THE ART OF LOGIC.  
Plainly taught in the English tongue, according to the best approved AUTHORS.  
Very necessary for all STUDENTS in any Profession, how to defend any Argument against all subtle Sophisters, and cavilling Schismatics, and how to confute their false Syllogisms, and captious Arguments.  
By M. BLUNDEVILE.  
LONDON, Printed by William Stansby, and are to be sold by Matthew Lownes.  
1617.   

To the Reader.  
MInding here to treat of the Art of Logic in our vulgar tongue, for the profit of those my Countrymen, that are not learned in foreign tongues: I think it no shame nor robbery to borrow terms of the said Art from the Latins, aswell as they did from the greeks: and specially such terms as cannot be aptly expressed in our native speech: and yet therewith I do not forget plainly to show the signification of every such term, so as every man may easily understand what each term signifieth: thinking it much better so to do, then to fayne new words unproper for the purpose, as some of late have done. And as my mind is hereby to please the unlearned, that are desirous of learning, having both good wits, and also good disposition with aptness to learn. So my hope is not to offend the learned, who, I am sure do well allow of Aristotle, in saying, that every good thing, the more common it be, the better it is: neither are they ignorant, that in old time past, aswell the greeks as the Latins, of what Art soever they wrote, each one wrote the same, for the most part, in his own vulgar speech. Every man is not able in these costly days, to find either himself or his Child at the University, whom if God not withstanding hath endued with a lively wit, and made him so apt to learning, as having some help at home, he may by his own industry, attain unto right good knowledge, & be made thereby the more able to glorify God, and to profit his Country. Truly, I see no cause why the learned should disdain, or be miscontent that such Man or Child should be freely taught this or any other good Art, without any cost or charge. Wherefore arming myself with assured hope, that with this my labour, I shall greatly profit and pleasure the unlearned, and not hinder or displease the learned, I will boldly follow mine enterprise, and here briefly show the order of my said Work, which is divided into six Parts or Books: for sith Logic is chiefly occupied in discussing of Questions, and that such questions, both simple and compound do spring of words, the first Part of my Book shall treat of Words, showing which be Simple, which be Compound, and also which comprehend more, and which comprehend less: & which be of affinity, and which be not: leaving out no necessary Rules belonging thereunto, that are taught either by Aristotle, or by any other Modern writer: Secondly, because all simple questions consisting of single words, are to be discussed by Definition and Division: the second Part treateth of them both, and therewith showeth also with what method and order such simple questions are to be handled. Thirdly, because all compound questions are to be discussed by reasoning or argumentation, and that every kind of argument doth consist of Propositions: the third Part treateth of a Proposition, and of all things belonging thereunto. Fourthly, because no sound argument can be made to prove or disprove any thing that is in question, unless the Disputer know from whence to fetch his proofs: the fourth Part of my Book treateth of all the places from whence any argument is to be fetched. And the fifth Part treateth of Argumentation, and of all the kinds thereof, teaching how every kind is to be performed. The sixth and last Part treateth of Confutation, showing how all Sophistical arguments are to be confuted.   

A Postscript.  
THough I wrote this Book many years past, whilst I sojourned with my most dear Brother in Law, M. William Hurnell, a man of most singular humanity, and of great hospitality, at his house in Winkborne in Nottinghamshire, not far from Southwell: yet notwithstanding upon divers necessary considerations (as I thought) since that time moving me thereunto, I still stayed it from the Press, until now of late that I was fully persuaded by divers of my learned friends, to put it in print, who having diligently perused the same, and liking my plain order of teaching used therein, thought it a most necessary Book for such Ministers as had not been brought up in any University: to many of which Ministers though God had given the gift of utterance, and great good zeal to set forth in good speech the true Christian doctrine: yet, if they should have to deal with subtle Sophisters and caviling Schismatics (whereof in these days, the more is the pity, there are too many) they were not able without the help of Logic, to defend the truth of God's Word, and orderly to confute such false Conclusions as perverse Schismatics and Heretics are wont to gather out of the very words of holy Scripture: wherefore, through my said friends persuasions, I have now at length committed my said Book to the Press, praying all those that shall vouchsafe to read it, as thankfully to accept the same, as of my part it is friendly offered: Vale.   

The Contents of the Chapters contained in these six Books of LOGIC.  

THE FIRST BOOK. Treating of a Question, and of Words, both Singular and Universal.  
WHat Logic is, of what parts it consisteth, and whereto such parts do serve. Which be the two chief offices of Logic, and wherein Logic is chiefly occupied, that is in discussing of Questions, which is done by Definition, Division, and Argumentation. Chap. 1.  
What a question is, and that every question is either simple or compound, also of what parts a compound question consisteth (that is to say) of two parts, called the Subject and the Predicate, and what those terms do signify. Because all questions do consist of words either simple or compound, in this Chapter are set down three principal divisions of words. First, which be simple, and which be compound. Secondly, which be of the first intention, and which be of the second intention: and thirdly, which be singular, called in Latin Individua, and which be universal. Chap. 2.  
What Individuum is, and all the four kinds thereof (that is) Individuum determinatum, Individuum demonstratiwm, Individuum vagum, and Individuum ex hypothesi (that is to say) by supposition. Chap. 3.  
Of universal words, whereof some are called Predicables, and some Predicaments, and first of the five predicables (that is) Genus, Species, Differentia, Proprium, and Accidens, and how every one is divided, and to what uses they serve, but first of Species, and then of the rest. Chap. 4.  
Of Predication, and of the divers kinds thereof. Chap. 5.  
Of the ten Predicaments in general, which be these, Substantia, Quantitas, Qualitas, Relatio, Actio, Passio, Vbi, Quando, Situm est, and Habere. Chap. 6.  
Of the forepredicaments, and showing which they be, and to what end they serve. Chap. 7  
Of the ten Predicaments in special, showing what Substances, and how many kinds there be, and what properties it hath, whreto is added the Table of Substance. Chap. 8.  
Of Quantity, both whole and broken, called in Latin quantitas continua, & discreta, and of the divers kinds of bot●…quantities, and what properties quantity hath, whereto is added a Table of quantity. Chap. 9  
Of Quality, and of the four kinds thereof, and in this Chapter are defined the five intellectual habits, that is, Intelligence, Science, Prudence, Art, and Sapience: it showeth also what properties quality hath, and to every of the four kinds of quality is added his proper Table. Chap. 10.  
Of Relation, and of the kinds thereof, together with a Table showing every kind, and finally what properties Relation hath. Chap. 11.  
What Action is, and how it is divided, and what properties do belong thereunto. Chap. 12.  
What Passion is, and what properties do belong thereunto. Chap. 13.  
What the Predicament Vbi is, and how it is divided, and what properties do belong to that Predicament. Chap. 14.  
What the Predicament Quando is, how it is divided, and what properties belong thereunto. Chap. 15.  
What the Predicament Situm esse is, what it comprehendeth, also what Descriptions are to be fetched from this Predicament, and what things are said to alter their situation, and finally what property it hath, to which Predicament is added a brief Table. Chap. 16.  
The divers significations of the predicament Habere, also what words it comprehendeth, with a Table showing the same, and finally what properties it hath. Chap. 17.  
The manifold uses of the aforesaid ten predicaments. Chap. 18.  
Of the Postpredicaments, which are in number five, that is, Oppositio, ante and post, simul, motus, and habere, and first of Opposition, and how many things are said to agree together, to be divers, or to be contrary one to another. Chap. 19  
How many ways things are said to be one before or after another, and to what end that Postpredicament serveth. Chap. 20.  
Of the Postpredicament Simul, showing how many ways things are said to be together. Chap. 21.  
Of the Postpredicament Motus, showing how many kinds of movings there be. Chap. 22.  
How many ways the word Habere is to be understood. Ch. 23.   

THE SECOND BOOK. Treating of Definition, and of Division, and of Method.  
OF Definition, and showing how many kinds of Definitions there be. Chap. 1.  
How many Precepts are to be observed to make a true definition. Chap. 2.  
Of Division, and of the divers kinds thereof. Chap. 3.  
How many Precepts are to be observed to make a true Division. Chap. 4.  
Of Method, and of the three kinds thereof, that is, Compositive, Resolutive, and Divisive, and what Method is to be observed in handling either of a simple, or of a compound question. Chap. 5.   

THE THIRD BOOK. Treating of a Proposition.  
OF a Proposition, showing of what parts it consisteth, and how many ways it is divided, and what questions are to be asked of a categorical or simple proposition, being divided according to substance, quality, and quantity. Chap. 1.  
Of the three properties belonging to a simple Proposition, that is, Opposite on, Equivalency, and Conversion. Chap. 2.  
Of the Laws and conditions belonging to the four Opposites, and also of the threefold matter of a proposition, that is, Natural, Casual, and Remote, and then of Opposition, showing how many ways simple propositions are said to be opposite one to another. Ch. 3.  
Of the Equivalency of simple propositions. Chap. 4.  
Of the Conversion of simple propositions, showing how manifold it is. Chap. 5.  
Of a modal proposition, and of the two kinds thereof, that is to say, conjunct and disjunct. Chap. 6.  
Of the Opposition, Equivalency, and Conversion, belonging to modal propositions. Chap. 7.  
Of Opposition belonging to modal propositions. Chap. 8.  
Of Equivalency and Conversion of modal propositions. Chap. 9  
Of an hypothetical or compound Proposition, showing how it is divided, that is, into a Conditional, Copulative, and disjunctive, and of what parts it consisteth, and also what things are to be considered in a compound Proposition. Chap. 10.  
Of the truth and falsehood of all the three kinds of compound Propositions, first, of the Conditional; secondly, of Copulative; and thirdly, of the disjunctive. Chap. 11.   

THE FOURTH BOOK. Treating of Logical places.  
WHat a place is, and that it is twofold, that is, either of Persons or of Things. Again, the places of things be either artificial or inartificial, and the artificial places of things are either inward, outward, or mean: and the inart●…ficiall places of things are six in number, comprehended under the place of authority, as the Table of places set down in the beginning of this Chapter doth plainly show. Also this Chapter showeth to what end such manifold divisions of the places serveth, and how places are divided according to the School. men, that is, into Maxims, and difference of Maxims. Chap. 1.  
Examples of all the places belonging to persons. Chap. 2.  
Of the places of things, and first of artificial places, whereof some be inward, some outward, and some mean: and first of inward places, whereof some belong to the substance of things, and some do accompany the substance, giving examples of every place, together with their proper Maxims or general Rules, belonging to the same, and how Arguments are to be fetched from every such place, either affirmatively or negatively, or both ways. Chap. 3.  
Of outward places, showing how Arguments are to be fetched from every such place, together with the general Rules or Maxims belonging to the same. Chap. 4.  
Of mean places, giving examples, and showing how Arguments are to be fetched from such places, together with the Rules belonging thereunto. Chap. 5.  
Of the six inartificial places comprehended under the place of authority, whereunto is added a Table of authority. And in this Chapter is not only declared to what end the knowledge of all the foresaid places do serve, but also it showeth by one example how to use them when need is, either to prove or to dilate any Theme, which example is taken out of Hunneus. The Theme whereof is thus: Man ought to embrace Virtue. Chap. 6.   

THE fifth BOOK. Treating of Argumentation, and of Demonstration.  
OF Argumentation, and of the four kinds thereof in general, and also of the first principles of a Syllogism, aswell material as regular. Chap. 1.  
What a Syllogism is, how it is divided, and of what parts it consisteth (that is) of matter and form. Chap. 2.  
What that matter and form is, and that the matter consisteth of three terms and three propositions, and the Form to consist of Figure and Mood. Also by what means the mean t●…rme or proof is to be found out. And finally, it defineth the three Propositions, whereof a simple Syllogism consisteth, showing how they are named, and how to frame the same to make a true Syllogism. Chap. 3.  
What Figure or Mood is, whereof the form of a Syllogism consisteth, and how many such Figures there be, and when a Syllogism is said to conclude directly or indirectly: it showeth also how many Moods do belong to every Figure, and how they are named. And finally, what the four vowels A, e, i, o, do signify in any such Mood or Vocable of Art. Chap. 4.  
Certain rules aswell general as special belonging to the three figures. Chap. 5.  
Examples of the four perfect Moods, belonging to the first Figure. Chap. 6.  
Examples of the five unperfect Moods, belonging to the first Figure. Chap. 7.  
Examples of four Moods, belonging to the second Figure. Chap. 8.  
Examples of the six Moods, belonging to the third Figure. Chap. 9  
Of a Syllogism expository, s●…ewing why it is so called. Cham 10.  
Answer to an objection concerning the three Figures and Moods, belonging to the same. Chap. 11.  
Of Reduction, and of the kinds thereof, and also of the signification of certain Consonants in the words of Art, serving to Reduction. Chap. 12.  
Of Reduction by impossibility, showing unto which of the perfect Moods, every unperfect Mood is to be reduced by impossibility. Chap. 13.  
Of a Syllogism made in oblique cases, and of the six abilities, and three defects of a Syllogism. Chap. 14.  
Of a compound Syllogism, showing that it is threefold, that is, Conditional, Copulative, and Disi●…nctiue, and that the truth of a compound Syllogism is to be found out by reducing the same into a simple Syllogism. Chap. 15.  
Of a Consequent, showing what it is, and of how many parts it consisteth, and how it is divided, also by what means, and by what Rules the goodness of a Consequent is to be known. Chap. 16.  
Of a Syllogism demonstrative, showing what it is, and of what manner of Propositions it consisteth, which Propositions are here defined, it showeth also the three properties belonging to the Predicate and Subject of a demonstrative Proposition, and also showeth wha●… definitions Aristotle maketh of demonstration, and it defineth what science is, and thereby giveth example of a Syllogism demonstrative. Chap. 17.  
Of the three things, whereon dependeth the certainty of Man's knowledge, that is, universal experience, principles, and man's natural knowledge in judging of Consequents, showing how principles are defined by Aristotle, and how they are divided by the Schoolmen. Chap. 18.  
That the Schoolmen do divide Demonstration into two kinds, that is, either perfect or unperfect, wherein is declared what is to be observed in either kind of demonstration. Chap. 19  
Of Science, Opinion, Ignorance, Wi●…, and the four sciential questions. Chap. 20.  
Of a Syllogism dialectical, showing what it is, and of what kinds of propositions it is made, and what things are said to be probable: Again, it showeth how the Schoolmen do make the matter, whereof a Syllogism consisteth to be twofold, that is, Materia remota, and Materia propinqua, and what each matter containeth. And finally, it showeth the difference betwixt a dialectical proposition, a ' Problem, and a Position. Chap. 21.  
Of a sophistical Syllogism, showing what it is, and that it may be false three manner of ways. Also in this Chapter is declared another kind of false Syllogism, called Syllogismus falsigraphus. Chap. 22.  
Of Induction, showing what it is, and what is to be observed therein, and that it is twofold, that is, perfect and unperfect. Chap. 23.  
Of an Enthimeme, showing what it is, of what parts it consisteth, and from whence that kind of Argument is to be fetched. Chap. 24.  
Of an example, showing what it is, and wherein it differeth from all the other forms of Arguments, and to what end it serveth, and what is to be observed in reasoning thereby. And finally, from what places such Argument is to be fetched. Chap. 25.  
Of an Argument called Sorites, showing how it proceedeth, and wherein it differeth from the Argument of the Rhetoricians called Gradatio. Chap. 26.  
Of divers other kinds of captious Arguments, and first of Dilemma, showing of what parts it consisteth, and how many kinds of captious Arguments it comprehendeth, which are these four, that is, Certains or horned Arguments, Crocodelites, Assistatons, and Pseudomenons, every one of which is here defined, and example given thereof. Chap. 27.  
Of an argument called Enumeratio, showing what it is, and how it is to be confuted. Chap. 28.  
Of an argument called Simplex conclusio, showing what it is. Chap. 29.  
Of an argument called Subiectio, showing what it is, and that it differeth not much from Enumeratio before described, Chap. 30.  
Of an argument called Oppositio, made of parts repugnant. Chap. 31.  
Of an argument called Violatio, which is more meet to confute then to prove. Chap. 32.   

THE six BOOK. Treating of Confutation.  
COnfutation is twofold, whereof the one belongeth to the Person, the other to the Matter: and that of Matter is divided into two kinds, that is, General and Special, and the general confutation is done three manner of ways, that is, either by denying the Consequent, by making distinction, or else by instance, any of which three ways, when it is to be used, is here set down. Chap. 1.  
Of special confutation, showing how it is done, and what order Aristotle observeth in treating of special confutation, whose order is briefly here set down, and first of an Elench. Chap. 2.  
Of Disputation, and showeth how manifold it is. Chap. 3.  
Five marks of Soph●…strie, that is, Rep●…ehensio, Absurdum, Paradoxis, Solecismus, and Nugatio, with their examples. Chap. 4.  
There be thirteen Fallaxes, whereof six do consist in Words, and seven in Things, and first it treateth of the six Fallaxes consisting in Words, and showeth how to confute the same. Chap. 5.  
Of the seven Fallaxes consisting in Things, and sh●…weth by examples how to confute the same. Chap. 6.    

THE ART OF LOGIC.  

THE FIRST BOOK.  

CHAP. I.  

Of the Art of Logic, and of the parts and offices thereof.  

WHat is Logic?  
Logic is an Art, which teacheth us to dispute probably on both sides of any matter that is propounded.   

Of what and how many parts doth it consist?  
Of two: that is, Invention and judgement.   

Whereto serve these parts?  
Invention findeth out meet matter to prove the thing that ye intent: and judgement examineth the matter, whether it be good, or not; and then frameth, disposeth, and reduceth the same into due form of argument.   

What is the chief end or office of Logic?  
The chief end or office of Logic is twofold: The one to discuss truth from falsehood in any manner of speech; the other is to teach a compendious way to attain to any Art or Science. And therefore it is defined of some, to be the Art of Arts, and Science of Sciences; not for that it teacheth the principles of every Art or Science, (for those are to be learned of the Professors of such Arts or Sciences) but because it showeth the method, that is to say, the true order and right way that is to be observed in seeking to come to the perfect knowledge of any Art or Science. Of which methodical part, mine old friend, M. jacomo Acontio Tridentino hath written in the Latin tongue a very proper and profitable Treatise. And therefore I mind here to deal only with the first office, which is to discuss and to discern truth from falsehood in any speech or question that is propounded.   

How is that to be done?  
By three special instruments: that is, by Definition, Division, and Argumentation: whereof we shall speak hereafter in their proper places. In the mean time, because questions are the matter wherein Logic is chiefly occupied, we will speak first of a question.     

CHAP. II.  

Of a question, and of certain divisions of words.  

WHat is a question?  
A question is a speech where of some doubt is made and uttered with some interrogatory: as, How, What, or Whether: and such question is either simple, or compound.   

Which call you simple, and which compound?  
It is called simple, when the question consisteth only of one word; as when I ask what justice is, or what Fortitude is, and such like; and is to be discussed by defining and dividing the same. It is called compound, when it consisteth of many words joined together by rules of Grammar, to make some perfect sentence; as when I ask whether it be lawful for the Christians to make war upon the Turks, or not: and such like questions, which are to be discussed by arguing and reasoning on both sides: for Definition, Division, and Argumentation, as I said before, are the three especial instruments whereby Logic findeth out the truth in any doubtful matter.   

Of what parts doth a compound question consist?  
Of two, that is, the subject and the predicate.   

What mean you by these words, subject and predicate?  
The subject is the word or sentence, whereof another word or sentence, called the predicate, is spoken: as when I say, Man is a sensible body; here this word Man is the subject, and sensible body is the predicate: or each of them may contain many words, as this, To be learned in the Law require●…h a long study; here To be learned in the Law is the subject, and all the rest is the predicate.   

How shall I know in long speeches, and specially being preposterously set, which is the Subject, and which is the predicate?  
By ask this question, Who, or What: for that which answereth to this question, is always the Subject, as in this example: It were meet to learn my Grammar perfectly, before I entered into my Logic: here if you ask, What is meet, you shall find that to learn my Grammar perfectly is the Subject, and all the rest to be the predicate. And note that these two words, Subject and Predicate, are said to be the terms, limits, or extreme bounds of a Proposition, whereof we shall speak hereafter.   

Sith every question doth consist of words, me thinks it were necessary to show how words are divided.  
Of words the Schoolmen make divers and manifold divisions, of which I mind here to recite but three only, whereof the first is this: Of words some be simple, which they call Incomplexa; and some be compound, which they call Complexa. Simple or single words, are such as are sole or severed one from another, not making any sentence, as man, horse, wolf. The compound are words joined orderly together by rules of Grammar, to make some perfect sentence, as, Man is a sensible body. And hereof the questions are said to be either simple or compound, as hath been said before.   

What is the second division of words?  
Of words some, be of the first Intention, and some of the second.   

Which are they?  
Words of the first Intention are those, whereby any thing is signified or named by the purpose and meaning of the first author or inventor thereof, in any speech or language whatsoever it be: as the beast whereon we commonly ride, is called in English a Horse, in Latin Equus, in Italian Cavallo, in French Cheval. Words of the second Intention are terms of Art▪ as a Noun, Pronoune, Ve●…be, or Participle, are terms of Grammar: likewise Genus, Species, Proprium, and such like, are terms of Logic.   

What is the third division of words?  
Of words, some be called Individua, that is to say, particular, or rather singular; and some be called Vniversalia, that is to say, universal, common or general.     

CHAP. III.  

Of singular and most particular words, called Individua.  

WHat is Individuum?  
Individuum is that which signifieth but one thing only, and can be applied but to one thing only; as this name, john, or Robert, signifieth but one certain man, and not many.   

How many kinds of Individuums be there?  
Four, that is, Individuum determinatum, Individuum demonstratiwm, Individuum vagum, and Individuum ex hypothesi.   

What is Individuum determinatum?  
Individuum determinatum, that is to say, certain or determined, is the proper name of some one certain thing, whatsoever it be, as john or Thomas is the proper name of some or one man: again, Bucephalus is the proper name of great Alexander his horse: and London is the proper name of the chiefest City in England.   

What is Individuum demonstratiwm?  
Individuum demonstratiwm, which is as much to say, as showing or pointing, is a common word or name joined with a pronoun demonstrative, to signify some one certain thing only, as when we say, this man, or that horse: and Individuums demonstrative be more ready to signify particular things, as well in accidents▪ as in substances, then are Individua determinata: for This, or That, and such like Pronouns, do point out a thing, as it were with the finger, when proper names oftentimes do fail: yea the pronoun demonstrative is of such force, as being joined to the most general word that is, maketh it Individuum, as well as when it is joined to the most especial: for, this substance or this body is Individuum, as well as this man or that horse.   

What is Individuum vagum?  
Individuum vagum, that is to say, wandering or uncertain, is a word betokening some one certain thing, but not certainly: as when I say, There was a certain man here to seek you; by this speech is meant but one man, and yet uncertain who it was: and therefore, to make the thing more certain, we use to add some token or mark; as we read in the Acts of the Apostles, There was a certain man which was halt and lame from his mother's womb, whom they laid daily before the gate of the Temple, etc. And note, that like as we do use individua, demonstrativa, & determinata, in declaring things either present, or certainly known: so in speaking of things absent, or uncertainly known, we express our minds oftentimes by individua vaga.   

What is Individuum ex hypothesi?  
Individuum ex hypothesi, that is to say, by supposition, is a word which of his own natural signification being common and universal is made notwithstanding by supposition a singular word, and to signify but one thing only: as for example, this word, The Son of Marie, is a common term, and yet by supposition is made to signify none but Christ only: likewise when we say, The Greek Poet, we mean none but Homer.     

CHAP. IU.  

Of words universal or general.  

WHat words are said to be universal or general?  
Those words are said to be universal, which are spoken of many things, that is to say, which may be applied to many things, or comprehend many things, as this word▪ Animal (which is as much to say as a sensible body) comprehendeth both man, bruit beast, fish, fowl, bird, and every thing else that hath feeling and moving.   

How are such words divided?  
Into Predicables and Predicaments.    

Of the five Predicables.  

WHat call you Predicables?  
Predicables are certain degrees, or rather pedigrees of words that be of one affinity, showing which comprehend more, and which comprehend less.   

How many such be there?  
There be five, that is to say, Genus, Species, Differentia, Proprium, & Accidens: which may be Englished thus, General kind, Special kind, Difference, Property, and Accident. But we think it best to begin first with Species, because it is next to Individuum.    

Of the special kind, called in Latin Species.  

WHat is Species?  
Species is a special kind, which is spoken of many things, that is to say, it comprehendeth many things differing only in number, in ask the question, what the thing is: as when I ask, What is john? it is rightly answered, to say, A man: for this word man is an universal word, comprehending both john, Thomas, Robert, and all other singular men.   

How manifold is Species?  
Twofold, that is, Infima and Subalterna. Infima, that is to say, the lowest or most especial kind, is that which comprehendeth many things differing only in number, and therefore cannot be a general kind, as man, horse, and such like special kinds. Species subalterna, is that which comprehendeth many things differing in kind, and in divers respects may be both genus and species, as these words, animal or sensible body, bird, fish: for this word bird, in that it comprehendeth divers kinds of birds, as a Blackbird, a Mavys, a Goldfinch, and many other kinds of birds, it is a general kind: but in respect of these words, substance, body, or animal, it is but species.   

How is species called of the greeks?  
It is called Idea, which is as much to say, as a common shape conceived in the mind, through some knowledge had before of one or two Individuums having that shape: so as after we have seen one wolf, or two, we bear the shape thereof continually in our minds, and thereby are able to know a wolf whensoever we find him, or (if need be) to paint him. But genus extendeth too far, and comprehendeth too many special kinds to be so easily painted. And note that such shapes or Ideae are said also to be perpetual.   

Why are they said to be perpetual?  
Because they continue in the mind, though the things themselves cease to have any being: as the shape of a Rose continueth in our minds in the cold heart of Winter, when there is no Rose indeed. And this is the true meaning of Plato touching Ideae, that is, to be perpetual in the mind, not separate from man's intelligence, as some men fain: for universalities are always to be comprehended in man's mind, but not Individua: which, because they are infinite, there can be had of them no certain science or knowledge.    

Of the general kind, called Genus.  

WHat is Genus?  
Genus is a general kind which may be spoken of many things differing in special kind, in ask the question, what the thing is: as if I ask, What is man, or horse? It is rightly answered, to say, Animal: for this word Animal comprehendeth both man, horse, lion, and many other special kinds of beasts.   

How is it divided?  
Into two, that is, Genus most general, and Genus subalternate.   

What is genus most general?  
It is that which in no respect can be species, as these, Substance, Quantity, Quality, and all the rest of the ten Predicaments, which be the highest kinds, comprehending all other kinds, and are comprehended of none.   

What is that which you call subalternate?  
It is that which in divers respects may be both genus and species, as these, animal or sensible body, stone, tree, fish, bird: which being compared to their superiors, as to substance or body, be special kinds: but if to their inferiors, as this word sensible body being compared to man or horse, or this word stone to a flint or Diamond, or this word tree to an Appletree or Peartree, or this word fish to a Salmon or Pickerel, or this word bird to a Mavys or Goldfinch, and such like, than they be general kinds. The order of all which kinds, as well general as subalternate, as also most especial, you may see here in the Table following, taken out of the predicament of substance: in which Table, Substance is the highest or most general kind, under which are placed the less general or special kinds, according as they be in degrees high or low, nigh or far from substance. Moreover, on each side of the general kinds are set down in this Table the differences whereby the said general kinds are divided every one into those inferior kinds which it comprehendeth. And the like Table may be made of all the rest of the Predicaments.  

A Table showing the order and degrees of general kinds and especial kinds, taken out of the predicament of Substance.  Differences, General and special kinds Differences, Examples. With body, Substance is either Or without body, as 

An Angel,  
A Spirit,  
The soul of a man separated from the body.   Compound of the four elements, as all natural bodies and unnatural If with body, it is either Or simple, as 

The 11. heavens,  
The 4. elements.    
Living, Body compound is either Or unliving, as 

Stones,  
Metals,  
Liquors.   Sensible, Again, the living body is either Or unsensible, as 

Tree,  
Herb,  
Shrub.   Reasonable, as man: The sensible body, called in Latin Animal, is either Or unreasonable, as 

fourfooted beasts  
Creeping beasts,  
Fish,  
Fowle, or  
Bird.    The reasonable body is man, called in Latin Homo, which is a most especial kind: As Socrates, Plato, and every other singular man.    

Of Difference, called of the Latins, Differentia.  

WHat is difference?  
Difference is that whereby things do differ one from another, or any thing from itself.   

How many kinds of differences be there?  
According to Porphyrius, there be three kinds, that is to say, common, proper, and most proper or especial, called of the Latins, Differentia specifica.   

What call you a common difference?  
A common difference is some separable accident, whereby one thing differeth from another, or from itself: as a hot man from a cold, or a man standing from himself sitting.   

What is proper difference?  
A proper difference is some inseparable accident, whereby one thing differeth from another, or from itself: as the Swan by whiteness differeth from the Crow, the gray-eied man from another man that hath black eyes, or from himself, as having now an unmovable scar in his face, whereas before he had none.   

What is the most proper difference?  
The most proper difference, only received and allowed of the Logicians, is that which is spoken of many things differing in kind or number, in ask the question what manner of thing any thing is, as this word reasonable or unreasonable: for if I ask the question, what manner of thing this man or that man is, as john, Thomas, or Richard, etc. it is rightly answered, to say, A reasonable body. Likewise if I ask what manner of thing a horse is, it is truly answered, to say, An unreasonable body: for these be the most proper and especial differences, whereby men and bruit beasts do differ one from another.   

How manifold is the office of a Logical difference?  
Twofold: the one to divide the general kind into his especial kinds, and the other to constitute or make the self-same special kinds. Wherefore such differences are said in divers respects to be sometimes divisive, and sometimes constitutive, yea and sometimes both; as these differences, corporate and uncorporate, living and unliving, sensible and unsensible, reasonable and unreasonable; which in that they do divide some general kind into other kinds, either more special, or not so general, they may be called differences divisive: but in that they constitute or make any special kind, as this difference reasonable being added to a sensible body, maketh the special kind, man; such difference may be well called a difference constitutive, or rather specificative, as the former Table of general kinds and differences doth plainly show.   

What other division do the Schoolmen make of this Logical difference?  
They say, that of these differences some do extend further than some, for some may be applied to many special kinds, as living, and unliving, sensible and unsensible, and also the difference unreasonable, but the difference reasonable can be applied but to one special kind only, which is man.    

Of Property, called in Latin, Proprium.  

WHat is property?  
It is a natural inclination or property incident to one especial kind, which is to be understood four manner of ways.   

Show how.  
First, it is called Proprium, which is proper to one only kind, but not to the whole kind, as to be a Poet or physician, is proper to man, but not to every man: Secondly, it is called proper that belongeth to all the kind, but not to that kind alone: as to be two-footed, belongeth to all mankind, but not to that kind alone: for ●…l flying fowls are also two footed: Thirdly, it is said to be proper, when it belongeth to one only kind and to all that kind, but yet not always: as to be hore-headed or bald, is proper to man in old age, but yet not always: Fourthly, it is said to be proper, or rather most proper, which is incident to one kind alone, to all that kind and always, as to have a natural aptness to laugh or to speak is proper to man only, to every man, and always, and therefore this kind of property is said to be convertible, with the kind whereunto it belongeth, as whatsoever hath naturally power to speak or laugh, the same is man, and whatsoever is man, the same hath power to speak or laugh.    

Of an accident, called in Latin, Accidens.  

WHat is an accident?  
An accident is a voice or word signifying things casual, cleaving to substances or subjects, without which subjects they have no being at all, and it is thus defined. An accident is that which may be absent or present without corruption of the subject whereto it cleaveth, because it is no substantial part of the subject, and of such accidents some be called separable, and some unseparable.   

What is a separable accident?  
A separable accident is that which may be easily separated from the subject, as outward heat or cold from a man's body, whiteness or blackness from a wall.   

What is an unseparable accident?  
An unseparable accident is that which cannot be separated from his subject in deed, but only in thought or imagination, as heat from the fire, heaviness from lead. And such accidents be either incident to certain subjects, or substances in particular, as some men to be gray-eied, or redheaded; or else to some whole kind in general, as to all Ravens to be black, and all Swans to be white.    

Of the manifold uses of the aforesaid five Predicables.  

TO how many uses do the Predicables serve?  
To these four necessary uses: First, they show which words do comprehend more, or extend furthest, and which comprehend less or least, and what affinity is betwixt word and word, so as in making any definition, a man may easily perceive how every word ought to be expounded one by another, that is to say, the less common by that which is more common; as if you would define a Spaniel, you must say that he is a dog: for this word dog is a more common word than Spaniel, because it comprehendeth both Spaniel, Gr●…yhound, Hound, Cur, Mastiff, and every other kind of dog. Secondly, they show the nature of propositions, which be necessary, and which be casual or accidental.   

Which call you necessary, and which casual?  
That proposition is said to be necessary, whereof the predicate is either a general kind, a special kind, a special difference, or property, and is necessarily coupled to his subject; as when I say, john is a sensible body, john is a man, john is reasonable, john is apt to speak.   

When is a proposition said to be accidental?  
When the predicate is an accident, as when I say, john is learned or unlearned, white or black. Thirdly, they yield matter meet to make definitions and divisions: for Logical definitions be made of the nighest general kinds joined together, with their true differences or properties: as in defining a man, we say that man is a sensible body endued with reason; and in making divisions, we either divide the general kinds into their especial kinds, as a sensible body into man and bruit beasts, o●… the special kinds into their Individuums, as man into john, Thomas, etc. or else we divide subjects into their accidents, as of men, some be free, and some be bound, and such like. Fourthly, they help much towards the invention of arguments: for arguments be fetched from the common places, as from the general kind, the special kind, the difference, the property, and from other like places of invention, as shall be taught hereafter in his proper place. And note, that of these predicables do spring certain predications, whereof we come now to speak.     

CHAP. V.  

Of Predication, and of the divers kinds thereof.  

WHat is predication?  
Predication is a certain kind or phrase of speech, whereby one word is spoken of another, and aptly applied to another, as when we say, john is a man; for this word man is a general word, and is spoken of john, Thomas, Richard, and every other singular man.   

How many kinds of predications be there?  
Two, that is, essential and accidental.   

What is essential predication?  
It is a natural and usual kind of speech, whereby one thing is naturally, and properly spoken of another, or as the Logicians say, when words superior are spoken of their inseriours being of one self affinity, as when the general kind is spoken of any his special kinds, or the special kind of any his Individuums, or when the difference or property is spoken of their special kinds, or of any of the Individuums comprehended under the said special kinds; as when we say, Man is a sensible body, or that john is a man, or, john is reasonable, or, john is apt to speak, or such like: for such speeches are both natural, and of necessity, because the predicate is aptly applied to his subject. To this kind of predication some men do also refer two other kinds of speeches.   

Which be they?  
Predication, identical and unusual.   

What is identical predication?  
It is a kind of speech, whereby one self thing is spoken of itself, as when we say, john is john, which though it be essential, yet because nothing is expounded thereby, it is not allowed of the Logicians.   

What is unusual predication?  
It is a kind of speech seldom used, as when we read in the holy Scriptures, God is man, The word was made flesh; for these be most essential and necessary speeches, though not usual in any other science then in Divinity.   

What is predication accidental?  
Predication accidental is when an accident is spoken of his subject, as, Wine is sweet, or, Wine is sour, Socrates walketh; for this is a casual kind of speech, employing no necessity, as do the other essential or natural speeches before recited. To this also may be referred predications by way of similitude, as when we say, One man is a God or Devil to another, A Tyrant is a Wolf or Fox, that is to say, like a Wolf or Fox, which are otherwise called figurative or metaphorical speeches. But whilst we talk here of accidental predications, it shall not be amiss to show you that the Schoolmen, the more distinctly to express the nature of accidents, do use two terms, Abstractum and Concretum. Abstractum is the bare shape of any subject separated by imagination from the same, as the whiteness or blackness of a wall, or any other thing that is either white or black, which abstract cannot be properly spoken of his subject; for it were no proper speech, to say, that this wall is whiteness: wherefore we must use the adjective called Concretum, signifying the shape, together with the subject, as when we say, This wall is white.     

CHAP. VI  

Of Predicaments.  

WHat are Predicaments?  
Predicaments are certain Titles or Tables containing all things that be in the world: for every thing, whatsoever it be, is either a substance, or accident: and if it be a substance, it is found in the Table of substance hereafter following: if it be an accident, it belongeth either to quantity, quality, relation, action, passion, time, place, to be scited, or to have: for these be the Tables of accidents, in one of the which every accident is easy to be found. So that in all there be ten Predicaments or Tables, one of substance, and nine of accidents, and these be called the highest and most general kinds, albeit there be others indeed higher than they, called of the Schoolmen, Transcendentia, that is to say, surpassing, as these, Res, ens, unum, aliquid, verum, bonum: which may be Englished thus; a thing, a being, one, somewhat, true, good. But forsomuch as these be not spoken of the other higher kinds according to one self signification, but may be diversly applied, they are excluded from the order of predicaments.   

What other words are excluded from the order of Predicaments?  
All compound words, called of the Schoolmen Complexa, as Goodman, Plato disputeth: and all doubtful words having divers significations, otherwise called Equivokes, and also terms of Art, as a Noun, a pronoun, a Verb, which be terms of Grammar, and as genus, species, differentia, which be terms of Logic, and such like: which terms of Art are called of the Schoolmen, names of the second intention, as hath been said before. Notwithstanding, differences constituting especial kinds, do belong to the predicament of the same special kinds, and the parts of any whole thing do belong to the predicament wherein the whole is contained: and first, principles do belong to the predicament or table of those things whereof they be principles, as a point or prick belongeth to the predicament of quantity, all which shall be plainly declared unto you, immediately. after that we have somewhat talked of those things which the Schoolmen call Antepredicamenta, that is to say, forepredicaments.     

CHAP. VII.  

Of Forepredicaments.  

WHat mean you by forepredicaments?  
Forepredicaments be certain definitions, divisions, and rules taught by Aristotle before the predicaments, for the better understanding of the same, and therefore are called Antepredicamenta, that is to say, For predicaments.   

What, and how many things defineth he?  
Three, that is, Equivokes, univokes, and Denominatives.   

What call you Equivokes?  
Equivokes be such things as have ourselves ●… name, and yet be divers in substance or definition; as a natural dog, and a certain star in the firmament, are both called by one name in Latin, Canis, yet they be nothing like in substance, kind, or nature. And note that the Schoolmen do call the word or name itself Equivocum Equivocans, and the thing signified by the word Equivocum Equivocatum. They make also two kinds of Equivokes, that is, Equivokes by chance, and Equivokes of purpose. The first is, when one self name is given to many things by chance, and not for any likeness that is betwixt them, as in English this word Hart signifieth as well the heart of a man or beast, as a certain beast called a Hart in the Forest. The second is, when one self name is given to divers things of purpose, for some likeness that is betwixt them, as a painted man is called man as well as the living man; for we will commonly say, Here is King Henry the Eighth, when indeed it is but his picture. But ye must note, that all Equivokes being generally pronounced without addition, aught to be understood according to their chief and most principal signification, as this word man being generally spoken, aught to be taken for a living man, and not for a painted man: but no Equivokes aught to be placed in any predicament, neither can it be defined, unless it be first brought to one certain signification; and therefore all Equivokes are utterly barred from all manner of Discipline.   

What call you univokes?  
Vnivokes be those things that have one common name, which is spoken of them essentially, or really, as a man, a horse, a lion, whose common name is animal, or sensible body; for in ask what either of them is, it is rightly answered, to say, animal. And I say here really, because it is not enough for Vnivokes to have a common name, unless the same be also real or essential, whereby are excluded all common names or understandings that be accidental: for though white or black, swift or slow, or such like, is a common name, and is commonly applied both to man and beast, yet that is accidentally, and not really or substantially. Moreover, the Schoolmen do call the common word itself Vnivocum Vnivocans, and the thing signified by the word Vnivocum Vnivocatum.   

What call you Denominatives?  
Denominatives are those accidents that be of like name, and differ only in case, or final termination; as humble, humility; proud, proudness: for of humility, a man is said to be humble; and of pride, to be proud: and according to the Schoolmen, that word whereof the name doth spring, is called Denominator, and the name itself Denominative, and the thing or person so called, the Denominated; as if I should say of valiantness, Peter is said to be valiant; here valiantness is the Denominator, valiant the Denominative, and Peter the Denominated: for Peter is the subject whereunto the Denominator doth cleave. The Grammarians do call the Denominator Abstractum, that is, a substantive, and the Denominatiue Concretum, that is, an adjective.   

To what end doth Aristotle chiefly use th●…se definitions?  
To show the differences of predications or kinds of speeches, which are to be allowed, and which not: again, to know which be predications essential, and which be accidental: for according to the three definitions before rehear●…ed, there be three Predications, that is to say, Predication Equivocal, univocal, and Denominative.   

What is Predication Equivocal?  
Predication Equivocal, is when the equivoke is spoken of any of the things that it signifieth, as to say▪ His Letter was a Letter of the matter, meaning perhaps a hinderer of the matter: but such kind of speeches ought to be rejected from all good discipline, as hath been said before.   

What is Predication univocal?  
It is when the general kind is spoken of his especial kinds, or the especial kind of her inferiors, or the special difference of that special kind which it maketh, or of the Individuums contained under the same special kind, as when we say, Man is a sensible body, Man hath reason, or, john is a man.   

What is Predication Denominative?  
It is when some accident is spoken of his subject, as when we say, Peter is proud, humble, or valiant.   

What, and how many divisions be there?  
Two: The first division is touching words simple and compound, whereof though we have said somewhat before, yet it shall not grieve us, here again to set it down in such order as the Logicians use.   

Show how.  
Of words, some be simple, called in Latin, Incomplexa, and some be compound, called Complexa. Simple words be distinct and several words, not set together by any rule of Grammar, to make any perfect sentence, as, good, just, a man a horse, to stand, to go. Compound words be words significative, which are joined together by rules of Grammar to make some perfect sentence, as, john is learned.   

What is the second division?  
The second division is fourfold, as followeth: First, of things that be, some be spoken of a subject, and yet be in no subject, as, man, horse, and such like universal natures or substances: for they be no accidents. Secondly, some be in a subject, and yet be not spoken of any subject, as all particular accidents, as this or that colour, for these be Individuums, and therefore not predicable. Thirdly, some be in a subject, and also be spoken of a subject, as all universal accidents, as Science, Grammar, logic, and such like: for of these some be general, and some be special kinds, and therefore are said to be predicable accidents. Fourthly, some be neither in a subject, nor spoken of a subject, as john, Thomas, this man, or that man, this horse, or that horse; for these be first natures or substances, and therefore are subjects themselves not predicable.   

Whereto serveth this division?  
By this division ye may learn the diversity of these two speeches, to be spoken of a subject, and to be in a subject: for to be spoken of a subject, is to be spoken really or essentially of some thing that is part thereof, as this word animal, or sensible body, is really spoken of man, horse, and of every other thing that hath life and ceiling; for they be substantial parts of that general kind: for if it be demanded what a man or horse is, it is rightly answered, that he is a sensible body. But to be in a subject, is to be spoken of another thing accidentally, and not essentially, as this word white or black is spoken accidentally of man, or of any other subject, and not essentially; for neither is man any essential part of white, nor white any essential part of man, and therefore cannot be in man, or in any other subject, but accidentally: and for that cause it is spoken of his subject accidentally, and not really.   

Now tell how many, and what those rules be, whereof you spoke before▪  
There be two rules. The first is thus: When one thing is spoken of another essentially, as of his subject▪ than whatsoever may be spoken of that predicate, must needs be also really spoken of the same subject: for as this wo●…d sensible body is spoken of man or horse essentially, as when we say that man is a sensible body; so this word living body, being spoken essentially of a sensible body, as when we say that every sensible body is a living body, is also as really spoken of the foresaid subject, man, in saying that man is a living body; for this word, living body, is a more general kind than sensible body is.   

What is the second rule?  
The second rule is thus: divers general kinds not contained one of another, nor both of a third, have divers special differences, which do make divers special kinds, as a sensible body and science: for the special differences of a sensible body are these, reasonable and unreasonable, making both man and bruit beast: but the differences of science be these, contemplative and disputative, and such like, whereby are made special kinds of knowledge: for the difference contemplative maketh natural Philosophy, and the difference disputative maketh Logic.   

To what end serve these rules?  
To the end it might be easily known what words are of affinity, and which be of one self predicament, and which not. Thus far as touching forepredicaments. Now to the predicaments themselves. And first we will speak of substance.     

CHAP. VIII.  

Of Substance.  

WHat is substance? and how many kinds of substances be there?  
Substance is a thing consisting of itself, and needeth no help to sustain the being thereof: and yet it is clad with accidents; for otherwise we could not discern with our outward senses, whether it were a substance, or not: for we cannot see the substance of any thing with our bodily eyes, but only with the eyes of our mind and understanding; but we may see the shape, the quantity, the colour, and such like accidents cleaving to the substance, without the which those accidents have no being at all: and therefore in seeing such accidents, we may assure ourselves that there is a substance sustaining those accidents, which doth always remain, though the accidents do fail or change never so often. As for example: We see in water, that though it be sometime hot, and sometime cold, now of one colour, and now of another, yet the substance of water doth still remain, so as we may perceive those accidents to be one thing, and the substance of water to be another. Now as touching the kinds of substance, according to Aristotle, there be two, that is, first and second.   

What call you first substances?  
First substances be those substances which the Logicians call Individua, as john, Thomas, this man, or that man, this horse, or that horse, and by reason of their accidents are to be discerned with outward senses.   

Which call you second substances?  
Second substances are those which they call special kinds, and general kinds, as man, a sensible body, a living body, and such like, which are to be comprehended only by man's reason, and be not subject to our outward senses, as first substances be. And these second substances are otherwise called of the Schoolmen, universal natures.   

How many properties do belong to substance?  
These three: First, substance is contained in no subject, as an accident is: for though the parts of a man's body be contained in the whole, yet every such part is a peculiar body or substance, and hath his proper being of itself so well as the whole, whereas accidents without substance have no being at all. Secondly, substances are said to be divers, but not contrary one to another: for neither is fire, as touching his substance, contrary to water, nor the Wolf contrary to the Lamb, but only in respect of their quality, whereunto contrariety doth properly belong. Thirdly, of substances, one cannot be more or less than another; for the greatest Giant, as touching substance, is no more a man then the least Dwarf that is; neither is a man full grown, more a man, than a child newly borne: for more or less appertaineth properly to quantity, and not to substance. But if you will understand how far the predicament of substance doth extend, and what it comprehendeth, consider well this Table following, whereby you may learn how to define any kind of substance, whatsoever it be: for there you shall find all the kinds, both general and special, together with their differences, most plainly set forth.  

The Table of Substance.  
Substance is either  


without body, as  


An Angel, as Gabriel, Michael, etc.  
A spirit or soul separate from the body, as the spirit or soul of this or that dead man.    
Or with body: if it be with body, it is either  


Simple, if it be simple, it is either  


Celestial, as the eleven heavens, and all the stars and planets.  
Or elemental, as fire, air, water, earth.    
Or compound, if it be compound, it is either  


living, if it be living, it is either  


Sensible, if it be a sensible body, called in Latin, animal, it is either  


Reasonable, as man, as  


Socrates,  
Plato,  
Virgil,    
Or unreasonable, as  


A bird or fowl, as a Lark, etc.  
A 4. footed beast as a horse.  
A fish, as a salmo a creeping beast as a worm, a snake, a viper.      
Or unsensible, as a plant, which is either  


A tree, as an Oak, an Appletree, etc.  
A shrub, as briars, broom, etc.  
Or herb, as Thyme, Isope, Margerum.        
or unliving, if it be unliving, it is either  


Perfect, if it be perfect, it is either  


Metal, as gold and silver, etc.  
Or stone, which is either  


Natural, as a precious stone, a flint.  
Or artificial, as a tile or brick.    
Or liquor, as wine, honey, etc.    
or unperfect, as  


Fiery impressions, as thunder, lightning.  
Or watery impressions, as rain, ha●…le, snow, etc.              

CHAP. IX.  

Of Quantity.  

WHat is quantity, and how is it divided?  
Quantity is that which comprehendeth the greatness and number or multitude of things, and is divided into two kinds, that is, whole and broken.   

What is whole quantity?  
Whole quantity, called in Latin, quantitas continua, is that whose parts are joined together with some common bound or limit, which is the ending of one part, and the beginning of another, as the parts of the line here set down in the margin, marked with the letters a. c. are coupled together with the middle 
b a— c  point b. which point is the ending of a. b. and the beginning of b. c.   

How many kinds of whole quantity be there?  
Of whole quantity there be three kinds, that is, linea, superficies, and corpus.   

Show how they are defined and divided.  
Linea (in English, a line) is a length without either breadth or thickness, which is either right, or crooked; ●…ight, as a yard, an ell, or pole; crooked, as a hoop, or circle.  
Superficies (which we may properly interpret to be the upper face of any thing) is a length and breadth without depth or thickness; and that is either plain, or bowing; plain, as a plain or smooth floor; bowing or compassing, as a vault or oven, whereof the outward side is called conu●…x, and the inward side concave or hollow.  
Corpus (which is as much to say as a body) is that which hath both length, breadth, and depth, and that is either round, or with angles; round, as a bowl or ball; with a●…gles or co●…ners, as a square die, or such like thing. All which three kinds of quantity are to be considered only with the mind mathematically. as things abstract, and separated from all k●…nde of matter, t●…at is to say as things that have no being ●…t all, but imaginatively▪ and yet so nec●…ssarily invented by man, as nothing can be measured without them. To these three kinds of whole quantity may be also added two other kinds, that is to say, moving, and time, being taken for the measure, space, or distance of place or time wherein any thing is moved.   

How many kinds of this moving be there, and which be they?  
Of this moving there be three kinds, that is, right, circular, and mixed. The right belongeth to the four elements, and to bodies without life: for their natual moving is either right upward, or else right downward, as the fire, whose proper moving is always to ascend right up, and the moving of a stone, or such like heavy thing, is to fall right downward: for (according to the rules of philosophy) all light things do move upward, and all heavy things downward. Circular, or round moving, belongeth to the heavens, and celestial bodies, which do turn round like a Cart wheel. The mixed moving (that is to say, partly right, and partly round) belongeth to all living beasts, that go sometime forward, sometime backward, or sidelong, sometime upward, and sometime downward.   

How is time divided?  
Time is divided into three kinds, that is, into time past, time present, and time to come: and under time are comprehended years, months, weeks, days, hours, and all other words signifying distance or difference of time.   

What is broken quantity?  
Broken quantity, called of the Latins, quantitas discreta, is that, whose parts are not joined with any common bound or limit, but be loose and several one from another; which quantity is divided into two kinds, that is, number and speech.   

What is number, and how is it divided?  
Number is a multitude or sum of unities or ones gathered together: and such number is either simple, respective, or figurative: Simple, as, two, three, four, five, etc. Respective, as half, double, treble, quadruble, and such like: Figurative, as a three-square or foursquare number, like to these here figured ⸫:: and such like.   

What things are comprehended under broken quantity?  
All names of measures, whereby we measure any thing, either dry or liquid, as gallon, quart; pint, bushel, peck, pound, dram, scruple, grain, etc.   

How is speech here taken?  
Speech is taken here for the measure or quantity of syllables, whereof some be long, and some be short: and such quantity is to be considered either in harmony, in rhythm, or verse; of which things, the general and special kinds, together with the rest that have been said touching quantity, are orderly set forth in the Table of quantity here following.   

What, and how many properties do belong to quantity?  
To quantity belong three properties: First, to have no contrariety; for great and small be not of themselves contrary, but only by way of comparison. Secondly, to be greater or lesser, but not more or less, spoken adverbially; for a little quantity is a quantity as well as the greatest quantity of all. The third and chiefest property of quantity, is, to be equal or unequal.  

The Table of Quantity.  
Quantity is either  


Whole, if it be whole, it is either  


permanent, if it be permanent, it is either  


A line, which is either  


Right, as a yard, an ell. Or crooked, as a hoop, or bow, etc.    
A superficies, which is either  


Plain, as a smooth floor, etc.  
Or bowing, as a vault, or oven, etc.    
Or a body, which is either  


Round, as a bowl or ball.  
Or with corners, as a square die, etc.      
Or movable, if it be movable, it is either  


Motion, which is either  


Right,  
Circular,  
Or Mixt.    
Or time, and that is either  


Time past,  
Time present,  
Or time to come.        
Or broken: if it be broken quantity, it is either  


Number, which is either  


Simple, as even or odd, etc.  
Respectiu●…, as double, treble, etc.  
Or figurative, as three-cornered, foure-cornered, etc.    
Or measure of speech, which consisteth either  


In composition of syllables, as Dactilus, Sponde●…s, etc.  
In harmony, as a third, a fist, etc.  
In rhythm, as charm, harm.  
Or in verse, as hexamiter, pentami●…er, jambicke.            

CHAP. X.  

Of Quality.  

WHat is quality?  
Quality is an affection, shape, or form of the mind or body, whereof the thing so affected or form taketh his name: as of wisdom a man is said to be wise, and of justice he is called just.   

How many kinds of quality be there?  
Of quality there be four kinds, that is, habit and disposition, natural power and impotency, passion and passable quality, figure and form.   

What is habit, and how is it divided?  
Habit is a constant and absolute perfection in any thing, not given by nature, but gotten by long use and exercise; and it is twosold, that is, of the mind, and of the body: again, habit of the mind is twofold, whereof the one is called intellectual, belonging to the reason and understanding of man, and the other moral, belonging to the will of man. Of intellectual habits, according to Aristotle, there be five, that is, Intelligence, Science, Prudence, Art, and Sapience.  

1 Intelligence is the knowledge of speculative principles, as 2. and 2. make 4. the whole is more than his part; take equal from equal, and equal remain, and such like.  
2 Science is the knowledge of true conclusions, consisting of most certain and infallible propositions; as, Man is a sensible body, Man is apt to learn: and under Science are comprehended the sciences rational, as Grammar, Rhetoric, and Logic; also the sciences Mathematical, as Arithmetic, Geometry, Music, and Astronomy, which are otherwise called Quadrivials, that is to say, the four ways or kinds of mathematical discipline; and finally, the science physical, that is to say, natural, as the natural philosophy of Aristotle, or of any other Writer treating of the secrets of nature.  
3 Prudence is an habit working with true judgement, and according to right reason in all things appertaining to man, be they good or evil. Prudence may be divided into prudence monastical, domestical, and political. Monastical teacheth to govern one sole person: domestical, to govern a household or family; and political, to govern a commonwealth.  
4 Art is an habit of knowledge consisting of assured and certain rules, tried and approved by experience, and learned by exercise, teaching to do or to make something that is profitable to man's behoof: and Art comprel end●…th all Arts, both liberal and mechanical, that is to say, handy crafts. 5. Sapience, consisting both of intelligence, and of science, is the head and chief of those knowledges that be most honourable in nature, comprehending two notable Sciences, that is, the Christian Divinity, and the Philosopher's Divinity, otherwise called Metaphysical, that is, supernatural. And all these intellectual habits are contained under a certain and most sure knowledge, which is always true: for uncertain knowledge is sometimes true, and sometimes false: whereto belongeth opinion, suspicion, conjecture, and such like. Thus much of habit intellectual.    

What is moral habit, and how is it dinided?  
It is a quality of the mind, gotten by custom and doctrine, teaching and inviting man's will to work, either well or evil; and is twofold, that is, either good, or evil: to the good belong all kind of virtues, as justice, liberality, fortitude, temperance, etc. to the evil all kind of vices, as pride, covetousness, cowardliness, and such like. And note, that of virtues, some be called moral, and some theological, that is to say, divine.   

Which call you theological or divine?  
Those that be not gotten by custom, or man's industry, but are the mere gifts of God, as faith, hope, and perfect charity, and all other gifts of the holy Ghost, as the gifts of the tongues, of prophesying, of healing, and such like: which some do attribute to habit infused, making a difference betwixt habit infused, & habit acquired or gotten, as you may see in the Table following,   

What is habit of the body?  
Habit of the body is a certain aptness & agility of doing any thing with the body, not given by nature, but gotten by custom & exercise, as to ride well, to run, to leap, to dance, to wrestle, to shoot, to fence, to dart, to swim, to write, to paint, and such like.  

The Table of Habit.  
Habit is either  


Of the body, as  


To fence,  
To dart,  
To shoot,  
To wrestle.    
Or of the mind, if it be of the mind, it is either  


Infused, as  


Faith,  
Hope,  
Charity.    
Or acquired, if it be acquired, it is either  


Intellectual, intellectual coprehen death both  


Knowledge certain, if it be certain, it containeth the 5. intellectual habits before defined, that is,  


Intelligence,  
Science, which is  


Rational, as  


Grammar,  
Logic,  
Rhetoric.    
Mathema tical, as  


Arithmetic,  
Geometry,  
Music,  
Astronomy.    
Physical, as  


Knowledge of the secrets of Nature and of the Soul.      
Prudence is either  


Monastical,  
Domestical,  
Political, which are before defined▪    
Art is either  


Liberal, as  


Husbandry,  
Architecture,    
or mechanical, as  


Tailor's craft,  
shoemakers craft,  
Carpenter's craft.      
And Sapience, which containeth both  


Christian Divinity, & also Philosophers Divinity, otherwise called Metaphysical and supernatural wisdom.      
And knowledge uncertain, as  


Opinion,  
Suspicion,  
Conjecture.      
Or Moral, which comprehendeth both  


Virtue, as  


justice,  
Fortitude,  
Temperance, etc.    
And vice, which is either  


By excess, as  


Rash boldness,  
Prodigality,    
By defect, as  


Cowardl●…nesse,  
〈◊〉▪                

What is disposition, and how is it divided?  
Disposition is an habit begun, but not perfected; and it is either of the body, or of the mind: for to disposition may be referred whatsoever was before attributed to habit (perfection in the thing only excepted) in which they differ for lack of continuance, by reason whereof, disposition is said to be easily removed, but habit not so, because it is thoroughly grounded: as for example, of the disposition that a man hath to learning, he is said to be studious: but of perfect habit, gotten by continual study in learning, he is said to be learned, which importeth a perfection, which is more than a disposition.    

Of natural power and impotency, the second kind of Quality.  

WHat is natural power?  
It is a natural ability to do, to suffer, or to resist, not gotten by exercise, but given by nature to the mind or body: to the mind, as to have a good wit or memory, to be apt to learning, and such like: to the body, as to be healthful, nimble, strong, and such like.   

What is natural impotency?  
It is a natural weakness either of the mind or body: of the mind, as to be dull of wit, to be forgetful, or unapt to be taught, and such like: of the body, as to be sickly, to be weak and feeble, and unapt to suffer any thing that an able body can do or suffer.   

What is comprehended under this second kind of quality?  
To this kind may be referred all the natural powers and impotencies of the soul vegetative, sensitive, and intellective: also all natural powers or virtues of herbs and stones, and the natural influences of the heavens, stars, elements, and of all the superior or upper bodies. All which things you may see plainly set forth in this Table following.  

Natural power is either  
Of the body, as  


Health,  
Hardiness,  
Nimbleness,  
Strength.    
or of the mind, if it be of the mind, it is either  


Power vegetative is either  


Principal, as  


Nutritive,  
Augmentative,  
Generative.    
Or adiwant, as  


Attractive,  
Immutative,  
Retentive,  
Expulsive.      
Power sensitive is either  


Comprehensive, which is either  


Interior, as  


Common sense,  
Phantasie,  
Memory.    
Exterior, as  


Sight,  
Hearing,  
Smelling,  
Tasting,  
Feeling.      
Or motive, which is either  


Appetitive, which is either  


Concupiscible or irascible, whereof spring all the perturbations and passions of the mind, as love, hate, wrath    
Progressive, as  


To go,  
To fly,  
To swim▪        
Or power intellective, which is either  


Speculative, as  


To contemplate,  
To understand.    
Or practive, as  


To will,  
To nill,  
To command,  
To choose.         

Natural impotency is either  
Of the body, as  


To be sick,  
To be weak,  
To be feeble.    
Or of the mind,  


To be forgetful,  
To be unapt to be taught.       

Of passion and passable quality, the third kind of quality.  

WHat doth the third kind of quality comprehend?  
Passion and passable quality.   

What is passion?  
It is a sudden motion of the mind or body, that endureth not long, and therefore easy to be removed. Passion of the mind is a sudden fear or joy conceived of some evil or good that is offered: and of the body, as paleness of colour, blushing, or trembling of the flesh.   

What is passable quality?  
It is an inveterate affection or motion of the mind or body, not easy to be removed: of the mind, as madness grown of some continual sorrow or melancholy: of the body, as blackness of the face by continual boiling heat of the blood, or paleness by continual sickness of the body: and therefore passable quality is compared and likened to habit, and sudden passion to disposition.   

What is comprehended under passable quality?  
All the objects of the five outward senses, as colours, light, brightness, which be the objects of the sight; sounds, voices, and noises, the objects of hearing; savours, the objects of tasting; odours and smells, the objects of smelling; tangible qualities, which be the objects of feeling: of which tangible qualities some are said to be first, and some second: the first be these heat, coldness, moistness, dryness: the second be hardness, softness, heaviness, lightness, roughness, smoothness, and such like.   

Which be the chief passions or affections of the mind?  
The chief affections be these four, joy, lust, sorrow, fear.   

How is joy defined, and what good or evil branches do spring thereof?  
joy is a sweet and delectable motion of the heart, wherewith it is stirted and delighted, whilst it enjoyeth some good that is present, or (at the least) seemeth good: and hereof springeth delight, boasting malevolence, rejoicing at other men's evil.   

What is lust, and what affections do spring thereof?  
Lust is a motion of the mind, stirred up by thinking of some good indeed, or seeming good, that is absent, whereof do spring these affections, hope, desire, love, anger, wrath and hatred.   

What is sorrow, and what affections do arise thereof?  
It is a grievous motion of the heart, causing it to shrink together, whilst it flieth some present evil, that is evil indeed, or seemeth evil: and hereof spring these affections, envy, slandering, mercy, agony, lamenting, calamity, carefulness, grief and desperation.   

What is fear, and what affections do rise thereof?  
Fear is a grievous motion, causing the heart to shrink together, whilst it flieth some evil that is to come: and hereof spring these affections, hea●…nesse, shame, terror, sounding, and such like: all which things you may see briefly set forth in the Table next following.  

The Table of passion and passable quality.  
Passion is either  


Of the mind, as  


joy,  
Lust,  
Sorrow,  
Fear.    
or of the body, as  


Sudden paleness,  
Sudden blushing,  
Or  
Trembling of the flesh.      
Passable quality containeth  


All the inveterate passions both of mind and body before set down.  
And also all the objects of the five Senses, as  


Colours,  
Sounds,  
Odours,  
Savours,  
Tangible qualities,    


The objects  
Of the sight,  
Of hearing,  
Of smelling,  
Of tasting,  
Of touching,  
Or feeling.        

Why are these objects of the senses called passable qualities?  
Because they make the senses to suffer, as the colour of any thing, by striking into the eye, maketh the sight to suffer, and causeth either pleasure or grief to the sight: so likewise the sweetness of honey in striking the taste, delighteth it: and chose, the bitterness of gall, or such like thing, endued with a bitter savour, offendeth the taste.    

Of figure and form, the fourth kind of quality.  

WHat difference is betwixt figure and form?  
Figure, according to some, is that which is enclosed with one bound or limit, or with many, as a circle environed with one round line, called the circumference, or as a triangle or foursquare figure, whereof the one is enclosed with three lines, and the other with four, and such like: but form is the drawing or describing of the said figure. Again, according to the opinion of some, figure is compared to an image representing some lively thing: and form is said to be the due proportion and feature of the same. Some again do attribute figure to things without life, and form to things, that have life, briefly set down in this verse following:  
Formam viventis, picti dic esse Figuram:  
Englished thus:  

The shapes of painted things they Figures call:  
But living things (they say) are form all.    

What doth this fourth kind of quality comprehend?  
It comprehendeth the accidental figures and forms, as well of natural, as artificial things: of natural, as the shape of man, beast, or fowl: or artificial, as the shape or figure of a house, temple, ship, or such like: also it comprehendeth all Geometrical figures, as well perfect as unperfect.   

Which call you perfect?  
Those that are enclosed within such bounds as nothing can be added or taken away from them, without marring or altering the same, as a circle, a triangle, a square, and such like: whereof some are plain, enclosed only with lines, as circles, triangles, squares, and such like: and some are solid or whole bodies, enclosed with upper faces, either one or many, as round spheres, sharp pinnacles, cubes, as a die, and round pillars.   

Which call you unperfect?  
Those which are not so enclosed with their bounds, but that some one thing may be added or taken away from the same, without changing or altering of the figure, as the rightness, roundness, concavity, or convexity of unperfect figures, may be lengthened or shortened, and yet the former shape thereof shall still remain, and not be altered, but only in quantity.  

A Table of figure and form.  
Figure and form is either  


Perfect is either  


Plain, as  


A perfect circle.  
A triangle, whereof there be six kinds:  


Isopleurus,  
Isosceles,  
Scalenon,  
Ambligovius,  
Oxigonius,  
Orthogonius.    
A quadrangle, as  


A perfect square,  
A long square,  
A square like to a Thorne-backe, called Rhombus.    
Or having many angles, as  


A figure of 5. 6. or 7. angles, or more.      
Or solid, which is either  


Spherical,  
pyramidical,  
Cubic, or Piller-like.      
Or unperfect, which is either  


Right,  
Circular,  
Conuex,  
or  
Concave.       
But the true descriptions of all the figures contained in this Table, are to be learned of the Geometricians, and not of the Logicians.    

Of the properties of quality.  

HOw many properties do belong to Quality?  
Three: First, to be contrary, as virtue is contrary to vice, heat to cold, white to black: yet such contrariety belongeth not to every kind of Quality; for Triangles be not contrary to Squares, nor round pillars to sharp pinnacles.   

What is the second property?  
To be more or less: for one man may be more virtuous, or less virtuous; more learned, or less learned; more healthful, or less healthful; more or less, hot or cold. Yet this property belongeth not to every kind of quality; for one triangle is no more a triangle then another. The like may be said of the rest of the perfect Figures, as well plain as solid.   

What is the third property?  
To be like or unlike: and this is the chiefest property belonging to every kind of quality: as, two Grammarians be like one to another in their profession, two healthful or unhealthful, two white or two black, two triangles or two squares are said to be like or unlike one to another.   

How define you likeness or unlikeness?  
Likeness, according to Boetius, is when divers things have one self quality. Unlikeness is, when they have divers qualities.     

CHAP. XI.  

Of Relation.  

WHat is Relation?  
It is the referring, comparing, or applying of one thing unto another, for some respect of ●…ffinitie or likeness, wherewith they are kn●…t so together, as the one cannot be well understood without the other: and therefore the things so compared are called Relatives, or rather Correlatives; for of things, some are said to be absolute, and some respective or relative.   

Which call you absolute?  
Absolute are those which may be understood by themselves, without being applied to any other thing, as substance, quantity, quality.   

Which are said to be relative or respective?  
Those that cannot be well understood of themselves, without having relation to some other thing, as the Father and the Son, the Lord and the Bondman, the Master and the Scholar, etc. Here note, that of the Schoolmen the thing from which the application is made, is called in Latin, Fundamentum, in English, The foundation; and the thing whereunto the relation or application is made, is called in Latin, Terminus, in English, the bound, end, or term, as in th●…se Correlatives, the Father and the Son, the Lord and the Bondman, the Schoolmaster and the Scholar. Here, the Father, the Lord, and Schoolmaster, are called, every of them, Fundamentum; but the Son, the Bondman, and Scholar, every of them is called, terminus, that is, the end or term; and the application of the one to the other is called relation.   

How many kinds of Relatives be there?  
Two: Relatives secundum esse, that is, indeed, and Relatives secundum dici, which we may call, Relatives in name.   

Which call you Relatives indeed?  
Those which according to their principal signification have relation to some other thing, without which they cannot be understood: as a Father is not to be understood, without there be a Son, nor a Son, unless there be a Father. The like may be said of a Tutor and Pupil, the Master and his Scholar, and such like.   

What call you Relatives in name?  
Those that according to their principal signification may be understood, without having relation to any other thing; and yet, because in some respect they have relation to some other thing, they are called Relatives, but not properly, for they differ not from the abso●…e things before defined, as virtue, vice, habit, disposition etc.   

What other division is there of Relatives?  
Of Relatives, some are said to be of one self name, and some of divers: of one self name, as like, unlike, equal, unequal, schoole-follow, neighbour, and such like: of divers names, as the Father, the Son, the Lord and Bondman, etc. And of such, some be more worthy, and some be less worthy, as the Father is more worthy, the Son less worthy; the Master more worthy, the Scholar less worthy: which divisions this Table doth show.  

The Table of Relation.  
Relation is either  


In deed, if in deed, it is either  


Of one self name, as  


A Schoolfellow,  
Like,  
Unlike,  
Equal,  
Unequal,  
Kinsman,  
Neighbour.    
Or of divers names, whereof some be  


More worthy, as  


The Master,  
The Father,  
The double,  
The cause,  
The whole,  
The Captain.    
And some be less worthy, as  


The Scholar,  
The Son,  
The one half,  
The effect,  
The part,  
The Soldier.        
Or in name, as  


Substance,  
Quantity,  
Quality,  


and such like absolutes.           

Of the properties of Relation.  

HOw many properties do belong to Relation?  
Five: First, to have contrariety, as virtue and vice, science and ignorance. But this property belongeth not to all: for double and the one half hath no contrariety, nor the Father and the Son.   

What is the second property?  
The second is to be more or less, as to be more like, or less like; or more equal, or less equal. Yet this belongeth not to all: for double hath neither more or less, nor one Father is said to be more or less than another.   

What is the third property?  
The third is, that all Relatives (which are Relatives indeed) are convertible: for he is a Father, that hath a Son, and he is a Son, that hath a Father, etc.   

What is the fourth property?  
The fourth is, that one Correlative is not before another, but are both together: as the father is called no father, until he hath begotten a child, and a child is called no son, before he be begotten of the father. For this is a general rule of Correlatives: If the one be, the other must needs be: If the one be taken away, the other must also be taken away.   

What is the fifth property?  
The fifth is, that whosoever assuredly knoweth the one Correlative, must needs know the other: for whosoever certainly knoweth that I am a father, must needs also certainly know that I have a child. The like may be said of all that be Correlatives indeed, to whom this property only belongeth, as Aristotle saith.     

CHAP. XII.  

Of Action.  

WHat is action?  
Action is some accidental form or shape, whereby any thing is said to do or to work upon his subject.   

What mean you here by this word subject?  
The thing that suffereth, as the water is the subject whereon the fire induceth the shape of heating: for here the water is said to be passive, and the fire active.   

How is action divided?  
Into actions of the soul, and of the body. The actions of the soul, are those which the soul doth: for, according to his power vegetative, his actions are to nourish, to increase, and to engender; and according to his power sensitive, to see, to hear, to smell, to taste, to feel●…; and according to his power intellective, to understand, to will, ●…o nill, and such like.  
The actions of the body are those that do immediately belong to some body or corporal accident, as to cut, to strike, to heat, to cool, to moisten, to dry, to make white, to make black, and such like.   

Is there no other division of action?  
Yes divers, but such as do rather belong to natural Philosophers, and to Divines, then to Logicians: and therefore we leave to speak any further of them.   

What doth this predicament comprehend?  
All Nouns and Verbs of the active signification: as these Nouns, generation, corruption, augmentation, diminution, alteration, moving from place to place, and such like: also all Verbs active, as, to engender, to corrupt, to increase, to diminish, to alter or change▪ and to move from place to place, and such like Verbs of the active signification.   

How many properties do belong to action?  
Two: First, to admit contrariety, not simply, but per accidens, as to kindle, and to extinguish: secondly, to be more or less, and yet accidentally, as one fire to burn more, and another less, one water to cool more, and another less.     

CHAP. XIII.  

Of Passion.  

WHat is passion?  
It is the relation or application of the patient to the agent: as for example, whilst the water suffereth to be heated by the fire, this sufferance is called passion.   

What doth this predicament comprehend?  
All Verbs of the passive signification, as to be engendered, corrupted, increased, diminished, or altered, and such like.   

What properties do belong to passion?  
The same that have been said before to belong unto action.     

CHAP. XIIII.  

Of the Predicament Where, called in Latin, Vbi.  

HOw define you the Predicament Vbi?  
Ubi is to be in some place, as when a body is enclosed within a place, and therefore is defined of some, to be the description of the place wherein any thing is said to be, or to be done or made, as in the heavens, in the earth, in the temple, in the house, and such like.   

How is this predicament divided?  
Into Vbi simplex, and Vbi compositum, that is to say, simple and compound.   

When is it said to be simple?  
When a thing indivisible is in some indivisible place, as an Angel in Puncto; or when a thing indivisible is in a place divisible, as an Angel in the Temple; for the Temple may be divided into many parts, though the Angel cannot.   

When is it said to be compound?  
When some divisible body is contained in a place divisible, as the being of things corporal in the water, or in the air; for corporal things be so divisibly placed in their places, as every part of the thing placed, is answerable to every part of the place wherein they are contained; and so contrarily, as to the parts of a man's body environed with the air, one part of that air is answerable to the head, another to the feet, and so consequently of all the rest: and therefore the Schoolmen say, that Ubi compositum, is to be in a place circumscriptively, but Ubi simplex, is to be in a place definitively, that is to say, in some certain place, though not according to the position or order of placing the parts. But when a thing is said to be in a place circumscriptively, than such place and thing may be both divided according to the parts of position or placing, as this part here, and the other part there, whereof spring these differences, above, beneath, before, beh●…nde, on the right side, on the left side, and such like. And finally, this predicament comprehendeth whatsoever answereth to this question, where any thing is said to be or to be done.   

What properties do belong to the predicament, Where?  
Three: First, to admit no contrariety; for though to be above and beneath seem to be contrary, yet that is to be understood physically, and not dialectically: secondly, it admitteth neither more nor less; for to be in the Temple, is no more to be in place, then to be in the market, or in any house: but the third and chiefest property of Vbi is to contain.     

CHAP. XV.  

Of the predicament When, called in Latin, Quando.  

HOw define you this predicament?  
This is said to be a relation or application of a thing measured by time, unto time itself, and containeth the differences of times, whereby any thing is said to be, to have been, or shall be, to do, or to suffer: and to speak briefly, it comprehendeth all words that answer to this question When, as yesterday, to morrow, the next day, and such like.   

How is Quando divided?  
Two manner of ways; for sometime it is said to be definite, that is, certain, as in this or that hour, day, or year, which is certain; and sometime ind●…finite, that is, uncertain, as to have been, without any limitation of time, which is uncertain. Secondly. Quando may be divided into his parts of succession, as into time past, present, and to come.   

What properties do belong to this predicament?  
First, to have no contrariety: Secondly, to admit neither more or loss: Thirdly, to be always flitting or fluxible, and never permanent, which property it hath by reason of time which continually passeth away.     

CHAP. XVI.  

Of the predicament, to be situated, called in Latin, Situm esse.  

WHat is Situm esse?  
Quintilian saith, that Situm esse is as much to say, as to be situated, ordered, or placed some manner of way; and it is a general word, comprehending all names that do express the site or ordering of the body and parts thereof, as to stand, to sit, to lie either groveling, or right up, or on the one side: and finally, it comprehendeth all those words which answer to this question, how any thing is situated, as when it is required how Norwich standeth from London, either Northward, Southward, Westward, or Eastward.   

How is site divided of the Schoolmen?  
Into site natural and casual.   

Which call you natural site?  
That whereby every part of the body hath his natural place; as in man's body, the head to stand above, the belly in the midst, and the feet beneath; and so in a tree, the root to belowest, the body in the midst, and the boughs or branches to be highest.   

What call you site casual?  
That whereby the position or ordering of the parts is altered any way by accident, as, now to stand upright, now to stoop, now to sit, or to lie down, this way, or that way.   

What descriptions are to be fetched from this predicament?  
The descriptions of places.   

What properties do belong to this predicament?  
Two: First, to admit no contrariety; for though upward seemeth to be contrary to downward, yet that is understood physically, and not dialectically. Secondly, it hath neither more, nor less; for to stand is no more a site, then to sit, nor sitting more than standing.   

Which things do alter their situation, and which not?  
All things without life and feeling, do keep their site, if by violence they be not changed: but all things having life and feeling, do alter their site, when and as often as it pleaseth them, as a beast to stand up, or to lie down, and so forth.  

The Table of Site.  
〈◊〉 is either  


Natural, as  


The head to stand above,  
The belly to be in the midst,  
And the feet beneath.    
Or casual, as  


Going,  
Standing,  
Lying groveling, or  
With the fa●…e upward.          

CHAP. XVII.  

Of the predicament, To have, called in Latin, Habere.  

WHat doth this word to have signify?  
It hath three special significations: First, to be clad with garments, armour, or ornament: secondly, to possess any thing, as to possess wife, lands, or goods: thirdly, to contain any thing, as a vessel to contain either liquid or dry matter that is powered therein: and therefore this predicament comprehendeth all such words as are derived of the names of garments, as to be gowned, cloaked, or coated: also of armour, as well defensive as offensive; defensive, as to be armed with a Corselet, jack, or shirt of male, and such like: offensive, as to be armed with a sword, dagger, caliver, halberd, or pike. Also beasts and fishes are said to be armed with nails, horns, talons, beaks, scales, fins, and such like. Also it comprehendeth words of ornament, as to be decked with Chains, jewels, and Tablets: also words of possession, as to have lands or goods: also words of containing, as to be full of wine, oil, or honey, as you may see in the Table following.  

The Table of the predicament To have.  
To have is threefold, that is,  


To be 〈◊〉  


With garments, as to be gowned or cloaked.  
With armour, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a 〈◊〉 or 〈◊〉.  
Or with ornaments, as with ta●…let 〈◊〉.   

To possess, as to possess lands or goods.  
To contain, as a vessel to be full of liquor, etc.        

What properties do belong to this predicament?  
Two: First, to admit more and less: for a man at arms is said to be more armed than a light horseman, and a P●…keman more than a Caliver or Harquebuzier. Again, he that is clad with two coats, is more clad than he that weareth but one. Secondly, this predicament admitteth in some sort contrariety: for to be armed and unarmed, clad and naked, are contraries by privation, but not otherwise.     

CHAP. XVIII.  

Of the use of the Predicaments.  

TO what use or end do these predicaments ser●…e?  
To many good uses. First, if you will define any thing, you shall be sure in some of these predicaments to find out the general kind thereof, together with all the differences (for the most part) belonging to the same: which if they be not set down, than they are to be gathered out of the proper accidents incident to the thing which you would define. Secondly, if you would divide any thing, here you shall find both the general kinds, special kinds, yea and divers examples of the Individuums comprehended under the same kinds. Thirdly, out of these predicaments you may gather matter apt to prove any question, either general or particular.     

CHAP. XIX.  

Of Postpredicaments.  

WHat mean you by Postpredicaments?  
They be interpretations of certain words more plainly expounded after the predicaments, for the better understanding of certain of the said predicaments.   

Which are they?  
These five, Oppositio, prius & posterius, simul, motus, & habere, that is to say in English, Opposition, before and after, together, moving, and to have: every one whereof may be taken and interpreted divers ways.   

What is opposition?  
Opposition is the repugnancy or contrariety of two extremes which are contrary one to another, in such sort as none of them is in like manner repugnant to any other thing: as for example, white and black being two extremes, are more contrary one to another, then either of them is to any other colour, as to red, yellow, russet, or blue.  
Sith some things are said to be agreeable one to another, and some contrary one to another, and some divers one from another; it were not amiss, first here to tell how, and when things are said to be agreeable, divers, or repugnant one to another.  
Things are said to be agreeable one to another three manner of ways: First, when they agree in general kind, as those which are subject to one next general kind, as man and horse do agree in general kind, because this word animal, or sensible body, is the next general kind to them both. Secondly, things are said to agree in special kind, as Edward and john are both comprehended under this word man. Thirdly, things are said to agree in number, as words having one self signification, called in Greek Synonyma, as a blade, a rapier, a curtilas or stuck, signifying a sword: also things of like substance or definition, as man, and a sensible body endued with reason. And by these three ways things are said also to differ one from another; for they may differ one from another in general kind, in special kind, and in number: in general kind, as a sensible body, and a tree; in special kind, as a horse, and an as●…e: again, they may differ in number, as the Individuums that be comprehended under one special kind, as john and Edward, do differ only in number.   

Is it all one, to be divers, and contrary?  
No: for those things are said to be divers, which differ any of the ways above said, or by any other difference, be it common, proper; or most proper. Yet few or none of these things are contrary one to another: for no substance admitteth contrariety, nor yet many accidents, unless it be by reason of quality, whereunto contrariety doth properly belong.   

How many ways are things said to be contrary one to another?  
Four manner of ways, that is, relative, contrary, privative, and contradictory, that is to say, by relation, by contrariety, by privation, and by contradiction.   

Which things are said to be opposite or contrary by relation?  
Those things are opposite by relation, which according to their own significations, have mutual relation one to another, neither can they be both verified of one self thing in one self respect, as the father and the son, the Lord and the bondman: for one man cannot be both a father and a son in one respect, but in divers respects he may: for every man that hath a son, is notwithstanding a son to his own father, and a father to his own son.   

Which things are said to be opposite by contrariety?  
Those things are said to be contrary, which being comprehended under one self kind, do most differ one from another, and yet both may be one after another in one self subject meet to receive the same, because the one giveth place to the other, unless it be such a thing as is naturally incident to the said subject: as heat and cold, being contained under quality, are most contrary one to another, and yet may be one after another in man's body, or any other subject apt to receive the same: for many times heat driveth out cold, and cold heat. Yet in fire it is not so: for heat is always naturally incident to fi●…e; and will never give place to cold, so long as it is fire, and not extinct.   

How are contraries divided?  
Of contraries, some have a mean, called of the Schoolmen, Contraria mediata, and some have no mean, called, Contraria immediata.   

When are they said to have a mean?  
When the two contraries are such, as neither of them is of mere necessity, in any subject meet to receive the same, as white & black: for that subject which is apt to receive them both, may be yellow or russet, and so the subject is neither white nor black.   

When are they said to have no mean?  
When the one of the two contraries may be always truly affirmed of any subject apt to receive the same, as sickness and health▪ for man or beast is truly said to be either sick, or whole. Also vice and virtue have no mean: for a man is said to be either good, or evil: yet some make good and evil to have a mean▪ called a thing indifferent. Likewise, hot and cold to have a mean, that is to say▪ lukewarm. And betwixt health and sickness Galen maketh a mean estate, that is to say, neither whole nor sick, but betwixt both.   

Which are opposites by privation?  
Opposites by privation are two contraries belonging to one self subject apt to receive the same, in the which subject, when the one is wanting at such time as nature doth appoint, the other must needs be, as sight and blindness in the eye, hearing and deafness in the ear, light and darkness in the sky, or in any other thing meet to receive both.   

Wherefore do you add this clause, at such time as nature doth appoint?  
Because it is not needful that one of these opposites be in the subject in all times: as for example, the whelp which is not nine days old, though as yet he seeth not, yet is he not said to be blind, because Nature hath appointed him no sooner to see.   

Which be opposite by contradiction?  
They be two contraries, having no mean, and do consist in contradiction, that is to say, in denying the one the other: and such contradiction consisteth either in propositions, or else in simple or single terms.   

Give examples of both.  
In propositions thus: john is honest, john is not honest: Plato disputeth, Plato disputeth not: in which kind of propositions, there is no mean of truth or falsehood; for of necessity the one of them must always be either true or false, in such sort, as both cannot be true together, nor both false together. In simple terms thus: a man, no man: to know, not to know: to be, and not to be: and therefore opposites by contradiction be most contrary, and do differ from all the rest; for in all the other opposites, it is easy to find out some mean subject, whereof neither of them can be truly spoken or affirmed.     

CHAP. XX.  

Of before and after, called in Latin, Prius & Posterius.  

HOw many ways is a thing said to be before and after?  
Five manner of ways, that is, by time, nature, order, honour, and cause, contained in these two Latin verses:  
Tempore natura, prius ordine dic & honore: Et causa effectis dicitur esse prior.   

Give examples of every one.  
First, by time, Cicero is said to be before Quintilian, and Socrates before Aristotle, and such like. Secondly, by nature, that thing is said to be first, or before, from which the consequent cannot return backward: by which way all general kinds are said to be before their special kinds, and special kinds before their Individuums: for if man be, then sensible body (which is the general kind) must needs be, but not contrarily: so likewise, if john be, man must needs be, but not contrarily; for it followeth not of necessity, Because it is a sensible body, Ergo it is a man, or because it is a man, Ergo it is john. Thirdly, by order one thing is said to be before another, as one before two, and two before three, letter's before syllables, and syllables before words, and words before speech. To this also appertaineth that which is said to be before by situation, as in going from Norwich to London, Thetford is before Newmarket, and Newmarket before Ware, and so forth. Fourthly, by honour or dignity, an Emperor is said to be before a King, a King before a Duke, a Duke before an Earl, an Earl before a Baron, etc. Fiftly, the cause is said to be before his effect, as the rising of the Sun is said to be before day; so the difference is said to be before his special kind, and the special kind before his property. And these be convertible: for if it be day, the Sun must needs be up: and if the special difference be, the special kind must needs be, and so contrarily.   

To what end serveth this manifold way of before and after?  
To the intent that we may the better understand what hath been said before touching opposites by relation, that is to say, that Relatives are always together by order of nature, and not one before another, but only by their fourth way, that is to say, by honour or worthiness, which way, as Aristotle saith, of all the other ways, is most unproper, and least to the purpose.     

CHAP. XXI.  

Of the word Together, called in Latin, Simul.  

HOw many ways are things said to be together?  
Two ways, that is, by order of time, and by order of nature. First, by order of time, the heat and shining of the Sun are said to be in the Sun together, that is, at one time: also the Angels were created all together, and at one time. Secondly, those things are said to be together by order of nature, which have natural relation one to another, and be convertible, neither is the one cause of the other, as the father and the son, single and double, and such like: and many do add hereunto divers special kinds and differences subject to one self general kind, as man and bruit beast, reasonable and unreasonable, are subject to the general kind, sensible body, or animal.     

CHAP. XXII.  

Of Moving or Motion, called in Latin, Motus, and of the kinds thereof.  

WHerefore is mention made here of moving?  
For the better understanding of the Predicament Action, whereunto Moving belongeth.   

How many kinds of motion or moving be there?  
Six, briefly touched before in the predicament of Action, that is to say, generation, corruption, augmentation, diminution, alteration, and moving from place to place.   

Define these kinds.  

1 Generation is a proceeding from the not being of a substance, to the being of the same, as from an acorn to an Oak.  
2 Corruption (chose) is a proceeding from a being to a not being, as from an Oak to chips or ashes.  
3 Augmentation is the increasing of a greater quantity in the whole: as from a child to a man.  
4 Diminution is chose a decreasing or diminishing of quantity in the whole, as a body that consumeth or pineth by disease or otherwise.  
5 Alteration is a proceeding or changing from one quality into another, as from hot to cold.  
6 Moving from place to place, is, as the moving of the sun out of the East into the West.      

CHAP. XXIII.  

Of the word Habere, that is, to have, and how many ways it is to be understood.  

HOw many significations hath this word, to have? Eight.  

1 First, to have a quality, as science, vice, or virtue.  
2 To have a quantity, as to be six, seven, or eight footlong.  
3 To be clad, as to have a cloak or coat.  
4 To have some part of the body clad or decked with some thing, as the finger with a ring, the neck with a chain.  
5 To have a part, or member, as a hand, a head, or foot.  
6 To contain, as a hogshead that hath therein beer or wine.  
7 To possess, as to have lands, tenements, or goods.  
8 To have a wife, which (according to Aristotle) is unproperly said, because nothing can be properly said to have, which is had itself of the same: for the wife hath the man, as well as the man the wife; and therefore this way of having serveth to little purpose.      
Here endeth the first Book.   

THE ART OF LOGIC. THE SECOND BOOK.  

CHAP. I.  

Of Definition.  
Having hitherto sufficiently spoken of the Predicables and Predicaments, and of all things belonging unto them, without the knowledge whereof, no true definition, nor good division, can be well made; me thinks it were meet now to treat of definition and division.  

What is Definition, and how manifold is it?  
Definition is a speech, whereby either some name or thing is declated: and it is twofold, that is, of a name, and of a thing.   

What is definition of a name, and how manifold is it?  
Definition of a name, is a speech whereby the signification of some word is declared: and it is tenfold.  

1 Definition verbal, as when a word less known is declared by a word more known, as thus, To imitate, is as much to say, as to follow, or to counterfeit: again, to accomplish, is to fulfil.  
2 Definition by difference; as, He is a King, which ruleth by Law; but he that ruleth by force, is a Tyrant.  
3 Definition metaphorical, or by figure; as, Adolescency is the flower of man's age: Good Preachers are the salt of the earth▪  
4 Definition by contrary; as, Virtue is, to flee vice.  
5 Definition by circumlocution; as, The writer of the Trojan war, that is to say, Homer.  
6 Definition by example, as to say, that this word reasonable or unreasonable is a special difference.  
7 Definition by want, or desect; as, That is three quarters, which lacketh a quarrer of a yard, or any such like thing.  
8 Definition by praise, or dispraise: by praise, as, Logic is an Art of Arts, and Science of Sciences: justice is the Queen of all virtues. By dispraise, as, Idleness is the corruption or destruction of youth.  
9 Definition by similitude; as, The Sun is the eye of the world; A City without a Magistrate, is as a ship without a Governor.  
10 Definition by Etymology; as, He is rightly called goodman, because he is a good man indeed, and full of good works.    

When is definition of the name needful to be used?  
When some doubtful word is cause of the controversy.    

Of the definition of a thing.  

WHat is the definition of a thing?  
It is a speech, which declareth briefly, plainly, and aptly, the very nature and substance of the thing which is defined.   

How is the definition of a thing divided?  
Into these six kinds, that is to say, into definition essential, causal, by the Relative, by the effects and offices, by numbering up of the parts, and by heaping up of accidents.   

What is definition essential?  
It is that which consisteth of the next general kind, joined with some special difference or property belonging to the same kind; as when I define a man to be a sensible body, endued with reason, or apt to speak: and this is the Logical definition most sure of all others, but not easy to be made of every thing, for lack of special differences and natural properties.   

When is it said to be a causal definition?  
When it is made of the general kind, and of the proper causes of the thing defined.   

How many chief kinds of causes be there?  
Four, that is, matter, form, cause efficient, and end.   

How define you matter?  
Matter is that whereof any thing is made, as cloth is the matter whereof a cloak or coat is made, and wool is the matter of cloth.   

What is Form?  
Form is the shape whereof any thing taketh both his being and his name: and therefore the Schoolmen do define form to be that which giveth a being to any thing, be it natural or artificial, as in the examples before recited, the coat or cloak hath both his being and name of the shape which it hath, and not of the matter.   

What is the cause efficient?  
That which maketh or worketh any thing, and is the author thereof, as the Carpenter is the cause efficient of the house, and Shipwright of the ship.   

What is the end, or final cause▪  
It is that for whose sake any thing is done, as the end of war is to have peace, the end of study is to get learning and knowledge.   

Give examples of definitions made of every one of these causes.  
Of matter let this be your example: Beer is a drink made of malt, water, and hops. Of form thus: Man is a sensible body, endued with a soul intellective or reasonable, which is the true shape of man. Of the cause efficient thus: That is a Decree of the Senate, which the Senate commandeth and ordaineth; for the Senate is the cause efficient of the Decree. Anger or wrath is the boiling of the blood about the heart, through the stirring up of choler. Of the end thus: A house is a building made to defend our bodies from the injuries of the air and weather.   

May not a good definition be made of many of these causes joined together?  
Yes indeed.   

Give example.  
Lo here the example of Demosthenes, in defining what Law is. Law (saith he) is the invention and gift of God, and the decree of wise men, the correction of crimes, either rashly or advisedly committed, and a common covenant or consent of the City, according to the which all men ought to live. In this definition, the first and chiefest cause efficient is God, the second cause efficient is the common covenant or consent of the City: the matter is the decree of the wise: the end is the correction of crimes, and the keeping of the Citizens in good order of life.   

When is a definition said to be made by the Relative?  
When one Relative is interpreted by another; as thus, He is a father, which hath a son; and he is a master, which hath a servant.   

When is a definition said to be made by the effects, virtues, or offices of the thing defined?  
When the nature of the thing is plainly declared by showing the said effects or offices, as thus: An adamant stone is that which being laid nigh to iron or steel, draweth the steel unto him: justice is a virtue which giveth every man his right.   

When is a definition said to be made by numbering up of the parts?  
When it containeth either the chief, or all the parts of some whole thing, or else all the special kinds of some general kind.   

Give examples of both these ways.  
Of the first thus: A house is a building, having a foundation, walls, and covering. Of the second way thus: A sensible body is that which comprehendeth both man and bruit beast.   

When is a definition said to be made by heaping up of accidents?  
When a thing is rather described, then defined, by such common and proper accidents as do belong to the same, as fire is an element that is hot and dry, and exceedeth all other elements in lightness: and therefore this last kind of definition ought rather to be called a description then a definition, which is usual to the Poets, Orators, and Historiographers, in describing either person, fact, or thing: also to the Physicians, in describing their simples, as roots, plants, herbs, and such like.     

CHAP. II.  

Of the precepts to be observed in Definition.  

HOw many precepts are to be observed in making a true definition?  
These three: First, that it briefly express the whole power and nature of the thing defined: Secondly, that there be nothing therein superfluous, nor any thing wanting: Thirdly, that the definition be not common to many things, but proper to that thing only which is defined, so as it may make it to differ from all other things.   

What order is to be observed in making a dialectical definition?  
First, you must know in what predicament the thing is contained which you would define, to the intent that in descending from the most general kind, down towards the most sp●…ciall kind of the same predicament, ye may find out by the way that which is next general kind to the thing that is to be defined: which next general kind being found out, ye must then seek out the special difference or property, the proper cause, effect, or common accidents belonging to the same: as for example, if ye would define what virtue is, ye must resort to the predicament of quality, wherein virtue is contained: then in descending from quality, proceed to habit, from habit to habit of the mind, which is twofold, that is to say, intellectual and moral, and not finding it under habit intellectual, proceed to habit moral, for that is the next general kind to virtue: that done, seek out the difference or property, true cause or effect: the difference is to be good, wherein it differeth from vice, for vice is also a moral habit as well as virtue: the effect of virtue is to incline man's will to do always according to right reason or true judgement, so shall you make a true definition of virtue, in saying that virtue is a good moral habit, inclining man's will to do always according to true judgement. And after this sort ye may learn to define any other thing.     

CHAP. III.  

Of Division.  

WHat is Division?  
Division is the parting or dividing of a word or thing that is more general, unto other words or things less general: for Division is twofold, that is, of a name, and of a thing.   

When is it said to be the division of a name?  
When some Equinoke or doubtful word is divided into his manifold significations, as this word Wolf, into a man having that name▪ into a four-footed beast, into an ulcerous sore, and into a certain fish, each one called by the name of Wolf: which kind of distinction or division is very necessar●…e, to avoid ambiguity of speech, which ambiguity causeth many times great error.   

How manifold is the division of a thing?  
It is threefold, that is, substantial, partible, and accidental.   

When is it properly said to be substantial?  
When any general kind is divided by his special differences into his proper special kinds: as thus; of sensible bodies, one is reasonable, as man, and another is unreasonable, as a bruit beast.   

When is this kind of division to be used?  
When the special kinds lack proper names, as most commonly the special kinds subalternate do, which may be divided again as general kinds into more special kinds: as for example, of unreasonable beasts some be terrestrial, some be aquatical, and some airy: again, every one of these may be divided into their special kinds, even until ye come to the lowest of all, and unto the Individuums comprehended under the same; and that not only of things contained in the predicament of substance, but also in any other predicaments of accidents, as of magnitudes, one is long, as a line; another is broad, as a superficies, and another is thick as a body. This division, though it ●…e of accidents contained in the predicament of quantity, yet it is called a substantial division, because the general kind here is divided by his special difference into his proper special kinds.   

What call you a partible division?  
I call that a partible division, which divideth some whole thing into his par●…s, which is called of the Latins, partitio; as if ye would divide the Roman Commonwealth into Senators, Knights, and Commons. You may also divide a house into his principal parts, as into the foundation, walls, and roof thereof. But the better to understand this kind of division, it shall not be amiss to show you here what kinds of whole, and what kinds of parts there be: for there is whole substantial, and whole integral: again, of parts, some are called substantial, and some integral; and of parts integral, some are called similar or like, and some dissimilar or unlike: again, of the dissimilar, some are called principal, and some not principal: of all which things I mind here briefly to speak.   

First, I pray you tell what you mean by whole substantial, and whole integral.  
Whole substantial, is that which consisteth of substantial parts cleaving wholly together, and not severally distinct in number, as whole man, consisting of soul and body: but whole integral is that which consisteth of integral parts, which though they cleave together, yet they are distinct and several in number, as man's body, consisting of head, breast, belly, legs, etc.   

How define you substantial parts?  
Substantial parts are the first and chief parts whereof any thing is compounded, of which parts if any be wanting, the whole must needs perish, and loseth his name, as the matter and form of any compound thing, be it natural or artificial, as the body and soul are the first and chief parts of man; the metal and fashion of a silver cup are the first and chief parts of the cup, whereof neither can be wanting: for the soul without the body is a spirit, and not man; and the body without the soul is but a dead carcase: again, the cup without matter or shape, is no cup at all.   

Which be called integral parts?  
Certain secondary parts, which being all gathered together, do make the whole perfect, as the head, breast, belly, arms, hands, thighs, legs, and feet, are the integral parts of man's body: and of these integral parts, some are called similar, and some dissimilar, that is to say, like and unlike.   

Which are similar, and which dissimilar?  
Similar, or like, are these that be of one kind, and of one self name; and being divided into parts, every such part, be it never so small, beareth also the name of the whole, as flesh, bone, sinew, skin, and such like: for every little part of the flesh is called flesh, and every part of bone is called bone; and so of all the rest. Hitherto also may be referred water, fire, gold, iron, or any other simple metal, wine, wood, stone, and such like: for every drop of water is called water, and so of the rest.   

Which call you dissimilar or unlike?  
Those parts that differ both in kind and name, as the head, breast▪ belly, arms, and legs, are the parts dissimilar of a man's body: likewise a house, a ship, and many other things, have also such parts, of any one of which parts the whole cannot be spoken: for you cannot say, Because here is the head of a man, Ergo here is a man. Again, of these dissimilar parts, some are called principal, whereof if any be wanting, the whole must needs perish; as without the head, belly, heart, liver, or guts, man's body cannot be. The not principal, are those parts without the which the body may be: for though those parts be wanting, yet the body is counted a whole thing, though not perfect in every point, as without arm●…s, hands, legs, or feet, the body may live: that building also that hath a foundation, walls, and roof, is counted to be a whole house, though it hath neither doors nor windows, yet not perfect in every respect.   

Wherein doth partition and division differ?  
In divers points: for in division any general kind may be rightly spoken of every special kind contained under the same; as this word, sensible body, which is spoken both of man and beast. But in partition, the whole cannot be spoken of every part: for you cannot say that the soul or body of man is whole man, nor that the head or foot is his whole body. Again, division divideth universal things into their particulars, and partition divideth particulars into their parts, and most commonly followeth division, helping to make subdivisions: as for example, when division hath divided a sensible body into man and beast, then followeth partition, and divideth man into soul and body, and the body into his integral parts, as head, breast, belly, legs, and such like.   

How manifold is division accident all?  
Threefold: for by that we either divide some subject into his accidents, or some accident into his subject, or some accident into his accidents.   

Give examples of all these three ways.  
Of the first let this be your example: Of men, some be free, and some be bond; some be virtuous, and some be vicious: and after this sort you may divide the predicament of substance into as many accidents as you will, running throughout all the nine predicaments of accidents. Of the second way thus: Of goods, some are said to be of the mind, some of the body, and some of fortune. Of the third thus: Of good things, some are said to be honest, some profitable, and some pleasant or del●…ctable: which kind of division is much used of the Orators. To this also may be referred the common order of dividing any speech or oration into his parts, which the Orators call partition or distribution, whereby is set down in what order every thing shall be uttered and declared, which first, and which last, and so forth.     

CHAP. FOUR  

Of the precepts to be observed in Division.  

HOw many precepts are to be observed in making a true division?  
Three: First, that the general kind be divided into his next special kinds, by such special differences as are merely repugnant one to another, and do comprehend the whole nature of the thing divided: as thus; Of sensible bodies, some be reasonable, and some be unreasonable: for it were no good division, to say▪ of sensible bodies, one is reasonable, & another is two-footed.   

What is the second precept?  
That the parts, being joined together, may be equal to the whole, and may comprehend neither more nor less than the thing which is divided, as reasonable soul, and carnal body, being the chief parts of man, do comprehend neither more nor less than whole man.   

What is the third precept?  
That no part or special kind be used as a general kind, nor the general kind as a part or special kind: as in this division which Cicero reproveth, I will show that through the concupiscence, boldness, and covetousness of our aduer●…aries, all mischiefs have chanced to the Commonwealth: here covetousness is mingled with concupiscence, whereof it is a part: for concupiscence is the general kind of all lusts or desires. But this precept seemeth rather to appertain to a Rhetorical partition, than a dialectical division.   

To what end serveth Division?  
To divers good ends. First, as Cicero saith, it helpeth great●…y to teach plainly to define, and to make things that be compound, intricate, or confused, to appear simple, plain, and certain: Secondly, by dividing things orderly into their parts, it greatly helpeth memory: and thirdly, it helpeth to amplify any kind of speech, and to make it more copious.     

CHAP. V.  

Of Method.  
Having hitherto sufficiently spoken of words, both singular and universal, and also of Definition and Division, which are the two chief instruments whereby all simple questions are discussed, I mind here to show with what order or method every such question is to be handled.  

What is Method?  
Method is a compendious way of learning or teaching any thing: and it is threefold, that is to say, Compositive, Resolutive, and Divisive or definitive.   

What is method compositive?  
It is that whereby we compound the whole of his parts, beginning at the smallest, and so proceed from greater to greater, until we come to the chief end whereto we tend, which kind of order or method we observe here in writing this Logic: for first we treat of words or terms, then of a proposition, and last of all of a Syllogism. So likewise he that will teach the nighest way from Norwich to London by order compositive, will bid him first go to Windham, from Windham to Atleborough, from Atleborough to Thetford, from Thetford to Newmarket, from Newmarket to Barkway, from Barkway to Ware, from Ware to London.   

What is method resolutive?  
It is that whereby any whole thing is resolved into his parts: or when we proceed from the end to the next and immediate cause thereof, and from that to the next cause of that, and so from one to another, until we come to the first cause of all, and most remote and furthest off: as when we resolve a Syllogism into his Propositions, and a proposition into his uttermost bounds or terms, which are the subject and the predicate: and this way is unlike to the other before recited, because it goeth backward, as in the former example. If ye will teach the way from Norwich to London by method resolutive, ye must say that there is a Town called Ware, twenty miles from London: next to that is a Town called Barkway, and so till ye come to that which was first in method compositive. To these two methods Galen addeth the third method, that is, method divisive or definitive.   

What is that method?  
It is, when in defining and dividing we descend orderly from a most general kind to all the special kinds contained under the same, and so to the lowest of all: as having to speak of quality, we define it, and divide it into his four special kinds, and every such special kind into his parts and members, even till we come to the lowest of all, as you see in the Table of quality before described. Which kind of method is more fully handled by my friend Accontio, in his little Treatise which he wrote in Latin, de methodo: the effect of which book I think it not out of purpose to set down even here▪    

The effect of Accontius his book, de methodo, which he affirmeth to be the second part or office of Logic.  
FOr the first office of Logic teacheth how to find out the truth in any speech: but method teacheth how to attain to the Art or knowledge of any thing. In which method, three things (as he saith) are to be considered: First, what method is: Secondly, what is the effect or uttermost end thereof: Thirdly, what be the causes of that end or effect.  
Method is a certain right way, whereby we may search out the knowledge of any thing; and having attained it, how to teach the same commodiously to any other, without examining whether it be true or false; for that belongeth to the first part of Logic.  
The effect or uttermost end of method, is the knowledge of anything.  
The causes of that end are these three, form, matter, and cause efficient.  
Form here seemeth to be that which is known by all the parts of such knowledge, being gathered together (as it were) into one self body: which parts are these; first, what the thing is; secondly, what be the causes thereof, and also what be the causes of those causes, even to the last or uttermost cause: thirdly, what be the effects, and also what be the effects of those effects, as well when the thing is taken generally, as for some whole thing, or as when the whole is divided into all his parts, even unto the parts indivisible.  
Matter here is generally taken, and not for the matter of any determinate or certain kind: unto which matter do appertain all things that be finite, perpetual, and immutable, that is to say, all universals.  
The causes efficient are partly those things that are more known, as first, to know what the thing is by definition consisting of the general kind, and of the differences thereto belonging: secondly, what is the effect or end of the thing, as in those things which do not depend upon our will: and thirdly, what be the causes of that end or effect, the consideration of which end belongeth to those things which do depend upon our will, and partly the cause efficient is the right applying or ordering of the more known things, which order containeth two parts: for first we must proceed always from the most general kinds to the next general kinds, as having to begin with the definition of the thing which you seek to know, when need requireth, you must proceed from the most general kind of all, that is to say, from the highest general kind, and so descend downward, until you come to the thing that is to be defined: but if you have to begin from the uttermost end of the thing, than next of all consider that, from whence the end doth immediately spring, and what doth follow next to that, and so proceed from one to another, till you come to the first cause of all. Finally, if you have to begin from the first causes, than you must orderly proceed from that which is first unto the second, and so to the third, and so forth until you come to the uttermost effect or last end.  
Now as touching the second part of applying or ordering the more known things, you must have consideration of every whole thing, and of all his parts: wherefore if you have to define any thing, Art, or science, whereof you treat, you must define the whole, and then every part thereof, until you come to the lowest part thereof, and yet every one in his proper place. And if you cannot comprehend in one definition all those things that are to be referred to one head, then use division in dividing the whole into his parts, and define every such part in order. But if all the parts which the thing containeth, have not one self end, but divers, then divide it by such differences as every part may have his proper end.  
Moreover, if the form, matter, or cause efficient have divers respects and considerations, than (according to that diversity) make divers divisions, and first declare what is common to all the parts in general▪ and what is proper to every one in particular.  
Finally, if some one whole thing lieth hidden, than it is to be found out by looking into some of the particular parts thereof. And these are all the chiefest points contained in the Latin Treatise which my friend A●…ontius wrote the methodo. And though that Petrus Ramus maketh but one kind of method, that is to say, to proceed from the first principles or elements: yet I am sure he will not deny, but that to go forward and backward, be two divers things, though not contrary, as doth well appear by the compositive and resolutive method before defined.  

I do not yet perfectly understand by all this, with what method a simple question is to be handled: therefore I pray you show the true way and order thereof.  
The method or way in handling a simple question, dependeth upon these 9 Interrogatives, that is to say, 1. First, what significations the name or word hath, whereof the question is made, and how it is to be taken. 2. Secondly, whether there be any such thing, or not. 3. Thirdly, what it is. 4. Fourthly, what be the parts or special kinds thereof. 5. Fiftly, what be the causes. 6. Sixtly, what be the effects. 7. Seventhly, what things be incident or appurtenant unto it. 8. Eightly, what things are like unto it. 9 And ninthly, what things be contrary to it. All which questions Aristotle reduceth into these four, that is to say, Whether it be? What it is? What manner of thing it is? and, Why it is?   

Give example of a simple question handled according to the nine questions before recited.  
As for example: If we have to treat of virtue, first, we must show the divers significations of virtue; for virtue signifieth sometime power and ability, as when we say, virtue attractive, virtue digestive, or virtue expulsive: but here virtue is to be taken for a moral habit, bringing forth good and commendable actions. Secondly, whether virtue be, or not, it plainly appeareth by the divers doings of men, whereof some be good, some be bad. Thirdly, what virtue is, we know by the definition thereof, in saying, that virtue is a moral habit, inclining man's will to do that which is always good, and agreeable to true judgement. Fourthly, the kinds of virtue be divers, as Prudence, justice, Temperance, Fortitude, Modesty▪ and such like. Fiftly, the causes of virtue be also divers; for the cause efficient thereof is good, and man's will obedient to true reason, and to true judgement: the matter or subject of virtue is the mind or heart of man: the final cause is blessedness. Sixtly, the effect of virtue is tranquillity of the mind, and many prosperous successes, and also public utility and peace. Seventhly, things incident to virtue are these, the honour, praise, and commendation of good men. Eightly, things of affinity or like to virtue, be all good inclinations, dispositions, or good natural affections, as to be loving, kind, and merciful. Ninthly, things contrary to virtue, be all manner of vices, as pride, covetousness, hypocrisy, dissimulation, etc.   

What method is to be observed in handling a compound question?  
A compound question is to be handled by arguing and reasoning on both sides, whereof we shall treat hereafter. In the mean time we have to speak of a Proposition, without the which no argument can be made: for all arguments do consist of propositions.     
Here endeth the second Book.   

THE ART OF LOGIC. THE THIRD BOOK.  

CHAP. I.  

Of a Proposition.  

WHat is a Proposition?  
It is a perfect speech whereby something is manifestly declared to be true or false.   

Whereof is such speech specially compounded?  
Of Noun and Verb, which Noun would be of the Nominative case, and the Verb of the Indicative Mood, as when I say, Man is a sensible body; for the Logicians do seldom allow any such speeches as are either of the Optative, Imperative, Interrogative, or Vocative Mood, as, I would to God I had a good horse: this speech is not accounted to be so true or certain, as to say, I have a good horse.   

Of how many parts doth a Proposition consist?  
Of three, that is to say, the Subject, Predicat, and Copulat.   

What is the Copulat?  
It is the Verb Substantive, called in Latin, Sum, es, fui, that is, to be, which doth couple or join the Predicat with his Subject, as when we say, Man is a sensible body: here in this proposition, the word man is the subject, and the word sensible body is the predicat, and the Verb is is the copulat: which copulat is not always incident to every proposition, and specially when the predicat is some other Verb, and not the Verb substantive; as, Plato disputeth, Socrates walketh; which is as much to say, as Plato is disputing, Socrates is walking.   

How many ways is a proposition divided?  
Three manner of ways, that is, according to substance, quality, and quantity. According to substance thus: Of propositions, some are said to be categorical, that is, simple, and some hypothetical, that is, compound, of which compound propositions we mind not to speak, before we have treated of all things belonging to a categorical and simple proposition, which is twofold that is to say, absolute and modal.   

What is an absolute categorical proposition?  
It is a speech which affirmeth or denieth something absolutely, without any respect; as when we say, God is true, or, Every man is a liar: and this is otherwise called of the Logicians, Propositio categorica de inesse.   

How is a simple proposition divided according to quality?  
Into an affirmative and negative proposition.   

When is it said to be affirmative, and when negative?  
It is said to be affirmative, when the predicat is affirmed of the subject; as when I say, that john is learned: and that is negative, when the predicat is denied of the subject; as, john is not learned. And note, that in such kind of speech, the negative is always joined to the Verbo.   

How many ways is a simple proposition divided according to quantity?  
Four manner of ways, that is to say, into an universal, particular, indefinite, and singular proposition.   

When is it said to be universal?  
When some universal sign is added to the subject.   

Which words are said to be universal signs?  
These: all, every, whatsoever, whosoever, none, no body, not one, none at all, every where, no where, and such like; as, Every man is a liar, No man is true.   

When is it said to be a particular proposition?  
When some particular sign is added to the subject▪   

Which call you particular signs?  
These: some, any, many, few, and such like; as, Some man is wise, Few are wise.   

When is it said to be indefinite?  
When the subject is a common word, having neither universal nor particular sign added unto it; as when we say, Men in these days be given to great follies.   

When is it said to be singular?  
When the subject is some Individuum, as when we say, that Cicero is eloquent.   

What, and how many questions do rise of these three divisions?  
These three: that is, of what kind? of what quality? of what quantity? in Latin thus, quae? qualis? & quanta? for if it be asked what kind of proposition it is, than you must answer, that it is either categorical, or hypothetical, that is, simple or compound: and if it be demanded of what quality it be, than you must answer, that it is either affirmative, or negative: if it be asked of what quantity, than you must answer, that it is either universal, particular, indefinite, or singular.     

CHAP. II.  

Of the three properties belonging to a simple proposition.  

WHich are those?  
These: Opposition, Equivalency, and Conversion.   

What is Opposition?  
It is the repugnancy of two simple propositions, having one self subject, and one self predicat.   

How many kinds of opposite propositions be there?  
Four: Contrary, Subcontrarie, Contradictory, and Subalternat.   

Which are said to be Contrary?  
An universal affirmative, and an universal negative; as, Every man is just, No man is just.   

Which are said to be Subcontrarie?  
A particular affirmative, and a particular negative; as, Some man is just, Some man is not just.   

Which are said to be Contradictory?  
Either an universal affirmative, and a particular negative, or else an universal negative, and a particular affirmative; as, Every man is just, and, Some man is not just: or, No man is just, Some man is just.   

Which are said to be Subalternat?  
Either an universal affirmative, and a particular affirmative, or else an universal negative, and a particular negative: as, Every man is just, and, Some man is just: No man is just, and, Some man is not just.  
All which kind of opposites you may the better remember, by considering with what order they are placed in this Figure following.     

CHAP. III.  

Of the Laws and conditions belonging to these four kinds of opposites before recited: and of the divers matter of a Proposition.  
FOr the better understanding of the laws belonging to the opposites, it shall be necessary to speak somewhat of the matter of a proposition, whereupon the said laws do partly depend.  

How manifold is that matter?  
Threefold, that is to say, natural, casual, and remote or unnatural.   

When is a proposition said to consist of matter natural?  
When the predicat agreeth with his subject essentially, or at the least necessarily: as when the general kind is spoken of his special kind, and the special kind of his Individuums, or the difference of his special kind, or the property of his subject: as, Every man is a sensible body, john is a man, Every man is reasonable, Every man is apt to speak.   

When is a proposition said to consist of matter contingent?  
When the predicat agreeth with his subject accidentally, so as it may either be, or not be; as, john is learned.   

When is a proposition said to consist of matter remote or unnatural?  
When the predicat agreeth no manner of way with the subject; as, A man is a horse, A man is a stone, etc.   

What are the laws of contrary propositions?  
Contrary propositions can be true no way both together; as, Every man is a sensible body, No man is a sensible body: but they may be both false, and specially consisting of matter contingent; as when I say, Every man is just, No man is just, which are both false.   

What are the laws of subcontrarie propositions?  
Subcontrarie propositions, consisting of matter natural, cannot be both false at once; as, Some man is a sensible body, Some man is not a sensible body: but consisting of matter contingent▪ both may be sometime true; as, Some man is just, Some man is not just.   

What be the laws of contradictory propositions?  
Those can neither be true nor false b●…th at once: for if one be true, the other must needs be false, whether the matter be natural, or contingent; as, Every man is just; Some m●…n is not just: No man is just; Some man is just.   

What be the laws of sub alternat propositions?  
If the universal be true, the particular must needs be true; as, Every man is just, Ergo some man is just; but not contrarily. Again, if the particular be false, the universal also must needs be false; as, Some man is a stone, Every man is a stone.   

What good is to be reaped by the knowledge of these opposites?  
It teacheth to know what speeches be repugnant one to another, and thereby to discern truth from falsehood.     

CHAP. FOUR  

Of the equivalency of simple propositions.  

WHat is equivalency?  
It is the reconciling or agreeing of two propositions, having one self subject, and one self predicate, in such sort, that though they be divers in words, yet they are made to be all one in signification.   

How is such reconciliation made?  
By the help of signs, either universal or particular, that are of like value, and equal one to another, and thereby make the speeches equal.   

Give example.  
As thus: Who knoweth not this to be true? Every man knoweth this to be true: There is none but that knoweth this to be true. All these are of like value, and do signify one self thing. Again, Some men are wise, Few men are wise, All men are not wise, Not many are wise, are also equivalent speeches. The Schoolmen do give divers rules touching the equivalency of speeches; but such as, in mine opinion, are neither necessary, no●… profitable, for that they cause many times barbarous, unusual, and intricate speeches. And therefore I think good hereto pass them over with silence, wishing all men to judge the equivalency of speeches, rather by the ear, and by custom of speaking, and by usual manner of taking the same in every several tongue or language, then by any rules, which perhaps will serve in one tongue, but not in another.     

CHAP. V.  

Of conversion of simple propositions.  

WHat is conversion?  
It is the changing or turning of the subject and predicate, the one into the others place.   

How manifold is such conversion?  
It is threefold, that is, simple, by accident, and by contraposition.   

What is simple conversion?  
It is that whereby the terms are only changed the one into the others place, the self same quantity and quality being still reserved.   

What propositions are converted by this manner of conversion?  
An universal negative, and particular affirmative.   

Give examples of both.  
Of the first thus: No virtue is discommendable, Ergo no discommendable thing is virtue. Of the second thus: Some man is a Philosopher, and some Philosopher is a man. And by this way sometime universal affirmatives may be also converted, as those whose terms are convertible, as the special kind and his difference or property; as, Every man is reasonable, and every reasonable thing is man: or, Every man is apt to speak, and every thing that is apt to speak, is man.   

What is conversion by accident?  
It is that whereby the terms are changed, and also the quantity of the propositions, but not the quality.   

What propositions are converted this way?  
An universal affirmative into a particular affirmative, and an universal negative into a particular negative.   

Give examples.  
Every patience is fortitude: Ergo some fortitude is patience. Again: No virtue is vice: Ergo some vice is not virtue.   

What is conversion by contraposition?  
It is that whereby neither quantity nor quality is changed, but only terms finite into terms infinite, that is to say, terms limited into terms unlimited.   

Which call you terms infinite?  
All Nouns having a negative set before them, as, not man, not beast.   

What propositions are converted this manner of way?  
An universal affirmative into an universal affirmative, and a particular negative into a particular negative.   

Give examples.  
Of the first thus: Every man is a sensible body, and every thing that is not a sensible body, is not man. Of the second thus: Some virtue is not justice: Ergo, some thing that is not justice, is not virtue. These speeches in English have some savour; but to be spoken in Latin, after the School manner, are very barbarous, or rather monstrous, as Ualerius termeth them, as to say, Quaedam non justitia non est non virtus.     

CHAP. VI  

Of a modal Proposition.  

WHat is a modal proposition?  
It is that which affirmeth or denieth something, not absolutely, but in a certain respect, sort, or mood, which mood is commonly the predicat in this kind of proposition, and all the rest of the subject called of the Logicians, Dictum.   

What is a mood?  
Mood is a word determining and limiting the signification of some other word whereunto it is joined, as a wise man, a white horse: for here this word wise being added to man, doth limit and restrain the general signification of the word man, which otherwise of itself comprehendeth both wise and foolish. And the like is to be said of any other general word, whereunto any such addition is put: but of moods making modal propositions, there are but these four, that is, Possible, Contingent, Impossible, and Necessary.   

How manifold is a modal proposition?  
Twofold, that is, conjunct and disjunct.   

When is it said to be conjunct?  
When the mood is placed either in the beginning or ending of a proposition; as, It is impossible that john is sick: or thus; That john is sick it is possible.   

When is it said to be Disiunct?  
When the mood is placed so, as it divideth the one part of the subject from the other; as, for john it is possible to be sick: and the Disiunct is said many times to be true, when the conjunct is false, being both made of self terms: as for example, the Logicians affirm this to be true, A white man it is possible to be black: but this other, A white man to be black it is possible, they affirm to be false.   

What maketh them so to do, sith by construction these two speeches in sense do seem to be all one?  
Because the mood is the Disiunct, which by parting and severing the Subject, maketh the Proposition to seem spoken in divers respects, as man to be white in one respect, and black in another, and so the speech to be true.     

CHAP. VII.  

Of the proposition, equivalency, and conversion of modal propositions.  
WE told you before, that of modal propositions, some were called conjunctly, and some disiunct: and as for the modals disiunct, they differ but little from absolute propositions before declared. And therefore we have here chiefly to deal with opposition, equivalency, and conversion belonging to modal conjunct, the matter whereof being not altogether so necessary as some men affirm, I mind to make no long speech thereof. But for the better understanding of opposition, equivalency▪ and conversion thereof, it is needful first to declare the quantity and quality of a modal proposition: of both which things, though Aristotle maketh no mention, but only a little of quality; yet the latter Writers do necessarily suppose modal propositions to be endued with quantity and quality: for they say that the mood necessary is much like to a sign universal affirmative; the mood impossible, to a sign universal negative; the moods possible and contingent, which are both of one value, are like to signs particular affirmative. Now as touching the quality, which is to be either affirmative or negative, like as the negative in absolute propositions is wont to be added to the verb, even so in modal propositions it is added to the mood, as by the examples set down in the figure of opposition hereafter following ye may easily perceive.    

CHAP. VIII.  

Of the opposition of Modals.  

HOw many ways are modal propositions said to be opposite?  
They are said to be opposite four manner of ways, even as absolute propositions are, that is to say, contrarily, subcontrarily, contradictoriy, and subalternately, as you see in this figure following, wherein the mood is set before in the place of the subject, the better to show the quantity & quality of every proposition.  
    

CHAP. IX.  

Of the equivalency and conversion of modal propositions.  
THe Schoolmen do affirm, that modal propositions are easily made equivalent, by reason that they may be uttered four manner of ways, that is to say, two manner of ways affirmatively, and two manner of ways negatively. The first way affirmatively, is, when no negative is added either to the subject, or to the mood; as, for a man to be just, it is possible, contingent, impossible, or necessary. The second way affirmatively, is, when the negative is added to the verb of the subject, the mood remaining still affirmative; as, for a man not to be just, it is possible, contingent, etc. The first way negatively, is, when the negative is only added to the mood; as, a man to be just, it is not possible, contingent, etc. The second way negatively, is, when the negative is both added to the verb of the subject, and also to the mood; as, a man not to be just, it is not possible, contingent, etc. which is all one and equivalent to this affirmative proposition, saying, that for a man to be just, it is possible, contingent, etc. for two negatives, as well in the Latin tongue, as in ours, do always make an affirmative. Again, as touching the conversion of modal propositions, they say, that the disiunct being like to an absolute or simple proposition, may be converted both simply and per accidens; but the conjunct suffereth no conversion: & though the Schoolmen do set down divers & manifold rules, and have invented these 4. words of Art, that is, PURPUREA, ILIACE, AM ABIMUS, EDENTULI, attributing as well to the vowels, as to the consonants thereof, certain significations, for the better understanding & bearing in memory the equivalencies & conversions of the said modal propositions: yet because in mine opinion they are more meet to breed preposterous, intricate & barbarous speeches, then to serve to any other good purpose, I think it better to pass them over with silence, then to trouble your memory therewith: wherefore leaving them as things superfluous, I mind now to treat of an hypothetical or compound proposition, & of all the necessary accidents thereunto belonging.    

CHAP. X.  

Of a compound or hypothetical proposition.  

WHat is a compound proposition?  
It is that which consisteth of two or more simple propositions, coupled together with some conjunction.   

How manifold is it?  
Threefold, Conditional, Copulative, and disjunctive.   

When is it said to be conditional?  
When the conjunction If is set before any simple proposition, as thus: If it be a man, it is a sensible body.   

When is it said to be copulative?  
When two simple propositions are joined together with a conjunction copulative, as, God is true, and man is a liar.   

When is it said to be disjunctive?  
When two simple propositions are joined together with a conjunction disjunctive, as thus; Either it is day, or night.   

Of how many parts doth a compound proposition consist?  
Of two, that is, of the antecedent, and of the consequent?   

Which call you the antecedent?  
That which followeth next after the conjunction, as thus: If it be justice, it is a virtue: here this speech, If it be justice, is the antecedent, and the rest of the speech, that is to say, it is a virtue, is the consequent: and so it should be, though the words were contrarily placed, as thus: It is a virtue, if it be justice.   

What things are to be considered in hypothetical propositions?  
These: First, whether they have any quantity, or quality: then, whether any opposition, equivalence, or conversion do belong to them, or not: thirdly, how to know the truth or falsehood of every such proposition, be it conditional, copulative, or disjunctive. And first, as touching quantity, they have none at all: for quantity is to be measured by signs universal, or particular, which are only incident to the subjects of categorical propositions: but quality they have, in that they affirm or deny some thing, by reason whereof there may be contradiction in hypothetical propositions, but it cannot be properly said, that they be either contrary, subcontrarie, or subalternat, for that they are without quantity; for want whereof they neither do aptly admit opposition, equivalence, or conversion, but only contradiction.   

How is that Contradiction to be understood?  
By reason of affirmation, or negation; which, as in simple propositions is to be taken on the behalf of the verb copulative, and not of the subject or predicate: so in compound propositions, it is to be taken on the behalf of the conjunction, having a negative set before it; and yet not of every conjunction, but only of that conjunction conditional, If: whereof I cannot aptly give you any example in our native tongue, because it is contrary to our natural and usual speech, to put a negative before the conjunction, If; and therefore I leave to speak thereof any further: and to say the truth, it maketh but a strange kind of speech in the Latin tongue, and I believe is seldom used in any disputation: as to say thus, Non si animal est, homo est: or, Non si lux est, dies est: both which are said to be negative speeches, according to the rule before given, because the negative is set before the conjunction si, and by virtue thereof (as the Schoolmen say) maketh the whole proposition to be negative.     

CHAP. XI.  

Of the truth and falsehood of hypothetical propositions, and first, of the Conditional.  

WHat is to be considered, to know the truth or falsehood of Conditional Propositions?  
First, whether they be affirmative or negative: for in the affirmatives it sufficeth, that the one part doth necessarily follow of the other, as thus: If it be a man, it is a sensible body: and it maketh no matter, though the parts severally taken, be both false, so as the Cousequent be good: as, If a tree be a man, a tree is a sensible body: for though both these parts be false, yet the Consequent conditionally is true: for a conditional Proposition hath no regard to the truth of the parts, but only that the Consequent may necessarily follow of the Antecedent.   

How is the truth of the negative Proposition to be known?  
By the Consequent: for if the Consequent be not rightly inferred of the antecedent, than the negative is true, as thus: it followeth not that because a Lion is a sensible body, that therefore a Lion is a man.    

Of the truth and falsehood of propositions copulative.  

WHen is a copulative Proposition said to be true or false?  
It is said to be true, when both the parts be true, as when I say, God is true, and man is a liar: again it is said to be false, when either one part or both parts be false: as when I say, man is a sensible body, and God is not a Spirit. Here because the first part is true, and the second part false, the whole Proposition is said to be false. It is said also to be false, when both parts are false, as thus; Man is true, and God is a liar. here both parts be false.   

What kind of propositions are wont to be referred to this copulative?  
Those which they call Temporal, Local, by similitude and causal: as of time thus, When a penitent sinner prayeth, than God heareth him. Of place thus, Where two or three are gathered together in the Name of the Lord, he is in the midst of them. By similitude thus, As a man dealeth with his neighbour, so will God deal with him. Of the cause thus, Because the Sun shineth, it is day. And therefore certain adverbs as these, When, Where, Until, so long as, as, so as, for, therefore, because and such like, have the signification sometime of the Conjunction (And) and sometime of the Conjunction (If).    

Of the truth and falsehood of disiunctives.  

WHat belongeth properly to disjunctive Propositions?  
To consist of repugnant parts, according to the signification of Conjunctions disjunctive, such as these be, vel or either, or else, and such like: as either it is day, or it is night, whereof the one destroyeth the other: for if the one be, the other can not be: and therefore they can not be both true: but they may be both false, if there be any mean betwixt the two contraries: as when we say, This woman is either white or black, both these are false, if she be brown, which is a mean colour betwixt white and black. But the later writers affirm the disjunctive to be true, if any one or both of the parts be true, as thus, Either a man is a sensible body, or else a tree is a Substance: and to be false when both parts be false, as Either a man is true, or God is a liar.     
The end of the third Book of Logic.   

THE ART OF LOGIC. THE FOURTH BOOK.  

CHAP. I.  

Of Places.  
THough immediately after the Treatise of a Proposition, the old men are wont to deal with the order of reasoning, called Argumentation, and with the forms thereof: yet sith by order of Nature it is meet to find out matter, before we go about to form, frame or order the same, and that the matter of proving any Question is to be fetched from certain common Places, I thought it best to treat first of those Places, and then to show the order of reasoning.  

What is a place?  
A Place is a mark or token, showing from whence any Argument apt to prove the Question propounded, is to be taken.   

What difference is betwixt Argument and Argumentation?  
Argument is the bare proof or mean term which is invented by him that disputeth, to prove the truth of the Question: but Argumentation is the whole reasoning itself, of what form so ever it be, comprehending both the Question, and also the proof thereof: whereof we shall speak hereafter in his proper place, and give you examples of both.   

How manifold is Place?  
Twofold, the one of persons, the other of things: the order and distribution of both which, you may plainly see in the Table following.   

To what end serveth this manifold division?  
That the disputers may the more perfectly know the power and proper nature of every Argument, according to the great or little force of the Place, from whence such Arguments are fetched.   

How is Place divided according to the Schoolmen?  
Into two kinds, the one called Maxim, and the other difference of Maxim.   

What is Maxim?  
It is a general rule approved and received of all Logicians, in such sort as no man will deny the same, as of contrary things there must needs be contrary consequents. Again, Whatsoever agreeth with the thing defined, agreeth also with the Definition of the same: and such like.   

What is the difference of Maxims?  
It is the proper name of every Place whereby one Maxim is known from another, and to what place every Maxim belongeth, as from the Contrary, from the Definition, from the thing defined: for by these names and such like, we know to what Place every Maxim belongeth.   

To what end serveth this division?  
The Maxims serve as shoote-ankers, and as places of refuge, when the adversary shall deny our Conclusion: again the differences being few in number, do cause the multitude of Maxims to be the more easily kept in memory.  

The Table of Places.  
Of Places, some be  


Of Persons, as  


Name, stock, birth, nation, sex, or kind, age, education, habit of the body, affections of the mind, state, call, or condition of life, diet, study, or exercise, acts done, death, wonders chancing before death, or after death, monuments left of things done, or written, and kind of Funerals showing how well or evil the person was beloved.    
and some be of things, which be, either  


Artificial Places are either  


Inward Places be either  


Of the substance itself, which be these.  


The Definition, and the things defined,  
The Description, & the thing described.  
The Interpretation, and the thing interpreted.  
The Matter, and the thing made.  
The Form, and the thing form:  
The general kind, & his special kind.  
The Difference and his property.  
The whole, and his parts integral.  
Principal, and not principal.    
Or, of things accompanying Substance, as these  


Generation, and the thing engendered.  
Corruption, and the thing corrupted.  
Use, Abuse.  
Subjects.  
Adiacents, and actions.  
Apposition.  
Common Accidents.  
Signs and circumstances, as time, place, and mean, etc.    
The Cause Efficient, and his effect.  
The End, and the thing ended▪  
The four Opposites, as  


Relatives.  
Contraries.  
Privatives.  
Contradictoric●….    
Things divers in kind, called in Latin, Disparata.  
Comparison, as more or less▪  
Like, or unlike.  
Example and Comparison.  
Also to Comparison may be added these places.  
Proportion.  
Changed proportion.  
Disproportion.  
Changed Disproportion.  
Translation or Figurative speech.  


From the Comparative to the Superlative.  
From the Positive to the Comparative.  
From two Positives to two Comparatives.  
From two Positives to two Superlatives, and chose.      
Outward Places be these  
Or mean places be these three  


Coniugates.  
Cases.  
Division.      
or inartificial places, which be these six  


Foreiudgements.  
Rumours.  
●…ormentes.  
Writings▪  
Oath.  
Witnesses.    
All which six places are comprehended under the place of Authority, as you may see in the Table of Authority hereafter following, in which Table are set down the said inartificial places, together with the definitions and uses thereof.          

CHAP. II.  

Of the Places of Persons.  

Glue examples of all the Places of persons.  
Though the Places of persons may be very well applied to the place of common Accidents hereafter following, because they either go before, accompany, or follow the subjects whereunto they do belong: yet because there is a difference betwixt persons and things, and that the Places before mentioned in the Table of persons, do more properly belong to Persons, then to things, I thought it best to give you examples of every Place belonging to the person, before I come to treat of the Places of things, and first of the name, then of the stock and family, and so forth.   

Of the name.  
Of this Place you may reason either in praise or dispraise more probably then truly, as to say thus: his name is Goodman: Ergo he ought to be a good man, for that name importeth good. I did once see an evil woman executed at Tyburn, whose name was Sweepestake, which name was answerable to her property, which was to sweep all her lovers purses so clean as she could. Cicero did not let to scoff in like manner with Uerres the Roman extortioner, against whom he made so many inveighing Orations, saying many times, that he had not his name for nought: for Uerres was as much to say as a sweeping thief, derived of the verb verro, which in English is to sweep.   

Of the stock or birth.  
Of this Place you may reason thus: He had strong parents: Ergo he is strong. He came of an evil race: Ergo it is no marvel though he be evil disposed.   

Of the nation.  
He is of the Island of Crete or Candy: Ergo he is a liar. He is a Fleming, Ergo a drunkard. He is an Englishman: Ergo a glutton. He is an Italian: Ergo a dissembler.   

Of the sex or kind.  
It is the promise of a woman, Ergo not to be performed or trusted.   

Of the age.  
He is but an Infant, Ergo not malicious. He is young of age, and therefore to be pardoned.   

Of education.  
He was evil brought up, and therefore can not be good.   

Of the habit of the body.  
He is big set, Ergo he is strong. He is red headed, Ergo evil conditioned.   

Of the affections of the mind.  
He is given to excess and riot, Ergo he is not temperate or modest: to this place may be referred all manner of virtues and vices.   

Of the state, call, or condition of life.  
He is a bond man: Ergo he can neither sue nor be sued.   

Of diet.  
He loveth to far delicately, and to lie soft: Ergo he is lascivious.   

Of study or exercise.  
He is very studious and applieth his book: Ergo no voluptuous man.   

Of things done.  
Pompey hath had many prosperous and noble victories: Ergo he is most meet to be sent as General of the war against Mythridates.   

Of death.  
The death of Scipio was much lamented of the Romans, Ergo he was dearly beloved of the Romans. Such a one suffered death most constantly for Christ's sake, Ergo he was a good Christian.   

Of things chancing after death.  
Honourable Monuments were set up by the people of Rome in the honour of julius Caesar after his death, ergo he was honoured and beloved of all the people of Rome in his life time. There were great earthquakes, and dead bodies did arise immediately after the death of Christ, ergo he was the Son of God, and was unjustly condemned.     

CHAP. III.  

Of the Places of things, and first of artificial Places.  

 
_   

 
Inward 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which field Arguments either appertaining 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 nature and substance of the matter in question, or else to such things as do accompany the substance and nature of the thing.   

Which be the Places of Substance?  
These, Definition and the thing defined, together with the rest rehearsed before in the Table.    

Of Definition and the thing defined.  

WHat is Definition?  
It is that which briefly, plainly and properly declareth the nature of any thing, by showing the substantial parts thereof.   

How m●…y a man reason from this place?  
Both 〈◊〉 and negatively, aswell from the Subject as the Predicate of the Question. Affirmatively thus, Every reasonable body is apt to learn letters, Ergo man is apt to learn letters. 〈◊〉 thus, No unreasonable body is apt to learn letters, Ergo no brute beast is apt to learn▪ letters.   

What be the 〈◊〉 or general rules of this Place?  
The 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Whatsoever agreeth with the ●…tion, 〈◊〉 with 〈◊〉 thing defined: and chose whatsoever agreeth not with the definition, agreeth not with the thing defined.   

What is the thing defined?  
That, whose nature and property is declared in the definition.   

How may a man reason from this place?  
Both affirmatively and negatively: affirmatively, as Peter is a man: Ergo he is a reasonable body. Negatively, as an Ape is no man: Ergo an Ape is no reasonable body.   

What be the Maxims of this Place?  
Whatsoever agreeth with the thing defined, agreeth also with the definition thereof: and whatsoever agreeth not with the thing defined, agreeth not with the definition of the same.    

Of Description, and the thing described.  

WHat is Description?  
It is a speech declaring what a thing is, by showing the properties and accidents whereby it differeth from other things.   

How may a man reason from this Place?  
Both affirmatively and negatively: affirmatively thus, Every laudable habit adorneth his possessor: Ergo virtue adorneth his possessor: negatively thus, no laudable habit shameth his owner or possessor: Ergo no virtue shameth his owner or possessor.   

What is the thing described?  
It is that, whose properties either natural or accidental are declared in the description.   

How are arguments to be fetched from this Place?  
Both affirmatively and negatively: affirmatively thus, This beast is four footed, having long ears and whole feet: ergo it is an Ass: negatively thus; This four footed beast hath no long ears nor whole feet: Ergo it is no Ass.   

When are arguments to be confuted, being fetohed from these places?  
When the definition or description is not true or proper to the thing defined or described.    

Of Interpretation and the thing interpreted.  

WHat is Interpretation?  
It is the declaring of a name less known by another that is more known, as thus, jesus is as much to say as a Saviour, a Philosopher is a lover of wisdom.   

What is the thing interpreted?  
That which is declared by the Interpretation, as this word jesus to be a Saviour, or this word Philosopher to be a lover of wisdom.   

How may a man reason from this place?  
Both affirmatively and negatively, if the terms be convertible. Affirmatively thus: He is a lover of wisdom: Ergo a Philosopher. Negatively thus: He is no lover of Wisdom: Ergo no Philosopher.   

What be the maxims of these two places?  
The Maxims of these Places are like, for whatsoever agreeth with the one, agreeth with the other, and chose.    

Of the Place of Matter, and of the thing made.  

WHat is Matter?  
That whereof any thing is made, as Silver is the matter of a Silver Cup, and the Cup is the thing made, called of the Logicians materiatum.   

How is Matter divided?  
Into Matter permanent, and Matter transient.   

What is Matter permanent?  
It is that which remaineth in the thing made, retaining still both nature and name, as stone and timber is the matter of an house.   

What is Matter transient?  
It is that which being changed, doth not return again into his first nature: as flower and water being made bread, will never be flower and water again.   

How are arguments to be fetched from Matter permanent?  
Both affirmatively and negatively: affirmatively thus, Here is timber, lime and stone: Ergo here may be an house: negatively thus, Here is neither timber, lime not s●…one: Ergo here is no house.   

How are arguments to be fetched from Matter transient?  
Affirmatively, but not negatively, as here is water and meal: Ergo here may be bread: but you can not say, here is no meal: Ergo here is no bread: for the matter permanent being taken away, the effect thereof is also taken away: but this Maxim taketh no place in matter transient, unless the Argument be made by the preterperfect Tense or time past, as thus: Here was no meal: Ergo here is no bread.   

What be the Maxims of this Place?  
The matter being set down, the effect also may be according to the difference of the matter.   

How may we reason from the thing made to the matter?  
In matter permanent you may reason from the present Tense to the present Tense, thus: here are iron weapons: Ergo here is iron. But in matter transient we must reason from the present time to the time past, thus; here is bread: Ergo here hath been meal.   

What be the Maxims of this Place?  
The thing made of matter permanent being set down, the matter also must needs be: and the thing made of matter transient being set down, the matter thereof must needs have been.   

How may you else reason from these two Places?  
By adding these two adjectives (good or evil) as thus: The house is good: Ergo the timber and stone was good: for the goodness or defect of the matter permanent, showeth the present goodness or defect of the thing made: and any good or evil thing made of Matter transient, proveth the Matter to have been good or evil.    

Of the Places of Form and shape.  

WHat is Form?  
Form is that which giveth shape and being to the thing form, whereof also the thing taketh his name, as the soul of man is the form, and man is the thing form.   

How is Form divided?  

Into  
Form substantial, which is the first being or shape of any thing, and that is either  


Mortal, as the soul of a bruit beast.  
Or immortal, as the soul of man.    
And into Form accidental, which is a mere accident, called of the Logicians Abstractum, as whiteness or blackness.    

How are arguments to be fetched from the Form and the thing form?  
Two ways, affirmatively from the substantial form, thus: Here is the soul of a beast: Ergo here is a beast: from the accidental form thus: here is whiteness: Ergo here is some white thing: from the substantial thing form thus: The beast is here: Ergo his soul is here: of the accidental thing form thus: Here is some white thing: Ergo here is whiteness: Negatively from the substantial form thus: Here is no soul of a beast: Ergo here is no beast: of the accidental form thus: here is no whiteness: Ergo here is no white thing: of the substantial thing form thus: The beast is not here: Ergo his soul is not here: of the accidental thing form thus: Here is no white thing: Ergo here is no whiteness.   

Rehearse the Maxims whereupon these arguments are grounded.  
The Maxims be these, where Form is either present or wanting, the thing form also must needs be either present or wanting, and chose. Yet this Maxim faileth in the form of man, for the soul intellective may be, and yet no man, unless you reason from the inbeing of the Form in the Subject, as, In the body is a reasonable soul: Ergo it is a man: for every Subject hath his name and being in his shape or form, as hath been said before.    

Of the general kind.  

WHat is general kind?  
It is that which comprehendeth many things differing in special kind, as hath been said before.   

How are Arguments to be fetched from the general kind to the special kind?  
Both affirmatively and negatively: affirmatively thus, Every virtue is to be desired: Ergo justice is to be desired. Negatively thus, No vice is to be praised: Ergo drunkenness is not to be praised.   

Rehearse the Maxims belonging to the general kind?  
To what kind soever agreeth the general kind being universally taken (that is to say) pronounced with some universal sign, a●… All, Every or None, to the same the special kind doth also agree: and whatsoever agreeth not with the general kind 〈◊〉 taken, agreeth not with the special kind: sor if no universal sign be added to the general kind, you cannot reason affirmatively, but only negatively, thus: It is no sensible body: Ergo it is no man: but you cannot reason so affirmatively, as to say thus, It is a sensible body: Ergo it is a man: because the universal sign All, or Every, is wanting.   

How many Places doth this Place of general kind comprehend?  
Four, (that is to say) All or every in quantity, All or every in respect, All or every in place, All or every in time.   

What is All or every in quantity?  
It is when an universal sign is added to the general kind, as every plant liveth, therefore every tree liveth.   

When is it all or every 〈◊〉 respect?  
When any general kind is understood in some respect, and that the general signification thereof is restrained by some word added unto it, or by some secret meaning limiting the 〈◊〉, as a white beast, a good man: for this word white restraineth the general signification of beast, and this word good the g●…nerall signification of man.   

Give examples of this place.  
God gave his holy spirit to all faithful men: Ergo to his Apostles.   

What is all or every in place?  
It is when the general kind is an adverb of place, signifying every where or no where, as justice is nowhere truly executed: Ergo neither in France nor in England.   

What is all or every in time?  
It is when the general kind is an adverb of time, signifying ever or never, as God is always with us: Ergo now at this present.   

What maxims do belong to these places?  
The same that do belong to the general kind universally taken before mentioned, by virtue whereof you may reason both affirmatively and negatively, as I said before.    

Of the special kind.  

HOw are arguments to be fetched from the special kind to the general kind?  
Affirmatively, but negatively thus; It is a man: Ergo it is a sensible body. But now you cannot say, it it no man: Ergo it is no sensible body: for it may be a horse, or some other sensible thing.   

What be the maxims belonging to the special kind?  
Where the special kind is, there the general kind must also needs be: again, all the special kinds being taken away, the general kind is also taken away.    

Of the place of Difference.  
THis place is comprehended under the place of definition, for difference is a good part of the definition, and yet for order sake I have thought good to place it next to the general kind and special kind before taught.  

How may a man reason from this place?  
Both affirmatively and negatively, as an Oyster hath feeling: Ergo it is a sensible body, a horse hath no reason: Ergo he is no man.   

What be the maxims in this place?  
Whatsoever agreeth with the special difference, agreeth with the thing that hath that difference, and whatsoever disagreeth with the special difference, disagreeth with the thing that hath that difference, for they be convertible.    

Of the place of Propertie.  

HOw may a man reason from this place?  
This place is contained under the place of Description before showed. And from hence you may reason both affirmatively and negatively, as thus; He is apt to speak: Ergo he is a man; He is not apt to speak: Ergo he is no man.   

What be the maxims of this place?  
Whatsoever agreeth with the property, agreeth also with the thing that hath that property. And whatsoever disagreeth with the property, disagreeth also with the thing whereto such property belongeth, for they be convertible.    

Of the place of whole integral.  

WHat is whole integral?  
That which consisteth of parts having quantity.   

How may we reason from the whole to every particular part?  
Affirmatively, but not negatively, thus; It is a house: Ergo it hath foundation, walls and roof: but you cannot reason so negatively from the whole to every particular part, as to say thus; Here is an House: Ergo here is no foundation or walls.   

What be the maxims of this place?  
If the whole be, every principal part must needs be: but if the whole be wanting, some principal part must needs be wanting, though not all: for the house might be wanting, and yet the walls and foundation may still remain.    

Of the place of integral parts.  

WHat is an integral part, and how is it divided?  
It is that which certain other parts make up the whole, and such integral part is either principal, or not principal.   

Define these two parts?  
The principal is that without the which the whole cannot be, as the head or belly of a living body, or as the foundation, walls, or covering of an house. The part not principal is that without the which the whole may stand, as a house without doors or windows: or the body may live without hands or feet.   

How may we reason from the principal part to the whole?  
Negatively thus; here is no foundation or walls: Ergo here is no house: but you cannot reason so of the part not principal, but only in having respect to the perfection of the whole, as thus; here is neither doors nor windows: Ergo the house is not perfect.   

What be the maxims of this place?  
If any principal part be wanting, the whole cannot be. If any part not principal be wanting, the whole is unperfect.    

Of the places of things accompanying Substance.  

WHat is the place of things accompanying Substance?  
It is that which comprehendeth such arguments as are not fetched from the substance of the thing itself, but from that which accompanieth the substance thereof.   

Which be those places?  
These: Generation, the thing engendered: Corruption, the thing corrupted: Use, Subject, adjacents, Actions, Opposition, common Accidents, and Circumstances and such like.    

Of the place of Generation, and of the thing engendered.  

WHat is Generation?  
It is the first being or springing of any thing.   

How are arguments to be fetched from Generation to the thing engendered?  
Affirmatively thus: It was good that Christ was borne: Ergo Christ was good; It was evil for Rome that Catiline was borne: Ergo, Catiline was evil to Rome.   

What be the Maxims of this place?  
Those things whose generation is good, must needs be good, and those things whose generation is evil, must needs be evil.   

How may we reason from the thing engendered to the Generation?  
Affirmatively thus: Catiline was evil to Rome: Ergo, the birth of Catiline was evil to Rome.   

What be the maxims of this place?  
If the thing engendered be either good or evil, the generation thereof must needs be also either good or evil.    

Of Corruption, and the thing Corrupted.  

WHat is Corruption?  
Corruption is contrary to Generation, and is the destruction of the thing engendered, and the thing destroyed is said to be corrupted.   

How may we reason from Corruption, to the thing Corrupted?  
Thus: To execute thieves and murderers, is profitable to the Commonwealth: Ergo, thieves and murderers are hurtful to the Commonwealth. The death of Virgil was a great loss to learning: Ergo, Vir. was a great furtherance to learning.   

How may we reason from the thing Corrupted, to the Corruption?  
Affirmatively thus: Virgil was a great furtherance to learning: Ergo, the death of Virgil was a great loss to learning.   

What be the maxims of these two places?  
Those things whereof the end and destruction is laudable, must needs of themselves be pernicious and hurtful. And chose, those things whose end and destruction is hurtful, must needs of themselves be good and profitable. Again, of good things, the loss is evil, and of evil things, the loss is good: but in reasoning from these places, you must take heed that as well the Corruption, as the thing corrupted, be absolutely good, or evil of itself, and not by Accident: for it were no good argument to reason thus; The death of Christ was good: Ergo, Christ was evil: for his death was good by accident for our salvation, and not for any crime that was in him. Moreover, you must beware that you use not one self predicate both in your antecedent, & in your consequent: for if good be the predicate in the antecedent, evil must be the predicate in the consequent, and if evil be the predicate in the antecedent, good must be the predicate in the consequent: for this kind of reasoning consisteth of contraries.    

Of Use.  

WHat is use?  
Use is the apt applying of every thing to his proper end, as the use of wine to comfort the stomach, and to rejoice the heart of man.   

How may we reason from this place?  
Affirmatively thus: the use of wine is good: Ergo, wine is good: the use of art Magic is evil: Ergo, the art itself is evil.   

What be the maxims of this place?  
That thing is good or evil, whereof the use is good or evil.   

What is to be observed in this kind of reasoning?  
Two things: first, that the thing whereof we speak, have some good or evil use of itself absolutely, and not by accident: secondly, that we take not the abuse in stead of the right use, as to say, Wine will make men drunk: Ergo, wine is not good.   

Whereto serve most chiefly these three places last mentioned (that is to say) the place of Generation, of Corruption, and of Use?  
They chiefly serve to prove the natural goodness or evilness of any thing.    

Of the Subject.  

HOw is this word Subject here taken?  
For that whereunto accidents and actions do belong: and having to speak here of common accidents, I thought it good to speak first of the Subjects, because all manner of Accidents must needs cleave to one Subject or other.   

How may we reason from this place?  
Affirmatively, and Negatively: Affirmatively thus; It is fire: Ergo, it is hot and apt to burn. He is a man: Ergo, apt to laugh or to weep. Negatively thus, Dead men have no being at all: Ergo, dead men are not miserable. He hath no gall: Ergo, he cannot be angry. There be no Pigmeans: Ergo, they fight not with Cranes.   

Which be the Maxims of this place?  
If the Subject be, the natural accidents and actions belonging to the Subject must also needs be: and the Subject being taken away, all the accidents and actions thereof must also be taken away.   

How may such arguments as are fetched out of this place be confuted;  
When the Accidents do not of necessity belong to the Subject, as thus, He is a man: Ergo, he is a good Poet, for this accident belongeth not of necessity to every man.    

Of adjacents and Actions.  
FOr so much as adjacents, otherwise called perpetual Accidents, and also natural and proper Actions belonging to any Subject be either contained under the place of Property, of Difference, or else of common Accidents, and have like kind of reasoning, I thought good therefore to refer you to those places, whereof some are taught before, and some do follow hereafter.   

Of Apposition.  

WHat is Apposition?  
Apposition is, when a thing showeth what his own quality or operation is, by being put or added to another thing, as, white Chalk being put to a wall, will make the wall white, and thereby Chalk showeth itself to be white: so likewise Ink being put to paper, or such like thing, will make it black.   

How may a man reason from this place?  
Affirmatively thus: Chalk being put to a wall, will make it white: Ergo, Chalk is white. Fire being put under a Cauldron of water, will make the water hot: Ergo, fire is hot. By this place also a man may prove conversation or company with others to be good or evil in this sort. This young man keeping company with that old man is made virtuous: Ergo, the old man is virtuous. He is become a thief by keeping company with such a person: Ergo, that person is a thief. And therefore the Scripture saith, cum bonis bonuser●…s, & cum perversis perverteris (that is to say) with the good thou shalt be good, and with the froward thou shalt learn frowardness.   

What be the Maxims of this place?  
If one thing being put to another, endueth the same with any quality, that thing must needs have the same quality itself. I do place this place next to action, because it seemeth to me that it appertaineth to action.    

Of common Accidents.  

WHat cast ye common Accidents?  
I call those common Accidents, such things as are either always, or for the most part so knit together, as the one goeth before or after the other, or else accompany each one the other: whereof some are necessary, and some probable.   

How may we reason from the Necessary?  
Both affirmatively and negatively, and first affirmatively, by the latter part thus. This Appletree hath flowers: Ergo, it hath budded. It hath fruit: Ergo, it hath both budded and flowered. This woman is brought to bed of a child: Ergo, she hath conceived. Negatively by the former part thus. This woman never conceived: Ergo, she can bring forth no child. This man never studied: Ergo he is not learned.   

What be the maxims of this place?  
If the latter be, the former must needs go before, and if the former were not, the latter cannot be.    

Of Probable Accidents, Conjectures, Presumptions, Signs, and Circumstances.  

HOw may we reason from Probable Accidents?  
From Probable Accidents you may reason Affirmatively thus: The feast of Bacehus is this day celebrated: Ergo, there will be many drunken this day. The general Sessions are holden this day: Ergo, there will be some hanged.   

What be the maxims of this place?  
If the latter be, it is likely that the former went before, and if the former be, it is like enough the latter may follow: but you must beware in reasoning from this place, that you fetch not your argument from such Accidents as chance but seldom, or be indifferent, for such be neither necessary nor probable, but sophistical and fallible, as to reason thus. She is a fair woman: Ergo, she is unchaste.   

Whereto serveth the place of common Accidents?  
In the judicial kind it helpeth greatly to prove the fact. In the Demonstrative kind to praise or dispraise. In the Deliberative kind to persuade or dissuade, and to gather together all Conjectures meet for the purpose and therefore this place is much used of natural Philosophers to prove things by natural signs, or by Physiognomy: also of Astrologers ●…o prove dearth, mortality, and such like, by wonders, and monsters, as by blazing stars, and such like impressions. Also it is much used of Chiromancers, Soothsayers, and such as use to judge by Conjectures, and therefore this place extendeth very far, and serveth to many uses. Hitherto also are referred the places of circumstances, and chiefly of time and place, from whence good arguments may be fetched.    

Of Time.  

HOw are arguments fetched from time?  
Negatively thus: Pythag was not borne in Numa Pompilius time: Ergo, Numa was not Pythagoras' scholar. The ceremonial laws of Moses were made for a certain time: Ergo, after that time they do not bind.   

What be the Maxims of this place?  
Nothing can be without time, for if time be taken away, the thing also must needs fail.    

Of Place.  

HOw are arguments fetched from place?  
Negatively thus: Cicero was not at Rome, when julius Caesar was slain: Ergo, Cicero slew him not.   

What is the maxim of this place?  
No certain body or thing is without a place, neither is one body at one time in divers places: and thus much touching inward places.    

Of outward Places, and first of Causes.  

WHich be outward Places?  
Outward places be those which appertain to the thing, and yet do not cleave thereunto: of which places the first is of Causes and Effects.   

What is a Cause?  
A Cause is that by virtue whereof another thing followeth.   

How many chief kinds of Causes be there?  
Four, (that is to say) the Cause Efficient, the end, matter, and shape, of the two last whereof we have spoken before, because they be inward places, and do belong to the Substance of the thing, and therefore we have to deal only here, with the cause Efficient and end.    

Of the Cause Efficient.  

WHat is that cause Efficient, and how is it divided?  
cause Efficient is that from whence proceedeth the first beginning of any thing that is made or done, and is the maker thereof. As for example, the Carpenter is the Cause Efficient of the house which he maketh, and so is every Artificer of his own work. Causes Efficient are divided into two kinds (that is to say) Cause Absolute, and Cause Adiwant. cause Absolute worketh by his own force and virtue, as the fire that burneth. Cause Adiwant worketh not by himself, but is a helper, and such cause is sometime principal, as virtue is a Principal Cause of blessed life, and sometime not Principal, as the gifts of the body and of fortune be helpers to the happy life: but not Principal Causes thereof. Again of Causes, some are of Necessity, without which the thing cannot be made, as the Instrument or matter, and some are said not to be of Necessity, as when we say, The speaking of truth causeth hatred, and yet not of Necessity. Also of Causes Efficient, some be Universal, and some Particular, as the Eclipse or evil Conjunction of certain Planets is the Universal cause of Pestilence: but the corruption of humours in man's body is the particular cause thereof. Again, of causes some be called of the Latins Propinquae (that is to say) nigh unto the Effect, as the father and mother be the nighest Causes of Generation of Children. And some be called Remotae, (that is to say) removed causes, which be further of, as the Grands●…rs, and Grandames of the said children. Moreover of Causes Efficient some work by a certain natural Necessity, as those that lack choice and judgement, as fire that burneth, and the Sun that shineth, and all other natural things that do work by their own force and virtue. Some again do work by counsel, reason, and free-will, as men, Angels, and most chiefly God himself.   

How may we reason from the Efficient Cause to the Effect?  
From the necessary Efficient Cause you may reason both Affirmatively and Negatively. Affirmatively thus: The Sun is lately gone down: Ergo, it is twilight. Negatively thus: The Sun was not up when Troy was destroyed: Ergo, Troy was not destroyed in the day time: but from the Efficient not Necessary, you can reason but only Affirmatively thus: He is slain: Ergo, he is dead: but you cannot say; he is not slain: Ergo, he is not dead.   

What be the maxims of this Place?  
The Necessary Cause Efficient not letted, the Effect must needs follow: as if he hath drunken poison, he must needs die. But if such Cause faileth, the effect also must needs fail: as the Sun is not up: Ergo, it is not day. He never studied: Ergo, he is not learned, to which place may be referred the places of occasion, Instrument, Mean, and Generation.   

How may we reason from the Effect, to the Cause Efficient?  
From the Necessary Effect, both Affirmatively and Negatively thus, it is day: Ergo, the Sun is up, it is not day: Ergo, the Sun is not up. From the Effect not Necessary you may only reason Negatively, thus: He is not dead: Ergo, He is not slain, but you cannot reason so Affirmatively, as to say, He is dead: Ergo, He is slain.   

What be the Maxims of this place?  
The Effect being put, the necessary Cause must needs be, and the Effect being taken away, the necessary Cause is also taken away.   

When do Arguments fetched from this place fail?  
When the Cause is not necessary or proper.    

Of the End.  

WHat is End, and how is it divided?  
The End is that for whose sake any thing is done, and of ends some be chief and last, and some not chief, but helping: The chief is that which is desired for itself sake, and such is the best state of every thing in his kind, as blessed life to Man: courage and fierceness to a Horse of service: heat and dryness to Fire: coldness and moistness to Water, etc. The helping end is that which is desired not for itself sake, but for that it helpeth to attain the chiefest end, and of such helping ends one may be better than another, as when we desire money to buy a house, and the house to dwell in, etc.   

How may we reason from this place?  
Both Affirmatively and Negatively, affirmatively thus, Virtue is good, because blessed Life is good: negatively thus, If Adultery be not good to allure another man's wife, To break wedlock is not good.   

What be the Maxims of this place?  
That thing whereof the end is good or evil, is also of itself good or evil.   

Tell the use of these places of Causes, and whereto they serve?  
The use thereof is divers and manifold: for sith that in the Deliberative kind two principal questions are to be discussed; first, whether the thing be profitable; and secondly, whether it may be possible and conveniently done or not. Arguments to prove the first, are to be fetched out of the End and Effect. And to prove the second out of the Cause Efficient. Also in the kind Demonstrative to praise or dispraise. Arguments are to be fetched out of the End and Effect. Thirdly, in the judicial kind, wherein doubt riseth of the fact, and will of the doer. Arguments are to be fetched from the End, to prove or disprove the same. Finally, these places, together with the other two Causes, Matter and Form before taught, do serve to make those kinds of Definitions which we call Causal.    

Of Opposites.  

WHat be Opposites?  
Things contrary one to another.   

How many kinds of Opposites be there?  
Four (that is to say) Relatives, Contraries, Privatives, and Contradictories.    

And first of Relatives.  

WHen are things said to be Opposites by Relation?  
When according to their own significations they have mutual Relation one to another, as the Father and the Son.   

How may we reason from this place?  
You may reason from the Affirmation of the one to the denial of the other, thus Augustus was Octa●…s his son: Ergo, He was not his Father.   

What be the Maxims of this place?  
Sith Relatives be always together by nature, if the one be, the other must needs be, and if the one be taken away, the other is also taken away.   

What is to be observed in fetching Arguments from this place?  
You must beware that you have one self respect, and not divers, for to reason thus is no good Consequent, This man is a Father: Ergo, He is no Son: or thus, This man is his Superior: Ergo, Not his Inferior, for in divers respects he may be both a Father and a Son; a Superior and Inferior; a Superior in one respect, and Inferior in another.    

Of Contraries.  

WHat be Contraries, and how are they divided?  
They be two Extremes Repugnant one to another, whereof some are called Mediate (that is to say) having a mean, and some Immediate having no mean at all.   

How may we reason from these two kinds?  
From the first kind you may conclude negatively, thus, He is prodigal: Ergo, He is not covetous: from the second kind you may reason both Affirmatively & Negatively, thus, This man is whole: Ergo, He is not sick; This man is not whole: Ergo, He is sick.   

What be the Maxims of this place?  
The Maxim of the Affirmative to the Negative is the general Maxim to all Opposites, thus: Whatsoever agreeth with the one Opposite, must needs disagree with the other Opposite: but the Maxim of the Immediate is thus: If one of the Contraries Immediate be not, the other must needs be, as the former examples do plainly show.    

Of Privatives.  

WHat be Privatives?  
Privatives are two Contraries, belonging to one self Subject, apt to receive the same, in the which Subject, when the one is wanting (at such time as Nature doth appoint) the other must needs be.   

How may we reason from this place?  
Two ways: first, from Affirmation of the one to the denial of the other, which is common to all Opposites, as thus, He is blind: Ergo, He seeth not. Secondly, you may reason from the denial of the one to the affirmation of the other, thus: He cannot speak: Ergo, He is dumb. But this kind of Argument is not strong, unless the thing required be applied to his proper Subject, and in such time as nature hath appointed, for it were no good argument to say thus: a sucking child cannot speak: Ergo, he is dumb; or thus, a whelp of two days old cannot see: Ergo, he is blind: for nature commonly suffereth not the child to speak before it be two years old, nor the whelp to see before it be nine days old.   

What be the maxims of this place?  
If the one be not in the Subject apt to receive the same at such time as nature hath appointed, the other must needs be.    

Of Contradictories.  

WHat be Contradictories?  
They be Contraries having no mean, whereof the one denieth the other.   

How may we reason from this place?  
Both Affirmatively and Negatively thus: he is wife: Ergo, he is no fool: he is a fool: Ergo, he is not wise.   

What is the Maxim of this place?  
If the one be, the other cannot be: for two Contradictories cannot be together at one self time, in one self Subject, and in one self respect.    

Of things differing in kind, called of the Latins Disparata.  

WHat be they?  
They are those things that do differ in nature and kind, as a Man, a Horse, a Stone, a Tree, whereof every one differeth from another in kind and nature.   

How may we reason from this place?  
From the Affirmation of the one, to the Denial of the other, as thus: Peter is a Man, Ergo, he is no Horse.   

What be the Maxims of this place?  
Whatsoever agreeth with the one, agreeth not with the other.   

What is to be observed in reasoning from all these kinds of Opposites?  
That the Repugnancy consist in the Predicat, and not in the Subject: for it were no good Consequent to say thus: whatsoever seeth is a sensible body: Ergo, that which is blind is no sensible body: for here the Contrariety consisteth in the Subject, and not in the Predicate.    

Of Comparison.  

HOw may we reason from the place of Comparison?  
Three manner of ways, that is, either from the More to the Less, or from the Less to the More, or from Like to Like.    

Of the More.  

THese two words, More or less, how are they to be taken?  
We understand here by More, that which hath more probability, and by the Less, that which hath less probability.   

How may we reason from the More to the Less?  
Only Negatively, and that three manner of ways: first, from the Subject, as thus: Cicero was not able to defend this cause, much less any other common Orator: secondly, from the Predicate thus: If this man be not able to bear one hundred weight, much less two hundred weight: thirdly, from the Subject, and Predicate both together thus: A strong man is not able to bear a hundred weight: Ergo, much less a weak child is able to bear two hundred weight.   

What is the Maxim of this place?  
If it prevaileth not in the More, it cannot prevail in the Less.    

Of the Less.  

HOw may we reason from the Less to the More?  
Affirmatively, three manner of ways, as before from the Subject thus: A little child was able to bear ten pound weight: Ergo, much more a strong man: From the Predicate thus: If Martyrs were ready to lose their lives for Christ's sake, much more their temporal goods: From the Subject, and the Predicate both together thus: Christ suffered most grievous torments for our sakes: Ergo, we ought to suffer a little pain for his sake.   

What is the Maxim of this place?  
If the Less prevail, the More must needs avail.   

What is to be observed in reasoning from these two places?  
You must beware that you take not the More for the Less, nor the Less for the More, for many times that which seemeth to be the More in number or quantity, is the Less in purpose, and chose, as for example: to bear a hundred weight, is more in quantity, then to bear half a hundred weight, and yet in purpose it is less, for it is less probable, and less likely to bear a hundred weight, then to bear half a hundred weight.    

Of Like and Unlike.  

HOw may we reason from Like to Like?  
When the thing which we bring to prove, is like or equal to the thing that is to be proved: from which place we may reason both Affirmatively and Negatively, thus: Peter is mortal: Ergo, Paul is mortal. The day Labourer is worthy of his hire: Ergo, the Preacher or Teacher: A man ought to be drowned in the sea for killing his Father: Ergo, he ought to be executed with the like death for killing his Mother.   

What is the Maxim of this place?  
Of things like, like judgement is to be made: but note that this kind of reasoning of Like, is more apt to teach and to print in the hearers mind a lively representation of the thing, then to urge him by any necessity of due proof to believe the same, because it is unpossible, that the two things which are to be compared can be like in all points, and therefore this is the weakest kind of argument that is, and yet necessary to such end as is before declared, and specially for Lawyers, to prove one ruled case, or for judgement by another Like. To this place also is referred the place of Example.    

Of Example.  

How may we reason from this place?  
Affirmatively thus: Peter slew Ananias for lying: Ergo, without all doubt God will punish those that use to lie: the Maxim whereof is all one, with that of like before set down.    

Of Unlike.  

HOw may we reason from this place?  
Negatively thus: God is not as man is, for man is a liar: Ergo, God is true and no liar.   

What is the Maxim of this place?  
Of things Unlike, unlike judgement is to be made.    

Of the degrees of Comparison.  
TO the place of Comparison, me thinks it were not amiss to refer all those places which Aristotle reciteth, and are taken out of the three degrees of Comparison, which children learn in their Accidents, (that is to say) the Positive, the Comparative, and the Superlative.   

From the Comparative to the Positives.  

HOw may we reason from the Comparative to the Positive?  
Affirmatively thus: Virgil was a more learned Poet then Horace: Ergo, Virgil was a learned Poet: Honey is sweeter than Milk: Ergo, Honey is sweet.   

What is the Maxim of this place?  
If the Comparative degree be truly and properly applied to any thing: the Positive must needs be also rightly applied to the same. I say, here properly to avoid Ambiguity, for it were no good Consequent to say thus: the sea of Caspia is more sweet than any other sea: Ergo, it is sweet and not salt: for this word Sweet hath not in this speech his proper signification, but is rather taken, for that which is less bitter or salt.    

From the Positive to the Comparative.  

HOw may we reason from the Positive to the Comparative?  
Only Negatively thus: Zoilus was no learned Poet: Ergo, he was not better learned than Homer.   

What is the Maxim of this place?  
If the Positive be denied, the Comparative also must needs be denied.    

From two Positives to two Comparatives and two Superlatives.  

HOw may we reason from two Positives, to two Comparatives, and to two Superlatives at once, and contrarily?  
In this manner: that which is good, deserveth justly to be beloved: Ergo, that which is better, ought more justly to be beloved, and that which is best, ought most justly to be beloved. And much after this manner you may reason from a double Comparative, to a double Positive thus: that which is more honest; is more laudable: Ergo, that which is honest is laudable.   

What is to be observed in reasoning from these degrees of Comparison?  
You must take heed that the Predicate be spoken of the Subject naturally and necessarily, and not by Accident, for it were no good Consequent to reason thus: he that is learned, is honest, therefore he that is more learned, is more honest: for a man may have much learning, and yet small honesty.    

Of Proportion.  

WHen are we said to reason from the place of Proportion?  
When two like Propositions being compared together, we conclude in this or such like manner: look what proportion is betwixt 6. and 4. the same proportion is betwixt 12. and 8. but betwixt 6. and 4. is Proportio Sesquialtera: Ergo, betwixt 12. and 8. the like proportion is: for when one number or measure doth comprehend another once, and one half thereof, that is called proportio sesquialtera, as 12. and 8. and if it contain it once, and one third part thereof, than it is called proportio sesquitertia, as 8. and 6. for 8. containeth 6. once and two over, which is the third part of 6.   

What is the Maxim of this place?  
Of things having like proportion, like judgement is to be made.   

Whereto serveth this place?  
This place is necessary for judges and Magistrates that have to consider of equity in cases of justice, and in rewarding virtue, or in punishing vice, in which the Geometrical proportion would be always used. Some do give such examples of this place, as in my opinion do rather belong to the place of Like then to this place, for the arguments of this place ought properly to be fetched out of the Predicament of quantity, and not out of quality, or out of any other Predicament.    

Of Changed Proportion.  

WHat is changed Proportion?  
Changed Proportion is when the Foundations, and Terms of two like Proportions are answerable in proportion aswell amongst themselves, as one to another.   

What mean you by these two words, Foundation and Terms?  
The Foundation is that from whence the Comparison first proceedeth, as the Father, and the Term, Bound or end is that whereunto the said Comparison is applied, and endeth in the same, as the Son and therefore the Son is called the Term, Bound or end: whereof we have spoken before in the Predicament of Relation.   

Give Examples of reasoning from this place.  
Look as 8. is to 4. so is 12. to 6. (that is to say) in double proportion one to the other: Ergo, as 12. is to 8. so is 6. to 4. for each other containeth the other once and a half, which is called proportio sesquialtera. The manifest Demonstration whereof you may see in this Figure here following.  
  

Why is this Proportion said to be changed or transposed?  
Because the order of numbers that are compared, is altered in the conclusion: for in the Antecedent the first is compared to the second, and the third to the fourth: but in the Conclusion the third is compared to the first, and the fourth to the second.    

Of Disproportion.  

HOw may we reason from this place?  
Negatively thus: 12. is not to 6. as 8. to 6. but 12. to 6. is double in proportion: Ergo, 8. to 6. is not double in proportion.   

What is the Maxim of this place?  
Of things having unlike proportion, unlike judgement is to be made.    

From Disproportion changed or transposed.  

HOw may we reason from this place?  
Negatively thus: 12. is not to 6. as 4. to 3. for betwixt the two first is a double proportion, and betwixt the two last Sesquitertia: Ergo, 12. is not to 4. as 6. to 3. for the one is a tripla, and the other double.   

What be the Maxims of this place?  
If the first be not to the second, as the third to the fourth, than the first shall not be to the third, as the second is to the fourth.   

To whom are these places most familiar?  
To those that are exercised in the Mathematical Sciences.    

Of Translation.  

WHat is Translation?  
Translation, otherwise called a Metaphor, is a figure of speech, whereby the proper signification of a word is changed into another unproper, for some likeness that is betwixt the thing signified, and being generally taken, it is rather a Trope, or Figure of Rhetoric, more meet to adorn speech, then to prove any thing thereby: notwithstanding being taken here as a place of Logic, you may reason both Affirmatively and Negatively, in this sort: A roaring Lion that seeketh to devour, is to be feared: Ergo, the Devil is to be feared: Love is blind: Ergo, they that be in love, are not able rightly to judge.   

What be the Maxims of this place?  
Whatsoever agreeth with the Metaphorical name, agreeth also with the proper name, and chose.    

Of Mean places.  

WHat be mean Places?  
Mean Places are those from whence such Arguments are to be fetched, as do partly agree with the nature of the things to be proved, and do partly differ from the same.   

How are Mean Places divided?  
Into Coniugates, Cases, and Division.    

And first of Coniugates and Cases.  

WHat be Coniugates or Cases?  
Coniugates or Cases, be like words derived all of one self word, differing only in termination or end, as wisdom, wise, and wisely: notwithstanding some use Coniugates and Cases as several places.   

Why, wherein do they differ?  
Their Difference is very small, saving that in Arguments fetched from Coniugates, the Abstract is mentioned, but not in those that are fetched from Cases.   

How may we reason from these two places?  
Both affirmatively and Negatively, from the Coniugates thus: A just man is to be praised, ergo justice is to be praised: a vicious man is not to be praised, ergo viciousness is not to be praised. From cases thus: He doth all things wisely, ergo he is wise: He doth nothing wisely, ergo he is not wise: for in these two last examples the abstract which is wisdom, is not once mentioned: what abstract is, look before in the Chapter of predication lib. 1. cap. 5. but you must beware in reasoning from this place, that your phrase of speech be natural and proper, and not unproper: for it were no good argument to say thus: white is sweet: Ergo, whiteness is sweetness.   

What is the maxim of these two places?  
Whatsoever agreeth with one of the Coniugates or cases, must needs also agree with the other.    

Of Division.  

WHat is Division?  
What Division is, and how many kinds there be, and what is to be observed in every kind hath been declared before, lib. 2. cap. 4. when we showed the order of defining and dividing.   

How may we reason from division?  
Two manner of ways: first, from the denying of one part or more of the division, to affirm another part thereof, as thus: Every sensible body is whole or sick, but Peter is a sensible body and not sick: Ergo, he is whole: or thus. Of sensible bodies there be some whole, some sick. Peter is a sensible body and not sick: Ergo, he is whole. In these two kinds of examples the division consisteth only of two parts, wherein it sufficeth to deny the one for affirming the other. But if the division consist of many parts, than you must deny all the parts saving that which you would affirm, as in this example following: Plato disputeth, is a proposition, but it is neither universal, particular, nor indefinite: Ergo, it is a singular proposition: in which kind of reasoning if you leave out or omit any part that is to be denied, than the conclusion is nought, for it is no good consequent to say thus: this proposition Plato disputeth, is neither universal nor particular: Ergo, it is indefinite. Notwithstanding, if you join the part omitted in your Antecedent with a conjunction disjunctive, the argument may be made good; as to say thus: this proposition Plato disputeth, is neither universal nor particular: Ergo, it is either indefinite or singular.   

What is the Maxim of this first way of reasoning?  
The Maxim is thus: whatsoever agreeth with the thing divided, must needs agree with some one of the parts thereof.   

What is the second way of reasoning from Division?  
The second way is to proceed from the affirming of one of the parts to the denying of the other, if it consist but of two, or to the denying of all the rest, if it consist of many. Of two parts let this be your example: Of sensible bodies some be whole, some sick, but this sensible body is whole: Ergo, he is not sick. Of many parts thus: of propositions one is universal, another particular; one indefinite, another singular: but this proposition Plato disputeth▪ is singular: Ergo, it is neither universal, particular, nor indefinite.   

What is the Maxim of this way of reasoning?  
Whatsoever agreeth with one of the parts, must needs disagree with all the rest, for every good division would be made of parts mere repugnant, or at the least divers in kind one from another: for it is a principal condition requisite to division, whereupon the second way of reasoning is grounded even as the first way is grounded upon another good condition belonging also to division, which is that the thing divided may not contain more or less than his proper parts.    

Of inartisiciall places.  
Having sufficiently spoken of places, inward, outward, and mean, which as I said before are places artificial, it is meet now that we speak of the places inartificial, which according to Quintilian be these six; Foreiudgements, Rumours, Torture, Writings or Evidences, Oath, and Witnesses: All which are briefly and plainly set forth in the Table of Authority here following, because they are all contained under the place of Authority.   

Of Authority.  

HOw is Authority here to be taken?  
Authority is here to be taken for any testimony worthy of credit.   

How may we reason from this place?  
Affirmatively thus: the learned Philosophers say that there be four elements, whereof all other things are mixed and compounded: Ergo, it is true. Christ saith that whosoever is baptised, and believeth in him, shall be saved: Ergo, it is true.   

What be the Maxims of this place?  
Whatsoever is allowed by the most part of the wise and learned, is to be believed as a thing probable, neither ought we rashly to descent from their opinion and judgement. Again, every man is to be believed in his own Art: but for so much as Authority is twofold (that is to say) divine and human, and that all arguments fetched from this place be not of like value, for some be true and infallible, some probable, and some Sophistical: this Table therefore here following shall plainly set forth every kind by itself, whereby you shall easily discern the one from the other.  

The Table of Authority here following.  


Authority is twofold,  


Divine which is twofold:  


Written,  


Of the written which we call holy Scriptures, sound arguments are made, so long as the words are truly expounded according to the meaning if the holy Ghost. But they be weak and càptious if the authority be corrupted either by addition, subtraction, or alteration of any word, syllable, or letter, or by wresling the senseotherwise then the holy Ghost meant it.    
or unwritten tradition:  


As for tradition or unwritten verity of what value it is & what credit it hath, I leave to the judgement of the learned Divines, amongst whom is no small strife and contention in these days for the same. The paynim were wont to refer to divine Authority the Oracles and answers of their false Gods, Priests, Prophets, and Soothsayers, which true Christians ought utterly to reject, and to abhor: notwithstanding Lactantius letteth not to prove the birth, death and passion of Christ against the paynim by Sibyl's prophecies, because he knew they would give more credit to them then to the holy Scriptures.    
or human which is threefold:  


Writings, as  


Histories, Laws, Statutes, Decrees, judgements, ruled Cases, Maxim●…, Proverbs, general Rules, Patents, Warrants, licenses, Commissions from the Prince, Charters, Deeds, 〈◊〉, Court-Rolles, Extents, Accounts, Obligations, Indent●…es, Wills and Testaments, and such like.    
Things uttered by mouth.  


If it be by mouth, it is either free and voluntary, as voluntary Confession, or Testimony, Rumour, Opinion, and the speech of the Wise.  
Or else forced by Oath or Torture.    
And the third kind of human Authority, is that which is allewed by use and custom of the people.           
As for such Arguments as are fetched from human Authority, the laws do teach 〈◊〉 large, which be sound, and which be weak: notwithstanding, for so much as Quintilian affirmeth, that the inartificial places, are the six places abovementioned, I have thought good to set down according to Valerius, the definition of every place, and briefly to show how every such place may be confirmed or impugned.    

And first of Foreiudgements or Ruled Cases.  

WHat call you Foreiudgements or Ruled Cases?  
They be judgements or sentences heretofore pronounced, whereby judges take example to give like judgement in like Cases.   

How may a man confirm or impugn Foreiudgements?  
You shall confirm them by aggravating the authority of those that first pronounced them, and by the likeness of the Cases: but you shall impugn or confute them by extenuating or diminishing the authority of the first pronouncers, and by the unlikeness of the Cases.    

Of Rumour and Fame.  

WHat difference is betwixt Rumour and Fame?  
Rumour is a particular assertion or affirmation proceeding of some suspicion, without any certain Author. But Fame is a common affirmation, having some certain Author: either of which whosoever will impugn, must call it an uncertain brute or clamour, taking his beginning first of malice, and his increase through credulity and lightness of belief, and that the same may chance to the most innocent man, that is, through the Fraud of his enemies, publishing abroad false surmises against him. Contrarily, he that will defend Fame or Rumour, must say that it riseth not of nought, nor is spread abroad without some just cause, and that it is accounted as a public Testimony, according to the old Proverb; which saith; vox populi, vex Dei, the voice of the people is the voice of God.    

Of Torture.  

WHat is Torture?  
Torture is a painful kind of punishment, invented for the inquisition of truth, and violently to wrest or wring the same out of such as would not otherwise confess it.   

How is this place to be confirmed or impugned?  
It is to be confirmed by aggravating the necessary use of torture for the finding out of the truth; but whoso will impugn it, must say, that such Torture causeth many times more lies then true tales to be told: for those that be strong and able to endure pain, and of a resolute mind, will never yield for any torment to say otherwise then they list themselves. Again, if they be weak and not able to suffer pain, it maketh them to say whatsoever you will have them, be it never so false.    

Of Writings and Evidences.  

WHat is meant by Writings?  
Deeds, Indentures, Releases, Obligations, and such like other Evidences before rehearsed.   

How is this place to be impugned?  
You may impugn Evidences or Writings, if ye can prove them to be unperfect any manner of way, as to be forged, to be made by some collusion or fraud, or to be extorted by force from some that was put in fear, and such like.    

Of Oaths.  

WHat is an Oath?  
It is a religious affirming or denying some thing, by calling God to witness, which is the strongest bond that may be, to bind man's faith and conscience.   

How is this place to be confirmed or impugned?  
He that will prove by this place, must aggravate the integrity, honesty and holiness of the parties that are sworn, saying, that the Oath of an honest, holy, and religious man is of great importance: And he that will impugn it, must do clean contrary, saying, That they are naughty men that are sworn, and common jurors, which by reason of wicked custom of swearing will easily be forsworn: or he must say that the party sweareth for fear, love, hatred, for hope of gain, reward, and such like.    

Of Witnesses.  

WHat be Witnesses?  
Witnesses be proofs of things done or not done, whose office is to speak what they have heard or known: the confirmation or confutation of which proof dependeth upon the goodness or evilness of the persons.   

To what end serveth the knowledge of places?  
He that will write or speak of any matter probably, wisely, or copiously: or will understand the effect, tenor, arguments, and proofs of other men's speeches, and writings, hath as much need to be practised in these places, as a Huntsman is in knowing the haunts of his game which he hunteth, for without that, he shall wander long time in vain, and hardly find that which he seeketh: neither is it enough to know the places, unless you can aptly apply them and use them when occasion shall serve, in disputations made either by mouth or pen, which requireth a continual exerciso of such as will be perfect therein. And therefore to the intent you might the better learn how to exercise yourself in the foresaid places, I have thought good here to give you at the least one example set down by Hunneus in his Logic: the Theme of which example is thus: Man ought to embrace virtue: which Theme he doth not only handle after the Logical manner with short speech, but also after the Rhetorical manner with copious speech, using therein this threefold order: For first, he bringeth in such proofs as are to be gathered in respect of the subject of the Theme. Secondly, those that are to be gathered in respect of the Predicate of the same: and thirdly, those that are to be had in respect of both.    

The Theme or Proposition. 
From the definition of the subject.   
MAn ought to embrace virtue.  

What arguments are to be gathered on the behalf of the subject of this Proposition?  
These that follow, and first, from the definition thus: Sith of all sensible creatures man is the most noble and most worthy creature, for that he is endued with reason and counsel, and was created like to the image of God: it is most meet therefore that such a creature should be like his Creator, in life adorned with such virtue and goodness as is answerable to true judgement, which the Logicians would briefly express in this manner: it becometh every sensible body endued with reason to love virtue: Ergo, every man ought to love virtue.    

From the Etymology.  
IT becometh every creature that is made of the slime of the earth, to be void of all arrogancy and pride, to be lowly, humble, and obedient to his Creator, and to embrace virtue in observing the Law of God devoutly and religiously, wherefore man called in Latin homo, of this word humo, (that is to say) earth, or rather slime of the earth, taking his original from so base and vile a thing, aught to be humble and void of all pride and arrogancy, and to love virtue above all things, being always obedient to God his Creator, and ready to do his most holy precepts and commandments.  

Logically thus:  
Every sensible creature that is created of the slime of earth, aught to be obedient to his Creator and to embrace virtue, therefore man ought to be obedient to his Creator, and to embrace virtue.    

From the Matter.  
MAn is made of the self same Matter of which all other unliving, dumb & vnsen●…ble creatures are made, (that is to say) of the four elements, whereby he is subject to alteration and corruption: wherefore man ought not to be proud or arrogant, but modest, humble, lowly, and obedient, showing in all the actions of his life, that he is not unmindful of his base estate and condition, nor ignorant from whence he came, and what he is, even no better than earth and dust.  

Logically thus.  
Man is made of a base matter, as all other things are, therefore Man ought not to be proud, but to love the virtue of humility and obedience.    

From the form or shape of man..  
IT hath been always most firmly, and with one whole consent agreed and believed, even from the beginning of the world, that the true shape of Man is a reasonable Soul, immortal, and capable of everlasting blessedness, which Soul God of his goodness did breath into man, to the intent that he should continually serve, honour, and obey him during this mortal life, and after death enjoy eternal life: what great madness were it then to think, that Man having obtained at God's hands so noble a shape, ought not to embrace all noble virtues, and to govern all his actions in such godly and virtuous manner, as he may at length attain to the everlasting joy whereunto he was first created and form?  

Logically thus:  
Man consisteth of a Soul capable of eternal felicity: Ergo, Man ought to love virtue, whereby he may attain to that felicity.    

From the general kind.  
Sigh it is given by nature to every sensible Body to seek his own safety, and to be best affected (that is) to have his full perfection according to his Kind: the love of virtue therefore, whereby Man is made not only perfect in this life, but also attaineth thereby everlasting joy in the life to come, must needs be to him most natural.  

Logically thus:  
Every sensible body willingly desireth that which is agreeable to his nature and kind, therefore Man must needs love virtue, as a thing most fit for his kind.    

From the special kind.  
BOth Men and Women, Rich and Poor, Young and Old, of what state or calling soever they be, if they intent to lead a good and godly life, have need of virtue: wherefore all Men that will live well, aught to embrace virtue.  

Logically thus:  
Both Rich and Poor, Young and Old aught to love virtue: Ergo, every Man ought to love virtue.    

From the common Accidents.  
EVery Man, after that he hath ended this short course of life, must appear at the last day before the terrible judgement seat of God, there to render account of all his deeds and words both good and bad, whereas every man that hath done well, shall receive for his good deeds a most glorious reward, even life everlasting: but the wicked for his evil deeds shall be condemned to hell fire, that never shall be quenched, a just reward for his deserts: wherefore all men ought in this life to fly vice, and to embrace virtue, from whence all good actions do spring.  

Logically thus:  
Every man shall render account at the last day, of all his deeds both good and bad, and shall receive a just reward according to the same: Ergo, Every man whilst he liveth in this world, aught to fly vice, and to embrace virtue.    

From the cause efficient.  
Sigh Man was created by God the Creator of all things, and Author of all goodness, excellency, and virtue, and was form according to the very Image and likeness of God: it behoveth man therefore to imitate his Creator, and by leading a godly and virtuous life, to show that he is somewhat like him, though not able in all things to attain to the perfection of so perfect a pattern.  

Logically thus:  
God the cause efficient is good, therefore Man being the effect, aught to be good.    

From the End.  
THe Prophets and Apostles inspired with the Holy Ghost▪ Author of all Truth, by many their writings do testify, that the greatness and excellency of that blessedness whereunto Man is created, is such as no man is able to express with tongue, nor in his heart or mind to conceive the same: wherefore sith Man is created to such exceeding great blessedness, it behoveth him to embrace virtue, which is the very mean and way to bring him to that blessedness.  

Logically thus:  
Sith most glorious blessedness is the end of Man, Man therefore ought to embrace virtue, that he may attain to that end.   

What arguments are to be gathered on the behalf of the Predicate, and from what places?  
These that follow, and such like, and first from the definition thus:    

From the Definition of the Predicate.  
Sigh Virtue is a moral habit, whereby Man's will and all his actions are always directed to God, and governed according to true judgement, and thereby are made most acceptable both to God and Man: Man therefore ought to embrace Virtue, from whence such noble fruits do spring.  

Logically thus:  
Man ought to love that habit from whence all honest actions do spring: therefore man ought to love Virtue.    

From the Description.  
MAn ought with all endeavour to follow that thing whereby he may attain not a vain and transitory glory, but a true and everlasting glory, and thereby to be made acceptable both to God and Man: Wherefore Man ought to embrace Virtue, from whence such glory springeth.  

Logically thus:  
That thing is worthy to be beloved of Man, which getteth him everlasting glory: Therefore Virtue is worthy to be beloved.    

From the Etymology.  
Sigh Virtue, if you diligently consider and weigh the signification of the word, is none other thing but a Noble affection of the mind, of great excellency, and most meet for Man: it is not to be doubted, but that those (which leaving so precious a thing, do set their whole delight in seeking after worldly riches and bodily pleasure) are much deceived, and do greatly offend.  

Logically thus:  
Such excellency as is most meet for Man, becometh Man best: Therefore Virtue becometh him best.    

From the general Kind.  
Sigh it is well known that Man ought with all diligence to seek after those habits, whereby human nature is best adorned, and made most perfect: And that Virtue amongst such habits is the chief: because that thereby the mind of Man is taught to know what truth is, and his will thereby is always inclined to honest and laudable actions: Man therefore ought with all his power and endeavour to embrace Virtue.  

Logically thus:  
Man ought chiefly to love those habits, whereby his nature is made perfect: Therefore man ought to love Virtue.    

From the special Kind.  
IT is most meet, yea most necessary for all men to love fortitude and temperance: for by temperance Man's will is bridled, and kept from all evil lusts and affections, and by fortitude he is made free from fear of death: and as without temperance man's life cannot be honest, so without fortitude his death cannot be commendable: wherefore it plainly appeareth how necessary a thing it is for a man to embrace Virtue, as that which chiefly maketh his life honest and laudable, and his death glorious and honourable.  

Logically thus:  
A man ought to love fortitude and temperance: Ergo, He ought to love Virtue.    

From the corruption of the Subject.  
THe destruction of Virtue is the cause of most grievous evils, for the light of Virtue being extinct, the mind is immediately wrapped in such darkness, as it cannot see nor discern what is honest, what is profitable, or what is hurtful, by means whereof man falleth into most filthy vices, which do so infect and corrupt the life of man, as it becometh most detestable both to God and Man: whereby it plainly appeareth how noble a thing Virtue is, and with what love and diligence it ought to be embraced of all men.  

Logically thus:  
The destruction of Virtue is evil: therefore Virtue is good and worthy to be beloved.    

From the use of the Subject.  
THe use of Virtue maketh man's life commendable, holy, glorious, and acceptable both to God and Man: than which nothing can be in this world more to be desired of man: wherefore it manifestly appeareth, that Virtue is so noble a thing, as all men ought to bestow all their study, labour and care in obtaining the same.  

Logically thus:  
The use of Virtue is good: Therefore Virtue is good.    

From common Accidents.  
Sigh all men do greatly desire to have their consciences quieted, and their minds free from all evil lusts, affects, and passions, which with continual strife do molest the same: and thereby do cause Man to lead a miserable life: Man therefore ought to refuse no pain nor labour, so as he may attain to Virtue, which is always accompanied with that tranquillity of mind and conscience that is so much desired.  

Logically thus:  
The tranquillity of the mind and conscience is to be desired: Ergo, Virtue which is always accompanied with that tranquillity is to be desired.    

From the cause Efficient.  
Sigh true Virtue is not to be gotten by any man's labour, exercise, or industry, without the great grace of God, who is chief Author and Giver of all good gifts: it well appeareth that Virtue is a most excellent thing, and most worthy to be had in admiration, and therefore with fervent love and diligence to be embraced of all men.  

Logically thus:  
God the chief Author of all good, is the cause Efficient of Virtue: therefore Virtue proceeding of so worthy a cause, must needs be an excellent thing, and worthy of all men to be embraced.    

From the Effect.  
TRue honour and glory hath been always had amongst all men in great admiration: because it seemeth not only by man's judgement, but also by the divine judgement of God, to be always attributed to virtue: wherefore sith Virtue doth yield such noble fruits and effects, Virtue must needs be a noble thing itself, and worthy of all men to be embraced.  

Logically thus:  
The Effect of Virtue, which is true honour and glory, is good, and to be desired.    

From the End.  
Sigh everlasting blessedness is of such excellency, as neither tongue is able to express the joys thereof, nor mind to conceive the same, and therefore aught to be desired above all things, as the just reward of all goodness, and final end of all evil, and that Virtue is the only mean to bring man to that blessed End: who then will once think that Virtue is not to be esteemed above all things, and worthy of all men to be embraced?  

Logically thus:  
The end of Virtue, which is everlasting felicity, is to be desired: Ergo, Virtue is to be desired.   

Hitherto you have showed how the aforesaid Theme is to be proved with Arguments fetched aswell from the Subject as the Predicate: now show what Arguments are to be fetched from both joined together?  
These that follow and such like, and first by Comparison, from the Less to the More.    

From the Less to the More.  
IF men will not let to bestow any pain, labour or cost to preserve their bodies from death, sickness, or any other hurt: how much more than ought they to endeavour themselves to obtain Virtue, which will preserve their souls from all corrupt affections and evil vices, and thereby deliver them from death everlasting?  

Logically thus:  
Man ought to be careful of his bodily health: Ergo, Much more of his soul's health, which is chiefly preserved by Virtue.    

From Similitude or Likeness.  
AS the beauty of the body is pleasant to man's eyes: even so the beauty of the mind or soul is as acceptable to God: and therefore as man will be diligent and careful in decking and adorning his body to please the eyes of men: even so he ought to be most careful to deck his soul and mind, with such Virtues, as do make the same in God's sight most acceptable.  

Logically thus:  
As the decking of the body is pleasant to men's eyes: so the decking of the Soul is pleasing to God.    

From Authority.  
David the Prophet in the 34. Psalm saith thus: Turn from evil, and do that which is good. The Prophet Micheas also agreeth hereunto in saying thus: Deal justly with all men, love mercy, and walk diligently in the way of God. By which words these two godly Prophets do teach no other thing, than that Man forsaking all kind of vice, should with all diligence embrace Virtue.  

Logically thus:  
God teacheth by his Prophet David, and also by Micheas, that Man should fly Vice, and love Virtue: Ergo, Man ought to love Virtue. By daily exercising yourself in such examples as this is, you shall in short time learn the right use of the places, and be able thereby readily to apply them to every good purpose.     
here endeth the fourth Book of Logic.   

THE fifth BOOK OF LOGIC.  

CHAP. I.  

Of Argumentation, and of the four kinds thereof in general, and also of the first Principles of a Syllogism.  
Having hitherto sufficiently spoken of words both simple and compound, whereof all questions do consist, also of definition and division, of Method, of Propositions, and of the places: It resteth now that I declare unto you the forms and kinds of reasoning called Argumentation, which be the means whereby in all compound questions the truth may be discerned from falsehood, wherein consisteth the chiefest fruit of Logic: and therefore you shall understand that there be four principal kinds or forms of Argumentation, (that is) a Syllogism, an Induction, an Ethymeme, and Example, I say here principal, because there be divers other forms which though they be not so necessary, yet I will briesly treat of them hereafter: But for so much as the Syllogism is the chiefest, whereunto all others are referred as things unperfect, unto a thing perfect, I will first speak of a Syllogism, and of all the parts thereof: but yet before I define or divide a Syllogism, I think it very necessary to declare unto you the first Principles aswell Material, as Regular, of a simple Syllogism consisting of simple Propositions.  

Which call you Material Principles?  
Material Principles are three simple Propositions, and three terms, (that is to say) the Subject, the Predicate, and the mean term hereafter defined, whereof the Subject and the Predicate are said to be the outermost limits or bounds of any simple Proposition.   

Why are they called Terms or limits?  
Because they limit a Proposition, even as Dole-stones or Meres do limit a piece of ground in the field, and be the uttermost parts or bounds whereunto any Proposition is to be resolved, as for example in this Proposition, every man is a sensible body: these two words, man, and sensible body, are the terms, limits, or bounds, whereof as the said Proposition is compounded, so into the same it is to be resolved, as into his uttermost parts that have any signification: for letters and syllables of themselves be without signification, and therefore can limit no speech, so that the terms of Propositions must be either Nouns, or Verbs, which be only voices significative, as have been said before.   

Which be the Principles regulative?  
The Principles regulative of a Syllogism be these two phrases of speech, to be spoken of all, and to be spoken of none.   

What is to be spoken of all?  
That is, when the predicate being truly spoken of the Subject, must needs be also spoken of all that is comprehended under the said subject: as when I say every man is a sensible body: here this word sensible body, is not only spoken of man in general, but also of Peter and john, and of every other man in particular, comprehended under the foresaid Subject, man.   

What is to be spoken of none?  
It is when the Predicate being denied to be spoken of the Subject, is denied also to be spoken of any thing contained in the Subject: as when I say no man is a stone, here like as this word stone is denied to be spoken of man, so it is also denied to be spoken of Peter and john, & of every other singular man: out of which Definitions are gathered two necessary rules.   

Which be they?  
The first rule is, whatsoever is truly affirmed of his natural and proper Subject, is also affirmed of all those things which are contained under the said Subject: the second rule is thus, whatsoever is denied to be spoken of any Subject, is also denied to be spoken of every thing contained under the said Subject.   

Whereto serve these rules?  
The first rule confirmeth all Syllogisms affirmative, and the second confirmeth all Syllogisms negative.     

CHAP. II.  

Of a Syllogism, what it is, how it is divided; and of what parts it consisteth.  

WHat is a Syllogism?  
A Syllogism is a kind of argument containing three Propositions, whereof the two first, commonly called the premises, being disposed according to mood, and figure, and granted, the third Proposition, otherwise called the conclusion, differing from the other two, followeth of necessity, by virtue of the premises: how these three Propositions are called, and what mood and figure is, shall be declared hereafter; In the mean time mark well the two other points touching this Definition: first, that the Conclusion must not be all one, but differing from the premises: secondly, that the said Conclusion be necessarily inferred of the premises, as in this example: every sensible body is a substance: every man is a sensible body: Ergo, every man is a substance: for if the Conclusion were thus: Ergo, every sensible body is a substance, or every man is a sensible body, the argument should not be good, because the Conclusion should be all one with one of the premises: the reason why the Conclusion must needs be inferred of the premises, and so consequently follow of the same, shallbe declared unto you hereafter.   

How is a Syllogism divided according to the Schoolmen?  
First, they divide it according to the diversity of the Propositions wherofit consisteth, into two kinds, viz. categorical, and hypothetical, (that is to say) simple and compound, calling that simple, which is made of simple Propositions, and that compound, which is made of compound Propositions: what simple and compound Propositions are, hath been before 
Lib. 3. cap. 1.  defined. Again, they divide the simple Syllogism three manner of ways, first according to the diversity of the terms into a common and into a singular Syllogism, for if the terms whereof the Syllogism consisteth, be common, or general, and specially the mean term, or proof, than that Syllogism is called a common Syllogism: but if the mean term or proof be Individuum, than that Syllogism is said to be a singular Syllogism, called of them, Syllogismus expositorius, whereof we shall speak hereafter: Secondly, they divide a simple Syllogism, according to the diversity of the figure, into a perfect, and unperfect Syllogism.   

When is it said to be perfect?  
When it needeth not to be altered any manner of way, otherwise than it is, that the consequent may manifestly appear.   

When is it said to be unperfect?  
When the Consequent doth not manifestly appear, unless the Syllogism be altered either by conversion, or transposing of the premises, whereof we shall speak hereafter: Thirdly, they divide a simple Syllogism, according to the matter of the Propositions whereof it is made, into three kinds, that is, into a Syllogism Demonstrative, dialectical, and Sophistical: of which three kinds we shall speak hereafter, and in their proper places; so as in all, the Schoolmen make four several divisions of a Syllogism, the first according to the diversity of the Propositions, the second according to the diversity of the Terms, the third according to the diversity of the figure, and the fourth according to the diversity of the matter of the Propositions whereof we have spoken before, and showed how manifold such matter is: but in the mean time we will show you of what parts a simple common Syllogism consisteth.   

Of how many parts doth a simple Syllogism consist?  
Of two; that is, Matter, and Form.     

CHAP. III.  

Of the Matter and Form of a simple common Syllogism.  

WHat things are said to be the Matter of a Syllogism?  
The Matter whereof a Syllogism is made, are three terms, and three Propositions, which we called before Material principles, and the Form consisteth of figure and mood, whereof we shall speak in the next Chapter.   

Define what these three Terms be?  
The one is called the Mayor term, or Mayor extremity, which is the Predicate of the question that is to be proved, the other is called the Minor term, or minor extremity, which is the subject of the question, and these two Terms are knit together in the Conclusion, and made to agree by help of a third Term, called the Mean term or proof.   

What is the Mean term?  
It is the proof of the question which is twice repeated before the Conclusion, and not once mentioned in the same.   

How is such proof to be found out?  
Four manner of ways, (that is to say) by experience, by quickness of wit, by erudition, and by searching the common places.   

Give examples of all these four ways.  
1 By experience, as when we affirm that intemperance is to be fled, because we know by experience, that it consumeth both body and goods in vain pleasures. 2 By wit, as to prove that the covetousness of wicked men is infinite: because wit and reason teacheth us, that if covetous men did either care for the Law of God, or for reason, they would not exceed so far the bounds thereof. 3 By erudition, as to prove that riches are not to be desired over-greedily, but to serve necessity: because it appeareth by the doctrine of S. Paul, that such as greedily seek to be rich, do fall into temptation, and into the snares of the Devil. 4 By searching the common places: as when the proof of any question is fetched from any of the common places before taught, as from the general kind, from the special kind, from the difference, or property, and such like, whereof you have had examples before.   

Which be the three Propositions whereof a Syllogism doth consist?  
These three: The Mayor, the Minor, and the Conclusion.   

Which call you the Mayor?  
That which consisteth of the Predicate of the question, otherwise called the Mayor term, and of the Mean, or Proof, being both joined together in one self Proposition; which Proposition is the whole strength of the Syllogism, for it is the cause and proof of the Conclusion.   

Which call you the Minor?  
That which consisteth of the Subject of the question called the Minor term, and of the Mean or proof joined together, which two Propositions are called by one general name, premises, because they go before the Conclusion.   

What is the Conclusion?  
It is that which consisteth of the Predicate, and of the Subject, and is the question itself concluded.   

Give example.  
For example, let this be your question: whether man be a substance or not, here you have two extremes or terms, whereof substance being the Predicate, is the Mayor term, and man being here the subject, is the minor term: now to prove that this word Substance, is properly and naturally spoken of man, as of his Subject, and that you may truly knit these two extremes, or terms together, you must seek out some cause or proof, otherwise called the Mean term, which being once found out, the Syllogism is soon made: let the Mean term therefore be this word, Sensible body, for every sensible body is a Substance, which proof is fetched from the general kind, than form your Syllogism thus: every sensible body is a substance: but man is a sensible body: Ergo, man is a substance. Here you see that the Mean term or proof is twice repeated before the Conclusion: (that is to say) in the Mayor Proposition, together with the Predicate of the question, called the Mayor term; and also in the Minor Proposition together with the subject of the question called the Minor term, and not once mentioned in the Conclusion. Thus much touching the Matter whereof a Syllogism consisteth: now of the Form thereof.     

CHAP. FOUR  

Of the Form of a Syllogism.  

YOu said before, that the Form of a Syllogism comprehended Figure, and Mood, now therefore tell what Figure and Mood is, and how many of them there be.  
Figure is no other thing, but the divers placing or disposing of the mean term in the premises: which figure is threefold; that is, First, Second, and Third: for if the mean term be the Subject in the Mayor Proposition, and Predicate in the Minor, as in the example above, than it maketh a Syllogism of the first figure, and if it chance to be Predicate in both Propositions, than it maketh a Syllogism of the second figure, as thus: no stone is a sensible body: but man is a sensible body: Ergo, no man is a stone: for here the mean term, Sensible body, is Predicate in both Propositions: but if the mean be subject in both Propositions, than it maketh a Syllogism of the third figure, as thus: every man is a substance: every man is a sensible body: Ergo, some sensible body is a substance: for here the mean term, that is, Man, is subject in both the first Propositions, and to these three figures do belong certain moods.   

What is ameode?  
A mood, called in Latin modus, amongst the Logicians, is none other but the true ordering aswell of the premises, as of the conclusion in a Syllogism, according to due quantity, and quality: what the quantity and quality of a Proposition is, hath been taught before, lib. 3. cap. 1.   

How many moods do belong to the first figure?  
To the first figure do belong 9 moods, thus named:  

Barbara: Celarent: Darij: Ferio: Baralipton:  
Celantes: Dabitis: Fapesmo: Frisesomorum.   
Whereof the first four, because they conclude directly, are called perfect moods, making perfect Syllogisms: and the other five, because they conclude undirectly, are called unperfect moods, making unperfect Syllogisms.   

What is to conclude directly or indirectly?  
That mood is said to conclude directly, when the Mayor term is made the Predicate, and the Minor term the subject in the conclusion. But if in the conclusion the Minor term be the Predicate, and the Mayor term the subject, than that mood is said to conclude directly: as for example: Every sensible body is a substance: Man is a sensible body: Ergo, man is a substance. This Syllogism concludeth directly, because the Mayor term, substance, is the Predicate in the conclusion: but if the conclusion were thus: Ergo, some substance is a man, than it should conclude indirectly: because this word man which was the subject of the question in this conclusion, is made the Predicate.   

How many moods do belong to the second figure?  
These four: Caesare, Camestres, Festino, Baroco.   

How many moods do belong to the third Figure?  
These six: Darapti, Felapton, D●…samis, Da●…isi, Bocardo, and Feriso●…: which words being otherwise called Terms of Art, and every one consisting of three syllables, were purposely invented by the Schoolmen, to signify the quantity and quality of every Proposition contained in a Syllogism, and are briefly set down in these four verses following.  

Barbara, Celarent, Darij, Ferio, Baralipton:  
Celantes, Da●…itis, Fapesmo, Frisesomorum:  
Caesare, Camestres, Festino, Baroco, Darapti:  
Felapton, Disamis, Datisi, Bocardo, Ferison.   
It seemeth to me that these names do not eavenly consist each one of three Syllables, for in the two first verses there be two Moods or names, whereof the one called Baralipton, containeth four Syllables, and the other called Frisesomorum, containeth five Syllables.  
You say true, but these Syllables are no part of these two Moods, but serve only to fill up the verse: for this Syllable tun, is no part of the Mood Baralip: nor the two Syllables morum, are any part of the Mood Friseso.   

What is to be considered in these words of Art or Moods?  
Two things, (that is to say) the Vowels and the Consonants contained in every Mood, and what they signify.   

Which are those Vowels, and what do they signify?  
The Vowels be these four, a. e. i. o. whereof a. signifieth an universal Affirmative, ●…. an universal Negative, i. a particular Affirmative, o. a particular Negative: of all which you shall have examples in the sixth Chapter of this Book here following.   

Which be the Consonants, and what do they signify?  
We shall have cause to speak of them hereafter in a fitter place.   

In the mean time, then give examples of the Moods belonging to all the Figures?  
Before we give examples, it shall not be amiss to set down certain rules requisite to all the three Figures, as well in general, as in particular.     

CHAP. V.  

Of certain Rules, as well General, as Special, belonging to the three Figures.  

HOw many General Rules be there, which are common to all the three Figures?  
Four: two of quantity, and two of quality.   

Which is the first of those that belong to quantity?  
In every Syllogism it behoveth either one or both of the premises to be universal.   

Why so?  
Because that of two mere particular Propositions, nothing by order of Logic can consequently follow: As for example, This Syllogism is not good: Some sensible body is a Man, but some Horse is a sensible body: Ergo, a Horse is a man.. The like reason is also to be understood, when the premises are indefinite Propositions, yea or singular Propositions, if the mean term be not likewise singular, for than it maketh a Syllogism expository, whereof we shall speak hereafter.   

Which is the second Rule that belongeth to quantity?  
If any of the premises be particular, than the conclusion also must be particular.   

Why so?  
Because the conclusion being implied of the premises, ought always to follow the weaker part of the same premises, but the particular is always accounted weaker than the universal, and the Negative weaker than the Affirmative.   

What is the first Rule belonging to quality?  
In every Syllogism it behoveth either one or both of the premises to be affirmative.   

Why so?  
Because that of two pure Negative Propositions nothing can be orderly concluded, as in this example: No man is a tree, but no Pear tree is a man: Ergo, No Pear tree is a tree: which Syllogism cannot be good, for the premises are both true, and the conclusion is false.   

Which is the second Rule belonging to quality?  
If any of the premises be Negative, than the conclusion must also be Negative.   

Why so?  
Because (as it hath been said before) the conclusion must follow the weaker part.   

Which be the special Rules belonging to the three Figures?  
In the first four Moods of the first Figure directly concluding the Minor, may not be a Negative, nor the Mayor particular, but universal.  
In the second Figure, the Mayor must not be particular, and one of the premises must be a Negative.  
In the third Figure, the Minor must not be a Negative, nor the conclusion universal: but as for the quantity and quality of every Proposition in every kind of Syllogism, of what Figure soever it be, it shall plainly appear by the Vowels, or rather Syllables of the Moods, otherwise called words of Art, annexed to the examples hereafter following.  
First give examples of Syllogisms of the first Figure, and of his four perfect Moods directly concluding.     

CHAP. VI  

Examples of the four perfect Moods belonging to the first Figure.  
THe first Mood of the first Figure, is when three terms being given, a Syllogism is made of two universal Affirmatives directly concluding an universal Affirmative, as this Syllogism here following: the terms whereof be these, Sensible body, Substance, and Man placed in this sort.  

Bar- Every sensible body is a substance,  
ba- But every man is a sensible body:  
ra. Ergo, Every man is a substance.   
The name of this Mood is called Barbara, divided into three Syllables, placed in the margin right against the Syllogism, to show the quantity and quality of every Proposition, according to the significations of the Vowels contained in every Syllable: and so are all the other names of the Moods hereafter following.  
The second Mood is, when three terms being given, a Syllogism is made of an universal Negative Mayor, and of an universal Affirmative Minor, directly concluding an universal Negative: As for example, let the terms be these: Sensible Body, a Man, a Stone, and the Syllogism thus:  

C●…- No sensible body is a stone,  
lafoy- But every man is a sensible body:  
rent. Ergo, No man is a stone.   
The name of this Mood is Celarent.  
The third Mood is, when three terms being given, a Syllogism is made of an universal Affirmative Mayor, and of a particular Affirmative Minor, directly concluding a particular Affirmative: As for example, let these be the terms: Sensible Body, Substance, and Man, and the Syllogism thus:  

Dam- Every sensible body is a substance,  
ri- But some man is a sensible body:  
i. Ergo, Some man is a substance.   
The name of this Mood is Darij.  
The fourth Mood is, when three terms being given, a Syllogism is made of an universal Negative Mayor, and a particular Affirmative Minor, directly concluding a particular Negative: As for example, let these be the terms: Sensible Body, Man, and Stone: and the Syllogism thus:  

Fe- No sensible body is a stone,  
ri- But some man is a sensible body:  
o. Ergo, Some man is a stone.   
The name of this Mood is Ferio.    

CHAP. VII.  

Examples of the five unperfect Moods of the first Figure.  

Glue examples of the five Moods of the first Figure directly concluding.  
The first Imperfect Mood of the first Figure indirectly concluding, is when the Mayor and Minor, being both universal Affirmatives, do conclude indirectly a particular Affirmative, as thus:  

Ba- Every sensible body is a substance,  
ra- Every man is a sensible body:  
lip. Ergo, Some substance is a man.   
The name of this Mood is Baralipton, whereof the last syllable, tun, is only to fill up the verse, as hath been said before.  
The second Imperfect Mood, is when a Syllogism is made of an universal Negative Mayor, and an universal Affirmative Minor, indirectly concluding an universal Negative, as thus:  

Ce- No sensible body is a tree,  
lan- Every man is a sensible body:  
'tis. Ergo, No tree is a man.   
The name of this Mood is Celantis.  
The third Imperfect Mood, is when a Syllogism is made of an universal Affirmative Mayor, and of a particular Affirmative Minor, indirectly concluding a particular Affirmative, as thus:  

Dam- Every sensible body is a substance,  
by- Some man is a sensible body:  
'tis. Ergo, Some substance is a man▪   
The name of this Mood is Dabitis.  
The fourth Imperfect Mood, is when a Syllogism is made of an universal Affirmative Mayor, and of an universal Negative Minor, indirectly concluding a particular Negative, as thus:  

Fa- Every sensible body is a substance,  
pes- No tree is a sensible body:  
more. Ergo, Some substance is not a tree.   
The name of this Mood is Fapesmo.  
The fifth Imperfect Mood, is when a Syllogism is made of a particular Affirmative Mayor, and of an universal Negative Minor, indirectly concluding a particular Negative, as thus:  

Fri- Some sensible body is a substance,  
se- But no tree is a sensible body:  
so. Ergo, Some substance is not a tree.   
The name of this Mood is Frisesomorum, whereof the two last syllables (as hath been said before) are only put to make up the verse.     

CHAP. VIII.  

Of the four Moods belonging to the second Figure.  

Give examples of the four Moods belonging to the second Figure.  
The first Mood of the second Figure, is when a Syllogism is made of an universal Negative Mayor, and of an universal Affirmative Minor, directly concluding an universal Negative, thus:  

Ce- No stone is a sensible body,  
sa- Every man is a sensible body:  
re. Ergo, No man is a stone.   
The name of this Mood is Caesare.  
The second Mood, is when a Syllogism is made of an universal Affirmative Mayor, and of an universal Affirmative Minor, directly concluding an universal Negative, as thus:  

Ca- Every man is a sensible body,  
mes- But no stone is a sensible body:  
tres. Ergo, No stone is a man.   
The name of this Mood is Camestres.  
The third Mood is when a Syllogism is made of an universal Negative Mayor, and of a particular Affirmative Minor, directly concluding a particular Negative, as thus:  

Fes- No stone is a sensible body,  
ti- But some man is a sensible body  
no. Ergo, Some man is not a stone.   
The name of this Mood is Festino.  
The fourth Mood, is when a Syllogism is made of an universal Affirmative Mayor, and of a particular Minor, directly concluding a particular Negative, as thus:  

Ba- Every man is a sensible body,  
ro- But some stone is not a sensible body:  
co. Ergo, Some stone is not a man.   
The name of this Mood is Baroco.     

CHAP. IX.  

Of the six Moods belonging to the third Figure.  

Give examples of the six Moods belonging to the third Figure.  
The first is when a Syllogism is made of an universal Affirmative Mayor, and of an universal Affirmative Minor, directly concluding a particular Affirmative, as thus:  

Dam- Every man is a substance,  
rap- But every man is a sensible body:  
ti. Ergo, Some sensible body is a substance.   
The name of this Mood is Darapti.  
The second Mood, is when a Syllogism is made of an universal Negative Mayor, and of an universal Affirmative Minor, directly concluding a particular Negative, as thus:  

Fe- No Man is a stone,  
lap- But every man is a substance:  
tun. Ergo, Some substance is not a stone.   
The name of this Mood is Felapton.  
The third Mood, is when a Syllogism is made of a particular Affirmative Mayor, and of an universal Affirmative Minor, directly concluding a particular Affirmative, as thus:  

Di- Some man is a substance,  
sa- But every man is a sensible body:  
mis. Ergo, Some sensible body is a substance.   
The name of this Mood is Disamis.  
The fourth Mood, is when a Syllogism is made of an universal Affirmative Mayor, and of a particular Affirmative Minor, concluding a particular Affirmative, as thus:  

Dam- Every man is a substance,  
ti- But some man is a sensible body:  
si. Ergo, Some sensible body is a substance.   
The name of this Mood is Datisi.  
The fifth Mood, is when a Syllogism is made of a particular Negative Mayor, and of an universal Affirmative Minor, directly concluding a particular Negative, as thus.  

Bornwell- Some man is not a stone,  
car- But every man is a sensible body:  
do. Ergo, Some sensible body is not a stone   
The name of this Mood is Bocardo.  
The sixth Mood, is when a Syllogism is made of an universal Negative Mayor, and of a particular Affirmative Minor, directly concluding a particular Negative, as thus:  

Fe- No man is a stone,  
ri- But some man is a sensible body:  
son. Ergo, Some sensible body is not a stone.   
The name of this Mood is Ferison.  
Thus you have all the three Figures, together with their Moods, plainly set forth with examples.     

CHAP. X.  

Of a Syllogism expository.  
ANd now because a Syllogism expository is said to be a Syllogism of the third Figure: I think it most meet to give you an example there of even here: sor I have already defined the same before.  
Yea, I remember ye said it was expository, when the proof or mean term is an Individuum: but if ye give example, I shall the better understand it.  
Let this then be your example, to prove some men to be both Orators and Philosophers, by a Syllogism expository thus: Cicero was an Orator: but Cicero was a Philosopher: Ergo, some men are both Orators and Philosophers: again, to prove that some rich men are not wise, thus: Crassus was not wise, but Crassus was rich: Ergo, some rich men are not wise, thus you see that this kind of Syllogism serveth to prove both affirmatively and negatively, as it were by way of example.    

CHAP. XI.  

An objection concerning the three Figures, and Moods belonging to the same.  

TO what purpose serve so many figures and moods, sith the first figure, and the four first moods belonging to the same are only perfect, yea, and so perfect indeed, as the Mathematicians in seeking out the truth of any problem, will use none other, because the first figure alone doth suffice to conclude all kinds of problems whatsoever they be, whereby it should seem, that the two other figures, with their moods, be superfluous?  
They be not altogether superfluous; for as the first figure serveth chiefly and only to conclude an universal affirmative, so the second figure serveth to conclude an universal negative, and the third figure to conclude both a particular affirmative, and also a particular negative, as you may perceive very well by the examples before rehearsed; neither be the fifteen unperfect moods so unperfect, but that they may easily be reduced unto the four perfect, by one of these ways here following, (that is to say) either by conversion, or by transposing of the premises: or else by a Syllogism leading to impossibility, of which three ways of Reduction we come now to speak: by which things it doth plainly appear what difference there is betwixt a perfect and unperfect Syllogism; for the perfect Syllogism hath no need of these helps to make the Conclusion manifest, as hath been said before.     

CHAP. XII.  

Of Reduction, and of the kinds thereof, and also of the signification of certain consonants in the words of Art serving to Reduction.  

WHat is Reduction?  
Reduction here is none other thing, but a declaration, proving or showing the goodness of an unperfect Syllogism, by a Syllogism of a perfect mood.   

How manfold is such Reduction?  
Twofold; for it is either offensive, or else by impossibility.   

What is Reduction offensive?  
Reduction offensive is, when a Syllogism is reduced to his perfection, either by conversion, or by transposing the premises, or else by both at once.   

What mean ye by transposing of the premises, for as touching conversion ye have spoken thereof before, lib. 3. cap. 6.  
The premises are said to be transposed, when the Mayor is put in the Minors place; or chose the Minor into the majors place.   

What is Reduction by impossibility?  
Reduction by impossibility is, when the goodness of the Syllogism is so proved, as the adversary denying the same, must needs be brought to some absurdity, as to confess two Contradictories to be both true at once, or some proposition to be false, which he hath confessed before to be true, or is manifestly true of itself. But first we will speak of Reduction offensive, and then of Reduction by impossibility; and because that Reduction offensive is done sometime by conversion, and sometime by transposition, and sometime by both at once: and again, that sometime one of the premises, sometime both, and sometime no more but the Conclusion only is converted, and that sometime by simple conversion, and sometime by conversion per accidens: the Schoolmen for ●…asement of the memory, have made eight of the Consonants, besides the Vowels in the words of Art before mentioned, to be significative, and to declare how every proposition ought to be reduced.  
For first, these four Consonants, b. c. d. f. (with one of the which every unperfect mood doth begin) do show that such unperfect moods ought to be reduced into those perfect moods, which do begin with the like letter, as,  

Baralipton, Baroco, Bocardo, into Barbara,  
C●…lantes, Caesare, Camestres, into Celarent,  
Dabitis, Darapti, Disamis, Datisi, into Darij,  
Fapesmo, Frisesomorum, Felapton, Ferison, Festino, into Darij    

Which be the other four Consonants, and what do they signify?  
The other four Consonants put betwixt the Vowels, be these, s. p. m. c. where of s. signifieth simple conversion, (that is to say) that the Vowel, which next before this Consonant, is to be simply converted, p. signifieth conversion per accidens, m. betokeneth transposition of the premises, c. in the latter end or midst of the mood, betokeneth Reduction by impossibility as in Baroco, and Bocardo.   

Give examples, and show how such Reduction is to be made.  
First, as touching reduction by conversion, Cesare is reduced into Celarent by simple conversion of the Mayor: as this Syllogism in Cesare.  

Ce- No tree is a sensible body, which is reduced into Celarent, thus:  
sa- But every man is a sensible body: which is reduced into Celarent, thus:  
re. Ergo, no man is a tree. which is reduced into Celarent, thus:   

Ce- No sensible body is a tree,  
lafoy- But every man is a sensible body:  
rent. Ergo, no man is a tree.   
And Camestres is reduced into Celarent by simple converting the Conclusion, and also by transposing the premises, as this Syllogism in Camestres.  

Ca- Every man is a sensible body, which is reduced into Celarent, thus:  
mes- But no tree is a sensible body: which is reduced into Celarent, thus:  
tres. Ergo, no tree is a man. which is reduced into Celarent, thus:   

Ce- No sensible body is a tree,  
lafoy- But every man is a sensible body:  
rent. Ergo, No man is a tree.   
Festino is reduced into Ferio, by simply converting the Mayor, as in this Syllogism in Festino.  

Fes- No stone is a sensible body, which is reduced into Ferio thus.  
ti- But some man is a sensible body: which is reduced into Ferio thus.  
no. Ergo, Some man is not a stone. which is reduced into Ferio thus.   

Fe- No sensible body is a stone,  
ri- But some man is a sensible body:  
o. Ergo, Some man is not a stone.   
Darapti is reduced from Darij by converting the minor per accidens, as this Syllogism in Darapti.  

Da- Every man is a substance, which is reduced into Darij thus.  
rap- But every man is a sensible body: which is reduced into Darij thus.  
ti. Ergo, some sensible body is a substance. which is reduced into Darij thus.   

Da- Every man is a substance,  
ri- But some sensible body is a man:  
i. Ergo, Some sensible body is a substance.   
Ferison is reduced into Ferio, by simple conversion of the minor, as this Syllogism in Ferison.  

Fe- No man is a stone. which is reduced into Ferio thus.  
ri- But some man is a sensible body: which is reduced into Ferio thus.  
son. Ergo, some sensible body is not a stone which is reduced into Ferio thus.   

Fe- No man is a stone,  
ri- But some sensible body is a man:  
son. Ergo, some sensible body is not a stone.   
And so forth in all the rest, according as the significative Consonants do direct you.     

CHAP. XIII.  

Of Reduction by impossibility.  

HOw is Reduction by impossibility made?  
By joining the Contradictory of the concluon to one of the premises, and to dispose the same according to some one of the perfect moods of the first figure, in such sort as you may thereby make your Conclusion contradictory to the premisse which you left out, and was granted by your adversary, whereby your adversary is brought into an absurdity, to confess two contradictories, to be true both at once.   

Give examples.  
As for example, if your adversary would deny this Syllogism in Baroco, every man is a sensible body: but some tree is not a sensible body: Ergo, some tree is not a man: than you may reduce it to the first Mood of the first figure, which is Barbara, by making the contradictory of your Conclusion to be the Minor of your Syllogism in this sort, every man is a sensible body: but every tree is a man: Ergo, every tree is a sensible body, which argument he cannot deny, because he hath granted the Minor to be true: for if this Proposition, some tree is not a man, be false, than this proposition, every tree is a man, must needs be true, for two Contradictories cannot be both true at once, and two true premises must needs infer a true Conclusion; and note that according to the diversity of the figures, the Contradictory of the Conclusion is diversly disposed (that is to say) made either Mayor or Minor accordingly; for in all the Moods of the second figure it must be made the Minor, the former Mayor being still reserved; and in the third figure it must be the Mayor, the former Minor being still reserved.   

To which of the perfect Moods is every unperfect Mood to be reduced by imp●…ssibilitie?  
To know this, it shall be needful to learn, first the use of certain words compounded of divers syllables, and invented by the Schoolmen for this purpose.   

Which be those words?  
The words be these contained in this verse following, nesciebatis: odiebam: letare Romanis: whereof the first nesciebatis, containing five syllables, representeth the five unperfect moods of the first figure: odiebam having four syllables, betokeneth the four unperfect moods of the second figure: letare Romanis, containing six syllables, signifieth the six unperfect moods of the third figure: in all which words the four vowels, a. e. i. o. do still retain their old significations before taught, serving here chiefly to show the quantity and quality of every Conclusion, for every unperfect mood must be reduced to that perfect mood of the first figure, which hath such Conclusion as that vowel of the syllable representing that unperfect mood doth signify: as for example in this word nesciebatis, here you see, that in the syllable nes. representing the first unperfect mood called before Baralipton, the vowel e. signifying an universal negative, doth show that this mood is to be reduced into Celarent, whose conclusion is an universal negative, so as the order of the syllables in the word nesciebatis, together with the signification of the vowels contained in the said syllables, you may plainly perceive that Baralipton is to be reduced into Celarent: Celantes into Darij, Dabitis into Celarent, Fapesmo into Barbara, Friselon into Darij. The like observation and consideration is to be had in the other words, representing the rest of the imperfect moods of the second and third figure: for odiebam appointeth Cesare to be reduced into Ferio, Camestres to Darij, Festino to Celarent, Baroco to Barbara: again letare Romanis appointeth Darapti to Celarent, Felapton to Barbara, Disamis to Celarent, Datisi to Ferio, Bocardo to Barbara, and Ferison to Darij, whereof I give you no examples, because I would have you to exercise yourself in examining the former examples of the three figures, and to see how you can reduce each unperfect mood, to his perfect mood by impossibility, according to these short rules here set down.  
The Schoolmen after they have taught the use of the moods, and of reduction, do immediately treat of a syllogism, made in oblique cases, and also of the six abilities, and three defects of a Syllogism: all which I willingly pass over with silence, as things more curious than profitable, for truly I know not whereto the Syllogism made in oblique Cases, doth serve more than for variety sake.     

CHAP. XIIII.  

Of Syllogisms made in oblique Cases, and of the six abilities, and three defects of a Syllogism.  

WHat mean you by oblique Cases?  
You learned in your Accidents, that every Noun hath six Cases, (that is to say) the Nominative, the Genitive, the Dative, the Accusative the Vocative, and the Ablative, whereof the Nominative is only right, and all the rest are called oblique: as this is a Syllogism made in oblique Cases: every drawing beast belongeth to man, or is the beast of man: but an ox is a drawing beast: Ergo, an ox belongeth to man, or is the beast of man, and as for the six abilities called sex potestates Syllogismi, they are but means to prove the goodness of one Syllogism by another, or to show which is more universal, or comprehendeth more than another, or to conclude a truth of false premises, which God wot is a silly kind of conclusion, the best parts of which abilities are more easily learned by the rules and examples before given, then by those that they set down in their treatises touching the same. Likewise the three defects, are none other but Elenches, or Fallaxes, whereof there be thirteen kinds set down by Aristotle himself, whereof we shall speak hereafter, in their place, so as they might say that there are thirteen defects as well as three, and therefore leaving to trouble you with these things, I mind here to treat of a compound Syllogism.     

CHAP. XV.  

Of a compound Syllogism, and of the divers kinds thereof.  

WHat is a compound Syllogism, and how many kinds thereof be there?  
A compound Syllogism is that which is made of compound Propositions, whereof as there be three sorts, so they make three kinds of compound Syllogisms, (that is to say) conditional, disjunctive, and copulative.   

Of how many parts doth a compound Syllogism consist?  
Of three, as well as a simple Syllogism, that is, of the Mayor, containing two simple Propositions, and of the Minor, repeating the one part of the Mayor, and of the Conclusion, concluding the other part of the Mayor, as in this example: if this woman hath had a child, she hath lain with a man: but she hath had a child: Ergo, she hath lain with a man.   

How is the truth of a compound Syllogism to be sound out?  
By reducing the same into a simple Syllogism thus; every woman that hath had a child, hath lain with a man: but this woman hath had a child: Ergo, she hath lain with a man.   

Are there no other kinds of compound Syllogisms?  
No, if you consider the order of concluding, there be but three kinds or ways, (that is to say) conditional, disjunctive and copulative; but if you consider the variety in uttering such Syllogisms, you may make seven sorts or ways, whereof three appertain to the conditional, two to the disjunctive, and two to the copulative.   

Which is the first way?  
The first way is of the antecedent, which being granted, the consequent must needs follow, both affirmatively, and negatively: Affirmatively thus: if he be godly, he is blessed: he is godly, therefore blessed: negatively thus, if he be not godly, he shall not be blessed, but he is not godly: Ergo, he is not blessed.   

Which is the secondway?  
The second way is of the Consequent, which failing, the Antecedent must also needs fail, as thus: If he be wise, he is free; but he is not free: Ergo, not wise.   

Which is the third way?  
The third way, is when by granting the Antecedent, the Consequent faileth, as thus: If he be not wise, he is wretched; but he is wise: Ergo, not wretched.   

Which is the fourth way?  
The fourth way, is when the former part of the mayor Proposition disjunctive being put, the latter part is clean taken away, as thus: He is either good or evil; but he is good: Ergo, not evil.   

Which is the fifth way?  
The fifth way, is when the former part of the disjunctive being taken away, the latter part must needs stand, as thus: He is either good or evil; but he is not good: Ergo, he is evil; for all Syllogisms disjunctive, are made for the most part of parts repugnant, whereof there can be no more, but one true part.   

Which is the sixth way?  
The sixth way, is by putting a Negative before the Conjunction copulative, so as it maketh the Antecedent to stand, and taketh away the Consequent, as thus: He is not both wise and wretched; but he is wise: Ergo, not wretched.   

Which is the seventh way?  
The seventh way, is when the Negative is placed in like manner before the Conjunction copulative, but yet so as the Antecedent being taken away, the Consequent doth stand, as thus: He is not both wise and wretched; but he is not wise: Ergo, wretched.     

CHAP. XVI.  

Of a Consequent, and by what means and rules the goodness thereof is to be known.  
But sith the goodness of an hypothetical Syllogism dependeth upon the goodness of the Consequent: it shall not be amiss to treat here of a Consequent, and first to define what it is, and to show how it is divided.  

What is a Consequent?  
A Consequent, is a speech consisting of such parts as do follow one another, and are joined together with some rational, (that is to say) an inferring or employing Conjunction, as Ergo, then, therefore, and such like.   

How many parts are requisite in a Consequent?  
Three, that is, the Antecedent, the Consequent, and the inferring Sign or Note, for of these three parts every Consequent consisteth.   

How is it divided?  
Into two, that is, Good and Evil: again, the good is divided into two, that is, Formal and Material.   

When is it said to be Formal?  
When the Antecedent being true, the Consequent doth necessarily follow thereof, as when I say: This woman hath had a child, Ergo, she hath lain with a man.   

When is it said to be Material?  
When the Consequent doth not of necessity, but casually follow, the Antecedent being true: as Socrates walketh abroad: Ergo, it is fair weather.   

Whereupon doth the goodness of a Consequent chiefly depend?  
It dependeth not so much of the truth of the Antecedent, and of the Consequent, as of the necessary connexion, or knitting of them together: and if the same be in form of a Syllogism, it requireth also the precepts of Mood and Figure before taught to be observed.   

How else shall a man know whether a Consequent be good or not?  
By examining the same with the Maxims or general rules of the places: whereof some do yield proofs or causes necessary, some probable, and some only conjectural.   

What rules do the Schoolmen set down to know a good Consequent?  
They set down some more, some less, but Caesarius only reciteth two, which are these: The first is, if a Consequent doth necessarily follow of his Antecedent, than the contrary of the Antecedent must needs necessarily follow the contrary of the Consequent: As for example, because this is a good Consequent to say, it is a man: Ergo, it is a sensible body: it is a good Conquent to say, it is no sensible body: Ergo, it is no man: the reason thereof is, because the contrary of the Consequent and the Antecedent cannot be both true together, but one of them must needs be false. The second rule is, that whatsoever followeth upon a good Consequent, must needs also follow upon the Antecedent thereof: As for example, if it be a good Consequent to say, it is a man: Ergo, it is a sensible body: ye may aswell say, if it be a sensible body: Ergo, it is a substance: and sith that a sensible body is a substance, you may therefore aswell conclude that a man is a substance. To these rules you may add also the third, which is, that of true things, nothing can follow but truth: but of false things, sometime that which is false, and sometime that which is true, as hath been said before: and yet such truth followeth not by virtue of the false premises, but because the conclusion or Consequent is a true Proposition of itself: As in this example. Every sensible body is a tree, but every Peartree is a sensible body: Ergo, every Peartree is a tree.     

CHAP. XVII.  

Of a Syllogism Demonstrative.  
HItherto we have treated of a Syllogism, according to the first three of the four divisions thereof, before mentioned: for if ye remember well, we said that according to the first division, a Syllogism is either categorical or hypothetical, according to the second division, either common or expository, according to the third division, either perfect or unperfect, and according to the fourth division, either Demonstrative, dialectical, or Sophistical, whereof we come now to speak, and first of a Syllogism demonstrative.  

What is a Syllogism Demonstrative?  
A Syllogism Demonstrative is that which is made of necessary, immediate, true, certain, and infallible Propositions, being first and so known, as they need none other proof.   

What mean ye by necessary and immediate Propositions?  
Necessary Propositions be those which cannot be otherwise, as those which do consist of the general kind, of the special kind, of the difference, or of the property, as hath been said before: and therefore Aristotle maketh a difference betwixt a Demonstrative and a dialectical Proposition, for a Demonstrative Proposition consisting of matter natural, is necessarily true, and cannot be otherwise, but a dialectical Proposition, consisting of matter contingent, or casual, is only probable, and may be otherwise.   

What be immediate Propositions?  
Immediate Propositions are those which are first, and have none before them, whereby they can be proned: as every sensible body endued with reason is apt to learn. Aristotle also setteth down three properties or conditions belonging to the Subject and Predicate of a Demonstrative Proposition.   

Which be those Properties?  
These, to be spoken of all, by itself, and universally.   

What is to be spoken of all?  
It is when the Predicate is known to be altogether and always in the Subject, either as a part of the substance thereof, as when it is a general kind, the special kind, the difference, or the property, as some inseparable accident always incident to the said subject, as when I say: Every man is a sensible body: or every man is endued with reason: or every man is apt to speak: or every Swan is white: or every fire is hot.   

What is to be spoken by itself?  
That is, when the Predicate is either the definition of the Subject, as a man is a sensible body endued with reason: or else some part of the Definition, as man is a sensible body, or man is endued with reason.   

What is to be spoken universally?  
It is when the Predicate is in the Subject, and in every such Subject by itself; and first, as when I say, a man is a sensible body endued with reason: here this Predicate sensible body endued with reason, is not only spoken of man, but of every man in general by itself: and first: for if ye should say, Peter or Socrates is a sensible body endued with reason: here the Predicate is not spoken of any of these, as first, but in the second place, because they are comprehended under the word man. For general kinds are said to be before special kinds, and special kinds before Individuums, as hath been said before.   

How doth Aristotle define Demonstration?  
In this sort: Demonstration is a Syllogism made of such Propositions as are true: first immediate, and manifestly known, and be the causes of the conclusion: first and immediate here is all one, signifying such Propositions as need not to be proved or made more evident by any other former Propositions. Again, the premises must be more known than the conclusion, for otherwise it should neither be Demonstration, nor yet good Syllogism. Finally, the Premises must render the very cause of the conclusion: and therefore Aristotle in another place saith, that Demonstration is a Syllogism causing knowledge and science.   

What is Science?  
It is a firm and assured knowledge of any thing.   

What is to know?  
We are said to know a thing, when we know the true causes thereof, and that it cannot be otherwise: for to make a perfect Demonstration, we must not only show that there is such a thing as we go about to prove, but also we must show the cause why it is so: for (as Aristotle saith) every discipline and doctrine intellective dependeth upon a former knowledge, which is twofold, whereof the one is to know that the principles (that is to say) the premises of the Demonstration be true, and the other is to know the true signification of the Subject and Predicate of the question: for unless a man know what the name of the Subject signifieth, whereof the question riseth, and also the proper qualities of the same, how shall he be able to judge, whether the proof which is brought in to prove the question withal be to the purpose or not? Again, unless he know the premises to be true, the Demonstration shall breed no certain knowledge in him.   

Give example of a Syllogism Demonstrative.  
Let this be your example: Every sensible body endued with reason, is apt to learn: but every man is a sensible body endued with reason: Ergo, every man is apt to learn. here you see that in this Syllogism the premises being true and first, do render the cause of the conclusion: and thereby do imply a most true Consequent: for whoso would go about to demonstrate any of the premises by some other former, or more known Propositions, should lose his labour, sith there is none before them more certain, nor more known to prove this conclusion withal then they: for to understand the truth of these premises, it sufficeth only to know the signification of the terms, and to have some experience of the thing called Man: and therefore this kind of Demonstration is called of the Schoolmen, Syllogismus Scientificus, because it yieldeth the perfect knowledge and Science of the thing in question.     

CHAP. XVIII.  

Of the certainty of Man's knowledge.  

WHereof dependeth the certainty of Man's knowledge?  
Of three things, that is, of universal experience, of principles, and of natural knowledge that a man hath in judging of Consequents: for these be three infallible rules of certitude or truth in all kinds of doctrine.   

What is universal experience?  
Universal experience is the common judgement of men, in such things as are to be perceived and known by the outward senses: as Fire to be hot, the Heavens to turn round about, Wine and Pepper to be hot in operation, Women to bring forth children, and not Men: which things all men (unless they be mad, and out of their wits) must needs confess to be true.   

What be Principles?  
Principles be certain general conceptions and natural knowledges grafted in man's mind of God, to the intent that by the help thereof, he might invent such Arts as are necessary in this life for man's behoof; for by the natural knowledge of the mind we understand, Number, Order, Proportion, and all other necessary Arts and Sciences.   

How doth Aristotle define Principles?  
In this manner: Principles be true Propositions, having credit of themselves, and need no other proof.   

How many Divisions do the Schoolmen make Principles?  
divers.   

Rehearse those Divisions.  
The first is, of Principles, some be called Speculative, and some Practive: The speculative be those natural knowledges or Propositions, whereof Natural Philosophy or the Mathematical Sciences be grounded, as these: The whole is more than his part: Those things which are equal to a third, are equal among themselves: of one simple body, there is but one natural moving, and such like. The Principles Practive, be those natural knowledges, whereby men's manners are governed: for by this natural light we know the difference betwixt good and evil: As for example: these be Principles Practive: God is to be honoured and obeyed: justice is to be embraced: civil society is to be maintained, and the disturbers thereof to be punished: these and such like Propositions are naturally received of all men as infallible verities. Again, of Principles, some be called General, and some Proper. The General, be those that may be applied to many Sciences, as these: the whole is more than any of his parts, if equal be taken from equal, equal do remain and such like. The proper Principles be those, that are properly belonging to some one certain Science, as a line to be a length without breadth, is a principle of Geometry: Again, this proposition, every thing is, or is not, is a principle of Logic: and to be short, every Science hath his proper principles: of which some be called dignities or Maxims, and some Positions.   

Wherefore are they called Dignities or Maxims?  
For that they are worthy to be credited for their self sake, for so soon as we hear them in such speech as we understand, we naturally know them to be true without any further proof, as these. Take equal from equal, and equal will remain: the whole is more than any of his parts, etc.   

What be Positions?  
Positions be those principles, which although they need no other proof, yet they be not so easily understood of all men at the first uttering, as Maxims be: for in these, besides the knowledge of the terms, it is needful to have also some experience, as in these Principles. Every thing that is compounded of matter and form is movable: whatsoever is heavy, tendeth naturally downward, and whatsoever is light, tendeth upwards. Again, of Positions, some are called Definitions, and some Suppositions, and of Suppositions, some are called Petitions, called in Latin Postulata, and some Suppositions assumpted.   

Define these kinds.  

1 Definition showeth what the thing is.  
2 Supposition is that which supposeth a thing to be, or not to be, as the Geometricians do suppose that there is Punctum, (that is to say) a prick, or a thing indivisible, having neither length, breadth, nor depth.  
3 Petition is a Proposition asked and granted to be true: as this is a petition in Geometry, that a man may draw a right line from one point to another.  
4 Supposition assumpted is, when a manifest supposition is assumpted to prove another thing withal, as to prove that demonstration consisteth of true Propositions, the disputer will assumpt this assertion, which saith, that of false things there is no certain knowledge: and truth is not known but of true things.    

What is the third thing whereof the certainty of man's knowledge dependeth?  
It is the knowledge that man hath in judging of consequents, which is not altogether artificial, but partly natural, for God thought it not sufficient for man's behoof to know simple Propositions, as principles or common conceptions gotten by experience, unless he could also compare them together, and join things like, and agreeable together, and sever things unlike, and disagreeing one from another, and by such comparison and composition to find out things before not known: and to the intent we should not err or wander out of the right way, God hath showed us an order, and prescribed certain bounds and limits of necessity to be observed in such composition, which bounds are Syllogisms rightly made: for so do the Consequents plainly appear: And because that proportions are known by nature, it shall not be amiss to give you an example in numbers: for three known numbers being placed in true order of a Syllogism, a fourth number unknown, of necessity doth follow, as in this question: If one pound of wax be worth a groat, what is ten pound of wax worth? Marry ten groats, which is proved by a Syllogism in this manner: Every pound of wax is worth a groat, but here is ten pound of wax: Ergo, they are worth ten groats: and like as in these kinds of Syllogisms Arithmetical, the proportion which is to be judged by man's natural knowledge, doth show the Consequent to be infallible, even so the Consequents in other Syllogisms are showed to be infallible, by such demonstrations as are not far fetched, or doubtful, but are manifest, plain and evident.     

CHAP. XIX.  

Of the two kinds of Demonstration.  

HOw do the Schoolmen divide Demonstration?  
Into two; that is, perfect and unperfect: and they call the perfect, demonstratio propter quid: and the unperfect, demonstratio quia est.  
It is perfect, when it proceedeth from the proper cause to the effect, called of the Schoolmen, à priore: for in that demonstration the Antecedent containeth the proper and true cause of the consequent; as when we say, the Sun is up: Ergo, it is day.   

What is to be observed in a perfect Demonstration?  
That the Predicate of the Conclusion, which is also Predicate in the Mayor, be first, properly, always, and that really and accidentally, incident to the subject of the Mayor, and to every thing contained under the same, which subject must be some general kind, and the very mean or proof of your conclusion: As for example, if you would prove a Cock to be a feathered fowl, it were not a sufficient demonstration to say, that every flying beast is a feathered fowl; for some beasts fly, that have no feathers; as Backs, that fly in the night season. But if you say, that every bird is a feathered fowl, & every Cock is a bird: Ergo, every Cock is a feathered fowl: you shall make a perfect demonstration, because the Subject, and Predicate of the Mayor, have such conditions as are before required; for this Mayor showeth the thing to be, and also wherefore it is, which is done so often as the Predicate is the true definition of the Subject: as when I say, Every man is a sensible body endued with reason, or else some chief part of the definition, as when I say, Every man is endued with reason, as hath been said before: for every good demonstration is either made of a true definition, or taken from the general kind, special kind, or else from the special difference, or property, yea, and sometime they may be taken out of the whole and of the parts, of the proper causes and effects, of perpetual adjacents, otherwise called common accidents, of proper acts, of contrarieties, and of divine authority, whereof you have had examples before in the treatise of places, and seats of arguments.   

When is it said to be an unperfect Demonstration?  
When the premises are true, implying a true Consequent, but yet are not first, neither do they show the original cause of the Conclusion; as in this example: Every sensible body is nourishable; but every man is a sensible body: Ergo, every man is nourishable: here though the premises be true Propositions, yet they be not first, neither do they show the original cause of the Conclusion: for the Mayor of this Syllogism may be proved by a former and more known Proposition; for that which is more general, is more known then that which is less general, as thus: Every living body is nourishable; but every sensible body is a living body: Ergo, every sensible body is nourishable. Again, it is said to be unperfect, when we proceed from the effect to the cause; as when we say, it is day: Ergo, the Sun is up. But that demonstration which proceedeth from the cause to the effect, is the more worthier, because we use therein discourse of reason and understanding: and in the other we only judge by the outward senses, whereof spring two principal kinds of Method, (that is to say) compendious or short orders or ways of teaching in all manner of Sciences whereof the one is called composition, proceeding forward from the first to the last, and the other is called resolution, proceeding backward from the last to the first, as hath been said before in the 〈◊〉 Method. Lib. 2. cap. 5.     

CHAP. XX.  

Of Science, Opinion, Ignorance, Wit, and of the four Sciencial questions.  

WHat other things are wont to be treated of by the Schoolmen in demonstration?  
divers things; as what difference is betwixt Science and Opinion: also they treat of the divers kinds of Ignorance, of prompt Wit: and of the four Scienciall questions.   

What difference is betwixt Science and opinion?  
Science, as hath been said before, is that which consisteth of necessary, certain, and infallible Propositions, and of such things as cannot be otherwise. Opinion is the knowledge of things casual, which may be sometime false, and sometime true.   

How many kinds of Ignorance do the Schoolmen make?  
Two: that is to say, absolute, which of the Schoolmen is called Ignorantia negationis, and ignorance by false conception, which they call Ignorantia affectionis. The first is, when we utterly deny to have any knowledge of a thing at all: The other is, when we think to know that which we know not, being deceived by some false persuasion, whereunto we are affected, whereof it is called Ignorantia affectionis.   

How doth Aristotle define prompt Wit, called of the Latins Solertia?  
He defineth it to be a promptness or readiness, in quickly finding out the proof or cause of any thing that is in question, without any study.   

Which be the four Sciential questions?  
These: whether the thing be, what it is, how it is, and wherefore it is: whereof the first inquireth of the Subject, whether it be: the second of the Predicate, as what it is: the third, how it is, (that is to say) how the Predicate is spoken of the Subject: and the fourth asketh the cause why it is spoken of the Subject? And thus much of a Syllogism Demonstrative: now of a Syllogism dialectical, or probable.     

CHAP. XXI.  

Of a Syllogism dialectical.  

WHat is a dialectical Syllogism?  
A dialectical Syllogism is that which is made of probable and credible Propositions.   

What things are said to be probable?  
Things probable, according to Aristotle, are these that seem true to all men, or to the most part of men, or to all wise men, or to the most part of wise men, or else to the most approved wise men: whereby it appeareth that things probable may be said five manner of ways.   

Show how.  
First, those things are probable, which unto all men aswell learned as unlearned being in their right wits, do seem to be true, as these: Every mother loveth her child: we love them that love us: we must do good to them that do good to us. Secondly, those things that seem true to most men, as these: it is better for a communality to be ruled by one Prince, then by many: It is not good to serve many masters at once. Thirdly, those things that seem true to all wise men, as these: what thing soever is honest, the same is also profitable: Virtue is better than riches. Fourthly, those that seem true to the most part of the wise and learned, as thus: the soul of man is immortal: the Sun is greater than the earth. Fiftly, those things that seem true to the most approved wise men, as these: The world had a beginning: it is better for a Prince to be loved, then feared of his Subjects. And generally under things probable are contained all true Propositions that be casual, and not implying any necessity. I say here true Propositions, to exclude false Propositions, whereof Sophistical Syllogisms are made, and not those which we call probable or Logical Syllogisms; and yet such Propositions be not so true in deed, as those that be required in a Syllogism demonstrative, but only do seem true, engendering a certain opinion in man's mind, doubting notwithstanding the contrary: for it breedeth not a perfect knowledge as Science doth, whereby the mind is of all doubts thoroughly resolved. And note here, that the Schoolmen do make the matter (whereof a dialectical Syllogism doth consist) to be twofold, that is, Materia remota, in English, far off: and Materia propinqua, (that is to say) nigh, or near at hand.   

What doth Materia remota contain?  
These four dialectical Predicates, (that is) Definition, called of the Schoolmen Terminus, property, general kind, and Accident: All which Predicates are before defined, and are called Predicates, because they are common words spoken of others. But truly I see no cause why these four Predicates should be attributed to a Dialectical Syllogism, more than to a Syllogism demonstrative: for sure I am, that as good demonstrations may be made of these as of any other Predicats.   

What is contained under Materia propinqua?  
These: a dialectical Proposition, Problem, and Position.   

What difference is betwixt these three words, dialectical Proposition, Problem, and Position?  
A dialectical Proposition is a probable question uttered with a simple Interrogatory; as whether the mother loveth her child? which is no question in deed, but to him that asketh.  
A Problem is a doubtful question uttered with a double Interrogatory, as whether the least fixed star in the firmament be greater than the Moon or not? or whether that the Sun be bigger than the earth or not? Position is a wonderful opinion maintained by some excellent Clerk, as to say, that all things are but one essence or being, as Melissus affirmed, or that all things do continually flow and change, as Heraclitus held, or that the earth moveth, and not the heavens, as Copernicus supposeth, only to find out thereby the true motions of the Planets, and not for that he thought so in deed.     

CHAP. XXII.  

Of a sophistical Syllogism.  

WHat is a Sophistical or false Syllogism?  
A false Syllogism is that which is either made of false Propositions, or else of such as seem probable, and be not in deed, or else of probable premises not rightly concluding: and of such Syllogisms there be three sorts, the one failing in matter, the other in form, the third in both.   

When is it said to fail in matter?  
It faileth in matter, when the Syllogism having true form, is made of such Propositions as seem probable, and be not probable in deed, as thus: no opposites are both true at once, but subcontraries are opposites: Ergo, they are not true. Here though this Mayor seemeth probable, because many opposites, as contraries, and contradictories be never both true at once, yet it is not probable in deed: for those opposites which be called subcontrarie and subalternate, may be both true at once as hath been before.   

When is it said to fail in form?  
It faileth in form, when it is made of probable premises, not rightly concluding: because they be not orderly disposed according to Mood and Figure, as thus: Some opposites are both true at once, but contradictories are opposites: Ergo, Contradictories are both true at once. Here the premises be probable, but the Syllogism halteth in form, because that of mere particulars no good conclusion can follow.   

When is it said to fail both in matter and form?  
It faileth both in matter and form, when the premises are neither probable, nor yet do conclude rightly according to the rules of Logic, as thus: No opposites are both true at once, but subcontraries are opposites: Ergo, no subcontraries are both true at once. Here first it faileth in matter, because the Mayor, (as hath been said before) is not probable in deed. Again, it faileth in form, because that contrary to the rules of a Syllogism, an universal conclusion is implied, one of the premises being particular, which should not be.   

Is there no other kinds of false Syllogisms?  
Yes, there is another kind of false Syllogism, called of Aristotle, Syllogismus falsigraphus, which proceedeth of the proper principles of some discipline, misconstrued, or not rightly understood, as thus: All lines drawn from one selfe-point to another selfe-point, be equal, a right line and a crooked line be drawn from one selfe-point to another selfe-point: Ergo, a right line and a crooked line be equal, as you see in the figure 
 a. b. in the Margin: Here the Mayor being a principle in Geometry, is not rightly understood; for the right meaning of the principle is, that the lines should be also drawn in one self space, and then they must needs be equal, (that is to say) all of one length: but as touching false Syllogisms, we shall treat of them hereafter more at large in the Elenches: in the mean time we mind to speak of the other kinds of arguments before mentioned; and first of Induction.     

CHAP. XXIII.  

Of Induction.  

WHat is Induction?  
Induction is a kind of argument, wherein we proceed from many particulars to a universal conclusion, comprehending all the said particulars: and by the particulars here I mean not only singularities, called in Latin Individua, but also such things as be less common than that universal which is concluded; as when we proceed from many special kinds, to some general kind comprehending the same, or from things less common to more common.   

What is to be observed in this kind of reasoning?  
That the particulars be all of like nature; for if there be any one contrary or unlike to the rest, than the Induction is not good.   

How manifold is Induction?  
Twofold: Perfect, and Unperfect: it is called perfect, when all the singularities are rehearsed: and unperfect, when but some certain parts are only recited.   

Give example of Induction.  
Of an Induction, proceeding from mere singularities unto universal, let this be your example: malmsey is hot, Gascoin wine is hot, Romney wine is hot, Sack is hot, Rhenish wine is hot, French wine is hot, & sic de singulis: Ergo, Every wine is hot; which may be brought into a Syllogism thus: Every thing that is wine, be it either of Greece, Spain, Italy, Germany, France, or of any other country is hot, but every wine is one of these: Ergo, every wine is hot.   

Give example of an Induction proceeding from the special kinds to their general kinds?  
Of an Induction proceeding from the special kinds to the general kind, let this be your example: Every Man hath moving, every Horse hath moving, every Ox hath moving, & sic de singulis: Ergo, every sensible body hath moving. In which example you see, that to every special kind is added an universal sign to make your Induction good, which would not be so, if you should use a particular sign, in saying, some Man, some Horse, some Ox, and so forth.   

Which of these two kinds of reasoning, either an Induction or a Syllogism is most familiar and easy to man?  
Induction is more familiar to man then a Syllogism, for the Syllogism proceedeth from universalities unto particularities, which universalities be more known to nature (that is to say) to the discourse of reason, and less known to our outward senses. But Induction proceedeth from particularities unto universalities, which particularities are more known unto us, (that is to say) to our outward senses, and less known to Nature. Again, by Induction we are able to prove the principles of Demonstration, which are not otherwise to be proved, as this principle: Every whole is more than his part, may be proved by Induction in this sort: This whole is more than his part, and that whole is more than his part, neither is there to be found any whole, but that is more than his part: Ergo, Every whole is more than his part. Also this principle, Every sensible body endued with reason is apt to learn, may be proved thus: This man is apt to learn; and that man is apt to learn, and so of the rest: Ergo, Every sensible body endued with reason is apt to learn.     

CHAP. XXIIII.  

Of an Enthimeme.  

WHat is an Enthimeme?  
An Enthimeme is an unperfect Syllogism, made for haste or speed of two Propositions only, (that is) of one of the Premises, called in this kind of argument the Antecedent, and of the conclusion called here the Consequent, for the other of the Premises being supposed to be true and well known, is left out of purpose, as a thing superfluous, and not needful to be recited, and sometime the Mayor is left out, as thus: Voluptuousness is not perpetual nor proper, it is not therefore the chief felicity: and sometime the Minor is left out, as here: Every good thing maketh his possessor the better, therefore voluptuousness is not good.   

How shall a man know when the Mayor or Minor is left out?  
It is easy to know which of the Premises is left out by this means, for if the Subject of the Antecedent and of the Consequent be all one, than the Mayor is left out, but if they be not all one, but divers, than the Minor is left out, as you may see in the two last examples, and the part lacking, being reduced together with the rest into a Syllogism, will quickly show the truth or falsehood of the Argument.   

From whence are such kinds of Arguments gathered?  
They are gathered for the most part from signs, which if they be necessary, than the Enthimeme also is necessary, as thus: The woman giveth milk: Ergo, she hath had a child, or is with child; if the signs be probable, than the Enthimeme is also probable, as thus: This man is a night-gadder: Ergo, he is a thief.     

CHAP. XXV.  

Of an Example.  

WHat is an Example?  
An Example is a kind of Argument, wherein we proceed from one particular to prove another particular, by reason of some likeness that is betwixt them, as thus: God did not punish the Ninivites because they repented: Ergo, He will not punish us if we repent. God did not let to plague King David for adultery: Ergo, He will not let to plague any other King for committing the same offence.   

Wherein differeth this kind of Argument from the rest?  
This kind of Argument differeth in form from all the rest before taught, for a Syllogism proceedeth from the general kind to the special kind, or otherwise. An Enthimeme imitating a Syllogism, reciteth in his Antecedent the cause of the Conclusion. Again, an Induction out of many particularities gathereth an universality, none of which things is to be found in an Example, proceeding only from one particular to another like particular. Notwithstanding Aristotle saith, that it may be reduced partly to an Induction, and partly to a Syllogism: for in taking the first particular, you may by an unperfect Induction imply an universal Proposition. And so from that universal Proposition to proceed by order of Syllogism unto the other particular implied in the conclusion of the Example, as in this Example: juaas died evil: Ergo, Pilate also died evil: it may be first reduced into an unperfect Induction thus: judas died evil, because he was the author of Christ's death, and did not repent: Ergo, Every man that was author of Christ's death, and did not repent, died evil. Into a Syllogism thus: Every man that was author of Christ's death, and did not repent, died evil; but Pilate was author of Christ's death, and did not repent: Ergo, Pilate died evil.   

Whereto serves this kind of reasoning by Example?  
Examples are very good in all moral matters, to persuade, or dissuade.   

What is to be observed in reasoning by way of Example?  
You must in any wise be sure that the similitude or likeness of the particulars do make to the purpose which you intent, and that it be the very cause why the Predicate of the Antecedent properly belongeth to the Subject, for otherwise the argument is not good; for if you should reason thus: judas died evil: Ergo, Peter died evil: because they were both sinners: for their likeness in this behalf is not the cause that judas died evil, but the cause before alleged.   

From whence is this kind of argument fetched?  
From the places of Comparison, as from the like, from the more, and from the less, of all which the general rule or Maxim is thus: In things like, is like judgement or reason, as hath been said before in the Treatise of Places. Thus far of the four principal kinds of reasoning: now of the rest, and first.     

CHAP. XXVI.  

Of the Argument called Sorites.  

WHat is Sorites?  
Sorites is a kind of Argument proceeding as it were by certain degrees unto the Conclusion, which is gathered of many Propositions necessarily following one another, and are knit together, so as the Predicate of the first Proposition is the Subject of the second, and the Predicate of the second the Subject of the third, and so forth even to the last Proposition, whose Predicate being joined to the Subject of the first Proposition, doth make the Conclusion as thus: The Soul of man doth move itself: whatsoever moveth itself, is the beginning of moving: the beginning of moving hath no end, whatsoever hath no end, is immortal: Ergo, the Soul of man is immortal.   

When is this kind of Argument said to be of force?  
When it is made of Affirmative Propositions, wherein words of affinity are necessarily joined together, as when kinds general, differences, or properties, are joined with those special kinds, of whom they are spoken, or when proper effects are joined with their proper causes, for if the Propositions be either Negative, or do not necessarily hang together, than it is no good Argument, as in Negatives let this be your example: A Man is not a Lion, a Lion is a sensible beast: Ergo, Man is not a sensible beast. Now of Propositions not hanging necessarily together, because that proper effects are not joined with their proper causes, let this common jest be your example:  

Whoso drinketh well, sleepeth well,  
Whoso sleepeth well, sinneth not,  
Whoso sinneth not, shall be blessed:  
Ergo, Whoso drinketh well, shall be blessed.   
Which is no good Conclusion, for much drink is not always the cause of sleep, nor sleeping the cause of not sinning.  
The Rhetoricians use another kind of Argument, called Gradatio, which is much like to Sorite●…, saving that the Subject of the first Proposition is not rehearsed in the Conclusion, for they use it rather as an ornament of speech, then as a proof, as the virtue of SCIPIO wan him Fame, Fame got him Enemies, and his Enemies procured his death.     

CHAP. XXVII.  

Of divers other kinds of Arguments, and first of a Dilemma, and what kinds it comprehendeth.  
THere be also other forms of Arguments, whereof some be Fallaxes, and some are good Conclusions, and they be these, Dilemma, Enumeratio, Simplex Conclusio, Subiectio, Oppositio, Violatio.  

What is Dilemma?  
Dilemma is an Argument made of two members, repugnant one to another, whereof which soever thou grantest, thou art by and by taken, as thus: It is not good to marry a wife, for if she be fair, she will be common, if foul, then loathsome: notwithstanding, this is but a slippery kind of argument, unless both the repugnant parts be such, as neither of them can be turned again upon the maker of the argument, for then by conversion, the Dilemma is soon confuted, as for example, you may convert both parts of the argument last recited thus: It is good to marry a wife, for if she be fair, she shall not be loath some, if foul, than not common: much like to this is that captious Argument, which Protagoras the Lawyer made against his Scholar Euathlus, who had covenanted to pay his Master a certain sum of money at the first Suit or Action that he should win by pleading at the Law: whereupon his Master did afterwards commence an Action against him, and in reasoning with him of the matter, made him this Dilemma: Either (saith he) judgement shall be given against thee, or with thee: if against thee, than thou must pay me by virtue of the judgement; if judgement be given with thee, than thou must also pay me by covenant; which the Scholar immediately confuted by conversion in this sort: Either (saith he) judgement shall be given with me, or against me; if with me, than I shall be quit by Law; if against me, than I ought to pay nothing by covenant.   

What other iutricate kinds of reasoning are said to be comprehended under Dilemma?  
divers, whereof some be called Certains or horned Arguments, some Crocodolites, some Assistatons, some Pseudomenons.   

Define all these kinds, and give examples.  

1 The horned Argument is, when by some subtle and crafty manner of questioning, we seek to have such an answer, as we may take vantage thereof, as the pharisees did, when they questioned with Christ touching the payment of Tribute to Caesar.  
2 The Crocodolite is, when being deceived by some crafty manner of questioning, we do admit that which our Adversary turneth again upon us, to our own hindrance, as in the fable of the Crocodile, whereof this name Crocodolite proceedeth: for it is said, that the Crocodile having taken away a child from his mother, reasoned with her in this sort; I will deliver thee thy child again, if thou wilt say a troth: whether therefore shall I deliver him or not? The mother answered, thou shalt not deliver him, and therefore of right thou oughtest to deliver him. No, saith he, I will not deliver him, to the intent it may seem that thou hast said troth; and though thou hadst said that I should deliver him, yet I would not deliver him indeed, for making thee a liar.  
3 Assistaton, is a kind of cavilling, not consisting of any sure ground, as if a man did say, that he doth hold his peace, or lieth, or knoweth nothing; another by and by might cavil thereof in this sort: Ergo, He that holdeth his peace, speaketh, he that lieth, saith truth, he that knoweth nothing, knoweth something.  
4 Pseudomenon, is a false or lying kind of cavilling, as thus: The heaven covereth all things: Ergo, it covereth itself. Epimenides, being a Candiot himself, said, That the Candiotes were liars; the question is, whether he said true or not; for though he said true, and that the Candiotes were liars, yet it is false, because a Candiot said it: again, if the Candiotes be no liars, nor Epimenides is a liar, than he is to be believed.    

How are the Fallaxes of these captious Arguments to be found out?  
The Fallaxes of all these kinds of captious Arguments are soon found out, if we consider well the rules before taught, touching the rep●…gnances of Propositions, as whether there be any ambiguity in the Terms, and whether the self-same Terms in the repugnant parts have respect to one selfe-thing, time, or place, or not: it is good also to consider the substance, quantity, and quality of the Propositions: for in the last example, this saying Candiotes be liars, is a Proposition indefinite, and therefore is not of such force, as to say, all Candiotes be liars, which is an universal Proposition, for of particular Premises nothing rightly followeth. In the other examples you shall find that there is some doubtfulness in the Terms, having respect either to divers things, to divers times, or divers places, as to say, he holdeth his peace when he speaketh: here is doubtfulness in the Terms, having respect to divers things, that is to say, as well to those things, which he meaneth to keep in silence, as to those words which he uttereth by mouth: so in this word, Suit, in the example of Protagoras was doubtfulness, for that Protagoras meant some other Suit, and not that which he himself commenced.     

CHAP. XXVIII.  

Of Enumeration.  

WHat is Enumeration?  
Enumeration is a kind of Argument, wherein many things being reckoned up and denied, one thing only of necessity remaineth to be affirmed, as thus: Sith thou hast this Horse, either thou didst buy him, or he came to thee by inheritance, or he was given thee, or bred at home with thee, or else thou didst take him from thine enemy in time of war; or if none of these were, than thou must needs steal him: but thou neither boughtest him, nor he fell not unto thee by inheritance, nor was given thee, ●…or bred up at home with thee, nor yet taken by thee from the enemy: it followeth therefore of necessity that thou hast stolen him.   

When is this kind of argument to be confuted?  
When your adversary can prove any necessary part to be left out.     

CHAP. XXIX.  

Of a simple Conclusion.  

WHat is a simple Conclusion?  
A simple Conclusion is no other thing, but a necessary Enthymeme, in the which the Consequent doth necessarily follow the antecedent, as thus: she hath had a child: Ergo, she hath lain with a man.     

CHAP. XXX.  

Of Subjection.  

WHat is Subjection?  
Subjection is a questioning kind of Argument, in the which we confute each question with a reason immediately following the same, as thus: How is this fellow become so well moneyed? had he any great Patrimony left him? No, for all his Father's lands were sold. Came there any inheritance to him by descent any otherwise? No, for he was disinherited of all men. Came there any goods unto him by Executorship, etc. If then he hath not been enriched by any of these honest ways, either he hath a golden Mine at home, or else he is come to these riches by some unlawful means. This argument faileth when any principal part is left out, and therefore differeth not much from Enumeration before recited.     

CHAP. XXXI.  

Of Opposition.  

WHat is Opposition?  
Oppositio●… is a kind of Argument, made of Repugnant parts, wherein we revert from the Opposite of the first Proposition, unto the same Proposition again, as thus: If I were in the City at such time as this man was slain in the Country, than I slew him not; this Proposition is now a simple Conclusion, and may be made an Opposition in this manner: If I had been in the Country at such time as you say this man was slain, than you might well suspect me to have slain him: but sith I was not there at that time, there is no cause therefore why you should suspect me.     

CHAP. XXXII.  

Of Violation.  

WHat is Uiolation?  
Violation is a kind of Concluding, more meet to confute then to prove, whereby we show the reason of our adversary, to make for us, and not for him, as thus: it is not good to marry a wife, because that of marriage many times cometh the loss of children to our great sorrow, yea, rather it is good therefore to marry a wife, to get other children for our comfort. Thus much touching the divers kinds of reasoning: now we will treat of Fallaxes, or false Conclusions, and show how ●…o confute them.     
here endeth the fifth Book of Logic.   

THE sixth BOOK OF LOGIC.  

CHAP. I.  

Of Confutation.  
THere be some that make two kinds of Confutation, the one belonging to person, the other to matter. Confutation of person is done either by taunting, railing, rendering check for check, or by scorning, and that either by words, or else by countenance, gesture and action: which kind of Confutation, because it belongeth rather to scoffing then to true order of reasoning, I will leave to speak thereof, dealing only with that Confutation that belongeth to matter, which is twofold, the one general, the other special: it is general, when we affirm that the Argument faileth either in form, in matter, or in both. Again, the general Confutation is done three manner of ways, that is, either by denying the Consequent, by making distinction, or by instance, (that is to say) by bringing in a contrary Example.  

Show when these three ways are to be used.  
If the Argument fail in form, than we must deny the consequent.   

Give Examples.  
Discipline is necessary, but the Ceremonies of Moses are discipline, therefore the Ceremonies of Moses are necessary: here you must deny the Consequent, because that of mere particulars nothing followeth: and to be short, when any Argument is made contrary to the rules of Figure and Mood before taught, the Consequent is not good, and therefore to be denied, as here: every covetous man doth violate the laws of liberality; but every prodigal man doth violate the laws of liberality; therefore every prodigal man is a covetous man: This Syllogism, being of the second Figure, is made in Barbara, which Mood belongeth not to that Figure: But if the Argument fail in matter, that is, when either one of the premises, or both are false, than it may be confuted aswell by denying the false part, be it Mayor or Minor, as by using distinction: and to find out the falseness of the matter, it is necessary always to have respect to the Maxims of the places, from whence the proof is fetched; for they do show which Propositions are true, and which are not; as for example in this Argument: No painted speech becometh Philosophers, but eloquence is painted speech: Ergo, eloquence becometh no Philosophers: here the Mayor is to be denied, because it is a false definition: for the true definition of eloquence is to speak wisely, aptly, adornedly, and to the purpose, and not to use painted words vainly: Again, whoso worshippe●…h God the Creator, worshippeth the true God; the Turks worship God the Creator: Ergo, the Turks worship the true God: This Argument is to be denied, because the Minor is false; for no man can truly worship God the Creator, unless he worship also jesus Christ his Son, which the Turks do not, and therefore they worship a feigned Idol, and not the true God.   

When is distinction to be used?  
When either the words or matter is doubtful.   

Give examples of both.  
All Verbs active do signify action, but God used this Verb Active Indurabo, in saying, I will harden Pharaohs heart: Ergo, God did harden Pharaohs heart: here distinction is to be made; for Verbs active have divers significations, according to the diversities of the Tongues wherein they are uttered: for in the Hebrew Tongue, Verbs active do signify permission or sufferance, aswell as action; as these words I will harden Pharaohs heart (is as much to say) as I will suffer Pharaohs heart to be hardened; likewise whereas we say in the Lord's Prayer, Lead us not into temptation, is as much to say, as, suffer us not to be led into temptation: Again, ambiguity may be in this matter, as thus: no sins are heard of God: but all men are sinners; therefore no men are heard of God: here distinction is to be made betwixt penitent sinners, and impenitent: for God will he are the penitent sinner: although he will not hear the impenitent sinner.   

When is confutation by instance used?  
When the Argument, though it fail neither in form, nor matter, yet perhaps it is neither so strong, nor so probable, but that a stronger and more probable may be made against it.   

Give example.  
Whoso killeth any Ambassadors in their journeying, doth violate the Laws of Arms: but the Frenchmen killed our Ambassador journeying to Spain: Ergo, the Frenchmen in so doing did violate the Laws of Arms: Here to the Mayor a man may answer by instance, thus: the Athenians killed the Ambassadors of the Lacedæmonians journeying to the Kings of Persia, because they went to procure his aid, to destroy the City of Athens: So likewise the Romans did intercept the Legates of Hannibal going to the King of the Macedonians for the like intent; and yet neither of these people did think to break the Laws of Arms, by doing that which should preserve their State and Commonweal.     

CHAP. II.  

Of special confutation.  

WHat is special confutation?  
Special Confutation is, when we confute any false argument, by detecting and showing the Fallax thereof, naming the Fallax by his proper name.   

What order do h Aristotle observe in treating of special Confutation?  
Aristotle first treateth in general of all those things that commonly appertain to the disputations of learned men, as first he treateth of an Elench, which is as much to say as reprehension, then of Syllogisms, and of disputation, and also of the marks and ends of Sophistry, and whereto they tend.   

How defineth he an Elench or Reprehension?  
Reprehension or Elench (sayeth he) is a Syllogism which gathereth a conclusion contrary to the assertion of the respondent, as if a man would defend Medea: not to love her child because she killed it, another might reason against him in this manner: every mother loveth her child: but Medea is a mother: Ergo, Medea loveth her child: the Conclusion of this Syllogism is contrary to the first assertion: and note here by the way, that there be two sorts of Elenches, the one true & the other false, it is said to be true▪ when it rightly gathereth a contrary conclusion to the respondents assertion: And false, when it faileth in any part requisite to a true Elench: of which parts we shall speak hereafter, when we come to treat of the Fallax called Ignorance of the Elench, which is one of the five ends or marks whereunto Sophistry tendeth, for a true Elench seemeth to belong unto dialectical disputation, rather than to Sophistical disputation. But now leaving to define a Syllogism, because it hath been defined before, and therefore not needful here again to be rehearsed, I will proceed to Disputation.     

CHAP. III.  

Of Disputation: and how manifold it is.  
Disputation's is a contention about some question taken in hand, either for finding out of truth, or else for exercise sake, and there be four kinds of disputation, whereof the first is called doctrinal, because it appertaineth to Science.  
The second is called dialectical, which belongeth to probable opinion.  
The third is called Tentative, which serveth to try another man's knowledge, in any kind of Science.  
The fourth is called Sophistical, which tendeth only to deceive.  

Give examples of all these four kinds?  
The Doctrinal Disputation useth no other but Syllogisms Demonstrative as this is, whatsoever hath reason, is capable of learning; but john hath reason: Ergo, john is capable of learning. dialectical Disputation useth only probable Syllogisms, as the former example of Medea, every mother loveth her child; but Medea is a mother: Ergo, Medea loveth her child: against this another probable argument may be made thus: whosoever killeth her child, loveth not her child: but Medea killed her child: Ergo, she loved not her child. Tentative disputation useth such arguments as are made of the first common principles of any science, in which principles who so is ignorant, cannot be skilful in that Science; as if a man would profess Geometry, and know not the definitions of a point, or prick of a line, or superficies, or of such common Maxims, as these are; the whole is more than his part: take equal from equal, and equal remain, etc. should quickly bewray his own ignorance.  
Sophistical disputation useth nothing but decei●…full arguments, or Fallaxes, whereof there be thirteen kinds hereafter set down: but first I will show you which be the five Marks and Ends of Sophistry.     

CHAP. FOUR  

Of the five Marks and Ends of Sophistry.  
ARistotle saith, that the fraudulent disputation of the Sophister, tendeth always to one of these five Ends or Marks; that is, either by force of argument, to bring you into some absurdity, which he calleth Elench; that is to say, a reprehension or reproof, or else to make you to confess that which is manifestly false, or to grant some Paradox, which is as much to say as an opinion contrary to all men's opinions: or to allow of incongrue speech contrary to the rules of Grammar, called in Latin, Solecismus, or to admit some vain repetition, called in Latin Nugatio.  

Give example of all these five Marks.  
Of the first Mark, let this be your example: If in disputing of Virtue, you have perhaps granted, that the meditation of Virtue doth make a man sad, the Sophister will force you by argument, to deny again that which you before granted, thus: all things that be contrary, har●… contrary effects: but it is proper to vice to make the mind of man sad: Ergo, Virtue maketh his mind glad: This kind of reasoning is more plainly taught before, when we talked of Reduction by impossibility.  
Of the second Mark let this be your example: Every dog hath power to bark; but there is a certain Star called the Dog: Ergo, that star hath power to bark. The Fallax of this argument consisteth only in the word Dog, which is equivoke, as shall be declared more at large hereafter, when we come to speak of that Elench or Fallax.  
Of the Paradox, which is the third Mark, let this be your example: the Sophister will make you to grant, that a rich and happy King is wretched, by force of argument, thus: Whosoever is subject to sin, is wretched: but all rich and happy Kings are subject to sin: Ergo, all rich and happy Kings are wretched and miserable: in this is also a Fallax, because that happiness is spoken here in two respects, for there is worldly happiness, and heavenly happiness.  
Of the fourth mark called incongruity of speech, I can hardly give you any fit example in our native tongue, because that our English adjectives do not differ in Case, Gender, and Number, and therefore I pray you content yourself with this Latin example, for it is an easier matter for an Englishman to speak false Latin, then false English: the Sophister will make you to allow of this false Latin, mulier est candidus, by force of argument thus: Omnis homo est candidus, at mulier est homo, ergo mulier est candidus; the English whereof is thus: Every man is white, but woman is man: Ergo, a woman is white: here this word white in the Latin is of the Masculine gender, contrary to the rules of Grammar, but this may be very well referred to the Fallax, called form of speech, hereafter declared.  
Of the fifth mark called Nugation, let this be your example: the Sophister will make you to allow of this vain repetition: Plato is learned, a man learned, by force of argument thus: Plato is learned, but Plato is a man learned: Ergo, Plato is learned; a man learned: here the premises and the conclusion are all one thing, and therefore contrary to the rules of Logic. But leaving these things as superfluous, and in my judgement serving to small purpose, if I may so say without offence, I mind therefore now to return to my matter first intended.     

CHAP. V.  

How to confute all manner of Elenches, or Fallaxes whatsoever they be.  
EVery Fallax consisteth either in words or in things: and of those that consist in words, there are in number six, and of others consisting in things, there are seven, so as in all there be thirteen, as I said before.  

Which be those six that consist in words?  
Equivocation, amphibology, or doubtful speech, Conjunction, Division, Accent, and Figure, or form of speech.   

Show what these Fallaxes be, and give examples?  
Equivocation is, when the deceit consisteth in the doubtfulness 
1 Equivocatio.  of some one word, having divers significations, as for example: Every Dog is a sensible body, there is a certain Star called a Dog: Ergo, That Star is a sensible body: here the Conclusion is to be denied, because this word Dog hath divers significations: another example, the Prophet saith that there is no evil in the City, but God doth it; but there be horrible evils in the City: Ergo, God is the Author of evil: the Conclusion is to be denied, because in the Mayor this word evil signifieth punishment, and in the Minor it signifieth sin: another example, Whosoever loveth Christ, observeth his word, and is beloved of the Father: but no body that breaketh the Law, observeth the word of Christ; therefore no body is beloved of the Father: here the Mayor is doubtful, because this voice, Word, may be taken either for the word of the Law, or else for the word of the Gospel, which the Apostles did ever keep, as Christ himself saith, and therefore they were beloved of the Father, and so consequently every true Christian, that doth keep the pure doctrine of Christ, is beloved of the Father: but the word of the Law saith, that every one is cursed that abideth not in all.  
Amphibologia or doubtful speech, is when some whole 
2 Amphibologia.  sentence is doubtful, and may be interpreted divers ways, as the Oracle of Apollo, in saying that Croesus' passing the River of Halis, shall overthrow a great Empire, by which Oracle was meant that he should overthrow his own Empire, and not the Persian Empire, which by wrong construing that Oracle, he hoped to subdue.  
Composition or conjunction, is the joining together of 
3 Compositio.  things that are to be severed. As for example, two and three be even and odd, but five maketh two and three, therefore five is both even and odd: which kind of argument is to be denied, because those things are joined together, which ought to be severed.  
Division is, when things are severed, which should be joined 
4 Divisio.  together, as, all the wise men of Greece are seven: Solon and Periander are wise men of Greece▪ therefore Solon and Periander are seven: here the Consequent is to be denied, because Solon and Periander are severed from the rest whereunto they should be joined.  
The Fallax of Accent is, when words are not rightly and 
5 Accentus.  simply pronounced, as when we do add to, or take from a word, any aspiration, letter, or syllable, and thereby alter the true signification thereof, as this Latin word, Hara, signifying a Swine's cote, being pronounced without H, doth signify an Altar. In English let this be your example▪ Every Hare is swift on foot, but this is a Hair, (that is to say) a cloth to dry Malt, therefore it is swift on foot. Of like sort is this old jest of a Master that said to his servant: Go heat this Capon's leg, who immediately did eat it: then his Master being angry, said, I bade thee heat it, with an h: no Sir (said the servant) I did eat it with bread. Likewise this Fallax may chance by not observing the right quantity of syllables, in any word, as Populus having o, long, is a Popple tree, but having o, short, it signifieth a people. Or when a word used Interrogatively, is made to have an Affirmative signification, as for example: Caiphas said to Christ, Art thou a King? Ergo, He confessed Christ to be a King. Or when a word pronounced ironiously is turned to good earnest, in speaking one thing and meaning another, as thus: My Master said, Come hither, you honest man: Ergo, He said that I was an honest man, when indeed he called him knave.  
The Fallax of form or manner of speech may be divers 
6 Forma Orationis.  ways, as first, when words are falsely supposed to be like either in signification, in case, or in gender, or to be of one self Predicament, because they are like in termination, as Poeta, in English a Poet, and Poema, in English a Poesy or poetical work: these two words, because they end both in a: Ergo, they are both of the Masculine gender. Also coloured and numbered are like in termination: Ergo, they are of one self Predicament, and yet the first belongeth to the Predicament of quality, and the other to quantity. Secondly, when a word is used in one self argument, sometime according to his proper signification, and sometime as a term of Art: as for example, God is every where: every where is an adverb, therefore God is an adverb. A Mouse eateth cheese, but a Mouse is a syllable: Ergo, a syllable eateth cheese. here Mouse in the Mayor hath his proper signification, and in the Minor is used as a term of Art: and the like is to be said of the word Every where in the first example. Thirdly, when a word hath not his proper signification, or is not used according to the true phrase of speech wherein it is uttered, as thus: Whatsoever thou hast not lost, thou hast still, but thou hast lost no horns: Ergo, thou hast horns. here this word, to lose, hath not his proper signification, for we are said to lose properly that which we had, and not that which we never had. And finally, this Fallax is called the common refuge and receptacle of all such kind of Sophistry. Hitherto of the Fallaxes in words, now of the Fallaxes in things.     

CHAP. VI  

Of the Fallaxes in things.  
OF these Fallaxes there be seven kinds (that is to say) Fallacia Accidentis, à dicto secundum quid ad dictum Simpliciter, Ignoratio Elenchi, Petitio principij, Fallacia Consequentis, Cansa pro n●…n cansa, Plura interrogata pro uno responsu: which may be Englished thus: The Fallax of the Accident, the Fallax of speech respective, in stead of speech absolute, ignorance of the Elench, Petition of the principle, a cause that is not the cause indeed, and many questions comprehended in one.  

Define what these be, and give examples.  
Fallacia Accidentis, may be divers ways: as first, when any 
1 Fallacia accidentis.  thing belonging only to the substance of some thing, is attributed also to some accident of the said substance, and chose, as thus: Whatsoever thou hast bought, thou hast eaten, but thou hast bought raw flesh: Ergo, thou hast eaten raw flesh: here the Consequent is to be denied, because the Mayor hath respect to the substance, and the Conclusion to the quality. Another example, What I am, thou art not, but I am a man: Ergo, thou art none. here in this the Mayor hath respect to the quality, and the Conclusion to the substance. Secondly, when Accidents are not rightly joined together, as when the qualities of the body are joined with the qualities of the mind: as Homer is a Poet, and Homer is blind: Ergo, Homer is a blind Poet: here the Conclusion is to be denied, because to be blind, and to be a Poet, are divers qualities, whereof the one belongeth to the mind, and the other to the body, and therefore are not rightly joined together. Thirdly, as (Melancthon saith) when an accidental cause is is made a principal cause, as thus: Elias was an holy Prophet, but Elias was clad with Camel's hair: Ergo, I being clad with Camel's hair, am a holy Prophet. here the Conclusion is to be denied, because to be clad with Camel's hair, was not the cause of Elias holiness. But me thinks that this and such like examples do belong rather to the Fallax of Causa pro non causa (whereof we shall speak hereafter) then to the Fallax of the Accident.  
The Fallax A dicto secundum quid ad dictum Simpliciter, 
2 Dictum secundum quid.  chanceth when we go about to make a thing to seem absolute, that is spoken in some respect, or to be in all, when it is but in part, as a Moor hath white teeth: Ergo, a Moor is white. Again, it may be in respect, by reason of time, place, person, comparison, and such like. Of time as thus: I saw john yesterday, but I saw him not to day: Ergo, I did see him, and not see him. Of place thus: It is not good to buy and sell in the Church: Ergo, it is not good to buy and sell. Of person thus: A Magistrate may kill a thief: Ergo, every man may kill a thief. Of comparison, thus: Riches are not good to him that cannot use them: Ergo, Riches are not good.  
Having now to speak of the Fallax, called the Ignorance 
3 Ignoratio Elenchi.  of the Elench: I think good to call again to your remembrance the definition of an Elench before briefly set down, which is a Syllogism rightly gathering a Conclusion contrary to the assertion of the respondent, which contrariety consisteth of four principal points or respects, whereof, if any be wanting, than the contrariety is not perfect.   

Which be those four points?  
First, that it be to one self thing. Secondly, in one self respect. Thirdly, in one self manner. And fourthly, in or at one self time: for if you be deceived at any time by some false Elench, in thinking that it rightly gathereth a Conclusion mere contrary to your assertion, when it is not so indeed, by reason that it faileth in some part requisite and incident to a true Elench: than it may be rightly said that you are deceived by ignorance of the Elench, which Fallax, as Aristotle saith, comprehendeth almost all others, and therefore he maketh a long and obscure definition of an Elench, rehearsing all the particularities thereof, nothing apt to be uttered in our English tongue.   

Yet I pray you to give examples of the four chief points before mentioned.  
Of the first, let this be your example: four is double to two, but not to three: Ergo, four is double and not double; this is not to one self thing. Of the second thus: This piece of timber is double in length to that piece, but it is not double to the same in breadth: Ergo, it is to one self thing, both double, and not double to one self thing, but not in one self respect. Of the third thus: This Prince ruleth mightily, but not mercifully: Ergo, he ruleth, and not ruleth; this is not in like manner. Of the fourth thus: I saw john yesterday, but not this day: Ergo, I saw him, and saw him not; this is not in one self time. And all these four ways in mine opinion are comprehended in the second point; which is when any thing is spoken not absolutely, but in divers respects: wherefore, it differeth not much from the Fallax of speech respective before declared, saving that this Fallax is more general, and comprehendeth more kinds of Fallaxes then that doth.  
Petition of the Principle is, when the Antecedent doth not 
4 Petitio principij.  prove the consequent, which chanceth most commonly three manner of ways: that is, either when the proof is as little known, as the thing that is to be proved. Secondly, when the proof is less known than the thing to be proved. Thirdly, when the proof, and the thing to be proved, do not differ, but is all one speech, signifying one self thing, called of the greeks Tautologia.   

Give example of these three ways.  
Of the first thus: The Sun moveth not, but standeth still in the midst of heaven, giving light to all the world: Ergo, the earth is movable; or thus: The Heavens are not made of Elemental matter, subject to corruption: Ergo, the Heavens are incorruptible. here in both these examples the Antecedent is as doubtful as the Consequent, and therefore proveth nothing. Of the second way thus: Every sensible body sometime sleepeth: Ergo, Man sometime sleepeth. here it is more to be doubted whether all sensible Bodies, all Beasts, Fowls and Fishes, do sometimes sleep or not, then whether man doth sometime sleep: for it is an easier matter to know the nature and property of one special kind, then of all, or many kinds. Of the third way, thus: john is learned: Ergo, john is learned. The soul doth live ever: Ergo, it is immortal.  
The Fallax of the Consequent chanceth two manner of 
5 Fallacia Consequentis.  ways, that is, either when we think the Consequent to be convertible with the Antecedent, but it is not so in deed, or else when we think, that upon the contrary of the Antecedent, the contrary of the Consequent must needs also follow.   

Give examples of both these ways.  
This is a man: Ergo, it is a sensible body: now if I would hereof by conversion conclude thus: it is a sensible body: Ergo, it is a man: this were no good Consequent; for every sensible body is not a man. Likewise when it raineth, the ground is wet: Ergo, when the ground is wet, it raineth; for these speeches are not convertible. Of the second way thus: It is a man: Ergo, it is a sensible body. It is no man: Ergo, it is no sensible body. Here you see that this Proposition, it is no man, is the contrary of the first Antecedent, which saith, It is a man. Of which contrary, the contrary of the Consequent doth not necessarily sollowe: for though it be no man, yet it may be some other sensible body. This Fallax comprehendeth all such false Arguments, as do not observe the Rules of right and true Consequents before given.  
The Fallax of non causa pro causa, is, when that thing is 
6 Causa pro non causa.  made to be the cause of the Conclusion, which is not the cause in deed; as Wine is nought, because it will make a man drunk. Of which drunkenness, Wine is not the cause, but the intemperance of the man, and his immoderate use thereof, for many things that be good of themselves may be abused, yea, even the liberty of the Gospel, and yet the doctrine of the Gospel is not cause thereof, but the malice of 
7 Plura interrogata pro uno responsu.  man abusing the same.  
The seventh and last Fallax, is when unadvisedly, and without using any distinction, you make an answer to many questions, as though they were but one; as for example, The Sophister, seeing two men standing together, whereof the one is blind, and the other hath his fight, will ask you perhaps whether they see, or not; whereunto if you answer directly, either yea, or no, you are by and by taken: for if you say that they see, than you grant that the blind man also seeth, and if you say, that they do not see, than you grant, that he which seeth, is blind; but if you answer, that the one seeth, and the other not, you shall by such distinction easily avoid the Sophister's cavillation: for divers questions huddled up in one, do always require divers answers. And thus I end, with the order of confuting all false Elenches, and Fallaxes; the knowledge whereof is very necessary, for the maintenance of the truth, which God loveth, who is the fountain of all truth, yea, and very truth itself; to whom be all honour, glory and praise, world without end,  
Amen.      
FINIS.