpillars of the Court? Or may he rather further his intents, if he be bold spirited also? For shamefastness is an ill servitor in a Prince's Palace, as well said the 
z Sen. in Hippol.  Poet. Or shall he be cautelous likewise, taking heed that whatsoever he well doth or performeth, he do it as 
a Velleius. 11.  though he seemed not to do it, and without boasting or bragging? Or (to avoid envy) shall he learn to 
b Tacit. 16. Annal.  dissemble, cloak, and obscure his own virtues, and proper gifts? Or shall he, being any ways advanced by his Prince's favours, like the Moon, 
c Tacit in Agric  acknowledge (oftentimes) that he hath received all the light of his glory, and grace of his rising, from that Sun his master? Or shall he strive and endeavour to become very 
d Sen. 11. de ira.  patiented, and 
e Sen. Hippolit.  extreme wary likewise? He must be very patiented, that he may bear injuries the better, & not fly out, or run into passion upon every cross he shall meet withal, or such distastes as shall be given him. He must be cautelous, lest he be taken in the traps of his feigned friends, or secret, or open professed enemies.   

11  
It may further be demanded, why it is better to live with, and serve a prudent and wise Prince, than a foolish?  
IS it because that a 
f Philip. Cominaeus. lib. 4.  foolish Prince being (for the most part) very suspicious, thinketh that every of his servants goeth about to deceive him, which to an Honest mind must needs be a great errosive? Or is it for that a 
g Idem ibidem.  foolish Prince not understanding his own affairs, cannot make difference of good service from bad, whereupon it cometh to pass, that his love is turned into hatred, and his hatred into love in a moment? Or is it not for these reasons only, but for this likewise, that 
h Phil. Com. lib. 4.  those servants which live under a wise Prince, have more means afforded them to retain their masters favour, if they once have had it, or to recover it if they have lost it, than it is possible they can have, who live under an Idiot, or foolish Prince? For no man almost dealeth in any thing with the Prince himself, but with his 
i This was well seen in the Duke of little Britain, who used only Peter Landoys.  servants, whom he changeth as often as he putteth on a clean shirt.   

12  
To the same purpose it may further be demanded wherefore (notwithstanding) many Courtiers have rather chosen to live in the Courts of some great Prince, though a fool, then in the Palace of a less potent Prince, though never so wise.  
IS it because that 
k Lucas de Penna.  it is true liberty (as some suppose) to live under the command of a potent Prince? Or is it rather, as others affirm, for that 
l Egisippus cum alijs, ut refert Guic.  the servitors services are graced and beautified by the greatness and supereminent dignity of their masters?   

13  
Seeing that none are borne Artists it may be demanded, what manner of Courtier is to be deemed and esteemed to be the better Craftsmaster in managing affairs of State?  
IS he the man who is 
m Guicchard.  furnished with the knowledge of divers tongues, well seen in Histories of the laws of his own and other Countries, that is religious, hath a quick wit, a ripe judgement, a fluent tongue, a grave style, & is an excellent penman? Or is he rather to be so accounted, who is 
n Guic. & Tacit 3. Annal.  smooth-tongued; gorgeously appareled, a great feast-maker, an artificial cosouner, a deep dissembler, a whoremaster, talebearer, flatterer, a privy-whisperer, and one that is given to all kind of villainy?   

14  
It may further be demanded, what might be the best means whereby Princes may free themselves, from being abused by flattery?  
MAy they effect this if they beware and take heed that they 
o Tholoz. de Repub. lib. 22. cap. 8  grow not into contempt with their people? Or shall they bring their purpose better about, if they sit often in counsel, and touching those things which they propound to be consulted upon, do show themselves 
p Plut. Apotheg.  patiented in hearing the truth, that their people may understand that they will not be offended, if they freely speak their minds, and confidently deliver that which is true? Or may this likewise further their intents, if upon the 
q Machiavelli his doctrine in his Prince. Cap. 23.  perceiving and finding out of some or other, who for some sinister respects (though towards themselves) have held their peace, or forborn to speak the truth, they do either show themselves to be greatly offended with them, or severely punish them?    

SECT. I. CHAP. FOUR  
Of a Kingdom: How it may be got, how kept, how it may be increased, how it may be made lasting or durable: And lastly, how it may be lost, or overthrown by hatred, contempt, etc.  

1  
It may be demanded, by what ways and means any Principality may be gotten, or conquered.  
IS it to be achieved by 
a Quintus Curtius. lib. 6.  foreign Arms, as it happened to Alexander, when he had overthrown Darius at Arbella? For after that victory, he never used in the full conquest of Asia, or other kingdoms, any other but foreign forces, for the most part. Or is it rather to be gotten by an homebred Army, seconded by the virtue and the manhood of the Leaders, and Captains, as it fell to the lot of 
b Xenophon.  Cyrus, Romulus, and Theseus? Or may it be attained by foreign force also, seconded by Fortune's favours, as it happened to Francis Sfortia, and Borgia Caesar? Or may it be gotten by the putting in practice of some notorious and desperate design, as it happened to Agathocles? Or may it be compassed by the favour of the Citizens, as Nabides got his dominion?   

2  
In the next place it may be demanded, how any Principality being once gotten, may be safely kept.  
MAy this be effected if the Prince prove industrious, and accommodate himself to make and take advantage of such accidents and occasions as time will continually afford him, and in all other things to imitate and follow the steps of his Ancestors? Or may it be effected, if he never give any offence to those, whose help he used in getting his dominion, but satisfy them according to their desires and hopes (if it be possible) as they have conceived of their own worths? Or may he this way rather attain thereunto, if finding treason intended against him, he should most severely punish it, for terror to the rest? Or may it this way be effected, if upon the obtaining of his dominion, he 
c The barbarous and inhuman practice of the Turks at every change of Prince.  destroy all the blood Royal, issues and allies, of the former Prince, and then observe the Country customs without changing their laws? Or may this rather be effected, if he that hath once gotten the sovereignty, remove his seat thither, and make his continual residence in his new dominion? Or may this yet rather be effected, if the Prince send Colonies into his new-gotten kingdom, or maintain garrisons both of horse and foot, in the frontier towns? Or may he better bring this to pass, if (after conquest made) dealing courteously with them, he retire himself, and accept of an annual pension, in the name of a tribute, leaving only some small company behind him, rather to nourish and increase his subjects good opinion of him, then for any other end or purpose? or may he effect this the better, if he altogether should change their laws and customs, and translate them to other remote places in the same kingdom, than those which before they inhabited? or may this rather be the way to purchase the favour and good opinion of the Senators, or commons, having them always addicted to his fortunes, taking upon him valiantly and courageously to defend those of his party, against the other faction? or were not this the better course, to stand upon his own guard, having an army ever in a readiness to chasten his subjects if they should rebel? Or finally, what if the 
d This did Croesus among the Lydians, as Polib. reporteth.  Conqueror should despoil the conquered of their weapons, and other means of defence or offence?   

3  
It may further be demanded, how a new got Kingdom may be enlarged?  
SHall this be attained unto, if the 
e This was the practice of the Romans in sending their Praetors.  Conqueror show himself mild & gentle to his new subjects, thereby to allure the hearts of the neighbour borderers, to take a liking of his manner of government? Or may it rather be effected, if 
f This fell out in the Macedunian Monarchy.  a great many of wise and warlike Princes do still succeed one another in the self-same government? Or may this be better done, if the conqueror have a great care that Military discipline be always used within his territories? Or should he rather go this way to work, to 
g This & such like practices were the Romans.  demolish the walls of the neighbour Cities, and cause the inhabitants to remove their dwellings into his territories? Or shall he friendly invite all strangers to come into his dominions, giving them letters of safe conduct, and securing them of their dwelling safely under his protection? Or shall he combine with divers neighbouring Cities, joining themselves with them as associates, so as the name of the Empire and government, as likewise the authority of levying of war, may ever remain with him, and be proper unto him? Or shall he make those whom he hath conquered to 
h Thus dealt the Spartans', Venetians and Florentius with them whom they conquered.  become vassals and slaves unto him? Or might this be effected, if certain Cities making 
i The practice of the Swissers at this day.  league among themselves, that they will all be governed, and with equal dignities, and respect, should draw in other Cities to affect that kind of government, and so to join in the same league and amity with them?   

4  
It may further be demanded, which might be the best way to make a state durable and lasting?  
SHall this be brought to pass, if by laws it be provided for, under pain Capital, that 
k All these things were foreseen by Lycurgus, the Laced. emonian Lawgiver.  no man should affect the Government? Or may it better be effected, if the Prince being strong of himself, shall yet give testimony to his neighbour Princes, that he is not ambitious, nor seeketh by levying of Arms, to enlarge his Dominions to any of their detriments? Or shall he do it yet the better, if by idleness, and vain pleasures he suffer not the minds of his subjects to be corrupted, or that they should grow too much effeminate?   

5  
Considering that Kingdoms are strengthened as well by awful Arms, as bright shining Virtue, it may be demanded, by what kind of force a Kingdom may best be preserved, and made durable.  
SHall it be made firm and stable by having an Army ever in a readiness, rather to offend then defend, according to the counsel of the Emperor Severus; which he gave to his sons, 
l Sic habetur apud Dionem in vita eius.  Agree among yourselves, every the Soldier, and contemn all others? Or shall this be the better way to make it stable, if the Prince 
m So did the Florentines to keep Pisa and Francis Sforeia to conserve Milan, but not to much purpose.  build many Forts, Towers, Citadels, Sconces, etc. within his Territories?   

6  
Seeing that hatred once conceived against a Prince by his subjects, is the next way to bereave him of his Crown, it may be demanded, how the Prince may run into such hatred, and what means he might best use to avoid it?  
MAy he run into this hatred by his own 
n Mach. de Repub. lib. 2.  boundless ambition, seeking to bring into bondage, and the great desires of his Citizens to continue free? Or may he come hated of his Subjects, by reason of 
o Mach. de Repub. lib. 3. cap. 6.  the injuries he hath offered them, either in seeking their lives, touching their honours, or preying upon them for their riches? Or rather may it this way come to pass that he be hated, for that he hath 
p Cic. Phillip. 2.  given cause to the Subjects to fear him, lest he do them a mischief? For, to fear, desire of revenge is a perpetual companion. And this proverb is most true, whom a man feareth, him he hateth; whom he hateth, he would gladly be rid of? Or may this be the reason he runneth into such hatred, for that he is 
q Tholoz. de Repub. lib. 22.  vicious; as cruel, covetous, sacrilegious, etc.   

7  
It may be further demanded, how the inflicting of severe punishments upon offenders, may be freed from hatred?  
SHall the Prince free himself therefrom, if he be 
r Sen. de Clem.  slow to punish delinquents, and thereby give testimony to the world, that his intent is rather to heal, and bind up a soar, then to launch and make it bleed by the arm of justice? Or shall he this way free himself, if he never punish, but 
s Sen. de Clem.  when the safety of the Common wealth calleth upon him so to do, or at least his Subjects be so persuaded? Or shall he this way rather be freed, if he 
t Cic. 2. de Offic.  never exact to take punishment of delinquents in an angry mood? Or may he this way avoid his subjects hatred, if he 
u Sen. 1. de Clem  show no● any signs of rejoicing, when he inflicteth punishment upon offenders, as though he thirsted after blood, or were delighted with the shedding of it? Or rather may this be his way, that when many have offended, he do not 
x Tacit. Agric.  now and then call them to account, as he listeth, holding them in a perpetual fear, but take his advantage against all, and punish all forthwith? Or rather by this way may he be freed therefrom, by not devising any new kind of punishments, but inflicting those which have been in use, according to old and ancient custom of the Country? Or may he this way likewise free himself, if he be very sparing in punishing of delinquents, and when he doth it, he might be thought to command it to be inflicted against his will, but never to be a spectator thereof? Or finally, may he thus free himself therefrom, if to please his subjects, he divert the force of his fury another way, 
y Tacit. 13. Annal.  causing such as have been his counsellors, and persuaders to wrong the Commonwealth, to taste the cup of his choler, by inflicting severe punishments upon them, or delivering them into the people's hands to be tormented?   

8  
It may further be demanded how a Prince may free himself of that hatred which he hath purchased, by vexing his Subjects with Impositions, Taxes, Tallages, etc. which are commonly grievous to them to bear?  
MAy this be done if the Prince persuade the people 
z Tacit. 13. Annal.  that if they will live in peace and out of danger, that it is altogether necessary they endure such impositions, which if they should not, it were impossible for them to live in safety, or the State to be durable? For 
a Tacit. 4. hist.  peace is not purchased but by Arms, nor Arms maintained but by Soldiers well paid, nor can the Soldier be paid without levying of Subsidies? Or shall the Prince free himself, if he command the gatherers of such Impositions, that they 
b Idem. Ibid.  neither by force, nor fraud, exact more of the Subject, then anciently hath been accustomed to be paid? Or shall he rather this way avoid their hatred, if sparingly, as just occasion enforceth him, he impend and lay out such treasure, as hath been levied by Subsidies, that his Subjects may see and perceive, that he is but a Steward, for the good of the Commonwealth, and no riotous spender, or exhauster of the treasure so gathered: or that he hath any desire to convert any of it, to his own use, or ends? Or shall he thus rather free himself, by taking of a course, that 
c Plin. Paneg.  just and uniform contribution be made according to every man's ability, never by favour sparing one man, that the burden may lie the heavier upon another man's shoulders?   

9  
It may further be demanded, how, and by what means, a great and potent Subject, may avoid and shun, the hatred of his Prince?  
MAy this be effected, if this great Noble man make himself first odious to the people? Or shall he better effect it, if he show himself very dutiful and obsequious to his Prince, praising all his good deeds, and sayings, and craftily dissembling whatsoever is bad in him? Or shall he attain thereunto, if he 
d This was the practice of Antipater, one of Alexander's Captains, as Q. Curt. reporteth.  never project to make himself great, strengthen himself with friends, or seek to be master of greater riches, then is convenient for his estate? Or if fortune have east all these things upon him, that he acknowledge continually, that he hath received, gained, and gotten them, by the grace and favour of his Prince, whose they are, whensoever he shall please to make use of them? Or shall he this way avoid his Prince's displeasure, if he have a special care to 
e This was the practice of joab, David's General.  attempt or do nothing, without consulting with, or obtaining the consent of his Prince, though otherwise he were assured that he could prevail in his attempts, and that it would turn to the good of his Country? Or shall he this way shun it, if being for a certain time made Deputy, Lieutenant General, or raised and evected to any other special place and dignity, he 
f The praictses of Antipater and Lucius Lucullus.  forthwith at the end, and expiration of his time resign his office to his Prince's hands, and in no wise seem to be desirous that it be prolonged, or continued unto him, lest he should seem to be sick of the swelling humours of Ambition? Or may he this way avoid it, if having won, and proving victor in divers battles, he impute the glory of his Conquests to the good fortune of his Prince, desiring that the victorious Army may now be led by some other, whom the Prince shall think good of, and retiring, put himself into his Prince's protection, carrying himself in a moderate fashion, as free from pride and ambition? By this only means a great General, though suspected and feared of his Prince, may so mollify and lenify his mind, that he shall have no cause to think ill of him, but shall make to himself great and apparent reasons to reward him for his good services.   

10  
It may further be demanded, why every Kingdom is so fickle and unstable?  
IS it because that every 
g Sen. Oedip. Idem. etiam Ep. xcij  Principality is the object of Fortune, who can never be daunted, but challengeth the like privilege against Empires, as Emperors. Or may this be the reason rather, because it is exposed to such, and so many hatreds, as the Tragical 
h Senec. Theb.  Poet sung, The Maker of the world coupled these two together; Hatred and a Kingdom. Or may this be the cause, for that it is subject to so many 
h Attius.  treasons, treacheries, etc. for there be very many in a Kingdom which be nought and unfaithful, few good?   

11  
To the same purpose it may be demanded, why among the Grecians and Romans, 
i Senec. Theb.  a Kingdom was so hateful for the most part?  
DId this come to pass by reason of the 
k Idem Agam.  manners, and crooked dispositions of their Princes, who being (for the most part) licentiously given, thought it was a great pledge of their Kingdom, and badge of their Royalty, that it was lawful for them to do that which no body else might? Or being self-willed, or proud, 
l Idem in Hippolito.  accounted it no less dishonour unto them, to be drawn to yield to any thing (though never so just) against their wills, then to be vanquished in battle? Or is not the fault so much in the dispositions & wills of kings, as in the harsh 
m Solust. ad Caesarem.  natures of the Subjects, being stubborn, refractory, and hardly won to yield due obedience? For no man willingly, would draw in another man's yoke.   

12  
Seeing that authority is as it were the 
n Cicero pro Cluent.  spirit by which every Commonwealth is governed, being flatly opposed to contempt, which may be called the 
o Arist. 5. Posit.  bane and destruction of all Kingdoms, it may be demanded, how a Prince may behave himself, that he neither fall into contempt amongst his own Subjects, or foreign States?  
SHall he effect this, if the 
p Tacit. 11. hist.  fashion of his government prove not too remiss, and gentle, whereby he may be thought to be negligent in ordering affairs of State? Or shall he perform it the rather, if he 
q Idem Ibidem.  show no levity in the form of his government, but constantly govern, according to the Laws and Decrees of the Commonwealth? Or shall he effect this likewise, if he show himself firm in his purposes, constant in his promises, and that he hath no 
r Idem Ibidem.  notable touch of mutability in his disposition? Or shall he bring this to pass, if (curiously) pondering things past, expending, and well weighing things present, and providently foreseeing things to come, he do timously consult, and determine, to bestow honours on 
s Idem Ibidem.  such men, as for their worth have deserved; not upon every fawning and obsequious favourite, or such as can purchase them with money? Or may he do this the better, if Fortune prove a mother unto him, and not a stepdame? Or shall he finally effect this likewise, if he first 
t Tacit. 15. Annal.  repress his own lusts, and inordinate affections, giving thereby his subjects examples to follow him in the like, and causing Foreigners to admire him therefore?   

13  
It may be further demanded how an Empire, or Kingdom may be finally lost?  
cometh it thus to pass, by a kind of a 
u Tholoz. lib. 22 de repub.  fatal necessity, when this or that State hath come    


a councillor to a Prince to be skilful of the customs of other nations, and to be a stranger in his own Commonwealth: or shall he compass this the better if he make choice of 
e Sallust. Catil.  grave and ancient men, as also of such as have 
f Idem in frag.  been tossed and tried with the variety of Fortune, having thereby learned to carry themselves both in weal & woe? Or lastly, shall the Prince never admit of any for his councillors, but such as 
g Plin. Paneg.  generally are accounted wise and virtuous? For particular men may deceive and be deceived, but no one man can deceive all men, neither hath any man been deceived of all men.   

2  
Again it may further be demanded, how a Prince may behave himself in his Consultations, that he may grow wise thereby, and so be accounted?  
SHall he effect this, if having wise councillors to advise him, he apt and accommodate himself to follow their directions, and what they have maturely deliberated and concluded upon, he forth with put in practice and execution? Or shall he better effect this, if sitting in Council himself, he propound, and hear them with patience and discretion debate the matter, and 
h Capitolinus de Marco Antonio.  never seem to be angry, or strive to master and overrule their opinions, though they determine clean contrary to his own humours, mind and desire? Or shall he rather bring this to pass, if being able to 
i Vigetius lib. 3.  contain himself, and keep close his own Counsels and intentions, he do (indeed) propound what ought to be done to all, or the most of his Counsel to consider of; but what he will do, to communicate it with very few, or rather none, but advise only with himself? Or shall he rather perform this, if he grant free liberty of speech, neither do too much affect those 
k Quint. Curt. lib. 8.  soft and silken words of the Court, which his flatterers will be ready to claw him withal; knowing that they will please his humours? Or finally shall he effect this, if with indifferency, and all alike equality, he hear every man's opinion, never 
l Thucid. lib 3.  rewarding any counciling well, least for the hope of gain, they might upon sinister respects (at any time) decline from the right, nor 
m Quint. Curt. lib. 3.  punish any (though they should counsel ill (so they do it not of maliciousness) for so he shall ever want councillors, if it be dangerous to give counsel?   

3  
It may further be demanded, why it is so exceeding available to a Prince, to have his counsels and determinations kept secret?  
IS it because that if they were 
n Guicchardine  known, they might be prevented and hindered? Or is it for this respect rather, because his honour and estimation both at home and abroad, is thereby much increased and augmented? Or not so much for the former reasons neither, but for that if his determinations were once known, 
o Idem.  many men pricked forward with envy, would detract from his wisdom, blaming him that he put not his intentions sooner in execution, though he could not (happily) find fit opportunity serving thereunto?   

4  
It may further be demanded, what course a Prince might best take, that he might not err in his Consultations?  
SHall he perform this, if he fully understand the 
p Tholoz. lib. 24.  nature of the business, which is to be deliberated upon? Or shall he do it the better, if understanding the matter, whereof to consult, he 
q Guicchardine  constantly determine with himself rather to respect (cautelously) the extremes, and final ends of businesses, then to regard middle courses, much less to run them? Or shall he also effect this, if he observe and mark how 
r Idem.  wisely and prudently his adversary (if any he have) behaveth himself in those things, which concern his honour, profit or safety? Or shall he rather accommodate and apply his counsels to the nature, manners and condition of his adversary, and by that means learn out and expiscate what might be likely that he will attempt against him? Or shall he compass these things the better, if in all his counsels and deliberations concerning the Commonwealth, he rather propound to himself how the honour, dignity and splendour thereof may be augmented, then what profit might thereby redound unto it?   

5  
It may further be demanded, what is chief required of Senators, that they may give wholesome counsel.  
MAy they effect this, if they be 
s Plin. Panet.  men fearing God, making his plain & even laws the strict and strait rule of their consulations? For seeing it is 
t Tholoz. lib. ●4.  God alone, which sustaineth and upholdeth Commonwealths, it were very fit that he should be made the chief head, and director of the counsels thereof. Or may they do it the better, if standing for the 
u Tacitly. Hist.  liberty of themselves, and the Commonwealth, they do stoutly and courageously, not faintly and fearfully pronounce and deliver their minds and opinions, lest they might rather be thought to run with the Fortune of the Prince, then with him, or the good of the Commonwealth? Or may they also effect this, if they show themselves 
x Tacit. 3. Hist.  modest, and of a quiet disposition? Or may they likewise effect it the better, if they can 
y Quint. Curt. lib. 4.  keep their own counsels? For it is very certain that no great matter can be looked for at his hands, who will vent what he should hold in? Or finally, may this better be performed, if choice be made of such Councillors which have 
z Tholoz. lib. 24. de repub.  no particular interest in those things which are to be consulted upon? For no man in his own cause, can speak, think, or judge uprightly, because every man therein will be partial.   

6  
Considering that middle courses (for the most part) prove unfortunate, it may be demanded why notwithstanding the running of a middle course being propounded by some one or other in public deliberations, it is (most what) embraced, followed, and put in execution?  
cometh it to pass through the ill 
a Fran. Guich.  disposition and worse affection of some addicted to faction and opposition, who perceiving that their own conceits cannot pass currant, had rather give way to, and allow of that which is worse, not extreme (lest he should seem to oppose) but different in a less distance, that thereby they may seem to have (in part) assented?  
Or is it not for this reason alone, but for that likewise the other advisers, 
b Idem.  lest they should displease some prime-man, who hath propounded a middle course of proceed, will likewise run along with him, and approve of his devise? Or rather is this the reason why such middle courses are by some no sooner propounded then approved, because (for the most part) provident and wary, especially ancient and aged Statists, do approve of that course which they imagine to be least violent and dangerous, and incline to the mean, as being the sweeter and more passable without noise or Nuissance.   

7  
Seeing that the close minds, wills and ends of councillors be strange, divers, and for sinister respects, privately kept to themselves, for (oftentimes) upon pounding of matters to be consulted upon, 
c This was the practice of Torlton Archbishop of Canterbury, against Edward the second, by whose advice his son was sent into France, who joining with his mother & Mortimer, became the head and Captain of the Rebels against his own father.  one thing is spoken, another thought and meant, whereby the minds and opinions (only) of others may be discovered; it may here be demanded, how a Prince may judge whether his councillors advise him well or no?  
SHall he know this by the 
d Mach. in Prin.  disposition of the Councillor? For he that more respecteth himself then his Prince, & in the carriage of any matter regards his own private more than the good of the Commonwealth, as long as he beareth this mind, he can never prove a faithful councillor, nor one whom the Prince or State may trust or rely upon. Or shall he understand this by the 
e Tholoz. lib. 24.  frequent use & experience he hath had of his councillors in the like businesses falling out ill, or well? Or shall he rather come to the knowledge hereof by making an 
f Idem ibidem.  exact: search and disposition how matters are carried and disposed of within his own territories? Or shall he rather come to this knowledge by the frequent reading of Histories? or by the apprehending or comprehending of these two Principles, What is Profitable, What is Honest. Which too indeed are the bounds and grounds of truth, and of that worthy wisdom and judgement which ought to be in a Senator.    

SECT. I. CHAP. VI  
Of Example, the use and abuse thereof in a Commonwealth.  

1  
It may be demanded, why subjects (for the most part) 
a Claudian.  frame & conform themselves to the fashion of their Princes?  
IS it for that both the 
b Plin. Paneg.  eyes of the mind, and the body, (for the most part) look upwards, and stand (as it were) at gaze at greatness and eminency, tending and bending the whole man to dance as they pipe? Or is it because 
c Tacit. 3. Annal  Examples urge and enforce more than Laws can do, seeing it is the nature of man, rather to be led of his own accord; then to be compelled? Or is it rather for that 
d Quintilian decls. 4.  Example in Princes is a kind of secret law? For it fareth and falleth out thus (for the most part) with their acts, that what they do, they even seem to command it.   

●  
Again it may be demanded, why in reforming of a Commonwealth, the producing of examples of the most famous and illustrious men, for virtue in the same do very much avail?  
IS it because that such men being compelled by no Laws, yet of their own accord, and free-will, acting, exercising, and exhibiting, singular and rare examples of virtue, do excite and stir up such as be good, to follow them, and those which are bad, they do either make them a shamed, or discourage them from going on in their lewdness? Or is it rather for this, that when by long process of time, there hath been no exemplary punishment inflicted upon offenders, men grow regardless of Laws, and the number of delinquents so increase, that the Magistrate is afraid to punish them? Then one Manlius Torquatus to punish his own son; or a Quintus Fabius to be accused and condemned for joining battle with the enemy, without the Dictator's leave; and such examples, do much bridle and repress other men's insolences.   

3  
It may further be demanded, why he that judgeth by examples is commonly deceived?  
IS it for that 
c Franciso. Guicch.  all the self-same reasons and circumstances in the like actions, do seldom, or never concur, and meet again? Or is it because the 
f Idem.  like actions are not always governed with the like wisdom and discretion? Or may this be the reason rather, because 
g Idem.  Fortune at all times, playeth not her part alike, but now and then faileth her favourites?    

SECT. I. CHAP. VII.  
Of Wits, Manners, and Dispositions: of divers Cities, Countries, and Nations, as well free as servile.  

1  
It may be demanded what kind of wits, may be termed the best wits.  
MAy such be counted for the best, which are 
a Guicch.  more stirring, sharp, and acute, fiery and subtle, then ordinary? But these noble and excellent wits (for the most part) do prove very cross, and are oftentimes the cause of much disquietness, turmoil, and trouble to him who is endued therewith. Or may those rather be taken for the best, which though 
b Idem.  more blunt, yet are more certain and lasting, and (for the most part) are more fortunate than the other.   

2  
It may further be demanded, why in one and the self-same City, there may be found many distinct families, whose manners and conditions are particular to themselves; as we read amongst the Romans, that the Manlij were ever stern and severe, the Publicolae courteous and gentle, the Appijs proud and ambitious, etc.  
cometh this to pass, by reason of the diversity of their temperatures? But that (as it may be thought) might be changed and altered, by the variety of Marriages. Or may this rather be the cause, for that every Family hath a peculiar manner of bringing up their children? for this commonly holdeth true, 
c Mach. Disput. de Repub. lib. 3. cap. 46.  whatsoever manners and opinions, are instilled into the minds of youth in their infancy, they will hardly or never be removed, but continue with them even to their old age.   

3  
It may be further demanded, why 
d Liu. in his books affirmeth this of the Frenchmen.  divers Nations, at the first assault, or onset given, seem to be magnanimous, and very fierce and forward to the battle, but within a while after do grow very fearful, and turn Cowards?  
MAy the cause consist in any peculiar affect in their natures? But it is possible that 
e Mach. disput. Cap. 36.  nature from day to day, may be corrected and amended? Or might this rather be the reason, that such Nations being 
f Idem Ibidem.  without order or exercise of Military Discipline, are not enabled with such ordinary manhood, as may establish their hearts and minds, making them to conceive an assured hope of victory, and therefore if they be not vanquishers in the first assault, they strait ways quit the field? And this (under correction) I take to be the true reason of their fearfulness and running away.   

4  
It may further be demanded, wherefore divers men (even lewd persons) having many times occasions offered them, to commit some memorable and notable villainy, notwithstanding (for the most part) they dare not attempt it, or put it in practice, and execution?  
IS it for that they are afraid lest they should 
g Mach. disp. lib. ●. cap. 27.  incur the note of infamy? But the greatness of the thing, might (happily) cover the badness of the fact, and likewise protect the party from danger. Or do they abstain from perpetrating and committing such horrtble villainy, by reason of their 
h Idem Ibidem.  own inbred goodness, or nice touch of their conscience? But such godly and holy motions do never enter into the hearts of such lewd lossels. Or may this rather be the reason, for that by nature, it is not afforded to the most men, to be 
i Idem Ibidem.  absolutely evil, or perfectly good?   

5  
It may further be demanded, why there should be such, and so great difficulty, in changing or amending old customs, though most men (convicted secretly in their consciences by evident truth) should confess they were altogether unprofitable, and dangerous to the Commonwealth to continue them?  
MAy this be the reason, for that although some good Citizens, or Patriots, foreseeing the danger, do persuade the change thereof, yet they should not be able fully to turn the people's minds, by reason of others oppositions? Or may this rather be the cause, for that most men stand so affected, and affectionated, to their ancient course of living, that they would not willingly departed therefrom? Or may this be the reason of the difficulty of amending evil customs, for that there is ever a want of proportionable means agreeable to the Laws, to bring that business about, so that they must be driven to fly to new courses altogether, which seldom prove fortunate? Or may this rather be the reason, for that if some few, or any one man, should go about to change the form of government, it should be necessary for him, first by force to invade the State, and then to seize the liberties thereof into his hands, which might be thought not to be the part of a good man, and therefore he will rather desist from his purpose, then do his Citizens so much good? Or may this be a further reason, for that the most men are persuaded, that there can scarcely be that man found, who having once brought a State under subjection, by ill means, would afterwards use that power and authority which he had so ill gotten, to the benefit and good of the people?    

SECT. I. CHAP. VIII.  
Of Benefits, and when to be bestowed: Of Ingratitude, and how a friend may be purchased that a man may trust unto.  

1  
It may be demanded when Benefits are to be bestowed upon a man?  
ARE they to be collated upon him 
a Mach. d●sp. lib. primo, cap. 23.  just at that time, when the bestower of them is compelled so to do, as needing the present help of such a man, or for some private end to himself best known? But this manner of giving should seem to be very extravagant, and distasteful, to the receiver, as thinking that they were collated upon him by reason of the party's necessity, which once served, he would never confer more upon him. Or are they not so to be collated upon any man, but 
b Idem Ibidem.  timously rather, before he which may have need of them, shall have occasion to use them, or the Collator thereof the person?   

2  
It may further be demanded, wherefore they who have 
c As Charond as amongst the AEginensians, The mistocles amongst the Athenians; Camillus, Scipio, etc. among the Romans, were imprisoned, banished, or put to death.  best deserved of a Commonwealth are (oftentimes) worst recompensed and requited?  
IS this the reason, for that 
d Pindarus.  there is nothing less lasting then the very name of a Benefit? Or is this rather the cause, for that it is 
c This was proper to the Athenians and Lacedæmonians.  appropriate and peculiar to certain Commonwealths, so to envy those which excel in virtue and goodness, as they themselves being not able to follow and imitate them therein, seek to spoil them of their government and Empire? Or may this rather be the reason, that some 
f Philip. Coming.  standing too much upon their own merits, have borne themselves too proudly against tje State, or their own society? Or might this likewise be the cause, for that those, who either by their rare exploits, or cunning ambition, creep into the favour of the people at home, and hunt after renown and admiration abroad, may seem to dim the glory of their Princes, who greatly desire to be accounted well-deserving of their own people, as those to whom it more properly belongeth, and therefore they must needs oppose such, and grow in distaste of them? Or is it for that all men generally by their own corrupt nature, are less prone, prompt, and ready to requite a good turn, then to revenge an injury? Or may this rather be the reason for that the Prince, or 
g Upon this very conceit the Venetians put to death Lauderanus, because he pacified a commotion by his own authority; as Petrus Bem bus reporteth in his Venetian History.  State, groweth into suspicion of such kind of men, lest they should affect innovation, or seek to tyrannize?   

3  
It may further be demanded, why kindnesses, and good will, are oftentimes requited with ingratitude, and unthankfulness?  
IS it because that he which neither can, nor hath any desire to remunerate him, to whom he is so much indebted, will either forget them, or persuade himself, and the world, that no such kindnesses were offered unto him, or received by him? Or may this be the reason, that those men, who have been (as it were) driven, and by fatal necessity compelled to receive kindness of other men, should afterwards grow ashamed of it, that they should be thought to have had need of such means?   

4  
Seeing that no man can deny, but that the use of friends is such, and so great, that many times a man may be driven to rely his whole estate thereupon; It may be demanded, how a man may be ascertained, that he hath purchased a true friend?  
SHall he give confidence to him, whom he hath 
h Guicchardine.  bound by grace and benefits? Or shall he trust him, who hath any ways need of his help? Or shall he rather repose his confidence in him who is bound 
i Pindarus.  unto him, by having equal profit and share in any business, which they shall jointly attempt and obtain?    

SECT. I. CHAP. IX.  
Of Estimation and Credit, of Authority, public and private, Severity, strictness of Government, Constancy, Piety, and Providence.  

1  
 Authority is the prop of kingdoms, and that it is of the most men confessed, that the majesty of an Empire consisteth in the splendour, grace, and defence thereof: it may be demanded, how a Prince might beget such a reverent opinion of himself amongst his subjects, & foreigners likewise, whereby he might become both admired and feared?  
SHall he effect this, if he institute such a form of government, which is 
a Cicero pro milone.  severe, constant, and strict, bearing an hard over those whom he ruleth? Or shall he attain thereunto the better, if having 
b Mach. Prin. & Tholoz.  homebred strength & forces, he continually keep them about him, and have them in a readiness? Or if he be destitute of such forces, do strait ways take a course to provide them elsewhere? Or shall he compass this the rather, if he excel other Princes in the 
c Claudian. 3.  integrity and soundness of his manners, fashions, and good conditions? Or shall he yet the better effect this, if he delight still 
d So Ferdinand King of Spain, and Henry the 5. King of England, grew famous.  to be in action, and grow famous for well performing of what he undertaketh? Or shall he likewise obtain his purpose, if in cases of difference betwixt Princes, he 
e Mach. Prin. Cap. 21.  cut off all respects of Neutrality, and declare himself for one of them? Or shall he this way come to his ends, if he give this testimony to the world, that he is a lover of virtue, honouring all excellent men, of what sort and Art soever? Or finally, shall he this way compass his desires, if he give encouragement and hope to his subjects whom he governeth, that they shall live quietly under his protection, and peaceably go about their affairs and businesses, in what kind soever they shall traffic or deal?   

2  
It may further be demanded, wherefore it concerneth a Prince so deeply to be highly esteemed both at home and abroad?  
IS it for that 
f Fran. Guicch.  estimation and authority once lost (which may easily be done) can hardly or never be recovered again? Or is it for that 
g Idem.  estimation and authority in martial affairs, is of so great consequence, that the effecting of any business of import, doth wholly seem to depend thereupon? Or may it be for this reason rather, that it shall be much more difficult for him whose credit and estimation beginneth to decay to defend himself and his estate from the least dangers, then for him who keepeth up his estimation, and hath it imprinted in the hearts of his subjects or soldiers, to effect great matters, though his means be weaker? Or may it be for this reason likewise, for that it sometimes importeth a Prince to set his authority upon the tentors, and stretch it beyond his ability for the effecting and performing of some great enterprise? Now a Prince shall never bring this to pass, unless his subjects and soldiers be persuaded, that his power, authority, and estimation, is greater than (indeed) it is; but if they be thereof once persuaded, he shall have that done readily, freely, and of their own accords, which otherwise he should never have had granted, much less extorted from them against their wills.   

3  
It may further be demanded, how a Prince may compass it to be feared of his subjects, and withal get himself great reputation thereby?  
SHall he do this, if he use them 
h Fran. Guich.  rigorously, and oftentimes inflict severe punishments upon them? For they will easily be brought to stand in fear of him, whom they know both can and will correct them, and bring them into order, especially if they perceive him by his natural inclination, to be thereunto addicted. Or shall he finally effect this the rather, if he never use a stronger 
i Guicchardine.  medicine, than the nature of the disease, or strength of his sick subjects are able to bear?   

4  
It may further be demanded, how a subject may gain himself reputation with the common people?  
SHall he do this, if he be 
k Mach. disp. cap. 34.  descended of noble Ancestors, who have approved themselves brave and excellent men in the carriage of themselves, and managing of great actions? Or shall he do this the rather, if he betake himself to a wise and well settled course of life, conversing with none (as near as he can) but with excellent men, and such are virtuous? Or shall he yet effect this the better, if in his younger years he shall perform any thing, either publicly or privately, which in itself is memorable, and withal is honest? Or shall he attain thereunto likewise, if being trusted with the 
l Mach. Prin. cap. 21.  managing of public affairs of his Country, he discharge himself well thereof, having rather an eye that his actions may redound to the good of the commonwealth, then to his own or other men's private, how near or dear soever they may be unto him, or himself to himself?   

6  
It may further be demanded, wherefore the Romans thought it necessary, that their Generals of the field managing Arms amongst foreign Nations, should have free liberty to dispose of those affairs according to their own best liking.  
WAs it for that the 
m Mach. disp. lib. 2. Cap. 33.  Senate did well understand, that if they commanded their Generals should attempt nothing without their directions, advice and privities, it would be the next way to make them lose, idle, and less circumspect in exercising their charge and office? Or was this rather the reason, for that they were persuaded, 
n Idem Ibidem.  that the fortune of the wars were doubtful, and that sometimes sudden accidents might fall out, which might very much either advance and further their designs, or greatly hurt them; which occasions (as they rightly deemed) he only could take, understand, and make advantage of, who should be present when they were offered?   

6  
It may further be demanded, how the Authority and estimation of a Prince may be made famous, if he should carry a strict hand over his subjects, in ruling and governing them?  
SHould he compass his ends, if he alone should 
o Tacit. 2. Annal. Liu. etiam lib. 9  retain and keep all the main offices and businesses of the crown in his own hands, so that all men should be enforced to look upon, and unto him, as of whom only they were to expect all things which might do them good? Or shall he yet compass his designs, if he never prorogue, or continue any too long in an office, (especially in military affairs) lest his substitute growing too proud, should work any thing which might turn to his prejudice?   

7  
It may further be demanded, why this or that Prince his government is counted sharp and severe; when the rule of others is thought to be very gentle and easy.  
MAy this be the reason, for that 
p Mach. disp. lib 3. cap. 22.  some austere man coming to the government, doth wish, and hath (as it were) a longing desire to have all men like himself? Or may this rather be the reason, for that such a man coming to sway the state, is commonly a valiant man, and therefore commanding great and difficult enterprises to be undertaken by his subjects, useth sometimes severity, whereby those things may be put in execution, according as they were commanded them?   

8  
It may further be demanded, wherefore it should be needful that that government should be strict and severe, which should beget authority and estimation to a Prince?  
MAy this be the reason, for that jenitie (for the most part) causeth contempt, and that in any corruption of manners it is necessary the 
q Sallust. Lepid.  subject do stand in awe, or be made to stand in awe of his Prince? Or may this rather be the cause, for that 
r Cicero pro Milone.  clemency and remissness opens the main gap to offending, when men are persuaded that they shall scape unpunished? For 
s Sen. 1 de Clem  who will fear him who always keepeth his sword fast locked in the feabbard, or for a little 
t Cic. 1. in Catil.  idleness suffereth the edge of his authority to be blunted? Or may this rather be the reason, for that the common people are every way better ordered, being compelled to do their duties, and by keeping them in fear, then if all the clemency, courteous entreaty, and demeanour of the Prince should be afforded them?   

9  
It may further be demanded, why the constant keeping of one manner and form of government, must needs much avail to make a Prince much esteemed?  
MAy this be the reason, for that (as all 
u Tholoz.  innovation in a State is dangerous) the Prince shall be put in fault, and greatly blamed, if upon changing any thing in the government, it should not well succeed and prosper? Or may this rather be the reason, for that 
x Thucid. lib. 6.  experience hath taught us, that those States and Commonwealths are best governed, which affect the least alteration of old customs and manners, though they be not all of the best?   

10  
It may further be demanded, why a godly and Religious Prince is held in great honour and estimation with the people?  
IS it for that 
y Tacit. 2. Annal  Piety and Godliness even of itself is venerable, making Princes to seem like Gods among their people? Or may this rather be the reason, for that the people are persuaded that the 
z Livy in his first book maketh mention, that Numa Pompilius conferred mightily with the Nymph Egeria etc.  Prince will not attempt or go about any enterprises, but such wherein he shall be seconded by the help of Heaven?    

SECT. I. CHAP. X.  
Of Glory and Renown, the desire thereof profitable to the Commonwealth: Of Power and Greatness, and the acquiring thereof. Of Ambition and unlawful desire of reigning: Of eminent Cities, and their being free, for the most part, from practices of Treasons, Rebellions, Insurrections, Mutiny, etc.  

1  
It may be demanded, what might be the reason, that the vehement desire and thirst after glory and renown, hath always been praiseworthy, and held profitable for the Commonwealth, whereas the least desire of reigning, in any great Subject, hath been condemned on all hands, and ever thought to be dangerous and hurtful to the State?  
IS it because 
a Fran. Guicch.  the hunting after honour and renown, elevateth and raiseth a man's thoughts, and exciteth to noble and generous actions? Whereas contrary wise the ambitious, and boundless desire of ruling, provoketh a man to propound to himself dangerous courses, and to run them though it be to his own undoing? Or may it be for this reason likewise, for that he which is of an 
b Idem.  ambitious and turbulent spirit, regardeth neither right or wrong, of Sovereign or Subject, but upon the least conceit to compass his unlawful desires, engageth himself in factions, brawls, and quarrels, filling all men's hearts with fear, and disturbing the quiet of the State so far, that as much as in him lieth, he will rather hazard the safety of it, then desist from his barbarous enterprise? Whereas he who is only desirous of honour and renown, neither feareth dangers, nor attempteth or alloweth of any lewd courses, whereby he, or his, might be branded with the note of infamy, or disgrace?   

2  
It may further be demanded, how 
c Livy lib. 2. Potency is the highway to gain authority.  potency and greatness may be acquired, whereby the authority of a Prince may be made more illustrious and resplendent?  
IS it to be purchased with money, to whom 
d Arist. Rhet. II. cap. 16. & horat. Serm. 11.  all things do stoop? Or is it to be acquired by Arms rather? for this is an infallible rule, that large Empire and Dominion, is not gotten, kept, or maintained by 
e Tacit. 15. Annal.  idleness, but by the use and exercise of Arms, and Military Discipline? Or is it not gotten by these means alone, but by 
f Tacit. 11. Annal.  firm counsel, and wary circumspection also? Or may it be attained unto, by making 
g Arist. Rhet. ad Alex Cap. Vltim.  firm leagues, and sure peace with foreign Princes? Or to conclude, may it be gotten by the 
h Quint. Curt. lib. 8.  benefit of fortune, who (most what) doth marvelously favour and advance some special sorts of men?   

3  
It may further be demanded, what might be the reason that those men who are ambitious, and have an itching desire to be invested with the government of States, if they once be evected to some eminent place in the Commonwealth, 
i So it fared with john of Gaunt Duke of Lancaster, and Thomas Woodstock Duke of Gloucester, protectors of Rich. the 2. And with Rich. the 3. protector of Edw. the 5. etc.  they are never contented, but strive and endeavour to rise higher and higher, and if once they can surprise the State, they will rather die, then come afterwards to lead a private life?  
cometh it thus to pass, for that all 
k Mach. disp. lib. 1. cap. 37.  men even by nature, are apt and prone to desire great matters, though they be not so fitted and accommodated in themselves, to obtain and keep them? Now where the desire is more than the ability to get, the mind can never be at quiet, or contented with those things which already it doth enjoy. Or is it for that 
l Guicchardinus.  Ambition of itself blindeth the eyes of men, persuading them that their merits and deserts are greater than (indeed) they be, and thereupon they affect and attempt strange matters, and run headstrong courses to their own destructions oftentimes? Or may this be the reason, for that he who once hath had his temples circled with a Crown, can never after brook a private life, because Kings and Kingdoms, are ever to be thought and believed to exceed proportion?   

4  
It may further be demanded, what man may rightly be censured and deemed to be ambitious?  
IS he so to be deemed and taken, who under 
m Aul. Pol.  pretence of amplifying and enlarging the dignity Royal; will seek to domineer over others, and rule all things according to his own lusts? without cause or reason, changing the ancient Officers (though never so honest) at his will and pleasure, and suffecting others into their places, whom he well knoweth to be of his own faction, and (when time shall serve) will favour his party? Or may he likewise be thought ambitious who with great 
n Tholoz. lib. 22  gifts, large promises, and all kind and friendly Offices, seeketh to conciliate and get the favour and good will of the people, whereby he may be one step higher to his rising?   

5  
It may further be demanded, why all the Arts, cunning and practices, by which ambitious men study to climb to the height of greatness, are kept so secret, that they hardly or never burst out, or come to be known, till they have obtained what they sought for?  
cometh it so to pass, for that 
o Mach. disp. lib. prim. Cap. 46.  men do not by and by (and as it were upon the sudden) but by degrees grow ambitious; whose progresses being not observed (except of some few) they may more easily deceive and blind men's eyes? Or may this rather be the reason, for that the ambitious do always 
p Idem. Ibidem.  use some honest pretext whereby they may compass their designs, as though all their actions did tend and bend to these ends, lest the Commonwealth (forsooth) or themselves should be wronged, when the truth is, that they strive to get the garland, that thereby they may both oppress others, and the weal Public?   

6  
It may further be demanded, how, and by what safe means it may be provided for, that a man shall not grow too ambitious and insolent in a State, or if he should, how his insolency may be repressed, and nipped in the head, whilst it is yet in the bud?  
MAy this be effected, if there should never way be given, or means afforded, to create or erect any such office, or eminent dignity in the Commonwealth, out of the which the State might have cause to fear, least in process of time, Tyranny might take her first rising, and beginning therefrom? Or may it rather thus be compassed, if the State take heed, and with wary circumspection provide, 
q Aristophanes in Ranis.  that they never foster, cherish, orbring up, any lions Whelp, much less the Lion himself, within their Territories? Or may it thus likewise be done, if such worms, and 
r Tholoz. lib. 22.  moths, which breed of too much moisture, and are wont to consume those things whereof they had their beginnings, be choked or shaken off, before they come to any great bigness, or turn the whole Substance of that they feed upon, into their own? Or may it thus likewise be brought to pass, if heed be taken, that if by the heat of the bosom of the Commonwealth, there be hatched and nourished any dangerous serpent, it be 
s The error of the Athenians and Florentives, that they would not do after this Counsel.  timously exposed to the cold (which is the only way to kill it) yet never suffer it to hiss other where in a place more commodious, least by sucking out the poison thereof, there might follow a deeper stinging? Or may this also be effected, if heed be taken that the 
t The practice of Rich. the 2. against the Duke of Hereford, and Tho. Mowbray Duke of Norfolk: For the King feared Heref. lest (having the love of the people) he should have vanquished Mowbray, and so he banished them both, and lest also it might have fallen out that the Duke of Heref. should have gotten the victory, & so have graced himself.  ambitious be never permitted to engage himself in any public business, especially never employed in Martial affairs, lest by the well managing thereof, he draw unto himself credit and estimation with the Common-people, which he abusing, might afterwards turn to the hurt and damage of the Weal Public? Or may it be brought to pass by this means also, if divers of his 
u Tholoz. lib. 22.  own rank and quality do bandy with him, and of set purpose oppose his proceed, the munition, and all other warlike furniture, being (in the mean time) under the command of the Prince, or Commonwealth? Or may this finally be effected, if 
x Mach. dis●. lib. 1. cap. 52.  hindrance be given to his ambitious designs, by the same ways, means, and instruments, which he himself used to climb to the top of his desires?   

7  
It may lastly be demanded, wherefore the more eminent Cities (as in particular it may truly be instanced in, and of, this Honour able City of 
y So Iacke Straw his rebellion begun in Kent, in the time of Rich. the 2. who was flame by the Right Honourable William Walworth, in Smithfield, whereby the City for that honourable service had the Dagger added to their Arms. So jacke Cade his conspiracy and rebellion in Henry the 6. his days, came from Kent likewise. So Kets conspiracy came from Norfolk in the time of Edw. the 6. So the rebellion in the North, was moved against Q Elizabeth of Famous memory by impious Pius Quintus B. of Rome. So the powder-treason was plotted & contrived in our Sovereign Lord King james his  London) are generally free from plotting, practising, or contriving any treasons, rebellions, insurrections, mutinies, etc. against the Prince, or State: when other more remote parts of the Kingdom, are, and ever have been more subject to put in practise such hellish projects?  
IS it for that in the more famous and eminent Cities (where the Magistrates are commonly more careful and watchful than other where) the plotters of treasons and rebellions, cannot so conveniently convene and come to together, to consult about their villainies, without being noted, observed, and espied, as they may do under any colourable pretext, in the Countries near adjoining, or other remote parts from such Cities? Or is it not for this cause alone, but for that in such eminent Cities (and in particular within this City of London) the word of God is more plentifully Preached, whereby the Citizens are better instructed in their duties to God and their Prince, then commonly they are in all the Country beside? Or may this be a further reason for the said City of London in particular, for that as well the chief Magistrate thereof, as other worthy 
time, by divers Gentlemen in several Countries. But in all these there was never a Citizen in any of them.  Citizens therein, are nearer to the Court, and by reason of their eminent places, and prime Offices which they bear, and daily do execute for the Prince, and in his name, to the good of Town and Country, have (ever) more dependence of their Prince, then in other places further distant therefrom, the other subjects can have: whereby it cometh to pass that they never desire innovations, nor engage themselves and their estates by plotting of treasons, raising rebellions, etc. but content themselves with their own conditions, studying to love, and to be beloved of their Prince, which things are not so well performed by particulars, in places further distant therefrom, as hath been showed? Or, to conclude, may this likewise be the reason, for that the said City of London, being the Chamber of the Prince, wherein he ever presumeth that he may be most safe, the Citizens even out of their love and loyalty to their Prince, have ever thought foul scorn that themselves should be found untrue, or disloyal; or that themselves, or their City should be branded with the hateful name of Traitors, or having treason, rebellion, or treachery, batched in it?    

SECT. I. CHAP. XI.  
Of Studies, dispositions, & whence the diversity thereof may proceed: Of Learning likewise, knowledge of tongues and Histories, how necessary & available they are in general, but especially for a Prince, that thereby he may more clearly see, and exactly judge of his own affairs. Of Intelligence, and the use and benefit thereof.  

1  
It may be demanded, whence the varieties of studies and diversity of dispositions of men might proceed?  
DOth this diversity happen by 
a Fran. Guicch.  reason of the variety of times and places? Or not so neither, but by the mutability of the unstable multitude rather, of whom this Proverb is truly verified, So many men, so many minds? Or falleth it out thus the rather, by reason of the 
b Tholozanus.  difference of years, and unlikeness of manners of the inhabitants of one and the self-same kingdom, the desires and ends of the Nobles, Senators, and people, being clean contrary one to the other?   

2  
It may further be demanded, wherefore wise men have in all ages greatly endeavoured to persuade all men to get learning and knowledge before any other thing?  
WAs it because they plainly saw and perceived, that it was the best means 
c Sen. Epist. 98.  to purge and purify the minds of men, whereby they might be apted to receive and retain virtuous precepts? Or might this be the reason, for that they well knew, that the embracing of good letters was 
d Quintilian, lib. 12.  the highway to wisdom, by which the policy of a State is most advanced?   

3  
It may further be demanded, wherefore the knowledge and skill of languages is necessary and profitable for all men, but especially for a Prince and privy councillor?  
MAy this be the reason, for that all men are commonly well pleased to 
e Guicch.  understand, & to be understood of those with whom they shall chance to have any dealing? Or may this be the cause, for that a man being skilful in the tongues, can 
f Cominaeus.  better explain himself and his own meaning, and shall much better be understood, then if he should deal by an Interpreter? Or may this likewise be a main reason, for that many times it falleth out, that a privy Councillor is to take notice of some serious businesses, which mightily import the State to know, and be secret in, which things can never be related, and transacted so well, nor to such good purpose, if for want of knowledge of the tongues, the Councillor or Relator must of necessity use the help of some third person? Or may the knowledge of tongues be thought so available to a Prince or Statesman, for the entertaining and giving audience to Ambassadors, hearing of their messages, be they hostile or friendly, and giving them their dispatches, answers, and dismissions?   

4  
It may further be demanded, wherefore wise men have held the knowledge of Histories to be the readiest way whereby a man may become wise, calling 
g Tacit. 4. Annal. Cic. de Orator. Diodorus Siculus. Cominaeus.  History the life and soul of memory, the light of truth, director of man's life, & c?  
IS it because that by reading of Histories, a man shall truly find 
h Diod. Sicul. 1. Bibliorum.  Virtue, to have her due praise, and honour given her, as contrariwise to Vice, her due shame and reproof? Or may this be the reason, for that 
i Plutarch. in Timol●onte.  History is avialeable to instruct any private man (of what degree soever) how to flame his life, and carry himself with commendation in the eye of the world, when, as in a glass, he shall see how to beautify & compose it, according to the pattern of other men's virtues? Or may this be a further reason, for that thereby a man may 
k Livy lib.  become a Statesman, and know how to manage public affairs, drawing his rules and directions out of old Antiquities, and times passed, as out of a Storehouse, and making application thereof to the time present?   

5  
It may further be demanded, what may be the chief use, benefit and end of Intelligence?  
MAy it be beneficial to a Prince or State, because he may thereby 
l Fran. Guicch. Aul. Pol.  distinctly know the condition and state of all Countries, the power and strength of their Princes and Governors, the wisdom and skilfulness of their Senators, in managing the affairs of State, and the originals and continuance of their families, with many other particulars necessary to be known to a Prince or State, who either hath, or may have dealing with other Nations? Or may this rather be the chief use & end of Intelligence, that a Prince or wise Statesman may thereby better 
m Polib. lib. 1. Pacuvius & Guich.  discover the secret frauds, and cunning practices of his fair tongued, and smooth-faced friends (but indeed his crafty and subtle adversaries) as likewise the machinations, drifts, and intents of his open enemies, whereby he may better be enabled to explicate and wind himself out of dangers, or frustrate their intentions, by crossing and counter-mining of them?    

SECT. I. CHAP. XII.  
Of peace, and the conditions thereof: Of the State, and affairs of Princes: Of Embassages, Ambassadors, and who are fittest to undertake such charge: what Arguments are most persuasive, and of the great use of Eloqence in a Statesman or Ambassador.  

1  
It may be demanded, why wisemen have always thought peace to be expedient for both parties, as well for the victor, as those who have been conquered?  
MIGHT it be for this reason, for that they supposed it 
a Senec. Here. Fur.  impossible for the world to continue, if it should be vexed with continual wars? Or might this rather be the reason, for that they truly judged that the 
b Idem Ibidem,  conquered must of necessity, accept of what peace and conditions soever the Victor shall grant them? And that they thought it likewise to be a 
c Liu. lib. 30.  comely and graceful thing to the conqueror, to afford them peace upon reasonable terms, that all men might take notice, that he knew how to begin, and engage himself in a just war, and was able likewise to make an end thereof? Or might not this be the only reason, but for that they thought it 
d Tacit. Annal. lib. 12.  profitable likewise, and safe for the Conqueror to lay down his Arms, considering that if he should still prosecute the wars, he should reap nothing but wearisomeness by continuing and protracting of them, and if he should make too much haste, and as it were enforce an end of them, he might run himself into many and 
e Henr. Ransov. de re Bellica.  needless dangers, even to the hazard of his own estate, which otherwise he might easily have avoided? For Fortune will sometimes play the jade, and the event of wars is uncertain?   

2  
It may further be demanded, how a safe and firm peace, may be distinguished and known from that which is unsure and not to be trusted unto?  
MAy this be known, if the peace be 
f Liu. lib. 25.  honest, as putting an end to the wars, by giving and accepting of tolerable conditions? Or may it this may be known likewise, if it be 
g Tacit. 4. Hist.  simple, plain, and without false colours or glosses, ambuiguity of words, or equivocations, and not subject to what constructions the peace-breaker may wrest or draw them?   

3  
It may further be demanded, why that Prince who came to his Kingdom by some of the Nobility, or Senate, shall more hardly keep it, than another, who obtained the Crown by the suffrages and assistance of the people?  
IS it because that 
h Mach. Prin. cap. 9  those of the Nobility think themselves to be little inferior, or rather equal with the Prince, whereupon he cannot sway the Sceptre as him listeth, but must be glad in the most things to be ruled by them? Or may this rather be the reason, for that it will be thought the Prince will 
i So fared it with the Duke of Buckingham, in the time of Richard the 3. with Charles the 8. and Lewis the 12. Kings of France, in the loss of Milan, etc. as reporteth Mach. Prin. Cap. 9  never be able sufficiently to satisfy those Nobles, without the hurt and wronging of others, which when he cannot, those very men, by whose aid and assistance he got the Crown, will be the first who will pull him down again? Or may this be the reason, for that 
k Idem Ibidem.  if the Commons should make head against the Prince, he could never be secured of his safety, or retaining of his Kingdom, because they would oppress him with multitude, the Nobility being but a handful to them?   

4  
It may further be demanded, wherefore it so much importeth a Prince to manage his Martial affairs in his own person, if he ever look to grow famous by his conquests?  
IS it because it 
1 Quint. Curt. Mach. Prin. So Alexander the Great, Ferdinand King of Spain, and Hen. the 5. King of Eng. became famous.  so much increaseth and augmenteth his estimation, and credit with foreign Princes abroad, and breedeth and begetteth him love and authority among his own people at home? Or may this be the reason, for that by this means, all 
m Mach. disput. lib. 1. cap. 30.  wrangling occasions, and heart-burnings are cut off, whereby a Prince sometimes proveth ungrateful to men, even of the best deserts? For when Princes present, and behave themselves bravely in the field, all the honour and glory thereof (as it pertaineth) so it redoundeth unto them: whereas otherwise if they were absent, and committed the managing of those affairs to their Generals, they strait ways imagine, that if their forces should prevail, the glory of the day should rest with the General, who led the Army, and that themselves can never challenge any part of the victory, gotten, unless they extinguish the merits of the General, or himself, and by that means prove unjust and ungrateful to their servants.   

5  
It may further be demanded, how a Courtier may come to be much employed in his Prince's affairs?  
MAy he effect this, if he 
n Guicch.  should wait diligently, and be always in the eye of the Prince? Or may he compass this the rather, if once employed he manage that affair well? For by this means, he shall both gain himself reputation, and be thought fit and able to deal in any business, and be sure (almost) never to be out of action, by reason of the dependencies which other businesses have upon those, wherein he formerly hath been employed.   

6  
Considering that by well or ill managing and handling of the affairs of Princes, in negotiating for them with foreign Princes, either great good, or great hurt may accrue to the Prince and State, it may be demanded what manner of men a Prince might chief employ for Ambassadors to foreign Princes?  
SHall he use such as are 
o Comineus.  skilful to pick and glean something out of other men's employments, and appropriate it to themselves, if there be hope that their credit and estimation, may grow greater by it? Or shall not a Prince trust to such to negotiate for him, but to those rather, who are faithful, careful, meek, and gentle, and have been long practised and experienced in managing such affairs?   

7  
It may further be demanded, with what tools an Ambassador shall soon persuade a foreign Prince, and draw him to favour, and further his masters designs?  
SHall he assail him with 
p Tholoz.  firm arguments and sound reasons? But he that is nice, and hath a special opinion of his own wisdom, will presently distaste that or any thing that is . Or shall he rather set upon him with 
q Fran. Guicch. Cominaeus. Mach. Prin.  representations of colours, Popularities, and circumstances? And (to speak as the truth is) these are of no less (if they be not of more) force, then firm and sound reasons: For circumstances, colours, representations, and such like stuff, are of such power and efficacy, that they can give life to true and sound reasons, pervert the judgement, if it be not stable and well grounded, and quickly lead into error.   

8  
It may further be demanded, why eloquence is so necessary for a councillor, or an Ambassador?  
IS it because that daily a most it falleth out, that a Prince hath occasion to send some one or other of his Council to foreign States, either to persuade; to accuse, or defend; to gratulate, or condole, etc. Now it is both requisite, and necessary, and commodious for a Prince to be furnished with men so qualified, with eloquence, utterance, etc. as that they may with credit to him and his Court, well discharge the place, and person they sustain; And it should be a great shame, disaduantageous, and dishonourable to the Prince, if for want of such gifts, in any whom he should send on such errands, it should fall out otherwise. Or may it rather be for this cause; for that in 
r Quintilian.  pacifying such as are seditious in the State, and compounding the quarrels and differences of such as are factious, there is no better mean to accord them, then to use an eloquent and plausible speech unto them?    

SECT. I. CHAP. XIII.  
Of Discord and Faction, whereof they take their beginnings, and of the nourishing, or not nourishing of them in a Commonwealth.  

1  
It may be demanded from whence discords and factions have their beginnings?  
DO they arise of such 
a Tholoz. de Repub. lib. 22.  motions as are suddenly suggested to the people, so that there cannot be time given them to think or consider what matter they go about? Or do they take their beginnings rather of 
b Idem Ibidem.  the private or open hatred of Familiars? Or may they proceed rather from the root of 
c Senec. Epist. 74  pride and ambition, whilst every man striveth to proceed, and go before another, and is always detracting from him he liketh not? Or may they have their beginnings from idleness and looseness of living, which oftentimes are wont to minister occasions of civil (or rather uncivil) brawls and contentions? Or may they arise of the 
d Tholoz. de Re pub. lib. 22.  different minds and dispositions of the people, from the designs and intentions of the Nobility? Or not so much from thence neither, but of the wavering mutability of the unconstant multitude also? their years being so divers, and their manners so unlike: For it is impossible, that where there is such and so great diversity of years, and disparity of manners, that the multitude or Commons altogether, should equally well like of, affect, and comport the present State, but contrariwise disagree, grow factious, and contentious.   

2  
It may further be demanded, whether it may be beneficial to a Prince or State to nourish factions, or no?  
IT were too hard a task for me (Right Honourable) to take upon me difinitively to determine this question: for I am not ignorant that amongst divers men, and those of the wisest sort, this doubt hath been canvased, and greatly controverted; yet seeing that I am entered into it, I thought it not fit altogether to pass it over in silence, without showing your Honour my private opinion therein, which that I may do the better, I will rip up the Arguments on both sides. That factions (therefore) should be nourished of a Prince or State, many things may induce and persuade thereunto, but especially these two, Honour and Profit. For that Prince 
c Mach. Prin. cap. 20.  must needs be honoured and feared, who always hath an enemy at his own devotion, and never resisting his designs and enterprises: For he that can conquer when he list, is not only admired, but much feared likewise, both at home and abroad. For all men with one voice will give it out, that he got the victory by his own valour and prowess: Which so reported and believed, there is no doubt but that he shall be much renowned therefore, though he achieved it otherwise; namely, by being seconded with a potent faction, joining with him against their own Prince, or otherwise. Again, that the chiefest and most potent Cities of a Kingdom, should be brought under the Prince's subjection, it were not only conducible and necessary, but also profitable, both to him and the commonwealth. Now to effect this, a Prince must either use force or policy. If he say to compass his designs by force, he must of necessity offer many injuries to the people, which the more openly they are done, the more they do provoke them to mislike the Prince: For that which the Law hath made Mine, and Thine, if it should be snatched away from the Subject, it would be grievously taken, and held for no better than an intolerable piece of injustice. But when the 
f Mach. dis. lib. 2. cap. 25.  Cities of themselves are become factious, and the Citizens do waste and connsume themselves by quarrels and factions, the fault shall never be laid on the Prince, but on the factious, and yet by this means the Prince in effect, shall obtain what he desired. For the Cities hereby growing weak, and wearied with continual garboils, will willingly put themselves into the Prince's protection, and yield themselves subject to his will. Further, for a Prince to divert the current of the wars, or any hostile invasions, from his own doors, it is very necessary, behoveful and convenient: Now it is not incredible, that ever he shall have any better way, or mean to bring this to pass, then by 
g Herod. lib. 4. Xenoph. de Pedia Cyri. lib. 3.  nourishing factions, and dissensions in his enemy's Country; for many have put this in practice heretofore, and greatly thriven thereby: Moreover divers of the wisest sort, have thought it very advantageous to the Prince, that the 
h Tacit. Agric.  Subjects should never come altogether, to consult, or agree altogether, upon any thing which might tend to their common or particular safeties. To conclude, 
i Tholoz. de Repub. lib. 23.  that a great Prince, or Monarch, may become more wary of his enemy, and better conserve his own estate, it hath been thought fit, by some of the wisest heads that ever have been, that such a Prince should never be without an enemy, or be a great nourisher of factions in a foreign Land: Which course, if Rome had taken, and not destroyed Carthage, they should have had their brave spirited youth better trained up, practised, and made ready in feats of Arms, which might have steeded the Commonwealth for offence or defence thereof; Grave and mature counsel should have flourished in the Senate, the Citizens should not have wasted themselves with civil wars, and so the Empire should have been more durable and lasting. The reasons of those who hold it unprofitable, and every way disaduantageous to a Prince, to nourish factions, are as follow. It is 
k Mach. lib. 3. dis. cap. 37.  impossible, say they, by reason of an inbred inconstancy in the nature of men, that those factions, which at this, or that present, depend upon a Prince, should always, and after one and the self-same manner, be so affected towards him, for that men being wavering, do greatly desire sometimes this Prince, sometimes that Prince, to be their chief Patron. Again, 
l Idem Ibidem.  the nourshing of factions, by a Prince in a foreign Land, is oftentimes the cause, that by little and little, discords and civil garboils are brought into his own Country, which will scarcely be thought to be convenient. Further, a great inconvenience, or rather an apparent loss might happen to a Prince, who should nourish factions within his own Dominions; For 
m Idem Prin. cap. 20.  upon any sudden invasion, such Cities of his, which should happen to be rend asunder by factions, must of necessity be all lost: For the 
n Tholoz. lib. de Repub. 23.  weaker part would rather submit, and apply itself to a stranger, then yield to the adverse faction in any thing. Moreover this course of governing, by nourishing of factions, must needs 
o Mach. Prin. cap. 20.  argue the weakness, and imbecility of the Prince, both in power and judgement: For if he were strong and prudent, he would never endure that his Country should be torn in pieces by factions and contentions. To conclude, seeing that every faction consisteth of few or many, both of these must needs be hurtful to the Commonwealth: This latter for that 
p Liu. lib. 34.  they trusting to their own strength, would presently take Arms, and turn the quiet of the State into garboils: The former likewise, though perhaps somewhat more secretly and slowly, would no less vex and molest the Commonwealth, by reason that 
q Arist. 5. Polit. cap. 4.  factions of the Nobility are wont to draw unto themselves all, or the greatest part of the Commons, to take part with such or such of them, as they most affect. These things thus standing, they conclude, that factions are rather to be extinguished and quenched, then nourished. For mine own part (Right Honourable) though I will determine nothing of this matter, yet thus I think thereof. That Factions, to the singular benefit of the Prince, and Commonwealth, may be nourished in a foreign government: and though it were not so convenient (perhaps) they should be set on foot, and maintained at home, yet at no hand are they to be neglected, especially in the time of peace. For seeing that there is no Commonwealth, which doth not breed and bring forth, yea foster and cherish some envy and contention: these contentions may prove healthful to the State of a Commonwealth, as Agues are sometime beneficial to the state of a man's body: And it is certain that the Roman Commonwealth, was never in better health and safety, then when the Tribunes of the People, and the Patricians were at variance: and the Lacedaemonian State never in better state, then when their Ephori, and their Kings could not agree. For by this kerbing of one another, the public Offices of a Commonwealth were better discharged, both at home and abroad.    

SECT. I. CHAP. XIIII.  
Of Sedition, Mutiny, and defection, of the greatest part of the people in a State, and of standing Neutral, or part taking.  

1  
It may be demanded whence sedition and mutining, in, or, against a State taketh his beginning?  
MAY it arise and spring out of the bitter 
a Tholoz. Aristotle 5. Pol. Cap. 3.  root of oppression, as when men apprehending the remedy of present evils and dangers, to be the evils and dangers themselves, do upon a sudden break out, and so take Arms? Or may it proceed 
b Idem Ibidem.  of fear as the Philosopher well conceited? For fear may move and incite men, to be seditious, fearing or expecting punishments to be inflicted upon them, for the wrongs they have done, and by this means running out, they think (or at least are willing) to prevent them before they can be put in execution. Or may this proceed of too much indulgency, clemency, and remissness of the government, together with the superfluity and abundance of all things, it being rather the nature of the people to 
c Livy lib. 2.  grow to be Wantoness then Warriors? Or may it come rather of 
d Sallust. Sugurth.  penury, and scarcity of things necessary? Or may it happen through the 
e Liu. lib. 38.  pride and ambition of evil Governors and councillors? Or may it rather arise of taking up too much money at Use, with the which the Commons being (as it were) eaten up, and their states consumed, they grow desperate thereupon, and so take Arms, thinking 
f Tacit. 1. Hist.  themselves most safe when they run the most uncertain courses? for worse than they are, they think they cannot be.   

2  
It may further be demanded, whether, when once sedition groweth hot, and cometh to Heads, it were better to stand Neutral, then to fall to partaking?  
TOuching this Question (Right Honourable) unless that 
g Solon.  great Athenian Lawgiver, had decreed and established by Law, that upon any sedition arising in that State, 
h Sic refert A. Gaellius. in Noct. Attic. lib. 2. cap. 12.  he that would not take part with one side, should be banished the City, and lose all that ever he possessed; I should scarce have thought it worth the looking into: but after so wise a man had determined it, and for that I perceived others, who thought themselves as wise, as the said Law giver, did stiffly stand against his opinion, and upon good grounds (as they suppose) produced arguments to the contrary, I thought it worthy my labour likewise, to put down the reasons on both sides, and in conclusion to enterpone mine own private opinion touching the premises. Those therefore who stand on Solon's side, and allow and stand for partaking do thus argue: 
i A. Gaellius noct. Attic. lib. 2. cap. 12.  If the good men, which be in the City or Commonwealth, perceiving the Seditious to be madded with fury, and to grow to an head, should apply themselves to either part, there is no doubt, but that they might be a means to reduce them to unity; persuading first with their own side, how ill beseeming a thing it is, for Citizen to strive with, or take Arms against Citizen, and what destruction of them and theirs may ensue, if they suffer themselves still to be led with passion, and by that means mollifying their own friends minds, they may (happily) get leave likewise to deal with the other side, in those or such like terms, and so persuade both parties to lay down their weapons. Again, 
k Phavorinus Philosophus.  those which take part with neither side, if the differences of the factious should once be compounded, should smart for it, being hated on both sides, deemed as public enemies, and such as solaced themselves, and rejoiced to see them at those odds, and therefore are justly exposed to the prey, and injuries of either party. Further, it were very dangerous when the City or Commonwealth is divided into faction, not to take part with the one or the other side, lest a 
l josephus de bello judaico.  third faction should spring out of the others, as hath sometimes been read to have fallen out in the jews Commonwealth. But those which stand for neutrality, think otherwise, and thus they reason 
m Tacit. Annal.  Civil Arms of themselves, can neither be provided, taken up, or managed by any good or lawful means, and the issue and end of them commonly proveth nought. For the Leaders and Captains of the seditious, under the pretence of seeking the good of the Common wealth, do every one seek to promote his own ambitious humours, and so draw the people to follow their fancies, which no good Patriote ought to do. Again, it argueth great folly in any, who shall take either part, and join with the seditious: for by that means they 
n Sallust. in bello Iug●rthino.  strengthen and encourage them, increase their malice towards their Countrymen, and fellow-Citizens of the adverse party, and become partakers of their rebellions, madness, and folly. Touching mine own private opinion herein, I think (right Honourable) that neutrality is regularly to be avoided in either Prince or Courtier, except in some main case, where a man by making show to be neutral, may more handsomely compowd and contrive his own business, and better promote, and sooner come to his own ends.    
FINIS.