THE SIX BOOKS OF A COMMONWEAL.  
Written by I BODIN a famous Lawyer, and a man of great Experience in matters of State.  
Out of the French and Latin Copies, done into English, by RICHARD KNOLLES.  
LONDON Impensis G. Bishop. 1606.  Rex & Lex.   

  

A SUMMARIE TABLE OF ALL THE CHAPTERS CONTAINED IN THE SIX BOOKS OF I BODIN.  

The Contents of the first Book.  
WHat the principal end is of a well ordered Commonweal. Chap. 1  
Of a Family, and what difference there is between a Family and a Commonweal. Chap. 2.  
Of the power of an Husband over his Wife, as also of the mutual duties betwixt them: and whether it be expedient to renew the law of Divorcement or not. Chap. 3.  
Of the power of a Father, and whether it be meet for the Father to have power of life and death over his children, as had the ancient Romans. Chap. 4.  
Of the power of a Lord or Master over his Slaves, and whether Slaves are to be suffered in a well ordered Commonweal. Chap. 5.  
What a Citisen is, and how much citizens differ from citizens, and how much from strangers: what also is to be understood by the name of a Town, a City, and of a Commonweal. Chap. 6.  
Of them that are under protection, and the difference betwixt Allies, Strangers, and Subjects. Chap. 7.  
Of Sovereignty. Chap. 8.  
Of a Prince tributary or feudatarie: and whether he be a Sovereign Prince: and of the prerogative of honour amongst Sovereign Princes. Chap. 9  
Of the marks of Sovereignty. Chap. 10   

The Contents of the second Book.  
OF all sorts of Commonweals in general, and whether there be any more than three. Chap. 1.  
Of a Lordly Monarchy, or of the sole government of one. Chap. 2.  
Of a Royal Monarchy. Chap. 3.  
Of a Tyrannical Monarchy. Chap. 4.  
Whether it be lawful to lay violent hand upon a Tyrant; and after his death to disannul all his acts, decrees, and laws. Chap. 5.  
Of an aristocraty. Chap. 6.  
Of a Popular Estate. Chap. 7.   

The Contents of the third Book.  
OF a Senate, or Council of Estate, and also of the power thereof. Chap. 1.  
Of the Officers and Commissioners in a Commonweal. Chap. 2.  
Of Magistrates. Chap. 3.  
Of the obedience that the Magistrate oweth unto the Laws and Sovereign Prince. Chap. 4  
Of the power and authority of a Magistrate over particular and private men, and of his office and duty. Chap. 5.  
Of the mutual duties of Magistrates among themselves, and of the power that one of them hath over another. Chap. 6.  
Of Corporations, and Colleges, Estates and Communities, and what profits or inconveniences ensue thereof unto the Commonweal. Chap. 7.  
Of the orders and degrees of citizens. Chap. 8.   

The Contents of the fourth Book.  
Of the rising, increasing, flourishing estate, declining, and ruin of Commonweals. Chap. 1.  
Whether there be any mean to know the changes and ruins, which are to chance unto Commonweals. Chap. 2.  
That it is a most dangerous thing at one and the self same time to change the Form, Laws, and Customs of a Commonweal. Chap. 3.  
Whether it be better in a Commonweal to have the Magistrates changeable, or else perpetual. Chap. 4.  
Whether the unity and concord of Magistrates amongst themselves be good and wholesome for the Commonweal, or not. Chap. 5.  
Whether it be convenient or expedient for the Majesty of a Sovereign Prince to judge his subjects himself, or to be much conversant with them. Chap. 6.  
Whether a Prince in civil factions aught to join himself to one of the parties, and whether a good subject aught to be constrained to take part with the one or the other faction: with the means to remedy seditions. Chap. 7.   

The Contents of the fift Book.  
WHat order and course is to be taken, to apply the form of a Commonweal to the diversity of men's humours, and the means how to discover the nature and disposition of the people. Chap. 1.  
The means to prevent the changes of Commonweals, which happen through the great riches of some, and exceeding poverty of of others Chap. 2.  
Whether the goods of men condemned should be applied unto the common treasure, or to the church, or else left unto the heirs. Chap. 3.  
Of reward and punishment. Chap. 4  
Whether it be more convenient to train up the subjects in arms, and to fortify their towns or not. Chap. 5.  
Of the surety of alliances and treaties betwixt Princes and Commonweals, and of the laws of arms. Chap. 6.   

The Contents of the Sixt Book.  
OF Censuring or Reformation, and whether it be expedient to enroll and number the subjects, and to force them to make a declaration, or give a certificate of their private estates. Chap. 1.  
Of Treasure. Chap. 2  
Of Coins, and the means how to prevent that they be not altered. Chap 3.  
A Comparison of the three lawful Commonweals, that is, a Popular Estate, an Aristocratical, and a Royal, and that a Royal Monarchy is the best. Chap. 4.  
That a well ordered Commonweal dependeth not either of lot, either of choice, and much less of women; but by descent to be derived from a most honourable stock: and that it aught to be given but to one alone, without partition. Chap. 5.  
Of the three kinds of justice, Distributive, Commutative, and Harmonical: and what proportion they have unto an Estate Royal, Aristocratique, and Popular. Chap. 6.   
FINIS.   


THE FIRST BOOK OF A COMMONWEAL.  

CHAP. I ¶ What the principal end is of a well ordered Commonweal.  
A Commonweal is a lawful government of many families, 
The definition of a Commonweal.  and of that which unto them in common belongeth, with a puissant sovereignty. This definition omitted by them which have written of a Commonweal, we have placed in the first place: for that in all arts and actions, it behoveth us first to behold the end, and afterward the means to attain thereunto. For a definition is nothing else than the very end and scope of the matter propounded, which if it be not well and surely grounded, whatsoever you build thereupon must together and in a moment fall. And yet oftentimes it falleth out with many, that having propounded unto themselves certain ends, yet can they not attain unto the end by them desired; no more than the unskilful archer who shooteth far and wide from the mark he aimed at, whereas he which shooteth markeman like, although he miss somewhat the mark, yet shall he shoot nearer than he, neither shall he want the commendation of a good archer, having performed what a skilful archer should have done. But he which knoweth not the end of the matter he hath in hand, is as far from the hope of attaining thereunto, as he is from hitting the mark, which shooteth at random, not knowing whereat. Wherhfore let us well examine the end, and every part of the definition by us before propounded. First we said that a Commonweal aught to be a lawful or rightful government: for that the name of a Commonweal is holy, as also to put a difference betwixt the same, and the great assemblies of robbers and pirates, with whom we aught not to have any part, commercement, society, or alliance, but utter enmity. And therefore in all wise and well ordered Commonweals, 
That a common weal aught to be a lawful government.  whether question be of the public faith for the more safety to be given; of leagues offensive or defensive to be made; of war to be denounced, or undertaken, either for the defending of the frontiers of the kingdom, or for the composing of the controversies and differences of Princes amongst themselves; robbers and pirates are still excluded from all the benefit of the law of Arms. For why? Princes which govern their States by their own laws, and the laws of nations, have always divided their just and lawful enemies, from these disordered, which seek for nothing but the utter ruin and subversion of Commonweals, and of all civil society. For which cause, if ransom promised unto robbers for a man's redemption, be not unto them accordingly paid, there is no wrong done: for that the laws of Arms aught neither to be communicated unto them, neither are they to enjoy the benefit of those laws, which lawful enemies being taken prisoners, or free men enjoy. Yea the laws do permit him that is taken of robbers, not thereby to lose his liberty; but that he may nevertheless make his will, and do all other lawful acts: which for all that was not in former time lawful for them to do, which were taken by their just enemies. For that he which was fallen into the hands of his lawful enemies, by the law of nations did together with his liberty lose also all such power as he had over his own things. Now if a man should say, that the law commandeth to restore unto the robber his pawn, his things committed unto thee upon trust, or what thou hast of him borrowed; or to repossess him, being by force thrust out of a possession, never so unjustly by him obtained; there is thereof a double reason: the one, for that the robber in submitting himself unto the Magistrate, and showing his obedience unto the laws, in demanding justice, deserveth to be therein regarded: the other, for that this is not so much done in favour of the thief or robber, as in hatred of him which would unconscionably detain the sacred thing left to his trust, or by way of force proceed to the gaining of that which he might by course of justice have otherwise obtained. Of the first whereof we 
A notable example of favour, extended unto an offender, submitting himself unto his Prince.  have examples enough, but none more memorable than that of Augustus the Emperor, who caused it to be proclaimed by the sound of the Trumpet, that he would give ten Sestertiees unto him which should bring unto him Coracotas, the ring leader of the thieves and outlaws in Spain: which thing Coracotas understanding, of his own accord presented himself unto the Emperor, and demanded of him the promised reward: which Augustus caused to be paid unto him, and so received him into his favour, to the intent that men should not think, that he would take from him his life, to deceive him of the reward promised; or yet violate the public faith and security with him, who of himself offered himself unto the trial of justice: albeit he might have justly proceeded against the felon, and so have executed him. But he that should use such common right towards pirates & robbers, as is to be used against just enemies, 
Pirates and rob bers are not to have the favour of just enemies.  should open a dangerous gap to all vagabonds, to join themselves unto robbers and thieves; and assure their capital actions and confederacy, under the vail of justice. Not for that it is impossible to make a good Prince of a robber, or a good King of a rover: yea, such a pirate there hath been, who hath better deserved to be called a King, than many of them which have carried the regal sceptres and diadems, who have no true or probable excuse of the robberies and cruelties which they 'cause their subjects to endure. As Demetrius the pirate by way of reproach said to Alexander the great, 
The notable answer of Demetrius ●…pirat, unto Alexander the great.  That he had learned of his father no other occupation than piracy, neither from him received any other inheritance than two small frigates▪ whereas he which blamed him of piracy, roamed about nevertheless, and with two great armies rob the world without controlment, albeit that he had left him by his father the great and flourishing kingdom of Macedon. Which frank speech so moved Alexander, not to the revenge of the just reproach given him, but unto commiseration, with a certain remorse of conscience: in so much that he pardoned Demetrius, & made him general over one of his legions. And not to go further for examples, in our age Solyman the great Sultan of the Turks, with great rewards alured unto him Hariadenus Aenobarbus, Dragut Reis, & Occhial, three of the most famous pirates of our memory; whom he made his Admirals, and great commanders at Sea; by their strength to confirm his own power, and to keep under the other pirates, then roaming all about the seas, and so to assure his traffic. 
How arch pirates may in some sort be favoured.  Truly by such allurements to draw arch pirates into good order, is, and shall be always commendable: not only to the end, not to make such people through despair to invade the State of other princes, but also by their means to ruinated and bring to nought other pirates, as enemies to mankind: who although they seem to live in never so much amity and friendship together, and with great equality to divide the spoil, (as it is reported of Bargulus and Vitriatus, the arch pirates) yet for all that they aught not to be of right called societies and amities, or partnerships; but conspiracies, robberies, & pillages: neither is that their equal parting of the spoil, to be termed a lawful division, but a mere robbery: for that the principal point wherein consisteth the true mark and cognisance of amity in them wanteth, that is to wit, right government, according to the laws of nature. And that is it, for which the ancient writers have called Common weals, Societies of men assembled to live well and happily together. Which as it may serve for a description of a City, so can it not stand for a true definition 
The ancient definition of a Commonweal●… defective.  of a Commonweal, as having in the one part thereof too much, and in the other too little: three principal things especially to be required in every Commonwealth, wanting in this description, that is to say, the family, the sovereignty, and those things which are common to a City, or commonweal: joining hereunto also, that this word, Happily, as they understand it, is not necessary: for otherwise virtue should have no prize, if the favourable wind of prosperity still blew not in the poop thereof, which a good man will never consent unto. For a Commonweal may be right well governed, and yet nevertheless afflicted with poverty, forsaken of friends, besieged by enemies, and overwhelmed with many calamities: unto which estate Cicero himself confesseth him to have seen the Commonweal of Marseils in Province to have fallen, at such time as it was by Caius Caesar triumphed upon: which he saith to have been the best ordered and most accomplished that ever was in the world, without exception. And so contrariwise it should come to pass, that a City, or Commonweal, fruitful by situation, abounding in riches, flourishing, and well stored with people, reverenced of friends, feared of enemies, invincible in arms, strong in fortification, proud in buildings, triumphant in glory, should therefore be rightly governed, albeit, that it were surcharged with all villainies, and grounded in all manner of vices. And yet nevertheless most certain it is, that virtue hath not a more capital enemy, than such a perpetual success as they call most happy; which to join together with honesty, is no less difficulty, than to combine things by nature most contrary. Wherefore sith that we may without reproach want other things; as also without praise abound therein: but that virtues we cannot without great imputation want; or be with vices polluted without infamy: it must needs follow, that those things which are thought to make the life of man more blessed, that is to say, riches, wealth, large territories and possessions, not to be of necessity required unto well ordered Cities, and commonweals: so that he which will look further into the matter, must as little as he may decline from the best or most perfect state of a Commonweal. For as much as by the goodness of the end we measure the worth and excellency, as well of Cities and Commonweals, as of all other things: so that by how much the end of every City▪ or Commonweal is better or more heaven-like, so much is it to be deemed worthily to excel the rest. Yet is it not our intent or purpose to figure out the only imaginary form and Idea of a Commonweal, without effect, or substance, as have Plato, and Sir Thomas Moore 
●…  Chancellor of England, vainly imagined: but so near as we possibly can precisely to follow the best laws and rules of the most flourishing cities and Commonweals. In which doing, a man is not be justly blamed, although he fully attain not unto the end he aimeth at, no more than the good Pilot, by force of tempest driven out of his course; or the skilful Physician overcome with the force of the malady, are the less esteemed: provided, that the one hath yet in the cure well governed his sick patient; and the other in his course, his ship.  
Now if the greatest felicity and happiness of one citizen, and of a whole City, 
The chief fellcitie of one citisen▪ and of a City or common weal all one; and wherein it consisteth.  be all one and the self same, and the chief good of both consisteth in those virtues which are proper unto the mind, and are only conversant in contemplation (as they which in wisdom are said to have far excelled the rest, have with great agreement affirmed) it must needs follow also, those citizens and people to enjoy true felicity, which exercising themselves in the sweet knowledge of things natural, human, and divine, refer all the first-fruits of their contemplation unto the almighty God, and great Prince of nature. If we then confess this to be the principal end of the most blessed and happy life of every one in particular, we conclude, that this is the felicity and end also of a Commonweal. But for as much as men of affairs, and Princes, are not in this point agreed, every man measuring his good by the foot of his pleasures and contentments; and that those which have had the same opinion of the chief felicity of a man in particular, have not always agreed, That a good man and a good citizen are not all one; neither that the felicity of one man, and of a whole Common weal are both alike: this hath made that we have always had variety of laws, customs, and decrees, according to the divers humours and passions of Princes and governors. Most men thinking the life of man to be but base, if his endeavours should be only directed unto necessity, and not also unto pleasure, and ornament: they would (I say) accounted it a miserable thing to devil in poor cottages covered with turf, or in straight cabins and lodges to shroud themselves from the injury of the weather. But for as much as the wise man is in a sort the measure of right and wrong, of truth and falsehood; or as it were an inflexible rule: and they which are thought to excel all others in justice and wisdom, with one consent affirm the chief good of every one in particular, and of all in common, to be but one, and the same; we also putting no difference betwixt a good man, and a good citizen, measure the chief felicity and happiness of every particular man, and of all men in general, by that most beautiful and and sweet contemplation of high matters, which we before spoke of. Albeit that Aristotle sometimes following 
Aristotle blamed  the vulgar opinion, seemeth doubtful in setting down the chief good thing, and not well to agreed in opinion with himself; as thinking it necessary unto virtuous actions to join also wealth and power: yet when he reasoneth more subtly thereof, placing the chief good and felicity of man, in Contemplation. Which seemeth to have given occasion unto Marcus Varro to say, That the felicity of man consisteth in a mixture of action and contemplation together: whereof this may seem to have been the reason, For that as of one simple thing, the felicity is simple; so of things double or compound, the felicity is also double and compound. For the goodness of the body consisteth in the health, strength, agility, comeliness, and beauty thereof: but the goodness of the mind, that is to say, of that faculty or power which is the true bond of the body and understanding together, consisteth in the due obedience of our desires unto reason, that is to say, in the action of moral virtues: whereas the chief goodness and felicity of the understanding and mind itself, consisteth in the intellectual virtues, that is to say, Wisdom, Knowledge, and true Religion: Wisdom, concerning worldly affairs; Knowledge, concerning the searching out of the secrets of nature; and Religion, the knowledge of things divine. Of which three virtues, the first seethe the difference betwixt good and evil, the second betwixt truth and falsehood, and the third betwixt true holiness and impiety: and so altogether contain what is to be desired, or to be fled from. In which three virtues, true wisdom consisteth, better than which God hath not given any thing unto man: For that it cannot be taken from us by theft, consumed by fire, or lost by shipwreck; but is of itself sufficient to make men, otherwise destitute and bore of all other things, happy; and that not every one in particular only, but even altogether also. Yet for all that shall a city be much more blessed and fortunate, which increased by these virtues, shall have also sufficient territory, and place capable for the inhabitants; a fertile soil to plant in, with beasts and cattle sufficient to feed and clothe the people with; and for the maintenance of their health, the sweet disposition of the heavens, temperate and fresh air, plentiful and wholesome water, also matter fit for building and fortification, if the country of itself be not safe and strong enough against the injuries both of the weather and the enemy. These are the first beginnings of a growing commonweal, viz. That those things be first provided 
Things requisite for the first beginning of a growing commonweal.  for, without which people can in no wise live; and then after that, such other things as wherewith men live the more commodiously and better, as medicines to cure diseases, metals wherewith convenient tools may be made for workmen, & arms for soldiers, not only to repulse, but also to take revenge upon the enemy and robber. And for as much as the desires of men are insatiable, after that those things are provided for which are necessary, as also those which are profitable; it lusteth us also to seek after, and to abound with vain delights and pleasures, that so we may more sweetly & pleasantly live. And as we have no care of nurturing our children, before that they by convenient education being grown, become capable both of speech and reason; no more regard have cities also for the conforming of manners, or searching after the knowledge of natural and divine things, before they have gotten such things as must needs be had to feed and defend their citizens; but are with mean wisdom content to repulse their enemies, and defend their people from injury. But the man that hath got all things needful for him to lead a safe and happy life withal, if he be well by nature, 
A notable discourse of the course that men hold for the attaining of felicity.  and better by education instructed, abhorreth the company of lose and wicked men, sorteth himself with the good, and seeketh after their friendship: and afterwards when he feeleth himself clean & free from those perturbations and passions which trouble and molest the mind; and hath not set his whole hope upon his vain pelf, he at great ease beholdeth the changes and chances of the world, the unstaidnesse and diversity of men's manners, their divers ages, and conditions; some in the height of power and sovereignty; others in the bottom of calamity and woe: he then studiously beholdeth the mutations, rise, and downfals of Commonweals; and wisely joineth things forepast, unto those that are to come. After that, turning himself from men's affairs unto the beauty of nature, he delighteth himself in beholding the variety of nature's work in plants, living creatures, and minerals, he considereth of every one of them, their form, their strength, and excellency: yea he seethe the successive transmutations of the elements themselves one into another, the singular Antipathy and contagiousness of things, the wonderful order and consent of causes; whereby the things lowest, are joined unto the highest, they in the middle unto both, and so in brief all to all: as also whereof every thing took beginning, whether it returneth again, when and how it shall take end; what in things is mortal and transitory, what immortal and eternal: and so by little and little, as it were with the swift wings of contemplation carried up into heaven, wondereth at the brightness of the notable stars; the power, placing, distance, and unequal course of the heavenly bodies; and so the good agreement and as it were most sweet harmony of the whole world, and of every part thereof: so ravished with a wonderful pleasure, accompanied with a perpetual desire to see the causes of all things, he is still carried on, until he be brought unto God, the first cause, and governor of all this most fair and beautiful work: whither when he is once come, he sta●…eth to search further, seeing that he is of an infinite and incomprehensible essence, greatness, power, wisdom, and beauty, such as cannot either by tongue be expressed, or by any mind of man conceived: yet so much as in him is he praiseth, extolleth, and with great devotion honoureth, that so great brightness of the divine Majesty, which by such heavenly contemplation draweth him unto the true glory, and chief end of all goodness. For by these means men seem in a manner to have obtained the most goodly knowledge of things natural, civil, and divine, and the very sum of human felicity and bliss.  
If therefore we judge such a man wise and happy, as hath not gotten store of common wealth and pelf, but the knowledge and understanding of most excellent things, and remote from the rude capacity of the vulgar people: how much more happy aught we to judge a commonweal, abounding with a multitude of such citizens, although 
A small commonweal may yet be happy.  it contented with straight bounds, contemn the proud wealth and pleasures of the greatest cities, which measure their greatest felicity, by their greatest delights, or by their abundant wealth and store, or by the vanity of their glory? Neither yet for all that do we make that chief good of a man, or of a common weal, to be a thing confused, or mixed: For albeit that man be composed of a body which is frail and mortal, and of a soul which is eternal and immortal; yet must it needs be confessed the cheiefe goodness of man to rest and be in that part which is more excellent than the rest, that is to say, the Mind. For if it be true (as true it is) that this our body is compact and framed of flesh and bones, to serve the soul; and our desires to obey reason: who can doubt the chief felicity of man wholly to depend of the most excellent virtue thereof, which men call the action of the mind? For although Aristotle, according to the opinion of the Stoics, had placed the chief goodness of man in the action of virtue; yet he the same man was of opinion, that the same action was still to be referred unto the end of contemplation: otherwise (saith he) the life of man should be more blessed than that of the Gods, who not troubled with any actions or business, enjoy the sweet fruit of eternal contemplation, with a most assured repose and rest. And yet not willing to follow the doctrine of his master Plato, and also accounting it 
Aristotle blamed.  a shame to departed from the opinion by himself once received and set down; for as much as he at the first had put the blessed life in action; he afterward with great ambiguity of words, hath placed the chief felicity of man, in the action of the mind, which is nothing else but contemplation: to the intent he might not seem to have put the chief good, both of men and commonweals, in things most contrary unto themselves; motion (I say) and rest, action and contemplation. And yet he nevertheless seeing men and commonweals to be still subject unto motion, and troubled with their necessary affairs, would not plainly put that chief good or happiness which we seek after, in contemplation only; which for all that he must of necessity confess. For albeit that the actions whereby man's life is maintained, as to eat, to drink, to sleep, and such like, are so necessary, as that a man cannot long want them: yet is no man so simple, as in them to put man's chief good or felicity. The moral virtues also are of much more worth and dignity than they: for that the mind by them (or by the virtue divine) purged from all perturbations, and affections, may be filled with the most sweet fruit and clear light of contemplation. Whereby it is to be understood, the moral virtues to be referred unto the intellectual, as unto their end. Now that can in no wise be called the chief good or happiness, which is referred unto a farther thing, better and more excellent than itself: as the body unto the soul, appetite unto reason, motion unto quiet rest, action unto contemplation. And therefore I suppose that Marcus Varro, who deemed man his chief good to be mixed, of action and contemplation; might (in mine opinion) have more aptly and better said man's life to have need of both; yet the chief good and felicity thereof to consist in contemplation: which the Academics called the sweet, and the Hebrews the precious death; for that it doth in a sort ravish the mind of man from out of this frail and vile body, and carrieth the same up into heaven. Yet nevertheless true it is, that a commonweal cannot long stand if it be quite or long time destitute of those ordinary actions which concern the preservation of the people's welfare, as the administration and execution of justice, the providing of victuals, and such other things necessary for the life of man; no more than can a man long live whose mind is so strongly ravished with the contemplation of high things, that he forgetteth to eat or drink, and so suffereth the body with hunger and thirst to perish, or for lack of rest to die.  
But as in this fabric of the world (which we may call the true image of a perfect and 
A notable comparison.  most absolute commonweal) the Moon, as the soul of the world, coming nearer unto the Sun, seemeth to forsake this perspirall and elementary region; and yet afterwards by the conjunction of the Sun, filled with a divine virtue, wonderfully imparteth the same unto these inferior bodies: so also the soul of this little world, by the 
A man is called the little world.  force of contemplation ravished out of the body, and in some sort as it were united unto the great 
* GOD.  Sun of understanding, the life of the whole world, wonderfully lightened with divine virtue, with that celestial force marvelously strengtheneth the body, with all the natural powers thereof. Yet if the same, become too careful of the body, or too much drowned in the sensual pleasures thereof, shall forsake this divine Sun; it shall befall it even as it doth unto the Moon, which shunning the sight of the Sun, and masked with the the shadow of the earth, looseth her brightness and light, by which defect many fowl monsters are engendered, and the whole course of nature troubled: and yet if the Moon should never be separated from the conjunction of the Sun, it is most certain that the whole frame of this elementary world should in right short time be dissolved and perish. The same judgement we are to have of a well ordered commonweal; the chief end and felicity whereof consisteth in the contemplative virtues: albeit that public and political actions of less worth, be first and the forerunners of the same, as the provision of things necessary for the maintenance and preservation of the state and people; all which for all that we accounted far inferior unto the moral virtues, as are also they unto the virtues intellectual; the end of which, is the divine contemplation of the fairest and most excellent object that can possibly be thought of or imagined. And therefore we see that Almighty God who with great wisdom disposed all things, but that especially, for that he appointed only six days for us to travel and to do our business in, but the seventh day he consecrated unto contemplation and most holy rest, which only day of all others he blessed 
Gen. cap. 2. Deut. Exod. cap. 20.  as the holy day of repose and rest, to the intent we should employ the same in contemplation of his works, in meditation of his law, and giving of him praises. And thus much concerning the principal end and chief good of every man in particular, as also of all men in general, and of every well ordered commonweal: the nearer unto which end they approach, by so much they are the more happy. For as we see in particular 
A fit comparison.  men, many degrees of worldly calamity or bliss, according to the divers ends of good or bad that they have unto themselves propounded; so have also commonweals in a sort their degrees of felicity and misery, some more, some less, according to the divers ends they have in their government aimed at.  
The Lacedæmonians are reported to have always been valiant and courageous 
Plato, Plutarch in the lives of Lysander, Agesilaus, and Lycurgus.  men; but in the rest of their actions injust and perfidious, if question once were of the common good: for that their education, their laws, customs, and manners, had no other scope or end than to make their people courageous to undertake all dangers, and painful to endure all manner of labour and toil; contemning all such pleasures and delights, as commonly effeminate the minds of men, and weaken their strength, referring all their thoughts & deeds, to the increasing of their state. But the Roman commonweal having flourished in justice, far passed the Lacedæmonians; for that the Romans, besides that they were passing courageous, had propounded also unto themselves 
Dionis Halicar. li. pri.  true justice, whereunto, as to a mark they addressed all their actions. Wherhfore we must so much as in us lieth endeavour ourselves to found the means to attain or at lest wise to come so near as we possibly can, unto that felicity we have before spoken of, and to that definition of a Commonweal by us before set down. Wherefore prosecuting every part of the said definition, let us first speak of a Family.   

CHAP. II ¶ Of a Family, and what difference there is between a Family and a Commonweal.  
A Family is the right government of many subjects or persons 
The definition of a family.  under the obedience of one and the same head of the family; and of such things as are unto them proper. The second part of the definition of a Commonweal by us set down, concerneth a Family, which is the true seminary and beginning of every Commonweal, as also a principal member thereof. So that Aristotle following Xenophon, seemeth to me without any probable cause, to have divided the Economical government from the Political, and a City from a Family: which can no otherwise be done, than if we should pull the members from the body; or go about to build a City without houses. Or by the same reason he should have set down by itself a treatise of Colleges, and Corporations; which being neither families nor cities, are yet parts of a Commonweal. Whereas we see the Lawyers, and law makers (whom we aught as guides to follow in reasoning of a Commonweal) to have in the same treatise comprehended the laws and ordinances of a commonweal, corporations, colleges, and families; howbeit that they have otherwise taken the Economical government than did Aristotle; who defineth it to be a knowledge for the getting of goods: a thing common unto corporations and Colleges, as unto Cities also. Whereas we under the name of a Family, do comprehend the right government of an house or family; as also the power and authority the master of the house hath over his people, and the obedience to him due: things not touched in the treatise of Aristotle and Xenophon. Wherhfore as a family well and wisely ordered, is the true image of a City, and the domestical government, 
The good government of a family the true model for the government of a Common weal.  in sort like unto the sovereignty in a Commonweal: so also is the manner of the government of an house or family, the true model for the government of a Commonweal. And as whilst every particular member of the body doth his duty, we live in good and perfect health; so also where every family is kept in order, the whole city shall be well and peaceably governed. But if a man shall be cross and froward unto his wife, if the wife shall be about to take upon her the office of her husband, and not show herself obedient unto him; if both of them shall accounted of their children as of servants, and of their servants as of beasts, and so tyrannize over them; if children shall refuse the commands of their parents, and the servants of their masters; who seethe not no concord to be in that house, no agreement of minds and wills, but all full of strife, brawling and contention? Seeing therefore the way to order well a city, leaneth & resteth in the good government of families, as it were upon certain proper foundations: it behoveth us first to have an especial regard and care for the good ordering and government of families.  
We said a Commonweal to be a lawful government of many families, and of such things as unto them in common belongeth, with a puissant sovereignty. By the word, Many, you may not in this case understand two, as for most part we do; for seeing that the law requireth at the lest three persons to make a College, we according to the Lawyer's opinion accounted three persons also, besides the master of the house, necessary to make a family; be they children, or slaves, or men enfranchised, or free borne men which have voluntarily submitted themselves unto the master of the house or family, who maketh up the fourth, and is yet nevertheless a member of the family. But for as much as ●…miliess, Colleges, Companies, Cities, and Commonweals, yea, and mankind itself would perish and come to end, were it not by martiages (as by certain Seminaries, or nurseries) preserved and continued, it followeth well that a family cannot be in all points perfect and accomplished without a wife. So that by this account 
Not perfect family without a wife.  it cometh to pass, there must be five persons at lest to make up an whole and entire family. If therefore there must needs be three persons, and no fewer, to make a 
How many persons be requisite to make up an whole and entire family, and how many families make a City.  College, and as many to make a family, beside the master of the household and his wife; we for the same reason say three families and no fewer to be necessary for the making of a City, or Commonweal, which should be three times five, for three perfect families. Whereupon (in mine opinion) the ancient writers have called fifteen a people, as saith Appuleius, referring the number of fifteen unto three entire families. For albeit that the master of the family have three hundred wives, as had Solomon King of the Hebrews; and six hundred children, as had Hermotimus king of the 
justin. lib. 4.  Parthians by his multitude of wives; or five hundred slaves, as had Crassus; if they be all under the command of one and the same head of the family, they are neither to be called a people nor a city, but by the name of a family only: Yea although he have many children, or servants married, having themselves children also; provided always, that they be under the authority of one head, whom the law calleth father of the family, although he yet cry in his cradle. And for this cause the Hebrews, who always show the propriety of things by their names, have called a family 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, not for that a family containeth a thousand persons, as saith one Rabbin, but of the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, which signifieth an head, a Prince, or Lord, naming the family by the chief thereof: better as I suppose than did the Greeks, of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, or the Latins of Famulis. But what should let (may some man say) three Colleges, or many other particular assemblies without a family to make a City, or Common weal, if they be governed by one sovereign command? Truly it maketh a good show, and yet for all that is it no Commonweal: for that no College, nor body politic can long stand without a family, but must of itself perish and come to naught.  
Now the law saith, that the people never dieth, but a thousand year hence to be the same that it was before▪ although the use and profit of any thing granted unto a common weal be after an hundred year extinguished, and again reunited unto the propriety, which propriety should otherwise be unto the Lord thereof vain and unprofitable: for it is to be presumed, that all they which now live will in the course of an hundred years be dead, albeit that by successive propagation they be immortal; not otherwise than Theseus his ship, which although it were an hundred times changed, by putting in of new planks, yet still retained the old name. But as a ship, if the keel (which strongly beareth up the prow, the poup, the ribs, and tackle) be taken away, is no longer a ship, but an evil favoured houp of wood: even so a Commonweal without a sovereignty of power, which uniteth in one body all the members and families of the same is no more a common weal, neither can by any means long endure. And not 
It is not the greatness of the number that maketh the Commonweal, but the union of the people under one sovereign command.  to departed from our similitude: as a ship may be quite broken up, or altogether consumed with fire; so may also the people be into divers places dispersed, or else be utterly destroyed, the City or state yet standing whole; for it is neither the walls, neither the persons, that maketh the city, but the union of the people under the same sovereignty of government, albeit that there be in all but three families. For as an Emot is as well to be called a living creature, as an Elephant: so the lawful government of three families, with a sovereignty of power maketh as well a common weal, as a great signiory. So Rhaguse one of the lest signeuries in all Europe, is no less a common weal, than are those of the Turks, the Tartars, or Spaniards, whose Empires are bounded with the same bounds that the course of the Sun is. And as a little family shut up in a small cottage, is no less to be accounted a family, than that which dwelleth in the greatest and richest house in the city▪ so a little king is as well a Sovereign as the greatest Monarch in the world. So Ulysses, whose kingdom was contained within the rock of Ithaca, is of Homer as well called a King, as Agamemnon: for a great kingdom (as saith Cassiodorus) is no other thing than a great Commonweal, under the government of one chief sovereign: wherefore if of three families, one of the chief of the families hath sovereign power over the other two, or two of them together over the third, or all three jointly and at once exercise power and authority over the people of the three families; it shall as well be called a Commonweal, as if it in itself comprehended an infinite multitude of citizens. And by this means it may chance, that one family 
Sometimes one▪ family may be greater than some Common weal.  may sometimes be greater and better peopled then a common weal: as was well said of the family of Aemilius Tubero, who was head of a family of sixteen of his own children, all married, whom he had all under his power, together with their children and servants, dwelling in the same house with him. And on the contrary part, the greatest 
Plut. in Emili. The greatest & best peopled city no more a common weal than the lest.  City or Monarchy, and the best peopled that is upon the face of the earth, is no more a common weal or city, than the lest. Albeit that Aristotle saith, the city of Babylon (whose circuit in a square form was so great, that it could scarce on foot be go about in three days) was to be called rather a nation, than a common weal, which aught not, as he saith, to have more than ten thousand citizens in it at the most: as if it were any absurdity to call an infinite number of nations, and dwelling in divers places, governed by one sovereign command, by the name of a Commonweal. By which means the city of Rome (more famous than which was never any) should not 
The multitude of people no binderance to the unity of a common weal▪ so that they be under one sovereign command.  deserve the name of a Commonweal, which at the foundation thereof had not above 3000 citizens; but in the time of Tiberius the Emperor, had cessed in it fifteen millions, besides an hundred and ten thousand others dispersed almost throughout the world: not accounting the slaves, the number of whom was ten times greater: and yet in this number were not comprised they of the Provinces subject unto the Empire of Rome, neither the confederate cities, or free nations, who had their Commonweals in sovereignty divided from the Roman Empire. Which sovereignty of government is the true foundation and hinge whereupon the state of a city turneth: whereof all the magistrates, laws, and ordinances dependeth; and by whose force and power, all colleges, corporations, families, and citizens are brought as it were into one perfect body of a Commonweal: albeit that all the subjects thereof be enclosed in one little town, or in some straight territory, as the commonweal of Schwitz, one of the lest of the confederate Cantons of Suisers; not so large as many farms of this 
* France.  kingdom, nor of greater revenue: or else that the Commonweal hath many large provinces and countries, as 
* Ester. cap. 1  had the Persians', which 
* Herodotus, 〈◊〉. in Arta●….  is reported to have had an hundred twenty seven provinces from the uttermost part of India, unto the sea of Hellespontus: or as is now also the commonweal of the Aethiopians, wherein are fifty provinces, which Pau. iovius without reason calleth kingdoms; albeit that they have not but one king, one kingdom, one Monarch, one Commonweal, under the puissant sovereignty of one and the same Prince whom they call Negus.  
But beside that sovereignty of government thus by us set down, as the strong foundation of the whole Commonweal; many other things beside are of citizens to be had in common among themselves, as their markets, their churches, their walks, 
Many thing●… common unto citizens among themselves.  ways, laws, decrees, judgements, voices, customs, theatres, walls, public buildings, common pastures, lands, and treasure; and in brief, rewards, punishments, suits, and contracts: all which I say are common unto all the citizens together, or by use and profit: or public for every man to use, or both together. That is also a great community which ariseth of colleges and corporations of companies, as also of benefits both given and received. For otherwise a Commonweal cannot be so much as imagined, 
No commonweal where nothing is common  which hath in it nothing at all public or common. Although it may so be, that the greatest part of their lands be common unto the citizens in general, and the lest part unto every one of them in particular: as by the law of Romulus, called Agraria, all the lands of Rome, at that time containing eighteen thousand acres, was divided * into 
Dionysius H●…ly carnasseus lib. 2.  three equal parts, whereof the first part was assigned for the maintaining of the sacrifices; the second for the defraying of the necessary charges of the common weal; and the third was equally divided among the citizens; who being in number but three thousand, had to every one of them allotted two acres: which equal partage long time after continued with great indifferency, for Cincinnatus the Dictator himself 260 years after had no more but two acres of land, which he with his own hands husbanded. But howsoever lands may be divided, it cannot possibly be, that all things should be common amongst citizens; which unto Plato seemed so notable a thing, and so much 
Plato his opinion for the community of all things in a commonweal, refuted.  to be wished for, as that in his Commonweal he would have all men's wives and children common also: for so he deemed it would come to pass that these two words, Mine and Thy, should never more be heard amongst his citizens, being in his opinion the cause of all the discord and evils in a Commonweal. But he understood not that by making all things thus common, a Commonweal must needs perish: for nothing can be public, where nothing is private: neither can it be imagined there to be any thing had in common, if there be nothing to be kept in particular; no more than if all the citizens were kings, they should at all have no king; neither any harmony, if the diversity and dissimilitude of voices cunningly mixed together, which maketh the sweet harmony, were all brought unto one and the same tune. Albeit that such a Commonweal should be also against the law of God and nature, which detest not only incests, adulteries, and inevitable murders, if all women should be common; but also expressly forbids us to steal, or so much as to desire any thing that another man's is. Whereby it evidently appeareth this opinion for the community of all things to be erroneous, seeing Commonweals to have been to that end founded and appointed by God, to give unto them that which is common; and unto every man in private, that which unto him in private belongeth. Besides that also such a community of all things is impossible, and incompassible with the right of families: for if in the family and the city, that which is proper, and that which is common, that which is public, and that which is private, be confounded; we shall have neither family nor yet Commonweal. In so much that Plato himself (in all other things most excellent) after he had seen the notable inconveniences & absurdities which such a confused community of all things drew after it, wisely of himself departed from that so absurd an opinion, and easily suffered that Commonweal which he had attributed unto Socrates to be abolished; that so he might more moderately defend his own. But some will say, that the Massagets had all things in common: yet they which so say, confess also every one of them to have had his pot, his sword unto himself, as also must they needs have their private apparel and garments also; for otherwise the weaker should be still spoiled of the stronger, having his garments still taken from him.  
Wherhfore as a Commonweal is a lawful government of many families, and of those things which unto them in common belongeth, with a puissant sovereignty: so is a Family the right government of many subjects or persons, and of such things as are unto them proper, under the rule and command of one and the same head of the family. For in that especially consisteth the difference betwixt a Commonweal and a Family: 
The chief difference betwixt a Family and a Commonweal.  for that the master of a family hath the government of domestical things, and so of his whole family with that which is unto it proper; albeit that every house or family be bound to give something unto the Commonweal, whether it be by the name of a subsidy, tax, tribute, or other extraordinary imposition. And it may be that all the subjects of a Commonweal may live together in common, in manner of Colleges, or companies, as did in ancient time the Lacedæmonians, where the men apart from their wives and families, used to eat and sleep together by fifteen and twenty in a company: As also in ancient time in Crect, all the citizens of all sorts men and women, young and old, rich and poor, always eat and drank together; and yet for all that, every man had his own proper goods apart, every one of them still contributing what was thought expedient for the defraying of the common charge. Which thing the Anabaptists in our time began to practise in the town of Munster, having commanded all things to be 
* Sleidan.  common, excepting their wives (of whom they might have many) and their apparel, thinking thereby the better to maintain mutual love and concord among them: in which their account they found themselves far deceived. For they which admit this community of all things, are so far from this good agreement of citizens among themselves, which they hope thus to maintain, as that thereby the mutual love betwixt man and wife, the tender care of parents towards their children, and their dutifulness again towards them, and in brief the mutual love of neighbours and kinsmen among themselves, is quite extinguished; all the kind bond of blood and kindred (than which none stronger can be imagined for the friendship and good agreement of citizens) being by this means taken away. For that which thou shouldest dearly love must be thine own, and that also all thine: whereas community is of the Lawyers justly called of itself, the mother of contention and discord. Neither are they less deceived, which think greater care to be had of things that be common, than of things that be private; for we ordinarily see things in common and public to be of every man smally regarded and neglected, except it be to draw some 
Things common smally regarded  private and particular profit thereout of. Besides that, the nature of love and friendship is such, that the more common it is, or unto more divided, the less force it is of: not unlike to great rivers, which carry great vessels, but being divided into small branches, serveth neither so keep back the enemy, neither for burden: in which manner love also divided unto many persons or things, looseth his force and virtue. So the lawful and certain government of a family, divideth every private man's wives and children, servants and goods, from all other men's families; as also that which is unto every particular man proper, from that which is to them all common in general, that is to say, from a Commonweal. And withal in every well governed Commonweal we see the public magistrate to have a certain especial care and regard of the private goods of orphans, of mad men, and of the prodigal: for that it concerneth the Commonweal to have their goods preserved unto them to whom they belong, and that they be not embeseled. As in like case the laws oftentimes forbiddeth a man to procure, to alienat, or to pawn his own goods or things, except upon certain conditions, as also unto certain persons▪ for that the preservation of every private man's goods in particular, is the preservation of the Commonweal in general. And yet nevertheless although 
Particular families may have also their particular laws: and how.  laws be common to all, it is not inconvenient, but that families may have their certain particular statutes for themselves and their successors, made by the ancient heads of their families, and confirmed unto them by their sovereign Princes. As we have example in the most honourable nation of the Saxons, amongst whom are many families, which use certain their own private laws, quite differing both from the laws of the Empire, and from the common laws and customs of Saxony. And betwixt the dukes of Bavaria, and the Counties Palatines there are also their particular laws, as well for the lawful succession in the inheritance of their houses, as in the right of the Electorship, which is in these two honourable houses, alternative, by the ancient decrees of their predecessors: which laws & customs the duke of Bavaria, with great instance required to have renewed at the diet of the Empire at Auspurge, in the year 1555 which is not so in the other families of the Electors. Betwixt the houses also of Saxony and Hess, are their domestical and proper laws 
* Anno 1370. and 1431.  confirmed unto them by the Emperor Charles the fourth, and Sigismond. In like manner it was decreed betwixt the houses of Austria, and Bohemia, that for lack of heirs male, the one of them should succeed into the inheritance of the other, as we see it is now come to pass. And not to go further than this 
* France.  Realm, I have seen a charter of the house of Laval granted by the King, and confirmed by the Parliament of Paris, directly contrary to the customs of Anjou, Britagne, and Main, wherein the most part of their inheritance lie: by which Charter the first inheritor (able to succeed) is to enjoy all, being not bound to give any thing unto his coheirs, more than the movables; with charge, that the heir male shall bear the name of Guy de Laval; or of Guionne, if she be an inheritrix, and the arms plain. In like manner in the houses of Baume, Albret, and Rhodez, the daughters by the ancient laws of their ancestors, were excluded both in direct and collateral line from inheriting, so long as there were any males in what degree soever; deriving as it were into their families, the law Salic, usual unto the Princes of Savoy. Such laws of families, which the Latins had also, and called them Ius familiar, were made by their ancestors and chief of their families, for the mutual preservation of their inheritance, name, and ancient arms; which may in some sort well be suffered in some great and honourable families: which private laws and customs by us thus spoken of, have oftentimes preserved from destruction, not only families, but whole common weals; which was the cause that in the diet at Auspurge in the year 1555, the Princes 
The great benefit which oftentimes cometh unto a Commonweal, by certain private laws and customs granted unto some great and honourable houses & families.  of the Empire after long civil war, wisely renewed the ancient laws of great houses and families, as having well perceived that by that mean the Empire was to be preserved from ruin, and the state of Almaigne from a general destruction. Which for all that, is not to take place in other obscure and particular base families, to the intent that the public laws, so much as is possible, should be unto all men common and the self same. For it is not without great cause to be suffered, that the laws of private families should derogat from the customs of the country, and so, much less from the general laws and ordinances. Neither are they which come after, by this law of families by their grandfathers, & great grandfathers made, contrary to the common customs and laws, further bound than they themselves shall thereunto give their consent. For which cause the successors of the house of Albret, of Laval, and of Montmorency obtained decrees from the Parliament of Paris, contrary to the ancient charters of their predecessors; for that they were contrary unto the customs of those places, when question was of the successions of Laval, of the County of Dreux, and of Montmorency, which they would make indivisible, contrary to the custom of the Viscomptie of Paris: For it beseemeth that the customs of families should be subject unto the laws, in like manner as the heads of families are subject unto their sovereign Princes. Much less are the laws of families and kindreds, allowed by the decrees of the Romans, to be be suffered, lest for the private the public should be neglected: as Camillus complained with Livy, 
* Livitie lib. 5  What (saith he) if the sacred rites of families may not in time of war be intermitted, pleaseth it you that the public sacrifices and Roman gods should even in time of peace be forsaken? For it was a law of the twelve tables conceived in these words, Sacred private Rites, firm be they for ever: which M. Tullius translated into his laws. And thus much in general, concerning the similitude and difference of a Common weal and Family: now let us discourse also of the singular parts of a Family.   

CHAP. III ¶ Of the power of an Husband over his Wife, as also of the mutual duties betwixt them: and whether it be expedient to renew the law of divorcement or not.  
ALL assemblies of men lawfully joined together, whether they be Families, Colleges, Universities, or Commonweals, are kept together and preserved by the mutual duties of commanding and obeying: for as much as that liberty which nature hath given unto every one to live at his own pleasure, bound within no laws, is yet subject unto the rule and power of some other. All which power to command over others, is either 
The division of power and command.  public or private: The power public, is either free from law, as is theirs which hold the chiefest place of sovereignty; or else restrained by law, as is the power of the Magistrates, who although they command over private men, are yet themselves subject unto the commands and laws of others their superiors. The power private, consisteth either in the heads of families, or in corporations, or colleges, where all by a general consent, or the greater part, commandeth over the rest. But the domestical 
Domestical power of four sorts.  power is of four sorts: viz. The power of the Husband over his Wife, the power of the Father over his children, the power of the Lord over his slaves, and the power of the head of a Family over his mercenary servants. And for as much as the right and lawful government of every Commonweal, Corporation, College, Society, and Family dependeth of the due knowledge of commanding and obeying; let us now speak of every part of commanding in such order as is by us before set down. For natural liberty is such, as for a man next unto God not to be subject to any man living, neither to suffer the command of any other than of himself; that is to say, of Reason, which is always conformable unto the will of God. This natural commandment 
The first & greatest command is the command of Reason over our affections, & so over ourselves.  of Reason over our affections and desires, is the first, the greatest and most ancient that is: for before that one can well command over others, he must first learn to command himself, giving unto Reason the sovereignty of command; and unto his affection's obedience: so shall it come to pass that every one shall have that which of right unto him belongeth, which is the first and fairest justice that is; and that where of the common Hebrew proverb grew, That every man's charity should first begin of himself: which is no other thing than to keep our affections obedient unto Reason. This is the first law of natural command, which God by his express commandment 
* Gen. cap. 2.  established, as we see in the speech which God had both unto her that was the first 
* Gen. cap. 3  mother of us all; as also against him who first defiled himself with his brother's blood 
* Gen. cap. 4 . For that command which he had before given the Husband and his Wife, is two ways to be understood; first literally for the power the Husband hath over his Wife, and then morally for the command the soul hath over the body, and reason over affection. For that reasonable part of understanding, is in man as the Husband; and Affection, as the Woman: For before God had created Eva, it was said of Adam, Male and female created he them 
* Gen. cap. 1. . Wherhfore the woman in holy writ is oftentimes taken for affection: but never more than with Solomon, who so lived as a man unto women most kind; but so writ, as if he had been unto them a sworn enemy, whereas he thought nothing less, all that his speech being to be understood of man's unreasonable desires, as well declareth the wise and grave Rabbin Maymon 
* Rabbi Maymon. lib. x. nemore. . But leave we the moral discourse unto Philosophets and Divines to dispute of, and let us take that which belongeth unto civil policy, and speak of the power the Husband hath over the Wife, as proper unto this our question. By the name of a Wife I understand a just and lawful Wife, and not concubine, which is not in the power of him that keepeth her; albeit that the Roman laws call it marriage, and not concubinage, 
A man hath no power over his Concubine, or her that is but unto him betrothed.  if the concubine be frank and free: which all nations have of good right rejected, and as it were by secret consent abrogated, as a thing dishonest and of evil example. Neither doth this power that the Husband nath over his Wife extend unto her that is but betrothed, upon whom the betrothed man may not lay his hand; which hath ever been lawful unto the Husband, both by the Civil and Canon law: yea if the betrothed man shall lay violent hand, or force her that is to him affianced or betrothed, he shall therefore by right suffer capital punishment. But what if by consent of the man and of the woman, contract of marriage be made by words of the present time, before they know one another; for that, the law calleth just marriage: I am for all that of opinion the power of an Husband not to be yet gotten by such a contract, except the Wife have followed her Husband: for as much as by the decrees of the Divines and Canonists (whose authority is in this matter the greatest) as often as question is made of the right of marriages, scarce any regard is had of such marriages betwixt man and wife, except it be of fact consumat, by the mutual coviunction of their bodies; which by the consent of many nations is expressly received, as often as question is made of enjoying of such commodities as are to be gained by marriage. But after that lawful conjunction 
How the Husband sometimes hath not of right power over his Wife, and why.  of man and wife (which we have spoken of) the Wife is in the power of her Husband, except he be a slave, or the son of the master of the Family, who have no authority over their wives, & much less over their children; which although their married father were manumised, should yet fall into the power of their grandfather. The reason whereof is, for that a Family should have but one head, one master, and one Lord: whereas otherwise if it should have many heads, their commands would be contrary, one forbidding what another commandeth, to the continual disturbance of the whole family. And therefore the woman by condition free, marrying herself unto the master of the family's son, is in the power of her father in law, as is also the free man marrying himself unto the master of the family's daughter, in the power of another man if he go to devil in the house of his Father in law: albeit that in all other things he enjoy his right and liberty. Neither seemeth it a thing reasonable, that is by the Roman laws ordained, That the married daughter, except she be before by her Father set at liberty, although she have forsaken his house and devil with her Husband, shall not yet for all that be in the power of her Husband, but of her father: A thing contrary unto the law of nature, which willeth, That every man should be master of his own house, (as saith Homer) to the end that he may be a law unto his family: and repugnant also unto the law of God, which commandeth the Wife to forsake father and mother to follow her Husband; and also giveth power unto the Husband to confirm or break the vows of his Wife. Wherhfore that law of the Romans is 
* Numeri. 3.  worthily abrogated, and especially with us: for that the custom generally exempteth the married woman out of the power of her father; as was likewise in the Lacedaemonian Commonweal, as Plutarch writeth, where the married woman saith thus; When I was a daughter I did the command of my father, but since that I am married, it is my Husband to whom I own mine obeisance: for otherwise the wife might tread under foot the commandment of her Husband, and acquit herself when she saw good under the guard of her father. Now the interpreters of this Roman law have used many cautions to avoid the absurdities and inconveniences following, if the wife should not be subject to her husband, until she were set at liberty by her father. Yet in that point the laws of all people agreed with the laws of God and nature, That 
The wife by all the laws of God and man bound to obey her husband.  the wife aught to be obedient unto her husband, and not to refuse his commands not repugnant unto honesty. One Italian Doctor there is of opinion, That the wife is not in the power of her husband: but for that of his assertion so singular and absurd, he hath brought neither reason nor authority, there hath been none so fond to follow the same. For it is certain by the law of Romulus, that the husband had not only the command of his wife, but also power of life and death over her, in four cases, without 
Four ●…●…seswherin a man by Romulus' his-law had power of life and death over his wife.  any form of judicial process against her: that is to wit, for Adultery, for suborning of a child, for counterfeiting of false keys, and for drinking of wine. Howbeit the rigour of those laws were by the kindness of husbands by little and little moderated, and the punishment of adultery committed to the discretion of the parents of the wife: which began to be renewed & again put in practice in the time of Tiberius the Emperor; for that the husband putting away his wife for adultery, or himself attainted 
* Tacitus lib. 2  with the same crime, the offence remained unpunished, not without the great reproach of their kindred, who in ancient time (after the manner of the Romans) punished the adulterous women with death, or with exile. And albeit that the power of the husband over his wife was much diminished, yet nevertheless by the oration 
* Livi. lib. 33.  which Marcus Cato the Censor made unto the people in defence of the law Oppia (which took from women their habiliments of colours, and forbade them to wear above one ounce of gold) it appeareth that the women were all their lives in the government of their fathers, their brethren, their husbands, & next kinsmen, in such sort, as that without their leave or authority, they could make no contract, or yet do any lawful act. This Cato the Censor flourished about 550 years after the laws of Romulus: and 200 years after, Ulpian the Lawyer writeth, That Tutors and Governors were wont to be given to women and orphans; but when they were married, that then they were in the hand of the man, that is to say in the power of the husband. And if any should say That he divided the title of persons that are in the power of others, from them that are in the power of others; it followeth not thereof that wives were in the power of their husbands, but was by him so done, to show the difference of power the husband hath over his wife, the father over his children, and the lord over his slaves. And what doubt is there but that this word Hand, signifieth oftentimes power and authority? the Hebrews, Greeks, & Latins, having always so used it, as when they say, The hand of the King▪ and, To come into the hand of the enemy. And Festus Pompeius, speaking of the husband bringing home his wife, useth the word Mancipare, a word proper unto slaves: which word we yet use in many our customs and laws, where question is of the emancipating of women. But to make it plain, this power of husbands over their wives to have been common unto all people, we will by two or three examples declare the same. Olorus King of Thracia compelled the Dacians overcome by their 
justin. lib. 32.  enemies, to serve their wives, in token of extreme servitude, & of the greatest reproach that he could devise to do them. We read also that by the laws of the Lombard's the woman was in the same subjection that the ancient Romans were, and that the husbands had all power of life and death over their wives▪ which they yet used in the time of Baldus, not yet 260. years ago▪ And not to seek farther, what people had ever so great power over their wives as had our ancestors? The French men (saith 
* Lib. 6. Belli Gallici.  Gaesar) have power of life and death over their wives and children, in like manner as over their slaves: and being never so little suspected to have wrought their husband's death, are to be tortured by their own kinsmen, and being found guilty are by them to be cruelly executed, without any further authority from the Magistrate. But for 
That it was lawful for a man to kill his wife for drinking of wine  drinking of wine it was much more manifest that it was cause sufficient by the Roman laws for the husband to put his wife to death; wherein all the 
* Dion. Halic. lib. 2. Plin. li. 14 cap. 13. Vaser. de instit. antiq.  ancient writers agreed; which was not only the custom of the Romans, but also (as Theophrastus writeth) of the ancient inhabitants of Marseiles●… in Provinde, and the Milesians, who used the same law against their w●…eses that had drunk wine▪ judging that the disordered desires of the woman subject to wine, would also make her drunk, and so afterwards 
Cicero de nat. lib. 3. & de Repub. lib. 1. Ps●…. in Problem. Rom. cap. 6. Arnob. lib. 2. adversus gentes. Tertul in Apolog. cap▪ 6. Gellius lib. 10 cap. 23. & Alcimus Siculus apud Athenae●…um.  an adulteress▪ We also found that the power given unto the husband by the law of R●…mulus, To put his wife to death for adulter●…e, without the authority of the Magistrar▪ was common to all Greece, as well as to the Romans▪ For the law of julia which gave leave only unto the father to kill his daughter together with the adulterer, being taken in the deed doing▪ and not otherwise, was made by Augustus the Emperor above seven hundred years after the law of Romulus: And yet by the same law it was permitted unto certain persons to do the same that the father might, against their adulterous wives: a right small punishment being appointed for the husband▪ who besides the persons in the law excepted, had killed the adulterers taken in the fact. But the public punishment of adultery derogateth nothing from the power of the husband▪ in other 
The punishment of wives▪ 〈◊〉 adulier●….  sorts of corrections over his wife, not extending unto death▪ which is unto husbands forbidden. After that Theodora the Empress having got the mastery over justinian the Emperor her husband, a blockish and unlearned Prince▪ when she had made all the laws she could for the advantage of women against their husbands▪ she amongst others also changed the pain of death for adultery, into the note of 〈◊〉: as did also in ancient time the Athen●…ianss▪ excommunicating the adulterors●…▪ with the note also of infanty, as we read In the Pleas of 〈◊〉 which seemeth but a thing ●…idiculous, considering that the note of 〈◊〉 cannot take any honour from her which hath already lost the same, and is altogether de famed▪ 〈◊〉 that upon the matter she●… re●… altogether unpunishe●…, & that for such a crime as the law of God 
* Levit. ●…0. Daniel 12. Deu. 24.  punishe●…h with the most ●…igorous death that then was▪ (that is to say with stoning) and which the ancient Egyptians punished a●… 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 with cutting off the ●…ose of the woman, and the man's privities. But in other crimes which more concerned the husband 〈◊〉 the public state; and deser●…ed not death power is by the consent●… all men 〈◊〉 unto the 〈◊〉 and to chastise his wife, so that it be sparingly done▪ and within measure. And to the end that lives band●… should not abuse the power the law gave them 〈◊〉 their wives▪ they had an action against●… their husbands▪ in case of evil 〈◊〉; 〈◊〉 ●…oward usage▪ which was afterward by the law of justi●…an taken away▪ and a ●…tie dec●…eed against them that had given the cause of the separation▪ which were especially grounded upon 〈◊〉; and poi●…ning attempted▪ but not having taken effect. Yet notwithstanding the decree of justinian, it is by our custom permitted unto the wife wronged or evil entreated by her husband, to require separation. And yet 〈◊〉 all that is no action of injury to be suffered betwixt the husband and the wife (as some 
No action of injury to be ad●…tted betwixt a man & his wife, and why.  would have it) and that for the honour and dignity of marriage; which the law hath had in so great regard, that it permitteth not the husband, or any third man to have an action of ●…elonie against the wife, although she have embeseled or purloined all her 
The ha●…red betwixt man and wife of all others most deadly.  husband's movables. But as no love is greater than that of marriage, (as saith Artem●…dorus) so is the hatred of all others most deadly, if it once take root betwixt man and wife; as was well declared by Leo Ambassador from them of Bizance unto the Athenians, whom when they in a great assembly had laughed to scorn for his small stature, Why (said he) do you laugh at me a dwarf, seeing my wife is much less than myself, and scarce so high as my knee; who pleased, although we lie in a very little bed, yet falling out the one with the other, the great City of Constantinople is too little for us two? Which his pleasant speech served well to the matter he had in hand, which was to persuade the Athenians unto peace; which is not easy to do betwixt the husband and the wife, especially if one of them hath once sought after the life of the other. And for that cause the law of God concerning divorcement (which was afterwards 
Divorcement by the law of God allowed.  common to all people, and yet at this present is used in Africa, and in all the east) gave leave to the husband to put away his wife, if she pleased him not, with charge that he might never take her again, and yet might well marry another; which was a mean to keep the insolent wives in subjection, as also to repress the anger of the wayward husbands; for what woman (except she were an arrant whore) would be so desirous of a man, as to marry an husband that without any just or probable cause had put away his wife. Now if it shall seem to any an unreasonable thing, to be lawful for a man to put away his wife, for no other cause but for that he liketh her not, I will not greatly strive, either therefore departed from the law now with us in use. Yet nothing seemeth unto me more pernicious, than to constrain the parties so in dislike to live together (except they will) to declare the cause of the divorcement they desire, 
Whether in divorcement it be better to ex.  & also well prove the same before the judge: For in so doing, the honour of the one or of both the parties is hazarded▪ which should not so be if neither of them were enforced 
pressethe cause thereof, or 〈◊〉 to have the same concealed.  to prove the cause of the divorce unto the judge. As did in ancient time the Hebrews, and yet do at this present also, as we see in their Pandects, where is described the lawful act of divorcement, & the bill of divorcement which Rabi jeiel of Paris gave unto his wife the xxix. of Octob. in the year from the creation of the world 
* In the year of Christ 1240.  5018. Another example thereof is also extant in the Epitome of the Hebrew Pandects▪ collected by the Lawyer Moses de Maymon in Chaldea, where the judge of the place having seen the special procuration, & the act of him that had put away his wife in the presence of three witnesses, adjoineth thereunto these words, That he did purely and simply divorce her, and without any cause showing, giving them both leave to marry whom they should see good. In which doing the woman was not dishonoured, but might with safe reputation marry with another ●…ortable to her own quality. And albeit that the Athenians admitted no divorcement, except the cause were first proved before the judges, yet seemed it to all good men to be a thing of great daunge●…: insomuch that 
* Plut. in Alci.  Alcibiades fearing the public scandal took his wife openly complaining before the judges, and carried her away home upon his shoulders. Moore indifferently dealt the ancient Romans, in joining no cause at all unto the bill of divorcement: as is to be seen when Paulus Aemilius put away his wife, whom he confessed to be very wise, 
* Plut. in Aemi.  honest; and nobly descended; and by whom he had also many fair children: but when his wives friends complaining unto him, would needs know of him the cause of the divorce, he showed them his shoe▪ which was very handsomely and well made; and yet said he, none of you but myself feeleth where this shoe wringeth me▪ But what if the cause seem not sufficient unto the judge? or be not well proved? is it therefore meet to enforce the parties to live together, in that society which is of all other the straightest▪ having always the one the other the object of their griefs still before their eyes. Truly I am not of that opinion: for seeing themselves brought into extreme servitude, 
Divorcement necessary.  fear, and perpetual discord, hereof ensue adulteries, and oftentimes murders and poisonings, for the most part to men unknown; as it was discovered in Rome, before the law of divorcement (first made by Spurius Caruilius, about 500 years after the foundation of the city) a woman being apprehended and convicted for poisoning her husband, accused other her companions in the fact, who afterward by mutual accusations appeached seventy others of the same crime for poisoning their husbands, who were all therefore executed: which how much the more is it to be feared where divorcements are altogether forbidden? For both the Greek and the Roman Emperors, willing to take away the often use and easiness of divorcements, and to amend the ancient custom, ordained no other penalty than the loss of the dowry, or of the other matrimonial conventions, unto the party that should be the cause of the divorce. Anastasius also suffered divorcement, by consent of both parties, to be made without any penalty or punishment: which was by justinian the Emperor, or rather Theodora his wife forbidden. Now of that which we have already said, every man as I suppose, may of himself judge which is most expedient for a Commonweal.  
But what change or variety of laws soever in such diversity of Commonweals, there was never law or custom that exempted the wife from the obeisance, and not only from the obeisance, but also from the reverence that she oweth unto her husband; in such sort that the law permitteth not the wife to sue her husband without the leave of the Magistrate. But as nothing is greater, better, or more necessary for the preservation not of Families only, but of Commonweals also, than the honest obedience of wives towards their husbands, as saith Euripides: so beseemeth it not the husband under the shadow of this power, to make a slave of his wife. And whereas Marcus Varro 
Wives to be corrected rather with words then with stripes.  is of opinion that slaves aught rather to be corrected with words than with stripes; much more aught the wife to be, whom both God and man's law doth call his housefellow. So Homer bringing in jupiter reproving his wife juno, and seeing her rebellions, useth great threats, but proceedeth unto no further extremities. And Cato commonly reputed to be a sworn enemy unto women, did never beaten his wife, reputing that to be as it were a sacrilege; but used so to maintain the power and dignity of a husband, as that he had his wife always at command: which he shall never do which of a master is become her companion, & afterward her servant, & of a servant her very slave. As was of old objected unto the Lacedæmonians, who called their wives their 
Plut. in Laconicis.  Ladies and Mistresses: which the Romans did also, not the private men only, but even 
Arist. lib. 2. Politic.  their Emperors themselves, in the declination of their Empire; who at length together with their domestical government lost also their public sovereignty. Albeit that 
Tranquillus in Claudio.  such women as take pleasure in commanding their effeminate husbands, are like unto them that had rather to guide the blind, than to follow the wise and clear sighted.  
Now the law of God, and the holy tongue, which hath named all things according 
The authority and power of the husband ●…uer his wife.  to the true nature and propriety thereof, calleth the husband Bahal▪ that is to say, Lord and master; to show that unto him belongeth the sovereignty to command. The laws also of all nations, to abate the pride of women, and to make men know that they aught to excel their wives in wisdom and virtue, have ordained that the honour and glory of the wife should depend of her husband, as of the Sun: in such sort that if the husband be noble, he enobleth his base wife; but if the wife being nobly borne marry a man of base degree, she looseth her nobility, albeit that of ancient time there have been many and yet are, which take their nobility and gentry from their mothers, and not from their fathers; as the Lycians, the delphians, the Xanthiques, the Ilienses, and the Capadocians: whether it were for the uncertainty of their fathers, or for that they had lost all their nobility in the wars; as in campaign; where the wines (for the cause aforesaid) ennoble their bale husbands and their children; as also among the Indian's in calicut, the kings even yet▪ and the Nobility which they call Naires have scarce at any time their own children inheritors of their kingdom or goods▪ but the children of noble women although they be bastards: yet for all that the interpreters of the law hold▪ that it aught not so to be done either by custom or decrees; for the general agreement of almost all people to the contrary, as Herodotus hath long ago written. And therefore it is most right that the wife should follow the Condition, Country, Family, Dwelling, and beginning of her husband: and in case that her husband be an exiled or banished man, yet is the wife bound to follow him, wherein all the interpreters both of the Canon and Civil law agreed. All laws and customs also have made the husband master of his wives actions, and to take the profit of all the lands and goods that to her befall: and suffer not the wife to stand in judgement either as plaintive or defendant, without the authority of her husband; or at lest without the authority of the judge who may give her authority so to do in the absence of her husband, or he refusing so to do. All undoubtful arguments to show the authority, power, and command that the husband hath over his wife▪ by the laws both of God and man: as also of the subjection, reverence, and obedience which the woman oweth unto her husband, in all honour and things lawful. Yet I doubt not, but that women in their matrimonial contracts have sometimes used to covenant not to be in any thing subject unto their husbands▪ but for as much as such covenants and agreements are contrary to the laws both of God and man, as also unto public honesty, they are not to be observed and kept▪ in such sort, as that no man can thereunto to be bound by oath.   

CHAP. FOUR ¶ Of the power of a Father, and whether it be meet for the Father to have power of life and death over his children▪ as had the ancient Romans.  
THe right government of the Father and the children, consisteth in the good use of the power which God (himself▪ the Father of nature) hath given to the Father over his own children: or the law over them whom any man adopteth for children unto himself: and in the obedience, love, and reverence of the children towards their Fathers. This word Power, is common unto all such as have power to command over others; either publicly or privately. So the Prince (saith Seneca) hath power over his subjects, the Magistrate over private men▪ the Father over his children, the Master over his scholars, the Captain over his soldiers, and the Lord over 
The power of the Father over his children is the only natural power.  his slaves. But of all these the right and power to command, is not by nature given to any beside the Father, who is the true Image of the great and Almighty God the Father of all things, as saith Proclus the Academic. Plato also having first in certain chapters set down laws concerning the honour of God▪ saith them to be as a Preface to the reverence which the child oweth unto the Father, unto whom next unto God he is beholden for his life, and for whatsoever thing else he hath in this world. And as the Father is by nature bound to nourish his children according to his ability▪ and to instruct them in all civility and virtue: so the children also when they are once grown up are bound, but with a much more straighter bond, to love, reverence, serve, and nourish 
The duty of parents towards their children: and their great duty again towards them.  their Father, and in all things to show themselves dutiful and obedient unto them, and by all means to hide and cover their infirmities and imperfections, if they see any in them, and never to spare their lives and goods to save the life of them by whom they themselves took breath. The which bond, albeit it be sealed with the seal of nature, and engrafted in every one of our minds, and carrieth with it a ready execution: yet so it is nevertheless, that to show the greatness thereof there can be no greater argument, than the first commandment of the second table, which alone of all the 
Exod. 22. Deut. 5.  ten Commandments propoundeth a reward unto children which honour their parents: although no reward be unto him due that doth but his duty: and so much the less, for that there is no more religious a decree in all the laws both of God and man; neither any curse greater in holy writ, than against him who wickedly laughed at the naked privities of his Father. Neither is it marvel if we in holy Scripture read 
Gen 27. 28.  
* Valer. Max. lib. 2.  of the contentions and strife of the sons among themselves, for the getting and foregaining their Father's blessing; as they which feared more their curse than death: As young Torquatus who cast off by his Father, slew himself for sorrow. And that is it why Plato saith, that above all things we must have care of the cursings and blessings that the Fathers give unto their children: for that there is no prayer that God doth more readily hear, than that of the Father towards his children. If children then be so straightly bound to obey and reverence their parents? what punishment then deserve they that are unto them disobedient, irreverent, or injurious? what punishment can be great enough for him which shall presume to lay violent hand upon his Father or Mother? for against him that shall murder either of them, there was never yet judge or law maker that could devise torment sufficient for a fact so execrable: although that by the law Pompeia, a punishment be appointed rather new and strange, than fit for such a crime. And albeit that we have seen one in our memory (who had caused his Father to be slain) torn with hot iron tongs, afterwards broken upon the wheel, and so at last (being yet alive) burned: yet was there no man which did not more abhor the wickedness of his villainy, than the horror of his punishment, and which said not that he had deserved more than he had yet suffered. Also the wise Solon; when he had made laws for the Athenians, being asked why he had appointed no punishment against him which had killed his Father; answered, That he thought there was no man so wicked as to commit so horrible a fact: which was gravely answered: for the wise law maker should never make mention of an offence which is not at all, or but very little known, for fear he should not seem so much to forbidden the fact, as to put the wicked in remembrance thereof. But if the crime be great and execrable, he must neither colour it by sufferance, as forgotten, neither point it out unto the eye with his finger; but by circumstances and propounding of the punishments of like facts, deter the wicked from such heinous offences. As we see the law of God hath not appointed any punishment against him that murdereth his Father or his Mother, neither against him that beateth either the one or the other (as doth the law Servia, which condemneth them to death for such a crime) yet giveth it full power and authority unto the Father and Mother to stone the disobedient child, so that it be done in the presence of the magistrate, to whom for all that it belongeth not to inquire of the truth thereof, or to examine the matter: which was so decreed lest the Father should in his anger secretly kill his son. As was one in hunting slain by his Father, whose wife he had defiled: which thing when Adrian the Emperor had understood, said, That so to kill was not the part of a Father, but of a thief or murtheret: for that the greatest profit of punishment is, that it be exemplary unto all. Another part of the law of God 
* Levi. 20.  willeth, 
Deu. 17. Exo. 21  That the child which revileth his Father or mother should die the death: the examination whereof is not left unto the parents, but to the judges themselves, to the intent that the offence should not remain unpunished. For so great is the love of the father 
Parents how unwilling to have their children publicly punished.  and of the mother towards their children, that they would never (if they might) permit the judges to determine of the life of their children, although they had been of them mortally wounded. As not long ago it happened with us, that a Father having received a deadly wound of his son, whom he would have lightly corrected; and fearing lest his son apprehended by the magistrate should die for it, ceased not even to his last gasp to cry out unto his son, by speedy flight to save his life: whom for all that being afterward taken, and confessing the fact, the judges condemned to be hanged from an high beam for a time by the feet, with a great stone about his neck, and so afterwards to be burnt quick. We have also another example of our time, of a Mother who would rather endure to be reviled, wronged, beaten, and trodden under foot by her own son, than to complain of him unto the judge; until that at length he in most beastly manner discharged his belly into her pottage: with which fowl fact the judge moved, condemned him to make her an honourable amendss, and to ask her forgiveness: from which sentence he appealed unto the parliament of Toulouze, where the former sentence was reversed as not just, and the son condemned to be burnt quick; the most wretched mother in vain complaining and crying 
Good justice done upon a disobedient child.  out against the rigour of the laws and severity of the judges, protesting that she did pardon him, and that she had not of him received any injury at all. And Seneca speaking of a Father who but thrust his son out of his house; OH with what grief (saith he) doth the Father cut off his own limbs! what sighs doth he fetch in the cutting! how often doth he mourn for those limbs cut off! and how often doth he wish to have them again!  
All this that I have said, and the examples of fresh memory by me produced, serve 
That parents should have power of life and death over their children.  to show that it is needful in a well ordered Commonweal, to restore unto parents the power of life and death over their children, which by the law of God and nature is given them, the most ancient law that ever was common unto the Persians', unto the people of the upper Asia, as also unto the Romans, the Hebrews, the Celtes, and in use in all the West Indies, until they were conquered by the Spaniards: otherwise we must never hope to see the good orders, honour, virtue, or ancient glory of Commonweals re-established. For justinian the Emperor deceiveth us in saying that no people had such power over their children as had the Romans: For we have the law of God, which aught to be holy and inviolat among all people; we have the testimonies of 
Deut. 21.  the Histories both Greek and Latin, whereby it is sufficiently to be understood, the Hebrews, Celtes, and Persians' to have had the same power over their children that the Romans had. The French men (saith Caesar) 
* Caesar lib. 6. Comment.  have power of life and death over their wives and children, as well as over their slaves. And although that by the law of Romulus' power was given unto the husband, for four causes only to kill his wife: yet nevertheless by the same law, full power was given unto the Father to dispose of the life and death of his children, without condition or exception thereunto adjoined; and that whatsoever they got, was not theirs, but their Fathers: Which power the Romans had not only over their own children, but also over the children of other men by them adopted. Which power was about 260 years after ratified and amplified by the laws of the xii Tables, which gave power also unto the Father to cell his children: and in case they had afterward redeemed themselves, or were set at liberty by such as had bought them, they might yet cell them again, and so the third time. The like whereof in all points is to be found in the Western islands, as we read in the History of the Indieses. And yet at this present amongst the Moscovites and Tartars (whom the ancient Historiographers called the Asian Scythians) it is lawful for the Father to cell his son four times, after which if he shall redeem himself he is for ever free. By means of this fatherly power the Romans long flourished in all honour and virtue; and oftentimes was their Commonwealth thereby delivered from most imminent destruction, when the fathers drew out of the Consistories their own sons being Tribunes, publishing laws tending to sedition. As amongst others Cassius threw his son 
Anotable example of a father's severity against his son, being a great officer.  headlong out of the Consistory, publishing the law Agraria (for the division of lands) in the behoof of the people, and afterward by his own private judgement put him to death, the magistrates, Sergeants, & people standing thereat astonished, & not daring to withstand his fatherly authority, although they would with all their power have had that law for the division of lands. Which is sufficient proof, this power of the father not only to have been sacred and inviolable, but also to have been lawful for him either by right or wrong to dispose of the life and death of his children, even contrary to the will of the magistrates and people. Also when 
* Valer. Maxi▪ lib. 4.  Pomponius the Tribune of the people, had for divers causes accused Torquatus unto the people, and amongst other things had charged him that he too much oppressed his son with country labour: so it fell out that the son himself going unto the Tribune, and finding him in bed, setting his dagger unto his throat, caused him to swear to desist from further prosecuting of the accusation against his father. So the Tribune coming again into the Consistory lest he might seem to use collusion with Torquatus, whom he had before accused, now excused himself unto the people for not presenting his accusation, by the oath extorted from him: which the people understanding, would not suffer him to proceed therein any further. By which two examples a man may judge that the Romans in their estate, made greater reckoning of the power of the father, than of the laws themselves, which they called Sacred: by which the head of him was vowed to jupiter, who had only attempted in offensive manner, but to touch the 
* Dion. Halycar. lib. 7. & Livius lib. 3.  most holy Tribunes body. For they were of opinion that domestical justice and power of fathers, were the most sure and firm foundation of laws, honour, virtue, piety, wherewith a Commonweal aught to flourish. Neither was it marvel if in the Roman Commonwealth we see such rare examples of reverend duty of children towards their parents, as are not else where to be read of: one I have amongst a thousand already 
The rare piety of a daughter toward her father.  spoken of; and another such there is, as that Painters even unto these times use therewith to embellish their Tables: that is to wit, of the daughter which secretly gave suck unto her father condemned to be pined to death (which never suffereth the healthful man to live past the seventh day) which act of piety the Gaoler having perceived, gave the magistrates to understand thereof; which by them reported unto the people, not only obtained her father's pardon, but also found such grace as that in the self same place in perpetual remembrance of the fact, they built a Temple dedicated unto Piety. Yea the very unreasonable beasts have a natural feeling of this kind duty, and are seen to feed their parents now grown weak with age: but especially the Stork, which the holy tongue 
* Levit 11. job. 38.  (which nameth things according to their secret proprieties) calleth Chasida, that is to say, dutiful and charitable; for so much as she nourisheth her father and mother in their age. And albeit that the father be in duty bound to instruct his children in all virtues, but especially in the fear of God: yet if he shall forget his duty, are not the children therefore excused of theirs: albeit that Solon the lawmaker contrary unto reason, hath by his laws acquitted the son from the nourishing of his father, if he have taught him no trade or occupation whereby to get his living. But the right instruction of children (than which nothing can be devised more profitable or better in a Commonweal) dependeth of that fatherly power which I have before spoken of. For public justice taketh no knowledge of the disobedientnesse & unreverentnesse of children toward their parents, neither of their other vices, which disordered liberty bringeth their young years unto, as dicing, drunkenness, whoredom: and albeit that punishment be appointed against such offences, yet nevertheless the poor parents careful of their reputation and credit, never are to complain of their children unto the Magistrate, neither accuse them; and yet the power to punish them is taken from them: so that children now standing in no fear of their parents, and much less of God do for most part escape the judgement of the magistrate, who commonly punisheth but slaves and such others of base condition.  
But impossible it is that the foundation of a Commonweal being evil laid, (that is 
The power of fathers over their children much profitable to the Commonweal: and the want thereof much hurtful.  to say, the bringing up of children ●…nd families) any thing that is firm and sure should be thereupon built. Besides that, the contention, strife, and discord, which we daily see amongst brethren and sisters, were easily appeased and extinguished whilst the father yet lived, their marriages not taking from him this power over them: and albeit that he had set at liberty them that were married, & departed out of his house, to keep house by themselves, (which they easily did not) yet nevertheless the remembrance of the reverend duty they aught unto their parents for ever remained fast imprinted in the hearts and minds of the children. Wherhfore should we then marvel the magistrate to be troubled with so many suits, and those for most part betwixt the husband and the wife, betwixt brethren and sisters; yea and that more, is betwixt parents and their children? but that the wife, the children, and servants, are all loased from the domestical power of their ancestors. So the fatherly power being by little & little diminished upon the declination of the Roman Empire; so also shortly after vanished away their ancient virtue, & all the glory of their Commonweal: and so in place of piety & civility, ensued a million of vices and villainies. The first stain, and beginning of taking away 
How the power of life and death over their children was in Rome first taken from their parents.  the power of life and death from parents, proceed from the ambition of the Magistrates, who seeking to increase their jurisdiction, & by little and little drawing unto them the deciding of all matters, extinguished all domestical powers: which happened especially after the death of Augustus Caesar; at which time we read the magistrates to have been almost always occupied in punishing of such as had murdered their parents. As we read in Seneca, who directing his speech unto Nero, saith, We have seen more murderers of their parents executed in five years of thy father, than were ever in all ages accused since the foundation of Rome. Now to him that will look nearer into the matter, it is no doubt, but that if one or two that have murdered their fathers have been executed, ten others have escaped man's punishment; the health and life of parents being subject to a thousand dangers, except their children either by the fear of God, or the goodness of their own nature, be kept within the bounds of their duty; neither aught it seem strange unto any man, that Nero made no conscience to kill his mother, neither repent him to have killed her, for that it was a thing common: the cause whereof Seneca giveth not, which was, for that the father to chastise his son must then go to the magistrate to accuse him, which the ancient Romans could never endure. For Quintus Fuluius the Senator in the time of Cicero, of his own authority put to death his son, for taking part in the conspiracy of Catiline. And in the time of Augustus, Tatius the Senator being about to proceed against his son in a capital crime, requested Augustus home to his house, who being come thither, took not upon him the place of a judge (as saith Seneca) but of a private man, as come only to give counsel. We see also that by the law Pompeia, made against parricides, all they which are next of kin are bound to the penalty of the law, except the father. Yet it sufficiently appeareth, that in the time of Ulpian and Paul the Lawyers, the power that fathers had of life and death over their children lay then in a sort buried and forgotten: for that one of them saith, The father must accuse his son before the judge: and the other, That the children are not of right to complain, if they be by their fathers disinherited, considering that in ancient time (saith he) they might put them to death. Both of them flourished in the time of Alexander Severus. And yet is there no express law to be found which hath taken from parents the power of life and death, before the time of Constantine the great: neither did that law of Constantine directly in express terms abrogat the old laws: Dioclesian the Emperor but a little before Constantine having decreed that the judge aught to give such sentence against the son as the father was willing unto. Now it is manifest by the law, that a positive law cannot be 
Note.  abrogated by any custom, be it never so old; except it be repealed by a contrary law, carrying express derogation with it: otherwise being in force and ready to be again put in use: insomuch that it was necessary that certain laws of the xii. tables by long custom out of use, yet for all that should by a new law be abrogated: which was done at the motion of Aebutius, in whose time the father's power of life and death, yet kept their children with in the compass of their duty. But when the children in the time of Constantine had by the sufferance of their fathers by little and little shaken off that power and authority of their fathers, they obtained also of the same Emperor, That of their mother's inheritance their fathers should have but the use and profit, and they themselves the propriety, which their fathers might not alienate. And afterwards they likewise obtained of Theodosius the younger, That the propriety of all manner of goods in general howsoever they came by them, should belong unto the sons, the use and profit thereof only being left unto the fathers; so that they could not alienat the propriety, neither in any sort dispose thereof: yea and with us not only the use and profit of such goods, but not so much as the bore use is left unto the father, which hath so puffed up the hearts of the children, as that they oftentimes command their parents, by necessity constrained to obey them, or to die for hunger.  
justinian also would not that children should be set at liberty by their parents without 
How parents were wont to emancipat their children.  their own consent, that is to say, without some bounty which the father aught to give unto his son: when as yet for all that in old time emancipation or setting at liberty, was the reward of the child's kindness and dutifulness towards his parents. Hereof proceeded that filthy buying and selling of emancipation betwixt fathers and their children: insomuch that such things as the father had given unto the son in reward of his emancipation, remained unto him for gain; neither was he bound to communicate the same with his brethren, or to have any whit the less therefore of his father's inheritance, except the same were expressly comprehended in the lawful act of emancipation: which they also yet use amongst us, which have the Roman decrees for laws. But if the son hath learned any gainful trade, or is by traffic in merchandise become rich, and giveth something unto his father that setteth him at liberty, it is counted unto the father for the right he should have in the goods of his son dying before him, so that he can claim no part therein, although it be not at all expressed in the act of the sons emancipation; or yet be expressed that such gift unto the father yet living, should be not let wherefore he should the less have the whole right of the lawful inheritance, his son dying before him. For why? that whatsoever it is that is given to the father, is accounted as given him for his lawful part: so that by this means the father is in worse state than the son, who for all that both by the laws of God and man is bound to nourish his parents so long as they live, the father not being bound by the law of Romulus to nourish his son, but until he be seven years old. And although Lawyers go farther, nevertheless to make it plain that parents are not bound to feed their children, it was never by any law permitted for children to sue 
Whether parents be bound to nourish their children: and how long.  their parents for their food, but by the leave of the magistrate by humble request before obtained. Besides all these indignities, justinian hath exempted all Senators, Bishops, & Consuls from the power of their fathers: as in like case them also which enter into houses of Religion. And in countries also where we use Statute laws, besides those we have spoken of, they have also exempted out of their father's powers them that are married, or have been out of their father's houses by the space of ten years: which hath caused the Italian Lawyers to writ that the French men are not in the power of their fathers: as in truth there remaineth nothing thereof, but the imaginary shadow, when as the father authoriseth his children unto lawful acts, as to redeem lands of inheritance, which the father himself hath sold, or to take a possession doubtful, or for the trade or traffic of merchandise: in which case the judge without the king's letters royal at the request of the father may set at liberty his son. And albeit that Philip of Valois set at liberty his son john, to give unto him the duchy of Normandy: yet such his emancipation served to no purpose, no more than those which were ordinarily made; seeing that neither the giver, neither he to whom the thing was given, neither the thing itself given, were subject unto the Roman civil law: nor that the fathers (in countries governed by customs) had any thing to do with the goods of their children.  
But the fathers thus despoiled of their power, and of the goods got by their children, 
Whether the son may resist his father offering him violencei or for any cause kill his father. Soldiers in ancient times were beaten with vines.  it is yet by many demanded, If the son may of right defend himself, or withstand his father, offering him violence? Neither have there wanted some which were of opinion, That the son might of right so do: as if in that there were no difference whether the father or any other should offer him violence. But if it be so that the soldier which had only broken the vine truncheon of his Captain, beating him by right or wrong, was by the law of arms to be put to death: then what punishment deserveth the son which layeth hand upon his father? Yea some have passed further, and written that the son might kill his father, if he were an enemy unto the Commonweal. 
Plin. lib. 12.  But in mine opinion that is not unlawful only for any man to do, but impiety also for any man so to writ: for these men in so doing propound not only pardon unto parricides, but give leave also unto others to presume to do the like, secretly encouraging them to commit so detestable a fact, under the colour of the public profit: whereas an ancient author saith, That no fault so great canby the father be committed, as that the same should with his murder be revenged. OH what a number of fathers should be found enemies unto the Commonwealth, if these resolutions should take place? And what father is there which in the time of civil war could escape the hands of his murderous child? For men know well that in such wars the weakest goeth to the walls, and they that get the upper hand make all traitors whom they list. And in other wars not only they are judged traitors which have given unto their enemy's help and counsel, but also they which have sold them armour, corn, or other victuals. As by the laws of England, to aid the enemy in any sort whatsoever, is accounted high treason. Which points of treason I see not to be distinguished by these interpretoes of the Roman law. But by these resolutions, that is come to pass which posterity will not 
A strange exam ple of a most unnatural son.  believe: as that a banished man of Venice, having brought to Venice his own father's head, who was banished as well as himself, demanded and obtained also in reward of his so exectable a murder, the honours and rewards by the Venetian laws due; viz. His return into his country, his goods, his children, and the liberties of the city, before taken from him. But happily it had been better that the city of Venice had been swallowed up with the sea, than to have given a reward unto so great and detestable a villainy. Henry the second the French king, took in good part the excuse of Maximilian king of Bohemia in the year 1557, in that he had refused to give safe conduct unto the duke of Wittenberg, ambassador for the French; confessing that it was indeed against the law of nations, but that yet nevertheless he durst do no other for disobeying of his father. Now if it be lawful to violate the laws of nations rather than to disobey our father in so small a matter; what just excuse can there be, or reason given for the kill of one's father? Wherhfore I thus resolve, That there can be no just cause for which a man may lawfully lay violent hand upon his father. And albeit that such kill of one's father be in itself a fowl fact, yet fowler is the reward thereof; but of all other things most fowl and pernicious it is to allow reward for the same, for that by prounding such rewards for kill of a man's father, neither brethren can be in safety from being murdered by their brethren; neither the nighest kinsmen for being slain one by another. As indeed it chanced in the year 1567. that Sampetre Corse was slain by his own cousin germane; for which he had given him in reward ten thousand crowns, which the Senate and people of Genua had caused to be levied for him. But how much better were it to follow the example of Cicero, who thought it better as it were in silence to pass over the self same questions moved by the two ancient Philosophers Antiochus and Antipater, as a place too slippery and dangerous. joining hereunto also, that the law of the Romans itself forbiddeth any reward to be propounded unto banished men for the kill of thieves: howbeit that Adrian the Emperor would have him pardoned that had killed a thief. Wherhfore I thus conclude, That princes and law makers should measure the power and authority of parents, according to the law of God; whether they be their lawful, or natural children, or both together; so that they be not conceived in incest, for such the laws both of God and man have always had in detestation.  
Now if some shall object it to be a thing dangerous, lest some furious or prodigal 
Objections against the power of fathers over their children.  fathers should abuse the goods or lives of their children, under colour of their fatherly power: to him I answer, that the laws have for such men provided guardians, and taken from them that power over another man, considering that they have not power over themselves. And if the father be not senseless or mad, he will never without cause kill his son, seeing that he willingly chastiseth him not though he deserve the same. For so great is the love and affection of parents towards their children, that the law never presumed that they would do any thing to their disgrace, but all to their honour and profit. Wherhfore the parents are ever thought to be free from all fraud in their children's affairs, whom to increase with riches and honour, they doubt not oftentimes to forget the laws both of God and man. And for this cause the Father having slain his son, is not by the law Pompeia subject to the pain of parricides: for why? the law presumeth that he would not without good and just cause so do; and hath privately given power unto him to kill the adulterer and his daughter found in the fact together. All most certain and undoubted arguments, whereby it is to be understood, that parents cannot abuse the power of life and death over their children; neither that if they could, yet would they. But haply some man will say, there have been many which have abused the same to the unworthy death of their children; yet bring no example thereof: Let us grant some such to have been: should therefore a good law giver leave a good law unmade for the inconveniences which some few times ensue thereof? It being a common saying in the law, That of such things as seldom happen the lawmaker aught to take no care. And where ever was there a law so just, so natural, or so necessary, that was not subject unto many inconveniences? So that he which would abrogat all laws for some few absurdities ensuing of them, should not leave one of them, as Cato the greater wisely reasoned. In brief (I say) that the natural love of fathers and mothers toward their children, is impossible and incompatible with so great cruekie, as is the unjust kill of their children: and that the greatest torment that a father can endute, is, to have either by right or wrong killed his son. As in fact it chanced in our memory, in the country of Anjou, that a father desiring to chastise his son, whom running from him he could not overtake, having by chance without any such purpose slain him with a blow upon the head, with an hard clod of earth which he threw after him, forthwith for grief hung himself, although no man knew any thing thereof. Which things the ancient Egyptian law givers well understanding, appointed no other punishment against him that had wrongfully or without cause slain his son, but for the space of three days after to be shut up together with the dead body of his son so by▪ him slain: For they thought it a thing detestable, for the death of the son to take away the life of the father, from whom he had received his. Yet might one say, that if fathers had the power of life and death over their children, they might constrain them to do something hurtful unto the Commonweal: Whereunto I answer first, that that is not to be presumed; and than that although it were so, yet that the laws had therefore wisely provided, having at all times exempted the children out of the power of their fathers, in that which concerned the public State. As also Fabius Gurges gave us well to understand, who being Consul, and seeing his father a private man mounted on horseback coming towards him, commanded him by one of his sergeants to alight, which he did, doing honour unto his son, and bidding him in such sort to proceed to defend the Consul's dignity. And so far hath it been from wise fathers to command their children any thing that might be hurtful to the Commonweal, as that there have been some of them found to have put them to death for transgressing the public laws: as first did Brutus his two sons, and after him L. Torquatus the Consul, who having caused his son to triumph in his camp for vanquishing his enemy in combat, presently after caused his head to be struck off, for that he had fought with him contrary to his commandment and contrary to the law of arms. There is yet one objection concerning the children's goods, which if they should be in the full disposition of the fathers, they might without cause disinherit some, and enrich others: whereunto mine answer is, That the laws have therefore also provided, by offering justice unto children disinherited; and propounding the causes of lawful disinheriting. Howbeit that the ancient law of the Romans is more commendable, which never permitted the child by way of action to impugn his father's will and testament; but only by the way of request, and speaking of his dead father in all humility all honour and reverence, leaving all the matter unto the discretion and conscience of the judge. But after that the Praetors, who could not make any man heir unto his father, yet by their decrees gave possession of the goods (the force of which possession, was almost the same that it was to be appointed heir,) & that the magistrates had bound certain definite portions unto the children; then forthwith began the parents by little and little to be contemned of their children, & their death by them longed for. Which thing was the cause that one of the Ephori of the Lacedæmonians made a law * concerning the making of Testaments, whereby 
Plu. in Lycurg.  it was lawful for every man to bequeath his goods as he pleased▪ (when as before, the liberty of making of Wills was by long custom taken away) alleging that the pride and insolency of children against their parents was so by the fear of disinheriting to be restrained. But if any man shall accounted it better for inheritances to be conferred by the appointment of the laws than by Testament, I will not strive with him therefore, seeing it is by the law of God 
* Numer. 23.  set down that children should not by assentation and flattery rather than by their kind duties preventing their father's inheritances, spoil themselves of their mutual and brotherly love: but yet why use we not the same divine law 
* Deut. 21.  which giveth unto the father the power of life and death over his children.  
We have before said▪ father's to have had that power of life and death over them 
Adoptive children as well in the power of their adoptive fathers, as were the children begot in lawful matrimony.  also whom they had adopted: in like manner as they had over them whom they had in lawful matrimony begotten: and although the laws of adoption were by the new laws of justinian almost abrogated; yet I think no man doubteth but that the law of adoption was of so ancient right, & so common also almost unto all people, as that it deserveth to be again called into use. We see the most ancient people to have had it in singular estimation: as we read jacob himself to have adopted Ephraim and Manasses 
* Gen. cap. ul●….  his nephews, (albeit he had twelve children yet living, who had divers others also) and gave them part of the land which he had by force of arms conquered. Which to have bene before also in use with the Egyptians, is manifest by Moses, whom the king's daughter▪ 
* Exod. 1.  adopted for her own. We see also Theseus to have been solemnly adopted by Aegeus king of Athens, who made him his successor in the State, albeit that he was but his base son: After which time all the Athenians which had base children by Athenian women, were constrained to adopt them, and to 'cause them to be registered as their lawful children, and to leave them their part and portion of their goods as they did unto the rest of their children. For why? they accounted none a bastard but him that was begotten of a father or a mother, being a stranger▪ albeit she were a woman of never so great honour. As also all the people of the East made little ●…no difference betwixt the children that they had by their wives and their handmaids. For jacob the Patriarch made like reckoning of those which he had by his wives, and of those which he had by his handmaids: although that Sara had driven out of his father's house the child begotten by the handmaid, * lest he should have had part in the lawful inheritance. And Diodorus 
* Lib. 2. cap. 3  also writeth, The children of the Egyptians begotten of their bondwomen, to have had as great prerogative as the rest that were begot in lawful marriage. For why? it was lawful for them to have as many wives as they would; as it was also unto the Persians' & all the people of Asta●… and almost only the Germane of all the barbarous nations (as saith Tacitus) had every one 
Tacit. lib. de moribus Germanorum.  of them but one wife. Thus having confirmed the matter by course of history, it followeth by consequence all the children of one and the same father to have been in his power, were they adoptive or not. But the Romans of ancient time made no more account of their base children than of mere strangers▪ neither were they compelled to adopt them, as were the Athenians, neither to bequeath them any thing by their will, neither had they any power over them. Which severity of the laws was yet moderated in the reign of Theodosius and Arcadius. And afterward it was ordained by the Emperor Zeno, that such base children should be accounted for legitimat, by the marriage of their father afterwards ensuing with their mother. And that more is Anastasius decreed that all bastards should by adoption be reputed legitimat▪ but first justinus, and after him justinian abrogated that decree, and shut the gate against bastards, to the end that every man should desire to have lawful wives and children; and that ancient houses, and the rights of successions and inheritances should not be altered and troubled by the adoption of bastards: the rights of adoption nevertheless yet still remaining, which had been received to supply the defect of nature; and whereof the ancient Romans had had so great esteem, as that the adoptive fathers had the same power of life and death over their adoptive children, that they had over their own: which was the true cause that women could not adopt children before the edict published by Dioclesian, considering that they themselves were in the perpetual power of their parents, husbands, or near kinsmen: as also in Greece it was not lawful for them to adopt, as writeth the Orator Isaeus. So then the right of adoptions, ennobled by the Romans (and especially after that they had extended the frontiers of their Empire more than ever before) other people also had it so much the more in regard: the Goths, (I say) the Germane, the French, the Saliens; as we see in the laws of the Ripuaires, where they use the word Adfatinir for adopter: holding their adoptive children in the same degree that they did their own natural and lawful children, in the right of their succession into their inheritance: For by the ancient custom of the Romans they were both indifferently called unto their father's inheritances as his heirs. For so we read in Cassiodorus, that Theodoric king of the Goths, adopted the king of the Herules: and that Luitpr and king of the Lombard's adopted the son of Charles prince of France, by cutting his hair, although he had sons of his own in lawful marriage begotten: as did in ancient time Micipsa king of the Numidians, adopting jugurtha his base son, albeit he had two lawful children of his own, and leaving his kingdom equally divided amongst them three: when as yet the first and chief cause of adoptions was to supply the defect of nature; that he to whom nature had altogether denied children, or at leastwise male children, might by the authority of the law have that defect supplied. As Scipio Africanus having no more children but Cornelia the mother of the Gracchis, adopted the son of Paulus Aemilius, afterwards called Africanus the younger, whom he left the inheritor not of his name only, but of his goods also. And so also Caefar the Dictator, having no children of his four wives, more than julia, which was married to Pompeius, adopted Octavius his sister's son, whom by his will he made heir of three parts, with charge that he should bear his name; whereby his own father's name was taken away, and he known by the name of his adoptive father. And he again having no children but julia (whom he called the Impostume of his house) adopted Caius and Lucius his sister's sons bought at home of their father Agrippa, according to the ancient manner: who afterward dead also without issue, he adopted Tiberius, who adopted Caligula: so did Claudius adopt Nero, unto whom Galba succeeding without children, 
* Tranquil in Galba.  adopted Piso before his army, which custom was afterwards kept in the adoption of * Aurelianus 
Vopiscus in Aureliano.  the Emperor; as would justinian the Emperor have adopted Cosroe king of Persia, which he refused; supposing (though yet falsely) the way unto the Empire to be by that mean shut up. 
* Procopius.  We read also that the Emperor Nerua for lack of children adopted Traian; & he Adrian; who afterward adopted Antoninus Pius; and not contented to have adopted so good a man, charged him also whilst he yet lived, to adopt Aelius Verus, and Marcus Aurelius, surnamed the Philosopher, to the intent the Empire should not want the most virtuous Emperors that ever were. But this last having begot Commodus heir apparent to the Empire, (but the most vicious man that might be) was about to have adopted another more worthy of the Empire, had he not been otherwise persuaded by his friends. For that almost no man used to adopt others, if he had legitimat children of his own. For which cause Claudius the Emperor was evil spoken of, for being persuaded by the enticement of Agrippina his second wife, he had adopted Nero her son, having sons and one daughter by his former bed, who were afterwards slain by Nero. But to leave strangers which are infinite, and to come to our own domestical examples: jews duke of Anjou and brother to king Charles, was for want of heir adopted by joane (who of her incontinency was in reproach called Lupa) who in the right of that adoption left unto him the kingdom of Naples, having rejected her nephew Alphonsus' king of Arragon, whom she had before by consent of, the 
* Martinus. V  Pope adopted. Afterwards also Rene of Anjou, jews his nephew, was adopted by joane the younger queen of Naples for want of children. And at the same time as it were, that is to say, in the year 1408, Henry duke of Pomeran was adopted by Margaret D'wolmar queen of Denmark, Sweden, & Norway, to succeed her in the same kingdoms. And not long after, Henry the fift king of England was adopted, not by Charles the sixt then distracted of his wits, but by his wife: who by her new son in law, caused Charles her own son to be denounced incapable of the Crown, albeit that he were a right wise and virtuous Prince. But justinian the Emperor willing to remedy such abuses, ordained that adoptive children should nevertheless not fail to enjoy the inheritance of their own natural or lawful fathers; for that their adoptive fathers would oftentimes upon small occasion cast them off again, whereby it came to pass that they went without the inheritance of both their fathers: yet did he wrongfully take away the right of the father's power, which was the only mark of adoption, which taken away, nothing more remained. Now it were much better to prohibit adoptions to them, which had sons either natural or legitimat: & in case they had none, that the adoptive children should succeed in all the right of their own natural and lawful children. Truly by our custom it is lawful for every man to adopt: yet no prejudice is thereby made unto the next of kin, or them which should lawfully inherit: for that more cannot be given or bequeathed unto the adoptive son, than to him that is a mere stranger: and yet that the father might for all that receive the profit of the adoption; whereof Scipio Africanus the Great, in his time complained in the Oration which he had unto the people of his Censureship: as also after the publication of the law julia Pappia, which gave great privileges unto them which had children: they which had none adopted some (to have the benefit of the lawas, to be capable of some Magistracy or office) and in short time after they had once gained that they sought for, cast off those their adoptive children again, so abusing the law. As contrariwise Clodius being a noble man borne, caused himself to be adopted by a man of base condition, that so discharged of his Nobility, he might be made Tribune of the * people; but having got that office, caused himself presently to 
Cicero pro domo.  be set at liberty by his adoptive father: Which the Senate understanding, decreed that from thenceforth they which were adopted should not enjoy the privilege of any public office: neither that any man should under the colour of such children as he had adopted obtain any magistracy or honour unto himself; neither hinder substitution made for want of children; neither to have the benefit of any conditional legacies, or covenants made or conceived in hope of children; nor that for such adoptive children, such donations should be voided, as were by the law itself to be revoked when the donatour had any children, either natural or legitimat; nor that by the adoption of male children, women should be kept from their lawful inheritance, from which they by the law are wont by the male children to be excluded; neither that the word Son added unto the laws, testaments, or other lawful acts was to be extended unto them whom we adopt: all which deceits it is good to cut off, and yet not to extinguish the right of adoptions; and at the lest to leave unto the adoptive father his fatherly power, to keep in obedience his adoptive son. And thus much of the second part of a Family, concerning the power of a father over his children, and of their mutual duties. Now let us likewise speak of the third part also.   

CHAP. V Of the power of a Lord or Master over his Slaves, and whether Slaves are to be suffered in a well ordered Commonweal.  
THe third part of the government of a Family dependeth of the power of the Lord oves his Slaves, and of the Master over his servants; and in their mutual duties one toward another. For the 
Whereof a Family took name.  very name of a Family, came of Famulus and Famulatio, for that it had in it a great number of Slaves: and so of the greatest part of them that are in subjection in the Family, men call all the whole household a Family; or else for that there was no greater means to gather wealth than by slaves and servants, which the Latins call Famuli, the ancients not without cause have called this multitude of Slaves and servants a Family. And Seneca willing to show of what moderation a Master aught to be toward his Slaves, saith our ancestors to have called the head of a Family, Father of the Family, and not Lord And for that the whole world is full of Slaves, excepting certain countries in Europe (which since also by little and little receive them) it is needful here to reason of the power of Lords and Masters over their Slaves, and of the profits and disprofits which may redound unto a Commonweal, if slavery should again be called into use: a question of great moment not for Families and societies only, but for all Commonweals also in general.  
Now every Slave is either natural, that is to wit, begotten of a woman Slave, or made a Slave by law of arms; or by some crime committed (whom men call a slave 
The division of Slaves.  to punishment) or one which hath for money departed with his liberty, or hath played away his liberty, as did in ancient time the Almans: or else such an one as hath voluntarily vowed himself to be a perpetual Slave unto another man; as was the manner of the Hebrews. The prisoner in war was Slave unto the vanquisher, who was not bound to put him to his ransom, if it were not otherwise agreed upon; as it was in ancient time in Greece, that the Barbarian prisoner taken in war, might be put to the chain, and kept as a Slave; but as for the Greek, that he should be set at liberty in paying for himself a pound of gold. The like law almost was made amongst the Polonians, 
* Cromer in hist. Polon. & in statutis Pol.  where it was decreed by the States, That all enemies taken prisoners in just wars, should remain Slaves unto the vanquishers, except the king would pay two Florins for every head. But he that had paid the ransom of any prisoner, was bound to set him at liberue, having again received his money: otherwise he might keep him, not as his Slave▪ but as his prisoner; according to the most ancient law of the Greeks, which from them derived unto the Romans▪ was afterward in use with all nations. As for debtors, prisoners unto their creditors, although it were lawful by the law of the twelve Tables, to divide them in pieces amongst their creditors, giving to some more, some less, according to the proportion of every man's debt, if they were not able to 
A cruel law against debtor.  pay: yet for all that so it was, that if he had one creditor, he could not take from him his life, and much less his liberty, a thing much dearer than life. For the father might well cell, chop, and change his children, yea and take away their lives also, but yet could not take away their liberty: for the good and noble hart would always rather choose to dye honestly, than unworthly to serve as a base Slave. And that is it wherefore the law of the twelve Tables (which adjudged the debtor not able to pay, unto the creditor) was shortly after at the request of Petilian Tribune of the people, taken away, and a decree made, That from that time forward the debtor should no more be adjudged unto his creditor, or divided in pieces among his creditors, neither by them for his debt be detained; yet reserving unto the creditor power to seize upon his goods, or by other way of justice to come by his debt, so as he saw he might by reason: which law continued firm and inviolat 700 years, unto the time of Dioclesian, who caused the same law afterward to be published upon pain of death.  
And thus much concerning all sorts of slaves: for as for them which are taken by thieves or pirates, or by false titles are sold for slaves, they continued nevertheless free, and in terms of right may do all lawful acts. As for other domestical servants, which for wages or without wages do their service, they cannot by contract or agreement 
Domestical servants cannot make themselves slaves by any contract that they make with their macters.  whatsoever, do any thing prejudicial to their liberty: neither in receiving any legacy upon condition be it never so little servile: neither can the slave himself when he is manumised, promise' unto his lord that hath set him at liberty, any thing prejudicial unto his liberty, other than the services ordinary & agreeable unto all such as are enfranchised. And this is it for which the Arrests of the Parliament of Paris have oftentimes disannulled the contracts of servants free borne, which have bound themselves upon a pain to serve certain years: which nevertheless they yet do in England & Scotland, where the masters after the term of service expired, coming before the judges 
Prentices of England by covenant, for a time slaves.  of the places, enfranchise their servants, & give them power to wear their caps; which was the ancient mark of a slave newly enfranchised, to cover his shaven head until his hair were grown: which gave occasion unto Brutus after that Caesar was slain, to 'cause certain money to be coined * with the impression of a cap upon it; as having set 
Plutar in vita Caesaris.  at liberty the people of Rome. And after the death of Nero, the common people went up and down the streets with caps upon their heads, in sign of their liberty. And king Eumenes after the death of Mithridates, coming to Rome, and with his cap on his head entering the Senate, acknowledged himself to hold his liberty by the people of Rome. Now albeit that domestical servants be not slaves, and that they may do such acts of liberty as free men may, be it in judgement or out of judgement; yet are they not as simple mercenary men which labour for their days wages, over whom 
Mercenary labourers no slaves  he that hath hired them hath neither power nor command, nor any manner of correction, as the master hath over his domestical servants, who own service, honour, and obedience unto their masters, so long as they are in his house, and may with moderate discretion chastise and correct them. For domestical servants aught to reverence their master, and do them all honest service and duties: whereof, for that they have a mutual comportment one of them towards the other, and belong unto moral discipline, we will not in this place reason.  
But as concerning Slaves, there are two great difficulties, not yet resolved upon: the 
Two notable questions concerning slavery.  one, Whether slavery be natural & profitable to a Commonweal, or contrary unto nature, and unprofitable? the other, What power the lord of right aught to have over his slave. Concerning the first point, Aristotle is of opinion that the servitude 
Slavery in the opinion of Aristo tle, a thing natural, but not so in the judgement of the Lawyers.  of slaves is of right natural: and to prove the same, We see (saith he) some naturally made to serve and obey, and others to command and govern. But Lawyers, who measure the law not by the discourses or decrees of Philosophers, but according to the common sense and capacity of the people, hold servitude to be directly contrary unto nature; and do what they can to maintain liberty, still interpreting such things as are obscure and doubtful (whether it be in the laws, or in testaments, in covenants, or judgements) so in favour of liberty, as that they give no way either to laws or to testaments: And if so be that the force of the laws be so great and so plain as that they may not serve from them▪ yet do they protest that bitterness of the laws to displease them, calling it hard and cruel. But of these two opinions we must choose the better. Now many reasons there be to prove that servitude is profitable unto the Commonweal, and also agreeable unto nature: For every thing that is contrary unto nature, is of no long continuance: and if you would force it against nature, yet will 
Reasons to prove that servitude or slavery is profitable unto a Commonweal: as also agreeable unto nature.  it of itself again return unto the natural course thereof; as is plainly seen in all natural things. But servitude seemeth to have taken the beginning thereof immediately after the general deluge; and even so soon as any form of a Commonweal was to be seen, and so hath always ever since continued: and although servitude in these latter times was left off, for about three or four hundred years, yet is it now again approved, by the great agreement and consent of almost all nations; yea the people of the West Indies, which are three times greater than all Europe, who never heard speech of the laws of God or man, have always been full of slaves; neither hath there been any Commonweal in the world, which hath not had slaves in it: yea the holiest men that ever lived have used them: yea and that more is, in every Commonweal the lord had power over the goods, the life and death of his slave, except some few, where the Princes and lawmakers have something moderated this power. Now like it is not, that all people and nations in every place, so many kings and princes, so many lawmakers (men for their virtue and experience most famous) would with so great consent, and so many worlds of years, have received slaves, if it had been a thing repugnant unto reason and nature. And what can be more agreeing unto courtesy and natural reason, than after victory obtained, to save them whom thou hast taken prisoners in just war, to give them meat, drink, and clothing, & with great charity to relieve them? & for so great benefits to exact of them only their service & labour? is it not much better than in cold blood to kill them? And this was the first beginning of slaves. Now whereas it agreeth also with the laws of God and man, that he that hath not wherewith to pay for the fault by him committed, should be punished in his body; is it not better and more courtesy to have him kept to labour in the public works? whereof such were also called servants to pain, another kind of servitude. In like sort, he that shall unjustly lie in wait for another man's goods, life, or state; what doubt is there but that he is a very thief and robber▪ and deserveth death? Than is it not contrary unto nature, to save him for labour, in stead of putting him to death: for the word Servant, cometh of saving, albeit that some unskilful Grammarians reprehend justinian in so saying. Now if it were contrary unto nature, that one man should have power of life and death over another, there should be neither kingdoms nor seignories, which were not contrary unto nature, seeing that kings and monarchs have the same power over their subjects, be they lords or slaves, if they once fall into any capital crime.  
These arguments have some good show to prove that servitude is natural, profitable, 
How servitude i●… agreeable unto nature: and how not.  and honest, but it may well be answered. I confess that servitude is well agreeing unto nature, when a strong man, rich and ignorant, yieldeth his obedience and service unto a wise, discreet and feeble poor man: but for wise men to serve fools, men of understanding to serve the ignorant, and the good to serve the bad; what can be more contrary unto nature? except a man should think it reasonable for a wise counsellor to be overtuled by his foolish Prince; or a sober and temperate servant to be governed by his bedlam and riotous Master. As for them that think it a charitable courtesy, in 
The former reason●… answered: and slavery proved not to be a thing agreeable unto nature:  unjust wars to have saved the lives of their prisoners whom they might have killed, it is the charity of thieves and pirates, who brag themselves to have given life unto them whom they have not deprived of life. For oftentimes it cometh to pass in unjust wars, (as are for most part those that are made by the mighty) that good men are most miserably and shamefully enforced to serve the wicked. And if the vanquished have wrongfully and without cause (as thieves) made war, why then put they them not to death? why take they not of them exemplary punishment? why take they them then unto mercy, seeing that they are thieves. As for that which is said, That servitude could not have continued so long if it had been contrary unto nature: true it is in things merely natural, which according to their natural propriety follow the immutable ordinance of God: but having given unto man the choice of good & evil, it chanceth oftentimes to the contrary; him to choose the worse, contrary to the law both of God and nature: in whom his corrupt opinion hath so great power, that it passeth in force of a law, of greater power than nature itself; in such sort, that there was never so great impiety or wickedness, which hath not been esteemed for virtue and godliness. Let one example serve for many. We know right well that there can be no more cruel or detestable a thing than to sacrifice men, and yet there are almost no people which have not used so to do, who all for many ages covered the same with the vail of piety and religion: as yet unto this our age they of Peru and Brasiles do, and certain other people upon the river of Plate; unto which so profane sacrifices our ancestors for all that with great devotion resorted. With like piety and devotion the Thracians also used to kill their fathers and mothers, grown weak with age, and so afterwards did eat them, to the end they should not languish with sickness, nor being dead become meat for worms; as they answered the Persian king. Neither must we say that there were none but the ancient Gauls that sacrificed men; which indeed they did unto the time of Tiberius the Emperor: for long time before, the 
* Caes. lib. 6. Belli Gallici.  Amorits and Ammonits' used to sacrifice their children: neither was it a solemnity among the Barbarians only, as generally among the Scytheses (as Plutarch writeth) but also among the Greeks (in whom civility nor only rested, but even from whom it was unto all other nations derived): for Achilles (as Homer reporteth) sacrificed unto his dead friend Patroclus with the slaughtar of men 
* Plut. in Themist. & Artax.  Themistocles also in the Persian war, sacrificed three men; as did the Persian king at the same time twelve: neither could jupiter Licius (as is reported) be otherwise appeased but by the slaughter of man, led by the ambiguity of an old Oracle, and of the Greek word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, which without accent signifieth either Light, or a Man M. Tullius detesteth our ancestors, for that they sacrificed with man's blood: but that he spoke as an Orator, and as best served his cause: for M. Varro attributeth it to all the people of Italy: as also the manner of vowing in the sacred spring time to have been, that whatsoever man or beast was that year first borne should be sacrificed. A man might also bring for example 
* jud. 11.  jephte general of the army of the Israelites, who is reported to have sacrificed his daughter unto almighty God, much about the same time that Agamemnon king of the Greeks sacrificed his daughter Iphigenia 
* Euripides.  (whereof some well learned men have made Tragedies) although that he sacrificed nothing unto God but the virginity of his daughter; as the Hebrew text plainly declareth; and as Rabbi Levi, and the other Hebrew interpetors all agreed. How beit other people did the like with great piety and devotion: which proveth well that we must not measure the law of nature by men's actions, be they never so old and inveterat: neither thereof conclude, that the servile estate of slaves is of right natural: as also much less to attribute it to charity, or to courtesy, that the people in ancient time saved their prisoners, taken in wars, whom they might have slain; to draw a greater gain and profit from them as from beasts. For who is he that would spate the life of his vanquished enemy, if he could get a greater profit by his death than by sparing his life? Of a thousand examples I will produce but one. At the siege of jerusalem under the conduct of Vespasian, a Roman soldier having found gold in the entrails of a jew that was slain, made his companions therewith acquainted, who forthwith cut the throats of their prisoners, to see if they had also swallowed any of their crowns; so that in a moment there were slain 
* jeseph▪ in bello judaico.  above twenty thousand of those jews. OH fair example of charity towards captives! But say some, they are nourished, they are well entreated for their service: but how I pray you are they nourished? and for what service doing? Cato the Censor (reputed the best and wisest man of his time) after that he had drawn all the service and profit he could from his slaves, even until they were grown crooked with age, so that he could wring nothing more from them, set them then to sale to such as would give most for them, to draw yet from them the very price of their blood which yet remained in them, lest he should be enforced to nourish them for naught, now grown impotent with age, or else be feign to kill them, or to set them at liberty; in such sort that the poor slaves in recompense of all their service made, were drawn to the gallows by their new masters: not yet so happy as Pallas her mule in Athens, which grown old went about whither she list unhalt●…ed, no man daring in her old age to load or charge her. And whereas there is nothing more holy or more natural given by God unto mankind, than marriage; yet so it is, that it was not permitted unto slaves: yea in case that a free man taken captive had a child lawfully begot by his wife; if the father died in the hands of the enemy, although the mother returned into her liberty, yet nevertheless was the child reputed illegitimat.  
What should I rehearse the execrable and profuse filthiness of both sexes, which 
The miserable estate and condition of slaver.  the poor slaves heretofore were and yet are enforced to endure and suffer? But as for cruelty showed upon them, it is incredible that we read, and that a man might speak of, if but the thousand part thereof were written: for Authors would thereof say nothing, if good occasion were not given; and we have not but the histories of the most civil people that ever were in the world. For they were enforced to till the ground in 
* Colum. lib. 1  chains (as yet they do in Barbary,) and to lie in dungeons, the ladders being drawn up from them, as they yet do in all the East▪ for fear they should be lost, or that they should set fire on the house, or otherwise kill their masters. Now as for every light offence of the slave, except he were of great price, it was so rigorously punished, as that to have broken a glass was unto him death: as for example, the Emperor Augustus being at supper in the house of Vedius Pollio, it chanced one of the slaves to break a glass; who having done no other fault but that (as saith 
* Lib. tertio de fra.  Seneca) was forthwith drawn unto a pond of Lampreis, which were fed with man's flesh: whereat the poor slave crying out, fled unto the feet of Agustus, entreating him, not for his life, but that he might not after he was put to death be eaten up of those fishes, for he found himself worthy of death for the glass he had broken: but the common opinion was, that the soul of the drowned never passed over into the 
* Vir. 6. Aeneid  Elysian fields; or else that it died together with the body: as Synesius writ of his companions sailing to Alexandria, who in a tempest suddenly risen, seeing the outrageous violence of the Sea, drew their swords to cut their own throats, so to give way unto the soul, which they thought otherwise to be in danger to be drowned together with the body: so much the poor slave feared to be eaten up of the fishes. But Augustus moved with compassion (as saith Seneca) pardoned the slave, causing all the rest of the glasses to be broken, and the pond to be filled up. Yet Dion the Historiographer, reporting the same history, saith that Augustus could not obtain pardon of Pollio for his slave, neither to have commanded the pond of Lampreys to have been filled up, than which nothing was more precious amongst the Remans': which for all that seemeth to have been more probable, seeing that Seneca confesseth Augustus to have been therewith contented, neither to have been therefore angry with his friend Pollio. And to show that this was no new matter more than two hundred years before, 
* Plut. in▪ vita Titi Flaminii.  Quintus Flaminius a Senator of Rome, caused one of his slaves to be slain, for no other cause but to gratify and please his Bardache, which said that he had never seen a man slain. Now if it chanced the master to be flame in his house, by whomsoever that it was, all the slaves that at the same time were under the same roof, were put to death every mother's son. As chanced at the murder of Pedanius great Praetor of Rome▪ when question was made of putting to death all his slaves, following (as saith Tacitus) the ancient custom, the common people being for 
* Lib. 14.  the most part men enfranchised, fell in mutiny, for that they knew well the murderer was but one, & yet nevertheless there must be put to death 400 of his slaves, all innocent of the fact: nevertheless the matter being debated in the Senate, it was there resolved, That the ancient custom should be kept, & so accordingly all the slaves were put to death. Her pass the murdering of slaves, enforced to kill one another in the lists, or to be torn with wild beasts, so to give pleasure unto the people, and to breed in them a contempt of death. And although the law Petronia had forbidden slaves without cause to be cast unto the wild beasts: yet was it never observed, no more than the edict of the emperor Nero, who was the first that appointed commissioners to hear the complaints 
* Sene. lib. 3. de Benefic.  of slaves: and after him the emperor Adrian ordained that inquisition should be made against such as had maliciously without cause slain their slaves: how beit that long time before they were culpable as murderers, by the law Cornelia: but that was holden in no regard, and all that the poor slaves could do to save themselves from the fury of their masters, was to fly unto the images of the gods, or of the emperors. For neither the temple of Diana in Rome, which king Servius (himself the son of a slave) had appointed as a sanctuary for slaves; neither the image of Romulus, which the Senate had of long time appointed for the self same purpose; neither the Sepulchre of Theseus at Athens; neither the image of Ptolemee at Cyrene; neither the temple of 
* Plu. in Thes.  Diana at Ephesus, could defend the slaves from the fury of their angry lords and masters. Howbeit that by the law of the Ephesians the slave which without just cause had fled unto the temple of Diana, was again restored unto his master, being before sworn not therefore to entreat him evil: but if the cause of his flight were just, then was he taken from his master and made servant to Diana: except women, who might not enter into her temple. But Tiberius of all other tyrants that ever were, the most crafty in his old age, appointed his image for a sanctuary, propounding capital punishment unto all such as should by violence draw any slave from the same; to the intent that by that mean the slaves might for the lest occasion come to accuse their masters, yea even of high treason. Insomuch that as Seneca writeth, a certain Senator fearing to be bewrayed of his slave, craved pardon of Tiberius for that he had but been about to touch his chamber pot with a ring upon his finger, wherein the image of Tiberius was engraven. In such sort, that the images of the emperors, but especially of tyrants were as snares to entangle the magistrates in, who oftentimes secretly murdered their slaves, for having recourse unto the images, so soon as they were returned thence. But the law of God had therefore much better provided, appointing every man's house for a sanctuary unto the slave flying from his master, forbidding to restore him again unto his master whilst he was yet in choler. For all masters are not of like discretion to Plato, which said to his slave, That he would sharply have corrected him, but that he was angry: whereas the Germane (as Tacitus saith) never punish their servants or children but in their rage, and that as if they were their enemies. Thus we see the lives of masters not well assured against their slaves; and the lives of slaves much less against their masters. For who could assure himself of his life, or of his goods in the time of the tyranny of Sylla, who had proposed thirty Sesterces unto free men, and unto bond men liberty, as a reward if they should discover their masters, or bring in the head of any one of them that were by him proscribed? In which fear the citizens were, until that threescore thousand of them being slain, and so the state in a manner again appeased, a certain slave yet presented unto Sylla the head of his lord & master, whom Sylla for so doing according to his promise set at liberty, but by and by after caused him to be cast headlong from the rock Tarpeia. At such time also as persecution grew hot against the Christians, there was no Christian master but was in danger of his life, or else glad to set at liberty his slaves. But the fear of persecution once ceasing, the lords and masters themselves become tyrants over their slaves.  
So the state of Families and Commonweals is always in danger of trouble and ruin, 
To great a multitude of slaves dangerous in a Commonweal.  by the conspiracy of slaves combining themselves together: all Histories being full of servile rebellions and wars. And albeit that the Romans were right great and mighty, yet so it was that they could not let the slaves to rise against the state in all the towns of Italy except Messana: and afterwards for all the laws they could make, they could not prevent but that threescore thousand slaves rise in rebellion under the conduct of Spartacus, who in set battle overthrew three armies of the Romans. For it is most certain, that in every country whatsoever, there was at lest ten slaves for one free man: as it is easy to judge by the musters taken in Athens, where for twenty thousand citizens were found ten thousand strangers, and four hundred thousand slaves. And Italy (victorious over all nations) had many more, as a man may perceive by the Oration of Cassius the Senator, whereby he persuaded the Senate for the confirming of Sylla his decree: We have at home (said he) whole nations of slaves much differing among themselves in manners, fashions, language, and religion. And namely M. Crassus alone had five hundred slaves, who daily brought in unto him the profit of their gainful arts and trades; besides them whom he employed in his ordinary and domestical service. Milo also in one day set at liberty 300 slaves, lest they should have been put to torture to depose concerning the death of Clodius Tribune of the people. And that multitude of slaves was it for which the Roman Senate, desirous to put a difference in the habit of slaves, to the intent to have them known from free men: one of the gravest Senators dissuaded the same, showing the danger like to ensue thereof, if the slaves should begin to enter into the number of themselves; for that so they might easily dispatch themselves of their masters, for the easiness of their rising into rebellion, and the difference of their habits. Unto which danger Africa & some part of Spain should be subject, if there were such a multitude of slave as in times past: for that they marked their slaves in the face, which they did not in ancient time, except such of them as were villainous and sturdy knaves, who were thereof called Stigmatic; who at any time being manumised, could for all that never enjoy the full fruit of their liberty or the privilege of citizens: marking the rest upon their arms. And this was it for which the Lacedæmonians seeing their slaves to multiply exceedingly above the citizens (for the hope their masters gave them of liberty which could get most children, and for the profit every man drew out of them in particular) made a decree that three thousand of them such as had the most able bodies should be taken up for the wars: whom so pressed out, they forthwith caused to be all in one night slain, and that so suddenly and secretly, as that no man knew what was become of them, more than they which had the doing of the matter.  
Now this fear that Cities and Commonweals had of their slaves, was the cause 
Why slaves were not suffered to bear arms.  that they never durst suffer them to bear arms, or to be enrolled in their musters, and that upon pain of death: and if by necessity they were constrained to take their slaves, they at the same time freely set them at liberty. As did Scipio Africanus the Greater, who after the great overthrow of Cannae manumised 300 of his slaves, all able bodies. Howbeit that Florus writeth, That arms were givento 8000 slaves; which we also read to have been done in the confederate war. But Cleomenes king of Lacedemonia finding himself unable to withstand the multitude of his enemies, as also of his slaves, his citizens being for the most part slain; in his so great necessity proclaimed liberty to all such slaves as were able to pay fifty crowns for their heads: in which doing he provided himself both of soldiers and money. Yea not so much as the effeminate people of Asia used their slaves in wars, except the Parthians, who might not by their laws manumise their slaves, whom they made almost as much of as of their children: whereby they grew into such a multitude▪ that in their army wherewith▪ they put to flight the power of M. Antonius, consisting of fifty thousand men, there was but 4500 free men, as we read in justin: yet had they no cause to rebel, being of their masters so well entreated. But as for other people they were so mistrustful of their slaves, as that sometimes they would not have them to serve in their galleys before they were enfranchised: as did Augustus, who at one time set at liberty twenty thousand to serve him in his galleys. And for fear they had▪ lest they should conspire together against the state, to keep them always busied in other mechanical arts, Lycurgus amongst the Lacedæmonians, and Numa Pompilius in Rome, forbade their own citizens to use any manual occupation. And yet they could not so well provide, but that ever there was some one or other desperate man, who propounding liberty unto slaves, still rob the State. As Viriatus the Pirate, who made himself king of Portugal: Cinna, Spartacus, Tacfarinas, 
* Appian. in bellis civilib. * jos. in bello judaico.  and Simon the son of Gerson, captain of the jews, who all of base companions made themselves great lords, by giving liberty unto the slaves that followed them. And the civil wars yet continuing betwixt Augustus and M. Antonius, was not to be seen but fugitive slaves still on the one side or the other: in such sort, as that after the discomfiture of Sex. Pompeius, there were found thirty thousand slaves which had taken part with him, whom Augustus caused to be apprehended through his dominions, and by a prefixed day to be again restored unto their masters, commanding the rest to be hanged that had no masters to lay claim unto them; as we read in Appian. And in truth the power of the Arabians grew by no other means. For as soon as Homar one of Mahomet's licutenants, had begun to raise war in Arabia, and promised liberty unto the slaves that should follow him, he drew such a number after him, that in few years they made themselves lords of all the East. The fame of which liberty, and the conquests made by those slaves, so encouraged the slaves of Europe, that they began to take up arms, first in Spain in the year 781, and afterward in France in the time of Charlemaigne, and of jews the godly; as is to be seen by their Edicts then made against the conspiracy of slaves. And after that also Lothaire the son of jews, having lost two battles against his brethren, called the slaves unto his aid with promise of liberty: who afterwards gave the overthrow unto their masters in the year 852. When suddenly this fire took such hold in Germany, where the slaves having taken up arms, so troubled the state of the Germane princes and cities, that jews king of the Almans was constrained to raise all his forces to subdue them.  
And this was the cause that the Christian princes by little and little released their 
The cause why Christian princes by little and little released their slaves.  servitude, and enfranchised their slaves, reserving only unto themselves certain services, and the ancient right of succession, if their enfranchised slaves should chance to die without issue: a custom yet in use in all the lower Germany; as in many places in France, and England also. For as yet many remembrances of bondage remain in the Christian Commonweal: as is to be seen in the laws of the Lombard's & Ripuaires' whereby slaves could not have their just liberty, or alienat their goods, until they had been twice manumised: and oftentimes the lord or master joined unto the act of enfranchisement, That it was done for the health of his soul. For they which first laid the foundation of the Christian Commonweal, had nothing in more regard, than to found the means how Christian slaves might be set at liberty: so that in hope thereof many of them oftentimes become Christians; & their masters for the health of their souls were content so to enfranchise them. We also read in the Histories of Africa, how that Paulinus bishop of Nolo, after he had sold all his goods to redeem Christian slaves, at last (which a man would wonder at) sold himself also unto the Vandals for his brethren. And hereof came the manumission of slaves made in churches before the bishops. Whereof, in the reign of Constantine the Great, ensued such a multitude of poor and needy men, who had nothing but their liberty to live upon (of whom the most part would do nothing, and the rest could do nothing) as that cities were with nothing more charged than with them. Hereof, began the alms-houses, and 
The beginning of a●…meses houses and hospital●….  hospitals, for the relief of little children, of the aged, of the sick, and of them that could not labour, to be erected and endowed by the Christian princes, at the requests of the bishops. Hereof S. Basil in his sermons complaineth, that the cries and groanings of the poor and weak were in the Churches confounded and mingled with the songs and prayers of the Priests. Much about which time julian the Apostata in despite of the Christians 
* Nicephorus.  exhorted the Pagan bishops by the example of the Christians to the building and endowing of alms-houses and hospitals for the relief of their poor. And for that poor men set at liberty, did oftentimes lay forth their children to be brought up of the charity and liberality of the Christians: Gratian made a law, That the children so exposed and left unto the world, should be slaves unto them that had so nourished and brought them up. And not long after, Valens the Emperor by an Edict gave power to every man to take up the vagrant and idle persons, and to 'cause them to serve them as slaves; forbidding also and that upon pain of death, any to go into the woods or deserts there to live as Her●…tss; of whom he caused a great number which had contrary to his Edict so go out, to be executed; to the intent to cut off idleness, and to draw every man unto labour. But after that Idolatry began to decay, and the Christian religion to increase, the multitude of slaves began also to diminish; and yet much more after the publishing of the law of Mahomet, who set at liberty all them of his religion. To the imitation of whom, the Christians also so frankly set at liberty their slaves, as that all servitude and slavery seemed in that age to have been shut up with the West Indians, wherein the Christians had shaken off from their necks all bondage, about the year 1250: yet for all that, that there were slaves in Italy in the year 1212, it is evident, as well by the laws of William king of Sicily, and Frederick the second Emperor; as also by the decrees of the bishops of Rome, Alexander (I say) the third, urban the third, and Innocentius the third, concerning the marriages of slaves, which the Lawyers call Contabernia, or keeping of company together: which Alexander was chosen Pope in the year 1158, urban in the year 1185, and Innocentius in the year 1188. Whereby it is evident, the Christian Common▪ weal to have been clear of slaves since the year 1250, or there about. For Bartholus 
A time wherein there were no 〈◊〉 in the Christian Commonweal.  who flourished in the year 1300, writeth that there were no slaves in his time; and that by Christian laws men might no more cell themselves, understanding the Edicts made by the Christian princes: which when Nicholas the Sicilian, otherwise called the Abbot of Panormo had learned of Bartholus, he thought it a thing well worth the noting. Nevertheless we read in the History of Polonia, that every prisoner taken in good war, was then and long time after slave unto him that had taken him, if the king would not pay two Florins for his head, as I have before said: and yet at this present the subjects bound unto the soil whereon they were borne, which they call Kmetoes, are in the power of their lords, who may at their pleasure kill them, and not be called into question therefore: and if so be that they kill another man's subject, then are they acquitted by paying ten crowns; the one moiety to the lord, and the other moiety unto the heirs: so as we read in the laws of Polonia; which are the like in the kingdoms of Denmark, Sweden, and Norway. But it is more than 400 years ago, since that France suffered in it any true slaves. For as for that which we read in our histories, that jews Hutin, who came to the crown in the year 1313 (the self same time that Bartholus lived) set at liberty all slaves for money▪ to defray the charges of his wars; 
When slaves ceased in France  that is, as I take it, to be understood of manumised men, which we call Mortmains, whom we even yet at this present see to be set at liberty by the king's royal letters patents, from that bond of servitude whereby they are prohibited to marry a wife, or to alienat their goods out of the territories of their Patron. So also we are to understand the edict of Charles the fift the French king, wherein in cities every 70 families, in country villages every hundred families, and every 200 heads of slaves, were be charged with a man at arms; which they should not have done if they had been in the possession of another man, & accounted as another man's goods. So it is also to be understood that is written of Humbert Dauphin, who at the same time by one edict enfranchised all the slaves of Dauphine, and commanded the same to be enrolled in the public acts and laws of the country. The same courtesy used Theobald county d'Blois towards his slaves, in the year 1245. To this also belongeth that which we read of Sugerius abbot of the covent of S. Dionyse, who set at liberty his manumised slaves, so that they changed their dwelling. And also the ancient decree of the Parliament of Paris, whereby it was permitted to the bishop of Chalons, by the consent of his Chapter, to enfranchise his slaves. Charles the seventh also coming to the crown in the year 1430 enfranchised divers persons of servile condition. And in our memory king Henry the second by his letters patents enfranchised them of Burbonnois, in the year 1549. By whose example also the duke of Savoy did the like in all his countries, in the year 1561. All which we see done in the great favour of liberty. Whereas otherwise the Prince, of his own lawful power could not enfranchise another man's slave, and much less the magistrate, what intercession soever the people should make: neither could he so much as give unto him that was by another man enfranchised, so much as leave to wear a ring of gold, without the consent of his patron. For Commodus the Emperor by his edict took from all them their rings of gold, who had obtained that privilege of the prince without leave of their Patron: neither would he have it any thing prejudicial unto the Patron, that his enfranchised slave had obtained of the prince this privilege, albeit that the prince had restored him to the state of a free borne man: which was a far greater matter than to have obtained the privilege to wear a ring of gold: which albeit that it belonged unto the prince only to grant, yet so it was nevertheless in the time of Tertullian, that the patrons had in a manner got that power unto themselves, 
* Tertul. in de resurrection.  giving unto their enfranchised slaves a ring of gold and a white gown, in stead of iron gives and whips, causing them so attired to sit down at the table with them, and to bear their name. And at last justinian himself by a general edict restored all them that had been slaves enfranchised unto the state of free borne men; so that for the confirmation thereof they needed not afterwards any the prince's charter. Which law for all that we use not: for in 
* viz. France.  this realm he must of necessity obtain the prince his letters patents, which have always used to restore unto manumised men and of servile condition, the state of free borne men, and to blot out all the stain of their old slavery; which letters were wont to be both requested and obtained without the leave of the patron: who for all that may lay hands upon such goods of his enfranchised slave as were got before he was set at liberty wheresoever they be; as not long since was adjudged by the court of Paris: as for such things as they get afterwards they may hold them to themselves; and having no children, by their testaments bestow them upon whom they please. I have seen the lord of the White Rock in Gascongue claim to have not only a right over his manumised subjects, and also that they were bound to trim his vines, to till his grounds, to mow his meadows, to reap and thrash his corn, to carry & recarrie whatsoever he should command them, to repair his decayed house, to pay his ransom, and also the four accustomed payments used in this realm; but also that if without his leave they should change their dwelling places wherein they were borne, or departed out of his land, he might lead them home again in an halter: unto all which the aforesaid services his manumised people yielded, saving unto the last, which by a decree of the Parliament of Tholouze was cut off, as prejudicial unto the right of liberty. Truly they whom the Polonians call Kmetons, are not compelled to do their patrons so great service; but yet suffer things much grievous: for that any man may kill them for the small payment of ten crowns, and their lord may so do for nothing. And in former time it was lawful amongst the Indian's by all means to tyrannize upon their servants, which were in number infinite, yea and to kill them also; until that Charles the fift by a law which he made commanded then all to be free. But in France, although there be some remembrance of old servitude, yet is it not lawful there to make any slave, or to buy any of others: Insomuch that the slaves of strangers so soon as they set their foot within France become 
Slaves by coming into France become free.  frank & free; as was by an old decree of the court of Paris determined against an ambassador of Spain, who had brought a slave with him into France. And I remember that of late a Genua merchant having brought with him unto Tholouze a slave whom he had bought in Spain, the host of the house understanding the matter, persuaded the slave to appeal unto his liberty. The matter being brought before the magistrates, the merchant was called for; the Attorney general out of the records showed certain ancient privileges given (as is said) unto them of Tholouze by Theodosius the Great, wherein he had granted, That slaves so soon as they came into Tholouze should be free. The merchant alleging for himself that he had truly bought his slave in Spain, and so was afterward come to Tholouze, from thence to go home to Genua, and so not to be bound to the laws of France. In the end he requested that if they would needs deal so hardly with him, as to set at liberty another man's slave, yet they should at lest restore unto him the money he cost him: whereunto the judges answered, That it was a matter to be considered of. In the mean time the merchant fearing lest he shou●…d lose both his dutiful slave and his money also, of himself set him at liberty, yet covenanting with him that he should serve him so long as he lived. Yet for all that, those privileges which they of Tholouze boast to have been granted them by Theodosius, seem not to have been so, seeing that Narbona a true Colony of the Romans, and the most ancient that was in France, Lectore, Nysmes, Vienne, Lions, Arles, Romans, and many others, which were also Roman Colonies, not nor Rome itself the very seat of the Empire, had not any such privilege. And thus much concerning the enfranchising of slaves.  
But now here might a man say, If it be so that the Mahometans have enfranchised all the slaves of their religion, which hath course in all Asia, and almost in all Afrique, 
Now it cometh to paste tha●…●…es 〈◊〉 be so many 〈◊〉 in the world.  with a good part of Europe also; and the Christians have semblably done the like (as we have before showed:) how cometh it to pass that yet the world is so full of slaves and slavery? For the jews may not by their laws have any slave of their own nation, neither by the laws of the Christians may they have any Christian. Truly all in that swerver from the law of God: For the law of God forbiddeth any slave to be made by the order of the Israelites amongst themselves, except that any of them shall of his own accord give himself in bondage to another, and suffer▪ his ear to be 
* Exod. 2●….  bored through to a post with an all: truly it adjudgeth the debtors unto 
* Deut. ●…5.  the creditors, and suffereth the jews to be sold for poverty: yet the same law commandeth them at the seventh year to be set at liberty. And although a man have entrhalled himself, and suffered himself to be thrust through the ear with an all, insomuch that he be bound to perpetual servitude: yet nevertheless all the interpreters of the law affirm, That in the year of jubiley he shall again recover his liberty, except he had rather again serve than become free. But such bondslaves as were borne of those kind of slaves which had of their own accord given themselves into bondage, they were in the fiftieth year to be set free: at which time the law by 
* Levit. 2●…. Herom. 32. Num. 13.  the sound of trumpet denounceth liberty unto all manner of slaves. Yet doth the law permit them to have strangers, of another nation and religion than their own, in perpetual bondage; and that their posterity and nephews might use the same right against strangers, that strangers might against the Isiaelites: than which kind of slaves julian the Emperor writeth none to have been better. You see (saith he) how willingly the Syrians serve other nations: and contrariwise what a love of liberty is in the people of the Celtes. But the jews when they had bought any strange bond▪ slaves of the Christians, or of the Pagans', they instructed them in their own religion, and so circumcised them: which thing Traian by a special law forbade: and albeit that they had yielded unto their lords or masters religion, yet nevertheless they enforced them still to serve: Whereas by 
* Exod. 12. Numer. 49.  the law it was provided, that such strangers as being circumcised had received the law of God, should enjoy the same privileges and benefits that the natural citizens did. The same law (saith it) shall be unto the stranger & the citizen. That is it that God by the Prophet jeremy 
* Hier. 34.  complaineth of, Slaves not to be set at liberty according to the law: and therefore a most heavy bondage to hung over the masters heads from their enemies. Hereupon also Philip the French king drove the jews out of his kingdom, confi●…cating their goods, for that contrary unto the law they circumcised Christians, and took them unto themselves into bondage for slaves. The like deceit we see the Mahometans to use, whose manner is to circumcise and to instruct in their religion such Christians as they have taken in war, or bought of pirates, or at leastwise their children, whom nevertheless they compel to serve with all their children and posterity. Whose example the Portugeses following, compel the bondmen whom they have bought out of Africa, to abjure the Mahometan religion, and instructing them in the Christian religion, 'cause them nevertheless with their children and offspring to serve them in perpetual slavery: so that now whole droves of slaves are sold and that openly in all parts of Portugal, as if they were beasts. In like manner the Spaniards having brought the Neigroes unto the Christian religion, keep them nevertheless and all their posterity for slaves. And albeit that Charles the fift had by a general edict made in the year 1540 set at liberty all the slaves of the West Indies, nevertheless a sedition there rising through the covetousness and insolency of them that were in greatest power, Gonsales Pizzare governor of that province revolted from Charles: whose power when Lagasca had discomfited, and for public example had caused him to be beheaded together with the chief men of that rebellion, he according to the edict, set at liberty all the slaves; yet with condition, that they should still serve their patrons. And yet for all that it could not be brought to pass, but that Lagasca returning into Spain, these late enfranchised men fell again into their slavery: and especially for the profit which their lords and masters were▪ in hope to have by the selling of them: to the imitation of the Portugals, who first called in again Servitude, now for many worlds of years buried in forgetfulness in Europe; and are in 
The Portugals the first that called in slavery again into Europe.  short time like enough to disperse the same over all Europe, as it is now already begun in Italy. For now a good while ago Africa and Asia, and the Eastern part of Europe also have accustomed to nourish and bring up in every city, stocks of slaves, in like manner as if they were beasts, and of them to make a great merchandise and gain. For within this hundred year the Tartars (a kind of Scythian people) in great number with fire and sword entering into the borders of Moscovia, Lituania, and Polonia, carried away with them three hundred thousand Christians into captivity. And not long ago even in our memory, Sinan Bassa having taken the Ifle of Gozo near unto Malta, led away with him 6300 Christians, and all the inhabitants of Tripoli in Barbary, which he sold in Graecia. So that it is not to be marveled that the captain of the Turks janissaries, and either of his chancellors (whom they call Cadelesquiers) use every one of them at their entrance into their office to receive of the prince three hundred slaves. For as concerning the Turks Praetorian soldiers, and those youths which are taken from the Christians as tribute, and are called tribute children, I never accounted them for slaves; seeing that they are enrolled in the prince's family, and that they alone enjoy the great offices, honours, priesthoods, authority and honour; which nobility extendeth also unto their nephews in the fourth degree, and all their posterity afterward being accounted base, except by their virtue and noble acts they maintain the honour of their grandfathers: For the Turks almost alone of all other people measure true nobility by virtue, and not by descent or the antiquity of 
No man noble among the Turks but for his valour or his virtue.  their stock; so that the farther a man is from virtue, so much the farther he is (with them) from nobility.  
Wherhfore seeing it is proved by the examples of so many worlds of years, so many inconveniences of rebellions, servile wars, conspiracies eversions and changes to have happened unto Commonweals by slaves; so many murders, cruelties, and detestable villainies to have been committed upon the persons of slaves by their lords and masters: who can doubt to affirm it to be a thing most pernicious and dangerous to have brought them into a Commonweal; or having cast them off, to receive them again? Now if any man shall say, That the rigour of the laws may by forbidding, and severe punishment moderate the cruelty of masters over their slaves: What law can there be more just, more strong, and indifferent, or better than the laws 
Reasons for the bringing in again of slavery answered.  of God, which hath so wisely provided as to forbidden to chastise slaves with whips (which the Roman laws permitted) and willeth the slave to be enfranchised, if his master shall break any limb of him? which law Constantine the Emperor afterward approved. But who shall prosecute the suit against the lord for the death of the slave? who shall hear the complaint? who shall exact due punishment therefore? shall he that hath nothing to do therewith? considering that tyrants hold it for a rule in policy, That one cannot be too severe unto his subjects, so to keep them low and obedient. But the Spaniards (some will say) entreat their slaves courteously, teach them, and bring them up, yea and that much more kindly than they do their hired seruans: and they again on their part serve their lords and masters with all cheerfulness and love incredible. But concerning the Spaniards it is a common saying, That there are no masters more courteous than they at the first; as generally all beginnings are pleasing: so also it is most certain, That there is no greater love, than the love of a good slave towards his lord: provided that it meet with an humour agreeing with itself. For which cause the law of God (in mine opinion) hath so wisely provided that no man should serve a perpetual servitude, but he which having served seven years, and so well tasted the humour and disposition of his master or creditor, had consented to be his slave for ever. But sith there are so few men one like unto anothe●… and contrariwise the variety and natural disposition of them infinite, what law giver can unto them all prescribe one general edict, law, or rule. The ancient proverb, which saith, So many slaves, so many enemies in a man's house, showeth right well what friendship, faith and loyalty a man may look for of his slaves. Of a thousand examples of antiquity I will recite but one, which happened in the time of julius Pontanu●…, who reporteth, That a slave seeing 
An horrible example of the cruelty of a faithless slave.  his lord absent, barred the gates, and having shamefully abused his mistress, bound her, took his masters three children, and so going up to the highest place of the house, seeing his master coming home, first cast down unto him upon the pavement one of his children, and after that another: the woeful father all dismayed, and fearing lest he should throw down the third likewise, with prayers and tears besought the slave to spare him that was yet left, promising him forgiveness for that he had already done, and liberty also if he would but save that third. Which his request the slave yielded unto, upon condition that he should cut off his own nose: which he chose rather to do; than to lose his child. But this done, the slave nevertheless cast down the third child also; and so at last to take that revenge of himself, which his lord thought to have done, cast headlong down himself also. And not to be tedious, I omit poisonings, murders, burnings, and many other mischiefs oftentimes every where done by slaves. But these inconveniences, you will say, are countervailed and recompensed with other mutual profits; for that by receiving in of slaves we cut off the infinite number of vagabonds and bankrupts, who after they have devoured all, would pay their creditors with 
Reasons for th●… maintaining of slavery in a Commonweal.  bills: & that by that means might be driven away such a multitude of rogues & naughty doers, which eat up whole towns, and as drones suck the honey from the bees: join also unto this, that of such idle mates, thieves and pirates furnish themselves; besides that, famine and evil provision for the poor, draw into towns all popular diseases; for the poor we must nourish and not kill, although it be in a sort to kill them, to refuse to nourish them (as saith S. Ambrose.) These reasons bear some show of truth. 
The same reasons answered.  For as concerning debtors, if they be not able to pay, God his law commandeth them to be adjudged to their creditors for seven years, but yet not into perpetual bondage▪ howbeit that the law of the twelve tables, practised in all the West Indies, and in the greatest part of Africa, will that they remain still prisoners unto the creditors, until they be fully satisfied. For they which have taken away from debtors in civil cases the benefit, to leave unto their creditors all such goods as they had, and command them to be committed not to their creditors, but to prisons, as the Turks do; seem to me to take away not only from the creditors, but also from the debtors, all power to keep themselves, yea and their lives also, as taking from them the mean for them to travel, and to gain to acquit themselves. But as for thieves and pirates, there was never in any time more than when the multitude of slaves was increased: For that the slave not able to endure slavery, and at length breaking from his master, was always constrained to be a thief or a pirate, not being able to endure his master, neither to show himself being marked, nor to live having nothing to live upon. A better example whereof cannot be than that of Spartacus the fensor, who at one time assembled out of the very bowels of Italy three score thousand slaves; when as at the same time above fourscore thousand pirates with nine hundred sail of ships were roving over all the Mediterannean, and had with so great forces taken 400 cities upon the sea coast; as that the Roman Empire was both by land and sea as it were beset with thieves and robbers. But the wise law giver is not he that driveth robbers out of the Commonwealth, but he that suffereth them not therein to enter: which may easily be done without that direful slavery, so dreadful unto states and cities; by erecting in every town and city public houses for poor children, where they may learn divers trades and occupations, as they do 〈◊〉 Paris, hio●…ss, and Venice, and other well governed towns, where Seminaries of Artiz●… are brought upto the great benefit of the Commonweal. But in such places as wherein slaves are now already received, I am not of opinion to have them altogether and ●…pone time set at liberty, as Charles the Emperor did at Peru: for that so they having nothing to live upon, nor occupation to gain by, and delighted with the sweetness of idleness and liberty, would take no pains: in such sort that the most part of them died for hunger: but the best way is, by little and little to enfranchise them, having before their enfranchisement taught them some occupation whereby to relieve themselves. Now if some shall say, That no man is a good master, but he that hath before been a good servant: I say that to be an opinion evil 
The old saying, That no man can be a good master, but he which hath before been a good 〈◊〉, refuted.  grounded, although it be right ancient: for there is nothing that doth more discourage and overthrow, (and if I may so say) a bastardise a good and noble mind, than servitude; or that doth more abate the natural majesty of good natures to command over others, than to have been once a slave. Solomon also the master of wisdom saith in his Proverbs, That there is nothing more intolerable, than when a slave is become a master, or a handmaid a mistress: which he referreth not only unto a more mystical sense; as when our intemperate desires bear rule over our reason: but unto him also which so dainly passeth from one extremity to another; as from servitude to command. But if it be true that reason and the law of God is always and every where to take place, and that it was not shut up only within the bounds of Palestine: why should not that law so profitably & so wisely made by God himself, concerning slavery & liberty, stand in force, rather than that which was by man's wisdom devised? Howbeit that the Tartars (which are by many thought to be descended from the ten tribes of Israel) have always enfranchised their slaves at the end of seven years: yet with condition that they should departed out of their country: which condition was first by Papinian (the great lawyer) rejected, but afterwards by him again received; but being joined unto enfranchisments; is accounted as if it were not written at all. And thus much concerning the power of a master over his slave, and whether slaves are to be suffered in a well ordered Commonweal. But now that we have sufficiently, & yet also as briefly as was unto us possible, entreated of a Family, & of all the parts thereof, which is the foundation of the whole commonweal; let us now likewise also speak of a Citisen & a City.   

CHAP. VI ¶ What a Citisen is, and how much citizens differ from citizens, and how much from strangers: what also is to be understood by the name of a Town, a City, and of a Commonweal.  
WHat we have before said concerning a whole Family, and every part thereof, containeth in it the beginning of all Commonweals. And as foundations can of themselves stand without the form of an house, before the walls be built higher, or any roof laid upon them: so also a Family can of itself be without a City or a Commonweal: and so can also the master of a Family use his power and command over his household without depending of the power of any other man: as they say there are many such families in the frontiers of the kingdoms of Fes and of Morocco, and in the West Indies: but a Commonweal can no more be without a Family, than a City without houses, or an house without a foundation. Now when the master of the Family goeth out of his own house where he commandeth, to entreat and traffic with other heads of Families, of that concerneth them all in general, he than loaseth the title of master, head, and lord, to be a companion, equal and fellow like with others, leaving his family to enter into a City, and his domestical affairs to entreat of public; and in stead of a lord calleth himself a Citisen, which is no other in proper terms than A free 
The definition of a Citisen.  subject holding of the sovereignty of another man. For before there was either City or citizen, or any form of a Commonweal amongst men, every master of a family was a master in his own house, having power of life and death over his wife and children: but after that force, violence, ambition, covetousness, and desire of revenge had armed one against another, the issues of wars and combats giving victory unto the one side, made the other to become unto them slaves: and amongst them that overcame, he that was chosen chief and captain, under whose conduct and leading they had obtained the victory, kept them also in his power and command as his faithful and obedient subjects, and the other as his slaves. Than that full and entire liberty by nature given to every man, to live as himself best pleased, was altogether taken from the vanquished, and in the vanquishers themselves in some measure also diminished, in regard of the conqueror; for that now it concerned every man in private to yield his obedience unto his chief sovereign; and he that would not abate any thing of his liberty, to live under the laws and commandment of another, lost all. So the word of Lord and Servant, of Prince and Subject, before unknown unto the world, were first brought into use. Yea Reason, and the very light of nature, leadeth us to believe very 
That violence and oppression gave the beginning unto Commonweals.  force and violence to have given course and beginning unto Commonweals. And albeit that there were no reason therefore, it shall be hereafter declared by the undoubted▪ testimonies of the most credible historiographers, that is to say, of Thucydides, Plutarch, Caesar, & also by the laws of Solon, That the first men that bore rule, had no greater honour and virtue, than to kill, massacre and rob men, or to bring them in slavery. These be the words of Plutarch. Yet have we more also the witness of the sacred history, where it is said, that Nimroth the nephew of Cham, was the first that by force and violence brought men into his subjection, establishing his kingdom in the country▪ of Assyria: and for this cause they called him the Mighty hunter, which the Hebrews interpret to be a thief and robb●…. Which thing also Philo the jew, and josephus by their testimonies confirm, viz. 〈◊〉 by his wealth and power to have first exercised tyranny. Wherein it appear 〈◊〉 Demosthenes, Aristotle, and Cicero, to have mistaken 
That kings were not first chosen for their justice and virtue.  themselves, in following the error of Herodotus, who saith, That the first kings were chosen for their justice and virtue; and have hereof feigned unto us I wots not what heroical and golden worlds: an opinion by me by most certain arguments and testimonies elsewhere refelled; seeing that the first Cities and Commonweals, long before the time of Abraham were full of slaves: as also not long ago the Western islands did swarm with them at such time as the Spaniards subdued them: a thing that could not possibly be, but by extreme violent forcing the free laws of nature. And it is not yet past seventy years that the people of Gaoga in Africa had never felt or heard of any king or lord whatsoever, until that one amongst them a travel or had in his travel seen and noted the majesty of the king of Tombut: and thereupon conceiving a desire to make himself a king also in his own country, he at first to begin withal, killed a rich merchant; and so possessed of his horses arms and merchandise, divided them amongst his nigh kinsfolks and friends, acquainted with his purpose; by whose aid he by force and violence subdued now some, and after others, kill the richest, and ceasing upon their goods: in such sort that his son become rich with the robberies of his father, made himself king, whose successor hath so continued after him in great power, as we read in Leo of Africa. This was the beginning of the kings of Gaoga, which in short time greatly increased.  
And thus much concerning the beginning of Commonweals, which may serve to manifest the definition of a Citisen, by us before set down, to be true, which is no other thing to say, but A free subject holding of the sovereignty of another man. A free subject 
A Citisen must be a free subject.  I say, for albeit that a slave be much more subject unto the command of the highest authority than a free man; yet so it is, that all people have always with their common consent agreed, That a slave is no Citisen, and in questions of right is accounted no 
Slaves not to be accounted citizens.  body; which cannot truly be said of men's wives and children, who are free from all servitude and bondage; albeit that their rights and liberties, and the power to dispose of their own goods, be from them in some sort cut off by the domestical power: in sort that a man may say, that every Citisen is a subject, some small part of his liberty being diminished by the majesty of him to whom he oweth obeisance. But every subject is not a Citisen, as we have said of a slave; and may also so say of a stranger, who coming into an other man's signory, is not received for a Citisen, having not any part in the rights and privileges of the City; neither is to be accounted in the number of friends, allies, or coallies, who are not altogether strangers, (as the Lawyer saith) neither enemies also. Howbeit that the Greeks of old called strangers enemies, as also did the Latins, which Cicero hath noted out of the law of the twelve tables; 
* Cice. officiorum. lib. 1.  The mildness of the word (saith he) mitigating the hardness of the thing: and they were called enemies which had conspired against the state. And it may well be also that those whom we yet by a common word call Hotes, or Hosts, were in ancient time nothing else but strangers. But men have since corrected the propriety of words, the form of speech still remaining: for the Greeks have called their enemy's 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, as men making war upon them; and strangers 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, which signifieth not pilgrims (as saith Acursius) but strangers, be they another man's subjects, or themselves sovereigns in their own country.  
Now amongst them whom we said to be subjects unto public empires and sovereign power; some are natural, some are naturallised; and of them which are natural 
The division of subjects.  some are free borne, some are slaves, and these slaves being set at liberty, in an instant become citizens, whereas stranger slaves be not so. Yet true it is that the enfranchised slaves in Greece were not admitted to be citizens, although that they were of the same country, and natural subjects. For the request of Demosthenes the Orator, which he made unto the people after the great overthrow at Cherronaea, That all the inhabitants of Athens, as well the enfranchised as others, might be accounted citizens; was rejected and denied, for fear lest the enfranchised men (of whom there was a great multitude) should become lords of their estate, and with the number of voices exclude the natural citizens from all honours and promotions; which the greatest number still carried away: which thing the Romans at the first not regarding, had almost before they were ware fallen into the power of the enfranchised men, had not Fabius Maximus in good time foreseen the matter, and thrust the multitude of the enfranchised men, before dispersed amongst all the tribes, into four tribes apart by themselves; to the intent that one and thirty tribes of the free borne men and ancient citizens, might still with the number of voices prevail: for they counted not in Rome their voices by the poll, as in ancient time they did at Athens, and now do also at Venice; but by degrees and centuries, in the assemblies of their great estates; and by lines or tribes, in their less estates. And for that it so great a matter was without sedition done by the only wisdom of Fabius the Censor, he took the surname of Maximus (or of the Greatest:) in which doing he amended the errors of Appius the Censor▪ 
Why Fabius was called Maximus.  who had dispersed the enfranchised and naturallised citizens (the issue of slaves and strangers) amongst all the tribes of the free borne men: yet afterwards (notwithstanding the order taken by Fabius) it was granted unto the citizens enfranchised, that they might enrol one of their sons being five years old or more in the tribe or line of their patron: But when those four tribes of the enfranchised citizens seemed yet too puissant and strong, it was decreed, That there should by lot one tribe be drawn out, wherein all the enfranchised citizens should give their voices. And this was the state of the enfranchised citizens, until the civil war betwixt Marius and Sylla, at which time the people at the motion of Pub. Sulpitius made a law, That the enfranchised citizens should from that time forward be again divided amongst all the tribes, which was the first and principal cause of the ruin of that Commonweal. Wherhfore as of slaves some are borne, some are made; so also of citizens some are made, some are borne: the natural Citisen, is he that is free of that wherein he is borne; whether he be borne but of one of his parents a Citisen, or of both of them citizens. True it is that of 
The natural citizen.  ancient time (and yet at this present also in divers Commonweals) to be a Citisen it was needful to have both father and mother citizens, as in Greece, otherwise they called them Bastards, or Mongrels, which were but citizens on the one side, and could not themselves neither their children be partakers of the greatest benefits or offices in the Commonweal, which they called Archontes, as saith Demosthenes in his Oration against Neaera, albeit that many (as Themistocles himself) were thereinto secretly entered. But in the time of Pericles five thousand of them were sold slaves, who had born 
* Plut. in Peri.  the countenance of citizens. And Pericles himself having lost his children that were right citizens, made request unto the people, That his son might be enrolled among the citizens, which son he had begot at Athens of his wife being a stranger. We also read that the Romans made a Colony of four thousand Spaniards, whom the Romans had begot of Spanish women, for that they were not true citizens. But afterward it took place that he should be a Citisen whose father was a citizen: and in many places it is sufficient for the making of a citizen, that his mother was a citizen. For the place maketh not the child of a stranger (man or woman) to be a citizen: and he that was borne in Africa of two Roman citizens is no less a citizen, than if he had been borne in Rome. Now the made or naturallised citizen is he who hath submitted himself unto the sovereignty of another, and is so received into the number of citizens. 
The naturalised citizen.  For the citizen of honour only, who for his merits towards the Commonweal, or of 
The citizen of honour properly no citizen.  special favour hath obtained the right and privilege of a citizen, cannot of right be called a citizen, for that he hath not put himself under the power of of another's command.  
Wherefore of many citizens, be they naturals, or naturallised, or else slaves enfranchised (which are the three means that the law giveth to become a citizen by) is made a Commonweal, when they are governed by the puissant sovereignty of one or many rulers: albeit that they differ among themselves in laws, language, customs, religions, and diversity of nations. But if all the citizens be governed by the selfsame laws and customs, it is not only one Commonweal, but also one very city, albeit that 
The enclosure of walls make not a city, but the government of the citizens under the self same laws: although they devil in ●…uers' towns or provinces dispersed.  the citizens be divided in many villages, towns, or provinces. For the enclosure of walls make not a city, (as many have written) no more than the walls of an house make a family, which may consist of many slaves or children, although they be far distant one from another, or in divers countries, provided that they be all subject unto the command of one head of the family: So say we of a City, which may have many towns and villages, which use the same customs and fashions, as are the Bailiwicks, or Stewardships of this realm: And so the Commonweal may have many cities and provinces which may have divers customs, and yet are nevertheless subject unto the 
* viz. France.  command of their sovereign lords, and unto their edicts and ordinances. And it may also be that every town and city may have certain privileges in particular, which are not common unto them of the suburbs; and the suburbs also may have certain prerogatives which are not common unto the villages, nor to the inhabitants of the open country; who are yet nevertheless subjects of the same Commonweal, and citizens of their city; yet are they not for all that burgesses: for the word citizen hath I know not how a more special signification with us, than hath the word Burgess: and is properly the natural subject, who hath the right of a corporation, or college, or 
The difference betwixt a citizen and a burgess.  certain other privileges, which are not common also unto the burgesses. I have said the natural subject, for that the subject naturallised although he devil in the town, and enjoy the right of a burgess, is yet called in many places a burgess: & the other is called a citizen, who enjoyeth a certain particular privilege proper unto free born citizens. As in Paris there is none but natural citizens, and borne in Paris, that can be Provost of the merchants. And in Geneva a burgess cannot be Syndic, or Senator of the privy counsel of xxv, which a citizen may well be: which is also used amongst the Swissers, and all the towns of Germany.  
And thus much briefly concerning the difference of subjects, citizens, burgesses, and strangers; as also concerning a Commonweal, a City, and a Town. But for as much as there is neither Greek nor Latin, nor any other writer that I have seen, which have used these definitions, it is needful by laws and by examples to make plain that which I have before said, being otherwise of itself obscure. For we oftentimes see great quarrels and controversies to arise as well betwixt princes, as citizens of the same town or city amongst themselves. For not understanding the difference of these words, yea they from whom we aught to expect the true resolutions of these things, are themselves oftentimes far wide, mistaking a city for a town, a Commonweal for a city, and strangers for citizens. But they which writ of a Commonweal without knowledge of the law, and of the common right, are like unto them which go about to build fair high houses, without any foundations at all. Aristotle hath defined 
* Arist. Politic. lib. 3. cap. 6.  unto us; A city to be a multitude of citizens, having all things needful for them to live well and happily withal: making no difference between a Commonweal and a city: saying also, That it is not a city if all the citizens devil not in one and the self same place: which is absurdity in matter of a Commonweal; as julius Caesar in his Commentaries well declareth, saying, That every city of the Heluetians had four villages, or cantons. Where it appeareth that the word City, is a word of right or jurisdiction, which signifieth not one place or region, as the word Town, or City; which the Latins call Vrbem of Vrbo, that is to say of aratio, or ploughing: for that as Varro saith, the compass and circuit of cities was marked out with the plough. It is also certain in question of right, That he which hath carried out of the city, that which was by the law forbidden to be carried out, and hath carried the same into another city or town of the same province; is neither to be said to have carried the thing out of the city, neither to have offended against the law. Yea the doctors go farther, saying, That he hath not done contrary unto the law, that hath transported the thing forbidden into any other city or town subject unto the same prince. And albeit that writers oftentimes confounded both, taking sometimes the one for the other, as the greeks oftentimes use the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and the Latines the word Civitas for a town, a city, or the right of citizens, for that the general which is the city, comprehendeth in it the particular, which is the town: yet so it is, that they abused not the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, as we see that Cicero hath well kept the propriety both of the one and of the other: for the word 
* Cice ad A●…ticum. lib. 4.  〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifieth properly a town, whereof came the word astuti, which with the Greeks signifieth as much as doth with the Latins Vrbani, for that the inhabitants of towns are commonly in their behaviour more civil and gracious, than are the peasants or rude country men: for the word Civilis, which we call civil, was not of the ancient Latins received for Vrbanas, that is to say courteous, or after the manner of the city. And lest any man should think them to be rashly confounded, and to be but a question of words, and not of matter: it may be that a town may be well built and walled, and that more is well stored also with people, and furnished with plenty of all things nececessarie to live withal, & yet for all that be no city, if it have not laws and magistrates for to establish therein a right government (as we have said in the first chapter) but is more truly to be called an Anarchy than a city. And so contrariwise it may be, that a town may be in all points accomplished and have the right of a city, and of an university, and well ruled also with laws and magistrates; and yet nevertheless shall it not be a Commonwealth: as we see the towns and cities subject unto the signory of Venice, which are no Commonweals no more than the towns in the provinces subject and tributary unto the city of Rome were of ancient time no Commonweals, neither enjoyed the right or privilege of Commonweals; but the city of Rome itself only, which had great privileges and prerogatives against them all in general, and against every one of them in particular: albeit that the laws speaking, of the other towns, do oftentimes use this word (City) but that also unproperly, for Traian the emperor writing to Pliny the younger, Proconsul of Asia, denieth the city of the Bithynians to have the right of a Commonweal, in being preferred before other private creditos in the right of a pledge, and that truly. For why? that was proper unto the city of Rome, and to them to whom they had especially given this prerogative, as was only the city of Antioch in all the Roman Empire. So we see that a town 
That the citizens, and not the walls or buildings of a city, make a city.  may be without a city, and a city without a town, and neither the one nor the other of necessity a Commonweal: and that more is, one and the same city may still be kept in the whole and entire state of a city, the walls thereof being laid flat with the ground, or it quite abandoned by the citizens; as did the Athenians at the coming of the Persian king, unto whom they left their town, putting all themselves upon the sea, after they had put their wives and children in safety amongst the Trezenians; following therein the counsel of the Oracle, which had answered them, That their city could not be saved but by wooden walls: which Themistocles interpreted, That the city (which consisteth in the lawful body of citizens) could not be saved but by ships. In like manner it happened also unto the inhabitants of Megalopolis, who understanding of the coming of Cleomenes king of Lacedemonia, all voided their town, which for all that was no less a town than before; yet was it then neither city nor Commonweal: in sort that a man might say, That the city was go out of the town. So spoke Pompey the Great, after he had drawn out of Rome two hundred Senators, and the better part of the citizens, and so leaving the town unto Caesar, said thus, Non est in parietibus respublica, The Commonweal is not in the walls. But forasmuch as it had in it two sorts of partakers, and that the citizens divided into two parts had put themselves under the protection of two divers heads, they now seem of one Commonweal to have made two. Wherefore by these words City, Town, Commonweal, College, Court, Parish, Family, are signified the right of these things. And as oftentimes it hath been judged that the church being without the walls of the city, and the parishioners within the city, that they should enjoy the right of citizens, as if the parish were within the compass of the walls: so also is it to be judged of a city. Neither let it seem unto any man strange, that I stand something the longer upon this matter; if he but remember what importance the lack of knowledge of these things was long ago unto the Carthaginensians. For at such time as question was made in the Senate of Rome, for the rasing of Carthage: the report thereof being bruited abroad, the Carthaginensians sent their ambassadors to Rome, to yield themselves unto the mercy of the Romans, and to request the Senate not unworthily to raze that their city one of the fairest of the world, famous for the noble acts thereof, an ornament of Rome itself, and a monument of their most glorious victories. Nevertheless the matter being long and thoroughly debated in the Senate, it was at last resolved upon, That for the safety of the Roman empire Carthage should be destroyed, as well for the opportunity of the place, as for the natural perfidiousnes of the Carthaginensians themselves, who had now already made war upon the allies of the Romans, rigged up a number of ships contrary to the agreement of peace, and secretly stirred up their neighbour people unto rebellion. The matter thus resolved upon, the Carthaginensian ambassadors were sent for into the Senate, unto whom answer was given by the Consul, That they should continued in their faith and fidelity unto the Senate and the people of Rome, and in pawn thereof to deliver unto the people of Rome three hundred hostages and their ships: in which doing they should have their city safe, with all their rights, privileges and liberties, that ever before they had enjoyed. With this answer the ambassadors returned merrily home. But by and by after commission 
The Carthaginensian ambassadors deceived for not well understanding what a city in ●…uth is.  was given unto Scipio Africanus the younger, To go in all haste with a fleet to Carthage, and with fire and sword to destroy the town, saving the citizens and all other things else that they could carry out of the town. Scipio arriving in Africa with his army, sent Censorinus his lieutenant to Carthage, who after he had received the promised hostages together with the Carthaginensian ships, commanded all the people of Carthage to departed out of the town, yet with free leave to carry out with them what they would, and to build them a city further off from the sea, or elsewhere to their best liking. With this straight command of the lieutenant the Carthaginensians astonished, appealed unto the faith of the Senate, & of the people of Rome, saying, That they had promised them that their city should not be razed: to whom it was answered, That the faith given unto them by the Senate should in all points be kept; but yet that the city was not tied unto the place, neither unto the walls of Carthage. So the poor inhabitants were constrained to departed and abandon the town unto the fire, which was set upon it by the Romans, who had not had it so good cheap, had the ambassadors before understood the difference between a town and a city. As oftentimes it chanceth that many ambassadors ignorant of the law of arms, and of that which right is, do even in matters of state commit many gross faults. Although that Modestinus writeth, That Carthage was no more a city after it was razed, and that the use and profit left unto the city, was in this case extinct above an hundred years before: but he was in the same error wherein the ambassadors of the Carthaginensians were, unto whom all their rights, prerogatives, and privileges were reserved. The like error was committed in the agreement made betwixt the Cantons of Berne and Friburg, in the year 1505, wherein it was agreed, That the amity and alliance betwixt those two Commonweals should be for ever, and so long to endure as the walls of both the cities should stand. Neither are we to stay upon the abuse which is ordinarily committed, or upon the acts of greatest importance of them, which call one and the same thing a town, a city, and an university: as some say of Paris, and certain other places, calling that the city which is contained in the Isle, and the university the place wherein the colleges stand, and all the rest the town, when as the town itself is contained within the compass of the walls and suburbs: howbeit that we herein follow not the propriety of the law, calling it the town and suburbs, for the divers privileges granted unto them by divers kings; and the university the body of all the burgesses of Paris together: but the city the conjunction or joining together of the town itself and the liberties, as also of the men using the same laws and customs, that is to say the conjunction of the provostship and of the county of Paris together: which abuse is grown, for that of ancient time all the town was not but the isle environed with walls, and the river about the walls, so as we read in the Epistle of julian, governor of the West empire, who made his ordinary residence in Paris; the rest of the city that now is being then in gardens and arable land.  
But the fault is much more, to say, That he is not a citizen, which is not partaker of the offices of government, of giving of voices in the consultations of the people, whether 
Aristotle his definition of a Citisen impugned.  it be in matters of judgement, or affairs of the state. This is the definition of a citizen, which Aristotle hath left unto us by writing, which he afterward correcting himself, 
* Lib. 3. cap. 1. & cap. 4. Polit. * Topi. lib. 6. * Pol. li. 3. ca 1  sayeth it not to have place put in the popular state only. Now he in another place himself confesseth that definition not to be good which is not general. Small appearance also is there in that he saith in another place, The noble to be more a citizen than the base, and the inhabitant of the town rather than the plain country peasant; and that as for the young citizens, they as yet but grow as novices, whilst the elder citizens decay; and that they of the middle age are the entire citizens, and the other but in part. Now the nature of a definition never receiveth division; neither containeth in it any thing more or less than is in the thing defined. And yet nevertheless that description of a citizen that Aristotle hath given unto us, is defective and lame, not being aptly to be applied even unto the popular estate, seeing that in the Athenian estate itself which had no peer for the liberty and authority of the people, the fourth rank or degree of citizens being more than three times as great as all the rest of the people, had no part in the offices of government, or in judgements. So that if we will receive the definition of Aristotle, we must needs confess, that the greater part of the natural burgesses of Athens, were in their own Commonweals strangers, until the time of Pericles. And as for that which he saith, The noble to be always more citizens than the base and unnoble, is untrue, not only in the popular estate of the Athenians, but also in the popular Commonweals of the Swissers, and namely in Strasbourg, where the nobles (in the quality of nobles) have no part in the offices of state and government.  
Wherhfore it is better and more truly said of Plutarch, That they are to be called 
Who indeed be citizens.  citizens that enjoy the rights and privileges of a city. Which is to be understood according to the condition and quality of every one; the nobles as nobles, the commonets as commoners; the women and children in like case, according unto the age, sex, condition, and deserts of every one of them. For should the members of man's body complain of their estate? Should the foot say to the eye, Why am not I set aloft in the highest place of the body? or is the foot therefore not to be accounted amongst the members of the body? Now if Aristotle's definition of a citizen should take place, how many seditions, how many civil wars, what slaughters of citizens would arise even in the midst of cities? Truly the people of Rome, for no other cause departed from the Senators, than for that they enjoyed not the same authority and privileges that the nobility did; neither could it otherwise be appeased than by the mean of the fable of the members of man's body, whereby the grave and wise Senator Agrippae reconciled the people unto the Senators. For Romulus the founder of the city of Rome, excluded the people from the great offices of command, from the offices of priesthood, and from the augureships; commanding the same to be bestowed upon such only as were descended from them whom he himself had chosen into the Senate, or else from them whom he had afterwards joined unto them. And this new people having vanquished their neighbours, enforced many of them to abandon their own country and customs, to become inhabitants and citizens of Rome, as they did the Sabines. Afterwards having vanquished the Tusculans, the Volscians, and Herniques, they agreed together that the vanquished should have part in their offices, and voices also in the assemblies of their estates, without any other change either in their law or customs; who for that cause were not called citizens, but municipes (as who should say, Men made partakers of their immunities) yet indeed less esteemed and honoured than the Romans themselves, albeit that their estate were united unto that of the Romans. As we see that Catiline descended of the ancient family of the Sergians in Rome, and so a natural Roman, by way of disgrace objected to M. Tullius Cicero, That he was but a new upstart of Arpinas. And that was the cause that many municipial towns chose rather to use the Roman laws than their own, to become true citizens of Rome, until the time of Tiberius the emperor, who utterly took away the very shadow of the popular liberty which Augustus the emperor had yet left; having removed the popular assemblies from the people unto the Senate: at which time the municipial towns of Italy refused the privileges of the city of Rome, whereat the emperor Adrian marveled (as saith Aul. Gellius) but without cause, for that they seeing the popular honours and offices to be all in one man's bestowing, they thought it now better to use their own laws than others.  
Thus we see two sorts of citizens differing in privileges, that is to wit, the Roman 
The divers sorts of citizens in Rome.  citizen, and the municipial or country citizen. Now the third sort were the Latins, who had at the beginning threescore towns, but were afterward augmented with twelve Latin Colonies, who after long wars made peace with the Romans upon condition, That they should live after their own manners and customs, and yet should be made citizens of Rome, whosoever of them should remove his dwelling into the city, having yet left behind him some lawful issue at home in the country. Yet when many of them fraudulently abused this agreement, & gave their children unto the citizens of Rome in adoption, or under the colour of servitude, to the intent that by them forthwith again set at liberty, they might in a moment enjoy the liberties and privileges of the city; order was taken by the law Claudia, confirmed by a decree of the Senate, and edict of the Consuls, That all the Latins which had so by craft obtained the freedom of the city, should be constrained again to return into the Latin cities: which thing was done at the request of the Latin cities themselves. And so is that to be understood that Boetius writeth, The Romans sent into the Latin Colonies, to have lost the liberties of the city: as also that which Titus Livius saith, The Roman Colonies sent to Puteoli and Salerne by the decree of the Senate, to have been no more citizens: which is not further to be understood or extended, but to their right for giving of voices, by that means now taken from them. So were they of Reims, of Langres, of Saintonges, of Bourges, of Meaux, and of Autun, free people of France, allies of the Romans, and citizens also, but without voice (as saith Tacitus) before that it was permitted unto them to have states and honourable offices in Rome. And those of Autun were the first that had the privilege to be Senators of Rome, and therefore called themselves Brethrens unto the Romans: howbeit that the Awergnats took unto them the same privilege & title, as descended from the Troyans' (as saith Lucan.) Now it is not to be doubted, but that that the Roman Colonies were true and natural citizens of Rome, drawn out of the Roman blood, using the same laws, magistrates, and customs; the true marks of a true citizen. But the further that these Colonies were distant from the city of Rome, the less they felt of the glory and brightness of the sun, and of the honours and offices which were divided among the citizens and inhabitants of Rome: insomuch that the inhabitants of the Roman Colonies at Lion, Vienne, and Narbone, thought themselves very happy to have gained but the privileges of the Italians, who were of ancient time the allies and confederates of the Romans, enjoying the honourable freedom of citizens, and yet without changing either of their own laws or customs, or losing any point of their liberties. And forasmuch as the Romans, helped by the strength & power of their friends and allies, had subdued divers other nations, and yet suffered not those their friends and companions 
The cause of the confederate war in Italle against the Romans.  to be admitted to sue for the honours and honourable offices in the city; thereof rise the confederates war in all Italy against the Romans, which never took end until that after much harm on both sides both done and received, the liberty of the city of Rome was by the law julia granted unto 
* Plu. in Syl●…  all Italians, some few only excepted. For the cities of Italy were called some Colonies, some Allies, some of them of the Latins, and some of the Italian jurisdiction, and all of them different. And that is it for which Titus Livius saith, I am inde morem Romanis Colendi socios, ex quibus alios in 
* Livi. lib. 26.  civitatem, at que aequum ius accepissent: alios in ea fortuna haberent, ut socij esse quam cives mallent. viz. Now since that time the manner of the Romans was to honour their fellows, of whom some they took into the city, and into like freedom with themselves: othersome they had in that estate, as that they had rather to have them their fellows, than citizens with them. And hereof proceeded that speech of Tiberius the emperor, in the Oration which he had in the Senate, which is yet seen engraven in brass in Lyon. Quidergo? Num Italicus Senator provinciali potior est? What then? Is an Italian Senator better than the provincial Senator? As if he would have said them both to have been Senators alike. And yet the same emperor excluded the Frenchmen which had obtained the freedom of the city of Rome, from suing for the honours or offices thereof. Whereby is better to be understood that which Pliny writeth, Spain to have in it 470 towns; that is to wit, 12 Colonies: 3 of citizens of Rome, 47 of them which had the freedom of the Latins: 4 of Allies, 6 of them that were enfranchised, and 260 tributaries. And albeit that the Latins were so straightly allied unto the Romans, as that they seemed to be very citizens; yet nevertheless that they were not so, it is to be well gathered by that saying of Cicero: Nihil acerbius Latino's far solitos esse, quam id, quod perrarò accidit, a Consulibus iuberi ex urbe exire. viz. The Latins used to take nothing more heavily, than that which but very seldom times happened, To be commanded by the Consuls to voided the city: for as for other strangers we read, them to have oftentimes been driven out of the city. In brief, such was the variety of privileges and prerogatives amongst them which were contained within the Roman empire, besides their confederate and free people, as that almost no one thing was so proper unto the Roman citizens in general, as that the magistrates and governors might not proceed in judgement against them in matters concerning 
Not one privilege more common unto the Roman citizens in general, than that the magistrate might not proceed against them in cases concerning life or liberty, ●…ithout the people's leave.  their life and liberty, without the people's leave. Which prerogative was by the tribunitial law junia granted to all the citizens of Rome, after that the people had expulsed their kings, and was called, The holy Law, being oftentimes after revived and confirmed by the Valerian Consul laws, at divers times made by the Consuls Publius, Marcus, and Lucius, of the honourable family of the Valerians: and last of all by the tribunitial law Sempronia, and Portia, where to meet with the proceed of the magistrates and governors, who encroached upon the jurisdiction of the people, and proceeded oftentimes against the people, without yielding thereunto, there was the penalty of treason annexed unto the law; for that those laws were oftentimes broken by the magistrates. And at such time as Cicero was about to have commanded the Roman citizens privy to the conspiracy of Catiline to be strangled in prison: Caesar desiring to dissuade the matter in the Senate, said, Our ancestors imitating the manner of the Grecians, did punish and correct their citizens with stripes; and of men condemned took the extremest punishment: but after that the Commonwealth was grown strong, the law Portia and other laws were provided, whereby for men condemned banishment was appointed. Which law Cicero having transgressed, was therefore not only driven into exile, but also proscribed, his goods confiscated, his house (esteemed to be worth fifty thousand crowns) burned, and a temple built in the plot thereof, which the people at the motion of Clodius their Tribune, commanded to be consecrated to Liberty: wherewith the magistrates terrified, durst not but from that time forward with less severity proceed against the Roman citizens, yea even after that the popular state was changed. And that is it for which Pliny the younger, Proconsul of Asia, writing to Traian the emperor, concerning the assemblies made by the Christians in the night, to the disquiet of his jurisdiction: I have (saith he) many in prison, amongst whom there are certain citizens of Rome, whom I have put apart for to sand them unto Rome. And S. Paul at such time as he was drawn into question, as a seditious person, and a troubler of the common quiet; so soon as he perceived that Felix the governor would proceed to the trial of his cause, he required to be sent unto the emperor; saying, That he was a citizen of Rome, for that his father being of the tribe of Benjamin, and borne at Tharsis in Caramania, had obtained the right of a Roman citizen: Which so soon as the governor understood, he surceased to proceed any further in the matter; and sent him to Rome, saying, This man might have been set at liberty, if he had not appealed unto Caesar. Whereas otherwise if he had not been a citizen of Rome, the governor would have proceeded in the matter, seeing the country of Palestine was before brought into the form of a province. As in like case Pontius Pilate, governor of the same country, was constrained to condemn Christ jesus as a tributary subject of his province, whom for all that he seemed to have been willing to have delivered out of the hands of his enemies, and from all punishment, if he could well in so doing have avoided high treason, which the people threatened him with: Which the governor fearing, lest he should seem to have any thing therein offended, sent the whole process of the matter unto Tiberius the emperor (as saith Tertullian.) For if the municipial magistrates of the jews had had sovereign power and jurisdiction, they would not have sent him back again unto the governor, crying That he had deserved the death, but that they had not the power to proceed thereunto against him. For the municipial magistrates of provinces had not any jurisdiction, more than to commit the offenders into safe keeping, for fear of the present danger, and to receive cautions, or to give possession, and sometimes to appoint tutors unto poor orphans: but in criminal causes, had no power or authority, neither over the citizen of Rome, neither over the stranger or provincial subject, or over others that were enfranchised; but only over their flaues, whom they might at the uttermost but with stripes correct. For as for the jurisdiction given to them that had the defence of towns, they were established by Valentinian three hundred and fifty years after. Whereby it is to be gathered, all power and authority for the execution of justice to have been given to the Roman governors, and their lieutenants in their provinces, and taken from the rest. For they but deceive us, which think the jews priests, for the quality of their priesthood to have made conscience to condemn to death our Saviour Christ jesus, as if by their religion they had been hindered so to do; and hereupon have concluded, That churchmen aught not to give judgement that carried with it the execution of blood: which proceeded of the ignorance of fantiquitie: For it is evident that before the land of Palestine was brought into the form of a province, it had but the Senate of the jews, consisting of 71 persons, composed in part of priests and Levites, who had the power of condemning offenders to death, as the Chaldean interpreter plainly showeth, and the Hebrew Pandects more plainly than he.  
Wherhfore this was the greatest and chiefest privilege proper to the citizens of 
The greatest & chiefest privilege proper unto the citizens of Rome.  Rome, That they could not by the magistrates be punished either with death or exile, but that they might still from them appeal; which liberty all the citizens of Rome enjoyed. The other Roman subjects which had not this privilege, were not called citizens: yet thereof it followeth not, that to speak properly they were not indeed citizens, and according to the true signification of a citizen: for they must needs be citizens, or strangers, allies, or enemies, seeing that they were not slaves; for so much as they were contained within the bounds of the Roman empire. But we cannot say that they were allies, for that only free people which defended the majesty of their estate, were called the fellows or allies of the Romans: neither could it be said that they were enemies or strangers, seeing that they were obedient subjects, and that more is, paid tribute unto the Roman empire: we must then conclude that they were citizens; for it were a very absurd thing to say, That the natural subject in his own country, and under the obeisance of his sovereign prince, were a stranger. And that is it for which we have said, That the citizen is a frank subject, holding of the sovereignty of another man. But the prerogatives and privileges that some have more than others, maketh us to call some of them citizens, and others tributaries. Yet we read that the emperor Augustus was so jealous of these privileges, that he would never give the right of a Roman citizen unto French men, for any request that his wife Livia could make unto him; yet for all that, not refusing to ease them from paying of tributes: neither liked he well of it, that his uncle Caesar had together & at once given the freedom of the city, unto that legion which he had raised of Frenchmen, and in general to all the inhabitants of Novocome: and blamed also M. Antonius, for that he had for money sold the freedom of the city unto the Sicilians. Nevertheless the succeeding princes kept not with so great devotion the rights and privileges of the Roman citizens. Antonius Pius by a general edict gave the freedom of the city of Rome unto all the citizens of the Roman empire (slaves always excepted) that so the city of Rome might be the common country of all nations. Wherein he seemed in a sort to imitat the example of 
* Plut. in Alexandro.  Alexander the Great, who called the whole world but one city, and his camp the chief fortress thereof. But Antoninus contented himself with the Roman world. And albeit that the city, or rather the grant of the immunities of the city seemed so to be communicated unto all, yet were the privileges of citizens divers, some always enjoying more than others; as is to be seen not only in the Commentaries and answers of the great lawyers, which flourished after Antoninus 
The greatness of the privileges and immunities which a man enjoyeth, maketh him never a whit the more therefore a citizen.  Pius, but also in the edicts of other princes. For Severus more than fifty years after Antoninus was the first that gave the privilege to them of Alexandria, that they might be made Senators of Rome: but the other Egyptians could not be made citizens of Rome, except they had before obtained the freedom of the city of Alexandria. Which well showeth, that the greatness of the privileges make not the subject therefore the more or less a citizen. For there is no Commonwealth where the citizen hath so great freedom, but that he is also subject unto some charge: as also the nobility, although with us exempted from taxes and tallages, are yet bound to take up arms for the defence of the Commonweal and others: and that upon pain of their goods, their blood, and life. For otherwise if the largeness of prerogatives and privileges should make a citizen, then verily strangers and allies were to be called citizens, seeing that oftentimes greater and larger privileges are given unto strangers or allies, than to citizens themselves: For why? the freedom of the city is oftentimes for an honour given unto strangers, who yet for all that are bound unto no command or necessary duties. As the Swissars gave the freedom of their city first to jews the eleventh, 
Honourable citizens.  and so afterwards unto the rest of the French kings. So Artaxerxes king of Persia, gave the freedom of the city unto Pelopidas (and all his posterity) entreating of alliance with him. So the Athenians made free of their city Euagor as king of Cyprus, Dionysius the tyrant of Sicily, and Antigonus and Demetrius kings of Asia. Yea that more is, the Athenians gave unto all them of the Rhodes the freedom of their city: and the Rhodians with like courtesy upon the agreement of the league, made all the Athenians citizens of their city, as we read in Livy: which league was called, The treatise of Comburgeosie. What manner of league that was made betwixt the Valesians, and the five little Cantons in the year 1528; and betwixt the Cantons of Berne and them of Friburg, in the year 1505; and again betwixt them of Geneva & them of Berne in the year 1558: the force of which leagues was such, as that there should be a mutual communication betwixt them both of their city and amity: and in case that any of the confederates forsaking his own city, had rather to go unto the city of his fellows and confederates, he should presently become a citizen and subject of the other city, without any new choice or special letters of his naturalisation or enfranchising. But the freedom of any city given for honour sake unto any, bindeth no man unto the command thereof; but him which forsaketh the dwelling place of his nativity or city, that so he may come into the power of another prince: For neither were those kings whom we have spoken of; neither Hercules, or Alexander the Great, when they were made honourable citizens of the Corinthians, subject or bound unto their commands; in such sort as that the right of a free citizen was unto them but as a title of honour. Wherhfore seeing it impossible for one and the same person to be a citizen, a stranger, and an ally; it may well be said that the privileges make not a citizen, but the mutual obligation of the sovereign to the subject, to whom for the faith and obeisance he receiveth, he oweth justice, counsel, aid, and protection, which is not due unto strangers.  
But some may say, How can it then be, that the allies of the Romans, and other people governing their estate, were citizens of Rome (as those of Marseilles and of Austun?) Or what is that which M. Tullius crieth out: OH the notable laws, and of our ancestors by divine inspiration made and set down, even from the beginning of the Roman name, That none of us can be the citizen of more than one city: (for dissimilitude of cities must also needs have diversities of laws) nor that any citizen can against his will be thrust out, or against his will be detained in the city. For these are the surest foundations of our liberty, Every man to be master both of keeping and of leaving of his right and liberty in the city. And yet he the same man, before had said it to be a thing granted unto all other people, that every man might be a citizen of many cities: with which error (saith he) I myself have seen many of our citizens, ignorant men, led; to have at Athens been in the number of the judges, and of the Areopagis, in certain tribe, and certain number, when as they were yet ignorant whether they had obtained the liberty of that city; and to have lost this, except they had by the law made for the recovery of things lost, again recovered the same. Thus much he.  
But first to that which he writeth concerning the Athenians; that law of Solons was long before abolished, which admitted not a stranger to the freedom of a citizen of Athens, except he were banished out of his own country: at which law Plutarch wondereth above measure; not foreseeing that to have been done of Solon, to the end (as it is like) That no man should enjoy the immunity and privileges of a citizen of Athens, and that popular prerogative which the people had, except he were bound unto the command and laws of the Athenians. But he which is against his will detained under the command of a strange city, hath without doubt lost the right of his own city: which can in no wise be applied unto those kings whom we have before spoken of, or yet to the Rhodians which had ordained the freedom of the Athenians. Wherhfore this is it, as I suppose, that M. Tullius meant (for why, he well agreeth not with himself) That he which was indeed a true citizen of Rome, that is to say, which was bound unto the Senate and the laws of the people of Rome, could not be bound unto the command of another city. As Pomponius Atticus borne in the city of Rome, being a Roman citizen, and of the honourable order of the knights, who for his love towards the Athenians, was thereof called Atticus (and unto whom three of the Roman emperors referred the beginning of their descent) refused the freedom of the city of Athens offered him by the Athenians; lest (as saith Cornelius Nepos) he should have lost the freedom of the city of Rome: which is true in regard of the true subjects and citizens; but not in the citizens of honour, which are not indeed subjects: neither in respect of them which are citizens of divers cities, under the power of one and the same prince, a thing lawful unto all even by the Roman law. For although one may be the slave or vassal of many masters or lords, yet can no man be the subject of divers sovereign princes, but by the mutual consent of the princes; because that these are under no man's command, as are they unto whom service is by turn done by slaves, who may by the magistrates be enforced to cell their slave, except the servile labours, which cannot at once be done to them all, be by turns done by the slave. And this is the point for which we oftentimes see wars betwixt neighbour princes, for the subjects of their frontiers, who not well knowing whom to obey, submit themselves sometimes to the one and sometimes to the other: and oftentimes exempting themselves from the obeisance of both two, are ordinarily invaded and preyed upon by both the one and the other. As the country of Walachie having exempted itself from the obeisance of the Polonians, hath become subject unto the Turks; and afterwards submitting itself unto the kings of Polonia, paid tribute nevertheless unto the Turk, as I have learned by the letters of Stanislaus Rasdrazetoski sent to the c●…nstable of France, bearing date the 17 of August 1553. Nevertheless there are many people upon the frontiers, which have set themselves at liberty, during the quarrels of princes, as it is come to pass in the low country of Liege, of Lorraine, & of Burgundy: where there are more than twelve subjects of the French king, or of the empire, or of Spain, who have taken upon them the sovereignty. Among whom Charles the fist reckoned the duke of Bovillon, whom he called his vassal: and for that he was his prisoner in the year 1556, at the treaty made for the deliverance of prisoners, he demanded an hundred thousand pound for ransom; for that he called himself a sovereign prince. But there are well also others beside the duke of Bovillon: & to go no further than the marchesse of Burgundy (which is called, The forbidden country) six princes have sovereign power over their subjects, which the mutual wars betwixt the French and the Burgundians have by long prescription of time brought forth. And in the borders of Lorraine, the counties of Lume & of Aspremont have taken upon them the right and authority of sovereignty. Which hath also happened upon the borders of England and Scotland, where some particular men have made themselves great commanders within this twenty or thirty years, against the ancient agreements. For, for to meet with such enterprises, the English and the Scots had of ancient time agreed, That the Batable ground, (that is to say a certain part of the country so called, upon the frontiers of both realms, being five miles long, and two miles broad) should neither be tilled, built, or dwelled upon; howbeit that it was lawful for both people there to feed their cattle: with charge that if after the sun setting, or before the sun rising, any of their beasts were there found, they should be his that so found them: which was one of the articles agreed upon by the states of Scotland, in the year 1550, and sent to Henry the second the French king, as was by him provided. But where the sovereign lords are good friends, as the Swissers of the country of Lugan, and the other territories which belong in common to all the lords of the league, whither they sand their officers every Canton by turn: there the subjects are not reputed to be the subjects of divers sovereigns, but of one only, which commandeth in his order; in such sort as that one of them seek not to encroach upon the others. Whereof rise a sedition between the seven Cantons Catholic, and the four Protestant's, in the year 1554, the Catholics desiring to chastise the inhabitants of Lugan and Loverts, who had separated them from the church Catholic: and the Protestant's hindering them so to do, and were now upon the point to have taken up arms the one against the other, if the Cantons of Glaris, and Appenzell, who allow of both religions, had not together with the ambassador of the French king, interposed themselves, and so pacified the matter. Now therefore the full and entire citizen or subject of a sovereign prince, can be no more but a citizen of honour of another signory. For so when as we read that king Edward the first gave the freedom of citizens unto all the inhabitants of base Britain; that is to be understood for them to enjoy the liberties, exemptions and freedoms, that they of the country enjoyed. So say we also of the Bernois, and the inhabitants of Geneva, who call themselves by their treaties of alliance, Equal, and by their letters Combourgeses. For as for that which Cicero saith, That the citizens of Rome might 
A citizen of Rome might at his pleasure give up his freedom.  at their pleasure leave their freedom of citizens, to become citizens of another city: nothing was unto them therein more lawful, than that was in like case unto all other people lawful also: and that especially in a popular estate, where every citizen is in a manner partaker of the majesty of the state, and do not easily admit strangers unto the freedom of citizens. As in Athens, where to make a stranger free of their city, there must of necessity 6000 citizens, by their voices in secret given consent thereunto. But in such places and countries as wherein tyrant's rule, or which for the barrenness 
Not citizens only but even strangers also in some places prohibited to departed.  of the soil, or intemperature of the air are forsaken by the inhabitants; not only the citizens, but even the strangers also are oftentimes by the princes of such places prohibited to departed, as in Moscovia, Tartary, and Aethiopia; and that so much the more, if they perceive the stranger to be ingenious and of a good spirit, whom they detain by good deserts, or else by force, if he would departed: in stead whereof he must buy it dear, or right well deserve of the Commonweal, that shall get his freedom of a citizen amongst the Venetians or Ragusians, or such other free states. And although that by the Roman law every man might give up his freedom; and that in Spain it is free for every man to remove elsewhere, and to be enrolled into another city, so that it be done by protestation to the prince: yet hath it and shall be always lawful to all princes and cities, by the right of their majesty and power to keep their citizens at home. And therefore princes in making of their leagues, protest that they will not receive any the subjects or vassals of their confederates into their protection, freedom, or privileges, without their express consent. Which is conformable unto the ancient clause of the Gaditan confederation reported by 
* Cice. in orat▪ pro Corn Bal.  Cicero: Ne quis faederatorum a populo Romano civis reciperetur, nisi is populus fundus factus esset; id est auctor. viz. That none of the confederates▪ should of the people of Rome be received for a citizen, except that people so confederate had been the ground, (that is to say, the author thereof.) For therein lieth the state of that cause: for that Cornelius Balbus was a citizen of a confederate city, & therefore could not contrary to the league, by Pompeius be made a citizen of Rome without the consent of the confederates. The same Cicero writeth also in the leagues of the French with the Romans to have been excepted, That none of them should of the Romans be received for a citizen. The same laws we yet at this present use. For although that the Swissers are with us joined in a most straight bond of amity & friendship: yet nevertheless is the same clause conceived in that league, which was with them made in the year 1520. And again at such time as the five lesser Cantons of the Swissers made a league of alliance and amity amongst themselves, it was excepted that no citizens of the confederates should be received; or if they should desire the freedom of another city, they should not otherwise obtain it, except they would devil 
The subject may not departed out of his country without the leave of his prince.  in the country, their land and goods remaining as before. And besides these leagues, there is no prince which hath not taken the like order. So that oftentimes the subject dare not so much as to departed out of the country without leave, as in England, Scotland, Denmark, and Sweden, the noble men dare not to go out of their country without leave of the prince, except they would therefore lose their goods: which is also observed in the realm of Naples, by the custom of the country. As also it was forbidden by the emperor Augustus to all Senators to go out of Italy without his leave, which was always right straightly looked unto. And by the ordinances of Spain it is forbidden the Spaniards to pass over into the West Indies, without the leave of the king of Spain: which was also of ancient time forbidden in Carthage, when Hanno their great captain had first discovered the islands of the Hesperideses. And by the 
The Canaries.  decrees of Milan, it is not lawful for any subject to receive the freedom of any other city; or to enter into alliance or league with any other princes or Commonweals, without the express leave of the Senate of Milan. And that more is, we see oftentimes that it is not permitted unto the subject, so much as to change his dwelling place, albeit that he departed not out of the signory and obeisance of his sovereign prince: as in the duchy of Milan, the subject coming to devil in the city of Milan, or within a certain circuit of Milan, must first have leave so to do; and also pay unto his prince three ducats. We also found that it was in ancient time forbidden the Bithynians (subjects unto the Romans) to receive any other subjects into their town, or to give unto them the freedom of a citizen, as they often times did, to decline the jurisdiction of others, or to ease them of paying of customs and tributes due: in which case the law commandeth, That he which hath so changed his dwelling should bear the charges of both places; which was also decreed by the kings, Philip the fair, john, Charles the fift, and Charles the seventh. Howbeit that the decree of Philip the long would, That the Provost or bailiff of the place, assisted with three burgesses, should receive into the freedom of their city, whosoever of the king's subjects as would, provided, That within a year and a day he should in the same city into which he removed, buy an house of the price of 60 sou Paris at the lest; and to signify the same by a sergeant, unto the lord unto whom the jurisdiction of the place wherein he dwelled belonged; and after that, that he should devil in the same city whereinto he was received for a citizen, from the first of November, unto the 24 of june; and yet paying the like tax or tribute that he did before he removed, so long as he dwelleth in that new freedom; and without declining the jurisdiction for any suit commenced against him three months before.  
And albeit that it be lawful for every subject to change the place of his dwelling, yet is it lawful for no man to forsake his native country; and much less for them 
Not lawful for any man to forsake his native country.  which are enrolled and tied to the soil, whom we call Mortmains, who of ancient time might not change their dwelling place without special leave. And so generally a man may say in terms of right, That the freedom of a citizen is not lost, neither the power of a prince over his subject, for changing of the place or country; no more than the vassal can exempt himself from the faith and obedience he oweth unto his lord; or the lord without just cause refuse to protect and defend his vassal, without the consent of one to the other, the bond betwixt them being mutual & reciprocal. But if the one or the other have given their express or secret consent; or that the subject forsaking his prince, hath yielded himself unto the protection of another prince, by the sufferance of the first, without contradiction, he is no more bound unto the obeisance that he oweth him: neither can otherwise than as a stranger afterwards return into the former city. For princes oftentimes by large gifts or privileges draw 
Why princes oftentimes by large gifts and privileges draw into their country's ingenious strangers.  into their country's ingenious strangers; whether it be so to weaken their neighbour princes, or for the better instruction of their own people, or so to increase their wealth and power, or else for their immortal fame and glory which they hope to get in making the towns and cities by them built, more renowned with the multitude of citizens and plenty of all things. So Theseus by proposing the liberty of the city to all strangers, made the city of Athens most famous of all the cities of Greece. So Alexander the Great by granting of great privileges, lest the city by him built at the mouth of the river Nilus (which he after his own name called Alexandria) the greatest, and best traded of all the cities of Egypt. So king jews the eleventh gave the privileges of the city of Bordeaux to all strangers whether they were friends or enemies (except the English) so that they dwelled within the town. So Francis the Great, founder of the city by him built at the mouth of the river Sequana, which they call The Port of Grace, proponing immunity from all tributes, to all them that should devil therein, in short time made it a most populos city. Neither should the city of London abound with so great wealth, nor such a multitude of citizens, had not Richard king of England proposed unto strangers all the immunities granted unto the citizens: so that they had dwelled ten years in the city: which space of time for the obtaining of the liberty of the city, most part of the Swissers and Germane, indifferently propounded to all strangers: a thing well agreeing with the Roman laws. True it is that more or less time is required in one place then in another, according to the commodiousness of the place, or the greatness of the privileges. As in Venice to obtain the grant and privileges of a simple citizen (without having any other interest in the state, except in certain mean offices) a man must have dwelled fourteen years within the city. They of Ferrara were content with ten years, so that the inhabitants had all the mean while borne the same burden with the citizens. And yet it sufficeth not to have dwelled in another man's country the time prefined in the customs, to obtain the freedom of a citizen; if the 
To have dwelled long in another prince's country maketh him never a whit the more the strange prince's subject.  stranger do not demand the citizens right and freedom, and be thereinto also received: for it may be that the stranger would not for any thing change his prince, howbeit that his affairs hold him out of his own country. For howbeit that many be of opinion, that a man having stayed the prefixed time in another man's country, without having obtained letters of naturalising, is yet capable of testamentary legacies: they in that agreed in favour of testaments, and especially of charitable legacies given unto poor strangers, who are always as much to be favoured as the widows and orphans. But to obtain the full right and privilege of a citizen, it sufficeth not to have dwelled the time appointed by the decrees and ordinances of the place, if a man have not both demanded and obtained the same. For as a gift is to no purpose, except that both he which giveth, and he to whom it is given agreed, the one in giving and the other in receiving: so neither is he made a citizen that would not; neither if he would could he so be, either of the princes interposing themselves. For which cause those Consuls, of whom the one was by an he●…ald at arms yielded unto the Numantines; and the other to the Samnites, for that they had without the commandment of the people made peace with the enemies▪ left not therefore to be citizens of Rome: because they were not received by the enemies. Which question for all that could not yet be fully decided, for the different opinions of Brutus & Scaeuöla betwixt themselves. For when the Consul yielded to the Samnites, returning to Rome was come into the Senate, the Tribune of the people compelled him to go out of the Senate: howbeit in fine the Senate by decree declared, That he had not lost the right of a citizen of Rome, being refused by the enemy: howbeit that in truth he was not only deprived of the right of a citizen, but also made a slave of the enemies, by the decree of the people, for having without their leave capitulated and treated of peace with the enemies: and aught to have been again restored by the people. Nevertheless the milder opinion of the Senate interpreted that the depriving of him of his freedom was conditional, as in case that he were of the enemy received. But if so be that a stranger doth enen against his will retain the rights of his own city, when as he yielded himself unto the power of another prince, by whom he is refused: much more doth he retain the same when he requireth not the right of a strange city: and then when it hath been offered him, hath refused the same: and much less if he have not been presented unto the strange prince, neither hath of him required letters of his naturalising, but only to stay in his country as a stranger the time prefixed by the decrees. Whereby is decided the difficulty and doubt which the Senate of Naples made, and therein resolved nothing; that is to wit, If he that had dwelled all his life in a strange country should enjoy the right and freedom of a citizen in his own country. And many there be, that think he aught not to enjoy the same; saying, That regard is to be had to the place of his long dwelling: but I am of opinion (if mine opinion may take place) That he aught nevertheless to enjoy the privilege of a free citizen, if he have not by consent of his prince expressly renounced it, or else done some fact contrary to the duty of a natural subject. Neither am I alone of this opinion. For the the court of parliament of Paris, by decree made the xiv of june, in the year 1554 adjudged that a French man having dwelled fifty years in Venice, continued yet still subject to the French king, and was received unto the succession of his next kinsmen: he having in the mean time done no harm against his country, neither committed any crime for which he aught to lose his liberty, neither having refused to come being called home by his prince; nor yet requested the freedom of the city of Venice to have been given him. For as for secret consent it aught to hurt no man, being esteemed as no consent in things prejudicial, except it be by word or deed plainly expressed: especially when we may otherwise interpret the mind of him that hath not declared the same. Whereby it is to be understood what is to be judged of the question propounded: which the court of Bordeaux all the judges being assembled together could not determine. As whether a Spaniard borne and brought up in Spain, and yet the son of a French man (which French man had always dwelled in Spain, & expressly renounced the place of his birth) being come into France there to make his perpetual residence, aught to enjoy the privileges of a citizen, without letters of his naturalizing? Nevertheless I am of opinion that he is a stranger, for the reasons before alleged, and that he aught not to enjoy the privilege of a citizen; saving unto the prince to reform it if it shall so seem good unto him. And if a stranger which hath obtained letters of his naturalising out of his own country, and yet will not there devil, he looseth the right he there pretendeth: for that the laws suffer not a double fiction. And for this cause jews the xii. the French king thrust out from the right of free citizens all strangers, who had obtained of him letters of their naturalising, and were retired out of his realm home. For by our customs he that will get the freedom of a citizen, must obtain the prince's letters to that purpose, and having obtained them, pay his fine unto masters of the receipt.  
These reasons show not only the difference that is betwixt a citizen and him that is none, but also of citizens amongst themselves; and that if we follow the variety of privileges to judge of the definition of a citizen, there shall be five hundred thousand of definitions of citizens, for the infinite diversity of the prerogatives that citizens have one against another, and also over strangers: seeing that it is often times better in 
Better sometimes to be a stranger than a natural citizen.  the same city to be a stranger, than a citizen, especially in such cities as are oppressed with the cruelty and insolency of Tyrants. As in Florence many citizens requested Cosmus the new duke to be reputed and esteemed as strangers, by reason of the liberty of strangers, and thraldom of the citizens, which they obtained not: and yet he alured fifty strangers to sue for the freedom of the city, putting them in hope of the great offices and commands: whereby it was brought to pass, that from those fifty citizens so made, he extorted fifty thousand crowns, confirmed the authority of the new citizens gotten by deceit, and thereby broke the power of the conspirators against him. So in ancient time the Venetians impoverished and brought low by the wars against the Genoese, and fearing the rebellion of many subjects, with a few of the great states, sold the right and privilege of a gentleman of Venice unto three hundred citizens, so to strengthen themselves with their goods, their force, and counsel, against the power of the people. It is then the acknowledgement and obedience 
The true difference betwixt a citizen and a stranger.  of the free subject towards his sovereign prince, and the tuition, justice, and defence of the prince towards the subject, which maketh the citizen: which is the essential difference of a citizen from a stranger, as for other differences they are casual and accidentary; as to have part in all or certain offices or benefices; from which the stranger is debarred as it were in every Commonweal. As for offices it is clear. And although the Bishops of Rome have of long time attempted to give all benefices to all men as of right: yet have princes oftentimes rejected those ambitious decrees of the Popes. I except the kings of Spain, of all others the most obedient servants of the Bishops of Rome, who not without great reward obtained by the decree of Sixtus Bishop of Rome, That bevefices should not be bestowed upon strangers. And so in Boulongne la Grace, where the Pope is sovereign lord, the offices and benefices are not given but to the natural inhabitants and subjects. The like whereof is done also in all the signory of Venice. But the Swissers have far otherwise proceeded than by way of agreement, who by a law made in the year 1520, decreed the Pope's Bulls and Mandates, whereby he had not doubted to give benefices unto strangers, to be publicly torn, and they that used them to be cast in prison. And by the laws of the Polonians also even from the time of Casimire the Great, unto the reign of Sigismundus Augustus, strangers were kept far from all benefices; which thing also the Germane by covenants, of late wrested from the Popes: in which covenants they of Mets were also comprised, and so justly by their letters complained unto Charles the ix the French king, those covenants to be broken by the craft of the Bishops of Rome.  
Another privilege there is also granted more unto citizens than to strangers, in that they are exempted from many charges and payments, which the stranger is constrained to bear: as in ancient time in Athens the strangers paid a certain special tribute for the right of their dwelling place, which they called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: whereas the citizens were free from all impositions. But the most notable privilege that the citizen had above the stranger, is, that he had power to make his will, and to dispose of his 
The greatest privilege that a natural citizen had in auntiens time above a stranger.  goods, according to the customs; or leave his nearest kinsmen his heirs; whereas the stranger could do neither the one nor the other, but his goods fell unto the lord of the place where he died. Which is no new law in France, as the Italians complain, but a thing common also unto the kingdom of Naples, of Sicily, and all the East, where the Grand signor is not only heir unto the strangers, but also to his Timariot, for their immovables; and to his other subjects for the tenth. As in ancient time in Athens, the common treasure received the sixt part of the inheritance of strangers, and all their slaves borne in the city: whereas in Rome the rigour was much greater (the common treasure swallowing up all the inheritance of strangers.) And albeit that where Diodorus saith, The Egyptians and Romans to have suffered the heirs of strangers to succeed them: he spoke therein like a stranger himself without regard; for it is most certain, that it was no way permitted for a stranger to dispose of his goods, neither to receive any thing by the testament of a citizen of Rome, the common treasure carrying away the succession: whereof our laws are full. Which we may also judge by the oration of Cicero, who to show that Archias was a citizen of Rome, saith amongst other things, That he had by his testament disposed of his goods. And himself in his own cause to give men to understand that the decree of banishment made against him at the suit of Clodius the Tribune, was of none effect: What Roman citizen is there (saith he) that hath made any doubt to leave me what he pleased by his testament, without regard to the decree of my banishment. The self same argument used also Demosthenes, to prove that Euxithenés was a citizen of Athens: Have not his next of kin (saith he) recovered the inheritance of their father that survived? And like as in France, and in England, particular lords take unto them the inheritance of strangers which die within their jurisdiction: so the Romans also after the manner of their ancestors, took unto them the heredetarie goods of strangers, whom they had received into their protection, being left at Rome, which they called, The right of application. And that is it for which they said in Rome, That the right to make a will and testament was only granted to a citizen of Rome. Whereby it is plain that right of application, or of Albinage (as some call it) to have been most ancient, and common as well to the Greeks and Romans, as to other people also, until that Frederick the second had derogated from the same by his edict, which was but evil kept: For he gave leave to all strangers dying within the compass of his empire, by their testament to dispose of their goods; or if they died intestat, to leave their next of kin their heirs. But the force of that law is even in Germany itself nothing, and much less in Italy, where strangers are much worse dealt withal than in France. For by our customs it is permitted unto the stranger to get in this * realm all the goods 
viz. France.  movable and immovable that he can, and them whilst he yet liveth, to cell, give, exchange, or dispose of by contracts made with men yet living, according to his own pleasure; and for a small sum of money, as for some twenty or thirty crowns paid into the common treasure, to obtain letters of naturalisation, and the right of a citizen; so that he may by his will give legacies, or appoint such an heir as himself pleaseth. But in many countries of Germany, and by the general custom of Bohemia, it is not suffered strangers to have one foot of land. As in like case in Italy it is forbidden all 
Strangers in many places hardly del●… withal.  strangers to get any immovables in propriety, as in the duchy of Ferrara it is a formal custom. And that more is, by the custom of Perouze, it is forbidden to transfer unto a stranger not only the propriety, but even the possession of any immovable. And by the custom of Milan it is not permitted unto the stranger, so much as to have the use and profit of any thing immovable, and that upon pain of confiscating the revenue with the inheritance; forbidding inheritors also to marry with strangers, upon like pain of confiscating their goods. And that which more unjust is, it is not lawful for the creditor being a stranger, to take his debtor's immovables or land, for default of payment assigned unto him, but that he must within the year again clear his hands thereof; which causeth the creditor oftentimes to cell his land underfoot, or for little, especially if the natural inhabitants fear or love the debtor. And not long since, by the ordinance of the emperor Charles the fift, all strangers are embarred from the succession of the subjects of Milan. By the custom of Venice also it is lawful to bind a citizen to a stranger, yet by that bond are not the heirs bound, more than for so much profit as came unto them thereby; quite contrary unto the Roman civil law. And by the custom of Brixia in Italy, a woman married unto a stranger cannot transfer her immovables unto strangers, neither the value thereof, neither directly, or indirectly. See now the good entertainment that strangers have in Italy; whereof they have no occasion to complain of France, seeing that in England the subjects cannot pawn their lands unto their creditors being strangers: whereof the ambassadors of foreign nations have oftentimes complained to have reason of their debtors: yet suffer they the next of kin to enjoy the goods and money of the stranger. The contrary whereof is done in Lituania, Moscovia, Tartary, and all the Turkish empire: in which place the goods of strangers dying there, are confiseat in like manner as in France: where nevertheless it is permitted to strangers if they die out of France, to make a will, and to appoint his children borne in France his heirs, so that their mother be not a stranger. And as for the clause commonly joined unto the letters of their naturalisation: Modo haeredes sint Regnicolae, the judges have so interpreted it of strangers dwelling in France, who are preferred before them that are nearer of kin dwelling out of the realm, in the succession of the naturalised stranger: for otherwise it is requisite to make the strangers children to succeed, for that they were borne in France, and of a free citizen, or natural subject. But the children of strangers borne in France, enjoy their father's inheritance, not by will (which is not lawful for strangers to make) but as from him dying intestat, if their mother be a free woman when the inheritance descendeth. And more than this, it is granted by our kings of an extraordinary bounty unto such merchant strangers as frequent the fairs of Champagne and Lion, That none of their goods, if they die in the mean time shall be confiscated: which right the English merchants enjoy also in Guienne. But as for them of the low country of Henault & Artois, of the towns of Amiens, Cambray, & Turnay, they are in the same state that citizens be, for so much as concerneth the right of succession: and that the edicts of our princes, and judgements given, have often times proved yet so as that the same should also be lawful for us, that was for them. The companies also of merchants of those cities which stand upon the baltic sea, have obtained the same, or greater privileges, now ever since the time of jews the younger, and more solemnly confirmed by king Charles the eight: which a few years ago were sent to king Charles the ninth (by Danezay the French ambassador, unto the king of Denmark) to be by him renewed. And yet this privilege granted unto those merchants, extendeth not unto other strange merchants, which have obtained the right of citizens, as hath been adjudged by the privy counsel. Of which so many and so great privileges, by our kings granted unto strangers, our merchants could obtain none in all Graecia, Asia, or Africa. For in our time when as Crozile a rich merchant of Tours, diing, had left behind him almost two hundred thousand crowns, nothing thereof came unto his nearest kindred, all the same being by the Turkish emperor given unto Abraham the chief of the Visier Bassaes.  
There is yet another difference (besides those we have already spoke of) betwixt citizens and stranger's; for that citizens by the ancient law Paetilia and julia, may forsake 
Other differences betwixt a citizen and a stranger.  their goods, leaving them in satisfaction unto their creditors, which the stranger may not do: for otherwise it should be lawful for strangers, for their advantage to suck the blood and juice of the subjects, and afterward to pay them with papers, although there be not fewer of these bankrups than of them that forsake their goods. This also a citizen differeth from a stranger, that the stranger in every place before he can pled in action, either real or personal, must put in caution for the payment of that which shall be adjudged. Which caution our citizens, except they have before played bankrupt, or forsaken their goods, are not bound to perform. But in a personal action, whether the defendant be a citizen or a stranger, he is not bound to put in caution to pay the thing that is adjudged, as was in ancient time determined, as well in the court of Rome, as in the court of Paris. But the same court hath departed from the opinion of our ancestors, and adjudged it to be a thing reasonable, that the stranger whether he be plaintiff or defendant, should put in caution to pay the thing that is adjudged. But there is one difference which is and hath always been common to all people, that is to wit, the right of mark against strangers, which hath no place against the subjects: for which cause the emperor Frederick the second, sent back unto the states of the empire, those which demanded the right of reprisal against the subjects of the empire. And in brief the stranger might be driven out of the country, not only in time of war (for then we dismiss the ambassadors themselves) but also in time of peace; lest the natural subjects manners should by the evil company of strangers be corrupted: for which only cause Lycurgus seemeth to have forbidden the Lacedæmonians 
Plu. in Lycurg.  his subjects without leave to departed out of his kingdom, or to have the use of gold or silver; as the East Indians of China forbidden their subjects upon pain of death from receiving of strangers: so to meet with the enterprises that the stranger might make against another man's estate. Wherhfore Cicero well foresaw not what harms hung (as it were) over our heads from strangers, when as he writ, They do evil which forbidden strangers their cities, and cast them out, as with our ancestors Penuu●…, and of late Papius: For by such strangers, who for the most part are banished men, the good manners of the natural subjects are corrupted. But if war be proclaimed against the prince, the stranger may be detained as an enemy, according to the law of arms: whereas otherwise he might not be stayed, if he had not otherwise bound himself by contract, or by some offence by him committed.  
Now if the stranger shall against the will, or without the consent of his own prince▪ submit himself unto the power of another prince, and be of him also received 
A stranger submitting himself unto the power of another prince, is yet the subject of his natural prince.  for his subject; yet hath his own prince still for ever power over him, and authority to lay hands upon him as upon his fugitive servant; yea although he come as an ambassador sent from his new prince. For so the emperor Theodosius the Great pronounced Danus the tyrant to be a rebel unto his majesty, and cast in prison his ambassadors, being subject to his power. So the emperor Charles the fift did the like against the ambassadors of the duke of Milan his subject, whom he detained prisoner, at such time as he understood the duke his master to have entered into league with the other princes, and to have proclaimed war against him. And howbeit that the news thereof being come into France, Granuellan, Charles his ambassador, was by the king's commandment there likewise imprisoned, yet was he forthwith again delivered, so soon as it was understood that the ambassadors and heralds of France, England, and Venice, were with safe conduct sent out of Spai●…e. Neither seemeth Charles in so doing to have violated the law of nations, or to have done any thing against the law: seethat the Romans did with greater severity punish the fugitive subject, than they did the very enemy. And the best excuse that the Imperials could found to excuse the murder done upon the persons of Rincon and Fregosi●…s the French ambassadors toward the Turk, was, That the one of them was a Spaniard, a natural subject of the emperors, and the other a Genua under his protection, both sent in the service of his enemy; the bruit being given out, that they went to raise new wars against him: howbeit that the emperor would not avouch the murder, but promised to do justice upon them that had done the same, if they should fall into his power. But do the subject what he can, yet can he not exempt himself from the power of his natural sovereign, 
No subject can exempt himself from the po●…er of his natural prince.  albeit that he become a sovereign prince in another man's country: no more than Philip Barbarius a slave, who being for his virtue become Praetor of Rome, being pursued and challenged by his master, was yet glad to agreed with him for his liberty. For in that the lawyers all agreed, That the subject in what place soever he be become sovereign, may by his prince be called home. As not long since Elizabeth queen of England called home again unto her the earl of Lineux, together with his son, who but a little before had married the queen of Scots; for not obeying of which her command, she confiscated their goods, for that contrary to the custom of that realm, they had without leave departed out of England, and married contrary to the queen's commandment. For the subject wheresoever he be, is bound to the laws of his prince conceived, concerning his person; in such sort, as that if the subject be forbidden to contract or to alienat, the alienations are voided, albeit that he make them in a foreign country, and of such goods as he hath without the territory of his own prince: and if the husband being out of his own country, give any thing unto his wife, contrary to the commandment of his prince, or the customs of his country, such a donation is nothing worth: for that the power to tie and bind a subject, is not tied unto places. And for this cause princes have accustomed to use mutual requests one towards another, either to call home their subjects, or to enforce them to obey, in such places as wherein they have not power to command: or else by mutual denouncing of their griefs themselves to lay hand upon strangers, until that they do obey them. For when the marquess of Rotelin, who had the tuition of the duke of Longueville, was sued unto to suffer the controversy of Neu●…chastel to be decided before the judges of the court 
Neu castle.  of Requests at Paris: the lords of Berne revoked the cause, for that judgement was to be given by them, of lands contained within the precinct of their country. See here the principal differences of subjects and citizens, from strangers; leaving the particular differences of every country, which are in number infinite. As for the differences of subjects amongst themselves▪ there are in many places no fewer, or happily more than▪ betwixt the subjects and the strangers (whereof we have much spoken before) as not only of the difference of the nobility among themselves, but of the difference betwixt the nobility and the vulgar people also. But particularly to prosecute how much the vulgar people differ among themselves, with such other things as appertain unto the sex, age or state of every man, were a thing almost infinite.  
Now to make the matter short, it may be that of right among citizens, some be exempted from all charges, taxes, and imposts, whereunto others are subject: whereof we have infinite examples in our laws. As also the society is good and available, 
The division of citizens or subjects into three estates▪ ●… thing observed in all Commonweal.  where some of the associates have part in the profit, and yet bear no part of the loss. And that is it for which we see the division of citizens or subjects into three estates, that is to say▪ the spirituality, the Nobility, and Commonalty, which is observed almost in all Europe. And beside this so general a division, there be other more special in many Commonweals, as in Venice the gentlemen, the citizens, and the common people: in Florence before it was brought under one prince, they had the great ones, the common people, and the reseall menie. And our ancient Gauls had their Druids, their Chival●…ie▪ and the vulgar people. In Egypt the priests, the soldiers, and the a●…anss; as we read in Diodorus. Also the aun●…ent law giver Hippodamus, divided the citizens into soldiers, handy crafts men, and labourers; & hath without cause been blamed by Aristotle; as we read in the Fragments of his ordinances. And albe▪ 
* Lib. a. Polit.  it that Plato enforced himself to make all the citizens of his Commonwealth equal in all rights and prerogarives; yet so it is, that he divided them into three states; that is to wit, into Governors, Soldiers, and labourers: which is to show that there was never Commonweal, were it true, or but imaginary, or the most popular that a man could think of; where the the citizens were equal in all rights and prerogatives; but that always some of them have had more or less than others.   

CHAP. VII. ¶ Of them that are under protection, and the difference betwixt Allies, Strangers, and Subjects.  
WE have now already told what difference there is betwixt Subjects, citizens, and Strangers: let us now also speak of Allies, and first of them which are in protection; for that there is not one of them which have written of a Commonweal, which have rouched this string; which for all that is the most necessary for the understanding of the states of Commonweals. The word of protection in general extendeth unto all subjects which are 
Protection.  under the obeisance of one sovereign prince or signory; as we have said▪ That the prince is bound by force of arms, and of his laws, to maintain his subjects in surety of their persons, their goods, and families: for which the Subjects by a recipro●…all obligation own unto their prince, faith, subjection, obeisance, aid, and secure. This is the first and the strongest protection that is. For the protection of masters towards their slaves, of patrons towards their enfranchised, of lords towards their vassals, is much less than that of princes towards their Subjects: insomuch that the slave, the enfranchised, the vassal, oweth faith, homage, and succour, unto his lord; but yet that is after his own sovereign prince, to whom he is a bound Subject▪ the soldier also oweth obeisance and succour unto his captain▪ and by the law deserveth death, if he defend him not at his need. Yet in all treaties and actions of peace betwixt princes & people 
How in 〈◊〉 of peace prin●… are said to be on●… of them in the 〈◊〉 protection of 〈◊〉 another.  in amity and friendship joined together: the word of Protection is special, importing not any subjection of him that is in protection, neither command of the protecture towards his adherents, but only an honourable and reverent respect of the adherents towards their protector, who hath taken upon him their defence and protection, without any other impeachment of the majesty of the adherents over whom the Protector hath no power at all. So that the right of protection is well deemed to be the greatest, fairest, and most honourable of all others that are amongst princes. For the 
To protect others is a thing most honourable.  sovereign prince, the master, the lord, the patron, draw unto themselves great profit and obedience, for the defence of their subjects, their slaves, their enfranchised, and vassals: but the Protector is to content himself with the honour and acknowledgement of his adherent, seeing that of all duties of courtesy, none is greater, than as every man standeth in most need of help, so to give him the greatest relief●…; neither of so great kindness to accept any other reward than thanks: for if he covenant for any thing farther, he looseth the name of a Protector. For as he which dareth unto anoman part of his goods or travel, if he receive any gain or profit thereby, he is no more to be called a lender, or that his doing to be termed a lending or pleasuring, but a mere mercinatie gaining: so he which hath liberally promised to do any thing for another man, is without any hire by the law bound to accomplish his promise: and the reason is, for that unto duty no hire is due. Neither is there any band of promise stronger, or more effectual, than that which is made to defend the goods, the life, the honour of the weak against the stronger, of the poor against the rich, of the good distressed against the violence of the wicked. And that is it for which Romulus, founder of the city of Rome, setting in order the state of his subjects, to keep them all at peace and unity among themselves, assigned unto every one of the hundred gentlemen, or Senators that he had chosen to be of his privy counsel, a certain number of his other meaner subjects, to be by them maintained under their protection and safeguard; holding him accursed and execrable, who should leave the defence of any his adherents. And the Censors marked them with the note of infamy, that had forsaken their adherents. The law also of the xii tables in that case carrieth with it the pain of excommunication, as in these words: If the Patron deceive his Client let him be accursed. Yet Plutarch writeth, The clients to have given money to the bestowing of their patrons daughters: which I remember not to have been elsewhere written; for in so doing they should have cozened their clients: but it may be that he mistook clients, for men enfranchised; who albeit that they be both called clients or adherents, yet is the bond of the enfranchised greater towards their patrons that set them at liberty; than is that of the free borne clients, who had no patrons but advocates, who defended the causes of their clients. howbeit with us the patrons exact money of their enfranchised clients, the better to bestow their daughters, which is like enough to have come from the Romans unto us. Now when that foreign people saw the Roman clients or adherents to be safe from the injury and oppression of the more mighty, not only every particular man, but men even generally, yea whole cities and provinces yielded themselves into 
How whole cities sometimes put themselves into the protection of some one honourable house of the Roman Senators.  the protection of the Senators. For so the house of the Marcelles had in their protection the city of Syracuse, the Antony's had likewise the city of Boulongne la Grass: and so others afterwards took upon them the protection and defence of others also. Yea the strangers in like case, that frequented the city of Rome, had also their protectors, who by the law of application or patronage, took unto ●…hem whatsoever the stranger dying in the city possessed. And of these same Romans that filled France with the multitude of their Colonies, it is like this law of protection, which of the advocates and not of the clients, they call the law of Auoison, or Auoverie to have taken▪ beginning. But the enfranchised clients differ much from the free borne clients, albeit 
Great difference betwixt the free borne clients and the clients enfranchised.  that they be both called clients, for the likeness that is betwixt the one and the other) but especially in this, that the enfranchised clients may from their liberty be again reduced into slavery, if they shall be proved to have been ungrateful unto their patrons whereas the free borne clients cannot so be. The enfranchised clients are constrained also to help their patrons with their labours: whereas the free borne clients are bound to reverence their protectors or advocates, and to do them mutual kindness, but not servile service or labour: neither if they have done any thing to deceive their patrons do they therefore lose their liberty: beside that the patrons surviving may by the law take part of the goods of their enfranchised clients: whereas the advocates, or protectors can take nothing of the goods or inheritance of their free born clients or adherents.  
And although there be so many things common to the free borne clients, with the vassals or adherents, as that they are almost accounted for one, yet is there great difference betwixt them. For the vassal is bound with all fidelity to honour and reverence 
The difference betwixt the free borne client and the vassal. This right is of the Latins called jus-commissi: & of the French Droit de comise.  his lord, to help him being in danger, and to do him all the kindness possible: and if so be that he shall deceive his lord, disgrace him, perfidiously abjure him, or give him the lie: he by and by looseth therefore his fee, which escheateth unto his lord by the right which the lord hath against his vassal in such case: whereas from the undutiful or unkind client, or adherent, nothing can at all be taken. Moreover if the vassal hath without any exception given his faith unto his lord, or acknowledge no man greater than him; whether he be sworn or not, he is bound unto the subjection & command of him the same his lord and prince: whereof he cannot be said to be discharged, albeit that he never so much renounce his fee: whereas the client or adherent standeth not in these terms, being in nothing subject to his advocate or protector. The vassal also whether he be a king or pope, or whatsoever else oweth faith and service unto the lord of whom he holdeth his fee, except he renounce the fee: whereas the free borne client or adherent, whether he be prince or private man, is free from all service and command of his more mighty advocate or protector. In brief the right of a 
Vassalage but new: protection most ancient.  vassal age seemeth in a manner to be but new, and before the coming of the Lombard's into Italy unknown: whereas the law of protection is most ancient and before the time of Romulus, who borrowed it of the Greeks: for it was long before used in Thessaly, Egypt, Asia, and Sclavonia, as we read in ancient writers: that so the weaker might be the safer from the violence or injury of the more mighty. The vassal also receiveth inheritance and fees of his lord, from whose fealty and obesance which he oweth unto him, he cannot be exempted, albeit that the sovereign prince should raise the fee of his vassal depending of him into a county, duchy, or principality, as hath been adjudged by the decree of the parliament of Paris. Whereby it is to be understood them to err and be deceived, who out of Caesar's Commentaries interpret them whom he calleth Soldurios et devotos, to be vassals, seeing that he hath made no mention of their fee, without which they cannot so be, joining thereunto also, that they were indeed true and natural subjects: for that their lives, their goods, and their persons, were consecrated unto their lord: which is the true mark of subjection, which the vassals own only unto their sovereign prince, not in the quality of vassals, but in the quality of natural subjects, who aught to run the same fortune with their prince, and to live and die for him if need be, albeit that the vassal be more specially bound, than the other subjects.  
All which things tend to this purpose, that it may plainly be perceived, what and 
The difference betwixt patronage, vassalage, and protection.  how much difference there is betwixt the rights of patronage, vassalage, and protection, which we see to be of many for the likeness among themselves confounded. For the vassal and the adherent own their fidelity unto their lord and protector; and the one of them are reciprocally bound unto the other, albeit that the lord be not bound by express word to give his oath of fidelity to his vassal, as the protector aught to his client or adherent, and so solemnly to keep all the treaties of protection. The lord and the vassal also aught to deliver solemn letters of their mutual obliging of themselves the one to the other: like as the protector and the adherent, are bound to give letters of protection the one of them to the other: but especially if one sovereign prince upon a league made, receive another sovereign prince into his protection, which are to be renewed either of the princes dying. For the right of protection belongeth not unto the heirs, except the same be in the league so comprlsed: and be it never so provided for, yet nevertheless either of the princes being dead, it is needful for his successor by lawful acts to profess his protection, & to have the league renewed. But to make more manifest the matter of protection betwixt sovereign princes, whereof we are to entreat: it seemeth that the sovereign prince or people, which hath put itself into the protection of another, is become his subject. And if he be a subject, then is he no more a sovereign, and his subjects shall also be the subjects of the protector. And what subjection would a man have greater, than to put himself into the protection of another man, and to acknowledge him for his superior? For protection 
What protection be●…ixt gre●… princes is.  betwixt great princes, is nothing else but the confederation and alliance of two princes, or sovereign lords, wherein the one acknowledgeth the other for superior; whom he bindeth himself to observe and reverence, and into whose protection he is received, so to be the safer from the injury of some other more mighty: also when the subject of a prince retireth himself into the territory of another prince, he is likewise in his protection; in such sort, as that if he be pursued after by the enemy, & taken prisoner in the territory of another sovereign prince, he is not prisonet of him that pursueth him, but of him into whose territory he hath fled: as was judged by the law of arms at the interparle of peace, which was betwixt the French king & the emperor Charles the fist, in the year 1555, when question was made of the imperial prisoners that the French had taken in the county of Guynes, which was then in the subjection of the English; it was maintained by the Chancellor of England, That they could not be detained as prisoners, being taken in the territory and protection of the English: howbeit that the contrary might be said: for albeit it was not permitted to pursue or take prey in another man's territory, yet it is lawful having raised it in his own territory, to pursue it into another man's ground: which yet suffereth this exception, If the lord of the ground forbidden him not so to do: as did the lord Grey, governor of Calais and Guines, who coming in the time of the pursuit, was said to have taken the flying Spaniards into his protection, although that they were carried away by the French. Now in this case the word Protection, is not taken in proper signification; for there is no protection, if there be no convention: and the strange prince cannot take another prince's subject into his protection without the consent of his own prince, as we shall hereafter declare.  
But yet before let us determine the propounded question, Whether a sovereign 
Whether a sovereign prince submitting himself unto the protection of ano their prince, looseth thereby his own sovereignty, and so becometh the other prince's subject.  prince submitting himself unto another sovereign prince, looseth the right of his own sovereignty; and whether he become subject to the other? For it seemeth that he is no sovereign, acknowledging a greater than himself. Nevertheless I am of opinion that he continueth still a sovereign, and not a subject. And this point is decided by a law, whereof there is not the like, and hath in divers readings been altered: but we follow the original of the Pandects of Florence, which hold, That sovereign princes who in treaty of alliance acknowledge the protector to be greater than themselves, are not yet for all that their subjects. I doubt not (saith the law) but that allies, and other people using their liberty are not strangers unto us, etc. And albeit that in the treaty of confederates and allies, by unequal alliance, it be expressly said, That one of them shall respectively regard the majesty of the other; that maketh not that he should be therefore his subject, no more than our adherents and clients are less free than our selves, although they be not equal with us, neither in goods, power, nor honour. And the ordinary clause inserted into the treaties of unequal alliance in these words, Comiter maiestatem conseruare (that is to say, courteously to preserve the majesty of the greater) importeth no other thing, but that betwixt the princes allied, the one is greater and more honourable than the other; and that the lesser allies should in all modesty respect the greater. So that it evidently appeareth, that protection importeth not subjection, 
Protection importeth not subjection.  but the superiority and prerogative of honour. And the more clearly to understand this point, and the nature of treaties and alliances, we may say that all treaties amongst princes are made either with friends, enemies, or neuter. The treaties betwixt enemies, are made to have peace and amity, or truce, or to compose wars begun for seignories or for persons, or to redress the injuries and displeasures of one of them against the other, or for traffic and hospitality that might be betwixt enemies during the time of truce. As for the others which are not enemies, the treaties which are made with them, are either by alliance equal, or unequal: in this the one acknowledgeth 
Alliance equal▪ or unequal▪ Unequal of two sorts.  the other to be superior in the treaty of alliance; which is in two sorts, that is to wit, when the one acknowledgeth the other to be his superior for honour, and yet is not in his protection: or else the one receiveth the other into protection, and both the one and the other is bound to pay a certain pension, or to give certain succours; or else own neither pension nor succours. As for allies by alliance equal, which the Latins call Aequo foedere, the quality is understood, when the one is in nothing superior 
Alliance equal.  unto the other in the treaty: and that the one hath nothing above the other for their prerogative of honour, albeit that the one must do or give more or less than the other for the aid that the one oweth unto the other. And in this sort of treaty, they have always entreated of amity, traffic, and hospitality, to harbour the one with the other, and to traffic together with all kind of merchandise, or some certain kinds only, and at the charge of certain imposts agreed upon by the treaties. And both the one and the other alliance is of two sorts, that is to wit, defensive only, or defensive 
Alliance defensive only, or both defensive and offensive.  and offensive; and yet may be both the one & the other, without exception of person, or with the exception of certain princes: and the most straight alliance is that which is both defensive and offensive, towards all, and against all; as to be a friend to friends, and an enemy to enemies; and so most commonly order is taken, and treaties of marriages one of them had with the other. But yet the alliance is more strong, when as one king is allied with another king, realm with realm, and one man with another man; as were in ancient times the kings of France and Spain, and the kings of Scotland and France. And that was it for which the ambassadors of France answered Edward the fourth, being driven out of the realm of England, That the king could not give him aid, for that the alliances of France and England were made with the kings, and the realms, in such sort that king Edward chased out of his realm, the league continued with the realm and the king that therein reigned: the effect of which words was this, with such a king, his countries, territories, and seignories: which words are as it were in all treaties expressed. But these treaties aught also to be published in sovereign courts or parliaments, and ratified by the estates, by the consent of the Attorney general, as was decreed in the treaty made betwixt king jews the eleventh, and Maximilian the arch duke, in the year 1482. The third sort of alliance is that of neutrality, which is neither defensive nor offensive, which may be betwixt the subjects of two 
Alliance of neutrality.  princes being enemies; as those of the Franche-countie have alliance of neutrality with the house of France, and are assured in time of war: in which alliance was also comprised the country of Bassigny, by the decree of Bade in the year 1555, in confirming with the king the renovation of the neutrality for the Franch-countie. And all these aforesaid alliances are perpetual, or limited to a certain time, or for the life of princes, and some years more, as is always in treaties of alliance agreed upon betwixt the kings of France, and the lords of the leagues.  
And thus much for the general division of all the treaties which are made betwixt princes, under the which are comprehended all the particular alliances. For as for the division of the Roman ambassadors, at the enterparle of peace betwixt them and Antiochus the great, it is very short. Livy saith, Tria sunt Genera foederum, unum cum bello victis dicer entur leges: alterum cum pares bello aequo foedere in pacem & amicitiam venirent: tertium cum qui hosts nunquam fuerunt in amicitiam foedere co●…unt, qui neque dicunt neque accipiun●… leges. There are (saith he) three kinds of leagues or confederations; one, when as laws and conditions are appointed to them that be in battle overcome: another when men in war equal come together in like league into peace & friendship: the third, when as they which never were enemies, by league join in amity, who neither give nor take laws. All the others, which are neither subjects nor allies, are either coallies, or enemies, or neuter without alliance or hostility, who all generally, if they be not subjects (be they allies, coallies, enemies, or neuter) are strangers. The coallies are the allies of our allies, which are not for all that our allies, no 
Coallies' 〈◊〉 they be. Coallies always comprised in the league of their allies.  more than the companion of our associate is ou●… companion; who yet nevertheless either in general or special terms, are always in all leagues comprised. As the lords of the three confederates of the Grises, the ancient allies of the Swissers, were in express terms comprised in the treaty of alliance made in the year 1531, betwixt king Frances the first of that name, and the Swissers, in quality of coallies. But in the year 1550 they were allies unto the house of France, and comprised in the treaty of alliance renewed betwixt king Henry and the Swissers, in quality of allies by alliance equal, in like degree and pension with the Swissers, that is to wit 3000 pound, for every league or confederacy, to take away the partiality that was betwixt the one and the others. For although the Swissers were allied with the league of the Grises, by alliance equal by the treaty made betwixt the Grisons and the seven little Cantons, in the year 1498: so it was yet nevertheless that they constrained the lords of the leagues of the Grises to obey the decrees made in their diets, if it should be there otherwise determined; which was like to have broken the alliance betwixt the Grisons and the Swissers, in the year 1565, for no other cause, (as said the Grisons) than to make the Swissers to know that they were their equals in alliance: but the truth is, that the emperor practised under hand, and gave eleven thousand crowns unto certain of the most factious of the Grisons, to make head, as they confessed afterwards being put to torture, and were condemned in a fine of ten thousand crowns; as I have learned out of the Commentaries and letters of the French ambassadors, which then was sent unto the Grisons. We have also example of them of Geneva, who were comprised in the treaties of alliance made betwixt the house of France and the Bernois, in whose protection they then were; and so were since the year 1527, unto the year 1558, that they exempted themselves out of protection, and entreated in alliance equal, and have always in alliance been comprised in the quality of coallies.  
But as those alliances which are defensive and offensive towards and against all persons 
N●… alliance 〈◊〉 unsure or weak, than the simple alliance of commerce and ●…raffick.  without exception, are of all others the straightest and strongest: so also there is no alliance more unsure or weaker, than the simple alliance of commerce and traffic which may be even betwixt enemies: which although it may seem to be grounded upon the law of nations, yet we see it oftentimes to be forbidden by princes in their own countries, lest their subjects should riotously abuse the store of things brought in, or be pinched with the want of things carried our. And for this cause princes have in this respect used particular treaties, & granted certain special privileges & liberties: as in the treaty of commerce or traffic betwixt the house of France & the porttowns of the Easterlings, & the Milanois with the Swissers; wherein they are by the treaties of commerce bound to deliver a certain quantity of grain, at a certain price expressed in the said treaties, which the French ambassadors would oftentimes have broken, for the doubt that the Swissers made to enter upon the Milanois, enemies unto the French, for fear the transportation of corn should have been forbidden: which when the governor of Milan had done, in the year 1550, the Swissers were upon the point to have made alliance defensive with the Milanese, or at leastwise to have had them excepted amongst the confederates as neuter. The force of which league was, that such as were in the same league excepted, could not become prisoners to any the confederates; when as yet for all that strangers, although they were no enemies, were by the law prisoners to them that took them: For so Pomponius writeth unto Quintus Mutius: For (saith he) if we have neither friendship nor hospitality, nor league of amity with any nation, these truly are not enemies: yet what thing soever of ours falleth into their hands becometh theirs; insomuch that a free man borne of ours, by them taken, becometh their slave; and so likewise it is, if any thing come from them to us: thus much he. But this law we now use not, for regard of that courtesy which aught to be betwixt man 
Who indeed are to be accounted enemies.  and man. But by the name of enemies we understand them unto whom we, or they unto us, have publicly denounced wart; or else without any denunciation have of fact made war upon us: as for the rest they are to be deemed of, as of thieves or pirates, with whom we aught to have no society or community. In ancient time also there was a treaty of alliance to have justice done them in a strange city, as we read in the books of the Grecians; but at length by the great consent and agreement of all nations, the port of justice hath by little and little been still opened, as well to strangers as to citizens.  
But in every alliance, league, confederation, or convention whatsoever, it behoveth 
In all alliance●… the soveraigneti●… i●… still unto all Princes, & people to be reserved safe and untouched.  that the laws of majesty be unto every prince or people reserved safe and untouched: for otherwise the one should fall into the power and mercy of the other; as the weaker oftentimes be by the power & might of the stronger enforced to receive laws; which is not so in the treaties of alliance equal: wherein even little cities are in the indifferent laws of leagues equal unto most mighty kings and people, being not bound either to observe the majesty of their more mighty confederates, or to give them place. As a man may see in that treaty of alliance made betwixt the kings of Persia, & the seignori●… of Thebes: For albeit that the Persian empire was bounded almost with the same bounds that the course of the sun was, viz▪ from the rivage of Hellesponrus unto the remotest parts of India; and that the city of Thebes was enclosed but in straight walls, and the country of Beotia; yet for all that were they both in the league of their alliance equal. Now where we said, that in alliance of protection, the protector hath a prerogative of honour; that is not to be understood only, that he aught to be the chief ally, as was jews the eleventh the French king with the Swissers, who did him that honour above the duke of Savoy, who was before the chief: For always the sovereign prince be he never so little, in alliance equal, is master in his own house, and holdeth the first place above all other princes coming into his country: but if the protector himself come, he is the first both in sitting and all other honours.  
But here might one say, Why should allies in league defensive & offensive against all without exception, using the same customs, the same laws, the same state, the same diets, be reputed strangers one to another? We have hereof example of the Swissers, who are allied amongst themselves, with such alliance as I have said, since the year 1315; yet say I nevertheless that such alliance letteth not, but that they are still strangers one unto the other, and maketh not that they are one citizens to the 
Alliance maketh not but that men may still be one of them strangers unto another, & not of the same Ci●…ie or Commonweal.  other. We have also hereof example of the Latins, and the Romans, who were allies in league defensive and offensive, used the same customs, the same arms, the same language, and had the same friends and enemies: Whereupon the Latins maintained, that it was and aught to be one and the self same Commonweal; and therefore by their ambassadors demanded to have their part in the estate & offices of Rome, as had the Romans themselves. S●… societ●…s (said they) equatio juris est, si socialis exercitus illis est quo duplicent vires suas; cur non omnia aequantur? cur non alter ab Latinis Consuldatur? Vbi pars virium, ibi & imperij pars est. And immediately after, unum populum, unam rempublicam fieri aequum est. Tum Consul Romanus. Audi jupiter haec scelera: peregrinos consuls, & peregrinum Senatum in tuo templo, etc. If society (said they) be an equality of right, if they have their allies army, whereby they double their strength: why then are not all things made equal? why is not one of the Consuls chosen of the Latins? where part of the strength is, there should also part of the government be. And immediately after, It is but right that there should be but one people and one Commonweal. Than said the Roman Consul, Hear o jupiter these villainies, strange Consuls, and a strange Senate in thy temple, etc. So he calleth them strangers which were allied unto the Romans with the strongest alliance that was possible to devise, insomuch that they seemed to be all of one and the self same city. Yea Festus teacheth us the Municipes (or enfranchised men) not to have been citizens: whose words we have thought good here to set down: Municip●…um id genus hominum dicitur, qui cum Romam venissent, neque cives Romani essent, participes tamen fuerunt omnium rerum ad munus fungendum unà cum Romanis civibus, praeterquam de suffragio ferendo aut magistratu capiendo: sicut fuerunt Fundani, Formiani, Cumani, Acerrani, Lanwini, Tusculani, qui post aliquot annos cives Romani effecti sunt. Al●…o modo id genus hominum dicitur, quorum civitas universain civitatem Romanam venit, ut Aricini, Cerites, Anagnini. Tertio definiuntur ij qui ad civitatem Romanam it a venerunt, ut Municipia essent suae cuiusque civitatis coloniae, ut Tiburtes, Praenestini, Pisani, Arpinates, Nolani, Bononienses, Placentini, Sutrini, Lucenses. That kind of men (saith he) is called Municipials, who coming to Rome and being no citizens, were yet partakers of all things together with the Roman citizens, except in giving of voices, and bearing of offices; as were the Fundani, the Formiani, the Cumani, the Acerrani, the Lanwini, and the Tusculani, who after certain years were made citizens of Rome. And otherwise that sort of men is so called also, whose whole city came into the city of Rome; as the Aricini, the Cerites, and the Anagnini. And thirdly they who so came unto the city of Rome, as that the Colonies of every city were accounted Municipials; as were the Tiburts, the Praenestini, the Pisani, the Arpinates, the Nolani, the Bononienses, the Placentini, Sutrini, and Lucenses.  
Now many I see to be in the same error, as that the Swissers for like reason are all 
That the Can●… of the Swissers are not one, but divers Commonweals.  but one Commonweal: and yet it is most certain that they be thirteen Commonweals, holding nothing one of another, but every one of them having the sovereignty thereof divided from the rest. In former time their country was but one member of the Germane empire, governed by the emperors deputy. The first that rebelled were the inhabitants of Schwits, Vri, and Vnderuald, who treated of alliance both defensive and offensive, in the month of December, in the year 1315: whereof the first article 
The beginning of the Swissers revols from the Empire, and the first establishing of their Commonweals.  was, That none of them should more admit the command of any prince, or endure any sovereign prince over him. And afterwards in the year 1332 alliance was made of four Cantons, which were called the four towns of the wood, viz. Vri, Schwits, and Lucerne. And in the year 1351, Zurith entered into alliance with these four. And in the year 1352 Zug was also received with these five; and the year following Berne. And afterwards in the year 1393, was made the treaty of Sempach (after that the nobility of the Swissers was by the commonalty discomfited and overthrown) wherein they of Zurich, Lucerne, Berne, Soleure, Zug, Vri, Schwits, Vnderuald, and Glaris, entered into alliance defensive and offensive; which they renewed in the year 1481. basil was also received in the year 1501: Schaffuse also and Apenzel in the year 1513, Mulhouse in the year 1520, Rotwill in the year 1519. The Valesians also in the year 1528, with whom beside the ancient treaty, a particular treaty was made betwixt them and the Bernoys for league defensive. Bienne also entered into league offensive and defensive with the Bernoys, in the year 1352, after that they had exempted themselves out of the power of the bishop of basil their sovereign prince. All which treaties of alliance, the abbot of Orbez, ambassador for the French king unto the Swissers, hath let me see. Whereby a man may not only note the plurality of Commonweals, but the diversity of alliances also. For they of Berne may summon the three little Cantons of Vri, Schwits, and Vnderuald, unto their succour, by virtue of their first league: and they of Zurich and Berne, may reciprocally summon the one the other: they of Lucerne may of eight Cantons summon five: And the three little Cantons of Schwits, Vri, and Vnderuald, may summon all the rest of the Cantons unto their aid, if they chance to be invaded, and that for divers causes. The assemblies of all the Swissers, except the Rhaetians, them of Geneva, and the Valesians, are holden every year: and whatsoever is decreed by the greater part of the ambassadors of the cities, bindeth them all in particular, and the lesser part of the whole in common. The last that entered into the league under the protection of the Bernois, were they of Geneva. 
Geneva the las●… that entered into league with the Swissers, under the protection of the Bernois.  All these allies, confederates, and coallies, made two and twenty Commonweals, with the abbot of St. Galliard a sovereign prince; all separated in sovereignty, and every one of them having their magistrates apart, their state apart, their burse, their demain and territory apart. In brief, their armies, their cry, their name, their money, their seal, their assemblies, their jurisdiction, their ordinances in every estate divided. And if one of the Cantons of themselves get any thing, the rest have no part therein: as the Bernoys have well given to understand: For since they entered into the league, they have joined unto their own domestical government little less than forty towns, upon whom they levy men and money, and give unto them laws: over which the other Cantons have no power at all: as was judged by Francis the first, the French king, by them chosen arbitrator in this matter. They of Basil also, when in the year 1560 they had lent fifty thousand crowns unto the French king, they took the Canton of Soleure to themselves in caution▪ but having by the common aid of all the Cantons taken in the bailiwike of Lugan, with certain other lands beyond the mountains; every Canton by turn one after another, sent thither their magistrates and governors, for the administration of justice▪ that so unto every Canton of the Swissers might be reserved their right and due. The town also of Bade, where they commonly hold their yearly assemblies or diets, is common unto eight Cantons, which after the victory of Sempech joined in league together. It is also (as I suppose) well known unto all men, how that they are not all of one and the same religion, but to be therein divided, and had therefore oftentimes taken up arms one of them against another, if the French king had not wisely provided therefore; as well for the sincere love and affection he bore unto them, as for the notable interest he had to maintain them in peace: for that of their health and welfare the security of France seemeth almost wholly to depend.  
But unto many it may seem, that they altogether make but one estate, considering that, that which is decreed in their diets in common, bindeth every one of the Cantons, 
The Cantons of the Swissers divided among themselves for religion.  and the lesser part of them all: as the seven Cantons Catholic gave well to understand unto the four Cantons Protestant's, at the diet holden in September, in the year 1554, insomuch that the common country situate beyond the mountains, divided in religion, and governed by the magistrates that every Canton sendeth thither by turn; it chanced that the seven Cantons Catholic caused them of the common country to bind themselves not to change the religion Catholic: and so following the same obligation would afterwards have proceeded against them of the religion there, against whom the cantons protestants opposed themselves, and were now ready to have entered into arms, had not the ambassador of France stepped in betwixt them, and wisely pacified the matter: yet for all that with this proviso, That the common subjects of the religion should be punished (for changing their religion, contrary unto the league) if the greater part of the cantons should be of that opinion, and that the cantons catholic should nevertheless redeliver the letters obligatory of the common subjects. By which mean their differences were again well appeased. Whereunto the cantons of Glaris and Apenzel served in good stead; who indifferently received both the one and the other religion, and made as it were an equal counterpoise betwixt the one of them and the other. So that it appeareth that the greater part of the cantons bindeth the less, and every one of them in particular. Yea and that more is, none of the cantons may have alliance with any prince whatsoever without the whole 
None of the cantons may make alliance with any prince, wishout the whole consent of the rest of the cantons  consent of the rest. As the cantons protestants having made alliance with Philip the Landgrave of Hessen, and the signory of Strasburg, in the year 1532, were by the rest of their allies enforced again to departed from the same. As in like case the cantons catholic were compelled to renounce their new alliance made with the house of Austria. And albeit that the five cantons catholic Lucerne, Vri, Schwits, Vnderuald, and Zug, had made alliance with Pope Pius the fourth, for the defence of their religion; yet could they not with any rewards (were they never so great) be induced to renew the same with his successors. But when treaty was had, for alliance to be made betwixt Francis the first, the French king, and the Swissers, nothing more letted the same, than the opposition of the cantons protestants; who before instructed in the new religion, and persuaded by the earnest sermons of Zuinglius their preacher, who affirmed it to be unlawful for them to serve strange princes in their wars, prevailed so much, that his followers and country men would no other wise make alliance with the king, but by the way of peace and friendship only. But the leagues renewed with Henry the second, they of Basil and Schaffuse, with the catholic cities, joined themselves unto the French, not in league of friendship only, but in giving of their aid also: when as for all that, they of Zutic and Berne, in the year 1554, forbade their subjects upon pain of death to serve the French king in his wars. And the same year the governors of the canton of Vnderuald, requested by the cardinal of Trent, That by their leave he might levy certain men in their country; forbade their subjects in general, upon pain of death, and confiscation of their goods, to go to serve any other prince than the French king: which are all undoubted arguments to show, that among the Swissers there are as many Commonweals as there are cities or cantons. In like case the three confederate cities of the Grisons, which consist of fifty companies or fellowships, have their governments divers one from another; and yet as often as they have their assemblies, the greatest city of the Grisons useth to sand thereunto eight and twenty deputies, the second twenty four, and the last fourteen: with power, that whatsoever the greatest part of these their deputies shall agreed upon, in matters concerning their common society, shall bind every one of them in particular: and sometimes also in matters of greater importance all the people assemble themselves. Wherhfore they are deceived, which of those three cities would make one Commonweal. For common assemblies and meetings, common domains, common enemies and friends, make not the same Commonweal; not not although they have the same bourse, or certain common treasure: but the sovereignty of power that every one hath to command or restrain their subjects: as in like case, if many heads of families should become partners of all their goods, yet should they not therefore make one and the self same family. The same opinion we may have of the alliance contracted betwixt the Romans and the rest of the towns of Italy, combined in league both offensive and defensive, against all men without exception: who yet nevertheless were divers Commonweals, divided both in their assemblies and sovereignty. The like we may say of the league of the seven towns of the Amphictioniques, who had their meetings and sovereignty divided: to whose example most of the towns and seignories of Greece afterwards entered into the same league and confederation, for the deciding of their controversies: and every year every signory sent their ambassadors and deputies unto the common estates, where the greatest affairs, proceed, and differences, betwixt the princes and seignories, were determined by their deputies, whom they called Myrios': by whom the Lacedæmonians were condemned to the signory of Thebes, in the sum of thirty thousand crowns: and for not obeying the decree, were condemned in double thereof: for that contrary to the treaty of peace, they had surprised the castle of Cadmee. The Phocences also afterwards when they had rob the holy treasure at Delphos, were by the decree of the Amphictioniques, enjoined to restore the money by them so evil taken out of the temple: for default of which doing, all their country was adjudged unto the treasury of the temple: so that if there were any person which showed himself disobedient unto the decrees of the Amphictioniques, he therefore incurred the indignation of all Greece.  
Here might one say, That all Greece was but one Commonweal, considering the power of the Amphictioniques: and yet nevertheless there were almost as many divers Commonweals, as cities, holding nothing one of them of another, neither of the states of the Amphictioniques; but that they had so promised one to another, as princes have accustomed to promise' among themselves, and to choose their allies for their arbitrators: which neither the Lacedæmonians, nor the Phocenses had done, neither could against their wills be of right thereunto enforced. Yea the Phocenses to give the Amphictioniques to understand that they had no power over them, plucked down and tore in pieces the decrees of the Amphictioniques, fastened unto the pillars of the temple of Delphos. Yet true it is, that Philip king of Macedon (being himself none of the league) took hereupon occasion to denounce the sacred war unto the Phocenses, and to ruinat their state: and in recompense thereof obtained the place and privileges of the Phocenses: the Lacedæmonians being also excluded out of the league of the Amphictioniques, for having given unto them succours. The like league almost we also found to have been amongst the ancient Gauls, as is to be seen in the Commentaries 
The alliance of the ancient Commonweals of Gaul.  of Caesar, where he saith, That Vercingentorix chosen their general, caused all the states of Gaul to be assembled. And albeit that the lords of Autun, of Chartres, of Gergoye in Awergne, and of Beawois, held nothing one of them of another; and that the signory of Bourges was in the protection of Autun; and those of Viarron in the protection of Bruges, and so consequently the other towns in like sort: yet so it was, that all the princes and seignories passed their differences by the decrees and judgements of the druids; unto whose censure if they refused to obey, they were by them excommunicated, and so of every man shunned, as men of all others most detestable. And yet is it most manifest that these Commonweals which I have spoken of, had their sovereignties divided one of them from another, the territories of their cities certainly bounded out, and every one of them their own proper state and majesty.  
But it may also happen, that to become but one estate, one Commonweal, & one signory, when the partners of one league do agreed in the same sovereignty: a thing not easy to be judged; if a man look not near into it. As the league of the Achaeans was not at the first but of three cities, divided in estate, assemblies, and sovereignty; allies 
The league of ●…e Achaeans.  by alliance equal, both defensive & offensive: who having the same enemies & the same friends, yet at the beginning kept every one of them unto themselves the majesty of their own city. But being troubled with continual wars, and enforced to hold their often assemblies, they by little and little become so straightly united together, that in fine they become but one Commonwealth composed of many: and in tract of time drew unto their estate all the towns and cities of Achaia and Morea, they all retaining still the first name of the Achaeans. As it happened unto them of the league, whom 
Whereof the Swissers took their name.  they call Swissers; for that the canton of Schwits, the lest of all the rest, was the first that revolted, after that they had slain their governor. And as the Achaians' were called the correctors of tyrants; so also the Swissers (to their great praise) carried this title of honour. The towns also of the kingdom of Naples, after the massacre of the Pithagorians, being much troubled, and not knowing unto whom to have recourse, cast themselves into the protection of the Achaians'. But the author and mean of all these cities, to make one and the same Commonweal, was Aratus, who procured it to be decreed by the estates, That every year one chief general should be chosen to command in their wars, and to govern their estates: and he was prince of the Achaians', that is to say, the first that called together their assemblies. And whereas before every city sent their ambassadors and deputies with instructions unto the assembly of the Achaians' (as the Swissers use to do) there to give their voices deliberative: Aratus brought to pass, that the assembly of the ambassadors and deputies so sent, should make choice of ten principal men, whom they called Demiurges, who alone had voices deliberative, and power to resolve, to determine, and decide matters of state: therest of the ambassadors and deputies having only voices consultative. These two points gained, there by little and little grew up an Aristocratical Commonweal, in stead of divers particular Monarchies, Aristocraties, and popular Seignories: many tyrants partly for love, partly for fear, being drawn thereunto. Now all the spoil of the enemies, and conquests made by the generals, were not any one cities, but belonged to them all. So that at length such was the union and consent of the confederates, that all the towns of Achaia and Morea being made subject, united, and incorporate unto the state of the Achaians', used the same laws, the same right, the same customs, the same religion, the same tongue, the same language, the same discipline, the same manners, the same money, the same weights and measures, as saith Polybius. The kings of Macedon entered also into this league; yea the two Philipss, Antigonus, and Demetrius, were chosen chief captains of the Achaians', holding nevertheless their realm separated apart from the signory of the Achaians'. And the Romans knowing well that they could not possibly conquer Greece, the league of the Achaeans standing whole, gave commandment unto Gallus their Proconsul, by all means possible to do what he might to break the same; which he not in vain attempted. For divers cities complaining unto the states, that under colour of a league and alliance equal, they had taken from them the managing of their estate and sovereignty; and assuring themselves of the aid of the Romans, revolted from the community of the Achaians': to meet wherewith, and to stay the other cities from doing the like, Aratus obtained commission from the states to inform against these rebels: after which the cities before revolted, put themselves into the protection of the Romans; yet with proviso, that their estate and sovereignty should remain unto them still. But when the power of the Romans seemed unto the rest of the Achaeans invincible, they for the safeguard of their liberty, entered into amity with the Romans also; yet with condition, That the Lacedæmonians, whom the Romans had in a manner drawn from the state of the Achaeans, should from thenceforth be under the protection and power of the Achaeans, except in case concerning the life or goods of a Lacedaemonian citizen, wherewith the Achaeans might not meddle. Which was by the Romans most subtly done: that so there might still be matter of perpetual discord and civil war betwixt the Lacedæmonians and the Achaeans. For if the Lacedæmonians had been altogether in power of the Achaeans, they had with their wealth greatly augmented the strength of the associates: and on the other side if the Romans should have left them altogether free, it was to be feared lest they should together with their wont valour, have recovered their ancient Commonweal also. The like deceit they used also against the Aetolians, which was another estate and league divided from the 
The league of the Aetolians.  Achaeans, composed of three cities, who had also their estate, assemblies, & sovereignty divided; but in fine, following the example of the Achaeans, they of three Commonweals allied with alliance equal, both defensive and offensive, established one Aristocratical Commonweal, managed by the states of the three confederates, & by one common Senate, wherein was precedent one chief captain every year chosen. The 
The league of the Lycians.  like we may say of the three and twenty cities of Lycia, which established one Aristocratical Commonweal, like unto that of the Achaeans; saving that the deputies of the greater cities had in their general assemblies three deliberative voices, the meaner citizens two, and the rest but one; as saith Strabo: and moreover out of the estates they chose a captain general, whom they called the Lyciarque, and so the other magistats and judges of all the cities also. Other alliances also and leagues there were of the thirteen 
The league of the 13. Cities of jonia. The 12. Cities of Tuscanie: and the 47. Cities of the Latins.  cities of jonia, of the twelve cities of Tuscanie, and of the forty seven cities of the Latins, strongly made by alliance equal, both defensive and offensive, holding their assemblies of their states every year, and choosing also sometimes (but not ever) a chief captain or general, especially in time of war: and yet nevertheless the sovereignty of every city continued in the estate of itself, as doth the Swissers. For albeit that the city of Rome was entered into league with the Latins, and that Servius Tullius, and Tarquin the proud king of Rome, had been chosen chief captains of the league of the Latins; yet so it is nevertheless, that every city kept still the assemblies and sovereignty thereof: and yet the kings of Rome lost nothing thereby of their majesty. Now it seemeth at the first show, that such leagues of cities were like unto those of the Achaeans: but the like thereof there is not one, except those of the Aetolians: and at this present the estate of the empire of the Germane, which we will in due place show to be no monarchy, but a pure aristocraty, composed of the princes of the empire, of the seven electors, and the imperial cities. Yet this is a thing common to all confederate cities, that in time of war they have used to make one general captain, every year to be chosen, or else once for all. For as the signory of the Achaeans chose for their captains the kings of Macedon, Antigonus, and Philip the second; and the league of the Aetolians made choice of Attalus king of Asia, as saith 
* Lib. 27.  Livy; and likewise the Latins, of the kings of Rome, and other their neighbour princes▪ so also the electors have oftentimes chosen strange princes, as Henry of Lutzemburg, Alphonsus the tenth, and Charles the fift, kings of Castille; who although they were sovereigns in their own realms, were yet nevertheless subjects to the empires, as captains 
A General chosen by many Cities or States in League together, maketh not them that have so chosen him ever a what the more one Commonweal.  in chief. For as a captain in chief, being not sovereign to them that have chosen him, maketh not them of the league to be one Commonweal: so also he changeth in nothing the estate and union of the Commonweal whereunto he is called. So Philip Valois the French king, was chosen general of the ecclesiastical forces, as we see in that league which was made betwixt Philip Valois, & Henry count Palatine, who was afterwards of the Germane chosen emperor. And not long since Adolphus uncle to the king of Denmark, was chosen chief captain of the league of the Hans cities. The Venetians also as often as they are to make war, have used to make choice of any strange general, rather than of a citizen of their own. But the Germane emperors take upon them a style of much higher quality than of Captains in chief, or General; avoching themselves not only to be chief captains and magistrates, but even monarches also: which whether it be so or not, we will in due place declare. They pretend also to have power to command not only the princes of the empire, but even them also who hold of them nothing. For it is not long since that the emperor Ferdinand sent his ambassadors unto the Swissers, to the end they should not receive Grombach, nor the conspirators his adherents, banished out of the empire: which thing, when the emperor seemed by his letters rather to command than to request; the Swissers (a free people) were therewith not a little moved. And before that also, Morlet Musa ambassador for the French king unto the Swissers, certified the king, How that the governor of Milan (as having such charge from the emperor) had forbidden the cardinal of Zion to enter into league with the French king, for that he was a prince of the empire: of which his command the cardinal made no great account, but without regard of his prohibition made alliance with the French king; from whom he received twelve hundred pounds pension yearly. True it is, that in all the leagues of the Swissers with foreign princes, the empire is always excepted, if there be not thereof express 
The Swissers in all their leagues with foreign Princes ●…till exceps the Empire  mention made. And for that cause Guiche the king's ambassador to the Swissers had thereof express charge (as I have seen by the instructions that were given him) to make mention of the emperor in the treaty of alliance, of the year 1521. For the Germane grounded themselves upon a maxim, in vertie whereof the emperor Sigismond caused the Swissers to take up arms against Frederick of Austria, to the prejudice of the alliance made with the house of Austria: presupposing that the empire was superior unto the Swissers, and that in all treaties of alliance, the right of the superior is still to be excepted, although there be thereof no express mention made. Which is certain, for as much as concerneth the laws of majesty; but the Swissers confess not that the emperor hath any superiority over them, and much less the emperor, subject to the states of the empire. It is also true, that by the treaty made betwixt the eight ancient cantons, there is an express clause, whereby the cantons of Zurich, Berne, Schwits, and Vnderualden (as having sometime been part of the Germane empire) declared, That for their part they intended to comprehend in that treaty the majesty of the sacred empire, the right whereof they purposed not to prejudice by that treaty of alliance. And within a few years aftet, the cantons of Zurich, Berne, Lucerne, Vri, and Glaris, in the name of all the cantons of the Swissers, sent their ambassadors to obtain the confirmation of their ancient privileges, of Ferdinand, then holding a diet of the states of the empire, at Ausburg. And by the treaties of alliance made betwixt the sacred empire and the cities of the cantons, it is expressly articulated, That they should not give any aid unto any strange prince, to make war upon the territory of the empire; as I have learned by a copy of the letters of the emperor Charles the fift, written to the lords of the cantons; whereby he complaineth, That their subjects joined with the forces of the French king, had entered upon the territories of the empire, contrary to the express tenor of the alliance that they had with the empire. And not long after, he by other letters demandeth of the lords of the cantons to punish their subjects, who had invaded the territories belonging to the house of Austria, contrary to the hereditary alliance made betwixt the princes of the house of Austria and the Swissers, in the year of Grace 1467, and renewed in the year 1501, in which league, the See of Rome, the Pope, and the empire, are excepted: and a yearly pension set down, of two hundred florins to be yeately paid unto every canton. Which alliance was again renewed by the xiii cantons, at the diet of Bade holden the xx day of july 1554. As for the league betwixt the said lords of the cantons, and the French king, it was only a league defensive, for the preservation of the states of the allies, and not for the invading of foreigners: which are the true reasons for which the Swissers are withholden to invade the territories of the empire, and of the house of Austria; and not for the right of any pre-eminence, or superiority that the empire hath over them. Which is also yet more expressly verified by the treaty of alliance, renewed betwixt the French king and the lords of the cantons, in june 1549, out of which are excluded all such as are not subject to the Swissers, nor use not the Germane tongue. And that is it for which Charles the fift, the emperor, laboured by all means to make agreement with the Swissers, that the dukedom of Milan, with the kingdoms of Naples and Sicily, might be comprised in the hereditary treaties of alliance, made with them for the house Austria: which the Swissers ●…latly refused to grant in the year 1555. The same we may judge of the cities of the Grisons, rend from the Germane empire, who sufficiently declared themselves to be in nothing bound unto the edicts of the empire, or of the emperor; in that they would not accept even of a Germane prince by the emperor appointed to be their bishop: but the 3 cities of the Grisons, being at variance among themselves, about the choice of their bishop▪ the Swissers by the authority of the league, taking upon them to be arbitrators of all controversies arising betwixt the confederate cities, without any regard had to the provision of the pope, or confirmation of the emperor appointed him to be bishop which was chosen by the Chapter, subject to the Grisons; and decreed, that from that time forward he should be bishop whom the league of the Cadde should make choice of.  
Now seeing that our reasoning is of leagues, and of laws of arms, question might 
Not lawful for subjects to entreat of any particular league or alliance among themselves, or with foreign princes, without the leave or consent of their own sovereigns.  be made, Whether it be lawful for subjects to entreat of any particular league or alliance among themselves, or with other foreign princes, without the leave or consent of their own sovereigns? Such alliances, and especially with stranger's princes have used to embarre, for the evil consequences that might ensue thereon: and namely the king Catholic by express edicts hath forbidden all his subjects so to do. And at such time as jews of France, duke of Orleans (he which was slain at Paris) was charge with many matters, nothing was more grievously objected against him being slain, than that he had secretly entered into league with Henry duke of Lancaster. Yet for all that the princes of the empire think it lawful for them so to do: and for their own safety to enter into league of alliance, both among themselves, and with other foreign princes, so that it be done without the prejudice of the Germane empire. For whatsoever leagues are by them otherwise made, are voided and of none effect. But when the empire is excepted, the emperor himself is not therefore excepted, as hath oftentimes but never more plainly been understood, than in the league which many of the Germane princes made with Henry the second, the French king, at Chambort, for the defence of the Germane empire, against the emperor Charles the fift, in the year 1552. In which league they acknowledged king Henry for their superior, promising courteously to reverence his majesty; and so by their common consent made him general of their wars, calling him The Protector of Princes, and of the liberty of the empire. And in the year 1559 the like alliance both defensive and offensive was made betwixt the king of Sweden, the marquess Assemberg, the duke of Brunsuich, the duke of Cleve, the prince of Orange, the county Aiguemont, and divers other imperial towns on the one part, and the king of Denmark, the duke of Saxony, the Landgrave of Hesse, the duke of Holste, the duke of Bavyere, the town of Nuremberg, the bishops of Wirciburg, and Bamberg the town of Lubec, and divers other, with Sigismond Augustus' king of Polonia, on the other part. Yea the emperor Charles the fift himself made particular alliance with the duke of Bavaria, and other the catholic princes, to choose his brother Ferdinand king of Romans. And a little after also the league of Franconia was made betwixt the house of Austria, the duke of Bavaria, the three bishops of Franconia, the archbishop of Salisburg, and the cities of Nuremberg and Ausberg. And Ferdinand also king of the Romans, for the catholic religion sake made a particular league with the bishop of Salisburg against the protestants, in the year 1556. We have seen also the league which was called The league of Suevia, to have made alliance offensive and defensive for 40 years, without excepting any thing sa●…e the empire. And the like league also betwixt the Sea towns, which they call the Vandals, that is to wit, Lubech, Hambourg, Vimare, Rostoc, Bresme, Suid, imperial towns, choosing for their chief captain Adolph uncle to the king of Denmark, who was not any way subject to the empire. Yet in all these leagues was ever excepted the majesty of the Germane empire. Yea that more is, the nobility of Denmark entered into a league defensive with Sigismond Augustus' king of Polonia, & the town 
A foul and rebellious league of subjects against their prince.  of Luec, against the king of Denmark himself: greater treason than which none could have been devised, if the king of Denmark had the highest power over his people, and were an absolute sovereign: of which matter, and of all the law of arms we will in due place reason: but first it behoveth us to speak of majesty, or Sovereignty.   

CHAP. VIII. ¶ Of Sovereignty.  
Majesty or Sovereignty is the most high, absolute, and perpetual 
The definition of Majesty or Sovereignty.  power over the citizens and subjects in a Commonweal: which the Latins call Maiestatem, the Greeks 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, & 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; the Italians Segnoria, and the Hebrews 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, that is to say, The greatest power to command. For majesty (as Festus saith) is so called of mightiness. For so here it behoveth first to define what majesty or Sovereignty is, which neither lawyer nor political philosopher hath yet defined: although it be the principal and most necessary point for the understanding of the nature of a Commonweal. And forasmuch as we have before defined a Commonweal to be the right government of many families, and of things common amongst them, with a most high & perpetual power: it resteth to be declared, what is to be understood by the name of a most high and perpetual power. We 
That Sovereignty consisteth in a perpetual power.  have said that this power aught to be perpetual, for that it may be, that that absolute power over the subjects may be given to one or many, for a short or certain time, which expired, they are no more than subjects themselves: so that whilst they are in their puissant authority, they cannot call themselves Sovereign princes, seeing that they are but men put in trust, and keepers of this sovereign power, until it shall please the people or the prince that gave it them to recall it; who always remained seized thereof. For as they which lend or pawn unto another man their goods, remain still the lords and owners thereof: so it is also with them, who give unto others power and authority to judge and command, be it for a certain time limited, or so great and long time as shall please them; they themselves nevertheless continuing still seized of the power and jurisdiction, which the other exercise but by way of loan or borrowing. And that is it for which the law saith, That the governor of a country, or lieutenant of a prince, his time once expired, giveth up his power, as but one put in trust, and therein defended by the power of another. And in that respect there is no difference betwixt the great officer and the lesser: for otherwise if the high and absolute power granted by a prince to his lieutenant, should of right be called Sovereignty, he might use the same against his prince, to whom nothing was left but the bore name of a prince, standing but for a cipher: so should the subject command his Sovereign, the servant his master, than which nothing could be more absurd: considering that in all power granted unto magistrates, or private men, the person of the prince is always to be excepted; who never giveth so much power unto another, but that he always keepeth more unto himself; neither is ever to be thought so deprived of his sovereign power, but that he may take unto himself the examination and deciding of such things as he hath committed unto his magistrates or officers, whether it be by the way of prevention, concurrence, or evocation: from whom he may also take the power given them by virtue of their commission or institution, or suffer them to hold it so long as shall please him. These grounds thus laid, as the foundations of Sovereignty, we conclude, that neither the Roman Dictator, nor the Harmoste of Lacedemonia, nor the Esmynaet of Salonick, nor he whom they call the Archus of Malta, nor the ancient Bailie of Florence, (when it was governed by a popular state) neither the Regent's or viceroys of kingdoms, nor any other officers or magistrates whatsoever, unto whom the highest, but yet not the perpetual power, is by the princes or peoples grant committed, can be accounted to have the same in Sovereignty. And albeit that the ancient Dictator's had all power given them in best sort that might be (which the ancient Latins called Optima Lege) so that from them it was not lawful to appeal▪ and upon whose creation all offices were suspended; until such time as that the Tribunes were ordained as keepers of the people's liberty, who continued in their charge notwithstanding the creation of the Dictator, who had free power to oppose themselves against him; so that if appeal were made from the dictator, the Tribunes might assemble the people, appointing the parties to bring forth the causes of their appeal, & the Dictator to stay his judgement; as when Papirius Cursor the Dictator, condemned Fabius Max the first, to death; and Fabius Max the second had in like manner condemned M●…nutius, both Colonels of the horsemen, for that they had fought with the enemy contrary to the command of the Dictator; they were yet both by appeal and judgement of the people acquitted. For so saith Livy, Than the father of Fabius said, I call 
* Livi. lib 7.  upon the Tribunes, and appeal unto the people, which can do more than thy Dictatorship▪ 
The dictator of Rome, neither sovereign prince nor magistrate.  whereunto king Tullus Hostilius gave place. Whereby it appeareth that the Dictator was neither sovereign prince, nor magistrate, as many have supposed; neither had any thing more than a simple commission for the making of wa●…e▪ the repressing of sedition, the reforming of the state▪ on instituting of new officers. So that Sovereignty is not limited either in power, charge, or time certain. And namely the ten commissioners established for the reforming of customs and laws; albeit than they had absolute power, from which there was no appeal to be made, and that all offices were suspended, during the time of their commission; yet had they not for all that any Sovereignty; for their commission being fulfilled, their power also expired; as did that of the Dictator's. So 〈◊〉 having vanquished the enemy, forth with discharged himself of the Dictatorship, which he had not had but fifteen days, Servilius in eight days, Mamercus in one day. And the Dictator was also named, not by the Senate, or the people, neither by the magistrates, or request made unto the people; nor by any laws which were always necessary to the creating of officers, but by an interrex, or a king created for a time, borne of honourable blood: for why, it was not enough for him to be a noble Senator only, that should name the Dictator. Now if one should say, that Sylla was by the law Valeria made Dictator for threescore years: I will answer as Cicero did, That it was neither Dictatorship nor law, but a most cruel tyranny; whereof for all that he discharged himself the fourth year after he was made Dictator, when as he with the blood of the citizens had quenched the flames of the civil wars; having yet still in the mean time reserved unto the Tribunes their free power to oppose themselves against his authority. And although Caesar forty years after had invaded the perpetual Dictatorship together with the liberty of the people, yet left he unto the Tribunes of the people, their power to oppose themselves against his proceed: but when as before, Pompeius being Consul, the very name of the Dictatorship was taken out of the Commonweal, and Caesar, contrary to the law of Pompeius, had procured himself by the law Servia, to be created Dictator, he was by the conspiracy of the Senators slain in the midst of the Senat. But let us grant an absolute power without appeal or controlment, to be granted by the people to one or many to manage their estate and entire government: shall we therefore say him or them to 
Who is to be called an absolute sovereign.  have the state of Sovereignty, when as he only is to be called absolute sovereign, who next unto God acknowledgeth none greaterthan himself? wherefore I say no sovereignty to be in them, but in the people, of whom they have a borrowed power, or power for a certain time, which once expired; they are bound to yield up their authority. Neither is the people to be thought to have deprived itself of the power thereof▪ although it have given an absolute power to one or more for a certain time: and much more if the power (be it given) be revocable at the pleasure of the people, without any limitation of time: For both the one and the other hold nothing of themselves, but are to give account of their doings unto the prince, or the people of whom they had the power so to command: whereas the prince or people themselves, in whom the Sovereignty resteth, are to give account unto none, but to the immortal God alone.  
But what if such absolute power as we have spoken of, be given to one or more for nine or ten years? as in ancient time in Athens the people made one of the citizens 
The great Archon of Athens no sovereign.  their sovereign, whom they called Archon. I say nevertheless that he was no prince, neither that the Sovereignty of the state rested in him: albeit that he was a sovereign magistrate, but yet countable of his actions unto the people, his time being expired. Yet might one say, What if that high & absolute power which we have spoken of, were given to one or more▪ for a year, with condition not to give any account at 
The Amymones sovereign magistrates, and ●…es not simple sovereigns.  all for their doings▪ For to the Cnidiens every year chose 〈◊〉 of their cirisens', whom they called Amymones, that is to say, Men without imputation, with such sovereignty of power, as that they might not be called to accounted for any thing that they had done, neither during the 〈◊〉 of their charge, nor after that the same was expired: I say yet for althat, that the sovereignty of the state was not in them▪ seeing that they were bound at the years end to restore again unto the people, the authority they were put in trust withal; the Sovereignty still remaining with the people, and the execution thereof with the Amymones, whom a man might well call sovereign magistrates, but not simple Sovereigns: For the one was the prince, the other the subject; the one the lord, the other the servant; the one the proprietary and seized of the Sovereignty, the other neither proprietary nor possessed thereof, neither holding any thing thereof, but as a feoffer or keeper in trust.  
The same we may say of the Regent's of France, created for the infancy, fury, or 
The Regent's of France.  absence of the king, whether the edicts, mandates, and letters patents, be signed and sealed with the sign and seal of the Regent's, and in their name (as they did before the law of Charles the fift the French king) or else that it be done in the name of the king, and the mandates sealed with his seal: for in that there is little or no difference at all: seeing that whatsoever is done by the attorney, the lord allowing the same, may well be thought to be done by the lord himself. Now the Regent is the true protector of the king and of his kingdom: for so the good county Theobald called himself Procuratorem regni Francorum, that is to say, Protector of the kingdom of France. So when a prince giveth absolute power to a Regent, or to a Senate, in his presence, or in his absence, to govern in his name; albeit that the edicts or letters of command go in his or their name, yet is it always the king that speaketh or commandeth. So we see 
The Senate of Milan, or Naples, what power it hath in the absence of the king of Spain.  that the Senate of Milan or Naples, in the absence of the king of Spain hath absolute power to dispatch all mandates in his name: As a man may see by the decree of the emperor Charles the fift in these words. Senatus Mediolanensis potestatem habeat constitutiones principis confirmandi, infirmandi, tollendi, dispensandi, contra statuta, habilitationes, prerogationes, restitutiones faciendi, etc. A Senatu ne provocari possit, etc. Et quicquid faciet, parem vim habeat ut si à principe factum ac decretum esset: Non tamen possit delictorum veniam tribuere, aut litter as salui conductus reis criminum dare. That is to say, The Senate of Milan hath power to confirm the constitutions of the prince, as also to infirm the same, to disannul them, to dispense with them contrary to the statutes, to make enablements, prerogatives, and restitutions, etc. No appeal shall be made from the Senate, etc. And whatsoever it shall do, shall have like force as if it were done or decreed by the prince: yet may it not grant pardon for offences committed, or give letters of safe conduct unto parties convicted. This power almost infinite, is not given unto the Senate of Milan and Naples, in any thing to diminish the majesty of the king of Spain, but altogether to the contrary, to ease him of his care and pains: join hereunto also, that this power how great soever it be, is to be revoked at the pleasure of him that gave it.  
But suppose that such great power be given to a king's lieutenant, or the governor 
Princes, lieutenants or governors of countries for term of life, yes no sovereigns.  of a country for term of his life, is not that a sovereign and perpetual power? For otherwise if we should interpret that only to be a perpetual power which shall never have end, there should be at all no sovereignty, but in the Aristocratical and popular state, which never dieth except it be utterly rooted out. Or if we understand the word, Perpetual, in a monarch for him and his heirs, there should be few perpetual sovereign monarchs, seeing there be but few that be hereditary; so that they which come to the crown by way of election, should not be sovereigns: wherefore we must understand the word Perpetual, for the term of the life of him that hath the power. Now if the sovereign and annual only, or which hath a certain prefixed and limited time to rule, chance to continued his government so given him, beyond the appointed time; that must either be by the good liking of him that gave the power, or else by force: if by force, it is called tyranny; and yet nevertheless the tyrant is a sovereign: as the violent possession of an intruder is in nature a possession, although it be contrary to the law, and they which had the possession before are so thereof disseised: but if such a magistrate continued his sovereign power by the good liking of the superior that gave it him, we will not therefore say that he is a sovereign prince, seeing that he holdeth nothing but by sufferance; and that a great deal the less, if the time be not limited, for in that he hath nothing but by commission during pleasure: and he that so holdeth his power, is neither lord nor possessor thereof. Men know right well, that there was never greater power given to magistrate next unto his prince, than 
Henry duke of Anjou.  that which was of late years granted to Henry of France, duke of Anjou, by king Charles the ninth his brother, for it was most great and perpetual, without any exception of the regal power: yet for all that one cannot say that it was sovereign, inasmuch as he was called lieutenant General for the king, So long as it shall stand with our good pleasure, joined unto it in his letters patents: which well declareth a power but during pleasure. Which power of lieutenancy (as of all other magistracies) ceaseth in the presence of the prince.  
But what shall we then say of him to whom the people have given absolute power 
How the people may created a sovereign Monarch.  so long as he liveth? in this case we must distinguish: If such absolute power be given him purely and simply without the name of a magistrate, governor, or lieutenant, or other form of deputation; it is certain that such an one is, and may call himself a Sovereign Monarch: for so the people hath voluntarily disseised and despoiled itself of the sovereign power, to seize and invest another therein; having on him, and upon him transported all the power, authority, prerogatives, and sovereignties thereof: as if a man should by pure gift deliver unto another man the propriety and possession that unto him belongeth: in which case such a perfect donation admitteth no conditions. In which sort the regal law is by the lawyer said to have been made in these words, 
The regal, or royal law.  Cum populus ei & in eum omnem potestatem contulit: when as the people conferred unto him, and on him all their power. But if the people shall give all their power unto any one so long as he liveth, by the name of a magistrate, lieutenant, or governor, or only to discharge themselves of the exercise of their power: in this case he is not to be accounted any sovereign, but a plain officer, or lieutenant, regent, governor, or guerdon and keeper of another man's power. For as the magistrate, although he make a perpetual lieutenant, and hath no care of his own jurisdiction, leaving the entire exercise thereof unto his lieutenant, yet for all that, it is not in the person of the lieutenant that the power lieth to command, or judge, neither the exercise and force of the law: but if he pass beyond the power unto him given, it is to none effect; if his doings be not ratified, liked, and approved by him that hath given the power. And for this cause king john of France, led prisoner into England, after his return thence, solemnly ratified all the acts of Charles the Dolphin, his eldest son, made regent in his absence, to strengthen and confirm the same, so far as should be convenient and needful. Be it then that a man either by commission, or institution, or by delegation, for a certain time, or for ever, exercise the power of another man: he that so exerciseth this power, is not therefore a sovereign, although that by his letters of commission or deputation he be not called a protector, lieutenant, regent, or governor: no not, albeit that such power be given him by the customs and laws of the country, which should be much 
Hector Boet. in hist. Scot  stronger than election. As by an ancient law amongst the Scots, the entire government of the kingdom was committed unto him that was nearest of blood unto the king in his minority, or under the age of xxv years, yet with charge that all things should be done in the king's name: which law was long ago abrogated, for the danger might grow unto the young king, by his nigh kinsmen affecting the kingdom: for which, Caesar thought it lawful for a man to become villainous.  
Now let us prosecute the other part of our propounded definition, and show what these words, Absolute power, signify. For we said that unto Majesty, or Sovereignty 
Unto sovereignty belongeth absolute power, and what that absolute power is.  belongeth an absolute power, not subject to any law. For the people or the lords of a Commonweal, may purely & simply give the sovereign and perpetual power to any one, to dispose of the goods and lives, and of all the state at his pleasure: and so afterward to leave it to whom he list: like as the proprietary or owner may purely and simply give his own goods, without any other cause to be expressed, than of his own mere bounty; which is indeed the true donation, which no more receiveth condition, being once accomplished and perfected: as for the other donations, which carry with them charge and condition, are not indeed true donations. So also the chief power given unto a prince with charge and condition, is not properly sovereignty, nor power absolute; except that such charge or condition annexed unto the sovereignty at the creation of a prince, be directly comprehended within the laws of God and nature. As it is at the investing of the Bohemian-tartar king. For the great king of Tartary being dead, the prince and the people to whom the right of the election belongeth, make choice 
The form of choosing the great king of Tartary.  of one of the kinsmen of the dead king, which they think best of (provided that he be either his son or his nephew) and having placed him in a throne of gold, the bishop (after a solemn song sung according to the manner of their ancestors) turning his speech unto the king, in the name of the people, saith thus, We pray thee, and charge thee to reign over us: to whom the king answereth, If you will have me so to do, you must be ready to perform whatsoever I command; whomsoever I appoint to be slain, you shall slay him presently, and into my hand you shall commit the whole estate of the kingdom: whereunto the people answer, Be it so: after which the king continuing his speech, saith, My word shall be my sword: whereunto the people giveth a great applause. This done, he is taken out of his high throne, and set upon the ground upon a bore board, unto whom the bishop again turning his speech, saith, Look up unto heaven and acknowledge almighty God, the king of the whole world: and behold also this table whereon thou sittest below: if thou rule well, thou shalt have allthings according to thy heart's desire; but if thou forget thy duty and calling, thou shalt be cast headlong down from thy high seat, and dispotled of thy regal power and wealth, be brought so low, as that thou shalt not have so much as this board left thee to sit upon. This said, he is lifted up on high, and by all the people proclaimed king of the Tartars. This so great a power given by the people unto the king, may well be called absolute and sovereign, for that it hath no condition annexed thereunto, other than is by the law of God and nature commanded.  
The same or like form of investing we may also see to have been sometimes used in 
The form of investing the duke of Carinthia.  realms and principalities, descending by succession. But the like is not to that of Carinthia, where yet at this present near unto the city of St. Vitus, in a meadow is to be seen a marble stone, whereunto a country peasant unto whom that office of right belonged, stepped up, having upon his right hand a black cow, and on his left a lean evil favoured mare, and all the people about him; towards whom he that is to be created duke cometh marching, with a great number of lords, all appareled in read, and his ensigns displayed before him; all in good and seemly order, except the new duke himself, who is appareled like a poor shepherd, with a sheephook in his hand: whom the clown upon the stone seeing coming, crieth aloud in the Sclavonian tongue, Who is that (saith he) that cometh marching so proudly? whereunto the people answer, That it is their prince: then demandeth he, Is he a just judge? seeketh he the good of his country? is he free borne? is he worthy of that honour? and withal religious? He is, saith the people, and so shall hereafter be. Than the peasant giving the duke a little blow on the ear, goeth down from the stone, and is for ever after free from all public charges: so the duke mounting the stone, and brandishing his sword, promiseth unto the people, To be a good and a just man: and in that habit goeth to hear mass; which in solemn manner done, he putting off his shepherds apparel, and attired like a prince, goeth up to the stone again, and there receiveth the homage and oath of fidelity of his vassals and subjects. True it is, that in ancient 
* Anno. 133●….  time the duke of Carinthia was the emperors greatest Huntsman: but since that the empire fell into the house of Austria, whereunto that dukedom belonged, both the name of the Great Huntsman, and the old manner of investing the duke grew out of use, and the duchies of Carinthia, Stiria, and Croatia, with the counties of Cilia, and Tirol, remain annexed unto the dukedom of Austria.  
As for those things which are reported concerning the investing of the king of Arragon, 
The manner of crowning of the kings of Arragon.  they are long since grown out of use; but this we have heard them to have wont to be done: The great magistrate of Arragon, whom they call the Chief justice, thus said unto the king: We which are unto thee in virtue nothing inferior, and in power greater than thyself, created thee our king; yet with this condition, that one amongst us shall still have more power and command than thyself. Wherein he is deceived that so writeth, the king to have been then chosen of the people; a thing that never was there done. For Sanctius the Great by force of arms drove the Moors out of the kingdom of Arragon, after they had seven hundred years possessed the same: after which time his posterity of both Sexes, held that kingdom by inheritance. And also Peter Belluga, who most exactly writ of the kingdom of Arragon, denieth the people to have any right in choosing the king; but when the line of the king utterly saileth. That were also a new and more absurd thing, that the king of Arragon should have less power than the states of Arragon, seeing that the same author Belluga saith, That the states might not assemble themselves without the kings express commandment; neither being assembled, might departed without leave given them from the king. That were also more absurd and ridiculous, that such speech should be used by the magistrate, unto him that was now crowned, sacred, and received a king by right of succession, who also placed and displaced the same great magistrate whensoever he list. For the same author writeth, Martin Didato the greatest magistrate, to have been placed in that office by the queen of Arragon, in the absence of Alphonsus her husband, king of Arragon and Sicilia; and also by her again discharged of the same office. And albeit that by sufference of the king, that great magistrate or justice of Arragon, determineth of the process and controversies betwixt the king and his people: as it is also in England sometime by the high court of Parliament, and sometime by the magistrate, whom they call the Lord Chief justice of England, and by all the judges of this 
* viz. France.  realm, and in all places: yet nevertheless so it is, that the great justice of Arragon, and all the estates remain in full subjection to the king, who is no ways bound to follow their advice, neither to consent to their requests, (as saith the same doctor) which is general to all estates of a monarchy, as saith Oldard, speaking of the kings of France and Spain, Who have (saith he) absolute power. Yet true it is, that none of these doctors tell us, what absolute power is. For if we shall say, that he only hath absolute power, which is subject unto no law; there should then be no sovereign prince in the world, seeing that all princes of the earth are subject unto the laws of God, of nature, and of nations.  
So to the contrary it may be, that some one subject may be dispensed withal, and 
That a subject may be dispensed withal from all the laws and customs of his Commonweal, yet be neither prince nor sovereign.  absolved from all the laws, ordinances, and customs of his Commonweal, and commandment of the magistrate; and yet be neither prince, nor sovereign. Example we have of Pompey the great, who was dispensed withal from the laws for five years, by express decree of the people, published at the request of of Gabinius the Tribune, at such time as extraordinary power was given him to make war against the pirates: neither is it any new thing or strange thing to dispense with a subject for his obedience to the laws, seeing that the Senate sometimes so dispensed without the consent of the people: until the law Cornelia published at the request of a Tribune, whereby it was ordained, That no person should be exempted out of the power of the laws, nor dispensed withal by the Senate, if he had not at the lest the consent of two hundred Senators. For by the law of the twelve tables, it was forbidden upon pain of death to grant any privilege but by the great assemblies of the people; but that law was evil executed, being still infringed by the Senat. Yet he that is so exempted from one law, or more, or all laws, is for all that always in the subjection and obeisance of them which have the sovereignty: yea although he be for ever absolved from all the laws of his country. As Augustus, who although he was the prince of the people of Rome, that is to say, the chief in that Commonweal, yet feigning himself to be inferior to the people in general, he oftentimes propounded questions unto the people, as if the people, and not Augustus, should make the laws: and at the choosing of magistrates, would shake the citizens by the hands, that so he might commend them that stood for the offices unto the people. But it behoveth him that is a sovereign not to be in any sort subject to the command of another: which thing Tiberius wisely meaning in these words, reasoned in the Senate concerning the right of sovereignty, saying that The reason of his doings were no otherwise to be manifested, than in that it was to be given 
A sovereign prince is not bound to give a reason of his doings.  to none: whose office it is to give laws unto his subjects, to abrogat laws unprofitable, and in their stead to establish other: which he cannot do that is himself subject unto laws, or to others which have command over him. And that is it for which the law saith, That the prince is acquitted from the power of the laws: and this word the Law, in the Latin importeth the commandment of him which hath the sovereignty. We also see that unto all edicts and decrees there is annexed this clause, Notwithstanding all edicts and ordinances whereunto we have derogated, and do deerogate by these presents: a clause which hath always been joined unto the ancient laws, were the law published by the present prince, or by his predecessors. For it is certain, that 
That the laws, letters patents, privileges, grants of princes have no force, but during the life of the princes that granted them.  the laws, ordinances, letters patents, privileges, and grants of princes, have no force, but during their life, if they be not rati●…by the express consent, or at lest by sufferance of the prince following, who had knowledge there of, and especially of the privileges. As when Bartolus was sent ambassador unto Charles the fourth, the Germane emperor, for the confirmation of the privileges of the city of Perouze, he obtained the same, yet with condition, That they should so long have force, until they were revoked by the succeeding emperors: unto whom for all that, no prejudice could have been done, although that clause had not been put to: which was the cause that Michael Del Hospital chancellor of France, constantly refused, yea even at the request of the queen, to seal the privileges by Charles the ix. granted unto SAINT t. Maur des Fossez, for that they carried with them a perpetual enfranchisment and immunity from taxes, which is contrary to the nature of personal privileges, and tended to the diminishing of the power of his successors, and could not be given unto corporations or colleges, which live for ever, but for the life of the prince that granted them only, although the word (perpetual) were thereunto adjoined. Which for all that if they were granted unto corporations or colleges, by a popular or Aristocratical state, must needs be for ever, or at leastwise so long as that popular or Aristocratical state should continued. And for this cause Tiberius the emperor, successor to Augustus, would not that the privileges granted by the dead emperors, should be of any effect, if their successors had not confirmed them: when as before the privileges granted by princes, if they were not limited unto a time certain, were accounted as given for ever. We also see in this 
* viz. France.  realm, that at the coming of new kings, colleges and corporations require to have their privileges, power, and jurisdiction confirmed; yea the very parliaments and sovereign courts, as well as other particular officers.  
If then the sovereign prince be exempted from the laws of his predecessors, much less should he be bound unto the laws and ordinances he maketh himself: for a man may well receive a law from another man, but impossible it is in nature for to give 
A sovereign prince is not subject unto the laws and ordinances that he himself maketh  a law unto himself, no more than it is to command a man's self in a matter depending of his own will: For as the law saith, Nulla obligatio consistere potest, quae a voluntate promittentis statum capit, There can be no obligation, which taketh state from the mere will of him that promiseth the same: which is a necessary reason to prove evidently that a king or sovereign prince cannot be subject to his own laws. And as the Pope can never bind his own hands (as the Canonists say;) so neither can a sovereign prince bind his own hands, albeit that he would. We see also in the end of all edicts and laws, these words, Quia sic nobis placuit, Because it hath so pleased us: to give us to understand, that the laws of a sovereign prince, although they be grounded upon good and lively reasons, depend nevertheless upon nothing but his mere and frank good will. But as for the laws of God and nature, all princes and people 
All princes and people are subject unto the laws of God and nature.  of the world are unto them subject: neither is it in their power to impugn them, if will not be guilty of high treason to the divine majesty, making war against God; under the greatness of whom all monarchs of the world aught to bear the yoke, and to bow their heads in all fear and reverence. Wherhfore in that we said the sovereign power in a Commonweal to be free from all laws, concerneth nothing the laws of God and nature. For amongst the Popes, 
* Innocentius Quartus.  he that of all others best known the laws of majesty or sovereignty, and had almost brought under him the power of all the Christian emperors and prince's, said him to be indeed a sovereign that was able to deerogate from the ordinary right (which is as I understand it, from the laws of his country) but not from the laws of God or nature.  
But further question maybe, Whether a prince be a subject to the laws of his 
Whether ●… prince be subiict unto the laws of his country that he hath sworn to keep, or not.  country, that he hath sworn to keep, or not? wherein we must distinguish. If the prince swear unto himself, That he will keep his law: he is no more bound to his law, than by the oath made unto himself: For the subjects themselves are not any way bound by oath, which they make in their mutual conventions, if the covenants be such as from which they may by law shrink, although they be both honest and reasonable. But if a sovereign prince promise' by oath to keep the laws which he or his predecessors have made, he is bound to keep them, if the prince unto whom he hath so given his word have therein any interest; yea although he have not sworn at all: But if the prince to whom the promise was made have therein no interest, neither the promise nor the oath can bind him that made the promise. The like we say, if promise' be made by a sovereign prince unto his subjects, or before he be chosen; for in that case there is no difference, as many think: not for that the prince is bound to his laws, or by his predecessors; but to the just conventions and promises that he hath made, be it by oath, or without any oath at all; as should a private man be: and for the same causes that a private man may be relieved from his unjust and unreasonable promise, as for that it was too grievous, or for that he was by deceit or fraud circumvented; or induced thereinto by error, or force, or just fear; or by some great hurt: even for the same causes the prince may be restored in that which toucheth the diminishing of his majesty, if he be a sovereign prince. And so our maxim resteth, That the prince is not subject to his laws, nor to the laws of his predecessors: but well to his own just and reasonable conventions, and in the observation whereof the subjects in general or particular have interest. Wherein we see many to be deceived, which make a confusion of laws, and of a prince's contracts, which they call also laws: as well as he which calleth a princes contracts pactionarie laws; as they term them in the state of Arragon, when the king maketh any law at the request of the people, and receiveth therefore any money or subsidy; then the Arragonians say that the king is unto that law bound, but not so unto other laws: and yet nevertheless they confess that the prince may deerogate from the same, the cause of the law ceasing: which to be true, as it may by reason and authority be confirmed, so was there no need of money, or of oath, to bind the sovereign prince, if it concerned his subjects (to whom he had promised) to 
The word of a prince aught to be as an Oracle.  have the law kept. For the word of a prince aught to be as an Oracle; which looseth his dignity, if his subjects have so evil an opinion of him, as not to believe him except he swear; or else to be so covetous, as not to regard his promise except therefore he receive money. And yet nevertheless the maxim of right still standeth in force, That the sovereign prince may deerogate unto the laws that he hath promised and sworn to keep, if the equity thereof ceased, and that of himself without consent 
The reason of the law ceasing, the law itself aught also to cease.  of his subjects: yet true it is, that a general obscure or doubtful derogation, in this case sufficeth not, but that there must be a derogation in words special. But if there be no probable cause of abrogating the law he hath promised to keep, he shall do against the duty of a good prince, if he shall go about to abrogat such a law: and yet for all that is he not bound unto the covenants and oaths of his predecessors, further than standeth with his profit, except he be their heir. And for this cause the states of Arragon complained to king Alphonsus, for that he for gain had altered and changed the money of Arragon, to the great prejudice of the subjects, and merchants strangers, contrary to the promise made by james the first, king of Arragon, in the year 1265, in the month of August, and confirmed by king Peter, in the year 1336, who swore unto the estates never to change the money; in recompense whereof the people had promised every one of them every seven years to pay unto him a maruedie, if they were in goods worth fifteen maruadies. Now the kingdom of Arragon descendeth by inheritance unto the heirs, both males and females; but the effect of the contract betwixt the prince and the people ceasing, as the subsidy for which the kings of Arragon had made that order which I have said, the king was no more bound to keep his promise: then were the people to pay the subsidy upon them imposed.  
We must not then confounded the laws and the contracts of sovereign princes, for 
Sovereign prin ces no●… bound unto their laws▪ may yet by their contracts bind themselves unto their subjects.  that the law dependeth of the will and pleasure of him that hath the sovereignty, who may bind all his subjects, but cannot bind himself: but the contract betwixt the prince and his subjects is mutual, which reciprocally bindeth both parties, so that the one party may not start therefrom, to the prejudice, or without the consent of the other. In which case the prince hath nothing above the subject, but that the equity of the law which he hath sworn to keep, ceasing, he is no more bound to the keeping thereof, by his oath or promise, as we have before said: which the subjects cannot do among themselves, if they be not by the prince relieved. The sovereign princes also well advised, 
Whether Sovereign princes well advised, aught to bind themselves by oath to keep the laws of their predecessors.  will never take oath to keep the laws of their predecessors; for otherwise they are not sovereigns. But than might some man say, Why doth the Germane emperor, who hath a pre-eminence above all other Christian kings, before he be crowned swear betwixt the hands of the archbishop of Cullen, to keep the laws of the empire, the golden Bullaker, to establish justice, to revenge the pope, to keep the catholic faith, to defend the widows, the fatherless, and poor? Which form of oath, wherewith the emperor Charles the fift bound himself when he was crowned, cardinal Caietan is said to have sent unto the pope, whose legate he then was in Germany. Whereunto I answer, that the emperor is subject unto the states of the empire; neither taketh upon him the sovereignty over the prince's electors, nor over the estates; as we shall in due place declare. And if a man say, That the kings of the Epirots in ancient time swore, that they should reign well and orderly according to the laws and customs of the country, and the subjects also on their part swore to defend and maintain their king, according to the laws and customs of their country: I say yet notwithstanding all these oaths, that the sovereign prince might derogat from the laws, or frustrate and disannul the same, the reason and equity of them ceasing. The oath also of our kings, which is the fairest and shortest that can be, containeth nothing in it concerning the keeping of the laws and customs of the country or predecessors. The words I will set down, as they be taken word for word out of the library of Rheims, out of an ancient book, which thus beginneth juliani ad Erigium Regem Anno 1058 Henrico regnant 32 iiij. Calend. Junii. Ego Philippus Deo propiciante mox futurus Rex 
The oath of Phi lip the first, son to Henry the first, king of France, at the time of his Coronation.  Francorum, in die ordinationis meae promitto coram Deo & sanctis eius, quod unicuique de nobis commissis canonicum privilegium, & debitam legem atque justitiam conseruabo, & defensionem adi●…uante Domino quantum potero exhibebo: sicut Rex in suo regno unicuique Episcopo & Ecclesiae sibi commisse per rectum exhibere debet: populo quoque nobis credito, me dispensationem legum in suo iure consistentem, nostra auctoritate concessurum. viz. The book of julian Erigius, Anno 1058, in the xxxij. year of the reign of Henry the first, the fourth of the calends of june. I Philip, by the grace of God forthwith to become king of France, on the day of my investing, do promise before God and his Saints, that I will keep canonical privilege, with due administration of law and justice, to every one committed to our charge: and by the help of God to the uttermost of my power defend them, in such manner as a king in his kingdom aught of right to give unto every bishop & church committed unto him: & by our authority to grant unto the people committed unto us, the execution of the laws remaining in force. I know that which is found in the library of the Beawais is like unto this, and the oath of the same Philip the first: but I have seen another in a little ancient book in the Abbay of S. Allier in Auvergne, in these words; je iure au nom de Deiu tout puissant, & promets de gowerner bien et devement les subjects commis en ma guard, & fair de tout mon powoir judgement, justice, et misericorde: I swear by the name of the Almighty God, and promise' well and duly to govern my subjects committed to my charge: and with all my power to do them judgement, justice, and mercy. Which seemeth to have been taken from the prophet Hieremie, where he saith, I am the great eternal 
Chap. 9  God, which do judgement, justice, and mercy; and in which things I take singular pleasure. Which forms of oaths show plainly unto the eye, that the oaths contained in the book lately printed and published by the title of Sacre Du Roy, are much changed and altered from the ancient form. But both in the one and the other oath, a man may see that there is not any bond for the sovereign prince to keep the laws, more than so far as right and justice requireth. Neither is it to be found that the ancient kings of the Hebrews took any oath: no not they which were anointed by Samuel, Helias and others. But some take a more precise oath, such as is the oath of Henry the 3 king of France, and of Polonia. Ego Henricus Rex Poloniae, etc. juro Deo omnipotenti, quòd omnia iura, libertates, privilegia publica & privata iuri communi non contraria, Ecclesijs, 
The ancient Hebrew kings not sworn when they were anointed by the Prophet●….  principibus, Baronibus, nobilibus, civibus, incolis, per meos praedecessores Reges, & quoscumque principes Dominos, Regni Poloniae justè concessa, & quae in interregno decreta sunt seruabo, iusque omnibus incolis more maiorum reddam. Ac si quidem (quod absit) Sacramentum meum violavero nullam nobis incolae Regni obedientiam praestare tenebuntur, etc. sic Deus adiwet. viz. I Henry king of Polonia, etc. Swear unto almighty God, that I will keep all the laws, liberties, public and private privileges, not contrary to the common law, justly granted unto churches, princes, barons, noble men▪ citizens, or inhabitants, by the kings my predecessors, or whatsoever other princes, lords of the kingdom of Polonia: as also all such things as were decreed in the time of the vacancy of the kingdom: and that I will administer justice unto all the inhabitants of this kingdom, after the manner of our auneestours: And if I shall violate this mine oath (which God forbidden) then the inhabitants of this kingdom shall be bound to yield unto us no obedience, etc. And so God help us. But this form of oath savoureth not of royal majesty, but the condition of a meaner prince, such an one as (amongst others) is chief in a Commonweal.  
But touching the laws which concern the state of the realm, and the establishing thereof; forasmuch as they are annexed & united to the crown, the prince cannot derogat 
laws royal which concern the state of the realm not to be●… infringed by a sovereign prince.  from them, such as is the law Salic: & albeit that he so do, the successor may always disannul that which hath been done unto the prejudice of the laws royal; upon which the sovereign majesty is stayed & grounded. Yet might one say, That Henry the 5, king of England & France, marrying Katherine of France, sister to Charles the 7, took an oath to keep the high court of parliament in the liberties & sovereignty thereof; and to 'cause justice to be administered in the realm, according unto the customs and laws thereof. See the words of the decree agreed upon for to make him successor unto the crown of France, the xxj of May, in the year 1420. I say they caused him to take such an oath, for that he was a stranger come to a new kingdom; from which the lawful inheritor was excluded by a decree of the Parliament of Paris, given for default and conrumacie; for the murder committed upon the person of john duke of Burgoigne, which was by sound of trumpet pronounced at the marble table in the presence of the princes. But as for general and particular laws and customs, which concern not the establishing of the state of the realm, but the right of men in private, they have not used to have been with us otherwise changed, but after general assembly of the three estates of France well and duly made; or of every bailiwike in particular: not for that it is necessary for the king to rest on their advice, or that he 
Parliaments impair not, but most of all show the majesty and greatness of a sovereign prince  may not do the contrary to that they demand, if natural reason and justice so require. And in that the greatness and majesty of a true sovereign prince, is to be known; when the estates of all the people assembled together, in all humility present their requests and supplications to their prince., without having any power in any thing to command or determine, or to give voice, but that that which it pleaseth the king to like or dislike of, to command or forbidden, is holden for law, for an edict and ordinance. Wherein they which have written of the duty of magistrates, & other such like books, have deceived themselves, in maintaining that the power of the people is greater than the prince; a thing which often times causeth the true subjects to revolt from the obedience which they own unto their sovereign prince, & ministereth matter of great troubles in Commonweals. Of which their opinion, there is neither reason nor ground, except the king be captive, furious, or in his infancy, and so needeth to have a protector or lieutenant appointed him by the suffrages of the people. For otherwise if the king should be subject unto the assemblies and decrees of the people, he should neither be king nor sovereign; and the Commonwealth neither realm not monarchy, but a mee●… aristocraty of many lords in power equal, where the greater part commandeth the less in general, and every one in particular: and wherein the edicts and laws are not to be published in the name of him that ruleth, but in the name and authority of the states, as in an Aristocratical signory, where he that is chief hath no power, but oweth obeisance unto the commandments of the signory: unto who me yet they all and every one of them feign themselves to own their faith and obedience: which are all things so absurd, as hard it is to say which is furthest from reason. So when Charles the eight, the French king, being then but about xiv. years old, held a parliament at Tours, although the power of the parliament was never before 
The parlements of France.  no●… after so great as in those times, yet Relli, than speaker for the people, turning himself unto the king, thus beginneth his oration, which is yet in print extant. Most▪ high, most mighty, and most Christian king, our natural and only lord, we your humble and obedient subjects, etc. Which are come hither by your command, in all humility reverence and subjection present ourselves before you, etc. And have given me in charge from all this noble assembly, to declare unto you the good will and hearty desire they have with a most firm resolution and purpose to serve, obey, and aid you in all your affairs, commandments and pleasures. In brief, all that his oration and speech is nothing else but a declaration of all their good wills towards the king, and of their humble obedience and loyalty. The like speech almost we see was also used in the parliament at Orleans▪ unto king Charles the ninth, when he was yet but scarce eleven years old. Neither are the parliaments of Spain otherwise holden, but that even a greater obedience & a greater loyalty of all the people in general, is given unto the king, as is to be seen in the acts of the parliament holden at Toledo by king Philip, in the year 1552, when he was yet scarce full xxv▪ years old. The answers also of the king of Spain unto the 
The parliament of Spain.  requests and humble supplications of his people, are given in these words, We will; or else, We decree and ordain; and such other like answers, importing the refusal or consent of the prince: yea the subsidy that the subjects pay unto the king of Spain, they call service. Whereby it appeareth them to be deceived, which say that the kings of Arragon cannot derogat from the privileges of the states, by reason of the privileges given them by king james, in the year 1260, and confirmed in the year 1320. For as the privileges was of no force after the death of the king, without the confirmation of his successors: so also the same confirmation of the rest of the kings following was necessary, for that by the law no man can reign over his equals. And albeit that in the parliaments of England, which have commonly been holden every third year; there the states seem to have a very great liberty (as the Northern people almost all breath thereafter) yet so it is, that in effect they proceed not, but by way of supplications and requests unto the king. As in the parliament of England, holden in October, 
The parliaments of England.  1566, when the estates by a common consent had resolved (as they gave the queen to understand) not to entreat of any thing, until she had first appointed who should succeed he●… in the crown: She gave them no other answer, But that they were not to make her grave before she were dead. All whose resolutions were to no purpose without her good liking: neither did she in that any thing that they required. Now also the estates of England are never otherwise assembled (not more than they are in this realm of France, or Spain) than by parliament writs, and express commandments proceeding from the king. Which showeth very well that the estates have no power of themselves to determine, command, or decree any thing; seeing that they cannot so much as assemble themselves; neither being assembled, depar, without express commandment from the king. Yet this may seem one special thing▪ that the laws made by the king of England, at the request of the states, cannot be again repealed, but by calling a parliament of the estates: Which is much used and ordinarily done, as I have understood by M. Dale, the English ambassador, an honourable gentleman 
D. Dale.  and a man of good understanding, who yet assured me, that the king received or rejected the law as seemed best unto himself: and stuck not to dispose thereof at his pleasure, and contrary to the will of the estates: as we see Henry the eight to have always used his sovereign power, and with his only word to have disannulled the decrees of parliament▪ albeit that the kings of England are not otherwise crowned, but that they must swear inviolatly to keep the laws and customs of the land: which how that oath is to be understood, I refer you to that which we have before reported. But here might some object and say▪ That the estates of England suffer not any extraordinary charges and subsidies to be laid upon them, if it be not first agreed upon and consented unto in the high court of parliament: for so it is provided by an ancient law of Edward the first, king of England, wherewith the people as with a buckler hath been oftentimes seen to defend itself against the prince. Whereunto mine answer is, That other kings have in this point no more power than the kings of England: for that it is not in the power of any prince in the world, at his pleasure to raise taxes upon the people, no more than to take another man's goods from him; as Philip Commines wisely showed in the parliament holden at Tours, as weread in his Commentaries: and yet nevertheless if the necessity of the Commonweal be such as cannot stay for the calling of a parliament, in that case the prince aught not to expect the assembly of the states, neither the consent of the people; of whose good foresiight and wisdom, next unto God, the health & welfare of the whole state dependeth: but concerning all sorts of taxes and tributes, more shall be said in place convenient. True it is, that the kings of England, since the time of Henry the first (as we read in Polidore) have as it were always accustomed every third year to demand of the people an extraordinary subsidy, which is for the most part granted. As in the parliament holden in April, in the year 1570, the queen of England by the consent of the estates, drew from them five hundred thousand crowns (as the like whereof is sometime also used to be done in Spain) from which manner of tribute she had now many years before abstained. Now here might some object also, That the estates of England have power to condemn, 
Polydor. in hist. Anglor●….  as king Henry the sixt was condemned by the estates, to be kept prisoner in the Tower of London. I say that that was done by the ordinary judges of England, the lords spiritual and temporal of the upper house, at the request of them of the neither house; who presented also a bill of request to the upper house, in the year 1571, tending to the end, that the earls of Northumberland, and Westmoreland, & other conspirators, might be declared to have incurred the pains contained in the laws of the land, made against them that were guilty of treason. Which showeth well that the estates in body together have neither power nor jurisdiction, but that the power is with the judges of the upper house, as should be, if the parliament of Paris assisted by the prince and peers, should be from the estates in body together separated, to judge of themselves of great matters.  
But yet there remaineth another difficulty to resolve upon, concerning the aforesaid estates of England, who seemed to have power to command, resolve, and decide of the affairs of state. For queen Marie having assembled them for the passing of the articles of agreement concerning the mar●…iage with king Philip: after many disputes and difficulties proposed, in fine, the conclusion of the treaty was made the second day of April in the year 1554, in form of a decree conceived in the name of the estates, in these words: The articles aforesaid, and that which dependeth thereof, seen and considered of, by the estates assembled in parliament, holden at the palace of Westminster, it hath been said, That concerning the disposition and collation of all benefices and offices, they are reserved unto the queen; as also of all the first-fruits, profits, rents, revenues of her countries, lands, and seignories, the queen, as sole and alone shall enjoy the royalty and sovereignty of her said realms, countries, lands, and subjects, absolute, after the consummation of the marriage; so that the said prince shall not pretend by the way of the courtesy of England, any claim to the crown or sovereignty of the realm, nor to any other rights, pre-eminences, or authorities: That all mandates and letters patents shall pass under the name of the said prince and queen jointly: which letters signed with the hand of the queen alone, and sealed with the great seal, shall be available: but being not signed by the said queen, shall be voided and to none effect. I have willingly set down the ratification at large, to show that the sovereignty wholly without division belonged unto the kings of England, and that the estates had but the view thereof: For the ratification of the estates, no more than of a court, a parliament, a corporation, or college, sufficeth not to show the power to command, but rather their consent to strengthen the acts, which gtherwise might have been called into some doubt, after the death of the queen: or in her life time by the magistrates and officers of the realm, opposing themselves against her. Wherefore we conclude the majesty of a prince to be in nothing altered or diminished by the calling together or presence of the states: but to the contrary his majesty thereby to be much the greater, & the more honourable, seeing all his people to acknowledge him for their sovereign: albeit that in such assemblies, princes not willing to reject their subjects, grant, and pass many things, whereunto they would not otherwise yield their consent, if they were not overcome by the requests, prayers, and just grievances of the people, anfflicted and vexed oftentimes without the knowledge of the prince, who yieldeth many things unto them all, which he would deny unto them in particular; or at leastwise not so easily grant them: either for that the voices of every one in particular, are less heard, than of all together: or for that the prince at other times commonly useth to see but by other men's eyes▪ and to hear but by other men's ears and reports: whereas in parliament he seethe and heareth his people himself, and so enforced with shame, the fear of religion, or his own good disposition, admitteth their just requests.  
So we see the principal point of sovereign majesty, and absolute power, to consist 
The principal point of sovereignty.  principally in giving laws unto the subjects in general, without their consent. And not to speak of strange countries, we have oftentimes seen in this realm of France 
Laws in France altered by the prince, without the assembling or consent of the 〈◊〉.  certain general customs abolished by the edicts of our kings, without the assembling or consent of the estates: when the injustice of the same is plainly to be seen; as the custom of this realm, commonly used in every place, concerning the succession of mothers unto the goods of their children, hath been changed without assembling of the estates, either in general or particular. Which changing of customs is no new thing, for since the time of Philip the fair, the custom general in this realm, which suffered not him that was overthrown in suit, to be condemned in charges also, was disannulled by edict, without assembling the estates. And the general custom which forbade to receive the testimony of women in civil causes; was abolished by the edict of Charles the sixt, without calling together of the estates. For it behoveth that the sovereign prince should have the laws in his power, to change and amend them, according as the case shall require; as saith the lawyer Sextus Cecilius: even as the master pilot aught to have the helm always in his hand, at discretion to turn it as the wether or occsion requireth: for otherwise the ship might oftentimes perish before he could take advice of them whom he did carry. Which is a thing necessary, not only unto a sovereign prince, but sometimes unto a magistrate also, the necessity of the Commonweal so requiring, as we have said of Pompee, and of the Decemuiri. And for that cause Augustus after he had overthrown Marcus Antonius at Actium, was by the Senate absolved from the power of the laws, albeit that he as then was but chief of the Commonweal, and no sovereign prince, as we shall in due place declare. And after that Vespasian the emperor was also exempted from the power of the laws, not by the Senate only, but only by the express law of the people as many think, and as yet it is to be found engraven in marble in Rome: which the lawyer calleth the law Royal, howbeit that it hath no great probability, that the people which long time before had lost all their power, should give it to him that was stronger than themselves.  
Now if it be profitable that the sovereign prince, for the good government of an estate, should have the power of the laws under him; than it is more expedient for the governor in an Aristocratical estate; and necessary for the people in their popular estate: for the monarch is divided from the people; and in the Aristocratical state, the lords or governors are divided from the commonalty and vulgar people; in such sort as that in both the one & other Commonweal, there are two parties, that is to wit, he or they that hold the sovereignty on the one part, and the people on the other; which causeth the difficulties which are betwixt them for the rights of sovereignty, which cease in the popular estate. For if the prince or lords which hold the estate be bound to observe the laws, as many think they are, and that they cannot make any law without the consent of the people, or of the Senate; it cannot also be again by law repealed, without the consent of the one or of the other: which can take no place in a popular estate, seeing that the people make but one body, and cannot bind itself unto itself. But, Why then (will some say) did the people of Rome swear to keep the laws? That was first begun by Saturnius the Tribune of the people, that so he might the more straightly bind the Senators to the laws by him made: which Dio Nicaeus writeth to have been afterward done in all laws. But it is one thing to bind all together, and to bind every one in particular: for so all the citizens particularly sworn to the observation of the laws, but not all together; for that every one of them in particular was bound unto the power of them all in general. But an oath could not be given by them all: for why, the people in general is a certain universal body, in power and nature divided from every man in particular. Than again to say truly, an oath cannot be 
An oath cannot be made but by the lesser to the greater.  made but by the lesser to the greater, but in a popular estate nothing can be greater than the whole body of the people themselves. But in a monarchy it is otherwise, where every one in particular, and all the people in general, and (as it were) in one body, must swear to the observation of the laws, and their faithful allegiance to one sovereign monarch; who next unto God (of whom he holdeth his sceptre & power) is bound to no man. For an oath carrieth always with it reverence unto whom, or in whose name it is made, as still given unto a superior: and therefore the vassal giveth his oath unto his lord, but receiveth none from him again, although that they be mutually bound the one of them unto the other.  
But if it be so, that a sovereign prince next under God, is not by oath bound unto any, why did Traian the emperor standing upright, before the Consul sitting, solemnly swear to the keeping of the laws? That seemeth to have been so done by him for two causes, the one, for that having gotten the Consulship, together with his principality, he swore as the Consuls did at their entrance into their Consulship; as also all the new magistrates did the first of januarie, after they had sacrificed in the Capitol: The other reason was, for that the Roman emperors at the first had not any sovereign power, but were only called princes, that is to say, the chief men in the Commonweal; which fo●… me of a Commonweal, is called a principality, and not a monarchy: 
A principality no Monarch.  but a principality is called a certain form of an aristocraty, wherein one is in honour dignity and place, above the rest: as amongst the Venetians: For the Roman emperor or prince, at the first was in honour above the rest, but not in power: howbeit that in truth the greatest part of the Roman emperors were indeed tyrants. Which is well to be understood, for that which happened in the reign of Caligula the cruel tyrant, 
The Roman emperors for most part tyrants.  who having bid certain forten kings and allies of the people of Rome to supper, and question there at the table arising about their honour and greatness; he to stay their strife, rapt out this verse, taken out of Homer's Iliads;  
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  

Good it is not to be ruled by many,  
One king, one lord, if there be any.   
And it miss but a little (as saith Suetonius) but that he had even then changed 
Sueton. in Caligula.  his principality into a monarchy, and set a crown upon his own head. For in a principality the prince or chief magistrate, who is above the rest, is yet no sovereign; as we shall hereafter show in the Commonweals of the Venetians, and of the Germane. And albeit that many of the Roman emperors, had taken upon them the sovereignty, and by divers sleights wrested from the people their liberty; yet nevertheless it was no 
Why Traian & some other good princes have sworn to observe and keep the laws.  marvel if Traian, one of the best princes that ever lived in the world, swore (as is aforesaid) to keep the laws, although he in the name of a sovereign prince were exempted; to the end by his own example to move his subjects to the more careful observing of them: but never one of the emperors before him so swore to the observing of the laws. And therefore Pliny the younger, who in a panegyrical oration, set forth the praises of that most worthy prince, speaking of the oath of Traian, crieth out in this sort, A great novelty (saith he) and never before heard of, he sweareth by whom we swear. And after that in the declination of the empire, Theodoric desirous to gain the favour of the Senate and people of Rome, followed the example of Traian, as we read in Cassiodore, Ecce Traiani nostri clarum seculis reparamus exemplum; jurat vobis per quem iuratis, Behold (saith he) we renew the example of our Traian, famous through all ages; he sweareth unto you, by whom you yourselves swear. And like it is, that other princes have used the same custom, of taking the like oath at their coronation, although they have the sovereignty by the right of succession. True it is, that the kings of the Northern people take such oaths as deerogate from their sovereignty: As for example, the nobility of Denmark withstood the coronation of Frederick, in the month of August, in the year 1559, until that he had solemnly sworn that he should not put any noble man to death, or confiscate his goods, until he were judged by the Senate; and that all noble men should have jurisdiction & power of life & death over their subjects, without appeal; and that the king should have no part in their fines or confiscation of their goods; and also that the king should not give any office without consent of the counsel: which are all arguments, that the king of Denmark is no absolute sovereign. But this oath was first drawn out of the mouth of Frederick this man's grandfather, at such time as he made war against Christian king of Denmark (who was driven out of his kingdom, and after long banishment returning, at length died in prison, wherein he had lived twenty five years) and was afterward confirmed by Christian father of Frederick, who took the same oath. And to the end he should not violate, or break the same, the nobility to that purpose treated a league with the town of Lubec, and Sigismundus Augustus' king of Polonia, who also himself seems not to have much more power over his own subjects than hath the king of Denmark over his.  
But of two things the one must be: that is to wit, the prince that sweareth to keep 
Two great inconveniences ensuing unto sovereign princes by swearing to observe the laws.  the laws of his country, must either not have the sovereignty; or else become a perjured man, if he shall abrogat but one law, contrary unto his oath: whereas it is not only profitable that a sovereign prince should sometimes abrogat some such laws, but also necessary for him to altar or correct them, as the infinite variety of places, times, and persons shall require. Or if we shall say the prince to be still a sovereign, and yet nevertheless with such condition, as that he can make no law without the advice of his counsel or people; he must also be dispensed with by his subjects, for the oath that he hath made for the inviolat observation of the laws; & the subjects again which are obliged & bound unto the laws, be it in particular, or in general, have also need to be dispensed withal by their prince, for fear they should be perjured: so shall it come to pass that the majesty of the Commonweal▪ inclining now to this side, now to that side, sometimes the prince, sometimes the people bearing sway; shall have no certainty to rest upon: which are notable absurdities, & altogether incompatible with the majesty of absolute sovereignty, & contrary both to law & reason. And yet we see many, even them that think themselves to see more in the matter than others, which maintain it to be most necessary, that princes should be bound by oath to keep the laws & customs of their country. In which doing they weaken & overthrow all the rights of sovereign majesty, which aught to be most sacred & holy, & confounded the sovereignty of one sovereign monarch, with an aristocraty, or Democraty: whereby it cometh to pass, that many princes, seeing that power to be taken from them, which properly belongeth unto them, & that men would make them subject to the laws of their country, dispense in the end, not only with those their country laws, but even with the laws of God & nature, making account of them all alike, as if they were bound to neither, but of both discharged. But to make all this matter more plain to be understood, 
Examples to prove that laws once made and established, may not by them that have the sovereignty be again changed.  we will by examples make manifest that before said. We read it thrice repeated in Dan. that by the customs of the Medes & Persians', the laws by their kings made, were immutable & irrevocable; & albeit that the king of the Medes would have exempted the Prophet Daniel, from the punishment of death, which by the edict which he had broken was to have been inflicted upon him; yet was he by the princes forbidden so to do, who showed him, that the edict by him made could not by the law of their country be revoked: whereunto when the king even against his will (as should seem) had assented, Daniel was accordingly condemned unto the beasts, and so cast unto the hungry lions. If then the greatest monarch upon earth could not deerogate from the laws by himself made; the grounds of majesty and sovereignty by us before laid, must needs fail: and that not only in a monarchy, but in a popular state also: as was that of Athens, whereof Thucydides speaking, showeth that the war of Peloponesus 
The laws of the Athenians to be changed.  began for a law made by the Athenians, whereby the Megariens were forbidden to come into the port of Athens; wherein the Megariens complained unto their allies and friends themselves to be wronged and the laws of nations violated: whereupon the Lacedæmonians sent their ambassadors to Athens, to request the Athenians, that that law might be again repealed. Whereunto Pericles then in greatest grace & authority with the people, answered the ambassodours, That by the express laws of their ancestors, the laws once made and confirmed by the people, and so hanged up upon the common pillar, might never be taken away. Which if it were so▪ the people was bound not to their own laws only, but even to the laws of their predecessors also. And that more is, Theodosius the emperor would not that the laws by himself made, should be of any force, except they were confirmed by the general decree of the whole Senat. In like manner also by the decree of jews the eleventh, the French king, concerning the institution of knights of the order, in the eight article, it is expressly said, That the king shall undertake no war, nor other thing whatsoever of great importance, concerning the high estate of the Common weal, without knowledge thereof given unto the knights of the order, so to have and use their advice and counsel. And for that cause, as I suppose, the edicts of our kings are of none effect, until they be read, published, verified, and registered in parliament, with the consent of the great Attorney general, and the approbation of the court. And in England it is by 
Polydore.  ancient custom received, that laws concerning the state of the Commonweal should take no place, except they were authorised by the Estates assembled in the high court of Parliament.  
These reasons, although they seem probable, yet are they not sufficient to prove the rule concerning Sovereignty, before by us set down, not to be true: For, as for 
The former reasons answered.  that which was objected concerning the law of the Medes, and authority of the king in abrogating of the laws; it is manifest that it was false, and by the courtiers his enemies devised against the life of Daniel: who grieving to see a man for his wisdom and royal descent honourable, and yet a stranger, to be in greater grace and favour with the king than themselves, and exalted in their country in degree next unto the king, made that false allegation of the strength of their laws against him, with whose accusation the king deceived, or else to prove if Daniels God could save him from death, caused him to be cast unto the hungry lions. But having in him seen the wonderful power and mercy of God towards his servants, he gave Daniels enemies to be devoured of the same lions: wherein the end well showed, the king to have been above the laws of his country. In like sort Darius Memnon at the request of a young jewish lady revoked 
Ahashuerosh Hester.  the decree whereby he had appointed all the nation of the jews to be utterly rooted out. As for that which Pericles answered unto the ambassadors of the Lacedæmonians, he therein respected not so much the truth, as the show thereof, that so taking occasion of war, which he sought after, he might frustrate the accusations of his adversaries, and danger of the law, as Timaeus and Theopompus have truly written, and Plutarch hath not denied. And that was it for which he said to the Lacedaemonian ambassadors, That the edicts once hanged upon the pillars, might not be taken away: which his sophistication the ambassadors returned unto him again, with a Lacedaemonian quip, saying, That they desired not to have the edict taken away from the pillar, but only the table turned. For if the laws of the Athenians had been immutable, why had they such variety, and infinite multitude of laws, which they were wont to establish at the continual motion of their magistrates, & to abrogat the old, that so the new might take place? But that Pericles therein abused the Lacedaemonian ambassadors, it is manifest by the oration of Demosthenes against Leptines, who had preferred a request unto the people, to the end that by a perpetual and irrevocable edict it might from that time forward be forbidden upon pain of death, to present any request unto the people for the obtaining of any privilege or exemption, and the like pain to be inflicted upon him that should so much as speak for repealing that edict. Wherein Demosthenes hardly withstood Leptines, & so wrought the matter, that his request was received, having manifestly showed the people by consenting to this law, to be despoiled not only of the prerogative that it had to grant exemptions and privileges to such as should well deserve of them, but also of the power to abrogat laws by them made, if the necessity of the Commonweal should so require. They had also a popular action, concerning the breaking of laws, which was commenced against them that would have the people to pass any edict contrary to the laws before received; as one may see in all the orations of Demosthenes: but yet that never letted, but that the new and profitable laws were still preferred before the old unjust laws. And in like case the general edict, wherein it was decreed, That the offenders fine once adjudged and set down by the people, might not in any wise be forgiven or abated; was yet many times revoked, and that once in favour of Pericles himself, and another time in favour of Cleomides and Demosthenes, who by di●…ers' judgements of the people, had been every one of them condemned in a fine of 
* Plut▪ in Peri.  thirty thousand crowns. They say also in this realm of France, the fine once being paid, be it right or be it wrong, is never 
Demetri. Demost.  again to be restored: and yet we see oftentimes the contrary, and the same to be again recovered. It is then a formality which is and hath always been in every Commonweal, that the law makers to give unto their laws the greater weight and authority, join thereunto these words of course, Edicto perpetuo & irrevocabili sancimus, etc. By a perpetual and irrevocable decree we ordain. And with us in the beginning 
The clause of perpetuity why annexed unto laws, and yet n●… laws perpetual.  of every law, universis praesentibus & futuris: which words are added to the eternal memory of posterity, lest the law should by any be infringed. And the more to show the difference of the laws, such as be made for perpetuity, are with us sealed with green wax, and strings of green and purple silk: whereas unto the temporary Edicts are put neither strings of silk, nor green wax, but yellow only. And yet for all this, there is no law which is perpetual, no more than were those of the Greeks' and Romans, who in making their laws, commonly used to join thereunto this clause, Vt nec per Senatum, nec per populum, lex infirmari possit: That the law might not either by the Senate or the people be weakened: which words if they imported a perpetuity, why did the people almost in the same moment that it had established a law, again abrogate the same. Concerning which matter, Cicero writing unto his friend Atticus: Thou knowest (saith he) the Tribune Claudius to have decreed that his law should hardly, or not at all, by the Senate or the people be infringed. But it is sufficiently known that regard was never had unto this clause: Vt nec per Senatum nec per populum lex infirmari possit: for otherwise (saith he) one should never see law repealed, seeing that there is no law which carrieth not this clause with it: from which men yet do ordinarily derogate. Thus much he. Which is yet more plainly to be understood out of the Oration of Fabius Ambustus against the intercession of the Tribunes of the people, who maintained, that the people could not choose both the Consuls of the nobility, for that by a law before made it was ordained, That one of the Consuls should be still chosen out of the people: Fabius alleged the law of the twelve Tables in these words, Quod postremum jussit populus id ratum esto, What the people shall last decree, let that stand for good.  
So we see the Medes, the Persians', the Greeks, the Latins, to have used the same form and cautions, for the establishing of their edicts and laws, that our kings do: who unto the laws by them made, oftentimes join this clause: Without that therefrom can by us, or our successors be derogated. Or else, without regard having unto any derogation, which from this present we have declared to be of none effect. And yet no man can so make a law unto himself, but that he may departed therefrom, as we have before said. Wherhfore the repeals and derogations of the former edicts and laws, are almost alway subject unto the latter edicts and derogations. And therefore Solon did wisely, who would not bind the Athenians to keep his laws for ever, but contented himself to have them kept for an hundred years: and yet nevertheless he yet living, 
* Plut. in Sol.  and present, suffered (though against his will) the greatest part of them to be changed.  
But that publication or approbation of laws in the assembly of the Estates or parliament, is with us of great power and importance for the keeping of the laws; not that the Sovereign prince is bound to any such approbation, or cannot of himself make a law without the authority or consent of the States or the people: but yet it is a courteous part to do it by the good liking of the Senate, as saith Theodosius, which 
The sovereign prince more of courtesy than of neces●…itie bound to observe the laws.  Baldus enterpreted not to be a thing so much of necessity, as of courtesy: as that is also a speech well beseeming sovereign majesty, for a prince to profess himself bound unto the laws of himself that reigneth. And certainly there is nothing better, or more beseeming a prince, than by his deeds and life to confirm those laws which he himself hath made: for that is of greatest force, for the honour and obedience of the subjects towards their prince: as contrariwise nothing is more dangerous for the contempt both of the prince and of the laws▪ than without just cause to break or infringe that which thou hast commanded: as an ancient Roman Senator said, Levius est, & vanius, sua decreta tollere quam aliorum, It is more lightness and vanity 
Livius lib. 3.  to take away a man's own decrees, than the decrees of other men. But it is one thing for a man so to do willingly and of his own accord, and another thing to be bound by bond or oath so to do it.  
But what if a prince by law forbidden to kill or to steal, is he not bound to obey his 
All princes bound and subject unto the laws of God and nature, and to their own just conventions.  own laws? I say that this law is not his, but the law of God and nature, whereunto all princes are more straightly bound than their subjects: in such sort as that they cannot be from the same exempted, either by the Senate, or the people, but that they must be enforced to make their appearance before the tribunal seat of almighty God: For God taketh a straighter account of princes than of others, as the master of wisdom Solomon himself a king, hath most truly written. Whereunto well agreeth that saying of Marcus Aurelius, who for his desire of knowledge, was called the Philosopher: The magistrates are judges over private men, princes judge the magistrates, and God the princes. This is the opinion of 2 great princes, esteemed of all other the wisest; unto whom we will join the third, Antigonus king of Asia, who hearing a flatterer say, that all things were lawful for kings: Yea, said he, forbarbarous kings and tyrants. The first that used this kind of flatrerie, was Anaxarchus towards Alexander the Great, whom he made to believe, That the goddess justice, was still at the right hand of jupiter, to show that princes could do nothing but that was right and just: Of which their justice he shortly after made proof, for being fallen into the hands of the king of Cyprus, he was by h●…s' commandment with hammers beaten to death upon an anvil. But how much more truly did Seneca say to the contrary, Caesaricum omnia licent, propter hoc minus licet, When all things are unto Caesar lawful, even for that are they less lawful. And therefore they that generally say, that princes are not subject unto laws, nor to their own conventions, if they except not the laws of God and nature, and the just contracts and conventions made with them, they do great wrong both unto God and nature, in that they make not the special exemption to appear; as men say in matters of privileges. So Dionysius the tyrant of Sicily, said to his mother, That he could dispense with the laws and customs of Syracuse, but not with the laws of nature. For as the contracts and testaments of private men, cannot derogat from the decrees of the magistrates, nor the decrees of the magistrates from the ancient customs, nor the ancient customs from the general laws of a sovereign prince: no more also can the laws of sovereign princes altar or change the laws of God and nature. Wherhfore the Roman magistrates did notably, who unto the end of all their requests & laws which they propounded unto the good liking of the people, commonly annexed this clause, Si quid ius non esset E. E. L. N. R. eius ea lege nihilem rogaretur, that is to say, That if any thing were therein contained that was not just and reasonable, they by that law requested nothing. But of all others they are most absurd, which say, That a sovereign prince can decree nothing against the laws of God and nature, without most apparent reason. For what apparent reason can there be divised, for which we aught to break the laws of God? And hereof proceed such paradoxes as this, That he whom the Pope hath dispensed withal for the laws of God, is sufficiently assured before God: which how true it is let others judge.  
There resteth yet another objection, by them objected which with more reason 
An objection that princes are bound to the civil laws.  examine matters. If princes (say they) be bound unto the lawss of nature, that is to say, of upright reason: and that civil laws be (in all things) agreeable unto right and reason, it must needs thereof follow, that the prince is also bound unto the civil laws. And to that end they allege that saying of Pacutius unto Theodosius the emperor, Tantum tibi licet quantum per leges licebit, So much is lawful for thee to do, as thou mayest by law do. For the plainer answering of which doubt, we must thus distinguish: That 
The answer, declaring to what laws a prince is bound, and to what laws not.  the laws of a sovereign prince, whereof question is made, concern either that which is public, or private, or common to both: and generally when question is, it is either of that which is profitable and not honest, or of that which is honest and not profitable, or is both profitable and honest; or else of that which is neither of both. And that I call honest, which is agreeing unto the equity of nature; unto which natural equity it is manifest all princes to be bound, seeing that which nature teacheth, is altogether comprehended in the law of nature, whereunto every prince is bound to obey: neither is such a law to be called a civil law, albeit that the prince cause it to be published, but rather the law of nature. And with so much the more reason, when the law is both honest and profitable. But if that which is by law commanded, be neither honest nor profitable, although of such things there aught to be no law; yet may the prince bind his subjects unto those laws, whereunto he is not himself bound, if they have no dishonour or dishonesty joined with them. For there be some things honest, some things dishonest, and some in a mean betwixt both. But if profit repugn against honesty, it is good reason that honesty should take place. As Aristides the just, to whom Themistocles was commanded to communicate his device, answered, That the counsel of Themistocles was profitable to the Commonweal; but yet in his judgement dishonest: the Athenians hearing so much, inquired no farther after the matter, but decreed that his profitable counsel to be rejected. But here when we reason of a Commonweal, we must speak according to the common manner; which our speech is not to be examined according to the subtlety of Philosophers: for they set down, nothing to be profitable which is not honest, neither anything to be honest which is not just: but that old custom is grown out of use, so that of necessity we must make a difference betwixt things honest, and things profitable. But if that which the prince by his law commandeth, be not honourable, but profitable, he himself is not by that law bound, although his subjects be, so that nothing be therein contained contrary to the laws of God and nature: and such laws the prince may at his pleasure abrogat, or from them derogat, and instead of them make others, either more or less profitable: for things honest, just, and profitable, have their degrees of more and less. If then it be lawful for a prince amongst laws profitable, to make choice of them that be more profitable; so also amongst laws just and honest, he may choose out them that be most upright and honest, albeit that some thereby receive profit, and some others loss; provided that the profit be public, and the loss particular: and yet if the prince shall otherwise decree, it is not lawful for the subject to break the laws of his prince, under the colour of honesty, or justice: as if the prince in time of famine, forbidden the carrying out of victuals (a thing not only profitable to the Commonweal, but often times also just and reasonable) he aught not to give leave to some few to carry them out, to the prejudice of the common state, & of other merchants in particular; for under the colour of profit that these flatterers and scrapers carry things, many good merchants suffer loss, and all the subjects in general are famished: and yet nevertheless the famine and dearth ceasing, it is not yet lawful for the subject to transgress the edicts of his prince, and to carry out victuals, until the law forbidding the same, be by the prince abrogated, not not though there seem never so great occasions for the transgressing of the law: as that now the city is full of victual, and all other things necessary; and that the law of nature persuadeth us to give relief unto distressed strangers, in letting them have part of such good things as it hath pleased God to sand increase of more in one country than in another: for as much as the power of the law that forbiddeth, is greater than the apparent equity, the show whereof every man might pretend to his desires, except the prohibition in the law be directly against the laws of God and nature.  
But so sometimes things fall out, as that the law may be good, just, and reasonable, 
A law may be good, just, and reasonable, and yet the prince no way subject or bound thereunto.  and yet the prince to be no way subject or bound thereunto: as if he should forbidden all his subjects, except his guard and garrison soldiers, upon pain of death to carry weapon, so to take away the fears of murders and seditions; he in this case aught not to be subject to his own law, but to the contrary, to be well armed for the defence of the good, and punishment of the evil. The same we may say of other edicts and laws also, which concern but some part of the subjects; which edicts and laws are called privileges, and are just in respect of certain persons, or for a certain time, or place; or for the variety of punishments which depend always of the laws; albeit that the forbidding of offences is proceeding from the laws of God and nature. Unto which edicts and laws the princes are not any way bound, further than the natural justice of the same hath place; which ceasing, the prince is no more thereunto bound, until the prince have abrogated the same. For it is not only a law of nature, but also oftentimes repeated amongst the laws of God, That we should be obedient unto the laws and ordinances of such princes as it hath pleased God to set to rule and reign over us, if their laws and decrees be not directly repugnant unto the laws of God and nature, whereunto all princes are as well bound as their subjects. For as the vassal oweth his oath of fidelity unto his lord towards & against all men, except his sovereign prince; so the subject oweth his obedience to his sovereign prince, towards and against all, the majesty of God excepted, who is the absolute sovereign of all the princes in the world.  
Out of this resolution we may draw another rule of estate, that is to wit, that the sovereign 
That a sove▪ prince is bound to his own contracts, aswell as other men be.  prince is bound unto the contracts by him made, be it with his subject, or with a stranger: for seeing he is the warrant to his subjects of the mutual conventions and obligations that they have one of them against another: of how much more reason is he the debtor of justice in his own fact, and so bound to keep the faith and promises by himself given and made to others? As the court of parliament at Paris writ back unto king Charles the ix, in the month of March, in the year 1563, That his majesty alone could not break the contract made betwixt him and the clergy, without the consent of the clergy; and that for this reason, For that he was himself the debtor of justice, and so bound to give every man his right. Which putteth me in remembrance of a resolution concerning the upright dealing of princes, worthy to be engraven in letters of gold, in their lodgings and palaces; which is, That it aught to be accounted amongst things which by chance seldom happen, if a prince fail of his promise; 
A notable saying.  and that it is not otherwise to be presumed. For that of his promise there is a double bond; the one for the natural equity thereof: for what can be more agreeing unto natural equity, than to have just promise kept? The other, for the honour of the prince himself, who is bound to keep his promise, although it be unto his loss; for that he is the formal warrant to all his subjects, of the faith that they have amongst 
A sovereign prince less in justice to be respected or relieved, than his subjects, when question is of his promise.  them; as also for that there is no more detestable crime in a prince, than to be false of his oath and promise. And that is it for which the sovereign prince aught always in justice to be less respected or relieved than his subjects, when question is of his promise. For if a prince have once bestowed an honour or an office upon a man, it is deemed, that he may not without just cause take it again away from him; but a particular subject may: and so it is ordinarily judged. And whereas by the law the patron might without cause take his fee from his vestal; yet was it not lawful for the prince so to do. Whereby it is well to be perceived, the doctors of the Canon law to err, and to be deceived, who deny a prince to be bound to his own conventions or agreements, otherwise than with a natural bond: for that say they, every bond is proper unto the civil law; which their error is to be removed: For who can doubt, but that the bond is of the same nature with the covenant? Wherhfore if the covenant be natural, and common to all nations, the bonds and actions arising thereof must needs consequently be of the same nature also. But no covenant almost, neither any obligation or bond can be devised, which is not common both unto the law of nature and nations. But let us grant some covenants to proceed from the mere civil law; yet 
That ●… sove▪ reign prince is bound to his own civil covenants.  who dare to deny a prince to be more straightly bound even unto such civil covenants, and promises, than are the private subjects themselves? yea and that in so straight a manner as that he cannot with all the absolute power he hath derogat from the same? For so almost all the learned lawyers are of opinion and accord. And what marvel? seeing God himself is bound unto his promises. For so he plainly protesteth with the prophet Hieremie, Call together unto me (saith he) all the people of the earth, that they may judge betwixt me and my people, if there be any thing that I aught to have done, which I have not done. Let us noth therefore call into question those things whereof many doctors have doubted. As whether a prince be bound unto the covenants which he hath made with his subjects? whereat we need not to marvel, seeing that out of the same fountain is sprung, that no less strange position: that a prince may of right, without any just cause enrich himself with another man's loss: an opinion repugnant unto the laws both of God and nature. But how much more uprightly was it of late judged in the court of Paris, that the prince might give his interest unto the party condemned; but not the interest of another man. And that in confiscations creditors are by right first to be preferred, The same court also by another decree determined, That the prince might derogat from the civil laws, so that it were done without prejudice to any particular men's right: which is to confirm the resolutions which we before have set down, concerning the absolute sovereignty. And Philip of Valois, by two testaments which he made in the year 1347, and 1350, (which are in the treasury of France in a coffer, entitled The testaments of kings, number 289) joineth a clause derogatory unto the laws of his country, from which he protested himself to be discharged, as not unto them bound. The like protestations he also used, when he gave unto the queen his wife certain treasure, and private lands, contrary unto the laws: with aswell his prodigal gift, as also that his derogation from the laws of his country, are yet extant in the public records. Howbeit that Augustus the emperor thought it not good for himself in like case to use the like liberty in his Commonweal, but being willing to give unto his wife Livia, that which he could not by reason of the law Voconia, he requested to be dispensed with all from that law by the Senate (although that it was not needful for him so to have done, considering that he was long time before in all other things dispensed with from the laws) to the intent the better to assure his gift, for that he was not a sovereign prince, as we have before showed. For otherwise he had not been any way bound so to do; as it was in most strong terms judged by a decree in the court of Paris, in the case of Philip the second, the French king, That he was not bound unto the customs of the civil law, at such time as they which were next of kindred would have redeemed of him the county of Guynes: howbeit that many both think and writ, the prince to be bound to that law: for that they think that law to be common to all nations, and not proper to any city: and yet then the which law the Romans themselves (in some cases) thought nothing more unreasonable. But our ancestors 
What account was made of the Roman civil laws in France.  would not have even their subjects bound unto the Roman laws; as we see in the ancient records, that Philip the fair, erecting the parliament of Paris and Monpellier declared, That they should not be bound unto the Roman laws. And in the erection of Universities, the kings have always declared, That their purpose was to have the civil and canon laws in them publicly professed and taught, to make use thereof at their discretion, but not that the subjects should be any way bound thereunto, lest they should seem to derogat from the laws of their own country by advancing the laws of strangers. And for the same cause Alaricus king of the Goths, forbade upon pain of death, any man to allege the Roman laws contrary to his decrees and ordinances. Which M. Charles du Moulin (my companion, and ornament of all lawyers) mistaking, is therefore with him very angry, and in reproach calleth him therefore barbarous: howbeit that nothing was therein by Alaricus decreed or done, but that which every wise prince would of good right have decreed and done: for subjects will so long both remember, and hope for the government of strangers, as they are governed by their laws. The like edict there is of king Charles the fair, and an old decree of the court of Paris, whereby we are expressly forbidden to allege the laws of the Romans, against the laws and customs of our ancestors. Yea the kings of Spain also have upon capital pain forbidden any man to allege the Roman laws, in confirmation of their own laws, (as Oldrad writeth.) And albeit that there were nothing in the laws and customs of their country which differed from the Roman laws, yet such is the force of that edict, that all men may understand that the judges in deciding of the subjects causes, were not bound unto the Roman laws: & therefore much less the prince himself, who thought it a thing dangerous to have his judges bound unto strange laws. And worthy he is to be accounted a traitor, that dare to oppose strange laws and strange decrees against the laws of his own prince. In which doings when the 
The Roman laws forbidden to be ●…aught in Spain.  Spaniards did too much offend, Stephen king of Spain forbade the Roman laws to be at all taught in Spain▪ as Polycrates writeth: which was more straightly provided for by king Alphonsus the tenth, who commanded the magistrates and judges to come unto the prince himself, as often as there was nothing written in the laws of their country concerning the matter in question. Wherein Baldus is mistaken, when he writeth the Italians to be bound to the Roman laws; but the French not otherwise than so far as they should seem unto them to agreed with equity and reason. For the one are as little bound as the other; howbeit that Italy, Spain, the countries of Province, Savoy, Languedoc, and Lyonnois, use the Roman laws more than other people: and that Fredrick Barbarussa the emperor, caused the books of the Roman laws to be published and taught: the greatest part whereof have yet no place in Italy, and much less in Germany. But there is much difference betwixt a right, and a law: for a right still without command respecteth nothing but that which is good and upright; but a law importeth a commandment. For the law is nothing else but the commandment of a sovereign, using of his sovereign power. Wherhfore then as a sovereign is not bound unto the laws of the Greeks, nor of any other stranger whatsoever he be, no more is he bound unto the Roman laws, more than that they are conformable 
Neither pope nor emperor exempted from the law of nature.  unto the law of nature; which is the law whereunto (saith Pindarus) all kings and princes are subject. From which we are not to excepteither the pope or the emperor (as some pernicious flatterers do) saying, That those two viz. the pope and the emperor, may of right without cause take unto themselves the goods of their subjects. 
A dangerous opinion, and not to be taught to princes.  Which opinion the Canonists themselves, the interpreters of the pope's law detest, as contrary to the law of God: whereunto for all that they join this evil limitation, in saying, That they may yet do it of their most high and absolute power and authority, as they term it: which is as much as if they should say it to be lawful for them to rob and spoil their subjects, oppressed by force of arms: which law, the more mighty use against them that be weaker than themselves, which the Germane most rightly call, The law of thieves and robbers. But pope Innocent the iiij himself, most skilful in both the laws, saith that most high and absolute power, to be able but to derogat from the ordinary law▪ whereas they would have such absolute and sovereign power to extend to the abrogating of the laws of God and nature. For what is more religiously by God's laws forbidden, than to rob and spoil other men of their goods? what thing do we read more often repeated, than to keep our hands from other men's things? yea we are by the most holy Decalogue commanded, not so much as to desire that which is another man's. Now certainly it is a greater offence to infect princes with this doctrine, than it is to rob and steal. For poverty commonly causeth thieves to seek after other men's goods: but they that maintain such opinions, show the lion his claws, and arm the prince so instructed, to pretend unto his outrages, this goodly show of Law and justice: who by nature nought, & made worse by instruction: so proving to be a tyrant, maketh no question most shamefully to confounded and break all the laws both of God and man: and afterward inflamed with corrupt desires and affections, which altogether weaken the more noble parts of the mind, he quickly breaketh out from covetousness to unjust confiscations, from lust to adultery, from wrath to murder. So that as thunder is indeed before the lightning, although it be latter heard: so also an evil prince, corrupted with these pernicious & pestilent opinions, pervetting justice, causeth the fine to run before the accusation, and the condemnation before the judgement. Howbeit it is an in congruity in law, to say that 
That a prince●… power aught always to be measured with the foot of justice.  a prince can do any thing which is not agreeing with honesty; seeing that his power aught always to be measured with the foot of justice. For so said Pliny the younger unto Traian the emperor, Vt enim foelicitatis est posse quantum velis: sic magnitudinis velle quantum possis, As it is (saith he) in thy happiness to be able to do what thou wilt; so beseemeth it thy greatness, to will what thou mayst. Whereof may be gathered, that a prince can do nothing that is fowl or unjust. It is also evil done, to say, that a sovereign prince hath power by violence to take away another man's goods, to rob, to commit adultery, or to do evil, seeing that so to do, is rather an impotency, or feebleness, proceeding from a weak mind overcome with impotent lust and desire, rather than any sovereignty. Now than if a sovereign prince may not remove the bounds which almighty God (of whom he is the living & breathing image) hath prefined unto the everlasting laws of nature: neither may he take from another man that 
Private men's losses by princes sometimes to be suffered, for the greater benef●… of the Commonweal.  which is his, without just cause, whether it be by buying, by exchange, by confiscation, by league with friends, or peace made with enemies, if it cannot otherwise be concluded than by private men's loss; whose goods princess oftentimes permit the enemies to enjoy, for the general welfare of the subjects and of the Commonweal: howbeit that many be not of this opinion, but would that every man should keep his own; and that no public diminution should be made of any private man's goods, or that if public necessity so required, it were again to be made goodby the whole state: which opinion I like well of, if conveniently it might so be done. But forasmuch as the welfare of private men, and all the goods of the subjects are contained in the health of our country, it beseemeth private men without grudging to forgive unto the Commonwealth, not only their private displeasures, and injuries received from their enemies, but to yield also for the health of the Commonweal, their goods. For peace hath for the most part some hard measure in it, which is again recompensed with the public profit: and this law doth all people use, that in conclusions of peace, not only public things are recompensed with public, and private things with private; but both with the mutual profits and detriments of both. And yet I see many great masters of both laws, both to be, & to have been of opinion, that in those leagues wherein it is excepted, that no question should be made of the loss on both sides received, such exception should be voided, neither to be any thing prejudicial unto private men: howbeit that we use it otherwise; for in the peace of Peronne, made for the deliverance of jews the xj the French king, prisoner unto Charles earl of Burgundy, it was in one article provided, That Seigneur de Torci should not execute the sentence of the 
The law of forgetfulness necessary for the ending of civil wars, and composing of controversies betwixt princes.  court of Paris against the lord of Saneuses. And therefore is Thrasibulus (and that not unworthily) commended, that having overthrown and driven thirty tyrants out of the city of Athens, he caused the law of forgetfulness to be proclaimed. Wherein was contained the forgetting of all private injuries and losses received in the late civil war: which was also afterwards proclaimed in Rome, after that Caesar was s●…aine in the Senate, at the treaty made betwixt the conspirators on the one side, and Caesar's partakers on the other. Yet is it by all means to be enduoured, that men's harms received, should be recompensed with other men's profits, and so as near as may be every man to have his own, which if it cannot be done without tumult and civil wars, we must defend the possessors of other men's things, although they hold them wrongfully, until the right honours may be satisfied out of the common treasure: or if the common treasure be exhausted, to borrow money to content them. As did Aratus, who having restored his country to liberty, after it had for the space of fifty years been oppressed with tyranny, restored also six hundred banished men, whose lands & goods had been by the tyrant confiscated. Yet would he not the possessors of those lands, which the tyrants had unjustly taken from those citizens, to be spoiled thereof: for that much thereof was lawfully bought and sold, and much of it holden in dowry, so that it could not be done without a most dangerous turmoil in the state. Wherhfore he bond all the citizens by oath, That they should keep peace and amity until such time as he returning out of Egypt, should then take order for all things. For having there borrowed threescore thousand crowns of K. Ptolemaeus Philadelphus, he returned into his country, and pri●…ing the land, so wrought the matter, that some made choice to take money and leave the land; and other some thought it better to take money themselves, than to recover again that which had been before their own. Wherhfore these causes that I have said ceasing, the prince cannot take nor give another man's goods, without the consent of the owner. And in all gifts, grants, immunities, and privileges, this clause is still annexed, Saving always our own right: and the right of other men: Which clause added unto the investiture of the duchy of Milan, which Maximilian the emperor made to king jews the xii, was the occasion of new wars, for the right which the Sforces pretended to the duchy, which the emperor could not nor would not give away. And this clause although it be left out, is yet supposed to be still put in: for that even the emperor would he never so feign, can no otherwise give or grant any other thing to any body. For that which the common people commonly saith, All to be the princes, is to be understood concerning power and sovereignty, 
How it is to be understood, All to be the princes.  the propriety and possession of every man's things yet reserved to himself. For so saith Seneca, Ad reges potestas omnium pertinet, ad singulos proprietas, Unto kings belongeth the power of all things, and unto particular men the propriety. And a little after, Omnia rex imperio possidet singuli dominio, The king in power possesseth all 
The king in some cases less privileged than the subject.  things: and private men as owners. And for this cause our kings by the laws and decrees of Court, are bound to voided their hands of such lands as are fallen unto them by way of confiscation (if they be not simply and without mean holden of the crown) to the end that the patrons of them that were proscribed, should lose nothing of their right in the lands confiscated. And if the king be debtor to any private man his subject, he is therefore often times sued, condemned, and enforced to pay the debt. But that strangers aswell as subjects, and all posterity may know of what integrity our kings have been, and with what moderation they have borne themselves towards their subjects, let this be for example, That the king himself in the year 1266, was by the judgement of the court of Paris, condemned to pay unto the curate, the tithe of the first-fruits even of his garden of pleasure. So when another of our kings had by the negligence of his advocate, made default of appearance at his day; he by ordinary course requested to have that negligent oversight pardoned: which the kings request the court of Paris denied, as appeareth by the decree of the court, in the year 1419. But no such strict proceeding is used against private men, who always in such case are again restored into the state they before were. And albeit that subjects under xxv years old, almost in all private judgements use to be again restored into the state they were, by the privilege of their age; yet our kings although but children, are never so restored by the benefit of their age, but in all judgements are deemed to be of full age. And yet the Commonweal nevertheless is always reputed to be in minority: which is to answer them which are of opinion, That the Commonweal aught not to be restored; in that they confounded the patrimony of the prince, with the Commonweal, which is always in a monarchy divided: but all one in a popular or an Aristocratical state. With this stoutness of courage the magistrates bore themselves towards our kings, & with this moderation also did our king's reverence justice, preferring still in all suits the Commonweal before private men, and private men before princes. There is also extant in the records of the court of Paris, a judgement given against king Charles the seventh, wherein he was condemned to suffer a wood of his to be cut down which he had near unto the city of Paris, for the public use in general, and the use of every one of the citizens in particular: and that more was, the price thereof was set down for him in the decree, whereunto a private subject could hardly have been driven. Than was it plainly to be seen how much a king differed from a tyrant: for when this Charles the seven had driven the English forces out of the hart of France, and easily taken the city of Paris (which confederated with the English, had wrested the sceptre out of this king's hand) he was so far from revenging of his received injuries, that he used the citizens most courteously, and showed himself more obedient unto the judges than private men have used to be. When at the same time Philip Maria, duke of Milan, having oppressed the Commonweal with taxes and tributes, embarred also his ports and rivers, in such sort as that none of the citizens without his leave could pass or travel thereby, but that first they must therefore pay money.  
Thus we have hitherto showed in what sort a sovereign is subject unto the laws 
Whether a sovereign prince be bound to the promises or conventions of the kings his predecessors or not.  and conventions by him made with his subjects: Now it resteth for us to see whether he be subject unto the contracts and promises of the kings his predecessors; and whether such his obliging be compatible with sovereign majesty or not. Which in few words to discuss, passing over a multitude of nice questions which might be made in this matter: I say that a prince is bound unto the covenants of his ancestors as well as other private heirs, if his kingdom come unto him by inheritance, or be given him by testament being not next of kin: as Ptolemee king of Cyrene, Nicomedes king of Bythinia, Attalus king of Asia, and Eumenes king of Pergame, by their wills appointed the people of Rome to inherit their kingdoms. But what if a kingdom be by will given unto the next of kin? as Henry the eight by his will left the kingdom of England to his son Edward the sixt: and substituted unto him his sister Mary, and unto her Elizabeth her sister, who all successively enjoyed the kingdom. In this case we must distinguish, whether the appointed heir will accept the state in the quality of an heir by testament appointed; or renouncing the succession of the testator, demandeth the crown by virtue of the custom and law of his country. For in the former case the successor is bound unto all the hereditary obligations and actions of his predecessors, as if he were a private inheritor: but in the second case, he is not bound unto the doom of his predecessor, albeit that his predecessor were thereto sworn. For neither the oath nor the obligation of the dead predecessor, bindeth the successor in the law, more than so far as the obligation made by the testator tendeth to the good of the Commonweal, and so far he is bound. And therefore king jews the xii, when he was demanded the artillery lent unto Charles the eight, answered, That he was none of Charles his heir. So of late king Francis the second, to like effect writ his letters unto the lords of the Swissers, demanding of him his father's debts, the copy whereof taken out of the records, bearing date the xix of januarie 1559, I have here set down as followeth, viz. Although that we be not bound to pay the debts of our most honourable 
The letters of the French king unto the Swissers  Lord, and dead father: for that we have not taken upon us this crown by right of inheritance as his heir, but by the royal law and custom generally observed even from the first institution thereof, which bindeth us not, but only to the observing of such confederations and treaties, passed and made by the kings our predecessors, with other foreign princes and Commonweals, for the good and profit of this crown. Nevertheless desiring to discharge the credit and conscience of the said our dead lord and father, we are resolved to discharge his lawful debts, etc. Only this requesting you, to moderate the interest, in such sort as you have used, according to the laws and customs of your country, and that no greater be of us exacted. Which his request the Swissers by their common decree approved, so that whereas before they had taken of our people so deep interest, as every sixt year came almost to as much as the principal, (which is twice so much as they do in France) they brought it down to a third part, which cometh to so much as the principal but in twenty years. But that our kings were not bound unto the bonds of their predecessors, the court of Paris determined, viz. In the year 1256. Wherhfore they are greatly deceived, which receive as from an oracle the formal and conceived words of the oath which the bishops of Rheims have at their pleasure not long since devised, which our kings at their coronation now use. For after that the archbishop of Rheims hath set the crown upon the king's head, the twelve peers of France putting to their hands, he saith unto him these words, Stay you here (saith he) and the kingdom which you have before until now holden by succession from your father, now from henceforth hold as the true heir thereof, put into your hands by the power of almighty God, and by the just delivery thereof, which we the bishops and other the servants of God here presently make unto you. An honest speech if it were true. But I think no man doubteth, but that the king even before his consecration enjoyeth both the possession and propriety of the kingdom, not by inheritance or his father's right, and much less by the bounty of the bishops or peers, but by the royal law and custom of the realm, as was long since decreed by 
* Anno. 1463  a decree of the French men, That no man should think the power of the king to depend of the pleasure of the bishops: not for that the Senate ever doubted of the power of the king before his coronation; but that those vain quirks of the bishops might be utterly refelled. For it is an old proverb with us, That the king 
The king never dieth.  doth never die, but that so soon as he is dead, the next male of his stock is seized of the kingdom, and in possession thereof before he be crowned, which is not conferred unto him by succession of his father, but by virtue of the law of the land; lest the succession of the kingdom should be uncertain, than which nothing can be more dangerous in a Commonweal. Wherhfore let us this hold, that the king which is by lawful right called unto his kingdom, is so far bound unto the covenants and promises of the kings his predecessors, as is for the good of the Commonweal: and so much the more, if the contracts were made by the consent and good liking of the people in general, or of the states, or high court of parliament: which it is not only seemly for a king to keep, but also necessary, although it be hurtful unto the Commonweal, considering that it concerneth the faith and obligation of his subjects. But if the sovereign prince hath contracted either with strangers, or with his subjects, for such things as concern the Commonweal, without the consent of them we have before said, if any great harm redound unto the Commonweal by such contract, it is not reason the lawful successor to be thereunto bound: and much less if he have obtained the kingdom by election: For that he holdeth nothing from his predecessor, as he should do if he held his state by resignation, for than he should be bound unto the contracts and promises of his predecessors, except it were expressly otherwise excepted. But by what right soever the prince shall have received his kingdom, whether it be by law, by testament, by election, or by lot, it is reason that the successors should perform all such contracts of his predecessor, as redounded to the profit of the Commonweal: for otherwise it should be lawful for him contrary to the law of nature, by fraud and indirect means to draw his own profit out of others harms: but it much concerneth a Commonweal, so much as in it lieth, to preserve and keep the public faith, lest in the extreme dangers thereof, all the means for the relief thereof should be shut up. And thus are to be understood, those things which the court of Paris decreed in the years 1256, and 1294, viz. The king not to be bound unto the covenants and agreements of the former kings his predecessors: their opinion being rejected, which say, That a sovereign prince is to be thrust out of his kingdom, if he perform not the testament of the former prince his predecessor: without putting the difference of princely successions, by us before put, but utterly confounding the succession of princes.  
But what needeth (might some man say) this distinction in succession of princes? seeing that all princes are bound and subject unto the laws of nations, whereof contracts and testaments do depend. Which is not so if we speak of all contracts and testaments in general: but admit that to be true, yet there of it followeth not, that a prince is more bound unto the laws of nations, than unto his own: and that so far as they agreed with the laws of God and nature: whereunto all that we have said concerning the obliging of princes, is to be referred. For as for the laws of nations, if they be any of them unjust, the prince may abrogat them by the law of his realm, & forbidden his subjects to use the same: as we said before of servitude and slaves: which by a dangerous example, by the law almost of all nations brought into Commonweals, were again by the wholesome decrees of many princes well agreeing with the laws of nature taken away: which being said of one thing, may also be extended unto other things of like condition: provided always, that nothing be done contrary to the laws of God and nature. For if justice be the end of the law, and the law is the work of the prince, and the prince is the lively image of almighty God; it must needs follow, that the law of the prince should be framed unto the model of the law of God.   

CHAP. IX. ¶ Of a Prince tributary or feudatarie: and whether he be a sovereign Prince: and of the prerogative of honour amongst Sovereign Princes.  
THis question deserveth a special Chapter by itself, for that it hath no community with the ancient marks of Sovereignty, which were before the right of Fees, used in all Europe and Asia, and yet more in Turkey than in any place of the world: where the Timariot hold not the Fees they have to serve in the wars, but so long as pleaseth the king of the Turks, who giveth them no longer but for term of their lives: which have them with condition, that in time of war the Timariot shall of their own charge without any pay bring such a number of horsemen and horses, as is appointed in the subsidy books, according to the proportion of the rent of the fees, which they call Timar, which is to say in their language, the Use and profit, derived as I suppose of the Greek word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; and the word Timar signifying with them the honourable use and profit, which is the true nature of Fee, to be free from all tribute or base charges. And for this cause the vassal in the ancient law of the Lombard's, is called Lewd, which is to say, frank and free: Aldius and Alda, affranchised, from whence the words Alaudium and Laudimia are derived, signifying the honourable rewards wont to be given to the lord of the fee, taking the oath of fealty of his vassal. But having thus much said for the explanation of these words, let us proceed unto our purpose.  
We have said here before, him to be an absolute sovereign, who next unto almighty God, is subject unto none: neither holdeth any thing next unto God, but of his own sword: For if he be enforced to serve any man, or to obey any man's command (be it by his own good liking, or against his will) or if he hold of another man, he looseth the title of majesty, and is no more a sovereign, as saith a certain Poet:  

Esse sat est servum, iam nolo 
* These Vicarij were slaves commanded.  vicarius esse:  
Qui Rex est, Regem Maxim non habeat.   

To be a slave it is enough, I will not serve a slave:  
Who is a king, friend Maximus, no other king must have.   
If they then which hold in fealty and homage have no majesty or sovereignty, there should be but few sovereign princes to be found. And if were grant that they which hold in fealty and homage, or that are tributaries, be sovereigns, we must by the same reason confess, the vassal and his lord, the master and the servant, to be equal in greatness, power, and authority. And yet the doctors of the law hold that the dukes of Milan, Mantua, Ferrara, and Savoy, yea even and some Counties also are sovereigns: 
The county of A●…ti.  which altogether differ from those things which we have before said of the right of majesty and sovereignty. Wherhfore it is requisite for us more exquisitely to entreat of these matters, whereof dependeth the principal point of sovereignty, and the prerogative of honour amongst princes, which they esteem as a thing unto them most dear of all things in the world.  
We said before in the Chapter of Patronage (which we otherwise call Protection) that princes which are in protection, if they have no other subjection, hold yet their majesty and sovereignty, although they have enred into inequal alliance, whereby they are bound to acknowledge their protectors in all honour. But there is great difference betwixt them which are in simple protection only, and them which hold in fealty and homage. For the client, or he which is the simple protection of another 
The difference betwixt him which is only in the simple protection of another prince, and him that oweth unto him fealty and homage.  prince only, acknowledgeth his patron his superior, in the league of their confederation, but no further than the dignity of the person and place requireth: but the vassal, or he which holdeth in fealty and homage, is glad not only to acknowledge his lord for his superior, but is enforced also in humble wise to give unto him his faith and duty, or else to forego his fee. When I say fealty & homage, I mean the oath of fidelity, the submission, the service, and duty of the vassal, which he is by the tenor of his fee bound to give unto his lord.  
Which that it may be the better understood, we will make nine degrees of inferiors, 
Nine degrees of subjection of inferiors towards their superiors.  in respect of their superiors: beside him who next unto almighty God, acknowledgeth none superior unto himself. The first sort, is of such princes as are in the protection of him whose majesty they observe and reverence, and commonly give themselves into his protection, so to be the safer against their most mighty enemies. The second, is of such princes as acknowledge a superior in their confederation, unto whom they use to pay a tribute or pension, so by his help and aid to be the safer: which deserveth not to be called patronage, because it is mercenary, whereas unto kind duty no reward is due. The third is, of such princes as being overcome by the more mighty, have of him received peace, who yet keep their majesty and sovereignty, with condition, courteously to reverence the majesty of the victor, and to pay unto him a yearly tribute, for which they are from him to receive neither protection nor aid. And albeit that these seem to be more charged than they which are but in protection; yet is it so, that in effect they are greater, for in paying the tribute they have promised for their peace, they are acquitted, and have nothing to do with any other for the defence of their estate. The fourth sort is of them which are themselves kings, and freely exercise their sovereignty over their own subjects; but yet are vassals or feudataries to some other prince for some fee, be it greater or be it less, which they from him receive. The fift sort, is of them which are not kings, neither have any sovereignty, but are become vassals for their fee, and are simply called mere vassals, who are bound to defend the honour of their lord, and to take up arms for him, but not at all times, nor against all men. The sixt sort are they whom we call liege vassals, who are not natural subjects unto the prince, but having given him their faith, are bound to defend his dignity and honour, and for his defence to take up arms without exception; yet not always, nor in all places, but so far forth as the profit of the fee, or the contract of their vassalage extendeth. The seventh sort are they whom we call subjects, whether they be vassals or tenants, or such as hold no land at all, who are bound to fight for the honour and defence of their prince as well as for themselves, and to have the same enemies and the same friends that he hath. The eight sort is of them, which in former time delivered from slavery, yet retain a certain kind of servitude, as do they which are tied unto the soil, and are of us called Mortmains. The last sort are the right slaves. This distinction of the degrees of subjection, I have made to take away the confusion that many make of the subject with the vassal; and of the simple vassal with the liege man; and hold, that the liege man oweth all obedience unto his lord towards and against all men; and that the simple vassal reserveth his superior: and yet nevertheless there is but the subject only which oweth his obeisance. For the vassal, be he liege or simple, if he be not a subject, oweth but the service and homage expressed in his investiture, from which he may without fraud exempt 
The difference of a vassal, or a liege man from a natural subject.  himself, by yielding up his fee: but the natural subject, which holds in fee, in farm, or fee simple, or be it that he hold nothing at all that he can call his own, yet can he not by any means without the consent of his prince exempt himself from the personal obligation wherewith he is unto him bound, as we have before declared. The simple vassal is bound but once in his life to give his oath of fidelity unto his lord: and such a vassal it may be as is never bound to give his oath: for that the fee may be without any such obligation of giving his faith, as is to be seen in the old laws of fees, (contrary to that which M, Charles du Molin hath both thought and writ) but the subject whatsoever is always and in all places bound to give his oath, and so often as it shall please his sovereign prince to require it: yea although he were a bishop without any temporality at all. As for the liege man, it is not requisite that he should be subject unto the lord of whom he holdeth: for it may be, that he may be a sovereign prince, holding some signory of another prince in liege, fealty and homage: it may also be, that he may be the natural subject of one prince, and liege man to another, by reason of his fee: or well the simple vassal of one Lord, without being subject or liegeman to another: and natural subject to another, to whom he is iusticiable, and yet holdeth of him neither fee nor revenue. For the vassal of a vassal is not for that, either vassal or subject of the same lord, if it be not in regard of the same fee. But it is needful to explain that we have said by examples.  
We found that the kings of England have given their liege faith and homage unto the kings of France for all the countries which they hold on this side the sea, except the counties of Oye and Guynes: And yet nevertheless they held the kingdoms of England and Ireland in sovereignty without acknowledgement of any other prince whatsoever. But after in the year 1212 they made themselves vassals unto the Pope and the church of Rome, and not only vassals, but also tributaries: beside the annual gift of smoke money, of ancient time granted by Ine king of England, in the year 740, & augmented by Etelpe, which they called S. Peter's pence. For it is found, that john king of England, by the consent of all the counties, barons and lords of the land, made himself vassal unto the pope and church of Rome, and vowed to hold the realms of England and Ireland of him in fealty and homage, with the charge to pay the yearly rent and revenue of a thousand marks for ever, upon Michaelmas day, beside the Peter pence, which I have spoken of: & gave his faith and homage unto the legate of pope Innocent the third, in the year 1213, in the presence of his chancellor, the archbishop of Canterbury, four bishops, six counties, and many other great lords. The Bull was made in authentic form, whereof I have seen the copy in a register of the Vatican, taken out by the commandment of chancellor du Prat, when he was Legat. And albeit that Sir Thomas Moore, chancellor of England, was the first that maintained the contrary: yet so it is, that in the same time, and until that king Henry the eight revolted from the pope, in the year 1534, the yearly revenue and tribute was always paid. But that is worth the noting, that the act of fealty and homage, given unto pope Innocent the the third, importeth that john then king of England, humbly requested forgiveness of his sins of the pope's legate. Whereby it is plain, that patronage of the bishop of Rome to have been by him sought for, to extenuat the horrible murder which he had cruelly committed upon the person of young Arthure his brother's son, duke of Britain, and lawful successor to the crown of England; lest otherwise he should have been therefore excommunicated by the pope. Whereas Philip Augustus, king of France, for the same cause had confiscated the duchies of Normandy, Guyenne, Anjou, Touraine, le main, & all the countries whereunto he pretended any right, on this side the sea: which the kings of England held by fealty and liege homage of the king of France; and yet had the chief sovereignty 
The king●… of Scots vassals to the English.  over the realms of England, Ireland, and Scotland. For first Constantine king of the Scots, with the rest of the nobility of that country, did fealty and homage to Adelstan king of England; and after that Balliol king of Scots did fealty and homage also to the king of England, declaring himself to hold the kingdom of Scotland under the protection of the English, excepting the xxxij Islands of the Orcadeses, which then & afterwards also were holden in fealty and homage of the kings of Norway; and own unto the new king coming to the crown ten marks of gold, as was agreed betwixt the kings of Scotland and Denmark, to end the wars, which were renewed for the same isles, in the year 1564; as I have learned by the letters of M. Danzai, ambassador for the king in Denmark. Howbeit the kings of Scotland which reigned after Balliol, renounced their homage unto the English, neither acknowledging them for their superiors, or yet to be unto them vassals. And albeit that David king of Scots did what he could with his subjects to consent that the kingdom of Scotland might be holden of England in fealty and homage: yet so it was, that he remained nine years in prison, and by the treaty made betwixt Edward the third his brother in law, and him, it was agreed, that he should be set at liberty, without any more obtained from his estates but that he should live in amity and friendship with him. As for the realm of Ireland, it is not long since it received the English government, excepting yet the earl of Argueil, who seemed always to keep the state of sovereignty.  
So might we say also of the king of Denmark, who is a sovereign prince in part 
The kings of Denmark in ancient time vassals unto the Germane empire.  of the kingdom of Norway, without acknowledging any prince for his superior whatsoever; and yet holdeth part of the duchy of Holsatia of the emperor in fealty and homage: in which sort he in ancient time held the country of Denmark, which was but a plain dukedom, when Canutus' duke of Denmark yielded fealty and homage unto the emperor Lothaire, and afterward to the emperor Fredrick the fift: who first of all sent unto Peter duke of Denmark the sword and the crown, and honoured him with royal dignity; yet with condition, That he should for ever yield unto the emperor fealty and homage: howbeit that his posterity afterwards revolted from the empire. And yet nevertheless these whom I have named, being no subjects, neither acknowledging the greatness of any prince, but in respect of the fees 
A fee is not to be given up but simply and without fraud.  that they hold of other princes, are acquitted of their fealty homage and service, by giving up their fee without fraud. I say without fraud, for that it is not lawful for the vassal to forsake his lord and patron at his need, although he would renounce his fee: albeit that there be no other penalty but the loss of fee appointed for him who in time of war forsaketh his lord; for that he doth an irreparable prejudice unto his honour, which for ever remaineth engaged for so foul a fact, as to have forsaken his lord in time of danger: seeing that by the oath of fidelity the vassal, but especially the liege vassal aught to aid him, were it against his own brethren and children. Yea some lawyers are of opinion, that he aught to aid his lord and patron, even against his own father: wherein I can in no wise agreed with them, for that the first and chief fidelity is due unto our parents. But if the vassal be also a subject, he looseth not only his fee and honour, if he forsake his sovereign prince at his need, but even his life thereon dependeth: seeing that it is death even for a common soldier, not to defend his captain in battle. Wherhfore we are not to marvel, if john de Montfort, and Peter, dukes of Britain would never yield their fealty unto the French kings without exception, as their liege men for the dukedom of Britain: about which matter the chauncelors of France and Britain were twice at debate before the kings, Charles the fift, and Charles the sixt. And albeit that these two kings caused two acts to be produced, concerning the fealty and homage done by the dukes of Britain, to Philip the victorious and jews the eight: yet for all that, the dukes would not do their homage as liege men, but were received doing their simple homage only. True it is, that the liege homage yielded to jews the eight, was not but for the life of him that did it, as appeared by the act, without binding of his successors. And the other act which is of young Arthure, was not pure and simple, but only conditional; as to be restored by Philip the victorious, unto the territories and segnories from which he was embarred; which he did not. Now such is the force and nature of true and lawful acts, as not to admit any time or condition, and the act of fealty and homage of all other acts the lest. But the end of the controversy was, that the simple oath of john and Peter should be taken, lest they should seem to be the liege vassals of the French: although both those dukes aught of right to have been deprived of the fee of the dukedom of Britain, for that they had renounced the French king their lawful patron. Neither is 
The ancient countie●… of Britain, vassals to the kings of France.  there any doubt, but that in truth the ancient counties of Britain were true subjects and liege men unto the kings of France (as is to be seen in the histories of Gregory bishop of Tours) and being revolted, were subdued by Charlemaigne, and afterwards by jews the devout, to whom they did homage, and yielded all obeisance with hostages; as a man may see in the histories of Floard and Girald, whom some call Vitald, the nephew of Charlemaigne. And again for another rebellion against Charles the Bald, in the year 1359, they were accused unto the estates, of treason, & so condemned and executed: which could not have taken place but against the natural subject, for treason against his sovereign prince. And after that Herispo county of Britain, doing his fealty, and with a great sum of money given appeased Charles the Bald: as had also before him duke judicael pleased Dagobert. Neither is it true, or like to be true, that Clodoveus, who had bounded the kingdom of France with the Pyrenei Mountains, both the seas, and the river of Rhine; or Charlemaigne that had in many places vanquished infinite numbers of the barbarous nations, and had subdued Spain, Italy, Hungary, Germany, the Saxons, them of Pomerland, the Polonians, and Russians, and had extended his empire even as fair as Scythia, would have received the dukes of Britain, even in the bowels of France, as companions of the French empire. And admit that by the favour of any the French kings, they obtained respite of homage, that could not be prejudicial unto the kings their successors, and much less unto the crown of France. And that more is, in the treaties betwixt the kings of France, and the first dukes of Normandy, it is expressly set down, That the counties of Britain, should be vassals unto the dukes of Normandy, unto whom they had oftentimes given their fealty and homage: which could nor possibly have been, if they had not been vassals and liege men unto the crown, seeing that the dukes of Normandy had given their fealty and liege homage unto the kings of France, & the counties of Britain unto the dukes. And if true it be, that the vassal can never prescribe for his fealty and homage against his lord; how then can the subject prescribe for his subjection against his prince? So the Seneschal of Renes (a man very well learned) cannot abide that Peter de Dreux prince of the blood, surnamed Maucler, had acquitted the sovereignty of Britain unto the kings of France, seeing that he was vassal and natural subject unto the king: and yet nevertheless, in yielding the homage, had reservation to make laws, to grant pardons, to call parliaments, to take the 
Royalties reserved unto the dukes of Britain, notwithstanding their homage due unto the French king.  benefit of confiscations even in cases of high treason, the regal rights in churches, and feofments of trust. By which arguments not only probable, but also necessary, I am persuaded to writ the dukedom of Britain, now even from the times of the first kings of France, to have been a province of the kingdom of France, although Argentraeus otherwise think. Yet is it worth the noting that john Montfort and his successors, although they went about to have rend the dukedom of Britain from the kingdom of France, yet as counties of Montfort and Virtus to have always yielded their fealty unto the French kings, without exception, as we read in the records, although that they still exercised in the countries of Britain certain royalties granted them by the king.  
There is then great difference betwixt him which holdeth simply in fealty and homage (being himself no sovereign, nor subject unto him which is lord of the fee) and him which is sovereign of a country, and yet vassal to some other lord for some fee; as of him which is in protection only, or which is tributary unto a prince, having sovereignty over his subjects, or which is himself a natural subject. Wherefore 
The prince that holdeth of another, is himself no absolute Sovereign.  we conclude, that there is none but he an absolute sovereign, which holdeth nothing of another man; considering that the vassal for any fee whatsoever it be, be he Pope or Emperor, oweth personal service by reason of the fee which he holdeth. For albeit that this word Service, in all matter of fees, and customs, is not prejudicial unto the natural liberty of the vassal; yet so it is, that it importeth a certain right, duty, honour and reverence that the vassal oweth unto the lord of the fee: which is not indeed a servitude real, but is annexed and inseparable from the person of the vassal, who cannot be therefrom freed, but by quitting his fee: provided yet, that he be no natural subject of the lords of the fee, from whom he cannot discharge himself by renouncing his fee.  
Now when I say, that homage and personal service is inseparable from the vassal; 
Homage a personal service, and not to be performed by a deputy.  that is so true, as that the vassal cannot acquit himself thereof by his deputy or attorney, as was permitted by the ancient laws of fees; which in this point is abrogated in Europe, and Asia; yea and in Italy itself from whence the laws of fees (as many think) first took their beginning. For jews Sfortia, governor of Lombardie, sent his Agent into France, to king Charles the eight, to have obtained of him that his nephew the duke of Milan might by him be received to do his homage by his deputy for the duchy of Genes: whereunto the king would not condescend. And when question was made of taking of fealty and homage of the marquess of Salusse, the court of Paris decreed, That his deputy should be admitted in his name, if the king so thought it good; for that the marquess pretended himself to be sick: yet with that condition, that so soon as he was able he should come and do it himself in person. The same hath also been often times judged in such like cases. But contrariwise the lord of the fee may constrain his vassal to yield his fealty and homage unto his deputy, as is commonly used. But if the vassal be yet under age, or so young as that he yet wanteth understanding, he is to be borne with for doing of his fealty and homage, until he be of age to do it, except it pleaseth the lord of the fee to receive it by his deputy: As did king jews the xj, who by Philip Commines his ambassador received fealty & homage of the mother of young Galeas duke of Milan, for the duchy of Genes, the duke her son being under age, and paying fifty thousand ducats for relief. And for the same cause in the treaty made betwixt jews the eleventh, and Maximilian archduke of Austria, in the year 1482, in the 56 article it was expressly set down, That the subjects on both parts should be received to do their homage by their atturneys, which otherwise they should have been constrained themselves in person to have done, if they had not been sick, or had some other just and reasonable let; or that it was some body collegiat. For it much concerneth the honour of the lord and patron, whether homage be done unto him in the person of a king his vassal, or by some oeher base attorney or deputy. And for this cause it was agreed in the treaty of Amiens, made betwixt Philip the fair the French king, and Henry king of England, in the year 1303, That the king of England should himself in persom come to do his fealty and homage without exception, if he were not otherwise letted by sickness without deceit: in which case he should sand his eldest son to do the fealty in his stead. And by another treaty made in the year 1330, betwixt Philip Valois, and king Edward the third, it was also said, That the king of England should in person come to do his fealty and homage, if he were not without fraud by sickness letted; which ceasing, he should then also come. And by the treaty of peace, made in the year 1259, betwixt jews the ninth the French king, and Henry the second, king of England, it is expressly declared, That the king of England should in person himself yield his fealty & liege homage unto the French king. Which liege homage (as they term it) is of that force, as that the person of no prince, pope, or emperor, is therein excepted. Now the form of the homage declared by the treaty, in the year 1331, betwixt Philip Valois the French king, and Edward the third, is this: The king of England having his hands joined, and put 
The form of the homage made by the kings of England unto the kings of France.  betwixt the hands of the French king, the Chancel or of France for the French king, shall thus say unto the king of England, Thou shalt become a liege man to the king of France, who here is, as duke of Guyenne, and peer of France, county of Poitou, and Monstrueil, and shalt promise' to bear unto him faith and loyalty: Whereunto the king of England shall say, I consent thereunto: Than the king of France shall receive the king of England into his fealty with a kiss. But the oath of Charles the king of Navarre was more religious, when he yielded his fealty unto Charles the fift, the French king, in the year 1370: for that he was not only the French kings vassal, but his subject also, unto whom he promised his faith and loyalty towards and against all men, which could live or die: albeit that he was then sovereign king of Navarre, and pretended a right unto the sovereignty of Berne, which yet resteth undecided. The form of the simple homage done by john de Montfort, Arthure the second, and Peter the second, dukes of Britain, is like, excepting the word Liege man. But for vassals which be also subjects, the form of fealty is more religious & precise, for that they are bound with a double bond, whereas the foreign vassals are not so. For the king of England, Edward the third being come to Amiens to do his homage unto the king of France, refused to join his hands betwixt the hands of the king, and so returned into his kingdom, where it was six months debated betwixt the French kings commissioners, and the assembly of the estares, about the resolution for the form of the homage: in fine, king Edward thought it better to follow the prescript form, than to lose so many benefits as he then enjoyed in France. But if the vassal be also a natural subject unto his lord and patron, he is bound to lay by his sword, his gloves, his hat, his cloak, his spurs, and upon his knees to put his hands joined together, into the hands of his prince, or of his deputy, and so to take his oath: and by the custom of this realm, if it pleaseth not the lord, he is not bound to be present, or to kiss his vassal; but may (if he so please) being present, see him in form, as we have aforesaid, give his fealty and homage to some small officer, or before his house, by kissing the hammer of his door. But by the customs of Vermandbis, the vassal is bound to do his fealty unto his lord being present; but if he be absent, it is sufficient for the vassal being present, to 'cause it to be done by his attorney, lest the honour of the vassal should be impaired by the baseness of the person of his lords attorney. But if the vassal have thirty heirs, every one of them is constrained to yield his fealty unto his patron requiring the same: as was long since provided by the decree of Philip the Victorious, the French king, in the year 1209. Yet some use another custom.  
Shall we then say, a Vassal (that is to say another man's man) although he at home 
Homage a base & servile thing, and therefore detested of honourable princes.  enjoy a kingdom, to have a sovereign majesty and power? Shall we call him that is bound to do most vile services, (and to use the words of fealty) him that serveth another man, shall we call him, I say, a sovereign prince? And that is it for which many▪ honourable princes had rather to lose and forego right great seignories, and their most rich fees, than to serve such a slavery. And othersome again, to the contrary, would not cell their sovereignty for any thing in the world. As the prince of Orange refused of king Lewis the eleventh, ten times so much as his principality was worth, which stood him in more than he received profit thereby: And for the same cause Edward the third, king of England, in the first article of the treaty of Bretigni expressly excepted, that all royalties should be given unto himself in those countries which he had by inheritance in France; lest he should for them have been enforced to have yielded fealty and homage unto the French kings. Neither for any other cause did Stephen, Vayvod of Valachia, revolt from the kings of Polonia, but for that the king of Polonia had caused his tent to be cast wide open at the same very instant that the Vayvod was therein doing unto him his homage, that so he might be seen of all men in doing of it. Which s●…ie disgrace the Vayvod took in very evil part: which is not to be marveled at in so great a lord as he, if we do but consider, that Calisthenes the nephew of Aristotle chose rather to lose his life, than after the Persian guise, in humble and devout manner upon his knees to honour Alexander the Great: albeit that Alexander courteously took them up with a kiss that so honoured him. Which was also an usual thing with the Roman emperors, when they gave unto the kings that were in their protection, their sceptres and diadems. For so Tiridates king of Armenia being come to Rome, humbled himself upon his knee before the emperor Nero, whom Nero taking by the hand, lift him up, kissed him, and taking his turban from off his head, set thereon a royal crown, and caused him to sit on his right hand. For albeit that the kingdoms were given by the Roman emperors without reservation of fealty or homage, yet so it was, that the kings laying aside their sceptres and crowns, of their own accord served the Roman emperors, some as servitors in their chambers, othersome called themselves but the Roman stewards, as adherbal king of Numidia termed himself nothing but the steward of the people of Rome. And Eumenes king of Pergame after the discomfiture and death of Mithridates king of Pontus 
The wearing of a cap was in ancient time the mark of them that were but lately made free, to cover their heads that were shaven when they were slaves.  came to Rome, and with a cap upon his head (in token of his late recovered liberty) thanked the people of Rome for the same. But Prusias king of Bythinia as often as he went into the Senate, commonly kissed the threshold of the gate, calling himself the Senate's slave: albeit that he was neither subject nor tributary, nor so much as in the Romans protection, but joined unto them in equal confederation. All these honours, were they never so great, proceeding from their own voluntary will, did little or nothing at all diminish the majesty of a sovereign prince, as doth that form of homage which is servile and constrained, and which the Tartars, Persians', and Turks esteem to be the true service of a very slave. And truly Solyman the Turkish king was about to have restored john king of Hungary into his kingdom in the year 1555, with condition to have holden the same of him in fealty and homage, without other subjection (as he by a Chiaus his ambassador, certified Sigismundus Augustus' king of Polonia) if king Ferdinand, who pretended the kingdom of Hungary to belong unto himself by inheritance, had not letted him so to do; as I have seen by the letters of Sanislaus Rosdrazeroski, a Polonian, written to Anne Mommorancie constable of France the same year 1555. And for this cause Francis the French king to hinder that Charlet of Austria should not be chosen emperor, declared unto the princes, Electors of the Empire, that the majesty of the Empire should be much debased, if they should of his vassal make their head and Emperor: wherewith the emperor not a little moved, and afterwards at the battle of Pa●…ie having taken him prisoner, would never consent unto his deliverance, until he had quite discharged the Low countries from the fealty and homage wherein they were before bound unto the French.  
But it seemeth that it is not enough to say, that Charles of Austria was vassal unto the crown of France, but that he was thereunto a liegeman also; and not only a 
Charles the fift a natural subject of these French Kings.  liegeman, but even the French kings natural subject; as borne & brought up in Flanders, than a province of the French kingdom: although many think the city of Gaunt the native place of Charles, and the cities upon the sea coast to have been excepted. For the earls of Flaunders were always accounted peers of France, even from the first beginning of that kingdom: and the sovereign royalties thereof, always before reserved unto the same, but especially at the solemn treaty of Arras betwixt Charles the seventh and Philip the second duke of Burgundy. Also Charles the fift being chosen emperor, asked leave of Francis the French king, that he might levy of his subjects the subsidy granted him at Arras, in the year 1520; whereunto the king's answer was, That he would therein do what he might, without diminishing in any thing the right of his crown: as I have seen by the instructions given to M. De la Roche-Gaucourt at such time as he was sent ambassador into Spain. Although that greater causes might have been alleged, which might have stayed Germane princes from the election of Charles the fift. For Charles of Austria was as than 
Charles the fift vassal and liegeman unto the pope and the Church of Rome.  not only the vassal, liegeman, and natural subject to the king of France, but also a liegeman unto the pope and the church of Rome, for all the countries, lands, and seignories that he then held, except that which he held of the crown of France, or of the empire; howbeit that he as then held nothing of the empire, but the lands near unto the Rhine, and Cambray: For Arnold the last of that name, county of Burgundy, gave it with the other countries to the emperor Conrade the second, in the year 1205, and after that, the emperor Charles the fourth gave it to Charles the sixt, the Dolphin, by fealty and homage, as appeareth by the investiture thereof in the treasure of France, the copy whereof we have out of the records. But at such time as he professed 
The kingdom●… of Naples and Sicily holden of the pope.  himself to be the liegeman of the bishop of Rome, in his fealty given for the kingdom of Naples, he then promised by his oath, not to take upon him either the charge of the Germane empire, if he were chosen emperor by the Germane princes; either of the dukedom of Milan; and with these conditions gave his fealty and homage un-the pope: which is not to be thought any new clause, but an ancient condition, joined unto all the acts of fealty and homage given unto the pope by the kings of Naples and Sicily, since the time that pope Vrban the fift, therein invested Charles of France brother unto king jews. And in the investiture of that kingdom, made by Innocent the fourth, unto Edmond the son of Henry king of England, in the year 1255, the copy whereof we have written out of the Vatican records, are these words, Ego Henricus, Dei gratia Rex Angliae, nomine Edmundi filij nostri Regis Siciliae, plenum & ligeum vassallagium facio ecclesiae Romana. viz. I Henry, by the grace of God king of England, in the name of Edmund our son, king of Sicily, yield full and liege homage unto the church of Rome, etc. And in the act of fealty and liege homage given by Robert king of Sicily, in the 1338, he by oath promised never to receive the imperial crown, neither the dukedom of Milan, nor any signory whatsoever in Tuscanie, upon pain of the loss of all such right as he might pretend unto the kingdoms of Naples and Sicily. The like is also found given by Charles king of Naples, in the year 1295: and by queen jone in the year 1348, as I have read in the register of the Vatican. And for this only cause pope julius the second refused to invest Ferdinand king of Arragon, Charles' the fift the emperors grandfather by the mother's side, in the kingdom of Naples, but upon the conditions I have aforesaid: and a yearly rent of eight thousand ounces of gold, or of four score thousand crowns, which the 
The ounce is worth ten crowns  kings of Naples were bound to pay every year, and a white ambling gelding, beside the aid expressed in the investure, with reservation of the county of Beneuent. Which their obligation was of such consequence unto the pope's, that so soon as they denounced war unto any, the kings of Naples were strait ways in arms for the defence of the Church of Rome. So Alphonsus king of Naples, at the denunciation of pope Sextus, made war upon the state of Florence, for that they had hanged the Cardinal of Pisa, the pope's Legate a later in his pontificalibus. And in our time pope Paulus the third by his Ambassador Alexander Farnesius, summoned the emperor Charles the fift, being then with a great army in France, to make peace with the French king, so with their united forces to make war upon the Protestant princes, as was agreed upon in the first article of the treaty of Soisson, made in September in the year 1544: which haply the emperor would not have done (having had his army but a little before by the French men overthrown in Italy, and now with doubtful event making war in France) if he had not been liege vassal unto the pope, & by him threatened to lose the kingdoms of Naples and Sicily, as he was well given to understand. Which the pope did, not so much moved with the public calamity or troubled estate of the Church, as with the power of Charles, wherewith he was like to have subdued most part of Europe, had he not been letted by the arms and power of the French. And albeit that in the year 1528, by the treaty made betwixt pope Clement the seven and his Cardinals, besieged in the castle S. Angelo on the one side, and the emperor Charles the fift on the other, it was set down, That the kings of Naples should for ever be acquitted of the yearly rent of 8000▪ ounces of gold, and of all the arearages, which amounted unto great sums: yet so it was, that all the rest of the points of the ancient investiture, still stood in their former force and virtue. But ever since, the Germane emperors have well known, and the pope better, (seeing Rome sacked, and himself put to ransom of 400000 ducats, after he had released the fairest rights of S. Peter's demain) what danger it was to make choice of the vassal of a sovereign prince, and the natural subject of another, to be head of the Empire: For with the forces of Germany he brought down the pope, and with the pope's power he ruinated the princes of Germany. And albeit that by the imperial title he held the duchies of Milan, of Gelder's, and other seignories of the empire, yet so it is, that he was the pope's ancient vassal & liege man, and so consequently to him first bound, & that more straightly unto the Church than to the empire. join hereunto also, that the pope's have since 
Pius Quintus the pope angry with Ferdinand the emperor for not recei●…ing of him the imperial crown.  this 300 years pretended that the emperor may not take upon him the empire, but having before of them received the imperial crown; as pope Pius the fift by his Legates sharply rebuked the emperor Ferdinand, for that he had not of him received the imperial crown, which his brother Charles had not before doubted so to receive; and had by excommunication compelled him so to do, had he not by the entreaty of king Philip his kinsman, and of the French king, otherwise appeased.  
But heresome man will say, How could it be that the emperor Charles the fift, should 
The same man cannot be liegeman to divers princ●….  be liegeman unto the pope, the French king, and the empire? seeing that no man can be liegeman unto many lords, although he have many fees holden of them all separately: For his faith and aid is due to one alone, and him the first and chiefest, without exception of any man living. And in case he be the vassal of many coheirs for one and the same fee, he is liegeman unto them all together, but not to any of them separately, considering that his fealty cannot be divided; neither can he do his liege homage unto one of them without exception, for the concurrence of the rest: yet truer it is, his fealty to be due unto one only of his patrons, whom he shall make choice of, if that his patrons cannot agreed, or else to them altogether; and that law we now use. For the condition of the vassal aught not to be made more hard, than if there were unto one man, but one heir; but it should be much harder if he should be enforeed to do many duties, many services, and many times to give his faith: and that much more the liege vassal, who cannot give unto many his faith severally, without exception.  
I here understand the liege homage properly as it is to be understood in the laws of Fees; for that our ancestors have abused this word Liege, in all their ancient treaties of alliance and oaths that they made: I remember that I have seen 48 treaties of alliance, which our kings Philip the v, and Charles the u vj. seven. and jews the xj, made with the three electors on this side the Rhine, and divers other the princes of the empire, wherein they by oath sworn betwixt the hands of the king's deputies, solemnly promised to serve them in their wars against all men, except the emperor, and the king of the Romans; vowing to be their vassals and liege men, more or less; some calling themselves councillors, some other pensioners, all liege vassals: except the Archbishop of trevers, Elector of the empire, who no otherwise called himself, but the kings confederate, and not his vassal, although he received his pension from the king, as did the other princes; who for all this held nothing of the crown of France, but were nothing but pensioners unto the French kings, to whom they gave their oath to aid them, at their charge, upon the conditions expressed in their oaths. Only the oath of the duke of gelders, and county of juliers, I will for example set down, that thereby men may judge of the rest, in Latin conceived in these words, Ego devenio vassallus ligius Caroli Regis Francorum, pro ratione quinquaginta millium scutorum auri, ante festum D. Rhemigij mihi soluendorum, etc. viz. I become liege vassal of Charles the French king, for the sum of fifty thousand crowns of gold, to be paid unto me before the feast of S. Rhemigius, etc. This oath bore date in june, in the year 1401. Yea, even betwixt king's themselves leagues were oftentimes conceived in such words, as that the one of them professed himself to be the others vassal. As in the league made betwixt Philip of Valois the French king, and Alphonsus king of Castille, in the year 1336, it is said, That they should give and receive fealty and homage the one of the other: which proceeding but of the ignorance of their ambassadors, is now better understood, as but an abuse of the words Vassal and Liege: the oaths also of the king's pensioners, and their treaties, carry no more such words.  
Wherhfore again to return from whence we have a little digressed. I say then, 
The vasia●… aught first to serve his most ancient Lord  that the emperor Charles the fift could not yield his liege fealty and homage unto the pope without exception, considering that he was liege man, peer, and natural subject unto the French king, and that the service and homage is inseparable from the person. And admit he were not the king's subject, but his liege man, or not his liege man but his vassal only; yet so it is, that in terms of right the liege homage is due unto the most ancient, and that the vassal aught to serve his most ancient Lord But if the lords be equal, and yet at variance amongst themselves for the service, he oweth aid neither to the one nor to the other: For that in matter of services or servitude, the service (for the indivisible nature thereof) is letted by the concurrence of them to whom it is to be done. For amongst equals the condition of him which forbiddeth (the service) is better: howbeit that in question of simple alliance, the aid is due unto him that is wronged and invaded in his country against the other common ally which maketh war upon him, as it commonly falleth out if the assailant have no just cause, and that after denunciation to him given by the common allies to come to some reasonable agreement, he refuse so to do.  
But most certain it is, that the natural subject aught always to preferte his natural lord above all, if he be present; as him to whom he is first bound, & from whom he cannot exempt himself. And therefore in the decrees of king jews the eleventh, and of Philip the second, duke of Burgundy, made for the order of France, the xiii article, and for the order of the golden Fleece, the ix article, it is set down, That the knights of what prince soever it be, aught to aid their natural lord, whose liege men they are, and the country wherein they were borne, against him that shall make war upon them, without any blemish to their honour; provided that their natural lord be there in person, and not otherwise, and that they signify so much unto the chief of the order whereof they are knights. Whereby it appeareth that the emperor Charles the fift could not give his faith unto the electors of the empire, but with reservation of his fealty unto the French king, and afterward unto the Pope. For beside the kingdom of Naples and Sicily, holding of the pope immediately and without mean, he was also his vassal and liege man for the kingdom of Arragon, as I have read in the records taken out of the Vatican▪ where the grant given by Peter king of Arragon is set down in these words, Ego Petrus Dei gratia Rex Arragonum, Comes Barcinonae, Dominus 
The act of the oath of the king of Arragon give to the pope.  Montispessulani, cupiens praeter Deum, principali beati Petri, & Apostolicae sedis protectione mu●…ri, tibi reverendissime pater, & Domine sum Pontifex Innocenti, & pro te, sacrosanctae Romanae Ecclesiae, & Apostolicae sedi, offero regnum meum: illudque tibi pro remedio animae meae primogenitorum meorum constituo censuale, ut annuatim de Camera Regis ducenta quinquaginta Massimitinae Apostolicae sedi reddantur: & ego ac successores mei, specialiter & fideles & obnoxi teneamur: hac autem lege perpetua seruandum forum decerno, quia spero & confido, quod tu & successores tui, quali beati, Petri manibus in regem duxeris solemniter coronandum. Actum Romae anno Christi 1204. In English thus: I Peter by the grace of God king of Arragon, County of Barcelona, Lord of Montpelier, desiring next unto God to be strengthened with the principal protection of blessed S. Peter and the Apostolical See; do offer unto thee most reverent father and high Lord, Pope Innocent, and for thee unto the most holy Church of Rome, and to the Apostolical See, my kingdom; and the same for the health of my soul and of my predecessors, I make unto thee tributary, so that out of the king's chamber shall be yearly paid unto the Apostolical See, two hundred & fifty Massimitines, & that I and my successors shall be especially bound to be (unto you) faithful and subject; and by this perpetual law decree a court to be kept: for that my hope and trust is, that thou & thy successors shalt lead us as it were with the hands of blessed Peter, to be solemnly crowned king. Enacted at Rome in the year of Christ 1204. So that kingdom of Arragon was by the Arragonian kings offered unto the Bishops of Rome, lest they should for their enormities and murders have been well beaten. But the kingdoms of Sardinia and Corsica, was by the pope's given unto the kings of Arragon (as the pope's guise is bountiful to give that is none of their own) for which kingdom the Emperor was also liege man unto the Pope, as I have scene by the investiture thereof made unto Peter the third, king of Arragon, in this sort, Pontifex Max de fratrum suorum ascensus, 
The investiture of the kingdoms of Sardinia and Corsica granted by the pope.  that in feudum regnum Sardiniae & Corsicae, proprietatem ecclesi●… Romanae etc. Per capam Auream te praesentialiter investimus, etc. Ita tamen quod tu & successores tui, praestabitis homagium ligium, vassallagium plenum, & fidelitatis juramentum, etc. Et centum equites armatos, & uno equo ad arma, & duobus equitaturis adminus per quenlibet, & quintagentis peditibus terrae vestrae de Arragonia, cum gagijs per trimestre, a die quo intrabunt terram Ecclesiae, etc. Et in super censum duorum millium marcarum argenti bonorum, & legalium strelingorun: ubicunque fuerit Romanus Pontifex in festo▪ beatorus Petri & Pauli, annis singulis, sub poena excommunicationis post quatuor menses, etc. & post tertium terminum non solueris, tu haeredesque tui, a dicto regno Sardiniae & Corsicae cadetis ex toto, & regnum ad Romanam ecklesiam revertetur. viz. The great bishop by the assent of his brethren, doth give in fee the kingdom of Sardinia and Corsica, the inheritance of the church of Rome, etc. And we personally therein, invest thee by a cape of gold, etc. yet so as that thou and thy successors shall therefore give liege homage, full vassalage, and oath of fidelity, etc. And an hundred armed horsemen, and one horse for service, and two furnitures at the lest for every one, and five hundred footmen of your country of Arragon, with pay for three months from the day that they shall enter into the territory of the church, etc. And moreover the rent of two thousand marks of good and lawful sterling money, wheresoever the pope shall be in the feast of the blessed Apostles, Peter and Paul, every year, upon pain of excommunication after four months, etc. and if after the third time thou shalt not pay it, thou and thy heirs from the said kingdom of Sardinia and Corsica, shall altogether fall; and the same kingdom shall again return unto the church of Rome. And after that, james king of Arragon, did also like homage at Valence, betwixt the hands of the pope's legate, in the year 1353, with reservation unto the pope of appeals, put in by the clergy, and abolishing of the laws and customs brought in by the kings of that country. I find also that Ferdinand, and after him Alphonsus, kings of Arragon, did the like fealty and homage in the year 1455. And in the public records of the court of Rome, are to be seen the names of the vassal kings set down in this order: the kings of Naples, Sicilia, Arragon, Sardinia, Jerusalem, England, Ireland, and Hungary. And this is the old description of such princes as 380 years ago, yielded their fealty & homage unto the bishops of Rome. And since the kingdom of Portugal, was 
The kingdom of Portugal holden of the pope.  by the valour of Henry of Benonia, taken from the Moors, the kings thereof made themselves vassals unto the bishop of Rome, and paid the yearly tribute of two thousand ducats into the bishop of Rome his treasure. And therefore Innocent the fourth, bishop of Rome, by his letters admonished the princes of the kingdom of Portugal, to appoint overseers to their prodigal king, who should also take upon them the government of the kingdom. And as for the Islands of the Canaries, Nigaries, 
The islands of the Canaries▪ holden of the pope.  and the Gorgonides; the emperor holdeth them also of the pope. We also read, that jews king of Spain, did fealty and homage unto the pope, in the year 1343, with charge to pay yearly into the chamber of Rome, four hundred florines of the weight and coin of Florence. And as for the remainder of the western Isles, and of Peru, it is certain that pope Alexander the sixt, dividing the new world betwixt the kings of Castille and Portugal, expressly kept unto himself the inheritance, the jurisdiction and sovereignty thereof, by consent of the two kings; who from that time made themselves his vassals, of all the purchases and conquests by them already gained, and that they should from that time forward, gain or make, as the Spaniards themselves have written. In like manner pope julius the second, gave unto Ferdinand king of Spain, Charles the fift, his grandfather by the mother's side, the kingdoms of Granado and Navarre; when he had driven the Moors out of the one, and Peter D'Albret out of the other, upon condition to hold them by fealty and homage of the church of Rome. For albeit that Charles the fift, the emperor pretended right unto the kingdom of Navarre, by reason of the donation to him made by German D'Foix, second wife unto king Ferdinand: yet so it was, that his ambassadors and deputies, when they came to the conference, seeing that their donation to want sure foundation, doubted not to pretend the pope's interdictions, as the surest stay of their most unjust rapines. And the cause of the interdiction was, for that Peter Albret, king of Navarre, would not at the command of pope julius the second, break faith and friendship with jews the xii, the French king, who was first called father of his country, when as he was king jews his liege vassal, and no way bound unto the pope. So that there remained 
The majesty of Charles the fift impugned by this French author.  no kingdom, not not any little territory or piece of ground, which Charles the emperor held not by fealty and homage, or whereof he could call himself a sovereign. For as for the Islands of Maiorca and Minorca, they were long time before reunited unto the kingdom of Arragon, after that they were taken from the heirs of james the Fortunate. And in the Low-countrieses, he had nothing which was not of necessity holden of the crown of France, or of the empire. And albeit that our princes have by divers leagues, granted the principality of Flanders and Artoise unto Charles the emperor, yet remaineth there a country in Burgundy, which they call the county of Charrolois, the propriety whereof belongeth unto the king of Spain, but the sovereignty thereof unto the French king, and is by the king of Spain holden in fealty: so that even for that, he is to ackdowledge himself to be our king's vassal. As for 
Title pretended by the French unto the kingdom of Castille.  the kingdom of Castille, no man doubteth (which hath but looked into the Spanish affairs) but that the kingdom of Castille by inheritance, descended unto king jews the ix. of France, in the right of Blanch his mother: yea, and the nobility of Castille by solemn acts, which are yet extant in the records of France, invited king jews to have taken upon him his mother's kingdom. Howbeit I doubt not, but that the Spaniards will reply, that Blanch, the daughter of jews the ix. married the king of Castille, upon condition that all such right unto the kingdom, as might have fallen unto her father, should now be given unto his son in law: which thing jews could not do unto the prejudice of his successors; without the consent of the states: joining thereunto also that the French kings daughters or sisters, when they are bestowed and married, can receive nothing but money of the royal possessions of the crown of France▪ And albeit that some may think that the French king might give those lands unto his daughter, as not yet united or incorporate into the crown of France; yet nevertheless there is yet extant in the records of France, a league made in the year 1369, betwixt king Charles the fift and Henry king of Castille, then driven out of his kingdom, whereby I have seen, that Henry promised as well for himself, as for his successors, to become vassal, and to hold his kingdom of Castille, of the kings of France: for that by the means of the king of France, he was again restored into his kingdom. Seeing then that the kingdom of Castille is hereditary descending unto the heirs both males and females, the successors of Henry are bound unto his deeds and promises. True it is, that the promise of Henry had not power to prejudice his successors, neither the estates of Castille, without the consent of whom, the treaty was made, if the realm of Castille had not been hereditary. But of the kingdom of France, it is otherwise to be thought and determined. And therefore it was by the wise resolved, that Philip the Fair, the French king, could not make Arthur duke of Britain, vassal unto the king of England, without the duke's consent; except he would by the same right, give up his kingdom of France unto the king of England, which he could by no sovereign power do, without the consent of the estates of France. For otherwise, his yielding of it up, should be to none effect or purpose, no more than that of king john of France, made unto the king of England in the treaty at Calais, wherein he without 
The author haply is in this partial, or 〈◊〉 mistaken.  consent of the states, yielded unto the king of England, all the right and title he had in the kingdom of France: which was again disannulled by the treaty of Chartres, whereby the king of England refused that right given unto him by such yielding up. The same is to be thought of the league of Tricasse, wherein Charles the sixt, without the consent of the states, yielded the kingdom of France unto Henry the fi●…t, king of England. And therefore pope Martin could by no request of the English, be persuaded to ratify that league, but called Charles the seventh, son to Charles the sixt, by the name of the French king: for that the kingdom of France is neither devolved by right of succession, (which they term from one intestate,) neither by testament, neither by resignation, but by virtue of the law royal, from which the kings themselves cannot derogat without the consent of the estates; which is not so in the kingdoms of Spain, England, Scotland, Naples, and Navarre.  
But cannot the imperial title (may some man haply say) make him a sovereign which is another man's vassal? As the prince or the people making a slave a magistrate seemeth thereby to have also enfranchised him; whereof there is no doubt, if he be the princes or the people's slave; for otherwise it is not lawful either for the prince, or for the people, to dispose of another man's servant: so neither have the Germane princes any power over other men's citizens or subjects, such as was Charles the fift. join hereunto 
The emperor n●… absolute sovereign.  to also, that the imperial title of the emperor carrieth with it no sovereignty: albeit that the emperor writing unto the princes of the empire, use these words, We command you, etc. You shall do this, etc. which other princes do not toward their own subjects: yea and that more is, that the prince's electors carry the titles of Butlers, esquires, and Tasters to the emperor, yet the sovereignty of the empire resteth not in the person of the emperor, but in the assembly of the states of the empire, who are able to give law unto the emperor, and to every prince of the empire in particular, in such sort as that the emperor hath not power to make any particular edict, neither peace nor war, neither to charge the subjects of the empire so much as with one impost, nor to call or dismiss the diets of the empire, without the consent of the princes. And that is it for which the emperor Maximilian the first, at the diet of Constance, holden in the year 1507, said unto the estates (the pope's legate then urging that the imperial crown was both to be requested and received of the pope,) That to take the imperial crown of the pope was but a needless ceremony, serving to no purpose; considering that the imperial authority and power depended of the estates of the empire: which in due place we will more particularly declare.  
Whereby a man may easily judge, that there are few or none absolute sovereign 
No prince in Italy which holdeth not of the pope, or of the empire.  princes. For the Venetian Commonweal excepted, there are no princes or Commonweals in Italy, which hold not of the empire, the pope, or the crown of France: which concerning the kingdom of Sicily and Naples, we have already declared. As for the duke of Milan he is a natural vassal of the empire, from which he taketh his 
The duke of Milan.  investure, and thereto payeth relief: for which the emperor Maximilian the first, in less than xv, or xuj years space, drew thence unto himself, above three hundred thousand pounds: For king jews the twelfth at one time paid therefore an hundred thousand pounds: and the Sforces had it no better cheap. For they which are now called dukes of Milan, in the remembrance of our ancestors, that is to say about an hundred and fifty years ago, were called but lieutenants, and the city itself but the ordinary chamber of the empire. And so namely john Galeace the second, and Barnabas his brother, in the investiture which they had from the emperor Charles the fourth, are simply called lieutenants of the empire. And Galeace the first being accused for charging the subjects with subsidies, without the emperors leave, was by a decree from the emperor sent prisoner unto the castle of Modene; where after he had of long time lived, he at length died; whose son Actius being by the emperor jews of Bavyere put into his father's place, for the sum of an hundred thousand crowns, obtained of him the first title of a prince, in the year 1338. And after that, Galeace the third, father in law to Lewes' duke of Orleans, paid unto the emperor Frederick the third, an hundred thousand florines, for the honour and title of a duke, in the year one thousand three hundred ninety seven.  
So say we also of the duke of Mantua, who acknowledgeth himself to hold of the 
The duke of Mantua.  German empire, and to be also a prince thereof.  
As for the duke of Ferrara he confesseth even at this present to hold part of his signory, 
The duke of Ferrara.  even Ferrara itself, of the pope, and therefore payeth a yearly rent or fee into the pope's coffers. For not long ago, viz. in the year 1372, the marquess of Este was by pope Gregory first established his lieutenant in the city of Ferrara, reserving unto the church fealty and homage, jurisdiction and sovereignty; with condition also, that he should yearly pay ten thousand florins of gold into the chamber of S. Peter, and to found an hundred men at arms paid for three months, for the defence of the Church of Rome, so often as need should require, as I have learned out of the Vatican records. And as for Rhegium and Modene, he acknowledgeth him to hold them of the empire: albeit that pope julius the second maintained them to be the Church fees, and in that quarrel made wars upon the Ferrariens and the French king, who gave them aid: as also to have the entire revenue of the fee, being before diminished by pope Alexander the sixt, in marrying his base daughter Lucrece unto the duke Alphonsus. And true it is, that the French kings long since took upon them the defence and patronage of the prince of Ferrara, since the time that Borsus, first duke of Ferrara, acknowledged himself liege vassal unto Charles the sixt, and therefore it was unto him permitted, that those dukes of Ferrara might bear the arms of France, the public acts whereof yet remain in the records of France.  
As concerning the Florentines, they of long time have pretended liberty against the 
The Florentine●…  empire, for the payment of six thousand Florines unto the emperor Rodolphe. As also do the Genoese, who as they say, were by the same emperor enfranchised. How 
The Genoese.  be it that afterwards they having received great harm from the Venetians, gave themselves into protection unto king Charles the sixt, the French king: and not long after unto the duke of Milan, who received them upon condition that they should therefore do fealty and homage unto the French kings.  
In like case they of Luca paid unto the emperor Henry the fift, twelve thousand Florines to be enfranchised; Sienna ten thousand; And Peter Gambecourt paid twelve thousand unto the emperor Charles the fourth for the signory of Pisa.  
But these were not true alienations, nor exemptions from subjection; but rather simple grants and gifts, with certain privileges to govern their estate, under the obeisance 
That a prince cannot alienat any thing of the public demain but that his successors may again resume the same.  of the empire. It was not also in the power of the emperors, neither of any prince whatsoever, to alienat any thing of the public demain, and much less of the rights of the sovereign majesty, but that it was always in the power of the successor to lay hand thereon again, as it is lawful for the lord to lay hold upon his fugitive slave. As the emperor Maximilian, having thrust his army into Italy, with the power of king jews the xii, and having brought a great fear upon all the cities of Italy, gave them well to understand: At which time the Florentines sent their ambassadors unto him, to yield unto him fealty and homage for their estate, and to obtain of him the confirmation of their privileges, which cost them forty thousand ducats. And albeit that Cosmus duke of Florence, by force of arms made himself lord of Sienna: yet so it was, that he took the investiture thereof, & yielded therefore sealtie & homage unto the king of Spain, as perpetual lieutenant of the empire. Which is sufficient reason to show, that they of Sienna were not before enfranchised or exempted from the empire; or if they were, why did then pope julius the second pay thirty thousand ducats to Maximilian the emperor, to redeem of him the liberty of Sienna, to the intent to invest therein 
* 〈◊〉.  the duke of Urbin. And yet nevertheless all that letted not, but that the duke of Florence, which had conquered it by force of arms, was constrained to take the investiture thereof of the king of Spain, and to pay therefore six hundred thousand crowns, which afterwards the king of Spain would have again repaid unto the duke of Florence, to have restored Sienna into the former estate; which he would not do, being informed that the king of Spain would have given it to the duke of Parma, to reunite Placence and Parma unto the duchy of Milan, from whence they had been before distracted. And how then could the Germane emperors, which are subjects unto the estates of the empire, alienat the demain and rights of sovereignty, in giving the rights of sovereignty unto the cities of Italy, or liberty unto the tributary people; seeing that the absolute sovereign prince cannot so do? no not so much as to distracted one clod of the public land, much less to give away the propriety. For kings and other great princes (to say truly) have not the propriety of the public domains, nay not so much as the whole use and profit: for that 
That princes have not the propriety of the public demain but only the bore use.  contenting themselves with the bore use, the rest belongeth unto the commonweal. And for that cause the Emperor Charles the fourth, granting the confirmation of the privileges to them of Perouze, joined thereunto this clause, Quoad vi●…eret: So long as he should live. And yet for all that pope julius the second took that town from the Baillions, and put it under the obeisance of the Church, from whence it was said to have been taken. And how could the cities of Italy, or duke of Florence, have any absolute sovereignty, seeing that for all differences and controversies concerning their estates, frontiers, domains, and tenors, they pled the same before the emperor, or at lest wise in the imperial chamber, where their causes are decided, and they enforced to do as is there adjudged. And albeit that they of Genes, who seemed to hold less of the empire than any one of the other towns of Italy, where by the marquess of Final (whom they had driven out of his estate) summoned before the emperor Maximilian the second, in the year 1559: and that they would receive the emperor as an arbitrator, and not as a judge or a superior: yet so it was, that the emperor taking upon him the authority of a judge, caused them before warned, to be summoned, and when that after many peremptory edicts they made not their appearance, he pronounced sentence against them, and by an herald at arms threatened to proscribe the territory of Genes if they obeyed not his censure. Now most certain it is, that there is none but the cities and towns which hold of the empire, that can be proscribed by 
Genes threatened by Maximilian the Emperor.  the imperial proscription, whether it be by sentence of the emperor, or by decree of the imperial chamber. For the imperial chamber could not have proscribed Mind, Munster, Magdeburg, and others, had they not been contained within the bounds and power of the Germane empire: much less could the emperor have proscribed Genes, if it had not been within the power of the Germane. And therefore when they of Genes had appealed from the interlocutory sentence of Maximilian unto the pope, they afterwards renouncing their appeal, yielded to the sentence, acknowledging the jurisdiction and sovereignty of the empire. And so at length the emperor gave sentence for the marquess, acknowledging himself to be a vassal unto the Germane empire, whom they of Genes would have had to have been theirs. And since that the marquess hath by that definitive sentence been maintained in possession of his marquisat, as I have seen by the letters of signor D'la Forest, ambassador for the king, dated at Vienna the xviij of july, in the year 1560: which judgement the emperor gave after he had seen the opinions of the lawyers of four universities. And not long after they were by another sentence of the same emperors, given in the month of july, in the year one thousand five hundred sixty four, condemned in a process which they had against Anthony Flisque, by them banished, who overthrew them by an appeal made unto the emperor.  
Which things although they be so plain as that there aught thereof to be no doubt, but that the cities of Italy on this side the rivers Rubicon and Tiber, excepting some few, are contained within the bounds of the Germane empire, & so have of themselves no sovereignty; yet is the same made more evident by the general consent of all the lawyers of Italy, who deny it to be lawful for any cities of Italy to make any laws or customs, contrary or derogatory to the Roman laws, published by the commandment of the emperor Frederick. And that the cities of Italy either had no right of sovereignty at all, or else renounced the same, it is manifest by that league which was made in the city of Constance; for in that league among such privileges as are confirmed unto the cities of Italy, the rights of sovereignty are expressly excepted. And therefore Alexander Imolensis of all the lawyers of his time the most skilful, saith, A certain jurisdiction to be thereby given unto the cities of Italy; but not the rights of majesty or sovereignty to be therefore unto them granted, and that even for that reason, for that the cities doubting or disagreeing about their right, the emperors were wont to appoint them judges and commissioners for the deciding of their controversies.  
Much less therefore may the imperial towns and cities contained within the 
The imperial towns and cities subject unto appeals made unto the imperial chamber  bounds of the Germane empire, pretend themselves to have any sovereignty, albeit that we see certain of them to boast of a certain show of liberty, which they of old received from the emperors; as Nuremberg from the emperor Frederick the first; Isne from Otho the third; eager from jews of Bavyere: yea and some of them there were, which not able longer to endure the hard bondage of their lords, princes of the empire, set themselves at liberty, as did the cities of ulme, Brunswic, Lubec, and others: but that which they call liberty, is but an old vacation from certain services, and an immunity from customs and tributes granted by the emperors, without any impeachment to their majesty. And therefore those cities which I have spoken of, honour the majesty of the Germane empire, receive from it laws, obey the magistrates thereof, accept of the decrees of the imperial chamber, and of the assemblies of the empire: and not only public and private judgements of princes and cities among themselves, but also the private judgements of particular men are decided by the imperial chamber, if appellation be made from the sentence which exceedeth the sum of fifty crowns. Seeing therefore that the imperial chamber may of the power of itself confirm or disannul the judgements of princes or cities, it must needs follow, that neither those princes nor cities have the power of sovereign majesty: For as a certain Poet (I know not who) saith,  Rescindere nunquam Dijs licet acta Deûm. It is not lawful for the Gods the acts of Gods t'undo. 
As for the Swissers Commonweals, we said before, them to have been rend from the 
The Swissers Commonweal●… to be subject either to the Empire or the king of France.  Germane empire, as oppressed with the tirannnie of their governors: and yet they so honour and reverence the majesty of the Germane empire, as that they in general requested of the emperor Ferdinand, to have the liberty of their privileges unto them confirmed: which is a certain form of ancient fealty, and acknowledgement that they hold their liberty of the empire. And albeit that some there be on this side the Rhine, which vaunt themselves to have sovereign power over their subjects, yet must they needs be the subjects and vassals either of our kings, or of the Germane empire. For there is no man which knoweth not (if he remember the antiquity of the French) that all the country of Lorraine, and the realm of Arles, after the death of the three children of Lothaire were divided betwixt the emperor Charles the Bald of France, and jews king of Germany his brother. As Vitald, Floard, and Lambert the best antiquaries do in their histories at large declare. Now so it is that the vassal can never prescribe for his homage towards his lord, nor the subject against the jurisdiction of his prince; and that the grants and sufferances of the emperor, and the kings of France could not prejudice either the crown or the empire: wherefore we must conclude these possessors of this majesty by sufference, to be subjects and vassals either unto ou●… kings, or to the Germane empire.  
And albeit that many think the duke of Lorraine to be an absolute sovereign, by 
The Duke of Lorraine no absolute Sovereign, but vassal of the Germane empire.  reason of the Arms that he beareth, being an armed arm, saying, as it should seem, That he holdeth nothing but of the sword: yet nevertheless so it is, that in his title he calleth himself a prince of the empire; which is indeed to acknowledge the imperial majesty. join thereunto also, that he hath usually received judges from the imperial chamber, and submitted himself to the jurisdiction thereof. For as for that that he is the last among the Germane princes, nor in their ceremonies holdeth not the place of the ancient dukes of Lorraine; that is, for that he holdeth but a little, viz. scarce the sixt part of the ancient duchy of Lorraine (a province of the Germane empire) which containeth all that country which lieth betwixt the river of the Maze and the Rhine. And therefore the dukes of Brabant, and the Germane emperors, called themselves dukes of Lorraine. So the emperor Charles the fourth, in the league which he made with john the French king, calleth himself duke of Lorraine. But this country which now is called Lorraine, is a part of the Germane empire and the duke himself a vassal of the empire. For Stephen county of Boulongne, was in that dukedom invested by the emperor Henry the first, and for that cause acknowledged himself a vassal of the empire, in the year 1019. And Frederick of Lorraine county of Vaudemont, duke Charles being dead without heir male, before Sigismond the emperor and the fathers assembled at Constance, claimed that dukedom of right to belong unto him, as next of kin; for that it was an imperial fee, whereof Isabel duke Charles his heir, who had married Renat duke of Anjou, was not (as he said) capable: which Renat denied it not to be an imperial fee, but showed many such imperial fees to have descended unto the daughters. And afterward the title coming to be tried by the sword, Renat being overthrown and taken prisoner by Frederick, could not be before delivered, until that he had married his daughter Yoland unto Anthony the son of Frederick, with condition, that if Renat died without heirs male, the duchy of Lorraine should descend unto the heirs of Frederick, & so unto the house of Vaudemont, as it is come to pass.  
Now if so it be that the dukedom of Lorraine be an imperial fee, comprehended 
The duchy of Lor●…ine devolved unto the counties of Vaudemont.  within the bounds of the Germane empire: neither the lord of Lumes nor the county of Aspremont, who are contained within the precinct of Lorraine, can challenge unto themselves any right of sovereignty, as they have done, seeing that it is plain by the law, that he which hath a limited territory, hath but the same right over every one of his subjects which are within the compass of his territory, that he hath over them all in general; except it appear, him by some special privilege to be free and from the general expressly exempted. By which reason all such as pretend a sovereignty, being enclosed within the bounds and territory of another man, may be thereof debarred: which a man cannot so easily judge of them, which in the frontiers of kingdoms, take upon them a kind of sovereign power; as do the five lords or princes in the confines of Burgundy, whom both the free counties, and the dukes have oftentimes challenged for their vassals: and for the sovereignty of whom, at such times as they had taken up arms, they obtained of the generals of both parts, that in the mean time they being free might be as neuter, until the event of the war had decided the cause: and so at length abusing the long possession of sovereignty, made of that their right, which they had but by sufferance, a perpetuity: but as we have oftentimes before said, so we must hereafter oftentimes say, That neither the right of sovereign majesty, nor the 
The right sou●…raigntie and liberty not to be prescribed agai●…st.  right of liberty, can by the client or vassal be prescribed against: and much less if it be withholden by concealment or by sufferance. In like sort the country of Bearne, betwixt the confines of France and Navarre, which the king's attorney general in the court of Paris maintained to be a province holden of the crown of France, and disallowed of the plea of the king's attorney of the parliament of Thoulouze, who had confessed it not to hold of the crown, in the year 1505; which although it remain undecided, yet the king of Navarre for all that by sufference holdeth it in sovereignty. In like case the principality of Dombes was maintained by Lizet the king's attorney, to hold in fee of the crown of France, and that the duke of Savoy had no power to give it to the empire, under the colour of being the emperors lieutenant, which he showed to be done in the most woeful times of the civil war, when as the dukes of Orleans and Burgundy had drawn all the whole kingdom into parts, in the year 1398: in like manner the princes of East Frizeland, and they which hold the territory betwixt England and Scotland, which they call the Batable ground: as also the abbot of Gosen, betwixt Metz and Pont a Mousson, who holdeth the abbey and twenty five villages, in title of sovereignty, without acknowledging any superior lord whatso. ever: as also the lords of Beavieu, willing to exempt▪ themselves from the crown of France, yielded themselves unto the empire, and so by the duke of Savoy, the emperors lieutenant, were received into the protection of the empire, from which they also by little and little exempted themselves, without acknowledging either duke, king, or emperor for their sovereign.  
As for the dukes of Savoy, the Italian doctors with one common error have holden 
The Duchy of Savoie to hold of the empire.  them to have absolute power and sovereignty, and to have so been judged by the decree of the parliament of Savoy: a thing altogether contrary unto the office of a lieutenant and vassal. And also Osazque the first precedent of Piedmont writeth, That the dukes of Savoy have obtained this power of the emperors, which they could not have as lieutenants of the empire; as Felinus the best interpreter of the law hath most truly written. For what can be more contrary unto sovereign majesty, than to profess one's self to be another man's deputy or officer, (for so the name of a lieutenant doth signify) or from whom shouldest thou think thyself to have the power of sovereignty in that province wherein thou thyself bearest rule? But even the dukes of Savoy themselves confess, and all their histories declare, this province of the Germane empire which is now called Savoy, to have been a fee of the same empire, erected into a county (holden of the empire in fealty) by Henry the fi●…t; and afterwards into a duchy by the emperor Sigismond. And evident it is the dukes always heretofore, and not long since duke Charles restored unto his country, to have yielded fealty and homage unto the emperor: and two years after, viz. in the year 1561, to have sent special letters of attorney unto the county D'Arques chief chamberlain to the emperor, to obtain for him of the emperor another investiture: for because that that which he had before taken at Ausburg, seemed not unto him in sufficient good form, as I have seen by the letters of M. D'la Forèst, ambassador for the king unto the emperor. But an hard matter it was to make such a form as should be unto him good; for that it seemeth that the title or quality of a perpetual lieutenant, doth prejudice not only unto sovereignty, but also unto the quality of a feudatory & proprietary in those lands which he holdeth of another man, if it be not by a doubtful or improper kind of speech.  
The dukes of Saxony and the counties Palatine are also perpetual lieutenants of 
The dukes of Saxony and the county Palatine lieutenants of the empire.  the empire; but that is in the emperors absence, to do justice unto the princes and imperial towns, yea even against the emperor himself, (as shall in due place be declared) and to all them which are of their government: which is a personal office, and not belonging unto lands; neither can he that taketh upon him the quality of a deputy, lieutenant, o●… governor, be feudatary or proprietary of those seignories that he holdeth of him whose lieutenant he is. And so the title of perpetual lieutenantship aught to have relation unto other countries, without the terrritorie and domains of his country of Savoy: which neither the Swissers, nor other princes of Italy & Germany could endure, and much less the French king, who holdeth nothing of the empire, whereby he might be iusticiable to the lieutenants of the empire. join hereunto also, that the Emperor Charles the fourth made Charles the sixt Dauphin of Viennois, 
Charles the fixed of France by the emperor made perpetual lieutenant of the empire.  his perpetual lieutenant, the xiv day of januarie, in the year 1378. And for that he was but nine years old, he gave him the privilege of his age, by a most ample and gracious charter, whereunto hung seals of gold, which I have read in the records of our kings. But withal made him perpetual lieutenant of the kingdom of Arles, (excepting only the county of Savoy) and that more is, gave him power of life and death over the subjects of the empire; with power also to confer honours, to impose and raise taxes, and from the same to exempt whom he saw good, to receive appeals made unto the emperor, to make peace and war, to give laws unto the subjects, and to disannul and abrogat the same, and such other like. This lieutenancy was for all the kingdom of Arles, which extended from the mountain jura (commonly called saint Claudius' mount) and the rivers Araxis and Rhodanus, unto the Alps, and the sea of Genes; all which the imperials have always pretended to be holden of the empire. But the earls of Province have long since exempted themselves from the Germane empire, amongst whom was Raymund the last, one of whose daughters was married unto jews the ninth, the French king, and the other unto Charles duke of Anjou, by which means the county of Provence is come to the house of Anjou, & from thence by the bounty of county Renat, unto the crown of France. Albeit that Philip Valois 
The soneraignty of the kingdom of Arles bought of the emperor by the French king.  the French king, had bought of the emperor Henry the fi●…t, the sovereignty of all the realm of Arles, without excepting either the county of Savoy, or the principality of Orange, or Beiavieu, which was afterwards given to Lewes' duke of Bourbon; either of the county of Provence, which was then in the house of Anjou; either of the frank county, which was given to Philip the hardy, by the emperor Charles the fourth, in the year 1362, being devolved to the empire for want of heirs male. And the sale of sovereignty of the said kingdom of Arles, was made for the sum of three hundred thousand marks of silver, with promise to 'cause it to be ratified by the princes of the empire, who afterwards consented thereunto: of which their confirmation the emperor gave john king of Bohemia surety, who sold also the town of Luques unto the same king, for an hundred and fourscore thousand florines of gold, in the year 1330. The contracts, ratifications, and quittances, are yet in the treasury of France to be seen, from whence I have the exemplifications conferred with the originals, well worthy to have been seen of them who were deputed for the affairs of Savoy, in the year 1562. But that me think well worth the marking, that in the deeds of bargain and sale, are comprised all the laws of sovereign majesty, which the Germane emperors give unto themselves in all the provinces of the kingdom of Arles: wherein are contained the Savoians, they of Belloioci, they of Provence, they of free Burgundy, which the emperor Charles the fourth gave to Philip duke of Burgundy to be possessed in the imperial right, the issues male of the counties failing. Whereby it is manifest the French kings to have the right of sovereign majesty over all the people of the kingdom of Arles, and not therefore to own any fealty or homage unto the Getman empire.  
And at the same time as it were the emperor jews of Bavatia made Edward the 
Edward the third King of England made perpetual Lieutenant of the Empire  third, king of England his perpetual lieutenant; and by his letters patents gave him power to make laws, and to administer justice to all the subjects of the empire: and that all the subjects of the empire should obey him, and in his name to yield unto him fealty and homage: which was an occasion rather sought for, than offered, for him to make war upon the French king, who then held Cambray and the castles of Creveceur, and Payerne, members of the empire: for that by the ancient leagues made betwixt the French kings and the emperors, it was provided, That they should not one of them take any thing from the other, or molest one the others sublects; as was declared unto king Edward by the imperial princes allied with him, and then assembled in the town of Hale: which is a most certain argument that the kings of France hold 
The Kingdom of France not to hold any thing of the Empire.  nothing of the empire; neither that the emperors have any right in that kingdom. Which is also expressly set down in the contract of purchase of Philip Valois, which I have here before rehearsed, which beareth this clause: And the kings and realms of France shall continued in their privileges, enfranchisments, and liberties, that they have always holden against the Germane empire, whereunto they are in nothing subject. Which was well given the emperor Sigismond to understand, at such time as he of his imperial power would have made the county of Savoy duke, in the town of Lions▪ against whom the king's officers there so opposed themselves, as that he was glad to get him out of the kingdom, at liberty to use his own power, which he did in great choler and displeasure. And this was done by the express commandment of the king, Charles the sixt, to cover two notable errors that had been before committed: the one passing by sufferance, in that the emperor Sigismond being magnifically received at Paris, and as beseemed the king's uncle, had place in a royal seat in full parliament; and the other, that afterwards he was suffered to make Seneschal D' Beaucaire knight; although the court had in this last point admonished the king, that unto him only it belonged to make knights in his own kingdom; as it had twice before been solemnly judged by two decrees against the counties of Flaunders and Nevers. Which I have the more willingly noted, to show the error of Alciat, who hath maintained, that the 
Alciat and Bartholus taxed.  French king is subject to the empire; which is a wilful error or ingratitude, considering the entertainment he had in France to teach and writ the truth: which I think not to have proceeded from him of ignorance, but in favour of the emperor Charles the fift, who drew him to Pavia, and there doubled his salary: or else to the imitation of Bartholus, author of that error, who writ the same things of the French kings that Alciat did: at such time forsooth as he was by the emperor Charles the fourth of a bastard not only made legitimat, and by him ennobled, but power also given him to take the benefit of age to him and his, which should profess to teach the laws, with arms also answerable unto his dignity and honour: viz. a Lion Azure in a field Argent. For which so many and so great benefits he writ all them to be heretics, which should deny the Germane emperor to be lord of all the world: which he seemeth to have gathered of the words of Antoninus Augustus, unto the law Rhodia; I am (saith he) the lord of the world, and law of the sea: which words seeing they were spoken but for ostentation sake, and for the augmenting of his honour, less need to be refuted; seeing that the Roman empire when it was at the greatest, (which was in the time of 
The German Empire not now the tenth part of the Roman empire.  Traian the emperor) contained scarce the thirtieth part of the world, and that the Germane empire is not now the tenth part of the Roman empire. And yet the emperor Sigismond sick of that incurable disease of ambition, sought to have brought every man's government under his, although he was in that his hope much deceived. For intruding himself to have made the duke of Lituania a king (whose country lieth above two hundred leagues from the frontiers of the empire of Germany) he sent him a crown and a sword, which for all that the duke refused, neither thought it good to change the name of the Great Duke (whereby he was called) although he had of himself shaken off the servile yoke of the Tartars, lest in so doing he might seem to have attributed his power and sovereignty unto the Germane.  
We see also that the German Emperors have sent the royal Crowns unto the 
The kings of Polonia hold nothing of the empire.  Dukes of Polonia, before they were by the Pope suffered to bear the Royal title; which they refused: and yet certain it is, that the Kings of Polonia never held any thing of the Empire. Oftentimes indeed the Germans have attempted to have subdued the Polonians, whose vain attempts the Polonians have not only repulsed, but also joined unto their kingdom the countries of Silesia and Prussia, both rent from the body of the German Empire. Which when the Prutenian knights had taken in evil part, and thereof oftentimes complained to the states of the empire, yet the emperors thought it not good for to attempt any thing against the Polonians, by whom they had known the imperial armies to have been many times repulsed and overthrown. And yet for all this, the Polonians refused not to take their royal sceptres from the bishops of Rome. True it is that the bishops of Rome of long time strive with the German 
The fruit that came of the strife betwixt the Germane emperor and the pope for the sovereign tie of the Christian Commonweal.  emperors for the sovereignty and chief government of the Christian Commonweal, and as chieftains of the faction, drew all the Christian princes and cities into arms; so that many cities and Commonweals, especially in Italy, were at such mortal hatred amongst themselves, as that they received not greater harm from the enemies of the Christian religion and name, than they did from one another. Neither wanted there some which writ in earnest, all Christian kings to be the bishop of Rome's clients and vassals; and in case that they were foolish, furious, or prodigal, that they might have overseers appointed over them by the pope: which we have before said, to have been done by pope Innocent the fourth, against the king of Portugal. And albe it that pope Innocent said, That his meaning therein was not in any thing to prejudice the regal power, in appointing such an overseer; yet did not his sayings at all agreed with his doings. Pope Vrban the fift also made no doubt, to make legitimate Henry the bastard king of Castille, so to thrust out of his kingdom his brother Peter, borne in lawful wedlock: who thereupon, by the power of the French, was not only thrust out of his kingdom, but s●…aine also by his bastard brother. Some there have been also 
The immoderate and absurd pow oer which some attribute unto the pope.  which have passed further, saying that the pope hath in power jurisdiction over the emperor; but over all other kings and princes really and indeed: excepting over the French king, whom the canonists themselves confess, indeed, and ofright to acknowledge none greater than himself under God. Which Belluga a Spanish doctor, and Oldrade the beauty of his time do also better declare, saying that the French king neither in fact nor of right acknowledgeth any prince of the world superior unto himself. But these great clerks which thus give the pope's power over other princes, have no better reason for that they say, than the authority of pope Gelasius, who hath written, That the pope hath power to despoil all kings and princes of their sovereignty and power. And some others there be which have maintained, That appeals may be made from all people and princes unto the pope, That there is none but the emperor and the pope which can revoke their own decrees, and deptive other kings and princes of their sovereignty and rule; That there is no prince but he, unto whom the pope hath confirmed his principality: And that which of all other is most absurd, that he of himself may give privileges, exemptions, and immunities unto another prince's subjects contrary to the decrees and laws of all princes; and that he is the only and supreme umpiere and judge of all man's laws. And what marvel if he rule over princes, which commandeth over angels? For so truly Clement V P. M. doubted not to command the angels. Yea some there be that have written, That so often as the pope shall put this clause to his rescripts, De plenitudine potestatis, Of the fullness of our power: so often doth he therein deerogate from the laws of all princes. And albeit that some have holden also, That we must rest upon that that the pope saith, without farther inquire of the verity thereof; yet so it is nevertheless, that Baldus hath written, That a man may say unto him, salva reverentia vestra, By your reverences leave. And upon the maxim set down by the canonists, That the pope can do all: the divines granting it to be so, do yet more subtly, and as it were in two words moderate the same, clave non errant, The key not erring. And forasmuch as it is every good subjects part to maintain the greatness and majesty of their own princes, I will not enter into the disputes of jaques de Terranne the pope's chamberlain, nor of Capito, nor of M. Charles du Moulin, and others, who have oftentimes overshot themselves either of set purpose, or else pressed with violent passions, have unawares entered into matter of religion, and so carried away either with love or hatred of the pope, have filled their writings with railings. Whereas I here speak not but of temporal sovereignty, which is the subject that I entreat of, (whereof they speak not) to the end it may be understood, who be absolute sovereign princes; and whether the other princes be subject unto the emperor, or the pope, or not.  
For at the beginning, after that pope Gregory (he which first called himself the servant 
The beginning of the pope's greatness.  of the servants of God) had obtained of Phocas emperor of Constantinople, the prerogative over all the bishops; his successors after turning the spiritual power into the temporal, by little and little still increased their power, in so much that the princes as well for the fear they then had towards God, as for the dignity of the prelacy, began to reverence them much more than in former times; but much more after that the empire of the East began to decline, which was after that the pope's had by their interdictions forbidden the people of Italy their obedience unto the Constantinopolitan emperors, or to pay them any tribute; upon occasion taken, that Leo the emperor, surnamed Monomachus, or the Image breaker, and also Thomas the emperor, had caused the images of Saints to be cast down and broken: wherewith the people moved, and enraged with the authority of the bishop of Rome, slew Thomas in the temple of Saint Sophia. Wherhfore the power of the Greek empire being weakened in the East, by the incursions of the Barbarians; and the Greek emperors out of hope again to recover Italy; the kings of Lombardie then also doing what they might to make themselves lords of all Italy, and the pope's also on their parts no less desirous to have therein a share, and finding themselves too weak to make their party good against the Lombard kings, upon this difference cast themselves into the protection of the kings of France, who then were the greatest monarchs of Christendom; wherein they were not of their hope deceived. For hereupon, Pippin grand 
The pope's put themselves into the protection of the French Kings, Pipin and Charlemaigne his son, the pope's great champion.  M r. of France (a man of great wealth and power, who then disposed of all the affairs of the realm) with a great army passing over the Alps, overthrew and discomfited the power of the Lombard's, and afterward going to Rome, was the first that gave unto pope Zacharie, part of the signory of Italy, who had before crowned him king of France, forbidding the peers and people of France to make choice of any other for their kings but of the house of Pippin, having publicly pronounced king Childerike for his sottishness to be unable for the government. Whereunto the people of France made so much the less resistance, for that Pippin then had the nobility and the army of France at command: and for that the pope (who as then was esteemed as a God upon earth) was the author thereof, unto whom Pipin had before solemnly promised, and given him letters patents thereof, That if he should become victorious over the Lombard's, he should give unto the Church of Rome the Exa●…chat of Ravenna, which contained thirty cities, and the province of Pentapole, which contained sixteen cities more: which he after the victory performed, laying the keys of the said cities upon Saint Peter's altar: yet reserving unto himself and his successors in the crown of France, the sovereignty of both the provinces; and that more is, power also to choose the pope's. Whereunto the pope not only willingly granted, but almost persuaded Pippin to take upon him the name of an emperor: which title none then used, but the emperors of Constantinople. But Pipin being dead, the Lombard's again took up arms, to the great disquiet of the pope's, who again had recourse unto the French kings, as unto a most sure sanctuary. Whereupon Charles, Pipin his son (for his many and worthy victories surnamed the Great) with a strong army passing the Alps, not only overthrew the king of the Lombard's, but even their kingdom also: and having surely established the power of the Roman bishops, was by them called Emperor: and they again by Charles so long as he lived, all chosen bishops of Rome. But after the death of this Charlemaigne, they which were of great credit in Rome, caused themselves to be chosen pope by the clergy, whether it were 
How the French Kings lost the prerogatione they had in the choosing of the Pope.  for the distrust they had to obtain that dignity of the kings of France, having no favour in the court; or through the negligence of the French kings, who had thereof no great care; or that it was by reason of the great civil wars which arose betwixt the children of jews the Gentle, wherewith the French kings busied, lost the prerogative they had in choosing of the chief Bishop. Yet Guitard, a good antiquary, who lived in the same time writeth, 3 pope's successively to have come into France to excuse themselves to jews the Gentle, That they had been by the clergy of Rome constrained to accept of the papal dignity, beseeching him to confirm the same: which he either as a man not desirous of glory, or else fearing to provoke the clergy (being then in great authority) did: of which his error he afterwards though to late full sore repent him; being by the college of cardinals constrained to yield up his c●…owne, & to make himself a monk, and the queen his wife a nun, shut up apart from her husband in a cloister with other nuns, who yet were again afterwards delivered by the princes and nobility of France, (disdaining to see the pride of the clergy) and so again restored unto their former honours.  
But after the death of this jews the Gentle (who was emperor of France, of Germany, and of the greater part of Italy, and Spain) the empire was divided into three kingdoms, which the brethren Charles the Bald, Lothaire, and jews, every one of them held in title of sovereignty, without acknowledging any superiority of one another; and again, the kingdom of Lothaire was divided amongst his children into three parts: unto one fell the kingdom of Lorraine, unto another the kingdom of Arles, and to the third the kingdom of Italy: jews holding Germany, and Charles the emperor, France. So their divided power began to decay, and the wealth of the bishops of Rome greatly to increase: they now succeeding one another by way of election, and in nothing acknowledging the majesty of the French kings, as they aught to have done: which came to pass especially in the time of pope Nicholas the first, 
When the pope began first to excommunicate Princes.  who better understood to manage matters of state than had his predecessors, and was the first that used the rigour of excommunication against princes, having excommunicated Lothaire the younger brother of jews king of Italy. But the children of Lothaire being afterwards dead without issue, those three kingdoms which I spoke of, viz. of Lorraine, Arles, and Italy, were divided betwixt their uncles, Charles and jews. Wherhfore jews king of Germany governed Italy, which fell unto his part, by his lieutenants and deputies; whose power was not such asto withstand the pope's, but that 
The increasing of the pope's power.  they still by little and little extended their power and government: which especially happened at such time as Guiscard the Norman had subdued the kingdom of Sicily and Naples, taken from the Greeks' and Moors; who to weaken the power of the Germane, and to reign himself the more safely in Italy, joined hands against them with the Bishops of Rome. But the posterity of Guiscard being dead without heirs male, left the kingdom of Naples and Sicily unto a woman their heir; married unto the Germane emperor Frederick the second, who going into Italy, there to confirm his power, made choice of another pope (one of his own favourites) than was he whom the college of cardinals had before chosen: which was pope Innocent the fourth, a man both for his birth and learning famous; who driven out of Italy, and coming into France (the pope's surest sanctuary) and strengthened with the wealth and power of jews the ix, the French king (whether it were for reverence of him the pope so solemnly by the cardinals chosen, or to weaken the power of the Germane) excommunicated the emperor Frederick the second: who seeing himself thereby become odious unto all men, & himself like to be forsaken even of his own subjects, & great troubles arising also against him in Italy, fearfully returned into Germany, having obtained absolution of pope Innocent, by yielding up his authority and power for any more creating of the bishops of Rome, leaving the kingdoms of Naples and Sicily unto his base son Manfred, who was also excommunicated by pope Vrban the fist: who not yet so contented, called in Charles of France, duke of Anjou, brother to king jews the ix, whom he invested in the aforesaid two realms of Naples and Sicily, reserving unto the See of Rome the county of Beneuent; fealty, homage, jurisdiction, and sovereignty for the rest; with a yearly and perpetual fee of eight thousand ounces of gold, as we have before said. After which time the house of Arragon, which by right of kindred 
Why the kings of Arragonmade themselves the pope's vassals for the kingdoms of Naples and Sicily, and submitted also unto him the rest of their kingdoms.  succeeded the posterity of Manfred, being always at odds with the house of Anjou, and so in continual wars for these kingdoms of Naples and Sicily; and seeing it not possible for them to recover them so long as the pope was their enemy, they ●…ound means to gain the pope's favour, and so made themselves the pope's vassals, not only for the kingdoms of Naples and Sicily, but also for the kingdoms of Arragon, Sardinia, Corsica, Maiorque, and Minorque: which they partly did also for to obtain the pope's pardon for their offences, as we have before said. The bishops of Rome in the mean time out of the troubles of these two great houses, increasing their own power and profit, peaceably enjoyed the territory about Rome, Spolet, and Beneuent, with a good part of Tuscanie, by virtue of the donation which we have before spoken of.  
As for the city of Rome, sometimes mistress of the world, they brought it under 
How the city of Rome was brought under the pope's obeisance.  their obeisance, having by little and little oppressed the liberty thereof, no man gainsaying them. Albeit that Charlemaigne having conquered Italy, expressly commanded that it should remain in full liberty, with power left unto the inhabitants to govern their estate, which the Roman bishops had also by their oaths confirmed; as Augustine Onuphre the pope's chamberlain writeth, and as it well appeareth by the Vatican records.  
Now if there were any sovereign prince that were a tyrant, or an heretic, or that 
The great daun, get princes were sometimes in by reason of the pope's excommunication.  had done any notorious crime, or not obeyed the pope's command; he was by the pope forthwith excommunicated: which was occasion enough to 'cause his subjects to revolt from him, and to arm other princes against him which was so excommunicated; who then had no other mean left to be again received into favour, but to make himself feudatary to the Church of Rome, and the pope's vassal. As I have before said of john king of England, who made himself vassal to Innocent the third, for the murder committed in the person of young Arthur duke of Britain. And augmented also the feodall rend of England, for the murder committed by the commandment of the king of England, in the person of Thomas Archbishop of Canterbury. As in like case it chanced for the murder committed in the person of Stanislaus archbishop of Guesne, by the commandment of the king: for which the pope excommunicated the king, and took the royal title from the kings of Polonia; enjoining also their subjects therefore (as some have written) to shave their heads behind, in such sort as we yet see them to do: which whether it be true or not, I dare not to affirm, neither could the Polonians tell me the cause thereof when I asked it of them: but manifest it is by ancient records, that after the murder of that bishop, the kings of Polonia all thought they had the power of sovereign majesty, yet were they called but by the name of dukes, until the time of Lucold duke of Polonia, who received the royal crown and title, of pope john the xxij, upon condition to pay into the pope's coffers a certain yearly tribute, which is yet at this day paid for the lamp of Saint Peter, as we 
Thomas Cramerus. Sovereignty by the pope pretended unto the Kingdom of Hungary.  read in their histories. And beside those kingdoms which we have spoke of, viz. England, Arragon, Naples, Sicily, Jerusalem, Polonia, Sardinia, Corsica, and the Canaries, all feudataries or tributaries unto the pope's, or else both together; they have also pretended the sovereignty of the kingdom of Hungary, to belong unto them, and so it is comprised in the Catalogue of the Chancery of Rome. And I have seen in the Vatican Register, an act dated in the year 1229, whereby Ladislaus the first, king of Hungary, promiseth his obedience unto pope Benedict the xii, and acknowledgeth that he aught to receive the crown at his hands. And by another act of Ladislaus the second, king of Hungary, excommunicated for the disobedience by him committed against the pope's Legate; for to have his obsolution, he bond himself to pay yearly into the pope's chamber an hundred marks of silver; which obligation beareth date the year 1280. Yet in the same Vatican register, dated in the year 1308, whereby it appeareth also, the barons of Hungary to have sharply opposed themselves against the pope's Legate, alleging Saint Stephen the first king of Hungary, to have received his crown of the pope, and that they would not endure the pope to have any such prerogative over them: and yet nevertheless they letted not, but that the king by themselves chosen, might if so pleased him 'cause himself to be crowned by the pope. And in the end of that act are many decrees of the pope's legate, concerning the state of that kingdom, with prohibitions to the kings of Hungary for alienating any the domains of the crown: which may seem to have been the cause that Andrew king of Hungary, was by Honorius the pope cited to Rome, to show why he had alienated part of the public domains. Innocentius also the third expressly enjoined the king of Hungary to fulfil his dead father's vow; threatening if he should refuse so to do, to deprive him of his kingdom, and to give it to him that was next of kin. Which a man need not to think strange in those times, seeing that at the same time we see the prohibitions made by the pope unto the counties of Tholouze, (and inserted into the Decretals) that they should not raise any new charges upon their own subjects. As for the kingdom of Jerusalem and Syria, won by Godfrey of Buillon and his allies, it is manifest that he therefore professed himself to be the pope's vassal, and to hold it of him by fealty and homage: beside that we found it comprised in the Catalogue of the feudatary kings of the church of Rome. And as concerning the Grand Masters of the honourable order of S. john Jerusalem, which was composed of eight sundtie people 
The Grand Master of S. john Hiersualem feudatory both to the king of Spain and the pope.  of divers language, they were always invested by the pope, and yet do fealty and homage unto the pope's for the sovereign power which they have over the knights of their order: albeit that they did homage also unto the emperor Charles the fist, for Tripoli in Barbary, before it fell into the hands of the Turk: as now also they do at this present unto the king Catholic, for the isle of Malta, which was upon that condition given them.  
And as for the kingdom of Navarre, under the colour of excommunication taken 
The kingdom of Navarre holden of the pope.  from Peter Albret, we said before, that it is by the kings of Spain holden of the pope's of Rome by fealty and homage. And not many years ago pope Pius the fift would under the same colour of religion, have taken also the rest that was yet left, from jone queen of Navarre, having caused her to be cited to Rome; and afterward for default and contumacy, causing her by his commissioners to be condemned: had not king Charles the ix taken upon him to protect her, as being his subject, vassal, and near kinswoman: which he gave all Christian princes to understand, unto whose majesty the proscription of that most honourable queen might well have seemed prejudicial.  
For many were of opinion that the pope was absolute sovereign lord of all the kingdoms of Christendom. And in our age, at such time as Henry the eight, king of England, was revolted from the pope, the earl of Aisimund, an Irish man, sent letters unto Henry the second the French king, (the copy whereof I have taken out of the records) whereby he offered himself to become his subject, if he should of the pope obtain the sovereignty of the kingdom of Ireland, which we said to have been under the fealty of the bishop of Rome, since the time of Innocent the third. They have also pretended themselves to have the sovereignty of Mirandula, and of the counties of Concord, Rege, Modene, Parma, & Placence, for which the pope's julius the second and third, both of them made great wars against the French king, when as yet it was most manifest those cities to depend of the Germane empire. Of Parma, and Placence there is no doubt; and the rest they confess Maud the countess to have had by inheritance, holden by fealty of the emperors, which she gave to the church of Rome.  
Now if we grant the aforesaid cities might have been given unto the bishop of 
The pope of right vassal unto the Germane empire for the cities he holdeth thereof in fee.  Rome, and to have been indeed given, as the bishops themselves vaunt; they must also confess themselves to have been vassals unto the Germane empire. But for that it seemed a dishonour to the bishop of Rome, which said himself to have power over all princes, to be accounted a vassal and client of the emperors; they said (but falsely) the sovereignty of all the cities of Italy, which were within the dominions of the Church of Rome, to have been by the emperors granted unto the bishop of Rome. And to exempt themselves, they produce a donation which I have read in the Vatican register without date or name of bishop, whereby Otho the emperor (but which Otho it is not said, when as there have been four of that name) doth give unto the church of Rome Pisaurum, Ancona, Fossabrum, and Ausun. Other letters patents also there is of the emperor Otho the fourth, unto pope Innocent the third, conceived in these words, Ego Otho quartus rex Romanorum semper Augustus, tibi domino meo papae Innocentio tertio, tuisque successoribus ecclesiae Romanae, spondeo, polliceor, & iuro, quod omnes possessiones Ecclesiae, etc. I Otho the fourth, king of the Romans, always victorious, do avow, promise, and swear, to thee my lord pope Innocent the third, and to thy successors of the church of Rome, that all the possessions of the Church, etc. And that which followeth after, containeth a most copious confirmation of all the lands and cities which then were in the dominion or patrimony of the church of Rome, whether they were given by the emperors themselves, or by any other lords or princes whatsoever: in the number of which cities are these contained: Comitatus Perusiae, Reatae, Saluiae, Interamnae, Campaniae, nee non Roman, Ferrariam, etc. Marchiam, Anconitanam, terram Comitisse Matildis & quecunque sunt circa Rodicofanum usque Ceperanum, exerchatum Ravenne, Pentapolim cum alij terris, etc. The same form of confirmation is in the Vatican records to be seen, both of Rodolph the emperor, and Charles the fourth, bearing date the year 1289, and 1368, importing that they also out of their abundance gave unto the pope and to the church of Rome so much as should be needful, and all that which Henry the fift his grandfather had before given and confirmed unto the church, that so all the occasions of discord which had before been betwixt the emperors & the pope's, might be altogether taken away. So that if these donations be good, the pope's are exempted from their fealty and homage due unto the emperors, by reason of the fees that they hold and which are members of the Germane empire. But if the emperors could not without the consent of the princes and cities of the empire, give away the public territories and rights of sovereignty; and that the imperial and public territories cannot be encroached upon; and much less the right of sovereignty and patronage, whose authority for ever over the subjects and vassals cannot be prescribed against; it must needs follow, the pope's to be the vassals of the Germane empire.  
The same we may say of the election of the bishops of Rome, which the Germane 
Right pretended by the Germane Emperors to the election of the pope.  emperors pretend of right to belong unto them. For the emperor Frederick the second to have absolution from pope Innocent the fourth, caused to be delivered unto him his letters patents, sealed with a seal of gold, dated the year 1229: whereof I have seen the extract, and of his empire the seventh, and of his reign in the kingdom of Sicily the xxij. Whereby he entirely renounceth the right of election which he had in the creating of bishops, using these words, Illum abusum abolere volentes, quem quidam praedecessorum ut electiones libere fiant & c●…nonice, We willing to abolish that abuse which some of our predecessors were known to have exercised in the elections of prelates, grant that those elections may be freely and canonically made. By which words he seemeth to renounce not only the creation of the bishop of Rome, but all other bishops also. Howbeit that in truth that right of choosing of the pope's belonged to the kings of France, and not unto the Germane princes, who have but usurped the name and title of emperors, got by the prowess and force of Charlemaigne king of France, and by him left unto his successors the kings of France, and not unto the kings of Germany: for so they were called in all the ancient treaties and histories of Germany and France, and not emperors, except those which were crowned by the pope's. But after that the power of the Germane kings was far spread in Italy, they then sought to usurp unto themselves that right of choosing of the bishops of Rome: whether it were for the increasing of their own wealth and power, or for to take away the ambition and foul corruption then used in voices giving, and in their elections. For the emperor Henry the third thrust out of his papacy Gregory the sixt, chosen pope by the clergy, and set Clement the second in his place; and afterwards 
Pope's chosen and placed by the German emperor.  compelled the clergy to swear, not from thenceforth to admit any into the papacy, without the consent of the Germane emperors; as we have learned out of the Vatican records. But Clement the second being dead, the college of Cardinals sent ambassadors unto the emperor to appoint whom he thought good to be pope, who appointed Pepon, afterwards called Damasus the second; who dead, the clergy again sent ambassadors unto the emperor, for the creating of a new pope: who sent unto them Brunon, otherwise called Leo the ix: and after him Victor the second. After whose death the clergy made choice of Frederick, and after him of Alexander the second: which when the emperor Henry the fourth understood, he sent them Cadol bishop of Parma for pope, who although he were so received in all Lombardie, yet was he thrust out by pope Alexander. After Alexander succeeded Hildebrand, otherwise called Gregory the seventh, chosen also by the clergy, who upon the grievous pain of excommunication, forbade all lay men to bestow any Ecclesiastical livings or benefices upon any whomsoever: And also excommunicated the emperor Henry the fourth, for disobeying his commandment in creating of bishops in Germany. Wherewith the emperor moved, and with his army passing over the Alps, chased this Gregory the seventh out of the city, who had holden the papacy eleven years, and placed in his stead Clement the third, who held that dignity seventeen years, against four pope's successively chosen by the clergy. After whose death Henry the 5 the emperor made Bourden pope; without regard of whom, the clergy nevertheless made choice of Calistus the second a Burgundion, who drove out Bourdin, before nominated by the emperor: and by a decree made at Worms, enforced Henry to swear never more to take upon him to bestow any spiritual livings upon any: yet with condition, that he might be in the assemblies of the Bishop's assistant, if he thought it so good. Which decree of the emperor Henry the fift is yet extant in the Vatican records, in these words, Pro salute animae meae dimitto Deo & sanctis Apostolis Petro & Paulo, sanctaeque Ecclesiae Catholicae, omnem investituram per annulum & baculum, & concedo in omnibus ecclesijs quae in imperio meo sunt, Canonicam fieri electionem. For the health of my soul I remit unto God and the holy Apostles Peter and Paul, and to the holy Catholic Church, all investiture to be made by Ring and pastoral staff, and do grant Canonical election to be made in all the Churches which are in mine Empire. Nevertheless 229 years after, the Emperor jews of Bavaria created Nicholas the fift bishop of Rome: john the two and twentieth, a Frenchman, then ●…itting as pope at avignon, who peremptorily citied the emperor to appear before him and for default & contumacy, pronounced sentence of excommunication against him: The emperor likewise on the contrary side summoned the same pope john to come before him, saying the bishops of Rome to be subject unto his edicts and commands, as emperor: and by sentence given at Rome, where Nicholas the Antipape held his seat, deprived john of his papacy. Which Nicholas afterwards retiring himself unto Pisa, was by the citizens there betrayed into the hands of pope john his mortal enemy at avignon, where he shut up in prison, for sorrow languished to death: and the emperor excommunicated, and therefore detested of all men, was forsaken of his subjects. And this was the eight emperor whom the bishop of Rome excommunicated: 
The eight emperors excommunicated by the pope were these▪ Frederick the first, Frederick the second, Philip, Conrade, Otho the fourth, jews of Bavaria▪ Henry the fourth, and Henry the fift.  after whose fall the Germane emperors thought it not good afterwards to attempt any thing against the bishops of Rome. But to the contrary the emperor Charles the fourth gave out his letters patents, in the year 1355, whereby he acknowledgeth unto pope Innocent the fift, That although he were chosen emperor by the princes, yet that he aught to take the confirmation of his election, and the imperial crown of him the pope; beginning in these words, Post pedum oscula beatorum, etc. After the kissing of your blessed feet, etc. Which words we see still repeated in all the emperors letters unto the bishop of Rome, even from the time of jews of Bavaria, until now.  
There is also extant in the Vatican, the form of the coronation of the emperors, 
Base services to be done by the emperor to the pope.  and by the emperor Charles the fourth approved; but no where more servile services: where amongst other ceremonies, the emperor is as a subdeacon to minister unto the pope whilst he is saying mass; and after divine service done, to hold his stirrup whilst he mounteth to horse, and for a certain time to lead his horse by the bridle: with divers other ceremonies at large set down in the Vatican records, which it is needless here to rehearse. And yet one thing more is worth the marking which is not in the record expressed, which is, that the emperor to receive the imperial crown, must go to seek the pope wheresoever he be, and to follow him if he chance to remove; as did the emperor Charles the fift, who being come into Italy, with hope to have go unto the* pope at Rome, being advertised of his departure thence to Bononia, was 
Clement the s●…uenth.  glad thither to follow him: that so the duty of an inferior prince towards the majesty of his superior might the more plainly be perceived. But after the death of Charles the fift, Ferdinand the emperor could not obtain, that the pope should in his absence ratify his election; but was oftentimes by the pope threatened, That he would take such order for him, as that he should have nothing to do with the affairs of the Germane empire: neither would he admit the emperors lawful excuse, until he was by the requests and meditation of the French king, and of the king of Spain appeased: which the Germane princes took in evil part, seeing they had promised unto Ferdinand to employ their whole power for the defence of the ma●…estie of the empire, against that the pope's enterprises; as I have learned by the letters of the king's ambassador, 
The humble subscription Charles the fift used in his letters to the pope.  dated at Vienna, in july 1559. And to show a greater submission of the emperors unto the pope's, the subscription of the emperors letters unto the pope, is this, Ego manus ac pedes vestrae sanctitatis deosculor, viz. I kiss the hands and feet of your Holiness. So used always the emperor Charles the fift to subscribe to his letters, when he writ unto pope Clement the seventh. Which he did not upon a feigned courtesy, but indeed in most humble and servile manner kissed the pope's feet, in the open sight of the people, and the greatest assemblies of many noble princes, at Bononia, Rome, and last of all at Marsielles in Provence, where were met together the pope, the emperor, the kings of France and Navarre, the dukes of Savoy, of Buillon, Florence, Ferrara, Vitemberg the Grand Master of Malta, with many other princes and great lords, who all kissed the pope's feet, except the dukes of Buillon and Vitemberg, Protestant princes, who had forsaken the rites and ceremonies of the church of Rome. In far more base 
The base submission of the Duke of Venice and of Frederick the second unto the pope.  sort did that duke of Venice humble himself (who of the Venetians themselves is called a dog) for that he with a rope about his neck, and creeping upon all four like a beast, so craved pardon of pope Clement the 5. But nothing was more base, than that which almost all historiographers which writ of the pope's affairs, report of the emperor Frederick the second▪ who to redeem his son out of prison, lying prostrate upon the ground at the feet of pope Alexander the fourth, suffered him to tread upon his head, if the histories be true. Whereby it is well to be perceived, the majesty of the Emperors, 
The majesty of the emperors greatly diminished by the pope  by the power (should I say) or by the outrageousness of the Bishops of Rome, to have been so diminished, as that scarce the shadow of their ancient majesty seemeth now to remain. They also say themselves to be greater than the emperors, and that so much greater, as is the Sun greater than the Moon: that is to say, six thousand six hundred forty and five times, if we will believe Ptolomee and the Arabians. And that more is, they have always pretended a right unto the empire: for the imperial seat being vacant, they have given the investitures unto them which held of the empire, and received of them their fealty: as they did of john and Luchin, viscounts of Milan, the imperial seat being empty in the year 1341, who are in the records called vassals of the church of Rome, and not of the empire; and are forbidden their odedience unto jews of Bavaria the emperor, who was then excommunicated, as we have before said. For which cause the Canonists have maintained, that the emperor cannot give up his imperial dignity unto any, but unto the pope: for which they yield this reason, That the emperors have their sovereignty of men, and the pope's of God: howbeit that both of them, as all others also in general, are of right to attribute all their power unto almighty God. Nevertheless the emperor Charles the fift worn with years and sickness, resigned his imperial dignity into the hands of the prince's electors, and sent unto them his resignation by the prince of Orange. But howsoever the Bishop of Rome pretended to have a sovereignty over all Christian princes, not only in spiritual, but also in temporal affairs; whether they got it by force of arms, or by the devotion and grant of princes; or by long possession and prescription: yet could not our kings even for any most short time endure the servitude of the bishop of Rome, nor be moved with any their excommunications, which the pope's used as firebrands to the firing of the Christian Commonweals. For these the pope's interdictions, 
The French kings not afraid of the pops ex communication.  or excommunications, were wont with other nations, to draw the subjects from the obedience and reverence of their prince: but such hath always been the love of our kings towards their people (and so I hope shall be for ever) and the loyalty of the people towards their kings: that when pope Boniface the eight saw himself nothing to prevail by his excommunication, nor that the people were to be drawn from the obedience of their king, after he had publicly excommunicated Philip the Fair, he in like manner excommunicated all the French nation, with all them which took Philip for a king. But Philip having called together an assembly of his princes, and other his nobility, and perceiving in his subjects in general a wonderful consent for the defence of his state and sovereignty: he thereupon writ letters unto Boniface (which are common in every man's hand) to reprove him of his folly: and shortly after sent Nogaret with his army into the pope's territory, who took the pope prisoner, (giving him well to understand that the king was not his subject, as he had by his Bull published) but seeing him through impatiency to become furious and mad, he set him again at liberty. Yet from that the pope's interdiction, the king by the advice of his nobility and Senate, appealed unto a general council, which had power over the pope, abusing the holy cities. For the king next unto almighty God had none his superior, unto whom he might appeal: but the pope is bound unto the decrees and commands of the council. And long tims before Philip the Victorious, and his realm being interdicted by pope Alexander the third, who would have brought him into his subjection: answered him by letters, That he held nothing of the pope, nor yet of any prince in the world. Benedict the third, and julius the second, had used the like excommunication against Charles the seventh, and jews the twelfth (who was called the Father of his country) that so as with firebrands they might inflame the people to rebellion: yet failed they both of their hope; the obedience of the subjects being in nothing diminished, but rather increased: the Bull of excommunication which the pope's legate brought into France, being by the decree of the parliament of Paris openly torn in pieces, and the legate for his presumptuousness cast in prison. And not long after john of Navarre, who called himself county Palatine, when he had made certain public notaries in France, and made legitimat certain of his bastards, by virtue of the authority which he had (as he said) from the pope, he was therefore by a decree of the parliament of Tholouze condemned of treason. True it is, that they which have thought better to assure the majesty of the kings of France against the power of the pope, have obtained the pope's bulls whilst they yet sat in the city of avignon▪ to be exempted from their power. And namely there is in the records of France a Bull of pope Clement's the fift, whereby he not only absolveth Philip the Fair and his subjects from the interdiction of Boniface the eight, but also declareth the king and the realm to be exempted from the pope's power. Pope Alexander the fourth also gave this privilege unto the realm of France, That it could not for any cause be interdicted▪ which was afterward by seven pope's successively confirmed, viz. by Gregory the viii. ix. x. xj, Clement the fourth, Vrban the fift, and Benedict the twelft; whose bul●… yet remain in the records of France: which yet seem unto me not to increase, but rather to diminish the majesty of our kings, who were never in any thing beholden unto the pope's. And that more is, the court of parliament of Paris, hath by many decrees declared that clause, Auctoritate Apostolica, By the authority Apostolical: 
The clause, Auctoritate Apostolica, usually put into the pope's bulls or decrees, rejected in France.  usually inserted into the pope's rescripts sent into France, to be voided, mere abusive, and to no purpose: and therefore it behoveth him, that would help himself by any such the pope's rescript, to protest in judgement, That he would not any way take benefit of that clause. By all which things it is plainly to be understood, not only the kings, but the kingdom of France also, to have been always free from all the pope's power and command. For as for that which john Durand himself a French writer, saith, That the French kings are subject unto the pope, so far as concerneth their oath, it needeth no refuting; as by him written being bishop of mend, and at such time as under the colour of oath joined unto contracts, the ecclesiastical judges drew unto themselves the hearing and determining of all matters: which their juggling craft was both by the king's edicts, and the decrees of the high courts of parliament, long since met withal, and taken away. But if the French king shall in his own private name contract with the pope, he may voluntarily and of his own accord bind himself unto the pope's jurisdiction, which we read to have been done by Philip Valois, at such time as he borrowed the sum of three hundred and thirty thousand florines of gold, of pope Clement the sixt, which is an ordinary clause in all obligations, in which sort the pope himself might aswell as a private man be bound also. But this money the pope may seem also not to have lent without reward; but being himself of the house of Turene, it may be thought that he for this sum so lent, procured of the king the great privileges which the counties of Turene yet at this day enjoy. Yea but I know some to pretend, that the French kings aught to receive their royal crown at the hands of the pope: for that king Pipin so received it at Saint Device in France, of pope Zacharie: as though one act in discontinued solemnities, and of so great consequence, could give a right, or establish a perpetual law: which it cannot do in the getting of the lest discontinued service; but by the prescription of 100 years: albeit that in truth the king leaveth not to be king, without any coronation or consecration, which are not things of the sovereignty. And that no man can deny, but that if the donation of the exarchat of Ravenna & Pentapolis, one of the fairest countries of all Italy, be made by the kings of France unto the pope's, and the church of Rome; it is also holden of that crown of France: seeing that the confirmation of the seignories so given, was requested of jews the Gentle, successor to Charlemaigne: which confirmation Carolus Sigonius, a most skilful man in the antiquities of Italy, writeth himself to have seen and read. Wherefrom a man may draw two most certain arguments; The one, That the donation was made by the predecessors of jews the Gentle: And the other that the sovereignty of the seignories so given, was yet reserved: For otherwise there should not have needed any of king jews his confirmation; considering that king Pipin had by law of arms won those territories from the emperors of Constantinople, & therefore might of right both give them by himself so won, and also appoint laws unto them so by him given. Albeit that the Constantinopolitan emperor sent ambassadors into France unto Pepin, to have had him to have infringed & revoked the said donation: which they could not of him obtain, but returned as they came; as is to be seen in the histories of Floardus and Sigonius. And that more is, Augustinus Onuphrius the pope's chamberlain, who had diligently searched all the Vatican records (speaking of the pope's) confesseth, that the exarchat of Ravenna, Romandiola, the duchy of Urbin, and part of Tuscanie, were given to the Church of Rome. But he speaketh not of that which I have read in the extract of the Vatican register, viz▪. john, surnamed Digitorum, to have written in letters of gold, the donation pretended to have been made by Constantine: in the end whereof are these words, Quam fabulam longi temporis mendacia finxit; which words I thought not good in any thing change: as being much stronger arguments than those of La●…. Valla, to convince the lies of Augustin Egubin, who of purpose to deceive, hath forged in Greek the donation of Constantine, to give it the more credit; whose deceit is easy to be refuted both by the manner of the style, and the knowledge of antiquity: and is sufficiently refelled by Sigonius and Onuphrius both Italians. Which is also well justified by the epistle of pope john, written in the year 876, who therein confesseth the great largeses and donations bestowed upon the church of Rome by Pipin, Charlemaigne, and his successors: and by the ancient marble table, which is yet to be seen at Ravenna, wherein are these words contained, Pipinus Pius primus amplificaendae ecclesiae u●…am aperuit, & exarchatum Ravennae cum ampliss. The rest of the inscription time hath defaced. And thus much concerning the greatness and sovereignty of our kings.  
I will not here touch the greatness and sovereignty of the Negus of Aethiopia 
The princes se●…ing the great Negus of Aethiopia no kings nor sovereigns.  commonly called Prester john, whom Paeu. iovius writeth to have fifty tributary kings under him, or (to say better) governors of Provinces, which yield unto him not only their ordinary tributes, but also their fealty and homage, and that in greater humility, than very slaves do unto their lords: as a man may see in the history of Francis Aluares a Portugal, who dwelled six years in Aethiopia, and yet nevertheless they are called kings without cause, because they be no absolute sovereigns, seeing that they be but tributaries, yielding fealty and homage unto another man.  
As for those princes which are no Christians, I have nothing to say, for the small assurance 
The Mahomitaine princes by their law forbidden to call themselves lords or sovereigns.  we have by the writings and reports of others, much differing among themselves. Yet nevertheless so it is, that in one chapter of the Alcoron, it is expressly for bidden all the mussulman (that is to say the right believing) princes, to call themselves lords, except their Caliph or great bishop their great prophet Muhamed his vicar. By means of which prohibition the Mahometan bishops have usurped absolute sovereignty above all their princes, giving kingdoms and principalities, to whom they thought good, in name and title of governments: which may be also the cause that no mussulman prince weareth a crown upon his head: albeit that before the most ancient kings of Asia and Africa did wear crowns. And namely joiada the high priest, having consecrated joas king of juda, set a crown upon his head. But the mussulman princes think that chapter not to have been made by Muhamed their law giver, but by their Caliphes, (who of many divers corrupt Alcorans made but one, long time after the death of Muhamed, defacing the rest, and for the augmenting of their majesty, to have been into their Alcoran by them inserted. But at such time as three of their great bishops had for the desire of sovereignty, at one time taken upon them the name of the great Caliph, the princes of Persia, the Curds, the Turks, the Tartars, the Sultan's of Egypt, the kings of Morocco, of Fez, of Telensin, of Tanes, of Bugia, and the people of Zenetes, and of Luntune, exempted themselves from the obeisance of the Caliphs', to hold their kingdoms in sovereignty: as also the kings of Tombut, of Guynee, of Gaoga, and other kings, which devil more into the hart of Africa, who know not the Caliphes' command, neither acknowledge any greater than themselves: except they 
divers Mahomitaine kings tributaries unto the king of portugal  which hold in fealty and homage of the king of Portugal, as the kings of calicut, of Malachi, of Cambar, and of Canor, whomethey have compelled so to do, and to pay them tribute; having also subdued all the sea coast of Africa, and of the East Indies, and almost in infinite number of places built fortresses; yea and in the island of Ormus even under the nose of the Persian king, having built a most strong castle, and straightly exacting tribute and custom of such as pass that way, or chance to arrive in the Persian gulf; and had done the like in the read sea, had not Barnagas governor of that coast, and the king of Aethiopia his subject, cut the Portugals in pieces, and razed the fortresses which they had begun to build, under the colour of alliance and amity contracted by Lopes ambassador for the king of Portugal, with the king of Aethiopia, in the year 1519. And yet for all that certain it is, that the king of Portugal was of ancient time feudatary or vassal unto the king of Castille, and the kingdom of Portugal a member 
Portugal of ancient time a member of the kingdom of Castille.  of the kingdom of Castille: which for the greater part holden by force by the Moors, was given to Henry, brother to Godfrey of Buillon, in marriage with the base daughter of Alphonsus king of Castille: from whom are descended all the kings of Portugal, since this four hundred and fifty years, unto Henry the Cardinal, who last reigned: having (of long) exempted themselves from the sovereignty of Castille, and holding divers kings their tributaries and feudataries, of whom Emanuel was the greatest, and for his martial prowess amongst the rest most famous; who vanquished the aforesaid kings, and caused them to pay him tribute. For there are now no feudatary kings in Asia, or Africa, which are not also tributary; howbeit in ancient time the kings of Persia, and the Romans, having subdued kings unto their empire, for most part made them to become their tributaries: as for such fealty and homage as is of vassals exacted, they knew not what it meant. For Philip the second, king of Macedon, being by the Romans overcome, they granted him peace upon condition, that he should pay them into their common treasure, a certain yearly tribute; which Perseus, Philip his son, afterwards refusing to pay, drew upon himself a great and heavy war, to his own utter destruction. And yet oftentimes such tributary kings had others tributary unto themselves, who had also power of life and death, and other royal sovereignties over their own subjects. So the kingdom of David was contained within the bounds of Palestine, and yet he enforced the neighbour kings to pay unto him tribute, his posterity nevertheless not long after yielding tribute unto the Egyptians, and the Assyrians. So the kings of Slavonia, and the Commonweal of Carthage used the like authority and right over the princes under their dominion, that the Romans exercised over them, enforcing them to bring their yearly tributes into their treasuries.  
Yet is there difference betwixt a tribute and a pension: for a pension is paid in respect 
Difference betwixt a pension and a tribute.  of fealty, or in time of wars to receive aid against our enemies: but a tribute is given, thereby to have peace; howbeit that he which receiveth such a pension, commonly boasteth of it, as of a tribute: as the kings of England called the pension of fifty thousand crowns, which jews the xj paid unto them by the treaty of Piqueni, by the name of a tribute; until that Elizabeth the daughter of Edward king of England was married unto Charles the eight, king jews his son. Howbeit that Philip Comines denieth it to have been either pension or tribute; yet needs it must be either the one or the other. So the Grand signor calleth the Germane emperor his tributary, for the pension which he payeth every year for the peaceable enjoying of a part of Hungary. The Venetians also, the Genoese, the Ragusians, the kings of Algiers and of Tunes, in his letters and in the conventions of peace, he calleth by the name of his great friends and allies, but accounteth them indeed his tributaries. But the great Precop Tartar, who in ancient time was sovereign of all the realms from Volga to Boristhenes, held all the princes and lords of those countries as his vassals and tributaries, who not only kneeled before himself, but stood before his ambassadors sitting: For so the Knez of Moscovie behaved himself before the ambassadors of this▪ Bohemian-tartar prince, and was therefore of other princes commonly called but by the name of a duke: howbeit that the dukes of Moscovie, for this and divers other such indignities cast off the servile Tartar's yoke, in the year 1524. And the first that revolted from them was B●…silius the first, who called himself The Great Chamberlain of God, and 
The Moscovi●… an absolute sovereign prince.  King of Moscovie: and so he which at this present reigneth, in despite that other princes term him but a duke, styleth himself The Great Emperor: as in truth he in power either excelleth, or is equal unto the greatest kings his neighbours, excepting the kings of the Turks▪ albeit that the right of sovereign majesty be not defined by the spaciousness of places, or the greatness of countries, as if that might make a prince either 
The notable saying of Eumenes to king Antigonus.  more or less sovereign: as Eumenes being overthrown, and having nothing left him of his own more than the castle wherein he was besieged, yet when as he was to treat of peace with Antigonus king of Asia (who as he was in power, would also in honour have seemed to have been his superior) answered, That he 
* Plutar. in Eumene.  acknowledged no man greater than himself, so long as he had his sword in his hand.  
And yet among sovereign princes there is a certain prerogative of honour due 
Degrees of honour among sovereign princes being equal.  unto the more ancient monarchs and Commonweals, although they be in wealth & power inferior unto them that be more new or of later time: as we see amongst the xiii Cantons of the Swissers, who are all sovereigns, acknowledging neither prince nor monarch in the world for their sovereign: the Canton of Zurich in all their assemblies 
The order of the Cantons of the Swissars.  hath the prerogative of honour: For their deputy as a prince in the name of all the rest of the Cantons, receiveth and dismisseth the ambassadors of other kings and Commonweals; and unto him only it belongeth to call a general assembly of all the states of the Cantons, and again to dismiss the same; albeit that the Canton of Berne be much greater and stronger: Next unto them of Berne, are Lucerne, and Vri, albeit that they are defended neither with walls nor ditches, no more than are the Schwits, and Vnderuald, which follow in order unto them of Vri: then follow after them Zug, Glaris, basil, Friburg, and Soleurre. Now haply a man may say, That this is done according to the time that every Canton entered into their alliance: which is not so; for by their treaties it appeareth, that the first that entered in that confederation and alliance were they of Vri, Schwits, Zug, and Vnderuald.  
Sometimes also the more ancient monarchs and Commonweals loose their prerogative of honour; as when they put themselves into the protection of latter princes, 
Degrees of honour betwixt sovereign princes being in alliance together.  or yield themselves tributaries: in which case it is most certain, that they are always less than the other into whose protection they put themselves, or unto whom they pay tribute. As it chanced almost to all kings and princes which sought the protection of the Romans: whereas others which were come into equal alliance with them, as the Hed●…i, were in their leagues called their confederates, their equals and brethren: and yet for all that, they in truth and effect were inferior unto them in honour. And verily Augustus the emperor showed himself wonderful ceremonious and difficult in the honours which he bestowed on kings and princes, allies and under the protection of the empire of Rome; making Tetrarques, inferior unto Ethnarques, and these inferiors unto kings; and the more ancient allies of the Romans, superiors unto the rest that came into their alliance after them. And albeit that the Romans in the flourishing time of their popular estate, seemed not much careful of such ceremonies of dignity and honour which is of kings and princes more regarded, yet did Q. Martius Philippus their ambassador show himself therein curious: Who contending with Perseus' king of Macedon, which of them should come over the river upon the frontiers of Macedon, unto the other: and Perseus for that he was a king, refusing to come over unto the Roman ambassador, the ambassador yet by sweet speech drew him over: Which he did (as he said unto the ambassadors of the allies and confederates there present with him) to show that the honour of the Romans was greater than that of the Macedonian kings; who for all that would in nothing give place unto the Romans. Yet was there a greater cause than that, which Martius, or else Livy omitted, which was forthat Philip the father of Perseus had upon conditions, received peace of the Romans and also paid unto them tribute; which his father Philip's act, if he had disliked, he should not have meddled with the kingdom: although that he was otherwise unworthy thereof, who his father yet living, had aspired unto his inheritance: and being but borne of a concubine, had slain his brother borne in lawful marriage. But after that he overthrown and vanquished by Paulus Aemilius▪ had lost the hope of his kingdom▪ he writ letters unto Aemilius, general of the Roman army, yet styling himself a king: which his letters the Roman general rejected, and would not vouchsafe to open them, except he first renounced his royal dignity, which can only agreed unto him which hath a sovereign power, subject to no other prince's command.  
And for the same cause Francis the first the French king declared unto Cardinal Bibiene the pope's legate, that the pope his master aught not to suffer the emperor Charles the fift to call himself king of Naples and of Sicily, seeing that he was but the Pope's vassal. Whereof the legate gave advertisement unto julian Cardinal de Medici's, who was afterwards pope; to the end that that title might have been razed, which as he certified him by his letters, was by the charters of fealty, forbidden the kings of Naples to take: whereas for all that, in all the records which we have got out of the Vatican, that is not only not forbidden, but the name and dignity of the king of Naples and Sicily expressly set down, as namely in the investitures of Charles of France, of Carobert, and of john. So many times ambassadors evil instructed in their master's affairs, through ignorance commit therein many notable defaults. And by the same reason we should take the royal title of a king from the king of Bohemia, who holdeth his kingdom in fealty and homage of the empire; and not for that it is so little, as many have written, that it is for that cause no kingdom, which were to measure kings by the elne: but it is, for that the country of Bohemia was by the emperor Frederick the first, for title of honour only erected a kingdom, without prejudice unto the right or sovereignty of the empire. But to say truth, this title agreeth unto none that is another man's vassal, nor hath nothing of his own in title of sovereignty. And it maybe, that for this cause pope Pius the fourth gave not the royal title to 
The title of a king belongeth not unto an other man's vassal neither to him which holdeth nothing of his own in sovereignty. The majesty of the emperor still impugned by this French author▪ and the French kings too much exalted.  Cosmus duke of Florence, albeit that he would very gladly have so done: whereof the emperor Maximilian the second, being by the French ambassador advertised, not unfitly replied, Italia non habet regem nisi Caesarem: Italy hath no king but the emperor. Although that be to be understood of the majesty of the Germane empire (whereof the Florentine state dependeth) & not of the emperor, who is himself subject unto the estate of the empire: albeit that all christian princes give him the prerogative of honour, next unto the pope, whether it be for that he is chief of the Germane empire, or else hath got it by long prescription of time. So also next unto the emperor, all other princes have used to give this prerogative of honour unto the French kings; not only for the long possession thereof, but also for that in all the world (whether you look among the Christians, or the Tartars, the Turks, the Ethyopians, the Indian's, or Barbarians) is not to be found so ancient a kingdom, or such a continual descent of kings of the same stock and line as is among the French kings. And therefore Baldus (being himself an Italian Lawyer and a subject of the empire) saith well, That the French king carrieth the crown of glory above all the kings, who have always given him that pre-eminence of honour. And there is also yet extant an epistle of pope Gregory's unto king Childebert, the beginning whereof is this: Quanto caeteros homines regia maiestas antecellit, tanto caeterarum gentium regna, regni vestri culmen excellit: by how much the royal Majesty excelleth other men, by so much doth the Majesty of your kingdom excel the kingdoms of other nations. As in truth this prerogative is unto him due: for the German emperors themselves cannot deny, but that the Germane empire was sometime a province and member of the ancient kingdom of France, conquered by the prowess of Charlemaigne king of France, and power of the French nation: but afterwards rend again from the same, being given in partition to jews of France, youngest son to jews the Gentle, at such time as Charles the Bald the French emperor held the imperial seat of the empire: Howbeit that yet nevertheless the German princes the Othons', by the grant of the Roman bishops having got the imperial title, have by little & little through the ignorance of our ambassadors usurped & taken unto themselves this prerogative of honour above the French kings. As in like case the king of Spain not many years ago would have prevented our king's ambassadors: but was at the request of M. Nowaille, ambassador for the French king, by a decree of the Venetian Senate embarred so to do, in the year 1558: and so likewise afterwards by a decree of the pope, given by the consent of all the college of Cardinals: where the pope said with a loud and clear voice, That the French kings had been always the ancient protectors of the church of Rome, and that the fairest and fruitfullest provinces of the kingdom of Spain, had been dismembered and rend from the kingdom of France: than which nothing could in that kind have been more truly spoken; for by our kings, the authority of the bishops of Rome hath been delivered from contempt, their wealth increased, and their power confirmed. 
Contention at the counsel of Trent betwixt the Spanish and French ambassadors about their places.  Wherein the pope also in some sort amended the error committed in the council of Trent; where Mendoza the Spanish ambassador, preferring himself and taking place before the French ambassador (which then was M. Lansac, assisted with the M. M. of Ferrier & Faut) was to have been compelled to have departed from the council, or else to have kept the ancient order of ambassadors, and so to have followed the French ambassadors: who withstanding the Spanish ambassadors presumption, requested that he might not so invert the order of the ambassadors: saying, that otherwise he would himself forsake the Council, and 'cause the French bishops to departed thence also. Whereunto the Spanish ambassador craftily answered, That as he would not go before the French ambassador, so would he not be enforced to follow him; and so took his place by himself apart from all the rest of the ambassadors. Yet notwithstanding these two former decrees which I have spoken of, the Spanish ambassador not long after at Vienna in Austria, earnestly requested of the emperor, That he might go in the same degree and order with the French ambassador; or that they might at leastwise go foremost by turns (as did the Roman Consuls, who had the pre-eminence, the twelve sergeants, and power to command, successively, each of them his day) which Henry the second the French king hearing of, writ again to his ambassador, That prerogative of dignity to be of so great moment and consequence, as that nothing therein was by him to be said or done more than he had commission for. And Ferdinand the emperor not willing to offend either the one or the other, thought it good to forbidden them both from coming together, either unto sermons or other public 
A good order for the avoiding of contention betwixt the ambassadors of great princes, for their places.  assemblies. The Senate of Polonia troubled with the same difficulty, thought it not good to prefer one ambassador before another, neither to prefer them by turns, or yet to make them equal: but decreed of all ambassadors in general, that as every of them first came into the frontiers of the kingdom of Polonia, so should they be first in order heard. And so accordingly M. De Monluc bishop of Valence (who for his wisdom and dexterity for managing of matters of estate, had been fifteen times ambassador) having by great celerity prevented the Spanish ambassador, had also first audience; wherewith the Spanish ambassador offended, would as then say nothing: as I have understood by M. de Nowaille abbot of Belle-iste, a man of great honour and virtue; who then was also ambassador into Polonia, as he now is at Constantinople. But before the year 1558, never Christian prince made question of the pre-eminence of the French ambassadors before them of Spain: and namely the English men always preferred them before the Spaniard; albeit that they had been ancient allies and friends unto the one, and enemies unto the other. As after the death of queen Marie, in the chapter holden by the knights of the most honourable order of the Garter, upon Saint George's eve, in the year 1555, concerning the conferring 
The French preferred before the Spanish.  of honours, it was decreed, That the French kings place should be above the rest, next unto the prince on the right hand; where before was the place for Spain, while king Philip was married unto the queen. And the next day after being Saint George's day, a day of great solemnity unto the knights of that order, a seat was accordingly reserved for the French king, on the right hand next unto the prince: and another on the left hand for the king of Spain, next unto the emperors seat on the same side, being then empty. And afterward in the time of Charles the ix, the queen of England caused to be sent unto him the banner of France, of the same stuff and greatness that her own was, as the king was advertised by M. de Foix then his ambassador there; and in the roll or Catalogue of these knights, which is signed every year by the queen, the French kings name is ever the first, next unto her own.  
But to take away these difficulties and jealousies betwixt princes, about their honours, which are otherwise inevitable and dangerous: it is declared in the xiii article of the ordinances of king jews the xj, touching the order of knights, that they should be placed according to the time of their receiving into the order, without prerogative of king or emperor. For every sovereign prince who is neither tributary, vassal, nor in the protection of another, may as seemeth unto him best in his own country bestow the prerogatives of honour upon whomsoever he pleaseth, and to reserve the chief place unto himself. We know right well that the Venetians, the Rhagusians, the Genoese, the Moscovites, and the Polonians, are in league with the great Turk, and yet hath he always given the prerogative of honour unto the French king, calling him in his letters the Greatest, and the Greatest among the most Great Princes of the Christians: & styleth himself The greatest of all Princes, and the chief Sarrach or Prince of the Musulmanss; that is to say, Chief Prince of the right believing or faithful, which last prerogative of honour the Christian princes themselves have given him by their letters: and as for the first title it seemeth himself to have taken it from the ancient 

  emperors of Constantinople, who bore in their arms four B. which we call Fusills, whereby thesewords are signified; 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, that is to say King of kings, reigning over kings. Which was the title that the kings 
The arms of the ancient emperors of Constantinople.  of Babylon in ancient time took upon them also, as we may see in Ezechiel, who calleth the great king Nabucodonosor 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that is to say, King of kings; for that all the kings of Asia were unto him tributaries: after which the kings of Persia having overcome the kings of Asiria, as Esdras writeth, used the same title: & after them the Parthian kings also, as Dion writeth, that Phraates the king of Parthia called himself King of kings. But neither feudatary kings which hold all their territories of others; neither dukes, marquess', counties, or other like princes can of right use the title of sovereign majesty, but only of his Highness, his Serenity, or his Excellency, as we have before said. Wherefore seeing that prince's Tributaries, and Feudadaries, are not to be accounted absolute sovereigns; neither they which are in the protection of others: let us now speak of the true marks of Sovereignty, thereby the better to know them who they be that be such.   

CHAP. X. ¶ Of the true marks of Sovereignty.  
SEeing that nothing upon earth is greater or higher, next unto God, 
Sovereign princes God his lieutenants upon earth.  than the majesty of kings and sovereign princes; for that they are in a sort created his lieutenants for the welfare of other men: it is meet diligently to consider of their majesty and power, as also who and of what sort they be; that so we may in all obedience respect and reverence their majesty, and not to think or speak of them otherwise than of the lieutenants of the most mighty and immortal God: for that he which speaketh evil of his prince unto whom he oweth all duty, doth injury unto the majesty of God himself, whose lively image he is upon earth. As God speaking unto Samuel, of whom the people of Israel had unadvisedly asked a king, It is not thee (saith God) but me whom they have despised.  
Now to the end that one may know him that is such an one (that is to say a Sovereign prince) we must know the marks, which are not common unto other subjects also: for if they were common unto others, than should there be no sovereign prince. And yet they which have writ best of or concerning a Commonweal, have not sufficiently and as it aught, manifested this point, than which none is more plentiful or more profitable in the discourse of a Commonweal▪ whether it were by them for flattery, for fear, for hatred, or by forgetfulness omitted. For when Samuel had denounced him king whom God had before chosen, and consecrated him before the people, as if he had but come by chance; he is reported to have writ a book of the power and Sovereignty of a king, which the Hebrew priests have written to have been by their kings suppressed and rend, that so they might more freely tyrannize over their subjects. Wherein Phi. Malancthon in mine opinion is deceived, who hath 
How Samuel his speech unto the people concerning the power of a king, by them demanded, is to be understood.  thought those things which Samuel spoke unto the people, concerning the cruelty or insolency of tyrants, to belong unto the right of sovereign majesty: Whereas he in that his Oration unto the people, would have reclaimed them from the alteration and innovation of the state, and to have been better advised. Will you (saith he) know the custom of tyrants? It is to take away the goods of their subjects, and to dispose of them at their pleasure; to take the tenth of their labours, to ravish other men's wives, to take from them their children to abuse them, or to make of them their slaves: For the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which he useth, signifieth not lawful rights in that place, but men's customs and manner of doing. For otherwise the good prince Samuel should in all his speech be contrary unto himself: for in giving of an account before the people, of the charge that God had given him over them; Which of you (saith he) is it amongst you that can accuse me of evil, or say that I have taken of him either gold or silver, or other present whatsoever? Whereunto all the people with great applause and acclamation gave him this praise, That he had never done them wrong, nor taken any thing of any person whomsoever. Should then this good prince being of so great integrity, godliness, and justice, as he is reported to have been of, have pronounced the cruelties, insolences, and adulteries of Tyrants, as laws of Sovereignty for princes to imitate? And amongst the Greeks' there are none, who have any thing written concerning the laws of Sovereignty, except Aristotle, Polybius, and Dionysius Halicarnasseus, who have writ with so great brevity and obscurity▪ as that they seem rather to have propounded the question, than to have declared what was to be thought thereof, as not therein well resolved themselves. For there are (saith * Aristotle) three parts of a Commonweal, the 
▪ Arist. li. 4. d●… Repub.  one to take advice and council, the other to establish magistrates and officers, and every man in his charge, and the third to administer and execute justice. Here (in mine opinion) or else no where he seemeth to speak of the right of Sovereignty; for that a Commonweal can by no means receive that division, as it were of the whole into parts, except the sovereign government were also spoken of. Neither hath 
* Polyb. lib. 6▪ de militari ac domestica Rom. disciplina.  Polybius▪ also determinately defined or set down the rights and marks of Sovereignty: but in speaking of the Roman Commonwealth, he saith, That their estate was mixed of the Power royal, of the Aristocratical government, and the Popular liberty: seeing (saith he) that the people made laws and officers; the Senate▪ disposed of the provinces and common treasure, received and dismissed ambassadors, and had the managing of the greatest affairs; the Consuls held the prerogative of honour, in royal form and quality, but especially in wars, wherein they were all in all. Wherein it appeareth, that he hath touched the principal points of Sovereignty, seeing that they unto whom he attributeth the same, had the chief government of the Commonwealth. But Dionysius 
* Dioys'. Halycar lib. 4.  Halycarnasseus seemeth thereof to have written better, and more plainly than the other. For he saith, That king Servius, to take away power from the Senate, gave power to the people, to make and abolish laws, to determine of peace and war, to place and displace officers, to hear the appeals of all the magistrates. And in another place speaking of the third trouble which happened in Rome, betwixt the nobility and the people, he saith, That Marcus▪ Valerius the Consul showed unto the people, that it aught to 
* Lib. 7.  content itself, to have the power to make laws, to choose officers, to receive appeals from all the magistrates, and so to leave the rest unto the Senat. Since which time the lawyers have amplified these rights, and they of later time, much more than they before them, in the treaties which the call The rights of regalty, which they have filled with an infinite number of particularities, such as are common unto dukes, counties, barons, bishops, officers, and other subjects of sovereign princes: in such sort that they call dukes sovereign princes, as the dukes of Milan, Mantua▪ Ferrara, and Savoy: yea 
A probable error.  even some counties also dukes subjects, being all or most part blinded with this error; which hath in it a great appearance of truth. For who is there that would not deem him to be a sovereign, which giveth laws unto his subjects, which maketh peace and war, which appointeth all the officers and magistrates of his country, which imposeth tributes, and at his pleasure easeth whom he seethe good: which hath power of life and death, and in brief to dispose of the whole Commonweal. All which they before rehearsed, have power to do: and what more can a man desire in a Sovereign prince? For all these are the marks of Sovereignty. And yet nevertheless we have 
The dukes of Milan, Savoy, Ferrara, and Florence▪ with such other like great princes no sovereigns: and the reasons why  before showed that the dukes of Milan, of Savoy, of Ferrara, of Florence, and of Mantua, hold all of the empire: and that the most honourable title that they have, is to be princes and deputies of the empire: we have also said that they have their investiture from the empire: and that they yield their fealty and homage unto the empire: in brief that they are natural subjects of the empire, and borne in the territories subject unto the empire. Than how can they be absolute sovereigns? For how should he be a sovereign, which acknowledgeth the jurisdiction of another greater than himself? of one which reverseth his judgements, which correcteth his laws, which chastiseth himself, if he commit abuse? We have before showed that Galeace the first, viscount of Milan▪ was accused, attainted, convinced, and condemned of treason by the emperor, for having without leave raised taxes upon his subjects, and that he therefore died in prison. And if any of them shall contrary unto the laws, by force; sufferance, or by usurpation take upon them the sovereignty; are they therefore sovereigns? or shall they prescribe against the fealty and obedience which they own unto their prince? Seeing that they confess themselves but princes and deputies of the empire. They must then renouce the titles of princes and dukes, of Highness and Excellency, & style themselves kings, to use the title of sovereign majesty, which they cannot do, without revolting from the empire; as did Galuagno viscount of Milan, who therefore endured the grievous punishment of his rashness. We have also showed that the cities of Lombardie were subject unto the empire. In brief we had declared also the intolerable absurdities that should ensue, if the vassals should be sovereigns, especially when they have nothing but what they hold of another: and that this were nothing else but to make the subject equal with his lord, the servant with his master: he that receiveth the law, with him that giveth the law, him that oweth his obedience unto him that is to command, which seeing they are things impossible, we may well conclude that dukes, counties, and all they which hold of another man; or that receive law or commandment from another, be it by force, or otherwise by contract, are in no wise sovereigns.  
The same opinion we have of the greatest magistrates, of king's Lieutenants general, 
The greatest magistrates or lieutenants no sovereigns.  Governors, Regent's, and Dictator's; what power so ever they have, if they be bound unto the laws appeals, and command of an other man, they are not to be accounted sovereigns. For it behoveth that the marks and recognizances of sovereignty be such, as that they cannot agreed to any other, but to a sovereign prince: for otherwise if they be to be communicated with subjects, a man cannot say them to be the true marks of sovereignty. For as a crown if it be broken in pieces or opened, looseth the name of 
A fit comparison.  a crown; so sovereign majesty looseth the greatness thereof, if any way be opened to tread under foot any right thereof; as by communicating the same with subjects. And for this cause in the exchange made betwixt king Charles the fift, and the king of Navarre, for the territories of Mante and Meullan, with Montpellier, wherein the royal rights are articulated, they are said all wholly and alone to belong unto the king. It is also by the common opinion of the lawyers manifest, that those royal rights cannot by the sovereign be yielded up, distracted, or any otherwise alienated; or by any tract of time be prescribed against: and therefore Baldus calleth them Sacra Saerorum, of Sacred things the most Sacred: and Cynus Individua, things inseparable, or not to be divided. And if it chance a sovereign prince to communicate them with his subject, 
Sovereignty admitteth no companion or partaker therein.  he shall make him of his servant, his companion in the empire: in which doing he shall lose his sovereignty, and be no more a sovereign: for that he only is a sovereign, which hath none his superior or companion with himself in the same kingdom. For as the great sovereign God, cannot make another God equal unto himself, considering that he is of infinite power and greatness, and that there cannot be two infinite things, as is by natural demonstrations manifest: so also may we say, that the prince whom we have set down as the image of God, cannot make a subject equal unto himself, but that his own sovereignty must thereby be abased; which if it be so, it followeth that the administration of justice, which Aristotle maketh the third part of a Commonweal, is not the true mark of sovereignty; for that it indifferently agreeth almost to all magistrates aswell as to the prince: neither in like sort to make or displace officers; for that the prince and the subject have both this power; not only in appointing the officers servants at home, and in time of war, but even of the officers, and magistrates themselves, which command in peace or in war. For we read that the Consuls, in ancient time created the military Tribunes, who were as marshals in the army, and he whom they called the Interrex created the dictator, and the dictator appointed the colonel of the horsemen: & in every Commonweal where justice is given with fees, the lord of the fee may at his pleasure appoint officers, and without cause displace them again, if they have not their offices in recompense of some their deserts. The same opinion we have of punishments and rewards, which magistrates or captains inflict or give unto them that have deserved the same, aswell as the sovereign prince. Wherhfore it is no true mark of Sovereignty to give reward, or to inflict punishment unto such as have so deserved, sith it is common both to the prince and the magistrate: albeit that the magistrate have this power of the prince. It is also no mark of Sovereignty to have power to consult of the affairs of the state, which is the the proper charge of the privy Council, or Senate of a Commonweal; which is always divided from him which is therein sovereign; but especially in a popular estate where the sovereignty lieth in the assembly of the people, which is always an enemy unto wisdom and good council. Whereby it is to be perceived, not any one thing of those three wherein Aristotle said a Commonweal to consist, to be the true mark of Sovereignty.  
As for that which Dionysius Halycarnasseus saith of Marcus Valerius the Consul, in the Oration which he made unto the people of Rome, for the appeasing of the troubles then risen betwixt the Senate and them; That the people aught to content themselves to have the power to make laws and magistrates; that is not sufficient to declare a Sovereignty of power in them, as I have before declared concerning the magistrates. Yea the power to make laws is not the proper mark of Sovereignty, except we understand thereby the sovereign princes laws; for that the magistrate may also give laws unto them that are within the compass of his jurisdiction, so that nothing be by him decreed contrary to the edicts and laws of his sovereign prince. And to manifest this point, we must presuppose that this word Law, without any other addition, signifieth The right command of him or them, which have sovereign power above others, without exception of person: be it that such commandment concern the subjects in general, or in particular: except him or them which have given the law. Howbeit to speak more properly, A law is the command of a Sovereign concerning all his 
What law properly is.  subjects in general: or else concerning general things, as saith Festus Pompeius, as a privilege concerneth some one, or some few: which law if it be made by the privy council, or Senate of a Commonweal, it is called Senatus consultum, as the privy council: 
The difference betwixt Senatus consultum, and Plebiscitum, a decree of the Senate and of the people.  or decree of the senate. But if the vulgar people made any such command, it was called Plebiscitum, that is to say, The command of the menial people: which after many seditions and stirs, betwixt the Nobility and the common people, was in the end called a law. For the appeasing whereof all the people in the assembly of the great estates, at the request of M. Horatius the Consul made a law, that the Nobility and the Senate in general, and every one of the people in particular, should be bound to keep the decrees and laws which the common people should make, without appealing therefrom; or that the Nobility should have any voice therein. But forasmuch as the nobility and the Senate made small account of such the people's decrees and ordinances; the aforesaid law was afterward renewed, and again published, at the instance of Q. Hortentius and Pub. Philo Dictator's: From which time forward such the people's decrees were no more called Plebiscita, but simply laws, whether they concerned every man in particular, or all men in general. As for the commandments of the magistrates, they were not called laws, but only edicts. For an Edict (as M. Varro defineth it) is the command of a Magistrate; which his command bound 
What an edict is.  none, but them which were of his own jurisdiction; provided always that such his commands were not contrary unto the ordinances of the great magistrates, or to the laws and commandments of his sovereign prince, and were no longer in force than the magistrate pleased, or had charge. And for that all the magistrates were annual in the Roman Commonweal, there edicts had not force but for one year at the most. And therefore they which succeeded in the same office, were either to allow or revoke the edicts, by their predecessors before made: & if so be that they were against the laws, or for longer time than the magistratie of him that made them, than were they to none effect: which when C. Verres did, he was in these words accused by Cicero, Qui plurimum (inquit) edicto tribuunt, legem annuam appellant, tu plus edicto complecteris, quàm lege, They that attribute most (saith he) unto an edict, call it but an annual law; but thou comprehendest more in an edict, than in a law. And for that the emperor Augustus, having oppressed the liberty of the commonweal, called himself but Imperator (that is to say chief captain & Tribune of the people) he called also his own decrees by the name of edicts: but such as the people made at his request, he called them Leges juliae; which manner of speech the other emperors after him used also; in such sort, that this word Edict, is by little & little taken for a law, especially when it cometh out of the mouth of him which hath a sovereign power; be it for one, or for all, be it an edict perpetual or only provisional. Wherhfore they abuse the words, which call edicts which are proper unto magistrates by the name of laws: but in what sort soever that it be, there are none but sovereign princes, which can give laws unto their subjects, without exception, be it in general or in particular. But here might some man object, That the Senate of Rome had 
That the senate of Rome had no power to make laws, but annual decrees only.  power to make laws, & that the more part of the greatest affairs of estate, in peace or war, were in the power of the Roman Senate to determine of▪ But what the authority of a Senate is, or aught to be in every Commonweal, we shall in due place declare. But by the way to answer that that is objected, I say, that the Senate of Rome, from the expulsion of the kings, until the time of the emperors▪ had never power to make law, but only certain decrees and ordinances: which were not in force past a year, wherewith for all that the common people were not bound, and so much less the whole body and estate of the people. Wherein many are deceived and especially Conan, who saith, That the Senate had power to make a perpetual law: for Dionysius Halycarnasseus, who had diligently read the Commentaries of Marcus Varro, writeth, That the decrees of the Senate had not any force, if they were not by the people confirmed: and albeit that they were so confirmed, yet if they were not published in form of a law, they then had force but for one year. Not more than the city of Athens, where the decrees of the Senate were but annual, as saith Demosthenes in the Oration which he made against Aristocrates: and if it were a matter of importance, it was referred unto 
A pretty quip of Anacharsis.  the people to dispose thereof as they thought good: which Anacharsis the philosopher seeing merrily said, The wise and grave propound matters at Athens, and fools and mad men resolve thereof. And so the Senate in Rome did but consult, and the people command: For so Livy often times saith, Senatus decrevit, populus tussit, The Senate hath decreed, and the people commanded. Yet true it is, that the magistrates, and namely the Tribunes, often times suffered the decrees of the Senate, in a manner to have the force of laws, if the matter seemed not to impair the power of the people, or to be prejudicial unto the majesty of the estates in general. For so properly the ancient Romans said 
* Cicero pro Ra●… birio Perduellionis r●…o.  Imperium in magistratibus, auctoritatem in Senatu, potestatem in plebe, maiestatem in populo inesse dicebant, Command to be in the magistrates, authority in the senate, power in the menial people, and majesty in the people in general. For the word Majesty, is proper unto him which stirreth the helm of the sovereignty of a Commonweal. 
Majesty proper only unto a sovereign prince.  And albeit that the law julia concerning majesty made by the people at the request of Augustus, hold him guilty (Laesaemaiestatis, or as we say) of treason, which striketh a magistrate in the execution of his office: and that sometime the Latin historiographers, yea and the lawyers themselves also give the title of majesty unto the Consul and Praetor; as in saying, Maiestatem consulis, maiestatem praetoris, The majesty of the Consul, the majesty of the Praetor: yet is it but improperly spoken, neither by our laws is he guilty laesae maiestatis, that hath hurt a prince, a duke, a county, or a magistrate: but he only that hath violated the person of a sovereign prince. And so by the laws of Sigismundus Augustus king of Polonia, made in the year 1588., it is set down that the crime Laesae maiestatis, should take no place further than his own person; which is according to the true signification of laesa maiestas. And for this cause it seemeth that the dukes of Saxony, of Bavaria, of Savoy, of Lorraine, Ferrara, Florence, and Mantua, put not into their styles of honour, this word Majesty, contenting themselves with the title of Highness: and the duke of Venice with the addition of 
The duke of Venice no sovereign prince.  his Serenity, who (to speak properly) is but a very prince, that is to say, the first, for he is nothing else but the first of the gentlemen of Venice: and hath no more above the rest of the Senators, than the chief place and dignity of the Commonweal in all their assemblies, wherein he sitteth as chief; and the concluding voice into what corporation 
The order of the Venetian Commonweal.  or college he come, if there be any question of voices. And as in Rome the edicts of the magistrates bound every man in particular (so that they were not contrary to the decrees of the Senate) and the decrees of the Senate in some sort bound the magistrates (if they were not contrary to the ordinances of the common people) and the ordinances of the common people were above the decrees of the Senate; and the law of the whole body and estates of the people, was above all the rest: even so in the Venetian Commonweal, the decrees of the magistrates bind every man in particular, according to the precinct and jurisdiction of every magistrate: but the corporation and college of the Decemuiriis above particular magistrates: the Senate is above the Decemuiri, and the great Council (which is the assembly of all the gentlemen of Venice) hath the power of sovereignty, containing the Senate, and all the rest of the magistrates, within the power of the command thereof, in such sort, that if the Decemuiri be divided with even voices, they appeal unto the council of the Sages, consisting of xxii, who if they cannot agreed, the Senate is assembled, and if the matter concern the high points of sovereignty, as is the majesty of the Commonweal, than it is referred unto the great Council. And therefore when any thing is decreed by the Decemuiri these words are joined unto the decree, In consiglio Di Dieci: whereunto if the college of Sages be joined, there is also commonly added, Con la Giunta, but if it be a decree of the Senate, it is declared in these words, In Pregaidi: but if it be in the great assembly of the gentlemen of Venice, these words are commonly adjoined thereunto, In Consiglio Magiore. For in these three corporations or colleges, are almost all things dispatched which belong unto their laws, their customs, and Commonweal, except such matters which the Septemuiri (the most secret council of the State) use by themselves to determine. It is therefore but by sufferance that the Decemuiri or the Senate make decrees and ordinances, which for that they are found just and reasonable, they pass sometime into the force of law, as did the edicts of the ancient Roman Praetors, which if they were equal and just, their successors kept them: and so by tract of time were received as laws; yet for all that was it always in the power of the new Praetors to make others: neither were they bound to observe or keep them of their predecessors. But julian the lawyer gathered a great number of such of these edicts of the former Praetors, as he thought best, and after that he had interpreted them, and brought them 
Magistrates edicts confirmed by him or them that have the sovereignty become laws.  into ninety books, he gave the same unto the emperor Adrian for a present; who in recompense of so great a work, made him great Provost of the city of Rome, and thereby made way for his nephew Didius julianus, afterwards to aspire unto the Roman empire. Adrian himself also persuaded the Senate, that not only the edicts which julian had gathered, but other his own writings should be taken for laws, which he confirmed also by his authority, and yet nevertheless still held the name of edicts, which hath deceived many, who have accounted those laws as praetors edicts. So also justinian the emperor, to the example of Adrian, by decree commanded many things which the lawyers had after julian written unto the praetors decrees (after they had been by him as he thought good corrected) to be received for laws, the name of edicts still remaining, being yet indeed nothing less than edicts, but laws aswell as those which every sovereign prince in his own Commonweal by the decrees of his lawyers and courts, hath commanded to be received for laws; as it often cometh to pass in this realm, that the kings seeing divers ordinances and decrees of parliament most equal and just, have confirmed the same, and caused them to be published, and to pass in force of laws; to show that the power of the law lieth in him that hath the sovereignty: and which giveth force unto the law by these words, Sancimus jubemus, We ordain and command; which are words proper unto sovereign majesty, as saith the Consul Posthumius, in the oration which he made unto the people, Nego iniussu populi quicquam sanciri posse, quod populum teneat, I deny that any thing can be ordained without the people's command, that can bind the people. The magistrate also presenting his request unto the people, for the enacting of a law, commonly began with these words, Quod bonum, faustum, foelixque sit vobis ac Reipub. velitis, jubeatis, Will you, and command you, that which may be good, happy, and fortunate, to you, and the Commonweal. And in the end of the law are still these words, Si quis adversus eafecerit, etc. If any man shall do against these things, etc. Which they called Sanctio, that is to say an ordaining or enacting, declaring the punishments or rewards due unto them that should keep or break the law: which are special formalities and proper unto the majesty of them which had the power to make the law; but never used by the Senate in their decrees, nor by the magistrates in their edicts. join hereunto also, that the penalty annexed unto the laws of a sovereign prince, is far different from that which is joined unto the decrees or ordinances of magistrates, or of corporations and colleges, which have certain limited penalties and fines, for the most part concluded by a mercement or forfeit of money, or with whipping cheer: For there is none but the sovereign prince, which can unto his edicts join the pain of death, as it hath been also forbidden by an ancient act of parliament, and the clause of arbitrary punishment joined unto the ordinances and decrees of magistrates and governors, which ever inclusively extended unto death.  
Wherhfore let this be the first and chief mark of a sovereign prince, to be of 
The first and chief mark of sovereignty.  power to give laws to all his subjects in general, and to every one of them in particular, (yet is not that enough, but that we must join thereunto) without consent of any other greater, equal, or lesser than himself. For if a prince be bound not to make any law without consent of a greater than himself, he is then a very subject: if not without his equal, he than hath a companion: if not without the consent of his inferiors, whether it be of his subjects, of the Senate, or of the people, he is then no sovereign. And as for the names of Lords and Senators, which we oftentimes see joined unto laws, they are not thereunto set as of necessity to give thereunto force or strength, but to give unto them testimony and weight, as made by the wisdom and discretion of the chief men, so to give them the better grace, and to make them to be the better received; and not for any necessity at all. For we found the most ancient edicts of Saint Denys in France, of Philip the first, and of jews the Gross; whereunto the names and seals of the Queen's Anne and Adella, as also of Robert and Hugh are annexed: And namely in the twelft year of the reign of jews the Gross, and of Adella the sixt.  
Now when I say that the first and chief mark of Sovereignty is for the prince to 
It belongeth only unto sovereign princes to grant privileges, and what a privilege is.  be of power to give laws unto all his subjects in general, and to every one of them in particular: these last words concern privileges, which only belong unto sovereign princes to grant, and particularly to others, to whom they be granted. A privilege I call a l●…w made for one, or some few particular men: whether it be for the profit or disprofit of him or them for whom it is granted. For so speaketh Cicero, Privilegiam 
▪ Cicero pro dom●… sua et post re●… ditum in Senaetu.  de meo capite latum est, A privilege was made concerning my life, he meaneth the law made against him by the common people at the motion and instigation of Clodias the Tribune, (to have him called to accounted for certain citizens put to death contrary to their appeal, about the conspiracy of Catiline) which he in many places calleth Lex Clodia, or a Law made by Clodius, whereof he oftentimes most grievously complained, both in the Senate and before the people, saying, That by the law of the xii Tables it was forbidden any privileges to be granted, but Comitijs Centuriatis, that is to say, in the general assembly of the whole body of the people. For so be the words of the law, Privilegia nisi comitijs centuriatis ne irroganto; qui secus faxit capital esto, Privileges let them not be granted but in the greatest assemblies of the people; and he that shall otherwise do, let it be unto him death. As for such privileges as bring profit and commodity to them to whom they be granted, they are more truly called benefits. And in this all that have written of Royalties agreed, that it belongeth not to any, but unto a Sovereign, to grant privileges, exemptions, immunities, and to dispense with the edicts and ordinances of other former princes: howbeit that privileges in monarchies have not been used, but only for the term of the life of the monarch himself that granted them: as Tiberius the emperor made them all to know which had obtained any privileges from the emperor Augustus, as Suetonius writeth. But now if any shall object unto me, the magistrates themselves to discharge men oftentimes of the laws: and the Senate of Rome to have so oftentimes done. I will answer him as did Papinian the lawyer, That we are not to consider what is done at Rome, but what aught indeed to be there done. For by the tribunitial law Cornelia, the Senate is forbidden to discharge any Roman of the laws, except there were two hundred of the Senators▪ present: which exemption from the laws seemeth also to have been granted unto the Senate, by reason of the difficult assembling of the whole people.  
But some man may say, that not only the magistrates have power to make edicts and laws, every one according to his authority and jurisdiction, but also that particular men make customs, both general and particular. Which customs have almost the force of laws, and yet depend not of the judgement or power of the sovereign prince, who as he is master of the law, so are particular men masters of the customs. Whereunto I answer, that custom by little and little take force; and in many years 
〈◊〉 difference betwixt the beginning of customs and laws: and that both of them depend of the power of the sovereign prince.  by the common consent of all or most part; but the law cometh forth in a moment and taketh strength of him which hath power to command all: custom creepeth in sweetly and without force, whereas the law is commanded and published with power, yea and oftentimes contrary to the good liking of the subjects. For which cause Dion Chrisostome compareth the law to a tyrant, and custom to a king. Moreover the power of the law is much greater than the power of custom: for customs are by laws abolished, but not laws by customs; it being always in the authority and power of the magistrate again to put in execution such laws as are by custom almost out of use. Custom also propoundeth neither reward nor punishment, whereas the law always carrieth with it either the one or the other, if it be not a law permissive, which easeth the penalty of another law: and in brief custom hath no force but by sufferance, and so long as it pleaseth the sovereign prince, who may make thereof a law, by putting thereunto his own confirmation: whereby it is to be scene, that all the force of laws and customs lieth in the power of him that hath the sovereignty in a Commonweal.  
This then is the first and chiefest mark of Sovereignty, to be of power to give laws 
That the power to make laws cannot be unto subjects communicated.  and command to all in general, and to every one in particular; which cannot be communicated unto subjects. For albeit that a sovereign prince give power to any one to make laws, of such strength and virtue as if he himself had made them: as did the people of Athens to Solon, and the Lacedæmonians to Lycurgus: yet were these laws neither the laws of Solon nor Lycurgus, who were but as commissioners and procurators for them which had given them that charge; but they were the laws of the Athenians, and Lacedæmonians: neither had these laws had any force, had not the people by their consent authorised the same. They indeed wrote those laws, but the people commanded them; they composed them, but the people enacted them. And almost always in a Popular or Aristocratical state, the laws took name of him which propounded or engrossed the same, who was nothing else but the simple procurer thereof: the confirmation of the same being from him which had the sovereignty. So when the Decemuiri by the people created at Rome for the making of laws without appeal, had sent ambassadors into Greece, to amplify their laws, and in xii tables comprehended the best of them, they commanded all the people to be called together, to behold and consider of those laws publicly set up: and so at length after three Fair days (the usual time appointed for the establishing of laws) the people in their greatest and general assembly, commanded, or rather enacted them to stand for laws. But unto what power it belongeth to make a law, unto the same also it appertaineth to abrogat or derogat from the same. Under this power of making & of abrogating of the law, is also comprised the declaration & correction of the same, when it is so obscure, that the magistrates upon the cases propounded found contratietie or intolerable absurdities, yet may the magistrate according unto right and reason also interpret the laws, & incline them either unto lenity or severity: so that he beware that in bending them too much, he break them not; yea although that they seem unto him hard or unjust: but let him hear what Ulpian saith, Duralex, sic tamen scripta est, An hard law 
What power the magistrate hath to interpret the law.  (saith he) but so it is written: which if the judge shall presume under the colour of equity to break, he is by the law condemned of infamy. So aught the law called Laetoria, (or rather Praetoria) to be understood, which Papinian reciteth, without naming of the author. Whereby it is permitted unto the Great Praetor of the city of Rome, to supply, to correct or amend the laws: which must (as we said) be moderately & in a measure done: for if a man should otherwise understand it, it should thereof follow, that a simple magistrate should be above the laws, if he might at his will and pleasure altar and infringe the same: and also that he might bind both the people and the prince unto his edicts; which we have before showed to be a thing impossible.  
Under this same sovereignty of power for the giving and abrogating of the law, are 
All the other marks of sovereignty contained under the first.  comprised all the other rights & marks of sovereignty: so that (to speak properly) a man may say, that there is but this only mark of sovereign power, considering that all other the rights thereof are contained in this, viz. to have power to give laws unto all and every one of the subjects, & to receive none from them. For to denounce war unto 
Other the marks of Sovereignty  the enemy, or to make peace with him, although it seem to be a thing different from the name of the law, yet is it manifest these things to be done by the law, that is to say by the commandment of the sovereign power. So also is it proper unto sovereign majesty, to receive the subjects appeals from other, and the greatest magistrates, to place and displace the greatest officers, charge or exempt the subjects from taxes and subsidies, to grant pardons and dispensations against the rigour of the law, to have power of life and death, to increase or diminish the valour and weight of the coin, to give it title, name, and figure: to 'cause all subjects and liegemen to swear for the keeping of their fidelity without exception, unto him to whom such oath is due: which are the true marks of sovereignty, comprised under the power of being able to give a law to all in general, and to every one in particular, and not to receive any law or command from any other, but from almighty God only. For a prince or duke who hath power to give laws unto all his subjects in general, & to every one of them in particular, is yet no sovereign, if he receive his power from the emperor, the pope, or the king, or any other greater than himself: or yet have a companion in his government, a companion I say, for that he seemeth in a manner to have a superior or master, which hath a companion, without whose help and consent he can command and do nothing: much less is he a sovereign, if he be another man's lieutenant or deputy.  
But forasmuch as the word Law, is too general a mark, it is the more expedient particularly 
The second mark of Sovereignty.  to specify the rights of Sovereignty, comprised (as I have said) under that sovereign law; as to denounce war, or treat of peace, one of the greatest points of sovereign majesty: for that oftentimes it draweth after it the ruin, or assurance of a Commonweal; which is to be verified not only by the law of the Romans, but of all other nations. And for that there was more danger to be feared from war, than from peace, it was lawful for the common people of Rome, to command peace, but if question were for making of war, it might not be decreed, but in the greatest assembly of all the states together, until such time as that the menial people had also full power to make laws. And therefore was it that war was decreed against Mithridates by the law Manilia, against the pirates, by the law Gabinia, against Philip the second, king of Macedon, by the law Sulpitia: peace was also made with the Carthaginensians, by the law Martia. And for because Caesar had without command of the people made wars in France, Cato Vticensis was of opinion in the Senate, that the army was to be called home, and Caesar for his presumption deliveted unto the enemy. In like case the estates of the people of Athens determined of war and peace. As a man may see by the war by them decreed against the Megarians, against the Syracusians, and against the kings of Macedon. I here but briefly set down certain examples of two of the greatest and most famous popular Commonweals that ever yet were: For in a regal state there is none (as I suppose) which doubt all the power of peace and war to be in the king: insomuch as that for any man to attempt even the lest thing therein without the king's command, is unto the doer thereof dangerous, if the king might thereof have before been advertised: and what charge soever that they give unto their deputies or commissioners, to entreat of peace or of alliance, yet consent they unto nothing, without the advertising of the king; as was to be seen in the last treaty of Cambray, betwixt the French king & the king of Spain; the commissioners on the king's behalf writ to him from hour to hour, the whole proceed both of the one part and of the other. But in popular or Aristocratical estate, we often times see that after the war is once denounced, it is then managed by the advise of the Senate, or privy counsel only: yea and sometimes by the advice of one only captain also: 
The greatest danger in war.  for that nothing is more dangerous in war, than to have the secret policies thereof revealed: which must needs be, if the people have therein to do. And therefore we read in the Greek and Latin histories the designs and enterprises of war to have been still managed by the wisdom and direction of some one or other captain, or in case that the matter were of greater importance and consequence, by the counsel of the Senate, without any more speaking thereof unto the people, after it was once by the people's command denounced and proclaimed against this or that enemy. But if one should say, war to have been oftentimes denounced by the advice of the Senate, without the consent or command of the people: I confess it to have sometimes indeed so happened and fallen out, but yet very seldom: and that the Senate in so doing did usurp the majesty of the people: which was the cause, that the Tribunes of 
The Senate in Rome had no power to denounce war without the consent of the people.  the people, and faithful keepers of their liberty, oftentimes interposed themselves to cross the matter, as we see in Livy, where he saith: Controversia fuit utrum populi jussu indiceretur bellum, an satis esset S. C. pervicere Tribuni, ut Q. Consul de bello adpopulum ferret, omnes Centuriae iussere. Controversy was (saith he) whether war should be denounced by the commandment of the people: or else that the decree of the Senate was sufficient, but the Tribunes prevailed; so that Quintus the Consul propounded the matter unto the people, which all the assembly of the people commanded. Howbeit, that the Senate itself would not ordinarily denounce war, except the people had before so decreed, As T. Livius speaking of the second Carthaginensian war, saith, Latum inde adpopulum vellent iuberent, populo Carthaginensi bellum indici: It was afterward 
Lib. 1▪ Dec. 3.  propounded unto the people, whether they willed and commanded war to be denounced unto the people of Carthage. And in another place, Ex S. C. populi jussu bellum 
Lib. 1. Dec. 2.  praenestinis indictum. By a decree of the Senate, by commandment of the people war was proclaimed against them of Praeneste. And again, Ex authoritate patrum populus Palaepolitanis 
Lib. 8. Dec. 1.  bellum fieri jussit, The people following the authority of the Senate, commanded 
Lib. 9 Dec. 1.  war to be made against them of Palaepolis. And afterward, Populus bellum fieri Aequis jussit, The people commanded war to be made against the Aequi. And at such time as war was to be undertaken against the Samnites, Patres solemni 
Lib. 8. Dec. 1.  more indicto decreverunt, ut ea de re adpopulum ferretur, The fathers after the solemn manner decreed, that concerning that matter it should be referred unto the people: Where Livy in calling it the solemn manner, declareth it to have been a thing so used to be done. And so against the Herniques, * Populus hoc bellum frequens jussit, The 
Lib. 5. Dec. 1.  people in great number commanded this war. And against the Vestines, * Bellum ex authoritate patrum populus adversus vestinos jussit, The people following the authority of the Senators commanded war to be made against the Vestines. The like manner of denouncing war was also amongst the Tarentines, so long as their popular state endured. For so saith Plutarch, Ex authoritate Senatus populum Tarentinum Romanis in ferri bellum iussisse, The people of Tarentum following the authority of the Senate, to have commanded war to be made against the Romans. And Livy speaking of the Aetolians, which were governed by a popular government, saith it to have been by their laws forbidden, that any thing should be determined concerning peace and war, but in the Panaetolian and Pylaican counsel. And for that the nobility of Polonia, Denmark, and Sweden, pretend the right of Sovereignty to belong unto them, it is not lawful for their kings without their authority and consent either to denounce war, or to undertake it being denounced against them, except in case of urgent necessity, according to the order of Casimire the great. True it is that in Rome concerning peace the Senate oftentimes determined thereof without the consent of the people; as we may see in all the treaties of peace betwixt the Roman and the Latins: and in the confederates war the Senate passed all the treaties of peace and alliance without the people, viz. in the tumult and uproar of Italy: lest the hard assembly of the people, and danger of delay, might have brought some detriment unto the Commonweal. Yea sometimes the generals and great commanders in the wars, of themselves determined of peace and war, without the commandment of the 
No peace by the General concluded with the enemy good without the confirmation of him or them that have the sovereignty.  people or Senate, especially if the wars were in some country a far off: as we see in the second war of Carthage, the three Scipios made all the treaties of peace and alliance with the people and princes of Spain and Africa, without the advise of the Senat. Yet true it is, that the Senate, yea and often times the people authorised their actions, and ratified their treaties, after that they were made: and if they were in any thing prejudicial unto the estate, had ofthem no regard. In which case the hostages and captains yielded unto the enemy, were at their own peril to answer the matter. As the Consul Mancinus, who for that the peace he had made with the Numantines, was rejected and not ratified by the Senate and the people, was himself delivered unto the 
The Romans oftentimes disclaimed the peace by their generals made with their enemies without the consent of the people.  enemy. And that is it which a certain Senator of Carthage, as Livy reporteth by way of exprobration objected unto the Roman ambassadors, saying, Vos cum Luctatius Consul primò nobiscum fedus icit, quia neque authoritate Patrun, nec populi iuss●… ictum erat, negastis vos eo teneri. Itaque aliud foedus publico consilio ictum est. You at such time as Luctatius the Consul first made peace with us; for that it was made without the authority of the Senate, or commandment of the people, said you were not thereunto bound: and therefore another peace was by your common council made. And the same author speaking of Manlius the Proconsul of Asia saith, Gallograecis bellum illatum, non ex Senatus authoritate, non populi jussu: quod quis unquam de sua sententia facere ausus est? War was made upon the Gallogrekes, neither by the authority of the Senate, nor the command of the people, which what man durst of himself ever do? But this was Orator like spoken by the adversary against Manlius being absent; for that it was sometime so done, we have by examples declared. Spurius Posthumius the Consul, also being himself with his army shut up in the Straitss and rocks of the Appennin mountains, in danger with hunger to perish, before he could have heard from the Senate or the people, what they would have had him to have done; to deliver himself and the Roman army out of those straitss, of himself made peace with the enemy, though upon very hard and dishonourable conditions. But when he with his army disarmed, was returned to Rome; the Senate and the people rejected the peace with the conditions by him accepted. Yea Posthumius the Consul himself, in the assembly of the people said, Cùm me seu turpi, seu necessaria sponsione obstrinxi, qua tamen, quando iniussu populi facta est, non tene tur populus Romanus, nec quicquam ex ea praeter Corpora nostrae debentur Samnitibus, dedamur per faeciales nudi vinctique, Seeing that I have bound myself, whether it be with a shameful or a necessary promise and agreement, wherewith for all that the people of Rome is not bound, forasmuch as it was without their commandment made, neither is there any thing thereby unto the Samnites due, more than our bodies; let us naked and bound be so yielded unto them. So the Consul called it not a treaty of peace, but a simple or necessary promise. And in truth the enemies had caused the Consul and all the captains and lieutenants of the army to swear, and further taken six hundred hostages, all which they might have put to death, if the people would not confirm the agreement taken; in which making they yet committed one gross oversight, in that they bond not all the soldiers in the army by oath to return into those straits and enclosures of the mountains, and even into the same state they were before, or else to yield themselves all prisoners, in case the people would not confirm the agreement by them made; which had they done, no doubt but that the Senate and the people would have sent them again into the same state they were, as they did the Consul, with the six hundred sworn hostages, whom for all that, the Samnites refused to receive of the herald. For in like case after the great overthrow by the Romans received at Cannae, when Hannibal had sent eight thousand soldiers, there taken prisoners, to Rome, to redeem their liberty with the ransom of a pound of gold for every head; and that the Senate would not agreed thereunto, but decreed, that they should either become the enemy's slaves, or die: the Consuls charged those soldiers, before the appointed day to return unto the enemy; who all obeyed their command, but one, who by a crafty wile sought to delude the oath, before by him given unto the enemy for his return; whom the Senate for all that sent bound hand and foot unto Hannibal. Or if it had seemed too hard a thing unto the Senate, to have yielded the whole army being sworn unto the Samnites, they would undoubtedly yet have confirmed those hard conditions of peace by them agreed upon. As did jews the xii, the French king, in the treaty made at Dijon by the lord Trimoville with the Swissers, giving them hostages of the chiefest men of his army, with condition that the Swissers might put them to death, if the king should not ratify the agreement with them made. As did the duke of Anjou unto the hostages which those which were besieged in the castle of Eruall had given him: when he saw that Robert Knolles, captain of the castle, being arrived within the castle, after the agreement, would by no means suffer the castle to be surrendered, saying, That the besieged without him could covenant nothing: and so also caused the prisoners that he had taken to be beheaded▪ For otherwise, if it were lawful for captains to entreat or conclude of peace at their pleasure, without express commandment or ratification, they might bind both people and sovereign princes, unto the pleasure and appetite of their enemies, and such hard conditions as they pleased: a thing most absurd and unreasonable, seeing that a common advocate may not in the lest matter of another man's, come to agreement, without express charge from him whom it concerneth.  
But some may say, that these rules take no place in Venice, where the Senate doth wholly discern and determine of peace and war, neither amongst the customs of the Swissers and Grisons, which are popular estates. And in the conversion of the Florentine Commonweal, from the nobility unto the popular estate, it is in one article especially provided, that the people shall have to do with nothing, but with making of laws, creating of magistrates, and the common treasure; as for peace and war, and other things concerning the sovereignty of the state, should be wholly in the power of the Senat. Whereunto we have before said, that Popular and Aristocratical estates 
Hard for the popular or Aristocratical estates by the multitude well to manage martial affairs: and why.  cannot if they would, well manage martial affairs, for the hard assembling together of the people: and in case that the people might be at all times assembled, yet were it a thing of great peril and danger, to have those things which aught of all others to be most secret in a Commonweal, the counsels (I say) of peace and war, revealed and made known unto the Vulgar people: which therefore were of necessity to be left unto the Senate, yet the power of peace and war cannot be taken from the nobility or people in either state, the sovereign majesty thereof saved. And albeit that the people give the charge thereof unto the Senate, yet a man knoweth right well, that the commissions and mandates which are given out for such purpose, depend of the authority of the people, and under the people's name are put in execution by the Senate, which is but the people's procurator and agent, taking authority from the people, as all other their magistrates do. As for monarchies, it is without any question that the resolution of peace and war dependeth of the sovereign prince, if the estate be a pure monarchy, For the kingdom of Polonia, Denmark, Sweden, and Norway, as they are states changeable and uncertain, as the nobility is stronger than the prince, or the prince than the nobility: the resolution of peace and war so dependeth of the nobility, as that the state seemeth to be rather Aristocratical than regal. And therefore the names of their dukes, marquess', counties, governors, and councillors, commonly to be in their leagues expressed, and their seals thereto annexed: as the peace betwixt the Polonians and the Prussians, made by king Sigismundus Augustus was sealed with an hundred and three seals of the nobility of his country: neither was there fewer in the act of the lawful creation of king Henry to be king of Polonia.  
The third mark of Sovereign majesty is to be of power to created and appoint 
The third mark of sovereignty.  magistrates, than which no more certain sign can be, especially the principal officers, which are not under the command of other magistrates. This was the first law that Tublius Valerius made after the expulsion of the kings out of Rome: that the magistrates should be chosen and appointed by the people. Which self same law was published also by the Venetians, at such time as they first assembled into the Gulf, for the establishing of their state, as Contarenus writeth: than which law there is none more religiously kept by the Senate and the Venetian people. Yet much better is it kept in monarchies, where all is governed by one, and where the greatest, the meaner, yea and the lest offices of all, as of Porters, Sergeants, Clerks, Trumpeters, Criers, which in the Roman state were placed and displaced by the Roman magistrates are provided for by order from the prince, even unto the meanest offices. I have said the appointing of princes officers, that is to say, of the chief magistrates, for there is no Commonweal, where it is not permitted unto greater magistrates, as also to many corporations and colleges, to make certain menial officers under them: as I have before showed of the Romans. But yet that they do by virtue of the office, which they hold, and as proctors created with power, to substitute other their deputies under them. We see also that clients and vassals, albeit that they hold their jurisdiction of some sovereign prince in fealty and homage, have nevertheless power to establish judges and officers in their jurisdiction: but yet this power is given them by some sovereign prince. For no doubt dukes, marquess', counties, barons, and lieutenants of countries, were no other of their first institution but judges and officers; as we shall in due place declare. But sometimes in a popular estate power is given unto the greater magistrates to created the lesser; as we read that the people of Carthage had a custom to make five magistrates, 
The lesser magistrates in a popular estate sometime created by the greater▪ but not without power from them which had the sovereignty  for to make choice of the hundred and four magistrates of the Commonweal; as they do also at Nuremberg, where the Censors which are chosen of the great Council, chose the new Senators, and that done, give up their charge. The Senate which is of xxuj, making choice of the eight Ancients: and afterward of the xiii of the seven Burgamasters, and of the xii judges for civil causes, and five for criminal. Neither is this any new matter; but an old and ancient fashion. For Aristotle writeth, the people of Carthage to have used to choose five men, who according to their discretion still made of the hundred and four magistrates: which was also a thing ordinary unto the Roman Censors, who by their discretion supplied the number of the Senators, which the Consuls did before by the sufferance of the people, who from the beginning made them, as Festus Pompeius saith. And sometime the dictator's were for that purpose only made to supply the number of the Senators. As Fabius Buteo named Dictator by the Consul Terentius, following the decree of the Senate, made choice at one time of an hundred seventy seven Senators, in stead of them that were dead. Howbeit that to speak properly, a Senator is no magistrate, as we will show in the discourse concerning the Senat. But howsoever that it was, whether it were the Consuls, the Dictator's, or Censors, that made choice of the Senators, & so supplied the Senate, they did it not but by the power of the people, which was also to be revoked at the people's pleasure. So may we also say of the Turks Cadelesquires, which are as the kings two great Chauncelours, who have power to place and displace all the Cadies and Paracadies, that is to say, the judges and their deputies. And in Egypt, in the time of the Sultan's government, before it was by Selimus the first conquered, the great Edegnare, which was a Constable to the Sultan, had power to place all the other officers: as had in ancient time the Grand M. of the Palace in France. And it is not long ago but that the chancellor of France had power at his pleasure to bestow all offices which had none, or but some little fees, viz. of some three or four crowns at the most: which was revoked by king Francis the first. And albeit that always the chancellor, the great Edegnare, and the Grand M. of the palace, had all their power from the kings and Sultan's, as by them placed: yet was so great power very dangerous unto the former kings and Sultan's, which by little and little have since been cut so short, as that in the reign of Charles the seventh, the very baylieffes and seneschals were placed by the prince, who before were wont to be placed by the majors, whose lieutenants they were. Sometime also it may be that magistrates, corporations, or colleges, have power to nominat and choose the principal magistrates: as we read in the records of the court of Paris, that by a law made in the year 1408, it was decreed that the officers of the high court of parliament should be made by election; and so thereupon commandment was given unto the chancellor to go into parliament for the election for the offices vacant. Which law was again revived by king jews the xj, in the year 1465. And after him in the time of Charles the eight, not only the precedents, the king's councillors, and advocates, were made by election, but even the king's attorney general (who is the only man of all the body of the court, which oweth not oath but to the king alone: albeit that the attorneys of other parliaments, which he calleth substitutes, take their oath in the court) was chosen also by the suffrages of the court: In the year 1496. But yet all their letters of provision & confirmation of their elections into their offices, than were, and yet are, always granted by the king▪ without whose confirmation their election was to no purpose. Which may serve for answer to that which one might say, that Arthure duke of Bretaigne, was chosen Constable of France, by the voices of all the princes, of the great Council, and of the parliament in the year 1324. For albeit that the king Charles the sixt, was then distraught of his wits, & that the seals of France had in them not the image of the king, but of the queen only: yet nevertheless the said new constable taking upon him the government of the king's sword, and of the French army, being sworn to the keeping of the laws, at the same instant acknowledged himself to hold his office and power in fealty and homage of the king: so that all authority and power to command, may well seem to flow and be derived from the fountain of the prince only.  
Yet may some say that the Great Palatine of Hungary, who is the greatest magistrate 
Great magistrates sometime chosen by the estates of the country, or otherwise: but still approved and confirmed by the king.  of that kingdom, and the king's lieutenant general, is chosen by the estates of the country: it is true; but yet his provision, institution, and confirmation, belongeth unto the king, who is the chief head and author of his power. Howbeit that the estates of the kingdom of Hungary, yet pretend to have the right to make choice of their kings; the house of Austria maintaining the contrary. And it seemeth that the kings have by sufferance passed it over, that the estates should still have the choosing of the great Palatine, so to 'cause them to forget the election of the king. Whereunto for all that they have been so obstinately wedded, as that they have thosen under the colour of protection, to put themselves under the Turks slavery, rather than to have this power for the choice of their kings (by the house of Austria) wrested from them. It is not therefore the election of great officers which declareth the right of sovereignty; but the prince's approbation, ratification, and confirmation, without which the magistrate is of no power at all. Yet if such creation of magistrates were by the founders of Commonweals, and law makers, so given unto the people, or colleges, as that they could not from the people or colleges be taken, then truly the prince should not have the right of sovereign majesty or power: for that the magistrates power were not to be attributed unto the prince, but to the people; as by little and little it happened unto the kings of Polonia. For when as by a law made by Sigismundus Augustus, all the magistrates of every country, were to be chosen by the particular states of every government; the majesty of the kings, who also reigned by the good liking of the people, was thereby much impaired. Which confirmation of magistrates so chosen, is no new thing; for even from the time of the Goths we read in Cassiodorus, that Theodoricus king of the Goths, gave his letters of confirmation unto the officers whom the Senate had chosen; using these words in his letters directed unto the Senate, for one whom they had made a Senator, judicium vestrum P. C. noster Comitatur 
* Cassiodorus. lib. 1. Epist. 6.  assensus, Our consent, reverent fathers, doth accompany your judgement. Now seeing that power to command over all the subjects of a Commonweal belongeth unto him that holdeth therein the sovereignty; it is good reason also that all magistrates should acknowledge their authority to proceed from him.  
But now let us speak of the fourth mark of Sovereignty, that is to wit, of the Last 
The fourth mark of sovereignty.  Appeal, which is and always hath been one of the most principal rights of sovereignty. As a man may see after that the Romans' had driven out their kings: not only the last Appeal, but even all Appeals from the Magistrates, were by the Law Valeria reserved unto the people. And for that the Consuls and other Magistrates oftentimes gave small ear unto them that did appeal unto them, the same Law was often times* renewed: and by the tribunitial law Duillia the pain of death adjoined 
〈◊〉 lib. 1. & 7. & 10.  there unto, for him that should oppose himself against the same; which Law Livy calleth the foundation of the popular liberty: albeit that it were evil executed. The same Law was yet more straightly kept in Athens, where the last Appeal was reserved unto the people, not only from the Magistrates of the city, but even from the Magistrates of their allies and fellows also: as the writings of Zenophon and Demosthenes do right well declare. The same Law Contarenus writeth to have been the first that was by the Venetians made for the establishing of their Commonweal: viz. That all men might freely appeal from the Magistrates, unto the Grand counsel of the people. Neither was Francis Valori Duke of Florence for any other cause slain, then for not having given way unto the Appeal, made from him unto the Great counsel of the people, by three Florentines by him condemned to die, and so notwithstanding their appeal by him executed. But some may say, that not only this Duke at Florence, but at Rome the Dictator's, and other Magistrates also oftentimes put to death condemned citizens, notwithstanding their appeal made unto the people, as is in many histories to be seen. Whereof there was an heavy example made by the Senate of Rome, which caused the remainder of the Legion sent to Rhegium being taken and brought to Rome, to be whipped and afterward beheaded without regard of the appeals by them made unto the people: or to the intercessions of the Tribunes exclaiming, the sacred Laws concerning Appeals to be violated, and trodden under foot. Whereunto in brief I answer, as did Papinian, That we aught not to rest ourselves upon that they do at Rome, but on that which aught to be there done. For it is most certain, that a man might appeal from the Senate unto the people: and that ordinarily the opposition or intercession of one of the Tribunes, stayed the proceed of the whole Senate; as we have before touched. And the first that gave the power unto the Roman Senate to judge without appeal, was Adrian the emperor, for the edict of Caligula, whereby he gave power to all magistrates to judge without appeal, took no place. And albeit that Nero decreed, that they which without cause had appealed unto the Senate, should be punished with like punishment, as if they had appealed unto his own person: yet forbade he not men to appeal from the Senate unto himself, although he had referred the appeals from all the magistrates unto the Senat. But this answer seemeth directly contrary unto that we have before said. For if no appeal were to be made from the Senate unto the emperor, but that the last appeal was unto the Senate, than was not the last appeal the true mark of sovereignty. join also hereunto, that the Great master of the Palace, whom they called Praefectum Praetorio, gave judgement without appeal, receiving also the appeals of all the magistrates and governors of the empire, as saith Flavius Vopiscus: as in every Commonweal 
* Flavius Volpiscus in Florian●….  we see certain courts and parliaments which gave judgement without appeal; as the eight parliaments in France, the four courts in Spain, the imperial chamber in Germany, the council at Naples; the forty at Venice, the Rota at Rome, the Senate at Milan; and so the greater courts of other cities, who hear and decide either all or most part of causes, both public and private, without appeal: and in all the imperial towns, duchies, and counties, depending of the empire, no appeal is to be made unto the imperial chamber, in criminal causes once judged by the magistrates of the prince, or of the imperial cities: whereby it appeareth the last appeal not to belong only unto the right of sovereign majesty. Whereunto I answer, under the name of Appeal, to be also contained requests made unto the prince, which the law call Civil Supplications: so that when we may not appeal from the sentence of the greater magistrates, yet may we by way of request put up our supplications unto the prince, which hath moved many of our late lawyers to say, Civil supplications to belong unto the right of sovereign majesty: and albeit that almost always the decrees are again judged by the same judges, as often as request is made unto the prince concerning a judgement given▪ yet is it in his will & power either to receive or reject the request▪ and oftentimes he calleth the cause unto himself thereof to determine, or to reverse that which hath been done; or else remitteth it unto other judges, which is the true mark of sovereignty and last appeal, wherein the majesty of the prince or people doth most appear: forasmuch as it is not lawful for any magistrate or judge to change or amend their judgement once given or recorded, without leave of their sovereign prince, and that upon pain of false judgement. And if so be that the sovereign prince would 
A sovereign prince cannot by any edict prohibit his subjects to appeal from his magistrates or to prefer their humble requests unto himself.  make an edict, that none of his subjects should appeal from any of his magistrates, or prefer any request unto himself against their judgements, as the emperor Caligula was about to have done: yet nevertheless should it always be lawful for the subjects to appeal, or to exhibit their requests unto the prince: For that the prince cannot so bind his own hands, or make such a law unto himself; either prohibit his grieved subjects from coming unto him with their humble supplications and requests: For that such edicts concerning appeals and judgements, are but civil decrees and laws wherewith the prince cannot be bound, as we have before said. For which cause it seemed a new and absurd thing unto the Senate of France, and especially unto Michael del' Hospital, that the commissioners appointed to proceed against the precedent of Allemand, forbidden him by a decree made against him, to come within twenty leagues of the court, so to cut him off from the means to prefer his petitions; which the king himself could not of right take from his subject, although it were in his power to grant or reject his request being once made unto him known. We see also, that in all grants of public lands by way of pension, with power and jurisdiction unto the children or near kinsmen of the house of France, and generally in the erection of duchies, marquisats, counties, and principalities, fealty and homage, appeal and sovereignty, are still reserved: that sometime there is only reservation made of appeal and sovereignty: as in the declaration made by king Charles the fift, to john duke of Berrie, bearing date the third of March, in the year 1374: wherein is also fealty and homage comprised. For it is certain that the duchy of Berrie was then the portion given unto the duke of Berry with the charge of rights royal, and reversion to the crown for want of heirs male: as I have learned by the letters of grant, which are yet in the treasury of France. We see also the like declaration of Philip Archduke of Austria, (Charles the fifts father) made to king jews the twelft, and another of him the same, in the year 1505: wherein he acknowledgeth and professeth himself ready to obey the decrees of the parliament of Paris, in regard of the countries of Artois and Flaunders, and of other lands which he held of the king; and not to forbidden them of those countries to appeal unto the court at Paris. And in the treaty of Arras, made betwixt▪ king Charles the seventh, and Philip the second, duke of Burgundy, there is express reservation made of fealty and homage, appeal and sovereignty, for those lands which he and his ancestors held in fee of the crown of France. Neither did Charleses the fift the French king take any other occasion to make war against the English men, than for that their English magistrates and governors which had the government of Aquitaine, under the fealty of the French, would not hear the subjects appeals. At which time the court of Paris commanded the king of England to be summoned, and for default of appearance pronounced sentence against him: whereby the duchy of Aquitaine was for that cause confifcated unto the king, as is to be seen by the decree of the parliament of Paris, given the xiv of May, in the year 1370. For otherwise if a sovereign prince shall remit unto his vassal the right of appeal and sovereignty; which is unto himself due, he maketh him of a subject a sovereign prince; as did king Francis the first, discharging the duke of Lorraine of all fealty and homage, appeal and sovereignty, for the castle of Chasteler upon the Maze in the year 1517. But when he suffered the same duke in sovereign manner without appeal to govern in the duchy of Bar; and that the dukes, officers, and magistrates afterward abused their permissive authority, as in absolute sovereignty, the king's attorney general thereof complained unto the king, advising him not to suffer the rights of his sovereign majesty to be so impaired. Which thing Anthony then duke of Lorraine understanding, and after him Francis his son, by recognizance in authentic manner declared, that their purpose was not in any thing to derogat from the fealty and homage, appeal and sovereignty that they aught unto the crown of France, by reason of the said duchy; and that they had not therein used sovereign justice but by sufferance: which letters of recognizance are in the public records to be seen, and were afterward exhibited unto the privy council, in the year 1564, in the reign of Charles the ninth, who by all means sought by a most gracious and large charter to have given unto Charles then duke of Lorraine, the sovereignty of the duchy of Bar: but all in vain, forasmuch as the king can by no means alienat from himself, the rights belonging unto his sovereignty, not not the high court of Paris assenting thereunto, although the power and authority of that court may where the king is, seem to be nothing; in the presence of whom all the power and authority of all magistrates cease.  
Wherefore the best & most expedient way, for the preservation of a state is, never to give any mark or right of sovereignty unto a subject, and much less unto a stranger: for that is one step and degree to mount unto his sovereign majesty. And therefore 
Not mark or right of sovereignty is by the prince to be bestowed upon his subject or a stranger.  it was long doubted in the council, whether power and authority without appeal, should be granted unto Francis duke of Alencon (who had made me master of the requests and one of his council) in that his dukedom; as had before been granted unto the ancient dukes there. And although he were the king's best and most loving brother, yet one of the attorneys general was so bold as to say in full council, That it were better to bring in twelve courts of parliament, than to suffer that, albeit that that jurisdiction was for a short time granted, and extraordinary judges by the king appointed; with reservation of appeals, in many cases and causes, as also with exception of fealty and homage. Wherein our ancestors much offended, who with too much facility (should I say, or necessity) granted the same jurisdiction unto the dukes of Normandy. For by this means the dukes of Britain and Burgundy revolted from our kings unto the kings of England; for that such judges were denied them, as had been granted unto the dukes of Alencon: taking it grievously themselves, in the name of their magistrates to be summoned unto the court at Paris, there to have those things reversed which their magistrates had unjustly determined; although sometime they were things of right small weight and importance; whereof the dukes of Britain complained both unto king Philip the Fair, and Philip the Long, who by their letters patents sent unto the court of parliament in February 1306, and in October 1316, declared that their meaning was not, that the duke of Britain or his officers, should be called before them into the court; but in question of sovereignty, or in case they should deny to do justice, or else had given false judgement.  
The same we are to think of all the princes and cities of Germany, from whom even in private judgements men may justly appeal unto the imperial chamber, if the matter exceed the sum of 50 crowns, or if any controversy be betwixt the cities and princes themselves. Whereby it is to be understood, neither the Germane princes, nor cities to have in them the right of sovereignty: For that it is a capital crime, even treason itself, to appeal from a sovereign prince, except he appeal as did that Greek (whosoever he was) who appealed from Philip king of Macedon evil advised, unto himself being better advised. Whice manner of appeal jews of Bourbon, prince of Conde used also from the interlocutory sentence of Francis the second, the French king, which he having understood the cause, is said to have given against him in the privy council: Which manner of appeal Baldus the great lawyer alloweth as good▪ and to be received. And well it would beseem the majesty of sovereign princes to behold and follow the example of that Macedonian king, who received the appeal; or if they would needs that their decrees whatsoever should stand fast and irremovable, because they would not seem unconstant or variable, that then they should do as did the same king to Machetas, who of his own goods recompensed him, for that he had unjustly condemned him in, without changing of his former decree and judgement.  
From this mark of Majesty, and benefit of supreme Appeal, dependeth also the 
The fift mark of sovereignty  power to grant grace and pardon unto the condemned, contrary to judgement given, and to the rigour of the laws; be it for life, be it for goods, be it for honour, or recalling from banishment: for it is not in the power of the magistrates or judges, how great soever that they be, to grant the lest of these things unto the condemned person, or of themselves, to altar any thing of the judgements by them once given. And albeit that the Proconsul's and governors of provinces, had as much power in their jurisdiction, as had all the magistrates of Rome together: yet so it was, that it was not lawful for them so much as to restore him whom they had but for a time banished (as we read in the letters of Pliny the younger, governor of Asia unto Traian the emperor) and much less give pardon unto men condemned to die: which is most straightly forbidden all magistrates in every Commonweal, be it well or evil ordered or governed. And albeit that Papirius Cursor, the dictator, may seem at the request of the people to have given pardon to Fabius Max. colonel of the horsemen, for having given battle contrary to his command, although he had slain xxv thousand of the enemies: yet nevertheless in effect it was the people which gave the pardon: albeit that they most instantly besought the dictator to pardon the fault: Which they themselves might at the same time have done, but yet had rather to request it of Papirius, than to take the guilty person from him against his will. For Fabius understanding himself in his absence to be by the dictator condemned, appealed unto the people: before whom Papirius defended his judgement, as justly given against Fabius: which a man of his virtue and severity would not have done, if an appeal might not have been made from the dictator, unto the people: and that in it was the power of life and death. Sergius Galba the Orator also, in like judgement by Cato the Censor, attainted of treason, took his refuge unto the people, who moved with his tears, and embracing of his children, pardoned him. Whereupon Cato said, That Galba had been well whipped, had he not taken himself unto his tears and his children. The same power of life and death had also the people of Athens, as appeareth by Demosthenes, and Alcibiades, who both condemned, were afterward by the people pardoned, and again restored both unto their goods and honour. And amongst the Venetians it is not lawful for any their magistrates, not not for the duke himself, the Senate, or the Decemuiri, to grant pardon unto the condemned: for that is left unto the discretion of the great council of the Venetian gentlemen only. The Decemuiri before abusing their power by sufferance, granted pardons, and nevertheless was order taken in the year 1523, that the counsel of the Sages, which are in number xxij, should therein be assisting unto them: and that the pardon should take no place, without the general consent of them all: but at length in the year 1562, the council was forbidden at all to meddle, or to have to do in that matter. And albeit that the emperor Charles the fift, in the erection of the Senate at Milan, granted thereunto all the marks of sovereignty, as unto his lieutenant and deputy in his absence, coming very near unto absolute sovereignty: yet so it is, that he still reserved unto himself the power to grant pardon and mercy unto the condemned; as I have learned by the letters patents by him granted: which hath been a thing right straightly observed and kept in all Monarchies. And although that in Florence during the popular state, the eight men without all right had usurped the power to grant pardons: yet was that power again restored unto the people by Sodorin, after the change of the state. As for other kings they have still thought nothing more royal, than to deliver the condemned from death: neither do they suffer the judges or magistrates of other dukes and princes, to examine the letters granted by the king for the restoring of the condemned: although that they examine the pardon granted. And albeit that king Francis the first had given unto his mother power to grant pardon unto the condemned: yet for all that the court of Paris, having taken order to have it showed unto the king, that it was one of the fairest marks of sovereignty, which could not be communicated unto a subject without impairing of his majesty: the Queen mother thereof advertised, renounced this 
Things properly belonging unto the sovereignty of a prince can in no wise be imparted unto a subject.  privilege, and restored the letters patents unto the king, before they were of her requested. For indeed that prerogative could not of right be granted unto the French Queen, neither any other the proper marks of Sovereignty.  
And albeit that the Roman laws say that the empress is dispensed with from all edicts and laws: yet that taketh no place in this realm of France; yea there is found a decree in the records of the court, in the year 1365, in july: whereby the queen was condemned to lay down in the court the money of her demanded, whilst the matter was in trial; that the creditor might demand it so laid down upon good caution given: which by the Roman law is a mere injury, so to begin suit of execution. I found also that king Charles the sixt, gave power to M. Arnald de Corbie, chancellor of France, by letters patents, the xiii of March, in the year 1401, to grant pardons unto the condemned, some of the great Council being present with him▪ but that was at such time as the chauncelours were almighty, having all in their own hands: and that king Charles the sixt was then not in the power of himself but of others, by reason of his malady. 
Privileges wrongfully wrested from kings cannot by any new confirmation be made good.   
Now if any man shall object and say, That in ancient times the governors of provinces gave pardons, as we yet may see by the custom of Henault, and of Daulphinie: as also that the bishop of Ambrun, by authentic charters pretended this power. Hereunto I answer, that such customs and privileges, wrongfully wrested and exported from our kings, were of good right abrogated by an edict of king jews the twelft. And if such privileges be of no force: so may we also say their confirmations to be of no more strength. For the confirmation is never any thing worth, if the privilege be of itself nought. Now must it needs be nought, for that it cannot be separated from the crown. For as we have before said, that the privileges by princes even lawfully granted, cannot stand good for ever: so the rights of Sovereignty, which cannot by the kings themselves be granted unto any, without giving away of their Sceptre and kingdom, can much less being granted, be by them confirmed.  
As for Governors, Deputies, Lieutenants general of Sovereign princes, it is another reason; for that they have not that power by privilege, or by office, but by commission, as the deputies or lieutenants of their princes. But in the state of a well ordered Commonweal, this power of Sovereignty aught not to be given to any, neither by commission, neither by title of office, except it be for the establishing of a Regent in his government, for the great distance of places; or for the captivity of Sovereign princes: or for that they are furious; or else in their infancy▪ As it was done by jews the ninth, who for his tender years, was by the estates of France committed to the tuition of his mother Blanch of Castille; after that she had given certain princes for assurance that she should not give the tuition of him to any other person. So the government of the kingdom was committed unto Charles the fift, as Regent during the captivity of his father king john. And in the captivity of Francis the first, Lovise of Savoy his mother, took upon her the protection of the kingdom committed unto her by the king her son▪ with all the royalties thereof, in the title of Regent. And the duke of Bedford Regent in France, king Charles the sixt being there distraught of his wits.  
But here may one say unto me, that notwithstanding the decree of jews the xii. 
The great privilege of the chapter of the church of 〈◊〉 in granting pardon unto the condemned●….  the chapter of the church of Rouen pretendeth always to have privilege to grant pardon in the favour of S. Roman: the day before whose feast, it forbiddeth all the judges, yea and the parliament of Rouen itself, to execute or put to death any one of such as then be condemned; (as I have seen it put in practice being in commission for the Prince, for the general reformation of Normandy) and for that the court notwithstanding the chapters pardon, had after the feast caused to be put to death one, which it had before the feast condemned: the chapter thereof grievously complained unto the king; having to friend one of the princes of the blood▪ the parliament sent also their deputies, amongst whom Bigot the king's attorney was very earnest in his oration in the Senate for the abuse, and encroaching upon the king's majesty: but the favour of the great bishops more prevailing than reason, that privilege was for all that he could say or do with the public shame and loss continued: but was since taken away by king Henry the third. This privilege had great affinity with that which 
A great privilege granted unto the Vestal Virgins and the Cardinals in Rome.  was given unto the Vestal virgins at Rome, which was to give pardon unto him that was going to execution, if any one of the Vestal virgins by chance happened to meet him, as saith Plutarch in the life of Numa. The like custom whereof is yet kept in Rome, for if a condemned man there meet a Cardinal, he is thereby delivered from punishment. But I deem that to be most pernicious in the privilege of S. Roman, that no man could enjoy the benefit thereof which had but lightly offended: but he only that had done the most execrable villainies that were possible to be found, such as the king used not to pardon, that such offences as could neither by the laws of God nor man, nor by the favour of Princes be pardoned, might yet under the colour of S. Romans privilege be remitted and forgiven. But that is joined with the greatest impiety to think the pardon to be so much the more acceptable to Cod, by how much the fact committed is the more heinous or detestable. But I am of opinion (saving always the better judgement) that no sovereign Prince, neither yet any man 
What is by the law of God death, aught not by the prince to be in any wise pardoned.  a▪ live can pardon the punishment due unto the offence which is by the law of God death, no more than he can dispense with the law of God, whereunto he is himself subject. And if it be so, that the magistrate deserve capital punishment, which dispenseth with the law of his king▪ how shall it be lawful for a sovereign prince, to dispense with his subject from the law of God? And further if the Prince himself cannot give away the least civil interest of his subject, or pardon the wrong done unto an other man: how can he than pardon the wrong done unto almighty God? or the murder wilfully committed; which by the law of God is death, for all the pardon he can give. But then wherein (might a man say) should the prince's mercy show itself or appear? if it could not show grace unto the punishment appointed by the law of God? Whereunto I answer, that there are means plenty, as in pardoning bloodshed committed by chance, or in defence of a man's self, or in mitigating the rigour of the positive civil laws: as if the prince should upon pain of death forbidden a man to bear arms, or to carry victuals unto the enemy; pardon shall yet well be bestowed upon him that hath borne arms for the defence of himself only; or on him which constrained by poverty, hath sold victuals dear unto the enemy, to relieve his own great necessity. Or whereas by the law the punishment for theft is death, the good prince may convert that punishment into the restitution of four fold, which is the punishment by the law * of God appointed. But the wilful murderer You shall take him 
Deut 19 & 21.  (saith the law) from my sacred altar, neither shalt thou have pity on him, but 'cause him to dye the death: and afterwards I will stretch forth my great mercies upon you. Nevertheless the Christian kings on that day which they command to be most holy kept, as on Good Friday, use for most part to pardon some one man or other, condemned of 
Why grievous offences are to be severely punished and not in any wise pardoned.  most horrible and notorious crime. Now pardons granted to such villains draw after them plagues, famine, wars, and ruins of Commonweals; and that is it for which the law of God saith, That in punishing them that have deserved to dye, they shall take away the cause from among the people: for of an hundred villains there cometh scarce two of them into the trial of justice: and of those that come, the one half of them for want of proof and of witnesses escape unpunished: and then if when they are proved princes grant unto them pardon, what exemplary punishment shall there be for offences and villainies committed in the Commonweal? And many offenders, when they cannot of their own prince obtain grace and pardon, interpose the favour of some other foreign prince, who becometh an intercessor for them. Whereof the States of Spain complained unto king Philip, presenting unto him a request, to the end he should advertise his ambassador in France, no more in the behalf of the French king, to request pardon of the king of Spain, for the condemned men which had retired themselves out of Spain into France: for that having obtained pardon, they many times slew the judges, who had before condemned them. But of 
The most gracious and commendable pardon that a prince can give.  all the graces and pardons that a prince can give, there is none more commendable, than when he pardoneth the injury done against his own person: and of all capital punishments none is more acceptable unto God, than that which with most severity is executed, for the wrong done unto the majesty of himself. But what then are we for to hope for of the prince, which most cruelly revengeth his own injuries, and pardoneth the wrong done to others; and especially those which are directly done to the dishonour of almighty God.  
Now that which we have said concerning the grace and pardon granted by a sovereign prince unto men condemned, is to the uttermost to be extended, even unto the prejudice of the great lords, unto whom the confiscation of the offenders lands or goods by law or custom belong, who are not to be received to debate or impugn the pardon granted by the prince; as by decree of parliament hath been adjudged. Now many there be, which draw the grace of the princes gracious restitutions unto private judgements: as when a man is for want of council deceived or cozened; or requesteth the benefit of his minority, which in many cities and Commonweals are proper unto sovereign princes: but yet are not the marks of sovereign majesty, except only the legitimating of bastards, of fees, and such like: for why the rest were partly by the magistrates having understood the cause, and partly by the laws and customs usually granted. For in the laws of Charles the seven and Charles the viii, it is expressly commanded unto the judges, in deciding of causes, not to have any regard of the decrees of foreign courts, further than they should with equity agreed: which by this common clause unto all decrees in this realm commonly annexed (Si satis superque apparet, If it shall sufficiently, and more than sufficiently appear) is declared. Which clause if it be not joined unto the decree, the magistrate hath but to understand of the fact; the punishment thereof being reserved unto the law, and the pardon unto the sovereign prince. And that is it for which Cicero craving pardon of Caesar for Ligarius saith, I have oftentimes pleaded with thee before the judges, but I never said, for him whom I defended, Pardon him my lords, he was deceived, he thought it not, if ever he do so again, etc. So children use to say unto their parents, of whom they crave pardon: But before the judges we say, That the crime is for evil will forged, the accusor is a slanderer, the witnesses false and suborned. In which words he plainly showed▪ that Caesar having sovereign power, had also the power of life and death, (and so to grant pardon) which the judges had not.  
Now as for liege fealty and homage, it appeareth, that it is one of the greatest rights 
The sixt mark of sovereignty  of sovereignty; as we have before declared: in respect of him to whom it is due, with out exception.  
As for the right and power to coin money, it is of the same nature with the law, 
The seventh mark of sovereignty.  and there is none but he which hath power to make a law, which can appoint the value, weight, and stamp of the coin: which is well to be understood by the Greek and Latin word; for the Latin word Nummus▪ seemeth well to have been de●…ived of the Greek word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. For nothing is in a Commonweal of greater consequence next unto the law, than the value, weight, and stamp of the coin; as we have in a spe▪ ciall treatise declared: and in every well ordered Commonweal, none but the sovereign prince hath power to appoint the same. As we read they did in Rome, when the value of the Victoriat was appointed and set down, it was done by an express law of the people. And albeit that the Senate by decree to ease the public necessity, made the half pound of copper as much worth as the pound; and a while after the quarter, as much worth as the pound, until that the ounce was valued as much worth as the pound: yet all this was done by the consent of the Tribunes, without which nothing that the Senate had therein decreed was of any force. And after that, Constantine the emperor made a law, That they which had coined false money should be punished as men guilty of high treason: which law all princes have most straightly kept, taking unto themselves the confiscations of false coins, excluding all others, which have any claim thereto. With like punishment also are they to be punished, which without the princes leave coin good money. And albeit that many particular men in this realm, had in ancient time privilege to coin money, as the county of Touraine, the 
The right and power to coin money the inseparable mark of sovereignty ᶜ to be granted unto subjects.  bishops of Meaux, Cahors, aged, and Ambrun, the counties of S. Paul, of March, Nevers, Blois, and others: yet for all that king Francis the first, by a general edict took away all those privileges: which could not indeed be granted: but being granted, were by the law made voided: joining hereunto also, that they were not to endure, but for the life of them that granted them, as we have before showed in the nature of privileges: howbeit that this mark and right of sovereignty aught not in any sort to be at all communicated unto a subject. As it was well declared to Sigismundus Augustus, king of Polonia, who in the year 1543, having given privilege unto the duke of pruss, to coin money: the estates of the country made a decree, wherein it was comprised, that the king had no power to give away that right, as being inseparable from the crown. For which self same reason the Archbishop of Gnesne in Polonia, and the Archbishop of Canterbury in England, both chauncelours, having obtained the same right and privilege from their kings, were thereof again deprived. And for this cause all the cities of Italy holden of the empire, which had of the former emperors obtained this privilege of coining of money; in the treaty at Constance gave up the same unto the emperor, excepting them of Luca, unto whom in favour of pope Lucius the third, their country man; the emperor at his request granted that privilege. We read also, that the principal occasion that Peter king of Arragon took hold of, to drive james king of Maiorque out of his kingdom was, for having coined money; pretending that he had no right nor power so to do. Which was also one of the occasions that jews the xj took hold of, to make war upon Francis duke of Britain, for that he had stamped a coin of gold, contrary to the treaty made in the year 1465. And the Romans when as they suffered money of Brass, and silver to be coined in all their provinces, yet did they forbidden any to be there coined of gold, reserving that still unto themselves. Howbeit that john duke of Berry had privilege of Charles the fift, the French king, to coin money of both metals; who because he would not any thing therein offend, caused pieces of gold to be coined with the figure of a sheep upon them, of the finest and purest gold that ever was either before or since coined in this realm.  
Yet is it not to be omitted, that though the prince contrary unto the law, shall give to any man power to stamp money, that the worth and valour thereof still dependeth of the sovereign prince; in such sort, that they which so coin the same, have no other profit thereby but the stamp only; where of princes do wonderfully vaunt and glory. But of ancient time in the Roman Commonweal, whilst it was a popular state, the Triumuiri Monetales, or masters of the mint, coined the money with such a stamp or mark as they themselves thought good, with their names & these letters thereupon, III Viri, A. A. A. FF. which Caulis baileiffe of the mountains interpreteth, Aere, Argento, Auro, Flavo, Ferunto: but more truly thus, Trium viri, Auro, Argento, 
King Servius the first that coined money in Rome.  Aere, Flando, Feriundo. And truly servius king of the Romans was the first that there stamped an heavy coin of brass, with the figure or impression of an Ox upon it, to the imitation of Theseus king of Athens, who had coined money with the 
Plutarch in Theseo.  same figure or mark, and the figure of an Owl. Whereby it appeareth the Greek and Latin princes of old, not to have been touched with that vain desire of glory, wherewith other princes were tormented: and wherafter the kings of Asia and Africa most greedily longed. The first that coined money in Greece with his own image 
Philip of Macedon the first that coined money in Grece with his own image thereon.  thereon, was Philip king of Macedon: which pieces of money were thereof called Philippaei; therein imitating the Persian kings, who called their pieces of gold first stamped with the image of Darius, by the name of Dariques. Whereof king Darius was so jealous (as Herodotus writeth) as that he caused Ariander governor of Egypt to be beheaded, for having stamped the money with his own image. As for the same cause also the emperor Commodus beheaded his minion Pecenninus. And also king jews the xii having left all the power and right of Sovereignty unto the Genoese, whom he had overcome, forbade them nevertheless to stamp their money with any other mark or figure, than with his own image, in stead of the form of a Gibbet, which they before gave, and yet give upon their money, as the mark of justice.  
Now if the power of coining money be one of the rights and marks of Sovereignty; 
The eight mark of sovereignty.  then so is also the power to appoint measures and weights; although that by the customs received there is none so petty a lord, which pretendeth not to have this right. Whereby it cometh to pass, that by the infinite variety of weights and 
The great variety of weights and measures hurtful to a commonweal.  measures, the Commonweal taketh no small harm. Which was the cause that the kings Philip the Fair, Philip the Long, and jews the xj had resolved, that there should be in this kingdom but one manner of weight and measure: and now the commissioners appointed for that purpose, by comparing them together, had made even all the measures and weights of this realm, and brought the matter to good effect, had not king jews by death been taken away, before it was fully perfected: yet the book whereby the same might more easily be brought to pass, is yet extant in the court of accounts: howbeit that the execution thereof proved more difficult than was thought it would have done, by reason of the great contention, and suits that thereof arise. Nevertheless we read in Polybius, that the same was well executed in all the cities of Achaia, 
Lib. 3.  and Morea, where they had not but like money, like weights, like measures, customs, laws, religion, officers, and government.  
As for the right to impose taxes, or imposts upon the subjects, is as proper unto sovereign 
The ninth mark of sovereignty.  majesty, as is the law itself: not for that a Commonweal cannot stand without taxes and tallages, as the Precedent the M. hath well noted, that taxes were not levied in this realm, but since the time of Saint jews the king. But if it must needs be that they must for the public necessity be levied or taken away; it cannot be done but by him that hath the sovereign power; as it hath been judged by a decree of parliament, against the duke of Burgundy; and many times since, aswell in the high court of parliament, as also in the privy Council. And for that divers particular lords, cities, and corporations, under show of the common good, have imposed divers taxes and payments upon their people: king Charles the ninth, by a general edict by him made in the parliament at Orleans, expressly forbiddeth them so to do without leave: albeit that for the common necessity they be borne withal in so doing without commission, so that they exceed not the sum of twenty five pounds. And afterward the same edict was more straightly again renewed at Moulins, well agreeing both with law and equity. And although that the Roman Senate in time of wars, yea and the Censors themselves imposed certain taxes and payments, which could hardly have been extorted from the body of the whole commonalty: yet so it was, that that still passed by the sufferance of the Tribunes of the people, who oft times also opposed themselves against the same. Yea and that in such sort, that they presented a request unto the people, that from that time forward no man upon pain of his head should be so hardy, as to 'cause any law to be passed in the camp: for that the Senate by subtle means had there in the camp at Sutrium, caused to be published that notable imposition, which they called Vicesima Manumissorum, that is to say, the twentieth part of the goods of them that were manumised; under colour that it was to pay the army withal: which thereunto right willingly agreed: and so suffered the law to pass. And in 
The Roman commonweal greatly relieved by the great riches by Paulus Emilius brought to Rome, after the overthrow of king Perseus  the second Carthaginensian war, at such time as there was great want of coin in the common treasury; there was by a law made a tax generally imposed upon every man, which was by another contrary law again repealed, after the return of Paulus Aemylius, who with the spoils of Perseus' king of Macedon, so filled the city, and every private man also with wealth, as that the people was from that time discharged of all taxes and payments, until the Triumuirat civil war, about an hundred years after, until that such new taxes and tributes as by the power or covetousness of former tyrants had been imposed upon the people, were by the good 
* Herodianus.  emperor Pertinax again eased and taken away.  
But here might some say, divers particular lords here and there, to exact not only customs, but tributes also, not only in France, where (as Caesar hath most truly written) nothing is more contemptible than the vulgar people: but in England and Germany, and much more straightly in Denmark, Polonia, and Norway: which impositions and tributes, are confirmed and grown strong, both by long prescription of time, and use of judgements: yea and that to be lawful, even unto such as have neither sovereignty, nor any jurisdiction at all, the court of Paris hath adjudged. Whereunto I answer, that the thing having begun by abuse, and by long continuance of time inveterat, hath well some colour of prescription: but yet an abuse can never be so overgrown, but that the law shall ever be of greater force than it; whereby the abuse is to be reform: and for that cause it was forbidden by an edict of Moulins, that any tribute should be exacted of the subjects, under the colour of prescription: for that many lawyers and judges have exposed all the strength and force of judgements only in prescription alone: not regarding whether that which is in question can of right be prescribed or not.  
Now if Pompeius hath denied, that the common high way can by any continuance of time be prescribed upon: why then should these men think the rights of customs and tributes, or of sovereign majesty to be prescribed against; and yet the common high way belongeth not unto the right of Sovereignty. Wherhfore it were better to confess (which yet without deadly wrong cannot be done) those aforesaid things which we have spoke of, not at all to belong unto the right of sovereign majesty: or else to say that the kingdom itself, and in brief the royal crown and sceptre might be prescribed upon. The same we are to think also of the exemptions from the payment of taxes and tributes, which no man can grant unto another man, but he which hath the sovereign power in a Commonweal: which is also provided for in an article of the edict at Moulins: neither is that enough, but that the charters of such immunities granted, must be also enrolled in the records of the court of accounts, and be allowed of by the judges of the court of Aids. But what kind of taxes and tributes there be, and how far they are to be exacted, shall in due place be declared: let it now for the present suffice, it to appear, that right and power to belong only unto Sovereign majesty. 
To lay an imposition upon salt, no mark of sovereignty.   
Now many there be that think also, that to have power to lay an imposition upon salt, is a more proper mark of Sovereignty than the rest: and yet thereof give no good reason. For almost in every Commonweal we see salt pits and mines both to be, & always to have been in private men's possession, not only upon the sea coasts towards the South (for toward the north it hardeneth not with the Sun) but also in the mediterranean regions, wherein mines of salt, and wells of salt water are found. As in Spain, in Italy, France, and the country of Cracovia, is found salt in great abundance. Yea even at Rome we read, some private men to have had salt mines. Yet true it is, that many sovereign princes have of ancient time imposed tribute upon salt; as did Lysimachus 
The kings which laid the first imposition upon salt.  king of Thrace, Ancus Martius king of Rome, Philip Valois king of France, who were the first that exacted tribute upon salt, every one in his own kingdom. And albeit that by the law Valeria the people of Rome were freed from such customs & tributes, as had by their kings been brought in and imposed upon them: yet Livius the Censor thought no imposition in the Commonweal lighter or fit, than that which was laid upon salt; who thereof surnamed Livius Salinator, (or Livius the Salter.) For why that imposition little or nothing impaireth the right of private men: but that they still remain lords and owners of their salt pits, aswell as of their other mines, saving unto the Sovereign prince his rights and customs.  
But forasmuch as the sea itself cannot be proper unto any private man, the rights 
How far of a sovereign prince may lay impositi on's upon the sea, from his own coast.  thereof belonging unto such sovereign princes as devil thereby, who may lay impositions thereupon thirty leagues off from their own coast, if there be no other sovereign prince nearer to let them, as it was adjudged for the duke of Savoy. Neither can any but a sovereign prince give them letters of safe conduct; which the Italians call Guidage; nor yet of right take any wrack: as is expressly provided for by the decree of the emperor Frederick the second. A thing truly most barbarous, and not in ancient 
Wracks by what small right they belong to sovereign princes.  time of sovereign princes used, shamefully to suffer the relics of the goods and fortunes of such as have by shipwreck miserably perished, and whom we aught with some part of our own to relieve, being cast upon our coast, and which aught with good faith to be again restored, to be most shamefully I say spoiled. Yet such is the manner of all that have ports upon the sea, in this case to show such extremity aswell unto their own people, as to strangers. But by what right do you ask? The common error maketh the right: or if the wrong be done not by error, but by knowledge, than it is mere wickedness, masked with the vail of error. For I have heard that at such time as the emperors ambassadors complained unto Henry the second, the French king, in the year 1556, that two galleys which had suffered wrack upon the coast of Corcyca, were taken by jordan Vrsin, requesting to have the same galley again restored: he was answered by Anne Mommerance than constable of France, that wracks by the law of all nations belonged unto such princes as ruled upon the coasts whereon they were cast. Which law was so strong, as that Andrew Doria never so much as complained of the loss of two of his galleys, confiscated by the prior of Capona the French admiral, for casting anchor only upon the land without leave, which of ancient time men by the law of nations might right lawfully do. And whereas by the Roman law it was lawful for any man to seize upon things lost, or upon goods or lands vacant and forbidden: now it is only lawful unto them which have the sovereign power, or some other jurisdiction by law or custom confirmed unto them, to take unto themselves things lost or forsaken, and that after a certain determinat time: which in a thing movable is defined to be forty days after the publication of the thing lost or forsaken: except it be in the mean time by the right owner challenged. And as for vacant possessions, the Roman emperors have decreed, That they may at any time within four years be again recovered by the prince: but that after four years once expired, a man may prescribe even against the common receipt. But forasmuch as these things are also granted unto private men, they no more belong unto the right of Sovereignty, than it doth to have a receipt of his own: which is not a thing common unto private men only, but even the prince himself hath his own receipt divided from the public receipt; and his own possessions separate apart from the possessions of the Commonweal: and so divers officers were by the Roman emperors appointed unto both. So jews the xii the French king, having obtained the crown, erected the chamber at Blois, for his particular domains of Blois, Montfort, and Cousi, which he commanded to be divided from the dukedom of Orleans, and the other public possessions; and the accounts thereof to be kept apart by themselves. But amongst the rights of receipt, there be some that belong not, but unto the sovereign prince only: as the confiscation of goods or lands in cases of high treason, under which are comprehended also such as be convicted of impiety against God, which we call Heresy; or of offence against the Commonweal, as in coining false money. Howbeit if our late lawyers have with two much learned and curious subtlety in an hundred and fifty chapters found out the laws and rights of the receipt: but yet so as that of one they make ten, that so they may seem the more: so confounding and mingling the rights of sovereignty with the rights of receipt (which are also common unto private men) and public things with things private. The other rights of receipt are almost all common unto the sovereign prince, with other lords justiciaries, as to have right unto treasure found: and the power to grant Fairs, which was in ancient time a mark of Sovereignty; as now it is at this present comprised under the case of privileges.  
As for the right of mark, or of reprisal, which sovereign princes have proper 
To grant letters of mark, or of reprisal now to belong only unto the sovereign prince.  unto themselves from all others, it was not of ancient time proper unto a sovereign prince; but permitted unto every man without leave, either of magistrate or of prince to take reprisal, which the Latins called Clarigatio: howbeit that the princes by little and little gave this power unto magistrates and governors; and in the end reserved this right unto their own sovereignty, for the better assurances of their pieces and truces, which were oftentimes broken by the rashness of some particular men, abusing this right of mark or Reprisal. In this realm the parliament granted letters of mark, as we found by the decree of the xii of February 1392, until that Charles the eight by an especial edict, reserved that power unto himself, in the year 1485. It is also of our men properly called a royalty or right of sovereignty, whereby the prince, a bishop being dead, taketh unto himself the profits of the bishopric, in the mean time whilst another bishop is chosen by the chapter, or by the prince himself appointed: and so being sworn, is put into possession thereof: but forasmuch as that in all places is not observed: and few there be that have that right, it is not to be accounted among the marks of sovereignty.  
There be many other right small things, which are accounted proper unto princes, 
Small things and yet proper only unto sovereign princes.  as things concerning their greater reputation and dignity, as in their edicts, mandates, and commissions to use these words, Dei Gratia, by the grace of God; which words jews the xj, the French king, forbade the duke of Britain to use in his life; although we read them to have been used almost in all ancient leagues; and attributed not unto great princes and commanders only, but even to the lest magistrates and deputies also. The kings of France have also reserved unto themselves the right to seal with yellow wax, a thing forbidden their nobility and other their justiciaries; which jews the xj by special privilege and letters patents granted as a great favour unto Renate 
To seal with yellow wax granted unto a great prince as a favour.  of Anjou, king of Naples and Sicily, that in feeling he might use yellow wax: with like privilege unto his heirs also, confirmed in parliament the 28 of june 1465. He which copied the Commentaries of Tillet, calleth it white wax, which I found our kings never to have used.  
But much more it belongeth unto the royalty of sovereign majesty, to be able to 
To be able to change the subjects language a mark of sovereignty.  compel the subjects to use the language and speech of him that ruleth over them: which the Romans so commanded their subjects, that even yet at this day they seem far and wide to reign over a great part of Europe. But the king of the Hetruscians, who last was by the Romans overcome in all other things yielded unto them, but in that he could in no wise be persuaded to yield, to change his country language, and to receive the Latin tongue, as Cato Censorius writeth. But France for that it swarmed 
The cause why the French tongue is somuch confounded with latin.  as it were with citizens of Rome, did so confounded the Latin tongue, with the natural country speech, as that the ancient writers called our country men Romans; yea the judgements and decrees of the higher court of parliament, viz. of Paris were set down in Latin (which the precedents and governors were commanded to do) until that Francis the first had given order that they should use their own country language: as by like edict Edward the third commanded the judges and magistrates of England, to give judgements in their own country language, when as before they used the French. And at such time as the Saracens had subdued the greatest part of Asia, and Africa: they withal most far spread their language and religion even into the farther part of Spain: which when Philip king of Spain would gladly have suppressed, yet could he by no means effect it.  
Some amongst the marks of Sovereignty, have put also the power to judge and 
A sovereign prince may according to his conscience decide matters beyond either law, or custom.  decide matters, according to their conscience; a thing common to all judges, if they be not by express law or custom prohibited so to do. And that is it for which we oftentimes see in the edicts upon the articles committed to the arbitratarie judgement of the judges, this clause added, Wherewith we have charged our conscience. For if there be either custom or law to the contrary, it than is not in the power of the judge, to pass beyond the law, or to dispute against the received law. For that was a thing forbidden by the most politic laws of Lycurgus: and also by the most ancient laws of Florence, whereas a sovereign prince may do both, if he be not by the law of God forbidden; whereunto we have before showed him to be still subject.  
As for the title of Majesty itself, it sufficiently appeareth, that it only belongeth to 
The title of majesty proper to sovereign princes.  him that is a sovereign prince: so that for him that hath no sovereignty to usurp the same, were a very absurd thing: but to arrogat unto himself the addition of most excellent and sacred majesty, is much more absurd▪ the one being a point of lightness, and 
Titles dew to God beseem not princes.  the other of impiety: for what more can we give unto the most mighty and immortal God, if we take from him that which is proper unto himself? And albeit that in ancient time neither emperors nor king's used these so great addition or titles: yet the Germane princes nevertheless have often times given the title of Sacred Majesty unto the kings of France; aswell as unto their emperor. As I remember myself to have seen the letters of the princes of the empire, written unto the king, for the deliverance of county Mansfeld, than prisoner in France: wherein there was six times V S. M. that is to say, Vestra, Sacra, Maiestas, or Your Sacred Majesty▪ an addition proper unto God, apart from all worldly princes. As for other princes which are not sovereigns' some use the addition of His Highness, as the dukes of Lorraine, Savoy, Mantua, Ferrara, and Florence: some of Excellency, as the princes of the confines; or else of Serenity, as the duke of Venice.  
I omit here many other meaner rights which Sovereign princes every one of them pretend in their own countries, in number infinite, which yet are no marks of 
Marks of sovereignty aught to be such as are proper to all sovereign princes in general.  sovereignty, such as aught to be proper to all sovereign princes in general, apart from all other lords, justiciaries, magistrates, and subjects, and which are of their own nature incessible and not to be alienated from the sovereignty: nor by any course of time to be prescribed. And if the sovereign prince shall give or grant any lands or lordship of the public possessions, unto any, with jurisdiction and power to use the same, in such sort as he himself might: albeit that the royal rights properly belonging unto sovereignty, be not in the charter or writings expressly excepted: yet are they always by the very 
Sovereign rights cannot by the prince be alienated neither by any other be prescribed against.  law itself thought to be excepted, which by an old decree of the counsel of France was decreed not only for grants made unto private men, but also for such gifts or grants as were made unto the princes themselves descended of the royal blood and family: which royal rights can by no tract of time whatsoever, be prescribed against or usurped upon. For if public place, or the public possessions of the Commonweal cannot be got by any prescription: how much less than can the royalties proper unto sovereign majesty be prescribed upon. But it is certain by the edicts and laws concerning the public demain, that it is not to be alienated, neither by any tract of time to be gained. Which is no new thing: For it is two thousand years ago since that Themistocles, making seizure of certain lands belonging unto the public demain, usurped by some private men; said in the oration which he made unto the people of Athens, That mortal men could nothing prescribe against the immortal God: neither could private men in any thing prescribe against the Commonweal. The self same speech Cato the Censor used also in the Oration which he made unto the people of Rome, for the reuniting of some part of the public demain, usurped upon by certain private men. How then can a man prescribe upon the rights and marks of Sovereignty? And that is it, for which in law he is guilty of death, that in any sort useth the marks properly reserved unto the majesty of a Sovereign prince. And thus much concerning the principal points of Sovereign majesty, in as brief manner as I possibly could, having handled this matter more at large in my book De Imperio. And forasmuch as the form and estate of a Commonweal dependeth of them that have the Sovereignty therein: Let us now see how many sorts of Commonweals there be.  
Finis Lib. Primi.    

THE SECOND BOOK OF OR CONCERNING A COMMONWEAL.  

CHAP. I ¶ Of all sorts of Commonweals in general, and whether there be any more than three.  
FOrasmuch as we have before sufficiently spoken of Sovereignty, and of the rights and marks thereof; now it behoveth us to consider who they be which in every Commonweal hold that Sovereignty; thereby to judge what the estate is: as if the Sovereignty consist in one only prince, we call it a Monarchy: but if all the people be therein interressed, we call it a democracy, or Popular estate: So if but some part of the people have the Sovereign command, we accounted that state to be an Aristocracy. Which words we will use, to avoid the obscurity and confusion which might otherwise arise, by the variety of governors good or bad: which hath given occasion unto many, to make more sorts of Commonweals than three. But if that opinion should take place, and that we should by the foot of virtues & vices, measure the estate of Commonweals; we should found a world of them, and them in number infinite. Now it is most certain, that to attain unto the true definitions and resolutions of all things, we must not rest upon the external accidents which are innumerable, but rather upon the essential and formal differences: for otherwise a man might fall into an infinite and inextricable labyrinth, whereof no knowledge is to be had, or certain precept to be given. For so a man should forge and fashion infinite numbers of Commonweals, not only according to the diversity of virtues and vices; but even according to the variety of things indifferent also. As if a Monarch were to be chosen for his strength, or for his beauty, for his stature, or for his nobility, or riches, which are all things indifferent; or for his martial disposition, or for that he is more given to peace, for his gravity, or for his justice, for his beauty, or for his wisdom, for his sobriety, or his humility, for his simplicity, or his chastity; and so for all other qualities, a man should so make an infinity of Monarchies: and in like sort in the Aristocratique state, if some few of many should have the sovereignty above the rest, such as excelled others in riches, nobility, wisdom, justice, martial prowess, or other like virtues, or vices, or things indifferent, there should thereof arise infinite forms of Commonweals: a thing most absurd, and so by consequent the opinion whereof such an absurdity ariseth, is to be rejected. Seeing therefore that the accidental quality changeth not the nature of things: let us say that there are but three estates or sorts of Commonweals; namely a Monarchy, an aristocraty, and a Democraty. We call it a Monarchy, when 
That there are but three sorts of commonweals viz: a Monarchy a Democraty: and an aristocraty.  one man alone hath the sovereignty in a Commonweal, in such sort as we have aforesaid. And a Democraty, or Popular estate, when all the people, or the greater part thereof hath in it the sovereign power and command, as in one body. The aristocraty is, when the lesser part of the people hath the Sovereignty, as in one body, and giveth laws unto the rest of the people, whether it be in general, or in particular: all which things are of themselves more clearer than the day. And true it is, that the writers of ancient time do therein well agreed, that there can be no less than three kinds or sorts of Commonweals: Whereunto some others have joined a fourth, composed of all three: and some other a fift, divers from all the rest.  
Plato hath unto these three well adjoined a fourth kind, that is to wit, where some few of the better sort excelling the rest in virtue, have the sovereignty: which for all 
The divers opinions of the ancient writers concerning divers sorts of commonweals.  that in proper terms, is nothing else but a pure aristocraty: how be it, he hath not received the mixture of the aforesaid three states, for an other divers form of a Commonweal. Aristotle beside these three kinds of Commonweals which we have spoken of: and the fourth also named by Plato, setteth down a fift kind of Common weal, by confounding together the three former states, and so maketh five sorts of states or Commonweals. But Polybius reckoneth up seven sorts; three commendable: three faulty: and the seventh compounded of the mixture of the three first. Dionysius Halycarnasseus, Marcus Tullius, Thomas More, Gaspar Contarenus, Francis Machiavelli, and many other following Polybius, have as it were with one consent approved his opinion, which in deed is most ancient, and took not beginning from Polybius, although he would seem to be the author thereof, neither from Aristotle, but above four hundred years before Aristotle. Herodotus (the father of antiquity) writeth, that fourth kind of a Commonweal, confused of the three other, to have be●… commended of many, and yet for all that contenting himself with the three former kinds, rejecteth the rest as imperfect: And were it not that I were not only by probable arguments, but even by forcible reasons drawn from that opinion of Polybius, Tully, and the rest, I could easily have suffered myself to have been overcome by the authority of so great and grave men. It behoveth us therefore by lively reasons to show them to have erred and been deceived, which have brought in that fourth kind of Commonweal composed of the mixture of the other three: which I trust the more plainly to bring to pass, if I shall use the same examples in refelling of them, that they themselves have before used. For they themselves have set down the Lacedaemonian, Roman, and Venetian Commonweals to have been compounded and sweetly mingled with the three kind of states, that is to say, with the Monarchy, aristocraty, and Democraty. But when Plato said, the best kind of a Commonweal ●…o be composed of the mixture of a Monarchy and Democraty, he was therefore forthwith reprehended by his scholar Aristotle, saying, that of these two could no commendable state be made, and that therefore it was better of all three estates to make a fourth: wherein Aristotle reasoneth also against himself; for if he confess no good thing possibly to be made of two extremes; what shall then be made of three confounded amongst themselves? And for that this opinion for the making of a fourth 
No fourth estate of a commonweal to be made of a confusion of a Monarchy, a Democraty and an aristocraty.  estate of the confusion of the rest, may move great troubles in Commonweals, and therein work marvelous effects, it is requisite for us well to examine the same: For when states of Commonweals are in themselves contrary, as a Monarchy and a Democraty, they are by contrary laws and ordinances to be governed. The Florentines thoroughly persuaded of that opinion of the ancients for the mingling of the three estates together, as the best form of a Commonweal; when they moved with the seditious sermons of P. Soderin, and Jerome Savanarola, had translated the sovereignty or chief power of the Commonweal unto the people: thought it best to keep the rout of the vulgar and common people from bearing of offices and rule, and altogether from the affairs of state: that so the chief managing of matters might be reserved unto the more ancient sort of the citizens, and such as were of greater wealth and ability than the rest: who yet had not power to dispose of all matters, but only of such things as were the chiefest, viz. the making of laws, the creating of magistrates, and disposing of the common treasure: reserving the rest unto the Senate and magistrates, that so they might enjoy that moderate state of a Commonweal, whereof they had so strongly dreamt. And certes if of the three estates moderately mixed might a fourth state arise, it should have a certain power by nature divers from the rest: as we see in Harmonical consent, composed of Arithmetical and Geometrical proportion artificially confused; yet quite differing from them both: so as if the mixture of things of divers and contrary natures, ariseth a third all together differing from the things so together mixed. But that state which is made of the mixture of the three kinds of Commonweals, differeth in deed nothing from a mean popular state; For if three cities, whereof one of them is governed by a king, and so a Monarchy; the second by the nobility, and so an aristocraty; the third by the people, and so a Democraty; should be confounded, and so thrust together into one and the same form of a Commonweal, and so the chief power and sovereignty communicated unto all: who is there that can doubt but that that state shall be all together a state popular? except the sovereignty should by turns be given; first to the king, then to the nobility, and afterwards to the people; As in the vacancy of the Roman kingdom, the king being dead, the Senators ruled by turns: yet must they needs again fall unto one of these three kinds of a Commonweal which we have spoken of: neither could this alternative manner of government be of any long continuance, either yet more profitable to the Commonweal, then as if in an evil governed family, the wife should first command the husband; then the children them both; and the servants after them to domineer over all.  
But to confounded the state of a monarkie, with the Popular or Aristocratical estate, is a thing impossible, and in effect imcompatible, and such as cannot be imagined. For i●… sovereignty be of itself a thing indivisible, (as we have before showed) how can it then at one and the same time be divided betwixt one prince, the nobility, and the people in common? The first mark of sovereign majesty is, to be of power to give laws, and to command over them unto the subjects, and who should those subjects be that should yield their obedience unto that law, if they should also have the power to make the laws? who should he be that could give the law? being himself constrained to receive it of them unto whom he himself gave it? So that of necessity we must conclude, that as no one in particular hath the power to make the law in such a state, that then the state must needs be a state popular. Now if we shall give power unto the people to make laws, and to create magistrates, and not to meddle in the rest; we must yet needs confess that such power given unto the magistrates belonged unto the people, and that it is not given but as in trust unto the magistrates: whom the people may again displace, even aswell as they placed them, in such sort as that the state should always be popular.  
And to prove that which we have said to be true, let us take the same examples that Polybius, Contarenus, and the rest have left us; They say that the state of the Lacedæmonians was composed of all the three kinds of states which we spoke of: For that in that Commonweal they had two kings representing a Monarchy; eight and twenty Senators representing an aristocraty; and five Ephori figuring and patronizing the popular estate. But what will these men than say to Herodotus, who bringeth the 
That the Lacedaemonian commonweal was mere aristocratical, and not composed of the confusion or mixture of the three sorts of commonweals.  Lacedaemonian estate for an example of a most pure aristocraty? what will they also answer unto Theucidides, Xenophon, Aristotle, and plutarch? who speaking of the wars of Peloponnesus (which continued twenty years betwixt the Popular and the Aristocratique Commonweals) say, that the whole drift of the Athenians and their allies was to change the Aristocraties into Democraties, as they did in Samos, Corfu, and all the other cities by them subdued. Whereas contrariwise the Lacedæmonians purpose and intention was to change the Popular states into Aristocraties, as in deed they did in all the cities of Greece after the victory of Lysander; yea even in the city of Athens itself, where after he had laid the walls even with the ground, he took the sovereignty from the people, and gave the same unto thirty citizens, (who are therefore of the Athenians called the thirty Tyrants) to rule and govern in such sort and manner as they did amongst the Lacedæmonians, where so many, and no more had the government of the state. But among the citizens of Samos, the Siaeyons, the Aeginits, the Mylesians, and other cities of jonia and the lesser Asia, they gave the sovereignty unto Ten principal men, with one chief Captain over them, for the managing of the wars; calling hoame again such as had been banished for holding with the aristocraty, and driving into exile them that were chief of the popular factions.  
What will they also say to Maximus Tyrius, who reckoning up the States which held the pure Aristrocratie first of all nameth the Lacedæmonians, and after them the Thessalians, the Pellenians, the Cretentians, and the Mantineans. We must first convince these so many and so famous authors of untruth, before we can thrust the Lacedæmonians from their aristocraty: which writers living almost in the same time wherein the Athenian and Lacedaemonian Commonweals flourished, and being 
Gasper Contareus, Nicholas Machiavelli, Sir Thomas Moor. The cause that induced Polybius and others to say that the Lacedaemonian estate was a state composed of the mixture of the three states and forms of a commonweal. The history of a Lacoedemonian commonweal.  themselves Grecians, were like more certainly and truly to know these things, than a Venetian Senator, a Florentine, or an English man.  
What was it then that deceived Polybius, who was himself a Megalopolitan, borne near unto the Lacedæmonians? Truly it was even the name of the Lacedaemonian kings. For Lycurgus having altered the state of the Commonweal, and by the good will and consent of the kings themselves (who derived their pedigree from Hercules) having translated the sovereignty unto the people, left unto the kings, but the bore name and title only, and to be the generals in wars. For why the regal power was now before already sore shaken and weakened: after that Aristodemus king of Lacedemonia, had at once left his two sons to reign together over the Lacedæmonians (to the imitation of the Messenians, over whom Amphareus and Leucippus together reigned) who whilst they would both be kings and command over all, could neither of them so be, but by their jealous conceits and contentions, drawing the state into factions, gave occasion to Lycurgus, being descended also of the same stock with them, to overthrow their royal power, leaving unto them and their house nothing else but the name and show of kings, giving the rest unto the Senate and the people. But as in Athens and Rome, after the kings were thence driven out, they yet left the name of a king unto a certain priest, whom they called King of the Sacrifices, to do a certain sacrifice, which the king himself only had in former time done: Which priest for all that was himself subject unto the great bishop, and could not (as Plutarch saith) have any estate, or bear any office as the other priests might: even so did Lycurgus unto the two kings of Lacedemonia, who upon the matter were nothing but Senators, having but their voices with the rest, without any power at all to command; but to the contrary were themselves constrained to obey the commandments of the Ephori, who oftentimes put them to their fines, yea and condemned them to death also, as they did the kings Agis and Pausanias, the sovereignty still resting with the people, in whose power it was to confirm or infirm the acts and decrees of the Senat. Thucydides also himself rejecteth the opinion of them which thought the kings each of them to have had two voices. But about an hundred years after the popular state, ordained, was again changed by the kings Polydorus and Theopompus; seeing it to be an hard matter to call the people together, and a great deal harder to rule them by reason, being assembled; oftentimes at their pleasure reversing the most wholesome and religious decrees of the Senat. Wherhfore they changed that popular government into an aristocraty, subtly wresting an Oracle of Apollo to that purpose: whereby the God (as they said) commanded that from thenceforth the government of the Commonweal should be in the power of the Senate: and yet to please the people so grieved to have left their power, they gave them leave to draw out of themselves five judges, called Ephori, as Tribunes or patrons of the people, who should examine the sayings, doings, and devices of the kings, and by all means let them from the exercising of tyranny. And these Ephorie, every ninth year once, upon some clear night gazing upon the firmament (as Plutarch saith) if they than saw any star, as it were, sparkle or shoot, they thereupon committed their kings to prison, who might not thence be delivered, until the Oracle of Apollo had so declared. In like manner the Phylactes or Gailor, every year had the king of Cumes in prison, until the Senate had determined what should be done with him. Now this state of the Lacedaemonian Commonweal endured about five hundred years, until the time of Cleomenes, who having slain the Ephori and the Senators, and so oppressed the Commonweal, took upon himself the sovereignty, and so held it until such time as he was overcome by Antigonus king of Macedon; who having vanquished him, restored that Commonweal into the state it was before: howbeit that twenty years after, being fallen again into the power of Nabis the tyrant, who was afterward slain by Philopomenes, that Commonweal was united unto the state of the Achaeans, whereof it was a province, until that about thirty years after, it was by Gallus the Roman Proconsul taken from the Achaeans, and by Roman emperors set at liberty. Thus in few words you may see the true history of the the Lacedaemonian Commonweal, for most part taken from Xenophon, Thucydides, Livy, & Polybius, whereof yet no man hath more curiously written than Plutarch, who out of the Lacedaemonian acts and public records, hath corrected such things as of others have been but slightly or falsely set down and reported: which hath given occasion to many to be deceived, and to think that state to have been mingled of the three divers kinds of Commonweals. Which is plainly to be gathered out of Livy, where he bringeth in Nabis the first tyrant of Lacedemonia, thus speaking to Titus Flaminius, Noster legulator Lycurgus, non in paucorum manu Rempub●…esse voluit, quem vos Senatum appellatis, nec eminere unum aut alterum ordinem in civitate, sed per aequationem fortunae & dignitatis fore credidit, ut multi essent qui propatria arma ferrent, Our lawgiver Lycurgus (saith he) would not the state of our Commonweal to be in few men's hands, which you call the Senate, neither would have any one or other order to excel the rest in our city; but by the making equal of men's fortune and dignity, thought it would come to pass, that there should be many which would bear arms for their country. Thus he covereth his tyranny with the show of a popular state, when as then there was no popular estate at all; yet in that he said most truly, that Lycurgus at the beginning gave the sovereignty unto the people.  
But let us see the rest. They also have put for example the Roman Commonweal, which they said to have been mingled of the three kinds of Commonweals: For so saith Polybius (who was master to Africanus the Great) We see (saith he) the regal power in the Consuls, the aristocraty in the Senate, and the Democraty in the people. 
The Roman commonweal a mere popular state and not composed of the three forms of commoweals.  Unto whom do plainly assent Dionysius Halycarnasseus, Cicero, Contarenus, Sir Thomas Moore, and many others: which opinion for all that is neither grounded upon truth not reason. For where is this Monarchy, that is to say, the sovereign government of one man? which in the two Consuls cannot be imagined. But sovereign majesty, if it were in the consuls could not possibly be divided betwixt two, for the indivisible nature thereof, which it seemeth more probable and reasonable to attribute the same unto the dukes of Genua or Venice. But what regal power could there be in the two Roman Consuls? who could neither make law, nor peace, nor war, neither 
No sovereignty in the Roman Consuls  any great officer, neither grant pardon, neither take a penny out of the common treasure, neither so much as to whip a citizen, if it were not in time of war, without leave of the people: which hath been a power always given to all governors of armies, whom we also may so call kings, and with greater appearance than the Consuls, who had not power but the one of them after the other, and that but for the space of one year only. The constable of France, the chief Bassa of the Turks, the Bethudere in Aethiopia, the Edegnare in the kingdom of Africa, have ten times more power than had the two Consuls together, & yet for all that they are but subjects & slaves to other princes, as were the Consul's subjects and servants unto the people. And to what purpose say they, that the Consuls had such royal authority, seeing that the lest of the Tribunes of the people might imprison them. As did Drusus the Tribune, who by a sergeant took Philip the Consul by the collar, and cast him in prison, for that he had interrupted him, as he was speaking unto the people: and that he might lawfully so do, shall hereafter be declared. The power of the Consuls was to lead the armies, war being before denounced, to assemble the Senate, to present the letters of the captains and allies unto the Senate, to give audience unto ambassadors before the people or the Senate, to call together the great estate, and to demand the advise of the people, about the election of officers, or promulgation of laws; who yet standing, spoke unto the people sitting, and their mazes down, in token of their subjection unto the people. The same authority with the Consuls had the chief governor of the city in their absence. join hereunto also, that the Consuls had power but for one year: wherefore I leave this opinion as scarce worthy the refuting.  
Now as concerning the Senate, which they say to have had the form and power of 
The small power of the Roman Senate: and that therein was no resemblance of an aristocraty  an aristocraty, it was so far there from, as that there was never privy council, which had not more authority: for it had no power to command either particular men, or magistrates: yea the Senators might not assemble themselves, except it so pleased the Consuls, or the Praetor in the absence of the Consuls: insomuch that Caesar a popular man, perceiving himself not gracious with the Senate, oftentimes called the people together in the year of his Consulship: but the Senate in all that year he assembled but once or twice, still presenting his request unto the people when he would obtain any thing: which was no great novelty, for the Consul for his pleasure to do, contrary to the good liking and mind of the Senat. For we read (that the Senate at such time as it was in greatest authority that ever it was) in the dangerous time of the Commonwealth, having requested the Consuls to name a dictator, the Consuls would therein do nothing: insomuch that the Senate having no power to command them, neither any sergeant or like officer, which are the true marks of them which have the power to command, sent Servilius Priscus with their request unto the Tribunes in this sort, * Vos (inquit) Tribuni plebis Senatus appellat, ut in tanto discrimine Reipublicae dictatorem 
Livius lib. 4.  dicere, consuls pro vestra potestate cogatis: Tribuni pro collegio pronunciant, placere consuls Senatui dicto audientes esse, aut in vinculase duci iussuros, The Senate (saith he) appealeth unto you the Tribunes of the people, that in so great danger of the Commonweal, you for the great authority you have, would compel the Consuls to nominat a Dictator: whereupon the Tribunes pronounced for their whole society, that their pleasure was, that the Consuls should be obedient unto the Senate, or else that they would command them to prison. And in another * place the same author saith, That 
Livius lib. 27.  the Senate was of advise, that the Consul should present the request unto the people, for the commanding of him whom they would have Dictator: which if the Consul should refuse to do, that then the Praetor of the city should do it: who if he should refuse also, that then the Tribunes of the people should propound the matter. Consul negavit se populum rogaturum, Praetoremque rogare vetuit: Tribuni plebis rogarunt, The Consul denied to request the people, and forbade the Praetor also to request them, the Tribunes made the request. Whereby it evidently appeareth, that the Senate could not so much as command the lesser magistrates, the greater magistrates forbidding them. And as for that which Polybius saith, That the Senate had power to judge of cities and provinces, and to take punishment of conspirators against the state: * Livy 
Liviu. lib. 26. ●…  showeth it to have been otherwise, as when question was made for the chastising of the traitors of Campania, who after the battle at Cannae had joined themselves unto Hannibal, an ancient Senator said in full Senate, Per Senatum agi de Campanis iniussu populi non video posse, I see not that any thing can by the Senate be done concerning the Campanians without the commandment of the people. And a little after, Rogatio ferator ad populum, qua Senatui potestas fiat statuendi de Campanis, Let request be made unto the people, whereby power may be given unto the Senate, to determine concerning the Campanians. And upon the request to that purpose presented unto the people, the people gave them commission, and commanded the Senate to proceed 
The people of Rome in their assemblies did ●…e in token of the●… sovereignty.  against them in this sort, Quod Senatus maxima pars censeat, qui assident id volumus iubemusque, What the greatest part of the Senate shall agreed upon, we that here sit will and command the same. Neither is Polybius●…sse ●…sse deceived, in saying, That the Senate at pleasure disposed of the provinces and governments: whereas Livy the best author of the Roman antiquities, is of contrary opinion, writing thus, Qui●…tus Fuluius postulavit a Consul ut palam in Senatu diceret, permitteret ne Senatui ut de provincijs decerneret, staturusque eo esset quod censuisset, an ad populum laturus: Scipio respondit se quode Republica esset facturum. Tum Fuluius a vobis peto Tribuni plebis ut mihi auxilio sitis. Quintus Fuluius requested of the Consul, that he should openly say in the Senate whether he gave leave or not unto the Senate, to determine of the provinces, and whether he would stand to that it should decree, or else would refer the matter unto the people: Whereunto Scipio answered, That he would do that which should be for the good of the Commonweal. Than said Fuluius, I request you the Tribunes of the people to aid and help me. So that it plainly appeareth, the Senate to have had no power at all, neither the decrees thereof to have been of any force, without the consent of the Tribunes of the people: and that the rest they had by the sufferance of the same people. Now he that hath nothing but by sufferance, hath indeed nothing of his own, as we have before said. Yea such decrees of the Senate, as were confirmed by the consent of the Tribunes of the people, unto whom they were to be communicated, could not yet be put in execution, except that either the Consuls did so command; or that the Consuls refusing so to do, the Tribunes themselves propounded the same unto the people. So that in brief all matters of estate, and namely all the counsels and decrees of the Senate were of no force or virtue, if the people did not so command: or if the Tribunes of the people consented not thereunto, as we have before touched, and shall more at large declare in speaking of a Senat. Wherhfore in the Roman state, the government was in the magistrates, the authority and council in the Senate, but the sovereign power and majesty of the Commonweal was in the people. Excepting that time wherein the Decemuiri contrary to the law, kept in their hands longer than a year, the sovereign power to make laws committed unto them; from which they were shortly after by force of arms removed: for than it might of right have been called an Aristocracy, or more properly to say an oligarchy. Now as we have before said, that the power of magistrates (how great soever it be) is not of themselves, neither theirs, but as committed unto them in trust: so at the first, after the driving out of the kings, the Senators were chosen by the people; who to discharge themselves of that labour, committed that charge to the Censors, who were also chosen by the people, so that upon the matter all the authority of the Senate depended of the people, who at their pleasure used to confirm or infirm, to ratify or disannul the decrees of the Senat.  
The same opinion hath Contarenus of the Venetian Commonweal, saying it to be 
The Venetian estate a pure aristocraty and not composed of the three forms of commonweals  also mixed of the three forms of Commonweals, as were those of Rome and Lacedemonia: For, saith he, the royal power is in a sort in the duke of Venice, the Aristocracy in the Senate, and the popular estate in the Grand Council. But janot after him hath most curiously brought to light the true estate of the Venetian Commonweal; wherein he showeth by most evident testimonies, drawn out of the most ancient and true Venetian records, That Contarenus in so saying was much deceived. He showeth plainly, that not past three hundred years ago, before the time of Sebastian Cyanee duke of Venice, the Venetian estate was a pure monarchy. Howbeit that Contarenus writeth it to have been established in the state it now is eight hundred years: and Pau. Manutius, saith it to have so stood twelve hundred years: all which janot proveth out of the public records, and certain history to be untrue. But howsoever that be, plain it is, at this day to be a pure Aristocracy: For by the view of the city and the 
A view taken of the Citizens and gentlemen of Venice.  citizens, which was taken about thirty years ago, were reckoned nine and fifty thousand three hundred forty nine citizens, beside children under seven years old, but of Gentlemen, in whom resteth the sovereign power of that state, betwixt four and five thousand young and old: yet had the church men and gentlemen under five and twenty years old, nothing to do with the state, more than to look on, neither had they access into the Grand Council, but by way of request: the young gentlemen being so upon request received at the age of thirty years, according as discretion was to be seen more in some one, than in some others: and yet hath it not been found this hundred year, that the Grand Council assembled, to decide the great affairs of that state, hath exceeded the number of fifteen hundred, as is to be seen in the histories of Sabellicus, and of cardinal Bembus, the rest being absent. It is therefore the lest 
The sovereignty of the Venetian estate to be in the grand counsel.  part of the Venetians that have the sovereignty, and they also of certain noble families, for all the gentlemen borne in Venice, are not received into the Grand Council; but there are of one and the same stock, of the same race, of the same name, whereof some are citizens, and come not into the council, and the others come. I do not here set down the reason why, which every man may see in Sabellicus. This great council as Contarenus saith, hath sovereign power to make and repeal laws, to place or displace all officers, to receive the last appeals, to determine of peace and war, and to give pardon unto the condemned. Wherein Contarenus condemneth himself: for seeing it is (as he saith) it cannot be denied, but that the state of this Commonweal is Aristocratique. For were it that the Great Council had no other power than to make laws and magistrates, it were enough to prove it to be an Aristocratical state, as we have before said: for if those officers have any power, they hold it of the signory: which sufficeth to show, that neither the Decemuiri, neither the Senate, neither the Sages, nor yet the duke with his six councillors, have any power but by sufferance, and so far as it shall please the Great Council. As for the duke himself he alone of all 
The small authority and power the Duke of Venice hath.  other magistrates hath no command at all, as not having power to condemn any man before him, neither to stay or examine any man; which is the first mark of command, given even unto the lest magistrates, neither may he decide any cause whether it be in matters of state, or administration of justice; either in the assembly of the six councillors, or of the Decemuiri, or of the Sages, or of the Senate, or of the forty judges in civil or criminal causes, or of the Grand Council. For albeit that he may enter into all their corporations and colleges, yet so it is, that he hath but his voice, as any one of them; but that he useth to give it to the last: neither dare he to open any letter directed unto the signory, or admit or discharge any ambassadors, but in the presence of his six councillors, or of the Decemuiri, or to go out of the city without leave. Yea Falerius the duke, for that he had without the consent of the council married a stranger, was by the Decemuiri hanged. And beside him Sabellicus reckoneth up twelve dukes more, either by the tumultuous people slain, or otherwise put to death for abusing their authority. But he weareth a most precious cap, a rob of gold, he is followed, honoured, and respected as a prince: and the coin carrieth his name, albeit that the stamp of the signory be upon it, which are all tokens of a prince: all which royal magnificence we grant him to have, but yet all without power or command. Now if it were so that we should not according unto truth, but after shows and appearances judge of the estate of Commonweals, there should be found none simple and pure, but all mixed and confused in such sort as they say. Yea the empire of Germany should be much more mixed, than the Venetian state. For the emperor hath other marks and 
The state of the German empire and of the Swissers, Aristocratical and not mixed.  more royal than hath the duke of Venice: then the seven princes electors, with the other princes, have the show of an Aristocracy, or of an oligarchy: and the ambassadors of the imperial towns resemble a democracy. And yet for all that most certain it is, that the imperial state of Germany is a pure Aristocracy, composed of three or four hundred persons at most, over whom one prince beareth rule, to put in execution the decrees of the council, or else is to be forced to give up his office, as we shall in due place declare. In like manner they say also the states of the Swissers to be mixed of the three divers forms of a Commonweal: Among whom the Burgamaister representeth the king, the Senate an Aristocracy, and the assemblies general and particular, the state popular: and yet for all that men know might well, that all their states and Commonweals are either popular, as are they which inhabit the mountains, or else Aristocratike, as are almost all the rest.  
And this opinion of the mixed state hath so possessed the minds of men, that many 
The estate of France a pure Monarchy and not mixed.  have both thought and w●…it this monarchy of France (than which none can be imagined more royal) to be mixed and composed of the three kinds of Commonweals, and that the parliament of Paris hath the form of an Aristocracy, the three estates of a Democraty, and the king to represent the state of a monarchy: which is an opinion not only absurd, but also capital. For it is high treason to make the subject equal to the king in authority and power, or to join them as companions in the sovereignty with him. And what popular power appeareth, when the three states are assembled? or the parliament called? or wherein is the sovereign majesty of a prince so much manifested, as when every man in particular, and all men in general, aswell the noble as the menial, with bended knee, and bore head, adore their king? offer unto him their requests, which he at his pleasure admitteth or rejecteth. What counterpoise of a popular power against the majesty of a monarch can there be in the assembly of the three estates? yea of the whole people, if it could be gathered into one place, which 
The power of a sovereign prince in nothing dimi nished by his parliament, but rather much the more thereby manifested.  humbleth itself, requesteth and reverenceth their king. So far is it from that such an assembly in any thing diminisheth the power of a sovereign prince, as that thereby his majesty is the more increased and augmented. For it cannot be exalted into a more high degree of honour, of power, and of glory, than to see an infinite number of great lords and princes, and people innumerable, of men of all sorts and quality, to cast themselves down at his feet, and to do homage unto his majesty; seeing that the honour, glory, and power of princes, consisteth not but in the obeisance, homage, and service of their subjects. If then no form or fashion of a popular power can be imagined in the assembly of the three estates, which they make in this realm, no more or haply less than in England and Spain: much less shall there be an Aristocracy in the Court of Peers, (who are so called, for that they be equal one with another among themselves, but not with the prince, as some have too rustically deemed) or in the assembly of all the officers of the realm, considering that the presence of the king doth make all power and authority of all corporations and colleges, and of all officers aswell in general as in particular to cease: in such sort, as that no magistrate hath power to command any thing in his presence, as we will in d●…e place declare. And albeit that the king sitting in his seat of justice, the chancellor first addresseth himself unto him, to know his pleasure, by commandment from whom he goeth, gathering the advise and opinions of the princes of the blood, and other great lords, the peers and magistrates, which he reporteth again unto him: yet is not that so done, to the intent to number the voices, as in the consistory among the judges, but that the king understanding their opinions, may as seemeth unto him good, receive or reject the same. And albeit that most times he follow the opinion of the greater part, yet to make it known, that it is not the judges or magistrates decree, but the decree of the prince only, and that the rest of the magistrates have therein no power, the chancellor pronounceth not this or that to be thought good unto the judges of the court, but with a loud voice useth these words, The king sayeth unto you. We see also that the court of parliament, writing unto the king, keepeth even yet the ancient style, which is this in the superscription of their letters, To our Sovereign Lord the King. The beginning of 
The form the courts of parliament in France hold in writing to the king.  which letters is on this sort, Our Sovereign Lord in most humble wise, and so much as in us is we recommend us to your good grace, And the subscription placed as low as may be: Your most humble and obedient subjects and servants, the men holding your court of Parliament. Which is not t●… th●…anner of the lords of an Aristocracies speech: neither of such as are companions in Sovereignty with the king, but of true and humble subjects. And for that I have touched this point before, I will now lightly pass it over. The state of France therefore is a pure Monarchy, no●… mingled with the popular power, and so less with the Aristocratique signory: which mixture of states is altogether impossible, and incompatible. And Aristotle most subtly examining this opinion, for the mixture of states, truly calleth the state composed of an Aristocratic and a Democraty 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, that is to say a Commonweal: but showeth not how that may be done, neither giveth thereof example, as he usually doth in others: but to the contrary confesseth, that he knew none such in his time; or yet had found any such before, albeit that he is reported to have gathered an hundred Commonweals into one book, which book is now lost. And forasmuch as Aristotle seldom or never reporteth the true opinions of Plato, but to the contrary always disguiseth and obscureth them as the ancient Academiques have right well noted; and namely where he rejecteth his Commonweal; upon whose sayings many resting themselves have oftentimes deceived both themselves and others. We not addicted to either, will in few words set down the true opinion of Plato concerning his Commonweal, deserving well to be known for the better understanding of the question we have in hand, which some which never read the same, call a divine opinion: some others in the mean time treading the same under foot, and railing thereat as fast.  
Plato feigned unto himself only two Commonweals, whereof the first he attributed to Socrates, who never thought (as saith Xenophon) of that which Plato maketh him to say: and in his Commonwealth he taketh away these words, Mine, and Thy, as the source and fountain of all evil, and would have all goods, yea wives and children to be common. But seeing every man to found fault therewith, he quietly left it, as if he had so writ more for argument sake, than for that he so thought, or to have the same put in effect. The second is his own, wherein he taketh away the community of 
Plato his commonweal a pure popular estate and not mixed.  goods, of women and children: as for the rest those Commonweals are both in all things alike. For both in the one and the other, he would not have above five thousand and forty citizens, a number by him chosen to have 59 entire parts: in which Commonweals he also maketh three estates or degrees of men: viz. the Guards, Soldiers, and Labourers: and after that divideth the citizens into three degrees, according to the unequal rate of their substance. As for the sovereignty he giveth it unto the whole multitude of the people; as to make and abrogat laws, cause sufficient enough to judge that he meant to make it a popular estate, if there were nothing else. But he passeth on farther, and giveth unto the whole assembly of the people power to place and displace all the officers: and not content with that, willeth also that the people should have all the power to judge in criminal causes; for that they are (as he saith) all therein interessed. In brief he giveth unto the people power of life and death, to condemn, and to grant pardon; which are all evident arguments of a popular state. For he appointeth no sovereign magistrate, which might represent the state royal, and but a little of the form Aristocratique: for he willeth, that the Senate, or the counsel for the affairs of the state, which he calleth Guards or keepers should consist of four hundred citizens, to be chosen of the people. Whereby it is most evidently to be understood, that Plato his Commonwealth is the most popular that ever was, yea then that of his own country of Athens, which Xenophon thought to have been the most popular state in the world. I omit the 726 laws set down by Plato, in the twelve books for the government of his Commonweal: sufficeth it me to have showed Plato his imagined Commonweal not to have been made of a mixture of an Aristocracy, and democracy, as Aristotle said, whose error Cicero, Contarenus, and others, one after another following, led the rest that followed them into error also.  
Let us therefore conclude, never any Commonwealth to have been made of an Aristocracy and popular estate; and so much less of the three states of Commonweals, and that there are not indeed but three estates of Commonweals, as Herodotus first most truly said amongst the Greeks', whom Tacitus amongst the Latins imitating, saith, Cunctas nationes & urbes, populus, aut primores, aut singuli regunt, The people, the nobility, or one alone, do rule all nations and cities.  
But some man will say, May there not be a Commonweal, wherein the people hath the power to created the magistrates, to dispose of the common revenue, and power of life and death; which are three marks of sovereignty, & the nobility to have power to make laws, to dispose of peace and war, and of the impositions and taxes; which are also marks of sovereignty: and besides all these to have one royal magistrate above all, unto whom all the people in general, and every one in particular should yield their faith and liege loyalty, and from whose judgement none might appeal or present any civil request. For so the rights and marks of sovereignty should seem to be divided in three parts: the people challenging one part thereof, the nobility another, and the king the third: whereby in that state a mixture might seem to be made of the royal Aristocratique and popular state together. Whereunto I answer, that such a state was never found, neither that such a state can be made, or yet well imagined, 
That it is impossible to compose one commonweal of the mixture of the three forms of commonweals.  considering that the marks of sovereignty are indivisible. For the nobility which should have the power to make the laws for all: (which is as much as to say to command and forbidden what them pleased, without power to appeal from them, or for a man to oppose himself against their commands) would by their laws at their pleasure forbidden others to make peace or war, or to levy taxes, or to yield fealty and homage without their leave: and he again to whom fealty and homage is due, would bind the nobility and people not to yield their obedience unto any other, but unto himself. And admit that every one would seek to defend his own right, and not suffer any thing to be taken from him that he thought belonged to himself: yet that doth most differ from the nature of a Monarchy, that he which hath the sovereignty, should himself be enforced to obey any other but especially his subject. Whereby it cometh to pass, that where the rights of sovereignty are divided betwixt the prince and his subjects: in that confusion of the state, there is still endless stirs and quarrels, for the superiority, until that some one, some few, or all together have got the sovereignty. Whereof as there be many examples of old, so is there none fit in our time, than the example of the kings of Denmark, whom the nobility ever since Christiern the great grandfather of Fredrick which now reigneth, hath almost made subject unto the laws. Christiern they thrust out of his kingdom, and set up his cozen in his place, with condition that he should neither make peace nor war, without the leave of the senate: nor that he should have any power to condemn any gentleman to death; with many other like articles, which I will in their place set down: which the kings since that time have sworn to keep: which that they should not go against, but that they might be the more firmly kept, the nobility will in no case that the king should of himself make any peace; and yet have themselves made a league with the king of Polonia, and them of Lubec, against the king, for the defence of their liberty. So indeed are the rights of Sovereignty divided betwixt the king and the nobility, but so as that they both living in perpetual fear and distrust; do seek for the alliance and fellowship of their neighbour princes and people, so to receive the less harm one of them from another. With like surges and tempests is the kingdom of Sweden also tossed, the king whereof lived in such distrust with his nobility, as that king Henry was 
To divide the rights of sovereignty dangerous to all commonweals.  glad to take a Germane for his chancellor, and one Var●…nneses a Norman for his high Constable: and yet at length was by his nobility thrust out of his royal seat, and by them cast in prison, wherein he lived seventeen year. Wherhfore such states as wherein the rights of sovereignty are divided, are not rightly to be called Commonweals, but rather the corruption of Commonweals, as Herodotus hath most briefly, but most truly written. For as bodies by nature well framed, if they begin to change, with wonderful stink and contagion annoyed all that come near them, until they be quite altered, and become new things; as when eggs are set upon, which before they were set, and after they be hatched also have a good smell and taste, though in the very alteration of them not so: so also Commonweals which change their state, the sovereign right and power of them being divided, found no rest from civil wars and broils, until they again recover some one of the three forms, and that the sovereignty be wholly in one of the states or other.  
Yet might one say, that in the estate of the Romans the less part of the people chosen out of the richer sort made the laws, and greatest officers; namely the Consuls▪ the Praetors, the Censors, had both sovereign power of life and death: and disposed of war, and that the greater sort of the people made the lesser officers and magistrates, to wit, the Tribune's of the people; the four and twenty military Tribunes; the two Aediles or Sheriffs; the Treasourers; the Scout, and mint masters, and gave also all benefices vacant, and more than that the greater part of the people judged of the great criminal processes before Sylla, if it tended not to the natural or civil death of any. And by this mean it seemeth that that Commonweal was composed of an Aristocracy, and of a popular estate: Whereunto I answer, that it had well some appearance, but yet nevertheless was in effect a true popular estate: for albeit that the great estate of the people was divided into six degrees, or companies, according to every one's ability, and that the knights, and the greatest part of the Senators, and of the nobility, and richer sort of the people were of the first company: who agreeing among themselves, the laws by them made were published, and the great magistrates by them chosen received to take their oath: yet nevertheless true it is that the five companies that remained, had ten times as many citizens in them: and in case that all the Centuries of the first company agreed not upon the matter, they then came to the second company, and so by order even to the sixt and last, which in deed seldom times or never happen. Matters being still so agreed upon, as that they came not always unto the second company, but seldom to the third, and most seldom to the fourth, scarcely at all unto the fift, and never unto the sixt: wherein was all the rabble of the poor and base people, in number far exceeding all the rest: yet sufficeth it for our purpose, that all the people had thein part, to show it to have been a popular state: albeit that the most noble and richer sort were first called. And yet for all that the menial people, (that is to say, the greater sort of the people) without the nobility, seeing themselves sometime deceived of their voices (after that the kings were driven out) and little or no regard to be had of them, began tumultuously to arise: whereof grew the three departures of the people into the mount Aventine, whither the people in arms had retired themselves for the defence of their liberty and power against the nobility: which could not be appeased until it was lawful for them to choose unto themselves their own sacred magistrates, and that in their own assemblies, from which the nobility was excluded: and then the Commonweal seemed in a manner to have been mixed of the nobility and the people. But if a man will consider the shortness of the time, and the turmoils where with the Commonweal was in the mean time afflicted, he shall confess that it could scarce have stood in that state, although most miserable twenty or thirty years: neither yet so long, had it not on every side been beset with enemies. For shortly after the people took unto themselves the power to make laws, wherein the majesty of the Commonweal is contained; and so by little and little wrested from the nobility (much against their will & long struggling therefore) the other sovereign rights also: in somuch that the nobility scarce made twelve laws in the space of four or five hundred; And yet at the same time that the people chose the greater magistrates by their greatest assemblies, the vulgar people was there present, and enrolled in the sixt company, which although it most seldom gave suffrage or voice, yet might it so do, if the other companies should have disagreed among themselves: a reason sufficient to show the state even at that time also to have been a popular state.  
Yet for all that a man may say that it followeth not hereof that there are not but three sorts of Commonweals, although they cannot be amongst themselves mixed: for it may be that of threescore thousand citizens in a city, forty thousand may have the sovereignty, and twenty thousand be excluded: where, for that the greater part beareth the sway, it shall be a popular state: and contrary wise if but an hundred of that multitude shall have the sovereignty, it shall be an Aristocracy; for that the less part of the citizens gathered together hath the sovereign power: what then, if of the same number of citizens five and twenty thousand shall hold the chief power? Truly, it may be doubted whether such a state be an Aristocracy, although the less part of the citizens enjoy the sovereignty, the rest being rejected: for why, it differeth much whether an hundred citizens, or five and twenty thousand bear rule, and much more if of an hundred thousand citizens five and forty thousand have the sovereignty: or of so great a multitude thirty only should bear the sway, the rest excluded, as among the Lacedæmonians: yet I always deem it to be an Aristocracy, if the lesser part of the 
In what state soever the lesser number beareth rule over th●… greater it is to be accounted an aristocraty.  citizens bear rule over the rest: for otherwise if the diversity of the number should make the diversity of Commonweals, there should be of them a million, yea an infinite of divers kinds of Commonweals: for the number of them which should have part in the state increasing or diminishing, should make an infinite diversity, whereof no knowledge is to be had; sufficeth it the sovereign power to be with the greater or 
What a principa litie is.  lesser part of the people, for the making of an Aristocracy or democracy. The rest of the difficulties which might be moved concerning the nature of every Common weal shall hereafter be in due place declared.  
Yet one thing remaineth in the question we have in hand to be discussed, which is that the Roman Commonweal under the emperor Augustus, and the other emperors after him, unto the time of Flavius Vespatianus, was called a principality, of which sort of Commonweal, neither Herodotus, neither any of the Greek or Latin writers, except Tranquillus, seemeth to make any mention: for he writeth that the emperor Caligula, seeing divers kings at his table to enter into the terms of honour, and the antiquity of their houses among themselves; with a loud voice brought forth that verse of Homer which Agamemnon useth against Achilles, who would needs make himself equal and companion with him.  
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  

An evil thing it is to be ruled by many:  
one prince, and one king, where there is any.   
And much it miss not but that he had even than taken upon him the imperial crown, and changed the form of the Roman principality into a kingdom; and thus much he. whereby it is to be understood the Roman state under Augustus after the battle at Actium, to have been neither a Popular state, an Aristocracy, nor a Monarchy. Now a principality is nothing else then an Aristocracy, or a Democraty, 
What a Principality is.  in which one chief commanded every man in particular, and it is but the first in general: for this word (Prince) to speak properly signifieth no other thing but him that is first. So the jews complained Aristobulus the first of the house of the Amoneans, to have changed the principality which was Aristocratique, into two kingdoms, at such time as he took one crown to himself, and sent an other to his brother. The like we found, that the ancient cities of Tuscanie made alliance with Tarqvinius Priscus king of the Romans; upon condition that he should not have power over them of life and death: neither to put garrisons into their towns, nor to impose upon them any taxes or tallages; or to change any of their customs or laws, Sed ut civitatum principatus penes regem Romanum esset, but that the principality of their cities only should be with the Roman king: for so saith Florus. Now all those cities were of a popular state. Wherhfore Tarqvinius was but the first and chief in the assemblies of those cities, who might govern the multitude no otherwise than doth the emperor in the Germane empire, or the duke in Venice, or Genua, who may most rightly be called princes, as in the same sense in ancient time the chief magistrate among the Athenians, was called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, or prince: yet was that Commonweal of all other most popular.  
But if there be two chief magistrates of like power, as in Rome; or three, as in many cities of the Swissers; or four, as amongst them of Geneva; it cannot there be called a principality, for that none is there chief or principal. But in the Roman Commonweal, Augustus by a crafty devise having made himself but great General of the army (by the name of Imperator) and Tribune of the people for defence of their profit, (from whom for all that he had taken their liberty) and as it seemed almost enforced by the Senate, had taken upon him the charge of the Commonweal for ten years, made that state in show and false semblant but a principality, when as before he had placed in all the provinces forty legions, and taken three for the safety of his person, and put sure garrisons into all the castles and strong fortresses of the empire: so invading the royal power without a Sceptre, without a Diadem, or a Crown; whose successors 
In matter of state he that is master of the forces, is master of the men, of the▪ laws, and of all the commonweal.  (excepting some few) some more, some less, exercised most cruel tyranny. For Tiberius in the beginning of his reign, rise upon the Consuls, and meeting them gave them way, (as saith Tranquillus) but afterwards oppressed the Commonweal with most filthy servitude and slavery. But here is to be considered what was in deed done, and was not made show of: for he that beareth greatest sway in the Commonweal, him men think to have the sovereignty: but if question be made of the right, then are we to look not what is indeed done, but what aught to be done. Wherefore it appeareth a principality to be nothing else, but an aristocraty, or a Democraty, having some one for chief or principal above the rest, the sovereignty yet still remaining with the nobility or the people.   

CHAP. II ¶ Of a Lordly Monarchy, or of the sole government of one.  
WE have before said, that a Monarchy is a kind of Commonweal, wherein the absolute sovereignty lieth in the power of one only prince: which definition we are now to explain. When we say of one, so the word Monarchy of itself importeth: For if we shall in the 
A true soveraig●… commandeth all others his subjects, but is himself by none commanded.  government join two or more, no one of them shall have the sovereignty: for that a sovereign is he which commandeth all others, and can himself by none be commanded. If then there be two princes equal in power, one of them hath not the power to command the other, neither can he suffer the command of the other his companion, if it stand not with his own pleasure, otherwise they should not be equals. We may then conclude, that of two princes equal in power in the same Commonweal, and both of them in all things lords of the same people, and of the same country indivisibly, neither the one nor the other hath therein the sovereignty: but it may well be said them both together to have the sovereignty of the state comprised under the name of an oligarchy, but is more properly called a Duarchie, a kind of Aristocracy, which may be of continuance and durable, so long as the two princes shall well agreed together. As Romulus and Tatius, one of them king of the Romans, and the other of the Sabines, after certain conflicts, making peace entered into society together, upon condition, that both their people united together, should devil within the same walls, and by the name of Quirites by common sovereignty be governed by both kings. But Romulus, who before by the slaughter of his 
A very hard matter for two princes in one and the same commonweal long to hold the sovereignty together.  brother Remus had rid himself of his fellow in the kingdom, could not long endure the stranger to reign with him, but caused him to be slain, or at leastwise held the murderer excused, being for the fact apprehended. Long time after the Roman empire was converted from a Monarchy into a Binarchie: at such time as Antoninus Pius left M. Aurelius, and Aelius Verus, emperors, and both fellows in the same empire: of which too Aelius in short time after died, and not without the suspicion of poison. For it is, and always hath been a thing most hard to maintain the equal sovereignty of both together. And that which Lucan writeth,  

Nulla fides regni socijs, omnis que potestas,  
Impatiens consortis erit.   

Not sincere love is to be found in partners of the sovereign state,  
And fellowship in power great, is always mixed with mortal hate.   
Is especially to be understood of a Diumuirat, or sovereign government of two together. For that the government of three or more together in the sovereignty, may be firm, but of two not so; seeing that by nature one thing is but contrary to one, and not to many: the third as a mean still joining the extremes together. And therefore the Roman emperors, when as they at the same time took upon them the same sovereignty of government, lest by the mutual concourse of their power, they should violate their faith and friendship, divided the empire, the one being emperor of the East, and the other of the West; the one residing at Constantinople, and the other at Rome, in manner as if they had been two monarchs, although sometimes the same edicts and laws were in both empires by the common consent of both princes published. Yet so soon as they began to quarrel, the two empires were indeed divided in power laws and estate. So might a man say of the Lacedaemonian Commonweal well governed by one king. But when Aristodemus left the kingdom to be governed wholly, and divided by his two sons Froclus and Euristhenes both at once, they quickly fell at odds, and had their state taken from them, by Lycurgus (being himself a prince descended of the blood of Hercules) and the sovereignty by him given unto the people. The like happened unto Amphareus and Leucippus, kings of the Messians. But the Argives lest they should shall into the same troubles, to avoid the plurality of kings, at such time as Atreus and Thyestes at once seized upon their father's kingdom, the people (I say) made choice of the wiser, or as Lucian saith of the more learned. And the princes of the blood of Meronee and Charlemaigne, divided the kingdom amongst them. So the children of Clodoveus, of their fathers one kingdom made four of equal power. And the three children of jews the Debonair divided so many kingdoms amongst them. Neither do we read many at once long to have holden a kingdom together undivided: for the indivisible nature of sovereignty, and the fellowship of government, is always full of dangers, where no one hath the sovereignty, except when a strange prince marrieth a queen, among such as are acquainted with women's government: where commonly the pictures of the man and his wife, their names and arms are joined together; as if the sovereignty belonged unto them both: as it chanced when king Ferdinand married Isabel queen of Castille, Anthony of Bourbon, joane queen of Navarre, and Philip king of Spain Marie the daughter of Henry king of England. Howbeit the English men would not suffer him to have any part with her in the sovereignty, or of the fruits or profis thereto belonging, but that the same should remain wholly unto herself; albeit that they were contented that they should both (for fashion sake) bear the name, and both the one and the other sign charters, and commissions, but yet so, as that the sign of the queen might of itself be sufficient, but that without hers the sign of king Philip should be to no purpose. Which was also agreed upon with Ferdinand king of Arragon, having married Isabel of Castille, 
I the king, and I the queen.  where all the commands were signed, Yo el Roy, and Yo la Reyna; and by the secretary of the state, with six doctors: but as for the sovereignty it was wholly in the queen. Than which no more effectual reason can be given against the Manichies, who crroneously appointed two gods of equal power; one good, & the other evil: for if it were so they being contrary the one to the other, should either ruinat the one the other, or else being at continual variance, should without ceasing trouble the sweet harmony and concord that we see in this great world. And how could the world endure those two lords of equal power, and contrary in will the one to the other, seeing that the lest city or Commonweal cannot suffer two, albeit that they were brethren, if they should fall never so little at variance: much more easily could it endure three such princes than two; for that the third might unite the two, or else joining himself with the one, constrain them both to live in peace. As it happened so long as Pompee, Caesar, 
A commonweal better governed by three great sovereigns then by two.  and Crassus lived, whom the people called the monster with three heads: for so long they peaceably governed the Roman empire, which then depended of their power. But so soon as Crassus was slain in Caldea, strait way the other two fell in sunder, and so eagerly made war the one of them upon the other, as that to reconcile them was impossible, until that one of them had quite overthrown the other, and made himself master of all. The like happened after the death of Caesar, in the Triumuirat of Augustus, M. Antoninus, and Lepidus, who having of one popular Commonweal, made three Monarchies; and Lepidus unfit for government, had submitted his authority unto Augustus, although Antoninus had married Augustus his sister, and that they two had equally divided the empire betwixt them, and lived in countries far distant one from another; yet rested they not long, but that the one of them was shaken out of all, by the authority and power of the other. Whereafter ensued the sure state of the empire, established under one man's government. Wherhfore let us hold it as resolved upon, that it cannot be called a Monarchy, where the sovereignty is in two men's power; neither that any government can consist in that state, if they shall fall at variance betwixt themselves.  
Now Monarchy is divided into three forms: for he that hath the sovereignty, is 
Three sorts of monarchies. Great difference betwixt the state, and the government of the state of a commonweal.  either lord of all: or else a king, or a tyrant, which maketh no diversity of Common weals, but proceedeth of the diversity of the governor in the Monarchy: For there is great difference betwixt the state, and the government of the state: a rule in policy (to my knowledge) not before touched by any man: for the state may be in a Monarchy, and yet the government nevertheless popular; if the king do distribute all places of command, magistracy, offices, and preferments indifferently unto all men, without regard of their nobility, wealth, or virtue. But if the prince shall give all command, honours, and offices, unto the nobility only, or to the rich, or to the valiant, or to the virtuous only, it shall be a royal Monarchy, and that simple and pure, but yet tempered in manner of an Aristocracy. So also an Aristocratique signory, may govern their estate popularly; dividing the honours and preferments therein unto all the subjects indifferently: or else Aristocratically, bestowing them upon the nobility or richer sort only; which variety of government hath deceived them which have made a mixture of Commonweals, and so made more sorts thereof then three, without having regard that the state of a Commonweal is different from the administration and government of the same: But this point we will farther touch in place convenient.  
Wherhfore a lawful or royal Monarchy is that where the subjects obey the laws 
The three sorts of Monarchies aptly described.  of a Monarque, and the Monarque the laws of nature, the subjects enjoying their natural liberty, and propriety of their goods. The lordly Monarchy is that where the prince is become lord of the goods and persons of his subjects, by law of arms and lawful war; governing them as the master of a family doth his slaves. The tyrannical Monarchy, is where the prince contemning the laws of nature and nations, imperiously abuseth the persons of his free born subjects, and their goods as his own. The same difference is also found in the Aristocratique and popular estate: for both the one and the other may be lawful, lordly, and tyrannical, in such sort as I have said: for the greatest tyranny of all other is of Tully called the rage of the furious and turbulent people.  
Now as concerning the lordly Monarchy, it is convenient for us first to entreat 
The lordly Monarchy the first that was amongst men.  thereof, as of that which was first amongst men: for they are deciued which following the opinion of Aristotle, suppose that golden kind of men (more famous for the poet's fables, then for that there were any such in deed) to have made first choice of their heroical kings: seeing we found, and all men are persuaded that the first Monarchy was established in Assiria, under the power of Nemrod, whom the holy scripture calleth the great hunter; which is a common phrase of speech amongst the Hebrews, by which word they signify a thief, or robber. For the ancient writers, viz. Plato, Aristotle, and Xenophon, have put robbery among the kinds of hunting, as we have elsewhere noted. For before the time of Nemrod no man is found to have had power 
Nemrod the first Monarkie.  and rule one over an other, all men living in like liberty; he being the first that took upon him the sovereignty, and that caused free borne men to serve: whose name seemeth to have been given him according unto his quality, for as much as Nemrod signifieth a terrible lord. Soon after the world was seen full of slaves, Sem one of the sons of No yet living. And in the whole course of the Bible, the scripture speaking of the subjects of the kings of Assiria and Egypt, calleth them always slaves: and not the holy scripture only, but the Greeks' also, who always in their writings term themselves free, and the Barbarians slaves; meaning by the Barbarians the people of Asia and Egypt. And therefore the kings of Persia denouncing war, demanded the earth and the waters, (as Plutache writeth) to show that they were absolute Lords of all that was in the land and sea contained. And that is it for which Xenophon in his Cyropaedia writeth, that it is a thing good and commondable among the Medes, that the prince should be lord and owner of all things: And thereof came the adoration which not only the subjects, but strangers also, yea and the ambassadors of foreign nations used towards the kings of Persia, to show that all was in his power. For when Themistocles, whose name even then and long before was most famous, would after the manner of the Greeks have spoken unto the Persian king, Atabanus captain of the king's guard, kept him from coming unto him, neither would suffer him to prefer any request unto him, until such time as he had after the Persian manner adored him: but afterwards when he was gone out of the king's presence, he courteously spoke unto him, and in these words excused that he had done; It is seemly OH Themistocles, to follow the fashion of the country wherein a man is: you Grecians make great reckoning of your liberty and equality of command; but we esteem it for the best thing in the world to reverence, serve, and honour our king, as the image of the living God. Whereunto agreeth that which Livy writeth, Barbaris pro legibus semper dominorum imperia fuerunt. The command of their lords have been always 
A lordly Monarchy, not to be accounted a tyranny and why.  unto the Barbarians for laws. Neither aught this lordly monarchy to be accounted a tyranny: for it is not inconvenient, that a sovereign prince having in good and lawful war vanquished his enemies, should make himself lord of their goods and persons by the law of arms, governing them now his subjects, as doth the good householder his servants or slaves: as we see it a thing received by the manner and custom of almost all nations. But the prince which shall by unjust war, or other unlawful means make of freemen his slaves, and possess himself of their goods, is not a lordlike Monarch, but a very tyrant: from which Adrian the emperor was so far, as that he would not that a slave a player, should enjoy his liberty, which his master at the request of the people of Rome had given him in the Theatre, but left it to the discretion of his master, to be as he thought good disposed of: As had Tiberius before, and after that Marcus Aurelius Adrian his son in like case forbidden the same: whatsoever consent the master had given at the clamour of the people; reputing it rather forced than done of good will: to the end that the full disposition should be in every man's power, of that which unto him belonged. And now although at this present there be few princes which have in their absolute power the bodies and goods of their subjects, although we see many tyrants; yet are there many in Asia and Africa: but in Europe I know none which take so much upon them, beside the Princes of the Turks, and of the Moscovites. True it is that the Moscovites call themselves Chlopes, 
The great Turk and the Moscovite the only lordly Monarque in Europe  that is to say, servants, which we corruptly call slaves. But the Fmperour of the Turks styleth himself Sultan, that is to say Lord: not so much for the largeness of his possession, (seeing that the king of Spain hath under his dominion and rule, people for their cruelty barbarous, for their multitude innumerable, in places infinite: which his kingdom is bounded with the same countries, wherewith the course of the sun is bounded, being ten times greater than the Turks empire) but is therefore called Lord of the Turks, for that he is lord of their persons and goods; whom for all that he governeth much more courteously and freely, then doth a good householder his servants: for those whom we call the prince's slaves, or servants, the Turks call them Zamoglans, that is to say tribute children; whom the prince useth no otherwise to instruct, then if they were his children: and to bestow on them noble preferments, which are of others desirously sought after. As for his Timariot horsemen, they hold all their possessions in fealty of the Prince, as it were during pleasure, renewing their letters patents from ten years to ten years: neither when they die can they leave their children heirs of their possessions, but of their movables only; except by the gift of the prince they keep the possession of their father's lands, as they do of his goods. Other princes there are none in Europe which call themselves lords of the bodies and goods of their subjects, and fewer in ancient time then at this present: for Augustus the emperor himself, although he were in effect the greatest monarch in the world, yet so it was that he so abhorred to be called Lord: neither had any that held of him in fealty and homage.  
Now if one say that there is no Monarque in Europe which pretendeth not all the 
How the goods and lands of subjects belong unto the sovereign prince.  goods and lands of his subjects to belong unto him in right of direct sovereignty, neither any man which confesseth not to hold his goods of his sovereign prince: yet I say that that sufficeth not that any man should therefore of right be called lord of all, or a lordly Monarch: seeing that every subject hath the true propriety of his own things, and may thereof dispose at his pleasure: although the prince for pomp and show challenge unto himself the sovereignty thereof. And yet there are divers lands which are called Allodial, wherein the prince hath neither propriety, nor sovereign 
The Huns the first that borough the lordly soveraignment of monarchs into Europe.  right, as not holden of him. The Hunns a Tartar-like nation come from the farthest parts of Scythia, at such times as they with fire and sword destroyed almost all Europe, first showed the example unto the Lombard's and Almans, German nations, and to the franks, the ancient inhabitants of France, calling themselves Lords of all, and so accustomed these nations to lord it over all: as that no man could hold a turf of ground but by their leave. True it is that the Romans having vanquished their enemies, most commonly sold them for slaves, or else condemned them to loose the 
* Plutar in 〈◊〉.  seventh part of their lands: which lands they strait ways gave unto their Colonies in pure propriety. But princes and people instructed in civility, for fear of rebellion, or distrust of their own power, rejected such lordlike sovereignty as had the kings of Persia and Asia over their subjects: contenting themselves with the shadow of such lordly Monarchy. And albeit that the Persian kings before the time of Artaxerxes, had used to 'cause their great lords and magistrates to be stripped stark naked before them and whipped as slaves: yet king Artaxerxes was the first that ordained that they should in deed be stripped, but should not have but their clothes and garments only beaten: and whereas their hair was wont in despite to be pulled off, he commanded the wool of their caps only to be so pulled. True it is that Francis Aluarez writeth, that he 
The great Negus of AEthiopia a lordly Monarque.  hath seen in Aethiopia the great chancellor, and other great lords and governors of provinces stripped stark naked, and cast upon the ground whipped as slaves before their prince: who held the same as a great honour unto them; by the discourse of whose history, a man may easily gather the great Negus of Aethiopia to be a Lordly Monarque. But the people of Europe more courageous, and better soldiers than the people of Africa or Asia, could never endure the lordly Monarques, neither had ever used them before the incursions of the Huns into Europe, as I have before said. And first of all Odonacre king of the Herules, who almost at the same time invaded Italy, that Attila did Germany; having brought Italy under his subjection, took the third part of the territory from the subjects (the punishment of all people by him vanquished,) but left their persons free, and themselves lords of their goods, without any 
The beginning of tenants and fees, and what in ancient time they were.  tenure, or yielding unto him of any fealty or homage. But after that the Almans, Lombard's, Frenchmen, Saxons, Burgundians, Goths, Ostrogothes, Englishmen, and other Northern people had tasted the manners and customs of the Huns, they began to make themselves Lords, not of the persons, but of all the lands of them whom they had vanquished: and yet afterward reserving unto themselves the most fruitful part thereof, left the rest unto the ancient inhabitants, to be by them enjoyed, yet as holden of them in fealty, with paying of some small tribute if they should change the possession thereof: which for this cause are called Seigneuries, or Lordships; to show that the shadow of the ancient lordly Monarchy as yet remaineth, although greatly diminished. For these fees and lordships were in ancient time nothing else but benefits and rewards given to soldiers for term of their lives, and afterward by favour continued from the father to the son: except dukedoms, marquisats, earldoms, and other like honours and dignities, given unto dukes, marquesses, earls, and such like honourable personages, and not unto the lands: a custom not yet changed in England and Scotland for regard of the dignities, where the dukes and counties being dead, their children and successors have their lands; but not still the dignities, prerogatives, and titles of their predecessors: for when fees or lands were given to soldiers for term of their lives, they afterward obtained, that they might either by their wills, or else dying intestate, leave them unto their children; and that if there were no heirs males left, they should by law descend unto the women: excepting in Germany, where the women are excluded from the inheritance of lands in fee▪ which was the strongest argument which Frederick county of Vaudemont used against Renat of Anjou king of Sicily at the counsel of Constance, demanding of the Emperor that he might be invested in the dukedom of Lorraine, considering that it was an imperial fee, and by consequent that Isabel wife to Renate was not thereof capable: although she were the duke of Lorains daughter. Howbeit that Renate the king of Sicily, might by an other reason have defended himself, that is to say, that in question of fees, and services, we are to follow the laws and customs of the land that oweth the service, and not of that whereunto the service is due: now by the custom of Lorraine the daughters succeed in fees. But how soever it be, most certain it is that the marks of 
The marks of lordly Monarchies more to be seen in the Northern countries then in any other parts of Europe.  Lordly Monarchies, have continued in Germany, and towards the North more than in the other parts of Europe. For albeit that William the Conqueror, having conquered the realm of England, by force of arms, called himself not only lord of that realm, but also caused it to be proclaimed, that the sovereignty and propriety of all his subjects goods, movable, and immovable unto him belonged: yet nevertheless so it was, that he contented himself with the direct sovereignty, fealty and homage: the 
Charles the fift made himself the lordly Monorque of Peru.  subjects still enjoying their liberty, and full property of their goods. But the emperor Charles the fift, after he had subdued the great country of Peru, made himself Lordly Monarch thereof, causing all things to be holden of him, excepting the slaves, whom for that they were innumerable he caused to be set at liberty. As for the lands he left them to be enjoyed by them that possessed them at his pleasure: and not to descend unto their children by inheritance. A crafty and subtle device, whereby Lagasca the lawyer, the emperors lieutenant in Peru (Gonsulo Pizarra, and the rest of the authors of rebellion vanquished and overthrown) by a perpetual bond to keep the inhabitants of that country, within the compass of their duty, compelled them for ever to ask of the king of Spain, the possession of their goods, their kinsmen being dead: except the parents themselves yet living, had before procured the same to be granted for their children in time to come: which was not to be obtained without a great sum of money to be paid into the king's coffers: they of greater power in the mean time being thereby kept from raising of any new stirs. For like cause whereof in one 
All persons of what degree soever sorbidden by the Mahometain laws, the great Caliph only excepted.  chapter of Mahomet's, it is forbidden all persons of what degree or quality soever to call themselves in any sort lords, except the Caliph, or great bishop the successor of Mahomet, who at the first was the only Lordly Monarch or lord of all, giving unto kings and princes their principalities and kingdoms, during his pleasure, until that the Ottoman princes, the Curds, and the kings of the higher part of Asia and Africa, by little and little exempted themselves out of their power (by reason of the division betwixt them and the Anticaliphes) and so took unto themselves the kingdoms of those countries.  
But yet here might some man doubt whether the lordly Monarchy be not a Tyranny, 
A lordly monarkie no tyranny.  considering that it seemeth to be directly against the law of nature, which reserveth unto every man his liberty, and the sovereignty over his own goods. Whereunto I answer, that of ancient time it was indeed against the law of nature to make free men slaves, and to possess himself of other men's goods: but if the consent of all nations will, that that which is gotten by just war should be the conquerors own, and that the vanquished should be slaves unto the victorious, as a man cannot well say that a Monarchy so established is tyrannical: seeing also we read that jacob the Patriarch, by his testament leaving unto his children certain lands that he had gotten, said that it was his own, for that he had got it by force of arms. And that more is, the rule that willeth that the law of arms should take no place where there be superiors to do justice (which is put in practice against the greatest princes, and imperial cities of Germany, who be proscribed by the empire, for not making restitution of that which belonged to others) showeth right well, that where there is no superior to command, their force is reputed just. For otherwise, if we will mingle and confounded the Lordly Monarchy, with the tyrannical estate, we must confess that there is no difference in wars, betwixt the just enemy and the robber; betwixt a lawful prince and a thief; betwixt wars justly denounced, and unjust and violent force; which the ancient Romans called plain robbery and theft. We also see tyrannical states and governments, soon to fall, and many tyrants in short time slain: whereas the seigneurelike states, and namely the Lordly Monarchies have been both great and of long continuance, as the ancient Monarchies of the Assyrians, the Medes, Persians', & Egyptians; 
Why the lordly monarchy is more durable than the royal monarchy.  and at this present that of Aethiopia (the most ancient Monarch of all Asia and Africa) whereunto are subject fifty kings as slaves, if we may believe Pau. iovius, who all are, and term themselves the slaves of the Grand Negus of Aethiopia. And the reason why the Lordly Monarchy is more durable than the royal, is for that it is more majestical, and that the subjects hold not their lives, goods, and liberty, but of the sovereign prince, who hath by just war conquered them; which plucketh down the courage of subjects, so that the slave acknowledging his condition, becometh humble, abject, and having as they say a base and servile hart. Where to the contrary, men free borne, and lords of their own goods in a royal Monarchy, if one would make them slaves, or take from them that theirs is, they would not take it, but easily rebel, bearing noble hearts, nourished in liberty, and not abastardised with servitude. And thus much concerning a Lordly Monarchy: Now let us speak of the Monarchy Royal.   

CHAP. III Of a Royal Monarchy.  
A Royal Monarch or king, is he which placed in sovereignty yieldeth 
A royal Monarque.  himself as obedient unto the laws of nature as he desireth his subjects to be towards himself, leaving unto every man his natural liberty, and the propriety of his own goods. I have put to these last words for the difference of a Lordly Monarch, who may be a just and virtuous prince, and equally govern his subjects, being himself yet nevertheless lord both of their persons 
The difference betwixt a royal and a lordly Monarque.  and goods. And if it so chance the Lordly Monarch having justly conquered his enemy's country, to set them again at liberty, with the propriety of their goods: of a lord he becometh a king, and changeth the Lordly Monarchy, into a Monarchy Royal. And that is it for which Pliny the younger saith unto Traian the emperor, Principis sedem obtines, ne sit Domino locus, Thou holdest the seat of a prince, Lord it not. This difference (betwixt a Royal Monarch and a Lordly) was well noted by the ancient Persians', calling Cyrus the elder (which overthrew the Monarchy of the Medes) by the name of a king: but terming Cambyses a lord, and Darius a merchant; for that Cyrus was a gentle and courteous prince towards his subjects, but Cam byses his son was haughty and proud, and Darius too great an exactor and covetous. So it is also reported Alexander the Great to have been advised by Aristotle, to bear himself towards the Greeks' as a father; but towards the Barbarians as a lord: which his council Alexander nevertheless rejected, willing that the Greeks' should be reckoned of according to their virtue, and the Barbarians according to their vices; saying, that the whole earth was but one city, and his camp the Castle thereof.  
We have moreover said in our definition, that the subjects aught to be obedient unto the Royal Monarch, to show that in him alone lieth the sovereign majesty; & that the king aught to obey the laws of nature: that is to say, to govern his subjects, and to guide his actions atcording unto natural justice, whose lustre was brighter than the light of the sun itself. It is then the true mark of a Royal Monarchy, when the 
The true marks of a royal Monarque.  prince showeth himself as obedient unto the laws of nature, as he wisheth his subjects to be unto himself. Which it is not hard for him looking into the duty of a good prince to obtain; as fearing God above all; if he be also pitiful unto the afflicted, wise in his enterprises, hardy in his exploits, modest in prosperity, constant in adversity, advised in his speech, wise in his council, careful of his subjects, comfortable to his friends, terrible to his enemies, courteous to the good, dreadful towards the evil, and just towards all. Which royal sovereignty so set down, as that the subjects stand obedient unto the laws of their prince, and the prince likewise unto the laws of nature: the law being on both sides a mistress, or as saith Pindarus, a queen reigning over both, it shall in the same bonds unite the subjects among themselves, and together with their prince: whereof shall grow a most sweet harmony, which may with wonderful pleasure and felicity bless them both. This is that regal and lawful Monarchy of one, which we seek after, whether the kingdom descend by succession, as it most commonly doth; or by the law, as this of ours, or by election, as in many kingdoms towards the North; or by gift, as the kingdom of Numidia (which by Caesar brought into the form of a province, was by Augustus the emperor given to young juba, who so of a slave become a king) or as the kingdom of Naples, and Sicily, given to Charles of France, and after to jews, first duke of Anjou, or left by testament, as in former times the kingdoms of Tunes, Fez, and Morocco, and was also of late put in practice by Henry the eight king of England, who by his will left that kingdom unto his son Edward the sixt, to whom he substituted his sister Marie, and unto her Elizabeth, who was afterward queen: or that the kingdom be got by fraud and deceir, so that he reign justly, as Cecrops, Hieron, Gelon, and Pisistratus, who right wisely used their power, as saith Plutarch: and in our time Cosmus de Medici's: or by chance, as the kingdom of Persia, by the neying of an horse fell to Darius Histaspis one of the seven Persian lords, it being so before agreed, after they had slain the Mages, who had usurped the kingdom, that he whose horse first neyed, should have the kingdom: or be it that the prince by force of arms, by right or wrong conquer his kingdom, provided that he uprightly govern the same so by him conquered; as Titus Livius saith of king Servius, Neque enim praeter vim quicquam adius regnt habebat. Neither had he any thing but force unto the right of the kingdom; and yet he was a good king, as it oftentimes hath been seen of a robber and a thief, to have proved a virtuous prince; and of a violent tyranny, to have grown a just royalty. Or be it that the king be chosen for his nobility, as was Campson chosen Sultan of Egypt by the Mamalukes: or for his justice and devotion, as Numa in Rome: or for his age, as the ancient Arabians made choice of the eldest amongst them for their king, as saith Diodorus, and they of Taprobana, as saith Pliny: or for his strength and force, as Maximinus the Roman emperor, being of such stature and strength, as that he seemed to have come of the race of Giants: or for his feature and beauty, as was Heliogabalus, therefore chosen emperor of the same Roman empire: or for his height and stature, as in Aethiopia the kingdoms were still given to the tallest: or for that he could drink most, as in Scythia, as Aristotle saith; who defineth a king to be him, who chosen by the people, reigneth according to the desire of them his subjects: from whose will (as he in another place saith) 
* Polit lib. 3.  if he never so little depart, he becometh a tyrant. Which his description is not only 
Aristotle blamed.  without reason, but also dangerous: for that soucraigne power which he said to be most proper unto a king, must so needs fall, if the king could nothing command against the liking and good will of his subjects; but must to the contrary be constrained to receive laws of them In brief it should be lawful for the people to do all things; and the most just and best kings should so be accounted for tyrants: neither were a king to be reputed of any thing else, than as of a mean magistrate, unto whom power were to be given, and again taken away at the people's pleasure. Which are all things impossible, and no less absurd also, than is that which the same Aristotle saith, That they are barbarous people, where their kings come by succession. When as yet his own king and scholar Alexander the Great, was one of them which descended in right line from the blood of Hercules, and by right of succession came to the kingdom of Macedon. The Lacedæmonians should be also barbarous, who from the same stock of the Heraclides, had had their kings about a thousand years. The people of Asia also, the Persians', and Egyptians, should so all be barbarous: in whom not only rested, but from whom all humanity, courtesy, learning, knowledge, and the whole source and fountain of good laws and Commonweals have sprung: and so at last none but Aristotle with some handful of Greeks' should be free from barbarism. Whereas indeed nothing can be devised more dangerous unto the state of 
The opinion of Aristotle concerning kings impugned. Arist. Polit. 3  a Commonweal, than to commit the election of kings unto the suffrages of the people; as shall in due place be hereafter declared. Although Aristotle be in that also deceived, where he saith, That there be three sorts of kings; & yet having in his discourse reckoned up four, in casting up of the account he findeth out a fift. The first he calleth Voluntary kings, as reigning by the will and good liking of the people, such as were the kings of Heroic times, whom he supposeth to have been Captains, judges, and Priests. The second he saith, are proper unto the barbarous nations, where kings come by succession. The third are made by election. The fourth was proper to the Lacedæmonians, whom he saith to have been perpetual generals in their wars; the son still succeeding his father. The fift and last kind, is of them which having themselves got the Lordly sovereignty, use their subjects, as doth the master of the house his slaves. As for the first sort of kings, we found, that they indeed executed the offices of judges, captains, and priests, yet none of them are found to have ruled at the will and pleasure of the people, either to have received their authority from the people, before Pitacus king of Corinth, and Timondas king of Nigropont: but to the contrarie* Plutarch writeth, That the first princes had no other honour before their eyes, 
Plutar i●… These.  than to force men, and to keep them in subjection as slaves: whereof the holy scripture also certifieth us of the first Lordly Monarch Nemrod; leaving the sovereignty to their children, in right of succession; as saith Thucydides. Which hath also been well confirmed by the succession of a great number of kings of the Asirians, Medes, Persians', Indian's, Egyptians, Hebrews, Lacedæmonians, Macedonians, Sicyonians, Epirots, Athenians: and their lines failing, the people in part proceeded to make choice of their kings by way of election, some others invaded the state by force, other some maintained themselves in Aristocratike and popular signory; as witnesseth Herodotus, Thucydides, josephus, Berosus, Plutarch, Xenophon, and other most ancient historiographers of the Hebrews, Greeks, and Latins, sufficient to convince the opinion of Aristotle of untruth in those things that he hath writ concerning kings. Whereas also he comprehendeth the Lacedaemonian generals, under the name of kings: he is therein deceived, seeing it is before declared, that he cannot be a king, which hath not the rights of sovereignty. And that the Lacedaemonian kings, after the conversion of that Commonweal, were nothing but Senators, and subject to the magistrates command, we have also before showed. Yea the general's power was not always given unto them, as Aristotle supposeth, who calleth them the perpetual generals of the wars: for as much as that power and authority was communicated to their citizens also, as to Lysander, Leonidas, Callicratides, Gilippus, whom the Lacedæmonians oppressed with wars preferred before their kings. And albeit that Agesilaus was one of their kings, yet so it was, that he durst not take upon him the charge of a general, until the signory had so commanded; as Plutarch in his lives reporteth. And when they were chief captains and generals, they gave them yet no royal power, no more than had the generals of the Acheans, which were made by election, considering that they were subject unto the slate of the Acheans, who if they so deserved punished them, as they did Democritus their general, whom they fined at thirty thousand crowns, as we read in Pausanias. So the Ephori punished their kings with banishment, imprisonment, and fines, yea and sometime wi●…h death, as we have before said. We must not therefore put these in the rank of kings, no more than him which is a Lordly Monarch, lord of the persons and goods of his subjects, who hath his proper difference separated from a Monarch Royal.  
As for the third sort of kings, which he said was made by election, that can make no difference of kings, no more than can the second, which he said was by succession, for otherwise he should by the same means make also a sixt kind of kings, made by chance; as was Darius the first: and so a seventh by donation, an eight by testament, 
The difference of Monarques h●…w it is to be gathered.  and a ninth by fins and deceit, and a tenth by force: which were naught else, but to make an infinite sort of kings, who all nevertheless are comprehended under one kind. For the difference of monarchs is not to be gathered by the means of the coming to the state, but by the means of governing of the estate. Which as we said is comprised in three kinds or sorts, viz. the Lordly Monarchy, the Royal Monarchy, and the Tyrannical Monarchy. But whereas Aristotle under the name of kings comprehendeth them also which were wont for a short time to be chosen, to establish or reform the Commonweal, and that done, to give up their charge, are quite different from the regal power. Neither hath it any appearance to call them kings, which are nothing else but simple commissioners, such as were the dictator's in the Roman Commonweal, whom Dionysius Halicarnasseus writeth, to have been in power and office like unto them whom the Thessalians called Archos, the Lacedæmonians Cosmos, the Mitylenians Aesymnetes, having like charge that the bailie of Florence had at such time as that Commonweal was governed by a popular government; that is to wit, the Grand Council of the people made choice of eight or ten persons, best seen in their affairs, to re-establish the state, and to put again in order that which by process of time was fallen into disorder, either in their laws, or in their customs, in their revenues, or in creating of their officers: which done they discharged themselves of their offices: like as the Decemuiri, or ten commissioners, which were chosen in Rome, to reform that was amiss in the state, whom we should by this means, according to the opinion of Aristotle call also kings; which should be a thing very absurd; for as much as the quality of a magistrate, and much less of a commissioner hath nothing agreeing or common with the sovereign majesty of a king. And albeit that Caesar in his Commentaries saith, the inhabitants of Autun to have every year chosen them a magistrate with royal power; that is of them but improperly spoken: for why, it is manifest, that he which was a magistrate could be no king. And that more is, the governors of the countries and provinces conquered by Alexander the Great, although that after his death every one of them took upon him the sovereignty in the country or province that he governed; yet it was a long time before they durst style themselves by the name of kings. The first that began was Antigonus, after the victory by him 
Antigonus the first of the successors of Alexander that styled himself king.  obtained against Ptolomeus Lagus: after which he set a crown upon his head, and used in his titles the name of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, or king. And immediately after, the Egyptians called Ptolomee king; as to their imitation did the Assyrians Seleucus, and the Thracians Lysimachus also. And not to go further, the ancient kings of Lorraine and Burgundy, after that they had yielded fealty and homage unto the Germane emperor, lost the name and sovereignty of kings, and called themselves but dukes: for that now they were no more kings, according to that fit saying of Martial, Quirex est, regem Maxim non habeat. For why, the name of a king is always majestical, and the most honourable that a sovereign prince can have: and for that cause the habit, the marks, the signs of kings, have been always particular, and proper unto themselves; as the royal arms, the golden robes, the crown and sceptre, not to be communicated unto other men. And there was nothing that made the majesty of the Roman kings so venerable, as the royal ornaments which Tarqvinius Priscus brought from the ancient kings of Hetruria, as we read in the histories. And the Romans themselves, after they had driven out the proud Tarquin their king, although they abhorred the very name of a king, and much more the government, having changed the royal state into a popular: yet so it was, that the Roman Senate used to sand unto kings, their allies and confederates, the royal marks of kings; namely a diadem or crown of gold, a cup of gold, the ivory sceptre; and sometime the popular rob embroidered with gold, & a chair of ivory, as the histories declare. And in the Commentaries of pope Gregory the seventh, 
* Tacit●… lib 2. Appianu●…, Livius Val. Max.  we read that Demetrius was by the sceptre, crown, and ensign established king of Croatia and Sclavonia: of which things the bishops of Rome have oftentimes been liberal (should I say) or prodigal? aswell as the emperors: yet had they no more so to do, than had the Greek emperor Anastasius, who sent the Consulatie ornament and titles of Augustus unto Clodoveus king of France, who (as Aymon saith) received them in the city of Tours: or than justinian, who gave unto king Childebert the title of a Senator: by which things it is certain, to be derogated from the sovereignty of another's majesty, which is itself the chiefest, except they be received from them that are in their confederation their superiors. But as for the Frenchmen they had not made any league with the Greek emperors, but by their valour had thrust the Romans out of the possession of their kingdom. True it is, that betwixt confederates of equal power, ornaments of honour, as girdles, rings, and such like, may both be given and received, without any emparement to their majesty: but to receive the honour of a Consul, or of a Senator, is as much as to acknowledge the majesty of a superior. Fredrick the emperor (first of that name) sent unto Peter prince of Denmark, a sword and a crown, with the title of a king, which was a title contrary to the effect, considering that he yielded himself vassal unto the empire, and did fealty and homage unto the emperor, for the realm of Denmark, promising and binding aswell himself as his successors, to hold that kingdom of the empire, in this form, 
* Tritemi●… cap. 17.  Rex Danorum Magnus se in potestatem Imperatoris tradidit, obsidesdedit, juramentum fecit, se successoresque suos, non nisi imperatoris & successorum eius permissu regnum adepturos, The great king of the Danes hath delivered himself into the power of the emperor, hath given hostages, taken his oath, that he and his successors shall not but by the sufferance of the emperor and his successors, take upon them that kingdom. Wherein he two ways offended, first, for that alured with the ornaments sent him by the emperor, he diminished his own majesty: and then for that he bond unto perpetual servitude, not himself only, but his posterity also: who perceiving the error, revolted from the empire. for seeing that the kingdom of Denmark depended of the voices and suffragies of the Senate and the people, he could not bind, not only his posterity, but not so much as himself unto that law. The duke of Austria also was by the same emperor, and almost at the same time, honoured with the same ornaments and title, yet with condition that he should still remain in the perpetual obeisance of the Germane Empire, wherein he then was, and ever had been: but when he breaking his faith, had revolted from the empire, he was within twelve years after spoiled both of his royal dignity and title. By like error Henry the first king of England, son to William the Conqueror, whilst he yet lived caused Henry his eldest son to be crowned king: for he strait way after, would needs be equal with his father, and take upon him to manage the greatest affairs of state; in such sort that great quarrels and contentions arise betwixt the father and the son, even unto parts taking, which had without doubt ruinated the state, had not the son been before by death prevented. So also in this realm, when the family of the Capets had usurped the kingdom, the better to confirm their wealth and power, not as yet well grounded; jest the kingdom after the death of their kings should fall into an Anarchy, they still caused▪ their sons (whilst they themselves yet lived) to be crowned and proclaimed kings. So Hugh to assure this succession, caused his son Robert to be crowned king: Robert, Henry: and he afterwards Philip; which manner of crowning of the sons, the fathers yet living, after their estate and power better confirmed and established, was again left. And so to do, unto me seemeth a thing 
Dangerous for sovereign princes to 'cause their sons whilst they themselves yet live to be crowned king●… with them.  very dangerous, especially if the new crowned king be sick with the ambitious desire of rule: for that the subjects more willingly behold the sun rising then setting: except the king have many kingdoms, with great floods, most high mountains, or the deepest seas, one from an other divided, not easily with the wings of aspiring ambition to be passed. So Seleucus king of both Asia's, graced his son Antiochus not only with the royal dignity, but also placed him in the government of the kingdom of the higher Asia; which is a thing may well be suffered where kings have used to be created by the voices of the Senate, and the people▪ as are the kings of Denmark, Suevia, Polonia, Tartary, Bohemia, Hungary, and Tunes: who commonly 'cause him whom they desire to reign, to be before hand elected by the suffragies of the people, and to bind the princes by oath unto him, So Changuis first of all the Tartar kings, chosen king by his subjects, caused Hoccata his eldest son to be crowned king, himself yet living. And Gostanus king of Sweden having usurped upon that state against the king of Denmark, caused his son Henry to be also chosen king. And Frederik now king of Denmark, was chosen king in the year 1556, two years before the death of his father: who not yet so secured, but doubting lest his uncles john and Adolphe after his death should practise a new election, and so raise new stirs, requested the French king by M. Danzai the French ambassador, and afterward by an ambassador of his own, (sent directly for that purpose) to stand his friend, and to receive him into his protection. So have done, and yet also do the kings of Morocco, Fez, and Tunes. And in our memory Ferdinand of Austria yet living, caused Maximilian his son to be chosen and crowned king of Hungary and Bohemia: as shortly after Maximilian did the like for his son Ernestus; and so people's voices by little and little taken away are at length quite buried in oblivion. The like was also attempted for the nominating of his successor by Sigismundus Augustus' king of Polonia, but was letted so to do by the states of that kingdom, although it seemed for the good of that Common weal, for the avoiding of sedition, which might rise about the election: yet would not the states of that kingdom thereto agreed; for fear lest the right of their election, should so pass into the force of succession. As we see the German Empire to have taken so deep root in the most honourable family of the house of Austria, as that there is but little hope for the pulling of it out thence again. And thus much concerning a royal Monarchy: now let us likewise speak of the third kind, which is a Tyrannical Monarchy.   

CHAP. FOUR ¶ Of a Tyrannical Monarchy.  
A Tyrannical Monarchy is that where one man treading undet 
À tyrannical Monarchy.  foot the laws of God and nature, abuseth his free born subjects as his slaves: and other men's goods as his own. This word Tyrant derived from the Greeks was of the propriety thereof honourable, and in ancient time signified no other thing then a Prince, which without the consent of the people, had by force or fraud possessed himself of the state; and of a companion made himself their master: whom they called a Tyrant, although he were 
The name of a tyrant in ancient time taken in good part: and how the same become odious.  a right wise and just prince. So Plato writing to Dionysius the Tyrant of Syracuse by way of honour giveth him this title; Plato to Dionysius the Tyrant greeting, and the answer was; Dionysius the Tyrant to Plato health. And so the rest aswell philosophers as friends, honestly called them Tyrants which had by force or fineness got the sovereignty of their cities and states: in which name the Tyrants themselves also gloried. And to show that the name of a Tyrant was aswell given unto a good and just prince, as to an evil and wicked, it appeareth evidently in that, that Pittacus and Periander reckoned among the seven Sages of Graece, were called Tyrants, having taken unto themselves the state and government of their countries. But for the mercy of their enemies, were constrained for the safety of their lives and goods to have guards of strangers about their persons, and great garrisons in their fortresses and strong holds: and for the maintenance of their soldiers and retinue were enforced to lay upon their subjects great impositions and tributes: and seeing their lives not yet so assured, having but poor friends, and puissant enemies, put to death, or banished the one, to enrich the other; and having taken their goods, ravished also their wives and children: they with these outrageous enormities raised a wondered hatred of themselves through out the whole world. For we read that Dionysius the elder which had oppressed Syracuse had always about him for the guarding of his person and the city ten thousand footmen, and as many horsemen; beside a fleet of four hundred galleys still ready furnished with all things necessary: and yet thought it not a strength sufficient to keep under those few citizens that were left, whom he had utterly disarmed, and in most servile manner oppressed: although he had before taken away not only their societies and companies; but forbidden also neighbours and friends to eat together, and often times commanded them returning home from supper or making merry, to be rob and spoiled by his guard; to the intent there might be the less friendship amongst them, and so they more hardly conspire against him. And yet for all that Plutarque hath given him the praise of a good prince, as one who in justice and virtue exceeded many, who abusing the most honourable names of Kings, are themselves polluted and defiled with all manner of vices. For we are not much to rest upon the vain show of words and glorious titles; when as often times the worst men arrogate unto them selves the most commendable names, shows, and recognancies of virtue; against which sort of Princes, the subjects for all that use to cast forth most reproachful taunts: as the three Ptolemeis kings of Egypt; of whom the one had put to death his brother; the other his mother; and the third his father: the subjects in derision called them 
* A lover of his brother.  Philadelphe, 
* A lover of his mother.  Philometor, and 
* A lover of his father.  Philopator. Also the most reverend and holy names have become abominable, for the wickedness of them that have most filthyly abused the same. The name truly of a king is holy, yet was it for the pride of Tarqvinius, and the ravishment of Lucretia by his son, made hateful unto the Romans. And the cruelty of Scylla in his Dictatorship made the Dictator's odious. So the immoderate ambition of Francis Valori made the Confalonniers of Florence hateful unto the Florentines. And so also it is evident, the name of Tyrant to have been hateful to all nations for oppressing of the people.  
But it may be, that one and the same prince, whose dominion is large and wide, may bear himself as a king unto his natural subjects: and as a lordly monarch towards them, whom he hath by just war subdued, and as a tyrant toward the rest: or that in the same city he may tyrannize over the rich and better sort of the citizens; and yet show himself courteous and gentle unto the poor and base sort. And amongst tyrants there are divers sorts and degrees of more or less: and as there is not so good a prince, which hath not some notable vice; so we see that there is none so cruel a tyrant, which is not endued with some good virtue, or hath not in him some thing to be commended. Wherhfore it is a thing of most evil example, and thereto dangerous 
A sovereign princes actions are not by his subjects to be rashly censured.  withal, rashly and foolishly to censure a prince, whose actions and comportments we thoroughly know not; whereas we aught first wisely to weigh his virtues and vices, his heroical or base and evil disposition: after the manner of the Persians', who condemned no man to death (although convicted of the crime whereof he was accused) except it first appeared by his former life, whether his vices exceeded his virtues or not. For so Livy did well, who having diligently reckoned up Hannibal his virtues, and coming afterward unto his vices, saith, Has tot ac tantas virtutes ingentia vitia aequabant, These his so many and great virtues, were countervailed with great vices. Wherhfore lest the good should be confused and so confounded with the bad; o●… that we should under the name of a tyrant comprehend them also which were right worthy and famous men: let us compare the worst tyrant with the best king; that by such comparison of the two extremes, those may be the better perceived which are in the midst betwixt both. Now when I say the best king, my meaning is after the 
The best king.  common manner: neither do I seek after such an one as is accomplished with all heroical virtues; or the rare paragon of justice, wisdom, and religion, a man without all imputation: which in the fables of ancient worthies, were propounded with more magnificence than truth, for princes to look upon and to imitat; such as never was, nor ever shall be: but rather such an example of a good and just king, as is indeed in the rank of princes to be found; and such an one as is always ready to bestow his goods, his blood, and life, for the good of his people: What manner of prince is of Homer in two words called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, whose whole endeavour is to be indeed such an one as Codrus and Decius are reported to have been, who advertised by the Oracle, that the victory over their enemies depended of their death, without farther delay suddenly sacrificed their lives: and Moses above all, whom Philo calleth the most wise law giver; a most just prince, who besought God, That he might rather die the everlasting death of the wicked, and have his name blotted out of the book of life, than that the people committed to his charge, should endure so great and grievous punishment as it had deserved: by which prayers he appeased the wrath of God, like a most good king, & true father of his people: than which name Augustus the great emperor is reported never to have heard any title or addition, unto him more pleasing, at such time as M. Valerius Messala, was by a decree of the Senate, and of the people of Rome, called Father of his country. For why, the best prince nothing differeth from the best father, as Xenophon was wont most excellently to say.  
Now the greatest difference betwixt a king and a tyrant is, for that a king conformeth 
The greatest difference betwixt a king and a tyrant.  himself unto the laws of nature, which the tyrant at his pleasure treadeth under foot: the one of them respecteth religion, justice, and faith; whereas the other regardeth neither God, faith, nor law: the one of them referreth all his actions to the good of the Commonweal, and safety of his subjects; whereas the other respecteth nothing more than his own particular profit, revenge, or pleasure: the one doth all his endeavour for the enriching of his subjects; whereas the other seeketh after nothing more, than by the impoverishment of them, to increase his own wealth: the one of them accounteth his own goods to be the goods of his people; the other reckoneth not only the goods, but even the bodies of his subjects also to be his own: the one of them severely revengeth the public injuries done against the state, and easily pardoneth the wrongs done unto himself; the other most cruelly revengeth his own, and pardoneth that which is done against others: the one easily forgiveth the offences of other men, but is of his own misdeeds a severe judge; whereas the other most sharply revengeth even the lest offences of others, but is unto himself most favourable: the one of them favoureth the honour of modest matrons, and other men's wives; the other triumpheth in their shame and dishonour: the one refuseth not to be freely and discreetly reproved for that he hath done amiss; the other hateth nothing more than the grave free spoken man: the one enforceth himself to maintain and keep his subjects in peace and unity; whereas the other seeketh still to set them at odds, so to ruinat them one by another; and with the confiscation of their lands and goods to enrich himself: the one taketh pleasure to see his subjects, and to be of them oftentimes seen and heard; whereas the other feareth their presence, and hideth himself from them, as from his enemies: the one reposeth his estate and fealty in their love towards him; the other in their fear: the one taketh no care but for his subjects; the other feareth nothing more than them: the one chargeth his subjects as little as he can, neither exacteth any thing of them, but when the public necessity so requireth; whereas the other drinketh his subjects blood, gnaweth their bones, and out of them also sucketh even the marrow, so by all means seeking to weaken them: the one advanceth unto the highest degrees of honour the best and most virtuous men; whereas the other still promoteth the greatest thieves and villains, whom he may use as sponges, to suck up the wealth of his subjects: the one frankly bestoweth the greatest and most gainful offices of the state upon men of best deserts, who free from bribery & corruption, may defend the people from all injury and oppression; whereas the other setteth the same to sale to such as will give most for them, so by their robberies and unreasonable exactions, to keep the people under, and then afterward when they are well fatted, to cut such caterpillars throats also, so to be accounted great iusticiars: the one measureth his manners, according unto his laws; the other measureth his laws, according to his own disposition and pleasure: the one is ready to expose his life for the good of his country and people; the other wisheth it and them all to perish for himself: the one is beloved and honoured of his subjects; the other hateth them all, and is likewise of them hated: the one in time of war hath no recourse but unto his own subjects; whereas the other hath no greater war than against them: the one hath neither guard, nor garrison, but of his own people; whereas the other for the defence of his person, and keeping of his subjects in awe, hath always a garrison of armed strangers to go before him: the one liveth secure in all quiet and tranquility of mind; the other troubled with careful and contrary thoughts, still languishing in perpetual fear: the one expecteth a most blessed and eternal life in heaven; the other still fearing everlasting pains of hell: the one hath the immortal good author of all his actions; the other followeth the advise of wicked men and damned spirits: in brief the one is praised and honoured of all men whilst he liveth, and much miss after his death; whereas the other is defamed yet living, and most shamefully reviled both by word and writing when he is dead. And albeit that a tyrant abound in wealth, have honour, sovereignty, health, and surpassing Champion like strength of body, with the deep and profound knowledge of many and great matters, and flowing eloquence most of tyrants to be in others feared; yet shall he therefore be never the better, but well the worse; abusing his wealth to fulfil his lust; his sovereignty, to the oppressing of other men's liberty; his strength for the performing of his villainy; and his knowledge for the circumventing of the plain and simple, and shameful confusion of all things. Which so many and notable gifts, if they chance by the grace and goodness of God to be given to any good prince: we then esteem of him, as of a God, sent even down from heaven into the earth here amongst us.  
But what need we to use many examples to prove this to be true, being of itself so 
tyrants slain by effeminate and weak persons.  manifest in every man's eye. And seeing that we found in histories tyranny to have been of all men so much feared, hated and detested, that even scholars and weak women have not doubted to adventure with danger of their lives, to gain unto themselves the honour of the kill of tyrants. As did Aristotle (not he of Stagira, but he that was surnamed the Logician) who slew a tyrant of Sicione. And Thebes, who slew her 
tyrants never in safety.  husband Alexander, tyrant of the Pheraeans. And to think that tyrants might by force warrant themselves, is but mere and vain error. For who were of greater force than were the Roman emperors, who ordinarily had forty legions at their command in their provinces, and three more in Italy, beside their Praetorian bands, for the defence of their persons: and yet in no place in the world were there so many princes slain; yea sometimes the captains of their guards slew them even in their palaces, whom they guarded. As Cherea the tyrant, and the Mamalukes eight Sultan's of Egypt.  
But he that would see the miserable ends of tyrants, let him but read the lives of 
* Plutar in Arat●… et Timoleone  Timoleon, and of Aratus, where he shall see the tyrants drawn out of the nest of their tyranny, stripped stark naked, thieves beaten to death with clubs in the presence of Children, and the rest of the common people: and after that their wines and children, their kinsfolks and familiar friends most cruelly murdered and slain: and that more is the very image & statues of them that were dead in their tyranny, accused, and publicly condemned, delivered unto the common hangman to be as it were executed; their bones also taken out of their graves, and cast into most loathsome iakesses, and the raking officers of these tyrants dismembered, and most miserably tormented with all the cruelty that a people enraged could devise: their edicts & laws torn, their castles and proud houses razed and laid even with the ground, and the very memory of their name, by public judgements and written books, condemned to perpetual infamy, as an example to all future princes, to the end they might have in detestation such plagues, so pernicious and dangerous unto mankind.  
And albeit that tyrants whilst they lived, have not wanted their flattering clawback's, 
Tyrant's always infamous and detested.  whom they with rewards induced to writ their unworthy praises; yet we read, that after their death, such their histories, and panegiricall orations, before written in their praises, were burnt, torn and suppressed, and the truth (yea sometime with more too) brought to light, & in stead of them other most reproachful and contumelious writings published, in such sort, as that not so much as one small fragment of any book written in the praise of any tyrant, were he never so great, is now extant or to be found. Which thing maketh tyrants, whilst they yet live to fret and fume as if they were mad: for that they see they must in time become a laughing stock unto the people and their very enemies. And albeit that they evil persuaded of the immortality of the soul, think the same to perish together with the body, or haply before the body, which embalmed with sweet odours may be long preserved, yet so long as they 
Tyrant's still tormented with the fear of future in famy.  live they still feel the torment of the infamy to come, which they yet living see shall befall them after their death. Whereof Tiberius the emperor grievously complained, but Nero much more, who wished that when he died, yea that whilst he yet breathed, all the world might with fire be consumed. And for this cause Demetrius, surnamed Poliorcetes, to gratify the Athenians undertook the war for the defence of their rights and liberty, to the intent to be honoured by their learned writings; knowing well that the city of Athens was as it were the watch of the whole world, which might in like sort make the glory of his noble acts to shine throughout the world, as doth a beacon set on fire upon the top of an high tower: neither was he therein deceived: but so soon as he gave himself over unto vices and villainies, there was never tyrant better (than he was by them) washed; having his name most shamefully by them defamed, by whom he had been before commended. And albeit that some may think tyrants, for that they have no taste of true praise, to care the less what posterity either think or say of them, yet in truth live they most miserably, if their life be so to be called, which live in continual fear, still feel the most sharp sting of grief; seeing themselves, their laws, their wives and children, their kinsfolks and friends, ever in danger. For it is impossible for him that hateth and feareth his subjects; and is again of them all himself also hated and feared, to be able long to continued or stand. Whereby it cometh to pass, that in stead of being assailed by his enemies, he is often times upon the sudden assailed by his own subjects. Neither may he repose any trust or confidence in his friends, unto whom he is himself oftentimes a traitor and disloyal, causing them for the lest suspicion to be slain: as we read it reported of Nero, Commodus, Caracalla, and such other tyrants. And sometime the whole people with one rage and fury runneth headlong upon the tyrant, as it did upon Phalaris, Heliogabalus, Alcetes tyrant of the Epirots, and upon Andronicus emperor of Constantinople, whom stripped and set upon a bore asses back, the people of Constantinople caused to endure all the indignities and reproaches that were possible, before they would give him leave to die. Yea and sometimes it chanceth, that even they themselves are the occasion of the hastening 
Tyrant's oftentimes to hasten their own deaths in seekeing to eschu●… the same.  of their own death, as it is reported of Caracalla the emperor, who would needs know of jultus, his mother's Mathematician, whom he thought should succeed him in the empire (for that is a common course amongst tyrants in their affairs and doings, to ask the council and advise of wizards and devils) unto whom the Astronomer by his letters answered, That Macrinus was the man that should succeed him; which letters by chance falling into the hands of Macrinus: he thereupon forthwith caused Caracalla to be slain, for fear of the danger prepared for him by Caracalla. So Commodus also, having hardly escaped the stab which a murderous villain was about with a dagger to have given him, (who in giving of the blow said, That the Senate had sent him that) strait ways after made a roll of all them whom he purposed to put to death: which roll by good hap coming into the hands of Martia his concubine▪ and she therein finding her own name enrolled amongst the rest, to avoid the danger prepared for her and the rest, caused the tyrant to be forthwith slain. Of like examples all the ancient histories are full, which show plainly the lives of tyrants to be always beset with a thousand inevitable mischiefs, death still hanging over their heads.  
Now the state of a royal Monarchy is quite contrary unto a tyranny: for the king 
The happy estate of a good Royal prince, in comparison of a Tyrant.  is so united with his subjects, that they are still willing to spend their goods, their blood, and lives, for the defence of his estate, honour, and life; and cease not after his death to writ, sing, and publish his praises, amplifying them also in what they can. As we see in Xenophon the lively purtract of a great and virtuous prince, drawn under the person of Cyrus, whose praises he hath with wonderful eloquence set forth, to give eaxmple to other princes for to imitat and conform themselves unto; as did Scipio Africanus, 
The worthy praise of Scipio Africanus.  who having always before his eyes and in his hands Xenophon his Cyropoediae, and framing himself to the imitation thereof, profited so much, as that he in virtue, honour, and prowess, surmounted all the kings and princes, not of his own age only, but of former times also; in such sort, that certain pirates inflamed with the report of his fame, and knowing that he was in his house in the country far from any town, came and beset the same: against whom as he was about to put himself with his people in readiness, and so to have stood upon his guard: they perceiving the same, forthwith threw down their arms, assuring him that they were not come thither, but only to see him, and to do him honour, which they most humbly requested, that they might be admitted to do him. Now if the lustre and brightness of virtue in such a prince, hath drawn even thieves and pirates into the admiration thereof; than of how much greater force aught it to be in good and loyal subjects? And what prince is there so foolish or voided of sense, which would not wonderfully rejoice to hear it reported, how that Menander king of the Bactrians, was for his virtue & justice so well beloved of his subjects, as that after his death the cities were at great strife & debate amongst themselves, which of them should have the honour of his sepulchre: neither could the matter be appeased, until that at length it was agreed, that every one of them should in the honour and memorial of him build a several tomb or sepulchre. What tyrants malice also or dissimulation is so great, whom Pliny his panegyrical oration would not drive into a frenzy? who when he had therein with all worthy praises so adorned Traian the emperor, as that it seemed nothing more could thereunto be added: he so concludeth the period, That nothing greater or better could be wished for unto the Commonweal, but that the immortal gods would imitat the life of Traian. Which excessive amplification, although it savour of impiety, yet who doubteth but that it proceeded from the zeal of a most famous man, towards his most excellent prince? for whose danger at his going out, and welfare at his coming home, all the temples were filled; and who himself in his solemn prayers, was thus wont to covenant with the gods, That they should keep and preserve him, if they saw it to be for the good of the Commonweal. What tyrant is so cruel, what show soever he make, which most heartily wisheth not for the honour which king Agesilaus received, at such time as he was fined by the Ephori, for having alone rob the hearts and gained the love of all the citizens unto him? What king is there, which wisheth not to have the surname of Aristides the Just? a title more divine and royal than ever prince yet knew how to get: albeit that in stead thereof many have caused themselves to be called Conquerors, Besiegers, Lightnings. Now on the contrary part, when as we read of the most horrible cruelties of Phalaris, Busiris, Nero, and Caligula, who is he which is not moved to a just indignation against them? or hearing of their miserable and wretched ends, can contain himself from rejoicing thereat?  
Thus have we seen the most remarkable differences betwixt a king and a Tyrant, which are not hard to be perceived betwixt the two extremes of a most good king, and a most detestable Tyrant: but is not so easily to be deemed, when the prince taketh part of a good king, and some other part of a tyrant: so as it were tempering the good with the bad. For so things often times fall out, that for the variety of times, places, persons, 
Necessary severity not to be accounted tyranny but to be in a sovereign prince much commended.  and other occasions presenting themselves, princes are constrained to do such things, as may seem unto them tyrannical, and unto others commendable. Wherhfore let no man measure Tyranny by Severity, which is often times in a prince most necessary: neither for his castles, guards, and garrisons: neither by the sovereignty of his commands, which are in deed more to be wished for, than the sweet requests of tyrants: which draw after them an inevitable violence. And that is it for which in law, he which hath bound himself at the request of a Tyrant, is always again to be restored into his former estate, wherein he was: whereas if he that shall so do at the commandment of a good prince shall not by the law be relieved: neither are those murders, proscriptions, banishments, incests, ravishments, and other such villainies which happen in civil wars, in the changing or destruction of the states of Common weals, or the establishment of the same, to be called tyrannies: for that in such violent conversion and change of state, it cannot otherwise be. As it fell out in the Roman Triumuirat, in the election of divers Emperors, and in our time Cosmus de Medici's, first taking upon him the dukedom of Florence. For he after the death of his kinsman Alexander Medici's, slain by the conspiracy of his enemies, took unto himself a strong guard of strangers for the defence and safety of his own person: built castles and strong holds: fortified the city with strong garrisons: imposed new tributes and customs upon the subjects; which unto the common people, and men abusing the popular liberty, seemed violent oppressions and tiranies: but unto the wise men necessary and wholesome remedies: especially in such a sick city and Commonweal, as with most desperate diseases and incurable ulcers was like otherwise to have perished: as also against such unruly citizens, and enured to all licentious liberty; who had a thousand times conspired against this new Duke, reputed for one of the most wise and virtuous princes of his time: but of them accounted a tyrant.  
Now to the contrary it happeneth often that the state of a city or Commonweal ruinated 
Severity in a prince more wholesome for the Commonweal th●…n le●…tie.  by the too much lenity and facility of one prince, is again relieved and upholden by the austeare severity of an other. It is sufficiently known how terrible the tyranny of Domitian was unto the Senate, the nobility, and other the great lords and governors of the Roman Empire; in somuch that all his laws and edicts were by their procurement after his death repealed: and yet for all that was he even after his death also most highly by the general consent of all the provinces commended: for that the Proconsul's with the other magistrates and officers of the Commonweal, were never before more upright or freer from corruption than they were in his time, for fear they had of his severity, & him. But when Nerua who succeeeded him in the Empire, abhorring severity, inclined altogether to lenity, & things began to fall into a most miserable estate; the laws being prostituted, justice perverted, and the poor by the mighty oppressed: then Fronto the Consul with many more with most earnest desire, wished for that cruelty and tyranny which they before had condemned in Domitian. Also when a prince with most sharp severity as with a bridle, keepeth in the minds and licentious desires of a furious and headstrong people, as if it were an untamed beast: such wholesome severity aught in no wise to be accounted or called tryanny; but to the contrary Cicero calleth such licentious liberty of the unruly people mere tryanny.  
It may be also that a prince may exercise tryanny against the great ones in the state, as it always happeneth in the violent change of an aristocraty into a Monarchy, when 
divers causes inducing princes unto Tyranny.  as the new prince being in necessity and poor, and not knowing where to have money, often times falleth upon the rich, without regard of right or wrong: or else infranchiseth the common people from the servitude of the nobility, and the rich by that one and self same act to gain the goods and wealth of the rich, and the favour of the poor. But of all tyrants there is none less to be detested than he which preieth upon the rich to ease the necessity of the poor. Now they that praise the goodness, bounty, and courtesy of a prince, without wisdom; are themselves unwise and ignorant in matters of state, abusing therein both their praises and leisure: for as much as such simplicity without wisdom is most dangerous and pernicious unto a king, and much more to be feared than is the great severity of a cruel, covetous, and inaccessible prince. So that it seemeth our ancient fathers not without cause to have used this Proverb, That of a crafty and subtle man is made a good king: which saying unto the delicate 
A true Paradox.  ears of such as measure all things by false opinions rather than by sound reasons, may seem right strange: for by the too much sufferance and simplicity of too good a king, it cometh to pass that flatterers, extortioners, and men of most wicked disposition, without respect, enjoy the principal honours, offices, charges, benefits, and preferments of the Commonwealth, spoiling the revenues of the state: whereby the poor people are gnawn unto the very bones, and cruelly made slaves unto the great: in somuch as that in stead of one tyrant, there is ten thousand. Out of which corruption also of the magistrates, and too much courtesy of the king, proceed many mischiefs and evils; as impunity of offenders, of murderers, and oppressors: for that the king so good and so gracious cannot refuse to grant them pardon. In brief, under such a prince the public good is turned into particular, and all the charge falleth upon the poor people: as we see in cathares and fluxes in sick and rheumatic bodies, the malady still falleth unto the weakest parts; which to be so, we might prove by many examples aswell of the Greeks as of the Latins: but we will go no farther than to this our own * realm, which was in the most miserable case that ever it was, under the reign of Charles surnamed the simple, and of some called Charles do nothing. It 
The happy estate of France under king Francis the first, a wayward and hard Prince.  was seen also, great, rich, and flourishing, in arms, laws, and learning of all sorts in the time of Francis the first: but especially some few years before his death, when as he waxing old, become so wayward and inaccessible, as that no man durst come unto him to crave any thing of him; having driven the courtly dogs, and shameless persons far from him, bestowing rewards, offices, honours, and benefits upon none but such as were virtuous, and had well deserved of the Commonweal: and withal so governing his bounty, as that at the time of his death were found in the common treasury almost a thousand Sestertioes, that is to say, seventy hundred thousand french crowns, besides three months tribute which was now due: neither was the Commonweal unto any then indebted, more than unto the Swissers, and the Banque of Lions, whom he would not pay, so to keep them in awe: at which time he had firm amity and peace also with all princes and people: and the bounds of his kingdom extended even unto the gates of Milan: his realm full of great captains, and of the wisest men of the world.  
But within twelve years after that Henry the second his son reigned (whose bounty 
The lenity and immoderate bounty of king Henry the second, most hurtful unto the kingdom of France.  was so great, as that the like was never in any prince of his time,) we saw the state almost quite changed: for as he was sweet, gracious, and courteous, so could he not deny any thing to any person; so that his father's treasures were in few months scattered, the great offices and places of command were set to sale more than ever, the greatest spiritual preferments without respect bestowed upon unworthy men, magistracies sold to them that would give most, and so consequently to the most unworthy greater customs and payments exacted than ever were before: and yet when he●… died, the estate of the receipt of France was found charged with two and forty millions, after it had lost Piedmont, Savoy, the isle of Corsica, and the frontiers of the Low country: Howbeit that all these losses were but little, in comparison of the loss of his reputation and honour. Whereas had the facility of this great king been tempered with severity, his lenity with some rigour: his bounty, with a certain sparing, and that for a weak and soft spirit, he had borne a stout and courageous mind: we had no doubt lived both well and happily, neither had the Commonweal fallen into such miserable calamities as now we have endured.  
But to hold this golden mean (some man will say) as it is hard for every man to do: so for princes whom divers strong perturbations call out of the middle course unto the one or other of the the extremes, it is of all others most hard. True it is, that virtue consisting in the mean, is environed with many vices, much like unto a strait line, which is hard to be found among a million of crooked: which granted, yet so it is nevertheless, that it is better and more expedient for the people and the preservation of an estate to have a rigorous and severe prince, than too gentle and courteous. The bounty of the emperor Pertinax, and the enraged youthfulness of Heliogabalus had brought the Roman empire even unto the very point of utter ruin: when as the emperors Severus of Africa, and Alexander Severus of Syria, by a rude kind of severity and imperial austerity re-established the same, in the former brightness and majesty, to the great and wonderful contentment of all good men. Thus therefore is the proverb that we received from our ancestors (That of an evil and subtle man is made 
How the paradox, That of an evil and crafty man is made a good king, is to be understood.  a good king) to be understood: for otherwise the word evil, of the propriety of itself signifieth not so much severity, as the uttermost point, or the extremity of impiety, which our ancestors called evil: so Charles king of Navarre was called an evil king, than whom none was more wicked of his time. We must not therefore judge a prince to be a tyrant for his severity and rigour, so that he do nothing contrary to the laws of God and nature. But forasmuch as this discourse hath brought us on so far, let us see also whether it be lawful for a good man to lay violent hand upon the person of a tyrant.   

CHAP. V ¶ Whether it be lawful to lay violent hand upon a tyrant; and after his death to dis●…null all his acts, decrees, and laws.  
THe propriety of the word Tyrant, being not well known, hath deceived 
Who is properly a Tyrant and that he may lawfully be of any man slain.  many, and armed the subjects unto the destruction of their princes. We have before said him properly to be called a Tyrant, who of his own authority taketh upon him the sovereignty, against the will of the people, without election, or right of succession, neither by lot, by will, nor just war, nor special calling of God: and this is he, whom poth the laws and the writings of ancient father's command to be slain; propounding also most ample rewards unto such as should kill him: viz. the honourable titles of nobility and prowess, arms, statues, crowns, and in brief the goods of the Tyrant also; as unto the true deliverer of his country, or as the Cretensians use to say of his mother. Neither in this case make they any difference betwixt a good and a virtuous prince; or a wicked man and a villain. For it is not lawful for any man living, of himself to invade the sovereignty, and to make himself master of his fellows, what colour of virtue or justice soever they pretend: and that more is, in law he is guilty of death, that wrongfully taketh upon him any the marks proper unto sovereign majesty. If then the subject will invade or take upon him the state of his king by any means whatsoever; or in a popular or Aristocratical state, doth of a companion make himself a sovereign, he deserveth death: So that our question in this respect hath in it no difficulty, but that such aspirers may of all the people, or any of them, be lawfully slain. Yet true it is, that the Greeks' have in this point differed from the Latins; as whether a man in this case aught by way of fact to prevent 
Whether a Tyrant may be lawfully slain before he be lawfully tried and convicted.  the course of justice? For why, the law Valeria published at the request of Pub. Valerius Publicola giveth leave to every man to kill a Tyrant, and afterward to try the cause of him so slain. Which law seemeth also not to want good ground of reason: for that to proceed by way of justice, the Commonweal should be consumed with the firebrands of tyranny, before the fire once kindled could be quenched: Besides that, who should call into question of justice the Tyrant, armed with his guard and garrisons? who should take him being possessed of the castles and strong holds? were it not better by times to oppress him by force, than by too religious standing upon the proceeding of the law, to lose the law together with the state? Howbeit the law of Solon is quite contrary unto this, expressly forbidding to proceed by way of fact, or to kill him that seeketh to possess himself of the sovereignty, but first to bring him unto his trial; which seemeth more reasonable than the law Valeria: For that otherwise good & innocent men might oftentimes be taken out of the way and slain by their enemies, under the colour of aspiring, before the truth could be tried: who so once dead, are in that regard always accounted as men justly slain. But these two laws so repugnant and contrary, may in mine opinion thus be well reconciled; if the meaning of Solon's law be referred unto him, who suspected of aspiring, hath not as yet possessed the castles or strong places, seduced the people, nor armed himself with strong garrison: and the law Valeria unto him who hath openly declared himself a Tyrant, seized upon the castles and citadels, and strengthened himself with garrisons. In the first case we found that Furius Camillus the dictator, by way of justice proceeded against Marcus Manlius Torquatus: and in the second case Brutus and Cassius even in the Senate and most open assembly of the people, slew Caesar, thinking of nothing less. But Solon, when as he too religiously (should I say) or superstitiously, had ordained that Tyrants should be lawfully tried before they were put to death, whilst he yet lived saw Pisistratus of a subject to aspire unto the sovereignty of the Athenian state, against whom for all that they which slew the Tyrants at Athens proceeded not by way of justice; whose children nevertheless Harmodius and Aristogiton slew, contrary unto the law, by the private authority of Solon only.  
But here might many questions be made, as, Whether a Tyrant who by force or 
Whether a Tyrant having aspired unto the sovereignty, and afterwards confirmed therein by the consent of the people in general, may yet lawfully be slay●….  fraud having oppressed the liberty of the people, and so aspired unto the sovereignty, may be justly slain; having after his aspiring caused himself to be so chosen or confirmed by the voices of the people in general? For why, it seemeth that such a solemn act of election, is a true ratification of him in his tyranny, the people consenting thereunto. Yet am I nevertheless of opinion, that he may lawfully be slain, and that without any lawful process or trial, except he shall first renounce his authority, quit his forces, and so put himself into the power of the people: for why, that cannot be thought to be done by the free consent of the people, which they do by constraint, being by the Tyrants despoiled of their authority and power. As when Sylla caused himself to be confirmed dictator for fourscore years, by the law Valeria, which he caused to be published, having at the same time a strong and puissant army of his own within the city: 
* Lib. de▪ legibus.  Cicero said, That it was no law at all. And in like case Caesar, who about thirty six years after, caused himself by the law Servia, to be made dictator perpetual. And also Cosmus Medici's, who after the death of his kinsman Alexander having an army in the city of Florens, caused the Senators to choose him duke of that city for ever: about which election whilst they made some doubt, he so thundered with his artillery before the palace, as that the Senate doubting otherwise of the safety of themselves, and of the rest of the citizens, hasted the rather to make choice of him. Howbeit if the children or posterity of a tyrant, shall for long time, as by the space of an hundrd years, in continual possession hold the sovereignty, possessed by their great grandfathers or ancestors, and so by their just commands, govern the Commonweal; such a government aught not now to be called a tyranny, for that in this case, 
Long prescription serveth in staed of a just title.  as in all other things, a prescription of so many years serveth in stead of a just title. And whereas it is said, that the rights of sovereignty cannot be prescribed: that is to say, in less than an hundred years, and concerneth private men, who the Commonweal yet standing upright, seek to usurp the sovereignty, but concerneth not the general conversion or change of the whole state of a Commonweal. We said that the possession of the posterity of a tyrant aught to be of long continued without interruption or interpellation: that is to say, that the subjects have not with any conspiracy rebellion, or intercession, troubled the government of the tyrant, or of his posterity: for thereby it is in a sort evident, and to be gathered, the subjects of their own accord to have yielded unto his commands, and to have taken him for their just prince. But interpellation or gain▪ saying, and resistance, may aswell be showed & declared by deeds as by words: of which sort was that which Aquila the Tribune of the people did, who in sight of all the people took off the crown that was set upon the head of Caesar's statue, Caesar himself in vain fretting thereat; who afterwards unto such grants of honours and preferments as he gave unto his friends, would still add that, If by Aquil●… his leave we may do it. And thus much concerning a Tyrant, whether he be a good man or an evil, who without all right hath aspired unto the sovereignty of the Commonweal wherein he liveth.  
But the chief question of this our discourse, is to know, whether a sovereign prince 
Whether a lawful sovereign prince tiranizing may of his subjects be lawfully ●…ayne or not.  come unto that high estate by election, or by lot, by rightful succession, or by just war, or by the especial vocation of almighty God; forgetting his duty, and become without measure cruel, covetous, and wicked, so perverting the laws of God and man, and such an one as we commonly call a Tyrant, may be lawfully slain or not. And true it is that many interpreters, both of Gods and man's laws, have said it to be lawful: many of them without distinction joining these two incompatible words together, a King a Tyrant: which so dangerous a doctrine hath been the cause of the utter ruin and overthrow of many most mighty empires, and kingdoms. But to decide this question well, it behoveth us to distinguish an absolute sovereign prince, from him which is not so: and also subjects from strangers, according as we have before declared. For it is great difference to say that a Tyrant may lawfully be slain by a prince a stranger; or by his own subject. For as of all noble acts, none is more 
That a prince ty●…anizing may by an other strange prince be lawfully slain.  honourable or glorious then by way of fact, to defend the honour, goods, and lives of such as are unjustly oppressed by the power of the more mighty, especially the gate of justice being shut against them: as did Moses seeing his brother the Israelite beaten and wronged by the Egyptian, and no means to have redress of his wrongs; so is it a most fair and magnifical thing for a prince to take up arms to relieve a whole nation and people, unjustly oppressed by the cruelty of a tyrant: As did the great Hercules, who traveling over a great part of the world with wonderful prows and valour destroyed many most horrible monsters, that is to say Tyrants: and so delivered people without number among the gods: his posterity for many worlds of years after, holding most great kingdoms, and other the imitators of his virtues: as Dio, Timoleon, Aratus, Harmodius, Aristogiton, with other such like honourable princes bearing the titles of chastisers and correctors of Tyrants. And for that only cause Temir-Cutlu, whom our writers commonly call Tamerlan emperor of the Tartars, denounced war unto Bajazet king of the Turks, who then besieged Constantinople; saying that he was come to chastise his tryanny, and to deliver the afflicted people; whom indeed he in a set battle vanquished in the plains near unto Mount Stella: and having slain and put to ●…light three hundred thousand Turks, kept the tyrant (taken prisoner) in chains in an iron Cage until he died. Neither in this case is it material whether such a virtuous prince being a stranger proceed against a Tyrant by open force, or fineness, or else by way of justice. True it is that a valiant and worthy prince having the tyrant in his power, shall gain more honour by bringing him unto his trial, to chastise him as a murderer, a manqueller, and a robber: rather than to use the law of arms against him. Wherhfore let us resolve upon that, that it is lawful for any stranger to kill a Tyrant; that is to say a man of all men infamed, and notorious for the oppression, murder, and slaughter of his subjects and people. But as for subjects to do the same, it is to be known whether the prince that beareth rule be an absolute sovereign; or not: for if he be no absolute sovereign, then must the Sovereignty of necessity be either in the people, or in the nobility: in which case there is no doubt, but that it is lawful to proceed against a Tyrant by way of justice, if so men may prevail against him: or else by way of fact, and open force, if they may not otherwise have reason. As the Senate did in the first case against Nero: and in the other against Maximinus: for that the Roman Emperors were at the first nothing else but princes of the Common weal, that is to say the chief and principal men, the sovereignty nevertheless still resting in the People and the Senate: as I have before showed, that this Commonweal was then to have been called a principality: although that Seneca speaking in the person of Nero his scholar sayeth: I am the only man amongst living men, elect and chosen to be the Lieutenant of God on earth: I am the arbitrator of life and death: I am able at my pleasure to dispose of the state and quality of every man. True it is that he took upon him this sovereign authority by force wrested from the Senate and people of Rome: but in right he had it not, the state being but a very principality, wherein the people had the sovereignty. As is also that of the Venetians, who condemned to death their Duke Falier, and also executed many others, without form or fashion of any lawful process: forasmuch as Venice is an Aristocratical principality, wherein the Duke is but the first or chief man, sovereignty still remaining in the state of the Venetian Gentlemen. As is likewise the German Empire, which is also nothing else but an Aristocratical principality, wherein the the Emperor is head and chief, the power and majesty of the Empire belonging unto the States thereof: who thrust out of the government Adolphus the emperor in the year 1296: and also after him Wenceslaus in the year 1400, and that by way of justice, as having jurisdiction and power over them. So also might we say of the state of the Lacedæmonians, which was a pure aristocraty, wherein were two kings, without any sovereignty at all, being indeed nothing but Captains and Generals for the managing of their wars: and for that cause were by the other magistrates of the state, sometime for their faults condemned to pay their fine; as was king Agesilaus: and sometime to death also as were Agis and Pausanias. Which hath also in our time happened unto the kings of Denmark and Sweden, whereof some have been banished, and the others died in prison: for that the nobility pretendeth them to be nothing but princes, and not Sovereigns, as we have before showed: so also are they subjects unto those states which have the right of their election. And such were in ancient times the kings of the cities of the Gauls, whom Caesar for this cause oftentimes calleth Regulos, that is to say little kings: being themselves subjects, and iusticiable unto the Nobility, who had all the sovereignty: causing them even to be put to death, if they had so deserved. And that is it for which Amphiorix the captain general, whom they called the king of the Liegeois said; Our commands (saith he) are such, as that the people hath no less power over us, than we over the people: wherein he showed evidently that he was no sovereign prince: howbeit that it was not possible for him to have equal power with the people, as we have before showed. Wherhfore these sorts of princes, having no sovereignty, if they polluted with wickedness and villainy, cannot be chastised by the authority and severity of the magistrate, but shall abuse their wealth and power unto the hurt and destruction of good men; it always hath and shall be lawful not for strangers only, but even for the subjects themselves also, to take them out of the way.  
But if the prince be an absolute Sovereign, as are the true Monarques of France, 
That it is not lawful for the subjects either by the way of fact, or justice to attempt any thing against the honour, life, or dignity of their sovereign prince, be he never so evil or wicked.  of Spain, of England; Scotland, Turkey, Moschovie, Tartary, Persia, Aethiopia, India, and of almost all the kingdoms of Africa, and Asia, where the kings themselves have the sovereignty without all doubt or question; not divided with their subjects: in this case it is not lawful for any one of the subjects in particular, or all of them in general, to attempt any thing either by way of fact, or of justice against the honour, life, or dignity of the sovereign: albeit that he had committed all the wickedness, impiety, and cruelty that could be spoken; For as to proceed against him by way of justice, the subject hath no such jurisdiction over his Sovereign prince: of whom dependeth all power and authority to command: and who may not only revoke all the power of his Magistrates; but even in whose presence the power of all Magistrates, Corporations, Colleges, Estates, and Communities cease, as we have said, and shall yet more fully in due place say. Now if it be not lawful for the subject by way of justice to proceed against his prince; the vassal against his lord; nor the slave against his master; and in brief, if it be not lawful, by way and course of justice to proceed against a king, how should it then be lawful to proceed against him by way of fact, or force. For question is not here, what men are able to do by strength and force, but what they aught of right to do: as not whether the subjects have power and strength, but whether they have lawful power to condemn their sovereign prince. Now the subject is not only guilty of treason in the highest degree, who hath slain his sovereign prince, but even he also which hath attempted the same; who hath given council or consent thereunto; yea if he have conccaled the same, or but so much as thought it: which fact the laws have in such detestation, as that when a man guilty of any offence or crime, dieth before he be thereof condemned, he is deemed to have died in whole and perfect state, except he have conspired against the life and dignity of his sovereign prince: this only thing they have thought to be such, as that for which he may worthily seem to have been now already judged and condemned; yea even before he was thereof accused. And albeit that the laws inflict no punishment upon the evil thoughts of men; but on those only which by word or deed break out into some enormity: yet if any man shall so much as conceit a thought for the violating of the person of his sovereign prince, although he have attempted nothing, they have yet judged this same thought worthy of death, notwithstanding what repentance soever he have had 
Treason but thought of punished with death.  thereof. As in proof it fell out with a gentleman of Normandy, who confessed himself unto a Franciscan Friar, to have had a purpose in himself to have slain Francis the first, the French king: of which evil purpose and intent he repenting himself, received of the friar absolution, who yet afterward told the king thereof; who sending for the gentleman, and he confessing the fact, turned him over to the parliament of Paris for his trial, where he was by the decree of that high court condemned to death, and so afterwards executed. Which we cannot say, that the judges did for fear, seeing that they had oftentimes refused to ratify the edicts and letters patents by that gracious king granted, notwithstanding whatsoever commandment he did give for them to confirm the same. And so in Paris, although a foolish man and altogether out of his wit, called Caboche, drew his sword upon Henry the second, Francis his son, as with a purpose to have slain him; but without effect or hurt done, yet was he nevertheless condemned, and so put to death, without any regard had unto his lunesie or frenzy; although the laws every where excuse the mad and lunitike man, from all punishment, what murder or villainy soever he do; seeing that he is more than enough 
That sovereign princes whatsoever ●…ught to be unto their subjects sacred and inviolat.  tormented with the frantic furious passion itself. And lest any man should think themselves to have been the authors of these laws and decrees, so the more straightly to provide for their own safety and honour, let us see the laws and examples of holy Scripture. Nabugodonozor king of Assyria, with fire and sword destroyed all the country of Palestine, besieged the city of Jerusalem, took it, rob and razed it down to the ground, burnt the temple, and defiled the sauctuarie of God, slew the king, with the greatest part of the people, carrying away the rest that remained into captivity into Babylon; and yet not so contented, caused * the image of himself made in gold, to be 
Dan. cap. ●….  set up in public place, commanding all men without exception to adore and worship the same, upon pain of being burnt alive: and caused them that refused so to do, to be cast into a burning furnace: and yet for all that the holy * Prophet's directing their 
Bar●…e. 1. Hier. 29  letters unto their brethren the jews, then in captivity at Babylon, will them to pray unto God, for the good and happy life of Nabuchodonosor and his children, and that they might so long rule and reign over them as the heavens should endure. Yea even God himself doubted not to call Nabuchodonosor his servant; saying, That he would 
Hier. 2●…. Ezec. ●…9  make him the most mighty prince of the world. And yet was there ever a more detestable tyrant than he? who not contented to be himself worshipped, but caused his image to be also adored, and that upon pain of being burnt quick. And yet for all that we see the prophet Ezechiel, inspired with the spirit of God, angry with Sedechia king of Jerusalem, greatly to detest his perfidious dealing, disloyalty, and rebellion against king Nabuchodonosor, whose vas●…all he was, and as it were rejoiceth him to have been most justly slain. We have also another more rare example of Saul, who possessed with an evil spirit, caused the priests of the lord to be without just cause slain, for that one of them had received David flying from him, and did oft-times what in his power was, to kill, or cause to have been killed the same David, a most innocent prince, by whom he had got so many victories over his enemies: at which time he fell twice himself into David his hands; who blamed of his most valiant soldiers (over whom he then commanded) for that he would not suffer his so mortal an enemy then in his power, to be slain, being in most assured hope to have enjoyed the kingdom after his death, he detested their counsel, saying, God forbidden that I should suffer the person of a king, the Lords anointed to be violated. Yea moreover he himself defended the same king persecuting of him, when as he commanded the soldiers of his guard overcome by wine and sleep to be wakened. And at such time as Saul was slain, and that a soldier thinking to do David a pleasure, presented him with Saul his head: David forthwith caused the same soldier to be slain, which had brought him the head, saiing, Go thou wicked, how dared thou lay thine impure hands upon the Lords anointed? thou shalt surely die therefore: and afterwards without all dissimulation mourned himself for the dead king. All which is worth our good consideration. For David was by Saul persecuted to death, and yet wanted not power to have revenged himself, being become stronger than the king by the aid of his enemies, unto whom he fled even against his will: beside that he was the chosen of God, and anointed by the hands of Samuel, to be king of the people, and had also married the king's daughter: and yet for all that he abhorred to take upon him the title of a king, and much more to attempt any thing against the life or honour of Saul, or to rebel against him, but chose rather to banish himself out of the realm, than in any sort to seek the king's destruction. So we also read, that the most holy and best learned men that ever were amongst the jews▪ whom they called the Essei (that is to say, the true executors of the law of God) held, that sovereign princes whatsoever they were, aught to be unto their subjects inviolable, as persons sacred, and sent unto them from God. And we doubt not, but that David a king and prophet, led by the spirit of God, had always before his eyes the law of God, which saith, Thou shalt not speak evil of thy prince, nor detract the Magistrate. 
* Exod. 23. 28.  Neither is there any thing more common in all the holy Scripture, than the forbidding not only to kill or attempt the life or honour of a prince, but even for the very magistrates also, although (saith the Scripture) they be wicked and nought. If therefore he be guilty of treason against God and man, which doth but detract the magistracy; what punishment then can be sufficient for him that shall attempt his life? For the law of God is in this case yet more precise than are the laws of men: For the law julia holdeth but him guilty of treason, which shall give council to kill the magistrate, whereas the law of God expressly forbiddeth in any sort to speak of the magistrate evil, or in any wise to detract him. Wherhfore to answer unto the vain and frivolous objections & arguments of them which maintain the contrary, were but idly to abuse both our time and learning. But as he which doubteth whether there be a God or nor, is not with arguments to be refuted, but with severe punishments to be chastifed: so are they also which call into question a thing so clear, and that by books publicly imprinted; that the subjects may take up arms against their prince being a Tyrant, and take him out of the way howsoever: howbeit that the most learned divines, and of best understanding, are clear of opinion, that it is not lawful for a man not only to kill his sovereign prince, but even to rebel against him, without an especial and undoubtful commandment from God; as we read of jehu, who was chosen of God, and by the prophet anointed king of Israel, with express commandment utterly to root out all the house of king Achab. He before as a subject had right patiently borne all his wickedness and outrages. Yea the most cruel murders and torturing of the most holy prophets, and religious men, the unworthy murders, banishments, and proscriptions of the subjects; as also the most detestable witchcraft of queen jesabel: yet for all that durst he attempt nothing against his sovereign prince, until he had express commandment from God, by the mouth of his prophet, whom God indeed so assisted, as that with a small power he slew two kings, caused seventy of king Achab his children to be put to death, with many other princes of the kings of Israel and of juda, and all the idolatrous priests of Bahal, that is to say of the Sun, after that he had caused jesabel the queen, to be cast headlong down from an high tower, and left her body to be torn in pieces and eaten up of dogs. But we are not to apply this especial commandment of God, unto the conspiracies and rebellions of mutinous subjects against their sovereign princes. And as for that which Calvin saith, if there were at this time magistrates appointed for the defence of the people, and to restrain the insolency of kings, as were the Ephori in Lacedemonia, the Tribunes in Rome, and the Demarches in Athens, that they aught to resist and impeach their licentiousness and cruelty: he showeth sufficiently, that it was never lawful in a right Monarchy, to assault the prince, neither to attempt the life or honour of their sovereign king: for he speaketh not but of the popular and Aristocratique states of Commonweals. And we have before showed, that the kings of Lacedemonia were no more but plain Senators and captains: and when he speaketh of states, he saith, Possibly, not daring to 
The wars of the German princes against Charies the fi●…t in Germany in Luther's judgement not lawful. Sledan. lib. 4.  assure any thing. Howbeit that there is a notable difference betwixt the attempting of the honour of his prince, and the withstanding of his tyranny; betwizt kill his king, and the opposing of one's self against his cruelty. We read also, that the Protestant princes of Germany, before they entered into arms against Charles the emperor, demanded of Martin Luther if it were lawful for them so to do or not; who frankly told them, That it was not lawful, whatsoever tyranny or impiety were pretended; yet was he not therein of them believed: so thereof ensued a deadly and most lamentable war, the end whereof was most miserable, drawing with it the ruin and destruction of many great and noble houses of Germany, with exceeding slaughter of the subjects: whereas No cause (as saith Cicero) can be thought just or sufficient for us to take up arms against our country. And yet it is most certain, that the sovereignty of the empire resteth not in the person of the emperor, (as we will in due place declare) but being chief of the state, they could not lawfully take up arms against him, but by a general consent of the state, or of the greater part of them, which was not done: then much less is it lawful to take up arms against a sovereign prince. I cannot use a better example, than of the duty of a son towards his father: the law of God saith, That he which speaketh evil of his father or mother, shall be put to death. Now if the father shall be a thief, a murderer, a traitor to his country, as an incestuous person, a manqueller, a blasphemer, an atheist, or what so you will else; I confess that all the punishments that can be devised are not sufficient to punish him: yet I say, it is not for the son to put his hand thereunto, Quia nulla tanta impiet as, nullum tantum scelus est, quod sit parricidio vindicandum. For that (as saith an ancient Orator) no impiety can be so great, no offence so heinous, as to be revenged with the kill of one's father. And yet Cicero reasoning upon the same question, saith, our country to be dearer unto us than our parents. Wherhfore the prince whom you may justly call the father of the country aught to be unto every man dearer & more reverend than any father, as one ordained & sent unto us by God. I say therefore that the subject is never to be suffered to attempt any thing against his sovereign prince, how naughty & cruel soever he be lawful it is, not to obey him in things contrary unto the laws of God & nature: to fly and hide ourselves from him; but yet to suffer stripes, yea and death also rather than to attempt any thing against his life or honour. OH how many Tyrants should there be; if 
What great inconuenie●…cieses should ensu●…e if it were lawful for subjects under the colour of tyrants to kill their sovereign princes  it should be lawful for subjects to kill Tyrants? how many good and innocent princes should as Tyrants perish, by the conspiracy of their subjects against them? He that should of his subjects exact subsidies, should be then (as the vulgar people account him) a Tyrant: he that should rule and command contrary to the good liking of the people, should be a Tyrant: (as Aristotle in his Politics sayeth him to be) he that should keep strong guards and garrisons for the safety of his person, should be a Tyrant: he that should put to death traitors and conspirators against his state should be also counted a Tyrant. And in deed how should good princes be assured of their lives, if under the colour of tyranny they might be slain of their subjects, by whom they aught to be defended? Not for that I would say it not to be lawful for other Princes by force of arms to prosecute tryanny (as I have before said) but for that it is not lawful for subjects so to do. Howbeit that I am rather of Diogenes the Cynic his opinion, who one day meeting with Dionysius the younger, then living in exile at Corinth, and seeing him merrily sporting himself in the streets with jesters and minstrels; very soberly said unto him, Truly thou art now in an estate unworthy of thee. I heartily thank thee (said Dionysius) for having compassion on me. And thinkest thou said Diogenes that I thus say for any compassion I have of thee? mistake me not, for I speak it rather in despite of the life thou now leadest, to see such a vile slave as thee, worthy to grow old, and die in the accursed state of tyranny, as did thy father, thus to sport thyself in security, and quietly to pass thy time among us. For can any hangman more cruelly torment a man condemned to torture, than fear? Fear I say of death, of infamy, 
The miserable state and condition of a Tyrant whilst he liveth.  and of torture: these be the revenging furies which continually vex Tyrants, and with eternal terrors torment them both night and day: Than envy, suspicion, fear, desire of revenge, with a thousand contrary passions at variance among themselves, do so disquiet their minds, and more cruelly tyrannize over them, than they themselves can over their slaves, with all the torments they can devise. And what greater wretchedness can happen unto a man, than that which presseth and forceth the tyrant? to have a desire to make his subjects beasts and fools, by cutting from them all the ways to virtue and learning? To be a slave and subject unto a thousand spies and pryers into other men's lives? to hear, see, and understand, what is done, said, o●… thought of all and every man? and in stead of joining and uniting of his subjects in love and amity together; to sow amongst them a thousand quarrels and dissensions: to the end they should always be at defiance among themselves, and in distrust one of an other? And who can doubt but that a Tyrant still languishing in such torment, is of all men most miserable, and more afflicted and tormented, than if he should die a thousand deaths? Death (as sayeth Theophrastus') is the end of all miseries; and the repose of the unfortunate, as sayeth Caesar: neither the one nor the other being in that point superstitious, as not persuaded of the immortality of the soul, or that it longer lived than the body, or that there remained any farther pains for the wicked after this life: so that to wish a Tyrant slain as a punishment for his deserts, is but to wish his good and rest.  
But most Tyrants have ordinarily near unto their own persons certain Mynnions, 
The policy of some Tyrants to avert from themselves the people's rage.  of whom they make great account and reckoning: whom they use as sponges to suck up their subjects blood, upon whom when occasion serveth, they discharge themselves; to the end that the people entering into fury, should seize upon them, and spare themselves: So had Tiberius, Seian; Nero, Tigillin; Dionyse the younger, Phyliste; and of late Henry king of Sweden, George Preschon, whom we read to have been given as a prey unto the furious people, and by them to have been rend and torn in pieces. So the Emperor Antonius Caracalla to please the people, put to death all the flatterers who had before induced him to kill his brother. Neither did Caligula in better sort entreat his clawbacks. And by these sleights have Tyrants oftentimes well escaped the rage and fury of the people. But if the conspirators began their fury at the person of the Tyrant himself, than were not only his friends and favourites, but even his wives, children, and nearest kinsmen, most cruelly slain. Which they did not only all Greece over, but in Sicily also: as after the death of Hiero the Tyrant, ensued the slaughter of all his friends and kinsfolks, the rage of the people with unspeakable cruelty bursting out, even to the dismembering of his sisters and cousins: his statues were cast down, all his edicts revoked, not only those which were unjust and unreasonable, but even those also which were right commendable and necessary; to the intent that no memorial of Tyrants might remain: yet true it is, that oftentimes their good decrees were still kept. And that is it for which Cicero said, That there was nothing more common, than to approve the acts of a Tyrant, and yet to place in heaven them that had slain them. And yet he in another saith it be a doubt, not yet resolved upon, viz. Whether a good man aught to come unto the counsel of a Tyrant consulting even of good and profitable matters? And yet this question dependeth of the other: for if a man make conscience to be assistant unto a Tyrant, consulting of good things, for fear lest in so doing he should seem to approve his tyranny: wherefore should he then approve the good laws and decrees by him made? for that is also no less to ratify his tyranny, and to give example to others, aswell as to give council unto a Tyrant, in good and commendable things. Except one should say, that tyranny which yet is in the force and strength of itself, is shored and countenanced by the 
That not only the good acts and decrees of Tyrants, but eve●… their evil acts and decrees also are oftentimes of necessity after their death▪ to be r●…tained in a commonweal.  council of good and honest men, under the covert of some one or other good and commendable act, which would otherwise of itself fall, by the only evil opinion conceived of tyranny; whereas he which is already dead, cannot be again revived to ratify his other evil acts. Yea it oftentimes falleth out, that not only the good & profitable acts of Tyrants, but even their evil and unjust acts and orders are of necessity to be retained also, if we will have the Commonwealth in safety to stand. Wherhfore Thrasibulus after he had put to flight the thirty Tyrants of Athens: and Aratus having slain Nicholas the Tyrant of Sicyone: and to the imitation of them Cicero after the death of Caesar the dictator, persuaded the publication of the laws of forgetfulness, to extinguish the desire of revenge: yet for the most part ratifying the acts of those Tyrants, which they could not utterly disannul, without the ruin of the whole Commonweal. As for that we read the acts of Nero and Demetrian, to have been revoked, and disannulled by the Senate, that concerneth certain perpetual edicts of theirs, which for that they had a perpetual inconvenience annexed unto them, would if they had not been abrogated, have in time utterly ruinated all that was now again set in order: as for their good & commendable laws, they were not at all altered. For what time was more glorious than Nero his first five years reign? what more fit or better for the well ordering of a Commonweal? Insomuch that Traian himself a most excellent prince, deemed no man to have been like unto Nero, for the well governing of a Commonweal. Unto this the opinions of the lawyers agreed, who hold the successors 
The successors of Tyrants how far they are bound to that which the Tyrants their predecessoures have promised.  of Tyrants to be bound unto all such things as the Tyrants their predecessors have justly promised or done, but not unto the rest. So the emperor Constantine the Great, by a law abrogated such things, as Licinius the Tyrant had before unjustly decreed, but confirmed the rest. The like we read to have been done by Theodosius the younger, and Arcadius the emperors, after the death of the Tyrant Maximus, by this law, Quae Tyrannus contra ius rescripsit non valere praecipimus: legitimis eius rescriptis non impugnandis, What the Tyrant hath against right decreed, we command to be of none effect; not impugning his lawful decrees. And albeit that these two young emperors, to be revenged of the Tyrant Maximus, had by a general edict revoked all the prodigal gifts and preferments, which he lavishly had bestowed upon wicked men, and of no desert in the Commonweal: and also disannulled his judgements and decrees: yet would they not repeal any thing that had been by him decreed or granted, without fraud and deceit, and the hurt of the Commonweal. Those last words without fraud and deceit, which we read in Theodosius, his law, are added against Tyrant's Agents, & Brokers, who are especially to be laid hold upon, to the end that others take not example by them, to build their houses, or enrich themselves by the ruin or hurt of others, during the time that tyranny beareth sway; or that the Commonwealth is with civil wars divided. As it happened in the state of Milan, rend in sunder by the Venetians, the French, the Swissers, and the Spaniards, every one of them taking unto themselves so much thereof, as they could by force and strength, as if it had been by good right, and the Sforces the rest: where amongst others it fortuned jason the famous lawyer, a favourite of the Spaniards, by fraudulent means to obtain the goods of Triwltius, a worthy captain of the French part: but the Spaniards afterwards driven out, and the French returned, jason was right well beaten with his own laws and decisions, being by the captain Triwltius again thrust out of his unjust possession, and that by his own doctrine. In which case yet the force of laws and decrees aught 
Natural equity in all cases cannot in any law be comprised, but is often times to be left unto the religious arbitrement of men expert in matters of state.  not to be of so great force and power, as natural and upright equity itself, which cannot be fully comprised in any laws, but is to be left unto the religious arbitrement of them who know how to manage the affairs of state, and wisely to balance the particular profit, with the counterpoise of the public, according to the infinite variety of times, places, and persons; always remembering the profit of every man in particular, and of all together in general, not to be one and the same: and that the public is always to be preferred before the private, except the private be grounded upon the greatest equity and reason. As if the Receivers in the heat of the civil wars, or in the reign of a Tyrant, or in such time as lawful enemies make invasion, shall be enforced to pay the public money: it is good reason it should be allowed them, as paid unto the Commonwealth. For so it was judged by decree of the parliament of Naples, for them that had paid unto the receivers of Charles the eight, when as after the return of the Spaniards, they would have enforced the receivers to have paid the money twice, natural reason (in this case) preferring the private profit before the public. For the receivers could not otherwise do, the Frenchmen then fully possessed of the kingdom of Naples. But if the Receivers or debtors of the Commonweal, shall without any summons or constraint, or for some colourable suit, pay unto the enemy, or a Tyrant, part of that which is due, to accept in stead of the whole, they shall yet still remain not only debtors for the whole, but be in danger also of treason. Wherhfore to conclude this question, It is not meet that the good decrees or laws of a slain tyrant should be repealed or disannulled.  
And in this, the princes much deceive themselves, which overthrow and make voided 
Murders even of evil and tyrannical princes, not to be rewarded, but severely punished.  all the acts of Tyrants, their predecessors; and namely they which give reward to them that have slain Tyrants, to make them a way unto the sovereignty. For they shall never assure themselves of their own lives, if they severely punish not the conspirators against their own prince and murderers of him, although he were never so great a Tyrant. As most wisely did Severus the emperor, who put to death all them which had any part in the murder of the emperor Pertinax: which was the cause (as saith Herodian) that there was no man which durst attempt his life. So also Vitelliu●… the emperor put to death all the murderers and conspirators against Galba, who had presented requests signed with their own hands unto the emperor Otho, to have had of him reward for their distoialtie. And Theophilus emperor of Constantinople caused them all to be called together, who had made his father emperor, after they had slain Leo the Armenian, as if he would have well recompensed them for so great a good turn: who being come together with many other, who though not partakers of the murder, were yet desirous to be partakers of the reward; he caused them altogether to be slain. And that more is, the emperor Domitian put to death Epaphroditus, Nero his manumised servant, and secretary to the state, for having helped Nero to kill himself, who most instantly requested him so to do, being thereby delivered from the executioners hands, and cruel exemplary death. And these things we read not only Tyrants, but even good kings also to have done, not so much in regard of their own safety, as of the dignity of them that were slain. As David did unto him who in hope of reward brought him his father in laws head cut off, but slain by his enemies. And Alexander the Great caused cruelly to be put to death him that had murdered king Darius, abhorring the subject which durst to lay hand upon his king: although Alexander himself by lawful war sought after his life and state, as being his lawful enemy. And yet in mine opinion the thing that hath most preserved the kings of France and their persons inviolated, is for that they have not used cruelty towards 
Lenity of sovereign princes towards them of their own blood offending them; and so in their danger, or otherwise their honourable prisoners: unto themselves both commendable and profitable  them which were near unto them in blood, albeit that they were attainted; convicted, yea and condemned as enemies to their prince, and guilty of treason. As john the second, duke of Alencon, although he was twice for the same cause condemned, as for that he had with the enemies conspired against king Charles the seventh and the Commonweal, and the sentence of death pronounced against him by the Chancellor, yet for all that would not the king, that he should be executed. Many have blamed this the kings too much clemeneie, as dangerous: but they see not, that kings in so doing, do not so much deliver their kinsmen from punishment, as themselves; neither so much to provide for other men's safety, as for their own; nor that in forbidding the blood of their kinsmen to be shed, they spare their own; nor that he which putteth a prince of his own blood into the executioners hands, or causeth him to be murdered, forgeth a knife to cut his own throat. For we have seen the emperors of Constantinople both of ancient and latter time, and many kings of Spain and England, who fouling their hands in the blood of their princes, suffered themselves afterward in their persons that which they had done to others. For not to speak of those things which are reported to have of late been done in the house of Castille: one king in that nation cruelly murdered six of his brethren: and in less than thirty six years fourscore princes of royal blood, were (as Philip Comines in his Commentaries reporteth) in England either slain or executed by the bloody executioners hands. Now the greatest safety of a sovereign prince, is to have their subjects persuaded, that they aught to be holy and inviolat; although it much concern the Commonweal also, the king's stock to be most sacred, lest the princes of the blood being taken out of the way, the Commonweal fall also; or else troubled with endless sedition, be rend in pieces, as we shall in due place declare. I know well that some have blamed Seleucus, for not having put to death Demetrius, surnamed the Besieger, one of the most valiant princes that ever was; but having only kept him in prison: And Hugh Capet, for having kept in prison in the castle at Orleans, Charles the last of the blood of king Charlemaigne: And Henry the first, king of England, for having kept in prison until his death, his elder brother Robert, having before caused his eyes to be put out: As also Christiern father to Fredrick king of Denmark, for having kept his cozen the king of Denmark thrust out of his kingdom, five and twenty years prisoner, who as a private man there died in prison, in the castle of Calembourg, being 77 years old: And john king of Sweden, who keepeth his elder brother Henry (rejected by the people) prisoner ever since the year 1567., lest he should trouble both him and the Commonweal. But they have been, and yet are by this means more reverenced and honoured of their subjects, than if they had put these their so honourable prisoners to death.  
But here some men will object, The keeping of such prince's prisons, to be a thing 
The keeping of great princes prisoners, dangerous.  full of peril and danger: which I confess, and was the only reason that moved the pope to counsel Charles of France, to put to death Conradin his prisoner, the son of Manfroy king of Naples. As with like cruelty had Ptolemy, last king of Egypt caused Pompey the Great, after his flight unto him from the battle of Pharsalia, to be slain; his councillors saying unto him, That dead men bitten not. And yet nevertheless neither could this Ptolomee escape destruction: neither wanted there heirs enough of the house of Arragon, who ceased not to drive out them of the house of Anjou, and to recover again the kingdom: and albeit that he which put him to death, being himself afterward also condemned to die, escaped: yet so it was, that the infamy of so detestable a murder, without cause committed upon the person of a young innocent prince, hath yet tested upon them which did the execution to their own destruction. And truly our ancestors seeing john duke of Burgundy, rashly in the very time of judgement, confessing the murder of jews his kinsman, duke of Orleans; and yet to have easily escaped the danger, said, That surely from thence forward a man might have the blood of princes good cheap, and in so saying said well. For the same john coming afterward under safe conduct, was himself likewise served, and in cold blood slain, they that were the authors of his death escaping unpunished.   

CHAP. VI ¶ Of an aristocraty.  
AN aristocraty is a form of Commonweal, wherein the less 
What an aristocraty is.  part of the citizens with sovereign power commandeth over all the rest; and every citizen in particular. And in that it is contrary unto the estate Popular, for that in the Aristocratical state the lesser part of the citizens command, and in the Popular state the greater: and yet in that they both agreed, that they which have the sovereignty, have power to command over every one in particular, but not over all in general. Wherhfore a Monarchy is in that better and more honourable than the other two; for that in it the power of one extendeth itself over all in general, and in particular also: a thing in mine opinion well worthy the noting. And like as a Monarchy is either Royal, Lordlike, or Tyrannical: so also an 
Three sorts of Aristocraties.  aristocraty may be Lordly, lawful, or factious; which in ancient time the called an oligarchy; that is to say, a signory of a very small number of Lords. As were the thirty lords of Athens, overthrown by Thrasibulus, whom they called the thirty Tyrants. Or the ten commissioners, commonly called the Decemuiri, appointed to reform the laws and customs of Rome: and long after the Triumuiri, who by force oppressing the liberty of the people, invaded the sovereignty. And that is it for which the ancients have always taken this word oligarchy, in the evil part, and aristocraty 
Impossible to establish an aristocraty only of good men.  in the good; defining it to be A government of good men. But we have before declared, that in matters of state (to understand of what form every Commonweal is) we must not have regard whether the governors thereof be virtuous, or otherwise; but to the government thereof. It is also a difficult matter, and almost impossible, to establish an aristocraty composed only of good men; for that cannot be done by lot, neither by election, the two usual means: whereunto we may join the third, by lot and election together, as impossible as the other; virtue with fortune having no agreement. Neither is lot and fortune to be admitted unto the consultations of honest causes: and if the same should be committed unto the choice of the promiscuous and vulgar people, they would not make choice of men altogether unlike themselves; that is of fools, of wicked and most impudent men, good and wise men (if there be any) every where being the lest part of the people: and what more shameful thing could there be, than the honour and reputation of wise men, to depend of the judgement (should I say, or of the rashness) of the head strong people. Yet let us grant some few good and wise men to be in the city, truly they will shun even the very sight of the wicked and of the bedlam multitude: neither if they come unto their common assemblies, be so shameless and impudent, as to name and make their choice of themselves as of wise men. For so Lactantius Firmianus merely jesteth at the seven Sages of Greece: If they were but wise (saith he) in their own judgements, than were they not wise: but in the judgement of others, much less, who were not wise in judging no more wise but seven, and all the rest fools.  
But some may say it should do well herein to imitate the ancient Romans, and other Latins, in the choice that they by solemn oath made of the most valiant and warlike man of all other for their General: who so chosen, should make choice of a second for his Lieutenant most like himself: and he likewise of the third: and the third of the fourth; and so in order one valiant man of an other, until the number of their Legions were filled. This truly might seem a good way for the forming of a Commonweal of good and worthy men, at the first beginning thereof: But who should prefine the measure and number of those good men? and who should be surety unto the Commonweal, that every one of those good men, should still make choice of an other good man like himself; rather then of his son, his brother, his kinsman, or his friend? and admit it were so done, sith every where there are so few good men, who should defend them from the multitude, and violence of them that were left, as fools and wicked men? But admit that a Commonweal may at the first be made of such a select number of good men; how long shall we think it can so stand? And that is it for which there neither is, nor ever was any pure aristocraty; wherein the most virtuous only had the sovereignty. For albeit that the Pythagorians having drawn unto their line the most noble and honourable princes of Italy: in the time of king Servius Tullius had changed certain Tyrants, into just Regalities, and were in hope also by little and little to have brought the Oligarchies, and Democraties, into Aristocraties, as in some places they had already done: yet nevertheless it so fell out, that the popular men, and ringleaders of the people, seeing all power and authority, under the colour of virtue, to be taken out of their hands, entered into great conspiracies, and so arming the people against the Pythagoreans, and the desperate rout, against the better sort: (as easy it was for the stronger to oppress the weaker) burned them in their diet, and massacred almost all the rest that escaped from the danger of the fire: which shameful murder of the Pythagorians raised great stirs in Italy. 
wheresoever the lesser part of the people hath the sovereignties there is one kind or other of an aristocraty.   
Wherhfore whether they be of the better sort, or of the worse; of the richer sort, or of the poorer; of the nobler, or of the base; of the more warlike, or otherwise which hold the sovereignty, so that it be the lesser part of the citizens or people, we call it by the name of an aristocraty. This lesser part of citizens or people we need not to define by any certain number: for that the variety of numbers is infinite, and can by no man be comprehended. As admit there be ten thousand citizens, of whom an hundred have the sovereignty; if in their common assembly three score of them shall be of one 
The lesser part of the people in an aristocraty not to be defined by any certain number.  opinion for the making of a law: that law shall in general bind the other forty which have part also in the sovereignty, but are the fewer in number, together with the other nine thousand nine hundred excluded from the government, and the same three score being of one mind together, shall rule the whole ten thousand in particular: Neither yet for all that is the sovereign right drawn unto those three score; But as in every lawful College and Corporation, the greater part is every where the better: so it followeth that three score being of one accord, shall over rule the other forty both altogether and a part: except by law concerning sovereignty it be provided, that two thirds of the citizens agreeing among themselves, should prevail against the rest; as we see it set down in almost all the laws and statutes of Colleges: by which means threescore four citizens, shall in the aforesaid number of an hundred, be superiou unto the other thirty six. Wherhfore in an aristocraty we are not to have regard how little, or how great the number of the citizens is; provided that they which have the sovereignty over the rest, be fewer in number than the one half of the whole. For admit there be an hundred thousand citizens in a Commonweal, of whom ten thousand have the sovereignty over the rest, it shall as well be called an aristocraty; as if of ten thousand citizens, one thousand only should hold the estate: considering that both in the one and other Commonweal, the tenth part hath the sovereignty: so we may say where the hundred, or the thousand part of the citizens bear the sway; and the fewer that they be, the more assured and durable is the state; so that they be not at variance amongst themselves. As the estate of the Pharsalians was the most durable of 
The Aristocratical estate of the Pharsalians.  Graece, and yet it had but twenty Governors. And the Lacedaemonian commonweal, which carried away the prize of honour from all the others of the East: albeit that it was most populous, yet for all that it had in it but thirty Governors, chosen out of 
The estate of the Lacedæmonians.  the better sort, to continued in the government so long as they lived. The Epidaurians saith plutarch had but an hundred and four score of the noblest and wealthiest of the citizens which had part in the sovereignty: out of which number they chose the counsellors of the state. The ancient Commonweal of Marseilles in Provence (which 
The ancient estate of them of Marseilles.  in the judgement of Cicero was the best ordered Commonweal that ever was in the world) had in it six hundred citizens which held the sovereignty: out of which number of six hundred were taken the Senators, and fifteen magistrates, and of these fifteen magistrates were three Precedents set over them in manner of the Roman Praetors. The like we may deem of the Rhodians and Theban Commonweals, after that their popular estates were changed into Aristocraties, the richer sort possessing themselves of the sovereignty: than which nothing can be more commodious for the Commonweal, especially if good citizens cannot be had. For which cause Titus Flaminius the Consul established the towns and cities of the Thessalians in form of an aristocraty, making Senators and judges of the richer sort, and giving to them the sovereign power, whom it concerned most, that their Commonweal should continued in rest and peace. Which order Andrew Doria seemeth to have followed in 
The Aristocratical estate of Genua framed by Andrew Doria.  reforming the Commonweal of Genua, by him drawn from the obeisance of the French, in the year 1528, at which time he by the consent of the citizens there established an aristocraty of eight and twenty families, chosen as well out of the base commonalty, as out of the nobility, so that they had six houses within Genua, all whom by a law he made noble, & partakers of the sovereignty of the state: leaving unto their discretion, every year to choose unto them ten other citizens, such as they should think fittest for their virtue, for their nobility or riches. Out of these eight and twenty families, he established a Counsel of four hundred men, every year to be chosen for the government of the state: who also made choice of the Duke, and eight governors for two years to continued, whom together they call the signory; for that unto them it belongeth to manage the weighty affairs of the Common wealth: except some such great matter happen, as may require the advise of the Senate, which consisting of an hundred persons, is usually every year chosen by the nobility, by secret voices, by lot given, as they do in Venice. And every one of these eight Governors after his office expired, continueth for two years procurer of the Common wealth: and from that time forward, remaineth one of the privy council, together with them which are and have been Dukes, who are Procurours of the Common weal so long as they live. Besides that there are forty Captains every year chosen, and an hundred men deputed to every one of those captains, which is a legion of four thousand men, appointed for the strength and defence of the city: Over which legion there is one Colonel, or chief Captain, whom they call the General; who are all chosen by the voices of the nobility: As for their jurisdiction or administration of justice, they use strangers, viz. a Praetor, who is always a stranger; with two Lieutenants his assistants, the one for the receipt, the other for criminal causes: and five other Civilians, judges for all private causes for two years, all strangers also; whom, they call the Rota. Yet besides them, there are seven extraordinary judges chosen out of the Citizens, for the extraordinary deciding of causes. Besides whom were also five Syndicques to receive informations against the Duke, and the eight Governors, after that their charge was expired, causing proclamation to be openly made, That if any man had any complaint against them, for any wrong or injury received from them, he should come in and be heard: at which time if none complained, they had letters testimonial given them, in witness of their upright dealing in their office. The same year 
The estate of Geneva  that Doria established an aristocraty at Genua, they of Geneva also changed their Pontifical monarchy into a Popular state, governed in manner of an aristocraty. And albeit that the Town long time before pretended, itself not to be subject unto the laws either of the Duke of Savoy or of the Pope, but to be free from them both; yet the citizens thought it not best for them to attempt any thing, until that discord about the Sovereignty was risen not only betwixt the Duke & the bishop, but even betwixt the bishop and the people also: at which time they took hold upon the occasion then presented unto their desires for the changing both of their Religion & state. Wherhfore their Commonweal now set at liberty, they established a Counsel of two hundred citizens, with sovereign and perpetual power; but that the people still reserved unto themselves the confirmation of laws, the election of their Syndicques and other the great magistrates, and the treaties of peace and war; all which belong unto the right of Sovereignty, as we have before declared. Now out of this great Counsel of two hundred, they made choice of a perpetual Senate of threescore persons: and out of that Senate, they take five and twenty to be of the privy Counsel for ever, chosen all by the great Counsel, and the four Syndicques chosen every year for sovereign Magistrates, beside the other judges and magistrates ordinary. But the difference betwixt this Commonweal and that of Genua is notable, but especially in this, that the Genoese use every year to change their great Counsel of four hundred, and Senate of three score, with other their Magistrates, except some few which continued for two years. Whereas the great Counsel of Geneva, the Senate, and privy counsel are once chosen for ever: yet so, as that the censuring of every one of them every year is still reserved unto the Citizens: which is most straightly looked unto; whereby it cometh to pass, that the Commonweal of Geneva is more firm, and less subject unto alteration or seditious innovation than is that of Genua. Moreover the choice of the great Counsel, the Senate, and of the privy Counsel at Geneva is not made all at once, as at Genes and Venice; but a room being become voided by the death or attainder of a councelour of the privy Counsel of five and twenty, they proceed to the choice of an other out of the great counsel, to put in his place into the privy Council: and after that of a citizen, or at lest wise of a Burgeois, to put into the great counsel, a man not any way sported or defamed: not having any regard in the choice of them, unto their wealth, or nobility, but in what they may unto their virtue and integrity only: a thing (as we read) used amongst the Lacedæmonians, who after the death of their Senators, made choice of others in respect of their honour and virtue only.  
The Swissers except the Grisons, and the other five little cantons, have almost the 
The state of the) Swissers.  same form of a Commonweal; as we see at Zurich the great Council of two hundred, the Senate, and the privy Council established after the manner of Geneva: or to say better, that of Geneva after the form of Zurich; which is almost like unto that of Berne. Which nevertheless differ in this, that with these the great Council & the Senate change every year: which they do not at Geneva: for with these the fraternities, which they call Zunfft, every one of them composed of one, two or three occupations: which are eleven at Schaffouse, twelve at Zurich, fifteen at Basil; and in other places more or less, choose twelve persons of every fraternity, for the great Council: and for the Senate they choose two, as at Zurich; or three, as at Basil; of whom one is the chief of the fraternity. So that the great Council at Zurich, consisteth of two hundredth, of 244 at Basil, of 86 at Schaffuse. And of Senators at Zurich the number is fifty, at Schaffuse twenty six, and at Basil sixty three. But they which are so chosen by the voices of the fraternity, are confirmed also by the great Council, and by the Senators or magistrate, or by the old Senate, as at Basil. For the one half of the Senate is that which was before, which had the charge already six months. And the other-moytie of the Senate, is of those which are but newly chosen, to the intent that the Senate should not be wholly changed all at once. True it is, that the ancient Senate of Basil, chose always the Senate for the year following: and the Burgamasters who had for their companions three Tribunes at Zurich, and two at Basil, who with the Bourgamasters being four, have nine other persons, as assistants joined unto them, and so together make the college of the thirteen men (as they call it) unto whom all the managing of the secret affairs of the Commonwealth are committed: and without whose authority nothing usually is propounded unto the Senate or great Council to resolve of. There are also at Zurich eight men, which have charge of the common receipt, over whom one Bourgomaster is governor. And at Zurich and Shaffuse the new Senators determine all causes criminal: whereas in all the other towns the Provost of the empire, with three Senators in the name of the whole Senate decide the same: which provost is also chosen of the Senate, and generally none may be chosen into the Senate which is defamed or base borne. By all which it is manifest, that their estate is governed Aristocratically; and yet more at Berne, Lucerne, Friburg, and Sole●…re, where the fraternities and companies have no voices in the state, neither power o●… authority to meet together, more than for matters concerning their occupations and trades: but every year four captains or chief men of every city, chose out sixteen other citizens, men of greatest integrity, and without all imputation: who three days before Easter make choice of the great Council, consisting of an hundred of the better sort of the citizens at Lucerne, and of more than two hundred at Berne: which great Council afterwards chooseth the Auoyer, which they call Schuldthessen, and the other magistrates. And particularly the Auoyer, with the aforesaid sixteen, and the four captains chose the Senate, which is of xxuj at Berne, and xviij at Lucerne: who have the power of the state at Berne for a year. The four captains are also annual chosen by the great Council; by which captains and the treasurors, all the judges are ●…lected and confirmed by the Senate: which Senate hath also the deciding of the first appeals. The second appeals are decided by the same Senate of xxuj, and xxuj others whom the Senate shall make choice of. But the last appeal of all is unto the great Council, the chief whereof is the Auoyer: where if question be of the life, fame, or fortune of any the citizens: it is by the decree there made decided, without further appeal. The same order almost is used in the state of Friburg, in making choice of the great Council, consisting of two hundred of the better sort of the citizens: by whom afterward is chosen the Senate of twenty four persons, and the Auoyer with the four captains.  
Whereby it is well to be understood those estates of the Swissers to be Aristocratique, 
The estate of the Swissers Aristocratical, ●…et temperated with a certain mixtu●… of popularity.  yet popularly tempered: for that the way is open for all the citizens of what degree soever unto all the officers and places of command, benefits and charge in the Commonweal, if they be not men infamed, distracted of their wits, or otherwise utterly ignorant of government. That is also belonging unto popularity, that almost all their magistrates are annual: which temperature of the better or richer sort with the meaner or poorer, in being capable of the honours of the Commonweal, maketh the same much more firm and stable, than if the honours and preferments were communicated but unto the Senators or richer sort only; with whom the vulgar people is most commonly at odds: and that so much the more amongst the Swissers, where the nobility (except some few) long sithence destroyed and almost rooted ou●…, the people took upon them the sovereignty: which by little and little falling again unto the nobil●…itie (excepting in the five mountain cities) have with a popular moderation tempered their states with better laws and orders than the rest. For commonly the Aristocratical state admitteth none but the Senators, the nobility, or richer sort, unto the honours and offices of the state, the rest being quite excluded. Howbeit there have been more Aristocraties, consisting of the more ancient and noble families, than of the richer or more virtuous. As the Commonweals of the Samians, the Corcyreans, the Rhodians, and Cnidians, and almost all the Commonweals of Greece, after the victory of Lysander, were by him changed into Aristocraties of the most ancient families, in choosing out ten or twenty, or at the most thirty, unto whom he committed the sovereignty for the government of their estates. We see also the state of Venice, to be as we have before showed mere Aristocratike: And them also of Rhaguse, of Luca, of Ausbourg, of Nuremberg, to be composed in form of Aristocraties, of the most ancient families, although they be but few in number. For as for the Rhagusians 
The estate of the Rhagusians.  (in ancient time called Epidaurians) having new built the city of Rhaguse, near unto the ancient city of Epidaurus, utterly razed by the fury of the Goths, and exempting themselves from the government of the Alhanois, established among themselves an Aristocratike form of a Commonwealth, governed by the most noble and ancient families; following therein almost the example of the Venetians: yet still much more respective and careful of their nobility, than are the Venetians. For a Venetian gentleman may marry a base woman, or a common citizens daughter: whereas the Rhagusian gentleman may not marry a common citizen, neither a stranger, how noble soever, if she be not a gentlewoman of Zarafi, or Catharo, and be farther worth at the lest a thousand ducats. There are also but twenty four houses, which have part in the state: out of whom are drawn divers families, out of which the great Council of about three hundred gentlemen is drawn; provided always that they be twenty years old, when they are so chosen. These make choice of threescore gentlemen Senators, for the managing of the affairs of the state, and in cases of appeal, so that they be above the value of three hundred ducats: who have also the hearing of criminal causes of importance, as if question be of the life, honour, or state of any gentleman. Beside this Senate there is a privy council of twelve persons, with a yearly prince or governor of the city; and five masters of requests (whom they call Provisors) men appointed to receive the requests of the people presented unto them in what court soever. There are also six Consuls to decide civil causes, and five other judges for criminal matters, and thirty others for the deciding of such suits and controversies as exceed not the sum of three hundred ducats. Many other meaner officers they have also, of whom we will in due place speak. Truly this Commonweal of Rhaguse hath of all others that we have heard, the purest aristocraty, and farthest from all popular mixture. The city of Luca also governed after the same fashion, admitteth 
The estate of 〈◊〉 of Luca.  only the ancient families to be partakers of the sovereignty of their government, who are but few, albeit that about the year 1555 there were numbered two and fifty thousand citizens, besides women. Out of the nobility are created an hundred & twenty yearly Senators: out of whom are chosen the ten Councillors of the privy Council, with the prince whom they call the Gonfalonnier. And in these consisteth the sovereign state of this Commonweal. Other officers there be also, as Censors, Praetors, and Receivers, of whom we will in due place speak. Sufficeth it now for the present to have showed divers Aristocratical estates, in respect of sovereignty, to the end by divers examples both of the ancient and new Commonweals, we may the better understand the true nature of an aristocraty.  
And forasmuch as divers men believe, and some of them of greatest knowledge of 
Whether the German empire be a Monarchy, or a ●…eere aristocraty.  the Germane have by writing also published, the Germane empire to be a true Monarchy: we will also speak of that estate, whereof although we have in brief somewhat spoken before, yet here we will more at large thereof discourse, and show the same to be an Aristocratical estate. True it is, that from the time of Charlemaigne unto the reign of Henry surnamed the Falconer, it was a pure Monarchy by right of succession, continued in the royal blood of the said Charlemaigne. But the descent of Charlemaigne, taking end in this Henry the Falconer, the Monarchy by the voices of the princes being translated from this Henry, hath of long time continued by the right of election: insomuch that the seven princes electors, having by little and lirtle withdrawn the sovereignty, have left nothing unto the emperor, but the ba●…e marks thereof in show; the sovereignty itself in effect remaining unto the state of the seven electors, of three hundred Germane princes or thereabouts, and the ambassadors deputed for the imperial cities. Which when it first happened, I see no man to have yet written▪ For that such things as by little and little and little creep into a Commonweal, are scarcely at all perceived, neither well felt, until the change be quite made. Now we have before showed that it is an Aristocratike state, wheresoever the lesser part of the citizens or people command over the rest together, and over every one in particular. And so it is, that the estates of the empire, composed of three or four hundred men (a●… 
In whom the sovereignty of the German empire consistteth.  I have said) have the sovereign power privately over the emperor himself, and over all the other princes, and towns of the empire in particular: as also to give laws to all the subjects of the empire, to determine of peace and war, to lay taxes and impositions upon the people, to appoint judges both ordinary and extraordinary, to judge of the goods, honour, and lives of the emperor, the princes and imperial towns: which all are the true marks of sovereignty. Which if it be so, as most certain it is, who can deny but that the state of the Germane empire is a true aristocraty? And that to be true which I have said, is most evident; sith it is so, that the power of sovereign command dependeth of the acts and decrees of the estates. But the decrees are made by the seven princes electors, accounted for one third part of the voices: and by the other princes of the empire, in number not above three hundred, who have also another third part of the voices: and by the deputies of the free cities or imperial towns, in number seventy, or thereabouts, which have the other third part of the deliberative voices: by whom all the laws and decrees of the empire, or whatsoever else is propounded, have used to be made, established, disannulled, or confirmed. And hath nothing particular in respect of the state, different from other Aristocraties, but that the seven princes electors have (as we said) one third part of the voices; the princes another, and the imperial towns the rest: in such sort, as that if the seven electors and the deputies, or the deputies and the princes, or the electors and the other princes, be of accord and agreed in one, the decree whatsoever passeth. And for that the ecclesiastical princes are the greater number, they oftentimes carry away the matter against the lay princes: which was the cause that the same lay princes, who had before renounced the Romish religion, took in evil part the diet which Charles the fift held at Ratisbon; neither being thither sent for, would come. And like as the gentlemen of Venice, Luca, and Rhaguse, until they be twenty years old enter not into the great council, neither have any part in the sovereignty: even so likewise the children or near kinsmen of the Germane princes, be they young, or be they old, have no voices in the diet, if they be not qualified princes of the empire: which are a certain number of Dukes, Marquesses, Counties, Lantgraves, Burgraves, Margraves, Barons, Archbishops, Bishops, and abbots. And albeit that the duke of Lorraine be a prince of the empire, and hath a voice with the rest of the princes, yet so it is, that his uncle the county Vaudemont, of the same stock and house with him, as other like princes of the same rank and order, have neither voices nor places in the assembly of the states and princes of the empire, but are reckoned amongst the children of those princes. Howbeit yet many are of opinion, the princes and imperial cities to have their sovereign states apart, neither to be bound unto any other men's commands or laws, otherwise than as friends and confederates; in such sort and manner, as the Swissers have their cities and jurisdictions among themselves, one divided from another. But the difference is to him that looketh nearer thereinto, right great, every Canton being sovereign in itself, and not subject unto the laws and commandments of others; neither otherwise bound among themselves, than in alliance offensive or defensive, as we have in due place declared: whereas the Germane empire is united by the estates general in sovereignty, who not only have power to bridle the princes and cities, with fines, exile, proscription, and other severe punishments, but also to depose and thrust out of the empire even the emperors themselves, as they did the emperors Adolphus and Venes●…aus, with many others. Beside that, the estates make ordinatie decrees and laws, which bind all the subjects of the empire, as well in general, as in particular. And that more is, the ten circles or circuits of the empire, hold their particular estates, and yet bring their requests, complaints, and grievances, unto the estates general, to receive their commandments and resolutions, as laws. Moreover the prince's electors, the day after the 
The prince's Electors hold their states of the empire and not of the emperor.  coronation of the emperor, protest themselves to hold their states of the empire, and not of the emperor, albeit that they do their homage betwixt the emperors hands. In brief, all jurisdiction and sovereignty of all appeals in civil causes, above twenty crowns by the ancient laws, and forty by the new, appertain unto the imperial chamber, as to all the appeals of the subjects of the empire: which chamber is composed of twenty four judges, and one prince of the empire, chosen every year, according to the order of the ten provinces or circuits. And if so be that any controversy arise betwixt any of the princes, or the imperial cities themselves; whether it be for their bounds, their lives, their honour or states, the deciding thereof belongeth unto the judges of the imperial court: except it please the whole states of the empire to take unto themselves the hearing and determining of the matter, in such their general assemblies as we have before spoken of. As in the year 1555, it is set down in a decree of the empire, That if from that time forward any province, prince, town, or subject of the empire should bear arms against the Germane nation, he should be judged by the states of the empire; who to that end were appointed to hold a diet at Worms. And in the same diet holden at Ausburg, it was forbidden all the princes of the empire, to raise any army, or to take up arms in the aid of any strange prince, and that upon a great penalty. And that more is, it is expressly and most straightly forbidden by the laws 
* Lib. 2. cap. 28.  of the empire, any prince, town, or corporation, to be so hardy, as to prohibit or let the appeals of the subjects unto the imperial chamber, and that upon great pain also. And in fine, the emperor himself, as head of the assembly of the states, more straightly bindeth them as it were into one body and Commonweal, than if they were but of 
The majesty of the empire not to rest in the emperor but in the whole assembly of the estates of the empire.  themselves only: and yet in him resteth not the majesty of the empire, but in the whole assembly of the states. For other which hold the sovereign power in Commonweals, do themselves create princes, dukes, and earls, whereas the emperor is himself by the other dukes and princes of the empire created. How therefore can he being the self same man be both the sovereign and subject of the empire, lord, and vassal, master, and yet constrained to be obedient unto the estates? And not unto the estates only, but even unto the deputies and lieutenants of the empire? Which unto some may seem right strange, and yet is indeed most true. I truly myself have read the letters of a great lord, pensionary unto the king, directed unto Mommorancie the Connestable, bearing date the twelft of May, in the year 1552: whereby he advertiseth, that Henry the second (than the French king) had just cause to complain unto the duke of Saxony, and the county Palatine, lieutenant for the empire, to have justice against the emperor Charles the fift and his brother Ferdinand king of the Romans, according to the golden bull, and decrees of the states: for that they contrary unto the laws of the empire and customs of their ancestors, having intercepted the king's letters directed unto the estates of the empire, had not suffered the same to be unto them delivered, but also forbidden the archbishop of Mets, chancellor of the empire to receive or present the same unto the states, as his office was. And by the assembly of the imperial diet holden at Heidelberg, in the year 1553, it was decreed, that none of the emperors court should manage any the affairs of the empire; as I have seen by letters from the French ambassador. And as for monies extraordinarily raised by the decree of the estates, for the affairs of the empire, they are not brought into the emperors coffers, but are laid safely up in store in certain cities therefore appointed: viz. Strausbourg, Lubec, and Ausbourg: Neither is it lawful for the emperor to take so much as one penny out of the common treasure, without the consent of the state. All which most plainly show them to be in an error, and much deceived, which call the Germane emperor a Monarch; or which deem that Aristocratical estate to be a right Monarchy. Whereas all to the contrary the emperor Maximilian the first, great grandfather to him which now reigneth (albeit that he was ambitious enough) yet in a discourse which he had with the states of the empire concerning such matter, told them, That he thought it not needful to take the imperial crown at the hands of the Bishop of Rome, neither to stand upon such ceremonies, seeing that the sovereign power, as they knew, rested in the states themselves. Neither is it lawful for the emperor of himself, or at his pleasure to call together a diet of the empire, without some especial and extraordinary urgent cause, neither to dissolve the same: but at the breaking up of every diet, order is there taken for the diet to be holden the year next following. So that it is not lawful for the emperor to rall an assembly of the states, which it was lawful for the Roman magistrates to do, as also for other magistrates in every popular and Aristocratical Commonweal, so that it were done by commanding of every one, as in particular, but not of altogether, as in common: After the ancient manner of the Romans, whereby the Consul might by his edict call together all the Senators, one by one into the Senate, upon pain of proceeding against them, by seizing upon their bodies or goods, by way of imprisonment, taking of pledges or rasing of their houses. And yet for all that the Germane princes are not bound to come unto the diet of the empire, if they be by none commanded, but by the emperor, as they gave Charles the fift the emperor well to understand, in the year 1554: and also Maximilian the second, refusing in the year 1566, to have any diet then according to his request holden. And if it fortune the emperor, or king of the Romans, to come unto the frontiers of their territories, the princes every one of them in their degree go to meet them, but yet in such sort, as if it were but to meet a strange prince.  
Now if one should say that the Emperor beareth himself as a judge, and determiner 
How the emperor determineth the quarrels and controversies betwixt the princes, or the imperial town●… of the empire.  of all quarrels and controversies betwixt the Princes, or the imperial Towns; True it is at the first motion, and when the parties are content to accept thereof, and that also but as Lieutenant for the Empire: as in like case the Duke of Saxony, and the County Palantine might also judge as the Imperial Lieutenants: and yet for all this, appeal made unto the Estates of the Empire suspendeth the power of the Emperor, aswell as of the imperial Lieutenants. Yet might some say, that the Princes of the Empire by their letters, and in the assemblies of the States, use these magnifical titles towards the Emperor, Your sacred Majesty, and such like, which cannot be applied but unto him which is himself a Sovereign: such as slaves would scarce use towards 
Glorious flattering ●…itless given to princes never awhit increase their sover●…ign ti●….  the greatest kings on earth: titles for fashion sake, foolishly or wickedly (should I say) given by flatterers unto men, which are only fitting the most mighty and immortal God. And yet do in deed no more increase the power of the German Emperor, then of the King of the Romans: whom by such like prodigal pomp and words, a man might also think to have the power of sovereign Majesty; so that in that Empire there should be two Sovereigns: and yet for all that one of them subject unto the other. For so George Helfustein Baron of Gondelphfingen, pronouncing the speech of Ferdinand king of the Romans in the general assembly of the States of the Empire in the year 1556, calleth him their Sovereign Lord  
But the greatest argument of Sovereignty is, that the Emperor giveth the fees of 
How the emperor bestowe●… the fees of the empire.  the Empire being voided, unto whom he pleaseth, and investeth in them whom he seethe good: and that without the consent of the States. Whereunto I again answer, that the express consent of the Estates is not necessary, and yet is it not altogether done without their good liking, who nevertheless permit the same; when as they might aswell cut of this point, as they have done the other marks of Sovereignty. And howbeit that the embasadour Marillac was of opinion, that the Emperor had not this power: and therefore advertised king Henry, how that the Emperor Charles the fift had at Brussels in the year 1551, invested Philip of Spain in the Duchy of Milan without the consent of the States of the empire: yet can he not found so much as any one investiture of any Imperial fee, in the conferring whereof the express consent of the Estates was had. But certain it is, that the Emperor bestoweth not these fees or investitures, but as in quality of the Lieutenant of the empire: in such sort as he receiveth the fealty and homage of the princes, for, and in the name of the empire. As in like case Ferdinand the emperor without the consent of the estates of the empire, received Granuellan sent unto him with special charge and deputation from Philip king of Spain in the year 1565, to do for him the fealty and homage due unto the Empire, for the Duchy of Milan, and the perpetual lieutenancy of the principality of Sienna: granting unto him as a vassal of the Empire charters of his fealty done: and for the confirmation of his possession therein. The same is to be thought concerning the confirmations of benefices, and other royal rights, which given by the princes or cities of the empire, or by the Chapters and Colleges of priests themselves, are yet nevertheless to be confirmed by the Imperial authority: according to the agreement made betwixt the Bishop of Rome, and the estates of the Empire. As for letters of safe conduct which he giveth unto ambassadors, heralts at arms, and other strangers, 
The majesty of the German emperor by this French author still impaired  whereunto the ordinary clause is adjoined in these words, Forasmuch as we for our Imperial power may do all things: they show right well that the Emperor was in ancient time a sovereign Monarchy; which he now is not: For why then should the Electors and other princes of the Empire refuse to grant unto the emperor, the diet which he requested of them in the year 1566? or why then should both he and his officers be by them forbidden so much as to touch the monies by them raised for the maintenance of the wars. And to cut it short, we need not but to look into the articles of the oath made by the Emperors (by us before declared) to know yet more evidently, that the sovereignty of the Empire is not any wise in the emperor, albeit that he carry the crown, the sceptre, and wear the other most precious and imperial habits, and in all solemnities and ceremonies hath the precedence before other the Christian kings, yea and that men attribute unto him the title of Most sacred Majesty, all in deed having the show of sovereign and royal majesty, but yet not the thing itself. And yet to say the truth, a man knoweth not how to do him so great honour as the majesty of the sacred empire, whereof he is the head, deserveth. But the manner 
A great policy in Aristocratical estates to give unto him lest power to whom they give most honour.  of well governed Aristocratike states, is to grant unto him the lest power to whom they give the greatest honour: and sometimes also lest honour unto them that be of most power: as of all others the Venetians in the ordering and government of their Commonweal best know how to use that matter. Seeing therefore we have thus showed the Empire to be but an Aristocratical estate, we may well conclude, That there is neither prince nor imperial city which hath therein the sovereignty, being nothing else but members of the empire, every one of them governing their estate under the power, and without any thing derogating from the laws and ordinances of the empire. Wherein many are deceived, which make so many Commonweals as there are princes and imperial towns; the contrary whereof we have before showed. But as in this realm every city and feigniorie have their judges, Consuls, Sheriffs, and other their particular officers which govern their estate; so is it in the Imperial towns and cities: but that here are more royal judges; whereas in the empire there is none but the Imperial chamber only which receiveth the Appeals from the other judges and lieutenants of the empire. And yet nevertheless when it chanceth the empire to be divided into factions, and part take; or that the princes bandy themselves one of them against an other (which hath been too often seen) then every town and prince for the most part bear themselves as divers Aristocratical estates, and particular Monarchies; making of every member a particular body of a sovereign Commonweal.  
Now as the state of the Empire itself is entirely Aristocratique, so also the great imperial towns and cities hold their estates in Aristocratical form: as Ausburg, Nuremberg, Worms, and others, which are almost all Aristocraties; albeit that in truth some of them are more popular than others, as is the city of Strasbourg. But for brevity sake I will for example only set down the state of the city of Nuremberg, 
The estate of Nuremberg Aristocratical.  the greatest, most famous, and best ordered of all the imperial cities, established in form of an aristocraty; wherein of an infinite number of citizens there are but xxviij. ancient families which have power over all the rest of the subjects, which are within the jurisdiction of Nuremberg. Out of these xxviij. families, they every year first make choice of two Censors, men without any imputation; which done, all the rest of the magistrates are every one of them displaced: then these Censors according to their own discretion make choice of xxuj. Senators: who out of themselves choose xiii. persons, for the managing of the secret affairs of that Commonweal: and out of the same Senate also make choice of other xiii. sheriffs also: beside the seven. Bourgmasters, which are an other particular counsel, whose authority and power is much like unto that of the Decemuiri in Venice. And these Magistrates which we have spoke of, are they which manage all the greatest affairs of that Commonwealth. I speak not of the five criminal judges: nor of the twelve appointed for the deciding of civil causes; neither of the Providitor for victuals, the two treasurers: nor of the three masters of the wards: almost of like authority with the procurators of Saint Mark at Venice, to the imitation of whom they of Nuremberg seem in some sort to have been desirous to fashion their Commonweal. And albeit that of the imperial towns some of them be freer than other; as are those which be neither in subjection nor protection of other princes, namely Nuremberg, Strasbourg, Lubec, Hambourg, Breme, Worms, and Spires. Yet so it is, that they all as subjects have a reverent regard unto the majesty of the Germane empire. True it is, that there are many which have exempted themselves from the power of their princes, to maintain themselves in liberty: and now of late to hold of the empire, as the town of Brunswich, which hath withdrawn itself from the obeisance of the princes of Brunswich, Worms and others, which 
Most of the I●…periall cities of Germany go●…uerned in form●… o●… Aristocraties.  have exempted themselves from the power of their ancient lords. As in like case the Swissers and Grisons, now divided Commonweals, but sometimes subjects of the empire. And namely, the lords of the Canton of Fribourg, in the treaty of Combourgeoisie, betwixt them and the lords of Berne, call the town of Fribourg a member of the empire, albeit that they have their state therefrom divided unto themselves in full sovereignty. Some others acknowledge and confess themselves to hold their liberties and privileges, for the government of their estate from the emperor; as they of Vri, underuald, and Schwits, having their letters patents therefore from jews of Bavaria the emperor, bearing date the year 1316. They also of Tietmarsh for the confidence they had reposed in the strength and situation of their country, (placed in the frontiers of the kingdom of Denmark) withdrew themselves from the Germane empire, and established their Commonweal in form of an Aristocrati●…, of eight and forty of the better sort of them, who so long as they live have the sovereignty, and when one of them is dead, still choosing another in his place. True it is, that in the year 1559, Adolph duke of Holst did what he could to have subdued them, pretending that Christiern his great grandfather had of the emperor Fredrick the third obtained the sovereignty over them of Tietmarsh, for having dismembered themselves from the empire; as I have seen by the letters of Master Danzai, ambassador for the king into Denmark.  
Wherhfore it is manifest not only the whole estate of the German empire, but even the imperial cities, themselves also to be governed in manner and form of pure Aristocraties. But here we must have regard in considering of the Aristocratique estate that we confounded not the princes and chief magistrates of a Commonweal with kings: nor a counsel of the nobility with a Senate: wherein Historiographers often times err and go astray, and that specially when as in a Commonweal there are so few of the nobility or better sort to manage the state, as that they are both Senators and magistr at's: which government of few, the Greeks' call an oligarchy. So the Pharsalian estate was governed by twenty of the nobility: the Lacdemonians by thirty, neither were there more in all the cities of the Greeks after the victory of Lysander. They of Thetmarsh were governed by eight and forty; and had no other Senators than the signory itself: the Cnidians by threestore (whom of their integrity of life they called Amymones) but these were but annual magistrates: whereas the other were perpetual. And all be it that the Cnidians never gave any account of that they had done in time of their government, yet were they not therefore sovereign lords, but sovereign magistrates; who their magistracy once expired, were again to restore unto the nobility, the sovereign governments by them committed to their charge. In like case they of Zurich chose every year thirty six magistrates, of whom twelve by course governed four months: which form of government continued unto the year 1330, that the common people enraged and rising up in mutiny cast them out, creating in their stead a Senate of two hundred of the nobility, with a Consul chief amongst them: and all those estates had the counsel of their nobility and Senate all one. Yet do they better and much more surely, which in an aristocraty (how little soever) be it divide the counsel of the nobility from the Senate: as amongst the Rhagusians, where although the number be but small of them that govern that Commonweal, being itself shut up into a small room: yet of them is made a Senate of threescore men, out of whom are selected twelve to manage the secret affairs of their state. Heretofore also the Commonweal of Chio established in form of an aristocraty by certain Genua gentlemen of the house Austinian, having won it from the emperors of Constantinople; every year made choice of twelve counsellors of estate for the Senate: out of whom they chose four, who with one sovereign prince or magistrate governed all the affairs of state: the authority of which four for all that, was but for six months, the sovereign magistrate yet still holding his place for two years: in which manner of government they honourably maintained their estate, until that of late years it was by the Grand signor taken from the Genoese, and so united unto the Turkish empire.  
And thus much concerning the definition of an aristocraty. Now as concerning the profits and dangers incident unto an Aristocratique estate: & the manner of the government thereof, we will in due place declare. It resteth now to answer unto that 
Four sorts of Aristocraties by Aristotle set down.  which Aristotle saith concerning an aristocraty, being altogether contrary unto that which is by us before set down. There are (
* P●…lit lib. 4. Cap. ●….  saith he) four sorts of Aristocraties: The first, where none but the richer sort, and that to a certain revenue, have pan in the government of the signory: The second, where the estates and offices are given by lot unto them which hold most wealth: The third, where the children succeed their fathers, in the government of the signory: And the fourth, when they which take upon them the state, use a lordlike power and command without law. And yet nevertheless in the same book, and a little after, he maketh five sorts of Commonweals, viz. the Regal, the Popular, the government of a few, the government of the nobility▪ and after these a fift kind, composed of the other four: which (as he saith 
* Lib. 4. Cap. 7.  afterwards) is no where to be found. But such a medley of Commonweals we have before not only by probable but even by necessary reasons also, proved to be impossible, and by nature altogether imcompatible: wherefore letting that pass, let us now also show the divers forms of Aristocraties by Aristotle set down, to be no way considerable. First he no where defineth what an aristocraty is: the very cause of his error. For what can be more vain, than to say it to be an aristocraty where the richer or the better sort have only part in the government? 
Aristot. by the author impugned.  For it may be that of ten thousand citizens, six thousand of them having two hundred crowns of yearly revenue, have all part in the signory; and yet nevertheless the state shall be a popular state, considering that the greater part of the citizens have the sovereignty: for otherwise there shall be no popular Commonweal at all. The like might be said for the government of the better sort also, who might chance to be the greater number of the citizens, which should have part in the signory: and yet according to the opinion of Aristotle, it should also be an Aristocratical estate, albe●… it that the greater part of the people bear therein the sway. As for the government of good men, if we shall measure them according to the highest degree and perfection of virtue, we shall not find one such: but if after the common manner, and opinion of the people, so every man will call himself a good man. But to judge of an other 
Hard to judge who is a good man.  man's integrity and virtue, as it is an hard matter for any man to do, so hath it it also unto wisemen always seemed a thing most dangerous: Insomuch that the wise and grave Cato being chosen out for the purpose, durst not give sentence whether Q. Luctacius was a good man or not. But admit that in every Commonweal the good are in number fewer than the bad; & yet have the government of the common state: why for the same reason hath not Aristotle made one sort of Aristocraty, wherein the nobility hold the sovereignty? seeing that they are ever fewer in number then the base & vulgar sort: why also maketh he not an other sort of aristocraty, wherein the most antitient families although but of base degree bore rule? As it chanced in Florence after that the nobility were driven out. For it is right certain that there are many base families, who although they be not famous or much spoken of for any great thing by them or their ancestors done, are yet more ancient and honest than a number of upstart gentlemen, who happily scarce know their own fathers. He might also make an other sort of aristocraty, wherein the tallest and greatest should have the sovereignty as he himself 
* Poli●…. lib. 3. Cap. 5.  saith they do in Ethiopia: and so consequently also an aristocraty of the fairest, of the strongest, of the valiantest, of the wisest, of the learnedst, and of others with such like qualities of the body, or of the mind: as we see to be incident but into the fewer sort: whereof should ensue an infinite multitude and variety of Aristocratique Commonweals. But that seemeth also unto me most strange that he should say the second sort of an Aristocraty, to be where the richer sort by lot have the government and managing of the state, whereas always, elsewhere, he had said lots properly to appertain unto the popular state. Thus the Athenian Commonweal was of all other most popular, he with Xenophon agreeth: and yet for all that the greatest honours, offices, and preferments were not their given, but unto the richest before the time of Pericles. And in Rome which was also a popular state, before the law Canuleia the greatest honours, priesthood, and preferments, were not bestowed upon any of the common vulgar sort of people, but upon the most ancient gentlemen whom they called Patricii: a most certain argument that the Commweale may be●… in state popular, and yet governed Aristocratically: and that there is a notable difference betwixt the state of a Commweale; and the government of the same, as we have before said. As for the fourth sort of Aristocraties, wherein (as Aristotle saith) some few which take upon them the managing of the state, use a Lordlike power and command over all without law, in manner of a tryanny: we have before showed the difference betwixt a Monarchy royal, Lordlike, and tyrannical: the like difference whereof is also in the Aristocratical government: wherein the Lords may govern their subjects as slaves, and dispose of their goods, as may the Lordly Monarch, without law and yet without tiranising also: not unlike the good master of the family, who is always more carful of his slaves, than of his hired Servants: and so also loveth them better. For why it is not the law which maketh the just and rightful government, but the true administration of justice, and equal distribution thereof. And the fairest thing in the world that can be desired in matter of state, (in the judgement of Aristotle himself) 
A wise and ve●…tuous king the greatest ornament and stay of a Commonwe●…  is to have a wise and virtuous king, knowing how to govern his people without law: considering that the law oftentimes serveth many but as a snare to deceive and snarl men in: and is also of itself dumb and inexorable: as the nobility of Rome complained at such time as the people would needs have laws, and be governed by them, after that the kings were driven out, who governed without law & gave judgement according to the diversity of the facts or causes presented before them: which manner of justice the consuls and nobility, who in some measure held the Commonweal in an Aristocratique state continued, until that the people desirous to bring it unto a popularity, requested to be governed by the equality of laws, and not to have their lives, fame, and fortune, to depend of the judgement of the nobility & choice magistrates only: which their request after that it had been, with much a do 6 years debaited, against the Lordlike Aristocratical government of the nobility: they at length at the instance of their Tribune Terentius Arsa caused it to pass in force of a law, that from that time forward the nobility, consuls, and magistrates, should themselves as well as the people, be bound to all such laws, as the Decemviri to that purpose appointed by the people should set down and make. It is not therefore the law which maketh good Princes, or magistrates in a Commonweal, be it a Monarchy or aristocraty; but upright reason and justice, engraven in the minds and souls of just princes and Magistrates; and that much better than in tables of stone. Neither ever were there more cruel tyrants than were they, which bond their subjects with greatest multitude of edicts 
Never worse government than where the greatest multitude of laws w●….  and laws, which ●…he tyrant Caligula of purpose, and to no purpose, caused to be set down in so small letter, as that they could hardly be of any man read, but with Lynceus eyes, to the intent thereby to entangle the more through ignorance transgressing the same: whose successor and uncle Claudius in one day made twenty edicts: and yet for all that there was never greater tryanny than then: neither worse or more villainous men. But as an aristocraty well ordered is of itself a marvelous fair and goodly state: so can there be none worse if it be once corrupted: when as for one tyrant there 
No form of a commonweal worse than a corrupt aristocraty  shall be many: and that especially when the nobility shall bandy itself against the people: as it often times chanceth; and as we read it to have in ancient time fallen out, when as in many Aristocratique estates none was by the nobility admitted into their number for the government of the state; but that they must first swear, to be for ever enemies unto the people, and all popular men: a course not so much tending to the destruction of the commonalty and people, as of the nobility and mighty men themselves: and so to the utter subversion of all Aristocraties, as we shall in due place declare And thus concerning the Aristocratical estate: now let us likewise see what a popular estate is.   

CHAP. VII. ¶ Of a Popular Estate.  
A Popular estate is a form of Commonweal, wherein all or most 
What a popular estate is.  part of the people together commandeth in sovereignty over the rest altogether, and over every one in particular. The principal point of a popular estate is seen in this, that the greater part of the people hath the Sovereign command and power not only over every one in particular, but also over the lesser part of all the people together. As for example in Rome, where there were but five and thirty tribes or companies of the people: eighteen of these companies together, had sovereign power over the other seventeen: and authority to establish laws, whereunto both they and every one of the Citise●…ss in particular were subject and bound, wherefore Tiberius Gracchus the factious Tribune of the people requested Marcus Octavius his companion and fellow of himself to give up his office, before that the eighteen tribes had given their voices for the deposing of him: for withstanding of Tiberius propounding and urging the laws for the division of lands: and for opposing himself against the profit of the people. Also at such time as Lucius Rullus, the busy Tribune by request which he presented unto the people, concerning the division of lands, desired that the commissioners which had that charge, might be chosen by the greater part of the seventeen tribes of the people only: Cicero, than Consul took thereupon occasion amongst the other things to cross the entertainment of his request, and publication of the law, saying: that the Tribune in so doing went about to deceive the other eightteene Tribes, that is to say the greater part of the people of their voices, which the Consul's objection was the less to have been regarded, and the more easily to have by the Tribune been answered, for that his request was, but if it pleased the people (that is to say: the greater part of the 35 Tribes) that the less part of the people (that is to say the seventeen tribes) might appoint the commissioners▪ so that the majesty of the people notwithstanding his request remained still whole and untouched: considering that the lesser part of the people was thereunto to be deputed, but at the will and pleasure of the greater part: to the end that the greater part of the people should not still for every trifling matter be called together. So by the law Domitia it was provided that if by the death of any of the Augurs, Priests or Bishops any benefice fell void, they should assemble but 17 tribes of the people for the nominating of him, whom they would have chosen Bishop: so that he which was by nine of the tribes of the people nominated and allowed, was by the chapter or College of Augurs or bishops to be admitted and received.  
When I say the greater part of the people to have the sovereignty in the popular 
Great difference whether voices▪ be taken by Poll o●… by Tribes & companies, in a popular Commonweal.  estate; that is so to be understood, when the voices are to be taken by Pole as in Venice, in Rhaguse, in Genua, in Luca, and almost all Aristocratique Commonweals: but if the voices be taken by tribes, parrishes, or companies sufficeth it, of them to have the greater part, also albeit that there be in them far the lesser part of citizens, as it hath commonly chanced in ancient popular Commonweals. In Athens the people was divided into ten principal tribes, whereunto in favour of Demetrius, and Antigonus they joined two others, of them called Antigonia and Demetria: and again the people was divided into thirty six classes or companies. But such divisions according to the divers encreasings of the people, and more easy and commodious giving of voices are often time changed. So Romulus at first divided all the people in Rome 
The small number of the people of Rome, and how they were divided in the time of Rom●…lus, and how they were again divided in the time of King Servius▪ with the manner of their giving of voices.  which then was about 3000 into three tribes or parts: and after that every part into ten companies, appointing over every one of them an head: how be it the voices (as Livy saith) were then all given by poll. But by the ordinance of king Servius the people was again divided into six companies, according unto every man's wealth and revenue: in such sort: as that the first company wherein the richest were enrolled, had as much power as all the rest: if the centuries of this first company were all of one accord and mind in giving of their voices, that is to say fourscore centuries, which were but eight thousand persons; for in that case the voices of the other five companies were never asked. But if two or three centuries of the first company were not of the same opinion with the rest: so many centuries of the second company were drawn out as might supply that defect, and that so often in every company, until the number of fourscore companies were filled up. So that in taking voices they seldom came unto the third & fourth company: but most seldom unto the first, and unto the sixt never: in which sixt company was the refuse of the people, and poorest citizens, which according to the view then taken, were in number above threescore thousand: beside the bourgesses and citizens of the five first companies in number sixteen thousand▪ And had this ordinance of king Servius still remained in force after kings were driven 
How the people of Rome wrested unto itself the sovereignty, and how that state of an aristocraty become a Democ●…atie, or a mere popular state.  out, it had not been a popular state but an Aristocratical, for that the lesser part of the people had then therein the sovereignty. But shortly after the expulsion of the kings the common people seeing themselves oppressed by the wealth & power of the greater, revolted thrice from the nobility, and held their state apart: to the intent they might every one of them, as well the poor as the rich, the base as the noble, have their voices alike; neither could they be before quieted, until they had obtained power out of the body of themselves to choose their Tribunes, the maintainers of their liberties: whereof their Tribunitial assemblies began first to be holden. But for as much as the nobility & richer sort dispersed among the tribes, caused the poorer & meaner sort (for the most part their followers▪) to give their voices at their appointment & pleasure; there was a decree made, That from thenceforth the nobility should no more be present at the assemblies of the common people: which was then divided into eighteen tribes, which by little and little in continuance of time took such increase, that they grew to the number of five and thirty tribes: who at length by means of their factious Tribunes got unto themselves the sovereignty of the Commonweal, with power to make all the laws, and choose all the magistrates, except the Consuls, the Praetor, and Censors, which for that they were the greatest magistrates, they were still chosen by the greatest assemblies, that is to say of the nobility and people together, the whole body of the people being (as we said before) divided into tribes or companies. But forasmuch as the enfranchised men, and such as by desert had obtained the liberty of the city, mingled through all the tribes of the people of Rome, in number far exceeded the natural and ancient citizens, and so by multitude of voices, carried all things away from them: which (as we have before said) was by Appius the Censor done, thereby to gratify the vulgar people, and by that means to obtain 
How Fabius by great wisdom overthrew the popular devise of Appius, and so obtained the name of Maximus.  of them what so he would: Fabius Maximus the Censor by great wisdom overthrew all the grace that Appius had by cunning got, by thrusting all the enfranchised men, and such as were of them descended, into four tribes by themselves: so to preserve the ancient and freeborn citizens in the right of their voices. For which only fact by him brought to pass without tumult or sedition, he obtained the name of Maximus, or as we say, the Greatest. Which his order still continued, until that about 300 years after, Servius Sulpitius Tribune of the people, would needs have the enfranchised men again enrolled into the Tribes of their masters by whom they were before manumised or set at liberty: but before this his motion was brought to effect, he was himself slain: which for all that in the time of the civil wars betwixt Marius 
Marius' popular.  and Silla, was by Marius (having seized upon the city) effected: so to make the estate of the Commonweal more popular, and to weaken the authority of the nobility and richer sort. Demosthenes after the victory of Philip king of Macedon at Chaeronea attempted the like at Athens; by presenting a request unto the people, That the enfranchised, and other the inhabitants of Athens, might be enrolled in the number of citizens: which his request was then even openly rejected, albeit that there then were not above 20000 citizens: which was seven thousand more than was in the time of Pericles, when as were found but thirteen thousand citizens enrolled, out of whom 
No commonweal so popular as that all the people gave therein voice, it being sufficient that the greater part of the tribes still carried awe aye the matter.  also 5000 strangers, who had s●…yly crept in for citizens, were sold for slaves: and yet the multitude of the slaves was than ten times more than the number of the citizens.  
This which I have said, may well serve to answer that which might be alleged, That there is not, neither haply ever was any so popular a Commonweal, as wherein the subjects had all voices alike; or if they had, that they could all meet together to make laws, created magistrates, and use the other marks of sovereignty: a good part of them to the contrary being ordinarily still absent, and so the less part making the law▪ But it sufficeth, that the greater part of the tribes carried away the matter, albeit that haply in some one tribe a thousand citizens were in voices equal unto another, wherein there were ten thousand; considering that the prerogative of every man's voice was in this tribe re●…etued unto him. Yet hereby it came to pass, that the more ambitious fort of men oftentimes by bribes or favour corrupted the chief men, and as it were the ringleaders of the tribes, especially at such time as the lesser part of the people was present at the assemblies: Which to meet withal, it was therefore oftentimes provided, that when any law of importance was made, it should in no wise be again repealed, except there were six thousand citizens at the lest present at the assembly, who gave their consent to the revoking thereof; as is oftentimes to be seen in Demosthenes. And the Ostracism (as Plutarch writeth) took no place upon any man, except six thousand citizens at the lest agreed in one therein: which yet was the lesser part of the people. T●…e like whereof is also observed in the laws of the Venetians, being of any great weight or importance; and namely in laws concerning the execution of justice, whereunto this clause is adjoined, That the great Council shall not in any thing deerogate from the law established, except there be at the lest a thousand Venetian gentlemen there present; and that of them, eight hundred all agreed in one and the same opinion, for the repealing of the law. Whereunto the Roman laws, concerning corporations and colleges, seem also to have had regard; where two third parts of the Collegiates, and of them also the most voices must agreed, to give any law or order unto the rest. And in all the assemblies of the Venetians, which have been called together for the government of the signory in our days, there have scarcely at once met together fifteen hundred gentlemen: so that when the law willeth a thousand of them at the lest to be present, the meaning of the law is, that there should two third parts of those which have voices in the state be still present, and of them eight hundred to be all of one opinion for the passing of any matter: which I think to be therefore done, for that eight hundred of them make the greater part of fifteen hundred: a thing requisite, where voices are taken by the Poll, as in Venice, and not by tribes or companies, as they did in Rome and other popular estates, by reason of the infinite multitude of them which had part in the signory. And in Rome, until the law Fusia, (made 693 years after the building of the city) they confounded the voices of the tribes, to the intent it might less be understood which way every tribe had go, so to avoid the displeasure of the citizens among themselves, about the giving of their voices. So at Strasbourg the most popular of the Germane cities, and at Mets, although it came into the power of the French, yet they give their voices by tribes; as the three popular Commonweals also of the Grisons, call the tribes and companies unto their assemblies, for the creating of their magistrates, and making of laws: yet so, as that the greater tribes have the greeter part of the suffrages or voices. True it is, that the cantons of Vri, Schwits, Vnderuald, Zug, Glaris, and Apenzel, which are true Democraties, and hold the more popular liberty, for that they are mountainers, make their assemblies for most part in open places, and there every one of them (being fourteen years old) give their voices for the choosing of the Senate, the Aman, and their other magistrates, which they do by lifting up their hand, after the ancient form of the Athenian 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and manner of other such popular Commonweals, sometimes constraining their neighbours with dry blows to hold up their hand, as they did of old. In like manner the tribes of the Grisons, which are of others most popular, and most popularly governed of any Commonweal that is, make their common assemblies for the choice of their Aman: (which is the sovereign magistrate in every one of their little cantons:) where he which hath been Aman the three years before, standing upright, and excusing himself unto the people, craveth of them pardon for whatsoever he hath done amiss in his office before: then after that he appointeth out three citizens, out of whom the people chose one for their Aman or chief magistrate for the year following: after whom they chose also his lieutenant, who is as it were the chancellor, and thirteen other councillors, of whom four are of the council for the more secret affairs of the state, and after them the Camarlign, or Chamberlain treasurer for the common treasury. But in this there is a notable difference, betwixt the government 
The cantons of the Swissers much ruled by their great men, but the Grisons not so.  of the Grisons, and of the other Cantons of the Swissers: for that he which can give unto his side, two or three of the principal officers, of any one canton of the Swissers, who are ruled by certain great men bearing sway amongst them, may assure himself to have gained the whole canton: whereas the people of the Grisons hold themselves in nothing subject or pliant unto their officers, if the good liking of the whole commons be not gained; as I have seen by the letters of the bishop of Bayonne, ambassador for the French king: and afterward by Master Bellieure ambassador also, and a man of good understanding in matters of state, having the same charge, gave the king to understand, in the month of May 1555, how that the ambassador of Spain had almost caused all the companies of the Grisons to revolt, insomuch that in assembly of the Cade, there were more voices for Spain, than for France. And after that how that they of the Commonalty of Linguedine, having not received the money promised them by the Spaniards, laid hand upon the Spanish pensioners amongst them, and putting them to torture, afterward condemned them in a fine of ten thousand crowns to be by them paid into the common treasure. Wherein the French ambassador so well bore himself, that notwithstanding the Spanish practice, they within two months after, together with the rest of the cantons of the Swissers sent 27 ambassadors into France, to renew and confirm their former alliances.  
These examples of popular cities we have set down, that thereby the force and nature of popular states and Commonweals might the better be understood: Wherhfore let us then conclude; That to be a popular State or Commonweal wherein the greater part of the people have the sovereignty; whether their voices be given by 
Aristotle his opinion concerning an Aristocratical or popular Commonweal.  poll, by tribes, companies, parishes, or communities. And yet Aristotle writeth unto the contrary: We must not saith he, according to the common opinion judge the estate popular, where the greater part of the people have the sovereignty: And afterward for example bringeth forth xiii. hundred citizens in a city, of whom a thousand of the better & richer sort have the sovereignty, excluding the rest: we aught not saith he to deem this a popular state; no more than that to be an aristocraty, wherein the lesser part of the citizens have the sovereignty, being men of the poorer sort. And after that he concludeth thus: The popular estate is wherein the poorer sort of the citizens have the sovereignty; and an aristocraty where the richer sort bear the rule, whether they be more or fewer in the one or in the other much concerneth not. And by this means Aristotle to establish his own, rejecteth the common opinion of all people: yea even of the Philosophers and lawgivers themselves: which common received opinion hath always been, is, and shall be mistress in matters of state. And yet he had neither true nor probable reason to departed from the common opinion: whereas thereof ensueth a thousand intolerable and inevitable absurdities. For so we might say that the faction of the Decemuiri or ten commissioners, appointed for the correcting and amending of the evil laws and customs of Rome, taking upon them the sovereignty, was a popular estate; albeit that all histories call it an oligarchy, although they in that bareness of the Commonwealth were not chosen for their wealth, but for their wisdom only. And to the contrary, when the people for the maintenance of their popular estate had driven them out, a man might say that the state was then changed into an aristocraty. So should we also say, if twelve thousand of the richer sort had the sovereignty, and but five hundred of the poorer sort were excluded, that that state were an aristocraty. And again to the contrary, if there were but five hundred poor gentlemen, which had the government over the rest of the richer sort, one should call such a Commonweal a popular state. For so saith Aristotle, calling the Commonweals of Appollonia, Thera, and Colophon popular states, wherein a few ancient very poor families had the sovereignty over the rich. Yea he passeth on further and saith, that if the greater part of the people having the sovereignty, give 
To judge of an estate we are not to consider who have the magistracies or offices but who they be in whom the sovereignty resteth.  the great offices and honours of their state unto the fairest or tallest of their citizens, it shall no more be a popular, but an Aristocratique estate: which is an other foul error in matter of state, considering that to judge of an estate, the question is not to know who have the magistracies or offices: but only who they be which have the sovereignty and power to place and displace the magistrates and officers, and to give laws unto every man.  
And these absurdities, and others also much greater than they, ensue hereof, in that 
That the state of a commonweal may be of one sort, and yet the government thereof of another and that quite contrary.  Aristotle hath mistaken the manner and form of the government of a Commonweal, for the sovereign state thereof. For as we have before said, the state may be a pure royal Monarchy, and yet the government there of popular: as namely if the prince give honours, offices, and preferments therein to the poor, aswell as to the rich: to the base aswell as to the noble, and so indifferently to all without respect or accepting of person. As also it may be that the state be royal, and yet the government aristocratical: as if the prince give the honours and offices to a few of the nobility, or to a few of the richer sort only, or some few of his favourits. And to the contrary, if the people having the sovereignty, give the most honourable offices, rewards, and preferments unto the nobility only, as they did in Rome, until the law Canuleia, the estate should be in deed popular, and yet the government Aristocratique. So if the nobility, or a few of the better sort should have the sovereignty, and yet bestow the most honourable charges and preferments upon the poorer and base sort, aswell as upon the rich, without favour or respect of persons: the state should be Aristocratique, and yet popularly governed. But if all or the greatest part of the people having the sovereignty, shall give the honourable offices and preferments indifferently to all, without respect of person, or by lot bestow the same upon all the citizens: a man might well judge that estate not only popular, but also to be most popularly governed. As was done at Athens at the request and motion of Aristides the just, whereby all the citizens were received into all the offices of the Commonweal, without respect of their wealth, contrary to the law of Solon, whereby it was provided, that in bestowing of honours and places of authority and command, regard also be had unto men's ability and wealth. So likewise if the nobility only, or some few of the richer sort should have the sovereignty in the state, and so exclude all the rest of the people from the honourable places and preferments in the Commonweal, so to keep them to themselves alone: one might say that estate not to be aristocratike only, but also aristocratically governed; as we may see in the state of Venice. But here happily some man will say, that none but myself is of this opinion, and that not one of the ancient, and much less of the modern writers which entreat of matters of state or Commonweals, have once touched this point. True it is that I cannot deny the same; yet this distinction nevertheless seemeth unto me more than necessary, for the good understanding of the state of every commonweal; if a man will not cast himself head long into an infinite labyrinth of errors, where into we see Aristotle himself to have fallen: mistaking the popular Commonweal for the Aristocratique: and so contrary wise, contrary to the common received opinion, yea and contrary to common sense also: For these principles evil grounded, nothing that is firm and sure can possibly be thereon built. From this error likewise is sprung the opinion of them which have forged a form of a Commonweal mingled of all three, which we have for good reasons before rejected.  
Wherhfore let us firmly set down and resolve that there are but three forms of 
That the state of a Commonweal may be of one sort and the government of an other, without confusion of the states.  Commonweals, and no more, and those simple also, and without any confused mixture one of them with an other; albeit that the government be sometimes contrary to the state: As a Monarchy is contrary to a Democraty or popular estate; and yet nevertheless the sovereignty may be in one only prince, who may popularly govern his estate, as I have before said: and yet it shall not be for that a confusion of the popular estate with a Monarchy, which are states of themselves incompatible, but is well (as it were) a combyning of a Monarchy with a popular government, the most assured Monarchy that is. The like we may deem of the Aristocratique estate, and of the popular government: which is by far more firm and sure, then if the estate and government were both Aristocratique: the state standing almost inviolable, when as the subjects by such a moderate kind of government are amongst themselves combined, as also unto the Commonweal. And albeit that the government of a Commonweal may be more or less popular, aristocratique, or royal, (as of tyrannies, some may be more cruel than others,) yet so it is that the state in itself receiveth no comparison of more or less. For the sovereignty is always indivisible and incommunicable in one 
Sovereignty always by nature of itself indivisible.  alone, or in the less part of all the people, or in the greater part thereof; which are the three sorts of Commonweals by us set down. And as for that which we have said, that the government may be more or less popular, may be deemed so to be, by the Commonweals of the Swissers, where the mountain Cantons of Vri, Schwits, Vnderuald, Zug, Glaris, and Apensel are so popular, as that the sovereignty of the Commonweal 
The popularity of the mountain 〈◊〉.  resteth only in them all, so that they be fourteen years old, in somuch that their chief magistracies & places of greatest command are sometime given even to very Saddlers, and such other mechanical men: neither of the aforesaid Cantons is any one of them walled except Zug. The other new Cantons and Geneva, are less popular, governing thrmselues by certain lords, which they call the Council, as I have learned by Master Basse-fountaine Bishop of Lymoges, who long and discreetly without blame, as any one ambassador, hath to his great honour managed this charge. And albeit that the Bernoys and they of Zurich compose their Senate of divers handy crafts men, yet they use commonly to create their Auoyers (or chief magistrates) of their most noble and ancient families: whereby they are less subject unto seditions and tumults: whereas the lords of the three Cantons of the Grisons being more popular, are also more subject unto seditions and stirs, the people in their assemblies being hard to be governed; and once moved, hard to be pleased; as the ambassadors of princes have always by experience found. For the true nature of the 
The true nature of the people.  people is, to desire liberty without restraint of bit or bridle whatsoever: and to have all men equal in wealth, in honour, in pains, and rewards; without regard of nobility, wisdom, or virtue: and as Plutarch saith wisely to have all cast into lot, and even balance, without respect or favour of any man, then if any valiant or honourable minded of the nobility or richer sort shall by any means attempt to restrain the people so intemperately abusing their liberty; them strait ways they do what they can to kill or to banish, and confiscating their goods, divided the same among the poorer sort, and that the rather, if they be rich, or seem to aspire: Yea often times it happeneth, that the common people puffed up with the punishment or slaughter of some one mighty man, violently breaketh out upon the rest, and that especially if it be once come to arms, 
The beginning▪ of the popular estate of the Swissars.  and that the nobility be by the force of the people overthrown. As it happened at the establishing of the popular estate of the Swissars, after the battle of Sempach, where almost all the nobility was slain, and the rest which were left constrained to renounce their nobility; and yet nevertheless were excluded from all honours and offices of charge in the Commonweal, except at Zurich and Berne (which is in them the less to be marveled at, for that the nobility there, with great safety and without force of arms, made their peace with the victorious common people, now before quite spent 
The ancient Grecians and Italians in their popular liberty more insolent than were the Swissars.  with civil wars.) Yet for all this insolency, did the Swissers more moderately use their popular liberty, than did in ancient time the Grecians or Italians, who oftentimes would needs have all bonds and obligations burnt or canceled: yea sometime the common people set on by such as were far indebted, ran upon the creditors and rich men, rob their houses, and enforced them to make an equal division of their possessions and lands, forbidding them the having or possessing of cattle or lands, above a certain number or rate by them set down: from which kind of dealing the Swissers have always abhorred. And albeit that the public pensions of princes, and gifts of strangers, in some of the Swissers cities, are not laid up in the common treasure, but divided among the people in particular; in the division whereof he that hath most male children hath also a greater part than the rest: yet for all that, when as they of the canton of Glaris requested of Morlet, the French kings ambassador, in the year 1550, That the private and extraordinary pensions, which the greater men yearly received of the king, might together with the public pension be equally divided amongst them all: King Henry denied so to do, and said, He would rather restrain his bounty, than suffer his private liberality to be so at their pleasure confounded with the common. Yea that worse is, the insolent liberty of the ancient Greek popular Commonweals, proceeded to that liberty (should I say) or rather lewd madness, as to banish them that were more wise and discreet than the rest for the managing of their affairs, as they did Damon, master to Pericles: and not only wise and discreet, but even the most just and virtuous also; as was Aristides in Athens, & Hermodorus at Ephesus: which what thing is it else, than to go about to pluck up virtue itself by the root? But they were afraid lest so great brightness of virtue in one great citizen or 
Why in popular commonweals they oftentimes banished the most wise and virtuous men.  subject▪ should so dazzle the eyes and minds of the rest of the common people, that forgetting their liberty, they should choose rather to live in subjection unto so wise and virtuous a man, than to rule themselves. Which thing they the more feared, if unto his virtues and good parts were joined nobility, or power, or experience in great matters; who with force joined thereunto, might from the citizens either with their will, or against their will, extort their liberty. Whereas the nobility and better sort, to the contrary make no account or reckoning of the popular state: but think it good reason, that he which hath the most nobility, wealth, virtue, or knowledge, should be also the more esteemed, respected and honoured; and that the honourable charges in the Commonweal, should of right be due unto such men: and therefore always desire and seek to have themselves always divided and separated from the dregs and rascal 
The inequality of the nobility and of the vulgar or common-people, not possible to be brought to any good conformity in one and the same state.  sort of the common people. Sigh therefore the princes and nobility so much differ from the common and base people, it is a thing impossible by any means to make them together equal: or being made in honours and command, even to reconcile them among themselves, together with the Commonweal: and so (as they say) with one and the same brewing to moderate two so contrary humours. Albeit that Solon vaunted, that if he had power to make laws, he would make them such as should be most indifferent, both for the rich and the poor, the nobility and the base: which the nobility thought Solon to mean of the equality in Geometrical proportion; and the people of the proportion Arithmetical: whereby it came to pass, that both the states yielding unto him, gave him power for the making of them laws, and establishing of their Commonweal. But these things, as also what commodities or inconveniences attempted upon every Commonweal, shall in their due places be more at large declared: sufficeth it now with what brevity well might be, to have set down the descriptions and kinds of all Commonweals, as also what is to every one of them proper, strange, or common with others: and also who in every Commonweal hath the power of Sovereign majesty. Now let us prosecute every part and limb, as it were, of a Commonweal, which are tied unto the sovereignty of the state, as members unto the head; viz. the Senate, the magistrates, the officers, colleges, and corporation▪ and that in such order as we have here rehearsed them.   
Finis Lib. Secundi.   

THE THIRD BOOK OF OR CONCERNING A COMMONWEAL.  

CHAP. I ¶ Of a Senate, or Council of Estate, and the power thereof.  
A Senate is a lawful assembly of Councillors of Estate, to 
The definitio●… of a Senat.  give advise to them which have the sovereignty in every Commonweal. For so order requireth, that having before spoken of them which have the power of sovereign majesty, and of the marks thereof, and also touched the diversity of Commonweals: We should now also speak of the Senate, as of the chief and principal part of a Commonweal, next unto the prince. Not for that a Commonweal cannot altogether be without a Senate or Council: for a prince may be so wise and discreet, as that he cannot found better council than his own: or else having not whom to trust, taketh advice neither of his own people nor of strangers; 
That a wise prince needeth not always to be advised by his counsel. The wonderful secrecy of julius Caesar in all his affairs.  but of himself alone, as we read of Antigonus king of Asia, and of jews the eleventh the French king; whom the emperor Charles the fift doubted not in that to imitat: as also of Caius julius Caesar among the Romans; who never spoke any thing unto others, of the enterprises he had in hand: nor of his journeys, not not so much as of the day of battle; and yet performed great matters, albeit that he were beset with many great and right puissant enemies: and was therefore the more redoubted, for that his designs were so close and covert, as that they were still executed before they enemy could perceive them: who still was by that mean overtaken, and ere he were ware surprised. Besides that, the captains and soldiers reposing themselves in the wisdom of such a prince or general, were always in expectation, priest, and ready even in a moment, to perform whatsoever he should command, but with the holding up of his hand. Not otherwise than the members of a body well composed are always ready to receive & put into execution whatsoever reason shall command them, although they be no whit partakers of the council thereof.  
Now many have (and that in mine opinion) without cause doubted, Whether it were better for the Commonweal to have a most wise and virtuous prince to govern the same without council; or a dull and unfit man of himself for government, but well provided of a grave and wise council? And truly unto the wise neither the one nor the other seemeth any thing worth. But if the prince be so wise as they suppose, as that he greatly needeth not of council: yet the greatest point for his advantage ●…n matters of any consequence is, to keep his designs and resolutions secret, which once 
Secrecy in a prince most needful.  laid open and so made known, serve no more but as mine's discovered; causing oft-times the ruin and decay of most famous cities and states. And therefore the wisest princes have still used to speak and talk most of such things as they meant lest. And as for an heavy headed and foolish prince, how should he be well provided of a grave and wise council, sith that the choice thereof dependeth of his own will? and that in a prince there is no greater sign of wisdom, than to know well how to make choice of wise men, whose council he may use and follow.  
But forasmuch as the brightness and beauty of wisdom is so rare amongst men, 
Whether it be less dangerous unto a Commonweal to have a good prince assisted with 〈◊〉 counsel, or an evil prince directed by good counsel.  and that we must with all obedience reverence such princes as it shall please God to sand us; the fairest wish that they can make is, That they may have a grave and wise council. For it is not by much so dangerous to have an evil prince and a good council, as it is to have a good prince misled by evil councillors; as said the emperor Alexander. Wherhfore we say, that a prince aught to follow the good advise and council of his grave and wise councillors, not only in his more great and weighty affairs, but even in his mean and lest matters also (albeit that in truth nothing can be mean or little, which concerneth the Commonweal) For there is nothing that 
The great benefit that a prince hath by following the good advise of his wise counsel, and the dangers to him ensuing by the rejecting thereof:  giveth greater credit and authority unto the laws and commandments of a prince, a people, or state, or in any manner of Commonweal, than to 'cause them to pass by the advise of a grave and wise Senate or Council: and the rather, if it be doubtful whether it be profitable or not, which the prince or state would have done. And that of all others, Charles' the fift the French king, was wont best to do: For having a purpose to drive out of his kingdom the Englishmen, who in fealty held all the castles and towns in Aquitaine; and now provided of all things, which he thought needful for the doing thereof, he received the complaints of the Frenchmen of Aquitaine (the king of England his subjects) against the English governors, directly contrary unto the treaty of Bretignie: who for such appeals and complaints unto the king, had used them evil. Upon which occasion, whether of purpose sought for, or by chance offered, the king took hold: but yet would not undertake the war, without the council and good liking of the nobility and people, whose help he was to use therein. Wherefore he commanded them all to be assembled unto the parliament of Paris, pretending that he had sent for them to have their advise, and by their wisdom to amend what had by himself not altogether so wisely been done or considered of. Which war by that council decreed, prospered in his hand, and took good success. But when the subjects see things done either without council, or contrary to the will and decrees of the Senate or council, than they contemn them and set them at nought; or else fearfully and negligently do the commands of their princes and magistrates: of which contempt of laws and magistrates, ensue the seditious and slanderous speeches of the people; and so at length most dangerous rebellion, or else open conspiracy against the prince, drawing after it the utter subversion of all estates. And so Hiero king of Sicily was together with all his kindred and friends most cruelly slain, for that he so proudly and insolently contemned the Senate, nor in any thing asked the advise thereof; by the advise whereof (his grandfather having invaded the sovereignty) had before governed the state fifty years and more. The same error committed Caesar, not only in the time that he was Consul, but in his dictatorship also, never using the advise or council of the Senate: The principal occasion that was taken for the kill of him, being for that he vouchsafed not to rise unto the whole body of the Senate (consisting of about a thousand Senators) coming at once unto him; too arrogantly and indeed too foolishly done; not that Caesar was by nature or disposition so proud, but for that when he would have risen up unto the Senate, he was by Cornelius Balbus (his flattering claw-back, and a man of all other most inward with him) persuaded not so to do. For which selfsame cause, also the Romans had long before slain their first king and founder of their city, and driven out their last king the proud Tarquin: for that both of them contemning the Senate, did all things on their own heads and the latter of them seeking also quite to suppress the Senate, by putting of the Senators to death: which thing was not dangerous only unto those princes which we have now spoken of, but also unto jews the eleventh the French king, who in nothing asked the advice of his Counsel, but had thereby (as he afterward confessed) brought himself within an inch of his utter ruin: for which cause, he would not that his son Charles the eight, should understand any more but three words of Latin (and those, such as are razed out of the history of Philip Comines,) to the end that mistrusting of his own wisdom, he should rest himself upon the grave counsel of others, and so by their advice to manage his affairs rather than by his own. For it is right 
Great learning in a prince sometime dangerous.  certain, that great learning in princes is often times a thing no less dangerous than a knife in a madman's hand, except he be by nature well given, and more virtuously instructed and brought up. Neither is there any thing more to be feared, than great learning accompanied with injustice, and armed with power. There was never yet prince less learned (except in deeds of arms) than Traian, neither any of greater knowledge than Nero; and yet for all that, this man had never his peer for cruelty, nor the other for bounty: the one of them deadly hating the Senate, and the other in all things following the advice thereof. Seeing therefore that a Senate is a thing so profitable in a Monarchy, and so necessary in all Popular and Aristocratical estates, as is in man wit and reason, without which his body cannot long govern itself, or have at all any being: let us first speak of the qualities requisite in Senators or Counsellors; then what number they aught to be, and whether there aught in a Commonweal to be more Counsels than one, and of what things they are to counsel of: and last of all, what power is to be given unto the Senate or Counsel in a Commonweal.  
First we said the Senate to be a lawful assembly: which is to be understood of the 
Senators from whom they have their lawful power.  power which is given them by the prince, or sovereignty in other states, to assemble themselves in time and place to them appointed. As for the time and place when and where they are to meet, it is not much material, sith that the divers occasions and opportunities of occurrents do often times of themselves require, and as it were point out the same. Yet is the decree of Lycurgus in the mean time to be commended, forbidding any portraitures or pictures to be in the place where the Senate should consult, for that the object of such things as we behold, often times distracted the fantasy, and transport reason else where, which aught wholly to be intentive unto that which then is to be consulted of. We said moreover in the definition of a Senate, That they should be Counsellors for the estate: to put a difference betwixt them and other counsellors and magistrates of the Commonweal, who are oftentimes called to give their advise unto the counsellors of estate, yea and unto the prince himself, every one according to his quality and vocation; and yet are not for all that counsellors for the estate, but only upon occasion men extraordinarily called. And as for the name and title of Senator, it signifieth a man well strucken in years: as also the Greeks call the Senate 
Whereof a Senator took name: and that a Senate aught to consist of men well strucken in years.  〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, which showeth well that the Greeks and Latins composed their Senates of seniors or aged men, whom our country men call Signior, for the authority, reverence, and dignity, which hath always been given unto the ancients, as unto the wiser sort, and men of greatest experience: upon that hope and opinion that they which were elder than the rest, should also in wisdom exceed the rest. For so it is provided for, in the laws of Charles the great; Nulli per sacramentum fidelitas permittatur, nisi nobis & unicuique proprio seniori: Let credit be given to no man upon his oath, but unto us and every proper elder: whereby he meant the manumised men's patrons, rather than the Senators; as if honour and reverence were due rather unto the elder, than the younger. Also by the custom of the Athenians, when the people were assembled to give their advice, the usher with a loud voice called all them that were fifty years old together, to consult of that which should be good and profitable for the Commonweal. And not only the Greeks and Latins have given this prerogative unto the aged, to give counsel unto the Commonweal, but also the Egyptians, Persians', and hebrews, who taught other people well and wisely to govern their estates. And what more divine order would we have than that of God? who when he would establish a counsel unto the Israelits his people▪ 
Deut. Cap. 1.  Assemble unto me (saith he) seventy of the most ancient of the people, wise men, and fearing God. For albeit that a man might found a number of discreet, wise, and virtuous young men, experimented also in the affairs of the Commonweal (a thing for all that right difficult,) yet so it is that it should yet be a thing right perilous to compose of them a Senate (which were rather to be called an assembly of young men) for that their counsel should not be received, either of the young or of the old: for that they of like age would esteem themselves as wise as they, and the other themselves much wiser than such young counsellors. And in matters of state (if in any thing in the world) opinion hath no less, yea and oftentimes more force than the truth itself. The common people thinketh, and that right well, young men never, or else right seldom to excel in wisdom: but they which are such, can neither govern the people, nor chastise the offenders, or in the open assemblies of the people persuade them unto that which is good and profitable. Neither is there any thing in a Commonweal more dangerous, than the subjects to have an evil opinion of the Counsel or magistrates which command over them: for then how shall they obey them? and if they obey them not, what issue is 
Youngmen by Solon forbidden to be admitted into the Senate, seemed they never ●…o wise.  thereof to be expected. And therefore Solon forbade any young man to be admitted into the Senate seemed he never so wise; which the Grecians in their own language have better set down than the Latins▪ 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. And Lycurgus before him, had composed his Senate of the elder sort. And not without cause have the laws given the prerogative of honour, privileges, and dignities unto the Elders; for the presumption we aught to have that they are wiser, of better understanding, of more experience, and fit to give counsel than the younger sort. Yet for all that, is not that granted to all old men: no not to them which having before excelled in virtue and wisdom, are now grown so old and decrepit, as that their natural forces fail them, and their brains weakened, can no longer do their duty, but are now as men destitute of wit and judgement, unable longer to use the instruments by nature given them to reason with, so that in them their very mind seemeth to be with age both weak and sick; whom Plato himself, who appointed the Elders to be keepers of his commonweal, hath excused from any longer bearing of charges in the Commonweal, or for any more giving of counsel. It is also said in the holy Scripture, That God having chosen seventy Elders, powered upon them abundance of wisdom: for which cause the Hebrews call their Senators, the Sages, or wise men. And Cicero elegantly (as he doth all things) calleth the Senate the soul, the reason, and understanding, of a 
The Senate the soul of the commonweal.  Commonweal; meaning thereby to conclude, that a Commonweal can no more maintain itself without a Senate, than the body can itself without a soul, or a man himself without reason: and that Senators should by long experience and practice be able and ready, to hear, consider, and resolve of the greatest affairs of the Common weal. For whatsoever things are notably done in war, or peace, in making of laws, in appointing the orders and degrees of the subjects, in reforming the manners and conditions of the people; and in brief in the whole disposing of the Common weal, are all nothing else but the execution of such things as are by a wise counsel devised and resolved upon: which the Greeks for that cause called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, 
Politic wisdom ever to be joined with fait●… and justice.  as if nothing could be more sacred than good counsel, and the Hebrews 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, as who should say, the most sure foundation of all things, whereupon all fair and commendable actions are built, and without which all things fall, and are turned upside down. When I say a wise counsel, my meaning is that politic wisdom should be ever joined with faith and justice: for it is no less, and I know not whether more dangerous, to have a Senate or Counsel consisting of evil and wicked men, how wise and expert soever they be; than of the ignorant and foolish: for that these as they cannot much profit, so can they not much hurt the Commonweal; whereas the other by their mischievous counsel to revenge themselves, make no question or doubt to endanger or overthrow the whole state of the Commonweal, so that they only may stand safe in the midst of the ruins thereof, yea and many times contrary to their own conscience, stick not most earnestly to cross their adversaries opinions▪ although most profitable to the Commonweal, turning their private hatred unto the common destruction? albeit that they reap no other profit thereby, than the triumph which they accounted themselves to have gotten of the shame of them, whom they have in counsel vanquished, drawing them of their own faction as it were in a string after them.  
another sort of Senators there are also which are led neither with envy, hatred, 
A Senator to 〈◊〉 too much conceited of his own opinion, a thing unto the Commonweal dangerous.  nor love of any man, but with an obstinate conceit and love of their own opinions, from which they will not by any reason or persuasion suffer themselves to be removed, and therefore come into the Senate armed with such a force and multitude of arguments, as if they were even there to combat with their enemies; lest that they should seem to have erred in their discourses, or lightly to have changed their opinions. And that worse is, such strong conceited men, accounted it a great shame to them, to agreed with any other man in opinion; but think themselves to have most bravely acquitted themselves, if as when men drive but one nail with another, they also shall obtrude one opinion to another: than which I cannot tell whether any thing can be worse, being a thing no less to be shunned, than a rock in the deep sea But as a wise master in a wrought sea, if he cannot by reason of the tempest in safety put his ship into the desired port, yieldeth then unto the wind, and taketh in all his sails, jest otherwise carried away by force of tempest he suffer shipwreck: and so trieth it out, until the sea be again calmed, and more favourable winds arise: Even so the irremovable resolution of a Councillor, in consultations of matters of state, was never of wise men commended; but always deemed as a thing joined not only with a certain obstinacy, but also arrogancy of mind: Whereas to the contrary, sometimes to change a man's opinion, is not only commendable, but also wholesome and profitable unto the Commonweal: and according to the new occurrents of time, to apply also the devices of new counsels: sometime with the agreeing voices, approving the opinion even of the more ignorant and simple sort. And therefore Sir Thomas Moor in the Utopian Commonweal by him devised, wisely set down, That nothing should be disputed or reasoned upon, the same day it was propounded, but to be still reserved unto the next assembly of the Senate▪ to the end, that he which had rashly and unadvisedly delivered his opinion, should not afterward enforce himself to maintain the same, rather than to yield to reason.  
Wherhfore it beseemeth a wise Senator, even in the entrance of the Senate, to lay 
The duty of a wise Senator.  down all favour towards his friends, all hatred towards his enemies, and all high conceit of himself; aiming at no other end, but to the advancement of the glory of God, and the welfare of the Commonweal. Wherein the manner of the Lacedæmonians was to be commended, who were so ready to defend whatsoever was once decreed for the good of the Commonweal, as that they which had before impugned the same, would now so conform themselves for the establishing thereof, as that they would themselves refel what they had before to the contrary commended: and all because it was not lawful for them to dispute of the laws once established by the Senate: which manner of custom the Achaeans and Florentine Commonweals, afterwards borrowed from the Lacedæmonians. And albeit that learning be always necessary 
Learning necessary for a Senator, but upright integrity more.  for a Senate or Councillor, especially the knowledge of antiquity, and of the estates of Commonweals: as also to be seen in the laws of his own country, which he aught not to be altogether ignorant of, yet is a sound judgement joined with faith justice, and integrity more necessary: by means whereof he may easily persuade any thing without much eloquence. But above all things a Senator must beware that he 
That a Councillor of estate aught not to be pensionar to another prince.  suffer not himself to be corrupted with the bounty of foreign princes: neither be beholden to any foreign lord or prince, for any thing that he holdeth of him, whether it be by fealty and homage, by mutual obligation, or by pension, which he receiveth: which although it be a thing most dangerous in a Commonweal, and aught therefore to be capital: yet for all that there is nothing than that more common in the Council of princes. Except in the city of Venice, which hath a Senate so free from this kind of base corruption, as that even for that cause their priests (be they never so free or nobly borne) out from coming into the Council of state; for that they are thought to be sworn to do nothing against the commodity or profit of the bishop of Rome. Whereupon it is, that commonly the citizens before the giving of their voices, cry out aloud 
Out of doors with the priests.  For a i Preti. And namely they banished Hermolaus Barbarus their ambassador unto the pope; as they did not long ago cardinal Mule, their ambassador unto him also, for that they had of him received the cardinals hat, without leave from the signory. But I found, that in this realm there have been thirty five chancellors, which have been cardinals or bishop at lest: and so in England the like. And in Polonia, where the archbishop of Gnesne is by inheritance always chancellor of the realm: the kings of that country have been glad to make a lay man their vicechauncellor, by no oath bound unto the bishop of Rome. As for pensions given by strangers unto the minions or ambassadors of other princes, it is a thing so ordinary, as that it is grown into a very custom. Yea Mounsier Cotignac the French ambassador into Turkey, was so bold as to presume to marry a Greek gentlewoman, without making of the king at all acquainted therewith. And not long after, another also at the instigation of Mhemet Bassa, and the duke of Naxo, would likewise have married the prince of Valachia his sister: which poor prince for refusing to give his consent thereunto, which he for fear had before granted, was by the Bassa thrust out of his estate, and Stephen Bathor (who now governeth the kingdom of Polonia) placed in his stead. All which, with other such like enterprises, are dangerous in an estate, and therefore in a well ordered Commonweal, in no wise to be suffered. And these unto me seem to be the chief qualities and ornaments of a good councillor of Estate.  
But beside these, in many Commonweals nobility of birth is always in a Senator required; as at Venice, Rhaguse, and Nuremberg: and amongst the Polonians it was by Sigismundus Augustus, in the year 1550 by law provided, That no man should 
Nobility of birth and also wealth to be in a Senator required.  be chosen a Senator, except he were nobly descended, by the father's side at lest, & had also borne arms. In other places choice was made of them by their wealth, as at Genes, and in ancient time in Atheus by the laws of Solon: and so almost in all other ancient Commonweals. And namely Augustus the emperor, would not that a Roman Senator of his time should be less worth than thirty thousand crowns, supplying of his own bounty what the wise Senators being poorer wanted: not that it was so necessary unto their Council, but that so they might have wherewith to maintain their estate, answerable unto their calling: as also lest the rest proud of their wealth, should contemn the other which were poorer, as commonly it falleth out in the Aristocratique estate, where the Senator is chosen by his wealth. And by the ancient order of the Romans also, no man could be made a Senator, except he had before borne some honourable place or charge in the Commonweal. And therefore the Censors from five years to five years, registered in the roll of the Senate, all them which had borne any great or honourable office or place in the Commonweal; viz. such as had been Consuls, Praetors, Aediles, or at lest Quaestors. And for that in the overthrow of Marius 90 Senators were slain; Sylla created Dictator, to supply the order of the Senators, which he favoured, created twenty Quaestors, and Caesar forty, who at the same time should be made Senators, with power also to give voices, which before was not lawful, until they had by the Censors been nominated and registered. Which indeed is a laudable custom, and in many well ordered Commonweals at this present observed. As in Polonia none is received to be a Senator, which is not a Palatine, a Bishop, a Castellan, or Captain; or else before hath been employed in some honourable embassage, or been general of an army. Neither hath any man place in the Great Turks Divano or Council, but the four Visier Bassanes, the two Cadilisquiers or chancellors, and the twelve Beglerbegs, governors of great provinces.  
But whereas we have before said, that Senators are to be chosen out of such as have before borne some honourable place or office in the Commonweal: that concerneth not them which shamefully buy their offices, neither the Commonweal wherein honours and offices are bought for money: for those virtues which we said to be required in a Senator; namely justice, faith, integrity, wisdom, experience, and knowledge in the laws both of God and man, are things so sacred and divine, as that they cannot for any reward or money be bought. Now that a Senator should by the Senate be examined or tried, is a new and unwonted thing: as men whom either the Censors, or the other offices and honours by them before obtained, had sufficiently already tried. Yet in the time of the Goths, the Commonweal being by them changed, we read it to have been done: For so ●…aith Theodoricus, with Cassiodore, Admittendos in Senatum examinare cogit solicitus honour Senatus, The careful care we have of the honour of the Senate, causeth us to examine such as are to be admitted into the Senat.  
As for the number of Senators it cannot be great, considering the perfection requisite 
The number of Senators commonly ●…oe in an Aristocratique or popular Com monweale, than in a Monarchy.  in a counsellor of estate. True it is, that in popular and aristocratique Commonweals, to avoid seditions, and to feed the enraged famine of the ambitious, which have part in the sovereignty: they are often times enforced to augment the number of the Senators; as in Athens by Solon's law, they by lot every year made choice of four hundred Senators; whereunto it pleased them afterwards to add another hundred, that so fifty might by lot yearly be drawn out of every one of the ten tribes: unto whom they joined also another hundred, to make up the full number of 600. After that they had unto the ten tribes joined two others, namely the tribes of Antigonus and Demetrius, albeit that in the time of Pericles, there were not in the city above 13 thousand citizens, and 20 thousand in the time of Demonsthenes. For which cause (as I have said) Plato in his popular Commonweal: by him set down, appointeth the Senate to consist of an hundred threescore and eight of the better and wiser sort, which was the thirtieth part of 5040 citizens the full number of them, of whom he would have his Commonweal to stand. And in like case, Romulus took the thirtieth part of his subjects to make the first Roman Senate of, choosing out of 3000, (the whole number that then was of the citizens) an hundred, and them also by him chosen not by lot, but by discretion, even of the nobler sort of his people: viz. such as whose ancestors had never served as slaves. But afterward, the Sabins being according to the league received into the city, he added unto the former number another hundred; unto whom, after the kings driven out, Brutus also put to an hundred more, which number of three hundred Senators, so continued by the space of almost four hundred years, without increasing or diminishing. But in the time of Cicero, it is manifest that there were about five hundred, by that he writeth four hundred and fifteen Senators, to have given voices when Pub. Claudius, who was afterwards tribune, was brought in question for having polluted the sacrifices of Bona Dea, by committing of adultery with Pompeia: at which time, when the Senators were not constrained to be present in the Senate, no man can doubt, but that many of them then dispersed into all the provinces of the Roman empire, or otherwise busied with their own affairs, or letted with age and sickness, were then also absent. And after that, Caesar to have more beholden unto him, and for the better establishing of his own government, augmented the number of the Senators unto a thousand, choosing into that honourable order, not only citizens of all sorts, but even Frenchmen and other strangers also, namely Lu. Licinius the Barber, as saith Acron. But Augustus (after the Commonweal again pacified) seeing the danger of so great a number of Senators, brought them to the number of six hundred, with purpose to have brought them also to the ancient number of three hundred, which was not much more than the ten thousand part of the whole number of the citizens, being then almost infinite.  
Wherhfore the number of Senators is not to be appointed, according to the 
Of whom it is fittest to make choice for Senators in an Aristocratique or popular Commonweal.  multitude of the people, neither to serve the ambitious desire of the ignorant; and much less for the drawing of money from them, but only for the respect of the virtue and wisdom of them which have deserved the place; or if it be not possible otherwise to satisfy the ambition of them, which have part and interest in the estate of popular and aristocratique Commonweals, but that of necessity the gate of the Senate must be opened unto the multitude, that it be yet so ordered, that none should therein have deliberative voices, but such as had borne the greatest offices▪ and charges in the state: as in the Cretensian popular Commonweal, all the citizens had free access and entrance into the Senate, and there might frank and freely deliver their opinions, but not with authority to determine any thing, that power being still reserved unto them only which then were, or had before been the great magistrates. And in the Senate of the Achaeans, none but the general and the ten Dimiurgi, had power to determine of such things as were in counsel propounded. Howbeit a wise lawgiver will never 
The danger of having many Senators.  go so far, if he may otherwise avoid the popular sedition: for beside the manifest danger, which is for revealing of counsel communicated to so many persons: it giveth also occasion unto the factious for troubling of the state, if they which have the power to determine and resolve upon matters, shall in opinion differ from them which have but voices consultative; which indeed are accounted as nothing: for preventing of which dangers, both the one and the other, the ancient Greeks' in their Commonweals still created a counsel apart, of the gravest and wisest of their Senators (whom they called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) to consult of the more secret and urgent matters of state; as also by themselves to dispose of the greatest affairs of the Commonweal, and to consider what thing were to be consulted of in the open Senate, or publicly to be propounded unto the people. Besides that, what an hard matter it was of such a multitude of Senators, to assemble so many as were requisite, and to make them to agreed when they were assembled; the estate in the mean time standing in danger & the opportunity for the well managing of matters passing. The Senator's office amongst the Romans was most glorious and full of honour; and yet could Augustus the emperor never bring to pass, that the Senators should be present at the ordinary Senate, which was holden the calends or ideses of every month at the farthest; albeit that he set great fines upon them that were absent, and gave not their assistance: which grew so heavy upon the offenders, as that he was glad to take of them so offending every fift man by lot. And Ruscius Caepio the rather to invite them to that their duty, by his last will and testament left a certain sum of money to them that came into the Senat. For it was requisite that there should be fifty Senators at the lest for the making of any decree, and oftentimes an hundred, or two hundred, yea and sometimes four hundred, which was two third parts of six Senators; as in corporations and colleges the manner is. Howbeit Augustus the emperor at length taking away the necessity of so great a number, appointed two hundred to be sufficient, being two thirds of three hundred; which was the lawful number of the Senators appointed by Brutus. Moreover the Senate was not ordinarily assembled but three times a month; and if it pleased not the Consul (without whose commandment the Senate might not assemble itself) or the greatest magistrate in the absence of the Consul, sometime an whole year passed without calling together of the Senate: as Caesar did in his first Consulship, having the Senate bend against him; and yet in the mean time by prodigal bounty caused even what he would to be decreed by the people. Whereas Solon had much better provided for the matter among the Athenians, having beside the ordinary Senate of 400, every year to be changed, appointed also a privy and perpetual 
The counsel of the Areopagis i●… Athens.  Council of the Areopagis, consisting of threescore of the wisest and gravest sort of the citizens, men without reproach, who by all the degrees of honour were risen to have the managing of all the most secret affairs of the state, and to foresee that in time of danger the Commonwealth should take no harm. Of which council how great the need was, was then well understood, when as Pericles to gain the favour of the common sort, had taken away the authority from the Areopagits, and translated the same unto the people: for shortly after, the state of that Commonweal sore shaken both with foreign and domestical wars, began forthwith to decline and decay. We found also, that the Aetolians, beside their great Council, which they called Panaetolium, had also their privy Council chosen of the gravest and wisest men amongst them; of whom Livy speaking, saith, Sanctius est apud Aetolos consilium eorum quos apocloets appellant, There is among the Aetolians a more sacred (or privy) Council, of them whom they call apocletoes: and immediately after, Arcanum hoc gentis Consilium, This is the secret 
* Select counselours.  Council of the nation: Whereas before he had said, Legibus Aetolorum cavebatur, ne de pace bellove, nisi in Panaetolio & Pilaico Consilio ageretur, It was provided by the laws of the Aetolians, that nothing should be entreated of concerning peace or war, but in their Panaetolio, or Pilaican Council. We read also, that the popular Commonweal of the Carthaginensians, beside their Senate of four hundred Senators, had also a particular or privy Council of thirty Senators, men of greatest experience 
The counsel 〈◊〉 the Carthaginensians.  in their public affairs and matters of state: Of whom Livy thus saith, Carthaginenses thirty legatos seniorum principes adpacem petendam mittunt: id erat sanctius apudeos Consilium, maximaque ad Senatum regendum vis, The Carthaginensians (saith he) sand thirty ambassadors, the princes of their elders to sue for peace: and that was the more sacred Council with them, and the greater power for the ruling of the Senate: which manner of Council the Romans wanted. And therefore Livy wondereth (as at a right strange thing) that the ambassadors of Greece and Asia, which came to Rome, could of so great a number of Senators understand nothing of that which king Eumenes then plotted in the full Senate, against Perseus' king of Macedon, Eo silentio curia clausa erat, The court (saith he) was with such silence shut up: Whereby he sufficiently showeth, that in his time, as also long before that, nothing was done or agreed upon in the Senate, which still was not by one or other of so great a number revealed. For which cause the Senators themselves sometimes were constrained to become clerks and secretaries in the secret affairs of the state, and to take of every man an oath, not to reveal any such thing as was in the Senate decreed, until such time as it was put in execution: For as yet no capital punishment was appointed for such as should reveal or bewray the secret council of princes. And indeed how could any thing there be kept secret, where five or 600 Senators were privy to all that was done in the Senate, beside the clarks and secretaries for the state? When as also the young Senators children, before the time of Papyrius Praetextatus might come into the Senate, & carry the news of such things as were there done, unto their mothers. Augustus was the first, who out of the Senate made choice of some few of the wiser sort to be of his privy council, without giving the rest of the senate to understand, that he would with them resolve 
Augustus' the first in Rome who out of the whole body of the Senate made choice of some few of the wiser sort, to be of his privy counsels  of the most important and secret affairs of state, but only to have their advise concerning such things as were to be afterward propounded in the open assembly of the Senate. Immediately after whose death, Tiberius the emperor requested of the Senate, to have twenty Senators appointed him, with whom he might (as he would have them to believe) consult of such things as the Senate was further to be moved of. Whose example the wiser sort of the emperors afterwards followed; namely Galba, Traian, Adrian, Marcus Aurelius, and Alexander Severus: of whom Lampridius speaking, He never (saith he) made decree without the advise of twenty lawyers, and divers other of the Senators, (men of great evidently and understanding in matters of state) even to the number of fifty, to the end there might be no fewer than were necessary for the making of a decree of the Senat. Whereby it evidently appeareth, that in that private Council of fifty Senators, with the prince, were the greatest matters dispatched; and that it was not only to consult of that which was to be in the Senate propounded, but even to resolve and determine of the most secret and important affairs of the state, and so by little and little to draw them from the Senate, unto the more private council of the prince. By which means was also provided for another difficulty (otherwise in a Monarchy inevitable) which is the multitude of Senators, which could not still follow the prince; unto whom for all that his council aught to be always assistant, especially in a Monarchy, where the prince is to visit divers his provinces: or is himself in person busied in his wars. For which cause and no other, the ancient divines and poets, have feigned Pallas always to sit on the right hand of jupiter, but not jupiter on the right hand of Pallas: to give us thereby to understand, That the Council aught always to be present with the prince, but not the prince to be tied to the place where the Council is resident: which were a thing not only not agreeable with the majesty of a sovereign prince, but also impossible. And albeit that there be many things in every Commonweal dispatched by the privy Council, wherewith it is not needful either the people or the rest of the nobility to be made acquainted: yet so it is, that in a Monarchy it is expedient and requisite that the prince should himself understand them: or at leastwise that every man should think that he so doth, so to give the greater authority and credit unto such things as are by the Council decreed, and that the subjects should not complain and say, The king understandeth not hereof. And for this cause the Grand signor of the Turks hath always a lattice or grate, opening into the Divano, or chamber wherein his Council sitteth, to the intent to keep his Bassas and them of his council in awe; whilst they think him their prince always to see them, and to observe their proceed and doings.  
But it may be (may some man say) that a Commonweal may be so little, and men 
In small Commonweals the privy Counsel is not to be divided from the Senate.  of experience in it so few in number, as that not a Senate, but even such a privy Council as we spoke of, cannot therein be made. In which case of so straight a Commonweal, it is not needful to divide the Senate apart from the privy Council. As in the Commonweal of the Pharsalians (which was within most narrow bounds shut up) there were but twenty persons which had the sovereignty, who in that state served for the nobility, the Senate, and privy Council. And yet nevertheless in the Lacedaemonian Commonweal always both before and after the conquest of Greece, there were but thirty lords, both for the state and the Senate: and yet out of this number of thirty, they made choice but of twelve for the managing of the secret affairs of their state, as we read in Xenophon: establishing the same form of government in Athens also, where they deputed thirty lords for the government of that state, as they did in all the rest of the cities of Greece, except some little ones, over whom Lysander placed ten chief men, without any other Senate or privy Council. And the reason was, for that they had resolved to change all the popular states of Greece, into Aristocraties; which they could not have done in the lesser towns, if they should in them have erected a signory, a Senate, and a privy Council. But for the present there is almost no Commonweal, be it Popular or Aristocratique, which hath not a Senate and particular or private Council: yea and oftentimes beside both them, a Triumuirat of some few, for the managing of the more secret affairs of state, and that especially in a Monarchy. For so Augustus the emperor (albeit that he surpassed all the rest that came after him, both in wisdom, and happiness) beside the Senate, which he had filled with 600 Senators, 
Maecenas and Agrippa▪ the only men with whom Augustus the emperor resolved of his greatest affairs.  and the private council of twenty select men, had also another nearer and more inward council of Maecenas and Agrippa, with whom he resolved of his highest affairs, calling unto him none but them two after the victory of Actium▪ to resoluè with, Whether he should still hold, or discharge himself of the empire. So julius Caesar, had none but Q. Pedius, and Cornelius Balbus of his most inward council, unto whom also he gave his manner of writing in secret character, for them the better to understand his secrets thereby. So Cassiodorus speaking of the secrets of princes, saith, Arduum nimis est principis meruisse secretum, Too high a thing it is (saith he) to have deserved to be of the prince's privity. We see in like case, that the court of the parliament of Paris, 
divers counsels at divers times erected in France for matters of state.  was the ancient Senate of the realm of France: but when it took pleasure in deciding of civil controversies, nor could not well be removed from the city; the kings appointed another council, which for that it handled matters of greatest importance, in the time of Charles the seventh, was called the Great Council: which when it was also entangled with deciding of extraordinary suits and controversies, by the laws of Charles the eight, and much more by the laws of king jews the xii, who appointed a court of twenty judges; king Francis the elder removed that Great Council from meddling with the secret affairs of state, having got unto himself another council of certain select princes his friends: which of the Latins is called; The Familiar Council, and of our country men, The princes private Council. But Francis being dead, Henry his son got another council also: which for that it consisted of few, was called the narrow or straight Council. But at last, when that Familiar or private Council, was thought to exceed also with the multitude of Councillors, Henry the third, the son of Henry ordained another Council, which for that it was only to consult of matters concerning the state of the Commonweal, and not of suits and controversies, was called the Council for the State. Beside these, it was thought meet that there should also be a more secret or chamber Council, wherein the king rising from his bed, should confirm or reject such things as were by the Council decreed: there are princes letters opened, ambassadors reported, and messages delivered. There is also apart another Council of the Finances instituted by Henry the second, and by little and little taken from the auditors, wherein are assistant the intendants and secretaries of estate of the Finances, and the treasurer for the common treasure. Beside all which princes have always had a more straight Council, of two or three of their most inward and faithful friends; who so highly stand in the prince's favour, not so much for their youth or person, as for their wisdom and virtue. As for the chamber Council whereof we spoke, it consisteth but of a few, and albeit that by the decree of Charles the ninth, made in November, in the year 1563, it is in the first article expressed, that so soon as the king was up, all the princes and the council might come into the chamber, yet was not that his decree therein observed or kept.  
Which plurality and diversity of Counsels in the kingdom of France, aught 
Seven counsels in Spain.  not to seem strange, seeing that in Spain there be seven, beside the strict and inward Council, which are always in divers chambers near unto the king, and yet within the compass of the same house or lodging; to the intent, that the king going from one of them to the other, may the better be informed of his affairs: as namely the council of Spain, the council of the Indieses, the council of Italy, and the council of the Low countries, the council for the wars, the council for the order of Saint john, and the Inquisition. Now if any man there be, that think the greatness of that kingdom (than which never yet was any greater) to require so many counsels: I deny it not, but yet so he may see also in Venice, which hath no very great territory, four counsels, beside the Senate and Great Council: viz. the council of the Sages for matters at sea, the council of the Sages for matters at land, the council of the Decemuiri, or ten men, 
divers counsels in Venice.  and the council of the Septemuiri, or seven men; where the duke maketh the seventh man, which they call the signory, when it is joined with the council of the ten men, and the three precedents of the forty, beside the Senate of sixty; which with the magistrates may come to the number of six score. And what then should let, but that where there be but few men worthy to be of council for the state, but that the Senate may be made right little, and the privy council less, and yet divided from the Senate also. The state of the Rhagusians is but straight, & comprised almost within the same bounds, wherewith the walls of the city are enclosed, and yet the Senate consisteth of threescore. In the city of Nuremberg is a Senate of twenty six Senators, and a privy council of thirteen, beside another council of the seven Bourgomasters. The Canton of 
The counsel●… of the Cantons of the Swistars.  Schwits is the lest of all the Cantons, and yet for all that beside the Senate of forty five persons, it hath a privy council of seven, of whom the Aman is chief. Which self same form of council is also kept in the canton of Vti. As for the cantons of Zurich, Berne, Schafluse. basil, Soleurre, Friburg, and Lucerne, they have always beside the Great Council, a little council also. The Great Council of Berne consisteth of two hundred Senators; and the little of twenty six: At Lucerne of an hundred, and the little of twenty eight: At Saint Galliard also the Great Council is of sixty six, and the little of twenty four: At Coire the Senate is of thirty, and the privy council of fifteen. And without going so far, it is well known, that the state of 
The counsel of Geneus.  Geneva is enclosed within the compass and circuit of a mile, yet for all that beside the council of two hundred, it hath a Senate of sixty; and after that a privy council of twenty five. Neither is there any canton so little, (except the three cantons of the Grisons, governed by the common popularity) which hath not a privy council beside the Senate, wherein some have three, and some have four. As in the canton of Bafill, where the secret affairs of state are managed by two Bourgomasters, and two other chief men of their colleges, whom they call Zunfft masters. And in like case at Berne the two Auoyers, and four ensign bearers, have the ordering of all the secret business of their state; as hath the privy council in a Monarchy. And namely in the diets and assemblies of the thirteen cantons, there is none but the privy council of the ambassadors, which make their decrees, and direct their commissions, concerning their common affairs: I say then that it is a thing most profitable in every Common 
A privy counsel besides the Senate necessary in every Commonweal.  weal, to have at the lest one privy council beside the Senate, sith that the ancient rulers of both the Greeks' and Latins have so taught us, reason so showed us, and experience therein confirmed us.  
But there is a notable difference betwixt the Senate of a popular or Aristocratique 
The manner of consultation in the Senate of a popular or Aristocratique estate, and in the Senate of a Monarchy much different.  Commonweal, and the Senate of a Monarchy: for in them the diuises and consultations are had in the secret or privy counsel; but the resolutions and decrees are all made in the great Counsel, or in the assembly of the States, or of the people, if the matter be such as is to be unto them published: whereas in a Monarchy the manner of proceeding is quite contrary, wherein nothing is communicated or imparted to the people, or the nobility, but such things as seem unto the Senate doubtful, or being of greater importance, are still referred unto the privy Counsel; and if the matter concern the sovereignty, it is reserved unto the judgement of the sovereign prince only. And albeit that the Senate or Counsel in a Monarchy seem to do all the rest of itself, yet still we see all to depend of the prince's command. And this which we have said concerning the manner of consultation, is almost no where better put in practice then 
The manner of the proceeding in their consultations in matters of state, in Venice.  in Venice: where if any difficulty arise in the counsel of the sages, it is commonly decided by joining of the Decemuiri unto them, (and therefore unto such decrees as are by them made are joined Con la Giunta) and if they cannot so agreed, but still rest among themselves in opinion divided, they call unto them the Septemuiri or counsel of seven: but if so nothing can be decreed for the diversity of opinions, the matter is then propounded in open Senate: And sometimes also (although but seldom) if the matter be of such consequence, or so much concern the majesty of the State, as that the authority of the Senate seemeth not to be thereunto sufficient, or that the Senate be thereupon divided, it is propounded in the great counsel of all the gentlemen of Venice, where it taketh the last and final resolution; which as Aristotle writeth, was also the ancient custom of the Carthaginensians, where if the Senate could not agreed, the difference was disputed, debated, and decided by the people.  
Now all this differing of resolving and determining, proceedeth from the diversity of the sovereignty, and of them which have the managing of the government: for what the Senate decreeth in an Aristocratique, or popular Commonweal, that the nobility, or people ratifieth and commandeth if the matter so require: contrary to that we see to be done in a Monarchy, where the wiser the prince thinketh himself, the less he useth the counsel of the Senate: (albeit that he often times ask the advise thereof, to make his doings the more acceptable, or for the easing of himself, committeth unto them commissions for extraordinary justice, or the judgement of inextricable matters and causes of appeals) especially if the Senate be so great as that the prince by publishing of his secrets to so many persons, shall not come to the point of his designs. By 
The policy of the Roman emperors to draw the Senate from matters of state by busying it with other extraordinary causes.  this mean Tiberius the Emperor sought to keep the Senate busied in disciding of great and extraordinary causes, to make it by little and little to forget the understanding of matters of state. And after him Nero likewise ordained that the Senate should have the hearing of Appeals which before were made unto himself, and that the fine for the offence set down by the Senate should be as great, as if he had heard the cause himself; By this mean making of a Senate an ordinary court and jurisdiction of judges: who in the time of freedom of that popular Commonweal never used to judge, except ordinarily in conspiracies, and other such like great offences against the state: or that the people which had the hearing of many causes, had committed the understanding thereof unto the Senat. For which cause Cicero accusing Verres saith in this sort, Quo confugient socij? quem implorabunt? ad Senatum devenient, qui de Verre supplicium sumat? non est usitatum, non est Senatorium: Wither shall our friends and allies fly? whom shall they ask help of? shall they come unto the Senate, to take punishment of Verres? it is no thing in use, it appertaineth not unto the Senat. Wherein many deceive themselves, which think that the Senate judged, when they saw that the Senators were drawn by lot to judge of public and criminal causes, sometimes by themselves, sometime with the knights, by the law Livia, and afterwards with the knights and the Treasurours, by the law Aurelia: for there is great difference betwixt the body of the Senate, and the Senators taken in the quality of judges, and betwixt the privy Counsel, and the counsellors thereof coming into the sovereign courts to judge. For before Nero the Senate never had so much as ordinary jurisdiction or 
The Senators of Rome as Senators no judges, but when they were thereunto extraordinarily by commission appointed.  power to judge of any matter; And namely Augustus would not that the Senate should trouble itself, with the judging of the honour, or of the life of Senators, albeit that he were thereunto importuned by his friend Moecenae. And albeit that Tiberius the emperor often times sent unto them such causes, yet was it but extraordinary and by way of commission; which Adrian the emperor afterward caused to pass into the form of an ordinary jurisdiction. We see in like case that Philip the fair, or as some others say Philip the long, to discharge himself of the Court of parliament, and easily to take from it the dealing with the affairs of state, made it an ordinary Court, giving it jurisdiction, and a fitting place in Paris: which Court was in ancient time the Senate of France, and yet at this day calleth itself the Court of Peers, erected by jews the young, (according to the truer opinion) to give counsel unto the king; as we may see by the creation of County D' Mascon for a Peer, by king Charles the fi●…t, in the year 1359, where it is said that the king of France ordained the twelve Peers, to give them their counsel and aid, and termed itself, as yet it doth at this present, (by way of prerogative of honour) the Court of parliament (without any other addition) 
The court of Paris sometime the ancient Senate of France by the king forbidden to deal with matters of state.  as it is to be seen in the letters which it wrote unto the king: whereas the other Courts of later time established, use their particular additions; As, The Parliament of Tholouse, of Rouen, of Bordeaux, of Dion, of Gratianople, and Aquasexia. But in the reign of Charles the ix, at such time time as the Court of Paris liked not of the decree of the Senate, whereby the king in the Court of Rouen was by the voices of the princes declared sufficient for the government of the kingdom without a Regent, according to the law of king Charles the first: the king yet under age, advised the court, to meddle only with the desciding of controversies, and the equal administration of justice: for that the king his predecessors had for that only purpose appointed that Court, and there placed them, and not to become his tutors, or protectors of the realm, or keepers of his town of Paris: and therefore commanded such laws and edicts as he had appointed to be proclaimed in the court of Paris, to be published: wherein if any thing should be contained that seemed not to stand with right and reason, he could (as he said) be content to be thereof told; but yet so as that after he had understood the matter, if it were his pleasure to have the law proclaimed, they should forthwith without farther reply do that they were commanded: with which the king's edict the court was wonderfully troubled; and for that the judges were equally divided into two opinions: the one being willing to have the king's edict published, and the other denying the same. The Court thought good again to advise the king, that the court might not be enforced to allow or publish such things as should thereunto seem unreasonable or unjust. Wherewith the king displeased, caused his privy Counsel to be called, and by the authority thereof a decree to be made the xxiv. of September, whereby the parliament of Paris was forbidden once to call in question the laws or decrees proceeding from the king concerning matters of state: which was also before by king Francis decreed in the year 1528. In like case the great Counsel which was not almost employed but in affairs of state, in the reign of Charles the seventh, and Charles the eight, was by little and little so filled with suits, that Charles the viii. made it an ordinary court of seventeen counsellors; whom jews the xii. made up xx. beside the chancellor, who was Precedent thereof, (in such sort, that under king Francis there was but a Precedent in steed of a chancellor) who were not employed but in hearing of extraordinary causes by way of commission, or remitting of the privy 
The privy counsel of France almost brought into the form of an ordinary court by hearing of private and particular causes  counsel, and ordinarily the appeals of the Provost of the household. We see also the privy Counsel itself to be as it were brought into the form of an ordinary court, by heating the differences betwixt the Towns and the Parliaments, and often times betwixt particular men, even for small matters: to the end that such a great company of the nobility, and men of mark, should be busied with some thing, having as it were lost the understanding of the affairs of state, which can never sort to good end, if they be communicated to so many persons: where the wiser sort are commonly over ruled by the greater part, joining hereunto also, that it is impossible, to keep the counsel 
Matters of state not without danger to be communicated unto many.  of the state secret: or to know in such a multitude who it is that discovereth the same, nor to cast them out who are holden for suspect: Except by using the custom of the ancient Athenians, by virtue whereof the Senators by a secret judgement which they called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 might with all liberty, and without displeasure condemn the blabbing Senator, or him that had defiled the honour of his estate. As in like case the Roman Censors without form or fashion of process, had accustomed to remove the unworthy Senators, and by that means to exclude them out of the Senate; except they would put themselves upon their trial before the judges which were above the Censors, or that the people had given some new office, or honourable charge to him that was so removed by the Censors, or condemned by the judges. But the Romans were much to blame, both for too easy receiving and removing of the Senators, and that in too great number: For Fabius Buteo made Dictator to supply the defect of the Senate, at one time received in an 177 Senators. Whereas Lentulus and Gellius Censors at one dash removed 64. Howbeit, it were more seemly and agreeing with the dignity and honour of a Senate to receive into it few, and them also chosen and culled out as pearls; than to exalt unto so high degree of honour men worthy 
Senator●… or coun selours of estate not easily to be admitted nor without great cause to be again displaced. The ancient counsel of England in number few.  and unworthy, and afterwards to cast them down again with eternal infamy and dishonour, unto whom they had before given their helping hands: Besides that it cannot always be done without danger and sedition, or the dishonour of him that ruleth. It is four hundred year since that the Privy Counsel of England, at the instance and ●…ute of the Archbishop of Canterbury (than chancellor) established, there were there into but fifteen persons then chosen; neither hath it ever since passed the number of twenty; and yet by means of that little Counsel they have retained their state most fair and flourishing in times both of peace and war, as is by their histories to be seen; and by the treaty of peace made betwixt jews the ix, and Henry the first, king of England; which for the more assurance thereof was sworn by the Prince and the xvij privy Counsellors: viz. one Archbishop, one Chancellor, one Bishop, six Earls, and six other Lords, with the great Treasurour, and a magistrate whom they call chief justice of England. Now I doubt not but that in every Commonweal, many by vain ambition, favour, impudence, or corrupt bribery, in sort even against the Prince and peoples will found means to enter into the sacred Senate; against which inconvenience remedy might be well provided, if we would but use Solon's law. For he would have none to be admitted into the Senate of the Areopagits, but such as had without touch, by all the degrees of honour ascended unto the highest places and preferments of the Commonweal: for so he deemed him to be well able to hold a place in the Senate without staggering or falling, that could hold himself upright in such dangerous and slippery ways. And that is it for which all the ancients both Greeks and Latins, have so highly commended the Senate of the Areopagits, composed of sixty persons, as we read in Athens. The same manner is yet used among the five lesser cantons of the mountain Swissers, that they which have passed through all the honourabre estates should continued Senators for ever: but this is not the way to have good resolution, and yet less to keep the affairs of state in secret, in that the Senators of the little cantons, which are forty five in Zug, and an hundred sixty four in Appenzel, and more or less in the others, when question is of matters of importance, may every one of them bring with him into the council two or three of the citizens, such as he liketh best of. Whereby it cometh to pass, that sometime there are four or five hundred, part Senators, part others, assembled together into the Senate, and yet all have deliberative voices therein. Whereas multitude is ever an enemy, unto wise resolutions.  
And thus much concerning the number of Councillors of estate: let us now also briefly speak of them that are to propound matters in the Senate; and then of such 
Who they be that aught to propound matters in the Senate or counsel.  things as are there also to be propounded. As touching the first, men of ancient time have always had great regard unto the quality of them which were to propound any thing in the Senat. For we see that to have been the proper charge of the greatest magistrates in Rome, whom for that cause they called Consuls: or in their absence the greatest magistrate that was in Rome (to wit, the Praetor of the city) supplied the place of the Consul: receiving the particular requests both of the citizens and strangers, of ambassadors from foreign princes, and allies letters from the governors of their provinces: which letters he read in the Senate, asked every man's opinion, commanded the decrees of the Senate to be written, & also dismissed the Senat. Among the Grecians the greatest Praetor executed the same office▪ who among the Athenians was called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; & the rest as they were created in some places 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, who bore almost the same office that do the providitors in the commonwealth of Rhaguse, & the sages in the state of Venice: howbeit that there the three Auogadors ordinarily propounded unto the senate, that whereof it is to consult. In the council of the Greeks the precedent caused to be cried aloud by a sergeant, That if there were any person that had any thing to say concerning the good of the state, he should speak: which Titus Livius speaking of the Achaeans affirmeth generally of all the Greeks. But as for 
A notable custom of the Aetolians in propounding of matters in their Senat.  the Aetolians, their custom was most notable, worthy to be of all men regarded, being highly commended and approved by Philipemen general of the Achaean league; which was, that the presiden●…, or he which in full council propounded any thing which seemed unto himself good, should therein have no voice himself. A great means to take away the practices and covert trains, which are commonly made in Popular and Aristocratique estates, where the busiest heads easily draw others to their opinions. Howbeit I cannot commend the fashion and custom of them of Genes, 
The custom of Genes discommended.  where none but the duke alone hath power to propound in the Senate that which pleaseth himself. For beside the difficulty of speaking with the duke on every side beset, and troubled with infinite affairs, and to lay before his eyes a thousand divers reasons for the debating of the matter in the council: it is also dangerous to give so great authority to one person, that he may open or keep secret to or from the Senate, whatsoever himself pleaseth; it being not lawful for any man to propound any matter but himself. It is also much perilous one citizen, who first delivereth his opinion to be of such authority and power, as that the rest which are to speak after him, dare not freely say what indeed they think. And that is it for which it is wisely provided in the realm 
The laudable custom for the propounding of matters used in France.  of France, that it is permitted to all them which have access into the council (although they therein have neither deliberative voice nor place) every man to propound his own requests, & to advertise the council of that which is profitable for the Commonweal; to the end it may be the better provided for. And oftentimes their opinion is also thereof demanded, and then afterward the advise of the councillors of the estate, which in council have place and deliberative voice, in such sort and order, as that the great lords deliver their opinions last; to the end, that the liberty of the lesser should not be impaired by the authority of the greater princes or magistrates, and especially by the power of ambitious and factious men, who cannot in any case abide to be contradicted. In which course they which have only voices consultative, make way for them which have voices deliberative: and oftentimes broach unto the council good and lively reasons: and where they in any thing err, they are without ie lousy again by the others brought into the right. Which is a custom much more commendable than that of the Romans, where the Consul first demanded the opinion of the chief man in the Senate, or else of him that was appointed Consul for the year following. And yet nevertheless the contrary was used before the people: for first the particular men delivered their opinions, and after them the lesser magistrates, and last of all the greatest, to the intent that the liberty of the lesser should not be prevented by the authority of the greater. join hereunto also, that the ambition to speak first doth oftentimes draw after it the envy of some, and the jealousy of others. So we see the cruel emperors to discharge upon the Senate, the discontentment that the people had of their cruelties, caused such things as they would have done to be propounded or read in the Senate: which to gainsay or seem to dislike of was death. Which was not to demand the advise of the Senate, but indeed most imperiously to command the same. Where of an ancient Senator complaining saith, Vidimus curtam elinguem, in 
* Plinius junior in pan●…girico.  qua dicere quod velles periculosum: quod nolles miserum esset, We have seen (saith he) the court dumb, wherein to speak that thou wouldst was dangerous; and to say that thou wouldst not, was a thing right miserable: For that the emperor Dometian, (unus solus censebat quod omnes sequerentur) alone decreed what all men should follow: and commendeth Traian (quod eo rogante, sententias libere dicere liceret, vinceretque sententia non prima, sed melior) for that he propounding of matters, every man might freely speak his mind: and that opinion prevailed not which was first, but best. By the custom of the ancient Hebrews, the king refrained from coming into the Senate, lest any should be contrary unto him, or he to any; for so they writ in their Commentaries.  
It were also to be wished, that the Council should sit in the morning yet fasting, for that is not to be holden for a council well digested, which is done after dinner, as 
The fiittest time for counselours to sit in council  saith Philip de Commines, and especially in countries where the people are subject unto wine. Solomon detesteth those princes, who when they aught in the morning to feed their mind with religious contemplation of high and divine matters, do with full feeding pamper the inordinate desire of their languishing & broken lust, & with new nourishment kindle the fire of new desires: Which he in three words declareth, Woe (saith he) unto princes which eat early. Which is a thing so much the more to be detested, by how much many think it to be the greatest bravery, to be well whittled with wine. For what can be more beastly than was the old manner of the Germane, who never used to consult of their greatest affairs but in midst of their cups persuaded so that every one of them warm with wine, should discover the very secret of his hart, and to be the more eloquent to persuade what they thought to be most expedient. Which custom they have now well changed, insomuch that even their private and domestical contracts made when they are in drink, are to none effect or purpose, it being alone a 
What things are in the Senate or council of the state to be chiefly consulted of.  sufficient cause for the judge to revoke them being so made. Now as concerning such things as are to be consulted of in the Senate, they depend of such occasions & affairs, as in course of time present themselves. The ancient Romans first consulted of matters concerning their religion, as the mark and end whereat all human actions aught both to begin and end. There was never also, saith Polybius (he himself being an Atheist) a people more devout than this: adjoining thereunto moreover, That by means of religion they had established unto themselves the greatest monarchy in the world. Than after matters of religion, and worship of the immortal gods, are to be entreated of the greatest and most urgent affairs of state, and most concerning the Commonweal, as the making of peace or war: in both which, long delay is no less dangerous, than is too 
A good rule by the ancient well observed in all their consultations for matters of state.  hasty resolution. In which case, as in all things doubtful, the ancients had a rule which suffered no great exception, which was, That we aught not to do, neither to council any thing to be done, whereof we doubt whether it be just or injust, profitable or hurtful; or if the harm that may ensue be greater than the profit that may come of the enterprise that is to be taken in hand: but if the harm be evident, & the profit doubtful, or contrariwise, there is then no deliberation to be had or doubt made which to choose. But the doubt is greater, when as that which we are to consult of, hath in show more & greater profits, if we can bring it to good effect, than it hath hurt if we fail therein. Howbeit the more wholesome opinion of the ancients is to be preferred, viz. That when question is of matters of estate, things doubtful, or subject to the change of fortune, 
Things doubtful or subject to fortune, in consultation of matters of state not to be at all embraced.  are not at all to be embraced. And therefore the subtler sort, 'cause them that be more simple, to propound and persuade in council such things as seem unto themselves doubtful; to the intent that so the blame may rest upon them, if things fall out evil: & yet the honour redound unto themselves if it fall out well. Howbeit nothing aught to be 
Nothing aught of right to be praised by the events.  thought commendable and well done, which dependeth of the event. For it behoveth us by most certain arguments and reasons to show wherefore this or that is to be done, and not by the event: yea it behoveth a wise man rather to fear unfortunate events, than to presume of happy success. And therefore a wise councillor never resteth himself upon the chances of fawning fortune, or upon adventures, but still forceth himself by good and wise discourse to gather the true effects of precedent causes: albeit that he often times see, the most adventurous and rash, to be the most happy & fortunate in their attempts. And therefore the ancient divines (who covered wisdom in fables) doubted not to exclude that goddess whom they called Fortune, out of the council of the gods; lest that which should be sought for by wisdom, should seem to have been obtained by the rashness of fickle fortune. And yet for all that we see nothing to be more commended or blamed, than the good or evil end of men's actions: and so wisdom measured by the foot of fortune. But if the law condemn the soldier that ●…ighteth with the enemy without the commandment of his captain, although he carry away the victory; how much more dangerous aught it to be, to put the hope of counsels, & state of the Commonweal in the uncertain hope of fortune? Besides that, such continual adventures do oftentimes draw after them the ruin of adventurous princes. And therefore to avoid that nothing should be rashly or unadvisedly decreed in the council, I like well the advise of sir Thomas Moor, To propound the day before what was in the Senate to be resolved on the day following; to the end that such deliberations might the better be digested: provided for all that, That question be not of the particular interest of any of them which have voice in the council: for in that case it is much better to resolve upon the matter the same day, & without delay, than to attend until the sound judgement of some be prevented by the subtleties of others, & that men come prepared with long trains of reasons, to reverse that which aught of right to be concluded. For as the truth, the more naked and simple it is produced, the fairer it is; so is it most certain, that they which disguise it by figures or colours of Rhetoric, take from it the lustre and natural beauty thereof: a thing which a man aught above all things in matters of council to shun. True it is, that to use oloquence, in the assemblies of the people, and with the sweetness of speech to delight the ears of the ignorant multitude, or with fair words to blind their eyes, or with pleasing reasons to turn their minds from rage and fury to peace and quietness, is a thing not only commendable, but necessary also. But all these things are far to be removed from a Senate or council, if advise be to be sought for or required of such Senators as we have spoken of, that is to say of wise men. And the Lacedaemonian brevity full of good reasons, is to be used, that they all may have time to speak: & that no orator having got the possession of speaking, should with long discourse or speech exclude the best & wisest of the senators. And therefore by an old decree of the Areopagits, it was not lawful in that grave council, to use either any induction or after-speech. As for the delivering of their opinions by secret suffrages, as amongst the Venetians; or by changing of places, as amongst the Romans, I cannot greatly commend of either, but especially if the matter in consultation consist of many points, of which some are to be liked of, and othersome to be rejected: so that it is necessary to propound every article or point apart, which the Latins term dividere sententiam, and so to 'cause the Senators to pass & repass from one side to another. Into which difficulties the Venetians falling, are oftentimes constrained to leave their secret voices given by lots, and to give the same by word of mouth; which they use to do, when question is of the life, fame, or fortune of any man, according to the manner of the ancient Greeks & Romans; a thing which cannot by secret voices, by lot, without injustice be done, for the infinite variety of cases which may present themselves to be judged upon. Now as the Senate of a Commonweal is not bound to the certain 
That the Sena●… aught not to intermedie with the jurisdiction of the magistrate.  hearing and deciding of causes, so aught it not to trouble itself with intermeddling with the jurisdiction of the magistrates, except it be in the controversies of the greatest magistrates, or sovereign courts among themselves. And for this cause Tiberius the emperor, in the beginning of his reign protested in the Senate, That he would not altar any thing in the course of justice, neither have to do with the jurisdiction of the ordinary magistrates. And they which make a confusion of a Senate & privy council, do greatly diminish the dignity & honour thereof, for that it aught to be regarded as to confirm the prince's actions, & wholly to attend the public affairs: work enough to busy a senate, except it be when question is of the life or honour of the greatest lords and princes, or of the punishment of cities, or other such causes of like consequence and importance, as may well deserve the assembly of the Senate; as in ancient time the Roman Senate, by commission from the people, had the hearing of the treasons and conspiracies of their allies, against the state, as we see in 
Livius lib. 26  Livy.  
Yet resteth the last point of our definition, that is to say, that the Senate is established 
What power a Senate or counsel of stateis of right to have in a well ordered Commonweal.  to give advise and council to them which have the sovereignty in every Commonweal. To give advise (I say) and council; for that the Senate in a well ordered Commonweal, aught not to have power to command, nor to direct out their mandates, neither to put into execution their advises and consultations, but only to make report thereof unto them which have the sovereignty. Now if a man should ask, Whether there be any Commonweal wherein the Senate hath such power? It is a question but of fact: but if demand were made, whether of right it aught so to have or not? our opinion is, that in a well ordered Commonweal it is in no wise to be suffered: for that it cannot be without impeaching of the sovereignty, and that much less in a Monarchy, than in an aristocraty, or a Popular estate. And in that the majesty of a sovereign prince is known, in that he can, and his wisdom, in that he knoweth to weigh and judge the advise of his council, and so conclude according to the resolution of the wiser part, and not of the greater.  
Now if any man think it strange or inconvenient for all other magistrates and sovereign 
Why magistrates and sovereign courts have a greater commanding power then hath a Senate or counsel of state.  courts, to have power to command, in their own names to direct out their commissions, and the Senate that judgeth of their authority and controversies, to be deprived of this power: let him consider that unto such magistrates and courts, power is given them even by their institution, election, and creation, and by the charters and grants unto them made for the limiting of their charge and power, without which neither martial nor civil or domestical affairs can well be governed: whereas there was never Senate in any ancient well ordered Commonweal, which had any power to command by virtue of the institution thereof. So we see, that in the kingdoms of France, Spain, and England, the privy council is not erected or instituted in form of a body politic or college; neither to have power by the election or ordaining thereof, to order or command any thing, so as is necessary for all magistrates, as we shall hereafter declare. And as for that that some will say, That the privy council may disannul and reverse the judgements and decrees of the magistrates and sovereign courts: and so conclude, that it is not without great authority and power: mine answer is, that the decrees of the council depend not in any thing of the council itself; but of the royal power, and by commission only, in quality of extraordinary judges for the execution of justice, besides that the commission and authority of the privy council is always joined with the person of the king. And therefore we see in a Monarchy all the decrees of the privy council to carry these words with them, By the king in his privy council: which can do nothing if the king be not present or at leastwise confirm the acts of his council. But we have before showed the power of all magistrates and corporations to cease, and be suspended in the presence of the prince. Now if the power of the Senate be nothing in the absence of the prince, and much less in his presence, where then is the senates power? And if the Senate cannot of itself decide and determine a controversy; how can it then dispose of such things as belong unto the state of the Commonweal? and that is it wherefore we see such things as are decreed upon by the Senate, to be still referred unto the prince: or if they be of less importance, yet to be still confirmed with the prince's authority, hand, and seal. Which is no new matter, but of ancient time done. For we see an old charter making mention of one Endobalde, county of the Palace of king Clotoire, who sitting in council with the Senate, was to report the decrees thereof unto the king, to the end to have them by him either approved or rejected.  
But the doubt is greater, whether the Senate in a Popular or Aristocratique estate 
Whether the Senate in a popular or Aristocratique estate aught to have more power than in a Monarchy.  aught to have more power than in a Monarthie, or not? considering the great difference there is betwixt one lord and many, or betwixt one prince the sovereign commander of his people; and an infinite number of men; as in a Popular estate. Besides that, we read also, that in the Roman Commonweal (which is holden to have been one of the most flourishing and best ordered that ever was) the Senate had power to dispose of the common treasure, and public revenue (one of the greatest points of sovereignty) to appoint lieutenants and governors of princes, to grant triumphs, and to dispose of religion. And for this cause Tertullian saith, That never any God was received in Rome, without the decree of the Senat. And as for ambassadors of kings and people, none but the Senate received and dismissed them. And that which more is, it was forbidden upon pain of treason, to present any request unto the people, without the advise of the Senate before had, as we have before declared. Which was not only in Rome observed, but also in all the Grecian Commonweals. For offending wherein Thrasibulus was in Athens accused of treason, as was afterwards also Androtian by 
What power the Senate or counsel aught to have in a popular or Aristocratique estate.  Demosthenes. Which order is even at this time better observed and kept at Venice, than ever it was in Rome or Greece. And yet notwithstanding all this I say, that the Senate of the Popular or Aristocratique estates aught not to have but the advise and consultation of matters of state only, the power still depending of them, which had the sovereignty. And as for that which is said of the power of the Roman Senate, that which it had, was nothing else but dignity, authority, council, and not power: for that 
That the Senate of Rome had no power to command in matters of state.  the people of Rome might when it saw good confirm o●… repeal the decrees of the Senate, which had no power to command, and much less to execute the decrees thereof; Dionysius Halycarnassaeus hath well noted, and Livy himself often times using this form of speech, Senatus decrevit, populus jussit, The Senate decreed, and the people commanded. Wherein Festus Pompeius is deceived, interpreting the word jussit, commanded, for decrevit, or decreed. So that it belonged to the Senate to decree, and to the people to command. As when Livy speaking of the authority of Scipio Africanus, saith, Nutus eius pro decretis patrum, pro populi iussis esse, His beck was in stead of the Senators decrees, and the people's commands. And that the lest Tribune of the people, opposing himself against the Senate, might stay all the decrees thereof. I have here before noted certain places out of Titus Livius: whereby it evidently appeareth, that the Senate could in nothing command: and especial by the decree where it is said, That the Consul if he should think it so good, should present the request unto the people, for the making of a dictator: and if it pleased not the Consul, than the Praetor of the city should take that charge upon him: who if he would therein do nothing, that then one of the Tribunes should do it. The Consuls (saith Livy) would therein do nothing, and forbade the Praetor also to obey the Senate: Now had the Senate had so much power to command, as had the Consul, or one of the Tribunes of the people, it would never have used such kind of speech; neither would the Consul have forbidden the Praetor to obey the Senat. For indeed the Senate could not command the Praetors, but used these or like words, If it should so seem unto them good; or if so it were their pleasure. So the same man in another place saith, Decreverunt patres ut Marcus junius Praetor urbanus si ei videretur, Decemuiros agro Samniti, Appuloque, quoad eius publicum erat metiendo, devidendoque crearet, The Senators decreed, that Marcus junius, Praetor of the city, if he should think it so good, should appoint ten men for the measuring and dividing of so much of the Samnite and Appulian land, as belonged to the Commonweal.  
Now if any man should say that these words, Si ei videretur (if it should so seem unto him good) imported a command: the contrary is proved in that, that Livy speaking of the punishment of the Campanians, saith, That the Consul Fuluius having read the decree of the Senate which carried these words: Integram rem ad Senatum reijceret si ei videretur: interpretatum esse, quid magis è Republica duceret, aestimationem sibi permissam: That he should, if he thought it so good, refer the whole matter unto the Senate: to have so interpreted the decree, as if the matter had been committed to his discretion, to deem what he should think best and most expedient therein to do for the Commonweal: at which time question was of the lives and goods of all the Campanians, part of whom the Consul of himself without farther authority from the Senate caused to be put to death, and the rest to be sold by the drum. But that the dignity of the Magistrates was in the Roman Commonweal greater than the Senates, it appeareth by that, that such as writ letters unto the Senate and people of Rome, 
The dignity of the great magistrates in the Roman Commonweal greater than the dignity▪ of the Senat.  if they therein comprehended the Magistrates also, they still placed them in order before the Senate; as is manifest by the inscription of their letters, in this sort; Cn. Plancus Imp. Cos. desig. S. P. D. Coss. Pret. Tribb. pleb. Senatui, Populo, plebiquè Romano: Cn. Plancus General, Consul elect, unto the Consuls, Praetors, Tribunes of the people, the Senate, People, and Commonalty of Rome sendeth greeting. Wherhfore Cicero doth but orator like taunt Vatinius, when he saith, Art not thou a most certain murderer of thy country? thou leftest not unto the Senate, that which never man took from it; that Legates should be appointed by the authority of that order. And he in * Livy 
●…ib. 28.  when as he speaketh of Triumphs, saying, It was never before by the people determined of triumphs, the estimation and bestowing of that honour having always been with the Senate: no not the kings themselves to have impaired the majesty of that order: he speaketh (I say) but like an orator: for that there was nothing which might not be taken from the Senate, the magistrate propounding a request to the contrary unto the people: as we have by examples before declared. But how soever the Senate for the maintenance of the authority thereof made decrees, yet could it not command or put in execution any of those things that were by it decreed: neither had it so much as any Lictors or Sergeants, the true marks of them which have power to command. But the Magistrates having the decrees of the Senate in their hand, directed their own mandates and commissions for the execution thereof, if they thought it so good: assuring themselves to be out of blame in doing that the Senate had before decreed, it being always ready to maintain them in so doing: So the Senate being no way able to restrain Caesar, took their refuge to that ancient decree of the Senate, which was commonly made but in the dangerous times of the Commonweal, viz. Videant consuls ac caeteri Magistratus ne quid detrimenti capiat Respublica: Let the Consuls and other magistrates foresee that the Commonweal take no harm: with which decree of the Senate (saith Caesar) the Consuls armed, suddenly raised their power and took up arms against Caesar: by which words it appeareth, authority to have been in the Senate, but the chief command in the Magistrates. But if any Tribune 
The great power in the Tribunes of Rome.  of the people once opposed himself against the decree of the Senate, not only the authority of the Senate, but of the Consuls and other magistrates also ceased. And for that cause there were ordinarily some of the Tribunes at the gate of the Senate, (before that the law Atinia gave them entrance into the Senate house) unto whom the decrees of the Senate were brought and showed, for them to confirm by writing over them this letter T, or reject by putting thereunto this word Veto, that is to say, I forbidden it. So that the Senate did nothing but by sufferance of the people, or of the Tribunes, who were as it were espials of the Senate, and keepers of the liberty of the people, having always free power to take exception to whatsoever was decreed, if the people by express law took it not from them, permitting the whole disciding of the matter propounded, unto the Senate, without the interruption of the Tribunes. As it did at the request of Tiberius Graccus Tribune of the people, giving leave unto the Senate for that year to dispose of the consulary provinces, with express prohibition unto the Tribunes for the opposing of themselves, for that time only. For after that time the people often times gave the provinces and governments, without the advise or authority of the Senat. Now to say that the Senate had the disposing of the common treasure, true it is, but that was but upon sufferance, and so long as it pleased the people; as we may see by the law Sempronia, whereby the people decreed that the soldiers should be appareled of the charge of the common treasure. And he that hath no power but by sufferance, and by way of entreaty hath no power at all, as we have before said. So in like case we see the Auogadours or Triumuiri in the Venetian state often times to oppose themselves, not only against the proceed of the Sages and Decemuiri, but even of the Senate also, and so 'cause the matter to be brought unto the hearing of the grand Counsel.  
But here again a man may say, that if the Senate in body or lawful assembly had 
What an authority was among the Romans.  no power to command, there was then no difference betwixt the decrees of the Senate, and that which they call The authority: for so it was that if there were less than four hundred Senators, by the decree of Augustus, (who were afterward brought to the number of fifty) that they agreed upon, was called an Authority, but not a Decree of the Senat. As also we may see by the law Cornelia, published at the request of a Tribune of the people: whereby it was forbidden the Senate any more to grant privileges or dispensations, except there were two hundred Senators at the lest present. Whereby it is to be gathered, that the Senate in such number had power to command: whereunto I say that a decree in the nature of itself carrieth with it no command, no more than the sentence of the judge, if the commission be not on forth. Now the Senate never judged or determined, neither could give out any commission or mandate; and therefore never had the power to command their decrees to be put in execution, without the power and authority of the magistrates still being of none effect. And yet whatsoever decree the Senate had made, and were it never so well by the power of the magistrate confirmed; was but annual as Dionysius Halicarnasseus hath well written; and not perpetual as Conan supposeth.  
But how then (might some man say) did the Senate cause three hundred soldiers citizens of Rome, which remained of the Legion that had sacked Rhegium in Sicily where they were left in garrison, to be led away, and being stripped and beaten, to be all afterward beheaded before the people, without any regard had unto the opposition of the Tribunes, or appeals of the condemned, most miserably crying out, the sacred laws to be therein broken and trodden under foot. But herein question was of military discipline, which in that respect hath nothing common with domestical laws and 
Martial discipline respecteth not the common or domestical laws.  customs. Beside that it was done but by the advise of the Senate, the execution thereof being performed by the magistrates, who were not bound to obey the Senate, if they had not been thereunto willing. Yea moreover such was the cruelty and horribleness of the villainy by the garrison soldiers committed at Rhegium, who themselves most cruelly rifled the city, which they aught with their blood to have defended against the assaults of the enemy: as that it caused all the ordinary power of the laws to cease: no punishment being thought sufficient to revenge the same. Which cases when they chanced, the tittles and quirks of laws were little at all regarded, especially in the midst of such a noise of weapons. But as often as the Senate or Consuls attempted to infringe the sovereignty of the people, or to break the laws, as often times they did the Tribunes, were strait ways ready to oppose themselves against them. For in that Caius Cornelius Tribune of the people, made a request unto the people, that the Senate from that time forward, should not decree any thing against the liberty of the people, and the majesty thereof: it sufficiently declareth the Senate often times before contrary unto the law, to have usurped the rights of sovereignty: howbeit therein is not to be respected what was done, but what of right aught to have been done. Howbeit it is manifest, that the Senate in the latter times thereof had power to make laws: but than it had left off to be a Senate, and was then become rather an ordinary court of judges. And yet the magistrates themselves, as the Praetors, the Aediles, yea and the famous lawyers also made a great part of the Roman law, albeit that they had no power to command at all: but all this dependeth foe the good liking of the prince or people, without whose authority and command, the force of the law, edict, or decree made, was nothing. Seeing then that the Senate in a Popular estate hath no ordinary power to command, nor to do any thing but by sufferance; much less power shall it have in an Aristocratique estate, or in a Monarchy: and so much the less in a Monarchy by how much kings are more jealous of their estates, than are the people, and better know than they, how to defend their own sovereignty.  
But whereas we said, It was not lawful without the privity of the Senate, to propound any request unto people, that indeed was so provided by the law Popilia and Hortensia: yet was it lawful always without the privity of the Senate, to propound requests unto the Commonalty: and although that by the consulary law Cornelia, it was also forbidden without the privity of the Senate, to propunnd any request unto the Commonalty, yet was that law shortly after again by the law Pompeia repealed and abrogated. Wherein many with great liberty abuse the words Populi ac Plebis Romanae, (the People and Commonalty of Rome) and especially the Greeks', and such as ignorant of the Roman antiquity, interpret the Greek writers.  
That is also worth the noting, that albeit that the request which the magistrates were about to propound unto the people, were disliked of the Senate, yet might they nevertheless lawfully move the same unto the people, after they had once made the Senate acquainted therewith. The same may serve also for an answer to that which josephus the historiographer saith, That Moses forbade the king to deny any thing concerning the public, without the advise of the Senate, and the high priest (howbeit that this article is not to be found in all the law) yet thereof it followeth not, that the king was thereby of necessity bound to follow their advise. For albeit that the Roman emperors term themselves the principal Senators, or chief of their council; yet 
Why the Roman emperors sometime called the Senators their companions, or good lords.  such additions in nothing diminished their majesty. Yea albeit that they called the Senators their companions, or good lords and masters; as did Tiberius, who in the beginning of his reign called the Senators, Indulgentissimos dominos, His most loving Lords, as we read in Tacitus. But how much princes gave unto the Senate, and the Senate unto princes, Pliny the younger doth in two words (as it were) declare; where he thus speaketh of a certain decree of the Senate, Voluntati tamen principis sui, cui in nulla re fas putaret repugnare, in hac quoque re obsequi, but to obey the will of their prince, whereunto they thought it not lawful in any thing to resist, even so in this this thing also to show themselves obedient.  
And further also, the Senators or Councillors of the estate, to speak properly are no where accounted either as officers or commissioners: neither in 
* Viz France. Senators neither officers nor commissioners.  this realm are they by any law, or edict, or charter of the kings made councillors, but only by a short brief without any seal, signed with the king's hand, expressing in few words, that the king during his pleasure giveth them place and deliberative voice in his council. But the king being dead, they must have another such brief for the holding of their places, except such as for their calling, or the charge they have in the Commonweal, have access and entrance into the council.  
Now if any man ask, Why a Senate in a well ordered Commonweal, should not 
For what reason a Senate in a well ordered Commonweal should not have also power to command.  have also power to command? The principal reason is, for that if it should have power to command also what it had in council decreed, the sovereignty should rest only in the council: and so the councillors of the estate, in stead of councillors should there of become masters, having the managing of the affairs, and power to dispose of all at their pleasure; a thing impossible to be done, without the impairing, or to say better the utter subversion of all sovereignty and majesty: which is so high and so sacred, as that it belongeth not unto subjects, of what estate or condition soever, once to touch it either nigh, or a far off. Whereby it is to be understood, them that give command unto a Senate, to go about the destruction of the Commonweal, and utter ruin of the state. And for this cause the Great Council of Venice (wherein the majesty of their state consisteth) seeing the Decemuiri to take upon them above that which was committed to their charge, forbade them upon pain of high treason to command or determine of any thing concerning the state, nor so much as to writ their definitive letters; but to have therein recourse unto the signory, until the Grand Council were assembled. For which self same reason, and that more of the citizens also might be partakers of that honour, hay have decred, That the six councillors of estate, assistants unto the duke, shall not be but two months in that so honourable a charge: to the end that the custom to command should not breed in them a desire still to continued the same, 
That the Senato●… counsel of estate aught to be perpetual, and not every year changed: with the dangers that ensue of such yearly change  as also to aspire higher. Howbeit I am not of opinion so to have the councillors of estate changed and rechanged; but rather to have them perpetual, as they were of ancient time at Rome, Lacedemonia and Pharsalia, and yet are in Polonia and Geneva. For the yearly changing which they made in Athens, and yet make in Venice, Rhagusium, Luques, Genes, Nuremberg, and divers other towns of Germany, doth not only greatly obscure the glory of the Senate, which aught to shine as the sun, but also draweth after it the inevitable danger of disclosing and publishing of the secrets of the estate: joining hereunto also, That the Senate, all new, cannot be informed of affairs passed, neither yet well continued the entertainment of the affairs present. Which for that it seemed unto the Florentines a thing very dangerous, they at the request of Peter Soderin their Gonfalonier (and a chief man in the reforming of their estate) decreed, That all the Senate of fourscore, should from six months to six months be removed; excepting such as had before been Gonfaloniers or chief officers in the Commonweal, whom they appointed perpetual Senators, of purpose to instruct the other new Senators in the affairs of state. The same order they of Genes are feign also to take in their mutable common Senate, wherein such as have been dukes and Syndics are perpetual Senators. Wherein the Rhagusians are better provided of their Senate than are the Venetians, whose example they seem to have followed in the forming of their Commonweal: For in Venice the Senate changeth every year all at once: but in Rhaguse the Senators which are also but one year in charge, change still one after another, and not all in one year. But if the desire of honour be so great, as that the citizens cannot otherwise be satisfied, except they all by turns may have place in the Senate, we must then imitat that which Solon did; who in the Popular estate of the Athenians by him framed, appointed a mutable▪ Senate of four hundred citizens every year to be changed: but withal he made a perpetual privy Council of the Areopagits, to the intent, that that mutable Senate, and yearly change of all the other magistrates might thereupon rest, as upon a most firm and sure stay. And thus having spoken of a Senate, order requireth that we should also speak of the Officers and Commissioners in a Commonweal.   

CHAP. II ¶ Of the Officers and Commissioners in a Commonweal.  
AS in the whole body of the law concerning Commonweals, are contained many things right fruitful and commodious: so also amongst the rest, the reasoning and discourse concerning public persons, hath always been thought most profitable: and albeit that many things concerning magistrates are thought common and usual, yet lie the same for most part almost wrapped up in obscurity: For that they which have thereof reasoned, do therein define nothing plainly. Wherhfore I have thought it best to begin this our discourse of their definitions. An Officer therefore is a public person, who hath an ordinary 
What an Officer is? what a Commissioner is?  charge by law limited unto him. A Commissioner is a public person, but with an extraordinary charge limited unto him, without law, by virtue of commissionely. Which definitions so by us set down that they may become more plain, it shall not be amiss to make a division of public persons, even from the first beginning of them. And first I call them public persons, who are to attend upon the public affairs: 
A public person who? Two sorts of public persons.  of whom there are two sorts, one which hath power to command, whom they call Magistrates: and another sort which hath no such commanding power, but is only to understand or to put in execution the commandments of the others; and are yet all public persons also. Howbeit for all that, all public persons are not Officers, or Commissioners; as Archbishops, Bishops, and Ministers, are public persons, and beneficed men rather than Officers: which we must not mingle together, considering that the one sort is established for matters divine, and the other for worldly affairs, which aught not to be confounded. joining hereunto also, that the establishing of them which are employed in divine matters, dependeth not of the politic edicts or laws, as the Officers do. Let us then see the definitions by us set down, whether they be good or not, before we enter into the division of Officers, for that no man, either lawyer, or of them which have before entreated of the state of Commonweals, hath truly told what an Officer, a Commissioner, or a Magistrate is: which for all that is a thing most necessary to be understood, seeing that the Officer is one of the most principal parts of a Commonweal, which cannot stand without Officers and Commissioners. But forasmuch as Commonweals were first served by Commissioners, before they were served by Magistrates or Officers (as we will hereafter show) it is fit that we should first speak of Commissioners, and of the difference betwixt them and the Magistrates or Officers.  
Aristotle saith, That a Magistrate is he that hath a deliberative voice in the Senate, 
Aristotle his definition of a Magistrate impugned.  and in judgement, with power also to command. He also calleth the magistrate 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which is not proper but to them which are of power to command, and agreeth not unto officers that serve, as Ushers, Sergeants, Trumpeters, Scribes and Notaries, whom he putteth into the rank of Magistrates, and yet have no power to command: so that this definition is in that respect too short. Besides that, it is a thing more absurd, that he should not be a Magistrate, which hath no entrance into the privy council, neither yet deliberative voice, nor power to judge: for if it were so, there should be but few magistrates in all Commonweals, considering that there are so few councillors of the privy council in well ordered Commonweals, and among them not one which hath deliberative voice, but by commission: and albeit that they had such voice, yet had they no command, as we have before declared.  
And as for the lawyers, there be but few of them which have touched this string: 
The lawyers definitions of magistrates censured.  and namely doctor jovean confesseth, That it always seemed unto him an hard thing, rightly to define a Magistrate. And indeed in the definition of a Magistrate by him made he is deceived: For he saith, That a Magistrate is he to whom the prince hath given any charge▪ in which sense and sort all Commissioners should be magistrates. But D. Cuiacius▪ beside the definition of Aristotle, promiseth to bring three others: A Magistrate (saith he) is a public person, who hath pre-eminence in doing of justice; or he which sitteth in seat of justice; or else he which hath jurisdiction and public judgement: so that by his account he appointeth four definitions, with that of Aristotle. Which is directly against the Maxims of all Philosophy, and contrary to the principles of Logic, that one should give more than one definition to one thing: and is also impossible by nature. But if any say, That many descriptious may be given of one and the same thing, for that the accidents are many which are in one thing: true it is, but an hundred descriptions cannot declare and make manifest the substance or nature of a thing: Which in the Art of reasoning is a great fault: but in the knowledge of the law much greater, and especially in the matter of Magistrates and officers, which is the entrance of the law, where the lawyers begin. For the principal mark 
The principal mark whereby a magistrate is known.  whereby a Magistrate is known, which is, To have power to command; is in these three definitions wanting: and the magistrates lieutenants have the hearing of causes, are precedents in judgement, and sit in the seat of justice, and yet for all that are no magistrates at all. The bishops also sit in public judgement, and seat of justice, and have the hearing of causes: For when Lentulus the Great Bishop, made relation unto the Senate, of the decrees of the college of Bishops, and the law Clodia, concerning the consecration 
The ancient bishops in Rom●… no magistrates▪ and why.  of Cicero's house, thus he began his speech, Pontifices religionis sunt judices, legis Senatus, The Bishops (said he) are judges of religion, and the Senate of law. So do the Cadies, or Mahometan Bishops in the East; and yet for all that they are no magistrates, considering that they had or have no power to command, nor to call men before them, to imprison them, or to put their own judgements in execution: neither have they any sergeant or officer whom they can command, no more than have the Cadies, or Paracadies in Turkey, or the ancient bishops of Rome; which is a thing worth the marking. And sometimes clean contrary, some have authority and power to command, which have no jurisdiction or hearing of the cause at all, as we will hereafter shortly show. And that more is, the Commissioners of public extraordinary causes, in ancient time deputed by the people of Rome, whom the law calleth quaestores parricidij, had (as at this present Commissioners appointed by the prince have) power to hear the cause, to sit in justice, to judge, to command, to compel, and yet for all that were no magistrates. Which being so, none of the aforesaid definitions can be good. Besides that there is another fault in them, for not having distinguished the magistrates from the other officers, nor made any difference betwixt an officer, & a commissioner; whereof a great confusion and medley of commissioners and officers must needs ensue. Carolus Sigonius, who seemeth more curiously to have searched into the definition of a Magistrate, is yet therein many ways also deceived: For he calleth all them magistrates which have any public charge of worldly affairs, without making of any difference between officers and commissioners, or betwixt the magistrates and other officers, which have also public charge; besides that he giveth power to all magistrates, to judge, to command, and to put in execution, even unto the Aruspises. Howbeit as a definition aught not to extend farther, or less way, than doth the thing that is defined: so aught also the description of a magistrate in this our treatise of a Commonweal, to agreed to all magistrates of all Commonweals indifferently.  
Now in the definition by ourselves proposed, we first said, all officers (whither they 
The difference be twixt magistrates and private men, as also betwixt magistrates and commissioners.  were magistrates, or magistrates servants) to be public persons: who in that differ from private men: for that private men have nothing to do with the affairs of the Common weal. We said also the Magistrates to have an ordinary charge, whereby to differ from Commissioners, who have also public charge, but yet extraordinary, according to the occasions in the occurrents of time presented: such as were in ancient time the Dictator's, criminal Quaestors, and other judges extraordinarily by the people of Rome appointed, at the motion and request of the Magistrates. And last of all we 
Offices not to be erected, but by express edict, or law.  said, their ordinary charge to be to them by law limited and bounded: for the erection of their public ordinary charges, erected by the name of offices, which otherwise should be no offices, if there were not for them an express edict or law. A thing always observed in the ancient Commonweals both of the Greeks and Latins; and now also better than ever: and to this end Princes 'cause their edicts to be published, in their sovereign and inferior courts: and in this realm of France, the charters of offices newly erected are sealed with green wax, with labels of green and read silk, and this style, viz. To all men present and to come, with a continuance perpetual: whereas the letters patents of commissions, are sealed with yellow wax, with a label of plain parchment, without any perpetuity. And albeit that all Corporations and Colleges be granted by the prince with a charge by law limited for ever, as I have said; yet so it is, that if the king will augment or increase the number of the corporation or colleges of judges, or other magistrates, yea or of the most base or vile officers: as of Sergeants, criers, trumpetours, land measurers, brokers, and such like, it must be done by public edict, verified and enrolled: of examples whereof all the records of the courts of justice are full. But whereas we said the laws concerning officers to be perpetual, 
Offices to be perpetual although that the officers oftentimes change.  that is to be understood of the perpetuity of the offices, which continued for ever after they be once by edict erected, (what time soever it be that is prescribed unto the officers themselves,) until that by contrary edicts or laws the same offices be again put down. Although the officer hold his place but for the space of eighteen months, as did of long the Censors their censorship, (which for al●… that was at length prorogued for five years, for that so great an office could not in less time well be discharged,) or for a year: as did all the other offices in Rome, by the law Villia: or for six months, as did the Senators of Florence, after it was a popular estate: or for two months, as did the six counsellors of the signory which are assistant unto the duke of Venice: or for one day only, as the Captains of the two fortresses of the castle of Rhaguse, 
Laws never awhit the stronger for being written  whose office is perpetual, albeit that their command last but for one day. But howsoever it be that offices be erected with ordinary and public charge, it must still be done by law: not for that it is needful to have parchment to writ it in, or green wax to seal it with, or yet magistrates to publish the edicts concerning the erection of such offices: for the writing, the seal, the verification, albeit that they give credit unto the laws which are made, yet make they no laws; no more than they do other acts and contracts. But to the contrary there were never laws more strong or better kept, than those of the Lacedæmonians, which Lycurgus forbade to be written, and were for that cause called Rhetes: for so he was persuaded that they should the rather remain inviolat and of long continuance, if they were once writ in the hearts of his citizens, and not in tables, in their minds, and not in books. The Athenians in like case had a certain form of presenting their requests unto the people, which if the people received, it then passed into the force of a law: which they used to engrave in brass, and to fasten it unto a pillar, jest any man should under the colour of ignorance excuse himself in transgressing the same. So when question was for the erecting of an hundred new Senators in Athens out of the two new Tribes of Antigonus and Demetrius, the law for the erection of them was published unto the people: which was also done in the erection of all other offices as is to be seen in Thucydides, Plutarch, and Demosthenes. 
All offices in Rome erected by one or other express law.  The like is to be said of the Roman magistrates: for the Consuls were created by the law junia: and the Tribunes of the people by the law Duillia: and when question was for the creating of one of the Consuls out of the people, it was done by the law Licinia. And afterward the Praetor for the administration of justice in the city was made by the law Sextia. And the four Praetors for public criminal causes, (beside the other before erected) by the laws Cornelia and Baebia. So may we also see of all the other Magistrates erected by the Emperors: that it was always done by express Edict, wherein the time, the place, and their ordinary charge are limited. As in all the first & twelft books of the Code, and in the Edicts of justinian it appeareth where every magistrate hath his particular Edict.  
We have put also into our definition of an Officer, that he must have an ordinary 
An officer always hath an ordinary charge, and in that he differeth from ●… commissioner whose charge is always extraordinary.  charge, for that the commands of the people of Rome granted by commissions and extraordinary charges were aswell called by the name of Laws, as were those that were made for ordinary offices: the charge, the time, and place being still limited by commission: as a man may see by the commissions granted unto the Dictator's, which were sometime made by the decree of the people, as I have before showed. And also by the commission granted to Pompee for five years, therein to end the pirates war: with command over all the coasts and haven towns of the Mediterranean Sea, all granted unto him by the law Gabinia. As also by commission given him for the war against king Mithridates, granted by the law Manilia. But forasmuch as these were not but extraordinary charges, a man could not call them offices, which are still ordinary and perpetual. And for because those wars were in short time to be ended, it was not meet therefore to created a new magistrate, whose office and charge should be perpetual, but only extraordinarily to commit the care of that war unto a most sufficient Captain and General: unto whom five years time was limited at the request of Catulus: to the intent that Pompee in that time might end the war, and not longer to protract it to be so always in employment: Or if the war were sooner ended, that then his commission should end also. And all such extraordinary charges we call by the name of Commission. The Dictatorship was also a charge given by commission, and not an ordinary power: for why, the Dictator was not but extraordinarily and without law nominated by the Interrex or Consul, some great matter so requiring: and for that all offices ceased the Dictator being created, his commission was limited but unto six months at the most, and if he had sooner dispatched the business for which he was appointed Dictator, his commission then also expired, and his authority ceased; as we have by many examples before declared. And as a man may see by 
* Livi●… lib. ●….  Aemilius Mamercus, who chosen Dictator, and the same day having dispatched the business for which he was chosen, the very next day following gave up his charge: showing therein how little he liked of long rule or authority. Howbeit such is the nature and power of all Commissions, as that according to the pleasure of 
Commissions to depend of the pleasure of him or them that have the sovereignty in the state.  him that hath the sovereignty, they may be either revoked or prorogued. And albeit that commissions in Popular and Aristocratique Commonweals are almost still livre mitted unto a certain time: yet in a Monarchy that extraordinary and permissive charge is tied to no time at all: for why, in Popular and Aristocratique estates and governments, the greater the charge is given by commission, the more need it is to have it in short time expired; lest longer power might give occasion to ambitious 
The greater the charge is that is given by come mission the shorter time it aught to endure.  minds to take unto themselves the government, and so to oppress the liberty of the state. And therefore the dictatorship was but for six months, neither was that power ever longer prorogued to any man in that free Commonweal, except to Furius Camillus. For at such time as the people of Rome had extraordinarily created the Decemuiri with a yearly and sovereign power, for the reforming of their old laws and customs, and the making of new and more commodious for the state: their commission 
Large and long commissions dangerous to the state.  which should not have passed, a year being expired, was again by the people for another year prorogued, with absolute and sovereign power: and all other magistrates suspended during the time of their commission; until that out of the best laws of other cities they had gathered the laws of the twelve tables. Upon which continuance of bearing rule, these Decemuiri took occasion to oppress the liberty of the state, and to take upon themselves the sovereignty, had it not by force again been wrong out of their hands, and that no without the great trouble and turmoil of the city. For which cause the people from thenceforth erected the offices of the Tribunes of the people, as defenders and keepers of their liberty; who alone of all the magistrates held their places after the creation of the dictator, all other magistrates and officers being for that time suspended. The Florentines did otherwise, who almost every sixt year extraordinarily created eight or ten Commissioners, with sovereign power, and without limitation of time, for the ordering of their Commonweal, and the reforming of the abuses therein: who being once created, all other their magistrates ceased. By which mean these ambitious in effect took upon themselves the government, albeit that in outward appearance they made fair show of the giving up of their charge. For the suspending of all magistrates in general, is a thing right dangerous, not only in Popular and Aristocratike estates, but even in a Monarchy also: which yet I never knew to have happened in this kingdom of France, but at such time as king john was taken prisoner by the Englishmen: For then Charles the fift having gotten of his father the government of the kingdom, appointed fifty commissioners for the reforming of the Commonweal, with power to examine the doings and abuses of all the other magistrates, from whom as then all power was taken. At which time the Commonweal destitute of governors, was by the seditious wonderfully disturbed: but more of these things in their place.  
But the better and the more easily to understand the difference betwixt an office and 
The difference betwixt an office and a commission.  a commission, a man may in some sort say, that an office is a thing borrowed, which the owner cannot demand again before the time it was lent for be expired: but a commission is a thing which one hath but by sufference, end as it were by leave, which the owner may again demand when he seethe good. And that is it for which Tacitus merrily speaking of the reign of Galba, which continued but three months, saith, Praecarium seni imperium, & brevi transiturum, The old man's empire was but by sufference and in short time to pass away: not for that he had indeed his empire by sufferance, but for that he was now grown extreme old, and being unfit for the government of the empire, foresaw that in short time it must again by natural death be taken from him, although he had not (as indeed he was) been before slain. Howbeit a Commission is of such nature, as that it expireth so soon as the charge thereof is executed, although it be not revoked, or that the time was granted longer for the execution thereof, and yet nevertheless may be always revoked, whensoever it shall please him that granted it, whether the matter for which it was granted be yet entire or not, as we have before showed by the example of the Dictator's. And to this purpose there is an old deeree of parliament yet extant in the records of the court of Paris, against the pursuivants sent to Troy with the judges for the public extraordinary causes, being indeed none of the body of the court, who (the commission expired) nevertheless yet bearing themselves as pursuivants, were by the court commanded to resign up their office, and a decree made them to be no officers at all.  
I stand longer upon this point, which although it may seem easy unto men of experience, yet unto others it may seem strange: yea two of the greatest orators of their time, namely Demosthenes and Aeschines grounded the state of their orations and pleas upon this point. For when Ctesiphon had presented a request unto the people, That it would please them, that Demosthenes for his good deserts towards the Commonweal (and namely for having most strongly fortified the walls and castles of the city of Athens) might in the open theatre be rewarded with a crown of gold. Aeschines Demosthenes his greatest enemy, opposed himself against the entertainment of the request, alleging for the cause thereof, That by the law no man was to be rewarded, except he had first given an account unto the people of his office well discharged, as all magistrates were bound to do. Demosthenes for that it concerned his own honour and reputation, taking the matter in hand, made of all others a most excellent oration for Ctesiphon, or more truly to say, for the crown he would have had, alleging, That the law spoke not but of Magistrates; and that charge of repairing and fortifying of the walls and other fortresses, was no magistracy or office, but only a simple commission; and therefore in his vulgar tongue saith, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. 
To fortify is no magistracy but a certain charge and ministry.  Which the Latins properly called Curatio, which is to say a Commission. Whereby it appeareth, that public charge, for repairing of the walls, not to have been an ordinary matter, but extraordinary, for that there is not still need for to repair them. Neither aught it to seem strange, if Demosthenes well knew to distinguish and put a difference betwixt a commission and an office (as having been of long time exercised in the public affairs, and as it were in the midst of the Commonweal) both which Aristotle altogether confounded. The one of them also having always managed the affairs of state; and the other as saith Laertius, never intermeddling therein. And that is it for which Nicholaus Grouchius, and Carolus Sigonius, for not having understood the difference betwixt an office and a commission, have so much troubled themselves with replies and rejoinders, without any resolution at all, as men ignorant in the knowledge of matters of law and of state. All which shall I hope be well manifested, by that which shall be set down in this book.  
In the laws of Charlemaigne Commissioners were called missi, a mittendo; which signifieth sent; which the Germane call by an old word Skaken: whereof they called the court of judges, which were extraordinarily sent into the provinces (& were indeed nothing else but Commissioners) Scacarium. But here perhaps may some man say, That the Commissioners of the castle of Paris, and judges of the court of Requests of the Palace, are also officers: which being so, how could it then be, that an office and a commission should not be also all one? Whereunto I answer, That of ancient time 
Commissioners turned into judges, and yet still known by the name of commissioners  those judges were but simple commissioners, with authority and power during pleawho yet afterwards for the common good and profit were made perpetual officers, with an ordinary and perpetual charge and power committed unto them them: their old and former name of commissioners, yet by abuse or for the honour of that court still remaining: whereby those judges of the court of Requests, are yet called the Commissioners of the Parliament; as judges appointed, and again to be revoked at the pleasure of the prince. Which judges of the court of Requests (for all that) cannot now be revoked by the king himself, except they first be by capital judgement condemned, or willingly of themselves resign their places: for so it was by the law of jews the eleventh provided. Not for that commission is incompatible with an office, most part of compassions being not directed but unto magistrates or officers: but for that an officer in the quality of an officer, cannot be also a commissioner, for the self same charge limited unto him by his office. For such commissions as they call Excitatives, extraordinarily directed unto officers for matters concerning the reviving the jurisdiction, or authority of their offices, are not properly commissions, if the time or the place be not by the commission altered; as to judge according to the latter proceed, and to leave the former: for after that the time and order appointed by the law, is altered by the authority of the prince or magistrate, it is to be now determined by commission. Now the difference herein which the lawyers hold, is nota●…le, as▪ That if any officer have judged of a fact contained in his commission, in the quality of an officer, that his judgement is nought: but yet that is to be understood in a thing which concerneth not his office: For if there be a concurrence of the commission Excitative, with the charge contained in the erection of his office, the ordinary hearing of the cause is to be preferred before the commission, even as the quality of the officer is to be preferred before the quality of the Commissioner; and the acts of the officers more assured than the acts of the Commissioners. And so in such concurrence of authority, if the officer commissionat also in a matter belonging to his own charge, have not declared in what quality he had the hearing of the cause: the act by him done shall be taken, as the act of an officer, to the intent it may be the more firm and sure. It is also 
Extraordinary commissions extenuating the authority of the magistrate odiou●….  manifest, extraordinary commissions extenuating the power and authority of magistrates or officers to be odious, or at leastwise less gracious, if they be not for the reforming and amending of the abuses and corruption of the officers. As they do in Venice, from five years to five years: And every year in Genes, where the Sindies are afterwards Commissioners, to hear the abuses committed by the magistrates & officers (which in ancient time in Athens was given to certain ordinary magistrates) as also at Rome by the law Bebia▪ when as before Quaestors or judges were by commission appointed by the people. That extraordinary hearing of causes of the judges by commission, was also gracious; which Vespasian the emperor appointed for the hearing and determining of suits and controversies, which in the time of the civil wars were grown infinitely, and for the deciding whereof the whole lives of all the magistrates would have scarce sufficed. Commissions may also be granted for things concerning the greater part of officers, or a whole corporation or college, in which and like cases commissions are necessary. And I remember that king Charles the ninth, having directed his letters patents, in the year 1570, for the general reformation of the waters and forests of Normandy, which drew after it question of the fairest of his demain; from the hearing whereof the precedent and councillors of the parliament of Rouen were forbidden: Which interjection although they left nothing unattempted to have letted, yet so it was, that in fine they agreed thereunto, after that I had again and again presented unto them the king's commands, to that effect and purpose, and commenced suit not only against the principal men of that provincial court, about matters concerning my commission, but also against the whole body and corporation of the city of Rouen, for the rights which they pretended against the king; and that, that was the cause for which I had obtained the interdiction.  
But briefly, and yet more plainly and plentifully to make plain all sorts of Commissioners, whether they be for the government of provinces, or for the wars; or 
divers sorts of commissioners, and from whom they have their commissions.  for the administration of justice, or for the king's receipts and treasure, or other things concerning the state. We say, that the commissions come still from the sovereign prince, or from the magistrates, or from commissioners deputed by the sovereign prince; for a fourth there is not. Again Commissioners deputed, are either taken out of the number of magistrates and officers, or out of other private men. And if the commission be directed unto the magistrates or officers, it is either for matter belonging unto them by their office, or otherwise not belonging unto them. And in what sort soever it be that commission be directed, whether it be to an officer, or a particular person, it is directed with power and authority to hear and proceed in the cause; either without appeal, or else with appeal reserved unto the sovereign prince, (if the commission came from him) or unto the magistrates named in the commission; or else a commissioner is appointed by him whom the sovereign hath deputed: as sometime commission is given out for the instruction of the affairs, or proceed unto the definitive sentence exclusively ro inclusively, saving the execution thereof, if appeal be made. Sometime also Commissioners are appointed by the magistrars to examine a fact, or the right of a matter, or both the one and the other together; sometimes without any power or command, and sometime with both.  
This division extendeth to all Commissioners, in what form of Commonweal soever it be. As is to be seen in the state of the Romans, where the managing of the wars, and government of the countries and provinces newly conquered, at the first belonged unto the ordinary magistrates and officers, viz. the Consuls, Praetors, and Quaestors, yea even a good way from the city, whilst that the Roman empire was yet 
The governour●… of the provinces in the Roman empire nothing but commissioners  contained within the bounds of Italy: But after that the bounds thereof were extended further, they then began to appoint Commissioners to govern their provinces, in stead of their ordinary magistrates, who although they were all by one name called Potestates, yet for all that they governed the provinces in stead of Consuls, Praetors, and Quaestors: they were also called Proconsul's, Propraetors, Proquaestors, that is to say, Commissioners, or Lieutenant sent in stead of Consuls, Praetors, or Quaestors: As is in Livy to be seen, who speaking of Philo the first Proconsul saith, Actum cum Tribunis Plebis est, ad populum ferrent ut cum Philo Consulatu abijsset, pro consul rem gereret, The tribunes of the people were dealt with, that they would move it unto the people, that when Philo was out of his consulship he might rule as proconsul. But after that the empire was grown great, and also extended far, such commissions were by the sufferance of the people granted by the Senate, to such as were lately go out of their offices in the city, who agreed among themselves for the government of the provinces; or if they could not so fall to agreement, cast lots for them, which they called C●…mparare inter se, & sortiri: Except the charge and commission were of such consequence and importance (by reason of some great war already risen, or like to arise in the province) as deserved to have some valiant and great captain without lot thereunto by the Senate appointed: Where if any partaking or factions chanced to arise about the matter, the people at the request of the Tribunes appointed one thereunto by commission. As it did Scipio Africanus, to whom the people gave commission for the managing of the wars in Spain and Africa, and by that means drew Hannibal out of Italy, and discharged that country of a long and most dangerous war. The like commission was without lot extraordinarily by the people also granted to Paulus Aemylius, to make war against Perseus' king of Macedon. And so also to the great captain Pompey against the pirates, by the law Gabinia, and against king Mithridates, by the law Manilia: all they which the year before had borne office, being rejected, the people naming whom they pleased and best liked. Howbeit that this was no usual matter, but right seldom times done: For ordinarily the Consuls, Praetors, and Quaestors discharged, and so going our of their offices in the cities, cast lots for the provinces, if they could not otherwise agreed for the government of them among themselves: 
The cause of the civil war betwixt ●…illa and Marius.  and for that the charge of the war against Mithridates by lot fell unto Cor. Sylla, Marius by the working of Pub. Sulpitius, one of the Tribunes by him suborned, caused it to be by the people taken from him; and by extraordinary commission given unto himself: which was the cause of the most cruel and bloody civil war that ever was in Rome. So also was the province extraordinarily appointed unto Cato Vticensis, against Ptolomee king of Cyprus; which by him undertaken, Clodius boasted, That he had plucked out Cato's tongue, which had always before been at liberty to speak against extraordinary powers and commissions. Sometime also if the horribleness of some enormous fact required a more severe trial, the matter was propounded unto the people, who put it over by commission unto the Senate; which out of the body of itself appointed some one or more, not only for instructions, but even to hear and end the matter. As when Lucius Tubullus the Praetor, had with grievous extortion most filthily polluted the Tribunal seat, and perverted justice; so that the people leaving the ordinary course, and the magistrates to whom the hearing of the matter belonged, referred it wholly unto the Senate by extraordinary commission: the Senate forthwith deputed Cn. Scipio to judge and end the cause. So also when Tiberius the emperor by commission appointed the Senate to inquire of the murders committed betwixt the Nucerians & Neapolitans: the Senate deputed the Consuls to inquire thereof. Yea sometime the senate without commission from the people, but as it were by mere sovereignty appointed commissioners, if the case in question were committed in Italy, out of the territory of the city of Rome, as a thing belonging to the Senate, apart from all others; as saith Polybius: as it happened in a strange robbery and murder, whereof Cicero speaketh in his book De Claris Oratoribus; to the hearing whereof (he saith) the Senate deputed the Consuls. By which examples here before produced, it appeareth 
Whether commissioners appointed by the prince, or people having the sovereignty, may appoint their Deputies and so commit the matter to others.  that Commissioners appointed by the prince, or people having the sovereignty, whether they be magistrates or private men, may appoint their deputies, and so commit the matter to others, if it be not expressly forbidden them by their commission so to do; or that question be of the estate itself in the commission: as the ambassadors or Commissioners which are to entreat of peace, or alliance, or other such like things cannot commit the same to others. As is also to be said if question be of the life, ●…ame, or state of any man: wherein the manner and examination for better instructions may be deputed to others, but not the judgement itself, except the judge before appointed by commission excuse his absence by sickness or some other lawful cause. But justinian the emperor afterwards ordained better by form of a perpetual edict, That Commissioners appointed by the prince, should depute nothing of their commission to others more than the instructions of the suit: neither thought he that sufficient, but decreed also, that the Commissioners appointed by the prince should themselves hear the appeal, and instructions of the suit. But to meet with all that is to be met with, the most sure rule is to have all that is committed, particularly in the commission, expressed, and so the commissioners to be ruled by the commission, as is the manner in all well established Commonweals.  
And albeit that a man might make many questions concerning commissions granted, as well by the sovereign prince, as by the magistrates, in time both of peace and war: yet will I thereof touch but two or three, and those most necessary to be understood of them which have the managing of the affairs of state, whether it be in peace or war. Wherhfore leaving the rest, and to be brief: we say that the 
divers wai●… whereby commissioners cease.  commission ceaseth by the death of him that granted the same, or by his revoking of the commission: or in case that the commissioner during the time of the commission, obtain some office or preferment equal to him that granted the commission: for then one of them cannot command the other. But as for the express revocation 
Whether the acts of a commissioner done after his commission revoked, and yet before he had knowledge of the revocation thereof, be good or not?  declared by the prince's letters or edicts, concerneth as well them which are ignorant of such revocation of their authority and commission, as them which know it. And albeit that the acts of a commissioner so revoked, done after the revocation of the commission, and yet before the knowledge of such a revocation to him given, hold for good but in regard of particular men, towards whom the commissioner hath executed his commission; and especially, if they have voluntarily yielded unto the commissioner, knowing the commission to be already revoked: and that towards others the acts of the commission after the revocation of the commission, are of none effect by the rigour of the law, yet equity and reason bindeth them thereunto, until that the commissioners or appointed judges do know that their commission is revoked. For as a commissioner hath no power until he have received his commission: so likewise the commission dureth, until the revocation thereof be signified; or at leastwise until the commissioner know that it is revoked. And therefore Celsus saith, that the acts of the governor of a province are good and available, if the commissioner know not that his commission is called in. And although Pope Innocent were of opinion, that it was otherwise to be judged, if question were of life or honour, and was therein of many followed, yet he continued not in that opinion. And albeit that he was a pope 
A good decree of Pope Innocent the fourth.  & sovereign prince, and a man most skilful in both the laws, yet willed he no greater authority to be given unto his writings than to other men's, neither to rest thereon further than there were good and strong reason therefore. But to take away these ancient difficulties, the secretaries to the state have used to join unto commissions, and almost to all mandates and letters patents this clause, A die qua rescriptum Significabitur, From the day that the rescript shall be notified: which clause if it be omitted, yet is it always necessarily to be understood. And thus much concerning the express revocation of a commission.  
So also a Commission taketh end by the death of him that granted it, be he 
Whether a commission always taketh end by the death of him that granted it?  prince or magistrate; provided always, that the thing committed be yet whole and entire: for otherwise the commissioner may continued that which he hath begun, so that it be done without fraud. But it is fraud in law, when a Commissioner not advertised by a pursuivant or express rescript (but by some other certain means) of the death of the prince, the matter being yet whole, nevertheless proceedeth therein. Now the matter is not whole and entire, which cannot by the Commissioner be left off without proiudice to the public state, or to the right of private men: as in matter of justice, if the parties have contested, the thing is no more entire, but the Commissioners may and aught to go through with that they have begun, whether it be the prince or the magistrate that hath given them commission. And so in war the matter is said not to be entire, if the battle stand ranged before the enemy, and that the retreat cannot without evident peril be made: in which case the general is not to forbear the giving of battle, although he be certainly informed of the death of the prince; or that it be forbidden him to join battle. So if rebellion arise, which cannot otherwise be appeased but by the execution of the authors thereof; that is first to be done, and afterward knowledge thereof to be given, (as saith the lawyer) although the death or countermand of the prince happen or come in the mean time. Yet the commissions coming from the prince, or letters mandatory, are in that different from the other letters royal, which they call letters of justice: for that these coutinue in their force and virtue, whereas the letters of command expire after the death of the prince. Yet nevertheless the new prince oftentimes ratifieth that which was done by the commandment of his predecessor, although he died, the matter yet whole and entire, and the rather if it be well and for his profit done; which the magistrates cannot do to the commissioners by them appointed, for that their ratifications in terms of justice are never to be received. And thus much concerning all the sorts of Commissioners.  
Now, that we have already said of Commissioners, hath no place in officers, for 
Whether the power of officers ●…nd together with the death of the prince?  that their power endeth not together with the death of the prince, although it be in some sort holden in sufferance, and as it were suspended until they have letters from the new prince, or confirmation from him for the continuance of their offices. And for this cause the parliament of Paris after the death of king jews the eleventh, decreed that the officers should continued in their charge, as they had before done, until that they received command to the contrary from the new king; following therein an ancient decree given in like case in the month of October, in the year 1380. Howbeit the court of Toulouse after the death of Charles the seventh, otherwise decreed than had the parliament of Paris, viz. That all their jurisdiction should cease, until they had received new commandment from the new king; and yet that if any occurrents should chance wherein the authority of the court should be requisite, that then the court should proceed by letters and commissions, entitled The people holding the Parliament royal of Toulouse, firmed with the seal of the court, without any mention making of the king. But forasmuch as the king coming unto his kingdom by right of succession, useth his majesty before he be consecrated; as it was judged by a decree of the parliament of Paris, the nineteenth of April, in the year 1398 (contrary to the opinion of many) it belongeth not unto any officers, parliament, or Senate, to doubt of the power or majesty of the prince: which if it were not, neither were they to have any authority or power: neither are in any other sort to proceed, but as officers unto the king, and under his obeisance. But if it were lawful for the people to make choice of their king, as it is in Polonia, Denmark, and Hungary; (where the kings being dead, the majesty of the kingdom is to return unto the people) another thing were to be said: For then the magistrates use not the prince's name in the vacancy of the kingdom (for that then there is no king) but every one of them do their lawful acts and duties, as if they had such power from the Senate and the people) by force of the law, and power proper unto the magistrates: whereas Commissioners and judges extraordinarily appointed, can by no means (the prince being dead) hold their authority and power; for that they do nothing by the virtue of the law or of ordinary power: and not for that commissions be odious, and offices gracious (as some have thought) for oftentimes a commission is more gracious, yea and more profitable also unto the Commonweal, than any officers ordinary power. And as for the decree of the parliament of Paris (bearing date the sixteenth of October 1381) whereby it was ordained, that the king's edicts and commands should have like power the king being dead, that they had whilst he yet lived; that is so to be understood, if the charge committed be then begun to be put in execution. And therefore if the power of the magistrates be annual, and the king die before the magistrates year be expired, yet may the magistrate nevertheless hold his office for his year: or if it be perpetual, continued the same in such sort and so long as the law giveth him leave, for that his office dependeth not of a simple command 
Offices by law established, are not but by contrary edicts or laws to be put down.  which may still be revoked, or of a charge which cannot be recommaunded, but is grounded upon a law, received, published, verified, and registered: in such sort as that his office cannot be suppressed but by a contrary edict or law. As when question was for the suppressing of the military Tribunes, (for the discord betwixt the Senate and the people, before created with the power of the Consuls) and in their steady to restore again the Consuls, it could not be done until that by the law Licinia, that power of the Tribunes was again taken away. And in our time when as the fift and sixt precedent of the parliament of Paris were to be suppressed, they were not yet therefore displaced (for that against their wills they could not, except that for some capital crime they had been before condemned) but an express edict was made, that after their death none should be more placed in their rooms, but so their offices to be suppressed. So by a general edict made by Charles the ninth, at the request of the estates of Orleans, in the year 1560, all offices erected after the death of king Francis his grandfather, were again suppressed. And often times it happeneth, that one officer is by one law made; but more often, that many are made at once: as when threescore sergeants were at once created by one edict of king Francis the first; and the criminal judges at once erected throughout the realm by an edict in the year 1527▪ when as before the same man was judge both of criminal and civil causes. Which course was so straightly observed and kept in the kingdom of France, as that the very clerks of the clerk of the parliament, were by express edict made an office, though afterwards by another edict again suppressed, at the instance of the chief clerk, in the year 1544: as were other small charges, which the Roman Commonweal were by the magistrates themselves commonly given unto their servants, without any law at all. Neither is it sufficient for the magistrates and other officers to be by the law created, but that their successors also have a particular declaration, to testify that they have obtained their offices, and yet no need of any new edict or law. And for this cause the prince's commissions directed unto the officers in the quality of officers, continued in force to their successors: for that the prince therein maketh choice of the magistrate or officer, and not of the person: but if choice be made of any man's person, whose name is expressed in the commission, he being dead, his successor in the same office cannot execute the commission, for that the prince made choice not of the magistrate but of the person.  
Yet there are other differences also betwixt an officer and a commissioner: for that 
The power of an officer or magistrate larger, than the power of a commission●….  the power of an officer besides that it is ordinary, it is also better authorised, and larger than is a commissioners, & that is it for which the Edicts and laws leave many things to the consciences and discretions of the Magistrates: who indifferently apply and interpret the laws according to the occurrents & exigence of the causes presented: Whereas Commissioners are otherwise bound, and as it were tied unto the very words of their commission, and especially where question is of the affairs of state: as in the charges and commissions of Ambassadors or Commissioners deputed to negotiate betwixt princes, where the Commissioners may not without danger of their lives pass one point beyond the lesson they have in writing, if this clause (which is often times put unto the charges and instructions of Ambassadors and Commissioners to treat with princes) be not thereunto annexed, viz. That if any thing else be to be done, the Ambassador shall at his wisdom and discretion, according to the change of places, times, and persons, have care thereof: much like unto that clause whereof Aeschines the Orator speaketh in the oration which he made for the defence of his legation; where he saith, that this clause put into the the commission of Ambassadors, viz. That they should do whatsoever they saw to be for the common good; extended not unto that they had in their express and particular charge: so that the aforesaid clause extendeth not unto the principal obligations and resolutions of treaties, as to the making or breaking of peace, but only unto the accessories and matters of less importance. As if question be of any thing to be granted unto the enemies or friends, for the enlarging of their power to the hurt of the Commonweal, it is not lawful for the Ambassadors without special command to entreat thereof: For seeing that in the less affairs of private men, an Attorney or Proctor having a general authority with full and entire power, may not yet for all that give, acquit, or alienate any thing, or give or take an oath of any person without a special charge; much less aught he so to do in things touching the public, and namely in things concerning the state: well may things done without commission, be confirmed, yet could they not of right without commission be so done. For albeit that in private matters he may say him 
In matters of state ●…e that goeth beyond his commission is worthily blamed, although that things fall out ●…er so well.  self to have well and duly executed his charge, which hath done it better than was to him enjoined, yet in public affairs of the estate it is not always so: for the Soldier which hath assailed the enemy, or the Captain which hath given battle contrary to the General's command, are both worthy of death, although they obtain the victory. For what could ever have more honourably been done, or more worthy eternal praise, than was that which was done by Fabius, colonel of the horsemen under Papyrius Cursor the Dictator? who with the loss but of an hundred men only, slew twenty thousand of the enemies; and yet for that he contrary to the Dictator's command had joined battle with the enemy, he was brought in question of his head, neither had so escaped, had not the Dictator (overcome by the earnest entreating of the people) so rested contented. And therefore Caesar in like case speaking of one of his captains called Syllanus, said him to have done well and wisely in not giving of battle, although he were sure to have carried away the victory: for that said he it is not the duty of a captain, to do any thing that is by his General forbidden him. Yea so much it concerneth not to do any thing that is forbidden in matters of war, as that the Lieutenant general to an other man, aught not to give the enemy battle, except it be so expressly given him in charge: which was the cause that the County of Aiguemond was shrewdly shent of the Spaniards, for giving battle unto the marshal de Termes (although he therein took him prisoner and discomfited the French army) for that he had hasarded the whole state of the low Countries, if he had lost the bartell. But this latter point is to be understood of such as be Lieutenants, or subject to the command of others, who by virtue, of their office have not power to command. For an officer, as the Consul, or in his absence his Lieutenant; or with us the Constable, the Marshal, or other General of the army, placed as in title of office, to have full and absolute command over the army, and to manage the war, may by virtue of his office, and without attending any other special command, make war upon the denounced enemies, pursue them and give them battle, besiege them, and take their fortresses and strong holds, and dispose of the army according to his discretion, if he have not express commandment to the contrary from his sovereign, and so his power suspended: yet having taken any strong places, or the enemy's General, he may not without special command deliver them, or yet make peace with the enemy. True it is, that in popular estates these points are not, neither can be so straightly 
Large●… commission●… to be given to generals for the wars in popular commonweals than in Monarchies, and why?  kept, the generals thereof themselves doing almost all; which in a Monarchy depend of the will and pleasure of one only prince: For why it is more easy to know the pleasure of the prince, than of the people; of one man, than of many thousands. As we may still see in Livy large commissions by the people given unto the generals of their wars▪ as in the wars against the Hetrusceans, all power was given unto Fabius, Omnium rerum arbitrium & a Senatu, & a populo, & a collega, Fabio Consuli Commissum, The disposing of all things (saith he) was both of the Senate, and the people, and his fellow in office committed to Fabius. And in another place, Initio liberum pacis at belli arbitrium permissum▪ At the beginning the free disposing of peace and war was committed unto him. And yet nevertheless they kept this difference betwixt them which had the managing of their wars by virtue of their office, and them which did the same by commission; as that the Consuls, Praetors, and others, having power to make war by virtue of their office, might avow and justify their own actions, without any other ratification, except they had taken upon them some thing that concerned the sovereignty of the people; whereas the Commissioners, if they therein passed their commission, must of necessity have their actions by the Senate or by the people ratified. As Pompey having had commission for the managing of the war against king Mithridate, passing farther made war also against divers other nations and people, at his pleasure bestowing the kingdoms, estates, and towns by him conquered and won: and albeit that the people would infringe or revoke nothing of that he had done, yet nevertheless after his triumph, he oftentimes requested the Senate, that those his doings might by it be ratified: and finding the Senate to make thereof difficulty, and to use therein long delays; he to strengthen and back himself against his enemies, and such as were about to look into his doings, joined himself in friendship and alliance with Caesar, so to make themselves both of them the stronger. For albeit that he had a general commission, and that in that case all was at his discretion: and therefore (as some think) needed no ratification: yet is it not so, the general clauses of commissions being always to be interpreted and ruled to the best good and profit of the Commonweal▪ not in any thing giving power to do that is hurtful unto the public state; which is not a thing lawful or permitted even unto a private man to do, having a charge in general terms committed unto him. Wherhfore these words expressed in commissions, be they Governors, Captains, judges, or ambassadors (for things to be done) 
General clauses in commissions for things to be done according to the description of the commissioners how they are to be understood?  At their discretion according to their wisdom; or at their will and pleasure: and others such like, are still to be so interpreted and vuderstood, as every good and wise man would interpret and understand them, still respecting the good and profit of the Commonweal: wherein if any fault be committed, accounted thereof is to be given; the lest fault that can be, being still in matters of state, and public interest to be inquired after: no excuse of error, or ignorance, being therein to be admitted or accepted. And much the less, if he which hath taken upon him such public charge had it not laid upon him, but was by him sought for: neither offered unto him, but by force by him extorted. For if private men's faults, when they have taken upon them the charge to do any thing one of them for another (although it be of their own accord) be not excusable; how should they then be excused in matters concerning the state and Commonweal.  
But to the intent that the force of Commissions and offices may the better be understood, it shall not be amiss to produce the examples of the ancient Romans, and to compare their manner of speech in the making of them, with that of ours. As in 
How the ancient Romans' gave extraordinary power unto their generals by commission.  that which Festus Pompeius saith, Cum imperio esse dicebatur apud antiquos, cui nomina▪ tim a populo dabatur imperium, He was said of the ancients to have power, to whom by name power was by the people given: which is as much as to say, by express commission, without appeal unto any other magistrate, unto whom so authorised the law gave power to command: For that a magistracy or office cannot be wishout power to command. So we see in Livy, at such time as Hannibal besieged Rome, Placuit▪ omnes qui Dictatores, consuls, Censoresue fuissent cum imperio esse, donec recessisset hostis a muris, that is to say, A decree was made (or commission given) that all such as had been Dictator's, Consuls, or Censors, should have power and authority to command, until the enemy were departed from the walls. So Cicero speaking of Augustus Caesar saith, Demus imperium Caesari, sine quo res military is geri non potest, Let us give (saith he) power and authority unto Caesar, without which military affairs cannot be managed. For why, Octavianus yet but young, could by the law neither bear office, nor lead the army, much less without power and authority take upon him a general's charge: and therefore Cicero persuaded, That the charge for the managing of the war should with power by commission be given unto him: which place of Cicero hath much troubled both Sigonius and Gruchius. For had Octavianus bene either Consul or Praetor, Cicero would not have used these words, for that he should then by law have had the power and command of a magistrate.  
Beside this, there was also a notable difference betwixt the manner of propounding 
The manner of propounding of requests unto the people for the creating of magistrates and commissioners in ancient time divers.  the request for the creating of a magistrate, and of a Commissioner: For the magistrate was usually created by virtue of the laws before made; the magistrate thus ask the people, Quos vellent consuls fieri, Whom they would to be made Consuls? and so of the other magistracies and offices being vacant. But for commissions of command, they used these words, Vellent iuberent ut huic vel illi imperium esset in hac vel illa provincia, If they willed and commanded that this or that man should have the government in this or that province. As is reported of Scipio Africanus, who had commission with power to command, although he were not yet of age to bear office, or to be a magistrate. And Cicero speaking of all sorts of commissions saith, Omnes Potestates, Imperia, curationes, ab universo populo proficisci convenit, It beseemeth all potestats, commands, and commissions, to come from the body of the whole people. Where by the word Potestates, he understandeth the governors of princes, who were properly so called. And by the word Imperia, Captains, who had particular commission to manage the wars (howbeit that the word Imperia, is understood also of the civil magistrates) with power to command. By the word Curationes, is meant all other charges, without power to command. The word Imperator, signifieth properly a general or chief captain, as Pliny speaking of Pompey, Toties Imperator antequam miles, So often a general before he was a soldier. But generally the word Curatio, importeth all sorts of commissions; as is easily to be gathered by this place of Cicero, Idem transfero in magistratus, Curationes, Sacerdotia: The same I transfer into magistracies, Commissions, and Priesthoods; which are the three sorts of public charges. Ulpian the lawyer allo well distinguisheth a magistrate from him whom he calleth Curator republicae, of whom he hath made an express book: whom the law calleth by a Greek word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; who had no power to condemn, nor to appoint any fine, which was lawful for all magistrates to do, as we have before showed.  
But it is to be noted, that all commissions pass into the nature of offices, as often as that 
How commissions pass into the nature of offices.  is by law made an ordinary charge, which was before done by commission, as we have by the examples of our own Commonweal before declared. And that which was before given at the pleasure of the magistrates, becometh also an office, if he that hath the sovereignty doth by law establish the same. As in ancient time the Consuls, as it were by commission made choice of the six Colonels, whom they called Tribunos militum, until that about 642 years after the foundation of the city of Rome, it was by an express law (made at the request of the Tribunes of the people) set down and decreed, That from that time forward it should be an ordinary office, and the people to have the choice of them: which was ever after observed, except some such great war were in hand, as that it was thought needful, that extraordinary choice should be made of those Colonels by commission: As in the Macedonian war against king Perseus, Licinius and Cassius the Consuls, made a motion unto the people, That the Tribunes, or Colonels of the soldiers, might for that year be chosen by the Consuls, as indeed they were. So likewise in ancient time also, the Consuls, Praetors, and other great magistrates made choice of their slaves and servants for their ushers, secretaries, sergeant, Trumpeters, and such like; as they did also in this realm, until the time of Philip the Fair, who was the first that took this power from the bailiff's and seneschals', and yet leaving unto the lords justices, power to establish sergeants and notaries in the provinces of their jurisdiction and territory. And in like case the king's attorney general, in the time of our fathers, made choice of such advocates as he thought best for the pleading of the king's causes; who are now as ordinary officers created by the prince himself, the particular commission before given unto the attorney general, being converted into the form of a most honourable office. And thus much in general concerning Commissioners and officers: it followeth now that we should also speak of Magistrates, and of such other things as are unto every one of them properly belonging.   

CHAP. III ¶ Of Magistrates.  
A Magistrate is a public officer, which hath power to command 
What a magistrate is.  in a Commonweal. And an Officer we said to be a kind of public person, who hath an ordinary charge by law appointed unto him. But a Commissioner we said to be a public person also, with a public, but an extraordinary charge, at the pleasure of the prince. Now orderly proceeding required that we should before speak of Commissioners, then of officers; for that they were before any lawyers or Officers established. For right certain it is, the 
The first commonweals governed without laws.  first Commonweals were by sovereign power governed without law, the prince's word, beck, and will, serving in stead of all laws, who both in time of peace and war, by commissions gave out charge to whom they pleased; and again at their pleasure revoked the same, all depending of their full and absolute power, being themselves not bound to any laws or customs at all. And that is it for which Pomponius writeth, the Roman Commonweal to have been at the first governed by regal power, without use of any law. And josephus the historiographer, in his second book against Appian, desirous to show the most honourable antiquity of the Hebrews, and of their laws, saith, That Moses of all others was the first that ever writ laws. And that in 
Moses the first that ever writ laws.  five hundred years after, the word Law was never heard of. Alleging in proof thereof, That Homer in so many books as were by him written, never useth this word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, or Law: a good argument that the first Commonweals used not but Commissioners, considering that an officer cannot be established without an express law (as we have said) to give him his ordinary charge, and limited to a certain time: a thing seeming to diminish from the power of sovereignty. For which cause kings and princes (jealous of their state and greatness) have usually annexed unto all their letters patents of office, an ancient clause retaining the mark of lordly Monarchy, viz. That the officer should enjoy his office so long as it stood with the prince's pleasure. Whereby it appeareth the officers power to depend of the prince's power▪ rather than of order. And albeit that this clause be to no purpose in the kingdom of France, for that by a law by jews the eleventh established, ordinary offices and charges, by the prince once lawfully bestowed, cannot from them on whom they are so bestowed be again taken, except they have committed some criminal cause worthy of death; and that in Spain, England, Denmark, Sweden, Germany, Polonia, and all Italy the like order be observed: yet for all that, the Secretaries of estate never forget the same: a great argument that all charges and offices were of ancient time in the nature of commissions; which whither it be profitable unto Commonweals or not, shall in due plaec be hereafter declared. But let us before speak of the Magistrate which whave before defined to be a common or public officer with power to command.  
Now there is no less difference amongst writers betwixt the officer and magistrate, 
All magistrates to be officers but not all officers to be magistrates.  than there is betwixt the officer and commissioner. For albeit that every Magistrate be an officer, yet every officer is not a magistrate; but only they be Magistrates which have power to command, which their greek names 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 well declare; 
All magistrates to have power to command.  as who should say Commanders, and the latin word Magistratus, which is as much as to say masters and commanders. And for that the Dictator was he which had the greatest power to command, the ancient writers called him Magister populi, the word Dictator signifying a Commander; as who should say, saying the word, and it was done: for that edicere is as much as to command, which is prope●… unto Magistrates: for that edicts are the Magistrates commands. Howbeit that many herein deceive themselves, who supposing the books written in latin in the name of Mar. Varro to be his, say that the Dictator is so called, quasi dictus ab interrege, as so called of the Interrex: But by the same reason the Colonel of the horsemen might be also called a Dictator; for that he was then also so appointed by the Dictator, as is to be seen through all the history of Livy, and should rather be called Dictatus, as a man appointed; in the signification passive, than Dictator in the active. Wherhfore Dionysius Halycarnasseus Varro his domestical friend better saith, the Dictator to have been so called as an Edictator, that is to say, a sovereign commander, and was therefore called Populi magister, or the Master of the people.  
Now we have before declared the definition of a Magistrate by the younger lawyers, and by Aristotle himself set down, to be in no wise to be allowed or maintained: 
Aristotle by the author impugned.  who call none but him a Magistrate which hath a deliberative voice in judgement, and in the privy counsel, with power to command; and principally saith he to command: for in his sixt book de Republica, seeing the number of officers to be infinite, whom he calleth all 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a name proper unto Magistrates having command in the Common weal: he findeth himself therein much entangled, for that he seethe others also besides them necessary for the ornament and glory of the Commonweal: and then after them all the Magistrates ministers, as sergeant, Ushers, Secretaries, Notaries, all whom he calleth by the common name of Magistrates: even as he doth them which have power to command: and so passing on further, saith, such ministers to have also power to command, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. And yet for all that in an other place 
〈◊〉 lib. 3. Politia.  he maketh question, whether that the judges and Orators are to be called Magistrates: whereunto he answereth, that a man may say them to be no magistrates, having no part of the command of the Commonweal; And therefore Cato Vticensis chastising the Registers, controllers, and Receivers, you aught (saith he) to remember your vocation, and that you are but ministers, and not Magistrates, as Plutarch reporteth. As for Preachers and Orators whom he calleth 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, if so it be that they have no command or ordinary power, it is right certain that they are no magistrates at all: but yet often times they are also Magistrates, I mean such as in Popular and Aristocratique estates and Commonweals have power to persuade or dissuade the people, to or from such things as they thought to be for them unprofitable or disprofitable, whom they called Rhetoras. Howbeit that in Athens every particular man, (so that he were fifty years old) had of himself power to speak; and the rest by the magistrates leave: whereas in Rome it was not lawful for any man to deliver any speech unto the people, but by the leave of the chief Magistrate in the assembly. And as for the doubt that he maketh of judges, as whether they be Magistrates or not, the resolution is easy, if we will grant the division of judges set down by justinian the emperor to be good: which is, that some of them be Magistrates, and some of them be not. We must therefore now confess, that amongst them which have public and ordinary charge; that is to say, of Officer's, some of them are Magistrates, (viz. such as have power to command) and some of them not, (as having no such commanding 
Which officer●… be also magistrates.  power) but serving only as the magistrates ministers: which division seemeth unto us necessary for the avoiding of such business as might arise of a division of itself imperfect. Wherhfore we have said that such public persons as have an ordinary charge limited unto them by laws, or by edicts, without any command at all, to be simple officers, whom the Emperors of latter times often times in their laws call officiales, being indeed but ministers unto the magistrates. The ancient Doctors of the law have for most part followed the opinion of Accursius, who set down neither any definition nor distinction of Officers; nor of Commissioners, nor of Magistrates; but simply saith, That there are four sorts of Magistrates, viz. them whom they called Illustres, the Spectabiles, the Clarissimos, and the Perfestissimos, to whom he giveth all command. All which are rather honourable qualities and titles attributed unto the magistrates and Officers, according to the conditions of their persons. Howbeit that in this division of them also according to their titles and qualities, he hath left out the Patricij, who were of greater reputation and dignity than the rest: as also the Augustales, who were superiors unto the Clarissimos: for why justinian the emperor appointeth these degrees of honour, the Patricij, Illustres, Spectabiles, Clarissimi, 
Acurs●… and Bartholus censured.  sive Speciosi, and the Perfectissimi, all which honours and titles were given aswell unto private men as unto magistrates. But as for that which Bartholus saith, That there are some which have honour without charge; as Counties and Marquises, unto whom for all that he attributeth power to command, and the administration of justice, it deserveth not answer; for that he therein is most manifestly contrary unto himself. So also is there small probability in that he saith, Scholmasters as magistrates to have jurisdiction over their scholars, and power to establish laws and ordinances: for so domestical power and the discipline of families should be also altogether confounded with the public jurisdiction, which we have before showed to be a thing impossible. Alexander Imolensis the greatest lawyer of his time, hath touched much nearer the true definition of a Magistrate: in that he saith, None to be Magistrates but they which are ordinary judges; And yet is not this enough: for why they are such magistrates as have power to command, and yet have not any ordinary jurisdiction: as the Censors, and the Tribunes of the people. And so to the contrary some there be (which being no magistrates) have an ordinary jurisdiction, but without any commanding power, without Pursuivant or Sergeant, as had in ancient time, and now also in every place the Bishops, who have the hearing and determining of all sacred and religious things, and yet were nevertheless no magistrates. The Bishops saith Lentulus are judges of Religion, and the Senate are judges of the law. So one may see neither the ancient nor late writers to have handled this point, or yet so much as touched the difficulties or differences of Officers, Magistrates, and Commissioners, as the matter well deserved. And albeit that the true definitions of Magistrates, officers, and commissioners be not to be found in the papers and writings of Lawyers, yet are the same to be gathered from them, and from the discourse of good histories. For Ulpian writeth it to be lawful for all magistrates, excepting the Duumuiri, by inflicting of judicial pains to defend their jurisdiction: which extendeth not only unto the imposing of fines upon the offenders, but even to the attaching of their goods and bodies, and casting of them into prison. And yet it appeareth (may some say) that Ulpian having excepted these Duumuiri (who were in like power that the Sheriffs were in towns without any jurisdiction at all) yet nevertheless accounteth them in the number of Magistrates▪ and seemeth also to say, these Duumuiri to have also had jurisdiction: For otherwise in vain were they excepted, if they had not such authority and power. And yet the same lawyer in another place saith, these Duumuiri to have had no jurisdiction nor the hearing of any causes whatsoever, but were only to receive needful cautions, and to deliver possession: which savoured more (as saith he) of power than of jurisdiction. And yet in this case (saith he) they were but simply the Praetor's deputies, who in their absence gave them this commission, for preventing gf the danger which might in the mean time happen, if men of necessity must be driven to run still unto the Praetors: who in like case also afterwards gave them power to appoint tutors unto the poorer sort of orphans for the preservation of their goods. Whereby it is evident them to have had no jurisdiction or power by virtue of their own magistracy, but only part of the Praetor's jurisdiction, and that also by leave and sufferance. But they which have nothing but such deputed or precarie jurisdiction, can of right call nothing thereof their own: Wherhfore whether the power of the Duumuiri consisted only in having power to command, or in jurisdiction, it was undoubtedly but by leave and sufferance: whereby it is to be understood, these Duumuiri not properly to have been at all magistrates. But they which have power to command, together with jurisdiction, may call men before them, attach them, and with penal judgement defend their jurisdiction, & also put their judgements in execution: whereas they which have power only to command without any jurisdiction, may well 'cause a man to be apprehended, but not proceed further. And in that some are deceived, who for that by the old law Alteria Tarpeia power was given to all magistrates, to impose fines unto the sum of threescore six shillings, therefore suppose all magistrates to have had judicial power also. For if the fine were by the magistrate imposed for public judgement sake (as by a Tribune of the people,) it was lawful for the party that was so fined either to pay the fine, without further examination of the matter, or to appeal unto the people, and so to try the cause of his fine, as is in Livy often times to be seen: which was done by the law Icilia. For why the fine of itself inflicted not any infamy upon the party so fined, but for the public crimes sake: as the punishment of beating with staves impaired not any man's reputation, but the cause wherefore he was so beaten. But if a fine were set upon him that had not obeyed the magistrate sending for him, or for not answering being asked, or for any other cause, not impairing his credit; it was lawful for the magistrate by taking of distress to exact the fine, without appeal: For that by the law Tarpeia, there was a certain stint and measure for fines appointed and set down unto the magistrate, that so the disobedient citizens might without any trouble of the state be kept in order, and their insolency restrained.  
Now the lest fine upon any man to be imposed, was one sheep; and the greatest 
The ancient fines that the Roman magistrates were to impose upon offenders.  too oxen, or thirty sheep: which for that according to the diversity of the cattle it made the penalty either lighter or heavier, and for that they could hardly be brought and looked unto in the city, a sheep was valued at ten asses, and an ox at an hundred, that is to say, at so many pound of brass. But afterward the riches and territory of the Romans increasing, extraordinary and greater fines were imposed, if greater cause so required. As Livy writeth of Fuluius, who for that he being Praetor and general against the enemy, the Roman army was put to flight, and he the Praetor reported to be the first that fled; the Tribunes of the people fined him at thirty thousand pieces of brass, when as before the greatest fine was but two oxen, or thirty sheep: howbeit that the fine was oftentimes forgiven, for that the sentence of the people condemning a man unto a fine, carried always with it the note of infamy.  
And for that we are by way of discourse drawn thus far, we will here amend an error in Aulus Gellius (about this matter) not as yet corrected. For he in his Noctes 
Aulus Gellius amend●…d.  Atticae, speaking hereof, writeth, The greatest fine to have been of thirty oxen, or two sheep; in stead of thirty sheep, or two oxen: and thereof gathereth, that as then there were more oxen than sheep in Italy, and that it was thereof called Italy: the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 with the Greeks', and with Varro signifying an ox. But Dionysius Halicarnasseus, Varro his domestical friend, writeth, That by the law Tarpeia, it was permitted to all magistrates, to impose fines: and yet a measure thereof to have been by the law appointed, viz. That the fine should not exceed two oxen, or thirty sheep at the most. In like error offendeth Festus Pompeius, and in the same words with A. Gellius; so that the one of them seemeth to have been deceived by the leading and authority of the other. Both of them also writ, a sheep in ancient time to have been called Ouis, in the masculine gender, which yet you shall no where found; although we see Boves for oxen, to be often times used in the feminine gender: But it may be that they mistook Duos O●…es, that is, Two Sheep, for Duos Boves, which is, Two Oxen. And lest any man should think me to attribute more to Dionysius Halycarnasseus a Graecian, than to Au. Gellius, or to Festus, both citizens of Rome, they themselves are of themselves refuted: For both of them confess, the least fine to be imposed, to have been a fine of one sheep; and the greatest, of thirty oxen, or two sheep: whereas (if they would have agreed with themselves) they should have said, the least fine to have been of one ox. Neither do we as yet see whom we may prefer in the searching out of the Roman antiquities, before this Dionysius Halicarnasseus, excepting Varro, whose domestical and familiar friend this man was, out of whom he had many good things: For as for the books which are in his name carried about in the Latin tongue, as well the foolishness thereof declare them to be none of Varroes, as for that in them it is read, many things to be in them spoken by contraries. But Au. Gellius writeth, Varro in his one & twentieth book Rerum Humanarum, to call Mulctam a Sabine word: but the latter Grammarians to take it to be so called by the contrary: whereby it is clear those books not to have been Varroes. Yet these things which we have written concerning the estimation of the cartel exacted for a fine, are confirmed by the authority of Demetrius Phalerius: For he writeth, a dram of silver to have been appointed by Solon's laws, for a reward to him that had killed a she wolf; but five drams unto him that had killed an he wolf: for that a she wolf easily killeth a sheep; but that the he wolf being stronger, killeth an ox. Whereby it is manifest, oxen to have been thrice as cheap in the country about Athens, as in Italy. For ten Asses, or the Roman Denarius over-weigheth the Greek dram. And in the same place in Au.▪ Gellius there is another more notable fault, where he saith, Mulctam, quae suprema dicitur, in singulos dies institutam fuisse, The fine which is called the greatest, to have been imposed every day: where the word dies, or days, is to be put out; for the meaning of the law was, that the greater fine might be exactect of every citizen in particular, if so be that many of them had in the same fault offended: for otherwise it had not been lawful for the magistrate the same day to impose divers fines, if many had offended: whereof the impunity of offences, and contempt of the magistrate should ensue. For proof hereof let that example of Au. Gellius serve, Marco Terentio quando neque citatus respondit, neque excusatus est, ego ei ovem mulctam dico, Forasmuch as Mar. Terentius, being summoned, answered not, neither made his excuse, I set the fine of a sheep upon him. Another error also there is in Festus, where he writeth T. Menenius Lanatus, & Sestius Capitolinus the Consuls, to have made the law concerning fines: for it is a thing not heard of, laws to have been made by the Consuls: and as for that law it was made in the year 297, after the building of the city: in which year Sp. Tarpeius▪ and Au. Aterius were chosen Consuls: but true it is, that about six years after 
The ancient manner of fines imposed upon offenders in Rome in Cartel, converted into fines in money.  T: Menenius, and Pub. Sestius Capitolinus, being Consuls, made a request unto the people, That the fine before imposed in cartel, might be converted into money, valuing every sheep at ten Asses, and every ox at an hundred. But whereas Dioxysius writeth it to have been lawful only for the Consuls to impose a fine, aught not to seem strange; for that at such time as the law was made, there was neither Praetor nor Aedile in Rome, the first Praetor being there made 386 years after the foundation of the city. And Cicero having as he thought best, made laws for his Commonweal, which he to the imitation of Plato had conceited, amongst the rest made one, whereby he giveth unto all magistrates jurisdiction and divination. But they which think the same to have been the very Roman laws which we see in Cicero, are much deceived; as we will hereafter show, all magistrates not to have had also jurisdiction, which yet seemed unto Cicero both good and profitable. And yet the magistrate that hath jurisdiction (to speak properly) whether it be that he have it in his own right, or from others, hath 
Power to command still annexed to jurisdiction.  also (saith a certain lawyer) all such things as without which he cannot exercise that his jurisdiction; that is to say, power to command: which is still said to be annexed unto jurisdiction, and without which jurisdiction is but vain and to no purpose. Whereof it followeth, that the jurisdiction of the ancient bishops, and of our bishops also, without power to command, was not properly a jurisdiction, but only a simple hearing and understanding of matters. For that which Lucullus the bishop said in the Senate, The bishops to have been the judges of religion, and the Senate of the law, tendeth to that end, and is so to be understood, as that when question is of religion, credit is to be given unto them, as is unto other men skilful in their professions and trades; or as unto judges appointed either for the bore examination of the fact, who are properly called Recuperatores (or as we term them Delegates:) or for the understanding of that is just and right, who more truly are arbitrators by law appointed, and not by the agreement of the parties, and yet are often called judges. And therefore we see the Vestal Virgins (in Livy) which had polluted their vi●…ginitie, to have been always chastised and punished by the Praetors of the city, but never by the bishops. And so when Publius Clodius was about to have committed adultery with Pompeia Caesar's wife, in the temple of the goddess Bona Dea, the full Senate had the determining of the matter, concerning the religion and sacrifices by him polluted. So in the beginning of the Christian religion, the Christian bishops (as Augustine, Nicephorus, and justinian do witness) had not so much as the lest jurisdiction of any matter, or the examination of the priests themselves: howbeit that justinian granted to them the examination of them that were of their own order and calling. Neither would our ancestors have any part of commanding power to be given unto bishops, and that the court of the parliament of Paris, hath oftentimes by the decrees and ordinances thereof witnessed. But why then (might some man say) do we see consistories, prisons, examinations, and fines to be permitted unto bishops? What other thing else do all these things declare, but a mere commanding power? Yea Philip the Fair, and king jews his son, granted unto the bishop of Paris power to apprehended and arrest men offending in his Diocese. Howbeit I suppose those former things to belong rather to their vocation, than to their power to command: for that the execution thereof belongeth unto magistrates: and yet such power of staying and apprehending granted to the bishop of Paris was by a decree of the Senate forthwith again from him taken. And although that not long since Henry the second had granted unto all bishops the power to stay and apprehended men for heresy and impiety: yet nevertheless was that law shortly after again abrogated. Yea the bishops themselves do in their own decrees profess themselves to have no power for the execution of any thing: yet is it with us permitted unto them, to stay and apprehended offenders, within the bounds of their consistories and courts; so that they go no farther.  
And when as fines contrary unto the laws were by the Bishops upon men imposed, the Parliament of Paris received every man's free appeal from them: yea and afterwards power was taken from them also, for calling of men before them; which they call, A lively summoning or Citation. For there is an old decree yet extant, whereby the Bishop of Paris was grievously fined, for that he had used such calling of men before 
The authority of the bishop of Rome not to be preferred before the authority of other princ●….  him. But when as the Bishops under the colour of ministering of oaths, and of the contempt of Religion, had with us drawn unto themselves the hearing almost of all matters, (for Alexander Immolensis was of opinion, the power of administering an oath to be sufficient to give unto the Bishop's jurisdiction also) the greater Courts forbade them under the colour of ministering an oath, to take unto them the hearing of any matter. And at length it was forbidden them also to have the hearing of the causes concerning the possession of benefices: and so after much, long, and hard suit, provided for by the decree of Martin the fist Bishop of Rome; which decree is yet extant in the public records. Yea the Spaniards truly, the most earnest defenders of the See of Rome, would not that their Bishops should have to do with any public or private judgements: except it were for Religion and Church matters, of which opinion I see Felinus (a man skilful in both the laws, and a most subtle interpreter of the Pope's decrees) to have been. And albeit that certain ambitious decrees do give unto the Bishop of Rome more authority and power than to all other princes and people: yet pope Innocentius the fourth, and every other good expounder of the law, have long since rejected these decrees: with all such others as have preferred the bishop of Rome before the Council of other Bishops and Princes. And Bartholus himself when he had fearfully written, The subjects not to be guilty of treason, which for the honour and welfare of the Bishop of Rome had taken up arms against their prince; craved pardon for that his error. Truly in mine opinion it were better and more profitable also for the Commonweal, commanding power to be given unto Bishops together with so great jurisdiction as they have: or else that their jurisdiction, to be restrained unto the hearing of matters of religion only; as we see the ancient Romans, the Swissers, them of Geneva, and the Germane to have done. And yet the censuring of manners is of necessity to be given unto the Bishops: which being once taken away, I see not what course would be taken for the punishment of secret wickedness & villainy, whereof we will in place convenient hereafter speak. Howbeit for all that, the imposing of fines is not to be permitted unto bishops, or yet commanding power to be given them: For why should the magistrate be enforced to put into execution the unjust sentence of the bishop? for it is utterly forbidden magistrates to enter into examination of the bishops proceed: except appeal be made as from the bishop abusing his power, unto the more higher courts; which with us is seldom done, for the heaviness of the penalty, if it shall be found the appeal to have been made without just cause: for so the interpreters of both the laws determine the acts of magistrates which have taken upon them the determining of things belonging unto the bishops, to be of none effect: as also if such things chance to be decided in the bishop's consistory as belong unto the magistrate, they confess them to be to no purpose. So that if a Priest be convicted of incest, or of forgery, before the magistrate, and confess the same, in the bishop's consistory no regard is had of such his confession made: for so it is in the Pope's decree expressed. But when this case had happened, wherein the Pope's Legate called before himself the acts and things done before the magistrate, & disannulled the same: appeal was made unto the parliament of Paris, where I remember it was long time doubted, whether the evident proofs whereupon the priest was before the magistrate convicted, aught to be voided or not; for of the rest of the acts it was less doubted: wherein the court at last judged, That it was in the Council to be decided. And again when the like case was in question before the criminal judges, I myself being present, the same court delayed again the cause, and referred it unto the Council: lest it should have seemed either to abrogate the ambitious decrees of the Pope, or to give unto the wicked licence to offend. For what could be more absurd, than to suffer a priest by the law Cornelia convicted of forgery, and by witnesses published, by retracting the cause, to reject the witnesses; and so when as no more could justify the matter, freely and without punishment to commit villainy even in the midst of the Commonweal? Our ancestors never handled the public judgements of priests, with divided examinations: But the Court of Paris, although it often times by just decrees either quite abrogated, or with equity tempered the Pope's decrees and ordinances, yet never more justly than in this case: which when it had often times been delayed, at length by a law made at Molines, that decree of the Pope's law was with us taken away. So by little and little are the Popse laws to be cut short and abolished. For at first in the beginning of the Christian Church, the authority of Bishops was shut up within very straight bounds, which justinian would have to extend farther by this law by him made. Si quis adversus Clericos, Monachos, Diaconos, Asceterias, actionem habeat Episcopus judex esto: sententiam vero episcoporum magistratus exequitor: If any man have any sure against Clerks, Monks, Deacons, or other the religious persons, let the Bishop be the judge, but let the Magistrates have the execution of the bishop's sentence: but the words of the law following▪ do give leave unto the magistrate to examine the bishop's sentence, except there be an other judge by the prince appointed. Which words have troubled many, doubting whether they aught to put in execution 
Whether the ●…uill magistrate be to put the Bishop's sentence into execution, before he understand of the equi●… thereof or not?  the bishop's command or not, before they have understood of the equity of the sentence. Now if no appeal be made from the sentence, most are of opinion, That it is without farther examination of the magistrate, to be put in execution: but if appeal be made, that then enquiry is to be made of the equity of the appeal, which yet some deny to be lawful. Yet in mine opinion, if question be of the thing itself, or of the matter of the judgement, and that the judgement be not given contrary to the Pope's decrees, that then the magistrate aught not farther to inquire of the cause. But if the bishop shall by his sentence go about manifestly to infringe the pope's laws, whether the error be in the matter itself, or in the form of the judgement; that then the magistrate may farther inquire of the sentence; that is, in case he abuse the pope's authority and decrees. The magistrate may also farther examine the sentence, if the bishop shall in judgement give sentence contrary to the laws of the kingdom, although he seem to have grounded the same upon the pope's decrees: as indeed many of their decrees are quite contrary unto the positive laws of Commonweals: in which case, the magistrate shall not suffer the laws of the kingdom to be infringed by the Pope's authority. In all other cases it is meant that the magistrate should faithfully put the bishop's sentence in execution: and so with us we use. The same law, and like manner of proceeding the Eastern people use also: with whom their Bishops have the bore hearing 
The positive laws of a kingdom not to be infringed by the Pope's authority.  of matters, and the magistrates the execution: for which cause the bishops have neither sergeant nor pursiuants, the chief tokens and marks of authority and magistracy.  
But yet question might be made whether all magistrates have jurisdiction and power to command or not? for that M. Messala the lawyer, and M. Varro have left in writing, That some magistrates had power to call men before them, and also to lay hands upon them: othersome had power also only to lay hands upon men: and other which had power to do neither the one nor the other: and that they which had power only to lay hands upon men, had also only a Sergeant and nothing else: and that they which had power to do both, had both sergeant and mase-bearers: whereas they which had neither power to call men before them, neither to lay hands upon them, had neither sergeant nor mase bearers. When I say power to lay hands upon men, my meaning is to have power to seize upon the body or goods of men; for by our customs many having praedial jurisdiction, (or as we term them manours) may lay hand upon men's lands, but not upon their bodies: which was not by the ancient Roman laws permitted; of whom it is needful here to speak, and in brief to declare their power, the more manifestly to show the power of all sorts of Magistrates, in every kind of Commonweal. For the great magistrates, that is to say, the Consuls, 
The power of the Consul's a●… other the great magistrates in Rome.  Praetors, and Censors; and amongst the commissioners, the Dictator, and he whom they called the Interrex; then also the Proconsul's, the Propraetors, and in general all the Lieutenants & Governors of countries, had power to call before them not only the private citizens particularly, but even the lesser magistrates also: excepting the Tribunes of the people, whose bodies (for that they were most sacred) it was not lawful to violate. Neither might these aforesaid magistrates only summon and apprehended men, but it was lawful for them also to punish and imprison them, and in brief to pluck down and raze their houses and palaces, who refused to obey these magistrates commanding them. But the Tribunes of the people had no power to call men before 
The 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Tribun●… of the people in Rome.  them, yet had they authority to command any citizen to prison, yea even the Consuls themselves. So L. Drusus Tribune of the people cast in prison Philip the Consul, for that he had interrupted him as he was speaking unto the people: which then by the law was death. Beside that it was also lawful for them to oppose themselves not only against all the magistrates, and the whole body of the Senate, but the opposition even of one of the Tribunes was of power to stay all the proceeding of the ●…est of the Tribunes his fellows in office: On which great power they presuming and bearing themselves, doubted not contrary unto the law to call men before them, and to take upon them authority and jurisdiction. Which thing Labeo the lawyer gave them well to understand, who being by one of them summoned, refused to make his appearance before him, openly protesting for defence of himself, That the Tribunes were not ordained or appointed for the administration of justice, or to have jurisdiction, but only to oppose themselves against the violence and abuse of other magistrates, and to give aid and secure unto such as appealed being unjustly oppressed, and to imprison them which would not yield and give place to their opposition. So the Tribune Sempronius, seeing that the Censor Appius would not give up his office, after that he had been eighteen months Censor, (according to the law Aemylia, which had brought the term of five years before prefixed to the Censor, unto the term of eighteen months) told him that he would thrust him into prison, if he obeyed not that law (which he did by consent of six others of the Tribunes his fellows in office▪) but Appius having practised with three other of the tribunes to oppose themselves against the commandment of the other seven, by that means held still his office: for why, the opposition of one only of the Tribunes sufficed to stay the proceed of all the rest, if order were not otherwise taken by the people, by taking from him his power and office; as by the request of Tiberius Gracchus, it was taken from Marcus octavius the Tribune, opposing himself against the law Agraria, that it might not take place. And this is it for which a Tribune of the people, speaking to the nobility said, Faxo ne i●…uet vox ista VETO, qua Collegas nostros concinnentes tam laeti auditis, I will make (said he) that this word VETO shall not help, wherewith you so merry hear our fellows in office singing in accord together. And but a little after, Contemni iam Tribunos Plebis, quip quae potestas iam suam ipsa vim frangit intercedendo, non posse aequo aure agi, ubi imperium penes illos, penes se auxilium tantum sit, nisi imperio communicato, nunquam Plebem in part pari Reipublicae esse, The Tribunes of the people (he said) now to be contemned, as whose power did now of itself break the strength of itself, by opposing of itself against itself, that things could not be there indifferently ordered, where the commanding power was with the nobility: and only the power of giving help with the Tribunes. And that the people could never have like part in the Commonweal, except the power to command were made common unto both. The Tribunes complained the people to have no magistrates which had power to command: the Tribunes (they said) to have power to oppose themselunes, and to yield the people relief, but yet to have no power to command; neither that the commonalty could be made equal with the nobility, except the offices and power to command were made common unto both: and therefore they made request, That the Consuls might be chosen as well out of the commonalty, as out of the nobility: which when it could not be obtained of the nobility, it was agreed, certain Tribunes of the soldiers with the power of Consuls, to be indifferently chosen out of both sorts: which manner of government continued forty five years, without any Consul, until such time as that it was agreed, That one of the Consuls should be still chosen out of the people. Howbeit a man might say, That the Tribunes in so saying made their power less than indeed it was, they having power to oppose themselves, and to command men to prison; which is a part of power. For so Ulpian speaking properly and as a lawyer, ●…aith, That it is not lawful without leave and commission from the magistrate, to call into judgement the Consuls, Praetors, or Proconsul's, or generally any of them saith he, Qui imperium habent, & jubere possunt in carcerem duci, which have power and can command men to be laid in prison. And so we conclude, that they which have power to commit men to prison, although they have no jurisdiction, are in right magistrates, as the Tribunes in Rome, the king's attorneys in France, and the three Auogadours at Venice. Neither do I in that agreed with Plutarch, who saith in his Problems, That the Tribunes were no magistrates, for that they had neither mase-bearer nor seat of ivory, the true marks (as he saith) of magistracy: for why, they had sergeants, the token of their command; as M. Messala affirmeth. And less is it to the purpose, that he allegeth of Appius the Consul: of whom, contending with one of the Tribunes in the assembly of the people, Livy thus writeth, Tribunus viatorem mittit ad Consulem, Consul Lictorem ad Tribunum, privatum esse clamitans, sine imperio, sine magistratu, The Tribune sent a sergeant unto the Consul, and the Consul sent a Lictor unto him again, crying out, That he was but a private man, without power, without magistracy: For so the Consul said but to impair the power of the Tribunes. Which for all that was so great, as that Licinius Stolo one of the Tribunes, was so bold, as by force to constrain Manlius the Dictator to depose himself of his Dictatorship. Another of them also committed both the Consuls to prison, for that they would not at the request of the Tribunes discharge ten soldiers from going to the wars. Yet true it is, that the power of the ten Tribunes of the people was shut up and contained within the walls of Rome. And therefore Mar. Fabius, and Luc. Valerius the Consuls, seeing that they 
The power of the tribunes shut up within the walls of Rome.  could not levy their soldiers; for that the Tribunes opposed themselves against them, commanded their chairs to be carried out of the city, and so did there what they saw good. Yet oftentimes the Tribunes took upon them more than belonged to their place, or than was by law permitted them, oftentimes propounding their edicts and prohibitions. Whereof Livy speaking saith, Communiter edicunt Tribuni ne quis Consulem faceret: si quis fecisset so id suffragium non obseruaturos, The Tribunes generally forbade any man to give his voice to the making of a Consul, but if any man so did, that they would have no regard of any such voice given. Which was but an abuse, and presumption upon the power of the people, to forbidden them the free and entire choice of their magistrates: over whom in general, albeit that no man could command, yet did the Tribunes so do over every one of them in particular, although they could by no right so do. Moreover they took upon them the administration of justice, to all such as came unto them, as is if they had had power to call men before them: as it is to be seen in Plutarch, where he saith, That the Tribunes administered justice in the place which was called Basilica Porta. And Aesconius Paedianus saith, Tribunos, Quaestores, Triumuiros▪ Capitales non in sellis Curulibus sed in subsellijs iura dixisse, The Tribunes, the Questors, and Triumuiri, judges of criminal causes, to have administered justice not in ivory chairs, (as the manner of the great Roman magistrates was) but upon their benches. And Appian also saith, Livius Drusus the Tribune, to have been most diligent in the administration of justice, and doing of right to every man. Pomponius also reckoneth the Tribunes of the people amongst the Consuls, Praetors, and other magistrates which administered justice unto the citizens and stranger's in Rome. Wherhfore Cicero saith them to have been called Tribunes of the people, for that they might examine the wrong done by the Praetors: which what manner of examination should it have been, if they had wanted jurisdiction? Yea they had not only taken upon themselves jurisdiction, but appointed also commissioners: and in many causes made them whom they called Aediles aedituos, their deputies or Lieutenants; which they could not have done, had they not had authority and jurisdiction: For why, that authority thou thyself hast not, thou canst not give unto another. Howbeit yet all this their presumption was but usurpation and abuse; as Labeo the lawyer well showed them, who being sent for by them, would never (as we said) come before them.  
The same opinion we are to have of those officers or magistrates whom they called 
The power of the 〈◊〉.  Aedules Curules, who had neither power to call men before them, neither to attach any man's body; and therefore neither had mase-bearer nor sergeant, (as Marcus Varro and Messalla have noted) and yet by the sufference of the Praetors usurped a great part of their authority and jurisdiction. Which the Praetors of the city oppressed with the multitude of causes easily suffered, at the first committing unto them causes concerning the sale or alienating of things movable: who afterward took upon them to have to do with lands and things immovable also: and after that drew unto them also the heating of courtesans and common harlot's causes, who might by no means set up that base and filthy trade of life, but that they must first openly profess the same before the Aediles, and that they would prostitute themselves. Which the ancients did, to the intent that such women as reason could not keep within the bounds of modesty, should yet for shame of such public profession (of so lewd a life before the magistrate) be restrained. But after that in latter times many even of the most noble dames in Rome (having together with their chastity also lost their modesty) a shamed not right impudently to make such open profession before the Aediles, That they would prostitute themselves. The emperor Tiberius took order, that from thenceforth the magistrates should proceed against them by way of justice: & at the same time also to repress the presumption and encroaching of the Aediles and others, by decree appointed unto what sum, and what causes, their authority was to extend: which yet they had not by their ancient institution, and much less to call particular men before them, or to commit them, although they had power to call a general assembly of the common people.  
As for the Questors, I see not that they ever had, or yet took upon them to have 
The power of the Questors.  had any jurisdiction or power to commit men: for so Varro saith, that they had not: albeit that the year after their office expired, they had sometime the government of some province bestowed upon them: as Gracchus the younger after his Questorship had the government of Sardinia given unto him. From which time they had as much and more power in the government of the provinces committed unto them, than had all the magistrates in Rome: but that was not by way of commission, as had all the rest of the governors of provinces.  
As concerning Censors, Fr. Ottoman, and Carolus Sigonius (both of them most skilful 
The power of the Censors.  antiquaries) say, That they had well as they writ, Potestatem, sed non Imperium, (that is to say) power, but not command a thing altogether impossible: for that the word Potestas (or power) in terms of law, or in the person of a magistrate, importeth always with it power to command. And namely Ulpian, where he saith, That the governor of a province had almost ample jurisdiction and power of life and death; calleth it properly by the name of Potestas. And we oftentimes in antiquities read, the Censors Edicts, that is to say, their commandments and laws. Varro also and Messala call the Consuls, Censors, and Praetors, Maiores Magistratus (that is to say) greater Officers; and the rest, Minores, or lesser. And saith moreover, That it was not in the power of the Praetors (who yet had both jurisdiction and command) to assemble the army of the city, which the Censors might, Praetori exercitum urbanum convocare non licere: Consuli, Censori, Interreg●…, Dictatori licere, He said it not to be lawful for the Praetor to call together the army of the city; but yet to be lawful for the Consul, the Censor, the Interrex and the Dictator so to do. And at such time as Hannibal besieged Rome, there was an edict made, That all such as had been Dictator's, Consuls, or Censors, should have a commanding power, until such time as that the enemy had raised his siege. Placuit (saith Livy) omnes qui antea Dictatores, consuls, Censoresue fuissent, cum imperio esse donec hostis a muris discessisset. Which they would not have done if the Censors had not had a commanding power, whilst they yet were in their office; especially seeing that they which had been Praetors, had no such power given them. Besides that, if the Tribunes (whom Varro putteth in the number of the lesser magistrates) had power to command, why should not then the Censors so have, whom he calleth the Greater Magistrates? Yea that more is, Plutarch giveth more authority and power 
plutarch noted.  unto the Censors, than to any other of the Roman magistrates: yet attribute I no●… so much unto his writings, but that I see him being a Graecian, to be oftentimes deceived in the antiquities of the Romans. Wherhfore that is it which hath deceived many, that the Censors, although they had power, yet had they no jurisdiction: albeit that Onophrius writ, That the Censors in some cases, and for some crimes had power to condemn men: but what those cases or crimes were, he showeth not. For either they must have been public crimes, or private crimes: of private crimes the Praetor of the city judged, but of public crimes the Praetor of the public judgements, and Triumuiri of criminal and capital causes determined. True it is, that the Censors were controllers of the people's manners: but there is great difference betwixt the judging of criminal causes, and the reprehending of men's manners and behaviours. And therefore Cicero said, The Censors judgement, no farther to touch the party by them condemned, than to make him blush. And that therefore, as all that the Censors judgement concerned only a man's name and credit, so it was called an ignominy or discredit, but not an infamy. For why, he saith not, That the Censors touched any man's honour, to the intent to note it with infamy, but rather with a certain ignominy, or kind of disgrace, 
Ignominy is a kind of disgrace; but not the same that infamy is.  which many have rashly abused for infamy; howbeit that there is great difference betwixt infamy & ignominy. Carolus Sigonius hath therein erred defining ignominy to be an infamy: and in the same place saith, That there are certain capital causes, which draw infamy with them, and yet without crime, contrary to the principles of the law: Whereby we are taught, that he which is by public judgement for any crime condemned, is thereby become infamous: And that the soldier for his fault worthily by his captain cassired, was thereby become ignominious, but not infamous, until that by the praetors express edict he were so declared. The ancient doctors of the law have called Ignominy, the infamy of a fact done: Whereof Cassius the lawyer saith, That he thinketh that a Senator put out of the Senate, can neither be judge, nor bear witness, until he be again restored: howbeit he doth say, That he doth but think so. Which phrase of speech Ulpian also useth, when as he saith, Se putare ei quae in adulterio depraehensa est & absoluta: notam obesse, That he did think, that unto her that was taken in adultery and acquitted, yet the note thereof was a blemish. For certain it is, that he which is by judgement acquitted, is safe from the infamy of the law, but yet not from the ignominy of the fact. And Calistratus saith, That he did also think the honour and reputation of a man to be impaired, Quando quis ordine movet●…r, when a man is put out of his place. Festus Pompeius also setteth down three sorts of military punishments, viz. Deprehensa, castigatio, ignominia, Deprehensa, saith he, is greater than castigatio, and lester than ignominia; and above all these the law addeth infamy. For otherwise if infamy, and the Censors note of ignominy were all one, the threescore and four Senators by Lentulus and Gellius the Censors at once displaced and thrust out of the Senate, as also the four hundred knights, who by Valerius and 
That men may be noted with ignominy and so disgraced, and yet not thereby become infamous.  Sempronius the Censors were cassired, and their horses and public wages taken from them, had been also infamous. Yea that more is, all the people of Rome had been noted with infamy, by the censure of Livius Salinator, who razed and noted all the tribes, and as Valerius Maximus saith, Inter aerarios retulit, put them all from their freedom, and made them to pay all duties as strangers; For that they had by public sentence first condemned him, and afterward made him Consul and Censor: only the tribe Metia he excepted, which had neither condemned nor acquitted him, neither thought him worthy of those so honourable offices in the Commonweal. He also afterward noted Claudius Nero his companion in the Censorship, who also requited him again with the like. Wherhfore Cicero speaking of the Censorship, thus saith, 
* pro Cl●….  Illud common proponam, nunquam animaduersionibus Censorijs hanc civitatem ita contentam, ut rebus iudicatis fuisse, I will (saith he) set before you that common matter, this city never to have been so contented with the Censors animadversions, as with judgements. And bringeth for example C. Geta a Senator, who by the Censors thrust out of the Senate, was afterwards himself made Censor. And after that he addeth, Quod si illud quoque judicium putaretur, ut caeteri turpi judicio damnati in perpetuum omni honore ac dignitate priu●…rentur, sic hominibus ignominia notatis, neque ad honorem, neque in curiam reditus esset: timoris enim causam non vitae poenam in illa potestate esse volverunt. Quare qui vobis in mentem venit haec appellare judicia, quae a populo Romano rescindi, ab iuratis judicibus repudiari, a magistratibus negligi, ab ijs qui eandem potestatem adepti sunt solent commutari? If that (saith he) should also be thought a judgement, as others with infamous judgement condemned, they should for ever be deprived of all honour and dignity: so unto men (by the Censors) noted with ignominy▪ should be no means for them again to return unto their honour, o●… into the court: For why, our ancestors would 'cause of fear, but not danger of life to be in the Censors power. Wherhfore how came it into your mind, to call these judgements, which may by the people of Rome be revoked, by the sworn judges be rejected, by the magistrates be neglected; and of them which have obtained the same power be usually changed. Whereby it evidently appeareth the Censors to have been without all manner of jurisdiction. For the Praetors had the hearing and examination of the suits of the farmers' of the public revenues of all such things as concerned tributes, rents, writings, repairations, and farming out of public things, made or done by the Censors: for that the power of the Censors was quite different from the jurisdiction of the Praetors. And so with us (here in France) power is given unto the governors of provinces, but yet without jurisdiction: except it be, that they by consent of both the parties, take upon them to decide or determine any matter. And so we may in like sor●…say, That the Censors had power to command, but without any jurisdiction.  
There were also other magistrates in Rome, which had power to command, and jurisdiction 
The power of the Triumuiri Capitals in Rome.  also in criminal causes, as those whom they called Triumuiri Capitales, whose power and authority extended yet only unto strangers or slaves: except perhaps such were the unworthivesse of the magistrates, and their corruption, or offence so great, as that the other magistrates did willingly wink at the proceeding of these Capital Triumuiri, & at the public punishment by them taken upon such notorious offenders. These Triumuiri beside this had also the putting in execution of all the capital judgements of the people, or of the other magistrates.  
Now by this discourse of the Roman magistrates and their power, it appeareth, that in Rome there were some magistrates, who at the beginning of their first institution had no power or command, or else power yet without jurisdiction; and yet to have at 
No magistrate without power  length usurped both. Howbeit I deem not them to be called Magistrates, which have no power; well they may enjoy some public honour or charge, but no magistracy. For the true propriety of the word Magistrate, importeth and draweth with it a power to command. And he that will have regard unto the phrase and manner of speech of the ancient Latins, and especially of the lawyers, shall found them to have called the offices with honest charges in the Commonweal, by the word Honours, Honour (saith Calistratus) est administratio Reipublicae cum dignitate, Honour is a government of the Commonweal with dignity or reputation: and those which beside their honour had power also to command, them they noted by the word Imperia. As in Livy we see the nobility to complain in this sort, Salios, ac Flamines sine Imperijs as potestatibus relinqui, The Salij and Flamines to be left without command, without power: understanding by the word Imperia, the great estates of the city, whether it were by commission, or by office, such as had Maze bearers and power to command allowed them. And by the word Potestates, meaning the governors of provinces, whom Ulpian the lawyer in proper terms calleth also Potestates. Which also Alexander Severus the emperor meant, when he with a loud voice saith, Non patiar mercatores potestatum, I will not suffer the buyers of the governments of provinces.  
Now as a man may have a public charge without honour, as Criers, sergeant, Trumpeters, (which in ancient time were slaves, & of the magistrates family without title of office) and especially the town clerks and notaries unto the magistrates, or Commonweal, until the time of Valcntinian, who forbade slaves any longer to have that charge. So a man may say also, That there are public charges with honour, without power to command; as ambassadors and privy councillors, secretaries of estate, and treasorours'; the ancient Aediles and Questors, and our Receivers. So also some other there be which have honourable charge, having also the hearing of many causes, and yet without command: as the ancient Roman Bishops, and our great Prelates. Others have honourable charge, with power also to command, and 
The great diversity of magistrates in their honour, power, and authorive.  yet without jurisdiction: as the Tribunes of the people, the Censors, and our Governors of countries, together with the king's Attorney. Some others there be also which have ordinary, and honourable public charge, and power to command with jurisdiction: and those are they, whom properly we call Magistrates: such as were the two Consuls and Praetors; who were increased even to the number of sixteen. As for the Dictator's, Governors of provinces, and those whom the Romans called Interreges: and Praefectos urbi Latinarum feriarum causâ: they had more power and authority, than all the other magistrates we have spoken of: yet were they not magistrates, but commissioners only, as we have before showed: albeit that some called them by the common name of Magistrates; but yet not they which knew how properly to speak. And so oftentimes it happeneth that they which have the greatest honours, are yet destitute of all power and command: as amongst the Venetians the chancellor is created out of the people, which is with them the greatest honour; and yet without any power. So the Procurators of S. Mark, are also (with them) highly honoured, and in all Commonweals the counsellors of estate, Embasladours, Bishops, and prelate's, who have no command, and yet are more respected, than the other little Provosts, and divers other judges, which have power to command, and jurisdiction to decide controversies, with administration of justice both high and low.  
There are also public charges, who have neither honour nor command, but rather 
Certain publi●… charges dishonourable.  to the contrary draw after them a certain kind of dishonour: as the Hangman's office; who after the charge committed unto him for the execution to death, was by the Praetor's edicts commanded still to lodge out of the city: a custom yet observed in Tholouse, and in divers other cities also. Other public charges also there be, not much more honest, and yet nevertheless necessary unto the Commonweal, and profitable unto them that have execution of the same: to the end that the profit arising thereby, might in some sort cover the dishonour thereof. And under this division are generally comprehended all public persons placed in title of office, or in commissions, or in simple dignity without power to command. And in like manner we might divide all public officers & magistrates, according to the diversity of the public charges, which every one of them hath: some in matters of religion, other some in the affairs of state; these have the administration of justice: others have the charge of the public revenues, some of the fortification and reparation of public places, and others the provision of victuals, and other things needful: these have the managing of the wars, for the defence of the subjects against their enemies: these the care of the public health and welfare of the people, and these the oversight and charge of the high ways, rivers, forests, ports and passages: all which public charges may be given either in title of office, or in commission, or simple dignity without command: or else with a commanding power also, or only by way of the execution of the commands of others, such as are the magistrates ministers, town clerks, notaries, ushers, surueyers, sergeants, cricrs. Which so great a mulritude of honours, offices, and public charges, to comprehend under the simple name of magistrates, or as the Greeks' call it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, were but to confounded the whole discourse of public honours and offices, of all magistrates and commissioners together. 
Three things especially to be respected in the creating of Magistrates & officer●… in every Commonweal.   
Wherhfore in every Commonweal for the creating of magistrates and officers, and such as are to be implo●…ed in common charge, three things are chief to be respected: First them that have the choice and creation of them: then of what manner of persons choice is to be made: and thirdly in what manner and form they are to be created or chosen. As for the first, it is a thing belonging only unto the sovereignty, as we have in due place declared. And the second, although it most properly belong also unto sovereignty, yet for the most part it ordinarily followeth the laws to that end and purpose established, and especially in the Popular and Aristocratike estates: wherein (as generally in all sorts of Commonweals) offices, and public charges are given unto men, either for their virtue and wisdom, or else for their wealth, or for their nobility; or indifferently for all these things together; for why there is no Commonweal so barbarous, which hath not some regard of these things in bestowing of the offices and public charges of the state: but which of these considerations were most to be respected, belongeth not to this place to discuss. And as concerning the third point, which is the manner and form for the choice and creation of magistrates and officers, it is of three sorts: For either it is done by election, or lot; or by a mixture of both together. Election is made either by lively voice, or by holding up of hands, (which the ancient Greeks' called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) a thing yet used amongst the Swissers: or else by tables or billets, by beans or stones, and that in two sorts, viz. by open, or by secret suffrages. By lot choice is made of one, or more of the citizens to be magistrates, or out of all sorts and degrees of the people, at a certain age, by the laws appointed. Now as for choice to be made by election and lot mingled together, although it be a thing not much used in ancient time, yet is it now at this present a a thing most common in Aristocratical estates, and especially in Genes and Venice. As the Romans always also did in making choice of the judges of capital causes, concerning life and death; who were by lot drawn only out of the order of the Senators, before the law Sempronia, or out of the orders of the Senators and the knights by the law Sempronia also; or out of both those orders, and the Tribunes of the common treasure, by the law Aurelia, the people being still excluded. But in a Popular estate, either must all the citizens together judge of every one in particular, or of the lesser part together, and that without lot or election. (For where the whole multitude of citizens have authority and power, there is no place left for election or lot:) or else must some citizens by lot, or choice, or both drawn out, judge of every man in particular: or some, of some chosen by lot or election only, or by both together; or else some partly by lot, partly by election taken our of all the estates of the Commonweal, to judge of some of the other citizens; or else some by lot drawn out of all, with some other taken out of one or many estates of the Commonweal: or part by lot and election drawn out of all, and other part out of a certain order of the citizens. And thus much concerning all the means that can be imagined concerning the variety of them which have any public charge: and for the estate, quality, and condition of every one of them, with the form of their calling and employment.  
Aeschines the orator, dividing the offices and public charges of the Athenians, hath cut them much shorter, and more obscurely reckoned them up, than was fit for so great a city, considering that therein were more magistrates and officers, than in any other Commonweal that then was, for the greatness thereof. He said, That there were therein three sors of officers: one sort of them which were taken by lot or choice; another of them which had public charge above the space of 30 days, such as were they which had the oversight of public repairations and buildings; and the third sort, of such as were by the ancient laws appointed; as commissioners chosen for the wars, or for the administration of justice, such as were the magistrates. But by this division cannot the diversity of magistrates and officers be judged, no more than by that of Demosthenes, (altogether different from that of Aeschines his adversary.) For he saith them only to be magistrates, which were by lot drawn in the temple of Theseus: or they to whom the people had given extraordinary power to command, or made choice of for captains. The division also of Varro, and Messala, is also too short, who make but two sorts of magistrates in Rome, viz: the great and the little. The great magistrates they called the Consuls, the Praetors, and Censors, as chosen by the great estates: and the other they called the little, as chosen by the common people; the ceremony of their soothsayerss divination being more solemn in the choice of the greater, than in the choice of the lesser. But better it were to search and found out the essential divisions of magistrates, and such as might serve in every Commonweal; as are those by us already set down, concerning the charge of magistrates. We may also otherwise divide magistrates into three sorts, in respect of their power. The first may be called Sovereign Magistrates, as owing obedience unto none, but unto the sovereign majesty only. The second are lesser Magistrates, who own obedience unto the sovereign Magistrates, and yet have command over other magistrates also. The last sort are they which own obedience unto other superior Magistrates, and yet have no command but over particular persons only. Let us then in order speak of these three sorts of Magistrates, and first of the obedience of Magistrates towards their Sovereign Prince.   

CHAP. FOUR ¶ Of the obedience that the Magistrate oweth unto the Laws and Sovereign Prince.  
SEeing that the Magistrate next unto the Sovereign Prince, is the principal person in the Commonweal, & upon whom they which have the sovereignty discharge themselves, communicating unto him the authority, force, and power to command: it is good reason before we pass further, briefly to touch what obedience he oweth unto his Sovereign Prince; which is the chief part of his duty. Now in this the Prince and Magistrate, and both of them do most differ from a private 
How much a prince differeth from a magistrate, and both of them from a private ●…an.  man: for that the Prince seethe no man in the state or Commonweal, whom he may compare or prefer before himself; but as one placed in a most high degree, and next unto the immortal God, beholdeth all his subjects set a great way beneath him: whereas the private man cannot by any public right command over any other subject, although that he by private and domestical commands rule and govern his own family. As for the Magistrate, for that he is to regard many persons, he must oftentimes change his port, his gesture, his speech and countenance, for the good performance of his duty towards all: which no man can well discharge, except he first know his duty towards his Sovereign prince, as also how to submit himself unto the other Magistrates his superiors, how to respect his equals, and how to command his inferiors, how to defend the weak, to withstand the great, and to do justice to all. And that is it, for which the ancients commonly said, Magistracy or authority to declare what was in a man, having as it were upon the stage in the Theatre, and in the sight of all men, to perform the parts of many persons. And so also may we say, A man to show what his office is: For if he be such an one as he aught to be, he graceth his place: whereas if he be otherwise, he debaseth not only the authority of his place and office; but even of the majesty of the state and Commonweal. So Livy speaking of Quintus Flaminius, a man unworthy his high place, saith of him, Non qui sibi honorem adiecisset, sed indignitate sua vim ac ius Magistratui quem gerebat dempsisset, That he had not (by his office) increased his honour; but by the unworthiness of himself, impaired the force and power of the office which he bore.  
Now the better to know what obedience the Magistrate oweth unto his Sovereign, it is needful first to understand, what it is that a Sovereign Prince may of right command 
The lawful commands of sovereign princes right divers.  every Magistrate to do. For why, the lawful commands of Sovereign Princes are right divers, and unlike themselves. Some of them serving for perpetual edicts or laws concerning all persons, of what condition or quality soever they be; or but for certain persons, and for a certain time, by way of provision: othersome contain some privilege or exemption contrary to the edicts or laws, for some one only, or for some few of the subjects: or some grant not contrary unto the law, or some reward for the good, or punishment for the evil, or some office or commission; or else serve for the expounding of some edict or privilege, or for the denouncing of war, or the making of peace, or for raising of soldiers, or for the erecting of Fairs or Markets, or for the levying of taxes, subsidies, fifteens, new impositions, or loans: or for the sending of ambassadors to congratulat the good haps of other princes; or to moon their misfortunes, or to entreat of marriages, and alliances, or other such like things; or for the building or fortifying of places to be fortified, for the repairing of bridges, high ways, ports or passages, or for to judge of certain suits and proceed in the law, or for the execution of some commands, or for the maintenance of letters of justice, or for the restoring of such as be under age, or of full age, or of such as be condemned, or for some particularity, or for some remission, or pardon, which may be of divers sorts. Of which commands so before declared, some contain divers kinds, as do privileges and grants, whether it be for some gift given, or for exemption and immunity from all charges, or from some one: or letters of discharge, or of estate, or to have the freedom of a citizen, or for to be made legitimat, or for nobility, or knighthood, or for the erecting of corporations or colleges, or other such like things. All which letters may be divided into two sorts, that is to say, into letters of jurisdiction or command, or letters of justice or state. Albeit that the word jubemus, or we command, be as well in the letters of justice, as in the letters of grace and favour, as is to be seen in the laws and letters patents of the Greek emperors. Yet the letters of grace, or which proceed from the only power and authority of the prince, are properly in France called Mandements, or Command's; and the secretaries which dispatch them are also called the Secretaries of the Commands: whereas the letters of justice are most commonly dispatched by the other secretaries; beside the difference of the great and little seal, and for the most part the diversity of the wax: or the single or double label, or the seal hanging in silk of divers colours, making the difference of the letters to be known. The ancient Latins called such instructions as were by princes given to their ambassadors, or governors of countries, or generals of their armies, Mandata Principum, or Prince's Commands, which we do call by the name of of instructions: For so the word Mandat●… is taken in the law, where justinian the emperor saith, That he had made a book of Mandates or Commandments for the governors of provinces.  
But leaving the subtility of words, let us go unto the matter, and examine the force 
The power and force of certain clauses commonly set down in the letters patents, and princes Mandates expounded.  of the clauses commonly set down in the letters patents and mandates of princes. And first these words, universis praesentibus & futuris (To all men present and to come) are joined only unto such letters patents as are to endure for ever: (howbeit that no worldly thing can so for ever continued) but not unto temporary edicts made by way of provision, nor to commissions, nor to any other letters of provision. But this clause, Quantum satis est etc. (so much as shall suffice) is of much greater importance, & ordinarily joined unto letters which they call letters of jurisdiction or justice, whereby the prince leaveth unto the discretion of him to whom such his letters are addressed, to allow of them, or to refuse them, as his conscience, and the equity of the cause shall require: which is not in letters of commandment which leave nothing unto him to whom they are directed, except happily sometimes the examination of the fact only: as in these words, Si paret etc. (If it shall appear unto you etc.) In such 
The prince's charters or letters of justice no commaunde●… unto the magistrate to whom they are directed  sort that one may say of all sorts of charters or letters of justice, albeit that they be granted by the prince, that they import not any command or constraint whatsoever unto the magistrate to whom they are directed: But to the contrary, that by our laws and customs it is most religiously provided, that the magistrates or judges should unto such charters or letters have no further respect, than in that they were agreeable with equity and truth. And although that the same form of letters of justice, be granted in England, as also in Spain, and other kingdoms; yet so it is nevertheless, that it is done rather for the particular profit of some one, than for the greatness or increasing of the majesty of the king, (who granted them by way of benefit unto the party) or for any necessity there is thereof: seeing that the whole is remitted unto the power of the magistrate, after the granting of such letters, which was not before the grant thereof. Which was the cause that the people in the assembly of the Estates in parliament at Orleans, presented a request unto the king for the cutting off of this formality of letters: as serving not but to the oppressing of the people, without any profit thereout of to be drawn unto the king or Commonweal. The ancient Greeks and Latins also never knew this form of letters of justice: but the magistrates upon the request of the parties did as much as do our judges upon the grant of such letters of justice. And the clause, Quantum satis erit quod liqueat (so much as may suffice for the manifesting of the matter) is the same which was contained in the Praetor's edicts, in this form, Si qua mihi justa causa videbitur, (if any just cause shall seem unto me.) True it is that the power to correct, supply, and expound the laws, concerning the civil jurisdiction, together with the restitution & relieving of them which had been circumvented, or deceived by the formalities of the laws, (a power before given unto the Praetors by the virtue of their office) resteth now (I know not how) amongst the marks of sovereign majesty; and for this cause the Praetor's authority and laws were called honourable; which the interpreters of the law call Nobile officium. Wherhfore as offices are confounded, when as the prince converteth unto himself such things as belong unto the magistrate▪ even so also are the rights of sovereignty impaired, when as they are by the magistrates usurped. Now as for the declaration, and correcting of the edicts and laws, we have before said that it appettaineth and belongeth unto them which have the sovereignty: But as for restitutions against the extremity of the law, and all that concerneth letters of justice, it greatly appeareth not that the sovereign princes have much troubled themselves therewith, but have left them to the magistrates to be in their name decided. I except only certain letters of justice, which pass under the great Scale, and whereunto the aforesaid clause, If it shall be just, If it shall be agreeable unto equity and truth, is inserted: which clause so much displeased a certain great parsonage, holding one of the highest places of honour in this Realm, (who understood not the force thereof) as that he would have razed out the same; saying the majesty of the king to be thereby impaired▪ howbeit that he was therein to be excused, as being a stranger, and not well seen in the laws and customs of a strange country. But how could the majesty of kings be in this respect impaired or diminished? seeing that the ancient kings of Egypt caused their magistrates solemnly to swear, 
A notable 〈◊〉  never to obey their commandments, in case they commanded them any thing that was unjust: as we read in the sayings of the Egyptian kings reported by Plutarch. Seeing therefore that the allowance or rejecting of letters of justice directed in the king's name unto the magistrates, dependeth of the equity and discretion of the magistrates themselves, it needeth not us to speak any more thereof. Wherhfore let us now proceed to those rescripts or letters of command, which for that they concern the state of the Commonweal, and public and not private causes, are called rescripts of State; or letters of command or state. Concerning which, a double question may be made: One whether such Rescripts or letters of the prince, containing only the simple examination of the fact, without giving any further hearing of the matter unto the magistrate, according to the desert thereof; whether (I say) the magistrate fully informed of the truth of the fact according to the tenor of his letters, aught to proceed to the further execution thereof being unjust, or to harken unto the unjust commands of his prince? The other, whether the magistrate having neither power to examine the 
Whether the magistrate be bound to obey his princes unjust commands or not?  equity nor truth of a matter, may refuse the unjust commands of his prince: the doubt therein being the greater, if they shall be thereunto by the prince more straightly urged, or expressly commanded: For sometime princes by their particular and secret letters, use to request the magistrates; so with covert requests accompanying their unjust commands: yea oftentimes in their letters patents their requests are joined with their commands, because they would not seem to wrist all things from them against their wills; but to request many things of them: as when they say, We pray and command you, wherein the prince seemeth as in nothing more to derogate from his sovereign majesty: for if the thing be just and honest which he commandeth, what needeth requests? if unjust or dishonest, why doth he command it? Now the magistrate is never to be requested to do his duty, or entreated not to do wrong, or that which is unjust or dishonest, as Cato the Censor saith. Besides that, to command is a thing incompatible with request. It is wisely said, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, 
Prince's requests to have the power of the most straight command.  Tyrant's requests to be commands: wherefore let us suppose nothing to be more straightly commanded, than that which the prince seemeth by filed speech or entreaty to persuade. Wherhfore to resolve this point, if the prince's letters give unto the magistrate neither the examination nor the hearing or disciding of the fact, or of the right and truth of the cause, but that only the execution of the princes command be unto him committed: the magistrate in this case may not in any sort take upon him the examination or hearing of the matter; except the letters of command be notoriously false, faulty, or absurd, and contrary to the laws of God and nature (as we read of the commands of Pharaoh and Agrippa:) or else to rob and spoil the poor people; as in our time Albert Marquis of Brandeburg, who amongst other his notable cruelties, set up sundry gibbets in all such towns and cities as he had taken in, threatening his soldiers to hung them thereupon, if that contrary to his command they should spare to rob and spoil the poor inhabitants: albeit that he had neither true, nor yet any colourable cause, for his taking up of arms against his country. Now if a man subject unto a particular Lord or justice, be not in law or right bound to obey him passing the bounds of his territory, or the power to him given, (albeit that the thing which he commandeth be both just and honest) but may well refuse his command: how should the magistrate then be bound to obey or to put into execution the princes commands in things unjust and dishonest, the prince in this case transgressing and breaking the sacred bounds of the laws both of God and nature? But some will say, no prince to be found so evil advised, nor that it is to be supposed that he would command any thing contrary unto the laws of God and nature: and true it is; for why he worthily loseth the title and honour of a Prince, which departing from reason, and forgetting the duty of a prince, breaketh the laws of God and nature.  
We have before (as we suppose) sufficiently enough declared, what and how much 
What commands of the prince, and how far the magistrate eught to execute the same.  a prince may do by the right of his sovereignty, from whence many things may be derived pertinent unto this question here in hand: for why it is not well to be understood what obedience is by the magistrate due unto the sovereign majesty, except the rights of Sovereignty be before well understood and fully known. But here the question is, what commands of the prince, and how far the magistrate aught to execute the same? for sometime dishonest and unjust things are by princes commanded, which the evil magistrates themselves do more willingly, and shamefully put in execution, than they were by the princes commanded. As not long ago in the time of the civil wars, (wherewith all France was on a light fire) the precedent of the court of Normandy (whose name deserveth to be buried in perpetual oblivion) being commanded extraordinarily to levy thirty thousand crowns of them which professed the reformed religion, extorted from them three hundred thousand; and for so doing (the calamity of the time considered) received a great reward. Howbeit that Tiberius the emperor (a man of incredible cruelty) sharply reproved the governor of Egypt for exacting more of the subjects than he was commanded: saying, Tonderioves meas non cutem detrahi volo, I would have my sheep shorn, but not slain. If therefore the commandment of the prince be not contrary unto the laws of God and nature, the magistrate is to put it in execution, although it seem to differ from the laws of other nations: which laws it is not against nature for the princes to change, for the profit or disprofit of their Commonweals. For albeit that the princes (as we have said) aught to keep the oath by him made unto his people, if he have so bound himself by oath; and although he were not by oath so bound, yet nevertheless of duty aught to keep the laws and customs of the estate and Commonweal whereof he is sovereign: yet for all that we must not thereof conclude or gather, That if the prince do in that case command any thing contrary unto his oath or the duty of a Prince, that the Magistrate is therefore to refuse to obey his command. Forasmuch as it belongeth not unto the Magistrate to examine or censure the doings 
The 〈◊〉 is no●…to censure his prince's command, being not contrari●… unto the laws of God & nature.  of his prince, or to cross his proceed concerning man's laws, from which the prince may as he seethe cause derogat. Yet if the Magistrate be commanded by the Prince to abrogat an ancient law, being more upright and profitable to give way unto another less just, and less profitable for the Commonweal; he may stay the execution of such a law or commandment in suspense, until he have showed his reasons therefore unto the prince, which he is in duty bound to do, not once, but even twice or thrice: and then if the prince notwithstanding his remonstrances, will not by him be advised, but refuse his wholesome and profitable admonition, and will needs have the law to pass further; then the Magistrate (as having already done his duty) shall put it in execution: which he may also at the first command of his prince do, if the delaying thereof be dangerous. And to that end and purpose tendeth that which is by Innocentius the fourth written, before he was Pope, That Magistrates aught to put in execution the prince's commands, albeit that they be unjust: which is to be understood of civil justice and utility: but not if such commands be contrary to the laws of nature. Which interpretation may serve also for the right understanding of that which the lawyers say, That the prince may deerogate even from the law of nature. Wherein 
How it is to be understood that a prince may derogate from the law of nature.  their meaning is, from the law of nations, and common constitutions of other people: lest any deceived by the obscurity of the words, or equivocation of the law of nature, should thereby rashly presume to break the sacred laws of God and nature.  
Now if any man shall object and say, That the emperor Anastasius expressly commanded, That the judges and Magistrates should not so much as suffer men to produce the prince's rescripts or letters granted unto particular persons, contrary to the general edicts or laws: Mine answer is, that that is to be understood, if in such the princes rescripts or letters no special clause be comprehended, derogating from the general laws: notwithstanding which derogation, yet the Magistrate aught nevertheless to advertise the prince thereof, and to put him in mind of his duty: who if he be not by the Magistrates reasons to be removed from his former opinion, but command the same the second time, the Magistrate is then to obey his command, although the thing so commanded be not agreeing with the common profit, and contrary unto the laws. For why, the Magistrate having so done his duty, is not to expect but the second command; as is by the law provided. To the example whereof the edict of Charles the ninth was made, concerning the magistrates admonitions unto their prince. So long before this Theodosius the Great, at the request of Saint Ambrose the good bishop of Milan, made a law, whereby he willed, That the execution of his letters patents and commands, should be holden in suspense thirty days after the signification thereof, when he had commanded any to be more rigorously punished than the usual manner and custom was. The occasion of the making of which law was, the execution of seven thousand Thessalians, put to death by the commandment of this Theodosius, for that they had murdered and slain certain of his Receivers and Magistrates. For which cause Saint Ambrose excommunicated the emperor, neither would suffer him to be reconciled, until he had made the aforesaid law. And hereof (as I suppose) proceed those rescripts, which are yet used by the bishops of Rome: the first called monitory, the second jussorie, and the third executory; or as we say in English, Edicts of admonition, of Command, and of Execution.  
The same opinion we are to have, if the prince by his letters patents command the 
How the Magistrate commanded by his prince to put in execution old penal laws, now of themselves or through the negligence of the magistrates forgotten, is to proceed in the execution thereof.  Magistrate to proceed to the execution of the penalty upon them that have offended against such his edicts and laws, as by the antiquity of themselves, or by the negligence of the Magistrates seem to have been quite forgotten and abrogated. For why, the long sufferance of the prince, and connivence of the magistrates, in the sight and knowledge of whom the laws are so broken, remitteth the penalty due by the law: which could not otherwise have been infringed, by the abuse of them which transgressed the same, had it by the prince or magistrate been still looked unto. And therefore the magistrate aught not rashly to proceed to the execution of the penalty of such forgotten or neglected laws, before he have caused the same to be again republished, being by his default before neglected. Yea the prince aught rather to proceed against his magistrates, who through their remiss negligence have suffered his edicts and laws to be contemned. For otherwise it should be a thing very unjust and savouring of tyranny, to make edicts and laws, and after long neglecting of them, upon a sudden to proceed against them, who by the example of others, had transgressed against them, seeing others before them to have escaped unpunished. Which was one of the tyrannical slights of the most cruel emperor Nero, as of other ancient tyrants also. Whereas the good emperor Traian to the contrary commanded Pliny governor of the lesser Asia, of new to publish such edicts and laws as were any wise before buried in oblivion, by the disobedience or error of his subjects, or the sufferance of the magistrates: for that a common error is reputed for a law, if the error be not against the law of nature, against which no error can probably be pretended.  
But some man may ask, Whether the magistrate own obedience unto such his princes commands, as shall unto him seem contrary unto the law of nature, albeit that indeed they be not contrary thereunto? For the equity and reason which we call 
The 〈◊〉 〈◊〉- ture not 〈◊〉 clear and 〈◊〉 fist.  natural, is not always so clear and manifest, but that it findeth impugners. Yea oftentimes the greatest lawyers and philosophers are therein entangled, and of quite contrary opinions, and the laws of people are therein sometime so repugnant, as that some of them appoint reward, and some others punishment for the self same fact, whereof books, laws, and histories are full, all which to prosecute were a matter infinite. Whereunto I answer, that if that which the ancients say may take place, a man never aught to do that whereof he doubteth, whether it be just or not; and much less aught he so to do, if he be thereof certainly persuaded that the thing which the prince commandeth, is of itself by nature unjust. But if question be of civil justice only, the 
The magistrate bound in civil causes to put his princes commands in execution, although they seem unto himself unjust or contrary unto law.  magistrate aught in such case to verify and put in execution his prince's commands, although he think them to be in civil equity or law unjust. And therefore the magstrats in every Commonweal were compelled to swear to observe the laws and ordinances; to the end they should not call into dispute or question, that which they aught to hold, as before resolved upon. And this was the manner and custom of the Romans when the old magistrates received the oath of the new, before they entered into their charge: which was commonly done upon the calends of januarie, in the capitol, after solemn sacrifices there made: for otherwise the magistrate lost his place of estate, if he took not his oath within five days after. Yea sometimes the Tribunes which held the estate of the people constrained them in particular which had withstood the publishing of a law, to swear to observe the same, after that it was once published, and that upon the pain of banishment. So L. Metellus Numidicus was by a decree of the people banished, for refusing to swear unto the laws published at the instance of the factious Tribune Saturninus. So also after that the laws of jews the twelfth were published in the high court of the parliament of Paris: for that many disliked of the same, the king's attorney general there made a request, That they might be duly observed, and prohibition given for any man to call them in doubt, and that upon pain of high treason; as is to be seen in the records of the court. For why, it is lawful for 
Laws once established aught not by prinat persons to be again called into dispute or question.  every man before the publishing of the law, to dispute and reason of the equity thereof: which to do after the publication thereof, is not lawful. And so, before that, when as king jews the eleventh had commanded certain unjust decrees of his to be published in the court of the parliament at Paris: the court refused to yield thereunto, for that they seemed unto every man unjust: but the king nevertheless still urging his former requests, joined thereunto grievous threats also; as that they should lose their heads that would not yield thereunto. Which thing Lavacr●…e, precedent of the parliament 
A notable example.  understanding, accompanied with the rest of the judges of that honourable court in their read robes, came unto the king, not to excuse the fault by him and the rest committed, in refusing the kings unjust decrees, but to show the reasons of their such refusal, and to request, That he with the rest might rather be put to death, than enforced to give their consent to the publishing of the propounded laws. The king beholding the gravity, the port, and dignity of these persons, and almost abashed with the so constant resolution of such his great magistrates, and withal doubting the power and authority of the parliament, caused those his decrees so much misliked, to be abrogated, and in their presence torn in pieces, requesting them to continued so still to maintain justice; solemnly protesting never more to sand unto them any edict which should not be both just and reasonable. It is a wonderful thing to say of what power and moment this thing was to keep the king within the bounds of reason, who otherwise had always used his absolute power and command. As before he came unto the kingdom, being as yet Dauphin, he caused the precedents of the court of Paris to be called before him▪ to raze out the clause, De expresso mandato (by express commandment) which the court had caused to be put unto the confirmation of the privileges granted unto the county of main, protesting, That he would never go out of the city, until it were done, or yet take upon him the charge by the king committed unto him. Whereupon the court indeed commanded those words to be canceled: but yet that the canceling might appear, commanded the acts to be kept, which are 
How the words de expresso or expresissimo mandato are in princes grants, edicts or decrees to be understood,  yet preserved undefaced. Now these words, De expresso mandato, and De expressissimo mandato, whereunto these words are also sometimes annexed, Multis vicibus iterato (or oftentimes repeated) which are many times to be found in the records of sovereign courts joined unto the publication of the prince's edicts and decrees, have this illation or meaning, that such edicts and privileges (granted by the princes express commandment) should not be so precisely kept, but that shortly after they might by the sufferance of the magistrates be again forgotten and neglected, as not much regarded. And by this secret of the courts, hath the state of this kingdom been preserved in the greatness thereof: which otherwise would have been ruinated by the flatterers of princes, who by such extorted privileges scrape unto themselves whatsoever they desire: and the good kings not still able to satisfy the hungry courtiers, sometimes well eased, which have used these restrictions, being so of their subjects well beloved, the confirmation of such edicts and privileges not carrying with them any effect unto the subject, or disobedience unto the king to give good words, or charge of conscience unto the magistrate in not performing it.  
But yet farther question might be made, Whether a magistrate may be suffered to 
Whether a magistrate be to be suffered to give up his place, rather than to allow an edict or command of his prince which he for certain thinketh to be unjust, and contrary unto reason  give up his place, rather than he will allow an edict, a commission, or commandment from his prince, which he for certain thinketh to be unjust and contrary unto natural reason, when as the equity of it is called in question, & especially if the other magistrates and multitude of the people shall hold it to be just, contrary to the others. For the force of justice, and power of upright reason, is not perceived but of the fewer and wiser sort: and a wise man being as it were the rule of reason, is of all others the greatest enemy unto the multitude. Which if it be so, why should a wise man be enforced to give his consent unto the multitude of mad magistrates. In which case I say, that the magistrate is not to be suffered to give up his place, if it please not his sovereign prince he should so do, but aught rather to be constrained to obey his princes commands, if the equity thereof being called in doubt, be approved by the greater part of the magistrates, which have charge to confirm such edicts: For otherwise if they should be permitted to give up their places, rather than to pass an edict approved by others, it would open a perilous gap to all the subjects, by their example to refuse and reject the edicts and commands of their prince: and so every one in his charge might leave the Commonweal unto danger, and expose it unto the tempest, as a ship without a Rudder, and that under the shadow of an opinion of justice▪ which may haply be but a devise of a subtle brain, to no other purpose than to contradict the more common opinion. And therefore among the most laudable laws made by jews the xii, there is one which importeth, That if the judges be of three or more opinions, those which were the fewer in number should be constrained to conform and join themselves unto one of the greater parties, for the concluding of the decrees. Whereupon the court of Paris of long time doubted, whether this law should be published or not: for that it seemed a very hard and a most strange thing unto many, to force the conscience of the judges contrary to their own opinions, and so enforce them to judge contrary to that they aught, and that especially in such things as were committed unto the wisdom and devotion of the judges, as are almost all both public and private judgements. Yet nevertheless after the court had considered of inconveniences which it saw ordinarily to arise upon the variety of opinions, and that the course of justice, and the concluding of many good decrees, was thereby also often letted, the court confirmed the aforesaid law, which by process of time hath been found to be most just & profitable. Hereunto also agreeth the manner and custom of the ancient Romans: for their judges oftentimes to change their opinions, and to join themselves unto the greater part, albeit that they were not thereunto constrained. As is to be seen in Pliny, of a judgement wherein one part of the judges had condemned the guilty person unto death, another part had clearly and fully acquitted him, and the third part had for a time banished him: in this diversity of opinions, as well they which had before acquitted him, as they which had condemned him to death, consented both to them which would have him banished. But our law is in that point better, which compelleth the fewer to join themselves unto the more. For in all corporations & colleges reason would, that that which pleaseth the greater part should take place and prevail, as strengthened with the most voices. Howbeit that in all such consultations and actions the rule of the ancient wise never faileth; which willeth, That of many honest and profitable things propounded unto us, we should choose those which be most honest, and most profitable: and so of many inconveniences and dangers, to make choice of the lest: for otherwise men's actions should never sort to good end. And a man may also say, That the equity of a law is not properly natural, if it be obscure or doubtful; for that true natural justice is more clear and resplendent than the brightness of the sun, as not wrapped up in obscurity, nor depending of the erroneous opinions of men, but of the most clear and immutable wisdom of the everlasting.  
And yet nevertheless since the law of jews the xii. I found not that any magistrate hath given up his place, as fearing to be enforced to maintain or yield to any opinion contrary unto his conscience: and especially since the places of justice were given unto men for virtue, and not for reward and favour. Neither hath the law of jews the xii. at any time constrained the judges to judge contrary unto their conscience, but hath rather silently given them leave to give up their places; howbeit that it were more equity so to constrain them, than to leave it unto their will and pleasure. For which cause the king's Attourneyes general have oftentimes constrained the judges to judge according unto Laws and customs of the land, albeit that all the judges were of contrary opinion. As I remember that whilst I was at Tholouse, one Bartholomew Precedent of one of the Chambers of inquiry, seeing all the counsellors of his court of one and the same opinion in a suit, and directly against the law: after he had assembled all the rest of the courts upon the matter, he constrained them to change their opinions, and to judge according to the law; And that justly also: for who enforced thee to seek for thine office? or to accept of it being offered thee? and having taken it upon thee, (being happily got either by suspending of voices, or by sure, or bribery,) and being sworn, wilt thou now forswear the laws, which thou mightest before have read, or at lest wise oughtest to have read? wilt thou by thy false opinion of the law and justice, wrong the place thou bearest? delude the laws? or forsake thy prince and Commonweal.  
Yet sometime it happeneth that such laws as of themselves seem unto every man 
Wh●… the magistrate is to d●… in case the law●… otherwise▪ just, now upon som●… sudden occutrents 〈◊〉 to be har●… and unjust.  most just, may upon some sudden occurent appear and prove to be most unjust. In which case, whereas the wrong is in the fact presented plain and evident, wise magistrates use to certify the king thereof, (as I remember it to have most oftentimes been done in the parliament at Paris,) who imparting the matter unto his Counsel, doth as he seethe cause derogate from the positive law; or add some thing unto the same: (which our men call the exposition or declaration of the law) a thing properly belonging unto the sovereignty of a Prince, as we have before declared. So that in this case, it is not lawful for the magistrate to judge against the law, although he may suspend his sentence until that the Prince's pleasure be further known. But otherwise the law being clear and without difficulty, the magistrate is to judge according thereunto without disputing of the equity thereof: for otherwise if the judge shall wittingly and wilfully judge contrary unto the law, he is by the laws themselves noted of infamy: but if he shall so judge of ignorance, or supposing himself to judge according unto the law; he is not therefore to be accounted infamous: howbeit that such his judgement is of itself voided, as if it had not been given at all, in such sort as that a man by the ancient Roman law need not at all to appeal therefrom.  
Now there is great difference whether question be of the laws already established, or of those which yet are by the magistrate to be published. For why, such as be already established, every man is bound to keep, and especially the magistrates, who if they wittingly serve therefrom, (beside the penalty appointed by the law) are subject also unto the note of infamy, as periurours and forsworn men. But as for such Edicts and 
Great care to be had by the greater magistrates in the publication of laws.  laws as are not yet published, but are but as yet presented unto the magistrates to be confirmed and published, of them it behoveth the greater magistrates (to whom the publication of laws especially appertaineth) well to consider, and to show the reasons if they shall dislike of them unto the prince, albeit that it concern but the particular interest of some one private person; but much more, in case it concern the great harm or good of the Commonweal: which good if it be very great, may in some sort cover the injustice of the law; (as the ancient statesmen say.) Yet must we not proceed so far in respecting of the public profit be it never so great, as therefore to forget reason, and to be carried headlong with wrong and injustice: as were in ancient time the Lacedæmonians, who measured all justice by the common profit, whereunto they directed all their laws, all their judgements, and counsels; so that if that were once in question, neither oath, nor reason, nor justice, nor yet the law of nature was by them 
Better it is for the magistrate of himself to give way unto the law contrary unto the laws of God and nature.  once respected. But much better it were for the Commonweal, and more beseeming the dignity of the magistrate, of himself to give up his office (as did the chancellor of Philip the second, duke of Burgundy) than to give way unto a law that is contrary unto the laws of God and nature, or that in every man's judgement seemeth to be dishonest or unjust; howbeit the Duke seeing the irremoveable constancy of his chancellor, ready to give up his office, thought it better to revoke such his commands, than to want so stout & wise a man. Which so constant resolutions of the magistrates, hath oftentimes preserved Princes from infamy, laws from decay, and Commonweals 
That a prince's faults which cannot be amended aught by all means to be of the magistrate cou●…red.  from destruction. But when such constancy cannot heal the diseases of the Commonweal, or faults of sovereign princes; and that the prince commandeth the magistrates, to have his actions excused unto his subjects; it is much better for the magistrate to obey his command, and in so doing to cover and bury the memory of a wicked fact already done, than in refusing so to do, to irritate the prince to the doing of worse; and so (as they say) to cast the helue after the hatchet. As did Papinian the great Governor of the empire, (and by Severus the Emperor in his will appointed Tutor unto the young emperors Antonius Caracalla, and Geta his sons) who by Caracalla commanded to excuse unto the Senate the murder by him committed upon the person of his brother Geta, would therein do nothing, but cut him off with this sharp and short answer, saying, That murders were more hardly excused, than committed: which was of him more stoutly then wisely said. For Caracalla with this answer enraged, and yet not satisfied with his brother's blood, in his rage commanded Papinian also to be slain: and after the death of him so great a man, (as who alone might have governed the furious young prince, and repressed his rage) never ceased without any contradiction or controlment to kill, murder, and tyrannize, until such time as he had brought himself together with the Empire unto destruction. Which I would not have to be so understood, as spoken of us in any respect to impair the worthy praises of so notable a man, (for that can in no wise be done) but that magistrates may hereby understand, how far they are to bear with the faults of princes, which once done, cannot by them be amended. For had Papinian covered that he could not now amend, he had saved his own life, and counterpeased the tyrannies and cruelties of the Emperor, who always before had him in greatest honour and regard. Which fault in Papinian I have thought good to note, for that many have right highly commended him for the same▪ without respecting, that such his resistance availed nothing, but brought an irreparable loss unto the affairs of the empire, being so deprived of so great a parsonage, as might therein do more than any other; for that he was a prince of the blood, and the greatest magistrate in the state. But had the matter than stood whole and entire, and that the Emperor had commanded him to put his brother Geta to death, he had then done both stoutly and wisely in refusing so to do, and had had just cause rather to die than to consent to that unnatural fact, for one brother to murder another. But Seneca and his companion Burra (the governors of Nero) shall be for ever blamed, as having no excuse to pretend for their most wicked counsel, persuading Nero to kill his mother, who by chance had escaped drowning: which most cruel counsel, command, or fact, shall together with the authors thereof be for ever crowned with eternal infamy and shame.  
But what if the prince shall command any thing to be done, and that the same thing 
A princes command being begun to be put in execution, whether it b●… by the princes contrary command to 〈◊〉 given over.  being begun to be put in execution, he changing his mind shall revoke his former command; shall the magistrate in this case stay from proceeding any further, or go on with that he hath begun? Whereunto a man at the first sight would say, That he aught to stay and to proceed no farther: following therein the maxims of the law. Howbeit to answer rightly thereunto, the matter is by distinction to be opened; that is to wit, that if the thing so begun may be left off without the public harm, it is then so to be left off according to the last command: but if it be so begun, as that it cannot be left off, without the manifest hurt of the state and Commonweal; the magistrate in this case is to proceed on with that he hath so begun, notwithstanding the latter countermand, and that especially in matters of war; as we have before said. And to this 
Great things by great men undertaken, aught also to be by them performed, or else never taken in hand.  purpose Marcellus the Consul saith, Multa magnis ducibus sicut non aggredienda, ita semel aggressis non dimittenda. As many things are not of great captains to be at all taken in hand: so being once by them undertaken, are not by them to be again given over. And this in time of war. But if at home the magistrate following the commandment to him given, hath begun to execute the condemned, or them that the prince hath commanded to be put to death, he aught forthwith to surcease from any further execution, if the commandment be revoked: and not to do, as did the Consul Fuluius, who having taken the city of Capua, as he was punishing the authors of the rebellion, and had now caused the greater part of the Senators of that city to be beheaded, receiving letters from the Senate of Rome, willing him to stay and cease the execution, put those letters in his bosom, without reading of them, & doubting of the contents thereof, proceeded to the execution of the rest, until he had put to death fourscore of them. True it is, that the Senate had no power in any thing to command the Consuls (as we have before said) yet for all that, the governors of provinces, and the generals of the Roman armies, yea a●…d the Consuls also, used most commonly to be obedient unto the Senate, and to yield unto the decrees thereof, as unto laws. And truly the principal cause why they of Gaunt put to death six and thirty of their lawyers, after the death of Charles Duke of Burgundy, was for nothing else, but for that they had condemned a citizen to death, after the death of the Duke; before they were again confirmed in their authority and office, although it was not a thing altogether necessary; as with like examples we have declared. Yea it is almost a perpetual thing, for them which are in authority and have power to command, to be able of their own right to execute that was commanded them, yea after that the time of their authority is expired, if he that gave them the authority and charge knowing and wittingly shall dissemble the fact, or not forbidden it when he might.  
Now all that we have hitherto said, is to be understood only of such letters or rescripts of command, as yet carry with them no power for the magistrate to examine the fact or matter they concern. But than what shall we say, if such rescripts or commands report such things as certainly known and true, which yet are neither publicly, nor unto the magistrate so known to be. Hear we must again consider, whether 
Whether the magistrate b●… to examine the truth of that he is by●… the prince commanded, before he proceed to the examination thereof?  the examination of the matter, be by special command expressly taken from the magistrate, or else left unto him: if it be left unto him, there is then no doubt, but that the magistrate may and aught to inquire of the truth of such things, as are reported in the prince's rescripts or letters: but if all examination of the matter be taken from the magistrate, than some doubt, whether he may inquire of the truth thereof or not; and especially if it be expressed in the rescript or mandate, that the prince being well informed of the truth, commandeth the magistrate to proceed to the execution of his letters or commands: howbeit the best opinion is, that the magistrate both in the one case and the other, aught to examine the truth of the matter. For when to inquire of the truth of the cause, is neither forbidden nor commanded, although it be expressed in the prince's rescripts or letters, to proceed to execution, yet aught the magistrate nevertheless to examine the truth of the matter. And to the intent, that the magistrates should not pretend to excuse themselves by ignorance, the emperor Constantine, provided by an express law, that the magistrates should inquire, whether these things were true or not, which were set down in his rescripts or letters of command, whether it were so in them expressed, or left out. And as for the other point, if in the rescripts or letters, it be expressly set down to proceed to execution, for that the prince is well informed of the truth of the matter; yet nevertheless aught the magistrate to examine the truth thereof: notwithstanding the clause which I have said, which aught not to hinder the examination of the matter, nor to be prejudicial to any other man's right; and so much less unto the public, and lest of all unto the truth: and so generally, all such narrative clauses as are but reported in rescripts, mandates, commissions, laws, privileges, testaments, and sentences, cannot be any thing prejudicial unto the truth. And albeit, that during the tyranny of the Sforces, they made a law, that all faith and credence should be given unto the prince's commands and letters; yet was the same law again disannulled, after that they were by the French, driven out of the estate of Milan. And if the faith and credit must needs be given unto the narrative clauses of princes rescripts and letters of command, that is to be understood, only of such clauses, as whereby the obscure places of their edicts, and laws, commissions, mandates, or judgements are expounded, which none can better declare, than they themselves that made them; howbeit, that such their declarations aught rather to be called decrees, than expositions or declarations. But if the prince shall in the bestowing of offices, places of charge, or other his grants in his rescripts or letters, testify for the fidelity, integrity, wisdom, or religion of any man, it is so far from, that the magistrate should rest contented with that testification, as that he aught therefore with greater diligence to inquire 
Whether the ma gistrate aught to inquire of the sufficie●…sie of him of whose wisdom and 〈◊〉 the prince shall himself by his rescripts or letters testify; in the bestowing of any office or other charge upon him  of him, for that the prince supposed him to be indeed such, and would not have such benefits or preferments bestowed upon an ignorant or unwise man. But contrary wise, if the prince shall simply give unto any man an office or place of command, he is no farther by the magistrate to be inquired of, for that the prince in his wisdom hath thought him worthy such honour and place; if the prince first give him not leave so to do, or that the custom of the country so require: as in the latter times they did in Rome; but afterwards, almost ●…ery where: but especially in the appointing of judges. So also in ancient time, in the reign of the Goths, trial was made of the Senators, before they were to be admitted into the Senate. For Theodoric, king of the Goths, writing unto the Roman Senate, for the receiving of a new Senator, saith, Admittendos in Senatum examinare cogit sollicitus honour Senatus▪ the care (we have) of the honour of the Senate, causeth us to examine such as are to be admitted into the Senate.  
But if any man under a false pretenced colour shall encroach upon the prince the profits and commodities unto him granted, being in the prince's rescript expressed, yet is he thereof by the magistrate to be embarred; and the rather, if the common treasure be with immoderate gifts exhausted: unto which disease every where spreading, remedy might be given, if the law of Valois concerning gifts might take place. For Philip Valois the French king, commanded those gifts and grants to be revoked from them, who in the letters of such gifts or grants, had not expressed what they or any other for them, had for the same cause in the letters of their grants, before obtained; which yet also is in use in Milan. For seeing that it much concerneth the Commonweal what money and profit, what rewards, and privileges, every man obtaine●…h, the magistrates 
It much con●…neth the Commonweal what gifts or privileges be granted unto particular men.  must thereunto have a most vigilant eye, and especially in popular estates, wherein as all public things lie open unto the spoil of all men; so for the same cause occasion is ministered unto the seditious, to the trouble and oftentimes to the ruin of the Commonweal. And for this cause it was most straightly provided by a law in the twelve tables, that no privilege or dispensation might in any wise be granted, and that upon pain of death, but only in the great assembly of the whole estate of the people: the words of the law being these, Privilegia nisi Commitijs Centuriatis ne irroganto, qui secus faxit Capital esto, ●…et no privilege be granted, but in the great and general assembly of the people: and he that shall otherwise do, let him die the death. And after that Constantine the emperor writing unto the people, saith, Nec d●…mnosa fi●…co, nec legibus contraria impetrari oportet, ●…t is not fit, things hurtful unto the common treasure, or 
Privileg●… 〈◊〉 things odious and 〈◊〉 unto the law●…, how they are to be interpreted.  contrary unto the laws, to be obtained▪ howbeit that all privileges are directly contrary unto the law; for otherwise they should not be privileges. And i●… it be so, that they must needs pass after the second command (as we have before said) yet beseemeth it the magistrate to cut them short, and to interpret them in strictest manner that he can, and to the lest hurt of the Commonweal, as things odious, and contrary unto the law; and not by favourable interpretations to increase their strength, or to draw them into consequence, as heretofore have the judges and the clergy, which by their fair gloss, have drawn the profit and privileges granted only unto soldiers, unto themselves also; using these fair gloasing words, of worldly Soldiers and heavenly Soldiers: so laying all the burden upon the poor country man, unto whom the same privileges aught of better right to be communicated than to them.  
But for that our purpose is not here to enter into the disputing of privileges, which 
Privileges to be most straightly examined.  were a thing infinite, sufficeth it in passing by, in general to advertise the magistrate to have special regard unto the privileges by princes granted, and most straightly to examine them, what good report soever the prince therein make of him that hath obtained such privilege: For that every man well knoweth, that the prince oftentimes knoweth not them to whom such privileges are granted; unworthy men still not so much obtaining them, as indeed wresting them from princes, even as it were against their wills: no craft or subtlety in this case left unsought out, to defraud the laws, and abuse the prince and magistrates, and that with so many shifts and quirks of words, and so much deceit, as that they seem hardly to be by the magistrate to be met withal, but by plain force. Such is that clause, De motu proprio (of our own mere motion) which invented at Rome, hath from thence crept abroad into all Europe. For why, there is almost neither king nor kesar, which when question is for the breaking of a law, or repealing an edict, or for giving way unto dispensations and privileges, joineth not thereunto this clause, De motu nostro proprio (Of our own proper motion) howbeit that the same princes have been importuned, and as it were enforced to grant that even unto unknown and most unworthy men, for whom they have been so importunately requested. There is at Rome a field called Flory, or Flourishing, not so much for the plenty of flowers, as of witnesses that are therein; out of which every man may take testimonies, for the bestowing of benefices upon them which devil even in the remotest places of Asia and Africa, and that with these words, De motu proprio. By which only clause, all the fraud and deceit of them that sued for preferment, be they never so bad or unjust, are easily excused: and by virtue of which words the examination of all sly incommings or crafty intrusions, cease, if we will receive the opinion of some most pernicious and dangerous unto the state: but such sleights and deceits we have long since bid farewell out of our Commonweal. And for that princes and magistrates circumvented with the wiles of deceitful men, could hardly, or not at all escape the same, it was wisely decreed, That the prince's rescripts, nor letters patents, should be of none effect, except they were presented unto the magistrate the same year that they were obtained; neither should be of any force, before they were by the magistrate approved. And yet it seemeth unto me, that the law of Milan is better, that is to wit, that the prince's mandates and letters patents directed unto the Senate, were not to be received after the year expired: neither those that were directed unto the magistrate after a month were passed: and that not only the year and day, but even the very hour also, should be therein set down, as the manner is almost throughout all Germany; following therein the opinion of many great lawyers, to stop the suits and controversies which often times arise for gifts, offices, and benefices granted unto divers in one day, as it was decreed by the parliament at Blois, at the request there made by Bodin deputy of Vermandois.  
But what if the prince by his rescript or letters patents, shall expressly forbidden the magistrate 
Whether the magistrate expressly forbidden to examine the truth of things contained in the prince's grants or letters, may yet pass beyond such his sovereigns' prohibition.  to examine the truth of such things as are contained in them, albeit that they be false or doubtful; aught the magistrate in this case to examine the matter? And it seemeth that he aught so to do: For we have before said, that he may, and aught to examine the cause, and inquire of the truth of things expressed in the prince's rescripts and letters, albeit that the prince therein declare himself to know the truth thereof. Yet for all that, I say, that it belongeth not unto the magistrate in this case to pass beyond the prohibition of his sovereign prince: For there is great difference when the prince declareth, That he knoweth the truth; and when he forbiddeth to inquire thereof: For in him it is to be presumed, that he hath been circumvented, and so mistaking things false for true, and things unknown for known, to have commanded them so to be put into his rescript, which he would not have done, had he been truly thereof informed: As if he should give a judges place unto a soldier, or a captains place unto a lawyer, neither the one nor the other aught by the magistrate to be admitted or received, although the soldier were commonly called a lawyer, and the lawyer a soldier, such pretended quality having happily given occasion unto the prince to be so in his grant deceived. But when the prince shall expressly forbidden the magistrate to examine the fact or matter, it is to be presumed, that he well knoweth that which he doth, and that he would not that the magistrate should farther inquire thereof. Yet may the magistrate well use the remedy by us before spoken of, and show the prince the truth, and the importance of his command, with the inconveniences and harms ensuing thereof, and so in what he may to draw him from his former purpose: and having so discharged his duty, yet nevertheless then to yield his obedience, if he shall be again so commanded: for otherwise the majesty of a prince or Commonweal should be but a mockery, as still subject unto the controlment of the magistrates. Besides that, it is much more also to be feared, lest that the other magistrates, by the example of one or two, and after them other private men also, should presume to contemn the prince's command, to the great endangering and ruin of the Commonweal.  
Now if a man should say that a Prince aught not to command any thing that is dishonest or unjust, he therein saith well: neither aught the prince (if it were possible) to command any thing not beseeming his honour, or that were so much as subject unto reprehension or slander, or knowing the magistrates to be of contrary opinion unto his, to constrain them thereunto: for that the ignorant and common people is no way more moved unto disloyalty, and contempt of their prince's edicts and laws, then to see the magistrates hardly dealt withal, and the laws by them contrary to their 
Whether the magistrate commanded by his prince any thing contrary to the common profit, or course of civil justice, aught to obey such his princes command, or to give up his place.  good liking published and forced. But now here the question is, what the magistrate aught to do, in case the prince forgetting his duty, command any thing contrary to the common profit and civil justice; yet provided still that it be not against the law of God and nature: whether the magistrate aught to obey such his princes command, or to give up his place? And if so it be, that the worldly magistrate aught to be obeyed, albeit that he command such things as are unjust: Ne Praetoris matestas contempta videatur, Jest the majesty of the Praetor should seem to be contemned (as saith the law) how much more than aught men to obey their sovereign Prince, of the majesty of whom all magistrates depend? Now it is in many laws repeated that we must obey the magistrate, whether the thing that he commandeth be just or not, following the counsel of all the wise which have hereof written. And to this purpose saith Cicero (albeit that he was a mortal enemy unto the Tribunes of the people) that men were to obey even the unjust oppositions of the Tribunes, in these words: Parere iube●… lex intercessori, quo nihil praestantius: impediri enim bonam rem melius est, quàm concedi malè, The law (saith he) commandeth us to obey the magistrate that opposeth himself, than which nothing is better: for better it is a good thing to be crossed then evil granted. And before he had said: Nihil exitiosius civitatibus, nihil tam contrarium iuri ac legibus, nihil minùs civil & humanum, quàm composita & constituta republica quicquam agi per vim, Nothing is more dangerous unto cities, nothing more contrary unto right and law, nothing more uncivil or inhuman, then in a well ordered 
Dangerous unto Commonweals for the the magistrates to refuse to put in execution their prince's Edicts or commands.  and settled Commonweal to have any thing done by force. We often times see the subjects to take up arms against their prince, the laws violated, and justice go to wrack, and all for the false opinion that the people have of the equity and integrity of the judges, refusing to verify and put in execution the Edicts and commands of their prince. OH but say they it is an unjust Edict or law, neither can we, nor aught we, to obey the same: an honest speech, if indeed thou canst not; but where learnedest thou that thou oughtest not? from whence hadst thou that doctrine? wilt thou (being a magistrate) with stripes, imprisoment, fines, yea, and with death itself enforce private men to obey, yea even thine unjust commands, and yet thyself not obey the commandment of thy Prince? But thou wilt deny thine own commands to be unjust: so doth the prince also deny that which he commandeth to be so: shalt thou now be judge herein, or he? or if thou wilt needs be judge, why shouldst thou not think to suffer the same in thine own decrees concerning private men. Besides that, as no man enforced thee to take upon thee thine office, so no man forbiddeth thee to give up the same, if the law thou likest not seem to thee so unjust: it is therefore the desire of bearing rule, that maketh thee that thou wouldst bear rule over private men, and yet not obey thy prince thyself. Wherhfore let us upon this conclude, it to be much better in all obedience to stoop unto the sovereign majesty, than in refusing of his sovereign commands to give example and occasion of rebellion unto the subjects; yet still keeping the respects that we have before set down, and especially when it concerneth the honour of God, which is and aught to be unto all subjects greater, and more precious than the wealth, the life, the honour of all the princes of the world. And to know how a man should bear himself herein, amongst many examples we will use but one or two. Saul commanded all the priests of God without just cause in his presence to be slain, yet was there no man which refused not his ungodly command, except Doeg, who himself alone performed that so cruel an execution. another notable example there is of one Petronius governor of Syria, who received 
A notable example of a wise governor or magistrate.  commandment to place the image of Caligula the emperor, in the fairest place of the Temple of Jerusalem, as it had been in all other Temples of the empire: howbeit that the jews had never suffered those images to stand in their Temples, but had still cast them down, and broken and beaten them all to pieces, even to the very shields of the emperors, which they had there placed. Whereof Petronius advertised the Emperor, and that it could not be done without great trouble and slaughter of the people: wherewith Caligula more incensed, sent more express and straight command unto Petronius, to assemble all the old bands of his garrison soldiers in those quarters, and so with a puissant army to put his commission in execution. Of whose coming the jews hearing, left their Towns, and the tillage of their grounds, and so in great companies all unarmed, went to meet him, if happily they so might by their humble prayers entreat him; telling him withal, that they aught not so much to fear any mortal man, as to commit so abominable a sin against the majesty of the immortal God: and therefore most humbly requested him to take in good part such their constant resolution, which was rather to die, than to see so great an abomination, as the most sacred Temple of God to be so polluted with the images of men. Nevertheless Petronius told them that it concerned his life, to perform his commission: and so to terrify them the more, marched with his army unto Tiberias, (as supposing himself to do nothing contrary to his own religion, or to the laws of God or man) but there the people came running unto him from all parts, disarmed, and resolved all to die, rather than to see the image set up in the Temple, humbling themselves, and bowing their heads before the army wherewith Petronius had beset them round: who seeing the great constancy of the people, and their exceeding zeal towards the honour of their God, as to choose rather to die, than so much as to see the image of 2 man in the Temple of God; wonderfully moved therewith, and with their pitiful complaint and tears, (and being himself also a man of a courteous and mild nature, and far from that cruelty, which the jews feared not whatsoever it had been) he commanded them all to return home; promising again to writ in their behalf unto the Emperor, and rather himself to die than to execute his commission, accounting his life a worthy ransom for the saving of the guiltless blood of so many innocent people. Nevertheless Caligula therewith the more enraged, sent unto him a new command, with grievous threats to put him unto the most grievous torture that he could possibly devise, if he forthwith put not his commission in execution, according to his command. But the ship, together with them that brought the commission, was by force of tempest carried an other way, and news brought into jury of the death of the tyrant, before that the cruel commission could come thither. And so Petronius having discharged his conscience towards God, his duty towards his prince, and well showed his great love toward the subjects, and discharged all the parts of a most wise Governor: was himself by the divine providence wonderfully preserved from the cruelties unto him by the tyrant threatened. But yet this is especially to be considered, that we 
That the Magistrate aught not upon a vain show of religion, or ●… conscience evil grounded, to refuse to execute his princes commands.  pretend not the vain show of religion, or rather of superstition, against our prince's commands, and so upon a conscience evil grounded open a way unto rebellion: for when the magistrate maketh conscience, and a matter of religion, about the executing of his princes commands, he seemeth himself (and giveth occasion unto others also) to suspect evil both of the religion and conscience of his prince. Wherhfore he aught to be well assured of the true knowledge of the eternal God, and of the true worship and service unto him due: which consisteth not in vain and sergeant shows of religion or conscience. divers other examples I could to the same purpose produce, were I not afraid jest those whom we call Pagans' should therein ashame us, with whom the fervent zeal unto the honour of God is so abated, and by process of time cooled, as that it is to be feared jest at length it be altogether frozen. And thus much for the obedience of the Magistrate unto his Sovereign Prince. Let us now also speak of his power and authority over particular and private men, and what a manner of man we wish him for to to be towards them.   

CHAP. V ¶ Of the power an●… authority of a Magistrate over particular and private men, and of his office and duty.  
WE have before said, That a Magistrate is an officer which hath public power to command, or to forbidden: Now he hath power so to command or forbidden, which hath public power to enforce or constrain them which will not obey that which he enjoineth them, or which do contrary to his prohibition, and may also ease the prohibitions by himself made. For albeit that the law saith, That the force of the laws consisteth in commanding, and forbidding; in suffering, and punishing: yet is this power more proper unto the Magistrate, then unto the law, which is of itself dumb: whereas the Magistrate is a living and 
The Magistrate a living law.  breathing law, which putteth all this in execution, seeing that the law in itself carrieth or containeth nothing but commands or prohibitions, which are but mockeries and to no purpose, if the Magistrate and the punishment were not attendant at the foot of the law, ready for him which transgresseth the same. Howbeit that to speak properly, the law containeth nothing but the very prohibition, and the threats for not obeying the same; considering that he which commandeth (inclusively) forbiddeth to transgress his command: and as for sufferance, that is no law: for sufferance taketh away prohibition, and carrieth with it neither penalty nor threat, without which the law cannot be, considering that the law is no other thing, than the commandment of the sovereign, as we have before declared: and whatsoever threat or penalty is propounded by the law, yet the punishment nevertheless never ensueth the breach thereof, until it be pronounced by the mouth of the Magistrate. Whereby it evidently appeareth 
The force of the law to consist in the Magistrate, or him that hath the power to command and constrain.  all the force of the law to consist in them which have the command, whether it be prince, people, or magistrate, unto whom so commanding, except the subjects yield their obedience, they have power to enforce or punish them, which Demosthenes calleth the very sinews of the Commonweal.  
We have said, that the Magistrate aught to have public power, to put a difference 
What power the Magistrate aught to have?  betwixt this power and the domestical power. We said also, that the Magistrate should have power to constrain such as would not obey: for the difference from them which have the hearing of matters, who may also judge and pronounce sentence, & call men before them, but yet have no power to compel or constrain men, or to put their sentences or commandments in execution; such as were in ancient time the bishops, and now our bishops also: such were also the ancient commissioners, delegates unto the Magistrates, having power to hear the causes unto them committed; as also to condemn the parties, but yet had no power to constrain them, but sent their sentences unto the Magistrates, to be ratified or reversed, and by them to be put in execution as they saw good: So might these delegates call men before them, but yet so, as that no man, except he listed, needed to obey them, except the Magistrates themselves had by virtue of their authority so commanded. And therefore he was not in danger of the law, who had by force rescued a private man, as he was to be brought before these private judges or delegates appointed by the Magistrates, which he should have incurred, had the delegates had of themselves any power to command. Howbeit that now by our laws and customs the delegates have with us power to command, and to 'cause their sentences to be put in execution by sergeant and other public persons, by virtue of their decrees which they give out, signed and sealed with their own hands and seals: whereas the bishops with us have no such power to constrain men, but sand their sentences to be executed by the Magistrates. As the Cadies, and Paracadies do in all the East, who have the hearing of all matters, but yet have no power to constrain men, but sand their judgements unto the Sabbassaes, which have the command and power in their hand.  
We have before said, that the first constraint of all them which had power to command, 
The first constraining power that the magistrate hath.  is the seizing or attaching both of men's goods and persons; which the ancients called prehensio, or as we say an apprehending or laying on of hands: for it were to no purpose, for the Magistrate to call a man before him, to judge him, or to fine him; and wh●● all is done not to have power to seize upon their goods nor person of him that shall disobey him. Now we have before said, that some there be, which have such power to apprehended and attach men; which yet have no authority or power to call a man before them, neither to examine a matter, neither to rescue a man, neither to enlarge them whom they have committed; as we have showed of the Tribunes of the people, of the eleven Magistrates in Athens, of the Capital Triumuiri in Rome, of the Auogadours in Venice, of the king's Attourneys, and the deputies of them which have power of the common treasure in other realms and Commonweals: and of the Commissioners of the Chastelet of Paris, who may all imprison men, and seize upon them, and yet for all that cannot relieve or enlarge them, which belongeth only unto the public Magistrates, which have power to condemn and acquit, and to judge, some of them of men's goods only, other some of men's goods and honour also, and other some of men's goods and honour, with power to inflict corporal punishment also, but 
The divers power of Magistrates.  not death: and some having power to put to death also, and that some of them such power, as from whom men may appeal; and some others, such as from whom men may not appeal. But the last and highest degree, is of such as have the absolute power of life and death; that is to say, power to condemn to death, and again to give life 
The Lighest mark of sovereign majesty is to have power of life and death.  unto him which hath deserved to die; which is the highest mark of sovereignty, above all laws, and above the power and authority of all Magistrates, as proper only unto sovereignty, as we have before declared. Whereby it appeareth, that there are two kinds of commanding by public power: the one in sovereignty, which is absolute, infinite, and above the laws, the Magistrates, and all other private persons: the other is a lawful command, as subject unto the laws and sovereignty, and is proper unto 
Two sorts of commmaunding by public power: the one in sovereignty, and the other by law  the Magistrates, and them which have extraordinary power to command, until it be again revoked, or the time of their commission expired. The sovereign prince next under God knoweth none greater than himself; the Magistrate under God holdeth his power of his sovereign prince, and remaineth always subject unto him and his laws: the particular man next after God (whom we must always put in the first place) acknowledgeth the sovereign prince, his laws, and his Magistrates, every one of them in his place. Under the name of Magistrates I understand also them which have jurisdiction annexed unto their fees, considering that they hold them also as well of the sovereign prince, as do the Magistrates, in such sort, as that it seemeth that there are none in the Commonweal but the sovereign princes, which may properly use these words, Impero & jubeo, I charge and command: which in ancient time signified, I will and command, seeing that the will of every Magistrate, and of all others also, which have power to command, is bound and dependeth wholly of the sovereign, which may altar, change, and revoke it at his pleasure. For which cause there is neither any one Magistrate, nor yet all together, which can put in their commissions, Such is our pleasure: or this clause, Upon pain of death, for that none but a sovereign prince or state, can use the same in their edicts or laws.  
And hereof riseth a notable question, which is not yet well decided, viz. Whether 
Whether the power of the sword be proper only unto the sovereign prince or common also unto the magistrate to whom the prince hath communicated the same?  the power of the sword (which the law calleth Merum imperium, or mere power) be proper unto the sovereign prince, and inseparable from the sovereignty; and that the Magistrates have not this merum imperium (or mere power) but only the execution thereof: or that such power is also common unto the Magistrate, to whom the prince hath communicated the same. Which question was disputed betwixt Lothaire and Azon, two of the greatest lawyers of their time: and the emperor Henry the seventh chosen thereof judge, at such time as he was at Bononia, upon the wager of an horse, which he should pay, which was by the judgement of the emperor upon the aforesaid question condemned. Wherein Lothaire indeed carried away the honour, howbeit that the greater part, & almost all the rest of the famous lawyers than held the opinion of Azon; saying, That Lothaire equum tulerat, sed Azo aequum (Lothaire had carried away the horse, but Azon the right) nevertheless many s●…nce have holden the opinion of Lothaire: so that the question remaineth yet (as we said) undecided, which for all that deserveth to be well understood, for the consequence it draweth after it, for the better understanding of the force and nature of commanding, and the rights of sovereign majesty. But the difficulty thereof is grown, for that Lothaire and Azon neither of them well knew the estate of the Romans, whose laws and ordinances they expounded; neither took regard unto the change in that estate made by the coming in of the emperors. Certain it is, that at the first, after that the kings were driven out of the city, none of the Roman Magistrates had power of the sword over the citizens: yea that which much less is, they had not so much power, as to condemn any citizen to be 
No magistrate in Rome after the kings once driven out▪ had power o●… the sword.  whipped or beaten, after the law Portia▪ published at the request of Cato Tribune of the people, 454 years after the foundation of the city. By which law the people took this power, not from the Magistrates only, but despoiled even itself thereof also so much as it could, giving the condemned leave for what fault or offence soever it were, to voided the country, and to go into exile: and that which more is, there was not any one magistrate, which had power to judge a citizen, if once question were but of his honour, or good name, or of any public crime by him committed; for then the hearing thereof was reserved unto the commonalty, or common people: but if it concerned the loss of life, or of the freedom of a citizen, none might then judge thereof, but the whole estate of the people in their greatest assemblies, as was ordained by those laws, which they called Sacred. Which although that they were not always so precisely kept, but that they were sometime broken; yet Cicero for transgressing the same escaped not, but being Consul, and having caused certain of the conspirators with Catiline to be executed, was therefore himself afterwards banished, and his goods all confiscated. Long after the laws Valeria, Sempronia, and Portia, which had now removed the Consul's hatchets and rods from the heads and backs of the citizens of Rome: Cornelius Sylla the dictator published his laws concerning public judgements, whereby were appointed a certain number of Praetors, as ordinary officers, which were to judge of all such causes as whereof the commonalty before judged, or at leastwise appointed commissioners for to judge of such crimes, as of murders, of robbing of the common treasure, of treason, or of extortion; but yet so, as that these Praetors had their lesson by writing, beyond which they might not pass a jot. For they by lot drew a certain number of particular judges out of them, which by the laws might in such causes be judiciary judges, who before all the people having heard the accusations and defences both of the one part and the other, had brought unto every one of them the judges, three little tables of divers colours, upon one of which was written an A. upon another a C. and upon the third N. L. the A. signifying acquitted, C. condemned, and N. L. as much as to say, Non Liquet, or it is not manifest, or the matter is farther to be inquired of (which they called Ampliare, and Amplius quaerere.) With these tables was also brought unto the judges a vessel whereinto every one of them did cast one of the three aforesaid tables, without any word speaking: Which done they counted the tables so cast in, and if there were more marked with C. cast in, than the Praetor in his purple rob mounting into an high seat, in open place, and in the sight of all the people pronounced these words, Reus parum cavisse videtur, which is to say, It seemeth that the party accused, hath not kept himself from doing amiss; or else Non iure fecisse videtur, He seemeth not to have done right; or Videtur provinciam spoliasse, He seemeth to have spoiled the province. This was the Roman gravity in judgement mixed with 
The great modesty of the Romans' in their judgements.  modesty, lest they should seem therein to lie, or rashly to affirm any thing which was not altogether most manifestly tried. Of which sort are these words also, Si quid mei judicij est, If my judgement be any thing. So presently after the Praetor had pronounced the aforesaid words, the penalty of the law was put in execution, the party condemned voided the country and went into exile, and the receivers seized upon his goods. If such penalty were for the offence of the law appointed, unto which law except the party so condemned yielded himself obedient, he was forthwith by the Triumviry of causes capital, apprehended and cast in prison. Wherhfore, might some man say, that these capital Triumuiri had power over the citizens: But we said before them to have had power only over strangers, and that truly: and so men condemned to exile, are but to be accounted strangers, for that they have lost the liberty of the city. To like purpose is that which Martian the lawyer writeth, concerning the decree of the Senate, at the motion of Turpilian, Si judex pronunciavit haec verba, calumniatus es, condemnavit eum, If the judge (saith he) hath pronounced these words, Thou hast slandered, he hath therein condemned him: and albeit that he say no more concerning the punishment of the offendor, yet shall the penalty of the law nevertheless be executed upon him. Not to speak in the mean time of the inscriptions of their libels, with the examination of witnesses and writings. This was the manner of the public judgements used by the ancient Romans: Whereby it is easily to be understood, that the Praetors or judges were but only the simple executioners of the law, without power to add or diminish one jot thereof, having not only no power of the sword, but not so much as to whip, or yet lightly to punish a citizen.  
Now if question were for the fine of any public crime, which was not provided for by the law, the lesser assembly of the common people or commonalty, was called together therefore: But if question were of the life, good name, or the whole estate of any citizen, the people then in their greatest and most solemn assemblies gave judgement thereof: and that in both cases extraordinarily, as commonly they use to do which have the sovereignty in all Commonweals: neither were voices in these cases given by tables or marks: for that the law itself, and not the people, was made judge of the punishment to be inflicted. The sentence of which law was almost this, or such like, Si M. Posthumius ante Calendas Maia's non prodisset, neque excusatus esset, videri eum in exitio esse: ipsi aqua & igniplacere interdici, If M. Posthumius made not his appearance before the first of May, neither made his excuse, it should seem good that he should be banished, and decreed, That he should be forbidden the use of fire and water: all which things are more plentifully and at large set down by Livy Asconius, and Cicero. But if the state of the Commonweal being changed, and the power of judgement and of giving of voices, being taken from the people, yet for a certain time continued this manner and form of judicial proceed, even after that the form of the Commonweal was changed from a Popular estate into a Monarchy, as a man may see in the time of Papinian the great lawyer, who gave occasion unto Lothaire & Azon to make question of the matter, in these words by him set down as a maxim, Whatsoever it is that is given unto Magistrates by decree of the Senate, by special law, or by the constitution of princes, that is not in their power to commit unto other persons: and therefore (saith he) the Magistrates do not well in committing that their charge unto others, if it be not in their absence: which is not so (saith he) in them that have power, without the limitation of special laws, but only in virtue of their office, which they may commit unto others, albeit that they themselves be present. And thus much for that which Papinian doth say, using the words, Exercitionem publici judicij: as if he should say, That they which have the sovereign majesty have received unto themselves the power of the sword, and by special law given, but the execution thereof unto the Magistrates. And this is the opinion of Lothaire. By which words yet Azon understandeth the right and power of the sword itself to have been translated and given unto the Magistrates. Now there is no doubt, but that the opinion of Lothaire was true, if he had spoken but of the ancient Praetors of Rome, and so kept himself within the terms and compass of Papinian his rule: but in that he was deceived, that he supposed that maxim or rule of Papinians, to extend to all Magistrates which have been since or yet are in all Commonweals, who yet for the most part have the hearing of murders, robberies, riots, and other such like offences, and so the power of the sword given unto them even by virtue of their offices. For the emperors and law givers having in the process of time seen the inconvenience and injustice that arise by condemning all murderers, unto one and the self 
Great 〈◊〉 in commonweals to have now oftentimes the power of the sword committed unto them even by virtue of the●… offices.  same punishment, or else quite to absolve them: and so the like in other public crimes also, thought it much better to ordain and appoint certain Magistrates, who according to their conscience and devotion, might increase or diminish the punishment, as they saw equity and reason to require. And first of all Augustus unto the three little tables noted with A. C. and N. L. added a fourth, whereby it was lawful for the judges to pardon them, who by other men's fraud or deceit had offended the law, as we read in Suetonius. And by little and little the ancient order and manner in the judicial or penal laws set down, was changed; the penalty by every one of them appointed yet nevertheless still remaining, not by any to be increased or diminished, but by them which we have before said, what diversity of causes soever happened. And oftentimes the emperors committed it unto the Senate, or some other the great and most worthy magistrates extraordinarily to judge of great personages, or of some notable crimes, and to punish them as they saw cause, or thought best, without binding them unto the ordinary penal laws. But in the time of Papinian, Severus the emperor gave power unto the great Provost of Rome, extraordinarily to judge of all offences and crimes, whatsoever they were, committed within the city or within forty leagues ●…ound about it. Yea the other Praetors of the city, who but by the ordinary course of law were to judge of civil causes and private crimes, dealt also with certain public judgements referred unto them, not by virtue of their office, but by the law itself: whereof Papinian showeth example. And sometime the Praetor preventing the great Provost, so by way of prevention extraordinarily judged of extraordinary crimes, together with the great Provost. As for the precedents and governors of provinces, in that they had power and authority of all the Magistrates of the city, and extraordinarily judged of all offences, and according to their own discretion appointed both penal and capital punishment unto all men, except the citizens of Rome; no man can reasonably doubt, but that they had the power of the sword, and were therefore called Potestates: for that before the creating of the great Provost, there was none but the governors of the provinces which had the power of the sword; whom they yet call even to this present in Italy, by the name of Potestats. Now it is plain by the maxims of the law, that the Magistrates which had power extraordinarily to judge, might condemn the guilty parties to such punishments as they would, yet so, as that they exceeded not measure: For so Ulpian the lawyer writeth, him to exceed measure, who for a small or light offence inflicteth capital punishment; or for a cruel murder imposeth 
All magistrates having ●…thoritie to judge of capital crimes, to have the power of the sword.  a fine. Whereof we may then conclude, that the great Provost, and the governors of provinces, and generally all such Magistrates as have extraordinary authority to judge of capital crimes (whether it be by commission, or by virtue of their office) have the power of the sword, that is to say, to judge, to condemn, or acquit; and not the bore execution of the law only, whereunto they are not in this respect bound as are the other Magistrates, unto whom the law hath prescribed what and how they are to judge, leaving unto them the naked execution of the law, without the power of the sword.  
And thus much briefly, concerning the question betwixt Lothaire and Azon: for the fuller and more plentiful declaration whereof, it is needful for us yet to search farther: where it is first to be inquired, Whether the Magistrates office be proper unto the Commonweal, or unto the prince, or unto the magistrate himself that beareth office, or else be common unto the Magistrate himself together with the Commonweal? Than whether the power granted unto the Magistrates be proper unto the Magistrates, in that they are magistrates, or else be proper unto the prince, the execution thereof only belonging unto the magistrates; or else be common unto them both together? Now concerning the first question, there is no doubt, but that all estates, magistrates, & offices, do in propriety belong unto the Commonweal (excepting in a lordly Monarchy) the 
To whom the propriety of estates, magistracy, and offices do properly belong.  bestowing of them, resting with them whith have the sovereignty (as we have before said) and cannot by inheritance be appropriate unto any particular persons, but by the grant of the sovereign; and long and secret consent of the estates, confirmed by a long lawful and just possession. As in this kingdom, the Dukes, Marquesses, Counties, and such others as have from the prince the government of the castles in sundry 
Dukedoms, earldoms, marquisats, and such like in ancient time but simple commissions, now for most part are become hereditary.  provinces, and so the command of them, had the same in ancient time but by commission only, to be again revoked at the pleasure of the sovereign prince, but were afterward by little and little granted unto particular men for term of their lives, and after that unto their heirs males, and in process of time unto the females also: insomuch as that in fine, through the negligence of princes, sovereign commands, jurisdictions, and powers, may lawfully be set to sale, as well as may the lands themselves, by way of lawful buing and selling, almost in all the empires and kingdoms of the West, and so are accounted of▪ as other hereditary goods, which may lawfully be bought and sold. Wherhfore this jurisdiction or authority which for that it seemeth to be annexed unto the territory or land (and yet in truth is not) and is thereof called Praediatorie, is proper unto them which are possessed of such lands, whether it be by inheritance, or by other lawful right, and that as unto right and lawful owners thereof, in giving fealty and homage unto the sovereign prince, or state, from whom all great commands and jurisdictions flow, and in saving also the sovereign rights of the kingdom, and the right of the last appeal.  
Other public officers there be also which have neither jurisdiction nor command, 
Some public offices to be with out any jurisdiction or command at al.  but only a certain public and servile charge: as the four offices of the Waxe-chafers in this realm, by right of inheritance belonging unto certain men, by the grant of king jews. divers also have attempted by process of time to prescribe the offices of the Constables both of Normandy and Champagne; as also the offices of the great Chamberlains, by right of inheritance to belong unto them: howbeit that in that their suit they have been often times by divers decrees rejected, and amongst others by one solemn one, in the records of the court made in the year 1272. True it is that the word (Constable) was in ancient time no other thing than the captain of a company, which they called a Constableship, as we oftentimes read in Frosard. And in the records of the Chamber of accounts I remember I have read, three hundred Constables to have been at once in the army. We read also that by the decree of the year 1274. Simon County of Montfort was excluded from the successive right which he pretended to the honour of the Mareshalship D'la foy, which the lords of Mirepoix challenge unto themselves in their styles. And forasmuch as certain Mareshals of France would have continued their estates in their posterity and successors, 
The states of the marshalships of France part of the demain of the crown.  they were embarred so to do by a decree made in Parliament the xxij of januarie, in the year 1361, as is to be found in the records of the court: wherein it is expressly set down, That the estates of the Marshalships of France should be as part of the demain of the Crown, and the execution thereof to remain unto the Marshals so long as they lived. And albeit that the power of the Mareshals was not of force but in time of war, (as was judged by a decree of the xv of August in the year 1459,) yet nevertheless the military discipline carried with it the power of the sword, albeit that it were not given unto it by express Edict or law; as in nothing communicating with the decrees and laws of civil policy, or of other the civil magistrates; which seemeth from the ancient manners and customs of the Romans to have been unto us translated. For albeit that the power of the sword, yea and of punishing with rods also was by the law Portia taken from all the Roman magistrates (so that it was not lawful for any of them, or for all of them in the city to beat or scourge a Roman citizen, as we have before noted,) yet nevertheless the Consul had still full power of life and death over the soldiers and men of war, (without which their military discipline could never have been kept and preserved) from whom there was no mean to appeal 
Marshal magistrates and Generals must of necessity have the power of the sword given them.  as saith Polybius, and for that cause saith he, the Consuls had royal power: howbeit he marked not, that the Praetors, Dictator's, Quaestors, and other Generals of their armies, had even the self same power. In like manner the Constable of France by his letters of commission hath not the power of the sword, or of life and death granted unto him: but having the managing of the wars, and conducting of the armies, as in his absence the Mareshals of France have: the power of the sword is also left unto them, as without which military discipline cannot possibly be maintained: which martial power the simple captains abused also, putting their soldiers to death, with out any form or fashion of just trial. Unto that Henry the second the French king, at the request of Francis Colineus the Dandelot, than Colonel of the footmen, by express edict forbidden them any more so to do.  
If then the martial Magistrates and Generals have in every Commonweal the power of the sword without any limitation or restriction unto the form of proceeding or of the punishment to be by them inflicted, according to the variety of crimes and offences, all being as it were left unto their own discretion and judgement, a man then cannot truly say them to be but the simple executioners of the law, considering that they have no law whereunto they are in this regard subject: and so consequently we may conclude, that the power of the sword is transferred into their persons, that power now not remaining in the prince alone. Whereby it also followeth, that they being present, may commit unto others, so much of that power and authority which they have by virtue of their place and office, as they please, and retain thereof unto themselves what shall seem unto them good, which they could in no wise do, if by special law they were constrained and bound, to hear & determine of matters themselves, and from word to word to follow the solemnity and pains set down in the laws. And this is it for which the law saith, That the Praetor of the city, being himself present, might commit his authority and power to whom soever he saw good, which the Praetors for public causes could not do: for the Praetor of the city had the hearing and disciding of all civil and criminal causes, (except such as they called public, as belonging to the common state) which fell out betwixt the citizens of Rome: as had also the Praetor, established for the hearing of causes betwixt strangers and citizens, who according to their discretion condemned, or acquitted such as were convented before them, moderating, correcting, or supplying the rigour or lenity of the law as they saw cause, which their power was limited by the will and discretion of the Praetor so judging, and not by the necessity of the law. And yet when as by the law or decree of the Senate, any particular cause otherwise out of their jurisdiction was committed unto them, albeit that it were referred unto their conscience to judge thereof, yet nevertheless could they not in this case commit the same unto others, as is to be seen by many examples noted by the lawyers. Which point so manifested leadeth us unto the disciding of an other question by us before propounded: viz. That the power and authority granted unto Magistrates by virtue of their office, is proper unto 
The power and authority granted unto magistrates by virtue of their office, proper unto the office and not to the person of the magistrates.  the office, albeit that the honour and dignity of the office be not proper unto the person: for Papinian saying, That Commissioners and Lieutenants have nothing proper unto themselves, but that they use the power and authority of them, which have commissionate and deputed them, sufficiently showeth, that the power is proper unto them which so commissionate and deputed them, whether they be Sovereign Princes, or Magistrates having power so to do. And so in like case the law saith, That the Governor of a country or province, hath within his government all power and authority next unto his Prince: wherefore it is not then only in the prince. But the difficulty of this question dependeth principally on this distinction, (whereunto the interpreters of the law have had no regard,) as namely, that it is great difference to say that the power or authority is proper unto the Magistrate in the quality of a magistrate, or in the quality of a particular person: for it followeth not, that if the authority or jurisdiction be proper unto the Praetorship, that therefore the Praetorship should be proper unto the person: but to the contrary the law saith, That he hath it in trust, and that he is but the keeper thereof. So we call the Provost of Paris the keeper of the Provostship of that city; which is to speak properly, and to show, that the estates and offices rest and remain in the possession and property of the Commonweal, as 
The propriety of offices to belong unto the Commonweal: and to be with the magistrate but as things left with them in trust.  a thing put in trust unto the magistrate. And for that cause the Bailiffs of cities and towns are so called of the word (Bail,) that is to say Gardiens or keepers. So also the Florentines called the Ten men deputed to the keeping of their state and sovereignty by the name of bailiffs. And that is it for which the Court of parliament in the decree concerning the Mareschals of France (before noted) saith, That their estate was of the proper demain of the Crown, as thereunto properly appertaining, and the exercise thereof belonging unto them so long as they lived. And so we may decide the 
When the power and authority lieth in the magistrate, and when not.  general question, and discuss the controversy betwixt Lothaire, and Azon, who spoke but of the power of the sword only: and conclude, that as often and whensoever the Magistrates and Commissioners are bound by the laws and decrees, to use the power and authority which is given them, in such prescript form and manner as is therein set down, whether it be in the form of proceeding, or concerning the punishment; without power for the magistrates to add or diminish any thing thereunto, or from: in this case they are but mere executors and ministers of the laws and of the princes, from whom they have their authority: yet not having any power in this point or respect in themselves, whether it be concerning civil policy, or the administration of justice, or the managing of war, or treaties to be had betwixt princes, or the charges of Ambassadors: but in that which is left or committed to the magistrates integrity and discretion, in that case the power and authority lieth in themselves.  
Now as in every Commonweal there are two principal points which the magistrates 
Two things to be always in every Commonweal by the magistrate principally respected.  aught always to have before their eyes: that is to say, the Law, and Equity: so say we, that there is also the execution of the law, and the duty of the magistrate, which the ancients called Legis actionem, and judicis officium: or as we say, the action or execution of the law, and duty of the judge; which is to command, to decree, or to put in execution. And as the word judicium, or judgement, is properly understood of that which is ordained by the magistrate following the strict terms and tenor of the 
The difference betwixt a judgement & a decree, and so likewise of magistrates, which have power and authority in themselves, and others which have not.  law: so the word Decretum, is likewise properly understood of that which the magistrate ordaineth or decreeth, following equity without the prescript law; the law itself being still referred to the strict execution thereof, and equity unto the duty of the magistrate. And for this cause all the decrees of the Prince are properly called Decreta, and not judicia, Decrees I say not judgements: for why the sovereign prince is not subject unto the law; wherein they deceive themselves, which take a decree to be any thing else then the resolute sentence of the Senate in their consultations: or the decree of a sovereign prince, or the voluntary ordinance of a magistrate, without being bound to law or custom in the making thereof. Now such proportion as there is of the law unto the execution thereof, the like there is of equity unto the office of the judge. And so likewise of magistrates, who in case wherein they are not subject to the law, resemble arbitrators: but being strictly and wholly bound unto the law, are but as judges appointed to understand of the fact only, without any power of themselves to determine of the merit or justice of the cause, otherwise than the very strictness of the law appointeth. Now of these the one is is servile, the other is noble; the one is bound unto the law, the other is not so; the one understandeth but of the fact, the other of the right; the one is proper unto the magistrate, the other is reserved unto the law; the one is precisely written in the law, the other is without the laws: the one is in the magistrates power, and the other quite without the same. And the better to note and perceive this difference, the law saith, That it is not lawful for a man to appeal from the punishment set down by the law, being pronounced by the magistrate, but only from 
No appealing from the law: and why?  that the judge hath declared and denounced the party accused to be guilty: whereas it is right lawful for a man to appeal from the punishment which the judge by his own discretion appointeth: For he which appealeth from the law, appealeth from the prince, from whom no appeal is to be made. And thus much concerning the distinction of the power of magistrates, whereby not only the question of Lothaire and Azon is decided, but many others also concerning the charge and duty of magistrates, wherewith divers have sore entangled themselves, some mistaking the practice, and some the theoric, but most part, for not having understood the Roman estate, albeit that they were well exercised and seen in all the parts of their laws, and yet nevertheless in the state of magistrates, concerning their power and authority they found themselves greatly troubled. For Moulin himself (the honour of lawyers) not using the distinctions by us before set down, hath without reason followed the opinion of Alciat and Lothaire: Whereunto he addeth the Praetors of cities, whom we call bailiffs, and Seneshals, by the laws of this realm, to have had the power taken from them for the appointing of their deputies: for that they are but as simple usagers or occupiers, and that he which hath a thing but only to use and occupy, cannot make any other usager or occupier but himself; which is a reason without appearance, as we have before showed. Whereunto join also, that it is not past an hundred or six score years at the most, since that Charles the seventh, and the eight, were the first which made an office of the Lieutenants, or deputies of bailiffs and Seneschals. For if Moulin his opinion were grounded upon reason, why should Papinian expressly say, That magistrates may depute and commit in their presence so much and so long, and with such limitation as they themselves please, of such things as they have by virtue of their office, and which are proper to their estate? Now their magistrates estates and offices in ancient time were much less proper, and less appropriate unto the persons, than they be at this present. For with us they are perpetual, and in Rome they continued but for one year; and therefore might with much better reason than they appoint their lieutenants or deputies. Besides that, the lawyers themselves have made and written divers express books concerning lieutenants and deputies, which were all to no purpose, if the comparison of him, which hath but the use only unto the magistrate, were to be admitted and received. And as for others, the ancient doctors and interpreters of the law; they have in such sort entangled themselves, as that it evidently appeareth them to have had no insight into the estate or government of the Roman Commonweal: without which it is impossible to determine any thing concerning these questions. For whereas the Romans had properly separated the office of the Proconsul's Lieutenant, whom they called Legatum, from the office of the Proconsul himself: and so of the deputy termed a particular Commissioner, whom they called judicem datum, from the Commissioner himself, and of him unto whom power was given by the magistrate to command, whom they called Eumenides cui mandata inrisdictio est, the doctors have confounded all together under the name of Delegates, which were a thing too long, and too superfluous to refute, having proposed unto ourselves no other end, but to entreat of that which concerneth the estate and duty of magistrates in general.  
It is also worth the noting, that in Popular and Aristocratique estates, such as were 
The Magistrates in Popular and Aristocratique estates much more bound ●…nto the prescript laws then in a regal Monarchy.  those of the Greeks', and of the Italians, their chief drift was so much as they could, so to bind their magistrates, governors, ambassadors, captains, lieutenants, and other their great officers & ministers unto their laws, as that they should not one jot serve or stray therefrom: which the ancients did much more than they of our time: whereas in a regal monarchy it is quite otherwise, where in public judgements all pains and penalties, and in private judgements that which concerneth every private man's right, is left to be judged and determined according to the discretion of the magistrate. And albeit that justinian the emperor made a law, That every man's right should be tried by the law, so to have kept the magistrates within the power of the laws: yet was that his law to no purpose, but much troubled all the judges and lawyers, willing to observe the same his law, being impossible to be kept, and incompatible with the other ancient former laws. For why, that which concerneth every man's right, consisteth 
Why in trial of private men's right, as also in public judgements, many things are to be left unto the wisdom and conscience of the magistrate?  in fact, and not in the law: by which words Paulus (the great lawyer) seemeth even by the root to have cut up all the opinions of all the interpreters of the law, being not only in number almost infinite, but also altogether inexplicable, thereby giving men to understand, that that which concerneth every man's right, aught not only in private, but even in public judgements also to be left unto the fidelity, integrity, conscience, and wisdom of the magistrate. Which with us is by a royal constitution provided for, and by the use of judicial proceed, in respect of the infinite variety of causes, places, times, and persons: which for that they are infinite, can in no laws, writings, or tables, be comprised, and much less under any certain rule be comprehended.  
Now I have before said, that there was a new officer erected in Rome, who was the 
The power of the Provost or Praetor in the city of Rome.  Provost or Praetor of the city, with power given him, to correct, supply, and amend, the laws and customs, in that which concerned his jurisdiction, so far as he saw good in private judgements: and every year the new chosen Praetor in the Tribunal seat appointed for the making of orations, after he had thanked the people for the honour he had of them received, gave them there to understand of his edicts, and in what sort his purpose was to administer the law. Which his edicts he caused afterwards to be painted, and set up in some public place: which for all that were not laws, neither had the force of laws, but were only edicts (that is to say, the magistrates commands) whereunto neither the people, nor the Senate, nor the Consuls, nor the other Praetors, nor the Tribunes, not yet the successors in the self same office, were not in any wise bound, but only particular men, and they also but in that which was within the praetors power and authority, as concerning their private suits, and business betwixt man and man. And therefore Cicero taunting Verres, intemperately abusing the power and authority of his Praetorship, saith, Quiplurimum edicto tribuunt legem annu amappellant, tu plus edicto complecteris quàm lege, They which attribute most unto an edict, call it but an annual law, but thou comprehendest more in an edict, than in a law. For the magistrate how great soever he be, cannot of himself deerogate from the law, and much less abrogat the same: for these things we have showed properly to belong unto sovereignty. Neither must we understand, that the * lawyer when he saith, That the Praetor might 
Papinian.  correct, amend, or supply the laws, that he had therefore power to derogat from them, or to disannul them, which is the highest point of sovereignty: but that he might by the authority of his office expound the obscure laws, and in what they might with equity be extended, yet without breaking or impugning the same. And that is it, for which the law generally saith, That the Praetor never could give possession of the goods unto them, who by the laws and ordinances could not be the heirs. Neither was it also in the power of the Praetors, nor yet of all the magistrates together, to make an heir of him which by the laws could be none; for why, that was to be done only by virtue of the law, whereby the magistrate by his definitive sentence declared, the succession to belong to such, or such a man, whom the law or the testator had appoin●…ed heir. And albeit that divers of the praetors edicts were more reasonable and indifferent than the laws themselves; yet so it was, that the first Praetor that would, might (without regard unto all the edicts of his predecessors) make all new, or again revive such laws, which by reason of their antiquity, were before buried in oblivion. And this was the cause that the Tribune Aebutius presented a request unto the people, which passed in force of a law; which was that the laws of the twelve tables, which by long tract of time were then grown out of use, might by an express law be repealed and abolished: which law needed not, if the Praetors by virtue of their edicts had had power to derogat from the positive laws. Yea the Praetors themselves did not always in the administration of justice follow their own edicts, but spared not sometime to give judgement quite contrary unto them, especially if the equity of the causes upon some strange occurrents so required; sometimes also changing them for the grudge or favour that they bore unto certain private men: which thing Cicero by way of reproach objected to Verres, saying, Ille nulla religione motus, contrà quàm edixerat, decernebat, That he moved with no religion, judged quite contrary unto that which he himself had before decreed. Howbeit that this reproach was but a flourish of the Orators, and not of any great importance: For as no man was subject unto the law which he himself made, so also might he upon good and just cause deerogate from the same. Yet certain years before it was enacted by the people at the motion of Cornelius the Tribune, That the Praetors, and so every other magistrate also should be constrained in giving of judgement, to observe their own edicts by themselves published and set up at their first entrance into their office, and not to departed therefrom; which cut off many courtesies and favours which the magistrates before showed unto such as they thought good. Nevertheless this law being published without the good liking and consent of many: and also contrary unto the nature of laws (which can never bind them that made them) was shortly after abolished. Howbeit that the magistrates for their own particular, and in their own causes, were constrained to endure the same edicts, judgements, and decrees, which they themselves had made, and caused to be executed upon others: yet that notwithstanding the magistrates were always at liberty, to deerogate from their own edicts, or to altar the same, whether they were published for the whole year that they were Praetors, or for a month, or for some few days or hours. For generally the law saith, That the magistrate may revoke that which he hath decreed, and 
The Magistrate may revoke his own decree or commands, but not his judgement once given.  forbidden that which he hath commanded, although that he cannot revoke that which he hath once judged and pronounced sentence of. For that judgements and decrees given or made upon the hearing of a cause, cannot without injury be reversed or changed, as also for that nothing aught to be more firm and sure than judgements once given, as whereby all civil society is especially maintained: wherein many interpreters of the law have deceived themselves, calling the magistrates simple commands, precepts, and not edicts: whereas an edict (as saith Varro) is nothing else but Magistratus iussum (that is to say) the magistrates command, and whereof another error hath risen also, viz. That such the magistrates simple commands should bind no man: For so the ancient doctors affirm. Which their opinion, if it were true, wherefore then 
The Magistrates simple commands of right aught to be obeyed.  should the law command us to obey the magistrates bore command, without regard whether it be just or unjust? Or why should the lawyer Maetian say, Reipublicae interest, ut iniustis & ambitiosis decretis pareatur, It behoveth the Commonweal, that even unjust and proud decrees (of the magistrates) should be obeyed. Yea and all the ancient Philosophers and law makers, have more religiously recommended nothing unto us, not only than the laws, but even than the writings and decrees of the wise. Now it is more reasonable to obey a simple verbal command, which is but for a day or an hour (if we doubt or mislike of the equity thereof) than to the commandments which were for a year, as were all the edicts of the magistrates: beside that it was more easy to perform the one than the other. And that more is, the laws, the ordinances, the decrees, and sentences, of themselves bind no man, if the commission (that is to say, the magistrates command) be not on foot. And therefore the Roman Praetors, and other their great magistrates, seldom times troubled themselves with giving of judgements, but were still occupied in appointing of judges, in commanding and the putting in execution of the sentences and judgements of such judges as had by them been appointed. Whose verbal commands (as these men term them) had they been of no force to bind men, the decrees and judgements of such as were by them appointed, should have been to no end or purpose, neither should they have been obeyed. And therefore the law permitteth all magistrates by punishment or penalty to 'cause their commands to be obeyed, without distinction whether they be commandments verbal, or by way of commission, or by decrees by them made, or by judgements by them given.  
Of this error (for not obeying the magistrates command) is risen also a far greater, 
Whether private men may by force resist the Magistrate offering them violence or wrong.  some defending that it is lawful for men in fact, and by force to resist the magistrates, offering them violence, (for that is the word which they use) whether it be in the administration of justice, or otherwise out of the same. Howbeit that the difference is great betwixt the one and the other: for that the magistrate out of judgement, and out of the quality of a magistrate, is no more but as a particular man, and so if he by word or deed wrong any man, he may be resisted, in such sort as the law permitteth: but in the execution of his charge within his power, not exceeding the bounds of his jurisdiction, there is no doubt but that he aught to be obeyed, whether it be right or wrong, as saith the law. But if he shall exceed his authority or power, a man is not bound to obey him, especially if the excess be in itself notorious, but may defend himself by oppositions and appeals: but if he may not appeal, or that the magistrate will not admit his appeal, but proceed against him; in this case it is to be considered, whether the grief be to be recovered, or otherwise irrecoverable: which if it be to be recovered, no resistance is then to be made against the magistrate; but if the case be irrecoverable, as in question of life, or of corporal punishment, and that the magistrate will needs proceed without regard of any appeal, in this case it is lawful for every man to make resistance, not of purpose to cross or offend the magistrate, but only to defend the life of the innocent man in danger, yet so far as that it be done without fraud or seditious tumult: not for the violating of the magistrate, as we said, but for the deliverance of him which is with injury by the magistrate oppressed. As when Appius Claudius inflamed with the desire and lust of the fair maiden Virginia, (wresting the laws) was about to give sentence against her liberty, Virginius her father to preserve the honour of his house, and wishing rather the death of his so fair a daughter, than that she should so lose her virginity, slew her openly with his own hand, and so set all the city on an uproar. Which desperate boldness of the man was not indeed to have been suffered, neither aught the quiet estate of the Commonweal to be with such 
Private men are not to judge whether the Magistrate do them wrong or not.  outrageous facts troubled, what violence soever be done by the magistrate. Howbeit that it belongeth not unto private men to judge whether the magistrate offer to do wrong, or not: which to determine, if it appertain but unto the greater magistrates, or the Prince only, in vain than it is to ask whether private men may by force resist the magistrates, offering them violence? but only this, whether Magistrates which go about to put in execution their sentences of life and death, or for the inflicting of some corporal punishment, contrary unto appeals from them made, may of right be withstood? which that they lawfully may be, I doubt not, so that it be done without fraud or tumult, in cases of life and death: but if judgement be of goods, or fines, or imprisonment, I think it not to be lawful, for that all these things may be amended, either by intercessions, or by appeals, or by actions of trespass, or injury, or by way of petition. But in other causes lawful it is not by the law either of God or man to 
In what cases the magistrates offering wrong, may of right in their judgements be withstood?  withstand the magistrate offering us violence: as many evil taught, and worse instincted in civil policy and government most dangerously affirm: by whose positions (if they will be like themselves) the estates of all cities and Empires must needs be troubled and confounded. For if it were lawful for the subjects by force to defend themselves against the magistrates, they might upon the same reasons and grounds resist their sovereign Princes also, and tread the laws underfoot. Wherhfore we see the lawmakers and lawyers to have respected nothing more, than to keep all force, and violence, not from the magistrates only, but even from private men themselves, having violence in so great detestation, as that they have restored even thieves and 
Violence in Commonweals, to be always detested.  robbers into places, unjustly by them possessed, if they were from thence by force cast out, and excluded the true owners thereof from their rights for proceeding by way of force. And albeit that some particular men having territoriall jurisdiction, may (in the opinion of many) in a sort in their own right of themselves lay violent hand, upon the land holding of them: when as the vassal neglecteth his duty unto his Lord, yet the truer opinion is that he cannot in his own cause so do, for that it is a thing injurious and unreasonable, that any man should be a judge in his own cause, or give sentence for himself. Now the law which forbiddeth private men to do that, which aught to be done by the magistrate, hath this reason joined with it, jest occasion should be given of greater stir and tumult. The law also of the xii Tables, which saith: Vis in populo abesto, Let violence be from among the people, is not to be understood only of violence to be done by force of arms, whether it be publicly or privately done: but also when men would have things otherwise done then by the ordinary way of justice: as when things are done by private men's authority, which should have been done by the Magistrate or judge. And if it be not lawful for the true lord or owner to put his seal unto his own things being in the possession of an other man; how then should it be lawful unto the territoriall lord of himself to enter or seize upon lands, the property whereof belongeth unto an other man? Wherhfore the opinion of Plato is to be of us rejected, who in his books of laws hath left the shameful violence and abuse offered unto maidens or boys, to be revenged by their kinsfolk, and not by the Magistrate.  
Now of this question dependeth an other; as whether the Magistrate may revenge 
Whether the magistrate may revenge the wrong and injury offered him as he sitteth in place of justice.  the wrong and injury offered him, as he sitteth in place of justice: whereof what to say the lawyers have not yet determined. Nevertheless without entering into farther dispute, it is and always hath been lawful for all Magistrates exercising their estate or commission, to condemn or chastise them, which give unto them rash or contumelious speech, and to proceed against them by way of fine, or by seizing upon their bodies or goods, according to the power and authority unto them given; if the wrong or injury offered be not such as may deserve corporal punishment: for then the magistrate aught to lay aside his public person, and to receive justice at an other man's hand. But yet if the injury be done unto the whole company or bench of judges, or Magistrates, in this case they may inquire and judge of the crime or offence, and so altogether lawfully do that which they could not do apart: and the reason seemeth to be, for that in so doing they punish not the wrong done unto themselves, but unto the Commonweal, which is therein far more wronged than are they which bear 
Private injury so nest by sufferance buried.  the persons of magistrates. And albeit that the law saith, That the action of injury is easily to be forgiven, and that it is soon by sufferance buried; that is to be understood of particular men, & not of public persons, and especially of Magistrates unto whom 
That the person of the magistrate aught to be always sacred and inviolat●….  whosoever shall offer violence, is by the law in danger of treason. And for this cause an outrage committed against the person of a Magistrate, the indignity of the fact is together with the heaviness of the punishment thereby increased▪ and that not only when he exerciseth his estate, but also in what place soever it be wherein he carrieth with him the marks and tokens of his office, or is known to be such a man, he aught to be inviolable, and as the ancient Latins say, Sacrosanctus, or most holy: for that word the law, Horatia (published for the safety of Magistrates) useth, conceived in these words: Qui Tribunis plebis, Aedilibus, judicibus nocuerit eius caput iovi sacrum esto; familia ad aedem Cereris, liberi, liber aequè vaenum ito, He that shall hurt the Tribunes of the people, the Aediles, or judges, let his head be sacrificed to jupiter, and his family and children, male and female, sold at the Temple of Ceres. Wherein some are of opinion that the word judicibus (or judges) is meant or to be understood of the consuls, who were afterwards the only judges amongst all the magistrates: whereof they have some probability, for they were first called Praetors, and after that judges; and after that their jurisdiction for the city was given to one special Praetor, they were called Consuls. Howbeit nevertheless it seemeth that the law Horatia having put the judges after the Tribunes, and the Aediles whom they called Aedituos (for why, the great and honourable Aediles, whom they called Curules, were not yet erected) was meant to comprehend all judges; considering withal, that the law itself was not published at the request or motion of any of the Tribunes, or in disgrace of the Consuls, but at the motion of Horatius the Consul himself. And this law Horatia was made forty four years after the sacred law junia, made for the safety of the Tribunes of the people: whereby they were as by a special law, more religiously provided for than were the rest of the magistrates. Whereby it appeareth this law to appertain to all magistrates, but especially unto judges, whose lives and persons are the more subject to all dangers, in that they are to judge of the lives, honour, and goods of all the subjects. And therefore the law saith not, That he that killeth the judges (shall die therefore) but if he shall offer them never so little violence; that is to say, Si nocuerit, which is, if he but hurt them. And well it is to be noted, that it is not said, as they are exercising their authority and jurisdiction only, but even in what other place soever they be: which otherwise were but to open a gap to have them slain in every other place where they ●…at not in judgement. So when as with us a certain noble gentleman being called into 
An heavy ●…sure upon a man for striking of a magistrate.  question, had with his sword wounded one of the judges of the court of Paris, not as then sitting in judgement: the court condemned 〈◊〉 to have his right hand cut off, his body afterward to be quartered, his goods confiscated, and a most great fine to be paid unto the judge. But if the magistrate disguised, or walking the streets by night to do any man harm, shall himself chance to be by any man hurt, he cannot redress such his wrong as done unto a magistrate, but as unto a private man. So Aulus Hostilius the Aedile, when as by night he had attempted to have broken open a Courtesans doors, was there grievously hurt: whereof he complaining unto the people▪ in hope to have found some good remedy, was sent away with shame enough▪ for that the outrage unto him done, was not to be punished as done unto a magistrate. Which aught not to seem strange, seeing that one of the Tribunes, who had unlawfully abused a boy, and taken by the Capital Triumuiri, was by him punished as a slave or stranger (the rest of the Tribunes his fellows forsaking him, as abhorring his most filthy lust) albeit that the sacred laws forbidden upon pain of death to offend the Tribune, or to command him to be punished for what thing soever. In like case if the magistrates went roaming up and down masked, and private men went masked also, carrying with them the marks of magistrates, as in Rome they did during the feast of Cybele: if any injury happened to be so done unto the magistrate, it was not punished as done unto a magistrate, but unto a private person: howbeit that out of these cases the magistrate is to be holden for such as he is, in what place soever he be.  
Neither is it not only unlawful to offend or abuse the magistrates by word or deed, 
Magistrates to be 〈◊〉 religeously respected.  but necessary it is, that we should dutifully respect and honour them, as them unto whom God hath given this power: which thing we see the ancient Romans (from whom the fountains of law and justice flowed into all the world) to have much more religiously observed, than did the other nations. For the Censors disgraced and degraded from his order a bourgeous of the city, by taking away from him his horse, for that he had but coughed and spauled a little too loud in their presence. And Vectius a citizen of Rome, for not rising unto the Tribune of the people, but passing by him, was by the people slain. Yea the law itself calleth it sacrilege, not to reverence the magistrate. We understand also not the same, but yet great reverence to have been given unto the magistrates even amongst the Greeks' also, in that it was not lawful for a man to laugh in the council of the Areopagits. We read also, that Fabius Maximus his son seeing his father a far off coming towards him, and that the Lictors or officers for his fatherly reverence durst not 'cause him to alight from his horse, commanded him himself to alight: which his command the father obeying, alighted and embraced his son, making much more of him, than if he had done otherwise. For domestical power (as saith the law) aught to stoop unto public authority. True it is, that in those times and in those places offices were given to virtue, and not to them that offered most: for then verily was the time wherein rewards were set up for virtue: Howbeit that the laws against ambition, and the ancient histories sufficiently declare honours and offices to have been oftentimes in Rome, de lapide emptos, as saith Cicero. But howsoever power and authority be got, whether it be by favour, by wealth, or force of arms, we must not therefore contemn the magistrate, which cannot be done without the contempt of God, from whom he hath his authority, in whatsoever fo●… it be. As witnesseth that speech of God unto Samuel judge of Israel, now grown weak with age: whose commands when as the people did refuse, It is not thee (saith he) but me, whom they have despised.  
Now if these deriders of authority and power, be not to be moved either with the fear of God, or the touch of religion, yet can they not deny, but that it is more than necessary for private men to obey, respect and honour the magistrates, for the defence of Commonweals, and of the civil society of men. Which the aunrient Poets have unto us well set forth in their devised fables, making the goddess Pitharchie (which signifieth the obedience of subjects unto their princes and magistrates) wife unto jupiter▪ Saviour: and of that marriage Eutuchia (that is to say Felicity) to have been engendered 
The duty of the magistrate for the maintenance of his reputation.  and borne. Wherhfore the magistrate on his part also aught to give a good opinion of himself, for his justice, wisdom, and sufficiency, that so the subjects may have occasion to honour and reverence him: and not by his unworthiness to suffer the honour of the Commonweal to be trodden underfoot or despised: for the fault which in a private man is but light, is in the person of the magistrate doubled. And therefore Solo●… in his laws gave leave to kill the drunken magistrate, without any danger of punishment therefore. Truly an unreasonable law, for that it was thereby to be feared, lest under the pretence of drunkenness the magistrates life should be oftentimes endangered. Whereby yet we may gather, how much vice was then detested, as also with what integrity, severity, and wisdom, magistrates aught to excel other men. And yet aught we not to imitat them, who by the rigour of punishment seek to be accounted severe; or by their too much lenity, desire to be accounted gentle, both the one and the other being therefore worthily reproved by the law. Wherein many have mistaken 
Lenity of rig●… neither of them commendable in a magistrate.  themselves, who having extraordinary power to punish without law, have thought equity to consist in lenity and mercy, repugnant to the rigour of the laws: howbeit that equity is of such a nature, as that it in nothing communicateth either with rigour, or with mercy; but declining from both the extremes, cruelty (I say) and mercy, keepeth clemency, the preserver of them both: not unlike the Lesbian rule, which being of lead, yielded as well unto the one side as to the other. Now if the offence be greater than the punishment appointed in the ordinary laws, the magistrate having extraordinary jurisdiction and power may as an upright judge augment the punishment. So if the fault be less, he may with like equity mitigat the punishment by the rigour of the law appointed. And truly the magistrate in seeking to be accounted 
Lenity more hurtful in a magistrate than severity.  pitiful offendeth more, than if he should seem to be cruel: For cruelty, although it be indeed to be blamed, yet keepeth it the subjects in obedience unto the laws, for fear of punishment; whereas too much lenity giveth liberty unto offence, and causeth the magistrate himself, the laws, yea and the prince which established the laws, to be altogether contemned. And this is it for which the law of God expressly forbiddeth to have any pity of the poor in judgement. Some others there be, which judge well 
Gravity b●…st beseemeth a magistrate.  and uprightly, inclining neither unto cruelty nor mercy, but yet cannot keep that gravity and severity which best beseemeth a magistratias in our time one of the chief magistrates of this realm, who in the highest seat of justice, and even then when he pronounced the sentence of death upon the condemned, would with one merry conceit or other, minister unto the hearers occasion of laughter. Whereas Augustus Gaesar did far otherwise, who albeit that he was accounted a sincere and upright iusticiar, yet for all that he never pronounced sentence of death upon any, but with deep sighs fet even from the bottom of his heart. Some other to the contrary, all enraged, threaten and revile them whom they give judgement of: as did ordinarily the emperor Claudius, who one day with a countenance more like a beast than an emperor, struck him in the face with a pen knife, whom he was to pronounce sentence of death of. Yet blame I not the grave exhortations, and bitter reproofs of the magistrate unto the offenders, and then especially, when as he meaneth to use more lenity than the rigour and extremity of the law requireth. For why, it is one of the things most requisite in a magistrate to 'cause the offenders to have the better understanding and feeling of the greatness of their offences: that so they may the better also perceive and see what they have therefore deserved, and so to be the rather induced to repentance. But it were a kind of injury, and not beseeming the authority and wisdom of a magistrate to charge him whom he hath condemned to death, with opprobrious words also. Papirius Cursor was of all that lived in his time (than which none is said to have been 
Papirius Cursor a notable man.  more plentiful of virtues) a man most famous both at home and abroad in the wars, but so terrible with the majesty of his command, as that he caused even the stoutest of his followers to tremble and quake at the force of his commanding speech: which his roughness of speech he for all that wisely tempered with great lenity in the executing of punishment. As when the general of the Prenestines was come unto him with his promised aid after the battle fought & the victory obtained▪ Paperius with stern countenance, and such speech as caused all there present to tremble thereat, having first reproved him, forth with commanded one of the Lictors to unbind his bundle of rods, and to make ready his axe: the fearful captain in the mean time expecting nothing but present death, when suddenly Paptrius commanded the same Lictor standing ready with the axe in his hand, to have done execution (as all men thought) but to cut up a stub of a tree which stood in his walk, and condemned the negligent captain in a great fine, which he right willingly paid, with great thanks that he had so spared him his life. Whom if he had put to death, it was in danger lest that those his followers the Romans allies would have thereupon revolted: which so great a fault no doubt Papirius would not have pardoned a Roman. But as there is great difference 
Moore severity to be required in a Martial magistrate then in a civil which severity aught not yet to pass into cruelty.  betwixt faults which are committed in war, and elsewhere (for that as an ancient captain said, In martial matters men scarcely offend twice) so must the military magistrates use another manner of fashion of commanding, of punishing, and execution of penalties, than must the magistrates in time of peace. For that the discipline of war aught to be much more severe than the domestical or civil government. And yet for all that aught not this martial rigour to pass into cruelty, nor the general to exceed the bounds of severity, as many commanders do, who in nothing show themselves valiant, but in kill their soldiers without hearing. As Seneca propoundeth one act of Piso the Proconsul, for an example of his notorious cruelty towards his soldiers. 
The notorious cruelty of Piso the Proconsul.  For seeing a soldier returning alone out of the field into the camp, from foraging, in a rage condemned him to death, for that he was returned out of the field without his companion, charging him, That he had slain him: the soldier still alleging, That his fellow was coming after him: which his excuse for all that Piso would not admit, but sent him presently to be executed. But lo, whilst that the execution was about to be done, he suddenly returned who was supposed to have been slain. Whereupon the captain which had the charge to see the execution done, returned to the Proconsul with both the soldiers, who embracing one the other, were with great applause and rejoicing of their fellow soldiers brought before him: Wherewith the Proconsul enraged, caused them all three to be put to death: The first, for that he was before condemned: The second, for that he was the cause of his fellows condemnation: And the captain, for that he had not done what he was by him his general commanded. So that for the appearing of one innocent mant, he put three to death: which was not justly to use, but most cruelly to abuse his authority. Which his cruelty was so much the more to be detested, for that there was there no means to appeal, nor prince to fly unto, nor civil exception to be taken, by reason of the rigour of the military discipline. And thus much concerning the power and authority of Magistrates over particular and private men: It remaineth now to speak also of the power and duty of one of them towards another.   

CHAP. VI ¶ Of the mutual duties of Magistrates among themselves, and of the power that one of them hath over an other.  
IN every well ordered Commonweal there be three degrees of 
Three degrees of Magistrates in every well ordered Commonweal.  Magistrates: The highest, which is of them which may be called sovereign magistrates, and know none greater than themselves, but the sovereign Majesty only: The middle sort which obey their superiors, and yet command others: And the lowest degree of all, which is of them which have no command at all over any other magistrates, but only over particular men subject to their jurisdiction. Now of sovereign magistrates, some have power to command all magistrates without exception, and other some acknowledge no superior but the sovereign Majesty, and yet have no power over all the rest of the magistrates which are placed in the middle & lowest degrees, but over such only as are subject unto their jurisdiction. Of the first sort of sovereign magistrates which have power over all others, and that know none their superiors, but the sovereign power, there are but very few, and fewer at this present then in ancient time: for that it is by daily experience found, nothing to be more dangerous in a Commonweal, then for some one 
Dangerous in a Commonweal to give power to one Magistrate to command over all the rest.  magistrate to be above the rest, who may lawfully command all the rest, aswell private persons as magistrates, wanting himself but one step or degree to mount unto the sovereignty, and that especially if his sovereign magistrate which hath such power be alone, and without a companion, having all in his own hand: as had sometime the Grand Provost of the Empire, whom they called Praefectum Praetorio, who had command over all the Magistrates throughout the whole Empire, and might receive the appeals from all the other magistrates and governors; but might not be appealed from himself, not not although the appeal were made even unto the Emperor himself, albeit that the first which were promoted to this dignity and honour, were but captains of the praetorian legions: as Seius Strabo the first that was preferred unto this office under Augustus: and after that Sejanus under Tiberius. Which honour the other succeeding Emperors thought good to bestow upon such as of whose integrity, fidelity, and devotion towards them they had had good experience and proof: such as they would in some sort to be their imperial Lieutenants, upon whom they for the most part discharged the managing of their greatest affairs, such as were by the Emperors themselves to have been discharged: as the hearing of imperial causes: the receiving and dismissing of Ambassadors: the hearing of appeals from the Magistrates of all provinces; which great charge for that no man could well execute, except he were skilful in the Laws, the Emperors in steed of captains of their legions, preferred lawyers to that honour. So did Otho the emperor promote Martian: Severus, Papinian: and Alexander, Ulpian. And at length under the Greek emperors, two great Provosts of the empire were by the Emperors created, and at last three also, that the greatness of their power so divided might be lessened; and yet the honour thereof imparted to more. Such sovereign Magistrates were with our ancestors: the Master of the Palace: and he whom they called the Prince of France: and of late Henry duke of Anjou, king Charles his great Lieutenant: and the chief Bassa in the Turks empire: and the great Edegnare or Diadare in Egypt under the principality of the Mamaluke Sultan's. Yet in this they differ, that in the Turkish empire the Great Sultan's children in the absence of their father command above all the Bassas, and had the pre-eminence and precedence before them: and in Egypt the great Edegnare commanded over all the rest of the Magistrates, excepting such only as had the keeping of the castles & fortresses of the kingdom committed to their charge, over whom he had no command. Which manner and custom whether the Princes of the East took it from ours, or our Princes from them, we still keep together with the Italians, Germans, Spaniards, and most of other Nations also. Wherhfore 
Sovereign power to command over all magistrates not to be given to one alone, but in the most dangerous times of the commonweal  the sovereign power to command over all Magistrates and officers without exception, aught not to be given to one alone, but in case of necessity; as when the Commonweal cannot otherwise be preserved: and yet than not with the authority and countenance of a standing office, but by way of commission only, such as were in ancient time granted unto the Roman Dictator's, the Archo of the Thessalians, and Azymnets of the Lacedæmonians: and now with us are given unto Protectors and Regent's, in the absence, fury, or minority of sovereign Princes. In the absence I say of the sovereign prince, for that in his presence all the power & command of magistrates and 
In the presence of the sovereign prince, all the power of the magistrates holden in suspense.  commissioners cease: For as the force and strength of all rivers and floods is together with their names lost and swallowed up when they once fall into the Sea; and as the other heavenly lights, as well the planets as other stars, loose their light in the presence of the Sun, or as soon as he approacheth the horizon, in so much as that they seem again to tender unto him the whole light that they had before borrowed of him▪ even so likewise all the authority of the Senate, and all the command and power of Magistrates cease in the presence of the prince. So we see that he which delivereth the sovereign prince's mind, whether it be in counsel, or in sovereign court, before the states, or unto the people, still useth these words, So and so the king commandeth, or saith. But to the contrary, if the prince be absent, the chancellor or Precedent keeping the king's place above the other princes, pronounceth sentence or judgement according to the opinion and mind of the Senate or Court wherein he sitteth, having ordinary jurisdiction and power, and not in the name of the king. And for as much as William Poyet chancellor of France, and Precedent of the great Counsel, in the absence of the king, oftentimes in judgement used this form of speech, The king saith so and so unto you; he was therefore charged with treason, besides the other points of his accusation. Wherhfore many are deceived which think those laws or Edicts which are published or ratified in the council or court, in the presence of the prince, to be so published or confirmed by the Court or Council: seeing that the Court hath then the hands bound, and that it is none but the king that so commandeth, the motion or consent of his Attorney, the prince himself being then present, serving to no purpose at all. And in Popular estates, the greatest magistrates as well as the lest, in token of their humility, laid down their mazes and other tokens of honour before the people, and so standing, spoke unto the people sitting: showing, that in their presence they had no power at all to command. So all the motions made by the magistrates of Rome, were by way of humble request, as in this form, Velitis, jubeatis, May it please you, or command: Whereunto the people there present, giving their consent with aloud voice, before the law Cassia Tabellaria, used these words, Omnes qui hic assident volumus, iubemusque, All we that here sit will and command. And after the laws called Tabellarias, the letters A. and V R. written in the tables, signified Antiquo, (or, I repeal the law) and Vti Rogas (or, as you request). And in like manner the people of Athens gave their voices sitting, the magistrate in the mean time speaking unto them standing, so long as they had any thing to say unto them.  
But than might some man say, If it be so, that the magistrates had no power to command particular men, nor yet one another, in the presence of the people which had the sovereignty. Why did the Tribune of the people sand his usher unto Appius Claudius the Consul, to command him to silence? And why did the Consul ●…o requited him with like, sand his sergeant unto him likewise, crying with a loud voice, That the Tribune was no magistrate? Whereunto I answer, that such contention and debate▪ oftentimes fell out amongst the magistrates, and especially betwixt the Consuls and the Tribunes: yet may we not thereof conclude, that either of them had any power to command the one the other, in the presence of the people, both their authorities then ceasing. So a controversy arising betwixt the high court of Paris, and the court of Aids, for wearing of their purple robes, and accompanying the king, not far from Henry the second the French king, the precedent of the greater court of Paris sent a sergeant unto the judges of the court of Aides, to forbidden them to go any further: (and albeit that the king was not so nigh as that he could hear such the precedents command) yet received he such answer from the judges, That he had no such power to command over the court of Aids, and if he had, that yet he could not rightly there use the same in the presence of the king.  
But yet some man might object and say, That if the magistrates had no power to command in the presence of the prince, they were no more magistrates, neither should so great regard be had of their honours and dignities the prince being present, so as we see there is. Whereunto mine answer is, That the magistrates by the presence of the prince lose nothing, but still continued in their offices, and so consequently in their dignities and honours, their power to command being but suspended. As in like case the Dictator being created, all the magistrates continued in their estates and offices, howbeit that all their commanding power was then holden in suspense: but so soon as the Dictator's commission was expired, and he once out of his office, the magistrates again commanded by the same right they had before: which they could not have done, if their magistracies and offices had so, & indeed been from them taken. Which may serve for answer to that which might be alleged of these words, which are oftentimes to be read in the writings of the ancient Romans, viz. Creaeto Dictatore magistratus abdi●…aht, Whereby it might seem that the Dictator being created, the magistrates were out of office: which is not to be understood of their offices, but of their power, as we have before said, which was so for a while suspended. For otherwise the Dictator yielding up his office, the magistrates must have sought for new power and authority from the people, their former power being before together with their office 
Why the power of the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 suspended.  expired. And the reason is general, that the power of the inferior should be holden in suspense, in the presence of the superior: for otherwise the subject might command contrary to the will of his lord, the servant contrary to the good liking of his master and the magistrate contrary to the will and pleasure of his sovereign prince●… o●… might at leastwise oppose himself against him, and by the virtue of his office forbidden the inferior persons to perform the commands of their superiors: which can in no wise be done, without inevitable prejudice unto the sovereignty▪ except it be that the prince laying aside the sovereignty of his person, goeth to see how his magistrates command; as the emperor Claudius oft-times went openly to see the doings of his magistrates, and without disguising himself sat beneath them, foolishly giving to them the more honourable place: or else in case tha●… the prince, his majesty in a sort set aside, give leave to the magistrate to judge of his cause. For the maxim of the law, which saith, That the magistrate of equal or greater power may be judged by his companion or fellow in office, or by his inferior also, when he snbmitteth himself unto his power, hath place not only in private persons and magistrates, but even in sovereign princes also; whether it please them to submit themselves or their causes to the judgement of other princes, or of their own subjects. And albeit that they may be judges in their 
Much more honourable for sovereign princes to refer the hearing of their own causes unto the magistrates than to judge thereof themselves.  own causes, unto whom power is by God given to judge, without being bound to the law, as Xenophon saith; yet neverthesse's it is much better beseeming their majesty, and more indifferent also for them in their own causes to abide the judgement of their magistrates, than to become judges thereof themselves. But to the intent that the sovereign majesty of princes should not in any thing be impaired of the greatness thereof, and yet that the brightness and glory of the royal name should not dazzle the eyes of the judges, it was wisely in this realm ordained by our ancestors, That the king should not pled but by his attorney; and that in all public causes wherein the king or Commonweal were privately interessed, the king's name should be still canceled, and the matter pleaded but in the name of his attorney. Which thing the rest of the princes and others having territorial jurisdiction, have afterwards imitated and followed. So Augustus the emperor writ unto the lieutenants of his provinces, That they should not suffer his name to be debased with being too common in their commissions, as Tranquillus reporteth. Yet is it by a certain special custom by our ancestors received, that if the king will in private judgements against private men, be restored, the king's attorney shall not in demanding thereof hold his seat and place, but change the same, lest he should seem to pled a public and not a private cause. But whereas we have said, the power of the magistrates to be suspended in the presence of the prince, belongeth unto the whole prince's family, so long as they wait upon the prince: for over them the civil magistrates have no power, except such magistrates as the prince hath appointed for the executing of the jurisdiction of the court.  
Yet a man might demand, Whether the magistrate might forbidden a subject or private 
Whether a magistrate may for●… a subject to come unto the 〈◊〉 being as then within the jurisdiction of his territory?  man to come unto the court, being within the jurisdiction of his territory? Which is not without some difficulty: howbeit without entering into farther dispute, I say, that the magistrate banishing the guilty subject out of the territory of his jurisdiction, where the prince may then be, secretly also forbiddeth him to approach the court, albeit that he cannot expressly forbidden him to come unto the prince's court. Wherein the rule of Ulpian the lawyer taketh place, which saith, Expressa nocent, non expressa non nocent, Things expressed hurt, but things not expressed hurt not. And I remember how that it seemed a thing right strange unto the court, and especially unto the chancellors of the household, that the Commissioners deputed by the prince, for the trial of the precedent Allemand (who familiarly used my council) having by their sentence condemned him, forbade him also to come within ten leagues of the court. Which thing the council understanding, decreed, That it was lawful for no man but the prince only to make any such prohibition. And haply was the chief cause that the precedent (of whose council I was) obtained of the king, to have the judgement reversed. For it were not only an hard and inhuman thing, to keep the subjects from having access unto the prince, to deliver unto him their petitions (as well agreeing with the laws both of God and nature) but it should also be a thing much prejudicial unto the majesty of a sovereign prince, as I have before said. And albeit that the superior courts of this kingdom have used to banish men out of the realm, and so out of the bounds of their jurisdiction, yet should such their judgement take none effect, if the king in whose name the courts of Parliament give judgement, gave them not commission so to do, and that his royal commands were not unto such their sentences subscribed: So their decrees also in form begin in the king's name.  
Now as the presence of the Prince holdeth the power of all Magistrates in suspense, 
The power of the lesser magistrates to cease in the presence of the 〈◊〉.  so is it also to be deemed of the power of the superior magistrates or commissioners over the inferior. As a man may see in France, where the Precedents & Councelours, every one in his jurisdiction, and the Masters of Requests in all seats of justice, (except the sovereign courts) have power to command the Seneschals, Bailiffs, Provosts, and other inferior magistrates, when they come into their provinces, and sit in their places of justice, and there may judge, ordain, and command as superiors unto their inferiors, and prohibit them to proceed any further, which is general to all superior magistrates towards their inferiors, as saith the law: judicium soluitur, ventante eo qui judicare iusserat, vel qui maius imperium in ea jurisdictione habet, The judgement is stayed, he forbidding it which commanded it, or he which hath greater power in the same jurisdiction. Where the word, Imperium, or power, signifieth not only the power to command, or forbidden, but even the magistrate himself: As when Cicero saith: Maius imperium à minori rogari ius non est, Lawful it is not, for the greater power to be examined by the less; he would say, that the magistrate or commissioner equal or superior in power, is not bound to answer before his companion, or one less than himself, which is a Maxim of the ancients, which Messala the Lawyer declareth by example, as thus: A minore imperto, maius, aut a maiore collega rogari iure non potest: quare neque consuls aut Praetores, Censoribus, neque Censores, Consulibus aut Praetoribus turban, aut retinent auspicia, at Censores inter se; rursus Praetores Consulesque inter se, & vitiant et obtinent, The greater power cannot by right be examined by the less, or a fellow in office, by an other his fellow officer though greater than himself: wherefore neither the Consuls or praetors trouble, or keep the south-saying from the Censors, neither the Censors from the Consuls or Praetors, but the Censors amongst themselves; and so again the Praetors and Consuls among themselves, do one hinder an other, and so prevail. And these be the words of Messala, which he saith himself to have writ out of the xiv book of C. Tuditanus, but hath failed in that which he saith after: Praetor etsi Collega Consulis est, neque Praetorem, neque Consulem iure rogare potest, The Praetor although he be the Consul's companion, can by right examine neither the Praetor nor the Consul, which was happily done by the error of him that writ it: For he should have said: Praetor etsi Collega Praetoris est, The Praetor although he be the praetors companion, and not, Consulis, or the Consuls: except we should salve the matter, in saying that the Consuls, Praetors, and Censors were all fellows and companions: Quia soli ijsdem auspicijs, ijsdem comitijs, id est maioribus creabantur, caeteri magistratus minoribus auspicijs & comitijs, for that they alone were created and chosen, by the same divinations and assemblies, that is to say the greater: whereas the other magistrates were chosen by the lesser, for otherwise the Latins never abused the word (Collega) in that sense; Besides that the Praetor was never the Consul's companion or fellow: but well to the contrary, appeal might lawfully be made from the Praetor to the Consul. As we read that Aemylius Lepidus the Consul received a man appealing from the Praetor Orestes; and by a contrary decree reversed the praetors decree. So we read also that Luctatius the Consul took the triumph from Valerius the Praetor, for that he being Consul was the general of the army, although he were that day from the army wherein the victory was got. That showeth also the power of the Consul to have been greater than the Praetors, for that the Consul had twelve Lictors, and the Praetors but two in the city, and six at the most if they were sent into the provinces, whom the Greeks' therefore called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, for so it is by the law Lectoria provided, which was made concerning the power of the Praetor of the city; who was of all other Praetors the greatest: Praetor Vrbanus duos Lictores apud se habeto, isque ad supremum solis occasum ius inter cives dicito, The Praetor (or Provost) of the city, let him have with him two Lictors, and let him administer justice amongst the citizens unto the going down of the sun. Wherhfore let this stand for good, not only fellows and companions in the same power, but also magistrates of like and equal power, not to have power to examine one another, and therefore much less them which have greater power than themselves.  
But yet question may be, whether a companion or fellow in office, or one of lesser 
Whether a companion or fellow in office may stay the proceed of his equal or superior in authority.  power, or he which is no fellow in office at all, yet having power in his own jurisdiction, may therein stay the acts or proceed of his equal or superior in authority? For oftentimes great controversies have fallen amongst magistrates about such prerogatives. And the difference is right great betwixt commandment, and impeachment or opposition: for companions or fellows in office have no commanding power one of them over an other, and yet nevertheless they may in public actions one of them oppose themselves against an other, and so hinder one an others proceed. 
Fellows in office although they have no power one of them over an other, yet may they well hinder one an others proceed, and why?  As Piso the Praetor or judge betwixt strangers and the citizens of Rome, often times troubled Verres the Praetor of the city, sitting in judgement of causes betwixt citizen and citizen: causing his tribunal seat to be brought near unto the tribunal seat of the Praetor of the city, so to hinder the unjust and injurious decrees of Verres; and so administered justice unto the citizens flying from the tribunal seat of the city, unto him, as by the law they might. And therefore Cicero in one of his laws saith: Magistratus nec obedientem, & nociwm ci●…em, mulcta, verberibus, vinculis coerceto, nisi par maiorue potestas prohibessit, Let the magistrate restrain the disobedient and hurtful citizen, with fine, stripes, and bonds, except an equal or greater power forbidden it to be done: 
The Magistrate can do nothing in the presence of his companion equal in power with himself without his express consent.  neither sufficeth it to say prohibessit, or forbidden it, for that the magistrate can do nothing in the presence of his companion equal in power with himself, without his express consent, or else that he submit himself unto his power. As it appeareth in that which Paulus the lawyer saith: Apud eum cui par imperium est manumitti non posse, & Praetorem apud Praetorem manumittere non posse, Before him which hath equal power (with himself) a man cannot manumize, and a Praetor before another Praetor cannot manumize. Neither doth that saying of Ulpian contradict or impugn the same: Consulem apud Consulem manumittere posse, which is, That one of the Consuls may manumize before the other Consul: seeing that that is to be understood that he might not do it upon the same day that he which did manumize or enfranchise had the bundles of rods and power to command; for that they both never had power upon the same day, as saith Festus Pompeius, as is in many places to be seen, whether they were at unity betwixt themselves or not. And therefore Livy surnamed the Salter, carried away the triumph from Claudius Nero his fellow and companion in the Consulship, for that he commanded that day wherein the victory was obtained (as saith Livy) albeit that the battle were given against hasdrubal by consent of them both; For Lucius Caesar (as Festus Pompeius writeth) deemeth him to be called the greater Consul, which had the bundles of rods or maces; or him which was first made Consul; which Paulus himself confirmeth. And all this wisely, for if both of them should at once have had the power, nothing could have been peaceable, nothing firm or sure in the great affairs of the Commonweal. Wherhfore the Decemuiri being created at Rome for the reforming of the Commonweal, and making of the laws of the xii Tables; it was added unto the law, That they should by turns have the maces with the power to command. Now if any man ask the reason why a fellow in office may impeach or stay his fellow officer in his proceeding, if they both have authority and power at the same time: it is grounded upon the reason general, of all them which have any thing in common, wherein he which forbiddeth hath most force, and his condition in that case is better than his which would proceed on further. Which reason prevaileth also, when question is of the force & power of laws, wherein the force of the law which forbiddeth, is greater than of that which commandeth.  
But whereas we have said Magistrates of like power or fellows in office not to be 
Magistrates of like power, or fellows in office, bound to the power or command of their fellows, being▪ In number more.  bound to the power or command of their companions or fellows, that is so true if that they both be in number equal: for in all Corporations and Colleges, they which are in number most, are also superior in power: and therefore the less part of magistrates fellows in office, cannot forbidden the greater. But if all the Magistrates were of one mind and opinion, these words were wont to be written upon their decrees and edicts, Pro Collegio, for the College, (which shall in their place be expounded.) But if it be true that we have said, why did than Messala say? Consulem ab omnibus magistratibus concionem avocare posse▪ ab eo neminem: deinde Praetorem ab alijs preterquàm a Consulibus: minores magistratus nusquam nec concionem nec comitatum avocasse, That the Consul might call the assemble of the people from all the Magistrates, but none might call them from him, and so next after him that the Praetors might call them from all others, excepting from the Consuls: but that the lesser magistrates could no where call away, neither the assembly nor sessions of the people. Whereof it followeth, that the impeachment & opposition of the lesser magistrates could not in any sort let or hinder the actions or commands of the greater. Whereunto I answer, that to call away belongeth to power and command, which opposition doth not. Now there is great difference, whether you command, or otherwise hinder any thing to be done, as we will hereafter more plainly declare. But first it is to be noted, that that which Messala saith is true in other magistrates, but not in the Tribunes of the people: whom we have showed to have had the title of magistrates, with power to assemble and call together the common people, and to constrain the Consuls to give place unto their opposition, not so much by the power they had to command▪ as by imprisoning of their persons, and seizing of their goods: for if they commanded any thing, and the magistrate refused or rejected their commands, they forthwith for such their contempt, commanded them to be cast in prison: For so Servilius the Senator directing his speech unto the Tribunes, saith, Vos Tribunt plebis Senatus appellat, ut in tanto discrimine Reipublicae Dictatorem dicere consuls provestra potestate cogatis, Tribuni pro collegio pronuntiant, placere consuls Senatus dicto audientes esse, aut in vincula se duc●… iussuros, The Senate calleth upon you the Tribunes of the people, that in so great a danger of the Commonweal, you for the power you have, would compel the Consuls to nominat a Dictator. The Tribunes in the name of the college of Tribunes pronounced that their pleasure was, that the Consuls should be obedient unto the command of the Senate: threatening otherwise to command them to be cast into bonds. And it was so far from being lawful for the Consuls to have power to hinder the assemblies of the common people called together by the Tribunes, as that it was not in their power so much as to interpret them in speaking unto the people, and that upon pain of death by the law Icilia, if he that had so interpreted the Tribune in his oration or speech, paid not the fine or amercement imposed upon him by the Tribune. As the Tribune Drusus well caused Philip the Consul to understand, whom he made to be cast in prison for interrupting him in his speech unto the people.  
That also which we have said, the greater part of a company, or college of magistrates 
The opposition of one of the Tribunes of the people, sufficient to hinder the proceed of all the magistrate in Rome, as also the proceed of the rest of his fellow Tribunes.  to prevail against the lesser, taketh not place amongst the Tribunes of the people, one of the Tribunes voices being able of itself to stay all the proceed, not of the Senate only, but of all other the magistrates, yea & of the rest of his fellow Tribunes also: whereas to the contrary, the acts of one Tribune alone, were of force, except some of his fellows and companions openly opposed himself against the same. As is in Livy to be seen, where he saith, The farmers of the public demain to have been discharged by a decree published under the name but of one of the Tribunes only. And that the power of the greater part of the Tribunes might be withstood by the fewer opposing themselves against them, it is manifest by that, that at such time as Appius the Censor by force held his power and Censorship longer than he should have done, and the time thereof being now expired, contrary to the law Aemilia, Sempronius the Tribune of the people in the open assembly of the people, said unto him, Ego te Appi in vincula duci iubebo nisi Aemiliae legi parueris, approbantibus sex Tribunis actionem collegae, tres auxilio fuerunt summaque invidia omnium or dinum solus Censuram gessit, I will command thee, OH Appius (saith he) to be cast into bonds, except thou obey the law Aemilia; and six so of the Tribunes allowing & approving the doing of their companion and follow Tribunes, three others of them took part with Appius, and so he alone held his Censorship, with the great envy and hart-burning of all sorts of men. So likewise at such time as Cicero then Consul (the army of Catiline being discomfited and overthrown, by the conduct of C. Antonius the other Consul) bore all the sway in the city, and had turned all the favour of the people unto himself alone, nine of the Tribunes of the people to restrain such his immoderate power, were all of opinion to sand for Pompey with his army; and had so done, had not Cato one of the Tribunes of the people alone opposed himself in Cicero's behalf, and so hindered the proceeding of his fellow Tribunes. So when Scipio Africanus accused of extortion, was to have been cast in prison, he was saved only by Sempronius one of the Tribunes, and father of the Gracchies, opposing himself against his fellows.  
But how (might some man say) could one Tribune alone let the actions and proceed of the Senate, of the Consuls, yea and of all his companions and fellows in office also? Yet most certain it is that he might so do, if the other Tribunes preferred not a request against him unto the people, to have him put out of his office and authority. And therefore at the request of Tiberius Gracchus the Tribune, Marcus Octavius another of the Tribunes, withstanding the profit of the people, and the enacting of the laws for the division of lands, was of necessity to be thrust out of his office of the Tribuneship, before the law Sempronia for the division of lands could be established. And to that end tendeth that speech of the Tribune unto the Senators, in Livy, Faxo ne iwet vox ista veto, qua collegas nostros tam laeti concinentes auditis, contemni iam Tribunos plebis, quip potestas Tribunitia suam ipsa vim frangat intercedendo, I shall make (saith he) that this word Veto, (or, I forbidden) which you now so merry hear our fellows together singing, shall help you nothing, the Tribunes of the people must now needs be contemned, for that the Tribunitial power doth weaken the power of itself, by opposing itself against itself. But this power and opposition of the Tribune, was ordained and provided for the liberty of the people, and against force offered them, and not for the private profit of the Tribunes themselves: who if question were of any particular of theirs, whether it were in civil or criminal causes, were not in any thing respected, but suffered judgement, as other men did, if some one or other of their fellows in office enterposed not themselves, and so letted the proceeding. As when Lucius Cotta one of the Tribunes of the people, being sued, would neither answer nor pay his creditors, Fiducia sacrosanctae potestatis, as bearing himself upon the reputation and credit of the most sacred power of the Tribuneship; his companions in office openly denounced unto him, That they would aid the creditors against him, except he made them payment. Yet at length by little and little it was agreed, That the college or company of Tribunes, should be also bound unto the same laws and customs that other colleges and companies were, viz. That decrees made by the consent of the greater part should bind the rest. As is easily to be gathered of that which Livy saith, Ex auctoritate Senatus latum est ad populum, ne quis templum arcemue iniussu Senatus, aut Tribunorum plebis maioris partis dedicaret, It was by the authority of the Senate propounded to the people, That no man without the command of the Senate, or of the greater part of the Tribunes of the people, should dedicat a temple or a castle. And afterwards by the law Attilia it was ordained, That the Praetor of the city, and the greater part of the Tribunes of the people, might appoint tutors unto women and fatherless children. Which custom grew into such force, as that the Senate commanded Quintus Pompeius Rufus a Tribune of the people to be cast into prison, for that he being but one, went about to forbidden an assembly of the states to be called. Whereas otherwise the wilful rage of one furious Tribune might have troubled the whole state of the Commonweal. And this was the cause why the Consul being about to assemble the great estates of the people, by sound of trumpet caused an edict to be proclaimed, forbidding all magistrates lesser than himself, to have regard unto the Auspicia, that is to say, unto the disposition of the air, or the flight of birds, for the conjecturing thereby, whether the thing which was then taken in hand, were agreeable with the will and pleasure of their gods or not. For if it thundered or lightened never so little, or if the birds were seen to fly on the right hand, or if any of them there present fell of the falling sickness, (which was therefore called Morbus comitialis) or if any other monster were borne, the assembly was accounted thereby polluted, and so the people presently broke up and departed without any thing doing: the soothsayers thereby denouncing unto them, That the gods were then angry, and not well pleased with their doings. Which was the charge of the Augurs or soothsayerss so to denounce unto them, but yet might not lawfully oppose themselves against that was to be done, as might the magistrates of equal power, or greater: but if the magistrates were inferior unto him that held the assembly of the estates, their opposing of themselves could not let the further proceeding of the superior magistrate, howbeit that such acts or proceed were thereby defective, and so subject to revocation. In such sort, as that Caius Figulus the Consul with his companion, after he had been chosen, taken his oath, and transported his army even into Spain; yet was he nevertheless with his fellow Consul, by a decree of the Senate, called back again home and enforced to give up their power and authority: For that the soothsayerss had before declared unto Tiberius Gracchus the Consul (then holding the great assemblies for the choice of the Consuls) That the signs and tokens whereby they took their predictions were unfortunate and contrary. Wherhfore the lesser magistrates could not trouble the assemblies of the greater, or call the people already assembled from them, but such magistrates only as were equal and of like power with them. But the Tribunes of the people although they might not interrupt the assemblies of the greater magistrates, or call the assembled people from them, yet might they by opposing of themselves hinder their other actions and proceed: and in case that the magistrates would yet needs proceed contrary to their oppositions, the Tribunes would then use plain force against them; so that ostentimes murders were thereabouts committed. For so Asellius the Praetor, or Provost of the city, for favouring the debtors against their creditors, was as he was doing sacrifice slain by atumultuous company of the creditors, having for their leader one of the Tribunes of the people. In like sort Appius Saturninus Tribune of the people, slew Munius the Consul, 
Appeals to be still made from the lesser magistrates to the greater; and not from the greater to the lesser, or to any other, but equal in authority with them.  in the very assembly of the people.  
And as public actions are troubled or letted by magistrates equal or greater in power than they by whom they are done, opposing themselves against them: so being once done, appeal is to be made from the lesser magistrates unto the greater, saving unto every man his jurisdiction and power. Now if it be not in the lesser magistrates power to command the greater, or to stay his proceed, much less can he undo what he hath already done, reverse his judgements, or receive appeals made from him, which are not lawfully to be admitted from the greater magistrates unto their fellows or men equal in authority with themselves. But even to the contrary, if a magistrates deputy or lieutenant be preferred to like estate or degree with the magistrate whose deputy or lieutenant he is, his commission of deputation or lieutenancy ceaseth, and the acts by him begun are interrupted and broken off. Wherhfore if the equal or lesser magistrate, shall receive one appealing from the equal or greater magistrate, an action of injury may be commenced against such a magistrate, as also against him who hath so appealed unto the lesser magistrate, or fellow in office with him from whom he hath appealed. For so Caesar as then but Praetor, being accused before one of the Questors, as having an hand in the conspiracy of Catiline, caused both the accuser and the Quaestor being both grievously fined to be cast in prison, and especially the Quaestor, for that he had suffered a greater magistrate than himself to be accused before him, as saith Suetonius. So the court of Paris by a severe decree forbade the judges or magistrates of them which have territoriall jurisdiction, to bind the king's magistrates or judges with their edicts or prohibitions: and that if they did otherwise, the king's magistrates or judges might by way of justice proceed against them for so doing.  
But here a man might doubt, Whether the inferior or lesser magistrate, who may 
Whether the inferior magistrate which may be commanded by the superior, may also be commanded by the superior magistrates Lieutenant or deputy.  be commanded by the superior, may also be commanded by the superior magistrates lieutenant, or deputy? Which most have thought to be a thing without doubt, considering that the lieutenants, or deputies, command nothing in their own names, neither can do any thing but in the name of the magistrate whose place they hold, and unto whom the inferior magistrate oweth obedience. For otherwise if it were lawful for the inferior magistrates to disobey the lieutenants or deputies of their superiors, other particular men by the same reason might likewise withstand them, which were the way to ruinat & overthrow the whole estate of the Commonweal. Howbeit that it might also be said, that magistrates lieutenants erected in title of office have power and authority by the law, and so also power to command in their own names, and in that quality to constrain the inferior magistrates to obey them. Yet nevertheless I say, that in that they are lieutenants or deputies unto other the superior magistrates, they cannot command or give our commission in their own names; which if they do, the inferior magistrates are not bound to obey them: As was adjudged by a decree of the parliament of Paris, at the suit of the Seneschal of Touraine against his lieutenant, who published edicts and decrees in his own name, which should have been set forth in the name of the Seneschal himself. Which was a thing without all doubt before the edict of king Charles the seventh that the lieutenants should be placed and displaced by the Seneschals: but the doubt arose after that they were by him erected in title of office, as having then their power from the king, and not from the Seneschals. But we must not thereupon presume, that the purpose and intent of the king therein, was to take away the power from the Seneschals or bailiffs (which could not be done but by an express edict for the suppressing of those offices) but contrariwise the erection of their lieutenants in the title of lieutenants, was much more to establish the honour of the Seneschals and bailiffs, and yet so to diminish their power. As first the Senators at Rome, and after that the emperors themselves, were wont to appoint lieutenants unto the Proconsul's (or governors of their provinces) who yet for all that had not their power to command from the Senate or the emperor, but from the Proconsul's or governors themselves. Wherhfore the law saith, Apud legatum Proconsulis non est legis actio, that is to say, that he might do no exploit or act of justice, but in the name of another man: not for that▪ it was not lawful for the Proconsul's lieutenants, as it was for the lieutenants of all other magistrates to manumise or enfranchise within the precinct and territory of the province of those magistrates whose lieutenants they were. Which the doctor Cuias hath denied, and in the ancient reading corrected these words, Ex quo provinciam ingressus est: Which his correction if it were to be admitted, thereof should follow divers inevitable absurdities, these words (as he would have them) being left out: for so the lieutenants could not in the territory of their magistrates, ordain, decree, command, or do any thing; which is all that the law properly calleth Legis actiones, or the actions of the law; all which we read lieutenants to have still done in their own provinces: and yet nevertheless the Maires, and Duumuirs, or Consuls of villages & towns, had power to manumise or enfranchise, and to appoint tutors by commission within their own jurisdiction. Wherefore the execution or action of the law, is not in the magistrates lieutenants or deputies, but in them which so appointed the lieutenants or deputies. Yea the magistrate himself, who doth but exercise another man's jurisdiction, can in his own name command nothing. Whereof it cometh, that a man cannot appeal from a lieutenant or deputy, unto him whose lieutenant or deputy he is: for so appeal should be made from the same man to himself. Howbeit that the magistrate may examine the injury and wrong done to private men by his lieutenant or deputy; and that because the lieutenant or deputy hath not all the jurisdiction and power of the magistrate, whose lieutenant or deputy he is: and yet less in ancient time, than at this present, when as the lieutenants of the Proconsul's or governors of countries, had no power to inflict corporal punishment upon any. The prince's lieutenant's general also in the wars, albeit that they have a most high command and power over all soldiers, of what degree or condition soever, yet if any of the princes of the blood offend against the laws military, the hearing and trial thereof belongeth not unto the lieutenant's general, but unto the sovereign prince himself; or at lest wise unto the chapter of the knights of the order, especially in case it concern either honour, or life. And in much more strong terms, if question be of ecclesiastical discipline, only the bishops are not bound to answer before the archbishop's officials, or vicar's general; as it was by a decree of the parliament of 
The power of the superior magistrates over the inferior▪ extendeth not farther than their own terri●…ory seat and jurisdiction.  Paris, adjudged for the bishops of Troy, and Nevers: Whereby it was said, that they were not bound to obey, but only unto the archbishops in person themselves. But that which I have said of the power of the superior magistrates over the inferior, is to be understood in their own territory, seat, and jurisdiction▪ out of which they are but as other private and particular men, without power or command.  
But now the question might be asked, Whether that magistrates equal and fellows 
Honour and dignity in nothing to communicate with authority and power.  in authority and power, be also equal in honour and dignity? Whereunto I answer, that honour and dignity doth in nothing communicate with authority and power: yea oftentimes it chanceth and cometh to pass, that he which hath most honour, hath so much the less power: than which secret none is almost greater, or more profitable for the maintenance & preservation of the Aristocratical or Popular Commonweals, or that is in any place of the world better kept than in Venice. Of the Consuls he that was first chosen Consul, was also first named in all their public acts and fasts, and so had the honour of precedence: but if they were both at once chosen, he that was the elder was in honour also above his fellow, until the law Pappia Poppeia, which gave the prerogative of honour unto the married Consul: or if they were both married, then unto him that had most children, which supplied the number of years. So amongst the Praetors, who were all of one college or company, and their power all one; he which was called Vrbanus (or the Praetor of the city) was in dignity and honour above the rest, and so called the Greatest Praetor, for that he was first of all chosen, and in the absence of the Consuls held their places, assembled the Senate, and called together the greatest estates, with such other like things belonging to the office of the Consuls. And amongst the ten Archontes of equal power in Athens, there was one, who yet in honour exceeding the rest, had the public acts authorised in his name, and gave himself names also unto the Annals and public acts and decrees, and was thereof called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. So amongst all the parliaments of France (being almost all of like power) the parliament of Paris hath the prerogative of honour above the rest, as more ancient; and by a certain singular right is yet called the Court of the peers of France, as having the trial and judgement of the peers, which none of the rest of the courts of parliament have. And albeit that in the time of Charles the viii, the great Council managed the affairs of state, yet so it is, that the king by express edict ordained and appointed, That in all edicts and mandates, wherein mention should be made of the court of parliament, and of the great Council, the Court of parliament of Paris should always be set foremost. So whereas the king's Attourneys are almost in number infinite, he of the parliament of Paris hath always the prerogative of honour above all the rest of the king's Attourneys, who all are sworn unto the judges of the sovereign courts (wherein they are Attourneys) except the Attorney general of the Parliament of Paris, who is not to be sworn but unto the king only. So we see that the Constable of France, and the Chancellor, albeit that they have not power or command one of them above the other, but are equal in sitting, and in going side by side, yet nevertheless the more honourable place is reserved unto the Constable▪ which is on the right hand of the king, and the Chancellor on the left: except some haply may say him to have that place for to bear the king's sword upon the king's right hand: yet besides that, at the consecration and coronation of the king, and other ceremonies wherein place of precedence is, the Constable goeth before the Chancellor, and next unto the Chancellor followeth the Grand Master of France. Which I would have understood to be of me so spoken, not as if my purpose were to determine any thing of honours, but as an example by the way whereby to perceive how much honour differeth from authority or power.  
But forasmuch as we have said, that magistrates equal in power, or which hold nothing 
Whether equal lords or compeers of the same territory and jurisdiction, may chastise or reform one another.  one of them another, cannot be commanded one of them by another; a man may doubt whether if amongst many princes or coequal lords, one offend, he may be restrained or corrected by the other princes or lords his equels? For why, jurisdiction is of itself by nature indivisible: and lords of one and the same jurisdiction have one of them as much power as the other; and every one of them hath entire power for all: which is not so amongst princes or magistrates which have their charges or territories divided, and which have not any thing to command one of them the other; and much less when many magistrates in one body or college have one and the same charge together; where no one of them hath of himself any power or command, except it be by commission from the whole college given him. Yet many there be which hold, that one of these lords may be restrained and corrected by the other lords his compeers and coequals, as having by his fault lost his jurisdiction and right, as it hath been judged in the court at Rome. Which judgement may well be borne with, howbeit that the reason thereof is not good; for to say that he offending hath thereby forthwith lost his power and jurisdiction, were to do execution before judgement, and to spoil the lord or magistrate of his estate or place before he were heard. And albeit that the threats, penalties, edicts, and decrees, expressed and set down in the laws, had the force of a thing already judged, as some have thought them to have: yet so it is, that the fact in question is always in judgement to be tried, whether it were done or no; and in case it be confessed, yet before the execution, must the sentence be pronounced by the mouth of the judge, who can have no power over his compear, who hath equal power and authority in the same territory with himself, as we have before declared, following therein the sounder opinion of the greater part of lawyers, not much regarding that others say, That every man is there to be judged where he hath offended: which is so true, if there be no lawful cause which may hinder judgement to be in the same place given. In a college or company of magistrates, or 
In a college or company of magistrates or judges the greater part agreeing in one, may judge or chastise any one or the lesser part of their fellows. A difference betwixt service and jurisdiction.  judges, if the greater part of them agreed in one, there is no doubt but that they may judge or chastise any one, or the lesser part of their fellows: as they did in the Senate of Rome, after the law which Adrian the emperor made for the judging of Senators; and as they do in all the courts of this realm. But between many equal lords or compeers of the same territory, the reason is far otherwise; for that every one of them hath himself the whole jurisdiction and power, nor cannot judge but by turns, one of them after another, neither have more than one seat of justice, in one and the same jurisdiction, but by the new grant of their patron or predominant lord. And in this, service differeth from jurisdiction; for that service suffereth itself to be at once & together enjoyed of every one that hath right thereunto: but jurisdiction not so, as many have thought, having excepted duchies, marquisats, and counties; which by the ancient laws of fees are of an indivisible nature. But it is neither for us needful, neither doth this place require us by reasons to refute the opinion of them which affirm jurisdictions so to cleave unto the territories, as if they were indeed services; lest in so doing we should pass without the bounds of our purpose. Sufficeth it in passing by, to say, jurisdiction to hold so little of fee, as that the sovereign prince selling or giving a fee, of what nature soever it be, is not therefore to be reputed to have given or sold the jurisdiction thereto belonging; as it hath oft-times been judged, & at length because it should no more be doubted of, was by an edict of Philip the fair more straightly provided for: yea although the donation were by the sovereign prince made to religious or devout uses; which many (but without cause) have excepted, the law being made general. Seeing therefore that magistrates in power equal, or which hold not any thing one of them of another, cannot be commanded or corrected one of them by another; much less can the equal lords or compeers of the same territory and jurisdiction command or reform one another, but the superior magistrate or predominant lord is to have the hearing and determining of the matter. By our customs the superior courts have reserved unto themselves, the controversies of the king's magistrates and officers amongst themselves, concerning their power and jurisdiction. But if question be for the executing of the decrees or judgements of one of them in the territory of another, it is to be done by honest request and leave before obtained: howbeit that by a new law, that custom is taken away out of this our Commonweal, and power given unto pursiuants to put in execution all the magistrates commands, almost throughout all the kingdom. As for sovereign princes, not subject to the power or command of others, they must in such case, of necessity use requests one to another, for that they cannot be compelled by the command of any greater power, as magistrates may, who without any leave asked, suffer the judgements of other magistrates to be put into execution in their provinces: or in case they refuse so to do, are to be constrained by the superior powers. Which ask of leave of the greater or equal power to execute or suffer judgement given out of their territories, to be executed therein, offering to do or suffer the like to be done in theirs, as occasion shall require, hath of all antiquity been observed and kept. Howbeit it seemeth the Roman empire yet flourishing, that to put in execution a mandat or judgement out of ones own territory, it was needful first to obtain the emperors letters of command, seeing that the law saith, Sententiam Romae dictam, possunt Praesides in provincijs, si hoc iussi fuerint exequi, The Precedents in their provinces may put in execution a sentence (or judgement) given at Rome, if they be thereunto commanded: yet much more seemly it were by the good leave of the magistrate to obtain the same, than by force to extort it against his will. As in like cause the Emperor said unto him which complained of his companion, without having before spoken unto him, Alloquere illum, ne rem iniustam faciat, Speak unto him, that he do thee not wrong: forasmuch as the prince's command, or constraint of the superiors in such case, giveth occasions of quarrels and jealousies amongst Magistrates, seeing the decrees of their equals, or of their inferiors, against their wills to be put in execution in their own territories: which often times turn to the great hurt of the subjects, and dishonour of the Commonweal, one of the magistrates, or of such as are in authority, in despite of the other discharging their choleric passions upon the poor innocents: As did the Consul Marcellus, who in 
Contention betwixt great magistrates or courts, about their power and jurisdiction, always unto the poor subject hurtful.  despite of Caesar caused certain of the citizens of Novocome to be whipped, to make them to know (as he said) that Caesar had no power to give unto them the right and freedom of the citizens of Rome. But much greater is the poor subjects harms if such contention and difference for power and authority, fall out amongst the greatest magistrates, or highest Courts. As I remember such a difference fell out betwixt the parliament of Paris, and of Bordeaux, about the execution of an arrest given in the parliament of Paris; which the parliament of Bordeaux upon the princes command suffered to be executed within the jurisdiction thereof, but with condition, that if any opposition or appeal were in the doing thereof made, the parliament of Bordeaux should have the hearing and disciding thereof. He which had the execution of the matter, willing to proceed farther, notwithstanding the opposition of the defendant, appeal was by the party made unto the parliament of Bourdeaux, whom the plaintiff prevented in the parliament of Paris. This contention betwixt the two parliaments was by the king referred unto the great Counsel; where it was decreed, That to receive and hear the appeal belonged unto the parliament of Paris; for that every man aught of right to be the interpreter and expounder of his own meaning: and as none but the prince may declare his laws and commandments, so it belongeth to the magistrate to declare the meaning of his own sentence. Now here question was of the right meaning of a thing already judged, at such time as the party guilty offered his opposition unto the officer, putting into execution the decrees of the higher Court, from which a man may not by the laws appeal▪ unto which opposition of the party guilty, if the officer give not way, than it is usual to appeal, not so much from the sentence of the higher Court, as from the injury of the officer which would not hear the opposition, which he must needs, except the Court have commanded the judgement thereof to be put in execution, notwithstanding any opposition.  
But what if the Magistrate shall have no respect or regard unto the requests or decrees 
Wilful magistrates by the prince or their superiors to be enforced to suffer justice to be done within their jurisdiction  of his equal, or of the inferior magistrate, nor suffer their commandments to be put in execution within his jurisdiction. Truly in this case he is to be thereunto by the superior magistrates compelled: or if they be of the higher sort of magistrates which are at controversy among themselves about their jurisdiction and power, they are by the prince's authority to be enforced: for so these words of Ulpian the Lawyer are to be understood, Si hoc iussi fuerint, If they shall be so commanded: viz. by the prince, (but not by the magistrates) at such time as the Precedents or governors of countries, every one of them in his own province had the chiefest power and authority next unto the Prince, by whom only they were to be commanded. And whereas in the Edicts or laws any thing is commanded to be done, it is thus to be understood, that every Magistrate in his own province is to be obeyed, for that the magistrate hath no power to command out of his own territory or jurisdiction. In ancient time the king's Pursuivants or officers, if they were to put in execution the commands of the royal magistrates in the territory of such lords as had therein territoriall jurisdiction, were first to ask them leave; until that afterwards it was by the most straight decrees of the highest courts forbidden them so to do, for that therein the sovereign majesty of the king seemed to be something impaired.  
But yet it might be demanded, whether the inferior Magistrates might 'cause their 
Whether the inferior Magistrate be to have leave from the superior, unto whom appeal was made, to put his own sentence in execution, the appeal being now let fall.  commands to be put in execution, without the leave of the superior magistrate, unto whom appeal was made? and that after the same appeal let fall, and the time past, appointed for the prosecuting thereof; which the Lawyers to no purpose call Fatalia, induced thereunto by an old error and inveterat fault of them which have translated the Code, and authentics out of Greek into Latin, wherein for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, they have read 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, which is to say, fatal days, for days prefixed and of assignation: which the law of the twelve Tables called Statos d●…es, days appointed; as in this law, Si status dies cum host, that is to say, If the day appointed with a stranger. Neither ever did lawyer or man that could speak Latin, use this form of speaking, neither hath any of the Latins or Greeks called them for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or Fatales. The Lawyers have oftentimes divided Dies sessionum, a diebus continuis, Days 
The error of the word Fatales.  of Session, from days of Continuation. And if any thing were by the magistrate commanded to be done within a certain time, the Lawyers called it Statutum tempus, and edictum peremptorium, a time appointed, or edict peremptory: but when the time wherein the suit aught to be determined is expired and passed, or that the suit is let fall, we say, Litem mori, the suit to die; or instantiam perimi, the instance to be lost: as before, we say, Litem vivere, or, the suit to live: but none of the Lawyers hath usurped Fatalem diem, or Fatalia tempora, a fatal day, or fatal times. But all this error is derived of the changing of this one Greek letter 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 into 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, for seeing that by the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the Greeks aswell as the Hebrews signify Fatum, or destiny, they must needs translate 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, fatalem diem, that is to say, a fatal day. Demosthenes often times calleth it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, which the Latins call statum diem; and we in our practice, praefixam, that is to say, an appointed, or prefixed day: for so Demosthenes saith against Media, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, & against Stephanus, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: and sometimes also he saith, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, as to Nicostratus: and the later Greeks have called it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, & 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, but never called it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. And so pope Synesius metaphorically calleth the last day of a man's life 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, because he would not call it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, or Fatal; a word unto Christian men and true religion strange. Wherhfore for Fatal days of appeals, we shall more truly and better use the terms of Appointed times, for so the lawyer calleth them. But that justinian's laws were written in Greek before they were written in Latin, I suppose no man to doubt. And that the Theodosian and Hermogenian Codes, out of whom justinian's Code was almost all compiled, were as well written in Greek as in Latin, it is plain: and so the law Properandum to have been translated rather by a Greek than by a Latinist, being altogether writ in the Greek phrase, as namely calling the defendant fugientem, or the party flying away; which is the proper Greek word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉▪ Neither aught it to seem strange, that the Greeks' translated the Roman laws, and even justinian's justitutions into Greek; seeing them to have translated most of the writings of Thomas Aquinas, as also the latter books of Aristotle's Metaphysikes out of Arabike into Greek, the Greek copy being before lost. But to return again from whence we have digressed, and to resolve the propounded question; I say, that it is not needful for the inferior magistrate, the appeal being let fall, to have leave of the superior magistrate (unto whom the appeal was made) for the putting in execution of their own judgements: as in the time of our ancestors, the manner was, by letters of justice (as they termed them) which by a decree of Charles the seventh, were utterly abolished and taken away: sufficeth it the appeal being once given over before the judge that gave the sentence, to request, that the same may now be put in execution, except the superior magistrate unto whom the party condemned hath appealed, hath expressly before forbidden the executionto be done. In which case it is needful, that such prohibition be taken away, before the inferior magistrate proceed further. For otherwise it is not requisite, that the appeal should by the superior magistrate be declared to be let fall or given over, that the sentence may be put in execution; for that the benefit of the appeal let fall, is obtained by the law, & not by virtue of the magistrates sentence. Neither is the honour or reputation of the superior magistrates impaired by the inferiors, not having from them express prohibition: in reverence & respect of whom, the inferior magistrates aught to stay the execution, if the stay thereof be not perilous unto the Commonweal. In which case they may proceed, although it were in question of life, and afterwards writ back their answer; whereas otherwise, in causes concerning life and death, if the magistrate give not way unto the appeal, he himself is in danger of capital punishment. Yea and in this case, the magistrate for not yielding unto the appeal, is guilty of treason, albeit that question were but concerning the whipping of a citizen.  
Now all that which we have hitherto said concerning magistrates, and of the obedience that one of them oweth unto another, is to be understood of magistrates that be of the self same Commonweal. But what shall we then say of magistrates of divers Commonweals? As if a man by the magistrates condemned in this kingdom shall fly into Greece, whether shall the Grand signor of the Turks, at the request of the French king, or of some other private man whom the matter doth concern, 'cause the judgement to be put in execution, without further enquiry of the equity of the cause? The like question whereunto I remember to have happened in the parliament of Paris, concerning a French merchant condemned by default and contumacy at Venice, at the suit of a Venetian merchant; who came into France to demand execution of the judgement given in Venice, having before obtained letters of request from the signory to that purpose, as the usual manner & custom of sovereign princes & lords in such cases is: For a mutual respect and care which all princes have unto justice, whereof they hold their Sceptres and Crowns. The French merchant excepteth against the Venetian, and no regard being had to his exception, appealeth unto the court of parliament. Where most were of opinion, that the sentence so given was to be put in execution, without any farther examination, whether it were rightfully judged or not: which otherwise might▪ seem a wrong offered unto the signory of Venice, which might use the like circumstance, & examine the judgements of the magistrates of France, and also reverse them, rather in revenge of their wronged majesty, than for the iniquity of the same. Yet for that the merchant was condemned by default, it was thought meet to have it inquired, whether he had by covenant in this point submitted himself unto the Venetian signory and jurisdiction or not? And then, whether the judgement were duly given, after certain peremptory edicts and appointed times, according to the laws and customs of the Venetians? Which being found to be so, the court adjudged the sentence to be put in execution. And this is the course in private judgements. Howbeit if question were of the honour, or life, not of one of our own subjects only, but even of a stranger flying unto us, the judgement of a strange magistrate is not to be put in execution, before the truth of the matter be again of fresh and thoroughly examined and tried. Yea Adrian the emperor commanded the governors of his provinces, to use 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 (for that word the law useth) that is to say, to judge again of them which had been condemned, by the justices of peace even of the same Roman empire. And that which I have said, is right straightly observed and kept in the Commonweals of the Swissers, of Geveue, of Venice, Lucque, and Genes, who cause the condemned strangers flying unto them, to be again of new tried, before they restore them unto foreign princes, demanding from them such their condemned 
Whether sovereign princes be bound to restore strangers flying unto them, unto their own princes demanding them again.  subjects again. For so all lawyers almost with one consent say; Sovereign Princes not to be bound to restore Strangers flying unto them, unto their own Princes demanding them again. Which is true that they are not bound in any civil obligation, from which all sovereign princes are exempted: but they without any distinction of the Law of nations or nature, altogether deny that a foreign subject is to be restored unto his prince requiring him again. Only Baldus addeth this condition thereunto, Not to restore him to be right, so that the prince unto whom the condemned or guilty person is so fled, do upon him justice. But if they will confess every Prince by the laws both of God and nature to be bound to do justice; they must also confess that he is bound to restore another man's subject unto his own natural prince, demanding him: not only for the more manifest trying out of the truth, and discovering of the conspirators their partakers, for which their personal presence and confrontation is most necessary; but also for exemplary punishment to be done, in the same places where the offences were committed: which of all other things seemeth most to belong unto the profit to arise unto the Commonweal by punishments, as examples of common revenge, the death of the offender, being one of the lest thing that in matter of justice is to be sought after. And if Magistrates in the same Commonweal are by mutual obligation bound to help one an other, and so the Commonwealth, (whereunto next unto God we own all our endeavours) for the prosecuting and punishing of malefactors and offenders; why then should Princes be exempted from the 
A notable 〈◊〉 of Mahomet the Great, first emperor of th●… Turks.  like bond, so well agreeing with the laws both of God and nature? Wherein the notable act of Mahomet (the second of that name) emperor of Constantinople, even he which was surnamed the Great, is tied worthily commended; in that he caused the murderer, who had most cruelly slain julian de Medici's in the Church before the Altar, to be apprehended at Constantinople whether he was fled, and so bound hand and foot, to be restored to Laurence de Medici's and the state of Florence, requesting of him: which he did not as respecting the power of the Florentines, being then but small, but as fearing the hand and power of the immortal and almighty God. And in this Realm the custom hath always been to restore the guilty fugitives unto their own Lords and Princes demanding of them, except therein question be made of the majesty, bounds, or state of the kingdom, which hath been by their decrees determined. One of the parliament of Paris: Another of the court of Rome against the king of England, who demanding his fugitive subject, was denied him: And the third of the parliament of Tholouse: that of Rome being then grounded upon the sovereignty of the See of Rome over the realm of England. But out of terms of estate, and where question is but of public punishment, there is no Prince which is not bound to restore another man's subject unto his Prince demanding him, as hath been solemnly judged by the parliament of Bourdeaux: howbeit that the same hath been also expressly articulated in divers treaties of peace. As in the treaty which the Swissers made with the emperor Charles the fift, as Duke of Milan, the seven article carried an express clause, for the restoring of guilty fugitives. And for this cause king Henry the second, after he had by his Ambassador requested the Lords and people of Geneva, to restore unto him Baptista Didato an Italian, his Receiver general of Rouen, who was thither fled with all the money of the receipt: which they being thereto oftentimes requested, refused to do: At length the king protested unto the Lords of Berne, in whose protection the signory of Geneva then was, that he would use the law of reprisal against them of Geneva; who before had resolved in their grand Council of two hundred, in no wise to restore him: but afterwards being by an Herald sent from them of Berne, willed to deliver him unto the king, they changed that their former opinion for the detaining of him: So at length the robber of the common. treasure was forsaken by them of Geneva, jest they in doing otherwise should have stirred up the displeasure of a most mighty king, or of the Swissers against them, as also seem to have opened a sanctuary or place of refuge for the eves, and other such like wicked men. And this we have gathered out of the letters of the French ambassador to Anne Mommorancie Constable of France, so that they are to be blamed which otherwise either think or writ. Wherhfore I hold it to be an injury unto the estate 
A guilty fugitive is not by another prince to be detained, but restored after he is by his own prince demanded.  of another man, to detain a guilty fugitive after he is demanded to be again unto his own prince restored; and much more if he should be so detained by the subjects among themselves. For which cause all the Tribes of Israel combined themselves against the Tribe of Benjamin, which was so utterly destroyed, except six hundred persons, for refusing to restore the guilty persons demanded of them. And for the 
●…. judic. 20. cap.  same cause we found that the Hippotae were all destroyed, and their city u●…terlie razed by the Thebaus; for that they chose rather to defend the murderers of Phox the Baeotian, and for them to take up arms, then to restore them unto the Thebans, demanding them. But if the Prince unto whom the fugitive is retired certainly know him 
A guiltless and innocent fugitive tive, is not to be restored unto his angry prince demanding of him.  whom he hath so received, to be an innocent and guiltless man, and to be unjustly pursued and sought after, as having but escaped the cruelty of a tyrant, it is not only a shameful and injurious thing to betray the poor innocent and strange man unto the cruel tyrant: but he should rather for the miserable man's defence, and safeguard of his life take up arms, seeing that by the law of God, we aught not to restore a fugitive 
Deut. 16. 〈◊〉 23.  servant unto his angry master, from whose fury he is fled into another's man's house.  
And thus much concerning Magistrates; and the obedience that they own unto Princes, and of the power that they have over particular men, and of the respect that they aught to have one of them towards an other. But to compare the Magistrates of ancient time, with ours now, belongeth not to this our purpose, considering that they are still in change, howbeit that we see them to be like in effect, although that they differ in names. As we read in the book of the kings, where it is said, That Azarias' the son of the high priest Tsadoc was near unto the person of Solomon to instruct him in matters concerning Religion; that josophat was chief of his council, or his Chancellor; that Eliphore, and Aiah were his Secretaries for the estate; that Banaia was his Constable; and Azarias the son of Natan his Lieutenant general over the governments of the twelve Tribes, which are and have been as it were like in all Monarchies. So in like manner we see in the Turkish Empire, that the first and principal Bassa is General of the army, as Constable or chief marshal; and Beglerbegs are governors general of Provinces; the Zanzacks are as more particular and inferior governors; the two Cadilesquires are the Chauncelours, attendinding unto the administration of justice, the one in Asia, the other in Europe; the Sabbassaes and Cadies are the ordinary magistrates and judges; the Mophti is the great Bishop. So in the kingdoms of Thunes, of Fes, and of Maroch, the Munafide is as chancellor, the Admiral is General of the army at Sea, a word or name which we have borrowed from the Arabians. So we see the charges and offices to be as it were like, although their names be divers, as the Great Master of Ethiopia is called Bethudere, which is an Hebrew word, signifying Master of the household. But forasmuch as Magistrates in every Commonweal are divided into Corporations and Colleges, and that there are more Corporations and Colleges of private men than of Magistrates, let us also say somewhat of such Corporations and Colleges.   

CAAP. VII. ¶ Of Corporations, and Colleges, Estates, and Communities, and what profits or inconveniences ensue thereof unto the Commonweal.  
NOw after that we have spoken of a Family, and of the parts thereof, of Sovereignty, and of Magistrates; we must speak of Corporations and Colleges also: wherefore let us then first speak of the cause of Corporations and Colleges, and after of their power and privileges in general, and of the manner of punishing of them, if they offend: and last of all whether the Commonweal can be without them. The difference of a Family, from Corporations and Colleges, and so of them from a Commonweal, is such as is the difference of the parts from the whole: for the community of many heads of a family, or of a village, or of a town, or of a country, may be without a Commonweal, aswell as a family without a college. And, as many families 
The difference betwixt ●… family, a college, and a Commonweal.  by amity allied, are members of one corporation and community; so many corporations and communities allied by a sovereign power, make one Commonweal. Now a family is a community natural; a college is a community civil; and a Commonweal hath that moreover, That it is a community governed by a sovereign power, and may be so straight, as that it may have neither corporation nor colleges, but only many families in it. And so the word Community is common unto a family, a college, and a commonweal. And properly a Corporation is understood to consist of divers families, or colleges, or of many families and colleges together. But the beginnings of all civil societies are derived from a family, which is 
A Family the beginning of all civil societies.  (as we say) itself a natural society, and by the father of nature itself first founded in the beginning together with mankind. But when reason, by God himself engrafted in us, had made man desirous of the company and society of man, and to participate together both in speech and conversation; the same so wrought, as that proceeding farther from the love of them that were domestical & their own, it extended farther, to take pleasure in the propagation and increase of families. So also families by little and little departing from their first beginning, learned by civil society to imitate the natural society of a family. For why, a Commonweal is a civil society, which can of itself stand without corporations or colleges; but not without a family: besides that, Commonweals may be dissolved, for that they are derived from the Laws and institutions of men: whereas families cannot altogether perish, but that all mankind must before perish also. Whereby it is to be understood, From the root of one family, by the everliving God himself planted, at the first to have sprung up as it were certain plants, who by necessity constrained, built for themselves houses and dwelling places, so to be the safer from the injury of the weather, and the rage of wild beasts: and after that Hamlets and villages, which in process of time become boroughs and Towns. But being grown to such a multitude, as that they could not longer be contained within the compass and precinct of the same country, they were driven to departed thence also, and to seek out new dwelling places. So that now thus divided in places, in regions, and kindred, being bound unto no law or command, as every one of them exceeded the other in strength and power, so he forced himself to thrust them that were near unto him, and weaker than himself, out of their houses and dwelling 
The beginning of strong towns and cities.  places; or to take from them their springs, their fountains, or pleasant places; or to drive them from their pastures or feedings: which violence so offered by the stronger, enforced the weaker either to seek out places by nature defensible and strong, or else by art or wisdom to fortify themselves, their children, wives, and families, with ditches, trenches, and walls, whereof strong towns and cities arise. For so Dionysius long since writeth king Servius to have placed certain places of refuge in the mountains & strongest hills, whether the poor country men might retire themselves out of the fields, so to save themselves from the incursions of their enemies. And yet could not the enemies force be so kept off with walls and other fortifications, but that they which had so shut up themselves therein, were yet nevertheless besieged by the stronger. For why, the first sort of men was most given to rapine, murder, and theft, delighting 
The first sort of man, most delighted in theft and murder, and oppressing of others weaker than themselves.  in nothing more, nor accounting any honour greater than to rob and kill, and to oppress the weaker sort as slaves: as Plutarch well agreeing with the sacred history most truly writeth. And long before Plutarch, Thucydides the most famous historiographer of them that flourished among the Greeks' reporteth, all Greece but a little before his time to have been troubled with the robberies and outrages committed 
Theft and robbery in ancient time no disgrace nor shame.  by the mightier sort; and then robbery & theft to have been no disgrace or shame. Yea such as travailed by Sea or land (as the same author reporteth) when they met, before they came near together, used commonly (and that without any reproach or imputation) to ask whether they were Robbers or Pirates or not. And not only Plato, and his disciple Aristotle, have put robbery among the kinds of hunting, but the Hebrews also▪ who call thieves and Robbers, mighty hunters, as they did Nimroth. And by the laws of Solon it is plain, that men might lawfully join in fellowship 
Theft in ancient time lawful both amongst the Greeks' and Latins.  to rob and steal, (provided always that it were not from the subjects of their own estate) as appeareth by these words, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, which the Latin interpreter thinking to be absurd and false, hath wrested them another way: For what other thing is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, than to rob? And what other thing is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉? Neither were robberies less allowed of the ancient Latins than they were of the Greeks and Hebrews, as it is to be perceived by the first league made betwixt the Romans and the Carthaginensians: wherein it was thus expressly set down: * Vltra Promontorium pulchri praedae aut mercaturae gratia Romani ne naviganto, 
Polyb. Lib. 3.  Beyond the fair Promontory, the Romans shall not sail either for booty, or in trade of merchandise. From which kind of robberies long it was before other people also abstained: for so Caesar speaking of the Germans in his time saith, Latrocinia nullam habent infamiam, quae extra fines cuiuscunque civitatis fiunt, atque ea iwentutis exercendae, ac desidiae minuendae causa fieri praedicant, Robberies done without the bounds of every city, have with them no infamy; and those they say to be done for the exercise of the youth, and avoiding of sloth. This licence and impunity of robbing and reaving, constrained men which as yet had no Princes nor Magistrates, to join themselves in society and amity for the defence of one an other, and to make Communities and Fraternities, which the Greeks' called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, as brethren which drew water of the same well, which they called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, as also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, which are rural and country people using the fair fountain, which the Dorians called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and whereof such country villages were called Pagi, as the Latins also said them Commessari, who in the same country villages, which the Greeks' called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉▪ did ordinarily eat and drink together: as 
* Festus in verbo pagi. The societies of men, why they were first sought out.  Festus writeth. Whereby it is plainly to be seen, the societies of men among themselves, to have been at the first sought out for the leading of their lives in more safety and quiet: and them first of all to have sprung from the love which was betwixt man and wife: From them to have flowed the mutual love betwixt parents and their children: then the love of brethren and sisters one towards another: and after them the friendship betwixt cousins and other nigh kinsmen: and last of all, the love and good will which is betwixt men joined in alliance: which had all at length grown cold, and been utterly extinguished, had it not been nourished, maintained, and kept, by societies, communities, corporations, and colleges: the union of whom hath for long time in safety maintained many people, without any form of a Commonweal, or sovereign power 
The happy estate of the people of Israel before they had any king, or other form of Aristocratique or popular commonweal.  over them. So the people of Israel for a long time flourished in great tranquility without kings, and without any Popular or Aristocratical estate, every man living at his pleasure in all liberty, every Tribe being in itself united by the bond of blood and kindred, and all of them together by the community of their law and sacrifices. Who when they were by any enemy to be assailed or invaded, the estates of their Tribes and communities assembling together, made choice of a chieftain, unto whom they gave sovereign power; and namely of such an one as God had with his spirit inspired and stirred up amongst them. So of many Tribes and families together united, was made ●… Commonweal, by mean of a sovereign power set over them. And for this cause the princes and lawgivers which first founded Commonweals, who had not yet discovered the difficulties they were to prove, to keep & maintain their subjects by way of justice, ordained and maintained fraternities, communities, and colleges; to the end, that the parts and members of the self same body of a Commonweal, being at accord among themselves, it might be for them the more easy to rule the whole Commonweal 
Fraternities, communities, and colleges, why they were first instituted and ordained.  together. So we see that Numa Pompilius, king and lawgiver unto the Romans (after he had abolished the name of the Sabines, which some thing divided the Roman state) established certain fraternities, and colleges, or companies of men, of all manner of occupations; appointing unto every fraternity certain patrons, priests, and solemn sacrifices, which were kept on certain appointed days of the year. And afterwards also ordained a fraternity of merchants, to whom he gave Mercury for their patron: which he seemed to have done to the imitation of Solon, who by a positive law permitted all manner of fraternities and communities whatsoever, with power for them to make such laws and statutes among themselves as they should see good, so that they were not contrary unto the public positive laws of the state. Lycurgus also did not only permit, but straightly command also to maintain and cherish such societies and communities, as well general as particular; and that all his subjects should take their refection and diet in companies of fifteen and fifteen together: which for that they were kept for friendship sake, were called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, of the friendship that they had one of them with another. As also in almost all the other towns of Greece, there were the like fraternities and companies, whom they called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, as in Italy the same colleges and companies were called Sodalitia; for the unity, company, and 
Amity and friendship the foundation of ●…l human and civil societies and more requisite for the keeping and maintaining thereof than justice is self.  friendship they had among themselves, eating and drinking together for the most part: and having no judges but themselves, if any difference or strife chanced to fall out amongst them, being such companions and fellows; as knowing that amity and friendship was the only foundation of all human and civil society, and much more requisite for the keeping and maintaining thereof, than justice itself: For that justice never flexible, but always keeping the uprightness of itself, by just judgement well endeth suits; but not hatred, making often times of friends foes: whereas amity and friendship, which is by company nourished, yielding of the right of itself, best establisheth the true natural justice, and plucketh up all controversies by the root, with great quietness and love reconciling subjects among themselves, together with the Commonweal. Now the principal end & scope of all laws, both divine and human, is to keep and maintain the love of men one towards another amongst themselves, and them altogether in their duty towards God; which cannot better be done, than by ordinary and orderly conversing and combining of men themselves together.  
Wherhfore the Cretentians in ancient time did all eat and drink together, young and old, men and women; for to maintain the love and amity which we have before spoke of amongst them: Howbeit that afterwards to avoid confusion, the ages and sexes were into certain orders divided. So we see in the law of God, the feasts of Passeover, to have been commanded to be holden by companies of ten and ten persons together: beside the feasts of Tabernacles, and the ordinary banquets of sacrifice, which God commanded to be solemnised with all joy and gladness: and that for no other cause, but that so men might be together united in religion towards God, and mutual love and friendship one to another among themselves. The same was also well observed 
Orderly feasts and meetings of old time instituted to maintain love and amity amongst men.  & kept in the Christian primitive church, who oftentimes made such feasts, which they called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, for the devout kiss, and charitable embracements one of them (in the feruensie of their zeal) gave to another, in the ending of them, besides their ordinary behaviour and communication. And albeit that many things are long since by tract of time grown out of use, yet nevertheless a resemblance of those old feasts is yet shadowed in our holy feasts and banquets: which not feigned but true feasts the Venetians do with most great care and solemnity keep: but the Swissers better than in any place of the world, where the fraternities and companies in every town have their common houses or halls▪ wherein they oftentimes make their feasts and banquets, neither is there any village so little, which hath not a common house in it for that purpose. Where if any strife or contention shall arise amongst them that be of the fellowship or company, it is by the common consent there ended, and the definitive sentence there written, not in paper, but upon the very table whereon they have banqueted, and that not with ink, but with chalk. And as in ancient time artisans, merchants, priests, bishops, and all sorts of men had their fraternities, and companies: so had also the philosophers, and especially the Pythagorians, who ordinarily met together, and lived for most part of their time in common. And thus much concerning the cause, the beginning, and progress of corporations, and colleges, communities, and companies: which afterwards by succession of time have in all Commonweals been better ruled by laws, statutes, and customs.  
But that all things which are to be said of corporations and colleges, may in order be declared: Let us first orderly set down and show, what power every corporation or college is of, and what privilege is to every one of them given; then how they are to be governed, and kept within the bounds of their duty; and last of all, whether a 
The divisiion of colleges and companions.  Commonweal can be without colleges or companies, and what colleges are most necessary and best fitting a Commonweal. Which the better to understand, we may say, that all colleges and companies are ordained either for religion, or for policy, and so concern but worldly things. If they be instituted but for policy, either they have jurisdiction, or are without all jurisdiction. Colleges without jurisdiction, are such as are ordained for the bringing up of youth, or for fellowship of physicians, or of other scholars, or of merchants, or of handy craft and trades men, or of companies of husbandmen: but such as have jurisdiction, are colleges of magistrates, and judges, such as of whom we have before spoken. Colleges ordained and made for religion, or for public devotion, are grown into number almost infinite; differing as we see, in laws, manners, life, attire, orders, fashions, and apparel. And it may be, that a college may be particular to one occupation, or to one science, or to one company of merchants, or to one jurisdiction: and it may also be, that two or more colleges, may be united into one body, as all manner of occupations together, all sorts of merchants, or all masters of sciences, or all the magistrates; which aught not of right to be called a college, but a body politic, or corporation: albeit that by the ambiguity of words they be oftentimes together confounded. For there was one college of the Tribunes, another of the Praetors, and another of the Questors: but when these three colleges meet together into one and the self same body, it is foolishly called a college: and yet can it not rightly be termed an University, which consisteth of the company and assembly of all the citizens, colleges, and corporations, yea and sometimes also of the villages of the same country. Wherhfore we shall rather call it a body politic than a college: which so together groweth of many colleges, or persons of unlike condition. And it may be also, that all the particular colleges may have the right of a general community, or of an university. And that not only all the colleges and communities, but that also all the inhabitants joined together with the corporation & colleges of a town, or of a country, or of a province, may have the right of a community for to hold their estates. Moreover the right of a college or company may be given to every mystery or occupation in particular, and yet forbidden them in general. 
What a corporation or college is.  And every one of them may have divers rules, statutes, and particular privileges. So that we may say, that every corporation or college, is a lawful community or consociation under a sovereign power. Where the word Lawful importeth the authority 
No corporation or college to be suffered without the leave of the soveraige.  of the sovereign, without whose permission there can be no college: and is referred not only unto the power of meeting together: but unto the place also where it aught to meet, unto the time and manner of meeting, and to what things aught to be entreated of, in their assembly. And the word community, or consociation, signifieth that there aught some thing to be common to all that be fellows of the college or 
Every college of society must have something common to all the fellows thereof, being otherwise no college.  society: For where there is nothing common, there is no college: sufficient it is for them to have their meeting common, their attorney or agent common, and the privileges given unto the college common unto all the fellows thereof: albeit that they have neither common treasure, neither ordinarily live or converse together. So that they have not well defined a college, which have said it to be a fellowship of three persons dwelling together, having their goods and substances in common. Wherein they are two ways deceived, for it may be, that three persons or more may have their goods in common, and live together, and yet be all no college, but a society of themselves, contracted for the getting of goods, and living together: as also to the contrary, fellows of the same college may devil separate in houses, not having their goods in common, nor any common treasure; neither yet commonly living together: and yet enjoy indeed the right of a college or company, as having by law and the princes grant, power to assemble themselves and meet together at certain places, and times: and to entreat of certain their affairs, such as are the fraternities or companies of artificers and trades men, whom the law calleth Collegia, or colleges. Yet some colleges there be, which have almost all those things among themselves common, as we 
What number of fellows aught to be in ●… college or society.  see those to have, which are together joined for study, religion or devotion sake.  
As for the number of fellows in a college or society, it is no matter what it be, so that they be not fewer than three: for that otherwise it cannot be a college. Wherhfore the Romans called it not a college of their Censors, or Consuls, as they did of 
What number of fellows aught to be in a college or society.  their Praetors, Tribunes, and Questors. And as for the fellows themselves, my meaning is, that they should be equal of power, in respect of their community or fellowship, having every one of them a deliberative voice in their affairs: howbeit that it may be, that the college, or prince, may make choice of one of the fellows to command, reform, and chastise every one of the fellows in particular, but not all of them in general: such as are our bishops and abbots, having power to chastise their religious and canons But if this head or chief have power over the whole body of the society or college in gross, it is not then rightly a college, but rather a form of family, such as are colleges or schools ordained for the bringing up of youth: wherein there be no bursors or fellows, which have therein any deliberative voice: For if it have in it any such bursors or fellows, having the right of the society or college, and deliberative voice in their assemblies, it is then a college, albeit that the rest of the younger sort be under the power and correction of the principal.  
And hereof ariseth a question, Whether a bishop in the company of his priests, or an abbot amongst his religious, be to be accounted fellows, having the very title and 
Whether the head or principal of a college be to be also accounted a fellow thereof  right of a fellow, and himself making a part of the college, without the quality or title of a bishop or abbot? Which question being by the learned on both parts disputed, yet remaineth undecided. But to leave the disputation apart, it seemeth, that he which is chosen by the college or prince to command all the fellows in particular, hath a double quality; one in respect of every one of the fellows, and another in respect of the whole college or society: where in regard of the fellows he is called Principal, Bishop, abbot, Prior, President, or such like, having power and authority to command every one of them in particular: howbeit that in the body of the college or corporation, he is no more than a fellow, although he have the place of precedence: and that is it for which they put their titles divided, as, the Bishop, Canons, and Chpite●…; the Abbot, Religious, & Covent; the Principal, Bursors, & College. Wherein one of the chiefest lawyers hath been deceived, saying, That the Philosophers have called the persons of a college, the college: showing indeed no Philosophy in so saying, considering 
That a college is a name of right: and consisteth not in the persons of the fellows, but may still remain, all the fellows thereof being dead.  that a college is a name of right, and that all the revenue and right of a college may remain in one person, the rest of the fellows being all dead. And in case that all the fellows of a college were dead, yet doth the right of a college remain: neither can the lands or goods thereof be confiscated, except the right of a college be before by the supreme authority suppressed. For one of the principal privileges of corporations and colleges is, that legacies may be unto them given by testament: whereas society by the law forbidden, are not colleges, but unlawful assemblies, unto whom it is not by the law permitted, to leave any thing by testament, albeit that legacies may be given unto every one of the colleges. But to the intent such unlawful companies and assemblies might be repressed, I think it needful, that it should by law be forbidden, any lands or legacies to be unto all or any of them left by testament, as unto fellows of such corporations or colleges.  
And whereas we have said, that a college or society may be without any common 
Antoninus' first that gave leave for legacies to be given to colleges  stock or treasure: that it also to be understood, that a college or society may be ordained with such proviso, that nothing shall be left unto it by gift or legacy. Antoninus the emperor was the first which gave leave for legacies & donations to be given to all colleges, except to the colleges of the jews, unto whom it was yet lawful to meet together for religion sake, and to have their Synagogues: as is to be seen in the oration of the ambassador Philo, unto the emperor Caligula. And Augustus himself by letters pattens directed unto the governors of the provinces of the empire, commanded, That they should permit and suffer the jews to enjoy their colleges. Whereupon 
Augustus' a great favorour of th●… jews.  Narbanus Proconsul of Asia, forbade the magistrates of Ephesus in any sort to let of disturb them. Yea that more is, Augustus himself commanded a daily and perpetual sacrifice of a calf, a goat, and a ram, to be made at Jerusalem for the welfare of himself, and of the Commonweal: and willed an ordinary alms or dole to be given unto the jews, of his own proper costs and charges, for the relief of their necessity. There be also corporations and colleges of judges and magistrates, which yet are not capable of testamentary legacies, if they have not express leave by their erection and institution so to do. As was judged against the Senate of Rome: whereunto Russius Caepio one of the Senators, had given by legacy a certain sum of money, which he willed to be still distributed to them only which came unto the council: which legacy the Senate demanding, Caepio his heirs denied it to be unto the Senate due: in which controversy Domitian the emperor gave sentence for the heir, and excluded the Senate, although it were the most ancient, and most necessary corporation of all the Roman Commonweal.  
And thus having set down and declared the beginning and definition of colleges, and communities: let us now also speak of their power in general; which is not determined by their particular foundations, statutes, and privileges, which are divers and 
The colleges of judges and the chief colleges in a Commonweal.  almost infinite, according to the diversity of the particular colleges and communities themselves. Now the chief corporations or colleges, and which have most power in a Commonweal, are the colleges of judges and magistrates: who not only have power over every one of their fellows, and the lesser part of their own college, but over other particular colleges also; and so over others subject to their jurisdiction, and yet without their college. And in this the colleges of judges and magistrates notably differ from other colleges: for that other colleges are established every one of them for the good government of that only which is unto themselves common; whereas the colleges of judges and magistrates, are principally erected for the good of other subjects, and to rule the other colleges, as also to chastise them if they shall transgress their laws and statutes. But as a wise man aught first to be wise for himself, and then for others; as also to look first into himself, before he can rightly judge of others; or as the Hebrews in their proverbs say, That charity aught first to begin of itself, if it be well ruled: So aught the colleges of judges and magistrates, first to establish justice amongst themselves, every one of them in particular, and to themselves all in general, the better to distribute the same to the other subjects.  
But question might be made, Whether it were more expedient that the colleges 
Whether it w●… more expedient the colleges of magistrates and judges to be judged and reform by their fellows of the same society, or by others.  of magistrates and judges, should be judged by their fellows, or by others? for some particular reasons, which in due place we shall hereafter set down. But here to make the matter short, If the college for the most part be composed of evil and naughty men, it is not to be left unto themselves, to judge of their own misdemainers; but they are to be judged by the superior magistrates, if they have power over them; or by the prince, in case they be not by any other superior magistrate to be reform. But if the greater part of them be good and honest men, there is then no doubt but that it is better and more expedient both for the college and the Commonweal, that the fellows should be judged by their fellows, rather than by other judges: For that every college I know not how hath in it some particularity which cannot so well be understood or judged, as by the fellows of the same corporation themselves. joining hereunto also, that by this mean the love and unity of the fellows among themselves, is in their college and society the better maintained. And for this cause chief the emperor Adrian decreed, That the Roman Senators should be judged by the Senate only. And for the self same reason the civil jurisdiction of merchants, and for the trade of merchandise hath been wisely in all Italy, and since that in France committed and given to certain magistrates and Consuls of the corporation and company of merchants, summarily to decide the differences arising about the contracts of merchandise, which have in them I know not how certain secrets, not to others well known.  
As for other corporations and colleges, as of physicians, and tradesmen, albeit that 
Colleges not having any jurisdiction but only a restraining power, how they are to use the same.  by their foundation they have not any jurisdiction or commanding power; yet nevertheless so it is, that they always have a certain restraining authority and power by their statutes and privileges, limited and allowed them; and sometime without any limitation at all left unto the wisdom and discretion of the corporation or college, or of the head thereof: which aught to be used with such moderation, as the father is to use towards his children: which aught not to be with cruelty or rigour. For if the law condemn him to pay the price of the slave, slain by him that hath taken upon him to teach him, albeit that it were in correcting of him: of much greater reason were he to be condemned, which having but the moderate correction of men of free condition, should use such rigour as that death should thereof ensue? As it sometimes happened in Lacedemonia, where young children were by the Great Master of the youth so rigorously whipped, a●… that sometimes they gave up the ghost upon the altar of Diana whilst they were yet in whipping; most part of them not daring so much as to sigh or groan, for fear they had to be accounted faint hearted cowards. And albeit that the emperor Fredrick the second gave power and authority unto the rectours of Universities, and that the principals of schools and colleges have always had the correction of their disciples and scholars: yet that is to be understood but of light matters, and not of such chastisement and correction as the magistrate hath by the princes grant over private offenders; as many have been of opinion. For why, neither the Germane emperor, no●… the pope can give any such power unto the principals of colleges, or to the colleges themselves: but in such countries as are unto themselves subject. For albeit that pope Gregory the eleventh in a Bull granted for the confirmation of the privileges of the Vniver●…itie of Paris, before granted by the pope's urban the fift, and Innocent the sixt, in one article provided, That if a scholar committed any thing deserving punishment, the hearing thereof should belong unto the bishop of Paris only: and in another article also, That no scholar should from thenceforth be imprisoned for whatsoever debt. Yet the French kings and magistrates have o●…eentimes well declared themselves not to be bound to any such the pope's Bulls. Yet true it is, that colleges instituted for religion, have ordinarily the correcting of them that are therein professed; and that so much the more, as their rule and order is the straighter: For which cause such as have therein taken upon them such profession, are exempted from the power and correction of their own fathers: albeit that many hold the contrary: whose opinion for all that is not in that point followed. And yet nevertheless certain it is, that the natural duty and reverence 
Whether children having taken upon them any vow of religion, be yet nevertheless bound to honour and obey their parents.  of children towards their parents, remaineth always in force and power, notwithstanding whatsoever bond and vow they have made to any corporation or college. For why, neither man's laws, nor the statutes or privileges of princes can deerogate from the laws of God and nature, which hath expressly bound children unto the obedience of their fathers and mothers; from which they can by no otherwise free, or yet deliver tthemselues, than by lawful emancipation: or their father's silence, who in saying nothing, seem to have consented unto their children's vows, which by speaking they might have letted: which consent for all that excuseth not children from doing the honour and reverence due unto their parents, although that they being so professed, be from thenceforth accounted children of the college; unto whom also their colleges in right of inheritance succeed, they themselves being accounted of servile estate & condition. For which cause the canonists give unto the abbeys power and authority over their own religious, exempt from the bishops, which hath oftentimes by the decrees of the parliament of Paris been confirmed. In such sort, as that they which are once entered into such religious orders, may not from that time be called to accounted or into question for any thing by them committed before they entered into the monastery: which yet is to be understood but of light & youthful faults; which otherwise were but to open a way to thieves and murderers, to retire themselves into such colleges, as into forests, for the avoiding of due punishment; as indeed it oft-times happeneth: wherewith the wise magistrates aught to meet, & according to the law of God to draw the murderers from the altar to do upon them justice. As the court of parliament of Thoulouse (not long ago) condemned two religious monks of the order D'aurade, to be in their habits shamefully drawn upon a hurdle to the place of execution, and there to be quartered, without disgrading of them, for having most cruelly murdered 
That Monks may convent their Abbot before the ordinary judge: and also appeal from the in●…ust sentence of their Abbot.  the head of their monastery, whose severity they could by no means endure. Yea the abbot himself may by his monks be convented before the ordinary judge, and that as well in criminal as civil matters: who may also freely appeal from the sentence of their abbot unto his superior, as it hath oftentimes been judged by the decrees of the parliament of Paris; & that without leave, as witnesseth 
* Panormitan the Abbot.  the abbot of Palermo; and hath also been judged by the parliament of Bourdeaux. And for the same reason if the college would without cause thrust out or deprive one of the fellows of his right, privilege, and liberty in the college, the hearing of the cause belongeth to the ordinary judge of the college. Howbeit that in ancient time the corporations and colleges of Artisans, Merchants, and other such like, had this power (for the removing of their fellows) as we read in Cicero of the Roman merchants, Mercuriales & Capitolini, M. Furium hominem nequam, equitem Romanum de collegio deiecerunt, The Mereuriales and Capitolini (saith he) thrust M. Furius a naughty man, and yet a gentleman of Rome, out of their college or company. And in Lacedemonia (as Plutarch writeth) it was lawful for to thrust out of their colleges or companies, him that had discovered or revealed the sec●…etss of their company. As in like case Panormitan the abbot writeth, That in abbeys or colleges erected for devotion, the chapters have power to thrust out any of the fellows, or to deprive him of his ordinary dividents, but not to beaten him, or to use sen●…re correction upon him, or yet to imprison him; as hath been iudeged by a decree of the parliament of Paris.  
But yet here a man might ask, Whether a college may make a decree, That none of the fellows shall convent or sue another of his fellows, before any other judges but the college? And in case it be so decreed, whether he that shall break the decree so made and sue his fellow before another judge, shall be bound unto the civil penalty in the decree set down? Wherein Scevola the lawyer is of opinion, the decree to be good; and that the fellow of a college or society cannot have recourse unto other magistrates, contrary unto the decree of the college, but in paying the penalty in the decree of the college expressed. Howbeit (in mine opinion) this decree is not general, neither can take place in causes criminal, no more than the conditional penalties set down in arbitrements, which have no place if they concern matters of crime. Secondarily mine opinion is, That the decree of a college or company, even in civil causes hath no place, if all the fellows of the college or society give not thereunto their consents, as they do in arbitrements, whereunto no man is bound that would not. For in all communities, corporations and colleges, and so generally in 
How decrees are in colleges and societies to be made, to bind every one of them to that is common to every one of them in particular, as also to that which is common to them all jointly and indivisibly together.  every society and company, if question be of any thing which is common to them all in particular & apart from the community, the express consent of every one of them is therein requisite, if any thing be therein to be done. But if question be of that which is common to them all jointly & indivisibly, it sufficeth that the greater part be of one opinion, for the binding of the rest: Provided always, that nothing be ordained or decreed, contrary to the statutes of the college, established by the sovereign prince, or by the founder of such corporation or college, authorised by the prince. Wherefore the laws of the Commonweal, and the statutes of the college standing whole and entire, the college may make decrees which may bind the lesser part all together, and all the fellows in particular: yet still provided, that two third parts of the fellows consent unto the making of the decree: albeit that they be not all of one advise or opinion, in matters concerning their common society, although that such decrees so made cannot bind the greater part of the fellows collectively, and much less the whole corporation and college: no more than the prince is bound to his own law, or the testator to his own will, or particular men unto their own agreements, from which they may by their common consent revolt, nothing being more agreeing with reason and nature, than every thing to be dissolved, by the same means that it was made.  
But yet it might be doubted, Whether decrees made by the consent and good liking 
Whether decres made by the consent of an whole college or society: may by the greater part thereof again be abrogated or repealed.  of an whole college or society, might be again repealed and abrogated by the greater part, or two third parts of the same society or college? Which I doubt not but that they may in all common estates, corporations, and colleges, if question be but of things common to them all in general (as they are one united body:) but if question be of every man's right by himself particular and apart from others, than every man is to give his consent thereunto. Wherhfore if the assemblies of the estates in a Commonweal consist and be of divers bodies, as in the diets of the empire, and in all other Commonweals are composed of three orders and degrees of men, viz. of the Clergy, the Nobility, and Commonalty, nothing can be done or decreed by any two of the orders, to the hurt or prejudice of the third, especially if the matter concern every one of the orders by themselves apart. By which reason I caused two of the orders of France, to change their opinions in matter concerning the third. For at such time as I was sent deputy for the province of Vermandois to Blois (whither king Henry the iij had called an assembly or parliament of all the kingdom of France) a great and weighty question was moved amongst the three estates, Whether it were more indifferent, and better also, the requests of the people to be before the prince judged and determined by 36, men which every one of the three orders should by voice choose, than by the prince himself with his council? And now the Clergy and Nobility had not only so decreed, but had drawn a great part of our sort unto their side also, having with hope of great rewards gained their voices. At which time I perceiving the drift and purpose of certain ambitious persons that were dealers in the matter, answered, That the matter was further to be considered of. For why, it was laboured, that such things as could not be obtained of the people in general, might so be from a few in the name of the whole extorted. Wherhfore the question being more thoroughly debated, I denied that the matter could so by us be passed, without a more special commission from the people. Neither that if we had any such special commission from the people, could it yet by us be done, without the great danger of the whole Commonweal; and that for many reasons, by me then discovered: whereby I drew the rest of my fellows back again to mine opinion, who laid this charge upon me to remove also the other two orders of estate from their former received and settled opinion. But when the Archbishop of Lions (Precedent of the Ecclesiastical estate) earnestly withstood me, seriously alleging that the Clergy and Nobility had before so resolved; I showed him, that such a Prerogative had from all antiquity been kept to every of the three Estates, as that no two of them could decree any thing to the prejudice of the third: as it had before without any difficulty passed in the parliament at Orleans; and as it is also used in the diets of the Empire, and the Parliaments of England, and of Spain. For which cause, and other reasons then alleged, I requested the other two orders of Estate, to take it in good part, in that they were by me hindered, as having the charge of the third estate. Which was the cause, that the thing being again called into consultation, both the estates changed their opinions. Which the king hearing, and dissembling his grief, said in the presence of Ruze Bishop of Angiers, and other Lords, That Bodin at his pleasure had over ruled the Estates.  
But if question be of a thing common to all a corporation or college, and which 
The greater part of a College or Community always reputed for the whole, and therefore may as it seemeth good, determine of any thing which concerneth the whole corporation or college.  concerneth not any the particular members apart from the whole body, but the whole and entire body only; the greater part of the society, may at their discretion thereof determine: albeit that the whole community have determined that their Statutes and orders should not be infringed, but by the consent of all the fellows. For why, The greater part of a Community is always reputed for the whole. Yea the law willeth, that he which is chosen of a community or college to entreat and decide of their common affairs, may bind every one of the college. Wherhfore they are deceived which writ the greater par●…, or two third parts of a College, to be able to do nothing, if the college have made a statute, That they must all thereto consent: for if that might take place, than any one of the fellows himself alone might impeach and stay the advise, decrees, and resolutions of the whole society; which is contrary to the formal disposition of the law, which willeth, That in all acts concerning a communie or corporation, the greater part should be the stronger; and that the more part of two third parts, may give law to all the fellows in particular, whether the rest of the fellows be there present or absent. For why, it is not needful that they should all be present, that the decrees should stand good, and that especially in light matters; provided yet that they be all thereunto summoned or called. Howbeit that in matters of weight & consequence, it is needful that two third parts be there present, albeit that they all give not their consents, except it be by a special law provided that the two third parts must of necessity agreed in one. As by the judicial laws of jews the xii the French king, it is ordained, That two parts of the judges, and no fewer, may in the higher Courts end any civil cause: whereas in criminal causes, equal voices acquit the party accused; who yet otherwise is to be condemned, if the greater part do but by one voice exceed the lesser. So also by a decree of Gregorte the x, concerning the election of the Pope, he must have two third parts of the college of Cardinals that is to be chosen Pope. As also in many elections of the heads of Colleges, it is necessary that two third parts of the college should agreed in one. Yea sometime it is necessary that all the fellows should be of one and the self same accord. As in Rome it was by the tribunitial law requisite that all the ten Tribunes should be of one opinion and mind, or at lest wise not openly to descent, for that otherwise one Tribune alone might impeach and stay the proceed of the whole College. Now if they all agreed in one, then unto the decree were joined these words, Pro Collegio, for the College: otherwise if there be no special statutes or law to the contrary, the greater part of two third parts sufficieth in all acts concerning the community of corporations and colleges.  
It is also necessary, that the consent whereof we speak, be given in the common assembly of the corporation or college: for albeit that all the fellows had separately 
For the making of a decree in a college, or corporation, the consent is to be given in the con●…on assembly of the same, & that in time & plac●… by the statutes the●…eof appointed.  and apart consented unto any thing concerning that which is common to all the College, yet so it is that such act is not to any effect or purpose, neither for nor against them which have so given their consents, although it were done even before public notaries: for that it is not done by the College, which is done by all the fellows apart. Neither sufficeth it that all they of the Corporation or College were called together, if it were not in time and place, by the Statutes appointed. Wherhfore two parts of the fellows gathered together, can do more, than all the fellows consenting apart.  
But here some man may ask, who shall call the fellows together? Wherein many are of opinion, that the most ancient fellow of the College or Society, hath power 
To whom it belongeth to call the fellows together in a college or society.  to call the rest together; as also to condemn them of contumacy for not coming▪ and yet for all that not to have power to fine them, which is but a ridiculous thing, if such contumacy cannot be punished, neither by him, nor yet by the college; as certain it is that it cannot: wherefore such calling of the fellows together, by the most ancient fellow, is but vain, except that the fellows of their own accord be content to obey the same. And therefore the Senate during the Consulship of Caesar could not be assembled or called together, Caesar the greatest magistrate forbidding the same, as is afore said. Othersome are of an other opinion, and hold, That two third parts of a College may of right call together the rest: but yet who shall then call together those two third parts they say not. Howbeit is two third parts suffice to do and determine the affairs of a corporation or community, we need not to trouble ourselves with the rest, all the fellows being called. Howbeit the custom kept almost in all corporations and colleges is, for the elders by their servants or other ministers to call together the rest; or else for them of themselves to come together at the tolling of a bell, or the sound of a Trumpet; as in ancient time they did in Graece and Rome, when as the magistrates which had power to assemble the people, or the Senate, caused their commands by the sound of a Trumpet to be published to the people in particular, but not to all in general, for that they could not be so in that sort commanded. And who so obeyed not but refused to come, him the magistrate had power to fine, or seize upon his goods. As we see how that Marcus Antonius being Consul, threatened Cicero to pull down his house, if he came not to the Senate being called. So that there is no question where he that calleth together the fellows, hath power to command. But if the College or society be destitute of an head or magistrate which hath power to command, or having power, yet is not willing to constrain them which will not obey him; then he whom it concerneth to have the society assembled, is to obtain commission from the magistrate to constrain them to come together, and so we use to do. Yet may the greater part of the fellows together, deprive every particular fellow of part of the profit and commodity he is to have of his College, if being orderly called he shall refuse to come, it being so decreed; yet so that it be moderately 
That it is lawful for all colleges & corporations to make such orders as they shall think best for themselves, not derogating from such orders as were given them from their sovereign prince, or from the laws and ordinances of the Common weal.  done. Wherhfore to conclude this question of the power of Communities, Corporations, and Colleges, we may say Solon's law to have generally place in every Commonweal, and to be approved by the Interpreters of both the laws: that is to say, that it is free for all lawful communities, corporations, and colleges, to make such orders as they shall think for themselves best, so that thereby they do not derogate from the statutes of the College, made or established by the Sovereign Prince, or that they be not repugnant or contrary to the laws and ordinances of the Commonweal. And in ancient time it was not forbidden corporations and colleges to make decrees and ordinances within themselves, without derogating from the public laws; as also to put thereunto such and so great a penalty and punishment, as pleased the College. But since that time by the statutes and ordinances of every College & Commonweal, that power hath been ordinarily cut short, and brought unto some small fi●…e. Neither am I of their opinion, which hold that a College may make ordinances and decrees without any penalty annexed unto them; for that such an ordinance, degree, or statute, should be but unprofitable and ridiculous, if no punishment were thereunto opposed against them that should disobey the same, especially if he that maketh the orders or decrees have not power by arbitrary punishment to 'cause them to be observed and kept. We see also in many places the Corporations of artificers and such like, which have the right of a community, to have also a certain form of restraining, and visiting of the works and wares of their occupations or trades, with power to seize upon them, or to break or confiscate them, if any thing be done contrary to their decrees and orders: saving yet always the Magistrates authority 
What things Corporations and colleges are in their assemblies & meeting●… to entreat and consult of?  for the hearing of the matter, if it be so reserved unto him. But whereas we said that a lawful Corporation or college may make ordinances and decrees, not derogating from the laws of the Commonweal: that is so yet to be understood, as that they in their assemblies and meetings entreat only of that which is unto themselves common, and not of such things as whereof they are by the law prohibited not only to determine, but even to consult also: jest in so doing they incur the penalty appointed against unlawful Colleges and Companies.  
And thus much concerning the power, rights, and privileges of Corporations and 
How Corporations & colleges are to be corrected and punished when they shall offend.  Colleges in general. Let us now see also how and in what sort they are to be corrected and punished when they shall offend. Howbeit that one might say that where no offence is committed, there no punishment is to be inflicted. Now so it is that a college or corporation cannot offend, nor so much as consent, or do any thing by fraud or deceit (as the law saith;) and therefore there lieth no action of fraud or deceit against a college or corporation, although all the fellows of the same college, or all the inhabitants of a city, or all the estates of a country, had particularly and every one of them apart consented thereunto: a thing yet altogether impossible in corporations and communities of Towns, Countries, Provinces, & Commonweals, considering that the children and furious persons which therein are, cannot yield their consent thereto. But forasmuch as things done by the greater part of the fellows of a college 
How Corporations and Colleges are said to offend.  collegiatly assembled, or by the greater part of the inhabitants of a town or city in a lawful assembly, are supposed to be done by them all, therefore the whole college or corporation is punished: as in rebellions of Towns, and seditions of communities, which are punished in their Corporations by loss of their privileges, or of the right of their community, by fines, charges, services, and other punishments, according to the quality of the offence: which punishment yet aught not to take place, if the rebellion or other crime be not committed by the consent of the community or corporation, and decree for the doing thereof made in their common assembly: as it was judged by a decree of the parliament of Paris, for the community of the city of Corbeil. And yet nevertheless, if the corporal punishment be for the offence committed, to be inflicted, as whipping, torture, or death, none of the society or corporation are so to be punished, but they which were therein partakers, or at lest thereunto privy, although the whole body of the community or college be therefore condemned. As in private offences done by many being of no college or community, there lieth not an action but against every one of the offenders in particular, and for the whole, in such sort, as that one of them having made satisfaction, the others are thereby acquired. But if such fact or offence be done by any one, following therein the advise, counsel, and deliberation of all, they may be all therefore convented, and every one of them apart for the whole, neither one of them making satisfaction, are the others thereby discharged. But happily it may seem a thing very unreasonable and absurd, that many, yea the greater part of the same college or corporation, should be found innocent, and yet to be altogether punished in the whole body, as in the cases by us before rehearsed. Whereunto I answer, That it is yet more strange, that the innocents should by lot be drawn together with the offenders, and that these should be punished, upon whom the lot should fall; as the manner was in the Decimation (or as it were tithing) of the army, for having borne itself cowardly against the enemy, where the most hardy & valiant, were oftentimes by lot drawn out, and for cowards executed. Which example the Senator Cassius used, at such time as he in full Senate, persuaded the Senators to put four hundred Slaves to death, although that there was one (and he unknown) amongst them guilty of the murder committed in the person of their master, joining thereunto these words: Omne magnum exemplum habet aliquid 
A notable saying.  ex iniquo, quod publica utilitate compensatur, Every great example savoureth something of injustice, which (yet for all that) is with the common profit again recompensed or requited. But this is not (may some say) to pay the debt, to allege one inconvenience in defence of an other, and of one absurdity to conclude an other. Whereunto I say, that the best justice that a man can do is, of divers inconveniences at once 
Of divers inconveniences at once propounded, it is always best to shun the greatest.  propounded, to shun the greatest, especially when question is of such offences as may in no wise be left unpunished. For we see that the wisest, & most advised Lawyers have descided, That if there be any one slain, or beaten, or rob by many, they are all bound for the whole, albeit that happily it was but one of them which gave to him the mortal wound: but if it shall appear, which of them killed him, and that it was done without the conspiracy of the rest, only he is bound that so slew him: But if it appear not at all by whom he was slain, neither that they had conspired against him, they are all acquitted from corporal punishment; but yet are to be therefore fined: For nothing is more effectual for the finding out of that which is true and just, then that in doubtful things it is admitted, still to shun those things which are more absurd and unjust. As if a felony be done which cannot by one man be performed; as if many have carried away an other man's timber log, and amongst those many it appeareth not who it was that did it, none of them is guilty of the theft, if we will stick unto the subtility of the words of the law; and yet are they all indeed guilty: whereof the Lawyers have no other reason, but that the inconvenience falleth greater on the one side, when they would shun it on the other, which is (as we said) the greatest reason that a man can have, to found out the truth of all things, when all other reasons fail. We speak not here of that which enemies do to towns besieged, and by force taken, pilling, kill, sacking aswell the good as the bad; and where the better that a man is, the worse commonly he fareth: but what a prince aught to do against his rebellious subjects. Howbeit that the Romans, although accounted the most just people of the world, have not always followed that rule of equity and justice which we before spoke of, but sometimes punished not only in general, but even in particular, 
The severity of the Romans against their rebellious conspitors.  all the inhabitants of their rebellious Towns after that they had taken them: and yet always observed this point, to punish the heads more severely than the rest, and to preserve them that had resisted the seditious; having still aspeciall regard whether the rebellion were consulted of and decreed in the Corporation and community or not. So Livy saith: Valerius Levinus Agrigento capto qui capita rerum erant, virgit caesos securi percussit, caeteros proedamque vendidit, Valerius Levinus having taken Agrigentum beheaded them that were the chief authors (of the rebellion) being before whipped, the rest and the prey he sold. And in an other place: Quoniam defectionis authores merit as poenas a dijs immortalibus, & a vobis habent P. C. quid placet innoxia multitudine fieri? tandem ignotum est illis, & civitas data, For that the authors of the rebellion (saith he) have from the immortal Gods, and you the appointed fathers, received their deserved punishment, what is it your pleasure to be done with the rest of the guiltless multitude? at length they were pardoned, and the freedom of the city given them. The Consul Fuluius, having after a long siege taken the city of Capua, being renolted from the Romans, beheaded fourscore of the Senators, beside xxvij others which had before poisoned themselves, and caused three hundred more of their chief gentlemen to be in prison starved, the rest of the inhabitants he sold for slaves. As for the other Towns which were under the obedience of them of Capua, there were none but the chief men punished. Atella, Calatiaque in deditionem acceptae, ibi quoque in eos qui capita rerum erant animaduersum, Atella and Calatia (saith Livy) were taken in by composition, and there also execution was done upon such as were chief doers in the rebellion. The other Consul Appius more severe than his fellow Fuluius, would have enquiry made also of their allies, who had had secret part in the same conspiracy: Whereunto Fuluius would not agreed, saying, That so to do, were but to provoke their faithful and loyal allies to rebel, in giving credit unto the traitorous Campanians▪ Whereby it is manifest with 
The notable clemency of the emperor Aurelianus.  what severity the Romans thought it good to punish their rebellious conspirators, during the time of their popular government. And as for the Roman Emperors, some of them used towards such offenders gracious favour, and othersome extreme ctueltie. The emperor Aurelianus for his clemency deserveth to be for ever commended, who laying siege unto the city Thyane, swore that there should not a dog escape alive, if he should take the city: but having by force won it, changing his mind, as with compassion moved, he straightly forbidden any man to be therein slain; and when some to provoke him unto wrath, put him in remembrance of the oath he had made: he said it concerned but dogs, which he commanded to be all forthwith killed. The like clemency Henry the fift the German Emperor, having condemned the city of Brixia to be utterly razed, and laid even with the earth; yet when he had won the same, pardoned the citizens nevertheless, lest the innocent people should so have perished together with the offenders; following therein the mercy of God, who would not only the good not to perish together with the evil and wicked, but promised to be merciful unto certain cities, and a multitude of wicked persons, for some few good men to be found amongst them. Some others of the Emperors have contrariwise used most barbarous cruelties, without discretion kill the good and bad together, and that for the fault of some few. As the emperor Antonius Caracalla, who in revenge of certain rhymes and songs made and sung against him 
The great cruelty of Antonius Caracalla, Theodosius the great, Xerxes, and Sylla.  at Alexandria, caused certain of his garrison soldiers and Praetorian bands to be intermingled with the people as they were there beholding plays: who upon a signal given, slew an infinite number of the poor citizens one with an other without respect, as they came to hand. The like whereof he had also before commanded to be put in execution at Jerusalem. And afterward at Thessalonica, where the Emperor Theodosius the great caused seven thousand of the inhabitants to be slain one with another pell mell in revenge of certain of his Receiours and other his magistrates and officers there slain, without any deliberation or decree for the doing thereof, before made in their Community or Corporation. Xerxes' king of Persia used an other manner of revenge, not in deed so cruel as the other, but yet far more ignominious and despirefull, causing the noses of all the people of a city in Syria to be cut off (which city after that was of that event called Rhinocura) for the like fault done by some few of them. But of all cruelties that of Sulla's passed, who beside three score thousand citizens of Rome by him slain, caused also all the inhabitants of Preneste to be put to death, pardoning none but his host, who would also needs die with the rest, saying, That he would not be beholden for his life, unto the murderer of his country. Which cruelty may yet be borne with, when the vanquished shall choose rather to die than to become subjects; as in all ages there have been such: but not if they shall be content to serve and obey them, by whom they are overcome and vanquished. So the Pisans (in the memory of our fathers) not able to endure the just government of the Florentines their lords, by the favour of Charles the eight the French king, yielded themselves to County Valentine Borgia, who being not able to protect them, they in vain offered themselves first to the Genoese, and then to the Venetians: By both which states they being rejected, after that they had for a long time been most straightly besieged, they yielded themselves subjects unto the Florentines their old lords, of whom they easily obtained pardon, and so afterwards continued their good and faithful subjects. But jews ear of Flaunders, and the last of his house (for after his death that earledom 
The great mischeite which befell 〈◊〉 earl of Flaunders, in seeking to ●…ke too sha●… revenge upon the Gantoys his rebellious subjects.  fell into the house of Burgundy) having brought the Gantois rebelling against him to such extremity, as that they were glad to crave of him grace and pardon, would not so receive them, but propounded unto them most hard conditions, and not beseeming a free people to accept of: as that they should all come unto him out of the city to crave pardon with halters about their necks; and that then he would consider what he were to do with them. Which put the poor distressed people into such a desperate fear, as that they went out being in number but five thousand (but all armed with despair) against the earl, who then was forty thousand strong, whom they in a great battle overthrew; and so brought under their obeisance all the towns of Flaunders, except Audenard. The earl flying out of the overthrow hid himself under a poor woman's bed; who afterwards found means for his escape, by covering him in an heap of apples: but being so escaped▪ for ever lost his power, together with his honour. With which so great an overthrow given, the Gantois become much more arrogant than before, 
Not more cruel enemy against the prince, than are his desperate 〈◊〉 Some princes unto cruelty to ha●…e also added contumely, in revenge of their rebellious subjects.  & never afterwards willingly endured their prince's commands. Whereby it was then perceived, Not more cruel enemies to be found against the prince, than his desperate subjects, Nor any war to be more just, than that which is by necessity imposed; as said an ancient Roman Senator. But that the aforesaid war was such, it is evident & plain, seeing that together with their most shameful yielding, most cruel death did hung over all their heads, and a reproach heavier than death itself; reproach and disgrace being always more dreadful unto men of honourable minds, than most cruel death. But in that time it should seem, that princes took pleasure to increase their cruelty with reproach and despite against their disobedient and disloyal subjects. For so 
* This Fredrick having sharply chastised the rebellions Millanotes his subjects, afterwards in despite caused such of them as would have their lives spared with their teeth to draw a figue out of a mules tail: whereof grew the despite full mock yet used by the Italians, by showing the thumb betwixt two fingers, with these words: E●…co, la 〈◊〉.  Fredrick the second, the Germane emperor, to revenge the miurie done unto his wife, with great disgrace at Milan, having besieged and taken the city, after he had put to death the chiefest of the citizens, and rifled and razed the city, used a contumely and despite towards the rest that had escaped the soldiers fury, as was unto them more despiteful than cruel; & yet worse than death. So Dagobert king of France, not contented to have slain the inhabitants of Poitiers, for aiding his enemy against him, caused also the town to be razed, and the ground to be ploughed with an eternal curse, and salt to be sown upon it to make it barren: whereof they are yet called Salted men of Poitiers. But as princes which with sufferance pass over the seditions & rebellions of the corporation or community of any town or province, give example to others to do the like: so those princes also which without measure exercise cruelty upon their vanquished 
Severity in punishing of rebellion aught still to be tempered with ●…gitie.  subjects, get unto themselves not only the title of most barbarous and cruel tyrants, but in so doing sometimes also hazard their whole estates. But he shall deserve the praise and commendation of a just prince, and preserve also his estate, which shall keep the mean in punishing the authors and ringleaders of rebellions, tempering severity with lenity. As did Charles of France king jews the ninth his brother: (afterwards king of Naples) who having commission from the king, to chastise the inhabitants of Mont Pelier, who had slain certain of the king's receivers & officers: took from them all their liberties and privileges, appointed the walls of their city to be razed, their steeples pulled down, and a fine of six score thousand crowns to be set upon them: or as some writ, caused half the goods of the citizens to be confiscated, and of six hundred of them one part to be drowned, another part to be hanged, and the third part burnt. And so indeed the judgement was to the terror of them given, and the decree set down: how bei●… that it was afterwards by the good prince moderated, in such sort, as that none but the offenders themselves were executed: for that the king's officers and magistrates had been so murdered by no public council, or assembly of the citizens orderly called, but by the insolency of the rash tumultuous people only. With like lenity Charles the sixt the French king disarmed the Parisians risen up in rebellion against him, and executing the authors thereof, restrained the rest of the whole body of the citizens, by imposing upon them a great fine. And admit all the citizens of a city, by their common consent, and the matter being before well debated, to have all together with one mind rebelled, and chosen unto themselves a new prince: Yea and to have augmented their wickedness with contumely and despite against their sovereign: yet were it not the part (I will nor say) of a good prince, but even of a wise prince, to take revenge of all of them of whom he might, for blemishing thereby for ever of his fame and reputation; than which nothing aught to be unto a prince more dear: albeit that he might so do (which yet were a most hard thing) the state of the Commonweal reserved whole. Wherhfore T. Quintius the Consul 
The wisdom of T. Quintus and▪ ●… Scipio Affricanus in chastising of their mutinous soldiers.  did wisely, who when he could not with the safety of the Commonweal chastise the army which he then had under his conduct and leading, for their rebellious mutiny, after he had appeased all matters, and yet thought it not safe for the soldiers so in danger of the law to return into the city, he himself came first to Rome, and there by consent of the Senate presented a request unto the people, Ne cui militum fraudi esset secessio, That the mutinous revolt might not be dangerous to any of the soldiers: which he with the great good liking both of the Senate and of the people obtained. With like wisdom Scipio Affricanus the father, repressed the mutiny of his army at Severone, with the execution of thirty five of the soldiers only: Certabatur utrum in authores tantum seditionis xxxv animaduerteretur, an plurium supplicio vindicanda defectio magis esset quam seditio: vicit sententia lenior, ut unde culpa orta esset, ibi poena consisteret, ad multitudinis castigationem satis esse, Question was (saith Livy) whether execution were to be done only upon thirty siue, the authors of the sedition: or that so great a revolt rather than a sedition, were to be revenged with the execution of more: wherein the milder opinion prevailed, That from whence the offence was begun, there should the punishment rest: and that to suffice for the chastising of the whole multitude. And shortly after in the oration which Scipio made unto the army, he useth these words, Se non secus quàm viscera secantem sua cum gemitu & lachrimis thirty hominum capitibus, expiasse octo millium noxam, Him no otherwise but as a man cutting his own entrels, with sighs and tears to have made satisfaction for the offence of eight thousand men, with the heads of thirty. So when Appius the Consul (with great rashness should I say, or pride) would by strong hand have restrained and corrected his army, than all in a mutiny, he was by the Colonels and captains stayed from so doing: who all with one voice told him, Nothing to be more dangerous, than to seek by force to chastise them, in whose loyalty and fide litie the whole force of the empire consisted. And albeit that nothing were to be feared in the punishing of an whole army, or 
A notable regard to be had in all general and popular punishments.  of a city, yet such general and popular punishments are not to be used: but in chastising of such offences, an especial regard is to be had, Vt poena ad paucos, metus ad omnes perveniat, That the punishment itself should touch but few, but that the fear thereof should come unto all; 
* Tully. That it beseemeth not a sovereign prince to be the executor or to behold the general execution of his rebellion's subjects.  as an ancient orator no less eloquently than wisely said.  
Yea moreover it beseemeth not a sovereign prince to be the executor or beholder of the execution of such general punishments; (if otherwise it may be in his absence done) to the intent his subjects minds should not so be alienated from him: but to the contrary it is needful for him with a convenient lenity to moderate even the just and necessary severity of his deputies and magistrates, to the imitation of Antiochus the 
The wise moderation of some great princes in chastising of their rebellion's subjects.  great king of Asia, who having given commission to Hermeas his constable, to punish the rebellion of them of Seleucia: and he condemning the corporation of the city in a fine of six hundred thousand crowns, and banishing also a great number of the citizens, and taking away the liberties and privileges of the city: Anoiochus called home again the banished; and contenting himself almost with the tenth part of the fine, restored again unto the city the ancient liberties and privilegs thereof. But not to go further, Henry the second the French king, having given commission to the duke Mont-morencie constable of France, to chastise the rebellion of the country of Guyenne, and especially of the inhabitants of Bourdeaux, granted them afterward a general patdon, and forgave them the rasing of their town hall, wherein they had made their assemblies, with the fine of two hundred thousand pound, and the charges of the army brought against him: in all which the inhabitants of Bourdeaux were by the duke condemned; restoring unto them also the right and freedom of the corporation of the town, excepting them only who had laid hands upon his officers, and some few privileges and domains of the town, which were then abridged and cut off. But the emperor Charles the fift, not so cruelly as wisely, by one and the self same judgement, 
The wisdom of Charles the fift in the severity by him used in chastising the rebellious Gaunties: and in the lenity to the contrary by him used towards the Spaniards rebelling against him in Spain.  revenged the often rebellions and injuries which they of Gaunt had of old used to do against his ancestors, and which till then remained unpunished: partly by the sufferance, and partly through the weakness of the earls of Flaunders. For when the citizens of Gaunt had now compelled the Bourgamaster openly to tear in pieces the emperors edicts, and had sent ambassadors unto Francis the French king to receive them with their city into his protection: and he refusing them, had solicited his other subjects, their neighbours to rebellion: the council of Spain decreed, That the city should be razed and laid even with the ground, and all the goods of the citizens confiscated. Howbeit the emperor having it in his power, spared the country and city wherein he was borne and brought up: but executed thirty of the chief authors of the rebellion, took away all their corporations and colleges, deprived the city of part of the public lands thereunto belonging, as also of all the privileges; and caused a most strong castle to be there built, and a garrison therein to be kept and maintained, and all at the citizens charge. This the emperors sentence I received of them of Gaunt, at such time as I was of council to Francis duke of Anjou, and of the Low countries. And not long after king Francis, who had refused to protect the Gantoys going in person himself to repress the rebellion at Rochel, raised for the custom of salt, with the majesty of his speech terrified them of Rochel, and fined them, but yet put no man to death: yea he left unto the city the liberties and societies thereof whole, yet protesting himself to have had no less occasion to revenge himself than had Charles the fift, but that he had rather to increase his commendation, by saving, than by spilling of his subjects, and by gentleness rather than by cruelty. By these examples before set down it is well to be understood, what is to be determined for the punishment of Communities, Corporations, and Colleges: wherein they which affect lenity, do give occasion unto the same citizens oftentimes to rebel: which in a Commonweal is of a prince especially to be taken heed of. In which thing no man seemeth to have behaved himself more wisely than Charles the fift. Yet he that seemed to have been so severe against the Gauntois, used the greatest lenity that might be towards the Spaniards of all sorts, at such time as they had not only rebelled against him, (when he went to take possession of the empire) but also chosen the duke of Calabria for their king, who refused that so dangerous a preferment. Of which so great a multitude Charles thought it not good to punish one, and that right wisely: for that in so doing he should have lanced all the members of the Commonweal. For albeit that it is an wholesome thing to cauterise or cut off a mortified member for the preservation of the whole body; must we therefore if all the members of the body be in a consumption, or taken with a Gangrena use sections or cauterisations? Hypocrates the great physician saith no, forbidding us to apply remedies to desperate diseases, and so much the less, if a consumption shall take hold of the chief and principal members of the body. 
How a community or corporation offending is to be punished.  Wherhfore to conclude this question, if the offence be committed by the council or deceit of a community or corporation, that which belongeth unto such a community or corporation so offending, is therefore to be confiscated or forfeited: but if there be no such thing thereto belonging that may so be forfeited, than a fine in money is to be set thereupon, but yet to be exacted only of them which gave counsel or aid to the committing of the offence: for as much as it could not be committed by the whole community or corporation itself: but if the guilty parties be not to be known from the guiltless, then are they altogether to be fined: but as for any corporal punishment, it is not to be inflicted, except that every one of them, and all of them together, have most grievously offended. Neither yet are they to be thought all to offend, although they follow the ensigns displayed, except that they altogether and every one of them apart gave their council or consent thereunto before: but the community or corporation being punished, doth not therefore exempt them that are guilty of the offence committed, from their due deserved punishment. 
Whether a commonweal can be without communities, corporations, or colleges.   
But these things being thus declared, concerning the punishments of Communities and corporations: it remaineth for us to see, whether that a Commonweal can be without such Communities, Corporations, and Colleges. We said at first, men every where to be, and always to have been desirous of the society and company of men: and so out of a familiar and natural society by little and little to have grown into a college, into a corporation, into a community, and so at length into a city: and so to have made these empires and kingdoms, which we here in the world see, having no surer foundation whereupon to rest (next unto God) than the love and amity of one of them towards another: which can in no wise be maintained, but by alliances, societies, estates, communities, fraternities, corporations, and colleges. So that to demand, whether communities and colleges be necessary in a Commonweal? is as much, as to demand, Whether that a Commonweal can be maintained and upholden without love and amity? without which the world itself cannot long stand. Which I have said, for that there have been, and yet are some of opinion, That all corporations and colleges are out of a Commonweal to be excluded and banished; not considering that a family, and the very Commonweal itself, are nothing else but communities. Which is an error whereat the greatest spirits have often times stumbled; for one absurdity or incommodity which ensueth of one good custom or ordinance, willing to have the same custom or ordinance abolished and quite taken away, without 
Great harms ensuing of corporations or communities evil governed.  regard of the great good which otherwise ensueth thereof unto the Commonweal. I confess that colleges and communities evil governed, draw after them many factions, seditions, part-taking, monopolies, yea and sometime the ruin of the whole Commonweal also: and that in stead of sacred love and amity, there ariseth of them conjurations, and conspiracies of one of them against another. And that more is, it hath been seen, that under the shadow of religion divers colleges have covered some most detestable and execrable impiety. Whereof no better example can be given, than of the fraternity of the Bacchanals in Rome, which devised under the colour of religion, so long covered the most execrable and detestabble filthiness of both sexes, until that the secrets thereof opened, polluted the city than mirror of the world, and all Italy with the loathsome savour thereof, above seven thousand persons being partly accused, attainted, convinced, and many of them execured and banished, 
Religion the fairest colour for a foul matter.  for the abominable villainies by them committed under the colour of that religion, which hath always the fairest and most glorious show that can be devised, to be set upon a fowl matter; as said Flaminius the Consul speaking unto the people of Rome, concerning the impieties by him found out, Nihil in speciem fallacius prava religione; ubi Deorum numen praetenditur sceleribus, subit animum timor, Nothing is in show more deceitful than corrupt religion: For where the majesty of the gods is pretended for the cloaking of villainies, there fear pierceth the mind. Which was the cause that the fraternities of the Bacchanals was by a decree of the Senate put down through all Italy: Which decree of the Senate confirmed by the people, passed into the force of a law, That from that time forward no more sacrifices should be made by night, but always done in public. Which thing Damonax a wise Graecian had long time before attempted to persuade the Athenians of, saying, Those 
Nightly conventicles under the colour of religion suspicious and in every Commonweal dangerous.  night-sacrifices to have always seemed unto him very suspicious. And better it is in every Commonweal openly to suffer whatsoever assemblies or sacrifices to be done by day, in the sight of all the people, then nightly assemblies to be made under the colour of religion▪ Whereof Cato the Censor most grievously said, Ab nullo genere non summum periculum est, sicaetus, & consilia, & secretas consultationes esse sinas, There is no sort of men from whom the greatest danger is not to be feared, if you shall suffer conventicles, and secret counsels and consultations to be kept amongst them: Which can so much the less be avoided, when as the false opinion of religion is pretended for to colour villainies. For that there is no conspiracy, which may not be contrived and made in such secret assemblies: which growing by little and little, and not perceived until they be grown great, at length bursting like to a rotten imposthume, infecteth the whole body of the Commonweal. As for proof thereof in our remembrance, whereas there have always been many conventicles and meetings of seditious persons, under the pretenced show of religion, so a more dangerous company of filthy fellows never more suddenly in any place broke out, than did that of the Anabaptists in Munster, the chief city of Westphalia, who there secretly multiplying, upon the sudden took up arms, and by the leading of a Tailor drove out the bishop and magistrates, and so possessed the city wholly to themselves, which could not be again recovered from them, not those fantastical seditions repressed, but by a strong army of the whole Germane empire. The Colleges and Fraternities of the Pythagorians dealt more moderately in Italy, who professing the study of wisdom, and having drawn unto them so many disciples, as that many the greatest lords & princes, both of Italy and Greece, moved with the admiration of their doctrine, were now become both their auditors and followers: they bearing themselves thereupon, went about to have every where overthrown the popular estates, and tyrannical governments, and for them to have established Aristocraties, and the governments of wise men. But that their so good a purpose was overthrown by certain ambitious and popular men, who setting the people in an uproar with fire and sword, destroyed all the Pythagorians. Which (as saith Polybius) troubled almost all the estates both of Italy and of Greece. And for this cause the emperors, and almost all other princes, pope's, and counsels, giving the jews leave to have their meetings & synagogues (which Tiberius, Claudius, & Domitian) the emperors, had of ancient time taken from them) commanded yet, That they should always do their sacrifices, and have their prayers openly, and in public. Which liberty Pharaoh king of Egypt (terrified with the judgements of God) would have also granted them, but was by Moses refused, alleging, That it was to be feared lest the Egyptians should overwhelm with stones the jews, using a strange religion, and by the laws of the country forbidden. And to say the truth, it is a thing most hard and 
The common people hardly to endure any religion contrary or repugnant to their own.  difficult to maintain colleges or corporations in a Commonweal of what religion soever, either publicly or privately, being contrary to the religion of the people, or of the greater part of them: For that the people every where most jealous of their religion, cannot but most hardly endure any rites and ceremonies, differing from the religion by themselves generally received: neither are by the laws, or by the magistrates command, or bands of men so to be restrained and kept in, but that their rage will oft-times most furiously break out, not against the weaker sort only, but even against the most mighty ones also. For so Thomas emperor of Constantinople, pulling down the altars and images of the saints, was by the angry people most cruelly slain in the very temple of saint Sophia. We have also seen in the city of Frankford four corporations 
The jews, and Catholics by the protest ●…nts borue within Frankford, and they of the confession of Geneva forbidden.  and colleges of divers religions, to have been publicly allowed and exerci sed, namely those of the jews, of the Catholics, of the Protestant's, and of the Confess▪ sion of Geneva: But it so fell out in the year 1562, in the month of May, that the Protestant's assuring themselves of the strength of their partakers, fell upon them of the Confession of Geneva, (who in their profession came nearest unto them) and bearing with the other which more differed from them, cáused that of the Confession to be there utterly forbidden. Which is less to be feared in such religions and sects as have been of ancient time received, and which as it were in their own right defend their profession: such as is the religion of the jews, from which all other religions, except 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, seem to have taken their beginning: which chrysostom therefore calleth The mother of the Gentiles: the princes of Europe and of Barbary having always granted unto the jews, their ancient privileges, corporations, & colleges, for the exercising of their religion, in paying unto them certain tribute, as they did unto the Roman emperors, which was called Aurum Coronarium; which the Germane emperors ordinarily give unto the emprises, for the confirmation of the jews privileges, which are yet greatet in Polonia and Lituania than in any other place of the world, since they were by Cazimir the great king of Polonia granted unto them, at the request of a jewish lady, called Hester; such as had of ancient time by a Persian king been unto this nation given, at the instance of another jewish lady of the same name. Where they so mightily increased, as that there was no prince in the greater Asia, which had not in it one or other Colony of the jews; as we read in josephus, and Philo. Wherhfore the most ancient antiquity of that the jewish religion, together with the great poverty of the jews themselves, who in no place of the world may possess any lands, maketh that they need the less, and are indeed the less able to sight for their religion and liberty.  
But it may be, that the consent and agreement of the nobility and people in a new religion or sect, may be so puissant & strong, as that to repress or altar the same, should 
That a sect or religion grown so strong, as that it cannot without the extreme peril of the state and commonweal be altered, is of a wise prince to be suffered.  be a thing impossible, or at leastwise marvelous difficult, without the extreme peril and danger of the whole estate. In which case the best advised princes and governors of Commonweals do imitat the wise pilots, who when they cannot attain unto the port by them desired, direct their course to such port as they may: Yea and often times quite changing their course, give way unto the storms and tempests, lest in seeking too much to put into the desired haven, they suffer shipwreck. Wherhfore that religion or sect is to be suffered, which without the hazard and destruction of the state cannot be taken away: The health and welfare of the Commonweal being the chief thing the law respecteth. Wherhfore Constans the emperor suffered the companies and colleges of the Arrians, not so much for the love and affection he bore towards them, as divers have written but so in quiet to preserve his subjects, and estate. And Theodosius the Great being himself a Catholic, and always contrary to the Arria●…s' opinion, yet bore with their religion, which he could by no means suppress, maintaining both the one sort and the other in peace and obedience. And after him Zeno the emperor, to reconcile the companies of all sorts of religions among themselves, and together with the Commonweal, commanded an edict, which they called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, which is to say, of union and tranquility or quietness to be published. After whose example Anastasius caused the law of forgetfulness to be set forth, cherishing the grave and modest preachers, and removing such as were of vehement and turbulent spirits.  
And yet no doubt, but that a prince favouring one sect or religion, and disliking another, 
How a prince favouring one sect or religion and disciding an other, may without force or f●…ur suppress that religion he disliketh, and advance the other which he better liketh of.  may if he will without force or constraint, or any violence at all, suppress that which he liketh not (except it be by the hand and power of the almighty supported) & that by keeping the maintainers thereof from all preferments and places of command; and by showing himself in deeds rather than in words, to abhor that religion which he desireth to have extinguished, For the manner of men is, to love such things as their princes embrace: and minds resolved, the more they are crossed, the stiffer they are, which otherwise of themselves grow weak and feeble, if they be not at all resisted. Besides that, there can be nothing more dangerous unto a prince, than to make proof of his forces against his subjects, except he be well assured to prevail against them: which otherwise were but to arm a lion, and to show him his claws wherewith to tear his master. But if the wiser sort of princes do in the variety of religions right, hardly keep the concord and unity of their subjects: what then is to be hoped for of such princes, as have no experience of governing of the state, on every side beset with their flatterers? pressed by their false informers, thrust forward by their furious followers: aiming only at this, how to fill themselves with other men's wealth and blood. So in the beginning 
A dangerous practice of such as are near unto great princes: to devise false calumnies against the professors of any religion, so to bring them into hatred, and to enrich themselves with their wealth.  of the Primitive Church, under the first emperors, so many gross and impudent calumnies, and slanderous reports, were devised and put in writing against the Christians, for the taking away of their assemblies and meetings, as the like whereof were never before devised, and would indeed seem incredible, were they not yet in writing extant. As witnesseth Anaxagoras the orator, in his apology to Antoninus: Tertullian in his apology for the Christians: and Origen against Celsus, certain of whose writings are yet extant. Whereby it is to be understood, that it was commonly objected unto the Christians, that they were Atheists, irreligious contemners of all gods, incestuous murderers: and such as in their secret assemblies and meetings used to kill young infants conceived of their mutual incests, and after that they had so killed them, to eat them. Which thing indeed Epiphanius reporteth of the heretics called Gnostic●…: as that they should in their meetings beaten in a mortar their new born children, begotten in incest,, with the yolks of eggs, flower, honey, and certain spices mingled together, and so to make cakes of them, and to bake them, and eat them: and that to have been with them accounted a sacrament of the body and blood. Which slanders so falsely objected against the Christians, might seem altogether incredible, if in the time of our ancestors the like accusation had not been commenced against the Templars, viz. under the reign of Philip the fair; for which the 
The Templars falsely accused, and for their great wealth wrongfully suppressed.  Colleges in France before granted unto the Templars, at last by a decree of pope Boniface the viii were taken from them, the master with a great number of his fellows most cruelly burnt, and the order quite suppressed. All which for all that, the Germane by their writings have since showed to have been but a malicious false accusation, invented for the taking away of their great lands and wealth from them. The like practice was also used against the Corporations and societies of the jews, aswell in 
The jews in like manner wronged.  France under Dagobert, Philip Augustus, and Philip the long: as afterward in Spain under Ferdinand king of Arragon and Castille, who of a merciless devotion drive them quite out of their countries, and enriched themselves with their goods, it being given out, that they had crucified boys, and poisoned wells with the blood of their leprous persons.  
Wherhfore, to decide the question before propounded, as whether Communities, 
Communities, Corporations, and Colleges, necessary in every Commonweal, but especially in a popular estate.  Corporations, Societies, and Colleges be good in a Commonweal, or no? or that the Commonweal may well be without them? Truly in mine opinion nothing could ever have been devised more effectual or better for the keeping & maintaining of popular estates, or for the overthrow of tyrannical governments, than corporations and societies: For why, the Commonweals and estates being one unto an other contrary, do by quite contrary means both maintain and ruinated themselves. And therefore the people and popular estates, accept and embrace all manner of communities, corporations, and colleges; as we said that Solon did, in establishing the popular estate of Athens. All which tyrants in their tyrannical governments seek utterle to overthrow, as well knowing, the unity and amity of subjects among themselves, to be the tyrant's inevitable ruin and destruction: the just royal, and Aristocratical estates, even for the same reasons still holding the mean betwixt both, neither accepting nor rejecting of all communities and colleges, but admitting only such as they see needful for the state and Commonweal; which with good laws and orders they still keep within the compass of duty and obedience. The good king Numa was the first that ordained Societies and Fraternities of artificers and men of occupation; and so Tarquin the proud was the first that took them away, and that forbidden the assemblies of the people, and that had in himself a purpose also to have suppressed the body of the Senate, by the death of the Senators, not suffering any new to be chosen in the rooms of them that died But he was no sooner by his subjects driven out, but that the popular estate was established, the number of the three hundred Senators supplied, and the colleges and companies before abolished again restored. But when the people by the help of their Tribunes began more insolently to rule, and that in the body of the Senate were almost six hundred of the nobility and chief men of the city, who had almost drawn unto themselves the sovereignty, the colleges, and companies of the citizens, were by a decree of the Senate, for the most part suppressed and put down: Howbeit shortly after Clodius the Tribune to be the more gracious with the people, and to maintain them in jar and discord with the nobility (which he had renounced, causing himself to be adopted by a base fellow, so to become Tribune) not only restored all the Colleges and companies by the Senate before suppressed, but ordained and erected a great number more: which Caesar being got to be Dictator, to maintain his own power and weaken the people's, put down; but were afterwards by Augustus having assured his estate, by an express edict again restored. All which Nero the the tyrant again suppressed. Whereby it appeareth, Tyrants always to have hated the corporations and communities of the people, and 
Communities, Corporations, and Colleges, always hateful unto Tyrants.  by all means endeavoured to have them utterly extinguished: Insomuch that Dionysius the tyrant of Sicily would not that even near kinsfolks should so much as visit one an other, but as they came late from supper from their friends, caused them to be rob and spoiled. As in like manner did Nero, who often times by night walking the streets, spoiled and slew such as he met, which returned late from supper with their friends; so much he feared the assemblies of his subjects, for the conspiracies they might so make against the tyranny of him so wicked a prince. And yet for all that the just Monarchy, 
The great benefit and use of Communities, corporations, and colleges, in a just Monarchy or royal estat●….  hath not any more assured foundation or stay, than the Estates of the people, Communities, Corporations, and Colleges: For if need be for the king to levy money, to raise forces, to maintain the Estate against the enemy, it cannot be better done, than by the estates of the people, and of every Province, Town, and Commutie. Yea we see that they themselves which would have these estates of the communities and societies of the people suppressed and abolished, have in time of their necessity no other refuge or stay to fly unto, but even to these estates and communities of the people: which being together united, strengthen themselves for the defence and protection, not of their Prince only, but even of themselves also, and of the whole estate and subjects in general, especially the Prince himself there being in person present. For where can things for the curing of the diseases of the sick Commonweal, or for the amendment of the people, or for the establishing of laws, or for the reforming of the Estate, be better debated or handled, than before the prince in his Senate before the people? There they confer of the affairs concerning the whole body of the Commonweal, and of the members thereof; there are heard and understood the just complaints & grievances of the poor subjects, which never otherwise come unto the prince's ears; there are discovered and laid open the robberies and extortions committed in the prince's name; whereof he knoweth nothing, there the requests of all degrees of men are heard. Besides that, it is almost a thing incredible to say, how much the subjects are eased, and how well they are also pleased, to see their king to sit as chief in the assembly of the estates, and to hear him discoursing; how every man desireth to be seen of him, and if it please him to hear their complaints, and to receive their requests, albeit that they be often times denied the same; yet OH how it pleaseth them to have had access unto their Prince, yea sometime they go away better pleased with such a denial, than if they had had that they requested, being by their prince altogether contemned. All which is better observed and kept in Spain, than in any place of the world, where the assemblies of the estates heretofore have been holden every two or three years one. And in England also, for that the people grant no payments, if the Estates be not assembled: as I remember was done, when as I passed over into England ambassador from Francis duke of Anjou. Our kings do not so often call together the assemblies of their estates, as do the kings of England. But whereas there are accounted sixteen Provinces in this kingdom, whereof six have their particular assemblies among themselves, (namely Bretagne, Normandy, Bourgundie, Languedoc, Dauphine, and Provence) some there were, who for fear their villainies and extortions should in those assemblies have been found out, laboured to the uttermost of their power to have had the same assemblies and meetings of the Estates of the aforesaid provinces, in any wise taken away and changed into elections. As also in the beginning of the reign of Charles the eight, at such time as it was with one general voice called upon, that a general assembly of all the Provinces might be had; there wanted not some who threatened it to be Treason to such as in the counsel should consent with the people for the calling of such an assembly: whose opinion Philip de Commines (a most worthy counsellor and a man of great experience) most earnestly withstood. But how necessary the assemblies & meeting of the whole people for to consult 
The general assemblies & meetings of the people to consul of matters, necessary for the good of the Common weals.  of matters, are, is hereby perceived; in that the people which may so call together such their counsels, with them all things go well: whereas others which may not so do, are oppressed with tributes & servitude. For as the shot of many pieces of artillery delivered one after another, is not of so great force and power for the battering of a fort, as when the whole tire of the great ordinance is together discharged, so the particular requests of men often times vanish but into smoke. But when whole Colleges or Communities, or the estates of a province, or of a people, or of a realm, shall make their requests unto their king; the voice is so loud, and the requests so effectual, as that it is hard for him to refuse it. Howbeit that there is a thousand other commodities & uses of the general assemblies of the Estates in every province and country, for the common good thereof. As if question be for the levying of forces, or of money to withstand the enemy, or for the building of fortresses, for the mending of high ways, repairing of bridges, or for the scouring of the country of thieves, or withstanding of the great; all these things which can in no wise be done by particular men, are best of all performed by them all in their general assemblies. As to pass over the rest, all these things have been better done in the province of Languedoc by their assembled Estates, than in any other province of this Realm. They within a few years erected a School, and appointed twelve hundred pounds yearly pension for the instruction of all the youth of the country. In the Town of Nismes, beside the other particular Colleges, they built the fairest fortresses of this realm; and caused Buzac to be executed, the most notable 
Buzac a notable thief and robber.  robber that ever was in our remembrance, of whom neither judge, nor magistrate, not nor yet the parliament of Thoulouse itself, could take punishment, he being grown so strong as to do his robberies in form of justice, and yet no man so hardy as to dare to lay hands upon him: of whose execution I was a beholder, & saw the people wonderfully rejoicing to see themselves delivered of a thief and robber, of all others the greatest: albeit that I remember ten thousand crowns to have been before laid out about the same matter. And to keep that province the safer from thieves & robbers, they appointed far greater rewards for the Provost Marshal than did any other province, as twelve hundred pound for his maintenance, and xxv pound for every process he should bring of the execution by him done. I have been willing in passing by, thus the rather to note these particularities, to show the great good which ariseth unto Commonweals by the assemblies of their Estates: which are yet better ordered in the Commonweals of the Swissers, & the German empire, than in other the Commonweals of Europe. For the Swissers beside the assemblies of Estate, in every Town and Canton, have their general assemblies of their Estates also; and the ten Circles or Circuits of the Empire have their assemblies of their Estates separate, unto whom the particular estates of the Imperial Towns & Countries refer themselves: and so likewise the estates of the circuits refer themselves and their decrees unto the assembly of the estates 
A measure to be had for the number of Corporations and Colleges in a Commonweal.  of the Empire, which without this policy had long ago been ruinated & fallen.  
We said that the mean and measure which is in all things commendable, aught also to be kept in all just Monarchies and Aristrocraties, in regard of the number of Corporations and Colleges to be had in their kingdoms and Commonweals: For as quite to take away all Corporations and Communities were to weaken or ruinated the estate, and to establish a barbarous tyranny, or tyrannical government; so likewise to permit and suffer all assemblies, and all fraternities, is not also without danger, as not easily to be ruled by the prince's power, or nobilities command. In them also often times are covered conspiracies, and secret Monopolies, whereof we have many examples, which hath been the cause often times by express Edict in this Realm to take away these fraternities; which for all that could never yet be put into execution. Howbeit much better it were to take away the abuse, than the thing itself that is abused, and to 
That it is better or the Commonweal, that men of one trade or occupation should be divided into divers streets, and quarters of the city, the●… to devil all in one street together.  pluck up the weeds alone, rather than both the good and bad together. And to avoid Monopolies amongst artificers and trades men, it is good to divide them into divers streets and quarters of the city, and not to seat them in one street or quarter together, (as they do in Africa, and also in many towns and cities of Europe) except th●… place for the having of water, or some other such common respect so require: For besides the incommodity that it is in great cities not to have artificers which are ordinarily required in every quarter thereof, there must needs either be secret monopolies amongst them so to cell their merchandise and wa●…es the dearer, or else jealousies and quarrels, if one of them shall cell better cheap than another, before his face that hath refused to take the money. I said artificers ordinarily required, for that it is not fit in their dwellings to mingle men given unto their study and quiet, together with Fishmongers, or Armourers, or Curriors with Scholars: for as for such as are less requisite as hammermen, they may well enough be ranged in the same street or quarter of a city together, and that better than to trouble the quiet of others. But as there is nothing better for the maintenance of the strength and unity of the subjects, than Corporations & Communities: so is there nothing which can so much weaken & keep underfoot a Commonweal, as by the utter taking away of Communities, Corporations, and Colleges, or Societies: Which the Romans well knowing, wisely put in practice, who after they had vanquished the kings of Macedonia, and conquered the country, utterly forbidden all assemblies and meetings together of the people there to consult of matters. And so afterwards also the Achaeans being over come, the consul Mummius as saith Livy: Concilia omnia singularum Achaiae nationum, & Phocensium, & Baeotorum, aut in alia part Graeciae delevit, Suppressed all the counsels of all the particular nations of Achaia, and of the Phocensians, and of the Baeotians, or in what soever other part of Graecia else: But after that they were once become good and obedient subjects unto the Romans: Antiqu●… concilia genti cuique restituta, The ancient counsels were unto every nation again restored, as saith Strabo.   

CHAP. VIII. ¶ Of the orders and degrees of citizens.  
NOw forasmuch as we have already spoken of Corporations 
A convenient and decent order to be in all things fit and requisite.  and Colleges, it remaineth for us also to speak of the orders and degrees of citizens. For if so be that in all things we desire and seek after a convenient and decent order, and deem nothing to be more ugly or foul to look upon, than confusion and broil: then how much more is it to be sought for in a Commonweal, so to place the citizens or subjects in such apt and comely order, as that the first may be joined with the last, and they of the middle sort with both; and so all with all, in a most true knot and bond among themselves, together with the Commonweal? For why, it is a most ancient and received opinion of the wise, Almighty God himself the great and supreme workemaster and creator of this great and wonderful Fabric of all things, in the creating thereof, to have performed nothing either greater or better, than that he divided the mingled and confused parts of the rude Chaos, and so settled every thing in his due place and order. Neither can there be any thing faiter to behold, more delightful to he mind, or more commodious for use, than is order itself. But they which go about so to make all subjects or citizens equal one unto another in dignity, order, and and place, as that there shall be nothing in a City or Commonweal first, or in the midst, but will have all degrees so mingled together and confounded, without respect of sex, age, or condition they seem to me to do as they do which thrust barley, wheat, rise, mill, and all other kind of pulse into one heap together; whereby they lose the use both of every kind of grain in particular, as also of the whole heap together. Wherhfore there was never any lawgiver so unskilful, but that he thought that there aught still to be some division, ordering, and sorting of the citizens or subjects in a city, or Commonweal. Here by ordering and sorting of the citizens or subjects, my meaning is, that there should be a part of the citizens divided from the rest in condition, state, or sex: in condition, as the nobility from them that were but from the Senators descended, the knights and gentlemen from the common people in sex: as women from men: in state, as free borne men from them which are but of manumised slaves made free; and they which are by state free, are divided from them both.  
As for slaves we have before said, them by the general con●…ent of almost all people, 
Slaves accounted no citizens and yet indeed worthy to be so reckoned of▪ though in the lowest and basest degree of citizens  to have been still exempted out of the number of citizens. Yea Aristotle hath termed slaves, but instruments for other men's uses; whereas some others have accounted of them, but as of beasts, or rather worse: and yet the question resteth undecided, Whether that slaves are to be accounted in a man's goods or substance, or not. But if the determining hereof might be unto me referred, surely I should wish the right and liberty of the city to be set open, as well unto the slaves as unto the free borne men. For what is this so arrogant temerity (should I say) or impiety of men, that forgetting men's conditton and state, they should enforce this so divine a creature, having his liberty shamefully taken from him, not only to serve their lust, but also to make no more account of him, yea and peradventure less too, than of a very beast? But be it that slaves be indeed of the basest sort of men, do they therefore not deserve to be termed by the name of citizens? There be in man's body some members, I may not call them filthy (for that nothing can so be which is natural) but yet so shameful, as that no man except he be passed all shame, can without blushing reveal or discover the same: and do they for that cease to be members of the whole body? The feet themselves, with perpetual labour hold up and carry about the whole bulk of the body, and are often times foul with dirt, filth, and dust, but yet who is so mad, as to think them therefore worthy to be cut off from the body? Now if these base members indeed be and are still called parts of the whole body, why shall we not by the same reason suffer slaves, who are still pressed and kept under with the most heavy burdens and commands of the other citizens, to be called and accounted members of the same city with them? But if we think this to be an absurd thing, then are they to be driven out of the city, and as rotten limbs to be cut off: but if we will still retain them in a city, in a family, and so in our obedience and service, we must also make them partakers of the city with us. For seeing they be subjects and not strangers, they must needs make up a part of the citizens, and be accounted in the number of them. Which I would have understood to be of me so spoken, not for that I should desire slavery long since taken away out of our Commonweal, to be thereinto again restored: but that forasmuch as the force and boldness of men is so far broken out, as that we see servitude and slavery by little and little to creep in, and to return again: it might be foreseen and provided for, that such slaves might not hereafter be more hardly used, than the state and condition of man requireth, and might also have their certain place and order in the city. Wherhfore let the order of slaves be of all others the lowest in degree in a city; and of them we will begin first to speak. For as for that which Cicero objecteth unto Antonius, That he had so contracted affinity, as that he might thereby the better commend himself unto them that were of the meanest degree: he meant it by them which had been mannumised men, and not by the slaves indeed: for that in the city Rome, slaves indeed had neither place nor degree. Neither did Metellus his speech concerning marriages to be made in degrees together belong unto slaves, to whom the rites and rights of marriage were altogether forbidden, having only their mutual conversing and company one of them of another; as Paulus the lawyer writeth in the second book of Sentences, albeit not altogether advisedly, for that they held the right of blood, as did other citizens, and were forbidden incestuous marriages as well as others; although that they had not the other rights of marriages. And for that slaves were oftentimes borne of uncertane fathers, their children were also accounted uncertain: and therefore slaves and manumised men were not said to be of any family, stock, or house; only they which were of the nobility descended, boasted themselves to have stock, or house from whence they came. Hereof came that speech of Decius against them that were descended from the nobility, Semper ista audita sunt, vos solos gentem habere: an hoc, si Claudiae familiae non sim, nec ex Patricio sanguine ortus, sed unus Quiritium quilibet, qui modò me duobus ingenuis ortum sciam, reticere possim? These things have always been heard, you alone to have a stock & house, But if I were not of the house and family of the Claudians, neither borne of noble blood, but some one of the common people, which but knew myself to be borne of two free borne pe●…sonss, could I in this hold my peace? Whereby he sufficiently insinuateth neither slaves nor mannumised men to have had any stock or house from which they might accounted themselves descended: and them only to have been accounted 
Why we call such as be noble borne by the name of gentlemen?  so to have, which had their beginning from them that were free borne: and hereof it cometh that we call such as be nobly borne by the name of Gentlemen, as having an house or family from which they are descended. Howbeit that they which were so nobly borne, went yet further, vaunting them only to have an house and family, from which they might produce their descent, none of whose ancestors had at any time served as slaves: For why, the multitude of the vulgar and common sort of the people, was thought almost all to have taken their beginning from such as having been slaves, were by manumission become free.  
Next unto slaves are they whom they call State-free men, and after them the Libertines, 
Four kind of libertines or of manumised men in Rome.  or as we may term them the manumised men, who were every where of divers sorts and condition, as there were also divers sorts of slaves. And to let other cities pass, we see in Rome to have been four sorts or kinds of these Libertines, or enfranchised men; viz. those whom they called Romani, Latini, juniani, and Dediticij: whom for that they be usual and common, I let them pass: sufficeth it as it were with the finger to point out the fountains of them, lest in a city these divers orders of enfranchised or mannumised men might be together confounded. Now the order or degreeof state free men, was in a mean betwixt slaves and the Libertines or manumised men, for in that their liberty was yet holden in suspense, they were in better 
State free men better than slaves and worse than libertines.  case and condition than were the slaves, and yet withal in worse than were the libertines, or men already enfranchised. And these orders every one of them according to the quality of their condition and state, were also likewise in their degrees placed. 
The nobility always divided from the vulgar and common people.   
The rest of the citizens are divided according to the variety of their conditions and estates, and diversity of their manners and customs. Yet that is common almost to all people, that noble men should in order and dignity be divided from the vulgar and common people, since first Nimrod the great robber, most notably attended upon with a great power of wicked companions, and such as himself was, with cruel servitude oppressed them that were too weak for him, and so first took upon him the government 
The first nobility grounded upon violence and oppression.  of the Assyrians, as we have before said. So left his nobility got by villainy, for his posterity to imitat: which opinion further spreading, took such deep root, as that every man as he was the mightier in violence and murdering of others, he was 
True nobility grounded upon virtue.  thought to be so much more the nobler: until such time as that the people by good laws and civility better instructed, deemed, that the true nobility, was by virtue and not so by villainy to be sought for.  
But forasmuch as one man excelleth another in some one or other virtue: and for 
Nobility in divers places dive●…sly accounted of, and neither in all places alike.  that such virtues as are in one city or place most highly commended, are in some other no less contemned. Hereof it cometh, that no one definition of nobility could ever yet be made agreeable unto the nobility of all the people: honour and infamy being still deemed and reputed of, according to the manner and custom of every country. For by the customs of the Perusines and Florentines, he which but now began to bear arms and serve in war, was of one before unnoble, now thereby become noble: whereas with us he is not so by and by: but if his posterity shall follow the wars, they are reputed to have gotten nobility as it were by the continuance of time. But not so at Venice, who still measure the nobility of their gentlemen, by the honourable antiquity of such houses and families as have always attended their public counsels and affairs. And albeit that the Decurions or petty captains by the Roman law, be reputed of by the name of gentlemen: which law is also received with them of Poitiers 
Whether the bearing of ar●…eses in the wars make a man therefore a gentleman or not?  by the consent of all the three estates, yet is it no where else with us so found. But that the bearing of arms should of itself make a gentleman, I see it to have so pleased not only the Florentines and Perusines, but divers interpreters of the law also, and especially Alciat, who hath not doubted to cite Triwltius the great captain as author thereof. Truly amongst the Egyptians it was not lawful but for the Calasyres: and many worlds of years after, for the Mammalukes in the reign of the Sultan's, to serve and bear arms: who therefore enjoyed most great privileges. Yet other people have divided genter●…e from war, neither have therefore reputed any one to be a gentleman, for that he was a soldier: unto which opinion all the greatest lawyers together with Plato have almost with one voice consented. And albeit that the Romans far exceeded all other people in martial honour, and bestowed the greatest privileges upon soldiers: yet for all that they bond not gentry unto martial service: seeing that it was lawful for the Libertines or manumised men to serve in the wars, and that men for the filthiness of their lives, and judgements, therefore upon them passed, infamous, who were therefore embarred from all honours, had yet no exemption from the wars.  
But forasmuch as all citizens after they had taken upon them the manlike atttire, were bound to bear arms, so by that reason all the citizens should have been thereby ennobled, which were a thing absurd: for were all the citizens noble, none of them were indeed in that vulgarity of nobility to be accounted at all noble. Wherhfore Lucius Siccius Dentatus is of Dionysius Halicarnasseus, called a common and ordinary man, whose speech against them of the nobility and gentry is yet at this present extant: Wherein he boasteth himself to have been in pay forty years in the service of his 
Lucius Sic●…ius Dentatus, a most worthy and Famous soldier, and yet not therefore accounted any gentleman.  country, to have fought in an hundred and twenty set battles, to have received 45 wounds, and twelve of them in one day, all of them in the fore part of his body: and in token of his good service, to have received fourteen Civic or oaken crowns (the honourable rewards due unto him that had saved so many citizens) three others the rewards of his good service done in the besieging of towns, fourscore and three gold chains, an hundred and threescore bracelets of gold, ten fair lances, and thirty five fair furnitures for horses. And yet this so worthy & valiant a man, adorned with so many trophies in reward of his valour, was by the Roman laws no more but as a common person. For they accounted him first a gentleman, that was the son of a new raised man: and him they called a new man, who was the first in his family that 
Whom the Romans' first accounted a gentleman.  had borne some honourable charge or office, and so had power to erect unto himself his statue or image; such as were Caius Marius, and M Tullius Cicero of Arpine, both of them being but new men. Of whom the one being first made Quaestor, and then Aedilis, and afterwards Praetor, at last came to be Consul; who in the time of his Consulship, in an oration which he made unto the people, boasting therein of his newness, thus said, Ego nou●…s homo primus omnium claustra nobilitatis refregi, etc. I being but a new man, was of all others the first which broke open the bars of nobility. The other having been seven times Consul, in an oration which he made against the nobility, said, Contemnunt novitatem meam, ego illorum ignaviam: mihi fortuna, illis probr a obiectantur. Quod si me iure despiciunt, faciant idem maioribus suis, quibus uti mihi nobilitas ex virtute caepit. Nunc videte quàm iniqui sunt: quod ex aliena virtute sibi arrogant, id mihi ex mea non concedunt: scilicet quia imagines non habeo, & nova nobilit as est, quam perperisse melius est, quàm acceptam corrupiss●…, They contemn (saith he) my newness, I their cowardice: my fortune is to me objected, but unto them their vices. But if they therefore of right contemn and despise me, let them so also do their own ancestors, whose nobility begun of their own virtues, as doth mine. Now but see how partial they are in their own cause; that honour which they arrogat unto themselves by other men's virtues, that they will not grant unto me for mine own: and all forsooth, because I have no images of mine ancestors to show, and for that my nobility is but new, which yet is better for me to have of myself raised, than having received it from mine ancestors, to have myself stained the same. For Cicero had six competitors in his Consulship, whereof two were noble men, two other of them were the first of their family which had borne office, only Cicero himself was a gentleman borne: whose father, as also the father of Marius, of Cato the Censor, of Q. Pompeius, of Curius, of Philo, and of Genutius, were all base persons of the commonalty, but yet their sons were accounted of as new men 
The Patritij who they were in Rome.  and gentlemen. But such as were descended from the Senators, by Romulus in the beginning of his reign appointed, or from them which were afterwards by the Consul Publius Valerius joined unto them, were called Patricij (as having their beginning from the Senators, whom they called Patres) all the rest were common men, or else men of some better note, whom they called Equites, or Gentlemen; who were in the midst 
The Equites or gentlemen in Rome what place they held.  betwixt the Senators & the common people, being partly dissended from the Senators, and part of them risen out of the commonalty: who if any of them were chosen into the Senate, they were no more to be accounted amongst those Equites or gentlemen: as is to be seen by Lucius & Nero the Censors, who yet serving upon public horses, were one of them by the other commanded to cell them: for after the overthrow by the Romans received from the Veians, the gentlemen began to serve upon horses provided for them of the public charge. Now I found that there were of the Patrician Families in Rome, about forty: but of such as by their valour left nobility to their posterity 
The Patrician families in Rome: Syl●…ia, Pomp●…lia, P●…titia, Mar●…ia, Hostilia, Tull●…a, Tarqu●…, Fabia, Antonia, junia, Sergia, julia, Gegania, Ma●…tia, Aemylia, Ch●…oelia, Valeria, Horatia, Posth●…mia, Mene●…ia, Virginia, Sulpitia, Furia, Lucretia, Quinctia, Papiria, Claudia, Ser●…ilia, Cormlia, Manilia, Cassia, Aebutia, Pinaria, V●…turia, Sempronia, Mutia, Aquila, Quintilia, Hortensia.  in Cicero's time scarcely thirty: of which families, or houses, seven were of the same name with the Patricij, viz. Pompilia, Martia, Tullia, junia, Mutia, Claudia, and Sempronia. And for that the entrance and way unto the honourable preferments in the state, before the law Canuleia, was kept shut up and stopped by the Pratricij (or them that were of the Senators descended) against the common and vulgar sort of the people; and yet for all that none of these Patricij was accounted noble, except some of their ancestors had borne the honourable offices of the state: many of the Patricij, who were descended from the Senators, and yet could not cite such their ancestors as had borne such honourable charge in the estate, (which was well to be understood by their statues or images) were accounted of as of men of base & low degree. So it came to pass, after the law Canuleia was made, that some even of the common sort of the people become noble, and some of the Patricij unnoble, that is to say, obscure and unknown. As Marcus Aemylius Scaurus, a man descended of the Senators raze, had his ancestors base and obscure men: whereas he himself being but a new man, came to be Praetor, Consul, and Censor, and at last being made chief of the Senate, raised nobility 
The noble Families in Rome. Licinia, Aurelia, Decia, Caecilia, Aelia, Domi●…ia, Cl●…adia, M●…tia, P●…rlia, Curia, Fabritia, Co●…cania, Acilia, Maria, Pompeia, Livia, junia. Tullia, Fulvia, Sempronia, Atilia, Calpurnia, Marcia, Pompilia, Luctatia, Platia.  to all his posterity. Wherefore the Roman nobility lay in the voices and judgement of the people, which as they thought best, bestowed the honourable preferments in the estate and Commonweal. Yet was it an absurd and most unreasonable thing, that any most wicked murderer and manquellar, were he never so basely borne, might by the benefit of bearing of some great place or office in the estate, leave nobility unto his posterity: whereas he which excelled in wisdom, justice, fortitude, and temperance, and so in all other virtues, godliness, and learning, yea and was descended also of the Senators race, if he could not show his ancestors statues, was even therefore accounted but as base and obscure. For such is the force of this word Ignobilis with the Latins, which in the self same sense is of the Greeks' called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; that is to say, such as either by some foul or notable fact or deed done, came into the knowledge of men: which is yet oftentimes taken in the better part, for they which are called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, refer it unto the honour of their house & stock: which amongst the Romans did especially appear amongst the Patricij or posterity of the ancient Senators: which for that they were almost dead and worn out, Caius Caesar by the law Cassia, and after that Augustus by the law Servia, chose many of the more noble families into the order of the Patricij. For before the law Canuleia it was lawful only for the Patricij to be bishops and priests, and for them alone to make sacrifices, and to keep the Auspicia or divine observations. But after that Genutius (first Consul that was made of the people) was in battle with the great slaughter of his army under his conduct overthrown, Patres non tam publica calamitate maesti, quàm feroces infoelicis Consulis plebei ductu, fremunt, omnibus locis, irent, crearent Consulem explebe, transferrent auspicia quo nefas esset, The fathers (as saith Livy) not so heavy for the public calamity, as become insolent with the evil conduct of the unfortunate Consul chosen from amongst the people, murmured and fretted in all places, that they should go and again created a Consul of the people; and thither to translate the Auspicia or divinations, whither it was not lawful for them so to do. And Appius Claudius the Consul, before that answered one of the Tribunes, ask him in an assembly of the people, Why one of the Consuls might not be chosen out of the people? Because (said he) none of the vulgar and common sort of the people can hold the Auspicia or divinations; and that therefore the Decemuiri had appointed a certain order of marriage, lest the sacred divinations should have been polluted with persons uncertainly descended. At which answer, the people was with indignation exceedingly enraged, to hear it denied them to hold the divinations, as if they were unto the immortal gods, more hateful than others. And albeit that the people at length had all things common with the Senators, viz. honours, commands, judgements, divinations, cures, priesthoods, counsels, powers, statues, triumphs, and all other the greatest preferments in the Commonweal; yet could it never be obtained, that any one of the common sort of the people, should nominat the Interrex, or pronounce who should be the Archpriest, the Priest of Mars, or of Romulus: or yet be chosen into the college of the Salij. But as a statue or image 
Certain honours in Rome never communicated unto the people.  was among the Romans the sign of nobility obtained: so in ancient time with us arms, with Cognisances set over them, were the tokens of nobility. Lawful it hath always been, and so still will be, for every man to devise unto himself his Cognisance to be 
Statues the sign of nobility among the Romans': as are arms with us.  known by, but yet not to usurp the Cognisances, or bear the arms of other noble families. But the ancient Grecians deemed not of nobility by the obtaining & bearing of great offices; which every man among the Athenians (after the law of Aristides, and the seditious declamations of Ephialtis) might by lot, and few by voices obtain: but 
How the ancient Graetians deemed their nobility.  nobility with them was still to be derived from the stock of their kings, or race of their great worthies, as from the Heraclide, the Aeacidaes, or Cecropidae, or from such other like: or else from such, as who for the worthy acts, either by themselves, or by their ancestors done, had by the general good liking, and public decree of the people, and of the nobility, with commendation obtained a crown of gold, extraordinary privileges, statues, to sit in the highest places, or to have their diet allowed them in the Prytanaeo, or other like public places: Such as is that decree of the Athenians (whereof Plutarch 
The P●…taneion was a place in Athens, wherein the judges and magistrates sat to consult of the great matters of state.  writeth) concerning Lycurgus the son of Lycophron, It pleased the people of Athens (saith he) that requital should be made unto such as had well deserved of the state, as to praise Lycurgus the son of Lycophron for his virtue and justice sake: and in the honour of him to erect a brazen Statue for him in the market place, except in such place as where the law forbiddeth any statue to be erected, and diet in the Prytanaeo to be for ever allowed unto the eldest of the posterity of Lycurgus. So in like manner Isaeus the orator writeth public diet, the first places, and privileges, to have been granted unto the posterity of Harmodius the tyrant queller. Which thing Aristotle reporteth to have been a thing common unto all the cities of Graece, to allow diet of the public 
The lenity of the graetians in bestowing their honours.  charge unto the children of such as had valiantly died for their country. Howbeit that the Grecians with too much lenity (should I say) or rather levity erected statues for such as had of them well deserved, which they upon the lest displeasure again cast down, and that with greater despite than they had with honour before set them up. So when the Athenians had appointed 365 statues to be set up in every place of the city in honour of Demetrius Phalereus, they again in a moment caused them all to be cast down: & not yet so contented broke them also with such fury, as that no fragment of them was left, except that only which was kept fast shut up in the tower of Pallas.  
Among the Hebrews were two sorts of noble men; the one descended from the 
The nobility of the jews: in whom it especially rested.  stock of Aaron, who only were priests: the other from the stock of the kings. For why, that nation wisely reposing their chief felicity in the sincerity of their religion, and the true worshipping of God, so likewise deemed their priests, which came nearest unto the power of the immortal God, to be of all others most noble. Yea God himself had an especial regard in making choice of Aaron, & in establishing of him after the most grievous revolts & misery of his people. And therefore as often as he commandeth extreme destruction to be denounced & threatened unto his people, he oftentimes doubleth that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, which is to say, That the state of the priest and of the common person, should be all one. And therefore when the jews had cast off from the servile yoke of Antiochus the Noble: the Family of the Aesmonaeans being of the stock of Aaron, held the high priesthood, together with the kingdom about two hundred years, that is to say, even unto the reign of Herod the Great. Wherein the Hebrews did well: for if great offices in Rome, got often times by corruption and bribery, left nobility unto their posterity which had so got them: what let is there why the priesthood of the eternal God, should not much more also ennoble men, especially if we measure 
Priesthood honourable.  nobility by the places men hold, and not by their persons. Truly all the best learned lawyers are of opinion, That the priestly dignity is to be preferred before all other honours and vocations: and that the ministers of divine things, & moderators of the most sacred rites, are not to be accounted among the number of the vulgar & common people: 
The most ancient kings to have been also priests.  which is no new or strange opinion, but drawn & derived even from the most ancient antiquity. For the most ancient kings, to make their royal power the more reverend and stately, exercised also the priestly dignity. Neither did the Greeks only, but the Roman kings also, yea and the greatest emperors themselves, style themselves high Priests or Bishops, whom the chief Arabian princes being also bishops, seem therein to have followed. And so the Christian kings being by their religion forbidden to mingle profane things with sacred or arms with religions; yet took that which was next; that is to say, in preferring a sacred, order of the Clergy, not only before the common and vulgar sort of the people, but before the Senators, yea and not before them alone, but even before dukes, earls, and other magistrates whatsoever: giving unto them the highest rooms, and first places next unto the kings themselves, in all assemblies, counsels, enacting of laws, and granting of liberties and privileges. And why not? when as the most ancient people of the Celtes, accounted their Druids, who were the princes of their religion and judgements, superiors not unto the common sort of the people only, but even unto their captains and rulers also. For which cause Caesar in recounting of their degrees, first reckoneth up the Druids, than their knights or horsemen, and after them the common people. For the order of knights in the time of their ancestors, with a most strong power of horsemen excelled all people; as witnesseth Caesar himself, as also Marcus Antonius: so that therefore I suppose them to have 
The great honour the Turkish and Arabian princes do unto their Musties or high priests.  been called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; for the Greeks call him 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, whom the Latins called Sellarium, and we an horseman. We said before the Turkish and Arabian princes yet in all their kingdoms and empires, to honour and observe their Muftis, or high Bishops, with the greatest honour and respect possibly to be given unto them, still referring unto them the greatest and most doubtful questions of their law, to be by them decided. Yet the Venetians use to exclude their priests from their counsels, from all 
The order of the Venetian Commonweal.  places of command, and from all offices, lest haply they should bewray the secrets of the city unto the pope, to whom they are by duty & oath bound. Wherefore among 
The Florentine how they divided their citizens  the Venetians, the order of the Senators is first and chief of all others, for that in it is the sovereign power of that state: next unto the Senators follow the gentlemen, who are not accounted of the number of the Senators▪ and last of all the c●…mmonerss, who yet are both by one name called Citadinia, or citizens. But the Florentines before that all was swayed by one man's command, divided not only the nobility from the clergy, but even from the common people also; and the common people they divided again into three sorts, of whom such as exceeded in wealth were called the Great ones, others of meaner wealth were called Popular Commoners, and they of the third sort, the refuse of the whole people. The ancient Egyptians much better divided 
The ancients, Egyptians how they divided their citizens.  their whole multitude of citizens, into Priests, Soldiers, and Labourers: setting the Priests and Soldiers, whom they called Calasyri, free from all taxes and payments. Hyppodamus, who gave laws unto the Melesians, did a little otherwise divide the people into Soldiers, Artificers, and Husbandmen: whose writings Aristotle seemeth either not to have well understood, or else not so wisely reproved, as is evidently to be gathered of those fragments which are yet to be seen extant in Stobaeus. I know not also how it came into Plato his mind, that having made a division of his citizens into Keepers, Soldiers, and Husbandmen, he separateth the Soldiers (under whose bucklers and defence the citizens aught to rest) I know not how, from keepers. But in brief, he would have the keepers of his Commonweal to excel all others in wisdom and experience: and so to rule over them, without any respect to be had either to the honour of their dissent, or to the greatness of their wealth or substance. Truly it was wisely so set down by that most wise man: who although he were himself descended of the most ancient stock of the Senators, and derived his pedigree by the mother's side even from Solon himself, the Athenian lawgiver, yet thought the true glory of nobility and sovereignty to consist in virtue only: Which thing Euripides had before also wittily said, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Wherhfore let us measure true nobility by virtue, for that therein not only Philosophers and Divines, but also Poets, Historiographers, and almost 
True nobility to be measured by virtue.  all lawyers, do with one consent in mine opinion agreed, denying any place to be left for nobility without honesty. And two things propounded, to wit, Noble descent, & Virtue, they have decreed, That the more higher & more honourable place is to be given 
The knowledge of secret and most excellent things, the second cause of nobility.  unto virtue, whether question be of bearing of rule, or of honour, or concerning the gravity and weight of their testimonies and witness. The next cause of nobility unto virtue, many have appointed to be the knowledge of hidden and most excellent things, whom they which have attained thereunto, the law itself expressly calleth most noble▪ whom (saith the law) Knowledge maketh most noble: or else as Cassiodorus saith, ex obscuro nobilem efficit doctrina, Learning maketh of an obscure man a gentleman. But then how much more noble is he than both of them, whom moral virtue concurring 
Integrity to be preferred before knowledge.  with the virtues of the mind and knowledge, hath together ●…obled? But yet if integrity be divided from such knowledge of most secret and most excellent things, the priority in this case is of right to be given unto integrity and virtue: except in such vocations and callings, as wherein such excellent knowledge is of necessity required: For why, it is better and more agreeing with reason, to have a General skilful in martial affairs, although he be otherwise a naughty man to govern an army, than a good man which is no soldier at all: but of these things more shall in due place be said.  
But yet that which Plato setteth down, That they which are but obscurely borne, 
Virtue joined▪ with noble descent to be preferred before nobility for virtue only.  excelling in virtues, are to be preferred before them which are nobly descended, excelling also in the same virtues with them; seemeth to me a thing very absurd and unreasonable. And truly these two things thus propounded, it is right that some regard should be had of the virtue and nobility of a man's ancestors, and on that opinion the Lawyers have always been, whether question be for the obtaining of honours, or for the taking of places in solemn assemblies & meetings, That they are still to be preferred, which both for their own virtues and the nobility of their ancestors together, are to be commended. But he whom the prince hath made noble, although he be not of any account or worth, either for his own virtue, or for the virtues of his ancestors, 
Civil nobility by the prince unworthily bestowed, no true nobility.  or for his learning & knowledge: yet by the consent of all the Lawyers he is to be accounted in the rank and order of the Nobility. And therefore Pliny writing to Traian said: Caesaris esse ut nobiles efficeret ac tueretur, That it was the Emperor's part to make noble men, & also to defend them. But this nobility Bartholus, not unfitly hath called Civil nobility; declaring thereby them to have so gotten a certain sergeant kind of nobility in the opinion of men, but yet indeed to have no part of the honour of true nobility, without virtue. Wherhfore let us grant them to enjoy the first-fruits of such their civil nobility, unto whom they are so by the prince's gift & grant conferred▪ whether that such their nobility be for money or reward, or for the prime of their youth, or for some other their most foul and filthy services, by the princes bestowed upon them. But to bestow such nobility belongeth only to them which have the power in sovereignty: and to them also whom Bartholus writeth to have but the principality, especially if they be subject unto the command of superior princes, or have fellows or companions in their government: who cannot so much as make a man base borne to be legitimate. Much less true it is, that some have written, the minions and domestical attendants of princes to be therefore become noble: for albeit that they thereby enjoy certain privileges and exemptions from other services, yet are they not therefore to be accounted noble, except they have borne the greater and more honourable offices and places of command.  
Yet question is, and I see it to have often times been before demanded, whether 
Whether an honourable fe●…, make a man noble or no●….  he which by some chance or casualty hath obtained some great place of service, or other fee, be thereby made noble? which I see to have so pleased many, so that an honourable power and command be knit and joined to such fee; such as are those of Dukes, Counties, and Marquesses, or that the title of nobility be by the sovereign Prince expressly set down in the charters and grants of homage and fealty, and so given unto the things themselves, and the professors thereof. And hereof rise that beginning of noble and unnoble fees. But by the custom of our country, wherein fees are deemed by of the same right and nature that other lands and possessions be: as concerning 
Nobility not to depend of lands or fees.  the right of the persons that had them, the Artificer which by inheritance, or by purchase possesseth a Dukedom, is nothing therefore the more noble, then if he possessed other tributary lands: For why it seemed unto our ancestors an absurd thing, out of the right of the land to fish out that honour which they otherwise had not▪ and the persons themselves to give place unto the things as a picture unto the table where on it is painted, and much more indignity that the right of nobility should be 
Of virtue and nobility do traffic is to be made.  so bought and sold. For of two of the greatest things, namely, of Virtue, and of Nobility, as Euripides plainly witnesseth no traffic is to be made, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  
Wherhfore seeing that by our customs, aswell as by the customs of the Germane, the Spaniards, the Britons, and Italians, all these fees, whether it please you to term them privileges or services by chance obtained are to be bought and sold, who can of right think himself any whit the more noble for the having of such mercenary things? And yet it is lawful for every most base Cobbler having got such fee, to created his vassals to hold of him; as it is also for every most honourable person to receive his own base vassal. Whereby it appeareth, that wealth and riches be they never so great, can neither get nor bring forth any true nobility at all. Howbeit that 
Wealth & riches be they never so great to bring forth no true nobility.  Euripides bringeth in a person according to the opinion of the common people thus speaking: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Nobility is in riches. And in Aulide: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  
And yet we read not only the vulgar add common sort of men, but even * Aristotle 
Lib. 4. poli●….  also himself to have placed the first degree of nobility in wealth; the second in honourable descent; and the third in virtue, placing that last which should have been in order first. Solon also in like manner made choice of the citizens of Athens by their wealth and riches, unto honours and places of command: the cause whereof we will in due place declare. Which opinion hath taken so deep root, that many think wealth, riches, and great substance, not only to beget nobility, but that all the glory of nobility is by poverty & want of wealth quite extinguished and blotted out, howbeit that they which so say are themselves but men of small authority and credit. Truly Augustus the emperor supplied the wants of the poorer sort of the Senators, jest that most honourable order should have been with poverty oppressed. But Bartholus hath expressly written, True nobility to be neither got by wealth, nor lost by poverty. Neither did M. Aemylius Scaurus deem the honour of his house to be taken 
True nobility to by neither got by wealth, not lost by poverty.  from him by his poverty: yea the nobility and glory of his family delivered him from the power of his most gracious and mighty accusors. Now than if there be a most shameful villain, and thereto rich withal; shall he therefore be in degree superior unto the honest poorer sort? men I think will not so say: then how much less aught we to judge murderers and men polluted with all kind of villainies, because they abound with wealth to be therefore the more noble? For why the Romans always divided wealth from nobility, for so Tacitus reporteth of Cassius and Syllanus, the one of whom saith he excelled in ancient wealth, & the other in the honour of his ancestors. And so Cicero called Rossius for nobility and wealth the chief man of the town wherein he dwelled. Wherhfore our kings at such time as they, troubled with wars and pressed with want of coin, had set nobility to sale, and that many men for their bad lives infamous, were yet for their money become noble▪ the Prince by a law made, declared none of them to be therefore so to be deemed noble, but that he might still be accounted amongst the number of the meaner sort, and bear offices amongst them. For what can be more absurd or pernicious, than to measure reputation by gain, degree by money, and nobility by wealth? whereas these things often times by theft and robbery, or immoderate lavash prodigality of tyrants are bestowed upon every bad fellow, or by some other chance, (although in truth nothing be by chance done) or fortunes frailty (whereof they be called the goods of fortune) given unto men, and so also again from them taken. Whereas honesty doth in nothing participate with fortune, nor the true possession of virtue and nobility can by theft be taken away, nor by fire be consumed, nor by the inundation of waters drowned, nor by any other force extinguished. But for as much as we are for the most part led by the vain opinion and popular errors of men, whereof both all public and private laws consist; it hath also prevailed, that he which hath either by the Princes grant, or by his own▪ virtue, or wealth, or learning, or service in wars obtained nobility, may of right transfer the same not only unto his posterity, but even unto them also whom he hath adopted. And that contrary to the decrees as well of the Divines, as of the Philosophers: Whereby it is sufficiently understood all sorts of men to have had their beginning from the rotten earth, as it is said, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. But it is one thing to reason of degrees and dignities in the assembly of wise men; and another thing to do it in the presence of the vulgar sort, and scum of the people. And yet nevertheless it not only is, but always also hath been a thing both honest and necessary, for every man to yield and consent unto the Laws and customs of his own city and country. And yet for all that some would not that the virtues, deserts, and honour 
How far the honour of the ancestors should extend unto their posterity.  of the Grandfathers should be extended farther than unto their Nephew's sons, and that also unto such as were of themselves lawfully descended, and not unto their bastards or base borne. True it is, that by the customs of the Turks, every man's degree & reputation is esteemed by his own worth and virtue, neither doth the grandfathers valour or nobility reach farther than their nephews: wherein they do also 
A good custom of the Turks, whose reputation still dependeth of their own worth and virtue, and not of their ancestors.  wisely, to the intent that every one of them should endeavour themselves by their own virtues to renew the declining honour of their stock and kindred; being otherwise, to be accounted in the number of the base and common sort of people. Howbeit that by our depraved and corrupt manners, the farther that a man is in descent or degree from the virtue of his ancestors, from whom he took the beginning of his honour, the more noble he is therefore reputed: neither if he shall by all manner of villainies, or looseness of life dishonest himself, doth he therefore lose his degree or honour, except he be in public judgement noted with infamy: in which case although he leave his lewd life and the company of wicked men, and join himself with the good, yet shall he not again recover his nobility▪ so by judgement once lost, but by the Princes restoring of him, and by special rescript. And as he himself from his ancestors received nobility, so doth he also unto his posterity derive the note of infamy, whether he were by right or wrong condemned: for that a thing by judgement passed, is still accounted to be indeed a thing true. And what marvel? seeing that 
Noble men by exercising of base trades, to lose their nobility thereby.  he which exerciseth base trades, and not beseeming a noble man, is even without any such public judgement to be thrust into the order of common persons. But which be such base trades is an high question, by reason of the divers Laws of divers nations, in that point one of them most unlike another. Herodotus writeth, That in his time they were by the customs of all people accounted base, which used handycraftes: 
handicrafts accounted base trades.  of which opinion we read Xenophon also to have been, who yet yieldeth a reason thereof not beseeming a philosopher; as forsooth that men of such occupations were still busied, and led a close and sedentary life: for what can be more painful or troublesome than the generals life? or more close and sedentary than the judges calling? And yet what can be more glorious or more noble than they both are in every City and Commonweal? But Aristotle said better, who writ all Mechanical 
handicrafts men why ●…hey commonly are basely minded.  or handiecraftes men in the cities of Graece to have been still kept from council, from all command, and honours: for that they being mercenary men, and to be hired for wages, had quite lost the strength and power of a noble and heroical mind. And truly the * Master of wisdom itself repelleth husbandmen, 
Eccles. cap. 38.  Smiths, Potters▪ Image makers, and such other handicrafts men from bearing of authority and rule, from honours, and from taking places with the judges. Lycurgus 
The Lacedaemonian and Roman citizens by Lycurgus and Romulus their lawgivers forbidden to exercise mechanical or handicrafts.  also and Romulus separated their citizens far from all handicrafts; yet Romulus permitted his citizens to use husbandry, and to bear arms: whereas Lycurgus gave his leave only to exercise arms. And to the end it may be the less doubted of, Dionysius Halycarnasseus repeating the same thing saith: Hoc lustro, qui puberes essent supra centum millia censa: mulierum autem, servorum, mercatorum, artesque sordidas exercentium (siquidem Romanorum nemini cauponariam artem, aut ulla opificia tractare licet) triplo plus quàm turbae civilis, In this view were mustered of them that were fourteen year old, above an hundred thousand: but of women, servants, merchants, & such as used base occupations and trades, (for why it is not lawful for any Roman to keep a Tavern, or to exercise any other handicraft) were reckoned three times more than there were of the civiler sort or citizens. Yet some there be which think Numa Pompilius to have derogated from the law of Romulus, seeing that he appointed Colleges or Companies of artificers, as if they might not have been made of strangers, or of slaves. Which seemeth to be also confirmed by that which Cicero said, Many to have been in Catilins' conspiracy, which flocked together about the Taverns, in hope that the minds of the needy might for money be moved to take his part. And by that also, that the Tribunes of the people had by the company and rout of the Artificers, wont to guard themselves against the insolency of the Consuls. But against these repugneth that which Dionysius Halycarnasseus writeth, viz. that in the seventh view were mustered an hundred thousand citizens, beside artificers: By which words it is manifest, that Numa derogated not from Romulus his law, for as much as king Servius, the third from Numa, was the first that so viewed or mustered the people. Neither doth that which is alleged convince them to have been citizens whom the Tribunes or seditious citizens stirred up to rebellion, seeing that very slaves in like case were often times called unto liberty: as we read they sometimes were by C. Cinna. Cicero also thus speaketh of the Artificers, whom the conspirators with Catiline stirred up to rebellion: Etenim omne eorum instrumentum, omnis opera, ac quaestus, frequentia civium sustinetur, alitur otio, For (saith he) all their instruments and tools, all their work and gain, is maintained 
All Roman citizens bound to bear arms.  by the multitude of citizens, and with quietness nourished. Now it were very improperly said, artificers to be maintained by the multitude of citizens, if they themselves had been also citizens. But by the Martial law of the Romans, the citizens after 
Toga virilis or the man's gown was by the Roman citizens worn, when they were come to be seventeen year old.  they had begun once to wear the * man's gown, were compelled to serve in the wars until they were five and fifty years old. Neither was there any way for a citizen of Rome to attain unto any honour, except he had served in the wars ten years: For which cause it is by Livy reported, two thousand of the citizens to have been openly sold, for that they had not for four years space served in the wars; which could by no means have been done unto artificers: whom Livy also in one place writeth, to have been men altogether unfit for the wars. That testimony of Cicero is in this point also of more weight: Illiberales sunt & sordidi quaestus mercinariorum omnium, quorum opera non quorum arts emuntur, est enim in illis ipsa merces author amentum servitutis, The gains (saith he) of all mercenary men are servile and base, whose works and not whose skill are of men bought, for in them their very wares is the earnest penny of their slavery. But where he speaketh of the Roman citizens indeed, he neither thinketh nor writeth any thing of them which is contemptible or base, or that soundeth not unto their reputation and honour. Whereby it is to be understood 
The base regard that was had in Rome of artificers and men of occupation.  Artificers and men of occupation in Rome, to have been either slaves, or strangers, and men of most base and low estate and condition: or if that by manumission they were become citizens of Rome, yet they were therefore but in the number of Libertines, having as it were in some sort lost the right of the citizens of Rome, no otherwise then Noble men with us, which have given themselves to base and gainful occupations or trades, who as they have thereby left their nobility: so have they also lost their degrees and places: except they have therefore obtained pardon of our Prince, as that enforced with necessity, they have so intermeddled in such base trades. 
Whether to use the trade of merchandise be against a man's credit and reputation or not?   
Howbeit concerning the trade of merchandise, it is not well agreed upon betwixt the Lawyers and the ancient writers amongst themselves, whether it be repugnant unto a man's credit and reputation or not. We read that by the Tribunal law Claudia, it was forbidden the Senators to have any greater ship at Sea, then of the burden 
Amphoras, the Roman measure is more than our bushel by 16 pound weight.  of three hundred Amphoras, and that also for the carrying of the first-fruits of their lands: Quaestus omnis (saith Livy) patribus indecorus visus, All gaining by trade (saith he) seemed unto the Senators unseemly. Which law Hortensius said to be in his time dead: as in Cicero we read: Whereby it is yet to be gathered, that not only to have been lawful for the rest of the citizens to do, every man's credit and reputation saved whole: But also even the Senators themselves, not to have altogether abstained from the trade of merchandise, or at lest wise to have had their factors; as we see the manner is for the Venetian, Spanish, and English gentlemen to have. And that it was lawful for the Roman knights or gentlemen to use the trade of merchandise, or at lest wise that it was not altogether forbidden them, is to be proved 
The Roman knights and gentlemen to have used the trade of merchandise.  by that which Cicero saith against Verres: Lucius Praetius splendidissimus Eques Romanus qui Panormi negotiatur, Lucius Praetius a most worthy Roman knight, which doth trade at Panormo. And in another place: Q. Mutius Eques Romanus qui Syracusis, Q. Mutius a Roman knight who tradeth at Syracuse. Much less therefore was the trade of merchandise forbidden the common sort of men. And yet although by the old custom of the Romans, it was no shame for the citizens to trade merchandise: (yet I say) it seemeth not for all that to have been altogether lawful for them so to do: as is to be proved out of Dionysius Halycarnasseus, who writeth above an hundred thousand citizens to have been cessed: but of women, and merchants, and others of base trades, three times as many as of the citizens: whereby he seemeth to have exempted merchants out of the number of the Roman citizens.  
Neither do we see that to have been the manner and fashion of the Romans only, 
The better sort of citizens in divers commonweals forbidden to deal in the trade of merchandise.  but of the Lacedæmonians and Thebans also. Howbeit that the use of gold and silver, being taken from the Lacedæmonians, there was no place left for merchandise: yet was it Lycurgus his pleasure, by an especial law more solemnly to provide therefore. As for the Theban citizens, it was not otherwise lawful for them either to sue for the magistracies, or honourable offices of the Commonweal, or to accept thereof being offered them, except they had full ten years before abstained from the trade of merchandise. And at length by the imperial laws all entrance unto honours, and places of command were shut up unto the order of merchants: and not that only, but even to deal in the trade of merchandise was aswell forbidden the nobility, as to intermeddle with martial affairs was forbidden merchants. By which laws the trade of merchandise seemeth unto many either base▪ or not very honest or commendable. Truly Plato, Aristotle, Apollonius, Thyaneus, say, The trade of merchandise to be an enemy unto virtue. Yea the law of God seemeth also to have restrained the holy people from the trade of merchandise, in these words, Non erit mercator in populo tuo, 
The people of God forbidden to be merchants.  There shall be no merchant in thy people: that is to say, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, which word improperly signifieth a deceiver, but more properly a merchant: for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, is properly to buy & cell; and in that sense it is almost always used. For that divine law which forbade the people, but not strangers, to commit usury, seemeth also to have forbidden to buy any thing, to cell the same thing the dearer unto a natural Israelite. Whereunto agreeth that which he the * Prince of wisdom writeth, Mercatorem manus a scelere puras vix 
Eccles. 24. Ezech chap. 82  habiturum, A merchant hardly to have his hands clean from wickedness. Wherhfore the * Prophet's most often, and the interpreters of holy scripture, more often do 
Chrysost. Homil▪ 21. in Mat●…eum.  so detest the trade of merchants, as that * chrysostom not obscurely or doubtfully, but even plainly denieth, That merchants can please God, by reason of their lies, perjuries, and deceits, and for that they are still prove unto unhonest gain, as Ulpian the lawyer writeth.  
Yet of that we are to he warned, that whereas the immortal God forbidden his people (whom he by a singular right and choice had consecrated unto himself) to trade in merchandise: belongeth not to other people in like manner also; for that he would have this his people to excel all others in purity and integrity of life. For why, merchandise is not only unto cities profitable, but honest also; and not only honest, but also necessary. For what if a city be built in such a barren soil, or situate in such a place, 
The trade of merchandise both honest and necessary.  as that men cannot therein not commodiously, but even not at all otherwise live? Such as we have heard the city of Athens to have been, and as our Limoge, and the Germane Nuremberg is: and Venice also the beauty of the Mediterranean sea. Which four cities without traffic and the trade of merchandise had never been such and so great as they were and are. Wherhfore M. Tullius out of the number of merchants, or at leastwise of base men, exempteth them which exercise a plentiful and gainful, and not a base and bore trade of merchandise, Mercatura si tenuis est, sordida putanda est, simagna & copiosa, multa undique apportans, multisque sine vanitate impertiens, non est admodum vituperanda, The trade of merchandise (saith he) if it be small and bore, is to be accounted also base, but if it be great and plentiful, bringing in on every side many commodities, and without vanity commnnicating the same unto many, it is not much to be discommended. Whereunto I would add that of Plato's, if it bring in but such things as are necessary, or at leastwise profitable for the citizens, and carry out but such things as are unprofitable, and to be spared. And therefore many lawyers say, The trade of marcandise abounding in plenty of all things, in nothing to derogat from the honour of a man's birth, his degree, or nobility. Which haply may be so in Italy, in England, and in Portugal, but not with us in France, nor yet in Germany. Yet that is every where 
The merchants trade in divers countries diversly reputed of.  true which Cicero writeth, Sordido's judicari qui mercantur a mercatoribus quod eodem loco ac momento vendant, Them to be deemed but base, which buy of merchants that which they hold even in the same place, and self same moment again cell: for why, they should gain nothing, except they should lie loudly: whereas nothing is more foul than vanity and lying. Whersore they do wisely which forbidden not only the nobility, but even the magistrates & soldiers also to deal in the trade of merchandise, lest under the colour of such traffic, a way be opened and given to baseness and rapine: neither is it to be suffered, that he which cannot by himself, should by the help and ministery of his servants in that point defraud the law.  
But base than these are the buyers and sellers of things dishonest, be they never so precious, and to be placed beneath handy craftsmen and labourers, or rather so much as is possible to be quite driven our of all cities: which cannot yet altogether be done, 
The same thing that in one place is accounted honest or profitable in some other to be reputed dishonest or unprofitable.  for that the law for things honest and dishonest, for things profitable and disprofitable, is not every where one and the same. We have heard painting and engraving to have been much commended and respected▪ by the estimation that the Greeks' and Latins had of them. For who was more famous than Protogenes? or more glorious than Apelles? one of whose tables, which for that it was most curiously wrought, preserved the Rhodes from destruction, Demetrius besieging of it: Which table is reported to have been esteemed at more than three hundred talents. And as Tully saith, It was given as a praise & commendation to Fabius, a most noble gentleman, That he was seen in painting: which yet the Hebrews account of all other occupations the basest. And by the laws and customs of the Turks, as of all them of the East, and of Africa also, it is not only a base thing, but capital also, with the needle, pencil, or moulding, with any pictures or lineaments to shadow or draw the purtrature of any plant, or living creature, or of whatsoever thing else that nature hath created. We read also the profession of Physic to have been amongst the Romans a servile and abject thing, and Physic itself to have been excluded from the other liberal sciences; which yet for all that the Hebrews and Greeks' ever had in great estimation: and begun then to be of our countrymen regarded, when as the Arabians had first divided Surgeons and Apothecaries from Physicians, using them but as their instruments and ministers. And albeit that Physicians be in cities to be reverenced, yet is it not to 
Eccles. cap. 38  be suffered them to be equal with orators and lawyers. For why, the most famous Philosophers have defined the civil and lawful knowledge of the law, to be the moderator and chief governor, not of arts only, but even of all liberal sciences also. And Rome (as Marcus Cato witnesseth) flourished above six hundred years without Physicians: whereas no city can without laws, and the lawful knowledge of the law, any small while endure or stand.  
The order and vocation of Husbandmen and Graziers, is also right commendable: 
The vocation of husbandmen and graziers in ancient time right commendable, and why now less respected.  as they which by those two most ancient trades, have taught cities, towns, villages, and families, to relieve and maintain themselves with things of all others most necessary. And truly Cyrus the Greater, of nothing vaunteth so much, as of the fields set and planted by his own industry and labour. Serranus, also Curius, Concinnatus, Torquatus, and Cato, men no less famous for their civil than their domestical praises; were yet for that most commended, Quod attritis opere rustico manibus salutem publicam stabilirent: quaeque modo arantium boum iuga rexerant, triumphalis currus habenas retinerent, That with their hands worn with country labour, they established the welfare of the Commonweal: and that those hands which of late ruled the yokes of oxen at plough, now held the rains of the triumphal chariots in the city of Rome. But these things were chief done in that age when as such men as had before been Consuls were now from the plough called unto the Dictatorship. Truly of all things whereby any thing is gotten, nothing is better than husbandry & grazing, nothing more plentiful, nothing more pleasant, and I might say also with Theophrastus, nothing better beseeming a free borne man, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: were not these most notable arts, in servile manner contumeliously let out unto base men, for wages hired. Now we have said those arts to be accounted base, whose wages is the earnest penny of their slavery: so that it aught not to seem strange, if that husbandmen in the fall of the Roman Commonweal were put back from the wars. Whereof it followeth, both the orders and degrees of husbandmen (I say) and shepherds to be placed in the rank and number of labouring men. For necessity itself (yea often times against reason) enforceth the dignity of degrees and vocations of men to be disposed of according to the laws and customs of every city and country.  
The Hangman's office almost every where is deemed of all other the basest: neither 
The hangman's office in some places respected▪▪ Deut. 17. and 19  by the Censors laws was it for him lawful to have a dwelling place within the city: as in this our age it is not lawful for him at Tholouse. Whereas by the laws of the Hebrews it was not only honest, but necessary also, even the noblest of them if they had been witnesses of capital crimes, to be also the executioners therein. Yea and 
The author in this custom by him reported much mistaken and deceived.  in England the nearest kin to them that be hanged, be it their fathers, their brethren, or nearest kinsmen, the last kindness they can do them, is to play the part of the hangman, and to strangle them hanging upon a low pair of gallows. But by our customs we see gainful rewards propounded unto this so base an office, lest we should be at any time destitute of an office so necessary for the cities: as we have heard say it to have long since happened in Gaunt, where the judge for lack of an hangman commanded the father and the son, both convicted and condemned for the same offence, to cast lots which of them should be the others hangman; wherein the lot fell unto the father, who now grown very aged, with much entreaty obtained that his son, as by age the stronger, and so fit to live, might become the executioner; who without fear hanged his father: the eternal monument of which impiety and villainy (which I against my will have beholden) the Gantois suffer yet to stand in statues of brass, and that in a public and open place even in the midst of the city.  
There is also in cities a great multitude of idle lazy fellows, who neither in time of 
Idle people to be thrust out of the city, or elssetto work.  peace, nor war, have any occupations to set themselves to work, o●… other trade to busy themselves withal: whom it is needful either to banish out of the city, or to keep them in public works: for why, they can in no degree be placed, and so much the more, if they have nothing of their own wherewith to maintain that their idle life. And these kind of men Amasis' king of Egypt put to death, in like manner as if they had been thieves and robbers. Wherein they of Paris do much better, who thrust the strong and lusty of these idle mates into their public works; courteously ●…eeding and curing the sick and aged, and diligently instructing the fatherless and poor boys and maids, some in learning, some in occupations, in four divers colleges, besides a great hospital endowed with most fair revenues.  
But if citizens live idle upon such goods as they have themselves before got, or were of old left them, albeit that they lead a foul and sluggish kind of life, yet are they to be therein suffered, if it were but that they might with their wealth help the poor Commonweals wherein they live. But if these men feed also their mind with the contemplation of high and heavenly things, I deem them then of all sorts of citizens the happiest, and to be placed in the highest ranks and degrees of them. But if they had rather lead an active than a quiet kind of life, it is much better to call them than poorer men unto honours and magistracies, if no dishonesty of life let: for that they are like to be clearer from bribery and corruption, than they which are pressed with poverty and want. Wherhfore in obtaining of magistracies and honours, the law commandeth the richer sort to be oftentimes placed together with the nobler; yea and some times also to be preferred before them, if no stain of their fore passed life let: and that is well agreeing unto the laws and customs of the Indian's, whom Pliny writeth to prefer still the best and richest man unto honours and places of command.  
Wherhfore in what order citizens are to be placed, is to be referred unto the judgement and discretion of the masters of the ceremonies of every city, for the unliknesse of 
How citizens are in a Monarchy to be ordered and placed.  their laws and customs almost infinite. Yet I suppose, that citizens in a monarchy might in this order not unaptly be placed. That next unto the king himself, who out of the number of the citizens, going far before the rest should follow the holy order of the clergy: next unto the sacred order of the clergy, the Senate: after the Senate should follow the martial men, and amongst them, first the general of the army, or great constable, & then the dukes, counties, marquess', governors of provinces, landgraves, burgraves, captains of castles, vassals, and other soldiers, with such others, as upon whom the charge of the wars, by the custom of our ancestors lieth. After them should follow the order of gown men, which should contain the colleges of magistrates, and companies of judges, partly divided into their places, with orators, lawyers, pleaders, advocates, attourneys, proctor's, scribes, registers, notaries, sergeants, apparitors, garders, triers, trumpeters, gailors, and all the company belonging to the law. Next unto whom should follow the order of physicians, surgeons, and apothecary's. And after them school men, such as professed to instruct the youth, or are themselves instructed; the professors (I say) of divinity, law, and physic, natural philosophers, mathematicians, logicians, rhetoricians, historiographers, poets, and grammarians. After the order of gown men, I suppose are to be placed merchants, agents, farmers of the common custom, bankers, money chaungers, brokers, and especially they which have the charge for the bringing in of corn into the city, and of such other things as are most necessary for the feeding of the citizens, such as are the cornmungers, butchers, fishmungers, fishers, bakers, puddingmakers, cooks, unto whom we will join husbandmen and graziers; and unto these all kind and sort of handicrafts men: which for that they seem almost innumerable, of them, they which are the most profitable, aught to have the first place, carpenters (I say) armourers, masons, metal men, coiners, gold beaters, goldsmiths, metal melters, glass makers, smiths, bakers, potters, horners, chandler's, weavers also, and such as deal in spinning of silk, wool, beasts, hair, flax, hemp, cotton wool, and such other like, whereof we see cloth, ropes, garments, hangings, sails, and paper to be made. Next unto whom follow curriers, skinner's, fullers, dyer's, tailors, shoemakers: unto which occupations, although printing be not for antiquity to 
Printers to be amongst men of occupations especially to be regarded.  be compared, yet seemeth it for the excellency thereof, before all the rest worthily to be preferred. For as for painters, image makers, carvers, makers and sellers of women's paintings, minstrels, players, dancers, fencers, tumblers, jesters, and bawds, are in mine opinion either to be quite driven out of cities, or else to be placed in the lowest place of all: so that even bathe keepers, barbers, sailors, hucksters, ostlers, coach men, carters, grave makers, sergeant, and hangmen, are to be placed before them: For that these are indeed necessary for the carrying out of filth, and the cleansing of the citizens and city's: whereas the other with their most base trades, the ministers of foul and vain pleasures, not only corrupt the citizens manners, but utterly overthrow even the cities themselves. But we have so described the orders of citizens, not so much that the dignity, as the condition of every one of them might so the better be understood.  
Neither are citizens but most seldom, and that also in time of great necessity, to be 
citizens but seldom and that also upon great necessity to be into orders divided.  in orders from other citizens divided: for that so doing may give occasion and minister matter unto civil sedition: when as some of them divided from other some, shall perceive themselves to be noted also with a difference of their order and degree. Yea we said, that the citizens of one and the same trade or occupation were not in one street or quarter of the city to be together placed: except they were by the straightness of the places or opportunity of the waters they were to use, thereto enforced; as butchers, curriers, felmungers, bath keepers: who for that they are to have the continual use of water for their often washing, must have their dwellings also near unto the rivers sides: so are also armourers, and smiths, to be placed apart by themselves from scholars and students, as for other handicrafts men, merchants, and trades men, it is good to have them separated one from another, and to be divided into every part of the city, that the citizens may more commodiously use their help in general, and not in time of danger be enforced oftentimes to run from the furthest place of the city to the furthest. Whereunto is to be joined, that citizens of the same occupation or trade, divided into divers parts of the city, cannot so easily conspire against the common good, or delude 
citizens better to be divided into three parts, than into two.  the laws, as if they devil together. But if assembly of all the orders and degrees of citizens, must of necessity be made (for that degrees must needs in some sort be distinguished from degrees, that a certain dignity of degrees may be kept) especial care is to be had, that the citizens be not divided into two parts only, and yet that in such assemblies there be not more than three degrees or places: for that contention arising betwixt two, they easily break out into force; or else upon equal voices break off, and leave the matter undecided: when as one thing is contrary but only unto one, and that by nature many things cannot unto one be contrary, but that the third must of necessity join itself unto the one of the two, so to reconcile them together: whereas if there be more than three parts, and in number equal, the same inconveniences do follow (that do of two) the even number being easily to be divided into two parts: but if in number unequal the number of opinions divers will hardly end the controversies once moved.  
It shall also be more commodious and profitable to have one orator or speaker, 
Whether it be good for to have one speaker for all the degrees of citizens, or divers.  for all the degrees of citizens together, then for divers orders and degrees, divers: so that it be agreed upon amongst all the degrees and orders what is to be requested, determined of, or done: as heretofore at Thurin and Orleans, when they called their assemblies. But if the orders and decrees of citizens shall therein differ among themselves, it is then needful for every order and degree of the citizens, to have their own speaker. As of late in the parliament of Bloyse, when as the Bishops grievously complained of the Nobilirie; and again the Nobility of the Bishops; and the Commonalty of them both, it was then needful to have three Speakers appointed: and yet so could not the good of the people be sufficiently provided for, but that the Speakers were blamed of falsehood and collusion, and that divers great and grievous complaints of the people were thereof given out. But these things are especially to be taken heed of in a Monarchy, wherein one man is judge of all controversies: Whereas in other kinds of states, albeit that there be many speakers, yet the matter is still in the end put to voices.  
But that division of the citizens (which we have spoken of) into three degrees or parts, 
Better three parts taking in a commonweal than two.  as it is unto all kinds of cities profitable, so is it in an aristocraty most necessary, that two of them disagreeing, the third may end the strife, or taking part with one, may draw the other whether it will or not from the former received opinion. For if two factions shall arise, they which are wise, & wish the good & welfare of the Commonweal, should set up an head of a third faction, and join themselves unto him: For three leaders of divers factions, or part▪ takers, are right easily reconciled; whereas two are most hardly brought to agreement: whereof oftentimes arise seditions and civil wars, and that especially in the Aristocratike estate: For that in that estate, betwixt the nobility and common people, can be no third degree, all the right of sovereignty being in the nobility, and nothing thereof in the people; all the same right in a Popular city, or estate, being common to the nobility and Senate together with the people. Wherhfore it is an easy matter to created a third degree or order: as at Rome the order of knights or gentlemen, was in a sort an arbitrator or umpire betwixt the Patricij and 
Not good in great assemblies to divide the people into three degrees and orders.  the people, as made of both degrees. But for that both the Patricij and the knights made scarcely the fifth part of the whole people, the people did therefore the more imperiously reign & rule: which was then especially understood, when as by a law concerning the Theatres, place for the beholding of plays, was first given to the Senate, & next after them unto the knights or gentlemen, all apart by themselves from the people: whereof Livy thus writeth, C. Attilij Serrani, L. Scribonij Libonis Aedilium Curulium Ludio Romanis primum Senatus a populo secretus spectavit, praebuitque sermons sicut omnis novitas solet alijs tandem, quòd mentò antè debuerit tributum censentibus amplissimo ordini, alijs demptum ex dignitate populi quicquid maiestati patrum adiectum esset interpretantibus: & omnia discrimina talia quibus ordines discernerentur, & concordie, & libertatis aequè minuende esse: ad quingentissimum quinquagissimum Sextum annum in promiscuo spectatum esse, quid repent factum? Cur non immisceri sibi in cauca Patres plebem vellent? Cur dives pauperem consessorem fastidierit? Nonam & superbam libidinem ab nullius ante gentis Senatu neque desideratam, neque institutam Postremo Africanum quoque ipsum, quod Consul auctor eius rei fuisset, poenituisse ferunt, At the Roman plays of C. Atilius Serranus, and L. Scribonius Libo, the honourable Aediles, the Senate apart and divided from the people, first beheld the same: which thing (as every novelty useth to do) gave occasion of speech, some deeming it now at length to be given unto that most honourable order, which should long time before have of right been given it; other some interpreting it to be taken from the dignity of the people, whatsoever was added unto the honour of the Senate: and all such differences as whereby degrees were discerned asunder to tend alike to the diminishing both of concord and of liberty: that the people indifferently together had beholden the plays, now five hundred fifty six years. What was that now so suddenly done? Why should not the Senators be contented to have the people mingled with them in the Theatre? Why should the rich scorn the poor man to sit by him? A new and proud insolency, never before of the Senate of any nation either desired or ordained. Last of all it is reported, Africanus also himself to have repent him, That being Consul, he had been author of that matter. Thus much he. Whereby it is to be understood, that for the preserving of the popular liberty, and concord, degrees aught so to be placed with degrees, as that all of them may more easily be joined unto all in society and communion together. Wherhfore this fact of Africanus was blamed, not only of the common people, but even of the Senators themselves, whose favour he was thought to have gotten: For so Tully writeth him to have been blamed, not only of the wiser sort, but even of himself also; for that, that was by force from the people extorted, which had before until then been willingly granted unto the Senators: for that albeit that the seats were indifferent unto all, yet never any of the people would presume to sit to behold the plays before the Senators. About an hundred years after was a law made by L. Roscius Otho, Tribune of the people, That the knights or gentlemen should sit and take their places upon the fourteen steps or degrees next unto the stage: For when the magistrates and the rest of the Senators, by the Censors law, did more commodiously see and hear from the first and nearest places unto the stage, the higher degrees and farther off, were accounted of less credit: & albeit that the places of the Theatre were of right great receipt (as which contained oftentimes threescore thousand of the citizens) yet could they not contain them all: & therefore by the law Roscia concerning the Theatre, it was needful that place should be kept for the knights, in the fourteen steps and degrees near unto the stage: and for that thereby the people's voices seemed secretly in some sort to be taken from them by Roscius the Tribune, whom it beseemed to have been a keeper & preserver of the popular liberty and dignity; at such time as he came to behold the plays, he was by the knights (whose favour he had won) with great acclamation and applause received, but of the people with greater tumult and stir, in so much that Cicero the Consul was glad to call all the assembly of the people out of the Theatre. And so as a man of great wisdom and eloquence, with a grave oration repressed the people's insolency, and with a reproof and chiding, well beseeming the dignity of a Consul, so appeased the tumult, as that the people returned again into the Theatre well pleased. Hereof came that speech of Pliny in commendation of Cicero, Te suadente tribus Roscio Theatralis legis auctori ignoverunt, notatasque se discrimine sedis aequo animo tulerunt, The tribes (saith he) at thy persuasion pardoned Roscius, author of the law of the Theatre, and took it patiently themselves to be noted with the difference of their seats and sit. Now a punishment was set down by the law of the Theatre, Ne quis nisi censum equestrem haberet in xiv spectaret, That no man except he had a knight's wealth, should stand in the xiv steps or degrees to behold the plays. But when many, their patrimony being by the civil wars wasted, durst not for fear of this theatral law behold the plays from the fourteen steps or seats, Augustus the emperor decreed, That they should not be therewith bound, who themselves or their parents had ever had a knight's wealth or ability. Now as for the order and degree of women, I meddle not with it; only I think it meet them to be kept far off from all magistracies, places of command, judgements, public assemblies, and counsels: so to be intentive only unto their womanly and domestical business. And thus much concerning the order and degrees of citizens. But by what means provision is to be made against the revolt and tumultuous storms of the common people, we will in due place more at large declare.   
Finis Lib. Tertij.   

THE FOURTH BOOK OF OR CONCERNING A COMMONWEAL.  

CHAP. I ¶ Of the rising, increasing, flourishing estate, declining, and ruin of Commonweals.  
ALl Commonweals take their beginning either from a Family, 
The beginning of Commonweals.  by little and little increasing; or else arise at once, as when a multitude of people as a Colony drawn out of another City or Commonweal, do as a young swarm of bees fly abroad unto another place: or as a slip or science plucked off from a tree, and planted in a strange soil, which taking root, bringeth forth much more plentiful and pleasant fruit, than do those trees which grow up of small kernels, or of their own accord, Yet both the one and the other of these Commonweals, are established either by the strength of some stronger than themselves, or by the power of some others, who voluntarily had subjecteth themselves together with their liberty, unto the power and pleasure of others, to be by them disposed of, as by a sovereign power without any law at all, or else upon certain laws and conditions betwixt them agreed upon. So the Commonweal having taken beginning if it be well rooted and grounded, first assureth itself against all external force, and then against the inward diseases of itself, and so by little & little gathering strength, groweth up until it be come to the full perfection of itself: which we may call the Flourishing estate thereof; which cannot be of any long continuance, by reason of the 
The flourishing estate of commonweals endure not long.  changes of worldly things, which are so mutable and uncertain, as that the greatest Commonweals oftentimes fall even all at once with the weight of themselves, some others by civil wars, some by popular diseases, but most by the enemy's violence, being as then ruinated, when as they thought themselves most assured: other some by the wrath of God, being upon the sudden, and in a moment overthrown: some few by age growing old, and by their inward sickness taking end. But yet no Commonweals, finding or feeling greater changes or falls than the fairest of them: which for all that, are not in that to be blamed, especially if the change or alteration come by any external force, as most commonly it chanceth, the fairest things being still the most envied at. And as Demetrius (he which was called the Besieger) deemed no man more happy, than him who had longest quietly lived in the greatest abundance of all things, never having tasted of adversity, as a man by fortune deemed most abject and unworthy, with whom she should contend or strive: so we see some Commonweals so shamefully buried in pleasures and idleness, or else so to be corrupted, as that they might well move any man rather to pity then to envy at their state. Wherhfore the rise and ruins of the Commonweals are well of us to be considered, and what the causes be of every such their conversion and change before that we give judgement of them, or propound them as examples to be imitated and followed. Now I call that a Conversion 
What the conversion and change of a Commonweal is.  of a Commonweal, when as the state thereof is altogether changed: as when a Popular estate is changed into a Monarchy; or an aristocraty into a Democraty; or contrariwise: For as for the change of customs, laws, religion, or place, it is but a certain kind of alteration, the state and sovereignty continuing still: which may also to the contrary itself be changed, without any change of religion, or laws, or any other things else, besides them which belong unto sovereignty. As when in our time the Florentine popular estate was changed into a Monarchy. Neither is the age or continuance of a Commonweal to be measured by the long standing of a city, or of the walls thereof, as Paulus Manutius seemeth to have done: who writeth 
The age of a Commonweal how it is to be measured.  the Venetian Commonweal that now is, to have stood twelve hundred years; which hath yet suffered three changes, as we shall forthwith declare. Sometime it happeneth also no change either of the city, or of the citizens, of the customs, or religion to be made, or any other force offered, or wrong done to any man; and yet that the state may perish: as when any sovereign prince willingly subiecteth himself, his kingdom, and people unto the power and obeisance of some other Prince, or else by his testament appointeth some popular Commonweal inheritor of his State and kingdom: As is reported of Attalus king of Asia; of Coctius king of Alps; of Ptolaemee 
Kings which made the Romans their heirs.  king of Cyrenae; of Eumenes king of Pergamus; of Nicomedes king of Bythinia; of Polemon king of Pontus, who left the people of Rome heirs of those so many their kingdoms: for then those kingdoms were quite taken away, and those Commonweals brought into the form of Provinces, and no change made of their Monarchies into a popular Estate. And so contrariwise, if of one or many cities or provinces 
divers changes of commonweals.  be made one or many Monarchies or popular estates divided in sovereignty, that is not to be accounted any conversion or change, but even a very beginning of divers new Commonweals: As when the country of the Swissers and the Grisons revolted from the German Empire, they become eighteen Commonweals, every one of them holding their estates (divided from the other) in sovereignty. Sometime also of two is made one and the same Commonweal: as were the Romans and the Sabines, their two kings and people being in the same power and league joined and combined together, neither of them subject unto the Laws or command of the other; but with equal power both of them growing together into the same city. And jest the Sabines so joined unto the Romans should have seemed to have accrued unto another man's kingdom, it pleased them that the names of both the people being taken away or suppressed, they should be called Quirites, which name the Magistrates in their orations unto the people ever after used: Albeit that Romulus (who because he would not seem to endure a fellow in the kingdom with him, had not spared his own brother) caused Tatius king of the Sabines not long after to be also slain: wherefore the Sabines Commonweal so perished not, either accrued unto the Romans' (as some have been of opinion) albeit that other people called them neither Sabines, nor Quirites, but Romans: For that that name once given unto the City and the people, could never more be changed; or for that the name of the Romans was more stately; or else for that those two people so grew together within the walls of Rome, yet so as that the one become not subject unto the other: as it chanceth when the one being vanquished, yieldeth itself unto the other, and so suffereth the laws of the vanquisher. Which may serve for the disciding of the question of Cune●…u the lawyer, who doubteth, Wither the subjects of the one Commonweal, if they be joined into one and the self same body with the subjects of another Commonwealth, be thereby the subjects of them with whom they are so joined: which thing Bartholus denieth; and for example thereof allegeth Raimond County of Toulouse, not erring indeed in his resolution of the question, but in the example by him produced, not having good regard unto the treaty made betwixt the County and the estates of Languedoc of the one part, and jews the ix the French king on the other part, wherein it was comprised, That the only daughter of the county Raymond should be espoused to Alphonsus' county of Poitiers, the king's brother, with condition, that if they died without heirs of their bodies lawfully begotten, the country of Languedoc should in full right return unto the crown; yet for all that so, as that the customs of the country should not be changed, neither any tax▪ imposed without the consent of the estates of the country▪ which hath always been observed, the sovereignty over the country and the inhabitants of Languedoc remaining unto the kings, as it had before that the county was therefrom exempted. But most certain it is, that an estate subject unto another, maketh not another Commonweal, but only a part of the subjects.  
But that these things may the better be perceived, it is to be understood, that all conversions and changes of Commonweals, are either voluntary or necessary, or else mingled of both: and as for necessity, it is also either natural or violent: For albeit that the birth of things be more fair and pleasing than their death, yet for all that so it is, that the source and course of flowing nature ravishing all things, giveth us also to understand, that the one cannot be without the other: so that all things which had beginning, although they have stood many hundred years, yet must at length in time take end and perish also. But, as we deem that death more tolerable which by little and little creepeth on through the weakness of age, or the course of some long linger disease, and that almost without any sensible feeling thereof: so also may we say the change or fall of a Commonweal, which proceeding as it were of age, and after having endured a long tract of worlds, to be necessary, and yet not violent: for that nothing can well be called violent, which is agreeing unto nature: seeing also that the course of every things age is certain, and a certain ripeness unto every age appointed: 
The natural change or fall of a Commonweal.  so that in due time to take end seemeth to be a thing of every thing to be wished for.  
Now Commonweals be also changed some times to the better, and sometimes to the worse, whether such change be natural or violent: yet the violent change still having violent motions, and so quickly done; and the natural changing still be little and little, and so the less felt. But of all changes of Commonweals, no voluntary 
The most pleasing and easy change of a Commonweal.  changes is more pleasing or easy than that which is made by the consent and good will of him which hath the sovereignty, and of his subjects: when as he which hath the sovereignty, chooseth rather to yield the same unto the nobility, or the people, than to hold it himself: as we have heard Sylla, with incredible violence to have taken upon him the Dictatorship, and that not without the most cruel slaughter of the people, and so to have turned the sovereignty of the Commonweal from a popular estate, into a Monarchy; and yet him the same man within four years after, voluntarily and of his own accord, dispoiling himself of the Monarchy, which he had covered under the colour of his Dictatorship, to have again restored the sovereignty unto the people, to the great contentment of them all in general, and the good liking of every one of them in particular. So also the nobility of the state of Sienna, by their common consent, yielded the sovereignty of that state unto the people, and abandoned the city themselves, which Pandulphus the tyrant, violently afterwards invaded. And as in men's bodies divers changes happen from the qualities of the elements, the disposition of the body or the mind, the temperature of the humours, as also from the manner of the education thereof, and diversity of diet: so also the Commonweal may suffer an universal change or ruin, from friends or enemies external or internal, or from both, whether it be from good to evil, or evil to good, and that often times contrary to the good liking of the subjects, who must sometimes as children and mad folks, be cured even against their wills, as Lycurgus, who changed the laws and royal state of his country, into a popular government, contrary to the good liking of the subjects, or of the greater part of them; howbeit that in so doing, he was well beaten of them, and lost one of his eyes (the reward of his virtue) although he had before renounced the claim and right that he and his successors had unto the kingdom, as princes of the blood, and nearest unto the crown.  
But forasmuch as there are but three sorts of Commonweals, as we have before 
Six perfect conversions or changes of Commonweals.  declared: there are also but six perfect conversions or changes thereof, viz. of a Monarchy into a Popular estate, or of a Popular estate into a Monarchy: and so likewise of a Monarchy into an aristocraty, and of an Aristocraty into a Monarchy: and of an aristocraty into a Popular estate, and of a Popular estate into an aristocraty. So also of every estate there be six other imperfect changes, or rather alterations; that is to wit, from the Royal estate unto the Lordlike: from the Lordlike estate unto the Tyrannical: from the tyrannical unto the Royal, or from the Royal into the Tyrannical: from the Tyrannical into the Lordlike, and from the Lordlike into the 
Unperfect changes of Commonweal.  Royal. So might one also say of an aristocraty, lawful, lordlike or factious: And of a Popular estate, lawful, lordlike, and turbulent. I call it an unperfect change, as the change of a lawful aristocraty into a faction; or of a Royal estate into a tyranny: for that therein is nothing but the changing of the qualities of good governors into evil, the Monarchy yet still remaining in the one, and the aristocraty in the other. I speak not here of the changing of a Monarchy into a Duarchie (or sovereign government of two) for that we have before declared such a Duarchie to be comprehended under an oligarchy (or government of few) otherwise a man might make also a Truarchie of three princes, ruling together in one Commonweal (as it chanced in the Triumuirat of Marcus Antonius, Augustus, and Lepidus) as also a tetrarchy (or government of four) and so other changes of Commonweals in number infinite: whereof there is not only no rule or precept to be given, but are also of themselves most absurd: For when we once pass the sovereign government of one, we forthwith enter into the popularity of more: which as the lawyers say, is still contained in the number of two.  
But besides these conversions and changes of estates, which we have already 
A Commonweal sometime holden in suspense.  spoke of, it happeneth some time that the estate of a Commonweal is holden in suspense and sufferance: as after the death of Romulus, the people of Rome was a year without a Monarchy, a Popular estate, or aristocraty: For the hundred Senators which commanded one of them after another, had no sovereign power, neither commanded but only by commission: true it is, that one might say, That the sovereignty was again returned unto the people, and the charge of command unto the Senators, until that by common consent they had chosen them a king.  
And some times again it chanceth, that the Royal, Aristocratike, or Popular 
An Anarchy.  Commonweal being quite extinguished, there ensueth a mere Anarchy: when as there is neither sovereignty, nor magistrates, nor commissioners, which have power to command; as it chanced the people of Israel after the death of jephte, when as their 
〈◊〉. 27.  estate was brought to a mere Anarchy, and upholden only by the providence and power of God alone, the best and greatest king: for so it is in holy writ reported. So likewise at Syracuse, after the death of Dion, and in Florence after that the nobility was thence driven out by the people: which so continued a certain time without government, as a ship without a pilot or governor. And so after the death of Abusahit king of Fez, that kingdom was in most miserable case eight years without a king. As also after divers murders of many the Egyptian Sultan's, the Mammalukes made choice of Campson Gaurus, having lived a certain time in a pure Anarchy. And in like manner the Russians, being weary and spent with civil wars, for lack of a sovereign, of themselves made choice of three of the Germane princes to rule over them.  
Wherhfore when an estate is come unto a mere Anarchy, that is to say, when no 
A mere Anarchy the very ruin of a Commonweal.  man either commandeth or obeyeth, it is to be accounted the very ruin and destruction, and not the changing of a Commonweal: although that the families and colleges therein continued friends together. But if the nobility or people have power to created the prince, and he being dead the magistrates shall themselves retain the sovereign power and command: yet is it not therefore to be deemed an Anarchyie, for that the sovereignty is still like again to fall either unto the nobility, or to the people.  
The last point is, when as an Estate or Commonweal is together with all the peopled 
Commonweals sometime together with the people utterly extinguished.  quite extinguished: as it happened unto the people and signory of Thebes, which Alexander the Great utterly rooted out, together with their city, saving only the house of Pindarus the Poet: upon the entrance whereof was written▪ 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Burn you not Pindarus his house. So also the Madianites, the Amorites, the jebusites, and Phaerezites, were by the people of Israel utterly destroyed: which was not the changing of one estate into another, but a mere ruin of the estate with the people together. But yet it may well be, that some one member of a Commonweal, or that some one province thereof may be destroyed, or a town razed, and all the people therein slain, and yet the Commonweal stand: as it chanced to the town of Arzille, in the kingdom of Fez, which the Englishmen razed, and put all the people therein to the sword: and to Sebastia, in the kingdom of Amasia, which Tamarlan the Tattar king used in like sort: and to the town of Bizance, a member of the Roman empire, which after it had been three years besieged by the emperor Severus, was in the end taken, sacked, razed, and all the people slain, and the scite thereof given to the Perinthians, who re-edified it, being afterwards called Constantinople, and now corruptly Stamboll, the choice seat of the Turkish emperors.  
But this is in Monarchies special and proper, that the monarchs one of them oftentimes 
A thing unto Monarchies special.  by force driven out by another, do not yet therefore change their estate: as in a few months in our remembrance it happened in the kingdom of Telesin, where the king Abuchemo was by the people driven out of his kingdom, and Abyamein chosen king in his stead: who forthwith after was also cast out by Hariadenus Barbarussa, who long time reigned not there, but that Abuchemo returning with the forces of the emperor Charles the fift chased away Barbarussa, and took sharp revenge upon his dissoiall subjects, making himself the emperors tributary and vassal: but was again not long after driven out again by Barbarussa: the state of a Monarchy yet never changing, no more than did the Roman empire, for having had four emperors in one year; one of them slain by another: the estate of the Monarchy nevertheless still remaining as the prize and reward of the victor.  
Sometime also rule and sovereignty is even thrust upon men by force and against their will: as first Claudius, and then Gordianus the elder were even drawn and enforced to take upon them the Roman empire. And in our remembrance the inhabitants of Tripoli in Barbary, after they were revolted from jachia king of Tunes, chose Mucamen 
An Eremite against his will chosen and crowned king of Tripoli.  for their king: who being shortly after poisoned, they upon the sudden enforced a religious Hermit to take upon him the crown and the kingdom; wherein he reigned against his will, until that Peter of Navarre, by force took the city of Tripoli, together with the king, whom he sent prisoner into Sicily: but was afterwards by the emperor Charles the fift (to his great contentment) sent back again to live in his solitary cell in Africa. 
Some commonweals even in their beginning destroyed.   
But as of men some perish and die in the most flourishing time of their age, some others in their youth, some in their childhood, and some before they could be well borne; so we also see some kingdoms and cities to be cut up and destroyed before they could strengthen themselves with laws and arms, othersome as abortives to be dead and extinguished before they were borne: as in our time the kingdom of the Anabaptists at Munster (the metropolitical city of Westphalia) was taken away and subverted before it was well thought to have been borne. john of Leiden, a Saddler, and their ringleader, who had there by the space of three years borne himself for a king, and taken upon him the sovereignty (though still by the imperial host besieged) being at last together with the city taken and publicly executed.  
Now when I speak of the flourishing estate of a Commonweal, my meaning is 
When the flourishing estate of a commonweal is.  not, that it should be come to the height of most absolute perfection: for that in these transitory things there is nothing so perfect, and in man's actions less than in any thing in the world: but I call that the flourishing estate of a Commonweal, when it hath attained unto the highest degree of the perfection and beauty thereof; or to say better, then when it is least imperfect, and farthest from all kind of vice: which cannot be well known, but after the declination, change, or ruin of every Commonweal: As the Romans having made proof of the Royal, Tyrannical, Aristocratike, and Popular estates and Commonweals, yet never flourished more than in the Popular estate: neither did that their Popular estate ever flourish more in arms and laws, than in the time of Papirius Cursor: Illa aetate, qua nulla virtutum feracior fuit, nemo erat, quo magis innixares Romana, quàm in Papirio Cursore staret, In that time (saith Livy) than which 
The flourishing estate of the Roman commonweal to have been in the time of Papirius Cursor  none was more plentiful of virtues, there was no man on whom the Roman Commonweal resting stayed, than upon Papirius Cursor. This was the judgement of the Romans, of the most flourishing time of their Commonweal▪ for never after was the military and domestical discipline, the laws and ordinances better executed, faith better kept, religion more sincerely embraced, nor vices more severely punished▪ So that it aught not to seem strange, if there was never then then greater store of most valiant and worthy men.  
Now if any man shall object and say, That the Romans were then but poor, as not yet got out of Italy, neither having as yet extended their arms into Grecia, Asia, and Africa, not not having as then so much as subdued Italy, neither that the Capitol did as then glister with guilded vaults, but was covered with shards: I say again▪ That virtue 
The excellency and perfection of a commonweal how it is to be deemed.  is not to be measured by the foot of wealth and riches; neither the excellency and perfection of a Commonweal, by the largeness of the bounds thereof, but by the bounds of virtue itself. So that I deem those their untrimmed and rough shades and groves, to have had in them more majesty and honour, than had afterwards their pleasant green woods, with the trees most artificially planted in order of the cu●…ious Quincunx, and reckon Rome homely and untrimmed, more stately and replenished with majesty, than when it was never so well decked, and with precious ointments perfumed. For never was the power of the Romans greater than in the time of Traian the emperor, who joined unto the Roman empire, not only Arabia Felix, but many other great provinces also beyond the river Euphrates, and with incredible workmanship 
The Romain●… commonweal at the highest in the time of Traian the emperor, and yet not then in the greatest perfection.  having built a bridge over the Danubie, (the remainders whereof are yet to be seen) subdued Decebald, with the kingdom of Dacia, & with the Roman legions daunted the most cruel and barbarous nations that then lived; when as the city of Rome itself, being head of the whole empire, did so abound and flow with ambition, covetousness, pleasures and delights, as that it seemed to retain no more but the shadow of the ancient virtue thereof. Neither was the Lacedaemonian Commonweal then most flourishing, when as it had by force of arms subdued all Grecia, with some parts of Asia also: for now they contrary unto the laws, had given way for gold and silver to enter into the city, now the discipline of Lycurgus seemed to have been almost extinct, and so indeed not long after that same Commonweal came headlong tumbling down. And thus much concerning the differences of the changes of Commonweals, which it is needful for us to note, the better to conceive such conversions and changes of estates, which none have touched heretofore.  
Now as for the causes of the changes of Commonweals, although they be 
The causes of the changes of commonweals.  right many, and hard to be all reckoned, yet so it is that they may be brought into some certain number, which may suffice for▪ our instruction. The most common cause of the change of Commonweals is, that when the posterity of princes failing, the great men fall out among themselves, and so take up arms for the government of the state: or for the too great poverty of the greater part of the subjects, and the excessive riches of some few: or for the unequal division of estates and honours, or for ambition and the great desire some have to command, or for the revenge of injuries, or for the cruelty and oppression of Tyrants, or for the fear that some have to be punished for their deserts, or for the changing of laws or of religion, or for the desire of some at full to enjoy their pleasures, or for the casting out of them which with their excessive and beastly pleasures pollute and defile the place of majesty and honour. All which causes we will particularly entreat of, and as need shall be, manifest the same with examples.  
We have now here before declared, That Commonweals had their beginning 
The first monarchies to have taken their beginnings from oppression and tyranny.  by violent tyrannies: whereof some have afterwards continued in the state of Lordlike Monarchies, and othersome in Royal Monarchies by right of succession: unto whom divers changes have also happened for the causes by us before touched. And that it is so, all the Histories, both sacred and profane agreed, That the first sovereignty and form of a Commonweal had beginning by the Monarchy of the Assyrians, and that the first prince called Nimroth (which is to say a Bitter Ruler) whom the Histories for the most part call Ninus, by force and tyranny made himself a sovereign prince; and that after him his successors continued that Lordlike Monarchy, taking unto themselves the whole and entire disposition of their subjects and their goods, until that Arbaces governor of the Medes, drove out Sardanapalus, which was the last king of the Assyrians, and made himself king, without any form of fashion of election at all. The cause why, being for that Sardanapalus drowned in vain pleasures and delights, was more amongst women than he was amongst men: a thing which men of courage and valour take most impatiently, to see themselves subject to such an one, as hath nothing of a man more than the figure only. We see also, that the princes of the Medes descended from Artabazus, the kings of Persia, of Egypt, of the Hebrews, the Macedonians, the Corinthians, the Sicionians, the Athenians, the Celtes, and Lacedæmonians, are all come by right of succession unto their kingdoms and principalities, for most part founded by force and violence; but afterward by justice and good laws polished, until that their posterity 
The beginning of Aristocraties.  failed (which oftentimes drew after it the changing of the estate) or that the princes abusing their power, and evil entreating their subjects, were themselves driven out or slain: and the subjects fearing again to fall into a Tyrannical government, if they should give the sovereignty to one alone, or not willing to endure the command of one of their own companions, founded amongst them the Aristocratical estates, little regarding the common people: at which time if there were any of the poorer or popular sort, which would also have had part in the signory or government, they sung unto them the fables of the Hares, which would command together with the 
The greatest honours and offices even in Popular estates still bestowed upon the nobility and richer sort of the people.  Lions: Or if it were that the Monarchy changed into a Popular estate, yet so it was nevertheless, that the nobility or richer sort still carried away all the great offices and places of state: as for example, Solon having founded the Popular estate in Athens, yet would not that the poor and common sort of the people should have part in the estates. Neither the Romans having chased out their kings (albeit that they had established a Popular estate) yet so it was, that the honourable offices and preferments were still reserved unto the nobility only. We also read, that the first tyrants being driven out, the men at arms and gentlemen were indeed always chosen unto the honourable places of estate, and the vulgar people still excluded: until that Aristides and Pericles in Athens, and Canuleius and the other Tribunes in Rome, first opened the gate of honourable offices and preferments unto all the people in general. But afterwards 
A monarchy of all estates most sure and durable.  when as it was by long experience found out, That Monarchies were more sure, more profitable, and more durable also, than were the Popular estates, or Aristocraties; and amongst the Monarchies, them also which were founded in the succession of the next heirs male: these successive Monarchies were generally received almost throughout all the world, and the Popular and Aristocratike estates driven out. Yea the people sometime fearing the death of their princes, without heirs male, persuaded them whilst they yet live, to make choice of their successors: as divers of the emperors of Rome did, and as they yet at this present time do in many places of Africa: or else the right of the election of the prince remaineth in the people, the prince being dead without heirs: yea and in some places the people having power for the election of their prince, albeit that their princes have heirs male also: as in the kingdoms of Polonia, Bohemia, Hungary, Denmark, Sweden, and Norway, where they have often times thrust their kings out of their kingdoms▪ for staining the majesty of their government with tyranny, licentious living, or cowardice. So sometimes also the people having had a cruel tyrant, chose for him a just and courteous prince: or having had an idle, an effeminate, or contemplative prince, make choice of some valiant captain: as did the Romans, who after the death of Numa Pompilius (to rule their religion together with their policy) made choice of Tullus Hostilius, a good captain. Yea most 
Unto most cruel tyrants oftentimes succeed most just and upright princes.  commonly it chanceth, that unto the greatest and most cruel tyrants succeeded the most just and upright princes, as men ashamed to follow or imitat the doings of them whose ends they abhor; or else upon certain conditions, having taken the sovereignty upon them, and so having their lesson by writing, have also their power therein somewhat diminished. So after the unfortunate end of Marcus Antonius, a man altogether given to riot and voluptuous pleasure, succeeded the great Augustus, a most wise & sober prince. So after the miserable death of Nero a most cruel tyrant, succeeded Galba, an emperor most gracious: So after the strange event of the most drunken and licentious Vitellus, succeeded Vespasian the most continent: And unto the monster of nature 
Prince's natures much altered by sovereignty.  Heliogabalus slain and drawn in the same faction that was Vitellus, succeeded Alexander Severus the most virtuous: a thing most strange, considering that he was his cousin germane, and together with him nourished and brought up: and that the power to command in sovereignty hath this mischief in it, that often times it maketh of a good man, an evil; of an humble man a proud; of a merciful man a tyrant; of a wise man a fool; and of a valiant man a coward. For what could be more notable than the first five years of Nero his reign? what more excellent than his youth? or who for modesty was to be compared in the beginning to Tiberius? who so behaved himself (as saith Suetonius) as if he had almost been a private man: and being of one called Lord, commanded him, that he should no more by way of reproach so call him: and against slanderous and infamous libels made of him, often times said no more, but that in a free city, men aught also to have their tongues free: but speaking unto the Senate: I have had this good fortune (said he) to have you for my gracious Masters, and so long as I live I will acknowledge you for my good Lords: for a good prince (said he) must be the slave not only of the Senate, but also of all the citizens in general, and often times of every one of them in particular. Neither did he any thing in the beginning of his reign, not not even in the lest things, without the advise of the Senate; and yet afterwards having well tasted of the power of sovereignty, he become the most detestable tyrant that ever was for cruelty and voluptuous pleasures. So we read also that Herod the elder reigned six years as a good and just king (as saith Philo) and one and thirty years as a most cruel tyrant, who caused seventy Senators of the the house of David to be all slain, which was indeed the whole body of the Senate except Semneas, and afterward put to death his wife a most noble gentlewoman, with three of his own children: and now lying at the point of death, gave commandment to kill all the best and chief of the Nobility of the whole land, to the intent that 
The fairest beginnings of princes reigns prove not always the best.  great mourning might thereby be after his death. Which examples I have amongst many other marked, whose beginnings were too fair to continued long: the reason whereof may well be, for that he which at the first seemeth to be so notable wise and worthy, must needs dissemble much: wherein Tiberius the emperor is said to have excelled all others. Whereas of them which have so curiously learned the art of false semblant and dissimulation, and have their countenances at command, nothing that good is, true, or honest, is to be expected; but all things vain, false, and feigned, full of hypocrisy and craft: Whereas he which at the first discovereth his imperfections (albeit that he be not therein wise) yet can he not possibly be a man exceedingly mischievous or nought: yea of such an one it is to be hoped, that he may at length prove an upright and just man: such an one as john the French king is reputed to have been, who was of such a stomach, as that he could by no means endure to look ar●…●…t upon him 
Why there be so few virtuous princes?  whom he hated or liked not of: And yet for all that we read not of 〈◊〉 thing by him either dishonourable or wickedly done. Neither aught it unto any man to seem strange, if there have been but few princes for their virtues famous: for if every where there be such a scarcity of good and valiant men, and that kings are not chosen out of the number of such: and that they to whom their kingdoms come by succession, commonly have their education polluted with so many vices, as that hard it is to say which of them is the greatest: it is almost a miracle if one of them shall be able to get out of such a gulf of all manner of vices. Yet if any such there shall be, as shall for his virtues become famous, he as a torch upon an high place or watch tower, filleth all things with the light and brightness of himself: neither is only whilst he yet liveth 
Evil princes even for their father's virtues oftentimes of their subjects beloved.  highly commended: but being dead, leaveth unto his children and posterity also, the most fragrant and sweet smells of his virtue and worth, who though they shall right wickedly live, yet are they the rather borne with, for their father's virtues sake. Cambyses did many most cruel and shameful things, yet was he always both loved and honoured of his subjects, and redoubted of his enemies, and all for the great love they bore unto his father Cyrus, which was so well graven in the hearts of the people (as saith Plutarch) that they loved even all such as had a great and rising nose, such an one as Cyrus had. And the emperor Commodus, albeit that he were a most cruel tyrant, and had in one day commanded the great Provost of Rome to kill all the beholders of the plays in the Theatre (which were not fewer than threescore thousand persons) for that they could not forbear laughing, to see him in stead of an emperor, so cunningly to play the Fencer, as if he had been one indeed; yet was he nevertheless of the people always beloved, for the love they bore unto the remembrance of Marcus Aurelius his father. 
A new prince without great virtues hardly to maintain his estate.   
Wherhfore we see kingdoms which come by succession, seldom times to suffer change or innovation, albeit that a wicked son succeed a good father: for that his kingdom is like unto a great tree which hath taken as deep root as it spreadeth branches: whereas he which cometh but newly unto a kingdom commended nor strengthened with no virtue or power of his ancestors, is indeed like unto an high tree: which for that it is not well rooted, is with the wind and tempest easily overthrown. For which cause a tyrant the son of a tyrant, must needs reign in great danger, except he be with great wealth and the power of his neighbour princes strengthened, or by long descent of his ancestors have obtained his kingdom. Neither can the verues of a new prince deliver his ungracious son from the conspiracies of his subjects: as it happened unto Jerome a tyrant of Sicily, who succeeded to Hiero his grandfather, a new prince in his kingdom, which he had by no right or claim gained, but was yet for his manifold and great virtues, of a private man, thought right worthy of that so great a kingdom, which he so held almost sixty years, without force or garrison, to the great contentment of all men; beloved not of his own subjects only, but of all his neighbour princes also, and especially of the people of Rome, to whom he was most dear: whose nephew, that he might seem to excel his grandfather in magnificence and state, thought it better for the assurance of his estate, to strengthen himself with strong garrisons of men, and so afterwards wholly giving himself over unto riot and excess, bore himself proudly towards all men, and so drew all men's hatred upon him: and as for the counsel, the most assured foundation of his grandfathers kingdom, he altogether set it at nought: & to heap up his mishaps, without any cause why, renounced the amity and alliance of the Romans. And so having lost both all the ornaments of his honour, and the stays of his assurance, was by the conspiracy of his subjects himself with all his friends and kinsfolks most miserably slain, and his Monarchy forthwith changed into a Popular estate. The like end almost had Dionysius the younger, another king of the same country also, and son to Dionysius the elder, who by fraud invaded the estate, which he of long time held with strong garrisons and fortresses, without the stay or alliance of any other foreign prince: but he once dead, and this his son a man unskilful of the government, and altogether given to riot, succeeding in his place, and banishing his uncle Dion, and confiscating his goods, he was by the same Dion, returning out of exile again into his own country, with an army thrust out of his kingdom, and all the fortresses of his tyranny overthrown: which Dion not long after being also slain, the Monarchy was again changed into a Popular estate. Whereby it is to be understood, new princes without great virtues hardly to maintain their estate: which although it be a thing right, manifest, yet appeareth it more plainly by the example of Herod the elder, upon whom Caesar for the valour of Antipater his father, by a decree of the Senate bestowed the kingdom of the jews: who although he were in great favour with Marcus Antonius, and Octavianus Augustus, yet for the better assurance of his kingdom, built most strong castles, and to gain the good will of his subjects, bestowed great masses of money for relief of the poorer sort, and eased the people of a third part of their wonted tributes: but knowing how little he had for all that gained, he took also an oath of allegiance of his subjects, seeking to gain them of the better sort with extraordinary favours and good turns: and yet for all that he could do, he was so hated of his subjects, that being become sickly, the people much rejoiced thereat: which he perceiving, it had almost driven him into a frenzy. But he being dead, the jews sent fifty ambassadors to Rome, that so eased of that regal government, they might become subjects unto the Romans, and so happily had obtained to have been, had not Herod his son been then in great favour with Augustus the emperor, unto whom the elder Herod had before by his 
That is nine hundred Thousand crowns.  will left fifteen hundred talents of gold. Howbeit yet, that all the successors and posterity of Herod, which were in number many, in less than threescore years, all in poor estate perished, as well for that he being but a new man, was not descended of royal race: as for that his prowess and valour failed in his successors.  
But these conversions and chaunging of kingdoms and Commonweals chance 
Covetousness, cruelty, and the voluptuous lives of princes, oftentimes the causes of the change or ruin of their estates.  so much the rather, if the tyrant be too great an exactor, too cruel, or too much given to his voluptuous and unlawful pleasures, or be delighted in all these together: as was Nero, Tiberius, and Caligula: and yet of these, wantonness and whoredom hath ruinated more princes than all the other causes: and so is it also much more dangerous unto a prince for his estate than cruelty: for cruelty keepeth men in fear and awe, & bringeth a terror upon the subjects; whereas wantonness bringeth after it an hate and contempt also of the tyrant; forasmuch as every man deemeth the effeminate man to be also faint hearted, and far unworthy to command a whole people, which hath 
Voluptuousness more dangerous unto a prince than cruelty.  not power over himself. So we see that Sardanapalus king of Assyria, Canades king of Persia, Dionysius the younger, and Hierosme, kings of Sicily, Heliogabalus, Amyntas, Chideric, Periander, Pisistratus, Tarquin, Aristocrates king of the Messenians, Timocrates king of Cyrene, Andronicus emperor of Constantinoble, Rhoderike king of Spain, Appius Claudius, Galeace Sfortia, Alexander Medici's, the Cardinal Petruce Tyrant of Sienne, Lugrac and Megal, kings of Scots, all for wantonness to have lost their estates, and most of them slain upon the fact doing. Neither is it long since Delmendin and Delmedin, two of the greatest cities of Africa, were by rebellion dismembered from the kingdom of Fez, and brought under the obeisance of the Portugals, for a maiden by force taken from her husband to whom she was betrothed, by the governor, who was therefore afterwards slain: as was also Ahusahid king of Fez himself with his six children all massacred by a secretary of his, for having abused his wife. Neither for any other cause did the people of Constantine (a sea town in Africa) choose rather to suffer the command of Delcaid a Christian renegat, than to obey the king of Tunes his son. And why in our time was Muleasses thrust out of his kingdom, and so lost his estate, but for intemperance? and yet nevertheless was so drowned in delights, as that returning out of Germany, without hope that the emperor Charles the fift (in whom his greatest trust was) would afford him any aid, and banished as he was out of his kingdom, yet spent he an hundred crowns upon the dressing of one peacock, as Paulus iovius reporteth: and to the end he might better conceive the pleasure of music, still covered his eyes, as having learned a double pleasure, not to be so well perceived by two senses at once: yet such was the judgement of God upon him, as that by the commandment of his sons he had his eyes put out with an hot bar of Iron, by little and little drying up the humours of them, and deprived of his kingdom also. 
Extreme cruelty oftentimes cause of the change of the prince's estate   
But for the cruelty of a prince, the estate easily changeth not, if he be not more cruel than the wild beasts themselves, such as were Phaleris, Alexander Phereus', Nero, Vitellius, Dometian, Commodus, Caracalla, Maximinus, Ecelinus of Milan, and john Maria of Milan, who were all slain, or driven out of their dominions, and their Tyrannical estates for the most part changed into estates Popular. Which befell them not so much for the cruelty by them used against the common sort of people (whereof no reckoning nor account is made in a Tyrannical estate) as for cruelty committed in the person of the great and best friended, who are always of tyrants to be feared: unto whom even contumely and disgrace is oftentimes more grievous than cruelty itself: whereof we have a domestical example of that Bodile, who for that he was by the commandment of Childeric king of France whipped, slew not only the king, but the queen also, being then great with child. So was also the emperor justinus the third slain by Atelia general of his army, whose son he had slain, and in despite prostituted his wife unto his servants. And Archetaus king of Macedon, was likewise slain by him whom he had put into the hands of Euripides the poet, to be whipped: as was his nephew also king of Macedon, slain by him whom he had without punishment suffered to be abused against nature by Antipater, and scorned him craving of him revenge.  
The Aristocratike estate also of them of Mitylen, was changed into a Popular, for that it chanced certain gentlemen as they went along the streets with their bastanadoes, in sport to strike all such of the common people as they met: Whereupon one Megacles took occasion to stir up the commonalty to fall upon the nobility, and so to kill them. And not to seek for examples farther, Henry, of late king of Sweden (but now a prisoner) was also thrust out of his kingdom, for that he not only disdainfully rejected the request of a certain gentleman his subject, but also with his own hand most cruelly stabbed him with his dagger: wherewith the nobility and people moved, took him prisoner, and enforcing him to resign his kingdom, gave it to his younger brother, who now reigneth. And almost always the tyrants-quellers have received 
Rewards still given unto the killers of tyrants.  either the estate or goods of the tyrants by them slain, or the greatest honours and preferments in the state, as rewards due to their deserts. So both the one and the other Brutus, obtained the greatest estates in Rome; the one of them for having driven out the proud king Tarquin, and the other for having slain Caesar. And Arbaces governor of the Medes having brought Sardanapalus king of Assyria to such extremity, as that he was glad to burn himself alive together with his concubines and treasures, for reward enjoyed his kingdom. So jews of Gonzaga having slain Bonacolse, tyrant of Mantua, was by the subjects chosen their prince, his posterity ever since by the space of about two hundred and fifty years having enjoyed that estate. And the Venetians having slain the tyrant Eceline, obtained the signory of Milan.  
Some others there be, which seek the tyrant's death, and so the change of the 
Some for desire of revenge▪ and some for the desire of honour and the deliverance of their country, to have procured the tyrant's deat●… and so the changing of the estate.  estate; having nothing before their eyes but the desire of revenge, and that without either the fear of God, the regard of their country, or love of their nearest and dearest friends: as he which to be revenged of king Roderike, who had ravished his wife, drew the Mahometan Moors into Spain, who drove out the king, and there using an hundred thousand cruelties, possessed the kingdom of Spain, which they held by the space of seven hundred years after. And some others there be also, who neither for hope of bearing of rule, of preferment; or of wealth: neither for revenge of wrongs, nor for any other private injuries received, are yet induced to the kill of a tyrant, without hope to be able by any means to escape therefore a most sharp and cruel death, respecting only the deliverance of their country, and the honour of the fact: such as were Harmodius; and Aristogiton in Athens, and those which slew Domitian and Caligula the cruel emperors. A thing which most commonly happeneth in the Popular estates, wherein the new tyrants by force or fraud having oppressed the liberty of the people, are never assured of themselves, or of their estate, without great and strong garrisons about them. So we see Alexander Medici's, nephew to pope Clement the seventh, & son in law to the emperor Charles the fift, by whose forces and power he obtained the sovereignty of Florence, and drove out them also that were of greatest power and courage in the state, to have compassed himself with great and strong garrisons, and always to have go armed, in such sort as that it seemed almost impossible to found the means to come near him, and yet for all that to have been slain by the conspiracy of Laurence Medici's, not only his near kinsman, but his most familiar and domestical friend also▪ when as the said Laurence had promised to prostitute unto him his own sister; that so he might the better deliver the man disarmed (even as he was kissing and embracing his sister, who me he thought to have ravished) to the murderer to be slain▪ which was so covertly done, as that the soldiers of his guard, whom he kept for the safety of his person, making merry in a dining chamber fast by, perceived nothing of the murder of their prince. And yet in so doing, the said Laurence neither delivered his country from tyrannny (whereinto it by and by after again fell) neither himself from danger, being at length by a murderous fellow himself also slain at Venice. And Cosmu●… Medici's, who after the death of Alexander, by the help of the garrison soldiers, the supportation of his friends, and favour of the pope, obtained the same government▪ albeit that he was reported to have been one of the wisest princes of his age, or of long time before him, and a right great justicier, even by the report of his enemies themselves, and had divers strong castles even in the city itself: yet nevertheless was he an hundred times in danger of his person, by the conspiracies of his subjects against him, being not able to endure a master over them, albeit that he were both just and virtuous. And he which now reigneth, not long since miss not much to have been ●…laine by the conspiracy of Puccinus, neither can be safe without a strong garrison, so long as the citizens his' subjects shall either remember or hope for the rewards of their valour and liberty. And for this cause Dionysius the elder of Syracuse, being chosen general, and having made himself master of all, and changed the Popular estate into a Monarchy, had always forty thousand soldiers in readiness at his call to set forward, beside a great garrison still attendant about his person, and divers strong holds, only to keep the people of Syracuse with a part of Sicilia in subjection. And yet nevertheless was he no tyrant, as we call a tyrant, that is to say, a cruel, vicious, and naughty man: neither was he ever amorous of other men's wives, but to the contrary sharply reproved his son (as saith Plutarch) for having taken away one of his subjects daughters, saying, That he should never have one to succeed him in his estate, if he used such fashions: as indeed it fell out with him, being shortly after his death chased out of his kingdom.  
Now if any man shall object and say unto me, That force and fear are two evil 
Force and fear, things necessary for a new prince, for the maintenance of his ●…state.  masters for the maintaining of an estate: true it is, and yet needful for a new prince to use, who by force changeth a Popular estate into a Monarchy, a thing altogether contrary unto a Monarchy Royal; which the less guard it hath, the surer it is: & therefore the wise king Numa put from him the three hundred archers which Romulus his predecessor had taken unto him for his guard, saying, That he would not distrust a people which had willingly and of themselves put their trust in him: neither yet command over them which should distrust him. But Servius having of a slave made himself a king, beset himself with strong guards, and that wisely, as being forsaken of the Senators, who took his servile government in great evil part: For as just, pleasing, & gracious, as he was, yet had it been a thing impossible for him without guards, garrisons, and fortresses, long to have maintained himself and his so new an estate, but that he should have fallen into the hands of his enemies. There was never a more gracious, magnificent, noble, courageous, or courteous prince than Caesar; and yet notwithstanding, all these his great virtues were not able to preserve him, but that he was by his son Brutus and other the conspirators with incredible consent and fidelity combined against him, in the midst of the Senate most cruelly slain: who being before warned to take unto him a guard for the safety of his person, frankly answered▪ that he had rather to die once for all, than still to languish in fear: wherein he did not wisely so to refuse a guard, having pardoned his greatest enemies (whom he suffered still to live) and desiring to change into a Monarchy the free estate of the most warlike people that ever was in the world. Which his course Augustus his successor followed not, but first caused to be put to death all the conspirators against Caesar, (not so much in revenge of the death of his uncle Caesar, as he pretended, as so to provide 
The notable wisdom of Augustus in his government, for the establishing of his estate.  for his own safety) after that he still guarded with a strong guard about him, easily kept himself from the violence of his enemies: And albeit that having quite discomfited and overthrown Sextus Pompeius, and Lepidus, and overcome Marcus Antonius in battle at Actium, (who afterwards also slew himself) and the other citizens of greatest force and courage, either in battle slain or otherwise taken out of the way; he might have seemed to have been able to have reigned in great security: yet nevertheless he dispersed forty legions into the provinces, placed three legions in Italy, and that not far from the city, kept a strong guard about him for the safety of his person: forbidden the Senators without leave to departed out of Italy, and committed the government of his legions not unto any the great Lords, but to gentlemen only, or some of the meanest of the nobility. As for the creating of the officers of the city, he divided it betwixt himself and the people; yet so as that of such as stood for them, he would bring some of them by the hand unto the people, and so recommending unto their choice them whom he wished to have preferred unto the offices and honours: he took from the people their free choice, and had the magistrates still beholden and bound unto him. justice he daily administered, without intermission, receiving and answering every man's request, having always before him the records of the public revenues of his forces, and of the provinces, so that he alone seemed to discharge all the duties of all the officers. Whereby it evidently appeareth him to have been a sole Monarque, and sovereign Prince, whatsoever fair title of a Tribune of the people, or of a Prince, was by one or other given unto him. That is also reported to have been of him very popularly done, in that he commanded debts due to the Commonweal, which were grown by the civil wars, and the records of the debtor to be torn and burnt. And yet this so mighty a Prince, endued with so great virtue & wisdom hardly escaped the hands of the wicked conspirators against him, albeit that the most desperate and dangerous sort of them were now long before dead. But after that the subjects having by little and little made proof of his justice and wisdom, tasted of the sweetness of long peace and assured tranquility, in steed of cruel and bloody civil wars,, and that they had to do, rather with a father than with a lord (as saith Seneca) and so began to love and reverence him: he again on his part discharged his guard, going as a private man sometimes with one man, and sometimes with an other without any other company; and so laid the foundation of that great Monarchy, with the most happy success that ever Prince did.  
Now all Monarchies newly established by the change of an aristocraty, or Popular 
How Aristocraties or Popular estates are changed into Monarchies.  estate, have as it were taken their beginning, after that some one of the magistrates, captains, or governors, having the power of the state in his hand, hath of a companion made himself Lord and sovereign, or else that some stranger hath subdued them, or that those states have willingly submitted themselves unto the laws & commandments of some other man. As for the first point, and the most ordinary change of these estates we have examples enough. For so Pisistratus, when he had got the chief office in the common weal, invaded the liberty of the people: as did also Cypselus at Corinth, Thrasybulus, Gelo, Dionysius, Hiero, Agathocles at Syracuse, Panaetius, and Icetes at Leonce, Phalaris at Agrigentum, Phidon at Argos, Periander at Ambrace, Archelaus in Ca●…die, Euagoras in Cyprus, Polycrates in Samos, Anaxilaus at Rhegium, Nicocles at sition, Alexander at Pheree, Mamercus at Catana, the Decemuiri at Rome, and there after them Sylla and Caesar: the Scaligers at Verona, the Bentinoli at Bolonia, the Manfreds' at Faventia, the Malateste's at Atiminum, the Baleones at Perusium, the Vitelles at Tifernas, the Sforces at Milan, and divers others of like sort, who of governors of cities and armies have taken upon them the sovereignty. For in matters of estate it may be holden for an undoubted maxim, that he is 
Master of the forces, Master of the Estate.  master of the estate, which is master of the forces. Wherhfore in well ordered Aristocratique and popular Commonweals, the greatest honours are granted without power of command, and the greatest powers to command are not granted without a companion therein: or if it be dangerous to divide the power of command to 
Orders necessary for the maintenance of Aristocratique and popular commonweal.  many, as in matters of war it is; then the power so granted unto the magistrate or General aught to be but short. And therefore the Romans made chief commanders their two Consuls: and the Carthaginensians their two Suffets, who every other day commanded by turns: For albeit that the dissension which is commonly betwixt them which are in power equal, is sometimes an hindrance for the execution of good and profitable things: yet so it is that such a commonweal so governed is not so subject to be turned into a Monarchy, as it were if it had but one chief and sovereign magistrate: as the great Archon at Athens, the Prytani with the Rhodians, the yearly General with the Achaeans and the Aetolians, and the Duke at Genes. And for the same cause the Dictatorship in Rome continued no longer than the charge required, which never passed six months at the longest; yea and sometime lasted but one day; which time expired, the power to command ceased: and if so be that the Dictator did for any longer time retain his forces, he might therefore be accused of treason. And in Thebes, so long as it was a Popular estate, the law was that the General of the army should be put to death, if he retained the forces above a day after the appointed time: which was the cause that the great captains Epaminondas and Pelopidas were condemned to death, for having retained their forces four months after the time, howbeit that they were by necessity constrained so to do, neither could without the great danger of the State have otherwise done. And so for the same reason almost all the Magistracies are annual, in Aristocratique and Popular Commonweals. Howbeit that in Venice the six Councelours for the estate which are assistant unto the Duke, continued but two months in their charge: and he that had the keeping of the principal fortress of Athens, had the keys thereof but for one day only: no more than hath the captain of the castle of Rhaguse, who chosen by lot, hath the charge but for a day, and is led into the castle hoodwinked. It behoveth also in popular & Aristocratical Commonweals so much as possible is, to beware that the laws 
To change the laws and ordinances concerning the magistrates time, or to prorogue his charge, a thing most dangerous in an Aristocratique or Popular Commonweal.  and ordinances concerning the Magistrates time be not changed, neither their charge prorogued, if the necessity be not very great: as the Romans did to Camillus, to whom the Dictatorship was prorogued for six months, which had never to any other person been granted. And namely by the law Sempronia it was straightly forbidden that the governments of Provinces should be granted unto any for longer time than five years: which law had it been kept, Caesar had never invaded the estate as he did, having the government of the Gauls by the consent of Pompeius and Crassus granted for five years more than the law allowed of; whereunto in that point was derogated in favour of him. Which was a notable oversight, considering that they had to do with the most ambitious man that ever was; who so well grounded his power to continued, that he gave at one time unto Paulus the Consul nine hundred thousand 
Wonderful bribes given by Caesar in aspiring to the estate.  crowns, to the intent that he should not oppose himself against his enterpises; and unto the Tribune Curio, fifteen hundred thousand crowns to take his part. The people of Rome moreover allowing him pay for ten legions of soldiers so long as the wars in France should last. Which so great a power was joined with the hardiest hart that then lived, and the most valiant that ever was, and descended of so noble an house, as that in an oration unto the people he doubted not to say, That by the father's side he was descended from the gods, and by the mother's side from kings; and yet withal so modest, as that his great enemy Cato said, That there was never so modest a tyrant as he, and withal so vigilant: as that Cicero an other great enemy of his, (who conspired his death) calleth him in one of his Epistles, The monster of wisdom & incredible diligence: and moreover so magnifical and popular as ever any was▪ sparing for no cost for the setting forth of plays, justs, tourneys, feasts, largesses, & other public delights: In which doing he upon the public charge won the hearts of the common people, and gained the honour of a most gracious and charitable man towards the poor. And yet for all that having by this means gained the sovereignty, he sought for nothing more than by all means to clip and cut off the wealth & power of the people, and to take from them their privileges: for of three hundred and twenty thousand citizens which still lived of the public corn which they received, he retained but an hundred and fifty thousand, and sent fourscore thousand over the sea into divers Colonies a far off: and beside that took away most part of their fraternities, corporations, and colleges. In brief it hath always been seen in all changes 
Aristocratique and Popular Commonweals still ruinated by the subjects, having too much power committed unto them.  of Aristocratique and popular Commonweals, them to have been still ruinated, which have at any time given too much power unto the subjects whereby to exalt themselves: Which thing julian the Apostatament by that his embleanie or devise of an Eagle shot thorough with arrows feathered with his own feathers, being before plucked from her. For so do the sovereign governors and magistrates of those estates, especially when too great power is given to him which is of too ambitious and haughty a mind. And thus much concerning the change of a Popular or Aristocratical estate into a Monarchy, wherein one of the subjects maketh himself Lord thereof.  
But the change of a Popular estate into an aristocraty chanceth commonly upon 
The mutual change of a popular estate into an aristocraty, and of an aristocraty into a Popular estate.  the loss of some great battle, or other notable detriment of the state, received from the enemy: as to the contrary the Popular power then most increaseth when it returneth from the wars with some great victory over their enemies. Of which manner of changes as there are many examples, so is there none more fit than those of the Athenians and Syracusians, two Commonweals of the self same time; when as the Athenians by the default of Niceas their general, vanquished by the Syracusians and so discomfited, forthwith changed their Popular estate into an aristocraty of four hundred men, who yet bore themselves for five thousand by the deceit of Pisander: so that the people complaining themselves to be so spoiled of the sovereignty, and coming to give voice in the council, was thence repulsed & driven back by the forces which the four hundred had in their power, wherewith they slew divers of the people and discouraged the rest: at which very time the Syracusians proud of their victory (to the contrary) changed their aristocraty into a Popular estate. And within a while after the Athenians having heard news of the great victory of Alcibiades against the Lacedæmonians, took up arms against the four hundred of the nobility, whom they by the leading of Thrasybulus thrust out or slew, and so again changed the aristocraty into a Popular estate. And in like manner the Thebans overcome by the Enophites, changed their Popular estate into an aristocraty. And albeit that the Romans having lost two great battles unto Pyrrhus changed not their popular estate, yet so it was that indeed it was then a fair aristocraty of three hundred Senators which governed the estate, and but in appearance and show a Democraty, or a Popular estate, the people being never then then more calm and tractable. But so soon as the Romans had gained the estate of Tarentum, the people forthwith began to set up their horns, demanding to have part in the lands which the nobility had of long time possessed. And yet nevertheless afterwards, when as Hannibal had brought the Roman estate into great extremity, the people become as humble as was possible: but after that the Carthaginensians were overcome, king Perseus overthrown, Antiochus put to flight, the kingdom of Macedonia and Asia subverted▪ than immediately again followed the stirs for the division of lands, and the turbulent seditions of the Gracchies, wherewith the Tribunes armed the people in most insolent manner, insulting upon the nobility. In like manner the Florentines overthrew their oligarchy, established by Pope Clement the seventh, restoring the people again unto their wont liberty: for so soon as news was brought unto Florence, That Rome was by the imperials sacked, and the Pope with the rest of the Cardinals and Bishops besieged▪ it is not to be believed, with what pride the headstrong people began to rage against them of the house of Medici's; with what ●…urie they cast down their statues, defaced their arms, and reversed all their decrees and laws. The Popular estates of the Swissers indeed first took their beginning from the pride and insolency of the governors of those places, but yet had their greatest encreasings after the victory of Sempach, about the year 1377, at which time the nobility being with a great slaughter overthrown by the rural people, there was no more talking of Aristocraties, nor of acknowledging of the sovereignty of the empire over them, in what sort soever. But the chief cause of these conversions and changes of these estates, is the rash unstaidnesse and unconstancy of the people, without discourse or judgement moved with every wind; which as it is with a little loss discouraged, so is it also after any victory intolerable; neither hath it any more deadly or dangerous enemy, than too much felicity and prosperous success of the affairs thereof; nor a wiser master than adversity and distress, wherewith it daunted and discouraged, learneth to rest upon the council of the wiser sort, leaving the helm of the estate for them to govern, which they themselves in such tempestuous times know not how to hold. Whereby it is to be perceived, nothing 
Nothing more profitable for the preservation of a Popular estate than wars.  to be more profitable for the preservation of a Popular estate, than to have wars, and to make enemies for it if otherwise it have none. Which was the principal reason that moved Scipio the younger so much as in him lay, to hinder the rasing of the famous city of Carthage, wisely foreseeing, that the people of Rome being altogether martial and warlike, if it had no enemies abroad would at length be enforced to make war upon itself. For which cause also Onomadesme general of the Commonweal of Chio, having appeased the civil wars, and driven out the most mutinous, would by no means banish the the rest, albeit that he was earnestly persuaded so to do, saying That so it would be dangerous, lest (that having cast onut all the enemies) they should fall together by the ears with their friends. Howbeit that this reason which hath place for the strange and foreign enemies, is not yet to be received for the maintaining of enemies at home amongst the citizens themselves: and yet in this case he did but that which best beseemed him, and was also most expedient. For he that will have the upper hand in civil war, if he shall banish all them that take part with the faction contrary to his own, he shall then have no hostages at all left, if the banished shall prepare new wars against him: but having slain the most outrageous and dangerous, and banished the most mutinous, he aught still to retain the remnant; for otherwise he is to fear lest all the exiled together, making war upon him, without fear of their friends at home, should so by force overthrow their enemies, and change the Popular estate into an aristocraty. As it happened unto the Heracleans, the Cumans, and the Megarenses, who were changed from Popular estates into Aristocraties, for that the people had wholly driven out the nobility, who with their friends combining their forces, and possessed of these three commonweals, overthrew therein the Popular estates, and again established Aristocraties. 
Popular estates most commonly to change into Monarchies.   
Yet amongst other conversions and changes of Commonweals, the change of a Popular estate into a Monarchy oftenest happeneth; and that either by civil wars, or through the ignorance of the people, having given too much power to some one of the subjects, as we have before said. For Cicero speaking of the civil wars betwixt Caesar and Pompey, saith, Ex victoria cum multa, tum certe Tyrannis existit, Of victory ensue many things, but especially a Tyrannical government. For that almost always in civil wars the people is divided: wherein if it so fall out, that the leaders of the factions bring the matter unto the trial of a battle, no man can doubt but that he who therein shall carry away the victory, possessed of the forces and powers, shall either for ambition and the desire of honour, or for the safety of his person, keep unto himself the 
Tyrannical governments most commonly to change into popular estates.  sovereignty. Whereas contrariwise Tyrannical governments (for the most part) change into Popular estates. For that the people which never knoweth how to keep a mean, the Tyrannical government once taken away, desiring to communicate the sovereignty unto them all, for the hatred that it beareth against Tyrants, and the fear that it hath to fall again into tyranny, becometh so furious and passionate, as without reason or discretion to fall upon all the kinsmen and friends of the tyrant, and not to leave one of them alive: whereof for the most part ensueth the slaughter, exile, & proscription of the nobility; in which case every man of valour, courage, and worth, chooseth rather to shun the fury of the most headstrong people, as the raging of a wild beast, rather than to bear rule over it. As it happened at Athens, after that Pisistratus was slain; at Rome, after Tarquin the proud was driven out: at Syracuse, after Hiero slain, and again after that Dionysius was banished: at Florence, after that the duke of Athens (who afterwards died General in the expedition of Poitiers) was driven out: at Milan, after that Galuagno the tyrant had there lost his estate, where the people of Milan for fifty years after, held a Popular estate, until that at last it was again changed into a Tyrannical government by the Toresa●…ss. Neither did the Swissars otherwise establish that they Popular estate (which by the space of 260 years hath continued even unto this day) but by kill of the tyrannical deputies of the empire, tyrannising over them. The like we see to have happened in Thessaly, after that Alexander the tyrant of the Phereans was slain: and in Sienna, after that Alexander Dichi the new tyrant, was by the conspiracy of Jerome Severin slain, and his partakers of the nobility De Monte Novo cast out, slain, and banished, the people forthwith took upon it the sovereignty. Neither is it to be doubted, but that the Florentines, after the death of Alexander Medici's the new tyrant, would have taken the government from them of the house of Medici's, and re-established their Popular estate, if they had certainly known the tyrant to have been slain: but when as almost only Laurence Medici's with Caracciolus the muttherer were privy to the murder (supposed to be not only the tyrant's familiar and domestical acquaintance, but his most inward friend also) no man could by him be persuaded, that he had slain the tyrant: but so by present flight making shift for himself, gave opportunity to young Cosmus Medici's his cozen (who then had the forces of the estate in his power) to take upon them the sovereignty. But this conversion or change of Tyrannical governments into Democraties, or of Democraties into Tyrannical governments, most commonly happeneth, as we have said, by occasion of civil wars: for if a strange enemy become lord of any Popular estate, he commonly joineth it unto his own: which is not then to be called a change, but a destruction of that Commonweal, so united unto the victors; except the victor (which seldom times happeneth) restore unto the vanquished their liberty and government: as the Lacedæmonians chose rather that the confederate cities of the Athenians, by them overthrown in the Peloponesian war, yea and that even the city of Athens itself also, should enjoy their wont liberty, than to be joined unto the Lacedaemonian estate: howbeit yet that the Lacedæmonians in every place established Aristocraties for Popular estates, quite contrary unto the manner and fashion of the Athenians, who in all places went about to overthrow Aristocraties, and to establish Democraties or Popular estates. So that it differeth much, whether the conversions or changes of Commonweals proceed from a foreign and strange enemy, or else from the citizens themselves.  
Sometime also the people are so fickle and fantastical, as that it is almost a thing impossible 
The ●…ickelnesse of the people oftentimes cause of the change of the estate.  for them to hold any one estate, which it is not by and by again weary of: as we may say of the ancient Athenians, Samians, Syracusans, Florentines, and Genoese; who after they had changed from one estate or form of government, would by and by have another. Which fantastical disease most commonly chanceth unto such Popular estates, as wherein the subjects be too wise and of too subtle spirits, as were those whom we have before spoken of: For amongst them every man thinketh himself worthy to be a commander, whereas where the subjects be more grosser witted, they the more easily endure to be by others ruled, and more easily yield unto other men's advises, than do they whom you must with the multitude of arguments and subtlety of wit convince, before you shall persuade them unto any thing: so subtillising their reasons, as that oftentimes they vanish even into smoke; whereof ariseth an obstinacy of conceit, always enemy unto wise counsels, with divers changes of Commonweals. As a man may easily see in Thucydides, Xenophon, and Plutarch, the Athenians less than in an hundred years, six times to have changed their estate; and since them the Florentines seven times: which so happened not neither unto the Venetians, nor Swissers, men not of so sharp a wit. For who knoweth not the Florentines to be most sharp witted men? but the Swissers to have always been men of a more dull spirit? And yet when as they both almost at the same time, changed their Monarchy into a Popular estate, the Swissers have therein so maintained themselves now almost three hundred years: whereas the Florentines not long after changed their estate into an aristocraty; they which in nobility and wealth exceed the rest, altogether disdaining to be made equal with the common sort of the people. But the 
The fickle and turbulent estate of the Florentines  nobility having so got the sovereignty, began also to strive amongst themselves for the principality: and with mutual hatred and proscriptions so weakened themselves and their estate, as that they were by the people taking up arms against them easily overcome and put to flight. But the nobility (and so the Aristocratical estate) thus overthrown, the popular sort, and they of them especially which were called the Grandes (or great ones) began to strive and contend among themselves, for the government of the state: and yet these much more cruelly than had before the nobility; for that they contended not by form of justice, or of law, but by very force of arms, and dint of sword; who having with mutual slaughters spent themselves, the middle sort of the people (for they were divided into three sorts) began to take upon them the managing of the estate: but these also falling together by the ears for places of honour and command, the very basest and refuse of the rascal people, become too strong for them, filling all places with the blood and slaughter of them, until they had driven out and slain the most part of them. Now these also of the base sort become masters of the estate, and having no more enemies left with whom to strive, began at length to struggle with itself, and made such cruel war upon itself, that the blood ran down the streets, yea & that most part of the houses were with fire quite consumed, until that they of Luca moved with their great miseries and distress, coming in great companies to Florence, exhorted them their neighbours to lay down arms, and to seek for peace: by whose good speeches they persuaded at last, ceased from their slaughters & butchering of one another. Whereupon to end the matter, they sent ambassadors unto the pope, to sand them some one descended of royal blood, to rule and reign over them: where by good fortune there was then at Rome Charles of France brother to king jews the ninth, who at the request of the pope, and of the Florentines themselves, came to Florence, and with the good liking of the people in general, took upon him the government, ended their quarrels, and reconciled the citizens among themselves, together with the Commonweal: and so having appeased the citizens, and reform the Commonweal, being invited to the kingdom of Naples, he left in the city of Florence his deputies. But he was scarce well go out of the city, but that the Florentines weary of the government of the deputies, came again unto their popular government, and so with all renewed their civil wars. For redress whereof they sent for the duke of Athens, who having taken upon him the sovereignty, commanded the citizens to lay down arms, and for the safety of his person, took unto him a strong guard, so to keep under the seditious and rebellious persons. But the citizens now supposing themselves so to be spoiled of their liberty, and brought into bondage by the terror of his guard, turned their old mutual hatred all upon the prince, first secretly, and afterwards three conspiracies breaking forth into open force, one after another in the city: yea at last the citizens altogether burst out into such hatred against the prince, that they besieged the palace wherein he lay, together with the soldiers which guarded him: neither could that so straight a siege be broken up, until the prince was content himself with all his family to voided the city: which for safeguard of his life he was glad to do, not having yet a whole year governed the state. So the city delivered of the fear of a master, appointed a form of an aristocraty, not much unlike unto a Popular estate; devising new names for their officers and magistrates, still changing and rechaunging them with the manner of their state and government, oftentimes no better ordered, than if it had been committed to mad men, or children without discretion: scarcely twenty years together keeping the same form of state. But as sick men in the heat of burning fevers, desire to be removed now hither, and by and by again thither, or from one bed to another, as if the disease were in the places where they lay, and not in the very entrails of their bodies: even so the Florentines were still turning and tumbling of their estate, until they light upon Cosmus Medici's, of all Physicians the most skilful, who cured the city of these popular diseases, by establishing therein a Monarchy, and building therein three strong citadels, furnished with good & sure garrisons; so leaving unto his posterity a well grounded sovereign state, by himself holden by the space of almost forty years: than which nothing could have been wished for of almighty God, better or more wholesome for such a most seditious city. And thus much briefly concerning the Florentine state, which haply might seem incredible, had they not been committed to the remembrance of all posterity, even by the * write of the Florentines themselves. The like tragedies we see to have 
Antoninus Poggius M●…biavellus.  been played also by the people of Africa (who in sharpness of wit are said to pass the Italians) when they made proof of Popular estates: whereof I will set down but one or two examples amongst many: as namely the inhabitants of Segelmessa, a city upon the sea coast in the kingdom of Bugia, revolting from their king, established among themselves a Popular estate, but shortly after entered into such factions and civil seditions, as that not able to endure either the government of their king, or yet the government of themselves, they by common consent laid all their houses and the walls of their city even with the ground, that so they might every one of them as kings and princes rule and reign in their own houses abroad in the country. The people also of Togoda, a city in the frontiers of the kingdom of Fez, weary of their aristocraty, forsook their country. For which causes the people of Africa, not able to endure the Aristocratique or Popular estates, have almost every where established Royal Monarchies.  
Now albeit that Aristocratike estates seem to many both better and more assured 
Discord amongst themselves dangerous unto the governors of an aristocraty.  and durable also than the Popular, yet so it is, that the governors thereof if they be not of accord among themselves, are still therein in double danger: the one from the faction among themselves, the other from the insurrection or rebellion of the people, who never fail to fall upon them if they once found them at variance among themselves, as we have before showed of the Florentines. The like whereof happened at Vienna, at Genes, and divers other Commonweals in Germany also. As it also chanced in the Peloponesian war, unto all the cities of Greece which were then governed by the nobility or richer sort. Which is also yet more dangerous, when the governors give leave to all strangers to come and devil in their cities or countries: who by little and little increasing, and in wealth and credit growing equal with the natural subjects or citizens, and having no part in the government, if they shall chance to be surcharged, or otherwise evil entreated of the governors of the state, will upon 
Multitude of strangers in an aristocraty dangerous.  the lest occasion rise up against them, and so haply chase even the natural lords out of their own country: As it chanced at Sienna, at Genes, at Zurike, and at Cullen; where the strangers increasing, and seeing themselves surcharged and evil entreated, without having any part or interest in the estate, drove out the governors and slew most part of them. And namely they of Lindaw, after they had slain the governors, changed their aristocraty into a Democraty or Popular estate: as also did the inhabitants of Strasburg, who in detestation of the Aristocratical government, which they had changed into a Popular, after they had driven out, banished, or slain their lords and governors, solemnly by law provided, That no man should have the great estate, or any other public charge in the city, except he could first well prove his grandfather to have been some very base fellow, and so himself to be descended from the meanest sort of the rascal people. Which yet is no new matter: For we read, that the strangers in the Commonweal of Corfu increased so fast, that in the end they seized upon all the nobility, whom they cast into prison, and there murdered them; changing afterwards that Aristocratical estate into a Popular government. The like happened unto the Aristocratique Commonweals of the Samians, the Sibarites, the Trezenians, the Amphipolits, the Chalcidians, the Thurians, the Cnidians, and them of Chio, who were all by strangers changed into popular estates, having with their multitude thrust out the natural Lords and governors. Which is the thing most to be feared in the Venetian estate, which we have before showed to be a mere aristocraty, and receptacle of all strangers, who have there so well increased, that for one Venetian gentleman there are an hundred citizens, as well noble as base descended of strangers; which may well be proved by the number of them which was there taken 20 years ago, or thereabouts: wherein were found nine and fifty thousand three hundred forty nine citizens, above twenty years old; and threescore seven thousand five hundred fifty seven women: two thousand one hundred eighty five 
The number of the inhabitants of Venice in the year 1555.  Religious men, 1157 jews: which are in all, an hundred thirty and two thousand three hundred and thirty persons; whereunto putting a third part more for the number of them which are under twenty years old, (taking the ordinary age and the lives of men to be 60 years, as the law pre●…ineth) it amounteth to the number of about an hundred seventy six thousand four hundred and forty citizens, beside strangers. In which number the nobility or gentlemen were not comprehended, who could not be above three or four thousand, accounting as well them that were absent, as them that were present. And truly I cannot but marvel why the Venetians have published, yea and that more is have suffered to be put in print the number that then was taken. The Athenians long ago committed the like error, and when the city was most populous, found that upon the number taken, there were in the city twenty thousand citizens, ten thousand strangers, and four hundred thousand slaves: which open number and accounted the Romans would not take of their strangers, and so much less of their slaves: whom they would not either by their countenance or attire have known from the rest of the citizens: Howbeit that some were of opinion that the slaves aught to be known by their apparel; yet their opinion prevailed which thought the same to be dangerous, and a thing to be feared, jest the slaves entering into the number of themselves, should make their masters their slaves, for so Seneca writeth. We read in the history of Cardinal Bembus, that the greatest assembly of the gentlemen of Venice in his time (when as that Commonweal was most populous) was but fifteen hundred; which their fewness they by most certain tokens, and their attire, make still to appear. But that which hath most maintained their signory against the commotion of the citizens, Is the mutual amity and concord of the governors and gentlemen among themselves; and the sweetness of liberty, which is greater in that city than in any other place of the world: so that being drowned in pleasure and delights, and having also part in certain honours and mean offices, whereof the gentlemen are not capable, they have no occasion to stir for the changing of the estate; as had those of whom I have before spoken, who were not only debarred of all offices, but by the governors of the State surcharged and evil entreated also.  
Now all these changes of Aristocraties into popular Commonweals have been 
The change of popular estates into Aristocraties of all others most gentle and quiet.  violent and bloody, as it happeneth almost always: whereas to the contrary it cometh to pass that Popular estates change into Aristocraties by a more gentle and insensible change. As when entrance is given unto strangers, who in tract of time by little and little plant themselves, and multiply, without having any part in the estate and government, it falleth out in the end that the natural citizen employed in public charges, or in the wars, or by popular diseases wasted, do so decay; the strangers still increasing: whereby it cometh to pass, that the lesser part of the inhabitants hold the sovereignty, which we have showed to be a right aristocraty. Such were the changes of those Commonweals which we have before noted, from the people unto the nobility, and such as have indeed happened unto the Venetians, the Luques, them of Rhaguse, & of Genes, which being in ancient time Popular estates, have by little and little as it were without feeling, changed into Aristocraties: joining hereunto also, that the poorer sort of the citizens having much a do to live, & so wholly intentive unto their domestical and private affairs, shun all public charges without profit: and so by succession and prescription of time exclude themselves with their families from entermeddling with the state. And this manner of change in the estate, is of all others most gentle and easy, and lest subject unto tumults and stirs: neither can otherwise be letted, but that it will in time change, but by keeping of strangers from entering into the city: or by sending of them out into colonies, or else together with the rest admitting them unto the honours and preferments in the estate: and so much the more if the people be given to war. For otherwise it is to be feared, that the nobility not daring to put arms into the subjects hands, but being constrained to go to wars themselves, should be all at once overthrown, and so the people invade to sovereignty: as it happened to the signory of Tarentum, which in one battle against the japiges lost almost all the nobility: after which the people seeing themselves the stronger, 
Aristocraties by some great ou●…r throw of the nobility oftentimes changed into popular estates.  changed the Aristocraty into a Popular estate, in the time of Themistocles. And for this cause the nobility of the Argives, being almost all slain by Cleomenes king of Lacedemonia, they that remained yet alive, fearing the rebellion of the people, of themselves received the commonalty into the fellowship of the government, and so of their own accord seemed willingly to grant that which the people otherwise have taken from them by force, & whether they would or no: by which means their aristocraty most quietly and sweetly changed into a Popular estate. So one of the things that gave advantage unto the people of Rome over the nobility, was the victory of the Vientes, who in one battle slew 300 of the Fabians, all gentlemen of one house, when as not long after twelve families of the Potitij, who ascribed the beginning of their houses unto the gods, were in one and the same year quite extinguished & brought to nought, as Livy writeth. And therefore the Venetians, better citizens than warriors, if they be to make war (which they never do but upon great necessity) use commonly to choose their general one of their nobility, their soldiers for the most part being strangers and mercenary men. But this inconvenience for the changing of the estate, for the loss of the nobility, cannot happen in a Monarchy, if all the princes of the blood be 
Monarchies hardly changed for the loss of the nobility.  not slain together with the rest of the nobility: as the manner of the Turks is to do in all places where they have any purpose absolutely to command, where they spare not so much as a gentleman: whereof have ensued the destruction of many Commonweals in the East, and great increasing of the Turkish empire. But this change, or rather union or increasement of one estate by another, proceedeth from external force. So in France also, when as almost all the nobility of France was slain in the expedition of Fontenay, near unto Auxerre, by the civil war betwixt Lothaire the eldest son of jews the Gentle, on the one part, and jews and Charles the Bald on the other: yet for all that all their three Monarchies stood still firm: and namely when the country of Champagne had lost so much of the nobility in those wars, as that for the restoring thereof, the gentlewomen had especial privilege to ennoble their husbands with whom they should marry, and yet for all that the Monarchy in the state thereof felt no change at all. And thus are the great and notable changes commonly made in Aristocratike and Popular Commonweals.  
But nothing is so much in an aristocraty to be feared, as lest some gracious man 
Ambition and the unworthy bestowing of the great preferments of the commonweal, things most dangerous to an Aristocrati●…  of the nobility, or of the people, desirous of rule & authority, should stir up the people against the nobility, and become leader of them himself. For thereof ensueth the most certain destruction of an aristocraty, together with the nobility. In this sort Thr●…syllus first, and afterward Thrasybulus at Athens, Marius and Caesar at Rome, Fra. Valori, and P. Sodorin at Florence, armed the people against the nobility: which is also so much the more to be feared, if the great honours of the estate be bestowed upon most filthy and wicked men, and other virtuous men and such as have well deserved of the Commonweal, kept back and excluded. Which thing seemeth not grievous only to every good man, and not to be borne withal, but ministereth occasion also unto the seditious and popular, to inflame the people against the nobility. Neither for any other cause did the people of the Orites by force wrist the power and government from the nobility, than for that they had preferred unto the chief honours one Heracleotes, a man for his evil life infamous. Which thing also was the destruction of Nero and Heliogabalus, for that they had bestowed the greatest honours and preferments of the empire, upon most wicked and corrupt men. Which of all other things is most to be feared and shunned in an aristocraty Aristocratically governed: that is to say, where the people is kept from all honours and places of command: which although it be of itself an hard thing patiently to endure, yet were it the better to be borne, if the government were committed to good men: but when it is given to wicked and unworthy men, every audacious fellow upon occasion offered, will easily draw the people from the nobility, and so much the rather, by how much the nobility shall be at less unity among themselves. Which plague, as it is in all estates and governments, 
Discord among the nobility a thing most dangerous to the sta●…  so is it especially in an aristocraty to be eschewed and fled. Now discord often times ariseth even of most small matters, which as sparks raise the great fires of civil wars, which at length take hold even of the whole body of the estate of a city or Commonweal. As it happened at Florence, for the refusal made by a gentleman of the noble house of Bondelmont, to marry a gentlewoman to whom he had before given his promise, gave occasion to the raising of a faction amongst the nobility, who so wasted and devoured one another, as that the people to end the quarrel, easily drove 
Small matters oftentimes the caus●… of great changes in commonweals.  out all the rest, and commanded the state of the city. And for like occasion arose great civil wars amongst the Ardeates, for an inheretrix, whom her mother would have married unto a gentleman, and her guardions to a base obscure man: which divided the people from the nobility, in such sort, that the nobility vanquished and put to flight by the people, took their refuge unto the Romans, and the people unto the Volsians, who were afterwards vanquished by the Romans. So also the city & Commonweal of Delphos, for the same occasion, was changed from an aristocraty unto a Popular estate. The state of Mitelin was also changed from an aristocraty into a Popular estate, upon a suit betwixt the nobilititie and the people, Which of them should have the tuition of two orphans. And the state of the Commonweal of the Hestiens, for a suit in matter of inheritance betwixt two private men. And the sacred war which changed not, but even utterly ruinated the estate of the Phocenses, was grounded upon the marriage of an inheritrix, whom two of their great lords strove to have. And that more is, the Aetolians and Arcadians, for a long time sore weakened one another with mutual wars, and all but fo●… a boars head: as they of Carthage and of Bizaque did also for a small frigate. So betwixt the Scots and the Picts, was raised a most cruel war, and all but for certain dogs, which the Scots had taken from the Picts, and never could be again reconciled, howbeit that they had for six hundred years before lived in good peace and amity together. And the war betwixt the duke of Burgundy and the Swissers, which could no otherwise be ended, but by the death of the duke himself, was all but for a waggon load of sheep skins which he had taken from the Swissers. 
Great men hardly to be called in question to give an account of their doings, without the danger of the estate.   
Sometime also the changes and ruins of Commonweals come, when the great ones are to be brought in question, to 'cause them to give an account of their actions, whether it be for right or wrong: wherein even they which are guiltless (and especially in Popular estates) not without cause always fear the calumnies and doubtful issues of judgements, which most commonly endanger the lives, the goods, and honour of such as are accused. And to leave foreign examples, we have store enough of our own, and that of such as of late have set on fire all the kingdom with civil wars when it was but spoken of, for calling them to accounted for two and forty millions. And no marvel if they so feared to be brought in question for embeseling of the common treasure and revenues, when as Pericles, a man of greatest integrity, and which had most magnificently spent even his own wealth for the Athenian Commonweal, rather than he would hazard the account that they demanded of him for the treasure of Athens, which he had managed, and so generally of his actions, raised the Peloponesian war, which never after took end until it had ruinated divers Commonweals, and wholly changed the estate of all the cities of Greece. Who always having been a good husband, and had the charge of the common treasure of that Commonweal, by the space of almost fifty years, was therefore yet found never the richer, as Thucydides, a most true historiographer, and Pericles his most mortal enemy reporteth of him: who caused him to be banished with the banishment of the Ostracism. And even for the self same cause the Rhodians and they of choose had their estates changed from Aristocraties into Popular estates. And albeit that Caesar was of himself most ambitious and desirous of sovereignty: yet was he not so much desirous to bear rule, as afraid to be called to accounted by private men, for such things as he had done, as his enemies had openly boasted that he should, so soon as he was discharged of his charge: not the lest cause that moved him to seize upon the estate. For what assurance could he have of himself, seeing before the two Scipios (Africanus the honour of his time, and Scipio Asiaticus) Rotulus and Cicero, by the judgement of the people condemned? Now if good men were to fear, what should the wicked do? who beside that they are in hope the better to escape, the Commonweal being all on a broil, are also resolved, that the common treasures can never more easily be rob, or good men spoiled and slain, than in the time of civil wars: ever taking it for an advantage to fish in the troubled water. And although it may fortune such wicked men also to perish (as oftentimes it happeneth them which have been the authors of civil wars, themselves to die a most miserable death) yet have they still in their mouths that desperate saying of Catiline▪ That the fire (forsooth) which had taken hold of his house, which he could not with water quench, he would yet quench with the utter ruin of the same. And truly much he miss not, but that he had utterly overthrown the Roman Commonweal, or stepped into the sovereignty, had not Cicero the watchful Consul, and Ca Antonius his companion (although it were with much a do) slain him so desperate a citizen, with all his fellows. Neither aught Cicero (by his good leave be it said) to have driven Catiline out of the city, but to have oppressed him even there, the conspiracy once detected. For it is not to be hoped, but that he which seethe himself banished from his house, & from his country, if he have power, will forthwith put himself in arms, as he did. And had he gained the battle against Ca. Antonius, he had put the 
How dangerous a matter it is in every commonweal to banish a great man.  whole estate in great danger, being one of the most noble gentlemen, and best allied of all them that were in Rome. Certain it is that by his departure out of the city, a great and dangerous sink of the Commonweal was so well cleansed; yet had it been better for him to have been there oppressed, than armed against his own country. But of such great and dangerous enemies, the wiser sort adviseth us, to make them our 
This was the Ostracism banishment.  very good friends, or else utterly to destroy them, rather than to drive them out of the city; except we should for honour banish them: as they did in the cities of Athens, Argos, and Ephesus, where the great Lords mighty in wealth, favour, or virtue, were for a certain time (which for all that never exceeded ten years) constrained to absent themselves, without any loss of goods or reputation; which was an honourable kind of banishment. Of whom so banished, not any one of them is reported to have therefore made war upon his country. But to banish a great Lord with loss of his good●… and contumely, is not to quench but to kindle the fire of war against the estate: For that often times such a banished man by the help of his friends aspireth unto the sovereignty; as did Dion banished out of Syracuse by Dionysius the younger, against whom for all that he yet took not up arms until he was by him proscribed. And Martius Coriolanus, who cast into exile, brought the Romans to such extremity, as that had he not suffered himself to have been overcome with the prayers and tears of his mother, and the other women whom the Romans had sent unto him, the Roman state had there taken end. In like manner the banished men of the house of Medici's, and the nobility of Zurich in the year 133●…, thrust out of their cities, by the help and power of their friends and allies besieged their own native countries, and for a long time wearied the citizens their countrymen with a most doubtful and dangerous war. But yet here some man may say, That it is more safety to keep a wicked and a dangerous citizen without the walls, than to be troubled with such a plague in the very entrails of the Commonweal. Whereto I yield: but yet how much greater a folly is it to let him whom thou oughtest to kill, to escape out of the city, who once got out, is both willing and able to stir up, and maintain war? Artaxerxes king of Persia had cast in prison Cyrus the younger, guilty of high treason, and had commanded him in princely manner to be bound with chains of gold; and afterwards overcome with his mother's requests enlarged him: but he had no sooner got his liberty, but that he made most grievous war upon the king, and was like enough by his brother's death to have obtained the kingdom, or else have undone his country; had he not by the king's army been circumvented and slain. I said we must kill such people, 
Great men en●…mieses unto the estate, are either to be slain, or by great kindness to be made thereunto faithful friends.  or make them our good friends: as did Augustus, having discovered the conspiracy of Cinna against him, and having him in his power attainted and convinced by his own letters, yet nevertheless pardoned him; and not so content, took him by the hand, and swore a bond of mutual friendship with him, and afterwards bestowed the greatest honours and preferments of the estate upon him, at the time that Cinna expected nothing but the sentence of condemnation, and so present execution; using these words of grace and favour unto him: Vitam tibi Cinna iterum do, priùs hosti, nunc insidiatori ac parricidae; Ex hodierno die amicitia inter nos incipiat, contendamus utrum ego meliore fide vitam tibi dederim, an tu debeas, Cinna (said he) thy life I give thee again, being before mine enemy, and now a traitor and a murderer; But from this day, let us begin to be friends, and from henceforth let us strive, whether I with greater trust have given thee thy life, or thou with greater faithfulness dost owe it. After which time he never had a more faithful friend; being also afterwards by him appointed heir of all his goods. Augustus had before put to death an infinite number of such as had sworn and conspired his death: but now had a purpose in Cinna to prove if by gentleness and mercy he could gain the hearts of men, wherein he was not deceived: for from that time there was never any found which durst attempt any thing against him. So the Venetians also having taken prisoner Gonzaga the duke of Mantua, of all others their most mortal enemy, (who had joined all his forces and power with king jews of France for the overthrow of the Venetian state) did not only set him at liberty, but made him General also of their forces; by which so honourable a kindness he bond, for ever after continued their most fast and loyal friend. And this is it for which Pontius the old captain of the Samnites said, That the great army of the Romans surprised in the straitss of the Apennine mountains was either frank and freely to be set at liberty, or else all to be put to the sword: for that so it should come to pass, that either the power of the Romans should by so great a slaughter be greatly weakened, or else having received from the Samnites so great a benefit, as the life and liberty of so many men, they should for ever after keep good league and friendship with them.  
But these conversions and changes of Commonweals do more often happen in 
Small Commonweals more subject unto change than great.  little and small cities or estates, than in great kingdoms full of great provinces, and people. For that a small Commonweal is soon divided into two parts or factions: Whereas a great Commonweal is much more hardly divided; for that betwixt the great Lords and the meanest subjects, betwixt the rich and the poor, betwixt the good and the bad, there are a great number of the middle sort which bind the one with the other, by means that they participate both with the one and the other, as having some accord and agreement with both the extremes. And that it is for which we see the little Commonweals of Italy, & the ancient Commonweals of Greece, which had but one, two, or three towns or cities belonging to them, in one age to have suffered more alterations and changes than are in many ages reported to have been in this kingdom of France, or in the kingdom of Spain. For it is not to be doubted but that the extremes are always contrary one of them to the other, and so at discord and variance betwixt themselves, if there be not some means which may bind and join the one of them with the other; which we see by the eye, not only betwixt the nobility and base common people, betwixt the rich and the poor, betwixt the good and the bad, but even in the same city also, where as but the diversity of places separate but by some river, or waste vacant piece of ground without building upon it, doth often times set the citizens at odds, and give occasion to the changing 〈◊〉 
Small occasions serve to raise great dissension amongst citizens, and so the change of the estate.  the estate. So the city of Fez was never at quiet, neither could the slaughters & murders ever be appeased or stayed, until that joseph king of Morocco and of Fez, of two towns standing somewhat distant one of them from the other by continuate building made them both one, and that now the greatest city of Fez, whereby he gained the praise and commendation of a most wise & discreet prince; for that he so not only joined houses to houses, and walls to walls, but bound also the minds of the citizens and inhabitants of both places (before burning with an incredible hatred one of them against an other, and always divided in wars) now in perpetual love and friendship together. Which happened also unto the Clazomenians, where one part of the city standing in the main, and the other part in an Island, there was always discord and war betwixt them of the Isle and the other citizens. And so at Athens they which dwelled by the havens side commonly called Piraeus, were at continual discord and variance with them of the upper Town which they called Astu or the City, until that Pericles with long walls joined the Haven unto the City. For which cause also such tumults and quarrels fell betwixt the citizens of Venice, and the mariners and other the seafaring men, as had brought the city into extreme peril and danger had not Peter Lauredan with his great authority and wisdom appeased the same.  
But most often it happeneth the changes of Commonweals to follow after civil discord, especially if some neighbour prince shall upon the sudden oppress a city or 
Commonweals most often changed or overthrowme by foreign princes, taking the advantage of the civil discord of the subjects amongst themselves.  State weakened with the slaughter of the citizens or subjects, or else the citizens or subjects themselves being by the ears together: As the Englishmen have often times vanquished and overrun the French being at variance among themselves: And the king of Fez easily took the city of Tefza, the citizens being almost all consumed and spent with civil war, And in the memory of our father's Philip the second duke of Bourgondie joined unto the bounds of his dukedom Dinan and Bo●…ines, two cities in the country of Liege (parted in sunder but with a river) after that they had with long wars weakened themselves, which two cities for all that he could not before by any force subdue; howbeit that in taking of them he did but marry the one of them unto the other, as saith Philip Commines. So also whilst the kings of Morocco were in arms together for the sovereignty, the Governor of Thunes and of Telesin dismembered those two provinces to make himself a kingdom of. And by the same means Lachares seeing the Athenians in combustion, in the time of Demetrius the besieger, stepped into the signory. And that more is, we read that four thousand five hundred slaves and banished men invaded the Capitol, and miss but a little to have made themselves lords of Rome, whilst the Nobility and Common people in the mean time were together by the ears in an uproar in the midst of the city, who thereupon fell to agreement among themselves; not unlike unto two dogs, who ready to pull one an others throat out, seeing a wolf, fall both upon him. Wherefore such civil discord is most dangerous unto cities or estates, especially if there be no society or alliance betwixt the State so troubled, and the neighbour Princes: for that the enemy so at hand, may oppress the state (the citizens or subjects so at variance among themselves) before that any help can come. Whereat we are not to matuell, for they to whom neither the huge height of steep mountains, neither the unmeasurable depth of the bottomless sea, nor the most solitary deserts, nor the greatest and strongest fortifications, nor the innumerable multitude of enemies can serve for the staying of their ambitious and avaricious couses and desires; how should they content themselves with their own, without encroaching upon their neighbours, whose frontiers touch theirs, and that fit occasion presenteth itself for them so to do? which is there the more to be feared where the Commonweal is but little: as is that of Rhaguse, of Geneva, and of Luque, which have but one Town, and the territory vene straight; so that he which shall gain the town, shall withal become master of the Estate also: which so chanceth not in great and spacious Commonweal, wherein many castles, cities, countries, and provinces are in mutual help together combined, so that one city thereof being taken, or a country or province thereof spoiled, yet followeth not the ruin of the Estate, one of them still succouring an other, as many members in one body, which at need help one an other.  
Yet for all that a Monarchy hath this advantage proper unto itself, above the 
A Monarchy not so easily changed or overthrown, as is an aristocraty or Popular Commonweal.  Aristocratique and Popular estates, That in these commonly there is but one town or city wherein the signory lieth, which is as an house or place of retreat for them which have the managing of those estates to retire unto; which once taken by the enemy, the estate is withal undone: whereas a Monarch changeth himself from place to place as occasion requireth: neither doth the taking of him by the enemy bring with it the loss of the Estate. As when the city of Capua was taken, their estate was also overthrown by the Romans, neither was there so much as one town or fortress which made resistance against them; for that the Senate and the people which had the sovereignty were all together taken prisoners. The city of Sienna also being taken by the duke of Florence, all the other towns and fortresses of that signory at the same time yielded themselves unto him also. But the king taken prisoner, is most commonly for his ransom set at liberty; wherewith if the enemy hold not himself content, the Estates may proceed to a new election, or take the next of blood if they have other princes: yea sometime the captive king himself had rather to yield up his estate, or else to die a prisoner, than to grieve his subjects with his too heavy a ransom. As indeed that which most troubled the Emperor Charles the fift was the resolution of king Francis then his prisoner, who gave him to understand that he was 
The resolution of Francis the French king, being prisoner to the Emperor Charles the fift.  upon the point to resign his kingdom unto his eldest son, if he would not accept of the conditions by him offered: For why, the realm and all the Estate stood yet whole without any change taking, or any alteration suffering. And albeit that Spain, Italy, England, all the Low Countries, the Pope, the Venetians, and all the Potentates of Italy had combined themselves against the house of France, overthrown our legions at Pavia, and carried away the king with the flower of the nobility into Spain; yet was there not any which durst enter into France to conquer it, knowing the laws and nature of that Monarchy. For as a building grounded upon deep foundations, & built with durable matter, well united and joined in every part, feareth neither wind nor tempest, but easily resisteth all force and violence; even so a Commonweal grounded upon good laws, well united and joined in all the members thereof, easily suffereth not alteration: as also to the contrary we see some states and Commonweals so evil built and set together, as that they owe their fall and ruin unto the first wind that bloweth, or tempest that ariseth.  
And yet is there no kingdom which shall not in continuance of time be changed, 
The insensible change of estates best and most tolerable.  and at length also be overthrown. But they are in better case which least feel such their changes by little and little made, whether it be from evil to good, or from good to better; as we have showed by the example of the Venetian Commonweal: which at the beginning was a pure Monarchy, which afterward was sweetly changed into a Popular estate, and now by little and little is changed into an aristocraty, and that in such quiet sort, as that it was not well by any man perceived that the estate was at all changed. another example we have also of the German Empire, which founded 
The insensible ●…stanging of the Venetian estate, and of the state of the Germane Empire.  by Charlemaigne and descending to his posterity, so long continued a true Monarchy under one sovereign princes government, until that the line of Charlemaigne failing, the Emperors begun to be created by election; at which time it was right easy for the princes which had the choice by little and little to clip the Eagles' wings, and to prescribe laws and conditions unto the Emperor to rule by; and yet right happy was he which could thereunto aspire upon any condition whatsoever: whereby the state of the Monarchy began by little and little to decay, and the state of an aristocraty to increase in the Princes and Estates of the Empire, in such sort as that at this present the Emperors have nothing more but as it were the bore name and title of an Emperor, the sovereignty resting in the Estates of the Empire itself. So that had not eleven most noble Princes of the house of Austria for their worthy deeds right famous, as it were in a successive right (one of them whilst he himself yet liveth, still procuring an other of the same house to be designed Emperor) in some sort maintained the majesty of the German Empire, the Emperors for their estate had now long ago been like unto the Dukes of Venice, and happily inferior too. The ●…ke change happened unto the Polonians, the line of jagellon failing: as also the Danes, after that Christian their king was by them his subjects imprisoned, and his brother to be chosen king in his place, sworn to such conditions as the nobility would: and after that Fredrick which now reigneth hath been constrained to confirm the same, (as I have before noted) whereby it manifestly appeareth, that the Nobility there hold as it were the sovereignty, and that by little and little that kingdom will change into an aristocraty if Fredrick should die without children.  
And albeit that the estates of Hungary, Bohemia, Polonia, and Denmark, have always 
kingdoms going by election and so indeed but A●…istocratieses, long continued in one family, easily change at length into Monarchies as by succession descending.  pretended the right of election of their kings, although they have children, (which prerogative they still maintain) yet commonly the kings their parents appointed their children unto the succession of their kingdoms, who so chosen in their father's places, better maintain the rights of sovereignty than do strangers (who have the same often times cut short, and so their sovereign power in them restrained) so that the kingdoms so descending, as it were in succession from the great grandfathers unto their nephews, the sovereign rights by little and little without violence return again from the nobility unto the kings themselves: which is both an easy change, & most wholesome for the Commonweal. For so Cazimir the Great, king of Polonia, worthily defended the sovereign rights by him received from his great grandfather: but he dead without issue, the Polonians indeed called jews king of Hungary (and Cazimir his nephew) unto the kingdom of Polonia, but with the sovereignty therein much diminished; he for the gaining of the kingdom yielding to whatsoever the estates desired. But jews dead also without heirs male, jagello duke of Lithuania marrying one of the daughters and heirs of jews, and so with her obtaining the kingdom of Polonia, yet more impaired the sovereign rights than they had before been: the princes of whose posterity nevertheless as it were in successive right, for the space of above two hundred years, took upon them the government of the kingdom, and notably maintained the rights of their sovereignty, until the death of Sigismundus Augustus, last heir male of that house: unto whom by right of election succeeded Henry of France, Charles the ninth the French kings brother: but with oaths and conditions bound unto the estates, so much derogating from the rights of a sovereign Monarch, as that indeed he might have seemed rather a prince than a king. And to say yet more, I being sent to Mets, to assist them which were thither sent with the duke, to receive the ambassadors of Polonia, and to parley with them, it was told me by Solomon Sboroschi one of the ambassadors, That the estates of Polonia had yet cut much shorter the power of the new elected king, had it not been in the regard they had of the honour of the house of France. Thus we see Monarchies peaceably by little and little to change into Aristocraties, if so it be that the Monarchy be not by ancient laws and immutable customs, maintained in the majesty thereof. As we see in the creation of the pope, where the Consistory (or College of Cardinals) deerogate nothing from the sovereign majesty that he hath in all the demain of the church, and the fees depending thereon: no more than do the order of the knights of Malta in any thing diminish the power of the Grand master, who hath the power of life and death, and to dispose of the revenues, estates, and offices of the country, yielding fealty and homage unto the king of Spain for the isle of Malta, which Charles the fift the emperor upon this condition gave them. And albeit that the college of cardinals after the death of pope julius the second, determined in the conclave, to moderate the pope's power: yet shortly after they flew from that they had before decreed, in such sort that Leo the tenth, then by them chosen, took upon him more power than had any pope of long time before him.  
But that change is of others most dangerous to a Monarchy, when as the king 
The most dangerous change of a Monarchy.  dying without issue, there is some one who in wealth and power exceedeth the rest; & so much the more, if he be also ambitious and desirous of rule: For no doubt, but that having the power in his hand, he will, if he can, take the sovereignty from the other weak princes. For so Hugh Capet the right line of Charlemaigne ended, being Provost of the city of Paris, and a man of great wealth, and no less favoured of the people, excluded from the kingdom Charles duke of Lorraine, who with his son Otho were the only men left of all the posterity of Charlemaigne. Which is also to be feared of the great Ottoman princes, who although they have their families of the Machaloglies, of the Ebranes, and the Turacans, of the prince's house and blood, to succeed in the Turkish empire: yet for all that if the Ottoman family should altogether perish, it is to be thought, that some one of the Bassas or other great men, in greatest favour with the janzaries, and the other soldiers of the court will carry away the estate and sovereignty from the other princes of the aforesaid families, being but weak, and far off 
These noble families are now also all or most of them extinguished and come to naught.  from the Grand signor, which might so raise the greatest civil wars in the East, for the great opinion which the people hath of long conceived of the valour and majesty of the Ottoman family. A notable example of such change of state we have in the change of the Lacedaemonian kingdom: where Cleomenes the king vanquished and put to flight by Antigonus, the kingdom was changed into a Popular estate, which so continued for three years: during which time the people made choice of five Provosts, or chief magistrates, whom they called Ephori, chosen out of the people themselves: but news being brought of the death of Cleomenes, slain in Egypt, two of the five Ephori conspired against the other three their companions and fellows in office: and so as they were doing sacrifice, caused them to be slain: which done, they proceed to the election of Agesipolis for their king, a prince of the royal blood. But whereas before Cleomenes they were wont to have two kings: one Lycurgus a man gracious with the people, but otherwise none of the blood royal, by corruption and bribery caused himself also by the people to be chosen king, Chilon, a noble gentleman, descended from Hercules, being for his poverty and want of ability excluded, who not able to endure so great an indignity offered unto his house and family, procured all the magistrates to be slain: Lycurgus himself only escaping, who after great effusion of blood, held the sovereignty himself alone, having before almost quite destroyed the royal race of the Heraclides posterity of Hercules. And thus much concerning the change and ruin of Commonweals, which whether they may by any means be foreseen and prevented, let us now also see.   

CHAP. II ¶ Whether there be any mean to know the changes and ruins, which are to chance unto Commonweals.  
SEeing that there is nothing in this world which cometh to pass by chance or fortune, as all divines and the wiser sort of the Philosophers have with one common consent resolved: We will here in the first place set down this maxim for a ground or foundation, That the changes and ruins of Commonweals, are human, or natural, or divine; that is to say, That they come to pass either by the only council and judgement of God, without any other mien causes: or by ordinary and natural means of causes and effects, by almighty God bound in such fit order and consequence, as that those things which are first have coherence with the last; and those which are in the midst with them both: and all with all combined and bound together with an indissoluble knot and tying: which Plato according to the opinion of Homer hath called the Golden Chain, that is to say, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, or by the will of man, which the divines confess to be free, at the lest concerning civil actions: howbeit that indeed it is no will at all, which in any sort whatsoever is enforced and bound. Which will of man is so mutable and uncertain, as that it should be impossible to give 
Man's will still mutable, and God his judgements inscrutable, afford no mean for man by them to foresee the changes and ruins of Commonweals.  thereby any judgement, to know the changes and ruins which are to fall upon Commonweals. As for the council of God, it is inscrutable, but that he sometime by secret inspiration declareth his will, as he hath done unto his Prophets, causing them many worlds of years before to see the falls of many the greatest empires and Monarchies, which posterity hath by experience found to be true. But this divine power of the almighty most seldom times showeth itself immediately without the coming betwixt of mean causes; neither doth he it without greatest force and most sudden violence: as when he in one and the self same moment with wonderful fire, and revenging flames, destroyed the five cities with Sodom and Gomorrha: and so changed 
God his inmediate judgement most su●…den and most dreadful.  also the place then full of most sweet waters and abundance of fish, with a most stinking & loathsome taste, as that it yet is unto all kind of fish pestilent & deadly: and as for the ground itself, before of wondered fertility, he so covered it with ashes and stinking sulphur, as that he seemeth in that country to have left no place for wholesome plants, or any kind of grain to grow in. So also he overwhelmed Bura and Helice, two cities of Greece, with such a deluge of water, and that so suddenly, that even they also which were about to have fled out of the cities into the ships, being by the wonderful rising of the waters, unable to come to the haven, were so all drowed. By the like wrath of God a great earthquake in a moment swallowed up three and twenty cities in Italy, where afterward the Fens called Pontinae burst out. As in like manner twelve cities of Asia are reported to have been all at once upon the sudden with an earthquake devoured.  
Wherhfore seeing that man's will is still divers and mutable, & God his judgements most secret and inscrutable: there remaineth only to know, whether that by natural causes (which not altogether obscure, but by a certain constant order of causes and effects governed, kept their course) a man may judge of the issue and success of Commonweals. 
By what natural causes the ch●…ngeses and ruins of Commonweals are to be foresee●…  Yet by these natural causes having in them this power (which are many and divers) we mean not civil causes, whereunto the change and ruin of cities and Commonweals must needs immediately follow: as when good deserts go unrewarded, and great offences unregarded, who knoweth not but that such a state or Commonweal must needs in short time perish and come to nought? For of all causes none is more certain, none more weighty, and in bri●…fe none nearer unto the change or ruin of a city or Commonweal, than these. But the causes which we here seek after, are the celestial and more remote causes▪ yet proceeding from a certain natural course and force: howbeit that it be good also to behold and foresee all manner of causes what soever. For as a painter doth one way consider of a man's body, and the Physician another: and the natural Philosopher one way considereth of the mind of man, & the divine another: so also the Politiitan doth one way, the ginger another, and the divine a third way, judge of the change & ruin of Commonweals. The Politician in the ruin of a city or Commonweal, blameth the injuries and wrongs done by the prince unto his subsects, the corruptness of the magistrates, with the iniquity of the laws: The ginger considereth and beholdeth the force and power of the heavenly stars and planets, and thereof thinketh divers motions to arise in men's minds, for the change and innovation of estates and Commonweals: But the Divine constantly affirmeth all plagues, wars, dearth, destructions of cities and nations, to proceed from the contempt 
Ps●…l 10●…. Levit. 27. job. 12.  * of God and of his religion, and God therefore to be angry, and to stupefy the wisdom even of the most wisest magistrates, and to arm even his stars against princes. And every one of these have their causes, by the help and concourse whereof wise men may guess the change or ruin of a city or Commonweal. In which point we see many to err and be deceived, which think, that to look into the stars, and to 
Astrological pray dictions, not to deerogate from the majesty and power of God.  search after their secret influences and virtues, is in some sort to diminish the majesty and power of almighty God: whereas to the contrary it is thereby made much more glorious and beautiful, to do so great things by his creatures, as if he did then immediately by his own mighty hand, without any other mean at all.  
Now what man is there of sound judgement, which feeleth not the wonderful 
Nothing done by the necessity of nature, itself being still subject to the power of God:  force and effect of the celestial bodies in nature in general? Which yet for all that no necessity of nature worketh, for that it may by almighty God be still kept back and restrained, being himself free from the laws of nature, which he himself hath commanded; not as by a decree of a Senate, or of a people, but even of himself: who being of all others the greatest, can do nothing but that which is right and just, for that he is himself the best, and hath a 
* Easie. 19  perpetual care of all people and nations, but yet thereof himself secure, for that he is himself the greatest. But as all things which had beginning have also a lose and frail dissoluable nature (as by most certain and undoubtful demonstration is to be proved) it must thereof needs follow also, not only 
All worldly things still subject to mutability and change.  cities and Commonweals, but even also other things, which from their first beginning have innumerable worlds of years flourished, must at length in tract of time fall also and take end. And albeit that Plato the prince of Philosophers, having not as yet the knowledge of the celestial motions, and so much less of their effects (which as then was covered in most thick darkness and clouds) when as he with a notable invention had conceited such a form of a Commonweal, as seemed unto many to be everlasting, if it erred not from the laws and orders by him set down; yet for all that he said, That it should in time perish: as he which most manifestly saw the vanity of all things, which as they had a beginning, so were they also to take ending; nothing being still firm and stable, besides him which was the father of all things. Which being so, there be no so notable orders, not so religious laws, no such wisdom or valour of man, which can still presetue estates or Commonweals from ruin and most certain destruction. By which reasons, Secundus (a Philosopher of the Stoic sect) greatly comforted Pompey, discouraged and almost desperate after the Pharsalian overthrow. Neither yet therefore do they which think the course of natural causes to concern the changes and ruins of cities and Commonweals, thereby bind the free will of man, and much less almighty God himself unto a fatal necessity: no not if we should deem all things to be done by a continuat and interlaced course of forerunning natural causes; seeing that even nature itself is by the power of God kept in & restrained. Wherefore we oftentimes see both plants, and other living creatures, which by nature have a certain period of their lives, by some external force to hasten or prevent the terms by nature prefined, and so sooner to die than by nature they should. And as for mankind, we have it oftentimes in holy writ recorded, That they which lead an upright & virtuous life, shall live long: whereas the wicked should shorten their days, and bring themselves unto a most speedy confusion and end. Whereby it appeareth certain prefixed bounds of every man's life, to be by God appoined, which by sin may be cut shorter, and by virtue extended farther. So kingdoms also have their beginnings, their encreasings, their flourishing estates, their change, and ruins: yet when these changes shall be, or ruins, or destructions betid them, we see it by no learning to be perceived or understood. For as for that which Plato hath written, Kingdoms then to fall and take end, when as the sweet consent and harmony of them should perish and decay; is a thing not worth the refutation: whereof yet for all that more in due place shall be said.  
Now many there be, which have thought the conversions and changes of estates and Commonwealas, to depend of the force, power and motion of the superior celestial bodies: which to discover, were a matter of infinite difficulty, which yet for all that should not be so great, if Commonweals should as men and other things take their beginning. And albeit that the state and ruin of Commonweals should wholly next unto God depend of those eternal lights, and of their mutual conjunctions and oppositions, yet could thereof no certain doctrine be delivered or gathered, for the 
The notable ●…torss of the Astrologers  great variety and inconstancy of them which have observed the force and course of the celestial stars & orbs; insomuch, that some one hath written the same star in the self same moment to have been in his direct motion, and another hath likewise written the same to be retrograde, which yet for all that, was to be seen in the heavens stationarie and immovable. So that they are by their own rashness to be refelled, which vaunt themselves to be able without error, to foretell the force and power of the stars, upon cities and Commonweals; as also what effects they shall for many years to come produce, when as in the very motion of the moon, which of all the other planets hath in it least difficulty there is not one of them which well agreeth with one another. So Cyprian Leovicius, following the table of Alphonsus, (the evident error of whom Copernicus hath declared) hath made so apparent faults, as that the great conjunctions of the superior planets were seen one or two months after his calculation. And albeit that Gerardus Mercator have endeavoured by certain eclipses of the sun & of the moon, by ancient writers set down, more curiously than any other, to judge of the course and order of the whole time from the beginning of the world; yet so it is, that all his observations threaten a fall, as grounded upon a false supposition: which can in no wise be true, For he supposeth that in the creation of the world, the sun was in the sign Leo, without any probable reason, following the opinion of julius Maternus, contrary to the opinion of the Arabians, and of all other the Astrologers, who writ, that the sun was then in the sign Aries▪ being yet both therein deceived▪ these, six signs; and Mercator too. For why it is manifestly to be proved, not only by the most ancient orders and customs of all people, but by the most divine testimonies of holy scripture also, The sun in the creation of the world, to have been 
The sun in the creation of the world to have been in the sign●… Libra. Exod. 23. ver. 16 Exod. 11. ver. ●…  in the sign Libra: whereby the Feast of the gathering of the first-fruits is commanded to be kept the last day of the year, that is to say, the two and twentieth day of the seventh month; which Moses hath expressly written to have been the first, before the departure of the people out of Egypt. Which to the intent it might be the less doubted of, we read to be oftentimes by him repeated: for when he had commanded the feast day Abib, that is to say, The feast of weeks, which the Greeks call 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: he joineth hereunto these words, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, that is to say, And the feast of the gathering of first-fruits in the end of the year. But the last moment of the year past, is the beginning of the year following; as Orus Apollo writeth, the Egyptians to have declared the revolution of the year, by a dragon turned about into a circle. But josephus, the best interpreter of antiquity, declareth the month Abib, which of th' Chaldays is called Niscan, and of us before, March, but now April, to have been in order the first for the deliverance of the people out of the bondage of Egypt: but yet the month which of the Chaldeis is called Ethanim, of the Hebrews Tisri, which was our October, but afterward fell into our September, to have been by nature the first. All which, not only josephus, but almost all the Hebrew Rabines also, namely Eleazar, Abraham, Ezra, jonathas the Chaldean interpreter, with almost all the rest, constantly affirm. Which for that it hath great force for the discerning of the ruins of Commonweals, is of us 
The world to have taken beginning in Autumn.  more manifestly to be explained. The ancient school of the Hebrews, begin the reading of Moses his books, the Genesis, in Autumn: and Samuel, the most ancient Rabine of the Hebrews, appointeth the first Tecupa, or yearly conversion of the year, in the Autumn equinoctial: whereby it is manifest, the doctrine and customs of that most ancient nation, to concur and agreed with the law of God. The same was the doctrine of the old Egyptians and Chaldies' also, concerning the beginning of the year, from whom all the mathematical scienses took not only their beginning, but were from them to all other nations of the world derived also. So julius Firmicus writeth, the Egyptians having received it from their ancestors, to have delivered it unto posterity, The sun in the beginning of the world to have been placed in the last part of Libra. The same was also the opinion of the Indian's, who are yet worshippers of the Sun, & of the Moon, as the Spaniards have reported. And although the year of the Grecians, took beginning from the summer Solstitium, yet nevertheless the people of Asia began their Olympiad's and the beginning of the year from Autumn. The Romans also from the remembrance of most ancient aniquitie, began the year from 
The ancient Ro manes to have begun the year in September.  the Ideses of September, Lex vetusta est (saith Livy) & priscis scripta literis, ut qui Praetor maximus sit, Idibus Septembris cl●…uum pangat, It is an old law (saith he) and written in old ancient letters, that he which was the great Provost, should ever the Ideses of September drive or fasten a nail. This nail Festus calleth annalem, or an annual nail, Qui quotannis figebatur in dextra part capitolij ut per eos clavos numerus colligeretur annorum▪ Which was every year fastened in the right side of the Capitol, that so by those nails the number of the years might be gathered. Augustus' appointed also the Olympic games in the month of September. And albeit that the Astrologers (as other people also for the most part) follow a new manner of account of the year, set down by Moses, and begin their account of the spring division, yet nevertheless they begin their tables of the celestial motions received from the Egyptians and Chaldeys from the Autumn division. Which antiquities, with the authority of so many and so worthy men, although they make the matter manifest enough and out of all doubt▪ yet even nature itself leadeth us thither also, as that we must needs confess the beginning of the world to have been in Autumn. For if we grant, as we must needs, man as all other living creatures also, to have been by almighty God created in such state and perfection as that they should need no nurses; so also is it to be thought him to have provided for all living creatures, and especially for mankind, ripe first-fruits for him to feed upon, and most beautiful to behold, planted in most fair gardens, as is in the sacred book of Genesis to be seen: which can in no wise be done, but that the world must be created in the beginning of Autumn. For why, Adam was created about jordan, whereas corn in the spring time yet shooteth not on ear; and the month Abib is so called, for that the corn in the spring time in those places runneth but up in spindle, and the trees but scarcely bud: neither is the law of nature, or the season of the spring, or of Autumn, from the beginning of the world changed. Wherhfore Plutarch in his Symposiaques, when he pleasantly questioneth, Whether eggs or birds were first? resolveth birds to have been first created: and so whatsoever things else are contained in the whole world, to have been in all parts created perfect For otherwise if God should have created man a crying child, or calves for oxen, or eggs for birds, he must also have created nurses to have suckled them, and birds to have hatched them: which if it be absurd and foolish to say, so must also of necessity those things be absurd, whereof these things follow, viz. the world to have been created in the beginning of the spring, and young shoots to have been made for fruitful trees, and so likewise other things to have been created young, and not in their perfection. Whereby it is evident them greatly to err & be deceived, which accounting & taking the beginning of the world from the spring, and the beginning of the day from noon, do with their vain conjectures go about to blot out and extinguish the authority of the sacred scriptures, as also the most ancient records of the Indian's, the Chaldees, the Egyptians, and Latins, and all forsooth because cold weather still followeth after Autumn: they fearing (as I suppose) lest Adam being a naked child, should have taken cold. Seeing therefore the Astrologers, even as these men also to have laid false principles and grounds, of the celestial motions, and much to differ amongst themselves, concerning 
Astrological predictions uncertain.  the course of the stars and planets, they can therefore (I say) set down nothing certain, concerning man's affairs, or the ruins of cities and Commonweals.  
But yet it hath less probalitie by the foundation of towns and cities, to judge of 
The rising or falling of commonweals not to be judged or deemed of by the foundation of the towns or cities therein.  the rising or falling of Commonweals: as many do also of houses before they lay the foundations of them, to foresee and let that they should not be burnt or razed, or sick of the falling sickness: which to do is a mere folly, differing little from extreme madness, as though natures most constant order should depend of man's lightness, and the force of the celestial Spheres, of the will and pleasure of a base carpenter or mason. Indeed by the law it is provided, That the value of houses burnt should be deemed by their age and continuance, for so it is read in the old Hetruscian copy: although that D. Cuias a most diligent interpreter of ancient readings, be of their opinion, which for aetatibus, think it aught to be read quantitatibus (as who should say by their quantities, rather than by their age) whereunto the lawyer never had respect. For his meaning was, That houses according to the stuff and matter they were built of, were to be esteemed of longer or shorter continuance: as if an house were built of clay or mortar, it was esteemed to be able to last some fourscore years: in such sort as that if it had cost an hundred crowns at first to build, being burnt forty years after, there should half the price thereof be abated in the estimation thereof: For as for houses built with brick (they as Pliny saith) if they be built upright are everlasting. And so Victrwius, and all other builders were wont to esteem of the loss sustained, by the age and continuance of the houses burnt. For to esteem of them by the elle, or by the greatness, so a barn built of clay or straw should be esteemed more worth than smaller buildings built of marble or of porphiree, as the temple of Porphiree at Sienna, one of the lest, but most costly buildings of Europe. But the deciding of such questions we must refer to Victrwius, and other builders. And as for that some think we are by the foundations of cities and other buildings, to judge what shall be the state or success of a kingdom or monarchy should less need the refutation: but that M, Varro (whom Tully writeth to have in learning excelled all other Greeks and Latins) commanded Tarentius Firmianus to declare unto him the Horoscope of the city of Rome: for so Plutarch and Antimachus Lyrius report. Whereupon he by the progress of that Commonweal gathering the causes thereof; and by things ensuing after, guessing at things forepast, & so by ret●…ogradation judging the causes by the effects, by most light and vain conjectures affirmeth the foundation of the city to have been laid in the third year of the sixt olympiad, the one and twentieth day of April, a little before three of the clock in the afternoon, Saturn, Mars, and Venus, being as then in Scorpio, jupiter in Pisces, the sun in Taurus, the moon in Libra, Gemini holding the heart, or middle of the heavens, and Virgo rising. But seeing that the chief points of this figute belonging unto Mercury, and that this whole celestial Scheame betokeneth men of traffic, or otherwise studious of Philosophy, and all kind of learning, how can it come to pass, that these things should agreed, or be applied unto the Romans, a people of all others most courageous and warlike? Howbeit that Taruntius in this his figure, or Horoscope of the foundation of Rome, is most shamefully deceived, as having therein placed the celestial orbs in a situation quite contrary unto nature, viz. Venus opposite unto the Sun: which yet can never be above eight and forty degrees 
Taruntius Firmianus deceived in his horoscope or figure of the foundation of Rome.  at the most distant from the Sun: which yet were a thing excusable and worthy to be pardoned, if it had been by him done by forgetfulness: as it happened to Augerius Ferrerius an excellent Mathematician, who in his book of Astronomical judgements, hath set Venus and Mercury, one of them opposite unto another, and both of them opposite unto the Sun: a thing by nature impossible, and he himself acknowledging that Mercury can never be six and thirty degrees from the Sun. Yet true it is, that john Picus earl of Mirandula, grounding upon this demonstration of the celestial motions, without cause blameth julius Maturnus, for that he placed the Sun in the first house, and Mercury in the tenth, which cannot be (saith he) except the sun should be from Mercury the fourth part of the circle (or three signs distant:) not having regard, that the globe may so be placed, to incline unto the North, as that the sun rising, Mercury may come unto the meridian, yea unto the tenth house two hours before noon, and yet not be thirty dgrees from the sun. But Plutarch writeth Antimachus Lyrius to have left recorded, the Sun to have been then eclipsed, which yet he saith to have been the diameter of the circle distant from the Moon. And yet there is another greater absurdity in that theme of Taruntius, in that he placeth the sun in Taurus the xxj day of April, which then entered not thereinto until the thirtieth of April. Howbeit also that Lucas Gauricus, who collected the celestial themes of many most famous cities, differeth altogether from this theme of Rome, by Taruntius before set down: for he placeth Libra in the East, as doth also Manlius. But of all absurd things none is more absurd, than by the overthrow of cities to measure the destruction of the estate or Commonweal, whereas before we have declared, that a city oftentimes may be overthrown and laid even flat with the ground, and yet the state and Commonweal thereof remain, as we have before showed of the city of Carthage: as oftentimes to the contrary the estate and Commonweal may perish, the walls and other buildings yet standing all whole.  
Wherhfore then I rest not upon such opinions, and much less upon that which Cardan saith, who to seem more subtly than others to handle these hidden and obscure matters, & to raise an admiration of himself with men unskilful of these things, maintaineth the beginnings and encreasings of the greatest cities and Empires to have come from that Star which is the last in the tail of Vrsa Maior, which he saith to have been vertical unto the great city of Rome at the foundation thereof, and from thence even by the help and working of the same Star translateth the Roman Empire to Constantinople, and so afterwards into France, and so from thence into Germany: which although they be so set down but by a most brainsick man, yet do 
Cardan his error detected and his opinion rejected.  men ignorant of the celestial motions wonderfully admire the same, and are therefore by us to be refuted. For perceiving that last star of Vrsa Mayor to be daily unto many people vertical, though perpendicular unto them only which are subject unto the circle which that star describeth, Cardican saith it should be vertical at such time as the Sun toucheth the Meridian circle: in which state he supposeth it to have been, at such time as Romulus the founder of the city laid the foundation thereof: which could not by nature so be, viz. that the last star of Vrsa maior in the same hour, that is to say at noontide, should together with the Sun touch the vertical circle: For that star being now in the xxj degree of Virgo, by proportion of the motion of the fixed statres, by reason of the motion of the eight Sphere, it must needs have been in the xix degree of Leo at such time as the foundation of the city of Rome was laid, and the Sun in the xix. degree of Aries, as the foregoing of the Sun declare. So that that star was the third part of the circle, or four signs and twenty degrees distant from the vertical, when as it aught to have been in the same sign, and in the same degree of the sign wherein the Sun was, if Cardan his doctrine were true: who yet when he knew the same star to have been vertical unto many great cities at the time of their foundation, since the beginning of the world, the Sun also then being in the Meridian; he to meet with that objection, said the Monarchy to be due but to one of them. But why that to the Romans from whose vertical it is distant twelve degrees, rather than to the Scottish fishermen which devil near unto the Orcadeses? or unto them of Norway, and other the Northern people? unto whom the same star is not only vertical, the sun touching the Meridian in September, but is also directly perpendicular? Yet is it also more strange, to say the same star to have given the Empire to Constantinople, considering that that city was built nine hundred years before that the Empire was thither translated. joining hereunto also that the horoscope of the city of Constantinople found in the Pope's library in the Vatican written in Greek letters, calculated by Porphyry (as some affirm) and copied out by Lucas Gauricus the Bishop, declareth the Sun then to have been in the xvij degree of Taurus, the Moon in the v of Leo, Saturn in the xx of Cancer, jupiter and Venus conjunct in the same sign, Mars in the twelft, Mercury in the first of Gemini, Aquarius holding the vertical of heaven, and the twenty-three of Gemini in the Levant; which he setteth down to have been in May upon a Monday, two hours after the sun rising. another celestial Theme of the same City is also taken out of the Vatican, calculated by Valens of Antioch, later than the former by forty minutes. But yet that is very absurd which Gauricus the good Bishop to come to his acconut supposeth the city of Constantinople to have been built in the year of our Lord 638, three hundred years after the death of Porphyry: which yet it is manifest to have flourished above 500 years before Christ: which he thinketh also to have been afterwards taken by the Turks army in the year of Christ 1430. when as in truth it was by them won and sacked in the year of our Lord 1453, the xxix day of May, being 1800 year before taken by the French men: wherein they reigned until the time of Clyarus king of Thracia, as Polybius (tutor unto Scipio Affricanus) writeth; at which time it was called Bizance. And again afterwards also was taken by Pausanias' king of Lacedemonia in the Median war. And yet more, afterwards also was besieged by Alcibiades general of the Athenians. And long time after, three years together again besieged by Severus the Emperor, who after he had sacked it, razed it also down to the ground, and carrying away the rest of the citizens into captivity, gave the ground whereon it stood unto the Perinthians about the year of our Lord two hundred: which yet not long after was again re-edified, and by Constantine the great wonderfully enriched after that he had thither translated the seat of his Empire. And yet again after that, was with fire and sword most cruelly wasted by the army of Galienus the Emperor, all the citizens therein being either slain, or else carried away into captivity. Yet ceased it not for all that to be still the seat of the Greek empire, until that the Frenchmen and Flemings under the conduct of Baldwin Earl of Flaunders seized thereon; which they held together with the Empire, until that about fifty years after they were by the Palaeologi again driven out: who having so recovered the city there reigned, until that it was by Mahomet the great Turk won. All which changes of the Empire, and ruins of the city, Gauricus never touched; neither did Cardan himself so much as suspect them: otherwise I suppose he would never have written things so absurd, and so disagreeing with themselves. But great marvel it is that this Cardan's star hath had such power as to grant the Empires of the world to Italy, Greece, France, and Germany, when as it was to them but vertical, and yet hath had no power at all upon the realms of Norway and Sweden, where it is not only vertical, the Sun being at the Meridian in the month of August, but is also perpendicular: and yet nevertheless distant from Rome and Constantinople in latitude twelve degrees at the lest. Besides that, why should he give unto this Star (which some foolish Astrologers take to be Saturnia) more power than to others, both for their greatness & nature more notable? why doth he exclude from the government of the world Regulus the greatest of all the six stars? why Medusa, Spica, the great Dog, the Vulture, all most fair and beautiful stars? why in brief a thousand and threescore others, (for so many there are accounted beside the wandering stars) unto whom the Hebrew Mathematicians had added thirty six more also? Sufficeth it for this time to have rejected these errors so gross, as the day itself is clear.  
But for as much as it were a thing infinite to refel all men's errors in this kind of 
The error of Peter Cardinal of Arliac.  matter, I will only touch theirs, who have thought themselves wiser than the rest, and have been had in reputation as best seen in the judgement of the heavens for the changes of Commonweals: such as was Peter of Arliac chancellor of Paris, and afterwards Cardinal in the year 1416: For he writeth the beginnings, channges, and ruins of religions and Commonweals, to depend of the motion and conjunction of the superior Planets. And to me it seemeth right strange, why john Picus Earl of Mirandula hath without farther search; accounted of the shameful errors of this man, concerning the knowledge of the Celestial Spheres, as of most certain & approved demonstrations; who having noted six and thirty great conjunctions of the superior planets, jupiter & Saturn, since an hundred and fifteen years after the creation of the world, unto the year of our Lord Christ 1385, there are not of them six true, and scarce any of them set in such place and time as they aught to be. Leupold, Alcabice, and Ptolomee were also of the same opinion, viz. the remove of people, wars, plagues, deluges, plenty, dearth, the changes of Estates and Commonweals, to depend of the motion and conjunction of the Planets, and especially of the superior planets Saturn I say and jupiter, and so much the more if Mars be also in conjunction with them both. And so indeed as often as they are in conjunction together, such things thereof ensue as often times draw even the wiser sort into admitation: howbeit that no necessity be imposed upon man kind by the influence of the heavens. But howsoever that be, it is manifest the Cardinal of Arliac to have been most grievously deceived, who reckoning up those great conjunctions from the beginning, supposeth it by his account to have been seven thousand years since the creation of the world, following therein the errors of Alphonsus, Eusebius, and Beda; which the great consent not of the Hebrews only, but of all Christians also hath long ago rejected: so soon as by the old interpretation of the Bible it was perceived them to have erred in their account above a thousand five hundred years: whereas all Churches at this present follow the more certain account of Philo the jew, who followed almost the mean betwixt josephus and the later Hebrews: for josephus differeth 342 years, and Philo but an 160 from the other Hebrews. Whereof it is to be gathered this present year, which is from the birth of our Saviour Christ 1583, (wherein Bodin writ these things in Latin) to have been 5531, or at most 5555 since the creation of the world. Wherhfore Arliac is deceived, who put the conjunction of the superior Planets seven thousand years ago, in the 320 year after the creation of the world: which after that computation must have happened twelve hundred years before that the world was made. The same man doth suppose also that at the creation of the world, the Horoscope whereof he describeth, the first degree of Cancer to have been then rising, the Sun then to have been in Aries, (which to be false we have by necessary arguments before proved) the Moon and Venus in Taurus, Saturn in Aquatius, jupiter in Pisces, Mars in Scorpio, Mercury in Gemini: which is all false and quite contrary unto the nature and motion of the celestial Spheres, which is manifest unto every man which shall more narrowly look thereinto, or take account of the motions of the Planets from thence unto these times: not to speak of that, that he placed the Sun in the xix degree of Aries, and Mercury in the xv of Gemini, having so against nature divided the one of them from the other six and fifty degrees, as we have before declared: viz. that Mercury when he is farthest from the Sun, never to be farther off than six and thirty degrees. Which may suffice in passing by, ot show that the Hypothesis of the Cardinal of Arliac and his foundation being false, the rest that is thereon built cannot stand. But this he had propounded unto himself, It to be a thing contrary unto the majesty of the Planets, if in the creation of the world he should place them other where than every one of them in their own throne and chariot: which devices of the unskilful, are more light and farther from the antiquirie of the Chaldeis, than that they deserve to be refelled.  
But how much more certainly and better do they, which having consideratlie looked thorough the antiquities of the Hebrews, and the animaduertions of Copernicus (who most diligently corrected the errors of Alphonsus, and of the Arabians) going orderly retrograde from these oppositions and conjunctions of the Planets which we now behold, unto the very first beginning, judge of the revolution of the time past, as also of the change and state of Commonweals; if yet by this means any such judgement, free from impiety and rashness may be made. Neither is it to be hoped (except happily in an innumerable sort of worlds) that the three superior Planets shall meet together in the first point of Aries, whereof our wizards rashly divine a general destruction of Commonweals, as also of the whole world then to ensue by fire from heaven. Howbeit that in the year of our Lord Christ 1909, there shall be a meeting together of the three superior Planets in the ninth degree of Aries: which yet for all that is no true conjunction, as not made by the centres, but by the Orbs and Spheres of the Planets. And in the year 1584., Saturn and Mars shall be in conjunction in the first point and 46 minutes of Aries, and jupiter in the same sign, but distant from them twelve degrees, with the Sun and Mercury: which conjunction shall scarce chance again in the revolution of eight hundred years. And in 
How a man may without offence presage the changes of Cities and Commonweals.  this sort it is lawful for a man looking into the yearly course of time, by writing to commend unto posterity the changes of cities and Commonweals, and so by things precedent and already forepast to judge also of things to come: yet saving always the majesty of almighty God, who is himself bound unto no laws of nature, neither hath thereunto bound any of his servants. Wherein many greatly offend, who think the power and influence of the celestial Spheres to be nothing, when as yet for all that their strength and power hath always been most great and effectual, not only upon these elements which we here see, and so upon all other sorts of living creatures, but even upon them also which live like beasts, as * in sacred writ is to be 
joh. 39 and 40.  seen, and yet of the good nothing at all to be feared. So many stood in great doubt in the year 1524, wherein the three superior Planets, Saturn, jupiter, and Mars were in conjunction in the tenth degree of Pisces, the rest of the Planets together with the Dragon's head being in Aquarius & Pisces, both of them watery Signs. Which self same year in the month of February were twenty other conjunctions of the 
Vain fears often times conceived, upon Astrologers vain predictions.  Planets also among themselves, besides the six stars; which of all other things, was a thing most worthy the admiration. So that hereupon the Astrologers all the world over agreeing together for the destruction of the world, with a great fear terrified the minds of many weak men; in that they so constantly all with one consent affirmed, the world to be now again overwhelmed with an universal deluge and inundation of waters; in somuch that many miscreants caused ships to be made for them to save themselves in from such the rage of the waters, and especially Auriolus Precedent of Tholose a most cunning lawyer, but a man either ignorant, or a contemne●… of the laws of God, howbeit that he heard the promises of God still preached unto him, and the oath by him made unto 
* Genes. 7.  Noah that he would no more destroy the world by water. And true it is that in that year were floods and inundations of waters in divers countries, but yet no such general deluge as was foretold and feared, neither any cities or countries at all known to be drowned. Wherhfore to affirm any thing of the changes and ruins of Commonweals, it sufficeth not to behold only those great conjunctions of the three superior Planets, but also diligently to observe and note the mean conjunctions, which are every two hundred and forty, and every twenty year: as also the eclipse of the Sun, and of the Moon, with the oppositions and conjunctions of the inferior Planets amongst themselves, and with superior planets, and in brief their mutual traiections, as also the force and power of the fix stars, and their respect towards others. True it is that many of the ancient writers have noted either dearth, or popular diseases, great mortality of living creatures, or the removing of people, inundations of waters, or the destruction of cities, or changes of kingdoms to have followed such conjunction of the superior planets; yet not in every place generally, but in certain countries and places only, whereby they have by a certain conjecture judged this or that sign to be by God deputed unto this or that country. And hereof according to the power of the four elements they have divided the twelve celestial signs into four parts, and have thereof left certain instructions to posterity: whereof for all that because they were not by long experience approved they could make no certain art: as the Chaldies' have 
The vanity of the Chaldean Astrologers.  feigned, who vaunted themselves to have spent 470 thousand years in the practice of nativities, the better to persuade men of the certainty of their knowledge, and to make it thereby the more saleable. Which the Chaldean babbles spread abroad far and wide unto all people, but unto none more foolishly then to the Indian Chinois, who say 783 thousand and seven hundred sixty two years, to be the last year past since the creation of the world. Others there be which in that matter lie not so loudly and yet impudently enough. For Linus the most ancient writer of the Greeks', Orpheus and Heraclitus, shut up the period of the greatest year within the revolution of 360 thousand years, whereof they supposed an hundred fourscore four thousand to be past. But a certain Egyptian priest vaunted before Solon, the Egyptians his country men to have an history of twenty thousand years written in hieroglyphical letters. And a little while after Herodotus (called the father of history) understood from the same Egyptians, records of thirteen thousand years to be extant in their sacred letters. Diodorus younger than the rest going into Egypt to found out the truth, heard certain Priests to say antiquities of three and thirty thousand years old to be found amongst the Egyptians: but when he came to weigh the truth of the matter in equal balance, he found all their antiquity to consist but of three thousand seven hundred years: the computation of which time from the beginning of the world, agreeth altogether with Philo, or within little less than two hundred years. And truly calisthenes persuaded by the speech of Aristotle his master, when as others at the sacking of Babylon greedily sought after the Persian wealth, he diligently searched out and gathered together the books and antiquities of the Chaldies', and there noted all the history of the Chaldies' to have been comprehended in 1903 years: which time well agreeth with the sacred history, if we accounted the time from Nimrod, who first obtained the sovereignty of the Chaldies': which history is to be thought so much the truer, for that it is so reported by Simplicius a mortal enemy of the Christians, as we have elsewhere declared. And therefore Ptolomey, who farthest repeating from uttermost remembrance the antiquities of the Chaldies' (of them I say, which had noted the steady courses of the celestial Spheres) bringeth the beginnings of the celestial motions no farther than from Nabonassar, and from those eclipses of the moon which happened in the time of his reign, that is, the year of the world 3750: But Ptolomey flourished in the time of Adrian the emperor, about four hundred years after Nabonassar. Wherhfore it aught not to seem strange to any man, if he neversomuch as once suspected the motion of trepidation, neither understood the revolution of the eight Sphere: yea he well observed not the Equinoctials: For he saith, The Equinoctium to have been the the twenty sixt of September, after the sun rising: which Hisparchus had taught to have happened 285 years the same day of the month, about midnight, whose errors could scarcely be perceived in the time of our ancestors: as not long ago Io. Regiomontanus showed the motion of trepidation, before unto Astronomers unknown. Wherhfore by what means could they by any art conclude men's fortunes, or the changes and ruins of cities and Commonweals, who understood not so much as the celestial motions, and much less the histories of all nations, when as yet they scarcely knew the tenth part of the world?  
Wherhfore they do foolishly which attribute the Quadripartite book to Ptolomey, 
The triplicities of the celestial signs not to be determinately assigned unto certain regions and countries, as the Astrologers appoint.  wherein the fiery Triplicity is given to Europe, and those countries which lie betwixt the West and the North; the airy triplicity unto Asia, and those places which are seated betwixt the North and the East; the watery triplicity unto Africa, and the earthly triplicity unto the other places. Neither have those things followed the conjunctions of the superior planets, which should have followed had their rules been true. Now if any man think (as many there be which think right foolishly) the places of the signs being changed, the force and nature of the celestial Spheres to be changed also; he must surely utterly subvert all the knowledge of the force and power of the stars by them before set down and delivered: seeing that the fix stars are found since the beginning of the world to have passed through the fourth part of the eight Sphere: but since the time wherein the course of the celestial Spheres began first to be of the Chaldeis noted under king Nabonassar unto this our time, to have overgone almost a whole sign, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, or which is all one, the Equinoctials in the same space, to have prevented the stays of the wandering stars, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and yet nevertheless the force and power of the celestial houses approved in men's nativities, is still the self same that it is reported to have before been: which thing to be so, Cardan himself confesseth: whom yet for all that it ashamed him not to writ the Britons, Spaniards, & Normans, in ancient time gentle and modest nations, to be now (the regions of the stars being changed) become sly, crafty, and deceitful thieves; for that they were in ancient time governed by Sagit●…ary, but now by Scorpio▪ unto whom the same may be answered which Cassius did unto a certain Chaldean ginger, who forbade him to fight with the Parthians before the moon was out of Scorpio: unto whom 
The jest of Cassius unto a chaldean ginger.  Cassius pleasantly answered, Non Scorpiones metuo, sed Sagittarios, I fear not (said he) Scorpions, but Sagittaries; meaning the Parthian archers, by whom the Roman legions wherewith Crassus in Chaldea discomfited and overthrown. And truly if Cardan's opinion were true, the nature of all things must needs so be subverted, which yet is still the same which ever it was: For the people toward the North are now taller and stronger, and more warlike than the rest of the people of the world; and such vitrvuius, Pliny, Caesar, Strabo, and Plutarch, have writ them to have been sixteen hundred year ago: and therefore them to be pleasant, drunkards, gross witted, hoarse, grey eyed, yellow haired: but Southern people to be sad, small of stature, lean, weak, smooth, black eyed, curled hair, and clear of voice. And yet it is manifest, the conjunctions 
The conjunctions of the superior Planets to have oftentimes wrought great effects for the alteration and changing of Commonweals.  of the superior planets in the same celestial house, viz. in Scorpio to have showed their force (if it were any) in Asia, and Europe, and not in Africa, which they say to be governed by the sign of Scorpio. For before the change of the Roman empire was made, and that Popular estates transferred unto the sovereignty of Caesar alone, the superior planets with a great conjunction met together in Scorpio: which conjunction changed again about seven hundred years after: at which time innumerable legions of the Arabians having received the new doctrine of Muhamed, rebelled against the Greek emperors, subdued a great part of the East Asia, abolished the orders, customs, rites, ceremonies, and laws of the Christians, when as yet Asia is in situation contrary unto Europe. The same conjunction happened in the year of our Lord 1●…64, after which ensued divers motions of the people, almost in all parts of the world. For Ladamachus king of the Tartars was by his subjects thrust out of his kingdom: Henry the sixt, king of England was by his subjects also taken and in prison slain, Edward the iiij of a subject made king: Fredrick the third driven out of Hungary by Mathias corvinus, who of a prisoner was chosen a king: jews the eleventh the French king, by his nobility and vassals besieged in his principal city, and brought in danger to have lost his estate. At which time also Alexander (commonly called Scanderbag) the king of Albania his soon, brought up in the Turks court, revolted from the Turk, and took up arms against him. Yet is it worth the noting, that the great conjunctions of superior planets, show their effects more in Scorpio, a martial sign, than in any other the rest of the signs, and so much the more if Mars be there als●…, or else some one of the other planets be also in conjunction or opposition with them. With like conjunction the same planets met together also in sagittary, in the year of our Lord Christ 74: at which time all the land of Palestine was sacked, the city of Jerusalem burnt and razed, and eleven hundred thousand dead in the wars: at which self same time were seen in Europe great civil wars, and four emperors slain the same year. Two hundred and forty years after, another conjunction of the same planets chanced in Capricorn, after which ensued wonderful changes not only of Commonweals, but even of empires and kingdoms also: Constantine the Great being therein chief doer: who having put to flight and slain four emperors, and translated the seat of the empire from the West into the East, by a perpetual law took away the vain and superstitious worshipping of the Paynim gods. We see also, that after the conjunction of the same planers in Aquarius, in the year 430, the Goths, the Ostrogothes, the Francons, the Gepiges, the Heruli, the Huns, & other Northern people going out like swarms of bees, overran and ransacked the provinces of the Roman empire, and most cruelly sacked the very city itself, sometime the seat of the empire. And again in the year 1524, when as the conjunction of the same superior planets, (yea twenty other conjunctions) had happened in Pisces, most great motions of the people ensued thereafter in many places in Europe: the people in arms against the nobility set all Germany on a broil: in which war an hundred thousand men are reported to have been slain: the Rhodes by the Turks was taken from the Christians: Fredrick, his brother Christian being driven out of his kingdom, possessed the kingdom of Denmark: Gostaws of a private man become king of Sweden: Francis the French king overthrown at Pavia was taken prisoner by the Spaniards. Besides that, it is to be seen, that after the great conjunction of the same superior planets in Leo, in the year 796 king Charlemaigne overthrew the estates of the Lombard's, took their king, and conquered Italy. At which very self same time the Polonians made choice of their first king: with divers other notable and remarkable changes. So also forty years after, the same conjunction happened in the sign of sagittary, when as the Moors sacked divers countries, invaded a part of Greece, and overran Italy: and the Danes were then up in great civil wars: when as at the same time Charlemaigne made himself Lord of Germany, took away the Paynim superstition in Saxony, and changed all the Commonweals and principalities in Germany, and Hungary, which he brought under his obeisance. With this great conjunction happened also four eclipses: which hath not happened since: but six hundred thirty six years after, viz. in the year 1544, in which time haply there had been more notable changes seen, if the great conjunction which happened the year following in Scorpio, had happened the same year. And yet nevertheless as it was, all Germany was up in arms; which wars continued seven years after. In brief, if any foreknowledge be to be had from celestial things, for the changes of Commonweals, we must consider the conjunctions of superior planets, since 570 years, with the conjunctions, eclipses, and aspects of inferior planets, and of the fix stars at the time of the great conjunctions, and to compare them with the truth of histories, and of times with conjunctions before past; and not wholly to rest upon opinion of them, which have determinately assigned the Triplicities unto regions, which I have by evident examples before showed not to be of any good assurance, but rather to stay upon the nature of the signs and of the planets. And yet for all that to refer the causes and effects of them unto the great God of nature, and not to tie them unto his creatures. As did 
The error of Leovicius.  Ciprianus Leovitius, who of a conjunction of almost all the planets, than to come together with an eclipse of the sun in the year 1584. by his writings (as from an oracle) denounced the end of the world even then to come, saying, Procul dubio alterum adventum filij Dei & hominis in maiestate gloriae suae praenuntiat, Without all doubt (saith he) it foreshoweth another coming of the son of God and man in the majesty of his glory. But seeing he had so strongly assured men then of the consummation of the world, why did he yet writ his Ephemerideses for thirty years after, when as the celestial signs and all Commonweals should according to his predictions have before perished? But therein he found himself as well deceived, as was before him Albumar, who with like rashness had written, That the Christian religion should take end in the year 1460. And Abraham the jew (surnamed The Prince of Astrologers) who prophesied, That in the year 1464 should be borne a great captain (whom they call Messiah) who should deliver the jews his country men from the servitude of the Christians. And Arnold the Spaniard, who with like folly prophesied of the coming of Antichrist, in the year of our Lord 136. But Leovicius might have known, that since the creation of the world unto this time, there have been two hundred and threescore conjunctions of the superious planets, wherein were twenty four great ones; that is to say, such as still come again after the revolution of two hundred and forty years, jupiter and Saturn meeting together in the same triplicity (as they call it) and the lesser every twenty years: and the meanest planets, as of Saturn and Mars, every thertie years in the sign Cancer: and the greatest of all, viz. of jupiter and Saturn in Aries, which cometh again about every eight hundred years. Howbeit that Messahala calleth it the greatest conjunction of all, when as the three superior planets meet together in Aries: which yet I see not shall chance in the year 1584., as Leovicius supposeth, when as jupiter shall be distant twelve degrees from the full conjunction of Saturn and Mars: which cannot rightly be called a conjunction so much as by their Spheres. But whereas the same conjunction, yea and a greater too, together with the most dark eclipses of the sun, and of the moon, happened in the reign of Charles the Great, yet we see not the world therefore to have taken end. True it is, that the Hebrew learned men writ, the destruction of all this elementary world, and so of all 
The opinion of the learned Hebrues concerning the consummation of the world.  mankind, & of all Commonweals, to ensue after every seven thousand years, by the inundation of waters, or else by fire, and so to rest a thousand years: after which God shall again restore that which is perished: and that this shall be done seven times, which maketh nine and forty thousand years complete, and that then this elementary world and the celestial also, with all the bodies thereof shall take end, the majesty of the great eternal God, with all the blessed spirits yet still remaining. Which they say to be by the word of God, howbeit very obscurely declared: when as the tilling of the ground is commanded every seventh year to be left off: and after seven times seven, not only the tilling of the ground is commanded to be left off, but even slaves and debtors to be set free, and every man to return again unto his own lands and dwelling. Truly it is by long observation at length known and found out, the motion of trepidation of the eight Sphere to accomplish the course thereof, in the revolution of seven thousand years, and the ninth Sphere in the space of forty nine thousand years. Whereof Io. Regiomontanus hath since within this four and twenty years made plain demonstration: of the truth of which motion neither the ancient Chaldies' nor Egyptians had any knowledge, but were thereof altogether ignorant. And albeit that the ancient learned Hebrews, have by the gift and goodness of God, had not only the knowledge of divine and celestial things, but even the hidden and secret causes of nature also revealed and made known unto them, and that from them the knowledge of most goodly things is unto other men come: as Porphyry the greatest of all the Philosophers of his time confesseth: and that this doctrine of the Hebrews curteth of the impiety of them which hold the eternity of the world, or else that God was for an innumerable world of years altogether idle: yet do these so learned Hebrews attribute nothing unto fatal necessity, either fear any the decrees of the celestial stars, but affirm all things to be governed and changed by the will and pleasure of almighty God: as by him which as often as he will is of power to shake the nature of all things, yea even the very foundations of the world itself, as was well seen in the general deluge, which overwhelmed the whole world 1656 years after the creation thereof.  
Yet doubt I not but that some more certain precepts might be given of the changes, 
By what order and mean some more certain and probable conjecture might be made of the changes and ruins of commonweals.  and ruins of Commonweals, if a man would enter into a certain account of the time passed even from the beginning of the world: and so comparing one thing with another, and knitting one thing unto another, shall proceed farther, and set in order the variety of Historiographers at variance among themselves: and also going backwards, shall of all the eclipses of the Sun and of the Moon, even to the beginning of the world, by most certain demonstrations comprehend the reason of the whole time passed: and compare the histories of the most true writers amongst themselves, and with the oppositions and conjunctions of the celestial stars and bodies, knit and conjoin the same with numbers, whose force in all the course of nature is greatest: which things folded up in infinite obscurities, and hidden and shut up in the most secret places of nature, are to be showed not by vain conjectures, but by most evident and manifest arguments. Which is not to be hoped for from them which are more desirous of words than of matter or knowledge: who upon an obstinate opinion confounded the beginning of the world, and beginning the year at the spring, which they aught to begin at Autumn, and the day at noon, which they aught to begin at even, not remembering darkness to have been before light, confusion before order, and a rude confused Chaos before the world itself: beside that it is in the sacred books of Genesis so often repeated, Vespere & mane dies unus, The evening and morning were made one day. Truly I commend many things in Gerardus Mercator a most pure writer for the observation of time: but in that I cannot commend him, that he beginneth the year elsewhere than of Libra; whereas we have by most certain reasons not only out of the most ancient customs of almost all nations; but also out of the most pure fountains 
The greatest and most notable changes of estates and Commonweals to have commonly happened in the month of September.  of sacred scriptures, declared the year to have taken beginning in Autumn. Which we will again show by the great and notable changes of estates and Commonweals: whereby things to come may be the better and more certainly perceived, and the greatest chances, alterations, and changes, seen to have happened about Autumn, that is to say, a little before, or a little after the Autumnal equinoctial in September, the Sun then entering into Libra: where the law of God appointeth the beginning of the year. And first it is manifest, the general deluge to have begun and also ended in Autumn. We read also, the great earthquakes, wherewith often times great cities, and whole countries have been destroyed, to have happened in Autumn, such as was that trembling of the earth at Constantinople, wherein thirteen thousand men were lost in the year 1509, in the month of September: in which month, and in the same city, the earth again grievously shook in the year 1479. So also in the year of Christ 545 such an earthquake happened in September, that almost all Europe shook therewith. The same month of September, wherein the battle was fought at Actium, ten thousand men perished in the land of Palestine with an earthquake. And not long ago, viz. in the year 1526, and 27, in the month of September a great earthquake happened at Puteoli. The third day of the same month, in the year of our Lord 1556, such a tempest of rain and thunder happened at Lucerne, as that a greater (as is reported) was never seen: which self same month & day the town hall at Maidenburg in Germany, with the citizens dancing therein, were all together with lightning consumed. The victory of Augustus also against Antonius in the battle at Actium, was by him obtained the second of September, where question was of the greatest empire that ever was, and the matter tried with the greatest forces that ever were assembled in any wars whatsoever: by which victory the empire both of the East and of the West, fell into the power of Augustus himself alone. The third day of the same month the Macedonian empire, which had so long, and with so great glory flourished, was by Paulus Aemilius changed from a great kingdom into divers Popular estates, the king Perseus being by him overcome and taken prisoner. Sultan Soliman on the like day took Buda the chief city of Hungary, with the greatest part of that kingdom. The same day and month Rhoderike king of Spain was by the Moors overcome and chased out of his kingdom, which wrought a wonderful change in the state of all that Monarchy. On the same day and month revolving, jews the twelfth the French king took the city of Milan, with jews Sfortia duke thereof, whom he deprived of his estate. The like day the emperor Charles the sift passed over into Africa, and invaded the kingdom of Algiers. The day following, that is to say, the fourth of September Sultan Soliman died before Sigeth, which being one of the strongest holds of Christendom, was by the Turks taken the seventh day after. The ninth of September, in the year of our Lord 1544, james king of Scots was by the English men slain, and his army overthrown. The same day in the revolution of the year, the council of Possi was gathered in France, Charles the ninth then reigning in the year 1561, and a decree made for the receiving of the new religion, which raised most great troubles in France. The same day and month Alexander the Great at Arbela overthrew Darius' king of Persia, with his army of four hundred thousand men; and so joined the kingdom of Persia unto his own. The tenth of September john duke of Burgundy, was by the commandment of Charles the seventh slain, whereof great wars arose throughout all France. The like day and month was Peter Louis the tyrant of Placence slain by the conspirators. We read also, that the eleventh of September the Palaeologues, the Greek emperors took the imperial city of Constantinople, and drove out thence the earls of Flaunders, who had there possessed the empire 560 years. The fourteenth day of September the Swiffers were with a great slaughter overthrown by the French, in the expedition of Mirignan: which self same day also the Turks great army laid siege to Vienna, the Metropolitical city of Austria. The seventeenth day the French army was by the English overthrown at Poitiers, and king john of France by them taken prisoner. Which day also, (or rather the like in the revolution of the year) a peace was concluded at Soisson, betwixt Francis the first, the French king, & the emperor Charles the fift, being both ready with their great armies to have fought for the kingdom, to the great hazard of both their estates, in the year 1544: a thing the more to be noted, for that the same year, month, and day, was also a great conjunction of the superior planets. The same day of the same month, in the year 1575. the Christian fleet with a great slaughter overthrew the Turks great fleet in the battle of Lepanto. The eighteenth day of the same month Boulleine was delivered unto the Englishmen. And the four and twentieth of September Constantine the Great, in a bloody battle overcame Maxentius the emperor, in the year of our Lord 333, and so of a simple strange captain made himself a great Monarch (which wrought a most notable and marvelous change almost throughout the whole world) and so from thenceforth commanded the account of the year to be begun in September▪ and in the Greek feasts unto that day is added, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. We found also, that in the year 1136, in the month of September there was a great conjunction both of the superior and inferior planets, in so much that the Astrologers of the East, by their letters written from all parts (as saith the Chronicle of Saint Denis) threatened the world with great calamities, and the people with the change of their estates, which afterwards indeed chanced: howbeit that in that the author of the history erred, that he saith, How that the same year there was an eclipse of the Sun the eleventh of April, and another of the Moon the fift of the same month, a thing by nature impossible. It is also right memorable, that the seventeenth day of September, in the year 1567. Charles the ninth the French king, was by his subjects assailed near unto Meaux, where by speedy flight, and the help of the Swissers he hardly with life escaped the hands of the conspirators: the which self same day, month, and year, Henry king of Sweden was by his rebellious subjects despoiled of his estate, and east in prison, where he yet remaineth, without any great hope to be ever with life from thence again delivered. The battle Montcontour was fought also in September. And the eighteenth day of September Bajazet at Nicopolis with a notable overthrow defeated a great army of the Christians, of three hundred thousand men. And the same day Saladin took the city of Jerusalem, on which Pompey had before taken it. Pope Boniface the eight also was in September 1303 by the French taken prisoner, and deprived of his papal dignity. We read also many the greatest princes and monarchs of the world, to have as this month died: as namely the great emperor Augustus, Tiberius, Vespasian, Titus, Domitian, Aurelianus, Theodosius the Great, Valentinianus, Gratianus, Basilius, Constantine the fift, Leo the fourth, Rodolphe, Fredrick the fourth, Charles' the fift, all Roman or Greek emperors. And of the French kings, Pipin, jews the younger, Philip the third, Charles' the fift surnamed the Wise, and jews his kinsman king of Hungaria and Polonia, with other most noble and famous monarch in number infinite. But that is worth the marking that Lothaire and Charles the bald, the one the king of France, and the other the Germane Emperor (and both of them the sons of jews the devout emperor) both died the xxix of September, the first of them in the year 855, and the other 877. So Charles the fift, and Sultan Solyman, two of the greatest Emperors that were these many ages, were both borne in one year, and so both also in one month died, viz. in September. Antonius Pius also and Francis the first the French king, both of them great & famous Monarques, were both borne in September, and died both in March the month opposite to September. Octavius Augustus was also borne in September, 
What times of the year the notable chances and changes of the world most commonly happen in.  and so likewise in the same month of September died. Whereby it is to be understood, Autumn and especially that month wherein the world was created, viz. September, in a sort to carry as a mark thereof the notable chances of many the most noble and renowned Princes, as also the strange changes which have happened aswell unto the whole world, as unto particular Estates and Commonweals. The next conversions and changes of cities and Commonweals we see to happen into the sign of Aries, which is an other period of the Sun, and the third and fourth sort of changes to fall out about the Winter or Summer Solstitium, or farthest stays of the Sun: not for that the creation of the world is to be derived from Aries, but for the notable periods of the Sun in those times. Wherhfore Leovicius following the dreams of unskilful men, aught not to refer the creation and destruction of the world unto the month of March; and much less to threaten unto the world even a present consummation and end. But he the same man had before by his writings promised unto Maximilian the Emperor the sovereignty of all Europe, with power to correct and chastise the cruelty and tyranny of other Princes (for so he writeth) of whom for 
Leovicius taxed.  all that it beseemeth him to have more modestly writ: But Maximilian was so far from the sovereignty which he had in his vain hope conceived, as that he yet living, and with the Germane host also looking on: Sultan Solyman without any impeachment having far and wide wasted the borders of the Empire, besieged and forced Sigeth the strongest place of the Empire, yea of all Europe: showing well that he should not have too far assured himself upon the prophecy of Luther, who hath left in writing that the power of the Turks should from thenceforth diminish, which yet more increaseth than ever it did. But it is strange that Leovicius saw nothing of the strange change of the three kingdoms his next neighbours: which sith he saw not, how could he have such certain knowledge of the end of the world, never as yet unto the Angels themselves revealed? For all which he bringeth no other reason, but that the Christian religion must together with the world take end in the watery triplicity, for that Christ jesus himself was borne under the watery triplicity; willing as should seem to bring in an other deluge: Wherein he showeth no less impiety than ignorance, whether we respect the maxims of the Astrologers, who affirm and say that never planet ruinateth his own house, which should yet happen unto jupiter being in Pisces. (For certain it is in the sign Pisces in the great conjunction in the year 1583 and 84, and that the conjunction of these two planets in that Sign is always friendly:) or that we follow the opinion of Plato, and of the Hebrews, and of all other Philosophers, who generally say, That the world is to be successively destroyed first by water, and then again by fire: or else that we rest ourselves (as indeed we aught) upon the promises of God, who cannot lie, which he in mercy made to Noah never to drown the world again. But as we aught not rashly certainly to affirm any thing of the changes and ruins of Monarchies and Commonweals: So can we not deny but that the effects are right great and wonderful in the conjunction of the higher planets, when they change the triplicity, and especially when the three 
Great and marvelous effects wrought by the conjunction of the superior Planets.  superior planets are in conjunction together: or that such their conjunction have concurrence with the the eclipses of the Sun or of the Moon: as it happened the day before the taking of Perseus' king of Macedon, and the battle of Arbella in Chaldea, which drew after them the ruin of two great monarchs, and the change of divers Commonweals, there appeared two most great and dark eclipses of the Moon. As there did also in the beginning of the Peloponesian war, wherewith all Grecia was on a fire, the Sun upon a fair day was wonderfully darkened, even at such time as Pericles the Athenian General began to set sail.  
But as for them which contemn the force of the heavenly stars, or else are altogether ignorant thereof; they stand as men amazed, to see in the same instant such conversions and changes of Commonweals, and such great and turbulent motions of the people together and at once raised. As namely Polybius (himself an Atheist) in his history exceedingly marveleth, That in the hundred and thirtieth olympiad in one self same time there was seen upon the sudden a new change of princes almost throughout the whole world. As namely Philip the younger to become king of Macedon, Achaeus to be king of Asia, which he usurped upon Antiochus, Ptolomeus Philopater to become king of Egypt, Lycurgus the younger, king of Lacedemonia, Antiochus king of Syria, Hannibal general of the Carthaginensians: and all these people as it were at the same instant up in arms one of them against another; the Carthaginensians against the Romans, Ptolomey against Antiochus, the Achaeans and Macedonians, against the Aetolians and Lacedæmonians. And afterward also three of the most famous generals of the world, namely Scipio Affricanus, Hannibal, and Philopoemenes, to have all died (as Livy writeth) in one year. These great changes are more evident to be seen after the conjunction of the two superior planets, with the Sun, or Mars: as it happened in the year 1564, that the superior planets were in conjunction in the sign Leo, together with the Sun & Mercury: So have we afterwards seen strange motions and stirs almost all Europe over. We have seen in the same time, in the same year, in the same month, in the same day, viz. the twenty seventh of September, in the year 1567., the French king guarded with the Swissers, assailed and in danger to have been taken by his subjects: and Henry king of Sweden despoiled of his estate, and by his own subjects cast in prison: and even as it were at the same time Mary the most noble queen of the Scots spoiled of her kingdom by her subjects, and by them imprisoned, by whom it beseemed her to have been delivered: and the king of Thunes driven out of his kingdom by the king of Algiers: the Arabians up in arms against the Turks, the Moors of Granado and the Flemings against the king Catholic, the Englishmen against their queen, and all France in combustion. The same conjunction of the three superior planets happened also an hundred years before, viz. in the year 1464, but not so precisely, neither in the sign of Leo, but only in the sign of Pisces, and yet by and by after all the people were seen up in arms, and not only the princes among themselves, but the subjects also against their princes, as we have before said.  
Now as for that which Copernicus (the great ginger of his time) saith, The changes 
The opinion of Copernicus concerning the motion & influence: of the earth, refuted.  and ruins of kingdoms and Commonweals, to depend of the Eccentrique motion of the earth, it is such, as that it deserveth no answer or accounted to be thereof made. For that he for the ground thereof supposeth two things most absurd: the one That the influences which all Philosopher's attribute unto the stars, proceed from the earth, and not from the heavens: the other, That the earth itself moveth with the same motions, which all the Astrologers of former times (except Eudoxus) have always given unto the heavens. And yet more strange it is to make the Sun immovable and the centre of the world; and the earth fifty thousand leagues distant from the centre, and to make part of the heavens, & of the planets, to be movable, and part of them immovable. Which old opinion of Eudoxus, Ptolomey hath by probable arguments and reasons refuted. Whereunto Copernicus hath well answered: unto whom Melancthon hath only with this verse right well replied, God in the heavens hath a tabernacle for the Sun, which cometh out as a bridegroom out of his chamber, and rejoiceth as a Giant to run his course. It goeth out from the uttermost part of the heaven, and runneth about to the end of it again: and there is nothing hid from the heat thereof. So also might he say, That josua commanded the Sun and Moon to stay their course. But unto all this might be answered, That the Scripture oftentimes accommodateth and sitteth itself unto our weak senses: as when it calleth the Moon the greatest light next unto the Sun, which yet nevertheless is the lest of all the stars except Mercury. But this doctrine of Copernicus might by a manifest demonstration, which no man hath yet used, easily be refelled, viz. that one simple body hath but one simple motion proper unto the same: as is manifestly to be proved by the principles of natural Philosophy: then seeing that the earth is one of the simple bodies, as the other elements be, we must necessarily conclude, that it cannot have but one only motion proper unto itself: and yet for all that Copernicus hath assigned unto it three divers motions: whereof it can have but one proper unto itself, so that the other must needs be violent, a thing altogether impossible: and so by the same consequence impossible also, that the alterations and changes of Commonweals, should proceed from the Eccentrique motion of the earth.  
But of all those things which we have yet brought to judge of the future changes 
Numbers to be of greatforce, whatby to deem the change and ruin of a Commonweal.  and ruins of Commonweals, we see no rule (whether it be of Astrology or music) certain and sure: howbeit that we have by them some probable conjectures, whereof yet none seemeth unto me more certain or easy, than that which may be drawn from numbers. For why I think almighty God who with wonderful wisdom hath so couched together the nature of all things, and with certain their numbers, means, measures, and consent, bound together all things to come: to have also within their certain numbers so shut up and enclosed Commonweals, as that after a certain period of years once past, yet must they needs then perish and take end, although they use never so good laws and customs: as Plato with Aristotle therein agreed. But when that period shall be, neither of them declareth: except some there be which suppose Plato to signify it by certain obscure numbers in his eight book De Republica: at which rock not only all the Academikes, but even almost all the sects of other Philosophers also, have suffered shipwreck. And first of all Aristotle skippeth over this place as over a dich, neither doth here carp his master (as his manner is) when as for the obscurity thereof he had not wherefore he might reprove him. Proclus also having curiously enough enterpreted seven of Plato his books de Republica: 
The eight book of Plato de Repub. most difficult and obscure.  would not so much as touch the eight, stayed (as I suppose) with the difficulty of the matter. Theon also of Smyrna (for there is an other Theon also of Alexandria; who writ a commentary upon Ptolomee in Greek) a man most skilful not in Plato his philosophy only: but in the Mathematics also: at such time as he expounded Plato his Commonweal there stuck fast, neither took upon him to expound this place. Cicero in one word excuseth the difficulty of Plato his numbers. Marsilius Ficinus (in mine opinion) the sharpest of all the Academikes plainly confesseth himself not to know what Plato in that place meant: fearing jest it should so fall out with him as it did with jamblichus, who seemeth to have been willing in three words not to have manifested a thing of itself most obscure, but rather to have made it darker. Philo the jew every where imitating of Plato, thought that obscure and hidden number to be fifty, and that he saith to be signified by the right cornered Scalenus, such an one as Pythagoras comprehended in the three numbers 3, 4, 5. and thereunto he supposeth those words of Plato to be referred, sesqui tertia radix quinario coniuncta: sesqui tertia the radix or root joined unto the number of five for the proportion of 3, 2, 4. is the proportion sesqui tertia. But in that he is deceived for that he hath brought in a plain number, whenas it appeareth Plato his meaning to have been to have a solid number sought out, which should in itself contain all kind of numbers, excepting the numbers perfect. Yet Philo of these radical numbers, 3, 4, 5, 

 Sesquitertia i●… that which containeth all that an other thing doth, and a third part more.  brought every one of them apart into themselves maketh three quadrats: whereof are made 50 numbers, all plain: but the words of Plato make mention of the hundred cube. Beside that there be Dimetients incommensurable unto the sides, as in the number of Plato: whose words it pleaseth me hear to set down, and to interpret the same: as well for that the interpreters do in the interpretation thereof very much differ amongst themselves: as also for that he saith the ignorance of that number to be unto the Governors of Cities and Commonweals almost capital. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. which is as I interprer it, Truly the compass of such things which take their beginning from God, is by the perfect number comprehended: but the compass of worldly things is contained by that number wherein are found numbers exceeding, and numbers exceeded by increase and decrease, three spaces in four terms comprehended; whereof are made numbers among themselves both like, and unlike, numbers increased, and diminished, which may be called by their own names, and compared among themselves: whose sesquitertiall radix joined unto the number of five, maketh two consents thrice increased, one equal equally: an hundred times an hundred: an other equal, on one part of itself longer, of an hundred dimetients, which might among themselves be compared, the numbers of five detracted less by the unity: but two of ineffable proportion: but an hundred Cubes of the ternary itself. And this number made by Geometrical proportion, is in worldly things most mighty, to them which have either the better or the worse beginning. Here Plato is s●…ylie led away, not unlike the fish Polypus, having on every side 
Obscurity by Plato and many the ancient writers of purpose in their writings affected.  cast out his blacking like ink, jest otherwise he should have been entangled and caught. Wherein truly he seemed to have imitated Heraclitus, to understand whose writings he said a man had need of a most skilful interpreter. Which obscure kind of writing and speaking by Heraclitus devised (when as he most often would beaten into his scholars ears that his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, that is to say speak obscurely) is often times used not of Plato only, but even of Aristotle himself also, to the intent that so having cast a mist before his eyes aswell of the learned as of the unlearned, concerning the knowledge of most difficult things, and shut up in the hidden secrets of nature, they might themselves become therefore the more admirable. Which thing we especially note in the books of nature; which books Aristotle boasteth himself of purpose to have so writ, as that he would not have them to be understood, imitating therein Plato his most obscure Timaeus: Which thing Lucilius writ also of himself, that he had rather not to be at all understood, then to be reprehended or found fault with all. But let us discover Plato his deceit by those things which he himself writeth 
Plato discovered and in some sort refuted.  more plainly, that we may more certainly judge of those things which he foldeth up in such obscurity of words: for he would that those things which take their beginning from God, should be contained within the perfect number. But what thing is there at length which oweth not the first beginning of the being thereof unto almighty God, either immediately without any other mean cause, or else some other the mean or middle causes coming between. And that God himself without any other mean cause created the Angels, and other the celestial bodies not only Plato, but even the Manichies also themselves confess; who yet most wickedly thought all earthly things to have had their beginning from the prince of evils. True it is that the earth brought forth plants & other living creatures, the waters also fishes, and fowls; yet both of them by the commandment of almighty God: But unto the creation of Man he would also have the 
* Faciamus hominem: Or let us make man.  Angels present. Howbeit that Aristotle was of opinion the forms of all things to be in a sort divinely infused into them, when as he writ in all things to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, or some divine thing. As for the mind of man he calleth it not obscurely or doubtfully but even plainly 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: which is (as I interpret it) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, from above, from God, or from heaven, not out of the power of the seed, as he saith of other living creatures: of whom for all that Virgil in general saith: Igneus est ollis vigour & caelestis origo, A fiery force they have, and a celestial beginning. Wherhfore we must confess all things to be included in perfect numbers if we will believe Plato. But let us grant unto the Academikes (which yet is an impiety to do) these earthly things which we speak of, to have had their beginning else where then from almighty God, shall therefore the perfect numbers as better, be attributed unto heavenly things? yea the perfect numbers should rather agreed unto earthly things, for that the perfect numbers how many soever they be are even, and of the female kind, for otherwise they were not perfect: neither are more than * four 
The four perfect numbers within an hundred thousand, are 6. 496. 6●…8▪ and 8128.  within an hundred thousand: there being also other perfect numbers * above that number of an hundred thousand, but such as cannot be applied either unto divine, or humane or worldly things. Wherhfore seeing that the number of six is the first of 
Perfect numbers above an hundred thousand: 130811, 2096128, 33550336. 536814528.  the perfect numbers, it aught by the opinion of Plato to agreed unto things immediately by God himself created; and yet we see the same number nevertheless to agreed unto most vile and abject living creatures. For Aristotle writeth the Hare (by the law of God an unclean creature, & forbidden his holy people to eat of) to live at the most but six years. The like number of years the same man attributeth also unto Mice. And unto certain kinds of flies, as unto wasps and Bees six years are by Virgil allotted, and their hives are still made six cornered; all which base creatures except the Hare are engendered of putrifcation. But as saith the Poet: Numero Deus impair gaudet, God delighteth in an odd number. And odd numbers are attributed unto men: For that which Seneca writeth: Septimus quisque annus aetati notam imprimit, Every seventh year imprinteth some mark into age, is to be understood only of the male sex: for experience showeth us even unto the view of the eye, that the number of six maketh a change, and leaveth a mark unto the female kind: So that as men begin to feel the heat of youth at fourteen years; women wax ripe at twelve, and so holding on from six to six, still so found in themselves some notable change in the disposition either of their bodies, or of their minds. All divine Holidays 
Plato vainly to attribute the perfect or even numbers unto heavenly things.  also are concluded in septenaries, or such other odd numbers. In many places also Diamonds grow by nature itself polished six square, as Pliny in his 33. book reporteth, which in the mountains of the Pyrenes is a common matter. Wherhfore it is an absurd thing that Plato attributeth the beginning and ending of divine things unto perfect numbers only. But Porphyree the most famous philosopher of his time, when he enterpreted that of Plato out of his Timaeus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, writeth the estate of all Commonweals, and the life of spirits to be determined, at the farthest in the revolution of a thousand years. Plutarch in his book entitled 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 supposeth the life of Spirits to extend longer, but yet neither of them sought after the perfect numbers. But if so be that Plato in so great fewness of perfect numbers, could not tell which of them should agreed to things sprung from a divine beginning; by what numbers then should he decide so great variety of worldly things? or if he knew that number, why did he pray and make vows unto the Muses that they would show him it.  
Wherhfore it behoveth a man of deeper consideration to seek out such numbers 
The numbers of seven and nine to be of great force in the change of worldly things.  as may signify the conversions & changes of worldly things, and which are by long experience, and not by light and vain conjectures approved: such as I deem the numbers of seven and nine and their quadrate and cubike numbers: viz. 49, 81, 343, 729, to be. For as the number of six (which is of all perfect numbers the first) changeth the manners, habit, or nature of the Female kind, so most 
* Hippocrat. de partis septimestri.  ancient antiquity hath by experience proved the number of seven in some sort to change the Male kind also: and that as the numbers of seven or nine use commonly to give unto men 
The number of six to be of great power in the femaile sex, and the number of seven in the mail kind.  the beginning and time of their birth, that so the number growing of the multiplying of either of them, hath been wont to bring unto them their end and destruction. Which same thing I transfer and apply unto Commonweals also, so that the numbers of seven and nine, and such as arise of their quadrate and cubike numbers, do often times bring ruin and destruction unto Commonweals. For that which we have alleged out of Seneca and Censorius every seventh year to imprint some mark into the age of man, and so the dangers of men's lives & substance to happen still upon their seventh years: understand that to belong especially unto men. Of which mine opinion I have use and experience the author: For it is every sixt year which leaveth a most certain note of itself unto women. And first to begin withal the strength of body and of mind is increased in them the sixt year, or else therein they die: the twelft year they begin to wax warm, and the eighteenth year are ready for husbands: and if diseases fall upon them in their sixt years, they are so often times in danger: The like whereof happeneth unto men the seventh, the fourteenth, and one and twentieth year: So that Plato not without cause attributeth the even numbers unto the female sex, and the odd numbers unto the male. And for this cause Plutarch saith, The ancient Romans to have used to give name unto their male children the ninth day, for that the seventh was more dangerous, and unto their female children or daughters the eight day: for that (as saith he) the even number is proper unto the female sex: And therefore I suppose them of old time to have used every eight day to do sacrifice unto Neptune, for that the element of water agreeth unto women, as doth the fiery element unto men: As also that they thought the number of seven to be feared. Howbeit that the law of God commandeth the male children to be circumcised the eight day: which the sacred interpreters of the Hebrews think 
The seventh day of all others most blessed.  to have been done, that so there might be one Sabaoth betwixt the birth of the child and the circumcision thereof, and so more strength might thereby be given unto the child. For why, Moses doth in sacred writ teach us, God most plentifully to bless the seventh day (which was the birth day of the world) with his grace and all other good things: which abundance and store of his good blessings is no where seen to be given unto the rest of the other days, by a certain wonderful cause of nature from all Philosophers hidden.  
Yet nothing seemeth in man's nature more wonderful than that the year threescore 
The clymactericall year of 63, most commonly fatal unto old men.  three hath been still noted to be unto almost all old men fatal, Obseruandum est (saith Au. Gellius) in multa hominum memoria, expertumque in senioribus plerisque omnibus sexagesimum tertium vitae annum cum periculo & called aliqua venire, aut corporis morbis gravioris, aut vitae interitus, aut animi aegritudinis, It is a thing observed (sayeth he) in the great remembrance of men, and also by experience proved in many old men, The threescore and third year of their age to come unto them all with some danger and hurt, either of the body, or of some great disease, or of loss of life, or of some tormenting grief of mind. Yea there is an epistle of Augustus the emperor unto his nephew Caius, bearing date the ninth of the Calendss of October, written to the same purpose, in this sort, ave mi Caiazzo, meus ocellus iucundissimus, quem semper medius fidius desidero quùm a me abes: sed praecipuè diebus talibus qualis est hodiernus: oculi mei requir unt meum Caium: quem ubicumque & hoc die fuisti, spero laetum & bene valentem celebrasse quartum & sexagesimum natalem meum: nam ut vides 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 communem seniorum omnium tertium & sexagesimum evasimus, etc. All hail my Caius (saith he) my most sweet delight, whom of my faith I always long for when thou art from me, but especially on such days as this is mine eyes do now seek after my Caius, whom wheresoever thou hast this day been, I hope that thou merry and in good health, hast celebrated my threescore & fourth birth day: for as you see we have escaped the threescore and third year, the common Climacteriall year of all old men, etc. Howbeit that Augustus lived until he was seventy seven years old; as did also Pomponius Atticus, who died at that age. We might reckon up an infinite number not only of the poor and base sort, but even of the nobler sort also, who ended their 
Great learned men which died at the 93. year of their age.  days in the threescore and third year of their age: but we will only reckon up some such as were for their learning famous, who as at that age died, viz. Aristotle, Cicero, Crysippus, S. Bernard, Boccace, Erasmus, Luthar, Melancthon, silvius, Alexander Imolensis, the most famous lawyer of his time, Cardinal Cusan, Linacre, and Sturmius: And therefore the old Greek divines seem to have consecrated the number of seven unto Apollo, and of nine unto the Muses, as Plutarque writeth.  
Now if any man will more curiously search out these things, whether it be in the 
The seventh and ninth years still dangerous or fatal unto old men; and the sixt year unto women.  sacred or profane histories, he shall found the lives of men for the most part to have expired and taken end still in the seventh or ninth years of their age: and women in the sixt. Plato is said to have died at the age of fourscore and one, which is nine times nine years: Theophrastus at 84, which are twelve times seven years, which period few men pass; or else they pass to xiii times seven, as did S. Hierom and Isocrates, who lived 91 years. Pliny, Bartholus, and Caesar lived fifty six years, which is eight times seven years: Lamech lived 777 years, and Methusalem (who of all others lived the longest) 970 years: Abraham lived an hundred seventy and five years, which are five and twenty times seven years: jacob 147 years, which are xxi septinaries, or spaces of seven years: Isaac lived 190 years, which make xx times nine years: David lived seventy years, which make ten times seven years. An infinite thing it were to reckon up all which are in histories found to have ended their days at these aforesaid periods of seavens and nine. He also who of our ancestors and of histories is called joannes de temporibus lived 361 years, that is to say three and fifty times seven years. It is manifest also men to be always borne in the ninth or seventh month whom the Graeks therefore call 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and that they which are borne either sooner or later live not. For which cause Hypocrates writeth a child to be fully made and perfected in all the parts and limbs thereof the seventh day: and afterward to take increase: and being borne the seventh month to live: but none to have lived being borne in the eight month: a child also in the seventh year to have all the teeth, and that men (as Pliny writeth it to have been even from the farthest memory of men observed) having been kept from meat seven days, albeit they may live longer, shall yet 
The Sabbath or seventh day of all other days the most blessed.  nevertheless at length die thereof. The law of God hath most religiously also both consecrated and commanded, the seventh day to be kept holy, as the birth day of the world, and of all that therein is: which one day of all others God almighty blessed, and which day all antiquity hath by long experience reported to be so unlike the other days of the week, as that it is taken up as an old proverb, No seventh day 〈◊〉 pass wherein the sun is not at one time or other therein to be seen. Upon which day the ancient Hebrews constantly affirm, The rage of devils to be restrained, wisdom to be into the minds of men infused, their bodies to be strengthened, and their fields with increase of fruit to be blessed. The seventh year also is by the law of God holy, as is also the seventh time seven year, which is the year of jubilee: neither is if to be doubted, but that a certain secret force is in them, both for the change and ruin of Commonweals. So that it aught not to seem strange, if that this number of seven be of the Hebrews called sacred or holy: which Calvin (following Galen, as I suppose) calleth Perfect (where he entreateth of the rest of the Sabbath day) which he even to astonishment woundereth to be so often and so religiously propounded, to be of all men observed and kept, in so much that even the pain of death is propounded unto the breakers thereof: so that the whole sum of all God his laws may seem to be therein contained: yet is not therefore the number of seven a number perfect, for that it is odd and masculine: whereas all perfect numbers are even and feminine. For why, 
What a perfect number is?  the Mathematicians define that to be perfect, which may be divided into the same whole parts, whereof it is made, so that in such division nothing be wanting or superfluous. As 1, 2, 3, make six: which three numbers do also equally divide six into equal parts, as it was of them made, as it is in other perfect numbers also. Lactantius 
* In lib. de oppi●…icto Dei.  in the same error offended, who calleth the number of three and ten, perfect and full numbers: and also Cicero, who deceived many, in calling the numbers of seven and 
In somnio scipionis.  eightfull numbers; which Macrobius understandeth to be solid, and others to be perfect numbers: neither of which can truly be said of the number of seven: as for the number of eight it is indeed a solid, but not therefore a perfect number. With like error is Plutarch himself deceived, who writeth, Three to be a number perfect: howbeit that Aristotle deemeth the force of that number to be of great force in the whole course of nature. Philo was herein also deceived, in taking ten to be the most perfect number. 
But four perfect numbers from one to an hundred thousand.   
Now indeed there are but four perfect numbers from one unto an hundred thousand, viz. 6, 28, 496, and 8128, amongst which the last cannot serve for the changing of Commonweals, for that it exceedeth the age of the world: neither the two first, for that they are too little: so that but one of them can be well applied unto the changes of cities and Commonweals, viz. the number of 
* The number 469▪ the only perfect number which can well be applied unto the changes of cities and Commonweals.  496, which is made of seventy septenaries of years, and a perfect number: it being also a thing by most ancient antiquity observed, All cities in the revolution of five hundred years, to suffer either some great change, or else some utter ruin. But these numbers touching the change or ruin of cities and Commonweals, may be two ways applied, viz. unto the princes themselves, or else unto the continuance of their kingdoms and empires. As if a man should say, This kingdom of France to fall and take end, after that threescore and three kings had therein reigned, this number consisting of the numbers of seven and 
The numbers of seven and nine fatal unto Commonweals.  nine, converted in themselves. As Esaias, who living in the time of Romulus, prophesied, That nine kings should more yet reign in judea, and that the tenth should together with the people be led away into captivity, and so that kingdom to take end: As also that there should be nine kings of the Persians', or as that the seventh king of the Romans should be thrust out of his kingdom: which number of princes well agreeth with the number of the years which they reigned in jury, viz. 182, a number consisting of six & twenty septenaries: & at Rome 244, for in the 75 septenary, that is to say, in the 245 year Tarquin the proud, last king of Rome, was thrust out of his kingdom. Hieremie the Prophet then lived, when as the prophesy of Easie was fulfilled, and himself prophesied, That the people should be again delivered in the seventy year of their captivity, as indeed they were, and the temple again restored. The same Prophet 
* Chap 24.  Esayas prophesied also, The most famous city of tire to be in 70 years after unpeopled and left desolate, and afterwards within seventy years more after the ruin thereof, to be again restored. The same number agreeth unto the Athenian Commonweal, wherein seven princes, whom they call 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, reigned also 70 years▪ the taking of which city, and the victory of the Athenians at Salamine, is reported to have happened upon the very like day. As for the number which of the Academikes is called fatalis n●…merus, or a Fatal number, viz. 1728 (being indeed a quadrat number) seemeth to have been expired from the reign of Ninus unto the victory of Alexander the Great, at Arbela, and the overthrow of the Persian empire. For Herodotus, Diodorus, Trogus Pompeius, justin, and Ctesias, begin that empire from Ninus. And at such time as Jerusalem overwhelmed with most bitter calamities, was won and razed, the temple overthrown, king Sedechias slain, and the people carried away into captivity: at the self same time the Egyptians rebelled against the kings of Assyria, the Athenians shook off the tyrannical yoke of the Pisistratides, and the Romans expulsed the proud Tarquins. Now the temple had before stood 427 years, a time cousisting of whole septenaries. But for that in the computation of times, there is great difference amongst the Historiographers, we will use the Roman Fasts or Calendars, which cannot lie. Wherein we see, that from the foundation of the city, and of the Roman Commonweal unto the battle of Actium, wherein Marcus Antonius was by Augustus vanquished, and the whole empire brought under the power of one only Monarch, and a general peace established throughout the world, there are accounted 729 years, the solid number of nine. The same number of years passed from the conquest of the kingdom of the Lombard's by Charlemaigne, unto the conquest of the same country by jews the twelfth the French king, upon the Venetians and the Sforces. The like number of years is accounted also from the overthrow of the kingdom of the Picts, and the great victory of the Scots unto the captivity of Marie Steward their queen. As also from Egbert king of the West Saxons (who having vanquished the East Saxons, made himself the sole Monarch of England, and called the people Englishmen) unto queen Marie, who was the first woman that took upon her the sovereignty of that people in fourteen hundred and forty years space. So from the reign of Augustus, after the victory by him obtained at Actium, and the temple of I●…nus the fourth time shut up, unto Augustus the last of all the Roman emperors, slain by Odovacer king of the Herules, and the empire possessed by the Goths, there are accounted 496 years, which we said to be a perfect number, as consisting of seventy septinaries; with the perfect number of six: For by the Fasts the year following Odovacer began to reign. Wherein it is also worth the noting, that as the first emperor Augustus with wonderful felicity and wisdom, both established and increased that so great a Monarchy, which he held more than forty years: so Augustulus the last of the Roman emperors diminished both in name and sovereignty, held that his empire scarce a whole year, which happened the tenth of the calends of September. As it happened to Constantine the Great, who established the seat of the empire at Constantinople: and to Constantine the last Christian emperor, there despoiled of his estate, and slain by Mahomet king of the Turks, surnamed the Great. Now from the building of the city unto this Augustulus, are accounted 1225 years: which number consisteth of whole septinaries: which thing Vectius the great soothsaier foretold, as 
The number perfect of 496 a number proper unto the chaun●…eses of Commonnweales.  Censorinus out of Marcus Varro writeth. The same number of years we found from Ninus king of Assyria, unto the death of Sardanapalus, whom Arbaces governor of Media despoiled of his government, and translated the kingdom unto the Medes. Now from Saul the first king of the elect people of God unto that Sedechias was slain, and his kingdom overthrown, returneth that perfect number of 496 years. But whereas josephus reporteth the burning of both the Temples, and the taking of the city, to have chanced the selfsame day, viz. the ninth day of the first month; he in that agreeth not with the book of the Kings, neither with the Prophet Hieremy, who both otherwise report the same. So many years, viz. 496. are accounted from Caranus first king of the Macedons, unto Alexander the Great last king of that country, descended of the line and issue of Hercules, and of Aeacus. Some there be which add certain years more, and some others which detract some also. Wherhfore my meaning is not to allege any other than the records set down by the most certain Historiographers, and such as every man may draw even out of the very fasts and calendars of the Romans themselves. Of which sort is that, that from the foundation of the city of Rome, unto the sacking thereof by the French men, are accounted 364 years, which number consisteth of whole septinaries: As also from the building of the city, unto the slaughter at Cannae, Terentius Varro being then Consul (at which time the Commonweal was fallen into extreme danger) are numbered 536 years, that is to say 77 septinaries of years: And from thence unto the slaughter by the Romans, received from the Germane, under the conduct of Quinctilius Varro, are passed 224 years, a number consisting of whole septenaries: both which overthrows happened the second day of August, as is by the ancient Romans reported. Neither is that less memorable which Tarapha a most certain Historiographer amongst the Spaniards reporteth, The Moors and Arabians to have invaded Spain in the year of Christ 707, and that also the seventh year of the reign of king Roderike, and to have holden the same kingdom 770 years, neither could utterly be from thence again expulsed, before the time of Ferdinand king of Arragon and Castille. It is also worth the noting, that from the execution of Aman, and the delivery of the jews at the intercession of Hester, unto the victory of judas Machabeus against Antiochus the noble king of Syria and his lieutenant, there passed 343 years, which is the solid number of seven, that is to say seven times seven septenaries: both which victories happened the thirteenth day of the month Adar, as the Hebrews have well noted. The same number of years passed from the time that Octavianus (having vanquished Marcus Antonius, and united the whole Roman empire under his own obeisance) was by the Senate called Augustus, unto Constantine the Great; a time notable for the strange chances which then happened in the whole empire, as well in the laws politic, as in matters of religion. Tacitus hath also noted in another singularity, That the city of Rome was by Nero burnt, on the like day that it had long before been burnt by the Gauls, which was the fourteenth of the calends of August: wherenin some have go so far, as to number how many years, months and days, passed betwixt both those fires.  
But that the numbers of six are almost unto women fatal, I thought it not needful 
The number of six to be unto women fatal.  by examples to prove, lest I might be thought to stand upon trifles, only that I note, that in the year 1582, at such time as the prince of Orange had received a mortal wound, the one and twentieth of March, being the forty ninth year of his age, and that all men despaired of his life, he yet recovered his health at his entrance into his fiftieth year: But Carola Charlet of Bourbon his wife within two months after died, when as she entered into the six and thirtieth year of her age, which is the quadrat of the number of six: even as the prince her husband was wounded in the nine and fortieth year of his age, the quadrat of the septenary or number of seven: which I thought not to have written, but that I was told the same by the prince of Orange himself, as a thing by him noted, when as I was of council with Francis duke of Alencon at Antwerp.  
But now for that we are by way of discourse come so far, the last that remaineth is for me to answer some thing to them which take pleasure rather to carp than to commend my writings: for that 
* In his book: De Method historiarum.  I said I understood not the prophecies of Daniel concerning the rising and ruin of Empires and kingdoms. For I doubt not but that if he (amongst others a most wise man) would in their due times have plainly set down such things as he by divine inspiration had conceived and declared, all things then whereof we now doubt, should without all doubt be unto us most plain and clear. Truly he defineth the state of his own city, king Cyrus then beginning his reign, what time the captivity was ended, according to 
* Hier. 2●…. & Daniel 9  the prophecy of jeremy, (which he beginneth from the destruction of the City and of the Temple, and not from the reign of joachim as some suppose) and the holy people returned. He defineth 
A good discou●… of Daniel his seventy weeks.  it (I say) by seventy weeks of years, that is by 490. years, and that right plainly; when as the prophecy was made in the last year of the captivity, which was the seaventieth from the destruction of the City and of the Temple: that so the prophecies might in good order with the prophecies, and times with times be continued: whereas they which longer protract the times leave an hundred and twenty years at one gaping. But the Prophet expressly taught, that the beginning of the time aught to be accounted from the time of the prophecy given, wherein the people again returned as if it had been before dead, and appointed unto itself a Prince and other magistrates, from whence the restoring of the City is to be accounted, and not from the repairing of the walls and buildings. In which case Pompee said well: Vrbe deserta, in parietibus Rempublicam non consistere, That the city being forsaken, the Commonweal consisted not in the walls thereof. But many 
* josephus. Funccius. Mercator. Philo.  Historiographers from the time of Cyrus unto the reign of Herode the great (who having taken Jerusalem and slain all the Senators together with the king himself, and spoiled the jews of their kingdom) do account 490. years. Others there be which reckon otherwise, and so great variety and difference there is amongst them, as that all the opinions of all of them, may well be refelled, not only by every one of them a part, but even by all of them together. As for those things which Daniel writ concerning the Empires, he openly and plainly hath called the Medes, the Persians', and Grecians unto the Empire of Babylon; but besides them none. The fourth Empire (by him spoken of) we have showed not to belong unto the Romans, seeing that question is there concerning Babylon, which the Romans never subdued; which when they passing over the river Euphrates had unfortunately attempted, they received many and great overthrows of the most invincible Parthians. But yet more foolishy do they who attribute that fourth Empire unto the Germane, who never so much as dreamt of any the lest part of the Babylonians Empire. Which things for that they be by us else where disputed we will here let pass. Which things for all that Frankbergerus the Saxon and Bishop of Lipsic, by the authority of Luther, and one Dresserus a mere schoolman with railing without any reason at all refelleth, whom I shall yet count an eloquent man, if he shall but learn aswell to speak, as he hath learned to speak evil: But for that the angry man (a common fault of the wise) is angry with me, for that I dare not rashly judge of the divine oracles, lest in so doing I might offend in such his matters, and so far from all men's senses: he should have taught me why he thinketh the Prophet Daniel to have there omitted fifty empires, which I have 
* In meth●…do 〈◊〉.  noted to have been ten times greater than the Germane empire, and such as have in them also contained a great part of the Babylonian empire? Why also Daniel in his first chapter hath writ of himself, That he lived in the first year of the reign of Cyrus' king of Persia? And yet more, why he should writ himself to have received that divine oracle or prophesy in the 
* Chap. ●….  third year of the reign of king Cyrus? And why in the chapter following doth he make mention of Darius' king of Persia▪ who was invested in that kingdom seven and thirty years after that Cyrus began to reign? For neither Berosus a most true interpreter of the Chaldean antiquities, whom Ctesias and most of the ancient writers, have followed: neither Megusthenes the Chronicler of the Persian affairs, neither Herodotus, called the Father of History, neither any of the Greek or Hebrew historiographers, report any to have been before Darius Hystaspes: I except only josephus, who in that place dissenteth from Berosus. But lest we should seem to deal to sharply, and to press them too far, What is the reason why Daniel in the eleventh chapter of his prophesy writeth, That Darius should have three Persians his successors and that the fourth should come out of Grecia, who by mighty force and strong hand should obtain the empire? But that this was Alexander the Great no man doubteth, who thrust Darius Codomaenus out of the Persian empire, whose father was Darius Achos, his grandfather Darius Mnemon, and his great grandfather Darius Nothus, unto whom Daniel turneth his speech. Which if it be so, Daniel must needs have lived two hundred and twenty years, if he were a youth grown when as he was carried captive into Chaldea, which he must needs be, for that he then spoke both most eloquently and wisely. And thus much every man may most plainly gather both out of the sacred scriptures, and also out of the ancient histories of Herodotus and josephus. For Cyrus died in the 30 year of his reign, Cambyses in the 6, Darius Hystaspes in the 37, Xerxes in the 21, Artaxerxes in the 44, Darius Nothus in the 19, Darius Mnemon in the 36, Darius Achos in the ●…6, Darius Cadomanus in the 10, all making the sum of 228 years. For Daniel was taken prisoner together with king joachim. But let the interpreters of these divine oracles suppose all things to be manifest unto them, and let every one of them with great confidence at their pleasure determine of these Daniels weeks. Yet how can these which even most subtly have discussed all these matters, defend that of the Prophets Zacharias 
* Chap. ●….  and Aggaeus, who writ their prophecies in the end of the seaventieth year of the captivity, Darius Nothus 
* Chap. 23.  as they will have it then reigning. This is now (say those Prophets) the seaventieth year▪ And if it be so that they will have the seventy years to be accounted not from the destruction of the Temple, but from the Edict of Xerxes, then truly Zerubabel and Nehemiah the chieftains of the people must needs have lived full two hundred and fifty years, being so old when Cyrus began his reign, as that they were able to conduct the people out of Chaldea into the land of Palestine: whom yet the doubt not to prove even by the testimony of Nehemiah himself, him to have lived even to the last Darius. Wherhfore all Historiographers are here much troubled and at great variance among themselves: one saying that there were but five of these Persian kings: an other six: and others seven: many eight: some nine: yea and some there be which have devised a tenth also. Truly Genebrardus in his chronology affirmeth there to have been of them only five: but Functius saith ten. Wherhfore in so great rietie of opinions one of the two may be: as viz. that none of them all be true, the other can in no wise be, that more of them than one should at all be true; and which of them it is I can not affirm: neither if I could would I And in mine opinion I have hereof more modestly than they written, that it was not a thing to me well known, unto whom for all that I will yield, if they can by any means maintain the certainty of their own positions. Howbeit that S. Jerome hath rejected many things which are found in the writings of Daniel: And that the Hebrews allow not of the rest which are not writ in the Chaldee, but in the Greek tongue by Theodotion.  
Wherhfore these examples thus propounded, it is lawful by a certain conjectural 
How it is lawful for a man to guess at the rising and falling of a Common wealth.  guessing to aim at the rising and falling of Commonweals: as also for a man looking into the precedent causes of things, with the divers conjunctions and oppositions of the Planets, to go so far as the knowledge of such things will bear: not rashly affirming, or lightly believing any thing concerning such things as are by the Almighty and ever living God far set from the sense and reach of man.   

CHAP. III That it is a most dangerous thing at one and the self same time▪ to change the form, laws, and customs of a Commonweal.  
HOw Cities and Commonweals arise; by what means they are also increased; what divers alterations and changes befall every one of them; and by what conjectures the fall and ruin of them is to be by us gathered, I suppose we have sufficiently before declared. But for as much as the presumptions by us already noted, are not sufficient to make any certain demonstration of, but rest upon such grounds as are farthest off from the senses and capacity of the common sort of men: Neither that if they were delivered by way of demonstration, or other more certain rules, should they therefore infer any necessity at all? It remaineth that we according to that wisdom and discretion wherewith almighty God hath of his goodness endued men, endeavour ourselves to rule Estates and Commonweals, and by all means to foresee and decline the changes and ruins of them. For why, it is one general opinion and doctrine of all Philosophers, yea even of them which idly dispute what is done in heaven: a wise man not to be bound or subject unto the power or influence 
Wise men not to be subject unto the power or influence of the stars, as sensual men be.  of the stars: but only they which give the rains unto their disordered appetites, and beastly desires, not suffering themselves to be governed by the rule of reason, or of other the best laws: unto whom Solomon the master of wisdom hath sharply threatened the torment of the wheel, saying, That God should 'cause the wheel to pass over them: that is to say, the force and effect of the celestial Spheres, which over the good should have no power at all. Seeing therefore that the power & influence of the stars may by the power of God, that is, by wisdom (by the gift and goodness of almighty God given unto men) be avoided: and that wise physicians have found the means to change the diseases, and to altar fevers contrary unto their natural courses, to the intent the more easily to cure them, or at leastwise to assuage them; why should 
The mine of a Commonweal to be by the wisdom of the governor prevented, or ●…lss warning thereof to be by him in d●…e time given unto his subjects.  not the wise politician, or governor of a Commonweal, foreseeing the conversions and changes which naturally happen unto Commonweals, by good laws and other convenient remedies prevent the ruin thereof: or if the force of the mischief be so great, and the destruction so certain, as that it can by no wisdom of man be prevented or stayed, yet shall he perform that which cunning physicians do, who by the Symptoms appearing upon the critical days, and by the causes of the disease, do more certainly and better guess of the sick man's death in what manner it shall be: and so yet in good rhyme giveth thereof warning unto his ignorant subjects, jest that they should upon the sudden be utterly oppressed with the ruin of the falling Estate and Commonweal. And as the most skilful Physicians even in the state of the disease, 
Wisdom never discouraged with the dangers of the Commonweal: so long as they see the state wisely and dis●… governed.  and the greatest grief thereof, do yet put their patients in greater comfort, if the Symptoms, be good then if the grief or fit without them were but easy and gentle; and as to the contrary when they see a man in the highest degree of health that may be, they are then in the greatest fear, jest he should suddenly fall unto some extreme sickness, as the great physician Hypocrates saith: So also a wise governor of a Commonweal, seeing the state on all sides beset, and almost overwhelmed with enemies, yet if in so great danger he otherwise see wise men sitting at the helm of the Commonweal, the subjects obedient unto the Magistrates, and the Magistrates unto the Laws; he taketh courage thereat, and promiseth both unto himself and others good success; the ignorant people & cowards having in the mean time lost their patience, and lying as men plunged even into the bottom of despair. In which state the Roman commonweal stood after the third slaughter of their army at Cannae, when as now many of the friendly and confederate cites, which before had continued in their fidelity and allegiance, revolted from the Romans', following the fortune and 
What opinion wise men had of the distressed estate of the Roman Commonwealea, f●…et the great overthrow at Cannae.  victories of Hannibal: For why almost all men now despaired of the estate of the Roman Empire: at which time of distress, of all others no man more hurt the Commonweal than did Terentius Varro the Consul, who with some few having escaped from so great a slaughter (as wherein threescore thousand of the citizens of Rome were slain) writ letters unto the Senate and people of Capua, That the Roman Commonweal was undone, as having in that battle lost all the force and flower thereof. Which thing so terrified them of Capua, (although in wealth and power they fa●…re exceeded all the rest of the Roman confederates) that they not only themselves forsook the Romans, but drew with them many of their allies and confederates also unto Hannibal: when as in deed the Consul should have extenuated the overthrow and loss received. Whereas Scipio, who was afterwards called Africanus, to the contrary with comfortable speeches then cheered up divers of the citizens despairing of the state of the Commonweal, and by oath constrained such as were about to have abandoned the city, to stay there still, and not to stir, but resolutely to adventure their lives for the defence of their country and Commonweal. Neither was the Senate terrified with the fear of so many dangers, as wherewith they were on every side beset and enclosed, but rather seemed with greater wisdom to manage the Estate than ever it did before. And albeit that the common people (according to their wont lightness and foolish ignorance) almost in every town and city sung the praises of Hannibal, after his so many and so great victories over the Romans: Yet for all that, the Senate of every city favoured the Romans: For so saith Livy, unus veluti morbus omnes Italiae populos invaserat, ut plebs ab optimatibus dissentiret: Senatus Romanis faveret, plebs ad Poenos rem traheret, One disease as it were (saith he) had infected all the people of Italy, viz. That the people still dissented from the nobility; the Senate still favoured the Romans; and the people still inclined unto the Carthaginensians. Yea Hiero king of Siracusa, accounted the wisest prince of his age, did then much more carefully than before honour and reverence the amity and alliance of the Romans', not doubting in what he could to help and relieve them; yea and in that their desperate estate amongst other things sent them a statue of Victory (of gold) for a present▪ as he which had oftentimes proved the incredible wisdom of that Senate in the managing of their affairs. Wherein a man may see, that the wiser sort seeing the Romans so advised and so constant in their extreme necessity, and that their laws were never more straightly kept, or martial discipline more severely observed, (as Polybius an eye-witness of those things, himself writeth) were always of opinion that the issue of their affairs would be good: not unlike the wise physician, who seeing favourable Symptoms in the strongest fit of his patient's disease, is yet still in good hope. Whereas Carthage to the contrary proud of so many and so great victories, mistress of so many countries and nations, and placed in the height of all worldly felicity, was never then then nearer unto ruin and destruction: whereof were most certain tokens, for that in that Commonweal was no place left either for law or virtue, all things being done by the popular rage, or unruly lust of the common people: so that it must needs shortly after be cast down headlong from the highest degree of honour, and become subject unto the Romans, as not long after it did, Scipio being then their general.  
Wherhfore the first rule for the keeping and preserving of Commonweals in 
The first rule for the keeping and preserving of Commonweals in their estates.  their estates, is well to know the nature of every Commonweal, together with the diseases incident unto them: whereof we have more at large discoursed in the former Book. For it is not enough to know which kind of Commonweal is better than other, but it behoveth us also to know the means how to maintain every one of them in their estate, if it be not in our power to change the same, or that in changing thereof we shall put all to the hazard of utter ruin and decay. For why, it is better to have an evil Commonweal than none at all: as with convenient diet in some 
Violent remedies never to be used but in desperat●… diseases.  sort to preserve the sick man, than by applying of medicines to an incurable disease so to take away his life quite. For as physicians say, we must never apply violent remedies but unto desperate diseases; and that whenas there is now no other hope left. And this maxim taketh place in every sort of Commonweal, not only for the changing of the estate, but even for the changing of laws, manners, and customs also: whereunto many having no regard have ruinated and overthrown right fair and great Commonweals, alured with the bait of some one or other good law, which they have borrowed from some one Commonweal quite contrary unto their own. For as we have before showed, many good laws there be good for the maintenance of a Monarchy, and yet fit for to ruinat a Popular estate: as other also there be good for the preservation of the Popular liberty, & yet most fitly serving for the overthrow of a Monarchy: for that those Estates by nature contrary, are by quite contrary laws both maintained and ruinated.  
And albeit ihat some laws there be good and indifferent to all sorts of Commonweals, yet so it is, that the ancient question of right wise Politicians is not yet well resolved, viz. Whether a new law being better, be to be preferred before an old ancient law 
A notable question.  that is worse? For the law be it never so good, is nothing worth if it carry with it a contempt of itself, or of the rest of the laws: Now so it is, that newness in matter of 
Ancient laws though worse still of greater esteem and reverence than the new though better.  laws is always contemptible, whereas to the contrary, the reverence of antiquity is so great, as that it giveth strength enough unto a law to 'cause it to be of itself obeyed, without the authority of any Magistrate at all joined unto it: whereas new edicts and laws with all the threats and penalties annexed unto them, and all that the Magistrates can do, cannot but with great difficulty found entertainment: in such sort, as that the fruit we are to receive of a new edict or law, is not often times so great, as the harm which the contempt of the rest of the laws draweth after it for the novelty of some one. And to make the matter short, there is nothing more difficult to handle, nor more doubtful in event, nor more dangerous to manage, than to bring in new decrees or laws. And this reason seemeth unto me very considerable, but yet I will set down another of no less weight, which is, That all the change of laws concerning the estate is dangerous: For to change the customs and laws concerning inheritance, contracts, or servitude from evil to good, is in some sort tolerable; but to change the laws which concern 
Ancient laws concerning the estate of a Commonweal not to be without great danger altered.  the estare, is as dangerous, as to remove the foundation or corner stones which uphold the whole weight or burden of the buildings; in which doing▪ the whole fabric is to be sore shaken, and beside the danger of falling, receiveth more hurt by the shaking thereof, than it doth good by the new reparation, especially if it be now become old and ruinous. For even so it is in a Commonweal now already grown old, wherein if a man never so little remove the foundations that upholdeth the same, he is in great danger of the ruin thereof. For the ancient maxim of the most wise politicians aught well to be weighed, That we must not change any thing in the laws of a Commonweal which hath long maintained itself in good estate, whatsoever apparent profit may be thereby pretended. And for these causes the old law of the Athcnians, which was afterward also received in Rome, and passed in force of a law, published at the request of Publius Philo, was the most necessary law that could be in a Commonweal, viz. That it should not be lawful for any person upon pain of death to present any request unto the people, without the privity of the Senat. Which law is yet better kept in Venice than in any place of the world else, whereas it is not permitted so much as to present any request even unto the Senate, without the advise of the council of the Sages. And yet 
The extreme danger he was in, which moved any new law amongst the Locrensians.  in the Commonweal of the Locrensians, this law was much straighter, Where he which would present any request, to have it pass in force of a law, was constrained to move it before the people with a rope about his neck, wherewith he was there upon the place to be strangled, if he prevailed not to prove the law by him moved to be good and profitable for the Commonweal. Which was the cause that this estate for a most long time stood and flourished, without any thing added or diminished to or from the most ancient laws and customs thereof, no man daring to propound any new law to pass, until that one of the citizens which had but one ●…ie, made a request unto the people, That he which wittingly should put out his eye which had but one, should therefore himself have both his own put out: For the making of which motion his adversary had given him cause, having oftentimes threatened him to thrust out his eye, and so to deprive him quite of his sight, although he were therefore to endure the penalty of the law, which was to lose one of his own. With the equity, or rather necessity of whose so reasonable a request the people moved (though with much a do) enacted the law. Whereby yet nothing was derogated from the law called Lex talioni●… (or the law of like punishment) which was then common to almost all nations: For why, it was reason that he which had maliciously deprived another man of his sight, should himself be deprived of his own sight also.  
Now if any man should say, That many laws must often times of necessity be changed, 
Laws concerning ordinary policy may oft●…ntimes be changed but not laws concerning the estate.  as the laws concerning victuals, or the bringing in, or carrying out of merchandise, or concerning the augmenting or diminishing of the punishment to be inflicted upon offenders, which are even in a short time to be changed; I therein agreed with him, for that necessity hath no law: first, if new laws give good hope of fruit and profit of them to arise, as of good corn yet in the blade, then are they not to be rejected: but here question is not of laws concerning ordinary policy, but of such as concern the very estate itself. Which I both would and wish, if possibly it might be, that they should still be most firm and immutable: not for that the Commonweal aught to serve the laws, seeing that they are all made for the maintenance of the Commonweal, and of the society of men: neither that any man wisheth the safety and preservation of the laws, but for the Commonweals sake. For why, the first and chief law of all 
The chief law of all Commonweals.  Commonweals, is this, SALUS POPULI SUPREMA LEX ESTO, The welfare of the people, let that be the last law. For what reason moved Themistocles to fortify the city of Athens with walls and bulwarks, even the very same reason induced Theramenes to persuade the Athenians to raze their walls, viz. the welfare of the people: whereas otherwise the Lacedæmonians had undone the citizens together with the city. Wherhfore no law is so sacred, but that upon urgent necessity it is to be changed. And therefore Solon after he had published his laws, caused the Athenians to swear to 
No law so sacred but that upon urgent necessity it is to be changed.  observe and keep them for the space of one hundred year: giving them thereby to understand, that laws could never be made immutable, neither were to be all at once together changed. Lycurgus also in like manner took an oath of the Lacedæmonians his subjects, to keep his laws until his return from the Oracle of Apollo, from whence he afterwards never returned, but went himself into voluntary exile, out of his native country; so to bind his citizens so much as possible was to the perpetual 
Better to suffer evil laws by little and little to grow out of use; then upon the sudden with danger to abrogate them all at once.  keeping of his laws. And albeit that the iniquity of some ancient law be by right evident, yet is it better to endure it, until that it in time by little and little of itself lose the force, than upon the sudden by violence to repeal it. For so did the Romans by many the laws of the twelve tables, which they would not abrogat, but only by not observing them, in that they were unprofitable or unjust, suffered them so to grow out of use: which they so did, lest in abrogating of them, they might seem to impair the credit and authority of the rest of the same laws. Yet after that they had by tract of time been of long buried as it were in oblivion (which was seven hundred years after that they were first published) it was at the motion of Aebutius the Tribune, decreed, That such of those laws as were as it were of themselves grown out of use, should be reputed as repealed and abrogated, to the end that no man should with them yet standing in force be entangled.  
But for that the nature of man as of all other worldly things also, is most slipperi●… 
Neither are old laws to be altogether suddenly without danger abrogated: or new laws rashly ●…stablished.  and unconstant, running still headlong from good to evil, and from evil to worse; vices by little and little still increasing, not unlike unto evil humours, which without sensible feeling increase man's body, until it be full of them, breedeth in it many most dangerous diseases, and so at length bringeth it unto utter destruction. For remedy where of new laws must of necessity be devised: which must yet for all that by little and little be done, and not violently all at once. As Agis king of Lacedemonia unwisely attempted to have done: who desiring to re-establish in the Commonweal the ancient discipline of Lycurgus, now by the negligence of the magistrates almost grown quite out of use, caused all the obligations and schedules of private men to be upon a sudden brought out & burnt: which done, he was about to have proceeded to the making of a new division of lands, to the end to have so made an equality of wealth and goods amongst the citizens, as Lycurgus had before done: which although it were a thing desired of many in the Lacedaemonian Commonweal (which had indeed so been founded) yet so it was, that in making too much haste in the doing thereof, he not only fell from his hope, but thereby kindled such a fire of sedition also, as burnt up his whole house, and so afterward despoiled of his estate, and by his rebellious subjects together with his mother and other his friends and partakers strangled; made away for a sort of mad and evil minded fellows to invade the state, having so deprived his country of himself a good and virtuous prince. Whereas he should before have made himself master of the forces, or if that had not been possible, yet to have sounded the minds of them of the geater sort, and by means to have gained them unto him one after another, as had Lycurgus done before him; and then to have forbidden them the use of gold and silver, that so it might have grown into as little estimation as iron: and in some time after that, to have forbidden all sumptuousness in apparel, and rich furniture, and not at once to have encroached upon the liberty of the people, to have proved their patience, and changed their discipline: For that to use such a violent letting of blood, before the corrupt humours purged, or so strong a medicine, before any preparative given, is not the way to cure the diseases, but to kill the diseased. Wherhfore in the governments of Commonweals, and healing the diseases thereof, we must imitat not the Physicians only, but even nature itself, or rather the great God of nature whom we see to do all things by little and little, and almost insensibly. The Venetians right wisely during the life of Augustin Barbarin their duke, attempted not in any thing to abridge his power, though by them much misliked and feared; lest in so doing they should eithe●… have offered some disgrace unto him their prince, now grown old, or else have raised some new stirs, and so have troubled the quiet of their Commonweal. But he once dead, before they proceeded unto the new election of Loredan, the signory caused such new laws and decrees to be published, as whereby the power of the dukes was right greatly impeired and diminished. The same we have showed also to have been done in the elections of the Germane emperors, the kings of Polonia, and of Denmark, who of sovereign monarchs are now brought unto the small estates of Generals in chief, some of them more, and some less: which the more closely to hide, they have left unto them the imperial and royal marks and cognisances in their habits, in their titles and ceremonies, but in few things else in effect and deed.  
But as it is a dangerous thing for the subjects all at once to abridge or cut short 
Dangerous for a prince upon the sudden to displace or cast off the anntient servitor of his predecessors, or great magistrates of the estate.  the power of a sovereign prince or magistrate, who yet hath the power in his hand: so is it also no less dangerous for a prince upon the sudden to displace or cast off the ancient servitors of his predecessors, or else at once to thrust out some part of the great magistrates and officers of the estate, and to retain the rest, they which are new chosen or retained, resting over charged with envy, and the other with evil doing or ignorance, and withal deprived of the honour and good, which they have bought full dear. And it may be that one of the fairest foundations of this monarchy is, that the king dying, the officers of the crown continued still in their charge, who by that means still maintain the Commonweal in the estate thereof. And albeit that the officers of the king's house be at the pleasure of the successor to be changed, so aught he yet therein to use such discretion, as that they which are removed have not occasion to innovat or move any thing as men disgraced, or at leastwise have no power left them so to do, albeit that they were thereunto willing. In which point the emperor Galba being deceived, and having thrust Otho out of the hope he had conceived of the empire, to adopt Piso to succeed him in the government, and yet for all that without disarming of Otho, he was shortly after by the same Otho (a man in great favour with the Praetorian soldiers) slain together with Piso, whom he had before adopted to succeed him in the empire and government of the state. All which perils and dangers are less to be feared in an Aristocratike or Popular estate, for that in them they which have the sovereignty never die; howbeit that there is in them no less danger in changing of their sovereign magistrates, or generals (as we have before declared) or in making of laws which may tend to the impairtng of the power of the people▪ or which may any way seem profitable unto the nobility, and prejudicial or hurtful unto the people: or in case that victuals and provisions fail, or that some great extreme dearth arise; in which cases there is always danger of popular commotions and rebellions. So that 
All alterations of laws or other great matters in a Commonweal are best to be made by little and little.  in brief, when question is for the displacing of great magistrates, or for the suppressing of corporations or colleges, or for the cutting short of privileges, or the augmenting of punishments, or for the reforming of disorders amongst the people, or for the calling of great men to accounted, or for the reducing of religion to▪ the former course and beginning thereof; which by succession of time, following the natural corruption of man, hath been altered & changed from the first purity thereof: there is no better means than to come thereunto by little and little, without forcing of any thing, if it were possible, as by way of suppression. Whereof we have a notable example of king Charles the fift (even he that was surnamed the Wise) who at such time as he was Regent in France (his father being as then prisoner in England) by the evil council of some, ignorant in matters of estate, at one chop suspended all the officers in France, of whom also he suppressed the greatest part, appointing fifty commissioners for the hearing of such accusations as should be laid against them for the extortion and bribery by them committed and used: whereupon all France was in such tumult and up●…ore (for the infinite number that then were of male contents) as that shortly after for remedy thereof, he by a decree in the high court of parliament at Paris, whereunto all the nobility were assembled, abrogated the former law. Which decree is yet extant in the act of that his court, to this effect and purpose, Cùm regiae potestati & procurationi, quam gerimus, non modò quae ab alijs, sed etiam quae a nobis ipsis & in Rempublicam, & in singulos peccantur emendare consentaneum sit, rebus planè perspectis & cognitis, quae de imperio magistratibus adempto nova lege iussimus, placet abrogari; ut quidem abrogamus, & apertè declaramus, legis illius, quae importunis quorumdam rogationibus erepta est, nullam vim fore, & quae acta gesta sunt, cum magno nostro dolore acta gesta fuisse; nec illam magistratuum ac honorum abrogationem, quam non iure factam esse censitemur cuiquam fraudi esse: aut cuiusquam ius ac dignitatem violare nos ulla ex part voluisse: ac proinde legem illam iure a nobis rescindi & abrogaritestamur, ut omnibus magistratibus salva omnia & integra restituantur, Whereas by the regal power and authority which we bear, it is fitting for us to correct and amend, not only such things as by others, but even by ourselves also are trespassed against the Commonweal, or other men in particular: all things thoroughly looked into, and tried, our pleasure is, That what we have by a new law commanded concerning power and authority taken from the magistrates, to be again abrogated, as indeed we abrogat, and plainly declare the force of that law (which was by the importunate suit of some wrested from us) to be nothing: and that such things as were then done, to have been done to our great grief: neither that that deprivation of offices or honours, which we confess to have been not lawfully done, to be impu●…ed to any man: neither that our will was in any part to violate any man's right or honour: And therefore we freely protest, that new law to be of us rightly repealed and abrogated: and that so all things safe and whole, may so again be unto the magistrates restored. And thus much he. But Charles the ninth coming unto the crown, and seeing the number of officers through the liberty of the times grown almost infinite, to 
The wise course taken of Charles the IX for the abating of the infinite number of officers in the Commonweal.  the great hurt of the Commonweal, in such sort, as that it seemed a thing almost necessary to have deprived them of their honours and fees, yet did he not so, for that it could not without great injury be done, when as the money they had before paid for them, could not by reason of the want of coin in the common treasury, be again repaid unto them: neither if it could have been, could he yet be without imputation & disgrace, that was so without cause displaced. Besides that, unto many their credit & reputation was in more esteem & dearer than was their profit, and much the more was it to be feared, that if they should both of their money and preferment be together spoiled, lest their present credit and profit being impaired, and the hope also of the recovery of the money they had paid lost▪ should minister unto many of them occasions for them to raise rebellions and new stirs in the estate of the Commonweal. Wherhfore the want of money in the common treasury profited us then mindful of other things, and fortune so favoured our unskilfulness and ignorance, as in ancient time it did a painter, who painting of an horse, when as he not knowing how cunningly to express the foam of the horses mouth, and weary of his work not well sorting to his mind, in an anger cast his wet sponge at it, and so by fortune expressed that which he by cunning could not do: even so it pleased that king to lessen the multitude of his officers still as they died, by choosing no new in their steads, when as he could not again restore unto them the money they had paid for their offices; neither yet if the prince's wealth & 
Not good for a prince to use the greatness of his power in displacing of the great officers of his realm and state.  power had been so great, as with his beck or a wink of his eye, to 'cause all his subjects to tremble, and so to be able to do what thing soever he list, should he yet seem to do wisely by force to take away the offices and places before sold unto his magistrates and officers: For that not only they which have received the injury, but even other his subjects also, are often times much moved and incensed with injuries and wrongs done unto other men: Besides that, the mightier that a man is, the more justly and temperately he aught to behave himself towards all men, but especial towards his subjects. 
Religeous houses with great wisdom quietly suppressed at basil and Coire.  Wherhfore the Senate and people of Basil did wisely, who having renounced the Bishop of Rome's Religion (which they now detested) would not upon the sudden thrust the Monks and Nuns with other the Religious persons out of their Abbeys and Monasteries: but only took order, that as they died, they should die both for themselves and their successors, expressly forbidding any new to be chosen in their places; that so by that means their colleges might by little and little by the death of the fellows be extinguished. Whereby it came to pass, that all the rest of the Carthusians of their own accord forsaking their cloister, yet one of them all alone for along time remained therein, and so quietly and without any disturbance held the right of his covent, being never enforced to change either his place, his habit, or old ceremonies, or religion before by him received. The like order was taken at Coire in the diet of the Grisons: wherein it was decreed, That the ministers of the reformed religion should be maintained of the profits and revenues of the church, the religious men yet nevertheless still remaining in their cloisters and covents, to be by their death suppressed, they being now prohibited to choose any new in stead of them which were dead: as I have learned by the letters of the ambassador of France, who was then at Coire. By which means both they which professed the new religion, and they which professed the old, were both provided for: whereas otherwise it had been an unreasonable thing to have thrust them, who had learned not only to live idly, but even to do nothing at all (as Lucilius merrily saith) having neither trade nor occupation to live upon, out of the old possession of their lands, were it never so unjust. Whereof beside the injury unto them done, danger might have also ensued, lest they not having whereof to live, and so brought into despair, might have attempted some thing against the state; and so haply drawn after them all their friends and allies alo, to the great trouble of the whole Commonweal. For the same cause the king having given leave for the free exercise of the new religion in this realm of France, and seeing that they which under the colour thereof were go out of their cloisters, demanded a portion in the lands and inheritance of their parents or near kinsmen: it was decreed, and that upon great pain, That they should again return unto their cloisters: which seemed to be a thing directly contrary unto the law, whereby free liberty was given for every man that would, to profess the new reformed religion. Howbeit that this was indirectly to stop the mouths of them which departing out of their monasteries, sought to trouble the estate, and under the vail and colour of religion, to trouble the most great and noble houses of this realm: beside that it had been also necessary in all the customs of this realm, to raze the article concerning the religions, who both by the cannon and civil laws, as also by all our laws and customs, are excluded and shut out from all hope of inheritance.  
But now that which we have said, That the multitude of officers, or of colleges, and companies, of privileges, or of wicked men, which through the sufferance of princes, or the negligence of the magistrate, are by little and little grown to the hurt of the Commonweal, are by the same mean to be again suppressed; hath place in all things which concern the public state, and hath a reference unto the nature of the laws, 
The best and surest way for the suppressing of a tyrant.  which have no force nor effect but for the time to come. And albeit that tyranny be a thing most cruel and detestable, yet so it is, that the surest way and mean to suppress the same, if the tyrant have neither children nor brethren to succeed him, is together with the death of the tyrant to abolish also the tyrannical government; & not by force whilst he yet liveth to strive to take from him the government, with the hazard of the ruin of the whole estate, as oftentimes it chanceth. But if the tyrant have children, and doth what he may to destroy the good, and to put the great men one after another to death (as Tarquin the proud, and other tyrants following his steps used commonly to do) or to suppress the magistrates or other great officers which might stay the course of his tyranny, to the end that he may without let or controlment do whatsoever him pleaseth: then in this ease violent remedies are to be used, but with such limitation and restriction as we have before set down, and not otherwise, lest so we might seem rashly to arm the subjects against their princes.  
We aught then in the government of a well ordered estate and Commonweal, 
The wise politician in the government of the estate is to imitate the works of God in nature who by little and little bringeth great things to perfection.  to imitat and follow the great God of nature, who in all things proceedeth easily and by little and little, who of a little seed causeth to grow a tree for height and greatness right admirable, and yet for all that insensibly; and still by means conjoining the extremities of nature, as by putting the Spring betwixt Winter and Summer, and Autumn betwixt Summer and Winter, moderating the extremities of the times and seasons, which the self same wisdom which he useth in all other things also, and that in such sort, as that no violent force or course therein appeareth. But if it be oftentimes dangerous to change the laws of an estate or Commonweal, as we have before declared: Let us now see also, if it be not in like sort dangerous oftentimes to chaungethe magistrates, or that it is much better to have them perpetual and without change.   

CHAP. FOUR ¶ Whether it be better in a Commonweal to have the Magistrates still changeable, or else perpetual.  
FOrasmuch as both cities, citizens, and Commonweals, use commonly to be for nothing more turmoiled and troubled than by men for the obtaining of offices and honours, me think this question to be one of the most profitable and most necessary of any that can be made in matter of estate, Whether it be better to have annual or perpetual Magistrates in a Commonweal? Than which question I know not whether there be any amongst them which concern a Commonweal more harder to decide, or more pleasant to understand, and therefore not in any wise by us in this place to be omitted. Which I say not as meaning to take upon me the deciding of this question, but only to touch the reasons which might well be given both on the one side and the other, leaving the resolution thereof unto them which heretofore have better sounded the proceeding and consequence thereof. Neither is it mine intent or purpose, either to propound and move this question, to give foot unto them which would change the laws already received, which the subjects aught to hold for good and wholesome in every Commonweal▪ nor for any desire I have to change the estate of Commonweals already established, which have continued by long succession and course of years.  
Now the first and strongest reason that is to be had to make the magistrates and officers 
Reasons to show that magistrates aught not to be perpetual.  annual, is, for that the first and principal end of every Commonweal aught to consist in virtue: and that the scope of every good and true law▪ giver, is to make his subjects virtuous. Which to attain unto, it behoveth him to propound unto the view 
Rewards for virtue aught to be unto all men common.  and sight of the whole world, the rewards of virtue, as the mark whereat every man aught to aim in best sort he can.  
Now most certain it is, that honour is no other thing than the reward and prize of virtue, which neither aught nor can by the counterpoise of profit be esteemed: whereas rather to the contrary virtue hath no more capital an enemy, than profit devised to arise by honour. If then the honourable preferments, offices and commissions be taken out of public place, to be always enclosed & shut up within the particular houses of most unworthy men, who for favour or money carry away the same; it is not then to be thought virtue in that estate to be the prize, the corrupt nature of man being such as is right hardly to be drawn unto virtue, what reward or prize soever be devised for the alluring of men thereto. And thus much for the first point, which aught to move princes and wise law givers, to set preferments, offices, and all such other the rewards of virtue, in the eye of all the world, and so to divide them amongst their subjects, to every man according to his deserts, which they cannot do, if they grant them unto men in perpetuities.  
Another point which the wise law giver aught still to have before his eyes, is, To 
The root of sedition is by all means to be cut up in a Commonweal which can hardly be where magistrates and officers be perpetual.  cut up the roots, and to take away the seeds of civil sedition, so to maintain his subjects in good peace and amity amongst themselves, and one of them with another. Which is a matter of such weight, as that many have thought it to be the only end which the good law maker aught to hope after. For albeit that virtue may oftentimes be banished out of Commonweals, for men to live in a disordered licentiousness of all kind of voluptuous pleasures: yet in that all men agreed, that there is no more dangerous a plague unto Commonweals, than civil sedition and discord. Forasmuch as it draweth after it the common ruin aswell of the good as of the bad. Now so it is, that the first and principal cause of sedition, is inequality; as to the contrary the mother nurse of peace and amity, is equality; which is no other thing than natural equity, distributing rewards, preferments, honours, and all other things common unto the subjects indifferently, and in the best sort that may be. From which equality the very thieves and robbers themselves may in no wise depart, if they mean to live together. He therefore that shall divide the honours and offices of estate unto a small number of men, as needs it must be, when they are given for term of life, he I say hath lighted the greatest flames of jealousy of one of them against another, and the greatest fire of sedition that can possibly be raised in a Commonweal.  
Now if there were no more but the two reasons before alleged, viz. The enjoying 
Perpetuity of offices the caus●… of impunity of the great officers.  of virtue, with the rewards thereunto due, and the avoiding of sedition, the greatest plague of a Commonweal; yet were they even sufficient to let, that offices should not be perpetual, but rather annual, to the end that every man so having therein part and interest, might so also have occasion to live in peace. But yet there are farther reasons also, which is, that by such perpetuity of offices and promotions, not only the unity and concord of subjects, and the true rewards of virtue are so taken away, but that the due punishment by the laws appointed for offenders are thereby also impeached, or rather quite abolished: Whereof the wise law giver aught to have a greater regard than of the rewards to virtue due▪ For that the wise and accomplished man looketh for no other reward of his virtuous actions, more than virtue itself: which a man cannot say of vice, neither of the vicious. And for this cause the laws both of God and man, even from the first unto the last, have commanded nothing more, than the punishment of the wicked. And what punishment should a man do upon them, who are always so high mounted, as that it is impossible to come nigh them? Who shall accuse them? who shall imprison them? who shall condemn them? Shall their companions or fellows in power? will they cut their own arms, or rip their own entrails? believe it they will never be so evil advised. What if the great ones be also partakers of their foul robberies, villainies, and extortion? how shall they then punish the others? they will rather blush for shame, and be touched with compassion of them which are like unto themselves, than with the heinousness of the offences be induced to take of them punishment. But if any there be so hardy as to accuse, yea or but so much as to complain of one of these demie gods, he is in danger of his life, as a false enformer, if he by proof clearer than the sun itself, prove not villainies done in most obscure darkness: and admit that all be by them well proved, and that the guilty magistrate be convinced and attainted, yet so it is, that this ordinary clause Frater noster est, He is our brother, shall suffice to cover and bury all the villainies, deceits, and extortion, of the most unjust magistrate that a man could imagine. So that hardly one of a thousand which had deserved punishment, should in five hundred years be brought to execution.  
But if the magistrates were annual, it is most certain, that the fear to be called to accounted, 
Great magistrat●… and officers in doubt to be called to accounted where they are but annual.  would always keep them in awe, and that they would tremble and quake as often as they heard that thundering threatening which the Tribunes of the people made to Manlius, Privatum rationem rerum ab se gestarum redditurum, quoniam Consulnoluisset, That he being a private man, should give account of such things as he had done, for that he would not so do being Consul. And indeed what could a man see more fair, than them which had but a little before administered justice, and taken charge of the common treasure, with other such public offices, after that they had put off their robes of dignity, to come in their common attire as private men, to give an account of their actions done in the time of their magistracy. And this is it for which Plutarch hath so highly commended the custom of the ancient Romans, who animated the young men to commence their public accusations against such as had evil acquitted themselves in their public charges, setting them on as grayhounds upon wolves, or other wild beasts. In which doing not only the offenders were punished, but every man else also upon an emulation and strife, as it were endeavoured him to do well; but especially they, who had themselves accused others, as well assured that there never wanted some, who still right narrowly looked into all their doings, so that it much concerned them to bear themselves most uprightly in the whole course of their lives. Which benefits those estates and Commonweals must neeedes want, which have their magistrates perpetual, or for term of life. For which cause the emperor Claudius wisely renewed an old edict or law, then grown out of use: which was, That he to whom the government of any province was by lot fallen (as the manner was) should forthwith, all excuses set apart, go unto his charge; and that the time of his authority and charge once expired, he should not forthwith take upon him any other new public charge or government, to the intent that the evil behaviour or extortion of the magistrates should not by such continuation of their power and authority remain unpunished. For whatsoever decrees or laws be made, the evil magistrates would still 
Evil magistrates most commonly hold together.  keep the power in their hands, and do what they can one for another; in such sort strengthening themselves, as that is a thing almost impossible to have of them any reason. Which was the cause that moved Hannibal that great captain to present a request unto the people of Carthage, To make their judges annual, which before held their places for term of life, and that none of them should keep his place two years together, as Livy reporteth, whose words we thought good thus here to set down, judicum or do ea tempestate dominabatur Carthagine, eo maximè quòd ijdem perpetui judices: res, fama, vitaque omnium in illorum potestate erat; qui unum eius ordinis, & omnes adversos habebat. horum in tam impotenti regno Praetor factus Annibal, vocare ad se Quaestorem; idem pro nihilo habuit; nam adversae factionis erat: & quia ex qu●…stura in judices potentissimum ordinem referuntur, iam pro futuris mox opibus animos gerebant: id indignum ratus Annibal, viatorem ad prehendendum Quaestorem misit, subductumque in concionem non ipsum magis quam ordinem judicum (prae quorum superbia atque opibus nec leges quicquam essent, nec magistratus) accusavit, & ut secundis auribus accipi orationem animaduertit, legem extemplo promulgavit pertulitque, The order or company of the judges (saith he) did at that time bear all the sway at Carthage; and well the more, for that the self same men were still perpetual judges: every man's wealth, fame, and life, was in their power; he that had one of them of that order against him, had them all his enemies. In this their so insolent a reign Hannibal being made Praetor, convented one of the Questors, or public receivers before him, which made thereof no reckoning, for why, he was of the contrary faction unto him: and forasmuch as out of the Questors choice was still made into the most mighty order of the judges, they still bore their haughty minds answerable unto the wealth and power they were afterwards to enjoy. Which Hannibal taking for a great indignity, sent a sergeant to lay hands upon the Quaestor, and having brought him into the general assembly of the people, accused not him more than he did the whole order of the judges (through whose pride and wealth, neither the laws nor the magistrates were (as he said) any thing at all regarded) and perceiving his speech to be with the good liking of the people received, forthwith enacted, and proclaimed a law, That the judges should be every year chosen, and that none of them should be judges two years together. And thus far he. For why, it was otherwise a thing impossible to chastise them, a man still having them all his enemies, that should touch but one of them. For that they being perpetual magistrates, and commonly allied one of them unto another, it was impossible to hope to have any of them punished, and much less to have against them justice, if a man had any thing to do with them: and in case a man refused one of them, he must in so doing refuse the whole bench of them also. As not many years ago in the court of Paris (which at this time consisteth of an hundred and fifty judges) in a suit betwixt Chr. Thuan, chief justice in that court, and john Tili, register of the court (who took upon him the defence of his daughter being absent) were, for alliance only, threescore judges on the one side, and two and forty on the other, challenged and rejected▪ and all upon the same bench. And for this cause it was ordained in the assembly of the estates of the country of Languedoc, holden at Montpelier in the year 1556, where then I was, and charge there given to john Durande, attorney for that country, That amongst other his instructions, he should especially move the king, that it might please him to ordain, that the nigh kinsmen or other of alliance unto the judges, should not from thenceforth be admitted unto the same bench, neither into the same court. Which same request four years after, was by the estates of France presented unto the king in the parliament at Orleans, howbeit that nothing could therein be obtained, neither can be, so long as honours and preferments are in perpetuity given in the Commonweal. For it is now two hundred and fifty years since that king Charles the fift, and before him Philip the Fair had ordained, That no man should be judge in the 
That ●…o man should be a judge in his own country.  same country wherein he was borne: as in like case Marcus Aurelius made an edict, That no man should be governor in his own country. Of which law the profit was thought so great, as that he would have the same afterwards extended even unto them which were but councillors or assistants unto the governors of countries: which was a thing then well put in execution, as it is at this present in Spain, & in most 
The ordinary judges in Italy strangers.  of the cities in Italy, where the ordinary judge is most commonly a stranger. Which was also by the ambassadors of Moscovie requested of the estates of Polonia. Howbeit that the decrees of our kings concerning those matters, were quickly buried, after that the public offices and charges began to be with us given for term of life. And not to search further into the edicts of the Roman emperors, we found also in Caesar his 
Lib. 7.  Commentaries, that the ancient Gauls, and namely they of Autun, had amongst them an inviolable law, which expressly forbade the magistrates to be continued in their places above one year, and that two of one family could not be magistrates together, nor yet one of them, so long as the other who had already been magistrate should live. And that more is, it was always expressly forbidden, That two of one family might be councillors together, neither yet one of them, so long as the other who had already so been a councillor was alive.  
Moreover the thing which aught of all others to be most recommended unto all 
The great office●… and preferments of the Commonweal given in perpetuity breedeth a carelessness of the Common good both in the magistrates themselves and others  subjects in general, & every one of them in particular, is the preservation of the Commonweal. And what regard or care of the public good should they have, which therein have no part? Such as are themselves excluded, and which see the common preferments and offices given in prey to some few in perpetuity? How should they have any care of that which concerneth them not, neither near, nor a far off? And admit that any good and honest man would say, would do, or undertake, any thing that were for the common good or profit, being himself but a private man, who should harken unto him? who should support him? who should favour him? So that every man leaving to think of the public, intendeth unto his own business, and he in that case should be but laughed at, and derided as a fool, which should take more care of the common welfare than of his own. As for them who already enjoy the public preferments and offices, they for the most part have no great care of the common good, being now for ever assured of that which they most desired. OH but how much more happy should both the subjects and Commonweal be, if every man in his degree and according to his quality, having enjoyed convenable preferments, and so having learned true wisdom by the managing of worldly affairs, should retire themselves from these vain and worldly businesses, to occupy themselves in the contemplation of things natural and divine? For most certain it is, that contemplation is the true mother and mistress of all true wisdom and happiness, which men altogether wrapped up in worldly affairs, never so much as once dreamt or tasted of; and yet for all that this is the end, this is the scope, this the chief point of all man's felicity.  
And yet besides these three, there is another great inconvenience also, in that offices 
One man to have many offices and especially in perpetuity, not good for the Commonweal.  and preferments are in Commonweals granted unto men for term of life: that is to wit, that some few would have all, and some one would possess himself of many public charges and offices at once; as it was in ancient time permitted them in Carthage: which for all that seemed both unto Plato and Aristotle a thing right dangerous, For that it is an hard matter for one man well to discharge one office, but well to discharge many no one man can; and is therefore in every well ordered Commonweal a thing forbidden. Howbeit that the ambitious desires of men always passeth beyond the prohibitions of the laws, the most unworthy most commonly burning with the hottest flames of ambition; not unlike the weak stomach, which is always more desirous of meat which it cannot digest, than is the stomach which can better digest it: thinking it not to stand with their honour and reputation to stay in the mean, or to abate any of their titles and dignities, but contrariwise to mount still higher and higher. In so much that the signory of Venice in some sort to satisfy the ambition of the citizens, gave leave unto him which had borne a greater office, to refuse the less being laid upon him: which is a dangerous course, to measure the public charges and offices, by the foot of the subjects ambition, and not by the common profit.  
Than how much more dangerous is it, to make the magistrates and public charges perpetual, only to serve the ambitious desires of some, and so to make the Commonweal subject unto the desire and pleasure of some few? For why, it is to be feared lest that they who can never satisfy their immoderate desires with the multitude of offices and public charges, but had rather to burst at the table of ambition, than in time to withdraw themselves: It is (I say) to be feared lest some hungry fellows shall at length say unto them, Departed you hence; or if they will not so do, pluck them away by force, not without their own dangers, and troubling of the quiet estate of the Commonweal. At the assemblies of the estates of Rome into the place called Campus 
Old m●…n in danger to be thrust off the bridges.  Martius, for the choosing of their chief magistrates, and other their great officers, certain narrow bridges were in divers places laid for the citizens to pass over by, that so the little tables wherein their voices were contained, might the better be of them received: at which time such as were threescore years old, were still warned to give place, and not to come to give their voices, lest haply they might by the multitude of the younger sort be oppressed: and not for that such old men were cast headlong from off the bridges into the river, as some have thought. But how much more seemly were it for them which have quietly of long enjoyed the great offices and preferments in the Commonweal, and which are now grown old therein, sweetly to retire themselves out of those high places, than violently to be thrust out by others? especially considering that there is no place more slippery or dangerous, than are the places of honour and command. Besides that (which worse is) such ambitious men in their falling draw after them the fall of many others also, together with the ruin of the whole 
Ambitious men never satisfied with honours, oftentimes the cause of great troubles in a Commonweal.  Commonweal▪ as did Marius, who having passed through all the degrees of honour, and been six times Consul (which never Roman had been before him) yet not so content, would needs take upon him the charge of the wars against king Mithridates (which by lot was fallen unto Sylla) howbeit that he was now grown extreme old, to the intent to obtain the seventh Consulship, and to continued a perpetual commanding power unto himself. But Sylla understanding of the commission given to Marius, and of the authority by a tumultuous assembly of the people taken from him now absent (and having also an army with him) contrary unto the law and the custom of their ancestors, strait way returned to Rome with his partakers, seized upon the city, where he made a most horrible massacre; which afterwards in such sort continued, as that all Italy and Spain was imbrued with blood, not only the captains and chief commanders of Marius his faction being by Sylla slain, but even his companions, friends, and kinsmen also, being most shamefully proscribed, or else banished, and so the Popular estate brought unto an extreme tyranny. So even for the same occasion three hundred years before, the Popular estate was there changed into a faction of an oligarchy; not for having of offices in perpetuity for term of life, but only for having continued the charge unto the Decemuiri, or ten Commissioners, for two years together; men appointed for the reforming and amending of the laws, who would have so continued the third year also, and by force of arms still maintained their commission, encroaching upon the liberty of the people, had they not by force of arms (though not without great danger of the state) been again removed.  
So by the same means many Popular and Aristocratique estates were changed into 
Continuation of great offices oftentimes the cause of the change of the estate.  Monarchies, or at leastwise into tyrannical governments; for having given the public charges and commissions unto their magistrates or commissioners, for longer time than was needful, or for proroguing of them longer than by the law they should; as to Pisistratus in Athens, to Philon in the city of Argos, to Cypselus in Corinth, to Dionysius at Syracuse, to Panaetius at Leontium, and to Caesar at Rome. Which Aemylius Mamercus the Dictator foreseeing, presented a request unto the people, which passed into the force of a law, whereby it was ordained, That the Censors power from that time forward should continued but for eighteen months, which before was established for five years: and the next day after that he was created Dictator, deposed himself of his Dictatorship, being not willing to hold it more than one day; giving this reason unto the people of his so doing, Vt scitas quàm mihi diuturna imperia non placeant, That you may know (said he) how little long lasting authority and power please me. And for the same occasion the law Cornelia, published at the instance of one of the Tribunes of the people, provided, That it should not be lawful for any man to seek to have one and the same office more than once in ten years. Neither miss it much but that Gabinius the Tribune had by the Senators themselves been slain in the full Senate, for having by his request made unto the people, procured commission for five years together to be granted unto Pompey, for the ending of the Piratical war: Whereof Dion giveth a notable reason, For that (saith he) the nature of man is such, as that a man having for long time borne some honourable charge, commonly hath all other men in contempt and disdain, neither can well endure to live in subjection after he hath for a long time commanded. Which thing Cassiodorus almost in the same sense writeth, Antiquitas, provinciarum dignitatem voluit annua successione reparari, ut nec diutina potestate unus in solesceret, & multorum provectus gaudia reperiret, Antiquity (saith he) would the honour of the provinces to be repaired with annual succession, in such sort as that one man should neither grow insolent with long power, and preferment be a comfort to many. And haply it was not one of the lest causes that the Assyrian and Persian empires stood so long, for that they every year changed their lieutenants and generals.  
But how then cometh it to pass, that even children by way of complaint sue to 
Great inconveniences ensuing by making of offices and dignities hereditary.  be maintained and kept in the possession of the honours and estates that their fathers and grandfathers had? As in fact hath been seen in the constables of campaign, of Normandy, and of Britain: in the marshal's De la Foy, as they term them, in the great chamberlains, and other infinite, even unto the sergeants sees of Normandy, as I have before noted. And namely in Anjou, Touraine, and main, the house of Roches had made the offices of bailiffs and stewards hereditary, had not jews the ninth revoked them, and made them mutable and iusticiable, by his decree in the year 1256. The like is done in Principalities, Dukedoms, Marquisats, and Earldoms, which now are had in perpetuity, which before were holden but by way of commission, and that during the prince's pleasure, which at the first were but annual, but afterwards perpetual: and at last by the favour of our kings are become hereditary. Howbeit that other people also as well as we, have in the same error offended. So that there is almost no place in all Europe (except in England) where offices and dignities are not now hereditary, in such sort as that commanding power and authority, with the administration of justice, is by right of succession fallen even unto women and children, and so of a thing public made particular, and to be sold to him that will give most, as it must needs be, being once brought into the form of a patrimony, which hath given occasion more boldly to truck all estates and offices, when as men see by the laws and customs even sacred justice itself profaned, and set to sale to him that will give most: Of which inconveniences is proceeded the evil custom of making of all estates and offices perpetual. For one should do injury to take an office from a merchant, and not restore unto him again the money that he paid for it. Thus we see the dangers and absurdities one of them as it were linked in another, by the making of the estates and offices of the Commonweal perpetual. Besides which reasons by me alleged, we have also the authority of the greatest Law makers, Philosophers, and Lawyers, as also the examples of almost all the auntienr Commonweals; as namely, of the Athenians, the Romans, the Celtes, and others infinite, who have flourished, and do yet flourish in divers places of Italy, Switzerland, and Germany, as also the authority of Sir Thomas Moor, chancellor of England, who in the Commonweal by him devised, maketh all the magistrates and officers therein annual, some from six monethis to six months, and othersome from two months to two months, and all to avoid the inconveniences which I have before spoke of. And these reasons they for most part use, which say, That magistrates and officers should not be in a Commonweal perpetual.  
But now on the other side, they which maintain it to be more for the public 
The great inconveniences ensuing of having the offices in a Commonweal still annual or changeable.  good, to make the estates and offices in a Commonweal perpetual, allege, That nothing can be well done in a years space, when as the magistrate must departed out of his charge before he well know his duty; and having begun to understand what belongeth unto his place, must yet forthwith leave the same unto a new man; and so he likewise unto another, all still new men; so that the Commonweal is still to fall into the hands of unsufficient men, and such as want experience. But suppose that the prince or the people, or they which have the choice of the magistrates, commit not the public charge but unto men known to be of good experience, yet seeing so many holy days, days not judicial, vacations, days of election, and of triumph, as take up a great part of the years, as well the public as men's private actions must therewith needs be troubled, wars begun be delayed, judgements interrupted, actions of the wicked abolished, punishments deferred, & in brief the Commonweal in the greatest dangers thereof to be abandoned. Whereof we have a million of examples in all histories, both of the Greeks', and of the Latins, which had their offices annual. And it hath oftentimes happened, that the magistrates and captains having charge to make & perform some war, were upon a sudden called home again, and so all was at a stay: as it happened when question was for the sending of one to succeed Scipio Africanus, the people, the Senate, and the magistrates, found themselves therewith greatly entangled; Mutis (saith Livy) contentionibus & in Senatu, & ad populum acta res est: postremò eò deducta ut Senatui permitterent: patres igitur iurati (sic enim convenerat) censuerunt ut consuls provincias inter se compararent, The matter (saith he) was with great contention debated, both in the Senate, and before the people; at length it was brought to that point, as that the people committed it unto the Senate: wherefore the Senators being sworn (for so it was agreed) determined, That the Consuls should divide the provinces betwixt them. Which was a great novelty to swear the Senate thereunto. But Scipio understanding of the decree of the Senate, whereby one of the Consuls was forthwith to succeed him, without farther delay concluded a peace, more to the advantage of the enemy than he would otherwise have done, if he had not feared lest his successor should have carried away from him the glory and honour of his victory, as it is reported himself to have oftentimes said. So the war against king Mithridates was protracted above twenty years, by reason of the continual changing of the Roman Generals, the enemy in the mean while (many fair opportunities by him offered, and by the Romans neglected) far and wide extending his dominion and empire. Yea sometimes the General was to give up his charge, when he was even upon the point to join battle with the enemy, although he had none appointed to succeed him: as it happened unto the great captains Epaminondas and Pelopidas, whose charge expired even at such time as they were to give the enemy battle: who yet nevertheless seeing themselves to have an advantage of the enemy, and that they could not without the most manifest danger of the state leave their charge, gave battle, and so obtained a most glorious victory, whereby the Thebans with their allies were preserved, and the Lacedæmonians with a great slaughter overthrown. But returning home, in stead of thanks and triumph, they were both accused of high treason, for that they had holden their charge longer than the time by the law appointed, & so brought unto their trial and convicted, were by the commissioners condemned to die: howbeit that they were afterwards by the people pardoned. Now who knoweth not how many strong places have been taken by the enemy, for changing of their captains? how many cities and towns have been forced, for having put into them new governors? and especially at such time as the enemy was nigh, & ready to besiege the same: as oftentimes it cometh to pass, that the favourites carrying away the honour, the old expert captains are excluded, who right often in revenge thereof either go over unto the enemy, or else otherwise disfurnish the place of victuals, and other things necessary.  
And yet there is another reason which might well stay the preferments and offices of the commonweal from being mutable, which reason Tiberius the emperor had 
The reason why Tiberius the Emperor would not have the great officers often changed.  still in his mouth, at such time as men complained him to be the first that had for many years together continued the estates and offices still in the same men's hands: I do it (said he) to the end that they which are already full of the blood of the people, may as Horseleeches, full and ready to burst, give the subjects some release, fearing jest such as should come new & all an hungered, should without remorse or respect at all, draw out the rest of their blood, gnaw their bones, and suck out the very marrow that was yet left in the subjects. And this unto me seemeth to be a reason of right great importance: for it is an old and true saying, Non parcit populis regnum breve, a short reign spareth not the people. And yet in the reign of Tiberius, offices and other places of command, were usually given and not sold; obtained, but not craved, upon men of desert bestowed, and not shamefully set to sale to them that would give most: which opinion of Tiberius aught to be of much more force in such places as where port sale is made of all preferments and offices of the common weal: for it is to be presumed (as saith Alexander Severus the emperor, & after him jews the 12) that the merchants of offices must sell by retail, & as dear as they can, that which they had before bought in gross.  
And beside that which we have already said, how is it possible that he should command with such authority as beseemeth a magistrate, which seethe that by and by after he shall but stand for a cipher (as they say) without any authority or power at all? who shall obey him? who shall fear him? who shall do his commands? whereas to the contrary, if the magistrates power be perpetual, he shall command with dignity, he shall boldly oppose himself against the wicked, and give aid and secure unto the good: he shall revenge the wrong done unto the oppressed, and resist the violence of tyrants, and that without fear or misdoubt of being thrust out, or despoiled of his dignity and office, as hath been seen by some even of the greatest princes, astonished with the constancy & immutable assurance of the magistrates, not having what to reprove him for: neither yet daring to displace them, fearing also the discontentment of their subjects, unto whom the brightness of justice and virtue is always redoubtable, and the integrity of valiant and courageous men right commendable.  
In brief, if we would have (as all men aught to wish to have) magistrates wise, stout, and well experimented in the charge committed unto them, we must wish them to be perpetual: for why it is impossible that new magistrates should be expert in their charge the first year, considering that the life of man is right short, and the nature of authority and power most difficult, whether it be for the training up of the subjects in wars, or for the maintaining of them in peace; for the administration of justice, or for the managing of the public revenues: all which cannot in short time of new magistrates be either thoroughly learned, or duly practised. For as the ruin of families commonly cometh of new servitors, even so the falls of Commonweals also proceedeth from 
New lords new laws.  new magistrates, who still bring in new devices, counsels, laws, factions, customs, edicts, styles, judgements, ceremonies, actions, and in brief a new change of all things in the Commonweal; whereof ensueth a contempt of the old laws & customs, as also of the magistrates themselves. All which may well be seen in the ancient Commonweals of of the Greeks & Romans, wherein the new magistrates were no sooner placed, but they forthwith forged new edicts & laws, so to 'cause themselves to be the more spoken of; without regard whether they were profitable for the Commonweal or not: propounding only this unto themselves, how to leave a remembrance of their names unto posterity: whereas men so sick of ambition, are still more desirous of a great than of a good name. Howbeit that it is not needful to use many arguments to prove & show as it were unto the sight of the eye, that the magistrates and officers aught to be perpetual, seeing that we have the law of God, which cannot be so bound unto places or persons, but that a man therefrom may well draw an example to imitate and follow. Now it is not found, that the magistrates and officers established in the law of God were annual: neither is it found, that they which were once provided of honourable places and preferments in the Commonweal, were ever after again removed to give place unto new magistrates, and so to yield unto ambition that which is to virtue due. So we found also, that Plato would that the offices in his Commonweal should still for the most part be perpetual. So that in brief we see the reasons by us alleged, to be by the sacred scriptures, as also by long experience and tract of time confirmed, not by the example of small Commonweals, but even of the greatest and most flourishing monarchies and kingdoms that now are, or ever were in the whole world, as were those of the Assyrians, the Persians', the Egyptians, the Parthians, the Aethiopians, the Turks, the Tartars, the Moscovites, the Polonians, the Germane, the French men, the Danes, the sweden, the Englishmen, the Scots, the Spaniards, the Italians; excepting some few Commonweals, which are still turmoiled with the continual changing of their Magistrates, and perpetual floods of sedition and discord for the shortness of their offices.  
Now it is not like so many people and nations to have failed of the light of nature, of judgement, of reason, & experience, seeing their estate so wisely managed, and to have so long flourished both in time of peace and war: which could in no wise so long have stood, had their mutable magistrates been every moment to have been anew chosen. And thus we see the reasons both of the one side and of the other, which might move some to make their magistrates perpetual, as some others also to make them annual. Unto which reasons sometime are joined such flourishes of eloquence, as might at the first well dasse the eyes not only of the ignorant, but even of the sharpest witted also, to hear the reasons of the one side, without giving of ear unto the reasons of the other, which are hereby us indifferently set down, that every man might suspend his judgement, until that every thing were in equal balance well weighed▪  
But as men oftentimes err in the maintaining of the societies of men▪ and government 
Two great errors oftentimes committed in the government of Commonweals.  of cities and Commonweals; so do they in two notable things also especially: whereof the one is, That they too narrowly look into the inconveniences of a law, without weighing of the good that ensueth thereof: the other, That they run from one extreme into another; and so as it were shunning the water, run all headlong into the fire, when as they should have stayed in the midst. Plato would, that the magistrates in his Commonweal should be all perpetual: which extremity seemed unto Aristotle blameworthy, who therefore running himself into the other extremity, and rejecting the opinion of his master Plato, opened a way unto all the citizens, to all the honours and preferments of his Commonweal, saying, That otherwise to do, were to kindle the fire of sedition in the whole estate: whereas yet neither the one nor the other of them hath made any distinction at all of Commonweals, whereof the resolution of this question especially dependeth. And we have seen even in this our time one* of the greatest persons of this realm, and the chief man of his cote, who having 
Michael hospitalis chancellor of France.  embraced the opinion of Aristotle, hath endeavoured himself by all means to change all the offices into commissions, to be holden but by sufferance: who never had other thing in his mouth, and yet without any distinction in what form of Commonweal this change were, without harm to be received.  
Now most certain it is, that Commonweals in nature contrary, are by contrary 
Commonweals in nature contrary, by contrary means to be also maintained.  laws and means to be also governed and maintained (as we have oftentimes before said, and yet must often times say) so that the rules and orders proper to maintain and preserve Popular estates, serve to the ready ruin and overthrow of Monarchies and sole governments. The Popular estates are maintained by 
Annual magistrates best in a popular Commonweal.  continual change of officers, to the end that every man according to his quality might have part in the offices, according as they have part in the sovereignty, which can in no wise be where offices be given in perpetuity. Besides that equality the nurse of Popular estates is by the annual succession of magistrates the better maintained, and the long custom of continual command give not an appetite or desire to some one or other ambition's citizen to aspire unto the sovereignty alone. Whereas to the contrary in Monarchies it is not necessary, not nor yet wholesome, that subjects having no interest in the sovereignty, should be nourished in ambition, it being sufficient for them to learn to be dutiful and obedient unto their sovereign prince, and especially if the Monarchy be Lordlike or Tyrannical: For that the subjects in the one be the princes natural slaves, and in the other the tyrant's slaves by force, it should be a thing impossible for such a Lordlike Monarch, or tyrant to hold their estates, and to give such yearly or successive commanding power unto their subjects. 
The policy and craft of tyrants.  And therefore tyrants, who are no less hated and feared of their subjects, than they themselves fear and hate them, having little or no trust or confidence in them, for most part guard themselves with strangers only, and some few of their own subjects, such as they know to be unto themselves most loyal and faithful, unto whom they commit the custody and guard of their own persons, of their estates, of their forces, and of their wealth, without any desire at all to change them, not only for that they distrust others, but also for that they would not acquaint them with the sweetness of power and command, lest so some one or other of them therewith inflamed, should be desirous to dispatch the tyrant of his life, so to obtain his place: or else otherwise in so doing to gratify the subjects. Whereas the Lordlike Monarch whom his subjects more willingly obey as his natural slaves, is not so much hindered or letted from the choice of his magistrates and officers, as is the tyrant, who is not but by force and constraint obeyed of his subjects; and therefore giveth not the preferments or offices of his estates in perpetuity, neither yet maketh them annual; but only bestoweth them as he seethe good, and that for so long as pleaseth him, dividing them amongst many at his good pleasure, without any law or decree therefore, all depending of his will and pleasure.  
But the Royal Monarch, who is in such sort to entreat his subjects, as is the good father 
The magistrates in a royal monarchy some perpetual and some annual.  his loving children, albeit that he be no more bound unto man's laws, than are the other monarchs, yet will he nevertheless of himself establish decrees and laws, for the placing and displacing of magistrates and officers, to the end they might so be holden; dividing the honours and rewards of virtue not to all indifferently, without discretion, but unto such as deserve the same; having still more respect unto the experience and virtue, than unto the grace and favour of them who are unto him most of all commended. And yet for all that, shall in all things observe and keep the commendable mediocrity, in such sort, as that he shall make many offices perpetual, and some changeable also from three years to three years; and othersome to be every year also changed; as namely the precedents of the parliaments, of the finances or common receipt, or governors of provinces, who could never otherwise be punished for their oppression and misdemeanour, if they had their such great authority and power in the estate and Commonweal still in perpetuity. He shall also divide the honours and p●…efermentss of the state, unto the richer and nobler sort, albeit that they be not men of so great experience as are some of the poorer and base sort, so to prevent stirs and seditions: yet for all that provided always, that unto them which of themselves are not of sufficient capacity be still associate men of good experience in their charge, so to cover and supply the defect of the others: And yet is not so bound, unto his own laws, but in case of necessity he may again displace them whom he hath before ordained to be perpetual magistrates, finding them of whom he hath so evil made choice, for the weakness of their minds or bodies, to be altogether insufficient for the public charge to be by them sustained, or for to cover the shame of them which are so insufficient, shall give them some honest means to discharge themselves of such their charge: as did the most wise emperor Augustus unto a great number of the Senators, who unworthy of their so honourable places, by that mean cleanly displaced themselves, without any force or stir; or at leastwise shall appoint them deputies for the executing of their charge: yet in the mean time suffering the magistrates and officers themselves, to enjoy still their titles of their offices, and wonted privileges. And to the intent that justice, the principal and chief ground of an estate 
That the colleges and companies of judges aught to be pe●…tuall.  or Commonweal may be the more religiously distributed, he shall for the administration thereof appoint perpetual colleges and companies of judges, and especially of such as are without appeal to judge of the lives, fame, and goods of the subjects: not only that these judges should so be the better experimented (as well for hearing the opinion of divers, as for their long exercise in judgement:) but also that so their several power might be in some sort weakened (for fear they should abuse the same) and that so being many of like authority and power, they should not so easily be corrupted: not unlike to a great deal of water which is more hardly corrupted than is a little. For as Pliny saith: Nemo omnes, neminem omnes unquam fefellerunt: meliùs omnibus quàm singulis creditur. No man ever deceived all men, neither did all m●…n ever deceive any man: better it is to believe all than one. Howbeit, yet that by the wisdom and virtue of some one good judge, a whole company, or bench of judges of the same court is oftentimes relieved: and their factions and secret practices broken; or being otherwise good men, yet misse-enformed by false accusers and petty foggers, cannot know or understand the truth: but are by the wisdom of some one of their company the better informed. As I have known one judge alone to have caused the whole company of judges to change their opinion, being before resolved and set down to have put a poor innocent woman to death: whom yet for all that he by most pregnant and lively reasons clearly and fully acquitted of that she was in danger to have been condemned for. Who therefore well deserveth to be named: and was Potier a learned judge of great integrity and virtue: who hath left unto his country his two sons inheritors of their father's virtues: one of them Master of the Requests: and the other, Secretary of the Finances; in virtue not inferior unto their father. Besides that, the experience of many worlds of years hath given us sufficiently to understand many judges, by conferring their opinions together, to give thereby a better and sounder judgement, than where they judge every one of them apart. Howbeit that Aristotle thinketh it better to have every judges opinion considered of apart by itself: and that he saith to have been the usual manner of judgement in many the cities of the Greeks. Now the Romans to have holden both these fashions and manners of judgements Asconius Paedianus is the Author, where he saith: Aliam esse rationem cum universi judices constituunt, aliam cum singuli sententiam ferunt, It to be one manner of proceeding when all the judges together determine of a matter, and another when every one of them deliver their opinions apart. Wherhfore causes are more indifferently and uprightly decided in Europe by a competent number of judges together: then by several judges in Asia and Africa, whereas one particular 
Better many judges then one alone.  judge of a Province according to his will and pleasure determineth of all appeals made unto him from the other particular and inferiout judges in that province. And albeit that in Grand Cairo (one of the greatest cities of the world) there be four judges which have their divers and separate jurisdictions, and every one of them have also their divers Deputies, who judge also of causes apart and by themselves, yet are the appeals still brought unto the first judge chief of the four; who alone without any companion or assistant by himself at his pleasure discideth all appeals: whom it is no great matter for him to win, that standeth in his good grace, or that hath the greatest presents to give him. Howbeit that the two Cadeleschers are the chief of all the judges, and may at their pleasure place or displace any of the rest of the judges, yea and all of them together also so long as it shall please the Grand Seignor▪ For why amongst the Turks all power and command is but by sufferance and during pleasure both given and received.  
Now we have before said that in the royal Monarchy all the Magistrates and Officers 
Good that inferior Magistrates & officers should be perpetual.  should neither be perpetual, neither all still mutable: For that it is not needful to change the mean officers, as Clarks, Sergeants, Ushers, Notaries, and such other like, who for that they have no power or authority to command, cannot hurt the Estate: and yet nevertheless the experience of their charge which cannot but in long time and by great practice be got, requireth that they should be perpetual. And so might a man say of other inferior officers also, being still subject unto the power and authority of the greater, but cannot yet often times be changed without the great hurt of the Commonweal, and many private men's hindrance. The Senators and Councelours of estate also, whose dexterity for the managing of the great affairs of the Commonweal is not but by long experience to be gotten; we see them to have 
That Senators and Counsellors of estate aught to be stìll perpetual.  been in Rome, in Lacedemonia, and amongst the Areopagis in Athens, perpetual: and so I think they aught to be every where else, so that in the perpetual change of mutable magistrates, the Senate should still be constant, firm, and immutable, and that upon it the other mutable offices and magistrates should as upon a most sure slay rest: which was not so well provided for by * Plato, who would have his Senate to be 
Lib. de Legibus Cap. 174.  every year by lot chosen. But now as for such great magistrates and officers as acknowledge no command more than the sovereign Princes alone, whither it be in martial affairs, the administration of justice, or the charge of the public receipt if the royal Monarch shall keep them but one, two, or three years in their charge at the most, he shall so leave open a way unto his justice, for the examining of their actions, and by the same means shall 'cause the wicked and corrupt magistrates to quake, standing always in dread to be called to give an account of their doings. And for that Magistrates and Officers are not to be changed all at once (for that all sudden changes in a Commonweal are dangerous) and that the public actions be not interrupted, the change of such great Magistrates as are in corporations and colleges together is to be made by the succeeding of them one of them unto an other: as they do in the Commonweal of Rhaguse, where the Senate is perpetual, and the Senators who are also sovereign judges, are not but every one of them one year in charge: who yet change not all at once, but successively, and as it were insensibly; and in their turn after that they have for a certain time lived as private men, return more fresh unto the same charge again.  
But yet generally in every Commonweal this rule hath always place without exception, 
A general and necessary rule to be kept in every Commonweal.  viz. That the perpetual Magistrates & Officers should have either no power at all, or else very little power to command, or else some companion joined with them: and that they to whom great power is given, have the same but for a short time, and by the law limited to some few months or years. By which tempering and moderation of power and command, the difficulties and dangers shall cease, which might otherwise ensue by the sudden change of all the Magistrates at once, for the interruption of public actions. Neither need we so to fear jest the Commonweal should be without Magistrates, as a ship without a master to govern the same: as it often times chanced in Rome, for the suit of the magistrates, who one of them hindered an other, or else the same day entered all into their charge, as they all at one and at the self same instant departed out of the same together. Neither need we to fear also jest the wicked by bribery mounted unto the more high degrees of honour, should escape uncorrected: or that the ignorant or unskilful should carry away the preferments of the estate and Commonweal: they which before had charge, having for certain years rested themselves, still returning again with much greater experience than before. Now they which wish for annual Magistrates, annual Senators, annual powers and commands, foresee not that (beside the difficulties and dangers by us before alleged to ensure thereof) by this means either rude artificers or such like ignorant and unskilful men, must be called unto such public charges as they are never able to discharge, or else that the Commonweal must needs be full of most wise men, and such as are of greatest experience and knowledge. Howbeit that cannot by nature be, that all men can do all things: whereas we see particular men scarcely well to discharge their particular charges; and in other some to rest great wisdom, who yet have no skill in government at all. But in doing that which we have said there shall not easily any default fall out, neither shall the subjects have any just cause whereof to complain; the rewards of honour being so exposed to every man's sight, as the mark whereat every one should aim, though few there be which hit the same, and the fewer officers and rewards there should be, and the dearer that they were prized, the more they should be of all desired: when as every man should for his virtue be called upon, and that there should be no cause of sedition, no man being excluded from the merit and reward of his virtue and sufficiency, so that the causes of sedition so taken away, the subjects may still live in all peace and tranquility. And if need be we may use Commissioners or Syndiques, as they did in the time of jews the ix, and Philip the fair, for the chastising of the officers, and the calling of them to accounted.  
Now some difficulties concerning the changing of Magistrates and Laws are by us before set down, and more I suppose will be imagined: yet were it unreasonable to look into the discommodities of a law (and so for the same to reject it) without consideration 
No law so good but that it draweth after it some discommodity.  also of the profits thereof, seeing that there is no law so good (as saith C●…o the Censor) which draweth not after it some incommodities. And in mine opinion that law may always be accounted good and profitable, if the good which may ensue 
That a good law is not to be changed for some one discommodity ensuing thereof.  thereof be manifest, and greater than the harm that is to be feared thereof: wherein many often times offend, which think it impossible to have all discommodities quite taken out of the laws, the Commonweal yet nevertheless still standing in safety, 
Dangerous to change all the chief magistrates of a Commonweal at once.  but so falling into such dangers as they before thought not of, strait ways blame the laws, and often times change the same, when as in truth they should have accused & changed themselves. So some good Princes evil advised often times to their harm cancel a good Law for some one incommodity they have seen therein▪ Whereof we will use no other example then that of jews the xj, who coming to the Crown at once displaced all his father's ancient servitors, and removed also the princes his nigh kinsmen from the government of the state: who therefore with a wonderful consent conspired with the enemy against him, and brought him to such a straight, as that they had almost struck the crown from his head, and by force wrested the royal sceptre out of his hands. But these stirs again quieted, and all things well pacified and set in order, fearing jest his son should fall into the like danger, charged him never to change them whom he had advanced; and yet not so contented, made a law, whereby he decreed all offices to be perpetual; and that such as were once preferred thereunto, should not be again displaced, otherwise then by resignation, death, or forfeiture: And by an other Edict declaring the former, published the xx. of September in the year 1482 decreed, That no officers having forfeited their offices, for what cause soever, should be enforced to yield up their offices, except it were so before adjudged, and the parties condemned. Which edict he commanded to stand in force, not only whilst he himself yet lived, but also during the reign of his son Charles. And albeit that he could not so bind the hands of his successor, yet so it is nevertheless, that this his decree & law hath ever since been inviolably kept, although the ancient clause, So long as it shall please us, remain still in all letters of office. Which words declare no perpetual power to be given unto the magistrates or officers, but by sufferance only, except by law or custom it be otherwise provided. Yet still remaineth that idle clause, that thereby it may be understood, all power and authority to have in ancient times been given by our kings during their pleasure, and so to have of the magistrates been holden but by sufferance only. And albeit that in the reign of Philip the Fair this string was again touched, for the giving of offices in perpetuity, yet for all that the matter still rested undecided. But Philip Valois revoked the commissions, and ordained, That from that time forward the royal offices should be perpetual; which well declareth them before to have been mutable at the pleasure of the kings, albeit that the officers had not forfeited them. And amongst those praises which they give unto king Robert, one of the greatest is, That he never displaced officer, if he had not for some foul and infamous fact before forfeited his office. Whereby it is to be gathered, king Robert his ancestors to have used other laws and customs.  
But yet haply it may seem unto some, that if offices should still be given with that clause, During the Prince's pleasure, the magistrates would better discharge their charges for the hope they should have by this mean to continued still in their places, proceeding still from better to better, and bearing themselves uprightly, for fear otherwise to be displaced. Whereunto I agreed, in a well ordered Lordly Monarchy: but the danger should be greater to open such a gap under a prince on every side beset with flatterers, and compassed in with clawbacks: For why, every man seethe, that princes so beset, must either make a most filthy gain and traffic of their offices, or else take such places and power to command, from good men, who almost always have the courtier's life (polluted with all manner of vices) in hatred and detestation. Besides that 
That offices in a royal Monarchy are rather to be bestowed by order of law, than by the Princes will & pleasure only.  this bestowing of offices during pleasure, savoureth somewhat of tyranny, or of a Lordlike government, rather than of a Royal Monarchy; which (so much as possible is) should by laws, and not by the princes will and pleasure only be governed: So as many a Lordly Monarchy, where the subjects being natural slaves adore and fear their sovereign prince, as a god come down from heaven, accounting his commands as the laws of nature itself. Whereas in a Royal Monarchy, where the subjects are as children, it is needful to rule and govern all things by law, as much as possible may be: for otherwise if the king shall without cause exclude some one more than some other from some office or preferment, he that should be so excluded should hold himself injured, and so rest discontented with his prince; who aught rather to be beloved than feared of his subjects: which to be, he aught to take away all occasion of discontentment that men might have against him; and better means is there none, than to leave all that may be to the disposition of the laws and customs, no man so having just cause to complain of the prince.  
The learned Budeus who was of opinion that it were best to have the magistrates and offices still changeable, without having regard unto the law made by jews the xi. hath holden, That in ancient time the Precedents and counsellors of the parliament of Paris were but annual: and that the solemn oath which they still take the 12. day of november, and the letters patents which they still are to have from the king for the opening of the Parliament, show sufficiently that their estates were not perpetual, but still at the pleasure of the prince to be revoked, and so to be by them holden but by sufferance: and so by these reasons drew many to be of the same opinion with him, who 
The erection of the parliament of Paris.  had they but turned over the records of the court, and of the chamber of accounts, they should have found that that Parliament which before was ambulatory & movable, and which had no power but by commission, was by Philip the long ordained to be an ordinary Court, with ordinary power, circuit, and jurisdiction; in the erection whereof was expressed that it should still have therein one or two Precedents, of whom the first was the Earl of Burgundy the kings nigh kinsman, as in like sort the Precedent in the Imperial chamber, is always one of the princes of the Empire. And so for a long time also the Precedent of the court of Paris was still a martial man and not a gown man as he now is: and even yet at this present the Great Praetor of the court of Paris, whom we call the chief Precedent, is still honoured with the quality and title of a martial man, as of a knight, or as the Latins call it Miles, or a soldier, although he never drew sword: which title the other judges of that court have not, who then were but three score, but now are an hundred and fifty. Whereby it is plain the court of Paris so founded to have an ordinary and perpetual power, neither to have need of the Princes annual rescripts, or letters patents for the disciding and determining of controversies. Howbeit that king Henry the second coming into the Parliament for the publishing of certain Edicts and laws, which in that court could hardly found passage (having it put into his mouth by certain flatterers) said openly, That the Parliament had at all no power, if it pleased not him by sending of his letters Patents every year to give opening unto the same; which his speech astonished many. But certain it is that the letters patents which are sent to this end, and the annual oath which the Precedents and Councelours take, is but a matter of formality and custom, necessary at such time as the parliaments were not holden but by commission: But afterwards that they were erected into the form of ordinary courts, such ancient solemnities are no more necessary: for why the annual Magistrates are to take an annual oath; whereas they which are perpetual Magistrates are to take it but once for all, without any needless reiteration of the same. So the continual Roman Magistrates every year took their oath, for that their power was but annual: whereas the Senators took it but once for all, for that their dignity was perpetual and during the whole time of their lives. The same might be said of the form of the commissions and decrees of that court, conceived under the name and seal of the king, and namely of the letters missive of the court: which although they be conceived in the name of the court, are yet nevertheless sealed with the little royal seal with the flower-de-luce: howbeit that all the other magistrates, seneschals, bailiefes, provosts, and governors of countries, having power of ordinary command or by commission, direct the same under their own names, and their own seals; which is yet retained of the ancient form, ever since that the parliament was but the king's privy council, which council for that it had no ordinary power, did nothing of itself, and the commissions are always granted in the name of the king, as having the only power to command in his council, as we have before showed. Which form hath been ever since followed in the erection of other parliaments, even unto the court of Aides, who give out all their commissions, under the king's name●… which hath moved some to say, That the parliaments have nothing but an extraordinary power by way of commission only. Howbeit that it sufficiently appeareth by that which is by us before said, them to have an ordinary and perpetual power, which they still hold the king being dead: Which if it were but a power holden upon sufferance, (as some would have it) it should then together with the death of the king take end, as all other powers and commissions else do. But these courts and the ordinary magistrates thereof, the king being dead neither change their attire, nor use any mourning garments, or other signs of sorrow: yea that more is, the first confirmations of the new king are always granted unto the Courts of Parliament; as hath been always used since the time of jews the eleventh, in such sort as that their power is not only ordinary, but perpetual also, not only in the whole bodies of themselves, but even in every one of the members, officers, and ministers of the said Courts of Parliament. 
The giving of offices during the prince's pleasure not to be discommended.   
And yet for all that is not the manner of those Princes to be discommended, who unto their Officers and Magistrates give their power but by sufferance, which they (if cause be) at their pleasure again take from them, as the kings of England have used to do. For albeit that the ancient and modern Commonweals, especially the Popular and Aristocratique (more straightly bound unto the laws than are Monarchies) have their Magistrates and officers for the most part annual, and that none of them was again displaced, without just cause why; yet so it was for all that, that the people sometimes revoked their former choice made, and placed some others whom they knew to be more fit for the charge they were to undergo: as it did in establishing the Dictator's and others their Captains and Governors, revoking sometimes (as I say) even their ordinary magistrates; as it did Octacilius the Consul, who at the request of Fabius Maximus was removed from his charge, as a man not sufficient for the managing of so great and dangerous a war as the State had then in hand. Neither had they for the removing of their magistrate, regard only if he had in any thing trespassed, and so deserved to be removed; but even unto the insufficiency of him also, whither it were known or unknown when they received him into the Estate, or that it were befallen him afterwards; deeming also weakness, or age, madness, or other like diseases, such as let and hinder men's reasonable actions, to be sufficient also to displace them from their offices. And namely Lucius Torquatus chosen the third time Consul excused himself before the people for the infirmity of his eyes; saying, That it was not reason to put the government of the Commonweal into his hands, who could not see but by other men's eyes. But OH how many are there of the blind, deaf, and dumb, not having in themselves any light of nature, neither wisdom, nor experience so much as to govern themselves, who are not yet content to guide the sails and tackles, but desire also to lay hands even upon the very helm also of the Commonweal?  
Now that which we have said concerning the mean that aught to be kept in the change and continuation of Magistrates and Officers, hath not only place in royal Monarchies, but even in Popular and Aristocratique estates also, where the offices 
That in every commonweal there aught to be some estates and magistrates perpepetuall.  almost all, or for the most part, aught to be every year, or from two years to two years still mutable: as they do among the Swissers, and divers other Commonweals. Yet nevertheless for the preservation of the same, there must still be some estates in the Commonweal perpetual: as namely those whose experience and wisdom is always necessary for the stay of the rest, such as be the Councillors of estate: And this is it, for which the Senate in Rome, in Athens, and in Lacedemonia, was still perpetual. And why, the Senators still during their lives held their charge and places: for as the hooks and hinges whereupon great burdens rest, must of themselves be strong and unmovable; even so the Senate of the Areopagis, and of other Commonweals also, were as most strong and sure hinges, whereupon as well all the mutable officers as the whole weight of the Estate and Commonweal rested & reposed themselves. The contrary whereof is to be done in Monarchies, wherein the greater part, and almost all the estates aught to be perpetual, except some few of the chief and principal: as they do in the kingdom of Spain, where they well know how to keep this mediocrity or mean proper unto the royal estate. And so for the same cause the Venetians which have an Aristocratique estate, make their officers every year changeable, and some of them from two months to two months; and yet nevertheless have their Duke, the Procurators of S. Mark, the chancellor, and four Secretaries for the Estate, perpetual; which the Florentines ordained in their Estate also (after that they were by jews the xii, delivered from the most cruel tyranny of County Valentinus Borgia) taking order that their Duke should from that time forward be perpetual, to the intent that the Commonweal before in perpetual motion and change of all their estates and offices, might yet have some thing firm and stable whereupon to rest and stay itself: which good order being in short time after by the most turbulent Florentines abolished, they fell again into greater tumuls and civil wars then ever they were in before: whereas if they had had but a perpetual Senate at the lest, and the Senators continued in their charge, (who from six months to six months were still changed and rechaunged) and had but kept a certain mean betwixt these two extremities, of general change, and still continuing of all their offices, their estate had been much the more assured, neither had their Commonweal been still so tossed and turmoiled with so many and so great surges of sedition, and tempests of civil wars. But these things thus by us declared, let us now see also whether in a wise and well ordered Commonweal it be good that the Magistrates should be all at unity, and of one accord among themselves or not?   

CHAP. V ¶ Whether the unity and concord of Magistrates amongst themselves be good and wholesome for the Commonweal, or not?  
THis question, viz. Whether it be good that the magistrates and officers of a Commonweal should be of accord, or else at discord and variance among themselves? may perhaps seem altogether needless and vain. For who ever doubted but that it was always expedient, yea and necessary too, that the Magistrates in every Commonweal 
Reasons to show that magistrates aught to be at un tie and concord among themselves.  should be of one and the same mind? to the end that they all together might with one consent and heart embrace and seek after the public good: And if so it be (as wise men have always thought) that a well ordered Commonweal aught to resemble a man's body, wherein all the members are united and conjoined with a marvelous bond, every one of them doing their office and duty; and yet nevertheless when need is, one of them still aideth another, one of them relieveth another; and so all together strengthen themselves, to maintain the health, beauty, and welfare of the whole body: but if it should happen them to enter into hatred one of them against another; and that the one hand should cut the other, or the right foot supplant the left, and that the fingers should scrape out the eyes, and so every member should draw unto itself the nourishment of the other next unto it; it must needs fall out, that the body in the end must become maimed, lame, and impotent, in all the actions thereof: even so in like manner may a man deem of the estate of a Commonweal, the honour and welfare whereof dependeth of the mutual love and good will of the subjects among themselves, as also toward their sovereign prince. Which sweet unity and agreement how is it to be hoped for, if the magistrates which are the principal subjects▪ and such as aught by their example to bind together the rest, be at variance and discord among themselves? But even to the contrary the subjects shall become partakers of the factions of the magistrates, they first nourishing secret grudges, and afterward open enmity, until that at length all break out into open civil war, all for the maintenance and upholding every one of them of the chief of their factions, to the destruction of the Commonweal: or in case stay be made thereof, and that things fall not out altogether so evil, yet must still public actions by such ambitious discord of the magistrates be hindered, and the Commonweal sore troubled: whereunto it shall happen as it doth unto a maid, for whom (as Plutarch saith) her suitors enter into such a jealousy and passion, as that desiring every one of them to have her to himself, they so in stead of loving and embracing of her, most cruelly rend her in pieces amongst them. And what good success may a man expect of an army, or what victory is to be hoped for over the enemy, where the captains and commanders are at discord among themselves? or what justice is to be looked for, where the judges are divided into factions? Yea it hath been oftentimes seen some of them to have been of contrary opinions and advise unto others, and that upon a very jealousy and hatred they had among themselves, and so play as it were at hazard with the life, the goods, and honour of the subjects: as Agesilaus king of the Lacedæmonians (albeit that he was one of the most famous of them that ever was) to impair the credit and authority of Lysander whom he hated, reversed all his judgements, and gave sentence quite contrary, not so much for the iniquity of the cause (as he himself said) as in despite of him his enemy only. And to make the matter short, most certain it is, that dissensions and civil wars (the capital plagues of Commonweals) take foot, root, increase, and nourishment, of nothing more than of the hatred and enmity of the magistrates among themselves. Whereof it followeth the unity and concord of them among themselves to be unto the subjects not only profitable, but even necessary also. Which may all seem right profitable arguments and reasons for the one side.  
But now they which more subtly reason of these matters, deem to the contrary, 
Contrary reasons to show that it is good for the Commonweal, that magistrates should be at discord and variance among themselves.  the health, and welfare of the Commonweal to be best preserved and kept by the discord of the magistrates. For why (say they) the force and nature of virtue is such, as that it cannot be contrary unto virtue; neither that good men, although they be at never so great odds, can yet be enemies among themselves: but being provoked by the injuries of the wicked their adversaries, do still well the more and more increase and flourish: neither is the valour of worthy men any where more evident and manifest, than when they without bitterness contend among themselves; and so pricked forward with an honest ambition, and inflamed with the heat of men like unto themselves, as with a fire, are by the emulation of their competitors incited to take in hand great matters, and so still to overcome their enemies in well doing. So when Taxilas king of the Indian's had by his ambassadors freely and without resistance offered his kingdom unto Alexander the Great, (then bearing down all the kingdoms of the East before him) if so be he wanted wealth; and withal refused not to receive wealth also at his hands, if he had of it too much: Alexander glad of such a match, said unto him, If we must thus contend and combat together, it shall never be said, that you shall take this point of honour from me, as to be accounted more magnifical, more courteous, or more royal, than myself: and so gave unto him another great kingdom, with an infinite mass of treasure. In like manner Tullus Hostilius king of the Romans, said unto Metius Suffetius Dictator of the Albanians, The civil discords which thou obiectest unto us, we deem them as profitable to our city; for we strive together, whether of us shall better or more earnestly fight for the good of the Commonweal.  
Now if contention and emulation be thus good and profitable amongst valiant & good citizens, and wholesome for Commonweals, how much more than aught it to be thought necessary for most base and abject men, for the stirring of them up to virtue, 
The fruit of ●…oess.  and deterring of them from vice. For of all the great profits which men use to reap from their enemies, none is greater than so to live as that we seem not to exceed them in vices, or be overcome of them in virtues. But if such discord and contention be both honourable and profitable in a city or Commonweal, wherein the princes and magistrates are all good men, and strive but for virtue only; how much more than shall the contention be profitable, where the good strive against the evil? But in case that all the magistrates be evil, then is discord and contention amongst them not only profitable, but even necessary also, lest otherwise they being at unity and concord among themselves, and in possession of the government, might freely and without fear make havoc and spoil both of the public and private affairs. In which case it cannot fall out better either for the subjects, or for the whole Commonweal, than if they by their mutual hatred and accusations shall openly detect and lay open unto the world, their own filthiness, their foul extortions and robberies, as the sheep are never more assured, than when the wolves devour one another; as it happened saith Philip Commines in England, that whilst the great lords slew or condemned one another, the poor people in the mean while remained safe from their invasion. Which was the wise council of Cincinnatus, seeing the Consul Appius openly to withstand the people to hinder them for the doubling the number of their Tribunes: Let be (said Cincinnatus) for the more they shall be, the worse they will agreed. And right needful oftentimes it was the power of the Tribunes to be broken and weakened by their own division, when as by the opposition of any one of them, all the proceed of the rest were so hindered and stayed. And truly Cincinnatus therein said wisely, for so the Commonweal stood and flourished, the Tribunes oftentimes being at discord and variance among themselves, which (they being at unity and concord) would have in a moment fallen: and so long it well stood until that Pub. Clodius a most wicked man, about four hundred years after presented a request unto the people, which passed into the force of a law, whereby it was ordained, That from thenceforth the opposition of one of the Tribunes should not hinder the proceeding of the rest of his fellow Tribunes. And therefore Cato the Censor, the beauty of the Roman wisdom (and one to whom was given the chief praise for wisdom and virtue amongst the Romans) could neither endure the agreement of his servants in his family, nor of the Magistrates in the Commonweal, but slily and secretly still sowed hatred and sedition amongst them; that so the wicked and offenders might with their accusations as with mutual wounds fall, and the good so gain praise. For why, he thought it a thing almost impossible in so great an accord of slaves and of magistrates, but that the one of them should make spoil of the Commonweal, and the other of his private substance, especially being in hope to escape unpunished, and our of fear for being accused. And therefore doubted not fifty times to accuse offenders, he himself being also forty times by others accused: howbeit that he still bearing himself upon the integrity of his forepast life, and the commendable things by him done, easily avoided all the slanders by his adversaries against him falsely surmised. Neither was that Commonweal ever after fuller of good and valiant citizens, than it was in his time. Yea the Senate of Rome allotted a great sum of money to Mar. Bibulus to buy his Consulship, and the voices of the people, to the intent to oppose him against Caesar his known enemy, who had cunningly set up Luceius his friend (whom the Senate would have had excluded) that so he might do all things as he thought good, his friend and fellow in office agreeing thereunto. And not to go farther, we have herefore the witness of julius Caesar, who in his Commentaries 
Lib. ●….  saith, The Gauls to have had a most ancient custom amongst them, to stir up their great lords one of them against another, to the intent that the common people (which were as he reporteth but slaves) might so be safe and free from their outrages and robberies. For so one of them opposing himself against another, and evil controlled by the good, and the wicked by themselves; there should be no doubt but that the Commonweal should so be in much more safety and assurance, than if they were of one accord among themselves. Whereby it is to be understood, the discord of princes and magistrates to have always been unto Commonweals wholesome: as the mean whereby the wicked (as we said) may by the virtue of the good, or their own mutual accusations be weakened. Which seemed a thing profitable not only unto the Romans, and our ancestors, but even unro Lycurgus the wise law giver also, who therefore himself set dissension betwixt the two kings of Lacedemonia, and appointed also, That there should always two enemies be sent ambassadors for the state; to the intent they should not by their mutual consent and good agreement betray the Commonweal: but that being at variance, they might still one of them be controlled by the other. As for that which is said, the parts of man's body which represent a well ordered Commonweal, to be never at discord among themselves, is quite contrary; for were not the humours of man's body much contrary, a man should quickly perish: the preservation thereof dependeth of the contrariety of hot & cold, of moisture and drought, of bitter choler to sweet phlegm, of beastly desires to divine reason; as also the preservation of the whole world next unto God dependeth of the contrariety, which is in the whole and every part thereof. Even so the magistrates in a Commonweal aught in some sort to be at difference among themselves, albeit that they otherwise be right good men, for that truth, the public good, and that which is honest, best discovereth itself by that which is thereunto contrary: and is still to be found in the midst betwixt two extremes. And it seemeth that the Romans had this principal end before their eyes, ordinarily making choice of their magistrates that were to be placed in the same charge, still enemies one of them unto another; or at leastwise of quite contrary humours and dispositions, as is in all their histories to be seen. As when the Senate foresaw that Claudius Nero should carry away the Consulship, an hot and sturting man, and withal a most valiant and courageous captain to oppose against Hannibal: the Senate (I say) procured to have joined unto him for his companion or fellow in office Livius Salinator an old captain, and a man of great experience, but yet as cold and stayed, as was the other hot and terrible, and yet fit to heat the old age of Livius, now a little too cold for the wars: who so joined and united together, gained a most notable victory against Hannibal, which was the ruin of the Carthaginians, and the preservation of the Roman estate. These two men also afterwards were by the people made Censors together; who still at discord, noted one of them another of infamy, a thing never before seen: and yet they thus still at variance, were in all men's judgements two of the most famous and virtuous men that then were in Rome. With like wisdom the Romans joined together Pabius Maximus, and Marcus Marcellus, in their wars against Hannibal, both of them right great and most expert captains, but the one of them being a cold, and the other an exceeding hot man; the one always still desirous of battle, and the other still seeking for delay; the one called the Roman Sword, and the other the Bucklet; the one a fierce warrior, and the other a long lingerer: by which contrary humours of these two so great personages the estate was not only preserved from ruin and destruction, which must needs otherwise undoubtedly have ensued, but far and wide enlarged also. If then the emulation and discord of the most virtuous magistrates be so profitable unto a Commonweal, what then is to be hoped for, when the good magistrates shall oppose themselves against the wicked?  
And these reasons may on both sides seem probable, but what in truth is to be 
The resolution of the former question.  resolved upon, is not so easy to judge which to do, not only the quality of the magistrates themselves, but the divers forms of Commonweals, is to be also considered. And yet I suppose, that in every kind of Commonweal it is good that the inferior magistrates and officers, being under the power and authority of the greater, should still be at variance and discord among themselves, and that more in a Popular estate than in any other: For that the people having none but the magistrates to govern them, is most easy to be peeled and polled, if the magistrates be not one of them by another controlled. And in a Monarchy it is expedient also, that even the greatest magistrates should sometime be at odds, considering that there is a sovereign prince to chastise and correct them; so that he be not mad, furious, or a child, or one otherwise subject unto another man's power. But in an Aristocratike or Popular Commonweal it is most dangerous, that the great magistrates should be at discord among themselves, and that especially if they be not good men, who never have any such contention or debate amongst them, as may hurt the estate or Commonweal: but such as was the honourable difference betwixt Scipio Affricanus, the elder, and Fabius Maximus: betwixt Scipio the younger, and Cato; betwixt Livius and his companion Nero; or the contention of Lepidus with Fuluius, of Marcus Scaurus with Catulus; or of Themistocles with Aristides: whose notable contention for virtues sake was always unto the Commonweal wholesome. But if the greatest magistrates in a Popular estate be evil and wicked men, or that their ambition be founded upon an evil ground, it is then dangerous lest that their differences be cause of civil wars; as it happened betwixt Marius and Scylla, betwixt Caesar and Pompey, Augustus and Mark Anthony, Thucydides and Pericles. And yet much more dangerous such contentions are in an aristocraty, than in a Popular Commonweal: For that the governors, which are always the fewer in number in an Aristocratique estate, and yet command the rest, have still to do with the people: who upon the first occasion take up arms against their lords, if they once enter into quarrels. For a few lords in an aristocraty are easily drawn into two parts, by the great magistrates, who if they fall into sedition among themselves, as also with the people, it cannot otherwise be, but that the change of the estate must thereof needs ensue; the leaders of the factions oppressing their enemies: or else the government of the estate falling wholly into one man's hands, which is not so much to be feared in a Monarchy, whereas the sovereign prince under his power keepeth all the magistrates in awe.  
But in every Commonweal it is expedient and necessary, that the numbet of the 
That the number of the sovereign magistrates in a Commonweal should still be odd.  sovereign magistrates, or of them which come near unto the sovereignty, should still be odd, to the end that the dissension amongst them might still be composed by the greater part or number of them; and that the public actions be not by the equality of them hindered or letted. And that is it for which the Cantons of Vrie, Vnderuald, Zug, and Glaris (which of all others are most Popular) have been glad to make in every one of them three sovereign magistrates, whom they call Amans, & not two, for that the third may easily reconcile two being at variance betwixt themselves: in stead whereof they of Schwits have four, as they of Geneva have also their four Sindicques, and they of Berne, Lucerne, Friburg, and Solure their two Auoyers: and Zuric, Basil, Schaffouse, their two Bourgomasters: as some there were which thought it better to have of such great magistrates more than four, and yet in odd number also; as in ancient time the Athenians had their nine Praetors, whom they called Archontas; that so the fewer might still yield unto the rest, or be in number overcome, which cannot be where only two bear the sway, except they had alternative power to command each of them his day by turns, so as had the Carthaginensians Suffetes, and the Roman Consuls, so as we have before said. And therefore by our laws also are three appointed for the common receipt, that so the third might still reconcile the other two his companions at difference betwixt themselves, or else by joining himself to one of them, make that part the greater. Which odd number of great magistrates is more necessary in a Popular or Aristocratike estate, than in a Monarchy; and the discord and dissension of them less in this state to be feared than in the other. For that as almighty God the Father of the whole Fabric of the world, and of nature, doth with an admirable concord and agreement govern this world, composed of the contrary conversions and motions of the celestial orbs among themselves, as also of the different natures of the stars and elements, and of the contrary force and power of planets and of other living creatures: even so also a king (the living image of God himself the prince of all things) should of the dissimilitude of magistrates, in some sort, at variance among themselves, keep and maintain the welfare of his subjects and people. And as in instruments, and song itself, which altogether out of tune, or all in the self same tune, the skilful and learned ear cannot in any sort endure, is yet made a certain well tuned discord, and agreeing harmony, of most unlike voices and tunes, viz. of Bases, Trebles, and Means, cunningly confused and mixed betwixt both: even so also of the mighty, and of the weak, of the high, and of the low, and others of the middle degree and sort betwixt both; yea even of the very discord of the magistrates among themselves ariseth an agreeing welfare of all, the straightest bond of safety in every well ordered Commonweal. So Caesar making sharp war upon them of Beawis, having in his army two captains deadly enemies one of them unto the other, commanded them to turn all that their hatred upon their enemies, who so in his very sight with great emulation gained a notable victory over their enemies, which their dissension had given unto their enemies, had they not had a general above them, who kept them both in awe. Which as it oftentimes happeneth, so did it also chance to jews the twelfth the French king, who gained the estates of Bolonia, and overthrew the Pope's army, by reason of the discord betwixt the cardinal of Pavia, and the duke of Urbin, who through jealousy of one of them against the other, so hindered & entangled themselves, as that they gave victory unto the French: into which danger the Roman estate was like to have fallen, by the contention risen betwixt Fabius Maximus, and Minutius the Roman generals, which had undoubtedly given Hannibal the victory, and the Romans the overthrow, had not Fabius for the good of the Commonweal forgot his displeasure, and by his valour delivered his rash companion together with the Roman army, from a most certain and present destruction.  
Wherhfore the contentions of the greater Magistrates are most dangerous in a 
The contention of the great magistrates most dangerous in a popular Commonweal: and their too great friendship to be no less perilous also.  Popular estate or Commonweal, (where there is no other head to command them but the multitude) and especially if he seek how to serve their own proud and ambitious desires, rather than the common good. And therefore the Roman Senate seeing Marcus Lepidus, and Q. Fuluius mortal enemies chosen Censors together, went unto them in great number to persuade them now at length for the Commonwealth sake to become friends, or at lest wise to suspend their enmity, so the better to attend unto their office, being the fairest and of greatest importance in the whole Commonweal. The like whereof we read to have been often done by the Senate, in setting the busy Tribunes, and proud Consuls agreed, at such time as their dissensions seemed to tend unto the danger of the State. But as it is not good that the greatest magistrates in a Popular estate should be too great enemies; so also is it not convenient that they should be too great friends, especially if they be not good men, and that for the reasons by us before alleged. Which was the cause that the younger Cato seeing Pompee, Caesar, and Crassus so straightly allied together, and that they so conjoined, were too strong for all the rest of the people; cried out aloud the Commonweal by such combyning of the great ones to be bought and sold; foreseeing as it were out of a watch tower the storms and tempests thereof then at hand. Yet true it is that of two extremities it is better that the great Lords and magistrates in a Popular or Aristocratique estate should be of one accord then at discord: for that being of accord, they will always like better to command others, and so in some sort or other to preserve the Estate such as it is, than together with the Commonweal, quite to overthrow their own power, whereunto their discord would bring them, when they had once given sails unto the tempest. In such sort as Livy said of calvinus the Campanian: Improbum hominem, sed non ad extremum perditum, qui mallet incolumi quàm eversa patria dominari, A wicked man (saith he) but not altogether desperate, who had rather to rule over his country yet standing upright, then over the same overthrown. So albeit that Mar. Tullius said, The three-headed alliance of Caesar, Crassus, and Pompee to be a thing greatly to be feared: Yet when he saw Crassus the moderator with the Roman legions slain in Chaldea, and julia Caesar's daughter Pompee his wife by untimely 
Philip. 2.  death taken away, he cried out: Vtinam Cn. Pompey, amicitiam cum Caesare nunquàm coisses, aut nunquàm diremisses, I would to god, OH Pompee, (said he) thou hadst either never made friendship with Caesar, or having once made it, hadst never broken it. For why their friendship much diminished the Popular power, but their enmity altogether ruinated the same; one of them being in no wise able to endure his equal, nor the other his superior, until that so by civil war the state was quite at length overthrown, and Caesar become master of all. And as for that which Caesar writeth, our ancestors the ancient Gauls to have thought the dissension of their princes and great governors to have been profitable unto their estates, I can hardly be persuaded therein: when as by the report even of Caesar himself, the dissension of the princes and of the estates of France, (then for the most part governed by Aristocraties) wrought their own destruction; some of them praying aid of the Germane, and some of them of the Romans, being long a prey both to the one and to the other, and in the end unto the Romans alone as the only conquerors. Neither is it true the mutual slaughters of the Nobility of England to have been commodious and profitable unto the commonalty and inferior sort, as Philip Comines writeth; yea at such time as I was Ambassador in England, I understood by some of the inhabitants there, them to fear nothing more than the factions of the Nobility and their civil discord: for the better appeasing and repressing whereof they have often times used to assemble the high court of Parliament, whereunto all the States are assembled. And thus we have declared in what sort the Magistrates aught to behave themselves towards their Prince, as also how they aught to bear themselves one of them towards an other, as also towards other private men; and whether they aught to be at unity among themselves or not. Now it remaineth for us briefly to show also, how the Prince aught to behave himself towards his subjects; and whither it be expedient that he should himself judge them, or be himself conversant among them.   

CHAP. VI ¶ Whether it be convenient or expedient for the Majesty of a sovereign Prince to judge his subjects himself, or to be much conversant with them.  
IT may seem unto some that this question not before reasoned of, hath not in it any doubt, and that it is not needful for us farther to enter there into, considering that all the ancient and wise polytitians are of accord, that kings were never for other thing established than for the administration of justice, as saith Herodotus speaking of the Medes; and Cicero likewise of the Romans; 
King's first established to judge his subjects.  as also we read that the first kings of Greece, Aeacus, Minos, and Radamanthus had no title more honourable than the title of judges; who for they with great equity administered justice, are by the Poets reported to have obtained of jupiter an everlasting power & office for judging of the ghosts in hell. And albeit that Homer calleth princes the pastors, or feeders of the people. Yet so it is that the title of judges hath long time after him continued in the person of the princes of Athens, who had the sovereign government for ten years. And not only the princes of the Medes, the Greeks, and Latins, but even the Generals also, who were as sovereigns amongst the Hebrews, had no other title than the title of judges: And at such time as they demanded of Samuel (now wearied with age) a king, they joined thereunto, that he might judge them, as other kings did their people: Which showeth sufficiently that the principal charge which they had, was to do justice themselves in person. And the principal reason that might move the princes themselves to judge the 
Reasons to show that princes themselves in person aught to administer justice unto their subjects.  subjects, is the mutual obligation which is betwixt the Prince and his subjects: For as the subject oweth unto his lord all duty, aid, & obedience; so the Prince also oweth unto his subjects justice, guard, & protection: so that the subjects are no more bound to obey the prince, than is the prince to administer unto them justice. Neither is it sufficient to have it done by an other man, as by the Magistrate at the Prince's command, seeing that the subjects being commanded to yield their faith and obedience unto the prince, cannot do it by their Deputies, but only by themselves in person; and that this obligation betwixt the Prince and the subject is reciprocal. Howbeit that it is less inconvenient that the vassal should give his faith and homage unto his Lord by his deputy, than the Lord to do him justice by his officer, for that the obeisance of the subject in this case cannot be called in doubt: whereas the subject hath no warrant that the magistrate or officer shall not suffer himself to be by bribes corrupted, which the Prince will not do, who is therefore still answerable before God, unto whom he cannot say that he hath therewith charged the conscience of his judges, his own thereby being not discharged. Besides that it much and notably concerneth Commonweals, that they which hold the sovereignty should themselves do justice: that is to wit, the union and amity of the Princes with the subjects, which cannot better be nourished and maintained than by the communion of one of them with the other, which is lost, and brought to naught, when the Princes do nothing but by their magistrates and officers: For so it seemeth unto the subjects that their prince's disdain and contemn them, a thing unto them more grievous than if the prince should himself do them wrong; and so much the more heavy, as a contumely or disgrace is 
The great good that ensueth when princes in person themselves do justice unto their subjects.  more hardly to be borne, than is a simple wrong or injury. Whereas to the contrary when the subjects see their Prince to present himself in person unto them to do them justice, they go away half contented, albeit that they have not that which they desired, or at lest wise they will say, The king hath seen our request, he hath heard our difference, he hath taken the pains to judge our cause. And if so be that the subjects be by their king seen, heard, or understood, it is almost incredible, how much they are ravished with contentment and pleasure, if the Prince be never so little virtuous, or have any other commendable quality in him. Besides that there is no greater mean to give authority unto his Magistrates and officers, and to cause justice itself to be both feared and reverenced, than to see the king himself sitting in his regal throne to do his subjects justice. Moreover the Magistrates often times do wrong and injury unto the subjects by standing upon the nice clauses, words, and syllables of the law, which they dare not pass, as being bound and subject thereunto. And in case that they make any conscience to judge according to the strictness of the law, they must yet first sand their reasons unto the Prince, and attend his answer, and exposition of his Edicts and laws made according unto the opinion and advise of his other officers, who will often times see the suitors purses bothom; in such sort as that many suits live longer than the parties and suitors themselves, yea and some times are for ever suspended. Whereas if the Prince himself in person shall vouchsafe to judge the matter, he which is the living law, and above all civil laws, being accompanied with his Counsel shall do both good and speedy justice, as having respect unto the very ground and equity of the matter, without farther standing upon titles and formalities. By this means also so many oppositions, appeals, civil requests, removing of causes, infinite decrees, one of them upon an other, which make suits immortal, should cease, and justice without stay or let take course, no appeal being to be made from the Prince. joining hereunto also that the Commonweal should so be relieved of the great charges and wages which it alloweth unto judges, and of their particular fees which are above measure heavy; besides the bribes and presents which must be given, which often times pass the ordinary fees, in such sort as that the subjects in steed of having good and speedy justice (which the Prince oweth them) are constrained to pay for it as for the most precious thing in the world: howbeit that oftentimes it happeneth, that the merchant is well paid, and yet the merchandise by him delivered is right little or nothing worth. And yet there is another very considerable point also: which is, That the parties contending are sometimes great and honourable, as that they would never answer before many judges, in discredit for their unworthiness, iniquity, or other like quality, whereby it oftentimes cometh to pass, that they end their suits and differences by combats and dint of sword: whereas the Prince in presence might even with the twinkling of his eye set them agreed. And were it that no other greater profit were thereby to come unto the Commonweal, then that the prince by use and exercise of judgement should have the force of right and justice thoroughly engrafted in his mind; what greater or better thing could there be wished of almighty God either for the prince or for the subjects, than that he might most curiously and seriously learn daily to administer justice? The knowledge of other arts and sciences, which is itself a thing most royal, and so most proper unto kings. For as for the knowledge of arms, and of martial affairs, it is well fitting a Prince against his enemies, whereas justice is most necessary for him at all times, and in all places, whether it be in peace or war.  
But not to rest altogether upon reason and arguments, we will also use the examples 
Examples of great Princes, who themselves in person administered justice unto their subjects.  herein of the most wise and noble princes. What man was there amongst men to be in wisdom compared with Solomon? And yet we read, That the only prayer that he made unto God, was to obtain wisdom wherewith rightly to judge his people, which his prayer was so acceptable unto God, as that he seemed therefore most plentifully, and to the great world's wonder, to have powered out upon him all the treasures both of wisdom and of knowledge; that so all men might understand God not only to have inspired him with wisdom, but also that the office of right judgement was even by God himself given unto kings; who was also for experience in great affairs and politic wisdom like unto the Great Augustus? And yet nevertheless we read that he without ceasing was still busied in the administration of justice, insomuch that even when he was sick, he caused himself to be carried in his horselitter to do justice. Howbeit that that was the ordinary vacant time of the Roman emperors, who for the administration of justice were commended above all the princes of the world, 
A notable example of the great emperor Adrian for the doing of a poor old woman justice.  even so far, as that a poor old woman to whom the Great emperor Adrian refused to answer her preferring unto him a request, excusing himself, That he was not then at leisure, Reign no longer than (said she) but discharge thee of thy charge thou bearest. Whereunto the emperor having not what to answer, presently stayed & did her justice. Now than if so great a prince (whose empire was bounded with the same bounds that the course of the sun was, and troubled with so great affairs) acknowledged the bond, To do his subject justice: what aught they then to do which hold but the scantlings of that great empire? Aught not every one of them to enforce himself in his own person, and to study with all his power, how to employ himself for the doing of justice? considering that (as Pliny the younger saith) there is no more noble Philosophy, than to entreat of the public affairs, and to do justice, putting in practice that which the Philosophers have taught.  
Now if the knowledge of that which is right, and the administration of justice, bring so many & so great profits unto princes; how much greater shall the same then be, if they 
To be necessary for a prince to understand of the affairs of estate.  shall by themselves handle but those things only which are proper unto their sovereignty? For as for the rest of the civil affairs, a prince may well commit them unto the magistrates: but the rights of sovereignty, and the deciding of them, he can in no wise put off, but together with the sovereignty itself. Surely they are very blind, deaf, and dumb, which never but by other men's eyes see, and by other men's ears hear, and by another man's tongue, and that oftentimes a strange tongue also, speak and talk of such things as are theirs, and most proper unto themselves. Now we have before showed also, not by the examples of strange nations only, but even by the examples of our ancestors also, the idle slothfulness of kings, who committed the managing of all their affairs unto their domestical servants, to have thereby brought both themselves and their posterity unto destruction.  
These arguments and reasons thus by us before alleged, make a fair show unto them who sufficiently understand not, nor by experience know not, the secrets of sovereignty, 
Reasons to show that it is not meet for princes themselves in person to administer justice unto their subjects.  and hidden knowledge for the maintaining of majesty: But unto me looking nearer into the matter, they are not sufficient to resolve this question, nor to maintain, That a prince aught in person himself to administer justice: Yea unto me it seemeth not only not necessary, but not profitable unto the subjects, the prince himself to be unto them the minister of justice. True it is, that for them so to do, it should be not only profitable, but even necessary also, if the princes were themselves such as Scylax feigned unto himself the kings of the Indian's to be; that is to say, so much better than their subjects, as the gods are above men. For what can be more glorious or more royal, than to see a prince by himself in the open sight of the people with great integrity and uprightness judge and decide causes, to give rewards unto such as have well deserved of the Commonweal, and to inflict punishment upon the wicked and offenders. For he must needs be a good and wise man himself, which is not delighted but in the company of good and wise men: and he must needs excel in integrity and justice, who himself with great equity administereth justice. But shall we therefore say, that vicious princes aught to thrust themselves into the sight, and so to communicate their vices unto their subjects? the lest vice in a prince being like unto a canker in a fair face: and so to do, what were it else, than in the sight of the people to set up an example of vice, to lead men, to draw them, yea & even to enforce them to be nought? For there is nothing more natural, than for the subjects to conform themselves unto 
Such a prince, such a people.  the manners, unto the doings and sayings of their prince; there being neither gesture, action, nor countenance in him, be it good or bad, which is not marked, or counterfeited by them which see him, having their eyes, their senses, and all their spirits, wholly bend to the imitation of him. So that Pliny well called the prince's life a Perpetual Censorship, whereunto we still direct and conform ourselves. And this is a doctrine from most ancient antiquity delivered unto all posterity, first by the master of wisdom himself, and after by Plato, Cicero, Livy, and Cassiodore, repeated as an infallible rule, That such as the prince of a Commonweal is, such will the people also be. Yea Theodoric king of the Goths, writing unto the Senate of Rome, passeth further, using these words, Facilius est errare raturam, quam dissimilem sui princeps possit Rempublicam formare, An easier thing it is (said he) for nature to change her course, than for a prince to frame a Commonweal unlike unto himself. And though examples need not in so plain a matter, yet we have seen king Francis the first, in this realm, and Mansor, surnamed the Great, emperor of Africa and Spain, who both two in divers times, and in divers places, began to have learning and learned men in estimation; when suddenly the princes, the nobility, the clergy, yea even the soldiers and artificers, with all the people in general, gave themselves so to learning, as that there was never found so great a number of learned men in all languages, and in all sciences, as in their time. Seeing therefore 
That an evil prince aught not much to come abroad for the people to imitat his vices.  that the prince's example is of so great force and power for the conforming and changing of his subjects manners, either to good or bad; great heed is to be taken, that the prince, except he be by nature well, and by education better framed and instructed, come not much abroad for the people to behold and imitat: but if he be evil & wicked, then by all means to be as a popular and common plague kept out of the sight of his subjects. Yet haply some man may say, That an evil prince should not therefore abstain or withdraw himself from public affairs, or from the judgement place or Senate; for that no man was so bad, but that he hath in him some virtues or commendable quality; or which cannot at leastwise dissemble some of his vices: of which his virtues & vices, his subjects may make choice, in such sort as that they may easily decline the one, and embrace the other. But in mine opinion and judgement, they will rather imitate 
The subjects still ●…eadier to imitate the vices than the virtues of the prince.  his vices, than his virtues: and so much the rather, by how much the corrupt nature of man is more prove and inclined unto vice than unto virtue; as also for that there is but one most straight way which leadeth unto virtue, whereas on both sides there are innumerable crooked byways and turnings unto vice, whereinto they may more easily fall, than into the strait and right way of virtue. In Alexander the Great were many most rare and heroical virtues, yet so it was, that he greatly blemished the beauty of them, as also of his other noble acts, by an evil custom that he had to be drunk; wherein he took such delight, as that he propounded a talon as a prize unto 
600 Crowns.  him which could drink most: in which beastly contention and strife forty together with him which had gained the prize burst and perished; he himself almost looking on. Mithridates also king of Amasia, imitating of Alexander the Great herein, surpassed him, that having set up a prize for him that could eat and drink most, he (as Plutarch saith) gained the foul victory in both (if to be overcome of intemperance and excess be to be accounted at all a victory.) But to sergeant virtues, or to dissemble vices, as it hath always seemed a most hard thing unto all men, so hath it especially unto princes, for that they of all others have lest learned to command their desires, to restrain their lusts, to bridle their affection, which he that knoweth not how 
Princes of all others most hardly to sergeant virtues, or to dissemble their vices  to do, shall never be a good or cunning dissembler. Dionysius the younger moved with the fame and virtue of Plato, caused him to be sent for unto Syracuse, who had no sooner begun to taste of the wisdom, virtue, and learning of the man, but that in a moment all minstrels, players, drunkards, bawds, harlots, and such like, were quite vanished out of the prince's sight, and the court so suddenly changed, as if it had been from heaven inspired. But for that Dionysius had but changed his countenance, & not his mind, and cast out the allurements of pleasures, but not pleasures themselves; he could not long dissemble his vices, eithes yet e●…dure Plato, who was no sooner go out of the court, and disembarqued out of Sicily, but that the prince forthwith returned unto his wonted vices, by him before for a while forborn, but not quite forsaken: at which very instant minstrels, dancers, harlots, bawds, and such other vermin of the court, which had before been driven out were again recalled. So much power the prince hath at his pleasure to change and turn the hearts of his subjects, but always rather unto vices and vanities, than unto virtues. But I do more willingly remember our own domestical examples than others; king Francis the elder, for the healing of a wound he had received in his head, caused his head to be polled, when suddenly after all his household servants, all the princes, all the nobility, the magistrates, the artificers, and people of all sorts in general, caused their heads to be from that time forward polled also, insomuch that if any did from thenceforth use the old fashion, and accounted it an undecent thing to be polled, he was therefore of all men derided: whereas before from the beginning of this kingdom, it had always been the mark of the kings, neither was it lawful for any but for the nobility and Senators, to wear long hair: all the rest of the meaner sort being before compelled to poll themselves as slaves, until that Peter Lombard bishop of Paris (for the power and authority which bishops then had above kings) obtained, That it might be lawful for the common people to wear long hair also. True it is, that the flatterers of princes help much to conform the manners and fashions of the people unto those of the princes, they still rather counterfeiting than imitating even the vices and defects of the prince, whom if they see laugh, they laugh also, although they know no cause why; if he be lame, they halt down right also. Alexander the Great, and Alphonsus king of Arragon, being both wry necked, the one by nature, and the other by custom, the courtly curs to sergeant that their deformity, held their necks also awry; as the Courtier, and Plutarch in the life of Pyrrhus writeth. Seeing therefore the nature of man is inclined to follow the vice of the prince, were it not even to undo a people, and to ruinat an estate, to thrust still into the sight of the people a prince evil brought up; and a pottraitor of vices for them to imitat? And yet it is more dangerous for that for one vice which the prince hath, oftentimes those of his train have an hundred, who every where as they pass, may altar & mar the good disposition of the people; or like swarms of flies & caterpillars, who having devoured the leaves, and fruit, do also leave their spawn behind them, able to insect the fields and trees be they never so clean and fruitful.  
But suppose we the prince not to be vicious (a rare gift, and by the goodness of God given unto men, when as in every age a tolerable prince is scarcely to be found) but to be of great virtue and perfection, yea even a man without fault (howbeit that there is a great space betwixt them which are endued with virtues, and them which are without vices) yet is it almost a thing impossible, but that some thing shall at one time or other fall from him, which well noted may seem unto the people foolish or ridiculous: wherein much is derogated from the reputation and dignity which the subjects aught to have of him. But let us suppose that also, him to be neither a man evil given, nor foolish; neither yet so to seem, but to be a man endued with great virtues, and of good 
Too much familiarity of a prince with his subjects; not good: and always to be seen of them in his majesty, a thing unto them dreadful.  education; yet so it is that too ordinary conversation, and too great familiarity of the subjects with the prince▪ much diminisheth his majesty, and withal engendereth a certain contempt of him: of which contempt proceedeth the disobedience of the subjects unto him and his commands, to the ruin of the whole estate. And now again to the contrary, if the prince to maintain his majesty shall ordinarily show himself unto his subjects, in his greatness, with a terrible port, it may be that so he may be the more of them redoubted: but it is dangerous lest he should be therefore the less loved. Whereas the love of subjects towards their sovereign is much more necessary for the preservation of an estate, than is fear; and so much the more, for that love cannot be without fear to offend him whom we love; whereas fear may well be, and most often is without any love at all, men commonly hating him whom they fear, and as occasion serveth still seeking to take him out of the way.  
And truly unto me more deeply considering of the matter, almighty God (the 
How princes are to behave themselves, to be of their subjects both beloved and fea●…ed.  sovereign prince of the whole world) seemeth to have showed a short way unto worldly princes (the true images of himself) how they are to communicate themselves unto their subjects, to be of them both beloved and feared: For the communicateth himself unto men but by visions and dreams, and that but to a few of the elect & most perfect of them also, men of great integrity of life. But when he with his own voice published the Ten Commandments, he caused his fire to be seen heavens high, and the mountains to tremble with thunder and lightning, with such a dreadful sound of trumpets, that the people strucken with fear, and falling flat upon their faces, besought him, That he would no more from thenceforth speak unto them himself (for that otherwise they should all die) but only to command such things as he pleased by his servant Moses. So that that people of all others most chosen, had but once almighty God (who showeth himself but in spirit to be seen) himself sounding forth his laws; when as yet for all that to allure men the more fervently to love him, he at all times, and in all places and countries, doth with great love, and eternal bounty, foster and cherish all mankind, yea indeed all sort of living creatures, pouring continually upon them his great and infinite favours, largesse, and bounty. If therefore the wise prince aught in managing of his subjects, to imitate the wisdom of God in the government of the world, he must but seldom times come into the sight of his subjects, and that with such a state and majesty, as best agreeth with his wisdom, power, and greatness, and yet make choice of some few most wise and worthy men, with whom to communicate his secret counsels, and by them to declare his will and pleasure unto the rest, and yet incessantly to heap upon his subjects his graces and favours; & with great wisdom and power to protect and defend them against their enemies. In the book De Mundo (or of the world) dedicated to Alexander the Great (and without cause ascribed to Aristotle, as savouring nothing of his style) a comparison is made of a sovereign prince unto God; as that the great king of Persia was still resiant in a proud and stately palace or castle, compassed in with three high walls, full of all pleasures and delights, never stirring abroad, or showing & acquainting himself but with some few of his friends; who yet nevertheless by fires and watches set upon high places, still in one day understood and knew all the enemies of his empire, even from the farthest parts of the East Indies, unto the straits of Hellespontus. And yet never was there any princes under heaven more honoured and reverenced, or better beloved of their subjects than they: or whose commands were more just unto their subjects, or more of their subjects regarded, or that longer preserved their empire, power, and state. So those princes also which give themselves over, and become slaves unto their vain pleasures and delights, most commonly used to withdraw themselves from the sight of the multitude into some secret places, that so they might at more liberty glut themselves with all kind of pleasures. For so Tiberius Caesar of all others the most cunning dissembler, made choice of a most desert island, wherein he for many years lived in all kind of voluptuous and beastly pleasures. Which was of him right filthily done, but yet more wisely than they who with the most odious smell of their loathsome pleasures pollute and defile as well public as private places: who besides that they offend more by giving of evil example than by the wickedness itself by them committed, do also in the minds and conceits of men engender a neglect and contempt of themselves.  
Wherhfore a prince that wise is, so often as he should show himself unto the people 
How a prince is to frame his countenance and speech when he showeth himself unto the people.  (which he should most seldom do) should so prepare himself, as that he may unto all men seem even in his face and countenance to carry with him a certain state and majesty, yet still mixed with modesty, but especially in his speech, which should always be majestical and sententious, and in the manner of phrase, something different from the vulgar. Which if it shall seem something hard for the prince to perform, or that he have not the grace of speaking, it is best for him to speak little, or else altogether to be silent: For that we know men in so great matters, as to contemn, or fear; to hate, or love; to be still no less with opinion, than with any certain reason, led & moved thereunto. For if the proverb of the wise Hebrew be true, That the fool himself in holding his peace is accounted wise, how circumspect and advised aught a prince to be, when he openeth his mouth to speak in public place? considering that his words, his countenance, and looks, are oftentimes accounted and esteemed of as laws, oracles, and decrees. Wherein Tiberius the emperor, lest he should in any thing offend, brought in a new fashion, as to be spoke unto, and also to give answer by writing, for what matter soever it was, Moris erat (saith Tranquillus) eo tempore principem etiam presentem scripto adire, The manner (saith he) at that time was, with writing to go unto the prince even then present; to the end that nothing might escape which had not before been well thought upon. For it is not possible but that they which speak much in open assemblies, as in the Senate, or before the people, must many times err: which done by a prince, shall breed contempt, or at leastwise 'cause him to be the less esteemed: so that a Graecian (I wots not who) not unfitly said, That a prince if he be wise should unto the people, or in open audience no otherwise speak, than he would do in a Tragedy.  
But I know that some of contrary opinion unto mine, will say, Is it not the true estate and office of a prince, to do justice unto his people? to hear the complaints of his subjects? to see the requests of his own? and by the mouth of every one to understand of their just grievances, which are commonly suppressed, or at leastwise disguised by another man? And why then should the prince hide himself from his people? talk but with few, and those of his most inward friends also? or answer nothing unto many, of right ask him of many things? yea not to be willing so much as to hear his subjects speak? Things altogether absurd, and not beseeming the majesty of a sovereign prince. Whereunto I say, that mine opinion is not, that he should so hide himself, as not at all to show himself; as the kings yet do even at this present in the East Indies, and namely the king of Borney, who speaketh not unto any but unto his wife 
The manner of the kings of Borney.  and children; neither is seen of any, but still speaketh unto others by one of his gentlemen through an hole by a reed or cane which he holdeth in his mouth, as he did unto the king Catholic (as we read in the histories of the Indieses:) but my meaning is, 
How a prince aught but seldom times to converse with his subjects.  that he should not be much in the assemblies of the people, neither easy to be spoke withal of all men, not to use much discourse with his subjects, except with such as are near unto him, or of his familiar acquaintance; not to take pleasure in jests and taunts, in play, or other public exercise: For that by such things the prince's majesty and reputation, which aught by all means to be whole and untouched, is greatly impaired and lightened: and so much the more, by how▪ much the prince is of greater estate and majesty: whereunto good and especial regard is always to be had. For it were not seemly for a petty prince in his estate to sergeant the great kings of Aethiopia, of Tartary, of Persia, or of Turkey, who suffer not their subjects so much as to look directly upon them, neither are so much of them redoubted and feared for their power, as for the majesty that they hold when they show themselves unto their subjects. Howbeit that the kings of Africa hold yet this majesty more, as in the history of Francis D' Aluarez is to be seen, where he speaketh of the majesty of the Great Negus, whom we call Prester john: and in the history of Leo of Africa, where he speaketh of the king of Tombut, before whom his subjects appear not, but upon their knees, with dust upon their heads.  
Now if any man shall say, That the kings of the East, and of the South are thus to be honoured, for that their subjects are of an abject and a servile nature; but that they of the North, or of the West, whose subjects be of greater courage, are not able to endure such a servitude and slavery: this shall be in due place decided, as also what the nature of every region is: and yet for all that I see the kings of England, Sweden, Denmark, and Polonia, who are situate toward the North, much better to maintain the majesty of their estates with their subjects, than do the kings of France, or the princes of Italy; and the kings of Moscovia yet better than all the rest, and yet are not therefore the less, but well the more of their subjects obeyed.  
Now the greatest danger that can come unto a prince, to do all by others, is, lest 
How the danger lest a prince should be dispossessed of his estate by him whom he putteth in trust for the managing of his affairs, is to be prevented.  that they upon whom he should so discharge himself, should take from him his estate and sovereignty, and so possess themselves thereof: which for all that hath never chanced in this realm, but only under king Childeric, surnamed the Loutish▪ since the time that the kings of France showed themselves unto their subjects in their majesty but once a year, viz. the first of May; as we read in our own histories, and also in Cedrinus a Greek author, who saith, That the ancient kings of France took no other pleasure but to eat and drink, leaving the managing of all their affairs unto the great Master of the Palace. But we must not draw into consequence the example of one king bereft of sense, to ground a maxim of state upon. Yet is there well one mean to meet with that inconvenience, which is, That the prince for one lieutenant, or for one great Master of the Palace, should have two or three in power and favour equal: For in so doing he shall never be circumvented, their power being so diminished, one of them still bewraying or controlling the other, the king's majesty being so still the more stately and sure. For Tiberius having made Sejanus too great; and so Commodus, Perennius; Theodosius the second, Eutropius; justinian, Bellisarius; Xerxes, Artaebanus; and Childeric, Pepin: committing unto them alone the managing of all their affairs, with the guard of their persons, they fell into the dangers which we spoke of, being in hazard of their estates.  
As for the administration of justice, and the hearing of the complaints and griefs of 
justice better to be administered by good and sufficient magistrates, than by the prince himself.  the subjects, it shall be always better provided by good and sufficient magistrates, than by the prince in person himself. For who knoweth not so many good parts to be requisite in a good judge, as are not all well to be found in the most sufficient prince in the world? Yea who knoweth not so many things to be within the compass of the duty of a good judge, as may overslip and escape even the most skilful and careful men? whereof many must needs escape the prince before he can perceive them, and so many times the very substance of the matter consisteth in that which is overslipped. And if one shall say, that the prince may have about him both wise and learned councillors, according to whose advise and council he may determine of matters, and so give judgement; such as Augustus, Traian, Adrian, Marcus Aurelius, Alexander Severus, and the other Roman emperors are reported to have had: who were always accompanied with most worthy and excellent personages: truly that seemed not so hard a matter unto the Roman princes, so brought up and so enured thereunto, but now we live after another manner and fashion. And who is there that seethe not, not only the prince not to be able to endure so many dilatory pleas, so many slights of the lawyers, so many shifts of the plaintiffs; such petitions and outcries of such as run from court to to court? but not even the magistrates themselves without incredible tediousness to be able to endure the same? all which yet they must devour. Yea the prince is not able himself to conceive all such things as are the greatest and of most importance in the Commonweal, and how then shall he alone suffice to decide and determine so many suits and causes? But if he shall take that charge in hand, and not well and orderly discharge the same, in stead of doing of the subjects right, he shall do them great injury and wrong. Wherein Demetrius (he which was called the Besieger) hath for just cause been blamed: who having received a great number of his subjects requests, put them into the lap of his mantle, and at the first bridge he came unto, whereby he was to pass over a river, shook them all into the water: Whereof the subjects seeing themselves by him contemned, conceived a mutual hatred against him, so that shortly after he was forsaken of his army, which yielded itself to Pyrrhus together with the kingdom, which he so gained without battle. Besides that in this course taken, we should be always driven to have recourse unto the commissioners for instructions: and afterwards unto the prince for judgement of the cause: howbeit that it is sometimes hard, and oftentimes pernicious also, to separate the instructions of the matter from the judgement.  
But suppose that the prince were at leisure, and that he both could and would see, 
An hard chargesble, and dangerous matter, for subjects to prosecute their suits before the prince.  hear, and judge all the causes of his people, yet were it a thing not beseeming the majesty of a king to make such an ordinary confusion of his court, where beside the subtleties, the countenances and favours, (not there subject to enquiry) and the contrarity of letters, commissions, decrees, and provisions, which are there dispatched under the name (but without the knowledge) of the prince, whereof colour is oftentimes made for the doing of wrong: it is yet moreover insupportable for the subjects, unto whom justice is due in the places where they are, to search for the same at the court, and to follow the prince still removing from place to place; where it were better for them sometimes to lose their right, than with so great charge to follow the suit. Besides that the most honourable and worthy causes for a prince that will himself intermedd●…e in judgements, are the causes concerning life and honour: who shall be the accusers? who would fall into so great charges to sue the matter in the court? and into the danger to be slain by the accused, if the prince should pardon the fault. For when princes use scarcely at any time to condemn the guilty parties, but do oftentimes pardon and restore such as be already condemned: by this means should ensue not only no punishment of offences, but even the greatest impunity of the offenders: than which there is no more certain token of a Commonweal in short time about to perish. Wherewith to meet, secret accusations have been brought in and admitted by an ancient edict of Conan king of Scots, which is at this day in use in Scotland, and called the Indict: and yet is better provided for by the ordinance of Milan (which well deserveth to be religiously kept in every Commonweal) where in every town there is a chest with an hole in it, in every principal church, whereof the governors have the key, whereinto it is lawful for every one secretly to put his bill of accusation against any man; wherein the crime committed, the time, the place, the party guilty, and the witnesses, are all of them comprised, with the reward of the moiety of the confiscation allowed unto the accuser. Which is an easy way for the punishing of offences before ordinary judges; a thing impossible to prosecute before the prince. For these reasons and the difficulties by us noted, Tiberius the emperor having obtained the empire, protested in the full Senate, and afterwards by his letters made it known unto the officers, That he would take upon him nothing which belonged unto the jurisdiction of the magistrates; 
Why the office to judge and decide matters, a thing proper unto the au●…tiene kings, now belongeth unto magistrates and judges.  for that it was more that was required of a prince, than of a magistrate. Neither aught it to seem unto any man strange, why the office to judge and decide matters, proper unto the ancient kings, should now belong unto the magistrates? for that when people as yet had no laws, but that the king's power and will was accounted for law, it was then needful for subjects causes to be judged by the princes: but after that laws were once established, according unto which the magistrate was bound to judge, and due punishment by them appointed for offences, and rewards unto such as had well deserved; that necessity was taken away, and translated from the princes unto the judges.  
But here some man may say, That a prince may be so wise, so just, and so full of understanding, 
Not good for a love●…gne prince how sufficient soever, to sit in judgement himself, for fear of too much lenity, or else seu: ritie▪ to the perverting of justice.  as that he will give no judgement but such as is agreeable unto equity and reason; and the compass of his territory so straight, as that he may himself suffice to judge and determine all the suits of his subjects, as there be divers such princes in the Low countries, in Germany, & especially in Italy: In this case should it not be a goodly and a profitable thing for the Commonweal, the prince himself there to administer justice? If thou ask me what mine opinion is therein, I think it not profitable either for that so blessed a prince, either for those his so happy citizens or subjects, or him in person himself to sit in judgement; not for that the subjects do so much love and honour the majesty of their prince, as not to dare freely enough to speak their minds, and to 'cause him to understand their right; neither for that they could hardly have access unto him, for the multitude of causes which he should still have before him, having opened this gap: but even for that nothing is so proper unto a prince, as clemency; nothing unto a king, as mercy; nothing unto majesty, as lenity. And therefore the emperor Titus (a man of so great courtesy, as that he was called Humani generis delitias, or the mirror of mankind) gladly took upon him the office of the great bishop, because he would pronounce sentence of death upon no man, either pollute his hands with man's blood, when as yet some other emperors who were also bishops (though not so religious as he) lest of all others abstained from such capital judgements of life and death. Now nothing is more contrary unto true justice, than pity; neither any 
Nothing more contrary unto true justice, than lenity and piti●….  thing more repugnant unto the office and duty of an upright judge, than mercy: he not only by the civil law, but even by the law of God also being forbidden to have pity (even of the poor) in judgement: which we said to be so proper unto majesty, as that it cannot be therefrom divided or separated. So that a prince sitting in judgement must take upon him two contrary persons, that is to say, of a merciful father, and of an upright magistrate; of a most gentle prince, and of an inflexible judge. And if the prince be by nature mild and pitiful, there shall be none so evil or wicked, who by force of tears and prayers shall not escape the punishment by the law appointed, even the most cruel men being oftentimes by them overcome. So we read, that Augustus the great emperor, for wisdom inferior unto none, examining a murderer, began in this sort to question with him, I am sure thou hast not killed thy father: in which words he not only instructed the guilty man what he was to answer to him both his prince and judge, but also most courteously gave him his pardon. Nero also at such time as the condemnation of a man was presented to him to sign, is reported to have said, Vtinam litter as nescirem, I would to God I knew not letters. And therefore Cicero pleading before Caesar, before resolved in any wise to have put Ligarius to death, said, That he pleaded not before him as a judge, but as before the father of the people: and having somewhat appeased his anger, began thus to press him farther, Causas, Caesar, egi multas, & quidem tecum, cum te tenuit ratio honorum tuorum, certe nunquam hoc modo; ignoscite judices: erravit, lapsus est, non putavit, si unquam posthac: ad parentem sic agi solet, ad judices, non fecit, non cogitavit, falsi testes, fictum crimen, Dic te Caesar de facto Ligarij judicem esse etc. Caesar (saith he) I have pleaded many causes, and that with thee, when thou stoodst upon thine honour, but yet never pleaded I in this manner: pardon him my lords, he hath erred, he was deceived, he thought it not, if ever he shall do so again: so men use to pled before a (sovereign prince, or a) father: but unto the judges, we say flatly, He did it not, he never thought it, the crime is forged, the witnesses are false. But say Caesar, thyself to be judge of the deed done by Ligarius, etc. And in this sort secretly insinuating unto Caesar, that he aught not to be a judge, holding the place of a sovereign: and afterwards highly commending Caesar his noble acts, his valour and his clemency, moved him so much, as that he changed both his colour and countenance, and was in such a sort ravished, as that he could not hear the one half of the oration (the shortest of all them that Cicero left in writing) but that he granted more unto the guilty man than ever he hoped for. If then Caesar himself, one of the greatest orators that ever was (even in the judgement of his capital enemy Cicero) and one of the most valiant and wisest men of his time, was so overcome by the force of eloquence, pardoning him whom he deadly hated, and had before resolved to put to death: what shall the less circumspect prince do, be he never so little inclined unto pity? how shall he be able to endure the filled speech of an eloquent advocate? the pititious complaints of poor old men? the cries and sighs of distressed women? the weeping and wailing of little children? King Agesilaus a most famous prince of his time, overcome by the importunate requests of a friend, writ unto the judges, requesting them, That if the party accused, in whose behalf he writ, were not guilty, he should be acquitted by the equity of his cause: but if he were lawfully convict, he should yet nevertheless be for Agesilaus his sake discharged, and so in any case acquitted. But OH how many should escape the penalty of the laws, if judges in such cases should harken not only unto the princes secret letters, but even unto their letters patents also: and then what may we deem that a prince himself would do? Wherhfore himself in person to sit in judgement, beseemeth not the majesty of a sovereign prince.  
But now if it be so hard for a prince in this case not to err and be deceived, then 
The people in a Popular estate easily moved unto pity.  how much more hard is it in a Popular estate, where the people suffer themselves to be deceived and led away with fair words, as a man may see almost in all the accusations made both in Athens and Rome, when the people give sentence; where the innocent were condemned, and the guilty acquitted: of examples whereof all the histories are full. As Servius Galba a great orator, accused, attainted, and condemned of treason before the people of Rome; not having any more to say for himself, but turning his speech and action, wholly framed to the moving of pity; and so embracing his children, and with tears commending them unto the people, so moved the beholders, as that he easily obtained pardon, and so escaped. Whereupon Cato the elder, who had accused him, said That had not Galba abused his children and his tears, he had been well whipped. Whereas other noble and valiant men, who could neither abuse their prayers nor tears, but bearing themselves upon their integrity, if but some lying orator, or false enformer, had accused them, they were most unjustly condemned. And so oftentimes in like manner not orators, but flatterers: and that not openly, but secretly, do with divers deceits cirumvent the prince. And therefore the nobility of Polonia, by force wrested a privilege from Lewes' king of Polonia and Hungary: That if question were of any of their lives and honours, they should not be judged but by the king himself: foreseeing, that so they might easily escape the judgement of the king, but not the judges, who are bound unto the strictness of the laws. And hereupon it is come to pass, that none of the nobility are ever there condemned to death, what offence soever they do, but always escape either by fine, or at worst, by being kept in prison for the space of a year and six weeks, which is now there passed into the force and strength of a law, and yet is there observed and kept; as I have learned of Zamosche the Polonian ambassador.  
But suppose the prince to be such an one as is not easily to be moved unto pity or 
A most hard thing for a sovereign prince sitting himself in judgement, to keep a mean betwixt too much lenity and severity.  compassion, yet then is it to be feared, lest he in judgement fall into cruelty. For whereas to keep the mean is to every man a right hard thing, so unto princes it is of all others most difficult, who easily suffer themselves to be carried into the one extremity or other. If he be a good prince and an embracer of virtue, he will have wicked men in extreme horror & detestation, wherewith even the wisest men are moved with a just anger, and so oftentimes carried away with a choleric passion. There need no better example than that of Augustus the emperor, who was accounted to be one of the most wise and virtuous princes that ever was, and at his first sitting in judgement endured as it were the pain of the condemned: and suffered not less (as saith Seneca) than did they themselves which were executed. And yet nevertheless this virtuous prince by continual custom of judging and condemning such as were convict before him (as most necessary it was) become too much rigorous and cruel, suffering himself to be transported with passion and indignation against the wicked: in such sort, that one day sitting in judgement, and condemning many the accused to divers punishments: his friend Maecenas being not able for the press to come near him, cast a little billet of paper into his bosom, wherein he called him an Executioner or Hangman: whereat Augustus suddenly stayed, and finding himself transported with choler, and so to be too hasty in judgement, to stay his anger forthwith broke up the court. And for this cause our fathers have right wisely ordained, That the Criminal Chamber of Parliaments should from three months to three months still be changed (which for this cause is called Tournelle: for that all the judges of the other Chambers judged every one of them by turns, to the intent that the common custom to condemn and put men to death, should not change the natural mildness of the judges, and make them cruel and hard hearted. Besides that it is a very hard, and almost impossible thing (as saith Theophrastus') that a good and honest man, should not enter into choler, seeing the most detestable enormities of the wicked, and so sometimes to become as a man even furious, and as it were out of his wits. So Claudius the emperor hearing one day the plaintiff rehearse the great and manifold villainies of one accused, fell into such an outrage, that taking up a knife which lay before him, he threw it into the accused man's face, even in full judgement. But if the prince which intermeddleth himself with judgement be by nature cruel, he shall then make a butchery of his court; as did the emperor Caligula, who by one 
The most strange & extreme cruelty of Caligula the emperor.  only sentence, for divers crimes condemned fifty persons, even unto the same kind of death, and often took pleasure to cut off the heads of many good men, sometime to prove his own strength, and sometime to prove but the edge of his Cimitar, If therefore it be so hard even for the most wise, to keep the mean betwixt mildness and rigour, which is necessary for judges, it is not so easily to be found in princes, who are most commonly extreme in their actions: for the waywardness of a private man, is indignation in a prince; and the anger of a subject, is called fury in a king.  
But let us proceed farther, and suppose, that the prince have the gravity, the knowledge, 
The best and surest means for the maintenance of a prince in his estate, is by all good means to procure the love of his subjects: and how the same is to be obtained.  the wisdom, the discretion, the experience, the patience, and all other the virtues requisite in a good judge: yet so it is, that he cannot be without danger, if he shall in person judge his subjects. For the best and fairest rule for the maintenance of the state of a Monarchy, is, that the prince, if it may be, cause himself to be beloved of all, without the disdain or hatred of any. Whereunto to attain, he hath two means, the one by appointing due punishment to be inflicted upon the evil, & the other by giving deserved rewards unto the good. And for that the one of them is favourable, & the other odious, it behoveth the prince that would be loved, to reserve unto himself the bestowing of rewards; which are, estates, honours, offices, benefices, pensions, privileges, prerogatives, immunities, exemptions, restitutions, and other graces and favours, which every well advised prince aught himself to grant: but as for condemnations, fines, confiscations, and other punishments, he is not himself to meddle with them, but to commit them unto his most upright and wise magistrates, for them to do good and speedy justice therein. In which doing, they which receive the benefits, shall have good cause to love, respect, and reverence the prince their benefactor: and those which are condemned, shall yet have no occasion at all to hate him, but shall still discharge their choler upon the magistrates and judges. For why, the prince doing good to every one, and evil to none, shall be beloved of all, and hated of none: which even nature hath figured out unto us in the king of Bees, who never hath sting, lest he should hurt any. And albeit that the sacred Scriptures teach us, all plagues, diseases, calamities, and other worldly chances to depend of the wrath of God; yet in this all divines (which more exactly entreat of divine matters) wholly agreed, none of all these things to be done by almighty God, as by an efficient cause; but by permission only, and to be from him divided, but as from a not letting cause: which cause the manner of the Hebrew phrase every where signifieth by the word Hiphil, ordinarily used, when it speaketh of the vengeance of God. We read also in the Poets (though somewhat otherwise) that jupiter had three kinds of lightning, which they called Manubias Albas', Rubras, Atras, The first is white, which serveth for advertisement, but hurteth no man, as proceeding only from jupiter, and his friendly aspect unto the Sun: For which cause Seneca saith, Id solum fulmen placabile est quod mittit jupiter, That only lightning (saith he) is peaceable which jupiter sendeth. The other is read, and proceedeth from the aspect of jupiter unto the inferior planets, whom they call the inferior gods, which hurteth and blasteth first-fruits and beasts, but killeth no man. The third is black, and made by the aspect of jupiter unto the high planets and the six stars (which they call the high gods) which killeth, overthroweth and destroyeth whatsoever it lighteth upon. For the Theology of the ancients belonged unto the Bishops, the Philosophers, and the Poets, as Marcus Varro witnesseth in the one and twentieth book of worldly things: wherein they all agreed, That the great God, which they thought to be jupiter (to speak properly and according to the truth) could not be himself augrie, neither hurt nor condemn any man, but all things to be done by mean causes, and the ministery and power of angels. And therefore the ancient Egyptians derived a law even from Promethius their law giver, whereby their kings were not only forbidden to kill any man, but even so much as to behold any execution done; lest by such looking on, some print of cruelty should remain in them the beholders. And this unto me seemeth a great secret of this our kingdom, and a thing of great force for the gaining of the subjects love and good will towards the prince; all rewards, gifts, honours, offices, charges, and commands, coming still from the king: but penalties, and punishments always adjudged and inflicted by the magistrates. For at such time as William Poyet (my country man) Chancellor of France was accused of treason, and by the envy of his most gracious enemies circumvented, the king who had received the wrong would not himself be judge in the cause, neither so much as be present at the trial; yea when the party accused had refused all the judges of Paris, it was the king's pleasure, that two judges, men of great integrity, and free from all corruption, should be called and chosen out of every court of parliament in France to try him: Whereby may be understood with what an observation of law and justice this kingdom standeth, when as almost at the same time Thomas Moor Chancellor of England, and Jerome Moron Chancellor of Milan, both of them accused of treason, had for their judges, one of them even the very conspirators themselves, guilty of the same treason against the prince, and the other his great enemies.  
But here haply some man may say, the honour of noble personages to require, that when question is of their lives, their honour, or whole estate, the king himself should take upon him the hearing of the matter. For when the duke of Alencon (Charles the seventh his nigh kinsman) was accused of treason, the court of parliament answered the king, That he could not be tried but in the presence of the king, and of the peers of France, without being lawful for them to appoint their substitutes. In like case upon council asked by jews the eleventh, when question was for the trial of Renate of Anjou king of Sicily, the court gave the same answer, viz. That it could not so 
Not lawful for the French king to be in person assistant in the trial of a prince or peer accused of treason.  much as give an interlocutory decree against a peer of France, when question was of his honour, except the king himself were there present. I say for all that, that this was not for the king to judge. For why, it is to be proved, that the king in ancient time was not in person himself assistant in the judgement of treason, although it were in the trial of the princes, or of the peers; as is to be found in the records of the court, a protestation the third of March 1386, made by the duke of Burgundy, as chief peer of France, against king Charles the sixt, wherein is contained, That the king aught not to be assistant at the judgement of the king of Navarre, arraigned of treason; and that so to be, appertained not but only to the peers of France, saying, The like protestation to have been made against king Charles the fift, to the intent he should not be present at the trial of the duke of Britain: and in case he would needs pass on farther, and break the custom of their ancestors, the peers of France demanded in full parliament, That an act of that their protestation might be unto them decreed, and so afterwards it was enjoined unto the clerk by a decree of the court, to deliver unto the peers, and to the king's Attorney general an act of such their protestation. So also when question was for the trial of the marquess of Salusse, under the reign of Francis the first, it was by lively reasons, and by the authority of the laws both of God and man maintained, That the French king could not in that judgement be assistant, seeing it concerned the confiscation of the marquisat: and albeit that the king's Attorney general urging the matter, the king was at the judgement present, yet gave he not sentence, whereby the marquess was himself condemned, and his goods most justly confiscate, yet that judgement for all that seemeth unto many but extorted, and the other princes rested therewith much discontented. So also Alexander the Great would never take upon him the person of a judge, neither thought it meet to be assistant in the judgement given against Philotas, Calisthenes, and others which conspired against his person, lest he should so seem to have terrified the judges, or to have taken from 
The king aught n●…t to be judge, where he is himself a party, as in matters concerning his own interest.  them the free power of judging: as we read in Quintus Curtius. For if it be contrary unto the law of nature, that the party should be judge also; & That the king is a party in all causes which concern either the public or his own proper patrimony in particular, in which case he cannot be a judge; by a much stronger reason aught the same to take place in the offence of treason, and especially in the chief point, where question is, the party accused to have attempted the honour or life of his prince. And for this cause jews the ninth would not pronounce sentence at the judgement of Peter Mauclere duke of Britain, albeit that he was there present when the judgement was given; neither likewise at the judgement of Thomas earl of Flaunders. Neither yet Philip the Long the French king, in the cause of Robert earl of Flaunders attainted of treason. Yea that more is, the decrees or sentences are given in the name of the peers, and not in the name of the king, albeit that he were himself there present: as is to be seen in the sentence given against Robert earl of Flaunders, which beginneth thus, Nos pares Franciae ad requestam & mandatum regis venimus in suam curiam Parisijs & tenuimus curiàm cum xii alijs personis, etc. We the peers of France at the request and commandment of the king came into his court at Paris, and with twelve other persons held court. The sentence also against Peter Mauclere, whereby the fee of the county of Britain was taken from him, is given by one archbishop, two bishops, eight earls, Matthew Montmorancie the viscount of Beaumond, and john of Soisson, conceived in these words, Notum facimus quod nos coram clarissimo domino nostro Ludovico rege Franciae iudicavimus, etc. We make it known, that we before our most noble lord jews king of France have judged, etc. By which words it appeareth that the king, albeit that he was present, yet gave not sentence, not not even in trials concerning sovereignty. So also we may see in the case of the succession of Alphonsus county of Poitiers, although there were but question of the demain, the king yet nevertheless gave not therein his opinion or judgement. Neither in like sort did king Francis, howbeit that he was present at the judgement of Charles of Bourbon the constable attainted of treason▪ And that more is, when question was of the fealty and homage which the counties of Champagne aught to do unto the king, it was judged by the peers of France, and many earls, the king the present, not to judge, but to assist them: the form of which sentence is yet found in these words conceived, judicatum est a paribus regni, videlicet a Rhemensi Archiepiscopo, & Lingonensi, Guillielmo Catalaunensi, Ph. Beluacensi, Stephano Noviomensi episcopis, & Odone duce Burgundiae, & alijs episcopis, & baronibus, etc. Nobis audientibus & judicium approbantibus etc. Now if the prince aught to doubt to judge the causes of his subjects, where it concerneth but their particular, and wherein he himself can have no interest, to the end not to give occasion of discontentment to them whom he should condemn, whether it were right or wrong, but aught still to maintain himself in the love and unity of his own people, as in a most stately and strong tower: then how much more aught he so to do, when he is himself a party, or the causes capital, as for rebellion or treason? I remember, that in the trial of Charles duke of Bourbon, one Valier examined in the tower of Loches, by the precedent de Selua, and the bishop of Puy, and other the conspirators examined at Tarrare by john Brinon precedent of Rouen, deposed, That the occasion which caused the duke to rebel, was the answer that king Francis made unto the articles which the duke had sent unto the court of parliament, concerning the suit he had against the king and the regent, concerning certain lands and domains which the duke claimed as belonging unto himself. Wherein had not the king in any sort meddled, but left it all together unto his judges and attourneys, he had not given occasion to so great a subject to have brought both the king himself, and the whole realm, into such a dangerous an estate as it was in short time after. For what good justice soever the prince do, always he that shall be condemned will think that he hath wrong done him.  
Now to say as some men do object and say, That if the prince in person himself 
A vain objection for the shortening of suits, if the prince himself in person take upon him the administration of justice.  should take upon him the administration of justice, men should have a good and quick dispatch of their suits; and that such numbers of appeals, such exceptions and petitions, with other long delays of justice, should be so quite cut off; deserveth not so much as answer. For who is he which knoweth not at what great charge he must be, how many circumstances and delays, how many windings and turnings, how many repulses and griefs he must endure that hath any suit in court? Neither is it to be thought, judgements to be so much the better, by how much they are the shorter. For albeit that Thucydides (the most famous of them that were of his time, of the council of the Areopagis in Athens) seemeth to have been in the same opinion that some others were, viz. That offences once committed, were forthwith to be punished; yet I verily suppose the opinion of Plutarch, yea of the Hebrews themselves to be the truer: for these think it necessary for him that will judge aright, to use delays in public judgements. But he in that little book which he wrote of the slow vengeance of God, plainly 
The quicker justice not always the better.  teacheth men to be warned by almighty God, if they will be the true imitators of his justice, to proceed but slowly and by little and little in the trial of capital causes, whether it be that the truth of the matter may the better appear, or for the drawing of some profit from the offenders before their death, or to draw them to repentance, or for their more grivous punishment (for that the punishment is the greater the longer that it hangeth over one's head) or the better or more justly to judge of another man's life, being withal in question. For right hard it is for a judge pressed with choler and desire of revenge, hasted by some, and thrust forward by others, to do good justice, what knowledge or fear soever he have to judge amiss: and what shall then the prince do, who hath neither the one nor the other? The judgements of the inferior magistrates are corrected by the superior, by way of appeal: but if the prince himself shall take upon him to judge, who shall reform his decrees? For he that in the former judgement hath not sufficiently declared his matter unto the judge, or by oversight let some thing pass; if yet he may appeal, all may well be amended: but if the prince himself shall once give judgement, the gate is then after sentence shut up, and no place left for appeal, or how to amend the error. Which we say to restrain a prince from intermeddling with judgements, except he be a man of great wisdom, or use therein the 
Causes worthy & well beseeming the princes hearing & deciding.  assistance of his wise and learned councillors; and the causes such as may seem worthy the princes hearing and judgement: following therein the council of jethro, who seeing Moses troubled from morning to night in doing justice to all men, and in all causes, You kill yourself (said he) with taking so much pain; choose me out of the wisest and most discreet men of the people to ease yourself upon; and if there be any thing high or difficult to judge, it sufficeth that you take upon you the hearing thereof, leaving the rest unto the other magistrates and judges to hear and determine. Which counsel of his father in law Moses followed. So likewise we read, that Romulus having committed unto the Senate and the magistrates, the ordinary administration of justice, reserved unto himself only the hearing of matters of greatest importance. And albeit that the Roman emperors afterwards would have their judgements to extend something farther, yet was the emperors jurisdiction for the hearing of matters still shut up and included within certain bounds: which for all that the prince's flatterers, or else the princes themselves often times went beyond, sitting in judgement sometimes even of light and ordinary matters: so as did Claudius the emperor, (the most sottish lout that ever was) who yet would always be judging and deciding of causes and controversies: of whom Tranquillus thus writeth, Alium negantem rem cognitionis sed ordinarij juris esse, subito causam apud se agere coegit, He compelled (saith he) another man denying the matter to belong unto the emperors hearing, but to be only an ordinary matter, and so to belong to the ordinary jurisdiction, he compelled him (I say) even forthwith and without more ado, to pled the cause before him, but that so foolishly, as that the lawyers openly mocked him, therefore insomuch that one of them was so bold with him as to say unto him in Greek, which yet most of the standers by 
Claudius' the emperor derided for taking upon him the deciding of common causes and matters.  understood, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, An old man, and a fool too. And another tripped him going out of the judgement seat, and so gave him a fall: yea his folly at last proceeded so far, as that the very pages and lackeys would play with his nose as he slept, and spot his face with ink. And into this case the prince must needs fall, who voided of wisdom, thinketh it a goodly matter in the presence of the people to determine great matters, and so to make himself to be of all men contemned and laughed at: than which nothing can be more dangerous in a Monarchy. Wherhfore the prince which will often sit in judgement, be present in the Senate, or much show himself unto the people, him I would have equal in understanding unto Solomon, in wisdom 
The great care that a prince should have of himself, which would oftentimes ●…it in judgement, or much show himself, and especially unto strangers.  to Angustus, and in modesty to Anreltus; or else but seldom to come abroad, and more seldom himself to administer justice, and that so much the less in the presence of strangers, who still judge such things as seem not commendable in a prince, not only in his mind, but even in the evil feature of his body, or uncomeliness of his attire: and such other small imperfections (which the subjects for the love and reverence which they bear unto their natural prince easily bear with all) to be even right great vices or deformities. Which the strangers never excuse, but reporting the same to the worst, still augment them in strange places, even to the lest of his looks, countenance, behaviours and gestures. The same of king Agesilaus had with the bruit thereof filled all the lesser Asia, Greece, and Africa, whom yet when the king of Egypt had seen lying upon the ground in a meadow, with a course Greek cloak on his back, and himself but lean, little, and lame withal, he made of him no great account, but rather had him in contempt and derision. The like is reported in the memory of our fathers, to have happened unto king jews the eleventh, who being chosen arbitrator in a controversy betwixt the kings of Navarre and Castille, and going unto the frontiers of his kingdom, the Spaniards at their arrival mocked the French men and their king, Who seemed unto them as a pilgrim come from Saint james of Compostella, with his great cap upon his head, set all about with brouches, and his jacket of course cloth, without any majesty at all, either in his countenance, or in his behaviour; and they of his train all in like sort appareled: (For why, he could not abide to see any man in brave attire) whereas the king of Castille and his troop being come, showed themselves in most sumptuous attire, with their horses in their rich comparisons: which showed a certain greatness in the Spaniard, insomuch as that it seemed the Frenchmen to have been but the Spaniards servants, but that there was a great and strong army of them not far off in the field, in readiness at all assays: which the Spaniards discovering, yield unto the French king such conditions as himself pleased. And yet the same king jews the eleventh considering princes by the opinion of men to be either praise or dispraise worthy (who commonly are led away but with the exterior show) hearing that the ambassadors of Venice were come bravely appareled, and well accompanied, he caused himself to be also most magnificently in royal robes attired, and so sitting in an high chair of Estate, admitted the ambassadors unto his presence.  
Wherhfore with greater reason aught a prince, when as he cometh to an enter 
That princes aught seldom to come to an interview of their persons.  view with another strange prince (which he aught but most seldom to do) to show himself in such sort, as that there be nothing in his attire, and much less in his countenance or behaviour and speech to be discommended. And that is it for which Philip Comines speaking of the interview of princes, saith, That they aught to shun it so much as they may: for that their presence always diminisheth their fame, and the opinion conceived of their persons, causeth them to be the less esteemed: a thing yet more to be feared towards the strangers than towards the subjects.  
Now that which I have said, It not to be fit for sovereignty, or for sovereign princes to intermeddle with judgements; aught yet more to be observed in a popular estate, 
The people u●…fie to judge of matters.  for the great difficulties in assembling of the people, and to 'cause them to understand reason; and then after that they have understood it, to induce them well to judge thereof, their judgements being often times perverted by seditious declamations or factions: which was the greatest occasion of the civil wars amongst the Romans, until that Sylla the Dictator had remitted the hearing of all causes unto the magistrates, excepting the offence of treason, and that in the highest degree.  
But yet besides the inconveniences by us before noted, nothing hath ever been more 
That the Senate or Magistrates are not to be deprived of their authority & power to have the sam●… given to the prince.  dangerous, or more ruinated Commonweals, than to translate the authority of the Senate or command of the magistrates, unto the prince or the people. For that the less the power of the sovereignty is (the true marks of majesty thereunto still reserved) the more it is assured; as well said Theopompus king of Lacedemonia, who having increased the power of the Senate, and appointed five Ephori in title of office, as Tribunes of the people: and being therefore by his wife reproved, for that in so doing he had much diminished his own power: So have I also (said he) much more assured the same for the time to come. For hard it is for high and stately buildings long to stand, except they be upholden and stayed by most strong shores, and rest upon most sure foundations; all which consisteth in the Senate or council, & in the good duties of the magistrates. In which thing the Venetians, as they have done many things wisely, so have they done in nothing more than in that, that they which have the sovereignty, intermeddle not with judgements only, but not so much as with any other thing else, which may well by the magistrates or the Senate be dispatched: Which haply hath been one of the chief means whereby that state hath been so long preserved, considering that there neither is, nor ever was any Commonweal, where they which have the sovereignty trouble themselves less with that which belongeth unto the council or the magistrates. The Great Council of the nobility, or gentlemen, wherein the whole majesty of that Commonweal resteth, is never assembled but for the creating of new magistrates, or enacting of laws, all the rest of the affairs of the estate being to be dispatched by the Senate, and the council of the Ten, and of the Seven men; and matters of jurisdiction by the other magistrates. Which if it be a thing commendable, and well appointed in Aristocratike estates, with better reason aught it to take place in Popular estates, Where the more heads there be, the less wit there is, and so the worse resolution also. Neither like I of Xenophon that most famous man's opinion, who speaking of the Athenian Commonweal, saith, That the more popular that the laws are, the better they maintain a Democraty, or Popular estate, When as (saith he) the people hath the hearing of all matters, and that all passeth by lot and voice: which thing indeed doth utterly overthrow all Popular Commonweals. As in Athens, when as by the persuasion of Pericles, the hearing and deciding of matters, and the managing of the state, was taken from the Senate or council of the Areopagis, to be brought back unto the people; the 
The Popular Commonweal not to be the best maintained by the most Popular laws.  city destitute of wit, and without council, fell first forthwith into great broils, and not long after into utter ruin & decay. But amongst the Swissers, where their Popular estates have now flourished 260 years, and so yet continued and grow from good to better, still flourishing both in peace and war: those their estates are preserved and upholden by laws of all other least popular, nothing being almost left unto the people more than the choosing of their officers, the other rights of sovereignty being but sparingly and within a certain convenient measure communicated unto them. Neither was the Roman Commonweal ever fairer or farther from civil wars, than when (the majesty of the people saved whole) all things were done by the Senate and the magistrates: which was from the first Carthaginensian war, unto the conquest of the kingdom of Macedon. But after that both the Gracchies by their most popular laws had taken from the authority of the Senate and the power of the magistrates, as much as they possibly could, all to increase the wealth and liberty of the people; there ensued thereof a most miserable change of that Commonweal: neither did the city of Rome ever after cease from civil wars and sedition, until that immoderate liberty of the insolent people, was by the power of one oppressed and brought under, and they so brought into extreme misery and servitude. The same inconvenience or mischief befell the Megarensians, who from a Popular estate fell into a most miserable Tyrannical government (as saith Plato) for the unbridled liberty and insolency of the people, taking upon them the hearing of all things, above the authority, jurisdiction, and power of the Senate, or of the other magistrates.  
But the best kind of Commonweal is that, wherein the sovereign holdeth what 
The best ordered Commonwealth  concerneth his majesty, the Senate maintaineth the authority thereof, the magistrates execute their power, and justice hath her ordinary course. Whereas otherwise if the prince or the people shall take upon themselves the authority of the Senate, or the commands, offices, or jurisdictions of the magistrates; it is much to be feared, lest that they destitute of all help, shall at the length be spoiled of their own sovereign majesty also. And in mine opinion they shamefully err, which think themselves to increase the prince's wealth and power, when they show unto him his Claws, giving him to understand, that his will his countenance, and his look, aught to be as an edict, a decree, and a law; to the end that there should be none of his subjects which should presume to take upon them the hearing or deciding of any matter, which might not be again by him reversed and changed: so as did the tyrant Caligula, who would not that the 
The foolish saying of Caligula.  lawyers should so much as give their council and opinions, when as he said, Paciam ut nihil respondeant nisi Eccum, that is to say, That is he to whom it alone belongeth to give his opinion; meaning by himself: but by the word Eccum, which is, Behold the man; alluding to the word Aequum, which is, That which is right and just. But this opinion by little and little crept into prince's minds, breeding in them an incredible desire of oppression and tyranny.  
  

CHAP. VII. ¶ Whether a Prince in civil factions aught to join himself to one of the parties, and whether a good subject aught to be constrained to take part with the one or the other faction: with the means to remedy seditions.  
NOw we have already declared▪ What a Sovereign Prince aught to be in the administration of justice towards his subjects; and if he should take upon him the person of a judge, when, and how, and in what sort of Commonweal he aught to do it: let us now also see out of the terms of justice, when the subjects; are divided into factions and part-taking, and that the judges and magistrates are themselves parties also, Whether the Sovereign Prince aught to join himself to one of the parties; & whether the good subject aught to be constrained to follow the one or the other party, or not. And first let us set down this as a maxim, All factions and part-taking to be dangerous and pernicious in every sort of Commonweals, and that they aught, if 
All factions and part-taking dangerous unto Commonweals.  it be possible, by all means to be prevented; or if that cannot be before they be plotted, yet to search the means to heal them▪ or at leastwise to employ all convenient remedies to mittigat the disease. And albeit that of civil seditions and part-taking there sometime cometh great good, as some one or other good law, or some other good reformation, which had not beve if the sedition had not happened; yet it is not therefore to be said, that sedition is not dangerous, although that it by chance and casually draw after it some good: as in man's body a disease chancing, is the cause that men use letting of blood, and purgations, and so draw away the evil and corrupt humours: so seditions oftentimes are cause that the evil or wicked men are slain, or driven away and banished, to the end that the rest may live in quiet; or that evil laws and decrees be canceled and repealed, to give place unto good, which had otherwise never been received. For which if one shall say, That seditions, and civil wars, are good, he might also say, that murders, parricides, adulteries, theft; and the subversion of estates & Commonweals are also good. For why, there is no impiety so great, no villainy so detestable, whereof no profit may redound, either to all, or to some men in particular; yea the very villainies of wicked men almighty God useth to draw either to the punishment of the reprobat, or to the glory of his name. Which yet to praise, were as if we should commend diseases; as Favorinus the Philosopher highly commended the fever quartain: which were but to confounded the difference betwixt good and evil, the difference betwixt profit and disprofit, betwixt honour and dishonour, betwixt vice and virtue; and in brief to confounded fire and water, heaven and earth together. Wherhfore as vices and diseases are dangerous both unto the body and the soul; so seditions and civil wars are hurtful and pernicious unto all estates and Commonweals.  
But it may be some man will say, That seditions and civil wars are good and profitable 
Seditions and factions dangerous even for Tyrannical governments  for Tyrannical Monarchies, and for the maintaining of Tyrants in their Tyrannical estates, they being always enemies unto their subjects, and such as cannot long continued, if the subject be once at accord amongst themselves. But we have before declared, the Tyrannical Monarchy to be of all others the weakest, as that which is not but by cruelties and villainies nourished and maintained; and yet commonly we see it to fall and take end by seditions and civil wars: so that if we look into all tyrannies which have been destroyed and overthrown, we shall found it most commonly to have happened of factions and civil tumults. Yea even the most crafty and subtle tyrants, who by little and little put to death, now some, and then others, to fat themselves with the blood of their subjects, and to save their own unlucky life, which they lead in continual pain and languor, never escape the murdering hands of conspirators; who so much the more increase, by how much more the tyrant putteth of his subjects to death; others which are unto them allied, being always priest and ready to revenge the death of their so nigh kinsmen: and albeit that the tyrant put to death all their kinsmen, friends, and allies, yet nevertheless they shall so stir up all the good subjects against themselves. And of the goods of the subjects for tyrants to enrich themselves, is to procure their own ruin and decay: for it is impossible that spleen should fill itself, or that the overgrowing of corrupt proud flesh should fatten itself, but that the other members must dry, and so the whole body shortly after perish and consume also. And therefore the Florentines in my judgement had no reasonable cause, why secretly to maintain the factions of the Pistoians, whom they had before subdued: for that they foresaw not, them whom they thought might so by their mutual broils and contentions be weakened, & so the more easily endure the Florentines their lords, by liberty and the use of arms to grow more fierce and courageous, than if they had lived in peace and quiet, and with abundance of delights lost their force and strength: besides that, they therewith lost so much of their own force, by the loss of so many good subjects, one of them by another ruinated and overthrown.  
Now if seditio●…s and factions be dangerous unto monarchies, then are they much 
An especial benefit a Monarch hath above other Commonweals.  more dangerous unto Aristocraties and Popular estates: for that monarchs may maintain their majesty, and as neuters decide the quarrels of their subjects; or by joining themselves to one of the parties, to bring the other unto reason, or else altogether to oppress them: whereas the people divided in a popular estate, hath no sovereign over them; no more than the lords divided in aristocraty have no man to command them: if it be not that the greater part of the people, or of the lords, be not of the faction, which so may command the rest. Now when I say faction, my meaning is not 
Private factions how they are to be suppressed.  of an handful of people, or some small number of subjects, but even of a good part of them banded against an other, able to trouble the whole estate: but if they be but few in number, he that hath the sovereignty in hand, aught at the first to repress them; which he may do either by commanding them to lay down arms, or by referring the cause of their dissension and variance unto indifferent judges: or if the matter be such as may require his own declaration and pleasure, then to do the same with good advice, and the mature deliberation of his most wise magistrates and councillors, not in any wise suspected to favour the one part more than the other: and this to the intent that the prince, or they which have the sovereignty, should not themselves bear the envy or discontentment of them which should so be condemned. But if the faction be grown so far, as that it cannot by way of justice, or by orderly inducements be appeased, it then be hooueth the sovereign prince, or them that hold the sovereignty in an aristocraty or popular estate, to use their forces for the utter extinguishing thereof, by the punishing of some few of the ringleaders and chief men in the faction; that so the punishment may touch but some few▪ and yet the fear come unto all of them. Neither aught the sovereign prince to defer the matter so long, until they be grown so strong as that they be not any more to be resisted, or that the leaders of them being for fear of punishment become desperate, shall seek to overthrow the whole estate of the commonweal. For there still are, and always have been good and valiant men, which for the welfare of their country doubt not to adventure their lives; although there be many, who to the contrary had rather their country should perish for them. Which kind of men (the very plagues of commonweals) are upon the sudden to be oppressed▪ jest happily the whole estate of the commonweal were often times by some one or other of them to be endangered; yea, although such civil discord rise but for some private displeasure of theirs.  
But all this which we have yet said, is to be understood but of factions which concern 
Factions and conspiracies against the prince or estate, how they are to be repressed and the conspirators punished.  not the estate; for if the faction be directly against the state, or the life of the sovereign prince, there is then no question whether the prince should take a part, or show himself an open enemy unto such seditious, which so profess themselves of all others the greatest enemy of their prince & commonweal: for otherwise, if when the state and welfare of the commonweal, or the prince his own life is attempted, he shall sit still but as an idle beholder, he shall so invite and animate not the more desperate sort of men only, but even very cowards to seek after his life also. But yet a great difference there is to be made in the manner of punishment of the offenders: for if the number of the conspirators against the state or his person be but few, he shall suffer the Magistrates to proceed against them by order of law, and as he seethe 'cause himself to moderate the heaviness of the punishment; which the fewer the conspirators are, is so much the sooner to be inflicted▪ and before that more be discovered, to the end that by the punishment of some few, the good subjects may still be kept within the compass of their allegiance and duty, and those which were evil inclined, so terrified from their evil intended purpose. Neither yet is too straight or strict enquiry to be made to found 
That in a conspiracy it is not good to make too straight inquiry to found out all the conspirators.  out all the conspirators, lest by force of torture and torment, such things be haply wrung out, as were indeed better unknown than known. And yet it is not to be dissembled or winked at, if the party guilty be once discovered to have conspired against the life of his sovereign, or yet to have but been willing so to have done. As it happened unto a gentleman of Normandy, who confessing unto a friar (his ghostly father) of a purpose that he had had to have slain Francis the first the French king, but yet not daring so to do, to have repent him now of his so wicked and detestable a purpose, was therefore of the friar so much as in him lay pardoned; who yet nevertheless forthwith revealed the same unto the king, who causing the gentleman to be apprehended, sent him unto the parliament of Paris to be tried, where he was as a traitor condemned to death. Howbeit, that (in mine opinion) the king in his greater wisdom might have done better to have pardoned him, for that it had repent him of that his wicked purpose (which the law for the heinousness of the fact do so severely punish) & so was become the betrayer & accuser of himself before he was by any other accused. And it may be that it had been better to have executed him without making of the king acquainted therewith, so to have disburdened him of the envy of such a judgement. So as did the emperor Augustus with Q. Gallus, who having not only purposed, but even desperately also attempted to have slain him; and being therefore by the Senate condemned of treason, was yet by the same emperor Augustus (dissembling the matter as if he had thereof known nothing) pardoned, and so sent away unto his brother then governor in one of the provinces: but was yet nevertheless upon the way slain, not without the secret commandment of Augustus himself, as many men supposed, using therein the like subtlety: a craft that had his uncle Caesar before used, in giving pardon to M. Marcellus at the request of the Senate; who yet was immediately after slain, as one of Caesar his most mortal enemies. Yet more likely it is, neither Caesar (who in a certain natural clemency exceeded almost all other princes) neither Augustus (placed in so high a seat of honour and majesty) to have been willing to have defiled or stained their so great honour & dignity with the secret murder of them whom they might most justly have executed. Howbeit that some of the finer sort to the contrary excuse the matter, as by them done for the safety of their own lives; and yet so by his means still to maintain the great opinion which they had before 
Torture for the finding out of conspirators aught to be most warily used.  caused men to conceive of their clemency and mercy. But if the conspirators be in number many, and that they be not all discovered, the wise prince aught to beware how he putteth to torture those that be condemned, albeit that he might even with a beck without danger kill them all: for that for one that he should put to death, there would arise up an hundred of their allies & friends, who it may be, have power enough, or at lest wise never fail of will enough to revenge the death of them which were of their blood; and in case all this were not so, yet aught the prince always to shun the note and blame of cruelty, as well of his subjects as of strangers: wherein Nero was greatly deceived, who having discovered the conspiracy against his person and estate, would needs by torture & torment know all them that were partakers therein: wherein he found so great a number of them that were, what by right, and what by wrong accused, as that the conspirators indeed seeing themselves condemned, discharged their choler upon the tyrant's most faithful and loyal friends: all whom he caused most cruelly to be slain; which was afterwards the cause of the open and general rebellion of the captains and governors of the provinces against him. And for this cause Alexander the great having put to death Parmenio, Philotas, and the rest which had conspired his death, by a new decree or law abrogated the ancient law of the Macedonians, whereby five of them that were the nearest of kin unto the conspirators were still to be put to death. But the best and surest way to avoid the farther danger of a conspiracy already prevented, is for a prince to dissemble the matter, as if he knew not the conspirators, as Tacitus well said, Optimum remedium insidiarum, est si non 
Conspirators prevented to have oftentimes been right wisely dissembled, and not farther inquired after.  intelligatur, The best remedy of a conspiracy is, not to seem to understand thereof. So when Hanno general of the Carthaginensians, had purposed to have slain all the Senators, and chief men of the city, under the colour of the marriage of his daughter; the Senate understanding of the matter, but dissembling the same, forthwith caused an edict or law to be published, concerning the charges to be made at feasts: wherein the number of the guests, & the charges of the feast (which was not great) was most straightly appointed. By which decree of the Senate, the conspiracy intended, was without any tumult or bloodshed at all quietly suppressed. So in like manner Eteocles captain of the Lacedæmonians, with a strong garrison of soldiers holding the island of Chio against the Atheniensians, and understanding that the garrison soldiers secretly conspiring together, had determined to kill the inhabitants their friends and allies, in whose aid they were come, and so to take unto themselves the possession of the island; and that the signal of the conspirators was, for every one of them to carry in their hands a cane, or reed: he (I say) understanding of the matter, and accompanied with certain of his most assured friends, & so walking about the city, slew the first that he met withal carrying of a reed, and so suddenly gave it out, That he would kill all the rest that so carried reeds in their hands, and yet withal took order with the inhabitants of the island, that the soldiers were paid their pay: and so by the death of one only soldier the conspiracy was quenched before the fire could be well kindled: and the occasion of the conspiracy so taken away, and all again well quieted. Wherhfore every governor and magistrate aught to take care, not so much to take away seditions already grown, as to prevent them: For that a sedition once set on fire, is like a spark suddenly blown, which with the rage of the people, which setteth all the city on a light fire before it can be again quenched. Wherein the prince's commands are not to be expected, who commonly know lest of such things as touch them nearest. Yea oftentimes it happeneth princes well to understand the secrets, writings, doings, and sayings of other foreign princes, and yet perceive not the fire kindled at home in their own realms, in their own palaces, yea even in their own bed chambers. The conspiracy of 
Prince's oftentimes better to understand of the conspiracies against 〈◊〉 princes, than of such as are against themselves at Rome contrived.  Pelopidas, for the surprising of the castle Cadmea, and the expulsing of the Lacedæmonians out of Thebes, was known in Athens, before that any thing thereof was disconered in Thebes, as the event showed. For why, but even a little before that Archias the captain of the castle was together with the garrison soldiers therein slain, he was by letters from the bishop of Athens warned to look to himself: which letters because he would not at supper read, he used the common proverb; In crastinum negotia, To morrow will serve for our business. Who knoweth not the emperor Charles the fift to have been either partaker, or privy almost to all things that were any where done by other princes, yet did he not so much as once suspect the conspiracy which 
* 1552.  duke Maurice and Albertus marquess of Brandeburg his familiar and domestical friends, had even fast by him contrived against him: yea and had also effected the same before he could feel or perceive the smoke thereof. But what need foreign examples? the conspiracy of Amboise, which set all France on fire, was divulged in Germany, England, and Italy, before it was once suspected by them against whom it was contrived in France: unto whom the cardinal Granuellan is reported by his letters to have first discovered the same, and yet there were above ten thousand persons which had therein a part. Whereby it is plain, such conspiracies as wherein the force and power 
Conspiracies hard to be concesl●…d, being often times ●… even by women revealed.  of many is to be required, to have always had most difficult and dangerous events: for that they can neither by a few be effected, neither yet by many be concealed. Yea often times it chanceth the conspirators most secret designs to be even by women first revealed. As it happened to Philotas, who discovering the conspiracy against Alexander the Great unto a courtesan whom he loved, was together with his complices to his destruction by her bewrayed. So Fulvia understanding of Catiline his conspiracy by one of his soldiers, revealed the same unto the Consul Cicero. And in our time the secret designs of the Prior of Campania (general of the French galleys) for the sudden surprising and rifling of the city of Venice by a soldier revealed unto a courtesan, 
The most dangerous conspiracy that can be against the person of a prince, and the hardest to b●…e avoided.  was forthwith by her discovered and made known unto the Senat. Yet for all that an hard matter it is for a prince, be he never so wise or subtle, to preserve himself from the danger of a resolute man that hath sworn his death: for that as the secret, & the exeuction thereof is but against one man only, so is it but in one man alone enclosed, willing and resolved to sacrifice his life (how dear unto him soever) to have another man's, howbeit that he were beset round with an army. Such an one as Sc●…uola is reported to have been; who of the event gave first name unto his house and family, for that he of his own accord had thrust his right hand into a burning fire, so to be burnt of, for that he mistaking the man, had slain the king's lieutenant in stead of the king himself. With no less boldness (or valour should I say) did a servant of Lazarus the Despot of Servia kill Amurath the king of the Turks, in the midst of his legions of men, so to revenge the death of his lord, and the dishonour done unto the queen his wife. So Pausaenias also in the sight of the whole army slew Philip king of Macedon, Alexander the Great his father. And Peter Aloisius also duke of Placence, was in his own castle by two murderers stabbed and slain even in the sight of his guard. And he that slew the emperor Domitian went to seek him out even into his cabinet with his arm in a scarf: in such sort as did Aod kill Eglon king of the Moabites. And if Cosmus Medici's duke of Florence (having ceized upon the estate) had not always go armed, neither could his great guards, neither yet his strong castles have kept him from the hands of most desperate men, who oftentimes found means to enter even into his most close and secret places, to have slain him an hundred times, what death soever they should therefore have died. Yea amongst the rest of many most desperate murderers, there was one, who even in the council chamber struck him with his dagger, thinking so to have stabbed him (his guard standing round about him) not knowing him as then to have had a privy coat upon him. And yet well he knew that his life lay thereon, and so indeed was presently cast headlong out at a window down to the ground.  
But forasmuch as we have before touched certain means which may preserve a prince from falling into these dangers, and whereby to hinder the conspiracies which might be made against his person: Let us now see how he aught to bear and behave himself in conspiracies and factions, which are not directly against himself nor his estate, but amongst his great lords among themselves, or among the estates, towns, or provinces subject unto him; all which he aught by all means to prevent, and not to neglect any thing how little soever it be for the meeting therewith. For as the great storms and tempests are caused of most light and insensible exhalations and vapours: 
Of small sparks often times do arise the great flames and fires of sedition.  even so seditions and civil wars the destructions of cities and Commonweals, are most times begun for most small matters, and such as a man would not think that even they should work such effect. In the reign of justiman the emperor all the cities of the Greek empire were divided into factions, for the maintaining of the colours of green & Blue, which they according to their fancies took unto them in their sports and justs, one of them braving and contending with another: which in the end took such force and went so far, as that the judges and magistrates of Constantinople, going about to punish the seditious, were letted so to do by others of the same faction who took part with them, and so took out of the hands of the officers and executioners such as were by them led to the place of execution, and not so contented broke open the prisons also, and let lose all the prisoners, and in the same rage burnt the temple of Saint Sophia: and to avoid the punishment which they (having laid down arms) were not to hope for, made choice of one Hippatius the captain and ringleader of their faction, for emperor; justinian with his family in the mean time lurking in a corner. Which tumult proceeded so far, as that thirty thousand men were in one day in that quarrel slain: and had not he the leader of the faction (and he even the new chosen emperor) there been killed, the emperor justinian had undoubtedly had much to do to have saved his life; who yet at the beginning together with his other courtiers took great sport and pleasure therein. The like whereof happened at Syracuse also, where two of the magistrates become rivals, and so falling out for their love, at the first gave occasion for other men to laugh at them, but at length so divided the whole Commonweal into two such factions, which so banded the one the other, as that the most courageous of the nobility being slain, the people taking up arms and driving out them that were left of the nobility or better sort, took upon it the sovereignty, and so changed the aristocraty into a Democraty or Popular estate. Wherefore it behoveth a prince, before the fire of sedition and civil wars by such sparks be 
That the quarrels of great men aught even in the beginning to be wisely appeased, or by force of the prince suppressed.  inflamed, to cast on cold water, or else quite to quench the same: that is to say, to proceed to the preventing thereof, either by sweet speeches and persuasions, or elsbies open force. So as did Alexander the Great, who seeing Ephestion and Craterus his greatest friends, upon a mutual emulation to be at discord and variance amongst themselves, and so to draw the rest of his valiant captains into parts-taking with them: he at the first with fair words, and gentle persuasions sought to make them friends together, but afterwards taking them apart, sharply rebuked them both, threatening withal to band himself against him which soever of them should first by word or deed offend the other: by which sharp reprehension putting them both in fear, made them friends together. And so our king jews, he who for his devotion towards God, for his love towards his neighbours, for his charity towards particular men, and upright dealing towards all, is numbered amongst the Saints; unto his great praise used the matter, as that all the time of his reign there was never difference or contentions betwixt any the princes, which he for his integrity and wisdom himself in most friendly and peaceable manner quieted not. Yet of all things this is in a prince most to be taken heed of, That in ending the differences and quarrels of the nobility or princes, he seem not to be led or moved with the love or hatred of any of them, one more than another. Wherein Archidamus king of the Lacedæmonians, wisely provided for himself, who 
A wise part of Archidamus in making of two great enemies friends.  seeing two great men his most dear friends at odds betwixt themselves, brought them both into the temple, and there demanded of them whom they would make choice of to be arbitrator of the difference betwixt them? who both answering, That they would make choice of none other but of Archidamus himself: Swear then unto me (said he) that you shall both abide mine award, and do as I shall enjoin you: which they both doing, he straightly enjoined them both, Never to departed out of that same church, until they had reconciled themselves one of them unto another, and so become sworn friends. Whereby he wisely without any offence or displeasure unto himself (by giving of judgement betwixt them) made them friends, and so with thanks enjoyed the fruit of their friendship and good agreement, than which nothing aught to be more dearer or more precious unto a prince: for that no fortresses are unto princes more assured, no castles stronger, than is the love and fidelity of their subjects towards them. But here I speak of a good prince, and not of a tyrant which taketh pleasure to see the great men still ruinated one of them by another; neither aimeth at any other mark, but how to flesh the great ones one of them upon another. Howbeit 
The craft of tyrants in setting other m●…n together by the ears, sometime dangerous unto themselves.  that it oftentimes falleth out, that the dogs falling unto agreement among themselves, fall all upon the wolf: so as did the factions of the Colonnois and the Vrsins, who having discovered that pope Alexander the sixt set them still at discord and variance among themselves, so by their calamities and falls to increase the strength and power of his bastard son Borgia; they fell to agreement among themselves, and so made head against him their common enemy.  
Sometime also a tyrant seeing the nobility in the State to flourish with the strength and alliance of friends, and the favour of the people, and not to seek one of them another's ruin, neither to have any equal adversaries to oppose themselves against them; doth yet secretly afford favour unto some of the meaner or weaker sort, and so armeth them against the richer and stronger, and by some notable and irremissable villainy by them committed against the other, bindeth them unto him, in such sort, as that they can never be reconciled again unto the parties by them so offended. So as john Bentivole the tyrant of Bononia is reported to have done: who fearing the good agreement of them of the greater sort, easily suffered the chiefest of the house and family of the Marischots (than the richest and a man of greatest credit in all that country) to be of his enemies slain, to the end that he might so be dispatched of him, and supported of them of the contrary faction: all reconciliation being by that so great an outrage broken off, and all hope of mutual friendship utterly cut a sunder: all which his tyrannical slights and deceits, together with the favour of the French king, yet helped him not, but that at length he was thrust out of his estate, and so by violence plucked headlong 
The obligation of wicked and desperate men grounded upon some norable villainy, in all Commonweals most dangerous, and how to be suppressed.  even out of the chiefest strength of his tyranny. But as the bond and obligation of a notable villainy is of all others the strongest, so is it also in every Commonweal most of all to be feared, for that thereby all the hope of amity and concord is cut off towards them which have received the injury. As it happened to the army of Carthage, which for want of pay revolting against the signory or state, under the conduct of two or three of their mutinous captains, ceized upon divers strong towns & places which they rifled and ransacked: which captains and ringleaders fearing to be by the soldiers at one time or other betrayed and delivered, persuaded the rest of the chief principal men amongst them, to kill the ambassadors of the signory, and to hung up Hasdrubal the General with the rest of the Carthaginensians which were fallen into their hands, to the end that having bound them by such cruelties, they should now have no hope at all to save their lives by composition. In which case there was no other mean for the signory to use, but even plain force, so utterly to root them out which could not otherwise be healed: as was afterwards that army of the Carthaginensians, being by a long and cruel war at length defeated. For why, they had directly banded themselves against the signory: in which case we have said the prince must of necessity become a party, and show himself a most sharp enemy unto the rebellious.  
But if discord and contention be amongst the princes and great men themselves, & 
How a sovereign prince is to end the quarrels and controversies that are betwixt the nobility.  that under the same sovereign prince, which yet he cannot either by his princely authority, neither by fair persuasion, nor hope of rewards, appease; he aught then to give them arbitrators, men of great integrity and wisdom, and such as they themselves can like of. In which doing the sovereign prince shall discharge himself of the heaviness of the judgement to be given, and of the hatred and displeasure of him or them that should be condemned. For if this manner of proceeding is and always hath been commendable for the ending of controversies even betwixt kings themselves, by committing their differences unto the arbitrement of princes; and that all nations use this manner and fashion: with how much more reason aught a wise prince (as of right he may) 'cause his own subjects to condescend thereunto, and especially them which are near unto him in alliance or blood, to the end that their quarrels and contentions should never (if it were possible) so far pass the bounds of reason, as to come to be tried by the sword or force of arms.  
But in ending such controversies, the prince above all things must beware that he 
Dangerous for a prince not to show himself indifferent in the quarrels and controversies of his great subjects.  show not himself more affected unto the one part than to the other: which hath been the cause of the ruin and overthrow of many princes and estates. So Philip the first king of Macedon was not slain, but for that he openly favoured Antipater against Pausanias a mean gentleman, in denying of him justice; which was the cause that Pausianas' discharged his choler even upon the person of the king himself. Neither for any other cause did Henry the sixt, king of England, stir up that long and deadly civil war, wherewith all England was in combustion eight and twenty years, and wherein were lost about fourscore princes of the royal blood (as Philip Comines reporteth) but for that the king took upon him to be captain of them of the faction of the house of Lancaster, against them of the faction and house of York: who at length having vanquished and overcome their enemies, put to death the king himself in prison, with all the rest of his nearest kinsmen. The conspiracy also of the marquess of Pescara, against Charles the emperor, was grounded upon the favour that the emperor bore unto the viceroy of Naples, against the marquess. It were but lost time to set down in writing the cruel & bloody wars which have been raised in this realm by Robert of Arthois, jews of Eureux king of Navarre, john Montford, john of Burgundy, and divers others of our time, which it is not needful to rehearse, and all for the favours of the kings, who forgetting the high degree of majesty whereunto they were mounted, would basely take upon them the offices of advocates, of judges, and arbitrators; so descending from the highest unto the lowest places, so to follow the passions of their subjects, making themselves companions unto some of them, and unto other some of them enemies.  
But some will haply say, That by this means the king shall know news, and keep the parties also in awe: whereunto I also well agreed, that a young king might so do amongst his ladies and gentlewomen, to take pleasure & knowledge of news enough, but not amongst his princes and other his great lords. Now if any man shall further object and say, Princes to be oftentimes, yea and that against their will enforced so to do, and to take a part, when as he which thinketh himself wronged, upon an obstinate 
When, and how a sovereign prince is to use his force for the appealing of the controversies and quarrels betwixt his great subjects  mind will not by any reason, persuasion, judgement, or arbitrement, suffer himself to be overruled or persuaded. In which case I say, that necessity hath no law: and yet that the prince before he may come to that point of extremity, as to use his force, aught to prove all the means that he possibly may, for the composing of the matter in controversy, and making of those his great subjects friends: which if it may not be, then by force and strong hand to overrule that which he could not otherwise do: For that it cannot be, that he which shall be so froward or presumptuous as not to harken unto reason, nor his friend's persuasion, can have many to take his part, or to stand fast by him in that his so great and obstinate wilfulness.  
Yet might some man say, That the occasion of the quarrel may be so secret, as that no proof can thereof be made, neither any judgement given, and yet that he which hath so received the injury, demandeth thereof an amendss: in which case the princes found themselves oftentimes much troubled, as when an injury or offence is unto any man secretly offered or done, which he which did it denieth, and that the truth cannot therein be tried but only by bore surmises & conjectures; in this case what is amongst the common and vulgar sort to be done? it is an easy thing to say, as that no man aught without most manifest witnesses to be condemned: but soldiers, and such as 
The beginning of combats.  stand upon their nobility, deem their honour to be stained, and their reputation greatly impaired, except he have satisfaction, who upon his oath affirmeth himself to have so been by any man secretly wronged. For why, such men say, the subjects lives and goods to be all in the prince's hand and power to be disposed of▪ but not their honour and reputation. In which case the people of the North have for the trial of the matter appointed combats; as is to be seen in the ancient laws of the Lombard's, of the Saliens, the Ripuaries, the English, the Burgundions, the Danes, the Almains, and the Normans; who in their customs call the Combat, The law of appearance: which many for all that have as a most beastly thing rejected, as never received or practised by the Assyrians, the Egyptians, the Persians', the Greeks', or Latins, except in lawful war, one man against his enemy, and that by the good leave of the General of the army; or else sometime one General encountering hand to hand with another, for the sparing of their subjects blood: so Cossus and Marcellus in battle hand to hand overcame their enemy's kings? Or else one king against another king, as did Romulus with the king of the Latins, and Hundig king of the Saxons, with Roe king of Denmark. So also Charles king of Naples challenged Peter king of Arragon unto the combat, for the trial of their right unto that kingdom, which they yet performed not. Neither is this any mean matter, when as Corbis and Orsua contending for the principality before Scipio Affricanus the Roman General, said, That they would have none other judge, either of God or man, to decide their quarrel, but Mars only. And yet 
Combats when to be admitted.  for all that it is better to appoint combats amongst subjects, according to the ancient and lawful manner of our ancestors, when the persons are of like quality which so stand upon their honour, and that there is some apparent conjecture of the wrong received (for why, the ancient laws never admitted combat in a plain and evident matter, or wherein good proof was to be had) for that to deny combat unro noble personages standing upon their honour, and at so great odds as that they can by no other means be appeased, were but to nourish the fire of civil war even in the entrails of the Commonweal, which after it is once kindled, inflameth the whole body thereof. For that two inconveniences propounded, wise men have well taught us, the greater aught still to be of us declined. join hereunto also, that to change a custom which hath for many worlds of years been found necessary, is not only an hard matter, but withal 
Combats by divers great princes forbidden, & for the avoiding of greater inconveniences by them again●… allowed.  dangerous also. Rotaris king of the Lombard's, had taken the law of Combats from amongst his subjects, but yet at their instant requests was enforced to restore the same again into the former force; protesting withal, That it was but inhuman and nought, (as is in the laws of the Lombard's to be seen) but yet for all that necessary to avoid greater inconveniences: For that the law of Combat being so taken away, more good and innocent men were most cruelly and secretly slain and made away, than haply had been, the danger and eternal infamy of such hidden treachery being still propounded to the offenders, to be tried by combat. So king jews the ninth, having the honour of God, and the welfare of his subjects before his eyes, was the first that forbade combats in this realm; which edect was thus, NOUS DEFENDONS BATAILLES PAR TOUT EN NOSTRE DOMAIN EN TOUTES QVERELLES, We forbidden Combats in all quarrels throughout our dominions. And for that this edict was evil kept, Philip the Fair, king jews his nephew, caused the like also to be published, whereby he utterly forbade combats: who yet within two years after was at the instant request of his subjects constrained to restore them again, by reason of the secret murders and stabbings, yea even of the most valiant men, who then were in every place so slain. Philip of France, surnamed the Hardy, duke of Burgundy, did not altogether forbidden combats in Holland, but yet commanded them not to be at all suffered, without the lawful appointment of the magistrates: whereas before they were there open and common without just cause even to all sorts of men. But it was a thing most barbarous, that Fronto king of Denmark in ancient time appointed all causes and quarrels to be decided by combat, as the Saxon historiographer saith. Howbeit that the Russians and Hungarians otherwise use it not, but when there is no evident proof of the matter brought in question. But in our remembrance the prince of Melphe, the king his lieutenant in Piedmont, found no remedy or means better, for the restraining of the secret murders and mutinies which were ordinary amongst his soldiers, than combat to be for them appointed, by the leave and authority of the General; with condition, That the vanquished should not be spared, but still be slain by the victor, and his body thrown into the river: For which such combats he appointed a public place betwixt two bridges, compassed round about with the river: so that the hope of flight or of aid taken away, and that they must either overcome their enemy, or there shamefully die; the soldiers afterwards began to behave themselves more modestly, and so live the more quietly together. 
Of the lie given, what is to be thought.   
But now, when as to have the lie given one, was neither by the Romans thought to be a thing injurious, neither that our ancestors had allowed the combat for the lie given to another man; it began in our age to be a thing not only contumelious, but even capital also; and that especially in the time of Francis the first the French king, who in a great assembly of his greatest peers one day said, that he was not an honest man which could endure the lie given him. Which he said, having by his heralds at arms given the lie to Charles the fift, for some dishonourable speeches he had given of him. Which yet since with us is grown as it were into a law, so that none of the nobility or martial men, which will put up the lie, is accounted of, as of a man of any worth or valour, but as of a base or vile fellow. Whereof have risen great quarrels, brawls, and murders, amongst all sorts of subjects. Which to meet withal, Henry the second, who not without much grief with a great number of his nobility, had seen a matter ended by combat, by a perpetual law forbade controversies or quarrels to be afterwards so tried. And to the intent that no man, who had rashly received the lie, should incur the note of infamy: Charles the ninth reviving the edict made by his father, for the forbidding of combats, joined thereunto moreover, That he would take unto himself the honour and reputation of such as found themselves grieved, for that they might not have the combat for the lie offered them: and yet there was never in France so many murders seen, as when combats were so forbidden. For who should not be well laughed at, which for the lie given him should appeal unto the judges? And yet in the opinion of the nobility and martial men, he shall seem to incur the most heavy note of infamy, which shall not by force of arms repel such a reproach or disgrace offered him. Neither can the frowardness (should I say) or vanity of so foolish an opinion easily be out of men's minds removed.  
But whereas we before said, that the combat is for the avoiding of greater inconveniences 
How, and for what cause combats are to be granted.  to be borne withal, my meaning is not, that it should be by law allowed, but only in case of necessity granted, and that by the princes express letters, after the hearing of the parties, and for the avoiding of murders and seditions, which might otherwise ensue. Whereby that inconvenience shall be avoided, which otherwise without combat could not be provided for, that kinsmen, neighbours, and friends, should for one man's wrong in a sort be enforced to take up arms, and so to entertain another man's quarrel: as oftentimes it chanceth the force and fury of wicked men, to fall upon the heads of good and worthy subjects. But that is in the hearing of the matter especially to be respected, that combat be not granted for the trial of any but of capital causes, and those also whereof no manifest proof is to be had or found out: following therein also the ancient laws, which will, That the vanquished should be declared infamous, and so disgraded of all his estates and honours, condemned to some shameful death, if he will not better die of the hand of the victor. Which severity of punishment, and fear of infamy, might stay many as well from entering into combats, as also from leading of a quarrelous and wicked life. For Philip the Fair having forbidden combats, thought it not good otherwise to restore them again unto the nobility, but upon the cause before known unto the magistrates, as it was by the old decree of the Senate provided. As by another decree of the same Senate given in the controversy betwixt the counties of Foix and Armagnac, it was said, That combats might not take place, when question was of civil right and law, which is yet the custom of them of Berne. And by the laws of Naples also, it was ordained, That combats should not take place but in cases of treason, and of casual murder: whereas before it was lawful in any offence whatsoever to challenge the combat of the adversary, theft only except: which yet I see by the custom of them of latter time, not to have been without good cause lawful. Howbeit that by the laws of Spain no just cause of combat is allowed. And thus much concerning private and particular quarrels▪ with the means to appease the same.  
But if quarrels and contentions arise betwixt whole families, or betwixt whole corporations 
Combats nor to be admitted for the quarrels and contentions betwixt families.  and colleges of the same city or Commonweal, and upon such like causes as do betwixt private men: combats in that case are not to have place▪ but the parties so at odds are by way of justice to be kept in good peace; or otherwise by force & sharp punishment to be inflicted upon the offenders to be kept in awe; yet for all that in such sort, as that justice should still have place even in arms in the execution doing: as it was in Rome, at such time as by a decree of the Senate it was appointed and set down, That four hundred innocent slaves should be all put to death; with which unusual manner of execution the common people all enraged was about to have taken 
Seditions arising for the execution of justice, how they are to be prevented.  up arms, if the emperor Nero had not for the keeping of them in, dispersed the soldiers of his guard into every quarter of the city, so to keep all quiet, until that the execution was done. Whereof justinian the emperor having even in like case failed, fell into the great and dangerous sedition (whereof we before spoke) which upon the sudden set all Constantinople almost upon a light fire. As not long ago the two most famous cities of Paris and Antwerp, were in great tumults and uproars, at such time as the people saved from execution certain persons for their religion condemned to die: whereof the revolt of the Low countries against the king begun. Neither is this any new matter, but known to have happened in the glory of the Roman Commonweal: when as at such time as the Consul had commanded one Volero a factious fellow to have the bastenado given him, (as the manner of punishing of such offenders was) the people by force took him out of the hands of justice, even as he was to have been stripped, and made him Tribune to defend the popular liberty against the Senate and the Nobility, with whom the people were still at war, if they had no enemies abroad. For which cause the Senate and Magistrates chief care, was to found out foreign enemies to oppose against the people: or if they wanted such, by all means to forge new enemies and wars, as knowing them otherwise never to cease from seditions & civil broils. For so soon as that the Carthaginensians had made peace with the Romans, after the first Punic wars, they forthwith entered into a great dangerous civil war at home among themselves: which still happened unto them at Rome, if they were never so little a while without wars. We see also, that they never shut up the temple of janus, which was the sign of an universal peace, but twice in seven hundred years space. And if we mark the histories well, we shall found nothing to have 
Nothing more hurtful unto a warlike people than peace.  been more daungerons and hurtful unto a valiant and warlike people, than peace: For that men accustomed to wars, and still trained up in arms, seek for nothing else but dissensions and broils, neither hate any thing more than to be at rest and quiet. And that is it for which the histories report Ca Marius to have been the best general of his time in the wars abroad, but the worst and most troublesome man alive at home and in time of peace: for that he well knew not what peace & quietness meant. Yet whether it be better in a Commonweal to train the people up in peace or war we will hereafter declare.  
Now we have in some sort touched certain means for the preventing of seditions and part-taking: but as it is much more easy to stay the enemy from entering, than to drive him out after he is once entered; so is it more easy also to prevent seditions and tumults, than to appease the same: and yet that more hardly also in a Popular estate or 
Seditions in a Popular Commonweal of all others most dangerous, and how to be appeased.  Commonweal, than in any other. For why, the prince in a Monarchy, and the lords in an aristocraty still are, and aught to be, as sovereign judges and arbitrators of the subjects: and so often times of their absolute power and authority appease and quiet all their differences: whereas in the Popular government the sovereignty lieth in the people themselves, which are so divided into factions, who in no other acknowledge the magistrates, but as men subject unto their command and power. Wherhfore in such Commonweals such seditions and factions are with the greatest care and diligence that possible is, to be at the first prevented: but if they be once risen before they were well foreseen, than it behoveth the most wise and virtuous men in the estate to take the matter in hand: who by their great wisdom and kind speeches may again appease the turbulent motions of headstrong and giddy common people. For as they which are sick of a frenzy, which causeth them to skip and dance without ceasing, cannot be cured, except the cunning physician tune his instrument unto their mad manner and fashion, to draw them unto his own, and so to fall by little and little▪ until that they be so again made more quiet and tractable: even so aught also the wise magistrate seeing the people in a rage, at the first to accommodate and frame himself unto their disordered appetite, that so he may afterwards by little and little induce them to harken unto reason: and so by yielding at first unto the tempest, at length put into the desired haven. For to seek by force to stay the rage of an angry and incensed multitude, is no other thing than as if a man should by main strength seek to stay the force and course of an heady stream, most violently falling from the high and steep rocks.  
And as for them which go about by force of arms and strong hand to stay the 
That the people up in tumult or sedition, is not by strong hand or open force to be stai●…d or appeased  angry people's rage and fury, if they be not very strong and well assured of the victory, they put the estate into great peril and danger: for if the subject become victor, no doubt but that he will at his pleasure prescribe laws unto the vanquished. And admit that the prince himself be not vanquished, yet so it is, that if he attain not unto the full of his designs, he shall in so doing make himself contemptible, give occasion unto his other subjects to rebel, for strangers to invade him, and for all men to contemn him. Which is yet more to be feared in popular estates, and was most manifestly known in the seditions which happened in Rome, wherein they which would needs proceed by force, and openly resist the desires of the people (up in fury) matred all: whereas to the contrary, they which sought by fair means to win them, still brought them to reason, and so upheld the state of the city, otherwise ready to have fallen. Appius Claudius seeing the people of Rome to demand to have had the obligations and bands for money lent, canceled, (wherein the richer sort and usurers had a notable interest) was of opinion, not to have any thing of the due debt remitted. And at another time the people being revolted from the nobility, he the same man would have had them most rigorously entreated, without any regard to have been had of them at all; for that the people otherwise would swell with pride, and become insupportable: howbeit, Servilius at the first time, and Menenius Agrippa at the second, withstood him, and so carried away the matter from him. Which Agrippa showed in deed, and by a most excellent fable of man's body and the parts thereof (which he so lively set before every man's eyes) that he caused the arms to fall out of the hands of both parties, and so sweetly again reconciled the people unto the nobility: whereby he together with the welfare of the Commonweal, and all men's love, gained also unto himself immortal fame and glory. And if so be that wild beasts will never by strokes be tamed, but by the kind handling of him that ●…ameth them: even so the people once moved or enraged, as a beast with many heads, and of all others the wildest and fiercest, is never by force, but by good and kind usage and entreaty to be gained. Wherhfore in such time of common uproar and tumult, something is to be granted unto the people: and if the sedition be raised for famine or for dearth of victuals, some present distribution is to be made, and relief given unto the poorer sort, who are not with words to be appeased. For that as Cato the Censor, speaking of the people of Rome, said, The hungry belly hath no ears. Neither in that case must the magistrates 
The hungry belly hath no ears.  spare fair words or promises, yea more than is ever to be performed. For that the matter so standing, both Plato and Xenophon give leave unto the magistrates to lie, as physicians to children and their sick patients. So the wise Pericles, to draw the people 
The wisdom of Pericles to draw the common people of Athens to understand reason.  of Athens unto reason, fed them with feasts, with plays, with comedies, with songs and dances; and in time of dearth caused some distribution of corn or money to be made amongst them: and having by these means tamed this beast with many heads, one while by the eyes, another while by the ears, and sometimes by the belly, he then caused wholesome edicts and laws to be published, declaring unto them the grave and wise reasons thereof: which the people in mutiny, or an hungered, would never have harkened unto.  
Yet whereas we have said, that the people is to be flattered, and to have something 
How, and when the people is to be flattered.  granted unto it: yea sometimes even things unreasonable; especially in popular and Aristocraticke estates, that is to be understood in time of extremity, when as it is already up in sedition: and not for that one aught still to follow the appetite and passion of the insatiable people, and without reason: But even to the contrary, it is so to be governed, as that it be not too hard kerbed, neither yet left with the reins at too much liberty. For as it is a right slippery high standing place to serve the appetite and pleasure of the unsteady people, so is it yet much more dangerous also, openly to oppose a man's self against it: so as did Appius, Coriolanus, Metellus, C●…to the younger, Photion, and Hermiodorus, who whilst they would have all things of the people by strong hand, and rather break than bow, they did either utterly undo themselves together with the Commonweal, or at leastwise brought it into most great peril and danger. True it is, that for the prince or magistrates thus to temper majesty with clemency towards an unruly and headstrong people, without judgement and reason, is a most hard and difficult matter: yet is there nothing more necessary, especially in Popular governments, than not too much to flatter, neither yet to deal too roughly with the people. But as the Sun goeth, rising and setting with the other stars and planets, daily carried about with the most swift motion of the superior celestial spheres, and yet for all that faileth not to perform his own natural course by retiring back by little and little; and that by how much the higher he is mounted up from the Horizon, the lesser he seemeth for to be: Even so aught the wise governor to do, following in part the affections and desires of the troubled people, so much the more easily afterwards 
Force never to be used against the people, where fair means may prevail.  to attain unto the full of his designs. And albeit that a prince had the power by force to repress and reform a mutinous and rebellious people, yet aught he not so to do, if otherwise he may appease them. For what Physician is there so inconsiderate, as to use sections, and cauterisings, or burnings, if the disease might otherwise be cured? And so what prince is there so evil advised, as by way of force and fact to proceed against his people, if with a kind word speaking he may appease all? But especially in a Popular estate, wherein it beseemeth the wise magistrate, by all fair means to appease and quiet the passions of a troubled people, in laying plain before their eyes the evil success which may ensue of their so evil and disordered proceed. We read thereof many examples, but yet none more famous than that of Pacwius calvinus of Capua, who being accounted a great favourer of the commonalty, and an utter enemy unto the nobility of that city, yet understanding of a purpose that the people had upon the sudden to kill all the Senators of the city, which so cruel a murder he greatly detested, but yet seeing the common people so resolutely set down upon the matter, as that they were not to be removed, he himself made show also, as if he had as well as any of the rest liked of that the people's will and purpose, yet withal gave the Senators to understand of the great danger they were in, and of the purpose he had for the safeguard of their lives, willing them to be of good cheer, and to fear nothing. And 
The commendable deceit of Pa●…uius, to deceive the angry people.  so afterwards the Tribune or chief leader of the mutinous people, having shut up all the Senators into a strong place, as men appointed for the slaughter: but indeed so to preserve them from the present fury, he then with a merry and cheerful countenance coming forth unto the angry people, spoke unto them thus, That which you men of Capua have oftentimes wished for, That it might once be in your power to be revenged of the most wicked and abominable Senate; you now have the same put into your hands, not by uproar and tumult, by assaulting and breaking open their houses one by one, which they keep and defend with strong companies and guards of their servants and friends, but even at your pleasure, and without danger. Receive them all shut up in the court, where I will give you power to pronounce sentence of every one of their lives. But before all things it behoveth you so to satisfy your anger, as yet to deem your own health and welfare better than the satisfying of your rage and wrath. For a Senate you will not altogether be without: for that you must needs either have a king, which is a thing to be abhorred; or else a Senate, the only Council of a free city. Wherhfore two things rest for you to do, the one that you take out of the way the old Senate: and the other, that you choose a new. And this said, he sat down; and so the Senators names being all put into a pot, he commanded the first name that was drawn out to be read, and him so named, to be brought out of the court. Is it your pleasure then (said he) that this man shall first die? Whereunto all the people cried aloud, That it was well said of him, and well done. Well, I see then (said Pacwius) what his doom is: let him be cast out; and now for him an evil and wicked man, make you choice of a good and upright Senator to be put into his place. Whereupon they all at the first were silent▪ for lack of a better to make choice of: but as soon as one more impudent than the rest had named one, presently a greater cry was heard than before; some crying out, That they knew him not; othersome exclaiming as fast against him as a naughty base fellow, of some beggarly trade or other, and so unworthy of the place: The like stir there was▪ when choice was to be made of the second, and third Senator, the base artificers and tradesmen still nominating some one, and some another: in such sort, as that they now began to fall out among themselves, about the choice, none of them being willing to yield or give place to other, which whilst they did in every Senator which was named, there was no less trouble and stir among themselves, than was before betwixt them and the Senators. Whereupon they were better contented that the old Senators should now still hold their places, than to suffer one of them to be preferred before another. Wherein the council of the Tribune was right wise, and cunningly by him put in execution: who after he had by his wise dissimulation somewhat appeased the mad people's rage, he as it were with his finger pointed out, and laid open even unto every man's eye, the great hurt and inconvenience that was to ensue, by putting the Senators to death: as that not only such a shameful murder should for ever be accounted most cruel and inhuman; but that also by the doing thereof the Commonweal should be without council, as a body without a soul; and the fire of sedition raised also amongst the people, about the preferment, and them that were to be preferred.  
But if the people once enraged be already up in arms, it is a most hard and dangerous 
The mutinous people best appeased by the good persuasion of some good old virtuous parsonage.  matter to appease them: in so much as that not long ago there was one that set fire on his own house (lest the Commonweal should with the flames of sedition even then have perished) so to turn the citizens than together by the ears to leave the fray, and to come to help to quench the fire, for fear lest all should have been burnt. Than if any man there be in virtue and valour exceeding the rest, who will with good speech take upon him to persuade the people unto peace and concord, he only, or else none, is the man that may appease the people's frantic fury and rage. Which thing Virgil most excellently expressed in these few verses following▪  

Ac veluti magno in populo cum saepe coorta  
Seditio est, saevitque an●…mis ignobile vulgus;  
jamque faces & saxa volant, furor arma ministrat:  
Tum pietate gravem ac meritis si fortè virum quem  
Conspexere, silent, arrectisque auribus astant:  
Ille regit dictis animos, & pectora mulcet.   

And as a sudden tumult raised amidst a people great,  
When as the base and rascal sort are in the greatest heat,  
And firebrands now and stones do fly, such weapons as there lie,  
Than if some good grave worthy sire they fortune to espy,  
They silent with attentive ear stand listening to his lore:  
He with good words their minds doth rule, and calms the whole uproar.   
Such we said Pericles to have been in Athens, Menenius Agrippa in Rome, and not long ago Peter Loredan in Venice, who at such time as the mariners and seafaring men banded themselves against the rest of the citizens, and in such sort massacred one another, as that neither duke, neither the Senate, nor other magistrate could come nigh, but that they were by force and violence of the furious people rejected; this plain gentleman Peter Loredan (I say) a private citizen, and bearing no office at all, showing 
Peter Lored an a most notable citizen.  but himself in the midst of these combats, and holding but up his hand on high, caused the weapons to fall out of every man's hand, for the reverence they all bore unto the virtue of so grave a parsonage; and so as it were in a moment appeased all that civil discord. Whereby it was to be seen, virtue to be of greater power and majesty than arms, than laws, yea than all the magistrates together.  
There is also in the reverend fear of religion a great power for the staying of the 
The reverend fear of religion a good mean for the appeasing of the seditious people.  tumultuous people. For at such time as the Florentines were fallen out into such a fury among themselves, as that the city swum with the blood and slaughter of the citizens: and that they could by no means be parted, Francis Soderin the bishop attired in his bishoplike attire, and attended upon with a company of priests, and a cross carried before him, came into the midst of the furious citizens, so bandying it one against another; at the sight and presence of whom, they all for the reverend fear of religion upon the sudden laid down their weapons, and so without more ado, got themselves home every man unto his own house. So also jadus the jews high Priest, in his Pontifici●…libus met Alexander the Great coming towards Jerusalem with his victorious army, with whose port and majesty Alexander terrified, worshipped the High Priest, and was so far from ransacking either of the country or holy city, as that he gave it great privileges, with whatsoever the High priest else requested. With like wisdom pope Vrban is reported to have turned Attila king of the Hungarians from the siege of Aquilia.  
But sometime such is the deadly hatred of citizens amongst themselves, as that they 
Seditions sometimes appeased by the interposition and mediation of friends.  need of the help of their friends and allies, yea and sometimes even of mere strangers to set them agreed. In which case an other good old man of Florence seeing the citizens without pity to kill and massacre one another, and on all sides to burn one another's houses, went to request the Luquois their neighbours and friends, to interpose themselves for the appeasing of these so deadly broils, as had well near ruinated the whole estate: Wherewith the Luquois moved, came in great numbers, by whose good travel and mediation all those slaughters and broils were well stayed and quited: a thing both commendable and profitable, not to them only which are so set agreed, but even to them also which were the workers therein, as reaping thereby great honour, together with the love of them whom they so made friends. Yea oftentimes it happeneth, that the citizens divided into factions, weary at length of their murders and tumults, seek but to found an occasion for them to fall to agreement; yet being of opinion it to touch them in honour, that should first seek for peace, therefore continued their bloody quarrels until that they have utterly ruinated one another, if some third man interpose not himself betwixt them for the making of them friends: which thing oftener happeneth in popular or Aristocratike commonweals, than in a monarchy: wherein the subjects are by the power and authority of one only prince still to be set at one, & reconciled amongst themselves, together with the commonweal. Howbe 
Nothing more dangerous unto a prince, than in seditions to make himself a party.  it, that sometime it happeneth the sovereign prince to make himself a party, in stead of holding the place of a sovereign judge: in which doing for all that he shall be no more but the head of one party, and so undoubtedly put himself in danger of his life, and that especially when such dangerous seditions and factions be not grounded upon matters directly touching his estate, but otherwise, as it hath happened almost in all Europe within this fifty years, in the wars made for matters of religion: for we have seen the kingdom of Sweden, of Scotland, of Denmark, of England, the Cantons of the Swissers, yea and the German empire also, to have changed their religion, the estate of every of these monarchies and commonweals yet standing entire and whole: howbeit that the truth is, that it was not done, but with great violence, and much bloodshed in many places.  
But religion by common consent once received and settled, is not again to be called 
It is dangerous to call that into question which aught to be holden as resolved upon.  into question and dispute, that so all the ways and entrances unto sedition and faction may be stopped, and the assurances of unity and peace strengthened; for that all things called into disputation, are so also but as things probable called in doubt: and what can come nearer to impiety then by probable arguments to call in doubt the laws of God, which are by their nature immutable and eternal; and such as of the truth whereof every man aught to be most certainly resolved and assured Besides that, nothing is so firm and stable, nothing so manifest and clear (except it rest upon most 
Religion once received and settled, to be no more called into question or doubt.  plain and undoubtful demonstrations) which may not by disputation and force of arguments be obscured or made doubtful; and especially where that which is called into question, or dispute, resteth not so much upon demonstration or reason, as upon the assurance of faith and belief only: which they which seek by demonstrations and publishing of books to perform, they are not only mad with reason, but weaken also the foundations and grounds of all sorts of religions.  
There is a most ancient law of Lycurgus extant, which the Florentines (of all others the sharpest disputors) established in their popular estate, viz. Ne de legibus semel reepctis ac probatis disserere liceret, That it might not be lawful to dispute or make question laws once received and allowed. For why he of others the wisest▪ well understood, laws disputed and reasoned upon to be still doubted of; which doubting brought with it an opinion of the iniquity thereof; whereof must needs follow the contempt both of the laws and magistrates, and so consequently the ruin and destruction of the whole commonweal. But if Philosophers and Mathematicians cannot abide to have the principles of their sciences reasoned of, what great folly, or rather madness is it to dispute not only privately, but even openly also of religion already approved. Howbeit that Anaxagoras maintained the snow to be black, and Favorinus the Quartain fever to be a very good and wholesome thing; and Carneades having one day highly commended justice, the very next day preferred injustice before it, and that it was (without all comparison) better to be a very knave than a virtuous honest man: which they all so perfuasively did, as that they drew a great number of men to be indeed of their opinions. Although Aristotle said them which made question, whether snow were white or not, to want sense: but them which doubted whether there were a God or not▪ not to be with arguments refuted, but by the laws punished: howbeit that he himself by necessary demonstration proved there to be one everlasting God, and that there could be no more gods but he. Wherefore, all the kings and princes both of Africa and of the East, do most straightly forbidden all men to dispute of their religion. Which like strict prohibition is also set down by the laws and decrees of Spain. So also the king of Moscovie seeing his people, who had received the rites and ceremonies of the Greeks', divided into divers sects and factions, by reason of the divers preachings and disputations of the ministers: he thereupon forbade them upon pain of death any more to preach or dispute of religion; and withal gave a book unto the bishop and parish priests, wherein was contained what he would have every man persuaded of, and to believe, concerning matters of faith and religion, which he commanded them upon all festival days to read and publish unto the people: with a capital pain thereunto annexed, if by any man's exposition any thing were at all thereunto either added or diminished. And Moses, when he had most curiously written all those things which he had learned and received from Almighty God, and declared the same unto the people: yet in one chapter of the law (the people yet wandering up and down in the desert) he commanded the priests and levites aloud and distinctly to read the law, yea, and that daily also, that so it might be understood and known unto the people of every age and sex: and so in another chapter forbade any thing to be unto the laws of God either added or detracted. Yet saith he not, that they should dispute thereof: but even to the contrary, the Hebrews instructed by the prophets from the father to the son: they teaching the law of God in seven Colleges, which then were in mount Zion, never yet suffered men to enter into disputation thereof, as we read in Optatus Milevit●…nus. For why, disputation was 
* Lib. 3.  invented▪ but for things probable and doubtful; and not for things religious and necessary, and such as every man is bound to believe: which by disputation are always made doubtful. Wherhfore seeing that disputations of religion bring not only the doubt and overthrow of religions, but even the ruin and destruction of Commonweals 
Disputations of religion dangerous.  also; it behoveth them to be by most straight laws forbidden: which after long civil war was by the estates and princes of the German empire provided for, and a decree made, that the princes should with mutual consent defend both the Roman and Saxon religion: whereunto that was also joined, That no man should upon pain of death dispute of the religions. Which severe punishments, after that the German magistrates had inflicted upon divers, all Germany was afterwards at good quiet & rest: no man daring more to dispute of matters of religion. Moreover, seeing that not only all wise lawgivers and Philosopher's, but even the very Atheists themselves also (as namely 
* Lib. 6. De militari ac domestica Romanorum disiplina.  Polybius himself an Atheist) are of accord, That there is nothing which doth more uphold and maintain the estates and Commonweals than religion: and that it is the principal foundation of the power and strength of monarchies and Seignories: as also for the execution of justice, for the obedience of the subjects, the reverence of the 
The power of religion.  magistrates, for the fear of doing evil, and for the mutual love and amity of every one towards other, it is by most straight and severe laws to be provided; that so sacred a thing as is religion be not by childish and sophistical disputations, (and especially by such as are publicly had) made contemptible, or by probable arguments made doubtful, and so at length quite taken out of the minds, both of the hearers & of the disputors together. Neither are they to be heard which think themselves to be able with more subtle reasons to persuade all things: for that as Papinian most wisely said, Summa ratio est quae pro religione facit, It is of all the greatest reason, which tendeth to the maintenance of Religion.  
I will not here in so great variety of people so much differing among themselves in 
Religion not to be enforced.  religion, take upon me to determine which of them is the best (howbeit that there can be but one such, one truth, and one divine law, by the mouth of God published) but if 
How a prince well assured of the truth of his religion is to draw his subjects thereunto, being therfo●…e divided into sects and factions  the prince well assured of the truth of his religion, would draw his subjects thereunto, divided into sects and factions, he must not therein (in mine opinion) use force: (For that the minds of men the more they are forced, the more froward and stubborn they are; and the greater punishment that shall be inflicted upon them, the less good is to be done; the nature of man being commonly such as may of itself be led to like of anything, but never enforced so to do) but rather it he hoveth the prince so persuaded of the truth of his religion, without fainting or dissembling to profess and follow the same, still devoutly serving the almighty God: by which means he shall both turn the will and minds of his subjects unto the admiration and imitation of himself, and at length also pluck up even the very roots of all sects and opinions: In which doing he shall not only avoid commotions, troubles, and civil wars, but lead also his straying subjects unto the port of health. Whereof as there are many examples, so is there none more fit for this our purpose, than that of Theodosius the elder, who at the beginning of his reign found all the provinces of the empire full of Arrians, whose strength and power was so grown and increased under three or four Arrian emperors their favourors, as that their doctrine was not only by eight counsels confirmed, which were at divers times assembled at tire, at Sardis, at Sirme, at Milan, Seleucia, Nice, Tarsis, and especially at Ariminum (where six hundred bishops were of their opinion: and but three of name which held the contrary) but that they also punished other their adversaries of opinion contrary unto themselves, with confiscations, proscriptions, and other most grievous punishments. Yet would not this good emperor now come unto the empire, either force or punish the Arrians, although that he deadly hated them, but granted unto them both the Arrians (I say) and the Catholics, their churches, and suffered them in every town to have two bishops, of either religion one: and albeit that he at the importunate suit and instance of the Catholic bishops, commanded certain edicts to be published against the Arrians, yet was he well contented to have the same holden in suspense, and not put into execution; as his letters unto Ambrose in these words declare, Trade Arrianis Basilicam, mei namque sunt omnia juris, Give (saith he) unto the Arrians a church: for that all are in my power. Which thing Rotaris also king of the Lombard's by his law permitted. And yet nevertheless this emperor living according to his religion, and instructing his children & kinsmen in the same, wonderfully diminished the Arian sect in Europe: howbeit that they have ever since continued, and so yet do, both in Asia and Africa, under the law of Mahomet, grounded upon the same foundation. The great emperor of the Turks doth with as great devotion as any prince in the world honour and observe the religion by him received from his ancestors, and yet detesteth he not the strange religions of others; but to the contrary permitteth every man to live according to his conscience: yea and that more is, near unto his palace at Pera, suffereth four divers religions, viz. That of the jews, that of the Christians, that of the Grecians, and that of the mahometans: and besides that, sendeth alms unto the Calogers or religious Monks, dwelling upon the mountain Athos (being Christians) to pray for him: as did Augustus to the jews, to whom he ordinarily sent his alms and perpetual sacrifices to Jerusalem, which he commanded to be there daily made for the health of himself, and of the Commonweal. For why the people of ancient time were persuaded, as were the Turks, All sorts of religions which proceed from a pure mind, to be acceptable unto the gods. And albeit that the Romans easily admitted not strange religions into their Commonwealeas (as in the wars against them of Veios' the Aediles had in charge, Ne qui nisi Romani dij, new quo alio more quam patrio Colerentur, That no gods should be worshipped but the Roman gods, neither after any other manner than after the manner of the country) yet for all that did they easily suffer every man privately within the city to use his own manner and fashion, and his own religion: yea the Romans themselves received into the city the sacrifices of Isis and of Esculapius, and suffered the Pantheon to be dedicated to all the gods. Only the jews of all people detested strange ceremonies: whereby they provoked the hatred of all people against them. For at such time as Antiochus the Noble besieged Jerusalem, the jews took truce with him for eight days, wherein they might keep holy the Feast of their deliverance out of Egypt, dedicated unto the honour of the immortal God: Whereunto Antiochus (as Plutarch writeth) willingly condescended; and yet not so contented, with great rejoicing brought also bulls and rams for the furnishing of the sacrifice even unto the gates of the city. Howbeit that afterwards the time of the truce expired, he took the city and sacked it. But as he was about therein to have sacrificed after the manner of the Greeks', the Priests & Levites cursing and banning, forsook the Temple. For which cause Antiochus enforced them, as contemners of the gods, to receive the Greek ceremonies and sacrifices, yea and caused hogs also to be killed in the temple, and the jews to be enforced to eat of them, tormenting such as refused so to do with all kind of torments and tortures, which in that city wrought the change both of the religion and state. But Ptolomeus Lagus (as Agatharchides writeth) and after him Pompeius, after long siege having taken Jerusalem (the same day that the jews had before taken truce with Antiochus) yet both of them kept their hands from sacrilege: which Crassus did not, neither Flaccus: whom yet Cicero denieth to have taken any gold belonging unto the temple; in which oration, as served for his purpose, he said, The gods of the jews to have delivered their servants from the bondage of the Romans. So that the jews detesting the gods of other nations, caused all other people and nations most grievously to hate and contemn them: For at such time as Quadratus being Precedent of judea, a common soldier had in contempt showed his tail unto the jews, as they were sacrificing in the temple, such an upro●…e and tumult ensued thereof, as that twenty thousand of the jews were there slain. At which time the jews by a decree of the Senate, were driven also out of Rome: where Tiberius caused such as would not remove thence, either to change their religion, or to become slaves; but this was done in Rome only. For the same Tiberius forbade Pilate, who had determined to have placed certain shields and escutcheons in the temple of the jews, to place the same, or to altar any thing of their religion. But Alexander Severus the emperor in his private sacrifices worshipped Abraham, Orpheus, Hercules, and Christ. But when the Christians as well as the jews, had begun to detest those thirty thousand gods which Pindarus now in his time worshipped, and so began to breed a contempt of the gods in the minds of men, the princes and magistrates began likewise with most grievous punishments to persecute them, except they would forswear Christ and the Christian religion, the jews (bearing themselves upon the antiquity of their religion) being become their accusers and informers against them, lest they should seem partakers of the same impiety with them. And thus as the multitude of religion and sects was innumerable, some detesting the rites and ceremonies of others: so thereof proceeded also the divers and manifold changes of Commonweals. And albeit that tyrants had before exercised incredible cruelties upon their subjects, yet never thought they it lawful for them to rule over men's minds before the time of this Antiochus, whom we but even now spoke of. Which was the cause that Theodoricus king of the Goths (though favouring the Arrians) would not yet enforce the conscience of his subjects, nor have them tormented for their religion; lest under the pretence of impiety he should have seemed to have taken the spoil of their goods, or bind their minds, which could by no threats or commands be constrained or bound. For so he wri●…ing unto the Senate 
No man to b●… compelled against his will to believe.  at Rome, useth these words, Religionem imperare non possumus, quia nemo cogitur ut credat invitus, Religion (saith he) we cannot command, for that no man is compelled against his will to believe: as we read in Cassiodore: Which reason of all others seemeth unto me most effectual, for the taking away of such punishments, as are under the colour of religion to be inflicted upon the subjects. Wicked and strange rites & ceremonies, and such other as the greater part of the subjects of greatest power detest, I think it good and profitable to have them kept out of the Commonweal. For the preservation of the subjects love amongst themselves, which is especially novished & maintained by their consent and agreement in matters of religion: yet if the same religion be liked of by the opinion of neighbour nations, and of many of the subjects, then aught it not only with punishments not to be restrained, but also so much as may be provided, that if it may not without sedition be publicly profes●…ed, yet that no man be forbidden the private exercise of such his religion. For otherwise it shall come 
To forbidden men the private exercise of their religion, is to make them oftentime●… to become Atheists.  to pass, that they which are destitute of the exercise of their religion, and withal distasted of the religion of the others, shall become altogether Atheists (as we daily see) and so after that they have once lost the fear of God, tread also under foot both the laws and magistrates, and so enure themselves to all kinds of impieties and villainies, such as is impossible by man's laws to be redressed. Howbeit what lettteth us to follow the council of the most holy prophets, of whom 
* Baruc●….  the one persuaded his countrymen l●…d away into captivity into Chaldea, That at such time as they should be enforced to fall down before the idols, yet that they should with a pure mind always worship the ever living God: & the 
* 〈◊〉.  other admitted the request or excuse of Naaman the king of Syria his servant, but newly instructed in the true religion and service of God, if he were present with the king his master sacrificing unto a strange god, so that he kept his mind pure and clean from idolatry. For they are much deceived, which think Commonweals to be better kept in order by men's commands and laws, than by the fear of God his judgements. For as the greatest tyranny is nothing so miserable as an 
Atheism worse than the greatest Superstition.  Anatchie, when as there is neither prince nor magistrate, none that obeyeth, neither yet any that commandeth, but that all men live as they list at liberty in all looseness of life, without fear of punishment. So the greatest superstition that is, is not by much any thing so detestable as Atheism. And truly they (in mine opinion) offend much, which think that the same punishment is to be appointed for them that make many gods, and them that would have none at all: or that the infinity of gods admitted, the almighty and everliving God is thereby taken away. For that superstition how great soever it be, doth yet hold men in fear and awe, both of the laws and of the magistrates, as also in mutual duties and offices one of them towards another: whereas mere Atheism doth utterly root out of men's minds all the fear of doing evil. Wherefore two inconveniences propounded▪ Superstition (I say) and Atheism, we must still decline the greater: yet when we may not publicly use the true religion, which still consisteth in the worshipping of one almighty and everlasting God: lest by contemning of the religion which is publicly received, we should seem to allure or stir the subjects unto impiety or sedition, it is better to come unto the public service, so that the mind still rest in the honour and reverence of one almighty and ever living God.  
But now, whereas some men marvel how it came to pass, that in the time of Theodosius, 
Why many sects better agreed in a Commonweal than two only.  considering the diversity of sects and of religions that then were, they could so stand without civil wars, being then at the lest an hundred divers sorts of them according to the account of Tertullian and Epiphanius: whereof the cause was, the multitude and variety of such different opinions, which so still held one of them in counterpoise with another. Now in matters of sedition and tumult, nothing is more dangerous, than to have the subjects divided into two opinions or factions only, whether it be before matters of estate, or of religion, or for the laws and customs, or other matters whatsoever that the subjects are so divided. For that but one thing can by nature be contrary unto another thing: and more things than one to be contrary unto one, is a thing not to be imagined. So that where there be more than two sects or sorts, there must needs be some in the mean betwixt the two contrary extremes, which may set them agreed, which otherwise of themselves would never fall to agreement. And therefore Solon by law provided, That in civil seditions and troubles, every man should of 
Whether Solon's law for partaking▪ as that every man should be of necessity bound to take either the one o●… the other part in time of sedition, be good and profitable unto Commonweals or not  necessity take either the one or other part, and that it should not be lawful for any man to stand as neu●…er: which unto many seemed a thing unreasonable, considering that the greatest praise and commendation of a good subject is; to be a quiet civil man, desirous and doing the best that he can to live in peace. Besides that, by this means the conscience of an honest man is forced, to take either the one or other part, when as haply he thinketh both nought, and that they are both in the wrong. And that more is, it may so happen, that if in such seditions he will follow that part which he judgeth the better, he must bear arms even against his father, against his brethren, and friends, which are in arms in the other side: which were the way so to compel men to commit unnatural murders, and to kill even them whom we aught to defend, & to deprive them of life, by whom we ourselves live. In brief the law of God forbiddeth him that knoweth the truth, to follow the common opinion of them which are out of the way: whereunto Solon's law seemeth to repugn, in forcing a man to take either the one part or the other, although that they be both nought. Howbeit that a man might say unto the contrary, this Solons law to be most profitable and necessary also unto Popular and Aristocratike estates, wherein is no sovereign, which standing as neu●…er, may determine and decide the differences of them which shall so be at discord and variance. For men well know, that the most crafty men in time of civil wars, withdraw themselves so much as possibly they can out of the press, if they be not well assured of the victory of the part that they themselves take (if it be not so, that they see the danger such, as that the public fire is like to take hold and burn even their own private houses) yea oftentimes the more subtle and deceitful sort set the rest at dissension and debate, that so they may themselves the better fish in troubled water, and make a bridge for themselves to pass over, to seize upon other men's goods and honours: imitating therein the priests of Mars, whom the ancients called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, or Fire-bearers, who having orderly performed their solemn execrations, cast fire brands betwixt both armies standing ready ranged, and so stirred them up to battle: but yet retired themselves in safety out of the medley and danger. Now if the law of Solon might take place, these fire makers durst not sow debate and discord among the citizens, seeing that they must themselves then run into the same danger with others. And as for other honest men which love peace, and like neither of the one nor other faction, if they must needs be constrained to take a part, they will then enforce themselves by all means to prevent seditions, and in what they may to withstand them: or if they cannot be foreseen, yet to do what they may to appease them. For why, the great virtue and authority of good subjects is of great force to keep the rash and mad vulgar people in some order: and to persuade them being disquieted again unto reason, who would ever be at odds and variance, if they were not by the good council of the wiser sort better persuaded. By which reasons Solon's law seemeth to be unto cities and Commonweals profitable. Besides that, if in the leagues and societies of princes among themselves, it be good and profitable for them all, some one of them to be of greater power than the rest, or at leastwise to join himself with them that be of greatest power: how much more true and profitable is it in civil wars still to take the one or the other part: where he which standeth as neuter, as he is of no man protected, so lieth he open to the common 
The dangerous estate of them that stand as neuters in time of sedition.  spoil of all men. For so Theramenes, who all the time of the Peloponesian war, and the troubles of the Athenians, had kept himself quiet, and stood still looking on, but as an idle beholder, without taking part either with the one or with the other, was himself at the last forsaken of all, and so left unto the mercy of the tyrants, who made him a miserable spectacle unto all men, and in the end most cruelly put him to death. He therefore which will stand as neuter, whether it be in civil war, or in wars amongst strangers, aught at the lest to do his endeavour to set the rest agreed: or if he shall see the quarrels, wars, and ruins of others, to tend to the profit of the better sort, or the assurance of his estate, his wealth or person (as it sometimes happeneth that tyrants and wicked subjects or citizens agreed not but for to ●…uinat the good) yet aught he which so standeth as neuter, to show himself in appearance desirous and forward to set them agreed: which many men have done even then when they most nourished and maintained such quarrels in the most secret manner they could: A thing which God (as Solomon 
Proverb. 4.  saith) abhorreth: if it be not in case (as I have said) that the concord and agreement of the evil, tend to the inevitable ruin and decay of the good. For as for one good virtue, there are many vices one of them quite contrary unto another; and that for one good man, there be ten which are nothing worth: so God hath also appointed, That the evil and wicked men should even one of them by another be brought to ruin and destruction: I will revenge me (saith God, speaking by the mouth of the prophet jeremy) of mine enemies, by mine enemies. I have said, that good princes and good subjects aught to dissemble the good and pleasure they take in the discord and contention of other the wicked princes or citizens; for that there is nothing which grieveth a man more, than to see others in all security, to take pleasure and rejoice in his ruin and decay.  
Thus have we seen certain means for the appeasing of tumults and seditions 
The use of bells, why in many country's forbidden.  amongst many. For which there might yet some more particulars be also rehearsed; as to take away the use of bells from rebellious or seditious citizens: so as we read to have been done in the rebellions at Montpelier, and at Bourdeaux, which were yet afterward unto them again not without a great fine restored: howbeit that the greater part of the inhabitants of Bourdeaux most instantly requested, That they might not be so restored, having felt the commodity that came thereby. But whether well or evil, I leave it to the resolution of every man of sound judgement. The great emperor of the Turks, with the other princes of the East, have taken straight order, That this invention of bells, first devised in Italy, should not into any of their dominions or territories be received: whereby they have well avoided one of the greatest occasions of civil tumults and broils. The noise and backward ringing of the bells (as when houses be on fire) being not only proper unto strange accidents, and to put the mutinous people into arms, but also to trouble even the quiet spirits of peaceable men, and to thrust fools headlong into fury: as did he, who the more to stir up the people rung the Tocsaine, together with the great bell at Bourdeaux, and was therefore himself hanged in the belrope, as he had well deserved.  
Another and the most usual way to prevent sedition, is to take away the subjects 
The best and surest way to prevent sedition.  arms: howbeit that the princes of Italy, & of the East cannot endure that they should at all have arms; as do the people of the North and of the West: no more than they did in ancient time in Greece and in Asia. For so Aristotle speaking of the Barbarians, accounteth it for a strange thing, that a man should in a quiet and peaceable city 
The common wearing of weapons in a peaceable Commonweal, the occasion of many evils.  wear a sword or a dagger in time of peace: which by our laws, as also by the manners and customs of the Germans and Englishmen is not only lawful; but by the laws and decrees of the Swissers even necessarily commanded: the cause of an infinite number of murders, he which weareth a sword, a dagger, or a pistol, being more fierce and insolent to offer unto others injury, as also to commit murder if any injury be offered him: whereas if he were disarmed, he should do neither the one nor the other; neither should yet incur the infamy and disgrace which followeth them, who when they are wronged, dare not to draw their weapons. The Turks herein go yet farther, not only in punishing with all severity the seditious and 〈◊〉 people, but also by forbidding them to bear arms, yea even in time of war, except it be when they are to give battle: whereas otherwise if the enemy be not nigh, they lay their arms up in their tents, or in their carriages: and yet they are accounted the best soldiers of the world: which if they do in the field, and in time of war, what is it to be thought them to do in their towns, and in time of peace?  
Among many the laudable manners and customs of the policy of Paris, there is one a very good one, and well put in execution, which is, That no car-man or porter shall wear sword, dagger, knife, or any other offensive weapon, and that for the murders by them committed in their ordina●…ie quarrels which they still had one of them against another▪ which if it might take place upon all persons: also a thousand murders and stabbings are committed, which should never have happened, neither the seditions and broils raised, which have upon this occasion been in many places kindled. For it is not the part of a wise politician, neither of a good governor, to expect until the murder be committed, or that the sedition be raised, before he forbidden the bearing of arms, but as a good physician preventeth diseases: and if chance be that the party be suddenly attainted with any violent grief, he first assuageth the present pain, and that done applieth convenient remedies unto the causes of the disease: even so the wise prince aught (so much as in him lieth) to prevent sedition, as also when they are happened to appease them at what charge soever: and then afterward to look into the cause of the diseases farthest off from the effects, and so thereunto to apply remedies convenient.  
Now we have before spoken of the causes which work the change of estates and 
Impunity of offenders to draw after it ruin of estates.  commonweals, of which self same causes proceed also seditions and civil wars, as of the denial of justice, of the oppression of the common people, of the inequal distribution of punishments, and of rewards; of the excessive riches of some few in number, and extreme poverty of the greater sort; of the too great idleness of the subjects, or of the impunity of offenders: and it may be that this last point is therein of greatest consequence or importance, and yet the lest of all regarded. Which as I have before touched, so must I also oftentimes repeat the same, for that the princes and magistrates which desire to be accounted merciful, do oftentimes turn upon their own heads the same punishment that the offenders deserved. And that is it for which the wise Hebrew hath so oftentimes advised us, Not to become surety for another man: not for that he forbiddeth a charitable dealing one of us towards another (as many have thought) but rather to give all men to understand, That they which become sureties for wicked men, and so found means to deliver them from deserved punishment, shall bear the pain of the offenders guilt therefore. As was said to king Achab, who had saved the life of Benadab the king of Syria, whom he should have put to death, God caused it to be told unto him by his prophet, That he was become surety for another man, and that it should surely cost him his life therefore. Which being but spoken in particular unto this one king, extendeth yet in general unto all princes and Commonweals, who have no more certain cause of their ruin and decay, than the want of the due execution of justice. To punish the rebellious, is also one of the means to prevent and meet with rebellions yet to come, which how it is to be done we have before said, when as we reasoned of punishments to be upon corporations and colleges inflicted; which is to take place when some one corporation, or the lest part of the subjects have erred or offended; but not if all the people in general, or the greatest part of them be in fault: For albeit that the physician or surgeon sometimes for the preservation of the whole body, cuts off a man's leg or arm, yet must he not therefore cut off the head, or any other of the principal members, if they shall chance to be infected: but therein follow the wise council of the great Physician Hippocratts, who unto desperate diseases forbiddeth us to apply any remedy at all. But beside the causes of seditions & rebellions, which we have 
The immoderate liberty of speech given unto Orators a great cause of seditions and rebellions.  before spoke of, there is yet another, which dependeth of the immoderate liberty of speech given to orators, who direct & guide the people's hearts & minds according to their own pleasure. For there is nothing that hath more force over the minds of men, than hath eloquence: So that our ancestors have not without cause pu●…traied Hercules Celtique not as a young & strong man with a great club in his hand, but as a reverend bald old man, drawing after him a great number of people enchained, & hanging by the ears with chains, which all issued out of his mouth; to show, that the armies and power of kings and monarches are not so strong as the vehemency and force of an eloquent man, who encourageth & inflameth the most cowardly & faint hearted to vanquish even the most valiant, who striketh arms out of the hands of the most courageous, who turneth rage into mildness, & barbarism into civility, who changeth whole Commonweals, and sporteth with the people at his pleasure. Which I say not for the praise of eloquence, but to show the force & power thereof, which is oftener employed to 
The force and power of eloquence.  evil, than to good. For seeing that this is nothing else but a disguising of the truth, and an art to make that seem good, which is indeed nought, & that right which is wrong, and to make a great matter of nothing, as of an Emot an Elephant (that is to say, an art to lie cunnungly) we need not doubt, but that for one which useth this art well, fifty use the same evil, & that amongst 50 Orators it is hard to found an honest man. For that to seek after the plain & bore truth, were a thing altogether contrary unto their profession, seeing that the best rule that Cicero giveth under the person of Marcus Antonius the Orator, is to say nothing against himself: or rather as Aristotle saith, So well to disguise matters, as that the deceit thereof cannot not be discovered: or to speak more plainly, to cover all things with lies and dissimulation. So that if we will but well look into all them which had the name to have been the most noble and famous Orators, we shall found them to have been still the stirrers up of the people to sedition, to have oftentimes changed the laws, the customs, the religions, and Commonweals, yea & some others of them to have utterly ruinated the same; in which doing they have also almost all of them ended their days by violent death. Which it is not needful here to prove by the Orators of Athens, or of Rome, but even by those of our age, who have so well besturred themselves, as that under the colour of religion they have troubled all the empires both of Africa & of the West: yea and many of them so wrested the sceptres even out of the king's hands. As it happened unto the king of Morocco, descended (as is supposed) from the house of joseph, from whom a preacher under the vail of religion took both the crown and sceptre: & albeit that he was commonly called the Ass Knight, yet preached he so well, as that he assembled an army of sixscore thousand men to take his part. In like sort he which was first called the Sophi, invaded the kingdom of Persia, and in short time drove out the children of Vsun Cassan the lawful king, under the same colour of religion. As also not long ago john of Leiden (who of a botcher become a preacher) seized upon Munster the Metropolitical city of Westphalia, and there taking upon him the state of a king, was hardly after three years siege by the imperial army thence removed. And by the self same means Jerome Savanarola a preacher, incited by Anthony Soderin, upon the contention which happened among the inhabitants at Florence, about the estate, so much prevailed with his persuasions unto the people, as that he translated the sovereignty from the nobility unto the people, and changed the aristocraty into a Democraty or Popular estate. Not otherwise than had before Ephialtes, by the setting on of Pericles by his seditious orations, drawn unto the people the sovereignty of that state, taken from the Senate of the Areopagis; and so made the Athenian estate of all others the most Popular. And to be brief, we have seen all Germany in arms, and an hundred thousand men slain in less than in a year space, after that the mutinous preachers had stirred up the people against the nobility. How often hath the speeches of preachers been heard, tending by all means to have incited the princes and people to kill, massacre, & burn their subjects: as did in ancient time Nestorius, preaching before the emperor at Constantinople in this sort, Give me emperor, the earth voided of heretics, and I will give thee heaven: destroy with me the heretics, and I with thee will ruinat the power of the Persians': for which he was called the Fire maker: For had the emperor given credence unto him, he had so put to death the greatest part, and almost all his subjects, and Nestorius himself first of all. Wherhfore a knife is not more dangerous in the hand of a 
Eloquence in an evil man as dangerous, as a sword in a mad man's hand.  mad man, than eloquence in the mouth of a mutinous Orator. And yet nevertheless it is a mean for them which will well use it, to reduce the people from barbarism to humanity, to reform disordered manners, to correct the laws, to chastise tyrants, to cast out vices, to maintain virtue. And as men charm the Aspis, Vipers, and Serpents, by certain words; even so the Orators (as Plato saith) by the sweetness of their eloquent persuasions, charm even the most savage and cruel people. Neither is there any other 
A wise, virtuous, and eloquent preacher, of all others the fittest man to appease rebellions, and to keep the people in obedience to their prince.  greater or better means for the appeasing of seditions & tumults, and to keep the subjects in the obedience of their princes, than to have a wise and virtuous preacher, by whom they may bend and bow the hearts of the most stubborn rebels, especially in a Popular estate, wherein the ignorant people beareth the sway, and cannot possibly be kept in order but by the eloquent Orators: which for this cause have always holden the chief degree of honour & power in such Popular estates, causing the honourable charges & commissions, gifts and rewards, to be still given to whom they saw good: so that in brief both peace & war, arms and laws, wholly depended on the pleasure of the Orators. And so to the contrary, there is nothing more to be dreaded in a tyrant, than the Orator which hath the bent of the people's bow, and is in credit & estimation with them, especially if he hate the tyrant, or his Tyrannical government. But forasmuch as the rules by us already set down, aught to be applied unto the nature of Commonweals, and that the Commonweals, laws & customs, are likewise to be fitted unto the nature & disposition of every nation. Let us now also speak of the nature of all people, as of a thing most necessary for the good government of Estates and Commonweals.    

THE FIFT BOOK OF OR CONCERNING A COMMONWEAL.  

CHAP. I ¶ What order and course is to be taken, to apply the form of a Commonweal to the diversity of men's humours, and the means how to discover the nature and disposition of the people.  
HItherto we have treated of that which concerns the general Estate of Commonweals; Let us now show what may be particular to some, through the diversity of people's humours, to the end that we may accommodat the public weal to the nature of the place; and the ordinances of man to the laws of nature, whereof many have had small regard: but striving to make nature obedient to their edicts, have 
The nature of the people is much to be regarded in the framing of a Commonweal.  oftentimes troubled, yea ruined great estates. And yet those which have written of a Commonweal, have not treated of this question. For even as we see a great variety in all sorts of beasts, and in every kind some notable alteration for the diversity of regions: in like sort we may say, that there is in a manner as great difference in the nature and disposition of men, as there is of countries: yea in the same climates the people of the East are found to differ much from them of the West: And in the same latitude and difference from the Equator, the people of the North differ from them of the South: And which is more, in the same climate, latitude, and longitude, and under the same degree, we found a difference betwixt a hilly country and the plains: so at in the same city, the diversity of hills and valleys forceth a diversity of humours and dispositions: And towns seated upon uneven 
Towns unevenly built upon mountains and valleys, are subject to seditions.  places, are more subject to seditions and changes, than those that are built upon an equal and plain ground. The city of Rome, which hath seven hills, was never long without sedition. And Plutarch (having not duly examined the cause) doth wonder why there were three factions in Athens of divers humours: those of the high city, which they called Astu, demanded a Popular State; those of the base town required Oligarchia, or the government of few; and the inhabitants of the Port Pjree, desired an Aristocratical State, that is, a mixed government of the nobility and the people: whereof we will soon show you a natural cause. And if Theophrastus found it strange that the people of Greece be so different in manners and dispositions, who would not admire to see such contrary humours in one and the same city? we cannot impute it to the mixture of people which have come thither from all parts, seeing that Plutarch speaketh of Solon's time, when as the Athenians were so little mingled with any other nations, as they held for certain, that they were issued out of the land of Attica, wherein the Orator Aristides doth glory. In like sort we say the Swissers (having their original out of Sweden) to be very different in manners, nature, and government: for although they be more strictly allied than ever any nations were, yet the five small cantons of the mountains, and the Grisons, are held more fierce and more warlike, and do govern wholly popularly: the rest are more tractable, and are goverded by an aristocraty, being more inclined thereunto, than to a Popular estate. It is needful to have a special care to the nature and inclination of the people, if we will change an estate 
To frame an estate, we must apply it to the nature of the subjects.  as it happened in Florence, about an hundred years since, when as the Commonweal by succession of time was almost changed into Aristocratia, the citizens being so increased, as they were forced thrice to enlarge the compass of their walls. For the prevention whereof the Senate was assembled, and the matter propunded: whereas the Senator Vespucius did show by lively reasons, That an Aristocratical estate was without all comparison the most sure, and far better than a Popular government; giving for an example the state of Venice, flourishing under the command of few gentle men: but Antony Soderine maintained a Popular estate, and prevailed; saying, That 
Guichardin.  the nature of the Venetians was proportionable to an aristocraty, & the Florentines to a Popular estate. We will soon show if his grounds were true. We read also, that the Ephesians, Milesians, and the Siracusians were almost of the Florentines humour: for they could not endure any but a Popular estate, nor allow any one to exceed his companions, banishing even those that surmounted in virtue: and yet the Athenians, Ephesians, and Milesians, were much more mild and tractable; so were they much nearer the East: and contrariwise the Siracusians, Florentines, and Carthagineanss, were 
The humours of sundry people.  much more fierce and rebellious, being more Westward. The people of the East have much more ostentation and many words, in the judgement of all ancient writer, and even of the ambassador of the Rhodiots, excusing the fault of his masters, upon their natural inclination, making mention also of the natural vices of other people, Gentes aliae (inquit) iracundae, aliae audaces, quaedam timidae, in vinum ac venerem proniores aliae sunt, Atheniensium populum fama est celerem & supra vires audacem ad conandum, Lacedemoniorum cunctatorem: non negaverim & totam Asiae regionem inaniora 
Livius lib. 4.  parere ingenia, & nostrorum tumidiorem sermonem esse, Some nations (said he) are choleric, others bold; some fearful, others prove to wine and women; the people of Athens are said to be sudden, and exceeding bold to attempt any thing; the Lacedæmonians are slow and deliberate: I will not deny, but that all the region of Asia brings 
Notable differences between the Athenians, Romans, and Carthaginians.  forth vain wits, and ours great talkers. The people of Athens (said Plutarch) were choleric and pitiful, taking pleasure in flatteries, and enduring easily a scoff: but those of Carthage were cruel and revengeful, humble to their superiors, and imperious to their subjects, faint hearted in adversity, and insolent in prosperity. The people of Rome contrary unto them were patiented in their losses, constant in their victories, moderate in their passions, hating flatterers, and taking delight in grave and severe men: so as the elder Cato demanding the Censorship of the people, said, That they had need of a severe Censor, threatening to punish vice with severity: yet the people desired rather to choose him that threatened them, being but of a mean calling, than the greatest 
Plut. in Calon●… Censorio.  noble men▪ that flattered them. The like they did to L. Torquatus, whom the people did choose Consul without his privity: understanding of his election, he told the people, That his disposition was such, as he could not tollerat their vices, neither could the people endure his commandments; and therefore if they were wise, they should make another choice: yet was he chosen again by the people. That which I say may be easily discerned by the difference of the Athenian and Roman Orators: for these did more respect the majesty of the people, than those of Athens, who abused the people with such insolency, as one of them having assembled the people for matters of state, after that he had made them to attend him long, in the end he came into the pleading place, with a garland of roses, saying unto them, That he had resolved that day to feast his friends, and so departed: whereat the people laughed. Another time Alcibiades speaking to the people, let fly a quail out of his bosom, and the people run after it, and brought it to him again. If he had done this in Carthage (saith Plutarch) before the people, they would have stoned him: the Romans would not have suffered it unpunished; for that a citizen of Rome was deprived of his Bourgeship, for that he had yawned too loud before a Censor, as Valerius Maximus doth testify.  
Therefore a wise governor of any Commonweal must know their humours, before he attempt any thing in the alteration of the state and laws. For one of the greatest, and it may be the chiefest foundation of a Commonweal, is to accommodat the estate to the humour of the citizens; and the laws and ordinanees to the nature of the place, persons, and time. For although Baldus saith, That reason and natural equity is not restrained nor limited to a certain place: that is to be understood, when as the reason is universal, and not whereas a particular reason of places and persons receives 
A good Architect fits his building according to the stuff he finds upon the place.  a private consideration. For which cause we must vary the estate of the Commonweal to the diversity of places; like unto a good Architect, which doth fit his building according to the stuff he finds upon the place: So should a wise Politician do, who may not choose what people he will. As Isocrates said in the praises of Busiris king of Egypt, whom he esteemeth very much, for that he could choose a country and a people the fittest in all the world to govern. Let us first speak of the nature of the people of the North and South, and then of the East, and West, and the difference betwixt the mountainers & those that live in valleys, or in moorish places, or that are subject to violent winds: then will we show how much discipline may change the nature and disposition of men, rejecting the opinions of Polybius, and Galen, who held, That the country and nature of the place did rule necessarily in the manners of men. And the better to understand the infinite variety which may be betwixt the people 
A division of people.  of the North and South, we will divide all the nations that inhabit the earth, or this side the Equator, into three parts: the first shall be of thirty degrees on this side the Equator, which we will attribute to the burning Regions, and people of the South: & the thirty degrees next, to those that inbabit the temperate regions, unto the sixtieth degree towards the Pole, and from thence unto the Pole shall be the thirty degrees of the nations of the North, and the regions that be exceeding cold. The like division may be made of regions beyond the Equator, towards the Antarctic Pole: then we will divide the thirty degrees of the burning regions into the moiety, the fifteen first 
The heat is greater under the Trow pick, than under the Equator.  being more moderate, betwixt the Equator and the tropics; the other fifteen more burning, under the Tropics: and by the same means we will take the fifteen degrees following of the temperate region, which stretcheth unto the 45 degree, which hold more of the South, and the other fifteen unto the sixtieth degree, the which are more distempered in cold, and incline more to the North: and in the fifteen following, unto the 75 degree, although that men be much afflicted with cold, yet are there many nations and Commonweals. But as for the other fifteen adjoining to the Pole, we must make no account of them; for that there are few men, which live in caves like unto brute beasts (as merchants do report, and histories have certified.) I 
〈◊〉 and Saxon Grammaticus.  have given the reason of these divisions in a particular book of the Method of Histories, and therefore need less now to enter any further into it. These points being concluded, it shall be more easy to judge of the nature and disposition of the people. For it is not sufficient to say, that the people of the North have force, with bigness & beauty of the body, and little wit: and contrariwise, that the Southern nations are weak, little, black, and have great wits: for that experience doth teach us, that those people which live in the extremities of the North, are little, lean, and tamed with cold; the which Hipocrates doth confess, the which we must reconcile with the rest, in setting 
Aristotle & Hipocrates agreed herein.  the limits as I have said. And the saying of Hipocrates shall be understood of those nations that inhabit beyond the 70 degree towards the Poles. We will also allow of the opinion of Hypocrates, and after him of Aristotle, who have written, That the people of the North have a flaxen and fine hair. And yet Galen saith, That they have the hair read: the which we must understand of those that are about the 60 degree, whereof there are many in England, whom the inhabitants say are issued from the Danes and Swedens, who invaded England; noting them by their read hair. But from the baltic sea unto the 45 degree, and on this side, the people have commonly flaxen hairs. And in old times, when as nations were not so mingled as since they have been, they did know a Northern man by his flaxen hair and his green eyes; as Plutarch, Tacitus, Juvenal, and in our times the Baron of Herbestein have observed: and 
The difference of the people in the Northern regions.  as I have discoursed in my book of the Method of Histories, and showed that Amiot in his translation of Plutarch, upon the town of Marius, terms them read and chestnut eyes: whereas he should have called them green eyes: the which is very apparent. But those which are about the 60 degree, have in a manner all eyes like unto Owls, and the colour of the water looks white in their eyes: they have a weak sight by day, and see better in the dark, like unto night Owls, which they call Nictalopes. Of this I was assured of the ambassador Pruinski, a Lituanian, and of Holster commissary of the wars, borne at Ostolcome in Sweden, who is haired like a Kow, and eyed like an Owl: which colour, force, and bigness, comes (as Aristotle saith) of the interior heat: as the inhabitants of Africa have black eyes, for the little heat they have in their interior parts, being exhaled by the heat and drought of the sun: whereas the cold doth keep in the heat in the Northern regions, if it be not so vehement as it doth in a manner quench it: for which cause those that inhabit beyond the 75 degree, are weak, little, and tamed with extreme cold, the which is so vehement, as many die; as the merchants report. And even the baron of Heberstein writes, That the spittle freezeth 
In the history of Moscovie.  sometimes before it falls to the ground, the which may seem incredible. But it is most certain that the baltic sea freezeth in such sort, as whole armies pass from the main land to the islands; although the heat in summer is sometimes so violent, as it burns not only the first-fruits of the earth, but also the houses and villages, as the same author writes that it hath happened in Moscovie, in the year 1524. The which also chanced in Polonia, in the year 1552, as Thomas Cromer writes. And the like chanced in England, in the year 1556, as I have seen by letters from M. de Novailles ambassador in England for the French king: in the which he doth assure, That the heat had been so vehement, as the flame kindled by the sun, burned the first-fruits and villages throughout a whole country. The which Aristotle doth affirm in his Problems, That the heat 
The heat more vehement in summer in cold countries than in hot.  is more violent in cold countries than in hot: but that is to be understood in watery places. And whereas there is some mountain which doubleth the heat by reverberation; as it happened in the town of Naim in Gascoine, the which was wholly burnt with the heat of the sun at noon day, in the year 1540: and the town of Montcornet near unto Laon, the which was burnt in the month of May, in the year 1574, after a strange manner, the fire flying through the streets, and through places far distant from the houses where it first began: for the situation thereof is waterish, as I have said; and the grossness of the vapour retains the heat, the which the masters of boat houses know full well; who to spare wood, cast water into their stoves. The Northern parts then being full of waters, lakes, and fountains, the vapours which are drawn up into the air, receive and retain the heat more violently: as in the Southern parts it is more vehement upon the earth. For even as the heat is more violent in metal than in wood, and in great wood than in small brush: so the sun hath more 
Why the sun is hotter on the earth than in the air.  effect upon the earth than in the air; and in a vaporous air in moist regions, than in a dry country, whereus the air is subtle, and without any sensible bodies: which may be the cause that God hath made the Southern countries more rainy, and less waterish: and those places which are moist in the Southern parts, lie commonly towards the North, and are covered with mountains towards the South, as Aquitaine 
What places in the South are most subject to waters.  (which is so called for the abundance of waters) hath the Pyrenean hills. Barbary hath mount Atlas, which is wonderfully high, out of the which the springs and rivers rise all towards the North (as we read in Leo of Africa) also the sun casting his beams perpendicularly upon the country, would make that inhabitable, the which is one of the most fruitful and best peopled countries in the world. And even as in winter the places under ground, and the inward parts of creatures, retain the heat which doth evaporat in summer: even so it fares with people that inhabit the Northern parts, which have the inward heat more vehement than those of the Southern regions: which heat causeth the forces and natural powers to be greater in the one than in the other: and which also doth cause the one to eat more, and to digest better than the other, for the coolness of the region which keeps in the natural heat. So as those armies which come from the Southern parts into the North, are more vigorous and lusty; as it was seen in the army of Hannibal passing into Italy, and the army of Moors and Arabians, which have come into Europe: and of seven thousand Spaniards which passed into Germany, under the emperor Charles the fift: and of forty thousand Gascoines, which went to secure the king of Sweden, who obtained goodly victories. And contrariwise the armies that come out of the North, grow weak and languish, the more 
Why the armies of the North languish when they go towards the South.  they go towards the South, yea even in summer; as it appeared in the Cimbrians, of whom Plutarch witnesseth, That they were all molten with sweat, and languished with heat which they felt in Provence, the which would soon have consumed them all, although they had not been vanquished by the Romans: as it happened to the French before Naples, & to the Lansquenets which passed into Italy, under the command of Charles of Bourbon and of George Fronsperg, of the which after they had sacked Rome, there died ten thousand without any blow, before the year was expired, as Guichardine writes. This doth also plainly appear in the troops of cattle which go out of the North into the South, they lose their fatness, and their milk, and fall away: the which Pliny hath noted, and the merchants found it true by daily experience. And even as the Spaniard doubles his appetite and forces, coming out of Spain into France; even so the French lose their appetites and languish, going into Spain: and if he will eat and drink as he doth in France, he is in danger not to continued it long. And even the nations of the Northern regions fall a languishing and fainting of the heart, when as the Southern winds blow: the same reason doth teach us, why that men and beasts, yea and birds which most suddenly feel this alteration, grow far in winter, and lean in summer. If Leo of Africa, and Francis of Aluares, (who have 
Why the people of the South be abstinent.  written the histories of Africa and Ethiopia) had well observed this reason, which is natural, they had not so highly commended the abstinence of those people: for they cannot have any appetite, the interior heat wanting in them. Neither must we blame the people of the North, for that they are more hungry, and devour more than they 
Why the people of the North are more hungry.  of the South, considering the inward heat and greatness of the men. The same effects are found in the Antarctic regions: for 〈◊〉 read in the Histories of the Indieses, That Magellan found near unto the strait which he called by his own name Giants Patagenes, so great and mighty, that eight Spaniards armed were troubled to hold one; but otherwise very simple. The people of the North get it by force, and they of the South by policy: so they of the midst participate of the one and the other, and are more fit for war, by the judgement of Vegetius and vitrvuius: and therefore they have erected great empires, the which have flourished in arms and laws. And the wisdom of God hath so well distributed his graces, as he hath never joined fo●…ce with excellency of wit, neither in men nor beasts: for there is nothing more cruel than i●…iustice armed with power. The people therefore of the middle regions have more force than they of 
The people of the middle regions are better tempered in wit and body.  the South, & less policy: and more wit than they of the North, & less force; and are more fit to command and govern Commonweals, and more just in their actions. And if we look well into the histories of all nations, we shall found, That even as great armies and mighty powers have come out of the North; even so the hidden knowledge of Philosophy, the Mathematics, and other contemplative sciences, are come out of the South: and the politic sciences, laws, and the study thereof, the grace of well speaking and discoursing, have had their beginning in the middle regions, and all 
The greatest empires were in the middle regions.  great empires have been there established; as the empire of the Assyrians, Medes, Persians', Perthians, Grecians, Romans, Celtes. And although that the Arabians & Moors had for a time seized upon the empire of Persia, Syria, Egypt, and Barbary, & brought a good part of Spain under subjection, yet could they not subdue Greece nor Italy. And whereas they would have subjecteth France, they were vanquished, and their army of 300 thousand men (which they had brought) defeated. In like sort the Romans have stretched forth their power over all the nations of the South and East, but they prevailed little against them of the North and West: & although they were conquerors over all other people, yet they employed all their forces, & had somewhat to do to make resistance against the Northern nations, who neither had walled towns, fortresses, nor castles; as Tacitus saith, speaking of the Germane. And although that Traian had made an admirable bridge upon the river of Danow, and vanquished Decebalus king of Daciens; yet the emperor Adrian his successor, caused it to be broken down, fearing lest the people of the North (having such a passage open) should enter into the heart of the Roman empire: as they did after that the emperor Constantine had discharged the Roman legions, which guarded the river of Rhine and Danow: For soon after the Almans, than the Goths, Ostrogothes, Vandals, Francs, 
The people of the North dispersed throughout all the Roman empire.  Bourguignons, Herules, Huns, Hongres, Lombard's; and in succession of time, Normans, Tartars, Turks, and other nations of Scythia, invaded the Provinces which the Romans had held. And although the English have had great victories over the French and conquered the country which lieth South to them, yet for these nine hundred years they could never expel the Scottish men out of the island; and yet it is well known how much more populous France is than England, and England than Scotland. We may observe the like in the Turks, a Northern nation, who hath extended the greatness of their empire to the goodliest regions of Asia, Africa, and Europe, having in a manner subdued all the islands of the Mediterrannean sea; yet have they been defeated by the Tartarians, & are much trouled to make head against the Moscovites. We read, that God did threaten his people by the oracles of his prophets with the nations of 
isaiah. 14. 41. Ezec. 16. 51. Dan. 8. 48. Za●…h. 11.  the North, foretelling that war murder, and the ruin of Commonweals should come from thence. For although that men be much diminished in numbers, force, proportion, vigour, and age, in respect of the ancients (a complaint of most writers by the history of Pliny) so hardly upon the face of the earth shall you now found a city comparable to Capua (containing thirteen miles in circuit) much less matchable to the famous Babylon, which though it were situated four square in a level soil, yet could a good foot man hardly travel round about it in three days: but this notwithstanding in multitudes of people, in strength of bodies, and large proportion of members, the Northern provinces do at this day far excel the Southern. In regard whereof that military discipline of the Romans, which privileged soldiers at fifty years from future service, was not allowable amongst the Lacedæmonians; who being nothing inferior to the Romans, either for strength of body, or warlike experience, yet freed their people from the service thereof, at forty: the reason being, for that they 
Lacedaemon more Southerly than Rome.  were so much the more unable to hold out so long as the Romans, by how much the one nation approached more near to the South than the other. So bring a Scythian from his native habitation to the South, and you shall found him presently to droop, and fall away with sweat and faintness. And therefore the pirates of the Mediterrannean finding by experience, that the English and Dutch captains are unfit for pains taking in those hot countries, in their markets prise them at a very low rate. For the people of the North are inwardly hot, enjoying a most dry air, and therefore more thrifty than the Southern, who inwardly are cold, according to the property of the South, a climate moist by nature. Wherein the Grecians deriving, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, i. ab humour, from moisture, are to be believed; experience teaching us, That when the winds blow from the South, we expect showers; but when from the North, fair weather and clear skies. For which reason the people of the North are and have always been great drinkers, witness the Greek proverb, To drink like a Scythian, the which Tacitus hath not forgotten, speaking of the manners of the Germane, Diem noctemque (inquit) continuare potando nulli probrum, ita ut craebrae inter vinolentos rixae fiebant, They held it no disgrace (saith he) to sit all day and night drinking: so as oftentimes there fell out jars among these drunkards. The which is not the fault of the men, but of the region: For such as travel from the South to the North, will eat and drink no less than they that are home bred. But Tacitus was deceived, in saying, That the Germane did drink more and eat less, by reason of the coldness and barrenness of the country. But contrariwise seeing that thirst is nothing else but an appetite of cold and moisture, and that hunger is an appetite of drought and heat; and that the people of the North have the interior heat much more in comparison than those of the South, they 
The reason why they of the North drink more than in the South.  must of necessity drink more. In like sort the people of the Northern regions have their skins softer, more hairy, and subject to sweated than the people of the South; which have the skin hard, little hair and curled, and the skin withered with dryness, enduring heat easile without sweeting: but they cannot well bear with cold, not wet; as appeared in the Spaniards, which died of cold in great numbers upon the high mountains of Peruana. And no wonder, for men bred and brought up in hot regions, in colder places inwardly wax i'll, whose bodies if any extraordinary or sudden alteration of wether attach (an accident often happening in those Sotherly quarters, especially upon the tops of those high hills) it must needs follow, that their natural heat, both inward and outward, do utterly forsake them: the contrary whereof betideth the Scythian, who by nature being inwardly hot, by cold becometh so much the more able and courageous, by how much the cold forceth the outward heat unto the heart, the true seat and centre of lively heat. Yea the report, how subject the Southern people through want of inward heat are to looseness and the bloody flux, almost passeth credit, albeit most true: Whereas on the contrary the countries situated Northwards, abounding with rivers and lakes, do enure men's bodies to fogs & cold moistures, and that in such able manner, that Scythians do oftentimes defeat their enemies by their ambuscadoes hidden in deep marshes; testified by Herodianus, who writeth, That the Germane infested the Romans with their missive weapons, themselves standing safe in the midst of the waters. Which secret of nature Galen not well understanding, seemeth to wonder at, especially for bathing their new born infants in cold ●…unning rivers; a custom used in like manner by the Ausonij,  

Natos ad flumina primùm,  
Deferimus, saevoque gelu dur●…mus & undis:   

Our new-born babes at first to springs we bring,  
T'endure cold storms their bodies so enuring.   
The ground of which Germane custom julianus surnamed the Apostata writeth to be, that this people held an opinion, That the true borne children would float upon the waters, but the base and bastards would sink to the bottom. And even as the people 
Proof to know the bastards from them that were lawful.  of the North do languish soon with heat, so are they soon wearied and tired with labour in the Southern parts, or in a hot season. The which was first known at the battle of Plombin, whereas the Celtes being environed with two armies of the Romans, fought valiantly: but after they had spent their first fury, they were soon vanquished. Polybius saith, That to vanquish the Celtes, you must but ward their blows for a time, and yet they were held invincible, Caesar holds the same opinion of the Gauls, That in the beginning of a battle they were more than men, but in the end less than women. The which is more natural to the Germane, and other people of the North (as Tacitus saith) who had known them by long experience: For the Gauls, especially those of Languedovich, hold the middle region betwixt the cold and extreme heat, although the quality of the Western region makes the country more cold. And those which are in the midst are impatient of cold or heat: the which Caesar doth witness of the Gauls, who suffet cold more easily than the Spaniards, and heat than the Germane. And even as the people of the middle regions hold of the two extremes in humour, so do they agreed with the one and the other in manners and 
The middle region participats of both the extremes.  complexions: and as God by his admirable wisdom doth unite all things by convenient means to their extremities. In like sort we see that he hath observed the same order betwixt the nations of the North and South, which can never concur together for the contrariety of manners and humours that is betwixt them. The which is a thing very considerable, when there is any question to treat a peace, or to make a league betwixt two nations so contrary, or to lead them both forth to the war together; you must place that nation betwixt them that doth participate of both their natures, and that have their affections more moderate. As Galen saith, That the Germane and Arabians have not that commendable civility which is in them that are borne in Asia the less, the which is not only betwixt the Pole and the Equator; but also betwixt the East Indieses and France Westward: A country for this virtue so highly 
〈◊〉 and humanity comes from Asia.  commended by Tully, that he doubteth not to affirm, That therein not only rested the mirror of civility, but that from thence it hath been derived to all foreign nations. But I am not of their opinions, who draw their arguments of civility and ba●…barisme from the effects of heat and cold, finding every day by common experience, that the Southern people go beyond all other nations in quickness of wit, whereas barbarism and rude behaviour proceed from ignorance and want of education, a lesson long ago verified by Herodotus, who for good wits and civil behaviour commendeth the Egyptians before all other people of what nation soever. And after him Caesar (in his Commentaries of the civil wars) gave them the like privilege, saying, That the Alexandrians did so artificially sergeant the Roman engines of war, as it seemed the Romans were but their apes, he useth these words, Ipsi homines ingeniosissimi ac subtilissimi, The men themselves were very witty and politic: And yet Egypt is partly under the Tropic, whereas the heat is more violent than under the Equator, by the judgement of Possidonius and the Spaniards. The Romans held the like opinion of the people of Africa, whom they called Paenos, who had often deceived the Romans, and overthrown their forces by policy. So Columella terms them Gentem acutissimam, A most subtle nation: But yet they had not such excellent wits as the Egyptians, neither are they so near the South. And without any further search we have the proof thereof in this realm, where the difference is apparent in regard of the English, who complained to Philip of Comines with admiration, for that the French lost most commonly in their wars against them, and won still in their treaties. We may writ the like of the Spaniards, who never made treaty for these hundred years with the French, 
The nature of the French.  but they had the advantage: the which were long to repeat in particular. I will only produce the treaty of Cambresis, made in the year 1559. It cannot be denied but the forces of France were great and sufficient to withstand a mighty enemy, yet the Spaniard got more by this treaty, without striking stroke, than they had done before 
The Spaniard always circumuents the French by treacheries.  in forty years, never hoping (as they confessed afterwards) to draw Savoy no●… Piedmont out of the hands of the French: For although the duke of Savoie, a virtuous and a generous prince, deserved much, as well for the equity of his cause, as for the alliance of the house of France, yet he expected not so happy an issue of his affairs: the which was cunningly handled by the Spaniard, which reaped both thanks, and the greatest first-fruits of this treaty, having so much diminished the state of France (which stretched even unto the gates of Milan) and set the duke of Savoy as it were a bar betwixt Italy and France, to shut up the passage that the French might pretend no more in Italy. It cannot be denied, that such as had the charge to capitulat for the French, did not show so great discretion, faith, and loyalty, as they might: but I understand from one of good credit, that it was resolved in the council of Spain, That they should prolong the treaty all they could; for that the nature of the French was so sudden and 
The reason why the Spaniards cirumvent the French.  active, as they would easily yield to that which was demanded, being tired with many journeys, and the ordinary tediousness of the Spaniard, the which was not forgotten in this treaty. It was also observed, That in all the sit and assemblies made by the deputies, always the French were first come, and although they had set all their people to watch, that they might sometimes enter the last; yet were they still deceived by the subtlety of the Spaniards, and impatience of the French, who seemed by this means to sue for peace. This fault is not to be imputed to them that had the charge to treat a peace, but unto nature, which is hardly vanquished. For we read the like of the ambassadors of France, conferring with the ambassadors of the emperor, of Venice, Spain, and Ferrare, before Francis Sforce duke of Milan. Our manner (saith Philip de Comines) is not to speak treatably, as they do: for we speak sometimes two or three together, so as the Duke said, Ho, one to one. Whereby we may judge as in any other observations, That the nature of the Spaniard (being much more miridionall 
The nature of the Spaniard.  than we) is colder, more melancholic, more stayed, more contemplative, and by consequence more ingenious than the French; who by nature cannot stay to contemplate, being choleric and full of spleen, the which makes him more active and prompt, yea so sudden, as he seems unto the Spaniard to run, when he goes but his ordinary pace: for which cause both the Spaniard and the Italian desire to have French men to serve them, for their diligence and quickness in all their actions: so as yearly there go infinite numbers into Spain; as I have seen being at Narbone, especially out of A●…uergne 
The Spaniard heavy & slothful  and Limosin, to build, plant, till their lands, and do all manual works, which the Spaniard cannot do, but would rather die for hunger, he is so slothful and heavy in all his actions. When as N. Strossie Prior of Capova, attempted to surprise Valencia in Spain, by means of the French galleys, whereof he was then Admiral: the practice being discovered, the Viceroy sought to expel all the French out of Valencia, which were found to be ten thousand: for whose loyalty the Spaniards stood bound, rather than they should departed: which shows how greatly that country is peopled with French. And without doubt those which are bred of the mixture of those two nations, are more accomplished than either of them: For in the Spaniard we desire more vivacity and cheerfulness, and to have the actions and passions of the French more moderate: and it seems the Italian doth participate of the one and the other, Italy being in the most temperate situation that can be, betwixt the Pole and the Equator, and in the midst of Asia, Africa, and Europe, bending a little towards the East & South. And even as they which live at the extremities of the Poles, are Phlegmatic, and at the South melancholy; even so they which are thirty degrees on this side the Pole, are more sanguine; and they which approach nearer unto the midst, more sanguine and choleric; and then drawing towards the South, more sanguine and melancholic: so 
Whence the variety of complexions doth grow  their complexion is more black and yellow, black being the colour of melancholy, and yellow of choler. Galen confesseth, That phlegm makes men heavy and dull; blood cheerful and strong; choler, active and nimble; and melancholy, constant and grave: 
The disposition of the four complexions.  and according to the mixture of these four humours, more or less, so many varieties there be, which Theodore Duca of the house of Lascare emperor of Constantinople hath laboured to comprehend in 92 kinds, not only for the four humours, but also for the three parts of the soul, Reason, Anger, & Appetite (or Desire:) but for that his opinions are not grounded upon the proof of any example, nor upon necessary reason; and for that he makes no distinction of the parts of the world, neither of moist places, hilly nor windy, from those that are dry, plain, and temperate: neither for that he hath not denied those people which have been brought up in civil discipline, from the rude and barbarous, in this variety of souls and humours which he hath supposed, we will follow that discipline which seemeth most agreeing to reason and nature, & hath been confirmed by many examples. Ancient histories do agreed, That the people of the North are not malicious nor crafty, as the nations of the South be. And Tacitus speaking 
The people of the North not subtle.  of the Germane, saith, It is a nation that is neither subtle nor crafty, discovering their secrets as it were in jest, and then they go easily from their promises. The like judgement we found of the Scythians in Herodotus, justin, Strabo, Pliny, and Vegetius, & therefore ancient princes as well as at this day, had no other guards for their persons than Scythians, Thracians, Germane, Swissers, and Circassians. And even the Seigne●…rie of Rhaguse or of Genes, have no other guards but Germane and Swissers. And which is more, the kings of Africa beyond mount Atlas, have none other guard but soldiers of Europe; who although they be Mahometans, yet had they rather trust in Christians that have abjured their faith, than in those of the country; the which was first put in practice by the great Mansor emperor of Africa and of Spain: and heretofore the king of Tunis had 1500 light horsemen of Christians renigadoes, and his guard of Turkish and Christian slaves, as Leo of Africa saith; knowing well that the people of the North have more force than subtlety, and having received entertainment of any prince, they always remain faithful for the guard of his person, and to revenge his injuries (although he be a tyrant) never aspiring to his estate. And therefore Chereas' captain of the guard to the emperor Caligula, having slain the emperor, was 
The people of the North faithful to the prince that entertaineth them  presently murdered by the guard, which were Germane, who could not (as josephus writeth) forbear revenge. In like sort the ancients have observed a barbarous cruelty in the people of the North: for even Thucydides son to Olorus king of Thrace, terms the Thracians a most cruel nation: and Taritus speaking of the Germane, They do not (saith he) put the guilty to death after order of law, but by cruelty, as enemies. I will let pass the ancient, and content myself with late examples. We have none more notable than that of George captain of the rebels in Hungary, being taken by them of Transiluania, they caused his soldiers and companions to fast three days, and then gave them to eat their captain half roasted, and his bowels boiled. I omit 
Strange cruelties of the people of the North.  the strange cruelties of Dracula duke of Transiluania, and of Otton Trucces, who caused the murderer of his lieutenant to be roasted with a slow fire, during the commons 〈◊〉: and of late Grombache a German, was condemned to have his heart pulled out being alive, and to have his face beaten therewithal, by Augustus' duke of Saxony in the castle of Goth. We found also, that the breaking upon the wheel was invented in Germany, and the impaling or setting men upon stakes alive, in Tartary. Neither is it less cruel in Tartary, to force them that are condemned, to break their own necks, or else to whip and torment them: Which makes men to think, that the cruelties of the king of Moscovie published and printed, are very likely. For the less reason and judgement men have, the more they approach to the nature of brute beasts, who canno more yield to reason and govern their passions than brute beasts. And contrariwise, 
Melancholic men cruel and revengeful.  the people of the South are cruel and revengeful, by reason of melancholy, which doth inflame the passions of the soul with an exceeding violence, the which is not easily suppressed. Polybius speaking of the warts of the Speudians, and Carthagineanss, people of Africa, he saith, That there was never seen nor heard of any 〈◊〉, where there was more treachery and cruelty: and yet they are but toys in respect of 
Terrible cruelties of the people of the South.  the horrible treacheries mentioned by Leo of Africa (and in our age) betwixt Muleasses and his own children. And even the king of Tenesme being solicited by joseph king of Morocco to submit himself under his obedience, which his grandfather had rejected, he slew his ambassadors; wherewith the king of Morocco being insenced, put a million of people to the sword in the realm of Tenesme, leaving him neither town, castle, house, beast, nor tree. And speaking of Homar Essuein a minister to Mahomet, seeking to make himself king, after that he had forced the fort of Vngiasen, he was not content to put all to the sword, but he cut & tare the children out of their mother's wombs. And the same author writes, That Isaak king of Tombut in Africa, having taken the king of Gagao, he caused him presently to be put to death, and his children to be guelt to serve him as slaves, doing the like unto all the kings he takes. We read of the like cruelties or greater at the West▪ Indies, newly discovered: for the Brasilians are not contented to eat the flesh of their enemies, but will bathe their children in their blood. But the cruelty is more remarkable, when as they do execute any one that is condemned by law; the which should be done without passion, and free from revenge. Yet we read of punishments that were used in old time among the Persians', which exceed all cruelty: and in Egypt at this day they flay them alive which rob by the high way, than they stuff the skin full of hai●… and set it upon an Ass, by his side 
The people betwixt both extremes, not subject to cruelty.  that is so flayed: Which cruelties the people that live betwixt both these extremes can neither see nor heat without horror: and therefore it seems, that for this cause the Romans suffered them that were condemned, to die of hunger, and the Greeks gave them hemlock (which is a sweet poison) to drink: and those of Chio did temper it with water, and the Athenians with wine, to take away the bitterness thereof, as Theophrastus saith. We may therefore note the difference of cruelty betwixt the people of the North and South: for that the first are transported with a brutish violence, like beasts without reason: and the other (like unto foxes) employ all their wits to glut themselves with revenge: and even as the body cannot be purged of melancholy but with great difficulty, so the passions and perturbations of the mind, which grow by a settled melancholy, are not easily pacified. So as they which are possessed with this humour, are more subject unto frenzy than any others, if they found not wherewithal to satisfy 
Why the people of the South are more revengeful than others, and more subject to madness.  their affections. And therefore there are more mad men in the Southern regions, than towards the North. Leo of Africa doth writ, That in the kingdoms of Fez and Morocco there are great numbers: And even in Grenado (which is more Southernly) there are many hospitals for mad men only. The variety of mad men shows the natural humour of the people: for although there be store of fools and mad men in all places and of all sorts, yet those of the Southern parts have many terrible visions, they preach and speak many languages without learning them, and are sometimes possessed with evil spirits, having lean bodies, more like unto ghosts than those corpulent and sanguine men towards the North, which do nothing but dance, 
Why music cures mad men, and expels devils.  laugh and leap in their fooleries: and in Germany it is called the disease of S. Victus, the which is cured by music: whether that the sweet harmony thereof doth recall the reason which was distempered, or whether that music doth cure the infirmities of the body by the mind, as the physic doth cure the mind by the body, or that evil spirits which do sometimes torment mad men are expelled with this divine harmony, delighting in nothing but in discords: or as we read that the evil spirit hearing the sound of a harp fled, and left Saul in rest, which seems to have been the cause why Elizeus when he would prophecy before the kings of juda and Samaria, he caused one to play of an Instrument. And when as Saul was encountered by the holy troop of the Prophets playing upon instruments of music, presently the spirit of God fell upon him. Oftentimes evil spirits do apply themselves to the humour of mad men: for choleric men strike in their fury, which happens not in those that are of a sanguine complexion, and much less in them that be phlegmatic, which have a Lethargy, the which is a dull and sleeping fury. And for that the melancholic man is the wiser, if he chance to fall mad, his fury is the more incurable, for that a melancholic humour suffers not itself to be governed as the rest: those that be sanguine, although they be not so often furious, yet are they often mad, the which is never incident to wise men, for Tully saith, Furor in sapientem cadere potest, insania non potest, & furioso curator datur, 
The difference betwixt a furious and a mad man.  non insano; quia insanus dicitur, qui suis cupiditatibus imperare nescit: Fury may well fall into a wise man, but not madness: a governor is given to a furious man, but not to a mad man, for he is called mad that cannot rule his own desires. As touching that which we have said, that the people of the South are commonly more grave, more discreet, and more moderate in all their actions: it is plainly seen not only in divers other nations, but also in this realm, which seems to be the cause that those which have made the customs, have limited them to be of full age that live towards the North at 25. years, and the others at 19 or 20 years, except it be in those countries which border upon the sea, whereas the people (by reason of their traffic) are more politic. I cannot without the note of ingratitude to mine own country forget the judgement which the ancients have given of the city of Angiers, as it is to be seen in the letters patents of king Charles the 5 called the wise, the which he granted for the privileges of the University of the said city in these words, Quodque inter regiones alias Regni nostri, civitas Andegavensis veluti fons scientiarum irriguus, viros alti consilij solet ab antiquo propagatione quasi naturali providere: For that among other provinces of this our realm, the city of Angers like unto a flowing spring of all sciences, is wont to sand forth men of great knowledge and judgement, as it were by a natural propagation. These letters are dated the first of August in the year 1373.  
We have yet another notable difference betwixt the people of the South and of the North, for that these are more chaste and abstinent, and those of the South much given to lust, the which grows by reason of the spongeous melancholy, so as all Monsters do commonly come from Africa, which Ptolemy saith to be under Scorpio and 
The people of the South much given to women.  Venus, adding moreover, that all Afrique did worship Venus: and Titus Livius speaking of the Numidians (who were the most Southerly of all the Romans subjects or allies) The Numidians (saith he) were given to venery more than all the other Barbarians. We read also that the kings of Africa and Persia had always great troops of wives and concubines, the which is not to be imputed to their depraved customs, for that at the West Indieses king Alcazares had 400 wives: and the father of Attabalipa the last king of Peru, (who was defeated by Pizarre) had 200 wives, and fifty children: and the king of Giolo had 600 children: so many had Hierotimus king of the Parthians, who had also a great number of wives: and Surenus General of that army of the Parthians which defeated Crassus, had ten thousand. The Scythians and Germans have enough of one wife: and Caesar in his Commentaries saith, that the Englishmen in his time had but one woman to ten or twelve men: and many men in 
A strange manee of gelding of men, which they used in Scythia & low Germany.  the North parts knowing their own insufficiencies, geld themselves in despite, cutting the veins Parotides under the ears, as Hypocrates saith: who seeking out the cause of this disability, concludes, that is for the coldness of the belly, and for that, they are commonly on horseback: wherein he is deceived, for Aristotle holdeth, that agitation doth provoke; and as for want of heat, it is most certain that those which devil in cold countries abound with heat inwardly, as it appears by the corpulency and strength of those Northern nations: and contrariwise those of the South are very cold. It is the nature of melancholy which abounds most in them of the South, the which being frothy, provokes to lust, as Aristotle writes in his Problems, where he 
Melancholik●… men most given to lust.  demands why melancholic men are most lecherous: the which is notorious in the Hare, the which is the most melancholic of all other creatures, and which only conceives being big with young, as well the male as the female, as M. Varro, and other writers do witness, and experience hath taught us; so as we may say they are much deceived which have so much extolled the pudicitie and chastity of the Scythians, Germans, and other Northern nations, as Caesar writes in his Commentaries. Among the Germans (saith he) it is a dishonest and villainous thing for a man to know a woman before the age of 25 years, which thing they conceal not: and Tacitus saith, 
The people of the North enemies to women.  there are none but the Germans among the barbarous nations that content themselves with one wife: yea sometimes they live in perpetual chastity, as the Emperor Henry 2. did, and Casimir 1. king of Poland, and Ladislaus king of Bohemia would never marry; the which was not for that they were chaste, but rather through a natural weakness: and John 2. great Duke of Muscovia, did so abhor women, as he did even sound at the very sight of them, as the Baron of Herbestein doth writ, speaking of the Muscovites, They never see their wives (saith he) until the day of their marriage. The people of the North are so little subject to jealousy, as Alcomer a German, and Irenicus do writ in commendation of their country, that men and women throughout all Germany doth bathe together pel mel, yea and with strangers, without any touch of jealousy, the which as Munster saith, is not known in Germany: whereas contrariwise those of the South are so passionate, as oftentimes they die of that disease. Being 
The people of the South much given to jealousy.  sent into England with an embassage, I heard Mendoza the spanish Ambassador say, That it was a shameful thing to see men & women sit together at holy sermons: to whom Doctor Dale Master of Requests answered pleasantly, That it was a more shameful thing for Spaniards to think of satisfying of their lusts even in holy places, the which was far from Englishmen minds. We read in the history of the Indieses that the king of Puna was so jealous, as he did cut off the privy parts, with the noses and arms of those Eunuches that attended of his women. The people that inhabit the middle regions hold a mediocrity in all this, but the most part of them allow but one lawful wife: and although that julius Caesar did persuade Helu●…dius Cinna to publish the law of polygamy (or many wives) to the end that Cesarion (whom he had by the Queen Cleopatr●…) might be legitimate, yet this law was rejected: and the same law being revived by John Leiden a cobbler, having made himself king of Munster in Westphalia, did more trouble their estate than all the other laws and alterations which he made. But the Roman Emperors made a general law to all nations without any distinction, noting him with infamy that had more than one wife: and since, that punishment of infamy hath been made capital within this realm. But the Roman law hath been of no force in Africa, for the inconveniences that happened; as it is incident to all those that seek to apply the laws of the people of the South to 
All laws agreed not with all nations.  them of the North, making no difference of their dispositions, wherein many have been much deceived, and even Cardan, who saith, That man is wiser than all other creatures, for that he is more hot and moist; the which is quite contrary to the truth, being most apparent that the wisest beasts are colder than any other, in the opinion of Aristotle. In like sort among military punishments, one was, to let the soldier blood that had offended, for that those which abound in blood had the passions of the mind more violent and less obedient unto reason. Of all beasts the Elephant is held to be the wisest, of the Ancients, for that their blood is coldest; and the most melancholic of all others, the which makes them lepers: and to this leprosy the people of the 
Melancholy the cause of wisdom  South are much subject, the which was called by the Ancients Elephantiasis, a disease unknown in Greece before Plutarch, or in Italy before Pompey, as Pliny writes. But he deceives himself to say, that it was proper to the Egyptians, for all the coast of Africa abounds with them; and in Ethiopia it is so common, as the lepers are not separated from the sound. But Leprosy differs from Elephantiasis, the which is a great swelling in the thighs and legs, and leprosy is a canker or infection over the whole body. It may be this melancholy is the cause of long life, for all the Ancients consent, that the Elephant lives three and four hundred years, and Ravens more, who have little 
Melancholy the cause of long life.  blood, and that very melancholy. Francis Aluarez reporteth, that he had seen Abuna Mare Bishop of Ethiopia who was 150 years old, and yet very lusty, which was the greatest age that ever was found in the Censors registers at Rome. And we must not wonder if Homer saith, that Memnon king of Ethiopia lived five hundred years, for Xenophon long after writes, that in the same country there were men that lived six hundred years: but those of the South have very dry bodies, and are subject to the falling sickness, quartain agues, and the King's evil. Hereby we may judge, that the people of the South are infected with great diseases of the body, and notorious vices of the mind: and contrariwise there are no people that have their bodies better disposed to live long, and their minds apt for great virtues. So Titus 
The people of the South subject to extremes.  Livius having much commended Hannibal for his heroical virtues, These great virtues (said he) were accompanied with as great vices, inhuman cruelty, treachery, impiety, and contempt of all religion: for greatest spirits are subject to greatest virtues and vices. Wherein the ancient writers have been deceived, commending so highly the virtue, integrity, and bounty of the Scythians, and other people of the North, and condemning the vices of the South: For he deserves no praise for his bounty, that hath no wit, and that cannot be wicked, for that he knoweth no evil; 
Posse & noll●… nobile.  but he that knoweth evil, and how to put it in practice, and yet is an honest man. In like sort Machiavelli was overseen, saying, That the Spaniards, Italians, and Frenchmen, were the wickedest people in the world; showing thereby, that he had never read any good book, nor known the disposition and differences of nations. But if we shall look more narrowly into the disposition of the people of the North, of the South, and of them that are betwixt both; we shall found that their natures are like unto young men, old men, and them of middle age, and to the qualities which are attributed unto them. In like sort every one of those three in the government of the Commonweal useth that which he hath most at command: The nations of the North, by force; those in the midst, by equity and justice; and the Southern parts, by religion. The 
The manner of government in the three temperatures.  magistrate (saith Tacitus) commands nothing in Germany, but with the sword in his hand. And Caesar writes in his Commentaries, That the Germane have no care of religion, and make no account of any thing but of war and of hunting. And the Schythians (saith Solinus) did stick a sword into the ground, the which they did worship, placing the end of all their actions, laws, religions, and judgements, in their force and arms. We found that combats came first from the people of the North, as we have said elsewhere: all the laws of the Saliens, Francons, English, Ripuaries, and other Northern nations are full of them: And the law of Fronton king of Denmark would have all controversies decided by single combat: Which laws could never be abrogated, although that both pope's and other princes have laboured much, not considering that the natural disposition of them of the North, is quite contrary to them of the South. And at this present in Germany they make great account of the Reisters' law, the which is neither divine, human, nor canonical; but the stronger commands the weaker: as Brennus' captain of the Gauls said unto the treasurer Sulpitius. The middle nations are more reasonable and less strong, they have recourse unto reason, unto judges, and unto suits. It is most certain, that laws and the manner of pleading are come from the people of the middle nations; as from Asia the less (whereas great Orators and Pleaders were in credit) from Greece, Italy, and France: whereof a certain Poet speaketh, Gallia causidicos docuit facunda Britannos, Eloquent France hath taught the pleading Britons. It is not at this day alone, that France hath been full 
The Frenchmen given by nature to pleading.  of suits and contentions, the which cannot be altered and taken away, unless they change the nature and disposition of the people: and it is much better to decide all controversies by law, than by the sword; the one is fit for reasonable creatures, the other for brute beasts: and to conclude, all great Orators, Lawmakers, Lawyers, Historiographers, Poets, Comedians, and others which draw unto them the hearts of men with goodly discourses and sweet words, are in a manner all of the middle nations. We see in the histories both of the Greeks and Latins, before they attempted the lest war, the matter was debated with many solemn orations, denominations, and protestations: the which the people of the North do not use, who presently fall to 
The several disposition of people according to the clima●…ss.  arms, and even as the one use force only like unto Lions, so they of the midst arm themselves with laws and reasons. In like sort the people of the South have recourse unto craft and subtlety, like unto Foxes; or unto religion: for eloquent discourses agreed not with the gross wits of the Northern people, and they are too base for them of the South, who allow not of any legal reasons or rhetorical suppositions, which hold truth and falsehood in suspense, but they require certain demonstrations or divine oracles, which exceed any humane discourse. So we see that the people of the South, the Egyptians, Chaldeans, and Arabians, have brought to light the hidden sciences both natural and mathematical, which torment the greatest wits, and force them to confess the truth: and all religions have in a manner taken their beginning from the people of the South, and from thence have been dispersed over the whole earth: not that God hath any acception of places and persons, or that he doth not suffer his divine light to shine upon all men; but even as the Sun is seen more easily in a clear and still water than in that which is troubled and filthy, so in my opinion the heavenly light doth shine far more brighter in pure and clean spirits, than in those which are polluted with base and earthly affections. And if it be so that the true purifying of the soul is by his heavenly light, and by the force of contemplation in the most perfect subject; without doubt they shall soon attain unto it which have their souls ravished up into heaven; the which we see happen unto melancholic men, which have 
Melancholic men most given to contemplation  their spirits settled and given to contemplation, the which is called by the Hebrews and Accademiks a precious death, for that it draws the soul out of this earthly body 
Means to govern the people of the South.  unto spiritual things. It is no marvel then if the people of the South be better governed by religion, than by force or reason, the which is a point very considerable to draw the people, when as neither force nor reason can prevail: as we read in the history of the Indieses, that Christopher Colombus when he could not draw the people of 
A fine policy of Colombus the Genevois.  the West Indies unto humanity by any flattery or fair means, he showed them the Moon the which they did worship, giving them to understand that she should soon loose her light: three days after seeing the Moon eclipsed, they were so amazed, as they did what he commanded them. So the more we draw towards the South, the more devout we find men, and the more firm and constant in their religion, as in Spain, and more in Africa: whereas Francis Aluarez, and Leo of Africa do say, that religion is much more reverenced and honoured there than in Europe, where among other observations Leo notes, That in one city of Fez there are seven hundred temples, 
Religion most respected in the South.  and the greatest is 1500 paces in compass, 31 gates, and within it 900 lamps, the yearly revenue of which temple is 73000 ducats. But Aluarez reports far stranger things of the greatness of temples, of the incredible fasts and devotion of the people of Ethiopia, and that the greatest part of the nobility and the people make very strict vows of religion. The greatest reason that hath so long maintained Ethiopia in that goodly and flourishing estate, and that doth still hold the subjects in the obedience of their prince and governor, is the assured persuasion which they have (as Aluarez saith) That good and evil comes not unto them by their friends or enemies, but by the will of God. As for suits, there are fewer than in any part of the world: and which is more strange, they keep no records in writing of any decrees, judgements, testaments, or contracts, except the accounts of the receipt and expenses. Who so should seek to govern those nations by the laws and ordinances used in Turkey, Greece, Italy, France, and other middle regions, he should ruin their estate. In like sort he that should accustom the people of the North to the pleading of France and Italy, should find himself much troubled, as it happened to Mathias king of Hongarie, who sent for judges out of Italy to reform the jurisdiction of Hongarie, but in a short time the people were so troubled with this canonical pleading, as the king was constrained (at the request of his Estates) to sand back his Italian judges into their country. So Ferdinand king of Spain sending Pedrarias Viceroy to the West Indies, the which then were newly discovered, he did expressly forbidden him to carry any lawyer or advocate with 
The disposition of the people is greatly to be observed in the government.  him, to the end he should not sow any seeds of suits and pleading where as there was not yet any. But who so should seek to root out all suits and processes in France and Italy, he should thrust the people into perpetual seditions: for even the judges themselves being unable to determine and end suits, for the difficulty and contrariety of reasons that are of either side, they oftentimes depute arbitrators, or else they prolong the suit of purpose to give the party's occasion to agreed friendly, and to discharge their choler upon the judges and advocates, else they would fall to arms, whereby it appears that the people of the middle region are more capable to govern a commonweal, as having more natural reason, the which is proper to humane actions, and as it were the touchstone to distinguish the difference betwixt good and evil, betwixt right and wrong, and betwixt honest and dishonest things. Wisdom is fit to command, and force to execute, the which is proper to the people of the North, but 
Three virtues proper to three nations of the North, South, & middle region.  they of the South being less capable of government, give themselves wholly to the contemplation of natural and divine sciences, and to discern truth from falsehood. And even as the wisdom to know good and evil is greatest in the people of the midst, and the knowledge of truth and falsehood in the people of the South, even so those 
Prudenti●…. Scienti●…. Ars.  arts which consist in handy works, are greater in the people of the North then in any other, and therefore the Spaniards and the Italians admire so many and so divers kinds of works made with the hand, as are brought out of Germany, Flanders, and England. And as there are three principal parts in the soul of man, that is to say, the imaginative or common sense, reason, and the intellectual part, even so in every well ordered Commonweal the Priests and Philosophers are employed in the search of divine and hidden sciences, being as it were the hart of the city, the magistrates and officers to command, judge, and provide for the government of the State, being as it were the reason of the city: and the common people apply themselves to labour and mechanical arts, the which is conformable to common sense.  
We may conclude the like of the universal Commonweal of this world, the which God hath so ordained by his admirable wisdom: As the people of the South are 
The disposition of the three nations in the government of the world.  made and appointed for the search of hidden sciences, that they may instruct other nations: Those of the North for labour and manual arts: and those of the middle betwixt the two extremes, to negotiate, traffic, judge, pled, command, establish Commonweals; and to make laws and ordinances for other nations: whereunto those of the North are not so apt for want of wisdom: neither are the people of the South, be it that they be too much given to divine and natural contemplations; or for want 
Why those of the South are not fit to govern a state.  of that alacrity and promptness, which is required in human actions; be it that he cannot yield in his opinions, dissemble, nor endure the toil which is necessary for a man of state; or that he is soon weary of public affairs, or that he is oftentimes expelied by ambitious courtiers: as it happened to the wise men of Persia, who were suddenly put from the government of the state, after the death of Cambyses: and to the Pithagorians in Italy. And it seems this was figured by the fable of jupiter, who expelled his father Saturn out of his kingdom: that is to say, an ambitious and politic courtier dispossessed a Philosopher given to contemplation: For who so shall well observe the nature of Planets, he shall found in my opinion, that the division of them doth agreed with the three regions above mentioned, according unto their natural order, giving the highest Planet, which is Saturn, to the Southern region, jupiter to the middle, 
The proportion of the Planets to the people.  and Mars to the Septentrional parts, the Sun remaining in the midst, as the spring of light equally common to them all. Than follows Venus, proper to the people of the South, than Mercury to them of the middle regions: and last of all is the Moon for the North parts, which showeth the natural inclination of the people of the North to war and hunting, fit for Mars and Diana: and the people of the South to contemplation, besides their disposition to venery. And the nations betwixt both the quality of jupiter and Mercury, fit for politic governments: the which hath a strange sympathy in man's body, which is the image of the universal world, and of a well ordered Commonweal: for setting the right hand of man towards the North, going from the East into the West, according unto the natural motion of the world, 
In Method. hist. cap. 5.  and the true constitution thereof; as I have showed in another place: the right part which is the more strong and masculine, having the liver and the gall, which the Hebrews attribute to the Moon and Mars, showeth plainly the nature of the people of the North to be sanguine and warlike. The left side, which is the feminine part (so called by the Philosophers) and the weaker, having the spleen and the melancholic humour, discovers the quality of the people of the South. Even so we found more women in the Southern parts, and more men in the North: for else it were impossible that every man in the South countries should have so many wives. 
Moore women in the South than men.   
And thus much as touching the general qualities of all people: for as for the particular, there are in all places and in all country's men of all humours, and subject to that which I have said more or less. Moreover the particular situation of places, doth much altar the nature of the country. For although there is not any certain place, whereas we may distinguish the East from the West, as we may the South from the North: yet all ancients have held, That the people of the East are more mild, more courteous, more tractable, and more ingenious, than those of the West, and less warlike, Behold (saith julian the emperor) how the Persians' and Syrians are mild and tractable. Who sees not the fury of the Celtes & Germane, & how jealous they are of liberty? the Romans are courteous and warlike, the Egyptians witty and subtle, and withal effeminate. The Spaniards have observed, That the people of Sina (the whic●… 
The people of the East more courteous, and more ingenious than those of the West.  are farthest Eastward) are the most ingenious and courteous people in the world: and those of Brezill, which are far Westward, the most cruel and barbarous. To conclude, if we look well into histories, we shall found, that the people of the West do participate much of the nature of the North; and the people of the East with them of the South in the same latitude. The natural bounty of the air, and of the Easterly winds, is the cause that men are more fair, and of a bigger proportion: and it is strange, if the plague or any other infectious disease comes from the West into the East, or from the North into the South, it continues not: whereas if they begin in the East, or in any part of the South, they are long and very infectious: as it hath been proved by experience in old times, and at this day the conjecture is infallible in the country of Languedoc, whereas the plague is ordinary. I have noted many examples in another place, the which I omit now for brevity sake: yet the difference of manners and dispositions of people, is much more notorious betwixt the North and the South, than betwixt the East and the West. But the greatest change in particular, is the difference of hilly places from valleys: and of valleys turned towards the North or towards the South, 
Remarkable particularities of places.  in the same climate or like latitude, yea in the same degree, which causeth a wonderful difference betwixt the one and the other: as it is plainly seen in mountains which stretch from the West to the East: as the Appenin, which divideth in a manner all Italy in two, mount Saint Adrian in Spain, the mountains of Anuergne in France, and the Py●…enees betwixt France and Spain, mount Taurus in Asia, and Atlas in Africa, which runs from the Atlantike sea unto the confines of Egypt above six hundred leagues; mount Imaus, which divides Tartary from South Asia, the Alps which begin in France, and continued unto Thrace: and mount Calphat, which divides Polonia from Hungary; the which causeth them of Tuscan to be of a contrary humour to them of Lombardie, and far more ingenious: as also we see them of Arragon and Valence, and other people beyond the Pyrenean hills, to be of a different disposition to them of Gasconie and Languedoc, who hold much of the nature of the North; and the people on this side mount Atlas are far less ingenious than the Numidians, and other nations which are on the other side mount Atlas: for the one are very white, and the other exceeding black; the one subject to many infirmities, the other sound, cheerful, and of long life. We must not then marvel if the Florentine (who is towards the East and South, having the mountains at his back upon the North & West) be of more subtle spirit than the Venetians, and more advised in his private affairs: 
The cause or the diversity of humours in Italy.  and yet the Florentines in their assemblies spoil all through the subtlety of their wits: whereas the Venetians in their counsels resolve gravely, as we have observed for these two hundred years: for those that have lest wit, yield to reason, change their opinions, and refer themselves to men of best judgement: but so many great spirits being subtle and ambitious, are obstinate, and will hardly yield from their opinions: & for that every man holds himself able to command, they will have a Popular estate, the which they cannot maintain without quarrels and civil dissensions, by reason of a natural obstinacy, proper to the people of the South, which are melancholic, and to those which for the particular situation of the place, do participate of the nature of the South. And even as they which go from Bouloigne to Florence, or from Car●…assonne 
A mountain●… causeth a great difference of people that live in opposite valleys.  to Valence, found a great alteration from cold to hot, in the same degree of latitude, by reason of the diversity of the one valley turning to the South, and the other to the North: in like sort shall they found a diversity of spirits. And therefore Plato gave God thanks, That he was a Graecian, and not a Barbarian; an Athenian, & not a Theban; although there be not twenty leagues betwixt Thebes and Athens: but the situation of Athens was towards the south, inclining towards Pyrene, having a little mountain behind it, and the river Asopus betwixth the two cities: so the one was given to learning and knowledge, and the other to arms. And although they had one kind of Popular government, yet was there no sedition in Thebes, whereas the Athenians had many quarrels and dissensions for the state. In like sort the Cantons of the Swissers have maintained their Popular estate very wisely these four hundred years: the which the Florentines and the Genevois could never (with the excellency of their wits) do ten years together, without some mutines. For the people of the North, and those that live upon mountains, being fierce and warlike, trusting in their force and strength, desire Popular estates, or at the lest elective Monarchies: neither can they easily endure 
Why the people of the North have elective kingdoms.  to be commanded imperiously. So all their kings are elective, whom they expel if they insult or tyrannize: as I have observed of the kings of Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Poland, Bohemia, and Tartary, which are elective.  
That which I have spoken of the nature of the Northern countries, agrees with the mountains, the which are oftentimes more cold than the regions that are far Northward: for in many places they have snow and ice perpetually: and even under the Equator the mountains of Peru are so high and cold, as many Spaniards died for cold, and lay long dead before they corrupted; as we read in the histories of the West Indies. Leo of Africa hath no cause to wonder, why the inhabitants of the high mountain of Megeza in Africa are white, tall, and strong; and those of the valley are little, weak, and black: for generally both the men, beasts, and the trees of the mountain, are of a stronger constitution than the others. And old men upon mount Atlas of 100 years old, are vigorous, as Leo doth testify. This force and vigour doth 'cause the mountainers 
Why those that live upon mountains love Popular states.  to love popular liberty, who cannot endure to be braved; as we have said of the Swissers and Grisons. And in like sort the inhabitants of the mountains of Bugia, Fez, Morocco, and Arabia, live in all liberty, without any commander: not through the assurance of any places that are fortified by nature, but for that they are savage and cannot be reclaimed. The which should serve for an answer unto Plutarch's demand, Why the inhabitants of the high town of Athens required a Popular estate, & those of the low town the government of few: considering the reason that I have given. He should therefore wrong himself very much, that should seek to change the Popular estate of the Swissers, Grisons, and other mountainers, into a Monarchy: For although a Monarchy be far better of itself, yet is it not so fit for that subject.  
We must therefore carefully observe what every nation desires, and what they abhor●…e; and first you must draw them to a milder kind of life, before you propound a royalty unto them, the which is effected by quietness and ease, enuring them to the studies of sciences and music. And for this cause Polybius saith, That the ancient lawgivers of Arcadia, had strictly bound the inhabitants of the mountains of Arcadia, to learn music, upon great penalties: thereby to temper the natural savagnesse of that people. Titus Livius also speaking of the Aetolians dwelling on mountains, the most warlike and rebellious people of all Greece, he saith, Ferociores Aetoli quam pro ingenijs Grecorum, The Aetolians were more fierce than was agreeable to the humour of the Greeks': They troubled the Romans more (although they had but three towns) than all the rest of the Greeks'. In like sort, the inhabitants of the mountain of Genes defeated the Roman armies, and continued war against them one hundred years, neither could they ever bring them in subjection until they had transported them from the mountains into the valleys, after which time they become good & quiet subjects; as we read in Titus Livius. We must not then marvel, if by the Swissers 
In Switzerland every one is bound to we are a sword.  laws every man is bound to wear a sword, and to have his house furnished with offensive and defensive arms: which other people forbade for the most part. And contrariwise the inhabitants of valleys are commonly effeminate and delicate: and even the natural fertility of the valleys, give the inhabitants thereof occasion to glut themselves with pleasure.  
As for the inhabitants upon the Sea coast, and of great towns of traffic, all writers 
Inhabitants of valleys are effe●…inate.  have observed, That they are more subtle, politic, and cunning, than those that lie far from the sea and traffic. Therefore Caesar speaking of the inhabitants of Tournay, These men (saith he) for that they are far from the ports of the sea, are not 〈◊〉 & effeminate with the merchandise and delights of strangers And to that end Tully said, That the inhabitants of the river of Genes, were called deceivers and conseners; & those of the mountains, rude and uncivil: for that these were not accustomed to traffic, to ●…ell and to deceive. Wherefore joseph speaking of the inhabitants of jerusalem & Sparta, saith, That they were remote from the sea, & less corrupted than others. For which cause Plato forbids them to build his Commonweal near unto the sea, saying, That such men are deceitful and treacherous. And it seemeth that the proverb which saith, That Islanders are commonly deceitful; should be applied to this that we have spoken, for that they are more given to traffic, and by consequence to know the diversity of men and their humours, wherein the policy of trading doth consist, to dissemble his words and countenance, to deceive, lie, and to cousin the simple for gain, the which is 
Merchants given to lie & deceive.  the end of many merchants. And to this end the Hebrews apply that text of Scripture, where it is said, Non eris mercator in populo tuo, There shall be no merchant among the people: which some do interpret a deceiver or cozener; but the Hebrew word signifies Merchant.  
There is also a great variety for the difference of places subject to violent winds, which makes people to differ much in manners, although they be in the same latitude and climate: For we see plainly, that those people are more grave and stayed, when the 
The violence of the wind breeds a great variety in men.  air is calm and temperate, than those which live in regions beaten with violent winds: as France, and especially Languedoc, high Germany, Hungary, Thrace, Circassia, the country of Genes, Portugal, and Persia, whereas men have more turbulent spirits, than those of Italy, Anatolia, Assiria, and Egypt, whereas the calmness of the air make men far more mild. We do also see in moorish places another difference of men, contrary in humour to them of the mountains. The barrenness and fruitfulness of places doth in some sort change the natural inclination of the heavens: And 
A fertile country breeds 〈◊〉 people.  therefore Titus Livius said, That men of a fat and fertile soil, are most commonly effeminate and cowards; whereas contrariwise a barren country makes men temperate by necessity, and by consequence careful, vigilant, and industrious: as the Athenians were, whereas idleness was punished capitally: Neither by Solon's law were the children bound to reliue the parents, if they had not taught them some means whereby to get their living. So as the barrenness of the soil doth not only make men more temperate, apt to labour, and of a more subtle spirit; but also it makes towns more populous: for an enemy affects not a barren country, and the inhabitants living in safety do multiply, and are forced to traffic or to labour. Such a one was the city of Athens, the most populous of all Greece: and Nuremberg, which is seated in the most barren soil that can be, yet is it one of the greatest cities of the empire, and full of the 
A barren soyl●… makes the people 〈◊〉.  best artisans in the world: and so are the cities of Lymoges, Genes, and Gand. But those that devil in valleys become soft and slothful through the richness of the soil. And as they that lie upon the sea for their traffic, and those of barren countries for their sobriety, are industrious: in like sort those which make the frontiers of two estates being enemies, are more fierce and warlike than the rest, for that they are continually in war, which makes men barbarous,, mutinous, and cruel; as peace makes men quiet, courteous, and tractable▪ And for this cause the English heretofore were held so mutinous and unruly, as even their princes could not keep them in awe: yet since that they 
People given to 〈◊〉 fi●…rce and savag●….  have treated of peace and alliance with France & Scotland, & that they have been governed by a mild and peaceful princess, they are grown very civil and full of courtesy. Whereas contrariwise the French, which did not yield to any nation in courtesy and humanity, are much changed in their dispositious, and are become fierce & barbarous since the civil wars: as it chanced (as Plutarch saith) to the inhabitants of Sicily, who by reason of their continual wars, wete grown like vuro brute beasts.  
But he that would see what force education, laws, and customs, have to change nature, let him look into the people of Germany, who in the time of Tacitus the Proconsul, 
Education alter●… natur●….  had neither laws, religion, knowledge, nor any form of a Commonweal; whereas now they seem to exceed other nations in goodly cities, and well peopled, in arms, variety of arts, and civil discipline: And the inhabitants of Bugia (which in old time was Carthage, the which in former times had contended with the Romans for the empire of the world, being the most warlike people of all Afrique) by the continuance of peace, and the practice of music (wherewith they are much delighted) they are become so effeminate and timorous, that Peter of Navarre coming thither with fourteen ships only, the king with all the inhabitants fled, and without striking stroke abandoned the city, whereas the Spaniards built goodly forts without any opposition. Therefore Plato maintained, That there were two arts necessary in all cities, Wrestling, 
Wrestling and Music necessary in all Commonweals.  and Music; the one being the nurse of the mind, the other of the body. If they neglect wrestling, the force of the body must languish: if the study of Music, they will become rude and barbarous: if both, then must both body and mind grow dull with idleness and sloth: For commonly we see those whose minds are delighted with the sweet sound of Music, to be very mild and courteous. What should I speak of the Romans, & of that famous city, which had so often triumphed over Europe, Asia, and Africa, whilst that it flourished in arms and learning; which hath now lost the beauty and virtues of their fathers, through sloth, to the eternal infamy of their idle prelates. Whereby it appears how much education prevails: whereof Lycurgus made trial, having bred up two grayhounds of one litter, the one in hunting, the other to the pottage pot, and then made trial of them before all the people of Lacedaemon, bringing forth a quick hare, and pots of meat; so as the one followed the hare, and the other ran to the meat. It is most certain that if laws and customs be not well maintained and kept, the people will soon return to their natural dispositions: and if they be transplanted into another country, they shall not be changed so soon, as plants which draw their nourishment from the earth: yet in the end they shall be altered, as we may see of the Goths, which did invade. Spain, and high Languedoc; and the ancient Gauls which did people Germany, about the black forest and Francford, with their Colonies. Caesar saith, That in his time (which was some five hundred years after their passage) they had changed their manners and natural disposition with that of Germany.  
But it is needful to purge an error into the which many have fallen, having taxed the French of lightness, imitating therein Caesar, Tacitus, Trebellius, and Pollio. If they term a certain alacrity and promptness in all their actions, Lightness; the injury pleaseth me, the which is common to all the people of the middle regions betwixt the Pole and the Equator: for even in like sort Titus Liu●…us doth call them of Asia, Greece, and Syria, Levissima hominum genera, Light kind of men: the which the ambassadaur of the Rhodians did freely confess in the open Senate at Rome. And Caesar himself doth interpret that which he would say, acknowledging that the Gauls have good wits, and prompt, and tractable. And Scaliger borne at Ve●…ona, writes, That there is not any nation of a quicker & more lively spirit than the French; be it in arms or learning, be it in the trade of merchandise, or in well speaking: but above all, their hearts are generous and loyal, keeping their faith more constantly than any nation. And Baptista Mantuanus, the most excellent Poet of his age, writes thus of the French,  

Hot fiery spirits have the Gauls, their bodies passing white,  
And of that white have they their names; a crimson colour bright  
Their woman's faces garnisheth, wherewith a comely grace  
Being mixed, Nature out of two sundry colours one doth raise:  
Frolic they are, of cheerful hue, delight in rounds and rhyme,  
Prove unto Venus' sports, to banqueting, and when they see their time  
As prove unto Church service. They list not bear the yoke,  
Hypocrisy they fly amain, and what is falsely spoke:  
Hating the sullen Saturnist, they give themselves to game,  
To hunting, hawking, hills and dales they'll thorough them amain.  
I, they in wars delight them too, the barbed horse to ride;  
Their brigantines, their bow, and spear, to use it is their pride:  
Whole nights abroad to sleep on ground it is their chiefest joy,  
And to be slurd with sun, and rust, th' account it nothing coy,  
With dust to be o'erspread, to sweated under the weight of arms,  
For country, kin, and eke for king, to under go all harms;  
Yea death itself to them is sweet. Thus far Mantuan.   
The constancy of the French appears plainly by the religion which hath been received 
The French held to be constant.  and allowed by our predecessors, for the which we have contended these threescore years with such obstinacy, as no nation in the world hath endured such burnings, spoilings, tortures, and civil wars, as we have caused unto ourselves. Whereby Caesar's testimony appears to be very true, writing, That all the nations of the Gauls was much given to religion, which is far from lighntesse and inconstancy. But that fiery vigour, as Veronensis saith, which we see in the french, and the wonderful alacrity in doing of things proceeds from choler: from thence grow the violent motions of the mind, from thence come murders, when as from words they fall to blows, and choler inclining unto rashness breaks forth suddenly, the which if it be restrained within the bound of reason it doth greatly increase wisdom the governess of man's life, as Galen saith, writing of a choleric humour, but if it be distempered, it turns into rashness, 
Inconstancy incident to them of the North.  which properly we call lightness, but this inconstancy is much more proper and incident to the people of the North. We have said (speaking in general) that the people of the South are of a contrary humour and disposition to them of the North: these are great and strong, they are little and weak: they of the north hot and moist, the others cold and dry; the one hath a big voice and green eyes, the other hath a weak voice and black eyes; the one hath a flaxen hair and a fair skin, the other hath both 
The difference of humours betwixt them of the North and South.  hair and skin black; the one feareth cold, and the other heat; the one is joyful and pleasant, the other sad; the one is fearful and peaceable, the other is hardy and mutinous; the one is sociable, the other solitary; the one is given to drink, the other sober; the one rude and gross witted, the other advised and ceremonious; the one is prodigal and greedy, the other is covetous and holds fast; the one is a soldier, the other a philosopher; the one fit for arms and labour, the other for knowledge and rest. If then the inhabitants of the South be wilful and obstinate, as Plutarch saith, speaking of the Africans, maintaining his resolutions very wilfully, it is most certain that the other is changeable, and having no constancy, those of the middle regions hold the virtue of the mean, betwixt wilfulness and lightness, not being changeable in their resolutions without reason, like unto the people of the North, nor yet so settled in their opinions, as they will not be altered without the ruin of an estate. Tacitus writing of the Germans, saith, that they hold it no dishonour to deny their word. The Eastgoths and Weastgoths being expelled by Attila, they required some land to inhabit from the Emperor Valens, swearing to imbrate the Christian religion, which having granted them, they treacherously seized on Valens, and burned him alive, and the people of Gronland which are nearest unto the Pole, being of an inconstant humour, as Munster 
The people of the North careless of their faith.  saith, did easily embrace the Christian religion, and then afterwards fell again to their Idolatry. And as for the Muscovites, the Baron of Heberstein saith in their history, that he hath not known any nation more dis●…oyall, which will have all men to keep their faith with them, and they with no man. This falsehood or treachery comes from distrust, or from fear, and both the one and the other from want of spirit and wit: for a wise and considerate man as those of the middle region be, is not distrustful, for that he forseeth what may happen, and with courage and constancy doth execute what he hath resolved, the which the people of the South do not so well, being fearful, nor they of the North which want wit. And to make it manifest how distrustful and suspicious the people of the North be, look into the realm of Denmark and Sweden, whereas the magistrates do hide men in the Inns to hear what is spoken. The government 
The government of a state alters the people's dispositions.  of every City is of great force in the alteration of the people's natures and dispositions: if they be oppressed with tyranny and servitude, they grow fainthearted and dejected: they which live in popular estates and enjoy their liberties, must of necessity be more bold and warlike, wherein not only the nature of the heavens and regions in general are to be considered, but also the particularities of the regions. What may grow in the minds of men from the air, water, winds, hills and valleys, what from religion, laws, customs, discipline, and from the state of every commonweal, and not to observe the climate alone, for we see in climates that be alike and of the same elevation four notable differences of people in colour, without speaking of other qualities, 
Great differences of people in colour in the same climates.  for that the West Indians are generally of a duskish colour like unto a roasted quinze, unless it be a handful of men that are black, whom the tempest carried from the coast of Africa: and in Seville of Spain the men are white, at Cape Bonne Esperance black, at the river of Plate of a chestnut colour, all being in like latitude, and like climates, as we read in the histories of the Indieses which the Spaniards have left in writing: the cause may be the change from one country to another, and that the Sun in Capricorn is nearer unto the earth by all the eccentrical latitude, the which are above four hundred thousand leagues. The transportation of Colonies works a great difference in men, but the nature of the heavens, winds, waters and earth, are of more force. The Colony of the Saxons which Charlemagne brought into Flanders, differed much from all the French, but by little and little they were so changed as they retain nothing of the Saxon but the language, the which is much altered, pronouncing their aspirations more lightly, and interlacing the vowels with the consonants: as the Saxon when he calls a horse Pferd, the Flemings say Perd, and so of many others. For always the people of the North, or that devil upon mountains, having a more inward heat, deliver their words with greater vehemency and more aspiration than the people of the East or South, who interlace their vowels sweetly, and avoid aspirations all they can (and for the same reason women who are of a colder complexion than men, speak more sweetly) the which was verified in one tribe of the people of Israel, for those of the tribe of Ephraim which remained in the mountain and towards the North, which they called Gallaad, were not only more rough and audacious and bold than those that dwelled in the valies, of the same tribe, but did also pronounce the consonants and aspirations which the others could not pronounce; so as being vanquished, and flying from the battle, not able to distinguish the one from the other being of one nation, they watched them at the passage of jordain, demanding of them how they called the passage or ford, which was named Schibolet, the which they pronounced Sibolet, which doth properly signify an ear of corn, although that they be both oftentimes confounded, by which means there were 42000 men slain. It is most certain that at that time the Hebrews held the pureness of blood inviolable, and that it was but one tribe. That which I have said, That the nature of the place doth greatly change the nature and pronunciation of men; may be generally observed, and especially in Gasconie in the country which is called Labdac, for that the people put L. in stead of other consonants. We do also see the Polonia●…ss, which are more Eastward than Germany, to pronounce much more sweetly: and the Genevois being more Southerly than the Venetian these men pronounce Cabre, and the Genevois say Crabe, whereby the Venetians distinguished them that fled, having gotten a great victory 
The nature of the place doth commonly change the language.  against the Genevois, making them to pronounce Cabre, and kill all them that could not do it. The like did the inhabitants of Montpellier in a sedition which happened in the time of king Charles the fift, seeking to kill the strangers, they showed them beans, which the strangers called Febues, and the inhabitants of the country called them Haves; like unto the Sabins, which did pronounce Fircus Faedus, for Hircus Haedus, as Marcus Varro saith. And thus much touching the natural inclination of people, the which notwithstanding carry no necessity as I have said, but are of great consequence for the settling of a Commonweal, laws and customs, and to know in what manner to treat with the one and the other. Let us now speak of other means to prevent the changes of Commonweals, which groweth through abundance of riches.   

CHAP. II The means to prevent the changes of Commonweals, which happen through the great riches of some, and exceeding poverty of others.  
AMong all the causes of seditions and changes of Commonweals 
The chiefest cause of the change and subversion of a state  there is none greater than the excessive wealth of some few subjects, and the extreme poverty of the greatest part. All ancient histories are full, whereas it appears that all they which have pretended any discontentment against the state, have always embraced the first occasion to spoil the rich: yet these changes and mutinies were more ordinary in old time than at this day, for the infinite number of slaves which were thirty or forty for one free man; and the greatest reward of their service, was to see themselves freed, although they reaped no other benefit but only liberty, which many bought with that which they had spared all their life time, or else with what they borrowed, binding themselves to restore it, besides the duties they did own to them that did enfranchise them: beside, they had many children, which happens most commonly to them that labour most, 
The cause of 〈◊〉 in an estate.  and live most continently, so as seeing themselves in liberty and oppressed with poverty, they were forced to borrow upon interest, to cell their children, or to satisfy their creditors with their fruits and labours; and the longer they lived, the more they were indebted, and the less able to pay: for the Hebrews called usury a biting, which doth not only waste the debtor unto the bones, but doth also suck both blood and marrow, so as in the end the number of the poor being increased, and not able to endure this want, they did rise against the rich, and expelled them from their houses and towns, or else they lived on them at discretion. And therefore Plato called riches and poverty 
The two plagues of all Common●….  the two ancient plagues of a Commonweal, not only for the necessity that doth oppress the hungry, but also for the shame, the which is more insupportable to many than poverty itself: for the preventing whereof, some have sought an equality, the which many have commended, terming it the nurse of peace, and love betwixt subjects; and contrariwise inequality the spring of all divisions, factions, hatred and partialities: for he that hath more than an other, and sees himself to have greater wealth, he will also be higher in honour, in delights, in pleasures, in diet and in apparel, having no great regard of virtue: the poor on their part conceive an extreme hatred and jealousy, seeing themselves thus trodden under foot, they think themselves more worthy than the rich, and yet are oppressed with poverty, hunger, misery and reproach. And therefore many ancient law givers did equally divide the goods and lands among the 
Equality the surest maintenanc●… of a Commonweal.  subjects, as in our time Thomas Moor Chancellor of England in his Commonweal saith, That the only way of safety for an estate, is when as men live in common: the which cannot be whereas is any propriety. And Plato having charge to frame the Commonweal and new Colony of the Thebans and Phociens, by the consent of the subjects which sent Ambassadors to him to that end, he departed, leaving it unfinished, for that the rich would not impart any of their wealth unto the poor: the which Lycurgus did with the hazard of his life, for after that he had banished the use of gold and silver, he made an equal distribution of the lands. And although that Solon could not do the like, yet his will was good, for that he made frustrate all bonds, and granted a general abolition of debts. And after that the use of gold and silver was allowed in Lacedaemon after the victory of Lisander, and that the testamentary law was brought in, the which was partly the cause of inequality of goods: King Agis seeking to bring in the ancient equality, he caused all bonds and obligations to be brought into a public place and there burnt them, saying, That he had never seen a goodlier fire: then he began to divide his own goods equally, but when he sought to distribute the lands, he was cast into prison by the Ephores and there slain. In like sort Nabis the tyrant having taken the city of Argos, published two Edicts, the one to free them of all debts, the other to divide the lands equally: Duas faces (saith Titus Livius) no●…antibus res ad plebem in optimates accendendam: Two firebrands for them that sought for innovations to kindle and incense the people against the better sort. And although the Romans have in that point seemed more just than other nations, yet have they often granted a general recision of debts sometimes for a fourth part, sometimes for a third, and sometimes for all; having no better means to pacify the mutinies and seditions of the multitude, lest it should happen unto them as it did unto the chief men among the Thuriens, who having gotten all the lands into their hands, the people seeing themselves oppressed with debt and usury, and without any means to satisfy, they fell upon the rich and expelled them from their goods and houses. These reasons may be held goodly in show, when as in truth there is nothing 
Equality of goods dangerous to a Commonweal.  more pernicious and dangerous to Commonweals, than equality of goods, the which have no firmer support and foundation than faith, without the which neither justice, nor public society can stand, neither can there be any faith, if there be not a due observation of conventions and lawful promises. If then bonds be broken, contracts disannulled, and debts abolished, what can there be expected but the utter subversion of an estate? for there can be no trust one in an other. Moreover such general abolitions do most commonly hurt the poor, and ruin many, for the poor widows, orphelins, and meaner sort having nothing but some little rent, are undone when this abolition 
Abolition of debts ruins the poorer sort.  of debts comes; whereas the usurers prevent it, and oftentimes gain by it: as it happened when as Solon and Agis did publish an abolition of debts, for the usurers (having some intelligence thereof) borrowed money of all men, to defraud their creditors. Besides, the hope of these abolitions do encourage the prodigal to borrow at what rate soever, and when their credit is cracked to join with the poor which are discontented and desperate, and to stir up seditions: whereas if the hope of these abolitions were not, every one would seek to govern his estate wisely, and to live in peace. If it be unjust for the creditor to loose his goods, and the debtor to gain that which is not his, how much more unjust is it to take land from the lawful owners to enrich 
The equal division of lands most injust.  other men with their spoils: for they that seek to be freed from their debts, pretend the oppression of usury, and the barren nature of silver, the which cannot be in lawful 
Equality of goods the ruin of human society.  successions, so as we may rightly say, that such a division of another man's goods, is a mere robbery under a show of equality, and the ruin not only of a Commonweal, but of all human society. To say, That equality is the nurse of friendship; is but to abuse the ignorant: for it is most certain, that there is never greater hatred, nor more capital quarrels, than betwixt equals: and the jealousy betwixt equals, is the spring and fountain of troubles, seditions, and civil wars. Whereas contrariwise the poor and the weak yield and obey willingly the great, rich, and mighty, for the help and profit which they expect: which was one of the reasons which moved Hippodamus the law giver of the Milesians, to ordain, That the poor should marry with the rich, not only to avoid inequality, but also to make their friendship the more firm. And whatsoever they say of Solon, it appears sufficiently by the institution of his Commonweal, that he made four degrees of citizens according to their revenues, and as many degrees 
Solon's division of citizens.  of state and honours: the rich had five hundred measures of corn, wine, or oil, in rent; the next three hundred, others two hundred, and those which had less might bear no office of honour. And even Plato hath made three estates in his second Commonweal, one richer than another, ordaining, That every one of the five thousand & forty citizens, should leave one of his children sole heir. And as for that which Lycurgus did, who would have equality perpetually observed in succession, dividing the lands by the poll; it was impossible, for that he might see before his eyes, or soon after, 
Equality impossible to be kept in a state.  this equality quite altered, some having twelve or fifteen children, others one or two, or none at all: the which would be more ridiculous in those countries whereas plurality of wives is tolerated, as in Asia, and in a manner throughout all Afrique, and at the new found lands, whereas it falls out oftentimes, that one man hath fifty children. Some have sought to prevent this inconvenience, as Hippodamus lawmaker to the Milesians, who would not allow above ten thousand citizens, the which Aristotle did like well of, but by that means they must banish the overplus, or else execute the cruel law of Plato approved by Aristotle, who having limited the number of his citizens 
A cruel law made by Plato.  to five thousand and forty, ordained that they should 'cause the rest to miscarry as soon as they were conceived, and those that were borne lame or crooked should be cast off: the which cannot be spoken without great impiety, that the goodliest creature which God hath made, should not only be made away after it is borne, but also be destroyed in the mother's womb. Whereunto Thomas Moor Chancellor of England seems to agreed, who would not have less than ten, nor more than 16 children in one family: as if he might command nature. And although that Phidon lawgiver to the Corinthians did seem to foresee it more wisely, forbidding expressly to build any more in Corinth (as they made a defence not to build in the suburbs of Paris, by the king's Edict in the year 1558,) yet the subjects multiplying they must either erect a new 
It is injurious to tie a city to a certain number.  Colony, or banish them injuriously. But in my opinion they err much which doubt ofscarcitie by the multitude of children and citizens, when as no cities are more rich nor more famous in arts and disciplines than those which abound most with citizens. It is indeed less to fear that by reason of so great a multitude of citizens there will be divisions, for that there is nothing that doth keep a city more free from mutinies and 
Great cities are less subject to seditions than others.  factions than the multitude of citizens, for that there are many which be as a mean betwixt the rich and the poor, the good and the wicked, the wise and the simple, and artificers and noblemen, which may recoucile these extremes when they disagree: and there is nothing more dangerous than to have the subjects divided into two factions without a mean, the which doth usually fall out in cities where there are but few citizens. Laying aside therefore this opinion of equality in a Commonweal already framed, ravishing and taking away another man's goods, whereas they should preserve to every man his own, according unto the law of nature; and rejecting also them that would limit the number of the citizens, we will maintain that this division of portions aught not to be allowed but in the framing of a new Commonweal in a conquered 
The manner how to divide a conquered city.  country: the which division should be made by families, and not by the poll, reserving always some prerogative for one of the family, and some right for the elder in every house, according to the law of God; who doth show us with his finger what course to take, for having chosen the tribe of Levi to give him the right of the elder above the other twelve, he gave them no lands but only houses in cities, appointing them the tenth of every tribe (which was twelve tenths) without any labour, the which was twice as much at the lest as any tribe had, all things deducted. And among the Levites the right of the elder was reserved to the house of Aaron, which had the tenth of the Levites, and all the oblations and first fruits: and to every private house he assigned 
Division of land by the law of God.  twice as much of the goods and lands unto the elder as to any other of the heirs, excluding the daughters wholly from the succession, but for want of males in the same degree, whereby we may judge that the law of God hath directly rejected all equality, giving to one more than to another: and yet he hath kept among the twelve tribes, except that of Levi, an equal division of inheritances; and among the yongers an equal division of the succession, except the right of the elder, the which was not of two third parts, nor of four five parts, nor of all; but of the half, to the end that such inequality should not be the cause of the great wealth of some few subjects, and the extreme poverty of an infinite number: which is the occasion of murders among brethren, of divisions in families, and of mutinies and civil wars among subjects. And to the end the divisions thus made may remain indifferent, there must not be any prohibition of alienation, either in a man's life, or by testament; as it is used in some places, if we will observe the law of God, which ordains, That all successions sold, shall return the fiftieth year to the house, family, or tribe, from the which it was sold: whereby the poor that are afflicted, and forced to cell to supply their necessities, shall have means to cell the first-fruits and revenues of their lands to the fiftieth year, the which shall return afterwards to them or to their heirs: ill husbands shall be forced to live in penury, and the covetousness of the rich shall be prevented.  
As for abolition of debts, it was a thing of a dangerous consequence, as it is said, not 
Abolition of debts pernicious.  so much for the loss of the creditor (the which is of no great moment, when the question is of the public state) as for that it opens a way for the breach of faith in lawful conventions, and gives occasions to mutines to trouble the state, hoping still to have abolition of debts, or at the lest an abatement of interests which have been long due, reducing them to the five and twentieth penny: the which hath been observed in Venice. We see by the law of God, that debts are not cut off, but it gives the debtor respite the seventh year, and suspends the debt. But the true means to prevent usurers to ease the poor for ever, and to maintain lawful contracts, is to observe the law of God, which hath defended all kinds of usuries among the subjects: For the law were 
Usury must be cut off.  unjust in regard of strangers, if it were lawful for them to deliver out money upon interest unto the subject, from whom he should draw his whole estate, if the subject might not use the like prerogative unto strangers. This law hath been always much esteemed of all lawgivers, and of the greatest Politicians, that is to say, of Solon, Lycurgus, Plato, Aristotle, and even the ten commissionars deputed to reform the customs of Rome, and to make choice of the most profitable laws, would not allow above one in the hundred for interest; the which they called Vnciarium, for that the usury of 
Tacit. lib. 5. Pest. lib. 19  every month came but to an ounce, which was the twelfth part of the hundredth crown which had been borrowed, and the usurer which exacted any more, was condemned to restore four fold: esteeming the usurer (as Cato said) worse than a thief, which was condemned but in the double. The same law was afterwards published 
An usurer esteemed worse than a thief.  anew at the request of the Tribune Duilius in the year of the foundation of Rome 396: and ten years after Torquatus and Plautius being Consuls, it was reduced to half an ounce in the month, and a half penny in the hundred: so as it did not equal the principal but in two hundred years. But the year following usury was quite forbidden 
Usury forbidden in Rome.  by the law Genutia, for the daily seditions which happened by the contempt of those laws of usury: for what moderation soever you make of usury, if it be any thing tolerated it will soon increase. And those which maintain under a colour of religion, That moderate usury or rents, after four or five in the hundred, are honest and just, for that the debtor reaps more profit than the creditor, abuse the word of God, which doth expressly forbidden it. For although some would take light interest for the good of the debtor, yet many would abuse it. For even as a hatchet at the first makes but a little rift, but in the end breaks all in sunder: so the sufferance of unlawful things, how small soever, grows in the end to all impunity: as they which have forbidden usury among Christians, and yet have allowed it for the church and hospitals; and some also have found it convenient for the Commonweal and the treasure; but there is nothing that gives the subject more occasion to break a law, than to defend a thing, and tollerat it with some exceptions. The which is an ordinary fault among princes and prelates, seeking to exempt and free themselves from those things which are forbidden to the subject: & who would found that bad in particular, which is publicly allowed? And for that all defences in matter of laws are unprofitable 
Laws are unprofitable without penalties.  without some punishment, the which are not regarded if they be not duly executed, therefore the law Genutia being ill executed, was by little and little neglected. And therefore in England they have provided, that when as any edict was made, they presently appointed a Magistrate or Commissary, to see the law observed, who continued in that charge until the law were disannulled. But the covetousness of usurers did so exceed, as they lent after twenty four in the hundred, until that the law Gabinia did moderate the greatest interest, at twelve in the hundred, unless it were in venturing at sea, whereas the creditor took upon him the hazard: But this law was ill executed in the provinces, whereas they did take forty eight in the hundred for a year, For the extreme necessity of him that borrows, and the insatiable covetousness of him that lends, will always found a thousand devices to defraud the law. The punishment of usury was very severe in the Commonweal of the Candiots: and therefore he that would borrow seems as if he would take it violently from the creditor: so as if the debtor did not pay the interest, which they could not recover by law, he was accused as a thief and robber: the which was but a gross shift, in regard of their sales they make at this day, the Notary putting in this cause, And the rest in money. It is true, that at the first council of Nice, the bishops procured the emperor to forbidden usury in money and first-fruits: the which in regard of first-fruits, were so much and half so much more: that is to say, fifty for a hundred. But it was not observed, especially for first-fruits, whereas he that borrows in a time of dearth is glad to pay it again and half as much more after harvest. Wherein it seems there is great reason, for he that lends might have gained 
Usury in first-fruits seems tolerable  more if he had sold it in a time of scarcity, as they do commonly. Besides there is nothing dearer than that which nourisheth, nor any thing more necessary. And therefore 
Nothing dearer or more necessary than that which nourisheth.  the emperor justinian having rated usury for the country man at four in the hundred in money, he decreed, They should pay but twelve in the hundred in first-fruits, and not fifty in the hundred as had been formerly used. Charles of Molins had no cause to seek to correct the Greek and Latin text of the law, against the truth of all copies, that he might defend the edict of jews the twelfth, and the decrees of the court of parliament, which made equal the interest in first-fruits and money: but the difference is great betwixt the one and the other: for by justinian's law, the poor labourer reaped great profit, being freed for thirteen bushels of corn after harvest, for twelve which he had borrowed in a time of death: and yet by this correction which Molins gives, he should be freed for a third part of a bushel, the which is very absurd; seeing that before justinian's decree, it was lawful to take fifty in the hundred for first-fruits. It is far better to rely upon the law of God, which doth absolutely forbidden usury, and the creditors good deeds shall be more meritorious and more honourable to lend without 
A meritorious deed to lend without usury.  profit, than to receive of the poor labourer, in the quality of usury, a handful of corn, for so great and necessary a good turn. Therefore Nehemias' (after the people's return from captivity) did forbidden them to take any more usury, as they had done before taking twelve in the hundred, as well in money as in first-fruits: and according to this example the decree of Nice was made: but after that Calixtus the 3, & Martin the 5, pope's, had given way to rents & annuities, the which were little before that time in use, the interest hath grown so high, as the usury limited by justinian, & partly practised by the Cantons of the Swissers, is far more easy and more supportable, although the laws of France and Venice do not allow any man to demand above five years arrearages past: For this sufferance of interest, without interest hath grown to be a law, whereby the usurers do suck the blood of the poor with all impunity, especially in sea towns, where there is a common bourse or bank; as at Genes, where there are some worth four or five hundred thousand ducats, others above a million, as Adam Centenier, & they say that Thomas Marin hath twice as much. So as the merchant for the sweetness 
Annuities worse than interest.  of gain gives over his traffic, the artificer scorns his shop, the labourer leaves his labour, the shepherd his flock, and the noble man sells his land of inheritance, to make forty or fifty pounds a year rend in annuities, in stead often pounds a year in fee simple land. Than afterwards when as the rents fail, and the money is spent, as they know which know not any other good means to live, give themselves to thieving, or to stir up seditions a●…d civil wars, that they might rob secretly: the which is the more to be feared, when as one of the estates of the Commonweal, and the lest in force and number, hath in a manner as much wealth as all the rest; as it hath been seen heretofore in the state of the Church: whereas the hundred part of the subjects in the Western Commonweals, making the third estate, had the tithes of what nature soever, and against the laws of the ptimitive Church (as the Popes themselves confess) and have seized upon testamentary legacies, as well movables as immovables, duchies 
The Clergy enriched, and others made poor.  Counties, Baronies, Lordships, Castles, houses both within and without Towns, rents of all sorts, and bonds made freely; and yet they took successions of all sides: they sold, exchanged, purchased, and employed the revenues of their benefices for other acquisitions; and all without tax, subsidy, or any charge, even in those places whereas the taxes are personal. So as it was necessary to enjoin the Clergy to put away such land as had been left unto the church within a certain time, upon pain of confiscation: as by a law made in England by king Edward the first, which did forbidden all church men to purchase any land; as it appeareth in Magna Carta: the which hath been since 
Clergy men forbidden to purchase lands.  renewed by the emperor Charles the fift in Flanders, upon pain of confiscation: the which seems to have been forbidden in old time. For we found that earls of Flanders have been heirs unto priests: which custom was abolished by pope Urbin the fift. For the same reason the parliament at Paris did prohibit the Chartrens and Celestines of Paris, to purchase any more, against the opinion of the abbot of Palerme. Yet these defences were grounded upon the chapter, Nuper de decimis. And at Venice it hath been enacted, and church men were commanded to dispossess themselves of all lands, prohibiting to leave any legacy to a Clergy man, nor to make a will by the mouth or writing of a clergy man. And by a law made at the request of the states of Otleans, the twenty seventh article, all clergy men are forbidden to receive a testament or last will, in the which any thing is given him (the which is very ill executed) for the abuses 
In old time every man was forced to leave something unto the church.  that were committed. Not a hundred years since within this realm, they would not have laid any dead body in holy burial, if he had not bequeathed some legacy unto the church; so as they took out a commission from the official directed to the first priest of the place: who taking a view of his goods that had died intestat, bequeathed what he pleased unto the church in his name that was dead▪ the which was reproved by two decrees of the parliament of Paris, one in the year 1388, and the other in the year 1401. I have also a declaration drawn out of the Treasure of France, by the which the twenty barons of Normandy named in the act, dated in the year 1202, declare unto Philip Augustus, That the goods of him that dies without making a will, belonged unto him, having lain three days sick before his death: and by the confirmation of the privileges of Rochel, granted by Richard king of England and earl of Poitou, it is said, That the goods of the Rochelois should not be confiscate, although 
The anntient rights o●… the duke of Nor●…andie and earls of Poitou.  they died intestat: the which was also common in Spain, until the ordinance made by Ferdinand in the year 1392, bearing these words, Que no sellaven quintos da los que mueren sin fazer testamento dexando hijos o parientes dentro del quarto grado que pueden haver & heredar sus bienes, uz. The fift shall not be levied of those which die intestat, so as they have any children, or kinsfolk within the fourth degree fit to succeed. It is no wonder then if the clergy were rich, seeing that every man was forced to make a will & to leave the church a legacy, under rigorous pains; being also straightly defended for many years, not to alienat nor rend out the goods of the church, upon pain of nullity. By the commandment of Charles the ninth a survey was made of all the revenues of the church within this realm, the which was found to amount to twelve hundred 
The revenues of he Clergy in France.  and thirty thousand pounds starling a year rend, not comprehending the ordinary and extraordinary alms. But Allemont precedent of the accounts at Paris, made an estimat, That of twelve parts of all the revenues of France, the Clergy enjoyed seven. And by the registers of the chamber of accounts it appears, that within this realm there are twelve Archbishoprics, 104 Bishopriks, 540 abbeys, and 27400 parishes or cures (taking every town for a cure, and the lest village for one where there is a parish) besides Priories and begging friars. Their revenues had been far greater if Pope 
The property of land is in vain whereas the usufruit is perpetual  john the 22 had not disannulled the decree of Pope Nicholas, who had allowed all begging friars to enjoy the fruits of lands, and the Pope should have the propriety, the which was a gross cunning to frustrate the vows of poverty▪ for that the property is fruitless and in vain, as the law saith, if the usufruct were perpetual, as bodies and colleges be. I do not speak of the well employing of their goods, but I say that this great inequality (it may be) hath ministered occasion of troubles and seditions against the 
An occasion found out to ruin the Clergy.  Clergy, throughout all Europe, when as in show they made a colour of religion: for if this occasion had not been, they had found out some other, as they did in time of our predecessors against the Templars and the jews; or else they would have required a new division of lands, as Philip the Roman Tribune did for the people, pretending that there were but two thousand men in Rome which possessed all, although they were numbered in all to be above three hundred thousand; and those few did so increase in wealth, as Marcus Crassus by a declaration of the Censors, was esteemed to be worth six millions of crowns: and fifty years after Lentulus the high Priest was found to be worth ten millions of crowns. The Romans laboured to prevent these inconveniences, publishing many laws touching the division of lands: among the which the law Quintia and Apuleia, would have the conquered lands divided among the people, 
The cause of seditions in Rome.  the which if they had been well executed, those seditions had been prevented which so troubled the Commonweal: but the mischief was, that the conquered lands were farmed out by favour to private men, with a pretence of benefit to the Commonweal, upon condition to pay the tenth of grain, and the fift of fr●…teses, and some rent for the pastures: yet this rent and other duties were not paid, for that great men held them in other men's names: for which cause Sextus Titius the Tribune presented a request unto the people, to the end that the receivers of the revenues might 〈◊〉 the arrearages that were due, the which was granted, but being not well executed, it was a means to present other requests unto the people, that the lands and revenues of the Commonweal which private men held without paying any thing, might be divided among the people: the which did greatly amaze the rich, and caused them to suborn Thorius the Tribune under hand, That by his intercession unto the people the lands should remain still in their possessions, and the arrearages should be paid unto the receivers of the revenues: which law they caused afterwards to be abrogated, when as the magistrates themselves held the lands, of the which they could not be dispossessed, nor forced to pay without great disturbance to the state. In the end the law Sempronia was published by force, at the request of Tiberius Gracchus, the which differed from the law Licinia, by the which all men were forbidden (of what estate or quality soever) to hold above five hundred acres of the Commonweals land, a hundred kine, and five hundred sheep and goats, and to forfeit the overplus: but the law Sempronia spoke of nothing but of the public lands, ordaining that every year there should be three Commissioners appointed by the people to distribute unto the poor the surplusage of five hundred 
Law●… made for the distribution of lands.  acres that should be found in any one family: but the Tribune was slain the last day of the publication, in a sedition moved by the Nobles: yet Caius Gracchus his brother being Tribune of the people ten years after, caused it to be put in execution, but he was slain also in the pursuit thereof, after whose death the Senate to pacify the people caused it to be executed against many. And to the end those lands should not remain waste, the poor wanting cattle and means to till it, it was ordained that according unto the law Sempronia of Tiberius Gracchus, the treasure of king Attalus (who had made the people of Rome his heir) should be distributed among the poor, to whom they had given part of the lands: by which means many of the poor were provided for. And to take away occasion of future seditions, they sent away part of the poorer sort into Colonies, to whom they did distribute countries conqueted from the enemy. But there was one article in the law of C. Gracchus which was most necessary, and yet it was abrogated, Prohibiting the poor to cell or make away those lands that were assigned unto them: for the rich seeing that the poor had no means to entertain those lands, redeemed them.  
There was also another cause of this inequality of goods, which was by the liberty 
The testamentary law the cause of inequality.  that every one had to dispose freely of his goods, and to whom he pleased, by the law of the twelve Tables. All other people, except the Athenians (where Solon first published this law) had not free liberty to dispose of their lands. And Lycurgus having divided the lands of the inhabitants of the city into seven thousand parts (some say more, others say less) and the lands of the country into twelve thousand equal parts, he did not suffer any one to dispose thereof; but contrariwise, to the end that in process of time the seven thousand parts of inheritance might not be sold, or diminished into many members, it was decreed, That the elder of the house, or the next of kin should succeed to the whole inheritance; and, that he could not have but one part of the seven thousand; and he must be also a Spartaine borne. Others were excluded from the succession, as Plutarch saith, speaking of king Agesilaus, who in the beginning was bred up straightly as a younger brother, for that he was issued of a younger house. This for a time did entertain the 7000 families in equality, until that one of the Ephores being incensed against his eldest son, presented a request unto the signory, the which passed for a law, by the which every man had liberty to dispose of his goods by will. These testamentary laws being received in Greece, and afterwards published in Rome, and inserted in the twelve tables, were the cause of great alterations. But the people of the East and West might not dispose of lands by testament: a custom which is yet observed in some parts of France, Germany, and other nations 
In Poland and many other parts of the North, they may not dispose of lands by testament.  of the North. And therefore Tacitus writes, that the Germans had no use of Testaments, the which many have unadvisedly attributed to ignorance and barbarism. And even in Polonia it is expressly forbidden by the laws of the two Sigismonds', according unto the ancient customs, to dispose of lands by testament. The Oxiles and the Phytales had a stricter custom, forbidding them to pawn any lands. And by the custom of Amiens and other customs of the Lowcountries of Flanders, no Nobleman might cell away their seigneuries until they had solemnly sworn poverty: the 
In some places noble men may not cell away their seigneuries.  which is also strictly observed in Spain. We have also said before, that the law of God did expressly defend all alienation of lands, either in a man's life or by testament, reserving the right of the elder in every family, without any difference of noble or villain, according to Lycurgus law in his division of 7000 parts in Lacedaemon: and those of Caux in Normandy, as well the Gentlemen as others, do much better preserve the dignity and beauty of their ancient houses and families, the which by this means are not dismembered, and all the estate of the Commonweal in general: the which is the more firm and stable being grounded upon good houses and families, and as great and immovable pillars, the which could not support the burden of a great building, if they were weak, although they were many. And it seems that the greatness of France, Spain, and England is supported by great and noble families, and by corporations 
Great kingdoms supported by noble families, especially in an Aristocratical estate, but they are contrary to a Popular estate, or to a Tyranny.  and Colleges, the which being dismembered into pieces, will be the ruin of the State. But this opinion is more probable than necessary, unless it be in an Aristocratical estate: for it is most certain that in a Monarchy there is nothing more to be feared than great men, and corporations, especially if it be tyrannical. As for a popular estate which requires equality in all things, how can it endure so great inequality in families, whereas some should have all, and others die of hunger: seeing that all the seditions which have happened in Rome and in Greece have been grounded upon this 
Inequality main tained the estat●… of Sparta.  point. There remains an aristocraty where as the noble and great men are unequal with the common people, and in this case the right of the elder may maintain the estate, as in the signory of Sparta, whereas the seven thousand parts equally divided unto the elder of every family, maintained the State: and as for the younger brethren, virtue advanced them to offices and honours according to their merits: and commonly they proved the most famous, having (as Plutarch said) nothing to advance them but their virtues. It was the ancient custom of the Gauls: and without doubt our Nobility would be much more esteemed, if the prohibition of selling of their seigneuries were duly executed, according to the laws and ordinances of this realm, and of the Empire, where it is better observed. The like defences were made in Polonia, by the laws of Albert, & Sigismond Augustus' kings in the year 1495 & 1538, & by an edict 
Laws prohibiting noble men to ●…ell their seigneuries.  made by Peter duke of Britain, forbidding the common people to purchase the seigneuries of noble men, upon pain of confiscation. And although that Lewis the 12 disannulled those defences in the year 1505, yet king Francis the first renewed the Edict in the year 1535 under the same pain of confiscation. The means to unite the nobility 
A means to unite the gentry & the plebeians.  and the common people more strictly together, is to marry the younger children of noble houses being poor (in an Aristocratical estate) with the Plebeians that are rich, as they did in Rome after the law Canuleia; the which is practised at this day by the Venetians, and almost in every Commonweal, whereas the nobility hath any prerogative over the common people: the which is the surest way to maintain the nobility in wealth, honour, and dignity. And yet it is necessary to moderate the dowries of women in what estate soever, lest that mean houses be not beggared to enrich the nobles: wherein the ancient lawgivers have been much troubled to observe this equality, and to provide that ancient houses and families might not be dismembered and ruined by the daughters. The law of God would not allow the daughters to succeed if there were any brethren: and although there were not any, yet the daughters that were heirs were commanded to marry the next kinsman of that family: to the end saith the law, that the inheritance may not be drawn from the house by the daughters. This law was observed in Greece, where as the next kinsman married the heir, neither might the daughter marry with any other. In Persia and Armenia the daughter had nothing of the house but the movables: a custom which is yet observed in all 
I●… the East parts the daughters inherit ●…o lands.  the East, and almost throughout all Afrique, although that justinian the Emperor, or rather Theodora his wife, having always favoured her own sex, reform that custom of Armenia, terming it barbarous, not regarding the intention of the ancient lawgivers. Hippodamus lawgiver to the Milesians, would not frustrate the daughters of all succession, but he ordained that the rich should marry with the poor, wherein he did observe the equality of goods, and entertained love betwixt the couples, and betwixt the poor and the rich. It is most certain that if the daughters be made equal with the sons in the right of succession, families shall be soon dismembered: for commonly there are more women than men, be it in Commonweals in general, or in 
The inequality of goods grows, for that the daughters being heirs are married to the rich.  private families: the which was first verified at Athens, where as the plurality of women gave name unto the city: and within these twenty years at Venice, (whether comes a world of strangers) there was found upon a survey two thousand women more than men: whether it be that they are not subject to the dangers of war and travel, or that nature is apt to produce those things that are less perfect. And therefore Aristotle said in his politics, That of five parts of inheritance the women of Sparta held three, the which came by the permission of the testamentary law; and for this cause (saith he) they commanded absolutely over their husbands, whom they called Ladies. But to prevent this inconvenience at Rome, Voconius Saxa the Tribune, by the persuasion of Cato the Censor, presented a request unto the people, the which passed 
The law of succession at Rome, d●…frauded.  for a law, whereby it was enacted, That the females should not succeed so long as there were any male carrying the name, in what degree of consanguinity soever he were; and, that they might not have given them by testament above the fourth part of the goods; nor more than the lest of the Testators heirs. This law retained the ancient families in their dignities, and the goods in some equality, keeping women in some sort in awe: yet they found a means to defraud it, by legacies and feofments made in trust to friends, with request to restore the successions or legacies unto the women which could not recover them by order of law not by petition, before Augustus' time; who following the pernicious counsel of Trebatius, took an occasion to abrogate the law, demanding a dispensation of the law Voconia of the Senate, for his wife Livia: so as this law being trodden under foot, the Roman citizens begins to be slaves unto their wives, who were their mistresses both in name and effect. Than might you have seen women wearing two rich successions at their ears, as Seneca saith; and the daughter of a Proconsul who did wear at one time in apparel and jewels the value of three millions of crowns, the inequality of goods being then at the highest, after which time the Roman empire declined still until it was wholly ruined. By the ancient custom of Marseilles it was not lawful to give above a hundred crowns in marriage with a daughter, and five crowns in apparel. And by the Statutes at Venice it is forbidden 
A commendable law at Venic●….  to give above 1600 ducats to a noble man's daughter: and if a Gentleman of Venice marry a citizens daughter, he may not take above two thousand ducats; nor the females succeed so long as there is any male of the family: but in truth this law is as ill observed as that of king Charles the 9, which forbids to give unto a daughter in marriage 
The law of France for the marriage of daughters.  above a thousand pounds' starling, and yet the ordinance of king Charles the 5 doth give no more unto the daughters of the house of France. And although that Elizabeth of France, daughter to Philip the fair were married unto the king of England, yet had she but twelve hundred pounds starling to her dowry. Some one will say unto me, that it was very much, considering the scarcity of gold and silver in those days: but the difference also is very great betwixt a thousand pounds, and four hundred thousand crowns. It is true that she was the goodliest Princess of her age, and of the greatest house that was at that day. And if we will seek higher, we shall found in the law 
The law of God for dowries.  of God that the marriage of a daughter at the most was taxed but at fifty sickles, which make four pounds' starling of our money, in which penalty he was condemned that had seduced a virgin, whom also he was forced by the law to bring home, if the father of the maiden so pleased: which makes me believe that the ancient custom of the Persians' is likely, for that the Commissioners deputed yearly to marry the maids 
The law of Persia.  gave the honestest and fairest to them that offered most, and with that money they married them that were less esteemed (that none might be unprovided for) with this caution to them that married the deformed, Never to put away their wives, but in restoring of their dowries▪ by the which they provided for the marriage of maids, the modesty of wives, the dignity of husbands, and the public honesty whereon wise lawgivers should have a special care, as Plato had. For to take from the daughters all means to prefer themselves according to their qualities, were to give occasion of a greater inconvenience. And it seems that the customs of Anjou and of main have 
Custom of Anjou.  given them a third part in successions, of gentlemen in fee simple, the which is left to the younger males but for term of life, to the end the daughters should not be unprovided for, having not means to advance themselves like unto the males: for the reformation of which custom they have heretofore made great complaints: the which might as well be done, as in the custom of Mondidier, and in that of Vendosme, (an ancient dependence of the country of Anjou, before that it was erected to a County or a Duchy) where as a younger brother of the house of Anjou, having taken his elder brother prisoner, made him to change the custom of Anjou in regard of the Chasteleine of Vendosme, the which he had but for term of life. And although that in Britain by the decree of Cont Geoffrie in the year 1181 the eldest in gentlemen's houses carried away all the succession, and maintained the younger at his own pleasure: yet to prevent infinite inconveniences, Arthur the first duke of Brittany enacted, That the younger children should have a third part of the succession for term of life, as it is observed in the country of Caux, by a decree of the Parliament at Roven, the daughter's portions being deducted. I have hitherto treated of subjects only, but we must also take heed lest that strangers set footing within the realm, and purchase the goods of the natural subject: and preventing all idle vagabonds which desguise themselves like Egyptians, when as in truth they are very thieves, whom all Magistrates and Governors are commanded to expel out of the real me by a law made at the estates of Orleans, as it was in like manner decreed in Spain by Ferdinand in the year 1492 in these words, Que los Egiptianos' consennores salgan del Reyno dentro sessenta dias: That all the Egyptians with their women shall departed out of the realm within threescore days. This swarm of caterpillars do multiply in the Pyrenees, the Alpss, the mountains of Arabia, and other hilly and barren places, and then come down like wasps to eat the honey from the bees. Thus in my opinion I have set down briefly the fittest means to prevent the extreme poverty of the greatest part of the subjects, and the excessive wealth of a small number, leaving to discourse hereafter, If the lands appointed for the service of the war may be dismembered or sold. Let us now see if the goods of men condemned should be left unto their heirs.   

CHAP. III Whether the goods of men condemned should be applied unto the common treasure, or to the Church; or else left unto the heirs.  
THis Chapter depends upon the former, for one of the causes which brings the subjects to extreme poverty, is to take the goods of the condemned from their lawful heirs, and especially from children, if they have no other support nor hope, but in the succession of their parents: and the more children they have, the greater their poverty shall be, to whom the succession of their fathers belongs by the law of nature, and who by the law of God should not suffer for their father's offences. By which confiscations not only the laws of God and nature seem to be violated, but the children (who haply have benebred up in delights) are oftentimes 
It seems against the law of nature to take the succession of the father condemned from the child.  reduced to such poverty and misery, as they are thrust into despair, and attempt any villainy, either to be revenged, or to fly from want which doth oppress them. For we may not hope, that they which have been bred up as masters, will serve as slaves: and if they have not in former times learned any thing, they will not now begin, when as they have no means. Besides the shame they have either to beg, or to suffer the reproach of infamy, doth force them to banish themselves, and to join with thieves & robbers: so as for one sometimes there go forth two or three worse than he that had lost both life and goods: so as the punishment which serveth not only for a revenge of the offence, but also to diminish the number of the wicked, and for the safety of the good, produceth quite contrary effects. These reasons briefly run over, and amplified by some examples, seem necessary to show that the law of justinian the emperor, received and practised in many countries, is most just and profitable: whereby it was enacted, That the goods of them that were condemned should be left unto their heirs, 
justinian left the goods of the condemned unto the heir.  unless it were in case of high treason. Contrariwise some may say, that this is a new law, and contrary to all the ancient laws and ordinances of the wisest princes & lawgivers, who would have the goods of any one condemned, adjudged unto the public, without some especial cause to move them to the contrary: be it for reparation of faults, which often times is pecuniary, and is to be paid to the Commonweal interessed, for else there should be no means to punish by fines, the which is an ordinary kind of punishment: be it for the quality of the crimes, and of those that have rob the Commonweal, which must be satisfied out of his goods that hath offended: or to terrify the wicked, which commit all the villainies in the world to enrich their children, 
Wicked men will attempt any thing to enrich their children.  and many times they care not to lose their lives, yea to damn themselves, so as their children may be heirs of their robberies and thefts. It is needless to prove this by examples, the which are infinite: I will only produce one of Cassius Licinius, who being accused and condemned of many thefts and extortions, and seeing Cicero (who was then precedent) putting on his purple rob, to pronounce the sentence of confiscation and banishment, he sent one to tell Cicero that he was dead during the process, & before the condemnation, choking himself in view of the judges with a table napkin, to the end he might save his goods for his children: Than Cicero (saith Valerius) would not pronounce the sentence. It was in the power of the accused to save his life in abandoning of his goods, according unto the conclusions of his accusers: as Verres and many others in like case did▪ for by the law Sempronia they might not condemn a bourgesse of Rome to death, nor whip them by the law Portia. And although that Plutarch, and Cicero himself writes to his friend Atticus, That he had condemned Licinius, it is to be understood by the advice and opinion of all the judges, not that he had pronounced the sentence, for those laws were not yet made against them which killed themselves before sentence. And a hundred and fifty years after, if any one being accused and guilty of any crime, had killed himself through despair or grief, he was buried and his testament was of force, in the time of cruel Tiberius, Pretium festinand●…, 
A law in favour of murderers.  (saith Tacitus) that is to say, Murderers in their persons had that advantage over others. But whether that he were condemned after his death, or that he died of grief, it appears plainly that many make no difficulty to damn themselves to enrich their children. And it may be there is nothing that doth more restrain the wicked from offending, than the fear of confiscation, whereby their children should be left beggars. 
The law of confiscation 〈◊〉 the wicked.  Therefore the law saith, That the Commonweal hath a great interest, that the children of them that are condemned, should be poor and needy. Neither can we say, that the law of God or nature is therein broken, nor is the son punished for the father, for that the father's goods are not the children's: and there is no succession of him whose goods are justly taken away before he is dead.  
And if any one fears that want will drive the children to despair, and to all kinds of wickedness: much more reason hath he to fear, that wicked children will abuse their father's goods, to the ruin of good men and of the Commonweal. And therefore the law excludes the sons of him that is condemned for high treason, from all successions direct and collateral, and leaves unto the daughters (who have less power to revenge) a fourth part of their mother's goods. But there is a greater inconvenience if 
Rewards are necessary for accusers.  the goods of the condemned be left unto their heirs, then shall the accusers and informers have no rewards, and wickedness shall remain unpunished.  
These be the inconveniences on either part, but to resolve of that which is most fit, is most necessary that the true debts being either public or private, and the charges of informations, should be deducted out of the goods of the condemned, if they have wherewithal: else there should be no punishment of the wicked. Yet this clause aught not to be annexed unto the sentence, and hath been reproved by many decrees of the court of parliament, to the end that the judges may know, that they aught to do justice although the condemned hath not any thing. In like sort it is necessary that fines & amercements should be le●…ied out of their goods that are condemned in any sum of money, provided always, that it be taken out of their movable goods▪ or out of that 
What order is to be observed in their goods that are condemned.  which they have purchased, and not out of those lands which come by succession, the which must be left unto the heir. And in capital crimes, that the movables & lands purchased, should be forfeited and sold to them that would give most, for the charges of the process, and the reward of informers; and the rest to be employed to public & charitable uses, the succession remaining to the lawful heirs: in so doing you shall prevent the extreme poverty of the children, the covetousness of slanderers, the tyranny of bad princes, the evasion of the wicked, and the impunity of offences. For to forfeit those lands which are tied unto the house, were no reason, seeing it is not lawful to 
Lands which come by succession cannot be forfeited.  alienat them by testament, nor in many places to dispose thereof in their life time: by the which should follow a great inequality of goods. And for this reason the goods and lands purchased must be sold, and not applied unto the church or public treasure, lest that in the end all private men's estates should come to the public, or to the church: for that it is not lawful to alienat those goods which are united to the revenues of the Commonweal, or to the church. Moreover informers and accusers must be rewarded, not with the possessions of the condemned (which might animate them to accuse good men wrongfully) but with some piece of money: For the desire to have the house or inheritance of another man, the which they could not obtain for money, would be a great occasion of false accusers to ruin the innocent. Yet must informers have some reward, else the wicked shall continued their villainies with all impunity. And as a good huntsman will never fail to reward his dogs with the entrails of the beast, to make them the more lively: so a wise lawgiver must reward them which seize upon the wolves and lions of the Commonweals. And for that there is nothing (after the honour due unto God) of greater consequence than the punishment of offences, we must seek all means possible to attain unto it. But the difficulty is not small, to take the confiscations from the public, to employ them as I have said, and especially in a Moarchy. Yet there are many reasons, the which a wise and virtuous prince will more esteem for his reputation, than all the goods in the world gotten by confiscations. 
The inconveniences which grow in adjudging of confiscations unto the public.  For if the public revenues be great, or the charges and impositions laid upon the subject sufficient, the confiscations aught not to be adjudged unto the treasure, if the Commonweal be poor, much less may you enrich it with confiscations. Inso doing you shall open a gate for false accusers to make merchandise of the blood of the poor subjects, and for princes to become tyrants. So we see that the height of all tyranny hath been in proscriptions and coufiscation of the subjects goods. By this means Tiberius the emperor made the way to a most cruel butchery, leaving to the value of 
Confiscations the cau●…e of tyranny.  sixty seven millions of crowns gotten the most part by confiscations. And after him his nephews Caligula and Nero, polluted their hands with the blood of the best and most virtuous men in all the empire, and all for their goods. It is well known that Nero had no colour to put to death his master Seneca, but for his wealth. Neither shall there be at any time false accusers wanting, knowing they shall never be called in question for their slanders, being supported by the prince, who reaps part of the profit. Pliny the younger speaking of those times, We have (saith he) seen the judgements of informers, like unto thieves and robbers: for there was no testament, nor any man's estate assured. And therefore by the laws, the king's procurator is enjoined to name the informer, lest the accusation in the end should prove slanderous: the which is necessarily observed in Spain, before that the king's procurator is admitted to accuse any man, by an edict of Ferdinand, made in the year 1492, in these terms, Que ningun fiscal pueda accuser a conse●…o person particular sin dare primeriment delator, That no fiscal or public officer may accuse any private person before the Council, but he shall first give in the accuser's name. If confiscations have been always odious in every Commonweal, much more dangerous be they in a Monarchy than in a Popular or Aristocratical estate, where false accusers are not so easily received.  
If any one will object, That we need not to fear these inconveniences in a Royal estate, having to do with good princes: I annswere, that this right of confiscation is 
Confiscations most dangerous in a Monarchy.  one of the greatest means that ever was invented, to make a good prince a tyrant, especially if the prince be poor. For he that hath no pretext to put his subject to death; if 
Tyrant's are enriched by false accusations, by means of confiscations.  he hopes to have his goods thereby, he will never want crime, accusers, nor flatterets. And oftentimes the wives of princes kindle this fire, & inflame their husbands to all cruelty, to enjoy the goods of them that are condemned. Achab king of Samaria could not get Naboths vineyard, neither for price nor prayer, but queen jesabel suborned too false witnesses, to condemn the innocent as guilty of treason both against God and man. And Faustine did still importune the emperor Marcus Aurelius her husband, to put to death the poor innocent children of Auidius Cassius, being condemned for treason, whose goods the emperor left unto his children; as the kings of Persia were wont to do, even in cases of high treason, and hath been often practised in this realm. And by the laws of Polonia, confiscation hath no place but in the highest degree of treason: and oftentimes it is given unto the kinsfolks. But it is a hard matter to recover the goods which are once forfeited, be it by right or wrong; for they hold it for a rule, That amercements once adjudged to the crown and received, are never restored, although the judgement were false. The which is the more to be feared, for that the goods of them that are condemned for treason, are forfeited to the prince, and not to the lords of the soil, who cannot pretend any thing if another man's subject be condemned for treason, as they may do in all other crimes. And although we may number as many good and virtuous kings in this realm, as ever were in any Monarchy upon this earth, yet we shall see that the revenues have been more augmented by confiscations and forced gifts, than by any thing else. Was there ever prince in the world in virtue, piety, and integrity, like unto our king Saint jews? and yet by the means aforesaid, having caused Peter of Dreux to be condemned, he did confiscate, and then unite unto his crown the earldom of Dreux: as he did also unto Thibaut king of Navarre and earl of Champagne, who was in the like danger, if he had not resigned Bray, Fortione, and Monstrueil: and Raymond earl of Tholouse, the country of Languedoc. 
1234.  The countries of Guienne, Anjou, main, Touraine, and Awergne, are come unto the crown by confiscations in the time of Philip Augustus. The duchy of Alencon, 
1202.  and the earldom of Perch, are also come by confiscations. In like case 
a 1458.  Perigort, 
b 1369.  Ponthieu, 
c 1370.  la March, 
d 1302.  Angoulesme, 
e 1302.  l'Isle in jourdaine, the marquisat of Salusses, and 
f 1535.  all the goods of Charles of Bourbon, with many other private Seigneuries, have been forfeited for high treason, according to the custom of other Commonweals, and the ancient laws. But the custom of Scotland in cases of treasons is more cruel, whereas all the goods of him that is condemned accrue unto the exchequer, without any regard of wife, children, nor creditors.  
If any man will say, That the king freeing himself of those lands which hold not immediately of him, according to the edict of Philip the Fair, and giving the most part of them which hold directly of him, unto such as shall deserve well, the which he may do before they be incorporate unto the crown: he shall not appropriate unto the public all the goods of private men, as else he might do in time. And to prevent this inconvenience, the king cannot recover those lands which hold directly of him, offering the price to them that bought them: for so he might by purchase get all his subjects lands. I do therefore think this more convenient, than to adjudge the confiscations unto the people; as they did in Rome by the law Cornelia, which Sylla the Dictator did publish, after that he had enriched his friends and partisans with the spoils of his enemies. But there is as small reason to give them to the flatterers of princes, and to the horse leeches of the court, as it is usual in all governed Monarchies, which opens a gap unto false accusers, giving unto the unworthy the rewards of the well deserving. Who doth not remember (although I grieve to remember) the blood of innocent citizens shed for gain under a colour of religion, to glut these horseleeches of the court? Therefore to avoid these inconveniences of either part as much as may be, I see no better means than that which I have said, That deducting the charges of the suit, his just debts being public or private, and the rewards of the accusers; the surplusage of his inheritance should be left unto the heirs, and that which was purchased to charitable uses▪ provided always that that which is given to the informers, or to the colleges in charity, shall be only in money and not in lands, for the reasons that I have formerly 
Informers must be rewarded with money, and not with lands.  given. As for charitable works, there never wants means to employ it, either in divine things, or in public works, or else about the sick or the poor. In old time at Rome amercements were adjudged to the treasury of Churches, to be employed in sacrifices, and therefore they called amercements Sacramenta, as Sextus Pompeius saith: for which cause Titius Romilius refused the people's bounty, which had decreed that they should restore unto him the fine in the which he had been condemned, saying, That things consecrated unto God should not be taken from him. The like was also observed in Greece for the tenth of the goods that were confiscate, the which were adjudged unto the Church, as we may see in the sentence given against Archiptolome, Antiphon, and his consorts in Athences in the form that followeth. The 16 day of Prytanee, Demonicus Dalopeie being Register, and Philostratus Captain, at the pursuit of Andron touching Archiptolemus, Onomaches, and Antiphon, whom the Captain hath accused that they went to Lacedaemon to the prejudice of the Commonweal, and that they departed from the Camp in one of the enemy's ships; the Senate hath decreed, That they should be apprehended, and that the Captain with ten Senators named by the Senate, should determine of them, to the end they might be punished, that the Thesmothetes should call them the next day, and bring them before the judges, and that the Captain or any other might accuse them, to the end that judgement being 
The law of Athens in cases of treason.  given, execution might follow, according to the laws made against traitors. And under the decree the sentence is set down in this sort, Archiptolemus and Antiphon were condemned and delivered into the hands of eleven executioners of justice, their goods forfeited, and the tenth reserved unto the goddess Minerva, and their houses razed: afterwards they did adjudge all unto the public treasure, and yet the law did allow the judges to dispose in their sentence as they should think the cause deserved for public or charitable uses, as we have a commendable custom in this realm. That which I have said of successions should principally take place, when as there is any question of lands holden in fee, for the prerogative and quality of the fee, affected to the ancient families for the service of the Commonweal. Wherein the Germane have well provided, for in all confiscations the next of kin are preferred before the public 
The law of Germany for confi●…cationss.  treasury when there is any question of land in fee; whereby flatterers have no means to accuse wrongfully, nor Princes to put good men to death for their fees▪ which seems to have been the reason that by the laws of God the amercement was consecrated unto God, and given to the high Priests, if he that had offended were not in presence, or had no heirs. And for that this Chapter concerns rewards and punishments, order requires that we discourse of the one and the other.   

CHAP. FOUR Of reward and punishment.  
IT is needful to treat here briefly of rewards and punishments, for he that would discourse thereof at large should make a great volume, for that these two points concern all Commonweals, so as if punishments and rewards be well and wisely distributed, the Commonweal shall be always happy and flourish, and contrariwise 
The two principal foundations of every Commonweal.  if the good be not rewarded and the bad punished according to their deserts, there is no hope that a Commonweal can long continued. There is not any thing that hath bred greater troubles, seditions, civil wars, and ruins of Commonweals than the contempt of good men, and the liberty which is given to the wicked to offend with all impunity. It is not so necessary to discourse of punishments, as of rewards, for that all laws and books of lawyers are full of them, but I found not any one that hath written of rewards: either for that good men are so rare, and wicked men abound; or for that it seems more profitable for a Commonweal to restrain the wicked with the fear of punishment, than to encourage the good to virtue with rewards. But for that punishments are odious of themselves, and rewards favourable, therefore wise Princes have accustomed to refer punishments unto the Magistrate, and to reserve rewards unto themselves, to get the love of the subjects, and to fly their hatred: for which cause Lawyers and Magistrates have treated amply of punishments, and but few have made any mention of rewards. And although the word merit is taken in the best sense, as Seneca saith, Altius iniuriae quam merita descendunt, Injuries make a deeper impression than merits, yet we will use it indifferently and according unto the vulgar phrase. Every reward is either honourable, or 
Difference of rewards.  profitable, or both together, else it is no reward, speaking popularly and politicly, seeing we are in the midst of a Commonweal, and not in the schools of the Academikes and stoics, which hold nothing to be profitable that is not honest; nor honourable which is not profitable: the which is a goodly paradox, and yet contrary to the rules of policy, which do never balance profit with the counterpoise of honour: for the more profit rewards have in them, the less honourable are they, and always the profit doth diminish the beauty and dignity of the honour. And even those are most esteemed and honoured, wherein they employ their goods to maintain the honour. So as when we speak of rewards, we understand triumphs, statues, honourable charges, estates, and offices, which are therefore called honours: for that many times the private estates of famous men are wasted thereby: the rest have more profit than honour in them, as benefices, military gifts, immunities of all or some charges; as of taxes, imposts, wardship, exemptions from the war; and from ordinary judges, letters of estate, of freedom, of legitimation, of fairs, of gentry, of knighthood, and such like. But if the office be hurtful, and without honour, it is no longer a reward, but a charge or burden. Neither may we confounded a reward and a benefit; for a reward is given 
Different●… of reward and benefit  upon good desert, and a benefit upon special favour. And as Commonweals be divers, so the distribution of honours and rewards is very different in a Monarchy, and in the other two estates. In a Popular estate rewards are more honourable than profitable: for the common people hunt only after profit, caring little for honour, the which they 
The difference of giving rewards in a Popular estate and a Monarchy.  do willingly give to them that are ambitious. But in a Monarchy the prince is more jealous of honour than of profit, especially if he be a tyrant, who takes nothing more disdainfully, than to see his subject honoured and respected; fearing lest the sweet enticing bait of honour, should make him aspire and attempt against his estate: or else for that a tyrant cannot endure the light of virtue: as we read of the emperor Caligula, who 
A tyrant cannot endure to have the subject honoured.  was jealous and envious of the honour that was done to God himself: and the emperor Domitian, who was the most base and cowardly tyrant that ever was, yet could he never endure that any honour should be done unto them that had best deserved, but he put them to death. Sometimes princes in stead of recompensing of worthy men, they put them to death, banish them, or condemn them to perpetual prison, for the safety of their estates. So did Alexander the Great to Parmenio his constable, justinian to Bellisarius, Edward the fourth to the earl of Warwick; and infinite others, who for the reward of their prowess have been slain, poisoned, or ill entreated by their princes. And for this cause, as Tacitus writes, the Germane did attribute all the honour of their goodly exploits unto their princes, to free themselves from envy which follows virtue. And therefore we never see monarchs, & much less tyrants, to grant triumphs and honourable entries unto his subjects, what victory soever they have gotten of the enemy. 
The honour of the soldiers victory is due unto the captain.  But contrariwise a discreet captain, in stead of a triumph at his return from victory, humbling himself before his prince, he saith, Sir, your victory is my glory, although the prince were not present: for he that commands deserves the honour of the victory, even in a Popular estate: as it was adjudged betwixt the Consul Luctatius and Valerius his lieutenant, upon a controversy they had for the triumph, the which Valerius pretended to be due unto him, for that the Consul was absent the day of the battle. So we may say, that the honour of the victory is always due unto the prince, although he be absent the day of the battle: as Charles the fift, king of France was, who gave his arms unto one of his gentlemen, and retired himself out of the fight, fearing to fall into his enemy's hands: And for this cause he was called wise, remembering how prejudicial his father's captivity was unto France. The like we may say of Popular 
Why Popular estates have more famous men than Monarchies.  estates, that the general's victories belong unto the people under whose ensigns they have fought, but the honour of the triumph is given unto the General: the which is not observed in a Monarchy. Which is the chief, and it may be the only occasion, why in Popular estates well governed, there are more virtuous men than in a Monarchy: For that honour which is the only reward of virtue is taken away, or at the least much restrained from them that deserve it in a Monarchy, and is granted in a lawful Popular 
Preferments to honour breeds men of desert.  estate, even in matters of arms. For as a generous and noble minded man doth more esteem honour than all the treasure of the world; so without doubt he will willingly sacrifice his life and goods for the glory he expects: and the greater the honours be, the more men there will be of merit and fame. And therefore the Commonweal of Rome hath had more great Captains, wise Senators, eloquent Orators, and learned Lawyers, than any other Commonweal, either Barbarians, Greeks, or Latins: For he that had put to rout a legion of the enemies, it was at his thoice to demand the triumph, or at the lest some honourable charge; one of the which could not be denied him. As for the triumph, which was the highest point of honour a Roman citizen could aspire unto, there were no people under heaven where it was solemnised with more state and pomp than at Rome: For he that triumphed, made his entry more 
The description of a triumph at Rome.  honourable than a king could do in his realm, dragging the captive kings & commanders in chains after his chariot, he sitting on high attired with a purple rob wrought with gold, and a crown of bay accompanied with his victorious army, being brave with the spoils of their enemies, with a sound of trumpets and clarons, ravishing the hearts of all men, partly with incredible joy, and partly with amazement & admiration: and in this manner the General went upto the Capitol to do sacrifice. Above all (saith Polybius) that which did most inflame the youth to aspire to honour, were the triumphal statues or images lively drawn of his parents and predecessors, to accompnie him to the Capitol. And after he had done the solemn sacrifice, he was conducted home to his house by the greatest noble men and captains. And those which died were publicly praised before the people, according unto the merits of their forepast lines. And not only the men, but also the women, as we read in Titus Livius, Matronis honour additus, ut eorum sicut virorum solemnis laudatio esset, There was honour given unto matrons, that there might be a solemn commendation of them as of men. I know there are preachers which will say, That this desire of honour is vain, which every good man should fly: but I hold that there is nothing more necessary for youth (as Theophrastus said) the which doth inflame them with an honest ambition; who when as they see themselves commended, then do virtues spring and take deeper root in them. And Thomas Aquinus saith, That a prince must be nourished with the desire of true glory, to give him the taste of virtue. We have no reason then to marvel, if never any Commonweal did bring forth such famous men, and so many, as Rome did: For the honours which were granted in other Commonweals, came nor near unto them which were given in Rome. It was a great reward of honour 
The honours given at Athens.  at Athens, and in the Olympike games, to be crowned with a crown of gold in the open theatre before all the people, and commended by an Orator; or to obtain a statue of brass, or to be enterrained of the public charge, or to be the first, or of the first rank in places of honours, for himself & his house; the which Demochares required of the people for Demosthenes, after that he had made a repetition of his praises, wherein there was no less profit than honour. But the Romans (to give them to understand that they must not esteem honour by profit) had no crown in greater estimation, 
The Romans esteemed honour more than profit.  than that of grass or green corn, the which they held more precious than all the crowns of gold of other nations. Neither was it ever given to any, but to Q. Fabius Maximus, surnamed Cunctator, with this title, Patrie seruatori, To the preserver of his country. Wherein the wisdom of the ancient Romans is greatly to be commended, having thereby banished covetousness and the desire of gainful rewards; and planted the love of virtue in the subjects hearts, with the price of honour. And whereas other princes are greatly troubled to found money, to empty their coffers, to cell their revenues, to oppress their subjects, to forfeit some, and to spoil others, to recompense their slaves and flatterers (although that virtue cannot be valued by any price) the Romans gave nothing but honours, for that the captains respected nothing less than profit: and even a private Roman soldier refused a chain of gold of Labienus lieutenant to Caesar, for that he had hazarded his life courageously against the enemy, saying, That he would not the reward of the covetous, but of the virtuous; the which 
A worthy saying of a souldi●…r.  is honour, that we must have always before our eyes. But virtue must not follow, but go before honour: as it was decreed by the ancient high Priests at Rome, when as Consul Marcus Marcellus had built a temple to Honour and Virtue; to the end the vows and sacrifices of the one should not be confounded with the other, they resolved to make a wall to divide the temple in two, but yet so, as they must pass thorough the temple of Virtue, to enter into that of Honour. And to speak truly, the ancient Romans only did understand the merits of virtue, and the true points of honour. For although the Senator Agrippa left not wherewithal to defray his funeral, nor the Consul Fabricius nor the Dictator Cincinnatus wherewithal to feed their families, yet the one was drawn from the plo●…gh to the Dictatorship, and the other refused half the kingdoms of Pyrrhus, to maintain his reputation and honour. The Commonweal was never so furnished with worthy men, as in those days, neither were honours and dignities better distributed than in that age. But when as this precious reward 
The 〈◊〉 refuse honours when they are given to the unwo●…thy.  of virtue was imparted to the vicious and unworthy, it grew contemptible, so as every one scorned it, and held it dishonourable: as it happened of the gold rings which all the gentlemen of Rome neglected, seeing Flavius a libertine to Appius and a popular man, created Aedile, or chief overseer of the victuals; the which they were not accustomed to give to any but gentlemen, although he had deserved well of the people. And the which is most to be feared, good men will abandon the place wholly to the wicked, for that they will have no communication nor fellowship with them: as Cato the younger did, who being chosen by lot with divers other judges to judge Gabinius, and seeing that they pretended to absolve him, being corrupted with gifts, he retired himself before the people, and broke the tables that were offered unto him. So did the chaste women in this realm, who cast away their girdles of gold, the which none might wear that had stained their honours, who notwithstanding did wear girdles, & then they said, Que bonne renomee valoit meux que ceinture doree, That a good name was better than a golden girdle. For always virtuous men have impatiently endured to be equalled with the wicked in the reward of honour. Have we not seen that the only means that king Charles the seventh found to make a number of unworthy men, who had gotten the order of knights of the Star, by women or favour, to leave it, he decreed, That the archers of the watch at Paris, should wear a star upon 
〈◊〉 natural ●…der of honour and virtue.  their cassocks, which was the mark of Saint Owen: whereupon all the knights of this disorder left the star. As in like case the people of Athens disannulled the law of Ostracism, by the which the best men were banished their country for three years, when as Hyperbolus one of the worst and wickedest men of Athens had been condemned by that law.  
It is a dangerous and very pernicious thing in every Commonweal, to grant honours and rewards without any difference, or to cell them for money; although that they which think to win honour in buying their offices, abuse themselves as much as those which thought to fly with the golden wings of Euripides, making that which should be the lightest of all others, of the heaviest metal: for then the precious treasure of honour turns to dishonour; and honour being once lost, then do they exceed 
The reward of honour turns to infamy, if it be given to the unworthy.  in all vice and wickedness: the which shall never happen if the distribution of rewards and punishments be ordered by a harmoniacall justice, as we will show in the end of this work. If a Consul be allowed a triumph, it is reason that captains and lieutenants should have the estates and offices, the horsemen the crowns and horses, and the private soldiers also should have part of the arms & spoils. And in the bestowing of offices they 
Harmonical proportion in the distribution of rewards.  must also have a respect unto the quality of persons: to Gentlemen the offices of Consul, and Governments; to the Plebeians the Tribunes places, and other mean offices fit for their qualities and merits: and if the virtue of a mean man or of a private soldier be so great that he exceeds all others, it is reason that he have his part in the greatest dignities, as it was decreed by the law Canuleia, to appease the seditions betwixt the nobility of Rome and the people: but he that would make a Consul, a knight of the Order, or a master of the horse, of a base fellow that had never carried arms, without doubt he should blemish the dignity of rewards, and put the whole estate in danger of ruin. In old time there was more difficulty to created a simple Knight, than is now to make a General: they must have deserved well, and prepare themselves for it with great solemnity. And even King's children and Princes of the blood were not admitted 
The estimation of honours in old times.  to be Knights but with great ceremonies: as we may read of Saint Lewis, when he made his son Philip the 3. Knight, who afterwards created Philip the fair Knight in the year 1284 and he his three children in the presence of all his Princes: and which is more, king Francis the first after the battle of Marignan caused himself to be dubbed knight by Captain Bayard, taking his sword from him. But since that cowards and housedoves carried away this price of honour, true knights never esteemed it: so as Charles the sixt at the siege of Bourges made above five hundred knights banerets, & many other knights, which had not power to raise a banner, as Monstrelet said. In like sort that military girdle which the Roman Emperors did use to give as a reward of honour to them that had deserved well of the Commonweal; as the collar of the order, the which they took away in reproach, as julian the Emperor did from jovinian and other christian Captains; and the honour of a Patrician, the which the Emperors of the East did esteem as the highest point of honour and favour: in the beginning it was not given but unto the greatest Princes and noble men. As we read that the Emperor Anastasius sent the order of a Patrician to king Clovis in the city of Tours, but after that it was imparted to men of base condition and unworthy of that honour, it grew contemptible, so as Princes have been of necessity glad to forge new honours, new prizes, and new rewards. As Edward the third king of England made the order of Saint George, or of the Garter: and soon after the 6 of january 1351 king John did institute the order of the Star in the Castle of Saint Owen: and long after that Philip the second 
The orders of England, Franc●…, and Bourgongne  duke of Burgogne erected the order of the golden Fleece: and 40 years after him Lewis the TWO king of France made the order of Saint Michael; as also after him the dukes of Savoy have instituted the order of the Anonciado, and other Princes have done the like, to honour with the title of Knighthood those that deserved well, whose services they cannot otherwise reward. By the first article of the golden Fleece, the 
The law of the Golden Fleec●….  which was instituted the tenth of january 1429 no man might be Knight of that order, unless he were a Gentleman of name and arms, and without reproach: by the second, he might not carry any other order of what Prince soever, but with the privity & consent of the chief of the order: the seventh article wils, That all personal quarrels and dissensions of Knights among themselves shall be decided by judges of the order, the which is a body and College, with a Chancellor, Treasurer, King at arms, Register, a private Seal of the order, and sovereign jurisdiction, without appeal or civil request. Lewis the TWO imitating the example of Philip Duke of Bourgogne, who had entertained him in the time of his disgrace with his father, instituting the order of Saint Michael into a College, the first day of August in the year 1469 he set down those articles whereof I have made mention, and all other articles specified in the institution 
The law of the order of Saint Michael.  of the Fleece: and beside in the 37 article it is said, That when any assembly shall be made the life and conversation of every Knight shall be examined one after an other, during which examination they shall departed out of the Chapter, and be called again to hear the admonitions and censures of the Chancellor of the order: and in the 38 article it is said, That an examination and censure shall be made of the sovereign and head of the order, which is the King, as of the rest to be punished and corrected, according to the advice of the brethren of the order, if he hath committed any thing against the honour, estate, and duty of Knighthood, or against the statutes of the order: and in the 42 article it is decreed, That any Knight's place being void, the Chapter shall proceed to a new election, and the Sovereign's voice shall stand but for two: and both he and all the Knights of the order shall be bound to take a solemn oath at their entry into the Chapter, to choose the worthiest that they know, without respect to hatred, friendship, favour, blood, or any other occasion, which might▪ divert them from the right: which oath shall be made in the Sovereign's hands from the first unto the last: and in the last article there is an express clause, That neither the King nor his successors, nor the chapter of the order may not derogate from the articles of the institution. Behold briefly the institution of the order and College of honour, the goodliest and the most royal that ever was in any Commonweal, to draw, yea to force men's minds unto virtue. It may be some one will say, that the first institution of 31 Knights in the order of the golden Fleece, of 36 in the order of France, and of 24 in the order of the Garter instituted at Windsor, cuts off the way to virtue, for that it is expressly defended in the last article of the ordinances of Lewis the TWO, not to increase that number, although the Sovereign Prince and the whole Chapter were so resolved; but in my opinion it is one of the chiefest articles that aught to have been duly observed: to avoid the inconveniences which we have seen by the infinite number of the order of Saint Michael, 
The excessiu●… number of Knights of the order, have ruined the order.  for the number is sufficient to receive them that shall deserve that honour: and the fewer there are, the more it will be desired of all men: as at a prize, the which is the more greedily desired, for that every man hopes for it, and few carry it. And in this number sovereign Princes are not comprehended, to whom they present the order only for honour, for that they cannot be tied to the laws of the order, and retain the rights and prerogatives of sovereignty. And although the number were small, yet were there but fourteen Knights at the first institution of the order, the which are named in the ordinance: and in the time of King Francis the first the number was never full. So it is most certain, that there is nothing that doth more blemish the greatness of the honour, than to impart it to so many And for this cause many seeing the small account was held of the order, procured to have their Seigneuries erected into Earldoms, Marquisats, and Duchies, which number hath so increased in a short time, as the multitude hath bred contempt, so as Charles the ninth enacted by an edict, That after that time all Duchies, Marquisats and Counties should be united unto the Crown, if the Dukes, Marquises and Earls died without heirs males issued of their bodies, although the said Seigneuries had not in former times belonged unto the Crown: the which is a very necessary Edict to restrain the insatiable ambition of such as had not deserved these titles of honour, whereof the Prince should be jealous. And generally in all gifts, rewards, and titles of honour it is expedient (for the greater grace of the benefis) tthat he only which holds the Sovereignty should bestow it on him that hath deserved; who will think himself much more honoured, when his Prince hath given him his reward, seen him, heard him, and graced him. Also the Prince above all things must be jealous that the thanks of his bounty may remain, banishing from his court those sellers of smoke, or punishing them as Alexander Severus did, who caused one to be tied 
Sellers of smoke dangerous to an estate.  unto a post, as Spartian saith, and smothered him with smoke, causing it to be proclaimed by the trumpet, So perish all such as cell smoke. He was favoured by the Emperor, who as soon as he knew the name of any one whom the Emperor meant to grace either with honour or office, he went unto him, promising him his favour, the which he sold at a high rate, and like a horseleech of the Court he sucked the blood of the subjects to the dishonour of his Prince, who should hold nothing more dear than the thanks of his gifts and bounty; else if he endure that his household servants steal away the favours of his subjects, it is to be feared that in the end they will make themselves masters, as Absalon did, who showing himself affable and courteous to all the subjects, abusing the charges of honour, offices, and benefices, giving them under the favour of the King his father to whom he pleased; he stole from him (saith the scripture) his subjects hearts, and expelled him from his royal throne. We read also of Otho, who having received 2500 crowns for a dispensation which the Emperor Galba gave at his request, he gave them among the Captains of the guards, the which was a chief means for him to usurp the State, after that he had caused Galba to be slain. This gift was like unto the Eagle which the Emperor julian carried in his Standard, the which pulled off her own feathers, whereof they made arrows to shoot at her. For 
It is the ruin of princes to give too great authority to his subjects.  the same occasion the last kings issued from Merove and Charlemaigne were expelled from their estates by the Majors of the palace, who gave all offices and benefices to whom they pleased without the king's privity or consent: and therefore Loup Abbot of Ferrieres did writ unto Charles the 3 king of France, advising him to have a special care that his flatterers and courtiers did not steal from him the thanks of his liberality. Some will say, that it is impossible for a Prince to refuse his mother, brethren, children, and friends: I must confess it is a hard matter to avoid it, yet I have seen a King who 
Charles the ninth to Henry.  being importuned by his brother for another, said unto him in the presence of the suitor, Brother, at this time I will do nothing for your sake, but for the love of this man who hath deserved well, to whom he graciously granted what his brother had demanded. But if the Prince will wholly yield himself to the appetite of his followers, we may well say that he is but a cipher, which gives all power unto others, & reserves nothing to himself: he must therefore know which be good and virtuous men, and that have well deserved. And lest the Prince should be forced to deny many importunate beggars, he must make choice of wise and faithful masters of requests, to receive every man's petition, who may dissuade such as demand any thing that is unjust or against the good of the State, or at the lest they must acquaint the Prince therewith that he may not be surprised in his answer: By this means importunate beggars shall be kept back by goodmen, neither shall they have any cause to be discontented with the Prince, who they will think understands not thereof, or else he will satisfy them with 
Tranqud. in Tit●….  pertinent reasons, wherein the Emperor Titus is greatly commended, for that he never sent away any man discontented, whether he granted or refused what he demanded, and therefore they called him, The delight of mankind. Moreover an impudent beggar knowing that his petition shall be viewed, read and examined by a wise Chancellor, or an understanding master of requests will not presume to pursue a thing that is unjust; for Princes never want flatterers and impudent beggars, the which have no other end but to drink the blood, eat the bones, & suck the marrow both of Prince and subject: and those which have best deserved of the Commonweal, are commonly 
Why good and virtuous men want rewards.  most kept back, not only for that their honour forbids them to flatter, and to beg the reward of virtue, which should be offered unto them: but also for the charges and expenses of the pursuit, and many times without all hope. And if their petitions be once rejected, they will not make a second attempt, no more than Callicratidas a Lacedaemonian Captain (one of the most virtuous of his age) who was mocked of the Courtiers of young Cyrus, for that he had not the patience to court it long: and contrariwise Lisander a flattering courtier, if ever any were, obtained whatsoever he demanded. 
Plut. in Lisand.  A modest and bashful man is amazed in this case, where as the impudent prevail, knowing well the humour of Princes, who always love them to whom they have done most good, and the most part hate them to whom they are most bound: and to say the truth, the nature of a benefit is such, as it doth no less bind him that gives, than him that receives it: and contrariwise thanks and the acknowledging of a benefit is troublesome to an ingrateful person, and revenge is sweet, whereof Tacitus gives the reason, 
Why we are more prove to revenge than to requited.  saying, Proniores ad vindictam sumus quàm ad gratiam, quia gratia oneri, ultio in questu ●…betur: We are more prove to revenge then to give thanks, for thanks is held a burden, and revenge a gain. And although that many Princes neither pay, nor give any thing but words, yet the lest promise that is made unto them they hold as a firm bond. There is yet an other point which hinders and cuts off the rewards of good men, which is, that if a wise Prince bestows any office, privilege, or gift to whom soever, before he can enjoy it, he must give the one half in rewards: and oftentimes their promises are sold so dear, as they carry away little or nothing at all, the which is an incurable disease but by severe and rigorous punishments, for the which they must of necessity 
Punishments & rewards, the two supports of a Commonweal.  provide, seeing that punishments and rewards are the two firmest supports of a Commonweal. The best means to prevent it is for the Prince to 'cause the gift to be brought and delivered, and if it were possible to be present thereat himself, specially if it be to a man of worth: for the gift coming in this sort from the Princes own hand, hath more efficacy and grace, than a hundred times as much given him by an other repiningly, or curtalled for the most part. The like censure is to be made of praise or commendations, which the Prince delivers with his own mouth to him that hath deserved it, the which hath more effect than all the wealth that he can give him: and a reproach or blame is as a stab unto generous minds to force them to do well. But it is impossible ever to see a just distribution of punishments and rewards, so long as Princes shall set to sale dignities, honours, offices, and benefices, the which is the most dangerous and pernicious plague in a Commonweal. All nations have provided for it by 
The sale of offices and benefices most dangerous in a Commonweal.  good and wholesome laws; and even in this realm the ordinance of S. Lewis notes them with infamy that have used the favour of any man to procure them offices of justice, the which was reasonably well executed until the reign of king Francis the first, and in England it is yet rigorously observed, as I have understood by M. randal the english Ambassador; the which was also strictly decreed by an edict of Ferdinand, great Grandfather by the mother's side to Philip, made in the year 1492 where as the form of choosing of offices of justice is set down: Queen no senior puedan vender, ny trocar officios de Alcaldia, ny AlquaZiladgo, ny regimiento, ny veyntes quatria, ny fiel executoria, ny iuraderia. It is not needful to set down the inconveniences & miseries that a Commonweal is subject unto by the sale of offices, the labour were infinite being so well known to all men. But it is more difficult in a popular State to persuade them that this traffic is good, then where as the richest men hold the Sovereignty. it is the only means to exclude the poorer sort from offices, who in a popular estate will 
Sale of offices lest used in a Popular estate.  have their parts without paying any money, and yet hardly shall they observe these prohibitions, when as the common people shall reap some benefit by choosing of ambitious men. As for a Monarch, poverty sometimes forceth him to break good laws to supply his wants, but after they have once made a breach, it is impossible to repair it. It was forbidden by the law Petilia to go to fairs and assemblies, to sue for the people's favour & voices. By the law Papiria no man might wear a white gown. The law Calphurnia declared him incapable for ever to bear any office that had been condemned of ambition, unless he had accused and convicted an other, and he that had caused his competitor to be condemned of ambition, he obtained his office; afterwards punishment was made greater by the law Tullia, published at the request of Cicero, whereby it was decreed that a Senator condemned of ambition should be banished for ten years, but it was not observed by the rich, who sent their brokers into the assembly of the States with great sums of money to corrupt the people, so as Caesar fearing to have one joined with him in the Consulship that might cross his designs, he offered his friend Luceius as much money as was needful to purchase the people's voices: whereof the Senate being advertised, they appointed a great somme of money for his competitor Marcus Bibulus to buy the people's suffrages, as Suetonius doth testify. This was upon the declining of the popular estate, the which was overthrown 
The inconveniences which grow by the sale of offices.  by this means; for undoubtedly they which make sale of estates, offices, and benefices, they cell the most sacred thing in the world which is justice, they cell the Commonweal, they cell the blood of the subjects, they cell the laws, and taking away all the rewards of honour, virtue, learning, piety, and religion, they open the gates to thefts, corruption, covetousness, injustice, arrogancy, impiety, and to be short, to all vice and villainy. Neither must the Prince excuse himself by his poverty, for there is no available excuse, or that hath any colour to seek the ruin of an estate, under a 
Povertie no lawful excuse in a prince for the sale of offices.  pretence of poverty. And it is a ridiculous thing for a Prince to pretend poverty, seeing he hath so many means to prevent it if he please. We read that the Empire of Rome was never more poor and indebted then under the Emperor Heliogabalus that monster of nature, and yet Alexander Severus his successor, one of the wisest and most virtuous Princess that ever was would never endure the sale of offices, saying in the open Senate, Non patiar mercatores potestatum, I will not endure these merchants, or 
A worthy saying of an emperor.  buyers of dignities: and yet this good Emperor did so abate the taxes and imposts, as he that paid one and thirty crowns under Heliogabalus, paid but one crown under Alexander, resolving, if he had lived, to take but the third part of it, but he reigned but fourteen years after that he had freed his predecessors debts, and defeated the Parthians and the people of the north, leaving to his successor an Empire flourishing in arms and laws. But his court was wisely ordered, excessive prodigalities were cut off, rewards were equally distributed, & the thieves of the public treasure were severely punished. He was called Severus, by reason of his severity. He hated flatterers as a 
The disposition of the emperor Severus.  plague to all Princes, neither durst the horseleeches of the court come near him. He was very wise in all things, but especially in the discovering of men's humours, and of a great judgement in decerning of every man's merits; being reverent with a severe kind of majesty. We have showed before, that the softness or simplicity of a Prince is dangerous to an estate. After that the great king Francis the first become (through his old age) austere and not so accessible, the flatterers and horseleeches of the court came not 
The good husbandry of king Francis the first.  near him, so as the treasure was so well husbanded, as after his death they found seventeen hundred thousand crowns in ready money, besides the quarter of March which was ready to be received: and his realm full of learned men, great Captains, good Architects, and all sorts of handicrafts, and the frontiers of his estate extending even unto the gates of Milan, being assured by a firm firm peace with all Princes. And although that he had been encountered with great and mighty enemies, and had been taken prisoner and paid his ransom, yet did he build Cities, Towns, Castles, and stately Palaces: but the facility and too great bounty of his successor Henry the second brought 
The prodigality of king Henry the second.  the estate indebted within little more than twelve years after, four millions three hundred forty eight thousand three hundred ninety three pounds eighteen shillings starling (as I learned out of the accounts) and the countries of Savoy and Piedmont, with all that which they had conquered in thirty years before, lost, and the rest much engaged. I omit to speak how much France was fallen from her ancient dignity and beauty, how worthy men were kept from their degrees, virtuous men trodden under foot, and the learned contemned: and all these miseries came upon the realm, for that 
The cause of the calamities of France.  he did prodigally give dignities, offices, benefices, and the treasure to the unworthy, and suffered the wicked with all impunity. That Prince than that will enjoy a happy estate let him refer the punishment of offences to the Magistrate, as it is expedient, and reserve rewards unto himself, giving by little and little according to every one's merit, that the thanks may be the more durable; and command punishments to be done at an instant, to the end they may be the less grievous to them that suffer them, and the fear deeper graven in the hearts of others, terrifying them from their wicked and disordered lives. These laws of punishments and rewards being duly observed in a Commonweal, virtue shall be always honourably rewarded, the wicked shall be banished, public debts shall be paid, and the State shall flourish with all abundance. But for that the frauds of courtiers are so many, and such infinite devices to rob the treasury, so as the wisest Princes may be circumvented, a law was made by Philip of Valois, and 
In the year 1333. 11. May.  verified in the court of Parliament, and chamber of accounts, whereby it was enacted, That all gifts given by the king should be voided, if his letters patents did not contain whatsoever had been given to him or to any of his predecessors in former times by the Prince's bounty: which law although it were most profitable, yet was it abrogated two years after by their means that were interessed, finding how much it did prejudice them, so as it was enacted that it should be sufficient to have the derogatory annexed to their patents, as I have seen in the ancient registers of the court: but that also was taken away, lest any remembrance of benefits should hinder the Prince's bounty.  
There was another law made by Charles the 8. whereby all gifts above ten pounds' starling should be enrolled: but since they have used so much fraud, as one in this realm was not ashamed to brag in a great assembly, That he had gotten (besides his offices) five thousand pounds' starling a year of good rent, and yet there was not any one gift made unto him to be found in all the registers of the chamber, although it were apparent that he had nothing but from the king. We must not therefore wonder at great debts, seeing the treasure is exhausted after so strange a manner, as he that hath most 
In what sort the prince should give.  received, makes a show to have had nothing. For to give so much to one man, although he deserve well, doth not only waste the treasure of the Commonweal, but also stir up the discontented to seditions and rebellions. And one of the best means to preserve an estate in her greatness, is to bestow gifts and rewards on many, to continued every one in his duty, and that they may balance one another. Also an advised prince must give sparingly to the importunate, and offer to them that beg not, so as they be of good desert, for some can never ask, nor yet take it when it is offered them. As Antigonus' king of Asia said, That he had two friends, whereof the one could never be satisfied, & the other could never be forced to take any thing. To such men Dionysius the elder, lord of Siracusa, behaved himself wisely, For to us (said Aristippus) which demand 
A safe kind of giving.  much he gives little, and to Plato who craves nothing, he gives too much. This was a safe kind of giving, retaining both the money and the thanks. Yet princes have many other means to grace and reward a servant, than with money, the which is less esteemed by men of honour, than a good look, an alliance, a marriage, or a gracious remembrance. And sometimes the gift is such, as it brings more profit to him that gives it, than to him that receives it. Charles the fift, emperor, being come into Spain, to 
An excellent policy of the emperor Charles the fift.  requited the well deserving of the duke of Calabria (who had refused the crown and kingdom of Spain, which was offered unto him by the estates) being then a prisoner, he freed him out of prison, and married him to one of the richest princesses that was then living, widow to king Ferdinand: with the which deed the people received great content, the duke great honour, wealth, and liberty, and the emperor the love of the duke, the love of the people, and the assurance of his estate, without any charge: And moreover by this means he kept the widow from marrying with any foreign prince: giving to the duke a wife that was aged and barren, to the end that the duke's line (which made a pretence to the realm of Naples) should be extinct with him.  
It is a principal point which a prince aught to respect, That his bounty and rewards be given with a cheerful heart: for some are so unpleasing, as they never give any thing without reproach, the which taketh away the grace of the gift, especially if the gift be in stead of a reward or recompense. But they do much worse, which give one & the same office, or one confiscatton to many, without advertising either the one or the other: the which is no benefit, but an injury. This is to cast the golden apple among subjects 
It is pernitio●…s to give one thing to many.  to ruin them. And oftentimes we see them consumed with suits, and murder one another with the sword: whereby the prince shall not only lose the first-fruits of his bounty, but the love of his subjects, and reap for thanks eternal hatred. The which is a gross error in matters of state, and yet usual among princes; not so much through forgerfulnesse of that which is past, but of set purpose, being falsely instructed from their youth, That they must be liberal and refuse no man, thereby to win the hearts of all men: and yet the end is quite contrary to that which they have propounded, giving one thing to many. And to refuse no man, is not to be liberal nor wise, but prodigal and indiscreet. I would not only have the prince liberal, but bountiful, so as he prove not prodigal: for from a prodigal he will grow to be an exactor, and of an exactor a tyrant: and after that he hath given his own, he must of force pull from others to give. The laws ofliberalitie 
The law of liberty.  command, That he should observe well to whom he gives, what he gives, at what time, in what place, and to what end, and his own ability that gives. But a sovereign prince must withal remember, that rewards must go before gifts, and that he must first recompense them that have well deserved, before he give to such as have nothing deserved; and above all, let him measure his bounty according to his ability. The Romans to relieve the poverty of Horatius Cocles (who alone had withstood the enemy's army, and saved the city from sacking, and the citizens from ruin) they gave him an acre of land, or little more; the which was much at that time, having but two leagues compass about the city. But Alexander the Great gave kingdoms and empires, and thousands of talents: if he had done otherwise it had been against his majesty and greatness. Alphonsus the fift, king of Castille, gave the kingdom of Portugal 
The beginning of the kings of Portugal.  to Henry of Boulogne of the house of Lorraine, from whom are issued the kings of Portugal for these five hundred and fifty years: it was for a reward of his virtue, marrying him to his bastard daughter. But yet was he blamed, to have given away so goodly an estate, his own not being at that time much greater. In like sort we may say, that the custom of the ancient Romans was commendable, to nourish upon the public charge three children borne at one birth, for a reward of the memorial victory obtained by the three Horatij against the Curiatij. But Solon's law, which would have their children which had been slain in the wars for their country, maintained by the public, could not continued, although it were practised throughout all Greece, as we read in Aristotle, for it did quite waste and consume their treasure.  
If any one suppose, that the bounty and greatness of a prince shall not appear, if he give to none but to such as shall deserve; I will yield unto him. I know that bounty & 
Bounty will besits a great prince  magnificence is well befitting a great prince: neither must we think it strange if the prince advance one of a poor and base condition to honour and wealth, so as there be virtue and merit in him: else if the prince shall raise an unworthy person above good men, or equal him in rank with great personages, in doing good to the one he shall wrong all the rest. That worthy saying of Chilo is extant, one demanding of him what God did, He casts down the proud (answered he) from above, and raiseth the poor and dejected to the highest degree of honour. A good prince should imitat God, advancing the poor and virtuous to honours and riches. But when as the college of Cardinals did admonish Pope julio the third, having created P. M. du Mont Cardinal, being a young boy whom he loved, saying, That it was a great dishonour to blemish so honourable an order with so base a man, having neither virtue in him, nor learning, neither nobility nor goods, nor any mark which might merit (as they said) to approach to such a degree: But the pope (who was very pleasant) turning unto the cardinals, What virtue, (saith he) what nobility, what learning, what honour, 
A pleasant answer of pope julius the third.  did you find in me, to make me pope? It is most certain, that a vicious and unworthy prince, will always have his friends and followers of his own humour: as it appears by the emperor. Heliogabalus, who gave the greatest offices, and enriched the most detestable villains in all the empire: wherewith his subjects and guard being incensed, they slew that monster of mankind, with his mother, and threw them into the common privies. But without any further search, we have seen the proof before our 
Advancements bestowed on the unworthy incense the subjects  eyes, how disdainfully it hath been taken to see the due rewards of good subjects, and virtuous men, given to the vicious, to strangers, and to the unworthy, the which hath put the goodliest realm of Europe in combustion. For we found, that the gifts in the year 1572 amounted to 270000 pounds' starling: and the year following to 204400 pounds: and in the year 1574 there was given 54700 pounds: and in the six months following they gave 95500 pounds starling, besides pensions which were not less than twenty thousand pounds starling: and the greatest part of all this treasure grew by the sale of offices, & by confiscations, which was the cause of all our miseries: and yet by the law of France, England, and Spain, such buyers should be held infamous: which laws should be revived, and that commendable custom which was practised under 
A commendable custom of Alexander Severus.  Severus maintained, who caused his name to be set up in all public places, whom he meant to prefer to any government, giving leave to all men to accuse him, yet with the pain of death to him that did it falsely, saying, That it was great shame to be less careful of the life and conversation of a governor, than the Christians were of the qualities of their bishops and ministers, whom they examined with all rigour before they were admitted. The which is much more expedient than the manner of examination which the Venetians, Genovois, Luquois, and Florentines, do use, after that the officer hath left his charge. For a bad and corrupt magistrate grown rich with thefts, will not stick to corrupt a judge, to save both his life and his goods corruptly gotten. It is better therefore to prevent a disease, than to labour to cure it, and better late than never, that the fear of this search might keep officers within the bounds of their duty. But yet Solon's law was far better, by the which the life of the officer was examined both before his admittance to the office, and after he had left it: as we read in the 
〈◊〉. in or at. de fals●… legate. & contr●… Tim●…rchum.  plead of Demosthenes. Having then examined the life and manners of such as aspire to dignities, offices, benefices, knighthoods, exemptions, immunities, gifts and rewards. If their lives be polluted and wicked, they are not only to be rejected, but also to be punished. And rewards are to be distributed to good men, according to every man's merit: and by an harmoniacall proportion you must give the purse to the most loyal, arms to the most valiant, justice to the most just, the cenfure to the most upright, labour 
A true distribution of offices and charges.  to the strongest, the government to the wisest, the priesthood to the devoutest: yet having respect to the nobility, riches, age, and power of every one, and to the quality of the charges and offices. For it were a ridiculous thing to seek a judge that were a warrior, a prelate courageous, and a soldier with a conscience. We have treated of Rewards, Triumphs, and Honours, which are for the most part given unto men of war: Let us now see if it be fit to exercise the subject in arms.   

CHAP. V Whether it be more convenient to train up the subjects in arms, and to fortify their towns or not.  
IT is one of the highest questions of State, and it may be of the greatest difficulty to resolve, for the inconveniences that may rise on either part, the which I will treat of as briefly as I may, setting down what I hold most convenient, leaving notwithstanding the resolution to the wise politicians. To follow the opinion of Aristotle simply, and to maintain that a city aught to be well fortified, well situated for the sending forth of an army, and of hard access for the enemy; were not to decide the difficulties which might be objected, whether it should have place in a Monarchy, as well as in a Popular estate, or in a tyranny as in a monarchy; seeing that we have showed before that Commonweals contrary one unto an other, or at the lest very different, must be governed by contrary or very different maxims. Besides, for the well training the subject up in arms, there is nothing more contrary than to fortify their towns, for that the fortification of them make the inhabitants effeminate and cowards: as Cleomenes king of Lacedemonia doth witness, who seeing the strong fortifications of a town, he cried out, OH goodly retreat for women. And for this cause Lycurgus the lawgiver would never allow 
Reasons against the fortifying of towns.  the city of Sparta to be fortified, fearing lest the subjects relying on the strength of their walls should grow fainthearted, knowing well that there was no such fortress as of men, who will always fight for their goods, lives, and honours, for their wives, children, and country, so long as they have no hope in flight, or of any retreat to save themselves. These two things than are contrary, to have warlike citizens, and fortified cities: for valiant and warlike men have no need of castles, and those which devil in strong places desire no war. So we see the Tartarians in Scythia, and the Aethiopians and Arabians in Africa, which are held to be most warlike: and yet they have no forts but tents, and some villages without wall or ditch. And even the great Negus or Preste-Ian, which is the greatest lord in all Afrique, having (as they say) fifty kings under 
Francis Aluere●… in the history of Aethiopia.  him that do him homage, hath no forts nor castles, but his tents, but that fort only which is built upon the top of the mountain Anga, whereas all the princes of the blood are kept with a sure guard, lest they should draw the subjects from the obedience of their prince by seditious factions. Yet there is no prince under heaven more reverenced and respected of his subjects, nor more redoubted of his enemies, than in Tartary, and Aethiopia. Forts are held fruitless and of small consequence in the opinion 
He that is master of the field, is master of the towns.  of the greatest captains, who hold him that is master of the field, to be master of all the towns. It is well known, that after the battle of Arbella in Chaldea, whereas Darius the last king of Persia was defeated, that there was neither city nor fort in all the whole Persian empire, that held out one day against Alexander the Great, although there were an infinite number, and the conqueror had but thirty thousand men. After that Paulus Aemilius had vanquished Perseus' king of Macedon in battle, there was not any one town that made resistance, but all the whole kingdom yielded in a moment. After the battle of Pharsalia, who forsook not Pompey? all the towns and strong places of the East, which before were shut against Caesar, did now open their gates unto him without any difficulty. And without any further search, it is well known, that after the victory which king jews the twelft obtained against the Venetians, he was presently master of the towns. As in like case after the battle of Marignan, all Lombardie, and even the castle of Milan, yielded unto king Francis; and upon his taking prisoner at Pavia, he lost all on the other side of the Alps.  
But there is a more necessary reason against the fortifying of places, it is to be feared, that an enemy entering the stronger, and taking those strong places, he will hold them, and by that means the whole country: whereas otherwise having once spoiled it, he shall be forced to leave it. For this reason john Maria de la Rovere duke of Urbin, razed all the forts of his country, and retired himself to Venice, finding his forces too weak to encounter the enemy; assuring him that the duke of Valentinois coming with all the power of the church could not hold it, being hated to the death, and the duke of Urbin beloved and respected of his subjects; as it proved true. for pope 
The strongest fort is the love of the subjects.  Alexander being dead, the duke of Urbin was received with great joy of his subjects, and all other princes that were feudatories to the church, were either taken or slain in their places of strength. And for the same cause the Genevois, after the battle of Pavia being revolted from the king of France, besieged their fort called the Lantern, and then razed it. As also the Milanois did the castle I of, the which was built before the Sforces were lords of Milan, to the end that foreign princes should bring them no more in subjection by means of their fort. So the ancient Siracusians did Acradina, and the Romans the cities of Corinth, Carthage, and Numance, the which they had never razed, if the fort of Acrocorinth and other places, strong by nature and easy to be fortified, had not forced them unto it, lest the inhabitants should make use of them, as Philip the younger, king of Macedon had done, who called the cities of Corinth, Chalcide, and Demetrias, the shackles and fetters of Greece. Which forts Titus Flaminius razed to the ground, to free them from the servitude of the Macedonians, and to take away all fear of tyrants. The which is another strong reason to take all occasion from princes to tyrannize over their subjects, as those do which assure themselves by Citadels, which the people called Tyrant's nests; and tyrants termed them a scourge for villains, in contempt and scorn of the poor subjects: as Grislerus lieurenant to the emperor in Switzerland did, who built a fort in the valley of Vri, and calling it Zwing Vri, that is to say, the yoke of Vri, which was the first occasion that moved the 
The first cause of the Swissers revolt.  Cantons of the Swissers to revolt, as we read in their histories. And Solomon was the first that made a Citadel in jerusalem, beginning even then to entreat his subjects ill, exacting new tributes of them, giving occasion to his successor to continued them, and for the ten tribes to revolt, and to choose themselves a king: for commonly Citadels breed a ●…ealousie and distrust betwixt the prince and his subjects, the which is the nurse of all hatred, fear, and rebellion. And even as castles and Citadels give bad prince's occasion to afflict their subjects, so towns well walled and fortified, do oftentimes 'cause subjects to rebel against their princes and lords; as I have showed elsewhere. And therefore the kings of England never suffer their subjects to fortify their houses, the which is more strictly observed in Moscovie, to avoid the rebellion of subjects, who are easily moved thereunto, trusting in their walls. And the inhabitants of Telesse in the realm of Thunis, relied so much in the strength of their city walls, as commonly they slew their governors, not able to endure any command: so as the king of Thunis going thither with a mighty army, he demanded of them, Who lived? they answered him, The read wall: but having forced the town, he razed it, and put all the inhabitants to the sword: as Hannibal did at Saguntum, Sylla at Athens, the emperor Severus at Byzantium, Dagobert at 〈◊〉, Nabuchodonosor and Vespasian to the city of jerusalem, all which were revolted for the trust they had in their ●…ortss, eating even their children through the tediousness of sieges, and in the end have been razed, and the inhabitants rooted out: the which would have easily compounded, if the confidence 
Weak towns compound soon to save themselves.  of their strong places had not abused them. For commonly we see, that weak towns and ill fortified, do soon compound and sand away the enemy, for some piece of money, without any infamy or dishonour: as it hath been seen by the city of Paris, the which was never taken since that Caesar forced it, the which had been long since razed if it had been fortified, having been so often threatened by the enemy: but still they have preserved themselves by treaties and compositions, the which they had not done being well fortified, either for fear of reproach and dishonour which follow them, which treat with an enemy when they may resist: or for the obstinacy of the inhabitants, or the heads of a faction, who had rather die, than yield unto an enemy, having 
Places of strength make the inhabitants obstina●….  no hope to escape, & seeing their houses on fire, they strive in ruining it, to quench it with the blood of their fellow citizens. But there be no cities so strong, that can long resist the canon, and much less famine: For if the besieged be few in number, they shall be soon weary and tired: if there be many, they shall be the soo●…er star●…ed.  
If then forts and citadels make a bad prince to tyrannize, an enemy to seize upon 
The inconveniences of forts and citadels.  the country, subjects to be cowards towards an enemy, rebels to their prince, and seditious among themselves? we cannot say they be profitable, or necessary; but contrariwise hurtful and pernicious to a Commonweal.  
As for the other question, Whether we should train the subjects up in arms, and seek war rather than peace: It seems we should not call that in doubt: for we must esteem that Commonweal most happy, whereas the king is obedient to the laws of God and nature, the magistrates unto the king, private men to the Magistrates, the children to the parents, the servants to the masters, & the subjects united together in love, and all jointly with their prince to enjoy the sweetness of peace and true tranquility of mind. But war is contrary to this which I have said, and soldiers are sworn enemies to this kind of life. It is impossible for a Commonweal to flourish in religion, justice, charity, integrity of life, and in all the liberal sciences and mechanike arts, if the citizens enjoy not a firm and an assured peace. And who is more enemy to a peaceable man, than a furious soldier? to a mild country man, than a bloody warrior? to a philosopher, than a captain? to the wise, than fools? For the greatest delight that soldiers take, is to forage and spoil the country, rob the peasant, burn villages, besiege, batter, force and sack towns; massacre good and bad, young and old, all ages, and all sexes; force virgins, wash themselves in the blood of the murdered, profane holy things, raze temples, blaspheme the name of God, and tread under●…oot all dluine and human laws. These are the first-fruits of war, pleasing and delightful to all soldiers, but abominable to all good men, & detestable before God. What 
War hateful to God and 〈◊〉  need examples in so manifest a matter? who can think of them without horror? or hear them spoken of without sighing? Who knows not the wounds of the husbandman? who sees not their miseries? who hears not their complaints? Every man's field, ca●…tell, and corn, wherewith we live and draw our breath, are in the power of soldiers, that is (as many do interp●…et it) of robbers. If it be so, I see no reason why we should instruct citizens in this cruel and execrable kind of life, or to arm them, but to 
The subject is not to be trained up in arms.  repulfe violence in time of extreme necessity. For those which take small occasions to make war, are like unto flies, which cannot hold themselves upon a smooth polished glass, but up on rough places. And those which seek war to enrich themselves with their neighbour's spoils, shall be in continual torment, leading a miserable life: for desire hath no bounds, although in show they seem to be contented with the desire of a kingdom: even like unto a slave, who desires only to be freed of his bands; being unbound, he affecteth his liberty; and being free, he demands to be made a citizen; after that he desires to be a magistrate; and being come to highest place of magistracy, he affects to be a king; and being a king, he will be an absolute and sole monarch; and in the end he will be worshipped as a God. How much more happy than is a prince, or a small Commonweal (although there be nothing little where there is content) enjoying an assured rest, and a peace without enemies, without war, and without envy. For the bounds of a well ordered Commonweal are not limited by the sword, as Agesilaus boasted, but by justice, as Pompey said to the king of the Parthians, when as he would have the river of Euphrates to distinguish the bounds of the Roman and Parthian empires.  
This have I briefly objected against the fortifying of cities, & military discipline: but many things may be said on the contrary part, That towns without walls lie open 
The inconveniences not to have fortresses.  to the spoil of thieves and robbers, and the lives and liberties of the citizens, to the mercy of their enemies. Moreover a town without walls seems to be a bait to entice any one that would invade it, who else would have no desire, and less power, if it 
A town unfortified, is a bait for an enemy.  were well fortified: like unto men that travel unarmed, they encourage thieves to kill them, to have their spoils. For it is manifest, that the sack of cities is a bait for souldidiours, and he will willingly be an enemy to them that are weak, that durst not look of them being armed. Besides, the first, and in a manner the only occasion to gather men together into one society and commonalty, was for the tuition of every one in 
A communality cannot be in safety without some defence.  particular, and of all in general, and of their wives, children, goods, and possessions, the which cannot be in safety without walls. For, to say, that men will make a wall against the enemy, that may well be when as they must fight: but those which must make defence, are not commonly the fourth part of the inhabitants, for that there are always more women than men, besides children, old men, sick men and impotent, who can have no recourse but unto walls.  
It is a ridiculous thing to say, That men without walls will be more valiant: if that were true, what need we any offensive arms to affronted the enemy, nay rather it should be necessary to command every man to fight naked, as Isadas did, being one of the goodliest and most valiant gentlemen of Sparta, who seeing Epaminondas with an army of Thebans fight with the Lacedæmonians, and labouring to enter into their city, he stripped himself naked, and with a pertuisan in one hand, and a sword in the other, he chargeth the enemy desperately, whereas he did valiant exploits: for the which 
Isadas punished for his rashness, and rewarded for his valour.  the signory gave him a crown, but he was condemned in a fine, having so rashly abandoned his life unto the enemy, being unarmed. In like sort should the Senate of Sparta have been condemned in a great fine, for that they had abandoned the people and so great a city to the mercy of their enemies; having no walls, the which without doubt had then fallen into the Thebans pour if they had not been fortified with ditches and ramparts. If a rampar did then avail for the safety of the citizens, who doubts but walls will be more profitable? and if walls make the citizens cowards, mutinous, and rebels, why did they not fill up the ditches of Lacedaemon? But the event doth show which of the two is most profitable, for Cleomines king of Sparta having lost the battle of Selaria, having no place of retreat was forced to fly into Egypt, abandoning his estate and country to the enemy, who presently entered into the city of Sparta without any resistance. And if walls make men cowards, Lisander having taken Athens, would not have razed the walls, the which Themistocles and Pericles had caused to be built for the defence of that city, the which was afterwards the most flourishing of all the East. To say that the enemy shall not be able to hold a country if there be no walled towns, I yield unto it: but who shall keep him from the spoil of cities, from burning of houses, from murdering of men, ravishing of women, and leading children into captivity, according to the ancient wars, that is, of the stronger? all histories are full of these calamities. There is also as small reason to think that weak 
Weak towns must ●…eeld to the victor's will  towns and without walls will compound with the enemy, and not stand out; where as contrariwise an enemy that shall see the entry easy, will never allow of any reasonable composition, which otherwise he would do, finding a difficulty to besiege and to force a town well fortified. Moreover who sees not but a small fort doth oftentimes 
A strong fort is oftentimes the ruin of the enemy's army.  stay a great and mighty army, whereof we have too many examples: and many times those which do besiege are besieged with cold, hunger, and diseases, and for one they kill within, there are a hundred slain without. Constantinople did endure the Turks siege eight years, until they were relieved by Tamberlan emperor of the Tartars, who defeated Bajazet king of the Turks with all his army. Even so the king of Fez indu●…ed a siege seven years in the town of Fauzara against the king of Morocco, whose army in the end was consumed with the plague in the year 1412. And the 
Leo of Africa.  town of Mecna in Africa held out also seven years, whereas the enemies died for the most part, and were forced to departed with shame and loss. And in our age the city of Metz (although it were nothing so well fortified as it is at this day) did long resist the army of the emperor Charles the fift, and was a buckler unto all France, which had been in great danger if the emperor had not found this town well fortified, from whence he was forced to departed, being both himself and his army besieged with hunger, cold, & many diseases. The city of tire held out-great Alexander seven months, during which time the king of Persia had good means to levy forces, and to provide for his estate. And if walls made men fainthearted and cowards, why did the Romans fortify their city, being the most valiant people that ever were? And it was available for them to have good walls, when as Marcius Coriolanus, the Tarquins, Hanni●…all, and others did besiege them, and burnt even unto their gates. And even when as the Gauls had forced and wholly burnt the city, their estate had been utterly ruined if they had not retired into the Capitol. The like had happened unto the Pope and Cardinals after that the army of Charles of Bourbon had sacked Rome, if they had not fled into the castle S. Ange, where they were besieged as long as the ancient Romans were in the Capitol. And every man knows that countries without forts are presently conquered upon the first battle that is won within the country, as we read of England, which the Saxons conquered from the ancient Britain's, who were expelled, and their 
The realm of England thrice conquered.  enemies took possession. After the Saxons the Danes entered, who were lords of it for the most part: then William the Conqueror by the means of one only victory become absolute lord, and took possession thereof. And during the quarrels betwixt the houses of Lancaster and York, the realm was lost and recovered thrice in six months: as if Henry the sixt, Edward the fourth, and the earl of Warwick had played at base: and although that Edward in the end enjoyed the realm, yet soon after his death his brother Richard duke of Gloucester (having made himself king by the murder of his nephews) was defeated and slain by the earl of Richmond, who had been banished into France, from whence he brought some small aid which king Lewis the 11 had given 
The Romans did always fortify their camps.  him. The which happens not in fortified countries where there is any retreat: for which cause the Romans did never camp but they cast up a trench about the army of 25 foot broad, and most commonly with palissadoes; neither did they ever give battle but they left a garrison within their camp, to make good the retreat if their enemies were the stronger, the which hath relieved them in great losses, as Paulus Aemilius did wisely discourse unto the army before that he gave battle unto the king of Macedon, saying, Maiores nostri castra munita portum ad omnes casus exercitus ducebant esse, unde ad pugnam exirent, quo iactati pugnae receptum haberent & qui castris exutus erat, etiamsi pugnando acie vicisset, pro victo habebatur: Our elders held a camp well fortified, a safe retreat for all events, from the which they went forth to fight, and retired if they were beaten, and he that had lost his camp, although he had overcome in fight, yet was he held as vanquished. The experience of many ages, and of the ancient Commonweals of the Persians', Egyptians, Greeks, Latins, Gauls, and other nations, which have always fortified and vittailed their towns, ports and places that were fit to be fortified, to assure and defend their friends, and to encounter and resist their enemies, gives us to understand, that it is necessary to use it; and even the Tartars within these hundred years build and fortify their places: for how valiant soever a nation be, yet 
A country unfortified cannot long resist a strong 〈◊〉.  can they not long resist nor vanquish him which is much more stronger. These reasons shall serve to prove that it is necessary to fortify towns. We will in like manner hold, that the citizens must be instructed in martial discipline, for that seeing by the laws of God and nature we may defend our lives from violence, and our goods from spoil, we must then conclude, That it is needful to accustom the subjects to arms, not only defensive, but also offensive, to protect the good, and offend the wicked. I call all those thieves and wicked which make war unjustly, and take away an other man's goods wrongfully, and even as we aught to punish and take revenge on subjects that be thieves and robbers, so must we of strangers what royal title soever they carry, this is grounded upon the law of God and nature. Neither is it true that Tully writ, That no 
The cause makes the war just.  war was just but for the recovery of ones own; or, that was denounced before unto the enemy: for the proclaiming of war makes it not just, but the cause must be necessary: there can be none then more just than to defend the lives of innocents. There are other private considerations besides these: for the best means to maintain an estate, 
War against an enemy, entertains the subjects in love.  and to preserve it from rebellions, seditions, and civil wars, and to entertain them in love, is to have an enemy against whom they may oppose themselves. This appears by the example of all Commonweals, and namely of the Romans, who never could found a more safe and surer remedy against civil wars, than to affronted the subjects with an enemy: for being on a time at war among themselves, the enemy entered the 
Dion. Halicar. lib. 7. Livi●…s lib. 3.  town, and seized upon the Capitol, but suddenly they were reconciled, and expelled him: a while after the Veientes seeing them return to civil wars, they began to waste and spoil the Roman territories, but the Romans were soon agreed, discharging their choler upon them, so as they never ceased until they had razed their city, and made the inhabitants subject. And about the same time the princes and people of Tuscan having conspired against the Roman state, sought to nourish seditions and divisions among them, saying, That their power was invincible, and would always grow, if it were not made weak by civil wars, the which is the only poison to make 
Civil wars the ruin of states.  Empires and States mortal, which else would be immortal. In like case the people of Spain being revolted from the emperor Charles the fift, forcing in a manner the duke of Calabria to accept of the Crown, being thus in arms one against an other, king Francis the first sent an army which recovered Fontarabie and the kingdom of Navarre, but suddenly this civil war was pacified among the Spaniards, who with one common consent fell upon the french, and recovered that from them which they had conquered, else the state of Spain had been in great danger, as many have supposed, if the french had temporised a while. And without any further search, we have a precedent of this realm, the which was in great hazard in the year 1562, if the english had not set footing into France, having seized upon Newhaven, but presently the civil 
New haven taken by the English caused the civil wars of France to cease.  wars ceased, and the subjects agreed to fall upon their common enemy, which the english perceiving, they have since resolved to let the french fight and ruin one another, and afterwards to invade the realm without any difficulty or resistance. But I will return to foreign examples, (and I would to God we had no domestical precedents) to show that it is a hard thing and almost impossible, to maintain subjects in peace and love, if they be not in war against some enemy. It is apparent in all the histories of the Romans, who after they had vanquished their enemies, presently fell to mutiny, for which cause the Senate entertained war, and devised enemies when they had none, to keep them from civil wars, the which they continued until they had extended their frontiers unto the islands of Orcadeses, to the Atlantike sea, to the rivers of 
Rest the cause of civil ware in a warlike city.  Danubius and Euphrates, and to the deserts of Arabia: and having no more enemies to make head against them, they murdered one an other most cruelly, and so much the more, for that they were grown mighty, and had few enemies, as in the civil war betwixt Caesar and Pompey for rule, whereof Cicero speaking said, Bellum pium ac necessarium visum est, civibus tamen exitiabile, nisi Pompeius vicerit, calamitosum etiam si vicerit: It seems, said he, to be a godly and necessary war, yet fatal unto the citizens unless that Pompey win, and lamentable if he do win: But it was more cruel betwixt Augustus and Marc Anthony: for which cause the emperor Augustus having changed the popular estate into a Monarkie, was not so ill advised as to discharge the forty legions, but he sent them into provinces, & upon the frontiers of barbarous nations, to entertain them in martial discipline, and to prevent all occasions of civil wars at Rome. But the emperor Constantine the great (following the counsel of some Bishops 
The first occasion to ruin the Roman empire.  and ministers unacquainted with matters of State) discharged the legions, which made them forget the ancient military discipline, and opened a gate to barbarous nations, who invaded the Roman empire of all sides, whereby it appears that laws, justice, religion, subjects, and the whole estate next under God, is in the protection of 
Arms the defence of states.  arms, as under a strong shield. There is yet an other reason of great moment, to show that it is necessary to entertain martial discipline, and to make war, for that there is no city so holy, nor so well governed that hath not in it many thieves, murderers, idle persons, vagabonds, mutins, adulterers, and diceplayers, which lead a wicked life, and corrupt the simplicity of good subjects; neither can laws, magistrates, nor any punishment keep them in awe. And even it is commonly said that gibbets are set up 
A mean to purge the Commonweal of vagabonds and idle persons.  but for beggars, for that statutes and ordinances in many places are like unto spider's webs, as Anacharsis said unto Solon, for that none but weak flies are taken in them, and great beasts break easily through them. There is no better means then to purge the Commonweal of this infectious filth, then to sand them to the war, the which is as it were a purging medicine to expel corrupted humours out of the universal body of the state. This was the principal occasion which moved Charles the wise king of France to sand succours so willingly unto the bastard of Castille under the conduct of Bertrand of Guesclin Constable, the which purged France of an infinite number of thieves: Even so did Lewis the TWO to the Earl of Richmond; and both the one and the other not only purged France of idle persons, but also returned with honour to have settled two kings in their estates, from the which they were expelled. Moreover, the military discipline of the Romans which should be common to all nations, made a coward 
The martial discipline of the Romans, was a school of virtue.  valiant, an intemperate man modest, a slothful man active, a prodigal man frugal, and a licentious man continent: neither is it sufficient for a captain or soldier to know how to fight, but there are many other excellent arts which be companions to this virtue, that is to say labour in business, resolution in dangers, temperance in desires, industry in action, speed in execution, and counsel in providing, these are necessary for the art of war. The subject then being instructed in military discipline, is not infected with lust, licentiousness, impiety and sloth, but being wicked and impious, they enure themselves to all kinds of virtue if they learn the precepts of the Roman military 
The praise of military discipline.  discipline and art of commanding. Besides, there is nothing that contains the people within the duty of honour and virtue more than the fear of a warlike enemy. The people of Rome (saith Polybius) were never more virtuous, nor the subjects more obedient unto the magistrates, nor the magistrates unto the laws, then when as Pyrrhus 
The fear of enemies keeps subjects in awe.  at one time, and Hannibal at an other were at the gates of Rome; but after that Perseus and Antiochus were vanquished, having no enemy left whom they might fear, than vices began to take root, and the people fell into superfluities and delights, which corrupted all good manners, and blemished the beauty of their ancient virtue. OH how wisely did Scipio oppose himself in open Senate, that the city of Carthage should not 
The providence of Scipio the younger.  be razed, foretelling they either should have civil wars, or that the virtue of the Romans would soon decay, having no enemy to contend withal, for even as moderate liberty puffs men up, and makes them prone to all vices, so fear retains them in their duties: and we must not doubt but the great politian and governor of all the world as he hath given to every thing his contrary, so hath he suffered wars and hatred among nations to punish one by an other, and to keep them all in fear, which is the only controller of virtue, as Samuel in an oration which he made unto the people said, That God had stirred them up enemies, to keep them in awe, try them, and punish them. And that I may conclude briefly, if there be no respect had of so many 
Wars allowed of God.  commodities, yet let us have a care of the health and necessity of the Commonweal, lest it grow waste and desolate through the spoils and insolency of the enemy, for when as the enemy's forces are near, although there be no invasion, yet the flocks are forsaken, the tillage is abandoned, and all traffic ceaseth; and oftentimes the whole years first-fruits are lost at the tumour of any danger, or the terror of war. Who will then doubt but the subjects should be trained up in arms, in the which there is not only much glory and profit, but also the health of the citizens, the help of their neighbours, the fortunes of the subjects, and the security of them all. By these reasons it appears, that they are much abused which think that the only end of war is peace. And if it were so, what better means were there to have peace in despite of the enemy, 
The way to have a peace, is to prepare for force  then to let him know that you have means to make war? Never wise Prince nor good Captain made a peace unarmed, and as Manlius Capitolinus said, Ostendite modo bellum, pacem habebitis, videant vos paratos ad vim, ius ipsiremittent: Show them war said he, and you shall have peace, let them see you ready for force, and they will do you right. These reasons are partly true and partly probable, and may of either side dazzle the eyes of the clearest sighted if they look not nearly unto them. To the end we may resolve something, let us distinguish of Commonweals. I hold then that in a 
A resolution of the question.  popular estate it is necessary to train the subjects up in arms, to avoid the abovenamed inconveniences, unto the which a popular estate is by nature subject; and if the people be warlike and mutinous by nature, as the nations of the North be, being trained up to arms and martial discipline, it shall be expedient to affronted them often with their enemies, and not to admit any peace but upon good terms, as a dangerous thing 
In a Popular estate the subjects must be trained up in arms.  to a warlike nation. And a peace being concluded, you must notwithstanding entertain your soldiers upon the frontiers, as the emperor Augustus did, although he had changed the popular estate into a Monarchy: or else sand them to Princes that are in league, to be entertained in the art of war; as the Swissers have wisely done, being a people bred in the mountains apt to war, and hardly maintained in peace, enjoying a popular liberty; and by this means they have always had soldiers nourished and entertained at another man's cost, besides their public and private pensions (which have been great, as I have formerly showed) and the assurance of their estate, by means of alliances contracted with so mighty a king. And as for forts, it is not needful in a popular estate to have their towns too well fortified (except it be the chief city, 
In a Popular estate only the capital city must be fortified  which is the seat of the popular estate) and much less any Castles or Citadels, lest some one thrust on with an ambitious desire of rule surprise them, and change the popular estate into a Monarchy: as Denis the tyrant did, having surprised Acradina the 
Citadels not to be built in a Popular estate.  fort of Siracusa by fraud. Or else the enemy may take them & fortify them, as the Lacedæmonians did, having razed the walls of Athens, they left a garrison in the Castle: and doing the like unto the popular estate of Thebes, they took their fort called Cadmee, leaving a garrison in it. For there is no means to subject a people, or to change a Democratia into a Monarchy but by Citadels, so did the tyrants in old time: and in our age Cosme de Medicis duke of Florence had made two Citadels in Florence, with a garrison of strangers, having found by experience that it was impossible 
Citadels the cause of tyrants.  to change the popular estate into a Monarchy, and to assure his life among the people: and therefore the Cantons of Vri, Vnderuald, Glaris, and Appenzell, which are all popular, have no walls, like unto the rest which are governed Aristocratically. We will give the same censure of Aristocratia in regard of fortresses, as of a popular estate, the which is so much more to be feared, for that it is more easy for one of the 
Citadels more dangerous whereas few do govern  commanders to win the common people to his will, and to incense them against the chief men. But as for royal Monarchies, if their bounds and limits be large, it is not expedient for the Prince to build Citadels, not places of strength, but upon the frontiers, to the end the people may be without fear of tyrannizing; and yet having fortified the frontiers of his estate with places impregnable, the subjects will still think it is against the enemy, and the Prince at need may use them against all enemies, both strangers and subjects in case they rebel: the which nature hath taught us, which hath armed the head and the extremities of all beasts, leaving the midst, the bowels, and 
To fortify the frontiers, is according to the law of nature.  the other parts unarmed. But the Monarch is ill advised that doth environ a town with mighty walls, if he doth not withal build a good Citadel, for that nothing doth more animate the subjects to revolt, the which they would not so easily attempt, seeing before their eyes Citadels well fortified. It is also necessary as well in a Monarchy as in an Aristocritie, that the governor of the town depend not of the captain of the Citadel, nor the captain of the governor, neither that the captain of the Citadel be a Prince, or a great man: the which is well observed in Turkey, according to the rule of the ancient Sultan's of Egypt, as also our kings do, but the Venetians more strictly than all others, for that they are forced to fortify their towns, to defend the subjects against their enemies, and fearing the rebellion of their subjects, who have no share in the government, they have strong Citadels in their towns, whither they do 
Citadels in towns of strength, keep the subjects from rebelling.  every year sand new Captains besides the Potestates or Governors, lest that he should hold the Citadel as his inheritance. And those of Rhagouse (which have but one city and a small territory) are forced to change their Captain every day, who is 
Distrust of noble men in an Aristo craticall estate.  brought into the fort with his face covered. In like sort the Athenians changed the Captain of their fortress every day, the which was one of the nine Archontes, for the distrust they had that one of the subjects should make himself lord. For the preventing whereof, it shall be needful to remove Citadels from the capital towns in a popular estate, or an Aristocratical estate, as the Venetians have done wisely at Venice, 
Citadels not to be built in the chief city of a Popular estate, nor in a signory.  to take all occasion from the duke, and to free the gentlemen from suspicion of any alteration in the state. It was wisely provided in England, Turkey, Muscovie, and in a manner by all the kings of the East and of Africa, that no subject should fortify his house in the country, for if the master of a private castle be a great man, he will soon take an occasion to revolt, if he be poor, to rob; and for this cause the imperial towns of Germany have oftentimes razed gentlemen's castles, that rebels and thieves might have no retreat, the which the Swissers have done throughout all their country, having expelled the ancient lords. But this were a dangerous thing in an ancient Monarchy to ruin private men's castles which are of strength, but well they may prohibit their subjects not to build any more without licence from the Sovereign, who may not easily grant it, for that it is sufficient to have a house able to defend him from thieves, and thus much for fortifications. But the question is not small, if in Aristocratia, the better sort only, which command, are to be trained up in arms, or all the people, or else wholly to banish the art of war. If the common people do once become soldiers, it is to be feared they will attempt to change the state, to have a part in the government, if they be not always employed against the enemies, as I have showed before by many examples; and if none but the better sort be armed, they shall be soon defeated, and will 'cause a necessary change of their estate: but if they will quite banish the art of war out of their Commonweal, they shall remain a scorn and pray to all their neighbours, if they be not strictly allied unto the strongest, or else if they have not towns that be inaccessible and forts impregnable, as the Venetians, who fearing 
The Venetians do not practise arm●… in their Commonweal.  the above named inconveniences, have banished the art of war out of their Commonweal, as Cardinal Contarenus saith: the which is rather to be attributed to sloth, then to any set or positive law, for that within these two hundred years they were very warlike, and obtained great victories of the Genevois, but pleasing themselves with the continual first-fruits of peace and ease, they have neglected the practice of arms, employing 
Why the Venetians neglected arms.  strangers in their wars: neither can they endure any gentleman of the signory to be a commander, but if they know any Venetian gentleman that aspires to the wars, and that follows the courts of other Princes, by and by they call him home, desiring rather to have an Almain a Bargamasco, or a stranger for their general, if they make war by land, than one of their own lords, and an army of strangers rather than of subjects: but withal they sand a Providador or commissary, by whose council the General is governed. And although there be many inconveniences, to have a Commissary command a General, a citizen strangers: one that understands nothing in matters of war, them that are bred up in arms: yet by this means they avoid many other dangers which are not less: the which we have seen fall out in their Commonweal, whereas they used none but their own subjects and forces. Their histories are full of conspiracies, seditions & civil wars, which they had in the midst of 
Why the Venetians employ strangers in their wars.  their city. The Carthagineanss, being not yet well instructed in the art of war, were wont to sand for Lacedaemonian captains, which should lead a Carthaginean army under a General of Carthage; yet would they never have both General and army strangers, lest their Commonweal should fall into the power of strangers. If war be not to be undertaken, but for the repelling of injuries, and to enjoy peace, and that it sufficeth to make a Commonweal happy to keep their own, to have their places near unto their enemies well manned and fortified, and to enjoy the first-fruits of a desired peace; 
The signory of Venice most happy.  without doubt the signory of Venice may justly term itself happy, which hath not only the seat of their empire by nature and art inexpugnable, but also have their towns and fortresses upon the continent so well fortified, as they neither need to fear the invasions of their enemies, nor the rebellions of their subjects: caring little for any new conquests, or to extend their bounds. We see the Venetians do fly from all occasions 
The Venetians desire peace with their loss.  of war, as from the plague, and they never enter into it but by constraint, and seek for peace at what price soever, even with the loss of their revenues; as we may see in the treaty which they made with pope julio the second, the emperor Maximilian, and the king of Naples, in the year 1508, their ambassadors being humbled at their feet, yielding to all which they demanded. As they did in like manner to Sultan Selim in the year 1570, abandoning the holy league to purchase his peace, after they had lost a goodly kingdom. And even as beasts which have no offensive arms, as hates that have no gall, as Stags and Does seek to save themselves from the hounds and hawk, by flight; so they are not to be blamed, nor that Commonweal to be less esteemed, which sues for peace, having no means to resist: the which would be dishonourable to a warlike nation, or for a conquering prince, who cannot demand a peace of his enemy without blushing. There was nothing that did so long protract the conclusion 
A generous prince demands neither peace nor war.  of a peace betwixt king Henry the second, and the emperor Charles the fift, as a certain rumour spread abroad, That the emperor demanded a peace: which was to get the highest point of honour, which a generous prince may desire, yea if he were entered into another's country. As the same emperor did in the year 1544, having thrust all the forces of the empire, and his own, into this realm, with those of the king of England on another side, who had already divided the realm betwixt them (as Sleidan saith) if the pope had not forced the emperor to make a peace: which the king would neither demand, nor accept, but with reasonable conditions. Although that 
jews the eleventh reproached by his subjects for demanding of a peace.  Lewis the eleventh demanded it of Edward the fourth, king of England, as soon as he was entered into Picardy, and bought it dearly, caring little that the earl of Lude and other his favourites called him cowardly king. But his father Charles the seventh did a stranger thing for to obtain a peace of the duke of Bourgongne, his vassal and natural subject; he sent the constable of France, the chancellor, a marshal of France, and many other great personages, to treat a peace with him, who in open assembly, and in the name of the king their master, craved pardon of the duke, for the death of john 
Charles the seventh demands a peace basely of the duke of Bourgongne.  duke of Bourgongne, confessing openly, That the king had done ill, being young, indiscreet, and ill counseled; entreating the duke, that he would forget his discontent: the duke said, That he did pardon the king for the honour of God, and compassion of the people of France, and to obey the council of the pope and other christian princes that had entreated him. A slave could not behave himself more humbly and abjectly unto his master, than the king did unto his subject, to restore the realm to his first beauty, and to exepll the English, as he did soon after. The Romans would rather have lost their estate, than once to have dreamt of it: For we cannot found that at any time during seven hundred years, that they had wars with all nations, that they ever demanded peace but of the Gauls, who held them besieged in the Capitol, after they had burnt their city: and of Coriolanus: But contrariwise being vanquished 
The Romans never demanded a peace of any but twice.  by the power of king Perseus, they would never accept of any peace of the victor, unless he would submit himself and his kingdom unto their mercy, although he offered to pay them tribute. And when as king Pyrrhus (after that he had obtained two notable victories, and was master almost of all Italy) sent his ambassador to Rome, to treat a peace upon reasonable conditions: they were answered, That the Romans would not treat of any peace, except that Pyrrhus did first departed out of Italy; and that they did contend with him for their honours and dignities, not for their lives and fortunes. The king receiving this answer, said, That the Romans could not live in quiet, 
The Romans of an undaunted resolution.  neither conquerors, nor conquered. This was the answer of a valiant people, who knew their own forces to be able to make head against an enemy: the which would be very much unbefitting a weak prince, who must (like unto a wise pilot) strike sails, & yield unto the tempest, that he may recover a safe port, & not to make necessity subject to ambition: as the Vavoide of Transiluania did, who said openly, That he had rather be slave unto the Turk, than allied unto Ferdinand, and so afterwards it fell out. We have an example of the great Knez of Moscovie, who seeing the Procope of Tartary entered into his country with eighteen legions, knowing well that 
Itis no dishonour to submit in time of necessity.  he was unable to make resistance, he went to meet him unarmed, and humbling himself before him, he saved his people and his estate from an inevitable ruin, yet holding his count●…ey by yielding homage to the Procope. But being at this day equal or greater in forces, & freed from the servitude of the Bohemian-tartar, all princes would scorn him, if he should demand a peace, especially having received an injury. For that prince that bears an injury, will soon endure to have a law prescribed him; and if he once suffer his enemy to give him a law, he shall soon be reduced into slavery. But howsoever, a mighty prince (if he be wise and valiant) will never seek for war nor peace, if necessity (which is not subject to the laws of honour nor force) doth not constrain him, neither 
When a prince should give battle.  will he ever give battle, if there be not more apparent profit in the victory, than of loss if the enemies should vanquish: as the emperor Augustus said, who for this reason never gave battle but upon necessity. But it is not unfitting a poor p●…ince, or a small signory, or for him that makes no profession of arms, to demand peace in his loss. As pope julio the third, who demanded peace of king Henry the second, calling him before God, to judge of the wrong which he had done him: The king granted him a peace, and said, That he would appear before God; but he doubted the pope would not show himself. Wherewith the pope, who was of a pleasant disposition (seeing the letters which were signed by the king in the camp lying at Metz, in the year 1552) was very glad, although in show he seemed to be grieved, saying, That it was not the king that had indicted those letters, but the capital enemy of the church. And as the greatness of courage and magnanimity is the light of all other virtues, and which doth advance princes to the highest point of honour; so is it the only virtue which doth most daunt an enemy, although he be mighty and warlike, 
A show of courage doth many times daunt an enemy.  and oftentimes gives the victory without blows: as Furius Camillus having sent home the children of the Falisques, whom their Schoolmaster had brought into his camp, he conquered their city without striking stroke. And Fabricius having sent unto king Pyrrhus the Physician which offered to poison him, refusing half his kingdoms and his treasure, (although he were one of the poorest gentlemen in Rome) and causing their ransoms to be paid, whom Pyrrhus had freely set at liberty, being loathe the Romans should be bound in any respect unto so great a king. Or as Scipio who having conquered a good part of Spain with little pain, sent back a lady of singular beauty unto her husband, prince of the Celtiberians, imitating the example of Cyrus. These virtuous acts took from their enemies all courage, to make any more war against so valiant and magnanimous a people, who could neither be vanquished 
The Romans could never be vanquished by honour, not by 〈◊〉.  by honour, nor vanquished by treachery: the which was more apparent after the battle of Cans, Hannibal having appointed eight thousand Roman prisoners to be ransomed for an hundred crowns a piece one with another, hoping that the Romans who had lost so many men, would willingly pay their ransoms: but the Senate decreed, That no one should be redeemed at any rate, giving all to understand, That either they must vanquish, or be slaves to the enemy: Wherewith Hannibal was so amazed, and daunted, as he despaired ever to vanquish the Romans. And contrariwise the Romans did assure their estate, which was much shaken and abandoned of all friends and allies. For the Senate did well imagine, that Hannibal having sucked so much blood of the Romans, he would also exhausted their treasure, in drawing from them eight hundred thousand crowns, and restoring unto them the veriest cowards of all the Roman army; making every one to resolve either to vanquish or die, having lost all hope of liberty, whereby they become fearful and invincible. And even as they never fainted in their losses; so were they never proud nor arrogant in their victories. For when as Antiochus the Great having lost a goodly army, sent his ambassadors to both the Scipios, offering to accept of what conditions the Romans pleased: Whereunto Scipio the African made an answer worthy of a great and virtuous prince, That the Romans lost 
A worthy answer of Scipio.  no part of their courage when they were vanquished, nor of their modesty, when they did vanquish, demanding no harder conditions after their victory than before. But the advantag●… which the Romans had, was, that they made war in their enemy's country, 〈◊〉 magazines of soldiers in Italy, to supply their armies if they were defeated: or if they conquered those countries where they made war, they might add them to their empire, & plant them with their own colonies. A wise prince will never attend an enemy in his own country, if he may stop his entry, unless he hath another army ready, or a sure retreat into some places of strength, else he hazards his whole estate 
A prince may not hazard his estate upon one victory.  upon a victory; as Antiochus, Perseus, juba, and Ptolemy the last king of Egypt did against the Romans: Darius against Alexander, and oftentimes the French against the English. And for this cause Lewis the gross understanding that the emperor Henry came with a mighty power to make war in France (the king having received Pope Gelasius into his protection, and suffered him to excommunicate the emperor) he gathered together an army of two hundred thousand men, as Suggerius abbot of Saint Den●…s i●… France hath left in writing, and went as far as the Rhin upon the territories of the empire, which was the only cause that made the emperor to lay aside arms, and to accept of what peace it pleased the king. In like sort Philip Augustus advertised that the emperor Otho the second, the king of England, with the potentates of the Low countries, came into his realm with a mighty army, he fortified his places, marched out of his frontiers, and defeated them in battle. And if king Francis the first, when as he lost his army before Pavia, and himself taken prisoner, had received such an overthrow in the hart of France, this realm had been in great danger; but chancing in Italy, the conquerors contented themselves with the victory; and the subjects in the mean time had leisure to rally their forces, and to fortify their frontiers.  
Many hold opinion, That a sovereign prince should not hazard his person on a day of battle, especially if the enemy be entered into the hart of his realm: It is true, if he be a coward and base minded: but having the reputation of a valiant and generous 
The presence of the prince is of great consequence to van●… an enemy.  prince, he doubles the courage and force of his army, and so much the more if he be beloved of his army, and his presence works a wonderful effect, when he is seen of them all, and every one seen of him, for oftentimes shame retains a flying army, seeing the presence of their king, and fearing lest he should fall into some danger, Vrget enim (ut ait Maro) presentia Turni, The presence of Turnus (as Maro saith) doth urge them to fight. As it happened to Caesar before Therovenne; and in Spain, fight for his life against Pompey's children, where the battle had been lost if he had not been present. And many believe that the victories which Edward the fourth got in nine battles, was, for that he did always fight on foot. How many princes and great men do willingly follow the king's person, which else would not march under any others command. For when as Eumenes was very sick his army refused to fight, unless he 
How a prince or General should carry himself in a battle.  were brought into the camp in a litter; such confidence they had in his presence. Yet would I not that a sovereign prince or a General, should do the office of a private soldier, putting his life rashly in danger; as it is said of Pelopidas, Marcellus, Gaston de Foix duke of Nemours, and many others, whose death hath drawn after it the hazard of the state.  
I will not here treat of the art of war, which many have handled, but only that which concerns the state. I conclude then, that a prince having well manned and fortified his frontiers, if he doubts that the enemy will enter into his country, let him prevent him, and put the war as far from him as he may: and if he be entered, not to hazard his estate and person rashly upon the event of a battle, especially if he have to deal with a warlike people, who commonly get the victory being brought to despair, knowing well, that there is no means for them to escape death in another's country, if they be vanquished, having neither fort, retreat, nor any succour. Among many we have a lamentable example of our king john, who chose rather to hazard his life, his nobility, and his whole estate, in a doubtful battle at Poitiers, than to grant a peace unto the prince of Wales, and the English army, who demanded only to departed with their lives: there did ten thousand desparat men defeat an army of forty five thousand 
It is dangerous to fight with a desp●…rat army.  French, and led away the king captive. Gaston of Foix committed the like error, having defeated the enemy at Ravenne, seeking to pursue a squadron of Spaniards that fled, he lost his life, and left all that he had conquered in Italy in prey to the enemy. What should I speak of ancient examples, the histories are full of them: but there is none more famous than that of Caesar, whose army was in despair through famine & 
Necessity of an invincible force.  want, being environed both by sea and land with the enemy's towns and legions, and had soon perished for hunger, if they had not vanquished, yet would Pompey needs give that battle of Pharsalia, having twice as many men as Caesar. In so great a despair of things, the General of the Volsques did encourage his army with a brief speech, after this manner, Armati armatis obstant virtute pares, sed necessitate superiores estis, Armed men stand against armed men, equal in virtue, but in necessity you exceed them. And another captain of the Samnites said, justum est bellum quibus necessarium, & pia arma quibus nulla nisi in armis relinquitur spes, That war is just to whom it is necessary, and those arms religious to them that have no hope but in arms. And therefore Fabius Maximus (the last of that family) endured all the scorns and disgraces of his enemies, 
No prince should fight a battle, but constrained.  rather than he would commit the fortune of the Commonweal to a doubtful battle: and in the end he reaped the honour, To have preserved his country. Whereas Hannibal having hazarded a battle against Scipio, who went to besiege Car●…hage, to draw the enemy out of Italy, lost both his army and the estate. It is no good consequence to say, that the Romans fought three battles with Pyrrhus, and as many with Hannibal, in the heart of Italy, for that they had magazines of men of war, as well out of their own countries, as from their allies: the which they could not want, for that by the laws every one was forced to carry arms at seventeen years of age, and were not freed from them until fifty five: neither was it lawful for any man to demand an office or 
Plut. in Gracchis.  benefice, that had not carried arms ten years. And at one time there were two thousand citizens excluded from the Bourgeship, for that they had been four years together absent from the wars, except they which had been dispensed withal upon some just cause (as Titus Livius saith) to the which discipline they were at the first constrained by the incursions of their bordering neighbours, being jealous of their greatness: But having afterwards brought all the people of Italy under their subjection, or treated alliances with them, and finding that a people given to arms, could not live idly in peace without civil wars, they found it expedient for the good of the Commonweal, to seek out new enemies, making war sometimes to revenge the wrongs 
The Romans sought occasion of war.  done unto their confederates: and sometimes defending them against their enemies, granting triumphs, honourahle estates, and great rewards to valiant captains. The which was wisely ordained by the Senate, as an healthful remedy against civil wars; the which Bebius the Tribune of the people did object unto the Fathers, That war was sown upon war, that the people might never be at quiet: and therefore there was no distinction betwixt military charges and offices of justice: So as one and the self same citizen, might be a valiant Captain, a wise Senator, a good judge, and a great Orator: as it is said of Cato the Censor, who was well skilled in tillage, as it appeareth by his books, yet was he not ashamed to leave his arms to go to the plough; or to leave the plough to pled, sometimes to be a judge, to sacrifice, or to play the Orator before the people or Senat. And Caesar was high Priest, and in Tully's opinion a most excellent Orator, and the best captain of his age. There were many not only in Italy, but also in Greece, that excelled in the art of war and policy. We read in julius Pollux, That the Athenians were bound to go to war at fourteen years, and continued until threescore. Therefore Aristides, Pericles, Photion, Leosthenes, Demetrius the Phalerian, Alcibiades, Themistocles, and infinite other Grecians, were like unto the 
Plut. in Phocione  ancient Romans, and did excel in the art of war and policy. But the wisest politicians did separate the art of war from other vocations. In the Commonweal of Crect every man was not allowed to carry arms, but certain special persons: nor in 
Plut. in Licurg.  old times in France, whereas the horsemen had this charge, and the Druids were exempt. In Egypt none but the Calasires were men of war: the which Lycurgus 
Herodot.  did allow. And therefore Plato divided the citizens into three orders, Keepers, Men at arms, and Labourers: imitating the Egyptians, who made three several kinds of estates. By little and little the Athenians made a distinction of Arms, Policy, and justice; 
In Phocione.  and so did the Romans. And truly in this short course of our life, there are few that do excel in politic arts, but in both not any. It seems that Augustus did first take from Senators, Proconsul's, and Governors of Provinces, the power to wear arms: so as in succession of time they called offices without arms dignities; as we 
Dion. lib. 53  read in Cassiodorus, Quamuis inquit, omnia dignitatum officia manu secludantur armata, 
In forma Comitive, Written to the Governor of a Province.  & civilibus vestibus induti videantur, qui districtionem publicam docentur operari: tua tamen dignitas à terroribus eruatur, quae gladio bellico rebus etiam pacatis accingitur: arma ista juris sunt, non furoris, Although (saith he) that all offices of dignity be excluded from armed hands, and that they seem to be attired with civil garments, that are taught to labour in the difficulties of the Commonweal: yet the dignity seems to be plucked from terrors, the which is girt with a warlike sword, even in the quietest times: these be the arms of justice, not of Fury. And consequently all nations by degrees, have separated soldiers from scholars and men of justice, being a difficult thing to excel in one art, but impossible in all; nor worthily to exercise many victories. Moreover it was a thing almost impossible, to train all the subjects of a Commonweal up to arms, and to maintain them in the obedience of the laws and magistrates. This was haply the cause which made king Francis the first, to cast the seven legions of foot, which he had erected within this realm, in the year 1534, every legion containing six thousand foot. And although that his son Henry did renew them twenty years after, yet was he forced to altar his opinion, seeing the Commonweal troubled, and mutinies grown in many places, by means of those legions. And yet in the opinion of strangers, and of those that have judicially examined the goodly ordinances that were made to that end, there was never any thing better instituted for the art of 
The entertainment of legions, very necessary in a state.  war, the which is as necessary in this realm, as in any part of the world, being environed with warlike and mighty nations, which make a common practice to spoil: like to a country of conquest. Yea if they had entertained but four legions of foot, besides the troops of horse, for the defence of the realm, and placed them as it were in garrison upon the frontiers, they had provided wisely for the safety of the Commonweal. France is not the twentieth part of the Roman empire, for the guard whereof Augustus Caesar said, That forty legions did suffice, being but five thousand men in a legion. The four legions of foot and troops of horse, paid in time of peace, according to the ordinance of king Francis the first, would not have cost three hundred and fifty thousand pounds starling, and yet is it half as much more as the legions had in Augustus his time: and the whole pay of the men at arms of France, in the year 1560, came but to 235300 pounds' starling, as well the old bands, as the men at arms. And Augustus entertained forty legions of horse and foot, besides his and the city 
Augustus kept forty legions continually in pay.  guards, and two navies for the defence of both seas, keeping the empire safe from foreign and civil wars, and all for twelve hundred thousand pounds' starling a year, with an excellent description of all orders: the which other princes should propound unto themselves, to imitat such as Orosius, Dion, Tranquillus, & other writers have described it in their monuments: and yet was it not lawful for the Roman soldiers (notwithstanding their small entertainment) to rob and spoil: as we see at this day. This was the means to maintain martial discipline, to defend the rights of citizens, and allies, and to repel the enemy: Else if you be priest with war, you shall be forced not only to abandon your neighbours, but also your country: or else in this extremity you must use untrained soldiers, who become captains before they were ever soldiers: 
The inconveniences, not to have trained bands.  or else forced with necessity you must beg and buy foreign succours at a dear rate. I do not think that foreign succours are to be rejected, as many suppose: for there is no great empire can be angmented▪ without the succours of confederates, neither can they long resist the violence of an enemy: but I allow of those succours which come from allies, that are united together in an offensive and defensive league, as the Cantons of the Swissers be: or at the lest in a defensive league, as they be with the house of France. For by this means they are not only the more strengthened, but 
It is good to have mighty friends and allies in an equal league.  they also take from the enemy those succours which he might draw from them, and the occasion from all men to make war against either of them, unless he mean to be a professed enemy unto them both. But I desire that the confederates should be tied by a mutual bond, and altogether equal, to avoid the reproaches, quarrels, and inconveniences that grow of inequality. Those leagues and treaties be unequal, when as one is bound to pay the diets or assemblies of their allies, although they did raise but one company of soldiers, and notwithstanding be tied to pay them a continual pension, besides their entertainment in the time of war, and succours of horse and foot at need without pension or pay. These treaties did our kings of France make with the Cantons of the Swissers, lest other princes should draw them to their succours. It is also necessary in an offensive and defensive league which is equal, That the conquests should be common (as it hath always been among the Cantons, when as they have made war in common) and that whatsoever is conquered by the one, should be private, wherein the ancient Italians were circumvented by the Romans in their treaties, for the Romans having made an offensive and defensive league with their neighbours the Italians, they had always for one Roman legion two from their allies ready paid, and the General of the army was always a Roman; and yet their 
Polybius and Livy. The Romans circumvented their allies in Italy in their treaties.  allies had no pension nor entertainment from the Romans, nor any part of their conquests which were made in common, nor in dignities and offices, except some towns of the Latins; which was the cause of the social or confederates war in Italy against the Romans, who were reduced to that extremity, as they were forced to give the right of a citizen, with part of their offices, and their voices at elections, almost to all their allies in Italy. The Athenians with the like fraud did cirumvent their neighbours and confederates, from whom they did exact tributes contrary to their treaties, neither did they ever undertake any war but one without the forces of their allies, whereupon most of them fell off unto the Lacedæmonians when occasion was offered.  
It may also be doubted whether it be fit to have many allies, or mercenary soldiers of divers languages, for the difficulty there is to speak unto them, and to encourage them by orations, a thing very necessary in war. But experience hath taught us, that divers nations and divers tongues are easy to govern and lead, as Hannibal did show, having an army consisting of Carthaginians, Mauritanians, Numidians, Spaniards, Italians, Gauls, and Greeks, and yet in fifteen years space he never had mutiny in his camp, & obtained great victories; but if such an army be once mutined, there is no means to pacify it: this is the opinion of Polybius, a captain of great experience, and Schoolmaster to Scipio Affricanus. That which we have spoken touching the succours of allies, is not to be understood that an estate should wholly rely upon them, but a well governed Commonweal must be supported by her own forces, and always be stronger than the succours she hath from her allies: for he always commands the state that is master of the force, and will make himself an absolute lord upon the lest occasion, if he have any desire, the which never wants in ambitious minds. And if allies and confederates be to be feared in an others country when they are the stronger, what assurance can we have of strange forces, which have no offensive 
Foreign force●… being the stronger, make themselves maister●… over them that call them to their succours.  nor defensive league with us? there is no doubt, but in danger they will be more careful of their own lives than of an other man's, and will attribute unto themselves the profit and honour of the victory, exhausting their treasures, and growing soldiers at their cost whom they serve. How often have we seen the stranger being the stronger, make himself absolute lord over them that called him? We have in our age the example of Cairadin that famous pirate, called in by the inhabitants of Alger, to expel the Spaniards out of their fort; having vanquished them, he slew Selim their king with all his family, and made himself king thereof, leaving the state to Ariadin Barbarousse his brother. And Saladin a Bohemian-tartar being called by the Caliph and the inhabitants of Cairo to expel the Christians out of Soria, after the victory he s●…ew the Caliph; and made himself absolute lord▪ and lest that they of the country should attempt any thing against him, he always employed Tartarians and Circassians (that were slaves) in the war, and for his guard, forbidding all others to bear any arms: and by this means he and his successors enjoyed that kingdom, until that Sultan Selim Emperout of the Turks made himself lord thereof. By the same means the Herules, Goths, and Lombard's become lords of Italy, the French of Gaul, the English Saxons of Britain, the Scottishmen of Scotland, having expelled the Britons and the Picts, who had called them to their succours; and the Turk of the empire of the East and the realm of Hongary, being entreated by the Emperors of Constantinople and the states of Hongary. And the Emperor Charles the fift had reduced Germany into the form of a Province, and made it hereditary by the same fraud that the rest, when as a part of Germany under colour of religion called in the Spaniards and Italians, for having subdued the princes of Saxony, he laboured to subject the rest under the spanish empire, intending to make Philip his son king of Germany, if Henry the second had not freed them with the forces of France, who for this cause was called by the Germans in their printed books the protector of the Empire, and the deliverer of the Princes. The which the princes of Germany having foreseen, did bind the Emperor Charles the fift in the twelft article of his oath, that he should never bring an army of strangers into Germany; but since the emperors death the Electors did swear never to choose a foreign prince Emperor; yet if the States of the country cannot agreed upon a sovereign prince, it is better to have a prince from a far country than a neighbour. And for this cause the Aetolians made Antiochus king of Asia their General for a year, the Tarentines king Pyrrhus, the Polonians Henry Duke of Anjou; Leo king of Armenia one of the children of Andrew king of Hongarie, to give him his daughter and his estate: else it is to be feared that a neighbour prince chosen General but for a year, will make himself perpetual, or if he be perpetual, will grow hereditary, taking from the subjects their right of election: or if the estate be given to one that is a king and to his heirs, it is to be doubted he will make it a tributary province to free his own country from taxes and impositions, which happily was the cause why they did not choose the emperors eldest son king of Polonia, for it is not to be expected that he will ever bear that affection to strangers that he doth unto his own, but will easily▪ abandon an others estate at need, to defend his own. To 
The conclusion of the proposition.  conclude, in my opinion a Commonweal well ordained, of what nature soever, should be fortified upon the approaches and frontiers, in the which forts there should be good garrisons trained up daily to arms, having certain lands appointed for soldiers the which they should enjoy only for their lives, as in old time the fees and feudataries were, and at this day the Timars and Timariot in Turkey, the which are given unto soldiers like unto benefices, upon condition they should be ready with horse and arms whensoever occasion of war required: which lands never go unto their heirs, but are bestowed by the princes free gift upon the most valiant soldiers, with a clause not to alienate them, that soldiers might not rob and steal as now they do with all impunity. And until that these lands in fee may be disposed according to their first institution, it shall be fit to erect some legions of foot and horse according to the estate and greatness of every Commonweal, that they may be bred up in martial discipline from their youth in garrisons upon the frontiers in time of peace, as the ancient Romans did, who knew not what it was to live at discretion, and much less to rob, spoil, and murder, as they do at this day, but their camp was a school of honour, sobriety, chastity, justice, and all other virtues, in the which no man might revenge his own injuries, nor use any violence. And to the end this discipline may be observed, as they do at this day in the Turks army, it is necessary that good Captains and soldiers be recompensed, especially when they grow aged, with some exemptions, privileges, impunities, and rewards, after the manner of the Romans. And although the third part of the revenues be employed about the entertainment of soldiers, it were not too much: for thereby you should be assured of men at need to defend the state, especially if it be envied and environed about with warlike nations, as those people be that are situate in the temperate and fertile regions of France, Italy, Hongarie, Greece, Asia the less, Soria, Egypt, Persia, and the islands lying in the Mediterranean sea: for the nations lying upon the extremities of hot and cold, as the Ethiopians, Numidians, Negroes, 
Those which inhabit in fertile countries, being environed by greedy enemies, have need to be warlike.  Tartars, Goths, Muscovites, Scottishmen, and sweden, have no need of great forts, nor to entertain any legions in time of peace, having no enemies but such as they make themselves; the people of the North being by nature too warlike, all horsemen, or for the most part, and given to arms, without any need to train them up in it, unless it be to discharge the country, or as I have said, for that they cannot be kept in peace. And to the end the state may not be brought in danger by any treacherous and faithless allies, or that strangers suck not the blood of the subjects growing warlike at an others charge, being ready to invade the estate, let all offensive and defensive leagues and alliances be equal, receiving as great succours at need as they shall be bound to give; and yet the succours of the confederate must not be such as they may force or prescribe a law. Moreover, it must not be allowed for all other subjects to carry arms, lest the labourer and handicrafts man should take a delight in thieving and robbing, leaving the plough and shop, having no experience of arms, and when as they are to march against an enemy, they forsake their colours and fly at the first charge, putting a whole army in disorder, especially the handicrafts man, and they that sit always, being 
Handicraftmen unfit for war.  bred up in the shadow, whom all ancient and wise Captains have held unfit for war, whatsoever Sir Thomas Moor saith in his Commonweal. Seeing that we have discoursed of men of war, of forts and of succours that are drawn from them that are in league, let us now speak of the surety of treaties and leagues betwixt Princes and Commonweals.   

CHAP. VI Of the surety of alliances and treaties betwixt Princes and Commonweals, and of the laws of arms.  
THis treaty depends of the former, the which aught not to be omitted, seeing that neither lawyer nor politician hath ever handled it: and yet there is nothing in all affairs of state that doth more trouble Princes and Commonweals, then to assure the treaties which they make one with an other, be it betwixt friends or enemies, with those that be neuter, or with subjects. Some assure themselves upon their simple faith mutually given, others demand hostages, and many require some places of strength: some there are which rest not satisfied if they disarm not the vanquished for their better assurance, but that which hath been held the strongest assurance, is, when it is confirmed by alliance and nearness of blood. And even as there is a difference betwixt friends and enemies, the conquerors and the conquered, those that are equal in power and the weak, the prince and the subject, so in like sort their treaties must be divers, and their assurances divers. But this maxim holds general and undoubted, that in all kinds of treaties there is no greater assurance then that the clauses and conditions inserted in the treaties be fit and sortable for the parties, and agreeing with the subject that is treated of. There was never any thing more true than the advice 
Plantius' Consul, ●…pud 〈◊〉 li. 8  of that Consul which said in open Senate, Neminem populum diutiùs ea conditione esse posse, cuius eum poeniteat, No people can continued long in that estate whereof they are weary. The question was touching the Privernates whom the Romans had vanquished, for that they had broken the league, they demanded of their Ambassador what punishment they had deserved? The pains, answered he, of such as should live in liberty. Than the Consul replied, If we pardon you, shall we be assured of a peace? the Ambassador answered, Si bonam dederitis, & fidam & perpetuam, sin malam haud diuturnam: If you give us a good peace, you shall have it kept faithfully and perpetually; if a bad one, it shall be soon broken. The younger Senators found these answers too proud and haughty, but the wiser sort said▪ That this people which contended only for their liberty deserved to be made citizens of Rome, else they would never be good subjects, nor trusty friends: and according to this advice the decree of the Senate did pass in force of a privilege, and was confirmed by the people; and yet had they yielded themselves to the mercy of the Romans, as all the other cities of the Latins their allies had done, who had conspired against the Romans. The assurance which the ancient Romans took of those whom they would make ubiect after they had vanquished them, was to seize upon all their places of strength, to put in garrisons, to receive hostages, and to disarm the vanquished. Mos autem, inquit Livius, Romanis vetustus erat, cum quo nec foedere nec aequis legibus iungeretur 〈◊〉, non prius Imperio in eum tanquam pacatum uti, quam omnia divina humanaque dedid●…sset, obsides accepti arma adempta, praesidia urbibus imposita forent: It was an ancient custom among the Romans towards those with whom they had not joined in league, nor contracted friendship upon equal ●…earmess; never to govern them peaceably, until they had yielded up all, delivered hostages, disarmed them, and put garrisons into their towns. For we may not think ever to keep that people in subjection which hath always lived 
A free people i●… never kept in subi●…ction, unless they ●…e disarmed.  in liberty, if they be not disarmed. To take away part of their liberty, is to incense them more, than if they were wholly subjecteth: as Lewis the 12 did unto the Genevois, who had put themselves under his protection when they were in danger, which being passed, they revolted, and allied themselves unto his enemies; against whom he went in person, besieged them, and forced them to yield; then he condemned them in two hundred thousand crowns, putting a strong garrison into their fort called the Lantern; yet he suffered them to live after their own laws and with their old magistrates, taking 
A Popular estat●… must either be wholly subjecteth, or set at free liberty.  only from them the stamp of their coin. It had been far better either to have made them good subjects, or to have restored them to their perfect liberty: for king Lewis the 11 to whom they had given themselves, made answer, That he gave them unto the devil▪ refusing to receive a yearly pension for the protection of such dis●…oyall allies, who had revolted from king Charles the 6, having 〈◊〉 them into his protection to defend them against the Venetians. And the Earls of Savoy received those of Berne into their protection, being oppressed by the lords of Bourdorg; but the fear being past, they desired nothing more than to be freed from their protection, the which the Earl willingly granted, choosing rather to have faithful fellows, than faithless allies. But king Francis the first in my opinion committed a greater error, who refused two hundred thousand crowns in his necessity, the which the Genevois offered him to be freed from his protection, giving him to understand that upon the first occasion they would revolt, as they did after the battle of Pavia, and afterwards expelled the garrison which remained in their fort, and razed it to the ground: he should either have ●…ade them faithful and free confederates, being tied together by an equal league; or else have made them subjects, and so have taken from them the government of their estate.  
But some one will say, that it is a breach of faith to infringe the treaties, and to change the protection into a sovereignty. I answer, that it is and always shall be lawful for the Patron to make himself absolute lord, if the client be disloyal. We read that Augustus made those people subject which had abused their liberty. And therefore king Charles the 9 (having discovered the secret practices of the Spaniards with the inhabitants of Thoul, Metz, and Verdun) was enforced somewhat to restrain their liberties, for in all treaties of protection there is an express clause, That those which are in protection shall retain their estate and sovereignty: but there is no great assurance if the Protector holds his client's forts, for that he may make them subject when he pleaseth. Who knows not that the cities of Constance, Vtrech, 
Imperial 〈◊〉 made▪ subject under colour of protection.  Cambray, Vienna in Austria, and many others which have put themselves in the protection of the house of Austria, have now lost their liberties. The kingdom of Hongarie hath run the same fortune: for after the death of king John, the estates of the country sent Ambassadors to the Turk to receive their young king and the realm into his protection, fearing lest Ferdinand should make himself lord thereof, pretending the realm to belong unto him by virtue of certain treaties made betwixt the house of Austria, and the kings of Hongarie; but those treaties had no sure ground, for the realm being elective, the king could not take this prerogative from the people without their consent: and if the house of Austria lying so near and being so famous for their glorious deeds, had made offer of any one of their princes to have been chosen, they had carried it without any difficulty; but the estates had rather make choice of Matthew Coruin for their king, than to loose the right of election: and although that the new king and the estates of the country did ratify the former treaties with the house of Austria, yet were they not kept, for that they seemed to be made by force against all law and reason, wherefore they did choose rather to put themselves under the Turks 
Hungary mad●… subject under shadow of protection.  protection; who soon after made himself absolute lord, knowing well that Ferdinand would carry it, who notwithstanding had some part, but he was forced to agreed with the Turk, paying yearly a good sum of money, which the Emperor terms a Pension, & the Turk a Tribute, vaunting that the Emperor is his Tributary. But there is a great difference betwixt a pensionar and a tributary, for tribute is paid by the subject, or by him who to enjoy his liberty pays that which is promised unto him which hath forced him thereunto. A pension is voluntarily given by him that is in protection, 
The difference betwixt tribute and pension.  or by him that is equal in a treaty of alliance to have peace, and to withhold the pensionar from joining with his enemies, or to have succours when he shall require them; as in the treaties of equal league betwixt the kings of France, and the Cantons of the Swissers, upon that condition that our kings might at their pleasures levy an army 
Why the king of France gave pension unto the Swissers.  of Swissers for the defence of this realm, and should likewise help them against the incursions of their enemies: and for that it was needful to make many levies of Swissers for the guard of this crown: fearing also lest the enemies thereof should draw them from the society of the French, our kings have willingly granted a thousand crowns yearly pension to every Canton, notwithstanding that king Francis the first, three years before the treaty, had gotten of the Swissers at Marignan one of the goodliest victories that ever Prince obtained. And although we have said, That protection rightly was that, when as one takes the defence of an other freely without any reward, for that the mighty are bound to defend the weak against the injuries of their enemies: yet for the assurance of treaties and protections, they use 
The mighty are bound to defend the weak.  to receive a pension from him that puts himself into protection, to the end that the Protector being bond not only by his oath, but also in receiving a pension, should be more ready to secure his adherent a need. This was held by the Ancients, against the honour and majesty of the Empire: but since that, they have confounded honesty with profit, they have begun to make merchandise of protection; whereof Saluian of Marseilles doth greatly complain, saying, That the weak putting themselves in the protection of the mighty, give all they have to be protected. It is well known that they of Luques, Parma, Sienna, and many others, pay great pensions to be protected: And oftentimes a pension is paid to the protector, not so much to warrant him from his enemies, as from the protector himself: as it happened after the battle of Pavia, all the potentates of Italy turned their vows to the Spaniard, and to free themselves from invasion, they put themselves into their protection. Among others the Luquois paid unto the Emperor Charles the fift, ten thousand ducats▪ the Siennese fifteen thousand, and the duke of Ferrare fifteen thousand, the which he paid to the Viceroy of Naples, under colour of lending, without hope of restitution, being in the protection 
It is dishonourable to abandon him you have taken into protection.  of the French. But it is shameful and dishonourable, to take into protection, to receive a pension, and to abandon the client in his great need. Not long since Sigismond Augustus' king of Poland had taken the protection of the inhabitants of Lifland, against the king of Moscovia: but having made a league with the Moscovite, he is not only said to have abandoned his clients, but to have betrayed them unto their enemy. But if he that is in protection as a sovereign, and in subjection as a vassal and subject, demands aid of his protector, he hath double reason to defend him, especially if they attempt any thing against his honour and person: as it happened in the year 1563, in the month of March, when as the Inquisition at Rome sent out a Citation 
By the commandment of pope Pius the fift.  against the queen of Navarre, to appear personally at Rome within six months, and not by any procurator, upon pain of confiscation of all her goods, estates, and seigneuries. King Charles' the ninth took her into his protection, saying, That she was nearly allied unto him in blood, that she was a widow, and tied to the house of France, a vassal and subject unto the king; and that by treaties of pope's, and general counsels she might not be drawn out of the realm for what cause soever: seeing that pope Clement the seventh sent two cardinals into England, to hear king Henry the eight, touching the 〈◊〉 betwixt him and Katherine of Spain. And for that the Citation and threat made unto such a princess, touched his honour and the estates, the king of France did advertise all his neighbour princes and allies, by his ambassadors, giving the pope's legate to understand, That his master should not take it ill, if he did punish those that were the cause of this enterprise: as Lewis the young did in the like case to Thibaud earl of Champagne, who had caused the earl of Vermandois to be censured by the pope: entreating the pope moreover, to revoke his sentences given as well by himself, as by his deputies: else he should not hold it strange if he used the means which had been accustomed in like cases.  
But it falls out often, that those which are received into protection, after the danger is past, make war against their protector: We have many examples, and without further search, in our memory we have seen many princes of Germany cast themselves 
The Duke of Saxony.  into the protection of king Henry the second, to be freed from the captivity and slavery 
The Landgrave of Hesse.  which did threaten them: the king received them into protection, and in stead of 
The marquess of Brandebourg.  taking any pension, he gave them two hundred thousand crowns towards their wars, and levied an army of threescore thousand men at his own charge for the liberty of the empire. And although by the 34 article of the treaty of Protection, it was concluded, That the confederate princes should suffer the king to seize upon the imperial towns, speaking French, yet the emperor was no sooner chased away, & the empire restored to her former beauty, by means of the French, but the chief of the confederates and adherents, forsook the king's protection: and which is more, took arms against their protector. And at an imperial diet, held in the year 1565, it was decreed, To sand an embassage into France, to demand those three imperial towns which are in the protection of France, Thoul, Verdun, and Metz, although that Verdun hath for these hundred and sixty years been in the protection of France, paying thirty pound starling only for a yearly pension. But this imperial decree took no effect, and the king was advertised by letters of the first of December 1559, from a pensioner of his, That the estates of the empire would be well pleased, to have the king hold those towns of the empire, doing homage for them: which showed, that he held not these 
Those which are in protection have need of greater securiti●… than the protector.  towns but upon good and just considerations. And for that the protector cannot be invaded by him that is in protection, being always the weaker: those which put themselves into protection, have need of greater security than the protectors, lest under a colour of patronage they lose their liberties.  
Some one may object, That it is an absurd thing to demand security of the protector, seeing that the client puts himself in his protection: and by an ancient decree of the court of parliament, the vassal demanding security against his lord, was rejected. But the deceit and treachery of man hath so far extended, as the wisest have held it necessary to succour the vassal against the violence of his patron, whom the sovereign prince shall take into his safeguard, if there be just cause: with greater reason the client is to seek all the security that may be from the protector. The first assurance depends 
The assurance of the league of protection.  upon reasonable conditions annexed unto the treaty: the second of the letters of protection, which the protector must deliver unto the clients, to testify, That all the rights of sovereignty and majesty remain absolute unto the client: and this is to be done in Monarchies, at the coming of a new prince: for the protection is dissolved by the death of the client, as well as of the patron: neither is the succession tied unto the protection. And therefore the inhabitants of Mets, after the death of Henry the second, demanded to have new letters of protection from Charles his son: not for that they should be more safe from their enemies, but to show that they were not in subjection, the which is general in all treaties made betwixt princes, and it hath been always observed, to renew leagues and alliances, which else should be dissolved ●…y death. So Perseus king of Macedon, after the death of his father, sent an embassage to the Senate of Rome, to renew the league they had with his father, and to the end he might be called king by the Senat. But when as the Senate offered to renew the same conditions of the league which they had with Philip his father, Perseus refused them, saying, That the treaty made with his father, did nothing concern him: and if they would contract a new league, they must first agreed upon the conditions. So Henry the seventh, king of England having received the duke of Suffolk from the Archduke Philip, father unto 
A league made with the father binds not the son.  the emperor Charles the fift, upon condition, That he should not put him to death, he kept his faith; but he being dead, his son Henry the eight caused his head to be cut off, saying, That he was not tied unto the treaty which his father had made.  
But for that protections are more dangerous for the adherents or clients, than all other treaties, it is needful to have greater security: for often times we see, that for want of security the protection is changed into a signory. And sometimes he thinks himself well assured, that makes the wolf the keeper of his flock. And therefore protections must be limited to a certain time, especially in Popular and Aristocratical estates, which never die. And therefore the inhabitants of Geneva having put themselves in the protection of them of Berne, would not have the protection continued above thirty years, the which did expire in the year 1558, and then the Genevois made an equal league with the Bernois, the which was not without great difficulty, being almost brought into subjection, by the practices of some citizens that were executed. Since the first impression of these books, a Printer of Geneva put them suddenly to the press, making an advertisement in the beginning, wherein he doth control some places: but he deserves to be punished by the signory: First, for that he hath attempted against another man's works, who hath spoken as honourably of Geneva, as of any Commonweal whatsoever. Secondly, for that he hath infringed the ordinances of the signory of Geneva, published the fift of june, 1559: whereby it is expressly defended, To make any invective against such authors as are set forth. For if the author deserved any reproachful words from the Printer, he should not have printed them, and much less set them to sale. But as for his reprehensions all men of judgement have esteemed them as they deserve. And heretofore this good Printer hath been answered, who maintains, That it is lawful for the subject to kill his prince, kindling by this means the fire of sedition and rebellion in all places. And whereas he saith, That Geneva hath not been in the protection of Berne, the author refers himself unto the treaty that was made in the year 1536. But the fault grows, for that they knew not what protection was, which our ancient treaties call Auovoison, and in Latin Aduocatio. The like may be said of Rotuille, and of Mulhouse, which are allied with the Cantons of the Swissers, but it is an alliance of protection. As in like case the abbot and town of Saint Gall, which are also allied, but yet in the protection of Zurich, Lucerne, Swits, and Glaris, as I have seen by the treaties which the abbot of Orbez, (having remained long ambassedour in Switzerland) imparted unto me from the first unto the last: those of Valdaost, were in like danger to them of Geneva, for the Valoisians would have made them subject, under a colour of protection, in the year 1559, if the king of France bade not defended them. And even as the vassal is freed from the fealty and homage which he oweth unto his lord, if he be ill entreated by him, as it was adjudged by the court of parliament, for the lady of Raiz against the duke of Britain: in like sort the client is exempt from the power of the 
The client is freed from the protection, if the protector make any br●…ach.  protector, if he doth infringe and break the laws of protection. But the chiefest caution and assurance, is, when as the protector is not seized of the places of strength, nor hath not any garrisons in his client's towns. There is nothing more true, than what was spoken by Brutus the Tribune of the people, unto the nobility of Rome, That there was one only assurance for the weak against the mighty, which was, That if the mighty would, they could not hurt them: for that ambitious men that have power over another, never want will. And therefore it was wisely provided by the Scots, when as they came into the protection of the English, made in the year 1559, That the queen of England, who took their protection, should give hostages, the which should be changed every six months: and that she should not build any forts in Scotland, but with the consent of the Scottish men. Wherein the Athenians did err, who having put themselves first into the protection of Antipater, then of Cassander, of Ptolomey, and in the end of Demetrius the Besieger, they suffered their protectors to seize upon their forts, and to put in garrisons, who presently made themselves sovereign lords. The which Demosthenes had well and wisely foreseen, when as one commended unto him the mildness and courtesy of Antipater: he answered, We desire no lord and master, how mild and gracious soever: and him did Antipater pursue even into Italy, and slew him. But the Athenians were circumvented by the same fraud as they had done their associates: For the Persians' being expelled out of Greece, all the cities of Greece made an equal league, for the defence of their estates and liberties, concluding, That they should have one common treasury in Apollo's temple, whither all the associates should yearly bring their money, that an account might be given of the receipts and expenses by a common consent. Every city sent ambassadors for the swearing of their league: Aristides surnamed the Just, came for the Athenians, who after solemn sacrifice, did cast pieces of burning iron into the sea, calling heaven and earth, and all their gods, to witness, and saying, As this fire is quenched in the water, so let them suddenly perish, that shall break their faith. But the Athenians seeing the 
The league broken by the ●…raud of the Athenians  common treasure great, fortified their city ports, & passages therewith, and made provision of navy, ships, & galleys well armed. And then finding themselves the stronger, they changed the equal league into protection, & protection into subjection. So as the 
The cities of Greece subjecteth under colour of alliance.  appellations of all the confederate cities came unto Athens; as we read in Xenophon, & all charges and impositions were taxed by the Athenians, who had freed themselves from all imposts: the which chanced for that the Athenians trained their subjects up in arms, at their confederates costs. And so did the Lacedæmonians to all their confederates, whom under colour of an equal league, they imperiously forced to obey: for that for the most part they were all mechanike people. And contrariwise in Lacedaemon there was not any Spartan that was an Artisan, being against Lycurgus his laws: so as the city of Sparta was far more mighty, and held in a manner all their other allies in subjection; as we read in Plutarch. We see that the Latins fell almost into the like difficulty, after that they had made an equal league with the Romans, against whom they took arms: for that the Romans commanded them imperiously as their subjects: whereof Setin captain of the Latins complained, saying, Sub umbra foederis aequi servitutem patimur, We are (saith he) slaves unto the Romans, under colour of an equal league. And a little after, Consilia populorum Latinorum habita, responsumque non ambiguum imperantibus milites Romanis datum, absisterent imperare ijs, quorum auxilio egerent: Latino's pro sua libertate potius quam pro alieno imperio arma laturos, The Latins having held a council, and given a plain answer to the Romans which commanded the soldiers, they wished them to forbear to command them whose aid they needed: the Latins would rather take arms for their own liberties, than for another's rule and empire. We read, that Licortas captain general of the Acheans, used the like complaints to Appius the Consul, after that the Acheans had treated an equal league with the Romans, Foedus Romanorum cum Acheis specie quidem aequum esse: re precariam libertatem, ●…pud Romanos etiam imperium esse, The league which the Romans have with the Acheans, in show it is equal, but in effect it is an entreated liberty, and with the Romans it is empery or absolute command. For the same cause the Samnites made war against the Romans, renouncing their league: for that under a colour of society, they would command absolutely over them. And for the same reason the cities of Italy allied unto the Romans by an equal league, revolted from their alliance for that the Romans drew from them an infinite succour of men and money, so that in 
The cause of the social war.  all their wars they had two of their allies for one Roman, and by that means conquered the greatest empire that ever was, and yet their associates had no part of the conquest, but some pillage, after that the Romans had taken what they pleased: which 
〈◊〉. 56.  was the cause of the confederates war in Italy, the which had no end, until that the allies were made citizens of Rome, to have part of honours and offices. And yet what equal league soever the Romans made, they were still the stronger, & held their allies as it were in subjection. How imperiously the Romans behaved themselves towards their confederates, the speech of the Consul Appius unto the General of the Acheans, contending for the liberty of the Lacedæmonians, is a sufficient testimony, saying, Dum liceret voluntate sua facere gratiam inirent, ne mox inviti & coacti facerent, Whilst they might do it of their own free will, they should deserve thanks; else they should be soon forced thereunto against their wills. And in the treaty made with the Aetolians (to whom they would not grant any peace, unless they submitted themselves wholly unto their mercy) there are these words, Imperium maiestatemque populi Romanor●…m gens Aetolorum conseruato sine dolo malo; hosts eosdem habeto quos populus Romanus, armaque in eos ferto: & bellum pariter gerito, obsides arbitrio Consulis 40, & talenta 〈◊〉 dato, You Aetolians shall maintain the empire and majesty of the people o●… Rome, without any fraud or guile, their enemies shall be yours, you shall carry arms, and make war against them with the people of Rome: you shall give forty hostages at the Consul's discretion, and fifty talents. They left them the free government of the state, but with such conditions, as they were little better than subjects; having unfurnished them of men and money, and taken the best amongst them for hostages. These words of the league, Maiestatem Romanorum conseruato, Maintain the majesty of the Romans; shows, that the league betwixt the Romans and the Aetolians was unequal, and that the one did respect the majesty of the other with all honour. And although the Romans gave laws unto the Aetolians, yet they did enjoy their estate and sovereignty: as they did in all Greece, which they freed from the power of the kings of Macedon. And after that they had vanquished and taken Perseus' king of Macedon, they freed all the people, and discharged them of the moiety of their imposts, suffering them to govern their own estates: and for their better assurance, they commanded upon pain of death, That all Governors, Captains, Lieutenants, Precedents, councillors of state, Gentlemen in ordinary, and even the king's Pages and Footmen (qui servire regibus humiliter alijs superb imperare consueverunt, Which had been accustomed to serve their kings humbly, and to command others imperiously) to departed out of Macedon, and to pass into Italy. And not content therewith, they divided Macedon into four provinces, forbidding upon pain of death, That the one should have no access, communication, traffic, commerce, nor alliance of marriage, with another: and moreover, that the moiety of those charges which were paid to the king, should be carried yearly into the treasury of Rome. And so the people of Macedon 
Macedon made tributary to the Romans.  received a law from the victor, and remained tributaries, yet they enjoyed the government of their estates. The Consul Mummius used the like policy, having subjecteth the estate of Achaia, he razed Corinth, and abolished the societies & commonalties of Greece; yet he suffered the free people to enjoy their laws and magistrates, easing them of part of their tributes: the which was a subtle means to draw unto the amity of the Romans all the people which had been held in slavish subjection, and to make tyrants to tremble, or at the lest to force sovereign kings and princes to govern their subjects justly, seeing that the prize and reward of the Romans victory, was the liberty 
The 〈◊〉 of the Romans victories  of people, and ruin of tyrants. Whereby they reaped the greatest honour that men might in this world, To be just and wise.  
It is also a double wrong which the lord receives from his subject, having put himself in the protection of another, and from him that hath received him, if he hold not of him by fealty and homage, or hath some living in the protector's country. And for that Charles of Lorraine bishop of Metz, put himself into the protection of the empire, and obtained a safeguard for him and his, of all that which he held in the country of Messin, in the year 1565, the king of France his lieutenant opposed himself to the publication of this safeguard: whereby he (having recourse unto the empire) brought in question his obedience due unto his prince, the protection of Metz, & his kings right. And yet many princes receive all that seek it, without discretion, the which is the cause of many inconveniences, if the protection be not just. It is a dangerous thing to undertake the protection of another prince, but it is more dangerous to undergo it without a just cause, being the chief subject of all wars, & the ruin of cities and kingdoms, when as subjects fall from the obedience of their natural prince, to obey another. And generally all treaties of alliance made with a prince or warlike people, draw after them a subjection and necessity to take arms always for his succour, and to run the same fortune: as the Romans confederates, who by their treaties were bound to furnish men and money for their succours, and all the profit and honour of the conquests came unto the Romans. They make no such treaties at this day, yet the victor prescribes a law unto the vanquished. And therefore many have been of opinion, That it was expedient 
neutrality is sometimes profitable.  for a prince to be a Neuter, and not to meddle with any other princes wars: the chief reason is, That the loss is common, but the fruit of the victory is his only whose quarrel they maintain; beside, he must declare himself an enemy to those princes which have not wronged him: but he that shall stand indifferent, is oftentimes a means to reconcile enemies: and maintaining himself in the love of them all, he shall reap thanks and honour of every side. And if all princes be in league one against another, who shall mediate a peace? Moreover it seems there is no better means to maintain the greatness of an estate, than to see the neighbour princes ruin one another. For the greatness of a prince (to speak properly) is nothing else but the ruin & fall of his neighbours: 
How a prince maintains his greatness.  & his strength is no other thing, but the weakness of another. And therefore Flaminius said unto the Consul Attilius, intending to ruin the city of the Aetolians, That it was not so expedient to weaken the Aetolians, as to oppose against the greatness of young Philip king of Macedon. These reasons may help them that defend neutrality: but it seems they are subject to greater inconveniences. First in matter of state it is a maxim, That he must either be the stronger, or of the stronger faction (and this rule doth not admit many exceptions, be it in the self same Commonweal, or among 
neutrality is many times dangerous.  sundry princes) else he must always remain a prey at the victor's discretion: as the Roman ambassador said unto the Acheans, whom Antiochus king of Persia persuaded, That they would remain neuters betwixt him and the Romans. And it seems, that whosoever will maintain himself, must of necessity be a friend or an enemy. Whereof we have an example in jews the eleventh, king of France, against whom they made war of all sides, so long as he continued a neuter: but after that he had allied the Swissers more strictly among themselves, & the city of Strausbourg with them, and that he had entered into that league, never any enemies durst assault him, (as Philip de Commines saith:) for neutrality, Neque amicos parrot, neque inimicos tollit, It neither 
Livius lib. 5.  purchaseth friends, nor takes away enemies: as an ancient captain of the Samnites said. And the like conclusion was made among the estates of the Aetolians, by Aristemus their General, saying, Romanos aut socios habere oportet, aut hosts, media via nulla est, We must have the Romans either confederates or enemies, there is no mean. We 
neutrality is oftentimes the ruin of princes.  have infinite examples in all histories: Ferdinand king of Arragon found no better means to pull the kingdom of Navarre from Peter of Albret, than in persuading him to be a neuter betwixt him and the king of France, that he might be abandoned at need. And the inhabitants of jabes remaining neuters, and not engaging themselves in the war which the people of Israel made against the tribe of Benjamin, they were all slain, and their towns razed. As also the Thebans fell into great danger, being neuters, when as king Xerxes came into Greece. As in the like case the town of Lays in Soria, was surprised, spoiled, sacked, and burnt, by a small troop of the tribe of Dan: for that (as the history saith) they were not in league with any sovereign prince 
jud. c. 18.  or state. And without any further search, the Florentines after they had left the alliance of the house of France, refusing to enter into league with the pope, the emperor, the king of England, and the king of Spain, against the king of France, they soon felt the first-fruits of their neutrality.  
But it were an unjust thing, will some one say, to join in league against France, with whom they had been so strictly conjoined: I confess it, so should they not have left it at need as they did; for the league is not only broken if thou be'st an enemy to my associates, or if thou joinest with my enemies, but also if for fear thou dost abandon thy associates, being bound by the league to secure them; as a Roman Ambassador said, Sisocios meos pro hostibus habeas, aut cum hostibus te coniungas, If thou takest my associates for thine enemies, or joinest with mine enemies. Yet some may say, that neutrality may well be granted with the consent of other princes, which seemeth to be the best support without any fear of the victors. The estates of Lorraine, Bourgongue and Savoy have maintained themselves in a free peace, so long as they had an alliance of tranquility, but after that the Duke of Savoy had once united himself to the Spanish faction, he was expelled his country by the french. But there is a great difference to be a neuter without the friendship either of the one or the other, and a neuter allied 
The difference of neutralities.  to both parties, and these are far more assured, than if they were enemies to both factions: for they are free from the victor's invasion, and if there be any treaty of peace betwixt both parties, they are comprehended of either side. And if neutrality be commendable in that manner, as I have said, it is far more commendable in a Prince that doth exceed all others in power and dignity, that he may have the honour to be the umper and moderator; as it happens always, that quarrels betwixt Princes are decided by friends that stand indifferent, and especially by those which exceed the rest in power and greatness, as heretofore many Popes which knew well how to maintain their rank, and reconcile Christian Princes, have reaped honour, thanks, and assurance 
In what case one should be neuter  for their persons and estates, and those which have followed either the one or the other party, have drawn after them the ruin of other Princes. It was thought very strange in Spain that Pope Alexander the 6 a natural Spaniard, should enter into league with Lewis the 12, king of France against the Spaniards; and when as the Spaniards had the better in Italy, he told the french Ambassador that he would remain a neuter, and be a common father to both parties, but it was too late now to make a show to quench that fire which he himself had kindled. As in the like case the Duke of Alva Viceroy of Naples being advertised of a request made by the Procurator of the chamber of Rome against the Emperor, touching the confiscation and reunion of the realm of Naples to the revenues of S. Peter, he did writ unto Pope Theatin, who had entered into league with the house of France, that he should remain as neuter for the dignity which he had above all other Christian Princes, but the truce being broken, the armies in field, and their ensigns displayed, the end was miserable, for the Pope renounced the league, leaving the french in their greatest need, and it was concluded by a treaty which he made with the Spaniard that he should continued neuter. Never was the hatred of any Prince so pernicious unto his enemy, as the favour of Theatin was then unto the french, without the which they had not been reduced to such extremity, as in one day to loose all they had conquered in thirty years. It is more strange, for that the memory is more fresh of the like errors committed by pope Clement the 7, favouring one of these princes against the advice of Lewis Canosa his Ambassador, who advertised him by letters written out of France, that the greatness and surety of his estate was to show himself a neuter: so soon after he see himself prisoner to the imperials and the city of Rome sacked after a strange manner, and both himself and his Cardinals ransomed at the victor's discretion. I enter not into the worthiness of the fact, neither is it in question to know who deserved most favour, but only, that he which alone may be judge and moderator of honour, should never make himself a party, although he were assured that he should incur no danger, much more when his estate is in question, and that he can have no security but hazard by the victory. There are others who to win favour of all sides forbids their subjects by public proclamations to give aid or secure to the enemies of their associates, and yet underhand they suffer them to pass, yea sometimes they sand them, so did the Aetolians, saith Titus Livius, Qui iwentutem adversus suos socios, publica tantum auctoritate dempta, militare sinunt, & contrariae saepè acies in utraque part Aetolica auxilia habent, Which suffer there your young men underhand to go to war against their own confederates, 
Allies are someimes dangerous.  and oftentimes troops of Aetolians are seen in either army. Such allies are more dangerous than enemies. But it may be some one will say that it is dangerous to suffer a Prince so to increase in power as he may give law unto the rest, and invade their estates when he pleaseth. It is true, and there is no greater occasion than that, to induce a neuter to seek by all means to hinder him; for the surety of Princes and Commonweals consists in the equal counterpeeze of power. So when as the Romans made war against king Perseus, some favoured the king, others supported the Romans, Tertia pars (said Titus Livius) optima eadem & prudentissima, si utique optio domini potioris daretur, sub Romanis quàm sub Rege esse mallebat: si liberum inde arbitrium neutram partem vole bat altera oppressa fieri potentiorem: it a inter utrosque conditionem civitatum optimam fore, protegente semper altero inopem ab alterius iniuria, & illihatis utriusque partis viribus parem esse: A third part, saith Titus Livius being the best and the wisest, if they were to make choice of their lord, had rather subject themselves unto the Romans than under the king, but if they might have their free will, they would have neither of them superior, with the ruin of the other, so as betwixt both the cities should be secure, the one always protecting the weak from the injuries of the other, and they both should remain equal, their forces being not impaired: So as the wisest have held opinion, that there was nothing better for the surety of estates, then to have the power of great Princes as equal as might be; yet those which were of this opinion, when as the Romans and Macedonians were in war, remained neuters, although they were tied to the power of the Romans, and to the king of Macedon, and it succeeded well for them: for there is a difference in wishing the parties to be equal, and in making himself a partisan. It is therefore commendable for the greatest 
It is honourable for great princes to be neuters.  and mightiest Princes to remain neuters, although it be not so concluded betwixt other Princes, as I have said before. And this is necessary for the common good of all Princes and States, which cannot be reconciled but by their common allies, or by them that are neuters. But those that be neuters do many times kindle the fire in stead of quenching it; the which may be excusable, if the preservation of their estate depends upon the war which they entertain betwixt others; but it can hardly be concealed, and the matter once discovered, the parties most commonly agreed to fall upon their common enemy, as it happened to the Venetians, who were always wont to sow division among their neighbours, and to fish in a troubled water. Lewis the twelfth discovering it, he allied himself with all the other Princes, and then they all jointly made a 
A general league against the Venetians.  league against the Venetians, who were reduced to that extremity, as they yielded cream, Bresse, Bergame, Cremona, and Guiradadde, being members of the Duchy of Milan, unto the french king, and to the Pope Favence, Rimini, Ravenne, and Ceruie, being of the patrimony of S. Peter: to the Empire Padova, Vincentia, and Verona: to the Emperor the places of Friuli and Trevisan, being the inheritance of the house of Austria: to Ferdinand the ports and places engaged by the kings of Naples to the signory of Venice, and to call home their magistrates from the imperial towns, and out of all the country which they held upon the firm land. Whereas before the war the Pope would have been contented with some one place, but this took not effect, for dominic Treviran Procurator of S. Mark stayed the Senate, saying, That the Venetians were always accustomed to take towns and castles, but having once taken them, it were absurd to restore them. It is therefore more safe for him that remains a neuter to meditate a peace, than to nourish war, and in so doing to purchase 
It is most safe for a neuter to mediate peace.  honour and the love of others with the assurance of his own estate, as the Athenians procured a peace betwixt the Rhodians and Demetrius the besieger, to the great content of both parties, who were tired with war, and yet were loath to demand a peace one of another: by which means the Athenians did reap great honour and profit to their estate. The which is so much the more necessary, if he which is a neuter be allied to them that are in war, and hath occasion to draw succours from his allies: as our kings have always done betwixt the Catholic and Protestant Swissers, and betwixt the Grisons and the Swissers, as well for the laws of friendship, as fearing that in the mean time he should want the aid of his confederates. And sometimes those which are wearied with the war, stir up a third party being a neuter, for the desire they have of peace, and the shame they have to seek it: as the Florentines not able to subdue the Pisans, by reason of the Venetian succours, who desired nothing more than to retire themselves, they did procure the duke of Ferrare underhand to mediate an agreement. It is the greatest point of honour that a Prince can attain unto, to be chosen judge and umpire of other prince's quarrels, as in old time the Romans were, for 
It is honourable for a prince to be an umpire in other prince's quarrels.  the great opinion which was held of their virtue & integrity: & since, this prerogative hath been given unto the Popes among other Christian Princes, who oftentimes have been chosen judges and arbitrators of all their controversies: as in the treaties betwixt king Charles the 5, and Charles' king of Navarre, made in the year 1365; and betwixt Philip Augustus and Richard king of England: If the Pope were not a party, as Innocent the 4 was against the Emperor Frederick the 2, than the Emperor made choice of the Parliament of Paris for arbitrator, which was the Senate of Peers and Princes, and the Council of France. And Pope Clement the 7 making a league with the kings of France and England against the Emperor in the year 1528, he caused it to be inserted in the treaty, That if it were needful to conclude a peace with the Emperor, he should have the honour to be arbitrator. Paul the 3 did the like betwixt the king of France and the Emperor in the treaties of Marseilles and Soisson. One of the most necessary things for the assurance of treaties of peace and alliance, is to name some great and mightier Prince to be judge and umpire in case of contravention, that they may have recourse unto him to meditate an agreement betwixt them; who being equal, cannot with their honours refuse war, nor demand peace. But to the end that other Princes be not driven to that exigent, it shall be necessary for them all to join together in league, to keep down the power of any one that might bring the weaker into subjection: or else if they be in league, to sand Ambassadors to meditate a peace before the victory, as the Athenians, the Rhodians, the king of Egypt, and the signory of Chio did, betwixt Philip the young, king of Macedon, and the Aetolians, fearing the greatness of the king of Macedon, as we read in Titus Livius. And for this cause after the taking of king Francis the first before Pavia, the Pope, the Venetians, the Florentines, the Duke of Ferrare, and other Potentates of Italy, made a league with the 
Why many princes made a league against the emperor after the battle of Pavia.  king of England for the delivery of the king of France: not for that the afflicted fortune of the French did move them unto pity (as it is usual to kings, to whom the name of majesty seems holy) but for fear of the imperial Eagle, which having covered a great part of Europe with her wings, might gripe and tear in sunder those petty princes with her talents: and yet they themselves had not many years before joined in league with the Emperor against king Francis after the battle of Marignan, and restored Francis Sforce to the Duchy of Milan; having found by experience how dangerous 
It is dangerous to be neighbour to a mighty prince.  the neighbourhood of a mighty Prince was, for if he be just and upright, his successor will not resemble him, for which cause Methridates king of Pontus seeing the Roman empire to reach up to heaven, he entered into league with the kings of Parthia, Armenia, and Egypt, and with many cities of Greece against the Romans, who had seized upon the greatest part of Europe under colour of justice, causing in one day forty five thousand Roman citizens to be slain throughout all Asia, by a secret conspiracy, but it was then too late to make a league against a power which was invincible. And therefore at this day if great Princes conclude a peace, all others seek to be comprehended therein, as well to assure their estates, as to hold those great princes in an equal counterpeize, lest that the one by his greatness oppress the rest: as in the treaty of peace made at Cambray in the year 1559, all estates and Christian Princes were comprehended by the king of France, or the Catholic king, or by them both together, and any others that the two kings should name within six months. But they must be named particularly, and not in general terms by the names of allies or 
〈◊〉 treaties the parties comprehended must be expressly named.  neuters, for if there be not a special expression, they may justly pretend ignorance; for that affairs of state are sometimes managed so secretly and so suddenly, as a league is made before the enterprise can be discovered, notwithstanding all the diligence of Ambassadors to learn out the conditions of the treaty: as it happened in the treaty of Cambray made in October 1508, whereas the Pope, the Emperor, the Empire, the king of France, the king of Arragon and Naples, the king of Castill, the Dukes of Lorraine, Ferrare, and Mantove, entered into league against the signory of Venice, the which was concluded before the Venetians had any notice thereof, although they had ambassadors in a manner with all these Princes: and without doubt if they had had any intelligence thereof, they might easily have prevented it, seeing that after the conclusion thereof, and the war begun, they found means to withdraw the Pope, and to make him a mortal enemy to the French, which was the only means to preserve their estate from inevitable ruin. The like happened unto the protestant Princes, against whom the treaty of Soisson was made in September in the year 1544, betwixt the king of France and the Emperor, where by the first article it was agreed, that the two princes should join their forces together to make war against them, the which they could never believe, until they had seen the preparations made against them. They might easily have prevented the storm which fell upon them: for that the Emperor had no great desire to make war against them, and the king less, who did secretly favour them; so as in giving the Emperor some succours, or sending an ambassador unto him, they had been comprehended in the treaty, for they had no enemy but the Pope, who was then a neuter betwixt the Emperor and the King. Sometimes the league is so strong, and the hatred so great, as it is a hard matter to hinder 
A league against France.  it, and much more to break it, being concluded. King Francis the first was well advertised of the league made betwixt the Pope, the Emperor, the king of England, the Venetians, the Dukes of Milan and Mantove, the Commonweals of Genes, Florence, Luques, and Sienna, all confederates against his estate; yet could he not prevent it, but in quitting the duchy of Milan. Those which had concluded a peace and perpetual amity with him, and those which were tied unto him by a defensive league, broke their faith, and made open war against him: the which was not held strange, for many make no esteem of the breach of faith in matter of treaties betwixt princes, especially if they may reap any profit thereby: yea some are so treacherous, as they swear most when as they intent most fraud, as Lisander was wont to say, That men must be circumvented and deceived with oaths, and children with toys; but he felt 
Plu●…. i●… Lisand.  the grievous punishment of his disloyalty. Doubtless, perjury is more detestable than atheism, for that the atheist who believes there is no God, is not so wicked and impious, as he that knows there is a God which hath a care of human things, yet under colour of a false and sergeant oath, is not ashamed to scorn and abuse his deity: so as we may rightly say, That treachery is always joined with impiety and baseness of mind; for he that willingly forswears himself to deceive another, shows plainly that he scorns God, and fears his enemy. It were better never to call the immortal God, or him they hold to be a God, to be a witness of their fraud, but only themselves; as Richard Earl of Poitiers son to the king of England did, who giving a confirmation of the privileges of Rochel, used these words, Teste meipso, Myself being witness. Seeing then that faith is the only foundation and support of justice whereon not only Commonweals, but all humane society is grounded, it must remain sacred and inviolable in those things which are not unjust, especially betwixt princes: for seeing they are the warrants of faith and oaths, what remedy shall the subjects have against their power for the oaths which they take among 
Faith betwixt allies must be kept.  themselves, if they be the first which break and violate their faith. I speak of just things, for it is a double impiety to swear to do a wicked act, and in this case he that breaks his oath is no treacher, but deserves reward. And in like case, if the Prince hath promised not to do a thing which is allowable by the law of nature and just, he is not perjured although he make breach thereof; neither are private men tied by their 
It is no disloyalty to break an unlawful oath.  oath, if they have promised to do more than is allowable by the Civil law. Those things which are by nature unjust and unlawful no man may promise', neither may any man urge them if they be promised. But wise Princes aught not to swear any thing unto other Princes that is not allowable by the law of nature and nations, not force any Prince that is weaker than themselves to swear to unreasonable conditions. And to take away all ambiguity of words, it shall be needful to show what is unjust, else he that is bound will take the word just in general to make use of it in some special case, as in the treaty made in the month of May, in the year 1412, betwixt Henry king of England and his children on the one part, and the Dukes of Berry, Orleans, and Bourbon, the Earls of Alancon and Armaignac, and the lord of Albret on the other part, who swore to serve the king of England with their bodies and goods in all his just quarrels when they should be required. There was no express reservation of their sovereign, against whom the king of England meant to employ them by virtue of this contract, the which he could not do. There is never any just cause to take arms against one's prince or country, as an ancient orator said, yet are not those princes free from the note of treachery, which infringe their faith in matters which they have sworn to their prejudice, being forced thereunto by the victor as some Doctors have maintained, being as ill informed of the estate of Commonweals, as of ancient histories, and of the ground of true justice, discoursing of treaties made betwixt princes, as of contracts and conventions among private men, the which is an opinion of most dangerous consequence, which error hath taken such root within these two or three hundred years, as there is no league (how firm soever) made betwixt princes, but it is broken, so as this opinion goes now for a grounded maxim, that the prince which is 
A dangerous opinion in treaties.  forced to make a league or peace to his hurt and prejudice, may go from it when occasion is offered. But it is strange that neither the first lawgivers and lawyers, nor the Romans who were the patrons of justice, did never think of this shift and evasion. For it is manifest, that most treaties of peace are made by force, either for fear of the victor, or of him that is the stronger; and what fear is more just than of the loss of life? yet never any prince or lawgiver did refuse to perform that which he had promised unto the victor, as if it had been forced. Quae enim viro forti, inquit Tullius, vis potest 
A resolute man cannot be forced  adhiberi? What force can be used▪ saith▪ Tully, to a valiant and resolute man? It appeared in the Consul Marcus Attilius Reg●…lus, who being taken prisoner by the Carthaginians and sent to Rome upon his word, swearing that he would return unless he could procure some noblemen that were captains to be set at liberty, from the which he dissuaded the Senate, yet did he not refuse to return, although it were to an assured death, nor yet the Consul Mancinus to the Spaniards, when as he could not persuade the Senate to the conditions of peace. What graver schoolmasters of the laws of arms, what better interpreters of the Roman laws can we desire, than the Roman Consuls? they went willingly unto torments rather than they would treacherously break their faith. The Consul Posthumius and his companion with six hundred Captains, Lieutenants and Gentlemen of the Roman army, being surprised by the enemy in the straits of the Apennine hills, whereas they could neither advance, retire, nor yet fight; being set at liberty upon their words, and having disputed of the law of nations in open Senate, and before all the people, touching accords and treaties made in war; they did never pretend force nor fear, but it was only said, that they could not treat of any conditions of peace with the enemy, without an especial charge and commission from the people of Rome: whereupon the Consuls which had sworn the peace, and those which had given themselves as hostages for the whole army, yielded themselves willingly to the enemy, to dispose of their lives at their pleasure, and so they were delivered unto them by the Heralds.  
In the treaty of Madrill, made the 14 of February 1526, it was said, That king Francis 
The treaty of Madril.  the first being come unto the first town of his realm, he should ratify the articles which he had sworn in prison, and 'cause them to be ratified by the Dauphin of France when as he came to age: and by the last article it was agreed, That if the king would not observe the peace which he had sworn, he should return prisoner into Spain, giving his two sons Francis and Henry for hostages. Being at liberty, all Princes offered themselves, and joined with him in league against the Emperor Charles the fift, to pull down his power whom they had raised up to heaven. The king having assembled all his princes and noblemen in his court of Parliament to resolve what was to be done touching the treaty of Madrill: Selua the first precedent, seeking to prove that the king was not tied unto the treaty, he grounded himself upon the authority of Cardinal Zabarella, who held, That whatsoever was done by force or fear, was not to be ratified; confirming it by the example of John king of Cypress, who being taken prisoner by the Genevois, gave his son for hostage, and yet kept not his promise. I wonder the Precedent of so great a Senate did not blush not only to 
Treaties made by a prisoner may not be broken.  commend a man that was ignorant of the laws of arms, but also to arm himself with such foolish arguments, yet this was the chiefest ground of the breach of the treaty of Madrill, adding thereunto, that the king could not give away or renounce the sovereignty of the Lowcountries, nor the duchy of Burgongne, without the express consent of the estates. This indeed was sufficient to break the treaty, the rest were impertinent. But all these objections were never brought in question by the ancients, they never required, That a prince being set at liberty out of his enemy's power, should ratify that which he had sworn being a prisoner: a ridiculous thing, that were to call the treaty in question, and leave it to the discretion of him that was a prisoner, whether he shall observe that which he hath sworn or not. Moreover the ancients never regarded 
An oath is needless where hostages are taken.  the breach of treaties, when as they took hostages: for that he is not tied to any laws of the treaty, nor to any other, neither is he forced to swear; for hostages are given to be pledge for him that is captive, and to suffer, if he shall make a breach of the conditions agreed upon. And were not he simple, that having a good pledge, should complain of his debtor, that he hath broke promise with him: therefore the Consul Posthumius maintained before the people, That there was no contravention in the treaty made betwixt him and the Samnites, seeing it was no treaty of peace, or league, but a simple promise, the which did bind them only which had consented thereunto, Quid enim (inquit ille) obsidebus aut sponsoribus in foedere opu●… esset, sipraecatione res transigitur? Nomina Consulum Legatorum, Tribunorum militum extant: si ex foedere res acta esset, preterquam duorum foecialium non extarent, What need (saith he) should there be of hostages and sureties in a league or peace, if it be concluded by entreaty? the names of the Consuls, Lieutenants, and Tribunes, which undertook it, are extant: if it be ended by a league, there should be no names joined unto it, but of the two heralds. Whereby it appears, that king Francis the first, and the king of Cypress, who left their children for hostages, were absolved of their promises by their enemies themselves, for that they had pledges, and did not trust in their prisoner's oath. And by the law of arms a prisoner which hath his liberty given him upon his word, is bound to return to prison again. And by a proclamation made by the Senate of Rome, all prisoners were enjoined upon pain of death (the which were very many, being let go upon their words by king Pyrrhus, to go visit their friends) should return at a certain day, but no man gave any hostage. And if the prisoner be held in bonds, he may escape, neither 
A prisoner taken in the war, being kept, may escape without 〈◊〉.  is he bound to him that took him: as king Francis the first said unto Granuella the emperors ambassador. For as a Roman Consul was wont to say, Vult quisque sibi credi, & habita fides ipsam obligat fidem, Every man desires to be believed, & a trust reposed, binds the faith itself.  
If any one say unto me, That the king had sworn to return, if the treaty took not effect: and that king john returned prisoner into England, for that he could not accomplish the conditions of the treaty, by which he had given a great part of the realm to the English, and promised three millions of crowns: I answer, that there was no fault in the king, for the estates opposed against the alienation of the revenues of the crown: and as for his return, neither he nor king john were tied unto it, seeing they had taken their children for hostages. And therefore king Francis seeing that the emperor would not remit the unjust conditions of the treaty, with the council and consent of his princes and subjects he proclaimed a new war against him: wherewith the emperor being moved, said, That the king had carried himself basely; and that he had broken his oath, and that he would willingly hazard his life with him in single combat, to make an end of so great a war. The king being advertised by his ambassador, That the emperor had touched his honour and reputation; he caused all the princes to assemble in his court of parliament; and after that he had called Perrenot Granuelle ambassador for Spain, he said unto him, That Charles of Austria (having 
The French king defies the emperor.  said unto the herald of France, That the king had broken his faith) had spoken falsely, and that as often as he should say so, he did lie: and that he should appoint a time and place for the combat, where he would meet him. The king of England finding in like 
The king of England defies him.  sort that he was touched, used the like challenge, and with the like solemnities. It was done like generous princes, to let all the world understand, that there is nothing more foul and impious than the breach of faith, especially in princes. Neither was there ever prince so disloyal, that would maintain it to be lawful to break their faith. But some have pretended that they have been circumvented in their treaties, by the fraud of their enemies: others, that they have erred in fact, or have been seduced by evil council: or that things were so changed, as the wisest could not have foreseen them: or that it should be impossible to observe the treaties without the inevitable loss, or apparent danger of the whole state. In which cases they would pretend, That an oath doth not bind, the condition or the cause of the oath being impossible or unjust. Some there be which maintain, That the pope may dispense not only with the oath of other princes, but also of himself: but they have been confuted by other Canonists. So pope julio the second finding no means to break his faith with king Lewis the twelft, that he might fly from the treaty of Cambray, he did not say, that he was not tied to his oath, but he took occasion to advance a factor in Rome to the bishopric of Arles in Provence, without the privity of the king or his ambassador, which did reside at Rome: where with the king being incensed (as the case deserved) he caused all the first-fruits which the beneficers of Rome had in France, to be seized on: then the pope having found what he sought for, declared himself an open enemy unto the king. So Gui●…chardin writes, That pope julio was wont to brag, That all the treaties which he made with the French, Spaniards, and Germane (all which he called barbarous) was but to abuse them, and to ruin one by another, that he might expel them all out of Italy. There are others which curse and condemn traitors, yet they love the treason, and hold the first-fruits thereof sweet: as it is ●…itten of Philip king of Macedon: and the Lacedæmonians condemned Phebidas their captain, for that contrary to the tenor of the treaty made with the Thebans, he had seized upon their castle called Cadmee, & yet they kept the place still, as Plutarch writes. Some which can found no just cause nor 
Plu. in Epawi●…da.  colourable to falsify their faith, and have any respect to their honour, they ask advise and council of lawyers: as the marquess of Pesquiere, who aspiring to make himself king of Naples, caused many consultations to be made under hand, to know if he which were vassal to the king of Naples, might (with his faith and honour saved) obey the pope, who was sovereign lord of the realm of Naples, rather than the king, who was but a feudatory: having two strings to his bow, for he made his account, that if the war were attempted by the duke of Milan with the pope's consent, against Charles the fift, should succeed well, he should then be king of Naples: but if he should fail, than would he beg the duchy of Milan, as a reward for his service, the duke being convicted of rebellion. But this conspiracy being discovered, he caused Maron the duke's chancellor to be apprehended and put into the castle, and making of his process, he suffered him to escape, fearing he should speak too plainly, if he were ill entreated: and soon after he died of thought, knowing well that his treachery and disloyalty was discovered, and inexcusable, seeing that he betrayed both the emperor and the duke, and all those of the league by the same means: the which is the most detestable treachery of all others. Yet do I not blame him, that to assure himself hath two strings to his bow, so as it be done with a respect to his faith and honour: as it is reported of Themistocles, who secretly advertised the king of Persia, That unless he departed suddenly out of Europe, the Greeks' had resolved to break the bridge which he had made upon the sea Hellespont, to pass his army out of Asia into Europe: desiring him to keep it secret. This he did to assure himself of the favour of the king of Persia, if he did vanquish; or to have the honour to have expelled him out of Greece, if he marched away, as he did. But these subtle devices being discovered by princes that are in league, do oftentimes 'cause good friends to become sworn enemies: as the Epirots, who agreed with the Acheans their confederates, to make war against the Aetolians, and yet they did signify by their ambassador, That they would not take arms against them. Another time they played the like part with Antiochus, promising him all friendship, so as they might not be in disgrace with the Romans, Idagebatur (inquit Titus Livius) ut sirex abstinuisset Epiro, integra sibi essent omnia apud Romanos, & conciliata apud regem gratia, quòd accepturi fuissent venientem, That was done (saith Titus Livius) that if the king did forbear to enter into Epirus, they should continued in favour with the Romans, and they should purchase grace with the king, that they would have received him if he had come. But their counsels being discovered, they procured to themselves a miserable slavery with the flight of Perseus. The lawyers hold it for a maxim, That faith is not to be kept with them that have broken their faith. But they pas●…e on further and say, That by a decree made at the council of Constans, it was ordained, That no faith should be kept with the enemies of the faith: for that the emperor Sigismond having given his faith to Lancelot king of Bohemia, and a safe conduct to john Hus, and jerosme of Prague, would not suffer any to proceed against them: but to free him of that doubt, there were many Lawyers, Canonists, and Divines, especially Nicholas abbot of Palerme, and Lewis du Pont surnamed Romain, which concluded in this opinion, the which passed for a decree, and was confirmed by the council. So as john Hus and his companion were executed, although that neither the council nor the emperor had any jurisdiction over them: neither was the king of Bohemia (their natural lord) of their opinion, to whom notwithstanding the emperor had given his faith, but they regarded it not. Whereat we must not marvel, seeing that Bartol (the first lawyer of 
If ●…aith be to be kept with enemies of the faith  his age) maintains, That faith is not to be kept with private enemies, but with captains in chief. According to which decree the cardinal Saint julian was sent Legate into Hongarie, to break the treaties of peace concluded with the Turk: against the 
L. conventionum F. ●…e Pactis.  which Humiades father to Matthew Coruin king of Hongarie opposed himself vehemently, showing that the peace was concluded with very reasonable and profitable conditions for the Christians, notwithstanding the Legate showed him this decree made by the Council, by the which they might not hold no faith with the enemies of the faith. The Hongarians building thereon, broke the peace. But the Emperor of the Turks having notice of this decree, and of the breach of the peace, levied a mighty army, and hath never ceased since, both he and his successors, to increase in power▪ and to build that great Empire upon the ruin of Christendom; for even the Emperor Sigismond himself was chased away with all the army of Christians, and the Ambassador which had carried this decree, was in his return slain by certain th●…eses that were Christians, whereby it appeared that God was displeased with that decree, for if it be lawful to break one's faith with infidels, then is it not lawful to give it; but contrariwise if it be lawful to capitulate with infidels, it is also necessary to keep promise with them. The Emperor Charles the fift made a league of friendship by his Ambassador Robert english with the king of Persia, who was pursued by the Sangiac of Soria even unto the frontiers of Persia, and yet he had no other reproach to make against king Francis the first but that he had made a league with the Turk. It is well known that the kings of Poland, the Venetians, Genevois, and Rhagusians have the like with them. And the same Emperor Charles the fift gave his faith unto Martin Luther (whom the Pope had cursed as an enemy to the Church) to come to imperial diet at Worms, in the year 1519, whereas Echius seeing that he would not abjure his opinion, alleged the decree of Constance, according to the tenor whereof he u●…ged them to proceed against him, without any respect to the faith which the Emperor had given. But there was not any prince which did not abhor this request of Echius, and detested his decree. And therefore the emperor to maintain the public faith, sent Martin Luther back safe to his own home, with certain troops of horse. I know not how it came in the father's minds at the council of Constans, to take all faith from heretics, when as the pope himself at his first installing, doth take an oath of the jews, suffering them to enjoy their religion with all liberty. Yea and many times the princes of Germany and Italy do admit jews to be witnesses in their suits, the form of the jews oath is set down in the decrees of the Imperial chamber, Lib. 1. the 86 chapter, where it is said, That they should swear to keep their faith with the Christians as loyally as their predecessors did with the Gifans that were Idolaters. So josua commander 
Faith must be kept with Pagans' and Idolaters.  over the Israelites, having been circumvented by the Gabionites being Pagans' and Infidels, in a treaty which he had made with them, to save them, and four towns which they had: and having afterwards discovered their fraud, being persuaded by the Captains of the Israelites to break the peace, he would not do it, saying, That they had given their faith, to the end saith the text, that the fury of God whom they had called to witness should not fall upon them. As for that which we said, That no faith is to be kept with them that have broken their faith: it is but agreeable with the law of nature, and all histories are full of them. And in our time Sinan Bascha having capitulated with them of Tripoli in Barbary, and sworn by his masters head to suffer 
Faith is not to be kept with them that have broken their faith.  the knights of Rhodes to departed with their baggage after, that the town was yielded, notwithstanding his oath he made all the inhabitants slaves, except two hundred which he set at liberty at the request of Aramont the french Ambassador: and being challenged of his oath, he answered, That no faith was to be kept with them, for that they had sworn at Rhodes never to carry arms against the Turks, reproaching them that they were worse than dogs, which had neither God, faith, nor law, the which might have been refelled by them of Tripoli, but that might overcame right, for that they were not tied to the oath taken by the knights of Rhodes; nor, if the Tripolitans had formerly sworn, could he now take revenge thereof by this new accord. For former perjury and treachery may not be repeated nor revenged when as they have once 
Perjury ●…red by a new treaty, may not be repeated.  concluded a peace and agreement together, else there should never be any assurance of peace, nor end of treachery. But if one Prince hath broken his promise and deceived an other, he hath no cause to complain if he be required with the like: as the Romans having vanquished the Epirots (who had broken their faith with them, and put garrisons into their towns during the wars of Macedon) presently after the taking of Perseus, they made it to be given out that they would also set the Epirots at liberty, and withdraw their garrisons, enjoining ten men of the chief of every city to bring all the gold and silver, and then suddenly they gave a watchword to the garrisons to sack 
Fra●…d circumu●…nted by fraud.  and spoil the cities, the which was done, and in this sort they spoiled 70 cities. In the punishment of this treachery, the Romans behaved themselves more cruelly than was needful, for that the revenge should not extend but to them that had committed the perjury; and this dissembling was against the ancient honour of the Romans. But if perjury were covered by a new treaty, it were not lawful to revenge it: yet there are some so base and treacherous as when they swear, they have no thought but for to swear and break their faith, as Charles Duke of Bourgongne gave a safeguard to the Earl of S. Paul Constable of France to cell him dishonourably to Lewis the TWO king of France. But Antony Spinola Governor of the Is●…e of Corsica for the Genevois, committed a fouler act, adding cruelty to his perjury; for having called all the Princes of the island together under colour of council, and inviting them to a banquet, he commanded them to be slain, the history is fresh. And the banished men of Cynethe a city of Greece, being called home, and received by a new treaty made with them which had expelled them, they swore to forget all injuries past, and to live together in peace and amity: but in swearing (saith Polybius) they studied of nothing else, but how to betray the city, as they did, to be revenged of the injury (which they had covered by a new accord) expelling all their enemies. But God to revenge their disloyalty, suffered the Arcadians, to whom they had betrayed the city, to kill all those which had put it into their hands. Oftentimes princes and seigneuries forsake their leagues for fear, who 
Fear●… is o●…ntimes the cause of a breach.  commonly do follow the victor's party: as after the battle of Pavia, all that were in league with the king of France in Italy, forsook him: and after the battle of Cans, almost all the Romans associates in Italy left them: and even the Rhodians after the taking of the king Perseus (with whom they were in league) they made a proclamation, That no man upon pain of death, should say or do anything in favour of Fear may well excuse base minded men from giving aid, but not from perjury: but what colour or excuse can he have, that comes to capitulat with an intent to deceive 
Fear cannot excuse periutie.  and cirumvent? It is inexcusable to men, and detestable before God. And yet the emperor Maximilian the first was wont to say, That he made no treaties with the French, but to abuse king jews the twelft, and to be revenged of seventeen injuries which he had received from the French, although he could not specify one: for every man knows, that for these two hundred years, Europe never had prince more religious than Charles the eight, nor more upright and just than Lewis the twelfth, who reigned in the time of Maximilian. Yea the last, who alone among all others, was called Father of the people, did show how loyal he was both in deed and word, having treated a peace with Ferdinand king of Arragon, from whom he had received many wrongs and losses, yet when as Ferdinand was come unto the port of Savonne, the king of France entered into his galley▪, accompanied only with two or three noble men, Ferdinand being amazed at his great assurance and bounty, went out of his galley, and lodged in the castle of Savonne. It was in the power of the king of France to retain him (as Charles of Bourgongne did in the like case to jews the eleventh at Peronne) but he was so free from any so vild adisposition, as he omitted no pomp nor magnificence to give him all the content that might be. The confidence of both kings is disallowed by treacherous men, who show plainly how perfidiously they would have dealt: but to all good men it must needs seem commendable, which detest that in others, which they themselves hold dishonest. But if princes being in war, have made a truce, and concluded a parley, they must come unarmed, 
What is to be observed betwixt princes going to parley.  lest the one (being secretly armed) should by fraud murder his enemy, as Iphicrates the Athenian did jason the tyrant: or as Mithridates, who slew the prince of Armenia his sister's son. Or if the one comes weakly accompanied and with small force, then must he take hostages from the other, or some places of strength, before he approach, as it is commonly used. So did king Perseus, who being come with a great train unto the frontiers of his realm, and would have passed the river which divided the two kingdoms, Q. Martius Philippus the Roman ambassador required hostages, if he meant to pass with above three in his company: Perseus gave the chief of his friends, but Martius gave not any, for that he had but three men with him. If there be question 
In what sort hostages are to be given for a prince that i●… prisoner.  to give hostages for the delivery of some great prince that is a prisoner, it must be done with equal forces on either side; and in delivering the hostages, to receive the captive at the same instant; as they did when as king Francis the first came out of Spain from prison: else it were to be feared, that a disloyal prince would hold both prisoners and hostages: as Triphon the governor of Soria did, having taken jonathan by treachery, he promised to set him at liberty for threescore thousand crowns, and his two sons hostage: having delivered him the ransom and hostages, he kept the money and slew the hostages with the prisoner: commanding his pupil the king of Soria to be cruelly murdered. We must by all means shun these pestilent kind of men, and not contract any league or friendship with them, unless it be forced. Yea if they had contracted marriage, yet there is no assurance, if the prince be treacherous and disloyal: as Alphonsus' king of Naples was, who slew Cont james the duke of Milan's ambassador. Such a one they writ was Caracalla emperor of Rome (who never showed a good countenance, but to such as he meant to murder) having made a peace with the Parthians, he demanded the king's daughter, the which was granted him: so as he went into Persia well accompanied to marie-her, being all armed under their garments, who upon a sign given, when as they thought of nothing but of good cheer, he caused all the noble men that were at the marriage to be slain, and so fled away: being not ashamed to boast, That it was lawful to use his enemies in that sort. This murder was not so cruel, as the excuse was detestable and odious: but God did not let his disloyalty to be long unpunished, suffering one of his household servants to murder him as he was at the stool, and to enjoy the empire for his reward. They say, that Caesar Borgia son to pope Alexander the sixt, was like unto this monster, whom Machiavelli doth produce for the paragon of princes: he had learned of his father to poison such as he invited to a banquet: it cannot be said, Which did exceed other in treachery: Alexander 
The treacherous disposition of pope Alexander the sixt, and Caesar Borgia his son.  the father never did that which he said, and Caesar his son never spoke that which he did: and both of them did religiously hold, That faith was to be given to all men, but to be kept with no man. Caesar gave his faith, and swore great oaths for the assurance of the peace which he had made with the princes that were in league against him: and having drawn them together upon his faith, he murdered them cruelly whereat his father laughing, said, That he had showed them a Spanish trick. But it was an extreme folly for the princes to put their lives into the hands of the most disloyal and perfidious man living, and known for such a one: and even at such a time as he was but subject to the pope, and had no power to give his faith to them he put to death: so as the pope might have excused them as his subjects and vassals, without any note of treachery. But the pope was poisoned with the same poison which he had prepared for his friends and companions: and his son escaping the force of the poison, was overreacht with the same fraud that he had circumvented his enemies. For when as Consaluus Viceroy of Naples had given him his faith (not being so skilful in the law of arms and heraldry, as he was to command in war) Borgia came to Naples, which when as king Ferdinand understood, he commanded him to keep Borgia's 
Treachery paid with treachery.  prisoner: the Viceroy shows his charge, and Borgia did urge him with his oath and faith: but the Viceroy could not give his faith without the kings express commission, much less release a subject that is captive, when as the king forbids it. Neither should Borgia have entered rashly into his enemy's country. We read that Albret earl of Franconie committed the like error to the duke of Valentinois: for being besieged by the emperor Lewis of Baviere, Othon the Archbishop of Ments persuaded him to come unto the emperor upon his faith, swearing, That if he were not reconciled to the emperor, he should return safe with him unto his castle. This good bishop being go forth, made show as if he had forgotten something in the castle, and returned back with the earl. After that he had delivered the earl into the emperor's hands, being urged of his promise, he said, That he was returned: like unto the soldier in Polybius, who notwithstanding his shift, was sent back by the Senate of Rome, with his hands, and feet bound to the enemy. But although the Archduke could not give his faith unto a rebel, without warrant from the emperor, yet for that he had fraudulently drawn a man into danger, who was ignorant of the laws of arms (otherwise than Consuluus had done) he was not free from the foul crime of treachery: like unto Paches, who persuaded Hippias, that he should come forth of his castle to a parley, swearing, That he should return safe: the captain being come forth, the castle was easily taken: then did he bring Hippias back safe into the castle according to his promise, and there slew him. In like sort Saturnius the Tribune with his complices, having seized upon the capitol by conspiracy and rebellion, coming forth upon the Consul's faith and safeguard, they were slain, and their memory condemned. The like chance happened in Luques in the year 1522, when as Vincent Poge and his companions had slain the Gonfaloniet in the palace, the magistrates gave them their faith and assurance, that they should not be called in question for the fact, so as they would departed the city: for that they were then in arms, and the stronger: yet soon after they were pursued and punished as they deserved. And to the end that by the promise of magistrates, the public faith and assurance should not be broken, the signory of Venice made a decree in the council of ten, published in the year 1506, That no governor nor magistrate should give any safeconduct to a banished man: the which was reserved for the signory only; who by another decree made in the year 1512, did forbidden to take any one prisoner, to whom the signory had given a safeconduct: not that princes and sovereign states are bound to give their faith unto subjects, and much less unto banished men; but having once given it they must keep it inviolable. We have no better schoolmasters of the laws of arms, and of the public faith, than the ancient Romans, and yet we read that Pompey the Great did capitulat with pirates, giving them a sure retreat in some towns & provinces, to live there under the obedience of the Romans: for he was advertised, that the pirates had nine hundred sail of ships, and above five hundred towns upon the sea coast, commanding the whole sea, so as the governors could not pass to their provinces, nor merchants traffic: and that so great a power could not be defeated, without exposing the estate of the people of Rome to apparent danger; the majesty whereof stood and was absolute by means of this treaty: and if he had not kept the faith which he had given them, or if the Senate had not ratified the treaty, he had polluted the honour of the Romans, and blemished the fame of so worthy an exploit. Not that I would have states to enter into any league, or have any commerce with pirates and thieves, (for that they aught not to be partakers of the law of nations, as I have said before.) And although that Tacferin chief of an army of thieves in Africa, sent ambassadors to Rome, to the end they should appoint lands & places for him and his to inhabit, else he would proclaim perpetual war against the Romans; yet the emperor Tiberius taking this for an indignity, would not so much as hear his ambassadors, saying in open Senate, That the ancient Romans would never hear, nor treat in any sort with Spartacus the slave, by his profession a Fencer, and captain of the thieves, although he had gathered together threescore thousand slaves, and defeated the Romans in three battles: but after that he had been vanquished by Crassus, all that escaped were hanged. Whereby it appears, that it is dishonourable 
It is dishonourable for a prince to deal with thieves.  for a prince or state, to treat with thieves: but having once plighted their faith unto them, it is against their dignity to break it. There is a rare example of the emperor Augustus, who made a proclamation, That whosoever could bring unto him Crocotus, captain of the thieves in Spain, should have 25000 crowns: whereof he being advertised, he went and presented himself to Augustus, and demanded the reward: the which the emperor caused to be given unto him, and withal pardoned him, to 
A notable deed of the emperor Augustus.  give an example to others, that they must keep their faith, without any respect to the party's merit.  
There is great difference, whether faith be given to a thief, a friend, an enemy, or a subject: for a subject which aught to maintain the honour, estate, and life of his sovereign prince, if he prove treacherous and disloyal unto him, and that he hath given him a protection, or if he come to capitulat with him, if the prince doth infringe his oath with him, he hath not so great cause to complain as a thief, if the these be not his subject: as the legion of Bulgarian thieves, which being come into France to devil there, king Dagobert gave them his faith, finding it dangerous suddenly to break such a troop of lose and desperate men: but soon after upon a certain day, a watchword being given, they were all slain. But there is a great difference, whether a sovereign prince doth capitulat with his friends or his enemies, & that those subjects which have rebelled against his majesty, be comprehended in the treaty: Many have made a question, if the prince breaking his faith with those rebels, and seeking revenge of them, whether the enemy be thereby wronged, and if the assurance given, or the truce, be thereby broken? as it oftentimes falls out, the which doth most afflict princes: as Titus Livius saith of Philip king of Macedon, Vnares Philippun maxim angebat, quod cum leges a Romans victo imponerentur seviendi ius in Macedonas, qui in bello ab se defecerant ademptum erat, One thing tormented Philip, that having laws prescribed him by the Romans, he might not tyrannize over the Macedonians who had fallen from him during 
A prince giving his faith to his subjects, must keep it.  the wars. I hold that in this case the treaty is broken, and that the enemy or the prince which hath contracted security for an other prince's subjects, may take it for an injury, & seek his revenge, although the subject were guilty of treason in the highest degree. As the Barons of Naples, who went to Naples upon assurance given, and an oath taken by Ferdinand king of Naples, unto the Pope, sovereign lord of Naples, the king of Spain, the Venetians, and the Florentines, who were bound, and had all sworn to entertain the treaty, yet they were imprisoned by Ferdinand king of Naples, who put them all to death, although he had received them under his father's assurance and his own. But there is no breach of the treaty if a private person seeks revenge of former wrongs of them that are comprehended in the treaty unless; he hath precisely promised that he shall not suffer any pursuit to be made against them for any thing that had been committed before the treaty; or that assurance was given them in general terms to return unto their houses. For a general clause in general terms hath the same force that a special clause in a special case, which may not be stretched from the places, times, persons and cases, contained in the articles of the treaty or safeconduit: all which notwithstanding were neglected by pope Leo the tenth, who having given his faith and a passport unto Paul Baillon (who had expelled his nephew out of Perouze) when he came to Rome he was committed prisoner, and his process made, not only for his rebellion, but for many other crimes, for the which he was convicted and executed. The history reports, that the pope had not only given his faith unto him, but to all his friends in general: true it is they were all his vassals. He did the like unto Alphonso 
Leo the tenth perjured to be revenged.  Cardinal of Sienne, being accused that he had attempted to poison the Pope: to draw him into his snares he gave him his faith, and to the Ambassador of Spain in the name of the Catholic king; yet he came no sooner to Rome but his process was made: whereupon the ambassador of Spain complained greatly, but the Pope (who wanted no lawyers) answered him, That a safeguard or protection how ample soever, is of no force, if the crime committed be not expressly set down: so as presently after the Cardinal was sttangled in prison. But the Spanish Ambassador could not stipulate 
ambassadors cannot promise' nor take assurance from another, without an especial commission.  a protection for any one without a commission from his master, as we have showed before; the ignorance whereof hath oftentimes been a great plague and ruin to princes. Pope Clement the 7 circumvented the Florentines in our age with the like fraud, having promised the Spanish Ambassador to maintain their estate free: but having seized of the city, he made it subject to Alexander his brother's bastard, who put the chief men to death, after the proscription of many, saying, That treason was always excepted: the which was a frivolous and idle excuse, seeing that he was never lord of Florence. Therefore in all treaties it is most safe to set down particularly the number and quality of the judges, for the differences that may arise among the associates, so as the number be equal of either side; with authority to the arbitrators to choose an umpire, if they cannot agreed among themselves: as in the league made by the four first Cantons in the year 1481, where it was said in the fourth and fift Article, that in all controversies they should choose an equal number to determine of them. And in the alliance betwixt the house of Austria and the twelve Cantons, the Bishops of Bohemia and Constance are named: but in the treaty betwixt the king of France and the Swissers, in the year 1516 in the 17 Article it is said, that in matters of controversy, every one should choose two arbitrators, and if they could not agreed, the plaintiff should choose a fift out of the Valesiians or from Coire to be umpire, who might not altar any thing of their opinions, but choose the one of them. It were more convenient that the fift had been chosen by the four which could not agreed, for that the Swissers were always demanders, and named whom they pleased, so as the king had always the worse cause.  
There is an other point which doth commonly deceive Princes, which is, to treat with Ambassadors, deputies, or Lieutenants, without an especial commission: for notwithstanding any promise which he shall make to have it ratified by his master, yet is there no assurance, for that the Prince which promiseth stands bound for his part, and the other remains at liberty to accept or reject the conditions of the treaty; and happily in the mean time there falls out some accident which breeds an alteration: as it happened betwixt the Samnites and the Numantines, and (without any farther search) to Lewis the 12, who treated a peace with the Archduke Philip passing through France in the year 1503, by virtue of an ample Commission which he had from his father in law, promising moreover to 'cause him to ratify it: but Ferdinand attended the issue of the wars of Naples, whereas the French were vanquished in two battles, and expelled the realm, so as he refused to ratify what his son in law Philip had concluded with the king of France, saying, that the Archduke had no especial commission. At the lest there must be a time prefixed for the ratifying of the treaty, or a resolute clause for the want thereof: for in matters of State, and of treaties betwixt Princes and Commonweals, a silent ratification is not sure. And this was the cause of the breach of the treaty of Bretigny, the which Charles the fift then Regent of France had not ratified touching the sovereignty of Guienne. And the same occasion made them of Carthage break the peace betwixt them and the Romans: for after the first war, they had made two treaties, in the first all the associates of both nations were comprehended in general terms only; and it was said, that the treaty made with Luctatius the Consul should hold if the people of Rome did like of it, the which they would not ratify, but sent an express commission into Africa with the articles they would have concluded, and Asdrubal General of the Carthaginians confirmed them. In this treaty the Saguntines were expressly comprehended, as allied unto the Romans, but this treaty was not expressly ratified by the Carthaginians; upon which point the Senate of Carthage stood, maintaining that Hannibal might lawfully make war against the Saguntines: and yet the Carthaginians having observed the treaty made by their General in all other clauses, they had ratified it in fact, which is more than words. It is therefore the more sure not to conclude anything without an especial commission, or express ratification, for there never wants excuses and devices to cover their disloyalties, the histories are full of them, as of the Calcedonians against the Bizantines, of Cleomenis against the Argives, and of the Thracians against the Thessalians, who when as they had concluded a truce for certain days, they spoiled their fields by night: and as the Flemings, who fearing to pay two millions of florins into the pope's treasury, (as it was concluded by the treaty of peace, if they did rebel against the king of France) they counseled Edward the third, king of England, to qualify himself king of France, and then they would take arms for him, the which was done. Others distinguish upon the word, as king Lewis the TWO, who making a show that he had need of the good council and advice of Lewis of Luxembourg Constable of France, he said, That he wanted his head. And the Emperor Charles the fift by a subtle alteration of a letter denied that which others thought he had affirmed, writing touching the delivery of the princes of Germany out of prison. But George Cornarus found a more subtle interpretation, seeing that he could found no means to break the treaty made with the king of France, said, That the treaty was made with the king for the preservation of his estate, and not to recover them when they were lost. But when all fails, and that there is no other excuse, he that is the stronger, is in the right, and the weaker hath wrong, as Atabalippa king of Peru (being prisoner to Francis Pizarre, Captain of the Spaniards) he promised the value of ten millions and three hundred thousand ducats for his ransom, the which he paid: the Spaniards having resolved to put him to death, said, That there was no means for his liberty, unless he become a Christian: he to save his life was baptised, but with much grief of mind, saying, That the immortal son was to be preferred before mortal gods, but terrified with such imminent danger, he embraced the Christian religion. What shall I say more? The Spaniards having a king that was penitent, confessing and obedient to all their laws, they put him to death, without any regard of faith or oath, like unto the wicked Milanese, whom it were a sin to name, who having taken his enemy at an advantage, set a dagger at his throat, threatening to kill him, if he did not ask him pardon for all the injuries he had done him, the which was done: then he threatened him with death if he did not deny God; he abjured God and all his works with horrible execrations, but his adversary not satisfied therewith, caused him to repeat those courtesies often, lest they should be counterfer, and then he slew this blasphemer, saying, That he was revenged both of body and soul. Behold the reward which this denier of God received, for putting his trust in the promises of a murderer. In the treaty made betwixt king Lewis the 11 and Charles Duke of Bourgongne, in the year 1475, he made the king to swear first by the word of a king, then by the faith of his body, and by his creator, by the faith and law which he had taken in his baptism, and upon the Evangelists and the 
A new kind of oath.  Canon of the Mass, and in the end upon the true Crosse. I omit to writ what he profited by this oath, and what succeeded. But the Earl of S. Paul would not give any 
Philip Comines.  credit to all this, when as the king gave him a safeconduit, unless he would swear by the cross of S. Lau, which was kept at Angers, the which he refused to do, having resolved to put him to death, and fearing above all things this cross, whereupon the lord of Lescut required him to swear before he would come unto his service, and he kept his oath. The like was done in the treaty of peace betwixt Charles Regent of France, and the king of Navarre, when as the Bishop of Lizieux said Mass in a tent pitched betwixt the two armies, and received the oath upon the host: for better assurance of the treaty, the Bishop divided the host in two, giving the one half to the king of Navarre, the which he refused, excusing himself that he had broke his fast, neither would the Regent take the other part, so as either suspected the other of perjury. The Ancients used sacrifices with effusion of blood, with many imprecations and execrations against the breakers of the league: and the kings of Parthia and Armenia when they entered into any offensive and defensive league, they tied their thombs, and drawing 
Tacit. Lib. 4.  forth the blood, they sucked it one after an other: as in the like case the king of Calange 
In the history of the Indieses.  at the East Indies, making an alliance with the Portugalls, drew blood from his left hand and rubbed his face and tongue therewith. But there is no assurance in any oaths if 
If the prince be disloyal, his oath is not to be regarded.  the Prince be disloyal: and if he be just, his simple word shall be a law unto him, and his faith an oracle. It is forbidden by the holy scriptures to swear by any but by the name of the eternal God, for it is he alone that can revenge the breakers of their faith and the scorners of his name, and not they which have neither power nor care of human things, the which the thirty Ambassadors of Carthage feared when as the Romans had agreed to grant them a peace, an ancient Senator (knowing the disloyalty of the Carthaginians) asked them in open Senate, By what gods they would swear: they answered, that they would swear by the same gods which had so sharply punished their disloyalty. For he offends no less that thinks to mock God, than he which doth it in deed, neither is he to be credited although he hath sworn. The prince's partisans of the houses of Orleans and Bourgongne did swear six treaties of peace in less than twelve years, and not any one was kept, as we read in our histories. And for that among all the treaties made among princes, there is not any one that hath more need of assurance, and that is more difficult to entertain, than that which is made with the subject, having conspired against his prince; I am of opinion that in this case 
The manner ●… to capitulat b twixt the pi●… and the subie●…  the treaty should be made with neighbour princes, to warrant the subjects, or else speedily to departed the country. And if any one will object that the subject aught not to have any safeguard or protection from his lord, as it was adjudged by a decree of the court of Parliament for the Earl of Tonerre, I confess it: But I say, the subject must either do thus, or else departed the country, when they have to do with a sovereign Prince. For there is no greater torment unto a Prince, than to be forced to capitulate with his subject, and to keep his faith with him. Lewis the 11 gave a good testimony thereof to the Duke of Nemours, to the Earl of S. Paul, to the Duke of Brittany, to the Earl of Armaignac, and to all his subjects that had rebelled, all which almost he put to death; and the history of Flanders puts his own brother in the number, affirming 
Meierus.  that he was poisoned. And not long since the younger brother to the king of Fez besieged the king his brother with an army, and forced him to conclude a peace with such conditions as he pleased, and then he entered into the Castle with a small train to do his homage, but suddenly he was strangled by the king's commandment, and cast out at a window in view of his army, which having lost their head, yielded presently. In like sort the Duke of York having taken arms against Henry the sixt king of England, having gotten the victory he made an agreement with the king upon condition that after his decease the Crown should come unto the house of York; and the prince of Wales, son to king Henry the 6 should be excluded, and in the mean time he should remain Regent of England: but soon after being taken he was beheaded with his accord, being crowned with a crown of white paper. You must not gall the Lion so hard as the blood may follow, for seeing his own blood and feeling the smart, if he have his liberty he will be revenged: I would I had not so many examples as have been seen in our time. But when as I say it is necessary that neighbour princes and allies be comprehended in the treaty made betwixt the prince and his subjects as pledges and warrants, I do not mean that it shall be lawful for foreign princes to thrust their neighbour's subjects into rebellion, under colour of protection or amity: and in truth the beginning and spring of all the wars betwixt king Francis the first, and the Emperor Charles the fift, was for the protection of Robert de la March, whom king Francis received, as du Bellay hath well observed. But a wise prince may meditate an accord betwixt another prince and his subjects, and if he finds that the outrageous proceeding 
In what case ●… foreign prince may take upon him the protection of another prince's subjects.  of a Tyrant against his subjects be irreconcilable, then aught he to take upon him the protection of the afflicted with a generous resolution: as that great Hercules did, who purchased to himself immortal praise and reputation, for that he took upon him the protection of afflicted people against the violence and cruelty of tyrants (which the fables call monsters) whom he went through the world to conquer: wherein the ancient Romans did also exceed all other nations. And without any more search, king Lewis the 12 received into his protection the Bentivoles, with the houses of Ferrara and Mirandula, against the oppression of pope julio the 2: but he caused to be inserted into the protection, That it was without prejudice to the rights and dignity of the Roman church: and for the same cause king Henry the 2 took the protection of the same princes of Mirandula against the violence of pope julio the 3, and of many princes of Germany against the Emperor Charles the 5 for the liberty of the Empire, and entertained the league of the sea towns which the Emperor sought to break, & to change the Empire into an hereditary kingdom else he which persuadeth: another Prince's subjects to rebel under culour of protection (which should be as a holy anchor for people unjustly tyranized) he doth open the gate of rebellion to his own subjects, and brings his own estate into danger, with an everlasting shame and dishonour. And therefore in all societies and leagues among princes it is always excepted, That the one shall not take the protection of another's subjects, whether the cause be just or unjust. The only reason which hindered the treaty of peace betwixt king Antiochus the great, and Ptolemy king of Egypt, was the protection of Acheus, who of governor of Asia had made himself king, and had withdrawn it from his sovereign prince, as Polybius saith. And for this cause Sigismond Augustus' king of Polonia, to have peace with the king of Muscovie, was forced to leave the protection of Rigie in Livonia. And whatsoever some say, that it is lawful for the vassal to free himself from the subjection of his 
When the vassal may free himself from his lord.  lord, if he be ill entreated; it is to be understood of an undervassall, which hath recourse unto his sovereign lord, and not of a liege vassal which holds immediately, and without the means of any other vassal, who in some other respect may be a sovereign: as the subjects of Guienne and of Poitou rebelled justly against the king of England vassal to the king of France, for that he denied them justice, and for that cause he was deprived of those fees which he held on this side the sea, according to the Canon law, although that many are contented to take away the jurisdiction only. And of late days the Genevois expelled the Marquis of Final out of his estate at the complaint of his subjects, and took them into their protection: who when as he complained unto the Emperor of the wrong which was done unto him, the Genevois answered, That they had freed but their own subjects from the tyranny of the Marquis: yet he prevailed against them, notwithstanding they pleaded that he was their vassal. Else every one might under colour of ill usage rebel against his lord, and put himself in the protection or subjection of another: as some subjects of the Duke of Savoy, having been thirty years or there abouts under the signory of Berne, seeing now that they would turn them over to their ancient lord, they beseeched the Bernois instantly, not to abandon them, being afraid of ill usage: but they were denied their request, as I have understood by letters from the Ambassador Coignet. And although 
1561.  that he that is banished by his prince may be received into protection by another prince, or into subjection, without any breach of the treaty (which forbids the receiving of another prince's subjects into protection) for that those which are banished for ever, are no more subjects: but if those banished men would attempt any thing against their ancient Lord, the prince which hath received them aught not to suffer them. And therefore the princes of Germany sent Ambassadors to king Henry the 2, to require him not to receive Albert Marquis of Brandebourg into his protection, being banished by a decree of the Imperial Chamber: the king made answer in the month of August, in the year 1554, That although the house of France had always been the support of afflicted princes, yet would he not show any favour unto the Marquis against the holy Empire. Yet notwithstanding if the prince exceeding others in power and dignity, be duly informed that another prince's subject be tyrannised, he is bound not only to receive him into protection, but also to free him from the subjection of another; as the law takes the slave out of the power of a cruel master: but it more befitteth to free the subject from the subjection of another, and to set him at liberty, than to subject him to himself, as the Romans did all Greece and Macedon, which they delivered from the dominion of kings, to set them at full liberty. So did pope Agapet (who freed the successors of Gautier d'Iuetot from the subjection of the kings of France, for that king Lothair had slain him with his own hand in the Church, at what time as he craved pardon of him) to give example to other princes not to use any such cruelties to their subjects: and for the like cruelty Henry king of Sweden was expelled his estate by his own subjects, in the year 1567. But it was held very strange that pope john the 22 in the treaty made betwixt Philip the long king of France and the Flemings, caused it to be set down, That if the king did infringe the treaty, it might be lawful for his subjects to take arms against him, to the which the Princes and Barons of France did oppose, causing that clause to be razed; and it was more strange that it should come out of the mouth of a french pope, a natural subject to France, and who had once been Chancellor. But the prince may well swear that if he break the treaty made by him, his subjects shall be freed from their obedience, as it was in the treaty of Arras, and hath been used among our first kings of this realm: as in the treaty which was made betwixt Lewis and Charles the bald brethren, the oath which either of them made was with this condition, That if it chanced, which God forbidden, that I should break my oath, I then absolve you from the faith which you own me. Lewis swore first in the Roman tongue these words which follow, the which the Precedent Fauchet, a man well read in our Antiquities, did show me in Guytard an historian and prince of the blood, Pro deo amur, & pro Christian poblo & nostro commun saluament dist di en avant, inquant des sanir podirmedunat, si saluerio cist meon fradre Churl, & in adiudha, & in cad una causa si come home par dreit son fradre saluar dist, ino quid il un alter sifaret. Et abludher nul played nunquam prindraij qui meon vol cist, meon fradre Churl in damno sit: That is to say, For the love of God and the Christian people, and for our common health from this day forward, so long as God shall give me knowledge and power, I will defend my brother Charles, and will aid him in every thing as any man by right aught to save his brother, and not as another would do: And by my will I will have no quarrel with him, if my brother Charles doth me no wrong. King Lewis having made an end of this oath, king Charles spoke the same words in the German tongue thus, In God est etc. Than both the armies subjects to the two princes swore thus, Si Ludovigs sagrament que son fradre Carlo jurat, conseruat, & Carlus meo sender de suo par no lostaint, si io retornar non luit pois, ne io veuls cui eo retornar ne pois, in nulla adiudha contra Ludovig: That is to say, If Lewis keeps his oath made with his brother, and Charles my lord for his part doth not hold it, if I cannot prevent it, I will not return with him in peace, nor do him any obedience. The subjects of Charles swore in the Roman tongue, and the subjects of Lewis in the Dutch. But to return to our purpose: it is dangerous to take the protection of another, especially of those which are subject to princes allies, but upon a just cause, so is it more strange to leave an associate in danger. But it is a question, whether a prince may take the protection of another prince unjustly 
If one that is in league may secure him that is not allied against his associate, being wrongfully oppressed.  oppressed, without breach of the league: for it is most certain that we aid private allies and common allies, if they be wronged by one of the allies: but he that is not comprehended in the league, may not be defended against him that is allied, without breach of the league: on the other side it is a thing which seems very cruel, to leave a poor prince to the mercy of one more mighty that doth oppress him and seeks to take his estate from him.  
The Senate of Rome was much troubled herewith, for that the Capovans being assailed, & unjustly oppressed by the Samnites, had recourse unto the Romans, who had a good desire to aid them: considering withal, that the Samnites would be too mighty & insupportable, if they had once seized upon the signory of Capova, and that it was a means to subdue the Romans: notwithstanding it was resolved by the Senate not to give any succours unto the Capovans, considering the league which they had sworn with the Samnites, Tanta utilitate (saith Titus Livius) fides antiquior fuit, Faith was of more respect than so great a benefit. I will set down word by word, the answer which was made unto the six ambassadors, the which deserves to be graven in letters of gold, Legatis Campanorum auxilia contra Samnites petentibus, Consul ex authoritate Senatus sic respondit: Auxilio vos Campani dignos censet Senatus: sed ita vobiscum amicitiam iustitui par est, ne qua vetustior amicitia ac societas violetur: Samnites nobiscum foedere iuncti sunt: itaque arma Deos prius quàm homines violatura, adversus Samnites, vobis negamus: Legatos sicut fas est, precatum ad Socios mittemus, ne qua vobis vis fiat, The Consul with the authority of the Senate did answer in this sort unto the ambassadors of the Campanois, demanding succours against the Samnites. The Senate holds you of Campania to be worthy of succours, but it is fit so to join friendship with you, as a more ancient league and society may not be violated: the Samnites are linked unto us in league, and therefore we deny you arms against the Samnites, whereby we should wrong the gods rather than men: but we will sand ambassadors (as we may lawfully) to request our associates, not to offer you any violence. The ambassadors of Capova had a secret charge, to offer the subjection of Capova unto the Romans, in case they should refuse to give them succours: who seeing themselves rejected, made this offer▪ Quandoquidem nostra tueri non vultis, vestra certe defendetis: itaque populum Campanum urbemque Capovam, agros, delubra Deum, divina humanaque omnia in vestram P. C. populique Romani ditionem dedimus. Tum iam fides agi visa, deditos non prodi, Seeing you will not protect us and ours, yet at the lest you shall defend your own: we yield therefore into your power OH reverent fathers, and of the people of Rome, the people of Campania, and the city of Capova, with their fields, churches, and all divine and human rights. Now is your faith engaged, not to betray them that 
A stranger is not to be succoured against an ally, unless he make himself a subject.  yield unto you. Whereby it appears, that the stranger is not to be succoured against the ally, unless he yield himself a subject unto him whose protection he pretends: for in that case every one is bound to defend his subjects against the injuries of the mighty. If the Athenians had made the same answer to the Corcyrians, demanding aid against the Corinthians their allies, they had not fallen into a war which set all Greece on fire for the space of twenty eight years, and was not ended, but with the ruin of the Athenians, who were made subject unto the Lacedæmonians, as they had deserved, what colour of justice soever they pretend, that the league aught to cease if one of the associates doth make war unjustly against a stranger. If this interpretation might take place, there should be no league nor alliance unbroken. And therefore in contracting of leagues and new societies, the more ancient associates (although they are held to be excepted by law) must be precisely excepted: so as no aid is to be given unto the latter confederates against the more ancient, unless they have first begun the war. As in the league made betwixt the house of France and the Cantons of the Swissers, in the year 1521, in the which the ancient allies were excepted: but there was a derogatory clause, in these words, If the ancient allies did not make war against the king of France, which was the principal subject of the treaty. But it may so fall out, that three princes being in league, one may make war against the other, and require aid of the third. In this case there are many distinctions. If the treaty of alliance be but of amity and friendship, it is most certain that he is not in that case bound to give any succours, if the treaty imports a defensive league, he must aid the most ancient ally by a precedent alliance: If the associates be of one standing, he owes succours unto him that is united unto him by an offensive and desensive league. If it be offensive and defensive of all parts, he must not secure neither the one nor the other: but he may well mediate a peace, and 'cause their quarrels to be compounded by their common allies: as it is commonly used, making war against him that will not refer his cause to arbitrators, or yield to their arbitrement, as it is expressly set down in the treaty of Stance, made betwixt the eight Cantons. Arbitrements are not to be rejected, how great soever princes be: as Henry king of Sueden did upon the controversies he had with the king of Denmark, who offered to refer his cause to Henry the second, king of France: the which the king of Sueden refused, saying, That he was as great a king as the rest. But the Romans, who exceeded all nations in riches and power, if they had any controversy with their allies, they referred it to the arbitrement of their common confederates, Romanus Legatus (saith Titus Livius) and communes socios vocabat. And if it be not lawful by the law of arms, to allow of the combat, when there is any proof by witness or 
The Roman legate did appeal to their common confederates.  otherwise, what an injustice were it, to suffer two princes or states to enter into war, if a third may reconcile them, or else join with him that is wronged. It were a simple part to suffer his neighbour's house to burn, the which he might quench with his honour. Moreover it may be doubted, whethet the league be broken, if thou shalt offer violence to any confederates father or brother, being not comprehended in the league. If they be subjects, there is no question: if they be absolute of themselves, it may be doubted; for that the father and the son are held to be all one: but in my opinion there is nothing done against the league, unless the father's person were excepted in the treaty. And although the father may pursue an injury done unto his son by action, yet may he not attempt war by the law of arms, for a son that is out of the father's jurisdiction, and not excepted in the treaty, although he be wronged by his confederates: for that the father's power hath nothing common with the laws of arms and majesty, much less may the league be broken for brethren that are wronged. But to avoid all these inconveniences, the most safest way is, to limit all leagues to a certain time, to the end they may add or take away from the treaty, or give over the league altogether, if they think it expedient for them: and especially betwixt Popular estates 
League's must be limited to a certain time.  and those which are governed Aristocratically, the which never die. For in Monarchies societies and leagues are dissolved by the death of princes, as we have said. Yet princes making treaties with Seigneuries and Popular states, have been accustomed to continued the time of the league after the prince's death▪ as it was in the league betwixt the Cantons of the Swissers, and Francis the first, where the time was limited for the king's life, and five years after, and since it hath always so continued: but that condition did bind the Swissers, and not Francis his successor, who might at his pleasure hold, or go from the league: for that an oath is personal, and to speak properly, cannot be taken for the successor.  
But some one will say unto me, That the first clause in all the ancient treaties and leagues, which the Romans made with other states and Seigneuries, was, That they should be perpetual. And therefore the Hebrews did call the strongest and best assured alliances, treaties of salt, for that salt of all things compounded of the elements, is lest corruptible: as they also call a statue or image that is everlasting, A statue of Salt, not that the holy Scripture means, that Lot's wife was turned into a salt stone, as many believe. But in my opinion there is nothing more pernicious in treaties than to make them perpetual: for he that feels himself any thing overcharged with the treaty: hath reason to break it, seeing it is perpetual: but if it be limited, he hath no cause to complain. Moreover it is easy to continued leagues and alliances already made, and to renew them before the time prefixed be expired: as hath been always done with the Cantons for these fifty years: and although we were assured of a perpetual amity and friendship, and that there should be no cause of grief or dislike, yet friendships grow cold, and have need to be revived and quickened by new treaties. And therefore in the treaty betwixt the Vallesians and the five small Cantons, it is set down in the last article, that the league should be renewed every tenth year. And in the treaties betwixt the eight Cantons it is said, that the alliances should be renewed every five years. The Romans did swear a league and perpetual amity with the inhabitants of Laurentum, and yet was it renewed every year, Cum Laurentibus (inquit Livius) renovari foedus iussum, renovaturque ex eo quotannis post diem decimum Latinarum, Being commanded (saith Livy) to renew the league with the Laurentines, it was thereupon renewed every year after the tenth day of the Latins. And the same author saith, Adire iusst sunt Legati Romani Cretam, & Rhodun, & renovare amicitiam, simul, speculari num solicitati animi sociorum ab rege Perseo fuissent, The Roman ambassadors were commanded to go to Crect and Rhodes, to renew the league, and to discover if their confederates minds had been corrupted by king Perseus. There was a league of perpetual friendship made in the year 1336, betwixt Philip of Valois, and Alphonso king of Castille: 
Treaties betwixt the kings of France & Spain  and afterwards it was renewed betwixt king john and Peter king of Castille, in the year 1352: and betwixt Charles the fift, king of France, and Henry king of Castille: and yet every one of these leagues was made perpetual for the associates and their successors. As was also betwixt the houses of Scotland and France, for these three hundred 
The league betwixt the French and Scots.  years, that they have continued in good and perpetual league and amity, unto the year 1556. There is also another reason why the time of leagues and alliances should be limited, for that there is an ordinary clause annexed to all treaties, Not to make any peace or truce, or to enter into league with a common enemy, or with them that are not comprehended in the treaty, without the consent of all the associates, or of the greatest part: But if one of the allies will not consent thereunto, must the rest be engaged in his hatred, and in a continual war, if the league be perpetual? That were against all divine and human laws, if the occasion of this hatred doth cease, and that a peace may be made without the prejudice to the allies. But this clause is ill practised, for if any one of the associates hath an intent to go from the league, he is so far from demanding the consent of the rest, as sometimes he doth treat so secretly, as all is concluded before that any thing can be discovered, and oftentimes they abandon their associate unto their enemies. We have a notable example in our memory, of the treaty 
The treaty of Chambort.  of Chambort, made in the year 1552, betwixt the king of France of the one part, and the duke Maurice, the marquess Albert, and the Landgrave of Hesse on the other; where it is said in the two & twentieth article, That if any of the associates should make any peace or agreement, or have any secret practice with the emperor, or his adherents, without the consent of his other allies, he should be punished as a petiured, without all 
The princes of the empire in the protection of the king of France.  remission, in the view of all the army. And yet within six months after, the elector Maurice agreed with the emperor at a treaty at Passau, neither advertising king Henry (who was chief of the league) nor yet comprehending him in the treaty. Against whom the marquess Albert exclaimed, saying, That it was a base and villainous act, calling the duke traitor, and disloyal to his country, the emperor, and the king of France. And yet he did worse than his companion: for after that he had drawn great sums of money from the king, he turned to the emperor, and made open war against the king: so as the imperial soldiers called Maurice Bachelor, or Graduate, & 
Why marquess Albert was called Doctor.  Albert Doctor, for the notable tricks which he played. And of late memory the signory of Venice concluded a peace with Sultan Selim, so secretly, as it was published at Constantinople, at the coming of the French ambassador, before that any one of the confederates of the holy league was advertised thereof, although it were expressly forbidden in the treaty, that not any one of the confederates might make a peace or truce with the Turk, without the consent of all the rest. So the ancient Romans having to do with faithless and disloyal people, they did not willingly conclude a peace, but a truce for many years, as they did with the Veientes, Veientibus pacem petentibus in annos centum induciae datae, The Veientes requiring a peace, they had a truce granted them for an hundred years. And in another place, Indutiae Veientibus pacem petentibus 
Liu. lib. 1. Decad. 1. 7. lib. 2. 8. lib. 7. 9 lib. 9  in annos 40 datae, A truce of forty years was granted unto the Veientes, who demanded a peace. And in another place, Cum populo Cerite inducias in centum annos factas, There was a truce made with the people of Cerites for an hundred years. And in another place, Hetruriae populi pacem petentes in annos 30 inducias impetrarunt, The people of Hetruria demanding a peace, they obtained a truce for thirty years. For always a truce is more holy, and less violable than a peace. And if we shall well observe the end of those which have broken any truce, we shall found that it hath been miserable, and many times the ruin of states. So the Romans have always punished severely the breakers of any truce: the first example was shown upon the person of Metius Dictator of the Albanois, who was pulled in pieces with four horses, and the city of Alba razed: the people of Veientes were rooted out, having rebelled seven times against the articles of the truce: the city of Carthage was burnt to ashes: the people of Capova slain for the most part, and the rest made slaves: the inhabitants of Corinth massacred, and their city burnt to ashes: the Samnites were ruined, having infringed their faith seven times, as we read in Titus Livius, Strabo, with infinite others, which were impossible to set down in particular, which carry an everlasting testimony of God's just judgements against treacherous and disloyal princes, and faithless people, which mock at oaths. As for treacherous and disloyal subjects, they were never unpunished, In Veliternos veteres cives graviter saevitum, quod toties rebellarent, muri disiecti, 
Liu. lib. 8.  Senatus abductus, They punished the Veliternians (who were ancient citizens) very severely, their walls were cast down, and their Senate carried away. And after the second Punic war, the Roman subjects which had been traitors were excepted, Perfugae (inquit Livius) bello punico 380 Romam missi, virgis in Comitio caesi, & de Saxon deiecti, In the Punic war 380 runnawayes (saith Livy) being sent to Rome, were whipped in the open assembly, and cast down the rock. And if the enemy having given hostages, did infringe their treaties, the hostages were publicly put to death: as it happened unto three hundred hostages of the Volsques, which were slain: and in like case the hostages of the Tarentines, Fugientes retracti, ac virgis diu caesi, de Tarpeio deiecti 
Liu. lib. 35.  sunt, Fleeing they were fetched back, and being beaten long with rods, they were cast from the mount Tarpeia (saith Titus Livius.) But since that they have made a trade of the breach of faith, they have also made a conscience to put hostages to death: as Narses, who pardoned the hostages of the Luquoys, having broken their faith: and Charles duke of Bourgongne had no sooner set three hundred hostages of the Leegeois at liberty (the which he might justly have put to death, whatsoever Comines saith) but they attempted a new war against him.  
The clause that hostages should be subject unto capital punishments, was unknown to the ancients, for it was always lawful not only to kill hostages that fled, but also if they that had given hostages had infringed their faith. But since they have thought it fit to express those words in their promises, lest that hostages should plead ignorance of the law of arms, or that it should seem too cruel that one should suffer for another's offence. I will not deny but the Romans have somewhat blemished the brightness of their ancient integrity and justice, the which happened unto them not so much through their own fault, as by the Grecians and Carthaginians, whose treachery they had often tried: witness that which Livy writes of the Ambassadors that were sent into Greece, when as they made report of their charge in open Senate: he saith thus, L. Martius & Attilius Romam reversi, nulla alia re magis gloriabantur, quam decepto 
Liu. lib. 42.  per inducias & spem pacis Rege, quae magna pars Senatus probabat: sed veteres moris antiqui memores, novam istam sapientiam improbabant, nec astu magis quam vera virtute bellage ssisse maiores, denunciare bella, & saepe locum finire, quo dimicanturi essent. L. Martius and Attilius being returned to Rome, gloried in nothing more, than that they had circumvented the king with a truce, and the hope of peace: the which the greatest part of the Senate did allow of, but the most ancient (remembering their customs of old) did disallow of this new kind of wisdom, for that the ancients did not make war by craft and policy, but by virtue, proclaiming war, and oftentimes appointing the place where they would fight. Yea they were accustomed to renounce their alliance and friendship that had wronged them, before they would begin any war. Veteres, saith Suetonius, bellum indicturi, renunciabant amicitiam, The ancients when they 
Tacit. lib. 5. Liu. lib. 36.  would make war against any one, they renounced his friendship: a custom which was observed among private men, even in the time of the Emperor Tiberius: for Germanicus being grievously wronged by Piso governor of Soria, sent him word that he renounced his friendship: and Henry the 5 king of England sent word to Lewis duke of Orleans by his ambassador, That he could not defy him, unless he renounced his friendship, and sent back the alliance. And at this day those which be brethren in arms, and princes which do wear one another's order, they sand back the order before they make war. But the Greeks who had taught the Romans their deceits and disloyalties, were punished, as we may see in Livy, where he saith, Phocenses cum pacti essent nihil hostile se a Romans passuros port as aperuerunt, tum clamour est sublatus à militibus, Phocenses nunquam fidos socios, impune eludere: ab hac voce milites urbem diripiunt, Aemilius primo resistere, captas, non deditas urbes diripi, The Phocenses when they had contracted that they would not endure any hostile act of the Romans, they opened their gates; then began there a cry among the soldiers, that the Phocenses being never faithful associates did laugh at them unpunished: at this cry the soldiers spoil the town, at the first Aemilius made resistance, saying, That they used to spoil cities that were taken by force, and not that yielded. But the Romans to repair this error, left their city in full liberty, and restored them the lands they had taken from them. So Polybius who was a Greek borne, and governor to Scipio the African, speaking of the Greeks, saith, That a word among the Romans was sufficient, but in Greece for the lending of a hundred crowns they must have ten notaries, and twice as many seals, and yet would they break their faith. But it is far worse at this day, where there is no assurance neither in letters, seals, nor safegards, yea ambassadors are not assured, for we have seen Rincon and Fregose ambassadors to the king of France slain by the officers of the Emperor Charles the 5, and yet no justice was done of them: whereas the Romans delivered Minutius and Manlius to their enemies, and at another time Fabius and Apronius, to dispose of them at their pleasures, for that they had somewhat wronged the ambassadors, the which is forbidden by the law of arms. If faith be not kept with ambassadors, what shall we hope of others? yea some have gloried in kill them, as Helen Queen of Russia, being entreated by her enemies to make a league, to the end she might marry with their king, she buried all the ambassadors alive▪ and before they were advertised thereof, she sent them word that she would have ambassadors of greater worth, whereupon they sent her fifty more of the noblest of the whole country, all which she caused to be burned alive, and under promise of marriage she murdered five thousand which she had made drunk. It is not needful here to rehearse how many cities and people have been ruined and rooted out for the breach of faith with ambassadors, who are and aught to be sacred and inviolable. And ambassadors are also to be warned that they exceed not their charge, nor speak not any thing to the dishonour of the prince or people to whom they are sent, for a wise ambassador will always deliver his charge, if in things that be odious sparingly, and in those that be pleasing full, to the end that he may entertain princes in friendship, and appease hatred; for that princes do oftentimes fall into mortal quarrels through the indiscretion of ambassadors. Among many we have the example of Stephen Vavoide of Valachia, to whom the Procope of Tartary sent an hundred ambassadors, threatening to waste all his country with fire and sword, if he sent not back the Procopes son, whom he had taken prisoner. The Vavoide incensed at these threats, put them all to death, except one whom he sent home maimed of his members, to be a messenger of this strange calamity. Others revenge not injuries done unto them by ambassadors so indiscreetly, but yet as cruelly, lest they should seem to have broken their faith, dismissing them, and yet sending others after them to kill them: as Tuca queen of Sclavonia did, who sent some to murder the youngest of the three Roman ambassadors, having threatened her, the which was afterwards the cause of her ruin, and of her estate. But the fact of the king of Mofcovie was most barbarous, who seeing an Italian ambassador to put on his hat before he was bidden, he caused it to be nailed fast unto his head; a most cruel and barbarous deed, yet was there an error in the ambassador, who should hold the rank and dignity of the prince his master, so as it be not with the contempt of the prince to whom he is sent: for sometimes ambassadors relying upon the greatness of their master, forget themselves to meaner princes, especially men that are bred up in Popular estates, accustomed to speak with all liberty, think they may do so with monarchs, who are not accustomed to hear free speeches, and much less that the truth should be spoken unto them: for which cause Philip the young, king of Macedon, seeing the Roman ambassador question too boldly with him, he could not forbear to brave him with reproaches. And Popilius the Roman Legate used Antiochus king of Asia with greater presumption, making a circle with a rod about the king's person, willing him to give him answer, before he went out of that circle: here Livy saith, Obstupefactus est rex tam violento imperio, The king was amazed at so violent a command: and yet he did what the Romans commanded, having tried their power. Marius the elder used the like liberty towards Mithridates' king of Pontus or Amasia, who although he neither were ambassador, nor had any public charge, yet he said unto the king, That he must obey the commandment of the people of Rome, or be the stronger. Than did Mithridates found that true which was spoken of the Romans, That they were of a freer speech than any other nation. And sometimes too great liberty without any injury offends princes. For which cause Marc Anthony caused an ambassador which was sent from Augustus to be whipped, for that he talked too freely to queen Cleopatra. But those princes are wisest, which having received any affront from ambassadors, demand reparation from their masters: as Charles earl of Charolois, said unto the ambassadors of Lewis the eleventh, That his Chancellor had braved him, but the king would shortly repent it; and so it fell out: for the same year he embarked the king in a most dangerous war, with the hazard of his estate. And therefore king Francis the first, doubting that he should hear something of an herald which was sent from the emperor Charles the fift, that might be some impeach unto his majesty, he caused a gibe●… to be set up before the court gate, when he heard that he approached, letting him understand, that he would hung him, if he opened his mouth, for having given the emperor the lie, he knew well that the herald could not bring him any answer, without some touch to his honour and dignity. Some there be that will attempt war against their associates for any small injury: as the Scots did in old time against the Picts, for taking away their dogs, having lived together almost six hundred years in great peace and amity. A good prince must try all means, and dissemble many things, before he come to arms. I do not agreed with Bartol, who saith, That the peace is not violated, if any one hath undertaken that he shall not be wronged, and yet his things are stolen away by him with whom he hath made a peace: for that there was nothing that did sooner move the ancient Romans to make war, than for things taken away, and injuries done. M. Aurelius the emperor said well, Putasne non aliter vim inferri quam si homines vulnerentur: vis est etiam cum quod per judicem debuit, per te ipse arripis, Dost thou think that violence is not offered, unless that men be wounded. It is violence, when thou takest that of thine own authority, which thou shouldest recover by law. But some make breach of their faith, by a crafty interpretation of the law. As that which Bartol proves, If by the truce it be lawful for a French man to pass into England, upon condition, That if after the truce he be found within their limits, it shall be lawful to kill him: if before the end of the truce he departed out of England, and by a storm is driven back into England after the truce expired: in this case he saith, they may lawfully kill him. In my opinion they may ransom him by law, but not kill him: for that he doth nothing against the truce, that by tempest is cast upon his enemy's country. It would seem uniustand injurious, to repair that which happens accidentally with the loss of life.  
Finis Libri quinti.    

THE SIXT BOOK OF OR CONCERNING A COMMONWEAL.  

CHAP. I ¶ Of Censuring or Reformation, and wheher it be expedient to enroll and number the subjects, and to force them to make a declaration, or give a certificate of their private estates.  
HItherto we have described at large the first part of the definition of a commonweal: that is, the true governing of many families with absolute power, and that which depends of the said definition. It remains now to speak of the second part: that is, of that which is common to an estate; and which consists in the managing of the treasure, rents, and revenues, in taxes, imposts, coins and other charges for the maintenance of a commonweal. And for the better understanding hereof, let us first treat of Censuring. Census in proper terms is nothing else but a valuation of every man's goods: and for that we are to treat of revenues, it is very needful to speak of censuring, and to show, that of all the Magistrates of a commonweal, there are not many more necessary: and if the necessity be apparent, the profit is far greater, be it either to understand the 
The commendation of censuring, or estimating the subjects estates.  number and qualities of the citizens, or the valuation of every man's goods; or else for the well governing and awing of the subject. And calling to mind the farthest bounds of antiquity, I do much wonder, how so goodly a charge, so profitable and so necessary, hath been laid aside so carelessly, seeing that all the ancient Greeks and Latins did use it, some yearly (saith Aristotle) others from three, four, or from five years to five years, making an estimation of every man's wealth and private estate: whereof Demosthenes having made an abstract out of the public registers, said (speaking unto the people) that all the revenues of the country of Attica did amount unto threescore thousand talents, or thirty six millions of crowns. Even 
Censors used by the Greeks and Romans. Liu. ann●… 310▪ ab u c.  so the Romans (who did imitate the Grecians) could well embrace this custom, and bring it unto Rome: for which cause king Servius is much commended in histories. And although the people of Rome had disannulled and abolished all the edicts and ordinances of their kings, after they had expelled them, yet this law of censuring or surveying continued still, as the foundation of their treasure, imposts, and public charges, etc. was continued in the Consul's persons. But after that the Consuls were distracted & drawn away for warlike employments, they then created Censors, threescore and six years after that the Consuls had executed it. L. Papirius, and L. Sempronius being the first that were called Censores, and they held the office five years: but ten years after L. Aemilius Mamercus limited the time of the Censors office to eighteen months. And soon after, this custom was followed by all the cities of Italy, and namely by the Roman Colonies, who brought their Registers and Inrollments to Rome. Afterwards this charge was still continued; and even Caesar the Dictator took the pains to go from house to house to supply the Censors charge, although he called himself Magister morum, or Master of the manners. And as soon as the Emperor Augustus was returned to Rome, after his victory against Marc Anthony, the Senate by a public decree gave him the office of Censor, 
Caesar and Augustus were both created Ceniors.  calling him Prefectus morum, or Controller of manners, who thrice numbered the citizens of Rome, and valued every man's goods: and not only of the citizens of Rome, dispersed throughout the whole empire, but of all the subjects of every province: And was there ever Emperor that left so goodly an estate of an empire, as he did?  
Afterwards it was discontinued under the tyranny of Tiberius and Caligula, and revived again by Claudius the Emperor, which made the 74 Lustre. It was left again 
Lustrum.  under Neron, and continued again under Vespasian, who made the 75 Lustre: and then it left under the tyranny of Domitian, who called himself Perpetual Censor, and yet made no survey. A hundred and fifty years after, or thereabouts, the Emperor Decius caused the Senate to declare Valerian Censor, with ample authority. And since that this office was laid aside, the empire hath always declined. True it is, that the Emperors of Greece did erect an office, which they called Magistrum Census, or The master of inrollments, who kept the public registers containing all testaments and public acts, with the names and ages of every person; yet not with such dignity and power as the ancient Censors. But it is certain, that all towns subject to the Roman empire, had their Censors, even under Traian the Emperor, and that the Senators of every ●…owne were chosen by the Censors, as we may read in an epistle written by Pliny they younger to the Emperor Traian. And (not to go out of this realm) we read, that king Childebert, at the persuasion and instance of Marouëus Bishop of Poitiers, made an edict, commanding all his subjects to be enrolled, and their goods to be valued; the which is yet sometimes put in practice at Venice, Genes, and Luques, whereas there be Censors created: and namely at Venice in the year 1566 they made three Magistrates to reform the people's manners, whom they called, I Seignori sopra il been vivere de la citta: The Magistrates for the well living of the citizens: for that the name of Censor in a free city abounding with all kind of delights, seemed harsh and severe.  
Few years before the creation of this Magistrate, having set forth my book of the Method of Histories, I did therein much marvel, that in so great a number of officers, wherein the Venetians did exceed other cities, they had forgotten Censors, which were most necessary. The commonweal of Geneve in stead of Censors have deputed ten Ancients, the which are chosen as magistrates, whereof four are of the counsel of threescore, and six of the counsel of two hundred; which hold the 
Censors in effect created at Venice.  subjects of that state in such awe, as few offences remain unpunished: so as without doubt this commonweal will flourish, if not through arms and wealth, yet by their virtues and piety, so long as they shall maintain the authority of those Ancients. Whereby it doth plainly appear, that the best and most flourishing 
Censors not to be wanted in a well ordered commonweal.  cities could not long subsist without Censors: wherein many ignorant divines abuse themselves, in thinking that David was grievously reprehended by God, and punished, for that he commanded his people should be numbered; when as God 
Num. 1. 2. 3. 4. 21. 26.  commanded Moses the Emperor of the Israelites to do it after their departure out of Fgypt, and again before they entered into the land of promise; and not only to number them, but to note every family, and to take the name of every particular person before they had conquered any thing, the which he should leave to posterity: but the fault which David committed, was in forgetting God's commandment, charging him, that when he did number the people every one should offer unto God two groats of silver (as joseph hath very well observed) being commanded in the text of the law, to exact that holy tribute for an expiation of their sins, so often as he should please to have the people numbered: then he adds, Lest a plague should be among the people. But in my opinion herein was the greater offence, that the prince too arrogantly trusting more in the force of his legions, than in the power and help of the Almighty, did not number all his people, but those only that were able to bear arms, omitting the tribe of Levi (which attended the sacrifice) and the tribe of Benjamin. And whereas the law commands every one to put half a sickle, or two silver groats; that is done in my opinion, to abolish 
The numbering of the people appointed by God.  the impiety of the heathen, who taking the number of their subjects, offered a piece of silver for every one unto their gods: as also God commanded they should sprinkle the blood of the sacrifice above, and of either side of the altar, forbidding them expressly, not to offer any more blood unto their devils, that he might call his people from the inhuman and hateful worship of devils. And it seems that king Servius had borrowed this ceremony from the people of the East, when as he commanded a box to be set in juno Lucina's temple, into the which they put a denier for every one that was borne: and another in the temple of Iwenta, where they did also put a denier for every one that had attained to seventeen years of age, at what time they put on a plain gown without purple: and the third was in the temple of Venus Libitina, into the which they put a denier for every one that died: which custom continued inviolable, even when as the office of Censor was neglected.  
We read, that the Athenians were enrolled in the public registers at the age of 14 years, yet we found no mention made of the tribute. But the numbering of the people which God commanded to be made, was but of such as could carry arms, from 20 years upward; in the which it seems that old men above 60 were not comprised, & yet they were found by pole to amount to six hundred thirty thousand 
The number of the Israelites.  five hundred and fifty, besides the tribe of Levi which made twenty two thousand, from a month old upward, which was in all six hundred fifty two thousand five hundred and fifty. And forty years after the number was taken, when as all those which came forth were dead, except Moses, josua, and Caleb, they were found 
Exod. 120  to be six hundred twenty four thousand seven hundred seventy three, comprehending the levites, besides the women, slaves, old men, and youth under twenty years, which were at the lest twice as many. But Titus Livius speaking of the number of the citizens that were found in Rome, saith in his third book, Censa sunt civium capita 415 millia, preter orbos orbasque, the number of the citizens is 415000 besides the blind. Florus in his 59 book saith, Censa sunt civium capita 313 millia 823 preter pupillos & viduas, the citizens are numbered at 313823 besides widows and pupils. Five years after he saith, Censa sunt civium capita 390 millia 936, The number of the citizens is 390936. And in the following survey, 394356. And in the next enrolment 450000 and in the other after that 150000. I omit the former surveys, which are all greater than this last: but it seems the citizens of Rome were not excluded, as it may appear in that which I have noted, for that there were none but widows and orphelines excepted: and yet Florus saith in his 27 book, Censa sunt 137000 civium, ex quo numero apparuit quantum hominum tot preliorum adver sa fortuna populi Romani abstulisset: The number of the citizens were 137000: whereby it appears how many men the Romans lost in their unfortunate wars. And in the former view he saith, Censa sunt civium capita 270 millia: The check-roll of all the citizens comes to 270000. as if he would infer, that the losses which they had received against Hannibal, had carried away 133000 citizens: for if the women had been comprehended which went not to the war, there had remained none but women, for that they be always as many or more than men, as I have before showed. And in Athens there was a survey taken, whereas the number of women was greater than that of men, as Pausanias saith. But the scruple is decided by Titus Livius, where he saith, speaking of the seventh enrolment, Civium qui puberes essent, supra centum decem millia erant: mulierum autem & puerorum, seruorumque & mercatorum, & sordidas arts exercentium (siquidem Romanorum nemini cauponariam, aut operosam artem tractare licuit) triplo plus quàm turbae civilis. The citizens of full age were above 110000 of women, children, slaves, merchants: and of those which used base trades (for no Roman might be a victualler or handicrafts man) the number was thrice as many as of the civil sort: whereby it appears, that merchants, handycraftsmen, women, nor children, were not registered: as for slaves they were not numbered among the citizens, but among movable goods, the which were commonly fifty for one: and even in Athens there were found a hundred times more slaves than free men, by a survey that was taken, whereas for ten thousand strangers, and twenty thousand citizens, there were four hundred thousand slaves. And of the number that was taken at Venice about thirty years since, there were found two thousand women more than men, as I have formerly noted.  
The benefits which redounded to the public by this numbering of the people, 
The profit that may be gathered by the numbering of the people.  were infinite: for first they knew the number, age and quality of the persons, and what numbers they could draw forth, either to go to the wars, or to remain at home; either to be sent abroad in colonies, or to be employed in public works of reparations, and fortifications: thereby they shall know what provision of victuals is necessary for every city, and especially in a time of siege, the which is impossible to prevent, if they know not the number of the people. And if there were no other benefit but the knowledge of every man's age, it cuts off a million of suits and quarrels the which are invented touching the minority and majority of persons: 
A means to cut off suits.  for which cause king Francis the first commanded his chancellor Poyet, to puplish an edict, enjoining all curates to keep a register of all such as should be borne: but for that the registers are not kept as they aught, this law is ill observed. And in regard of the quality, we see an infinite number of suits touching the nobility, which should be avoided by this means: and the suits of forgery & falsehood, for the disguising 
The citizens estates are known by the Censors.  and concealing of names of the parents, country, estate, and quality, of every one, whether he be a citizen or a stranger, a bastard or lawfully borne, a nobleman or a patrician, a plebeian or a nobleman, and of what name & house he comes, for want of registers and censors can hardly be found out.  
This appeared plainly, when as Pericles numbered the citizens of Athens, for the prerogatives and privileges they had above strangers, where there were found thirteen thousand three hundred and sixty citizens, and five thousand strangers which carried themselves as citizens, and were sold for slaves by a public decree. 
The citizens order is known.  Moreover, to order and govern the bodies & colleges of citizens according to the estate and age of every person, as they did use in Rome and in Greece, it is more than necessary to know the number of the subjects; to gather their voices in elections the number is also requisite; to divide the people into ten, hundreds, and thousands, it is also necessary to know the number of them. But one of the greatest and most necessary first-fruits that can be gathered by this censuring and numbering of the subjects, is the discovery of every man's estate and faculty, and whereby he gets his living, thereby to expel all drones out of a commonweal, which suck the honey 
It expels vagabonds & idle persons out of an estate.  from the Bees, and to banish vagabonds, idle persons, thieves, cooseners, & ruffians, which live and converse among good men, as wolves do among sheep, spending their lives in thieving, dising, robbing, drinking and whoring; who although they walk in darkness, yet hereby they should be seen, noted and known. And as for the valuation of goods, it is no less necessary than the numbering of persons. Casiodorus speaketh thus, Orbis Romanus agris divisus censuque descriptus est, ut possessio sua nulla haberet incerta, quam pro tributorum susceper at quantitate soluenda, The Roman territories were divided, and every private man's land laid out, that no man's possession should be uncertain, the which he had taken for the payment of a certain rent or tribute. If then a survey were taken of all the Roman empire, and the lands distributed accordingly, that it might be known what burden every one 
A means to equal the charges and imposts according to every man's estate.  was to bear in regard of the goods he enjoyed; how much more necessary is it now, when as there be a thousand sorts of imposts in every commonweal, which the ancients did never know? This point is of such consequence, as it should suffice, if it served for nothing else, but to 'cause every one to bring in a declaration of his goods and revenues: as was done in Provence in the year 1471: whereby it did afterwards plainly appear that the commons were oppressed by the clergy and nobility, if it had not been provided for by an edict made by Francis the first, in the year 1534, and by another of his successors: whereupon the three estates of Provence (being grown into great suits) were called before the Parliament at Paris, where a provincial decree was made, That all men of what quality soever, should pay their charges & imposts according to the register made in the year 1471, when as there were three thousand houses charged with a sou upon the pound, without respect of families or persons, but to the lands subject to contribution. They were also constrained in the year 1516 to make a survey and declaration of all the benefices of this realm, in regard of the tithes, the which by reason of the daily alterations and changes require a new survey or numbering: for some Incumbent pays more than a moiety of his benefice, when as another payeth not the thirtieth part for the tithes. The like was required by Marill as the king's advocate for the subsidy of Provence.  
By this means the poor men's just complaints shall be relieved, whom the rich are accustomed to overcharge, and to free themselves throughout all the realm of France, as well as in Provence & Languedocke: By this means, mutinies (which are usual in every commonweal, for the unequality of charges) shall cease: and moreover all suits depending before judges for relief, should be quite cut off: by 
A means to avoid concussion and favour in them that make division of the subjects.  this means the concussions, malice or favour of the assessors and other officers, who have charge to make an equal distribution of the tribute or impost, shall be discovered, or at lest the controversy shall be decided by the Censors register: or else they might put in practise the custom of the ancient Athenians, whereas if any one were overcharged that had less wealth than another, he might force him that was less taxed to take his charge, or to change estates with him: as Isocrates, who lost against Lysimachides, and won against Megalides.  
By this means you shall know who be miserable, who prodigal, which be bankrupts, who rich, which poor, who cooseners, which usurers, & by what gains some get so much wealth, and others are oppressed with so great want, and how to redress it: for that by the extreme poverty of some, and the exceeding wealth of others, we see so many seditions, trouble, & civil wars arise. Moreover, all edicts and decrees, and generally all judgements and sentences touching fines & amercements, should be ordered, and justice equally administered, when as every mansestate were known, seeing that the punishment may not exceed the offence. Also, all deceits in marriages, in bargains and sales, in all private & public negotiations should be discovered and known.  
I omit a multitude of suits touching successions, divisions, and mortgages, the which are concealed for the most part, and should be made plain by the registers without search, the which should ease the subjects charge, and prevent the falsehood of witnesses. It may be some will say unto me, That it were a hard thing to expose the poverty of some to be scorned, and the wealth of others to be envied. Behold the greatest argument that can be objected to hinder so good and commendable a thing. But I answer, That all envy will cease against those whom they hold to be rich and are not, and the mockery against such as have wealth and were held poor. And shall the envy of the malicious, or the derision of the scorner, hinder so good and commendable a thing? Never wise prince nor good lawmaker did regard envy or scorn, when there is question of good laws. Although this law (whereof question is made) concerns only movable goods and not lands. To say, that it is neither good nor comely to know private men's wealth or wants, the course, traffic and negotiation of merchants, which consists most commonly in books of credit, nor to lay open the secrets of families; I answer, that there are none but cooseners & deceivers that are loath to have their lives laid open, & their actions known: good men that fear not the light, will be always glad to have their estates known, with their qualities, wealth and manner of living. An Architect said one day to Livius Drucius the Tribune, That he would make the lights of his house in such sort, as no man should overlook him: To whom Drusus answered, I pray you make it in such sort 
A notable answer of a Tribune.  as every one may look into it & see mine actions. Velleius Paterculus who writes the history saith, that this man was sanctus & integer vitae, of a holy & upright life. But the office of Censor is chief against the wicked: And in old times every Roman kept a register of his actions and expenses, and of all his goods: But upon the declining of the empire, when as vices began to spring up, they neglected it, saith Asconius, for that many were condemned by their registers. And I found not that ever any but tyrant's thieves and bankrupts hated the office of Censor, and have hindered 
The Censor hate full to the wicked  all they could the valuation of goods, as I have noted of Tiberius, Caligula, Nero, and Domitian. It is therefore a mere mockery, to pretend that this would be a means for tyrants to oppress their subjects with exactions: for there is no tyrant so cruel, but he will more willingly take from the rich than from the poor; whereas for want of a Censor the poor are pinched, and the rich save themselves. We also see that by the practices of the usurers & the rich citizens of Rome, of six Censors chosen successively in one year, not any one could intent his charge: whereupon the Tribunes making their complaints before the people, said, That the Senators feared the registers and public informations, which discovered every man's estate, and their active and passive debts, whereby they should found, that some of the citizens were oppressed by the others, and ruined by the usurers. And then the tribunes protested, that they would not suffer any debtor to be adjudged to his creditors, nor enrolled to go to the wars, until they had first seen a declaration of the debts, to the end they might provide as they should found it needful. Than did the debtors flock together about the Tribune, to give him aid and assistance. Why should a good creditor fear to have his debts and contracts viewed, or his lands (lawfully purchased) known? why should he hinder the knowledge of his goods, lawfully gotten by his industie and labour? It shallbe always honourable unto him; and if he be an honest man, if he loves the preservation of the common weal, and the relief of the poor, he will make no difficulty to give a declaration of his goods for the relief of the public, if need shall require. If he be wicked, if he be an usurer, an extortioner, a public thief, and a obber of private men, he hath reason to oppose himself all he can, that his goods, his life, nor his actions may be known: but there is no reason to ask the vintner's advice if they shall suppress alehouses; or the strumpet, if they shall put down the stues; nor of bankers, if they shall abolish usury; nor of the wicked, if they should have Censors.  
The ancient Greeks and Latins have always spoken of censuring, as of a divine thing, the which hath always preserved the greatness of the Roman empire so long as Censors were in credit. Titus Livius speaking of king Servius, who first ordained that every one should give a certificate of his goods, saith, Censuminstituit rem saluberimam 
The opinion of the ancients touching Censors.  tanto imperio, He instituted the office of Censor, a wholesome thing for so great an empire. But after that Censors were created in the Consul's place, and that by little and little they began to take knowledge of the life and manners of every one, than began they to respect the Censors, and to reverence them more than all other magistrates: whereof Titus Livius saith, Hic annus Censurae initium fuit, a parva origine ortae, quae deinde incremento aucta est, ut morum disciplinaeque Romanae penes eam regimen, Senatus, equitumque centuriae, decoris, dedecorisque discrimen sub ditione eius magistratus, publicorum ius, privatorumque locorum vectigalia populi Romani sub nutu atque arbitrio essent, This year was the beginning of the Censors office, springing from a small matter, the which was afterwards so augmented, as he controlled the manners and discipline of the Romans, the assemblies of the Senate, and of knights, also the distinction of honour and infamy were subject to this magistrate; and the public rites, with the revenues of private places belonging to the people of Rome, were censured 
The charge of the ancient Censors.  by him. The Censors office than was to receive the number of the persons, and the valuation of their goods, to be superintendent of the treasure, to farm out the imposts, customs, and all the revenues of the commonweal, to reform abuses, to place and displace Senators, to dismiss the men at arms, and to censure the life and manners of every one. Plutarch speaks in a higher style, terming the office of Censor, Most sacred and mighty. It may be some will say, that the charge was over great: yet two Censors were sufficient in so great an empire. But their charges may be divided: for to place and displace Senators, that charge was given unto the Censors, to ease the people, saith Festus: the which could not be done in a monarchy, 
The Censors reformers of abuses.  whereas the prince makes choice of all magistrates, especially of his counsel. Yet it were necessary, that the overseers of the treasure should be true Censors, that is, men without blame or reproach: for you must always commit the purse to the most trusty, and the reformation of abuses to the most upright. As for the reformation of abuses, it is the goodliest thing that ever was invented in any commonweal, and it hath best maintained the greatness of that empire: ●… for even as the Censors were always chosen out of the most virtuous men of the commonweal, so did they strive to conform the subjects to the true pattern of honour and virtue. This was done from five years to five years: & after that they had settled the estate of the treasure, and farmed out the revenues. And if they discontinued this charge (as oftentimes it fell out by reason of the tediousness of the wars) then did it plainly appear, that the people grew corrupted in manners, and that commonweal declined, like unto a body which leaves his ordinary purging: this was manifest during the second Punic war, when as they had no time to attend that charge conveniently, but as soon as Hannibal was retired into the territories of Naples, than the Censors (saith Titus Livius) Ad mores hominum regendos animum adverterunt, castigandaquè vitia▪ quae velut diutinos morbos aegra corpora ex sesegignunt, nata bello erant, The Censors applied themselves to reform men's manners, and to punish vices, the which had sprung up by reason of the wars, as continual fevers do in sick and corrupt bodies. And yet they dealt not with any abuses, but such as were not to be censured by the judges: for the magistrates and the people took knowledge of murders, parricides, thefts, concussions, and such like crimes, the which are punished by the laws. Is it not sufficient, will some one say, to punish crimes and offences by the law? My answer is, That the laws punish those offences only, which trouble the quiet of a commonweal: and yet the greatest offenders do easily escape the punishment of the law, even as great beasts do easily break through the spider's web. And who is so ill advised, as to measure honour and virtue by the laws? Quis est (saith Seneca) qui se profitetur legibus omnibus innocentem? ut haec it a sit, auàm augusta est innocencia adlegem bonum esse: quanto latiùs patet officiornm quàm juris regula? quàm multa pietas, humanitas, liberalitas, justicia, fides exigunt, quae extra publicas tabulas sunt! What is he that professeth himself an innocent by all laws? how strict is innocency, to be good according to the law? how much larger are the rules of duty than of law? how many things do piety, humanity, liberality, justice, and faith, challenge at our 
The greatest viees are punished by the Censors.  hands, the which are not inserted in the public tables? It is manifest, that the most detestable vices, and that most corrupt a commonweal, are never called into judgement. Treachery is not punished by the law, being one of the most abominable vices: But the Censors (saith Tully) were not so curious of any thing, as to punish perjury. Drunkenness, gaming, palliardise, and looseness of life, are suffered with all impunity; and who can redress these disorders but the Censor? We see most commonweals swarm with vagabonds, idle persons, and ruffians, who by their deeds and examples corrupt good citizens; and there is no mean to expel this vermin, but 
A necessary reason to confirm the Censors office.  by the Censor. There is yet one special reason which shows that the Censors office is now more necessary than ever: for that in old times the master of every family had absolute command, the father over his children, the master over his slaves had absolute power of life and death, without any appeal; and the husband had the like authority over the wife in four cases, as we have showed elsewhere: but all this now ceasing, what justice may we expect of the impiety of children against their fathers and mothers? of the ill government of married couples? of the contempt of masters? How many virgins do we see sold and dishonoured by the parents themselves, or that rather suffer them to live loosely than to be married, thinking it better to cast forth their children, or to kill them, than to nourish them? and how can all this be prevented but by a Censor?  
I dispute not of the conscience to God, the which is the chiefest and most principal thing that aught to be cared for in every family & common weal; the which care although it hath been always committed unto Bishops, ministers, and other spiritual officers, yet the magistrate aught to have a special regard that it be above all things held in reverence: for although the law of God commands that every one appear before him at the three great feasts of the year at the lest, yet there are some which never go, and so by this contempt of religion, hath sprung up by little and little, the detestable sect of Atheists, which have nothing but blasphemy in their mouths, and contempt of divine and human laws; whereby do follow infinite murders, parricides, poisonings, treasons, perjuries, adulteries, and incests: neither is it to be expected, that either prince, or magistrate shall reduce those subjects under the obedience of the laws, that have trodden all religion under foot. But this depends of the overseears or Censors, who use divine laws when as man's decrees are of no force: for that Legum metus non scelera, sed licentiam comprimit, The fear of laws doth not suppress the crimes, but the liberty. There have been and are at this day infinite numbers, who although they offend not the prince's laws, yet live they most wickedly, and as Lactantius said well, Possunt enim leges delict a punire, conscientiam munire non possunt. laws may well punish offences, but they cannot fortify and amend the conscience. And as for the bringing up of youth (the which is one of the chiefest charges of a commonweal, whereof as of young plants they should have the greatest care) we see it is neglected, and that which should be public, is left to every man's discretion, using it at his pleasure, some in one sort, some in another, the which I will not touch here, having treated thereof in an other place. And for that Lycurgus said, That thereon consisted the foundation of a commonweal; he appointed the great Pedonome to be Censor of the youth, and to govern them according to the laws, not at the parent's discretion: for as the scope and end of a city is all one, so the education of all the citizens, according to Aristotle's opinion, should be all one: and so did the Athenians decree by a public edict, made at the request of Sophocles, knowing well, that in vain were laws made, if youth (as Aristole said) were not instructed in good manners. All this depends on the care and vigilancy of Censors, first to have a care of the manners and behaviour of schoolmasters.  
I will pass over with silence the abuses which are committed in suffering of comedies 
Comedies and plays pernicious to a commonweal.  and interludes, the which is a most pernicious plague to a commonweal: for there is nothing that doth more corrupt the citizens good manners, simplicity, and natural bounty; the which hath the more power & effect, for that their words, accents, gesture, motion's, and actions, governed with all the art that may be, and of a most filthy and dishonest subject, leaves a lively impression in their souls which apply thereunto all their senses. To conclude, we may well say that the Commedians stage is an apprenticeship of all impudency, looseness, whoredom, cozening, deceit and wickedness. And therefore Aristotle did not without cause say, That they must have a care lest the subjects went to comedies: he had said better, That they should pull down their theatres, and shut the commedians out of the city gates: Quia (said Seneca) nihil tam moribus alienum, quàm in spectaculo desidere: For there is nothing more contrary to good manners, than to haunt plays. And therefore Philip Augustus king of France, did by a public edict banish all players out of his realm. If any one will say, that both Greeks and Romans did allow of plays: I answer, that it was for a superstition they had unto their gods; but the wisest have always blamed them: for although a Tragedy hath something in it more stately and heroic, and which doth make the hearts of men less effeminate, yet Solon having seen the Tragedy of Thespis played, did much mislike it: Whereof Thespis excusing himself, said, It was but a play: Not (replied Solon) but this play turns to earnest. Much more had he blamed Comedies, that were then unknown: and now adays they put at the end of every Tragedy (as poison into meat) a comedy or jig. And although that comedies were more tolerable among those that devil in the Southern parts, being more heavy and melancholy by nature, & for their natural constancy less subject to change; yet should they be utterly defended to those that live towards the North, being of a sanguine complexion, light and inconstant, having in a manner all the force of their soul in the imagination of the common and brutal sense. But there is no hope to see plays forbidden by the magistrates, for commonly they are the first at them.  
It is the proper charge of the grave and wise Censors, who will be careful to entertain the honest gymnastical exercises, to keep the body in health: and of music to restrain the appetites under the obedience of reason: I mean music, which doth not only signify harmony, but also all liberal and honest sciences; 
Two means to maintain a city.  having a special care, that this natural music be not altered, nor corrupted, as it is at this day, seeing there is no thing that slips more sweetly and insensibly into the interior affections of the mind. And if we may not prevail so much as to have the jonique and Lydian songs, that is to say, the fift and seventh tunes banished out of a commonweal, and defended from all youth (as both Plato and Aristotle said it was necessary) at the lest let not the Diatonie music (which is more natural than the Chromatique or Enharmonique) be corrupted by other medleys: and that the Dorien songs, or of the first tune (the which is proper to sweetness and seemly gravity) be not disguised into many tunes, and so divided, as most part of musicians become fools or mad men, for that they cannot taste of a natural music, no more than a weak stomach corrupted with delicates, can digest good and substantial meat. All this depends of the Censors duty: for that neither judges no●… any other officers will ever regard it.  
They also complain of excess in apparel, and that the sumptuarie laws are trodden under foot. It shall nueer be reform, if therebee not Censors to see the laws executed, as in old time the Nomophylaces, or Law keepers, did in Athens. And therefore an ancient Orator said, That the Tribune which first restrained the Censors authority, had ruined the commonweal: It was Clodius, one of the wickedest men of his time, which law was six years after disannulled by the law Caecilia.  
Seeing then that to censure is so goodly, profitable, and necessary a thing, let us now see, if Censors aught to have any jurisdiction: for it seems it should be but a jest without some jurisdiction. Yet I say, that the Censor aught not to have any 
The Censors aught to have no jurisdiction.  jurisdiction at all, to the end that his charge be not entangled with suits and controversies. In like sort, the ancient Roman Censors had no jurisdiction; but a look, a word, and a dash with a pen, was more bloody, and touched more to the quick, than all the decrees and judgements of the magistrate. When as they made their scrutiny or survey, you should have seen four or fi●…e hundred Senators, the order of horsemen, and all the people stand trembling before them: the Senator fearing jest he should be put from the Senate; the horseman from his horse, & ranked among the base sort: and the simple citizen to be razed out of his order and from his line, and placed among the tributaries: as Titus Livius doth testify, That 66 Senators were razed at one time out of the register, and excluded the Senat. And yet jest this great honour and authority of the Censors should make way to a 
The Censors have no power not jurisdiction.  tyranny, if they were armed with power and jurisdiction, or if any should be condemned without hearing; it was therefore well advised they should have nothing but the censuring and reformation. And therefore Tully said▪ That the judgement of the Censors did only make men blush: and for that it did but touch the name, the Censors correction was called Ignominia, Ignominy; the which differs from infamy, depending upon the judge that hath public jurisdiction, and in causes that 
L. 1. de ijs qui n●…tant infam.  make men infamous. And therefore the Praetor did note them as infamous, that were cassiered with ignominy, the which had been ridiculous, if they had been infamous. And yet the doubt which Lawyers have made, If ignominious men should suffer as the infamous; shows plainly, that Ignominy and Infamy is not all one, as many have supposed.  
By the ancient custom of Greece, it was lawful to kill any one, or any of his children that was noted infamous, as the Orator Libanius saith in his pleading for Halirhotius. Now although the Censor had razed any Senator out of the Register book, yet if he would make petition unto the people he was admitted, and sometimes absolved and restored: but if there were any accuser that did second the Censor, or if the Censor himself would accuse any as a private man, if the accused 
A censure is no judgement.  were found guilty, and condemned by the people, or by Commissioners deputed by the people, than was he not only ignominious, but also infamous, and declared incapable ever to bear office: and therefore those which were censured, they were not judged, but yet they were as a man may say, d: and if the Censor were an eloquent man, he would oppose himself as an accuser of those that would seek to be restored against his censure: as Cato did against Lucius Flaminius, making an oration against his filthy and disordered life, having razed him out of the register of Senators. But those that were better advised, and had some hope of restitution, sued for some office, or honourable commission from the people, the which if they obtained, they were freed from all censure of ignominy, or else they were restored by the other Censors five years after: if he did perform neither the one nor the other, he was not admitted into the Senate: neither could a horseman recover his horse nor his rank. And (Vlpianus speaking of these men) doubts whether they are to be admitted as witnesses. And for the better confirmation hereof, Cicero brings in an example of Caius Geta, who was excluded the Senate by the Censors, 
Pro Cluentio.  and yet afterwards he was chosen Censor: and a little after speaking of censuring, he saith▪ That the ancients would have the Censors office to carry a certain fear, and not a punishment. The which was partly the cause why the Claudian law was disannulled, the which would not have any Senator excluded the Senate, nor razed out of the registers, if he were not accused before both by the Censors, and condemned by either of them, the which had embased the office of Censor, being so reverend, as the Senate of Rome would not permit the Censors (after their charge expired) to be accused, or called in question for any thing that they had done during their charge: the which was lawful against all other magistrates. And it seems for the same reason the Emperor Constantine did tear the libels of accusation propounded against the Surueilans or Overseers at the Council of Nice, saying, That he would not judge them that were Censors of every man's life. And for the same cause Charlemagne in his constitutions hath made a Canon, That no prelate should be judged without 72 witnesses, freeing the Pope from the censure of any man: the which hath been observed until the council of Constance, where it was decreed, That the Pope should be judged by the Council. I will not here dispute if the ecclesiastical jurisdiction be well grounded; but it is to be feared, that having presumed so much, they are likely to loose both jurisdiction & all ecclesiastical censure, the which hath always been of great consequence: for even as the ancient Divides (who were ancient judges and Prelates in Gaul) did excommunicate kings 
Caesarin Coment.  and princes that would not obey their decrees, even so the ecclesiastical censure amongst Christians, hath not only maintained discipline and good manners for many ages, but hath also made Tyrants to tremble, and reduced Kings and Emperors unto reason, pulling oftentimes their crowns from their heads, and their sceptres out of their hands, forcing them to make peace or war, to change their dissolute life, to do justice, and to reform the laws. All the histories are full, but there is none so famous, as of Saint Ambrose, who did censure Theodosius the Great, and Nicholas 1 Pope, who censured Lothaire King of Italy: and Innocent, who did excommunicate Lewis 7 King of France, to whom for three years space no priest durst administer the Sacrament.  
True it is, that the abuse of a censure of so great consequence, hath made the ministers, the discipline, and their censure to be contemned, the which consisted in interdiction, suspension, and excommunication: for many upon light causes, and without cause did excommunicate, yea they have set down 39 causes wherein a man did incur excommunication ipso facto, without judgement or sentence; and which is more, they did excommunicate Corporations, Colleges, Universities, Emperors, Kings, and Kingdoms, without distinction of age, sex, innocents, or mad men, although since (but too late) they have somewhat corrected this abuse: but in this kingdom it was decreed by the statutes of Orleans, that they should not use any excommunication, but in crimes and public scandal. The Prelates, Bishops, and Popes, have always pretended the censure of manners and religion to belong unto them, as a thing whereof judges and magistrates take no knowledge, but in case of execution. And since the ancients and overseers have used the like prerogative in many places, a thing which is very necessary, if there be no Censors, as well to reform the people's manners, and to watch over them, as to countenance the dignity of Pastor's Bishops and Ministers, whom we cannot esteem and honour too much, for the charge and dignity which they bear; God did wisely provide, making choice of his ministers, and giving the prerogative of honour unto the tribe of Levi, above all the tribes, and to the family of Aaron, of the which the Priests only were, above all the levites, giving them the tenths of cattle, first-fruits, and of all heritage's, with great honours and privileges: and by an article of the law of God it is said, That he that shall disobey the sentence 
〈◊〉. 17.  of the high Priest, shall be put to death. And they that shall abase the estate of the Ministers, Bishops, and Ancients, and seek to take from them, all ecclesiastical censure, with their goods and honours, to see them poor and scorned, they contemn God, and regard not religion, the which is a matter very considerable: and 
The poverty and contempt of the ministers makes religion to be contemned.  it was partly the chief cause, why the chief Minister of Losanna forsook the town, for that the heads of the Cantons could not endure that the Ancients should have the censuring of manners: yet the one is most necessary in every well governed commonweal, either to created Censors▪ or to submit themselves to the censure of the Bishops.  
The signory of Geneve reserves this prerogative to their Bishops, Ministers, and Ancients, to have the privilege of a Corporation, and to censure the lives, and manners of men in their consistory, and yet without any jurisdiction to command, or to execute their sentences, either by themselves, or by the officers of the signory, but for disobedience they excommunicate him, a matter of greater consequence: for the person excommunicated, after a certain time is pursued criminally before the magistrate, by the Inquisitor of the faith, as in the catholic church, but not so soon: for there hath been some one excommunicate fifteen years, and afterwards convented before the Inquisitor of the faith, who meant to proceed against him, he hath appealed to the Parliament, where his appellation was rejected, & he condemned in a fine, decreeing, that he should be seized on, and carried to the Bishop's prison, commanding the Inquisitor to proceed in his trial, even unto a definitive sentence, and to certify the Court. It was in those days, when as it was lawful to excommunicate any man even for petty debts, although the debtors had made it known that they had not any thing. But after the edict made at Orleans, and confirmed by the Parliament, the Bishops and Ancients could not use such censures within this realm. At Lion's Mr de Moulin was much discontented against the consistory, saying, That under colour of their censure they attempted upon the temporal jurisdiction, and yet he blamed it in the catholic church. But taking away suspension, interdiction, and excommunication, the ecclesiastical censure is of no force, and by the same inconvenience, good manners and discipline is abolished: but there is no reason, that for disobedience in slight matters, they should use such censures.  
The ancient Censors did set notes and marks upon the registers against those that deserved it, to advertise their successors in their charge of those that were so noted, if they did not amend. In my opinion that should suffice, and not to proceed against them by any amercements, or to excommunicate them for want of payment. I leave it to the wise to decide, whether it be better to divide the temporal censure (touching manners & other things above specified) from the ecclesiastical censure, or to join them together. But yet it were better to allow both to the Bishops & Ancients, than to take all from them, and thereby to deprive the commonweal of that which is most necessary: for we see those estates which do use it, to flourish in laws and good manners: we see whoredom, usury, mummeries, and excess in all things rooted out, the blasphemer, ruffian, and idle vagabound banished; and without doubt, those commonweals which shall use such censure, shall continued and flourish in all virtues: they which neglect laws, virtue, and religion, will be contemned, as it happened in Rome not long before the ruin of the empire; when as in stead of Censors, they created an office which they called The Tribune of Plaisirs, as we may note in Cassiodorus. But for that the Censors office was first instituted in regard of taxes, subsidies, and imposts, and to make a stock for public necessities, let us also speak of treasure.   

CHAP. II Of Treasure.  
IF Treasure be the sinews of a commonweal, as an ancient Orator said, it is very necessary to have the true knowledge thereof, first 
Money the sinews of a Commonweal.  to see by what honest means to gather money together; secondly, to employ it to the profit and honour of the commonweal; and lastly, to spare and to reserve some part for all needful events, lest the public treasury being exhausted, the commonweal might be oppressed with sudden calamity. We will therefore handle these three points every one in order.  
Touching the first point. There are many craftsmasters in matters of imposts, which know many means to raise up great sums of money, but they never had the true knowledge of honour and honesty. But leaving these cunning politicians I will follow those, who as they have had a great care of the treasure, so have they sought by honest means to increase the revenues of the commonweal, jest the city by want should be drawn into danger, and the prince forced by unlawful means to suck the private wealth and blood of his subjects, as it hath happened to those that seemed best acquainted with politic affairs: amongst the which the Lacedæmonians are named, whom not content with their own territories, as their master Lycurgus 
Polib. l. 6. de milit. ac domest. Rom. disciplino.  had taught them, taking from them all use of gold and silver, enjoining them to make money of iron, lest that strangers should grow in love with the Lacedæmonians country, or they with that of strangers, supposing thereby not only to free his citizens from injuries, but also from foreign vices: But they had no sooner passed their frontiers but they fell to borrowing, some of the king of Persia, as Lysander and Callicratides: some of the king of Egypt, as Agesilaus, and Cleomenes, kings of Lacedaemon. For which cause the Signiory of Sparta having soon won all Greece, and gathered together a great mass of treasure, they decreed, That all the gold and siiluer which they had taken from their enemies, should be kept in the public Treasury, to serve them at their need, with defence not to use it for any private occasion: but their treasure without ground or supply being soon wasted, they were forced to return to borrowing to make war (the which is not entertained and maintained by diet, as an ancient Captain said) whereby their commonweal 
War is not maintained by a diet.  decayed under king Cleomenes. Every commonweal therefore must provide to have their treasure built of a sure and durable foundation. There are only seven means in general for the making of a public treasure, in the which all other are contained. The first is, by the revenues of the commonweal: The second, by conquest 
Seven means to gather treasure.  from the enemy: The third, by the liberality and gift of friends: The fourth by the pensions & tribute of their allies: The fifth, upon traffic: The sixt, upon merchants, which bring in and carry out merchandise: And the seventh upon the subjects imposts.  
Touching the first, which grows by the revenues, there is not any seems to me more honest & sure. So we read that all the ancient monarches and lawgivers, which builded new cities, or transported new colonies, they assigned (besides the streets, temples, theatres, & the possessions of private men) certain places fit for the commonweal, and free to all in general; the which were called Commons, and let out to private men for a certain time, or for ever, paying a yearly rent into the Treasury or 
Revenues the chiefest means to make a treasure.  Exchequer, to supply the charges of the commonweal. We read that Romulus the founder of Rome & of the Roman commonweal, divided all the lands into three parts; appointing a third for the temporal of the Church, a third for the rents of the commonweal, and the surplusage to be divided among private men, the which at that time were three thousand citizens, every one of the which having too journeys, 
The division of the lands about Rome.  or acres of land: so as of eighteen thousand journeys or acres of land, lying in the territories of Rome, they reserved six thousand for the sacrifices, six thousand for the revenues of the commonweal and entertainment of the king's house, and six thousand for the citizens. Yet Plutarch sets down twice as many citizens, and saith that Romulus would set no limits of the territory of Rome, jest it should be seen what he 
The first beginning of public rents.  had usurped from his neighbours, and that his successor Numa divided the revenues to poor citizens: but the first opinion is the more likely and the more common; for the division of two journeys or acres continued a long time, as Pliny saith, speaking to Cincinatus the Dictator, the which was two hundred and threescore years after Romulus: Aranti sua duo iuger a Cincinato viator inquit, vela corpus & audi mandata Senatus: Cincinatus ploughing his two acres, Passenger (saith he) uncover thy body, and hear the commandments of the Senat. And Denis Halicarnasseus holds the first opinion; he was in household with Marcus Varro, the true Register of all Roman antiquities. But since by the law Licinia, every citizen was allowed to have seven journeys or acres of land. If it be true which we read in Pliny, or Collumella: Post exactos Reges Liciniana illa septem iugera, quae plebis Tribunus viritim diviserat, maiores questus antiquis retulêre, quàm nunc nobis praebent amplissima veruacta, After the expulsion of the kings, those seven acres which the Tribune divided to every one by the law Licinia, did yield our ancestors more profit, than now our large fields. And the oration of Marcus Curius is well known, noting him as a pernicious citizen that could not be contented with seven acres. In this division Romulus did imitate the Egyptians, who in old time divided all the revenues of Egypt into three parts: The first was for the sacrifices and sacrificers; The second, to entertain the king's house, and to defray the public charges; And the third for the Calasiris, the which were the men of war, always entertained to serve at need: all the other citizens were either husbandmen, or slaves. We read also, that Ezechiel, in reforming the abuses of the princes of the Hebrews, appointed certain lands for the sacrifices, some common for the people, besides the revenues for the entertainment of the king's house, and to serve for public expenses. To the end (saith he) that the princes shall no more grieve my people with exactions and imposts. Although from the beginning of the Israelits kingdom, the kings had some revenues; for the town of Ziceleg, with some land being given to David by king Achis, continued for ever as part of the king's revenues, and was never alienated. Of the regal revenues some are public, some are private, the last may be sold and made away, the first never. And to the end that princes should not be forced to overcharge their subjects with imposts, or to seek any unlawful means to forfeit their goods, all Monarches and States have held it for a general and undoubted law, That the public 
The public revenues by nature are inalienable.  revenues should be holy, sacred, and inalienable, either by contract or prescription. In like sort, kings (especially in this realm) granting their Letters patents for the reunion of crown lands, declare, that they have taken an oath coming to the crown, in no sort to cell or make away the revenues: and although it were duly and directly made away, were it for ever, yet is it always subject to be redeemed, and in such sort as the prescription of a hundred years, which gives a just title to the possessor, doth not touch the revenues of the crown. The edicts, decrees, and 
Nulla preseriptia occurrit Regi.  ordinances of this realm are notorious, not only against private men, but even against princes of the blood, who have been put from the division of the revenues, & the prescription of a hundred years. And this is not peculiar to this realm alone, but common to the kings of England, Spain, Poland, and Hungary, who are accustomed to swear not to alienate the revenues of the crown. The which is also observed in popular & Aristocritall states: and even at Venice the law allows no prescription (the which many would limit to six score years:) nor yet the Cantons of the Swissers: for king Henry 2 having requested the signory of Lucerne to engage themselves for a certain sum of money, Hugo the chief magistrate made answer unto the Ambassador, That both the Senate and Commons of Lucerne had sworn, never to pawn nor engage their lands. We read also, that the same ordinances were religiously observed in two the most goodly commonweals that ever were, Athens and Rome, whereas two great personages, Themistocles and Cato the Censor, caused all the public revenues to be seized on, the which had through tract of time, and sufferance of magistrates been usurped by private men, saying in their orations, Nec mortales contra deum immortalem, nec privatos contra 
Plut. in Catone Censorie, & Themist.  Rempub▪ praescribere posse, That mortal men could never prescribe against the immortali God, nor private men against the commonweal. And therefore the court of Parliament upon a civil request obtained by the king's Proctor general, against a decree made in favour of the successors of Foelix of Nogaret, to whom king Philip the fair 260 years before had given the lands and Signiory of Caluisson, for his virtues and well deserving of the commonweal, whereby it was revoked unto the Council: showing thereby that prescription hath no place, when there is any question of the revenues of the crown. And the court of Parliament at Rovan, by a sentence given the 14 of February, 1511, betwixt the king's proctor and the religious of S. Omer, adjudging the possession of certain goods unto the king, allowing the religious to relieve themselves by some other means, and to prove it duly, by way of inquest, and for cause, which words (and for cause) are not to be understood for the poor subjects of the country only, but generally for all. And oftentimes the treaties made betwixt princes have no other difficulties, but for the preservation of the revenues, the which princes cannot alienate to the prejudice of the public. Henry 8 king of England in a treaty made with the Pope and potentates of Italy, in the year 1527, caused this clause to be added, That they might not give away any thing of the crown of France, for the redeeming of king Francis: and upon this point the breach of the treaty of Madrid was grounded, for that the ancient custom of this realm, conformable to the edicts or ordinances of other nations, requires the consent of the three estates: the which is observed in Poland, by a law made by Alexander king of Poland, according to the disposition the common law, unless the sale were made at such time as the enemy had invaded the country: and that the form be observed from point to point, as in the alienation of pupil's goods (the commonweal being always regarded as a pupil) and if there be any thing omitted, it is all of no force, or at the lest it is subject to rescission, without restitution unto the purchasor of the thing purchased. Neither can the prince challenge 
L. si secundum C. de 〈◊〉 Reip.  that unto himself which belongs unto the public, no more than a husband can his wives dowry, wherein the prince hath less right; for the husband may abuse the first-fruits of his wives dowry at his pleasure, but a prince may well use, but not abuse the first-fruits of a public dowry: as the citizens that were in society with the Athenians complained, that the public money was to be put in Apollo's treasury, and not to be wasted by the Athenians.  
Our kings have and do acknowledge, that the propriety of the crown lands is not the princes: for king Charles the 5 and 7, would not have the crown lands pawned, unless the Parliament at the instance of the king's Proctor had so decreed, as we may see in the ancient registers of the court of Parliament, and chamber of accounts; and the reason is, for that the revenues belong unto the commonweal, as wise princes have always acknowledged: & when as king Lewis the 8 died (having given much by his testament to poor widows and orphans) he commanded all his jewels and movables to be sold to perform his legacies, lest that any thing belonging to the crown should be sold, as having no interest in it. And for this cause Pertinax the Roman Emperor caused his name being written upon the public lands, to be razed out, saying, That it was the very inheritance of the commonweal, and not the Emperors, although they enjoy the rents for the maintenance of their houses and the commonweal. And we do also read, that Antonius Pius lived of his own inheritance, applying nothing that belonged to the public, to his private use: whom king Lewis 12 (called the father of his country) doth seem to imitate, who would not mingle his patrimony & revenues, with that of the public; 
The public re●…nueses and the prince's patrimony differ.  erecting the chamber of Blois for his lands at Blois, Coussy, and Montfort: and yet many have erroneously confounded the public with the princes private lands. Neither is it lawful for sovereign princes to abuse the first-fruits and revenues of the crown lands, although the commonweal be in quiet and free from all trouble; for that they have the use only, and aught (the commonweal and their house being maintained) to keep the surplusage for public necessity: although that Pericles said to the Ambassadors of the confederates, That they had no interest in the employment of the treasure, so as they were maintained in peace: for it was contained in the treaty of alliance, that the money which should be raised in the time of peace, should be gared in Apollo's temple, and that it should not be employed but by a common consent. But there is great difference betwixt the Treasury or Exchequer in a monarchy, and in popular states: for a prince may have a treasury of his private patrimony, the which was called Fiscus by the Ancients, and that of 
Asconius et ulp. in l. 2. §. hoc interdictum. Ne quid in loc●… pub.  the public revenues Aerarium: the one being divided from the other by the ancient laws, the which can have no place in a popular or Aristocratical estate. Yet there never wanted flatterers to persuade princes to cell the revenues of the crown to make a greater benefit; the which is a tyrannical opinion, and the ruin of a commonweal: for it is well known, that the public revenues consist chief in that which Dukes, Marquesses, Earls, and Barons did sometimes possess, the which, either by succession, dowry, or by confiscation, have come unto the state in Lordships, copyholds, in fees, alienations, sales, seazures, rents, amercements, rights, confiscations, and other regalities, the which are not subject to imposts and ordinary charges, and oftentimes are gotten by them which are free from all charges. Moreover, commissions granted to cell the public revenues, for the making of money speedily, allow it to be sold for ten years purchase, when as private lands 
By the edict of Francis 1, in the year 1544.  in fee with justice are sold for thirty years purchase, and those that have dignities at fifty years and more: so as some with purchase of the public lands, reap in one year more profit by the jurisdiction, than they paid for the land. Others have paid 
The great prei●…dice that comes by public sales.  nothing at all, taking the valuation of the revenue by extracts from the Chamber of accounts, given in by the receivers in ten years, who oftentimes have not received any thing, for that the profit of inferior justice is made in the chief and regal court. As for sales, the purchaser hath more profit, than the interest of the money which they have paid can amount unto: as also the receivers of the revenues are not accustomed▪ to give any account of casualties, but for a small part. But in farming out the crown lands, the farmers are liable to subsidies, and are charged according to their abilities.  
There are infinite more abuses which the commonweal sustains by the sale of their revenues, but the greatest is, that the money which is made is not put out to rend (like unto those that think to be good husbands) but is most commonly wasted and given unto them that have lest deserved, and so for want of money to redeem this land, the commonweal falls to decay: then do they also cell the commons whereby the poor are relieved. It were more fit to cell the waste lands of the commonweal, 
The waste lands may be sold.  the which no man will hire, and brings no benefit to the commonweal, to the end the Treasury may be enriched, and that the citizens may profit by the tilling thereof: but if they may have a farmer, it is not lawful to cell it, although that Aristotle commends them of Constantinople, who sold their lands for a continual rent, the which is a mere alienation, and money taken before, diminisheth the rent: the which was expressly defended by an edict made by Charles the ninth. And although that afterwards he made an other edict for the renting out of waste lands, and paying of fines, by the persuasion of such as sought to make money: yet the Parliament of Paris upon the verification of the said edict, decreed, That the rents should not be redeemed, and that there should be no fine paid at the beginning; and for that the Commissioners for this sale did sue unto the King that it might be lawful to give money at the entry, the Court (all the Chambers being assembled) decreed, That the purchasers might not give above a third of the sum at the entry, in regard of the value of the lands: the which third part should 
7. May 1566.  be received by the receivers of the revenues apart, to be employed to redeem the revenues that were sold, imposing a quadruple penalty to be levied, as well upon the receivers, as of those that had gotten any assignation of the said money. And it is not here needful to relate what losses the king and commonweal have sustained by such alienations of waste lands. King Francis the second coming 
In the year 1559  to the crown, commanded his Proctors and magistrates to redeem the public revenues from private occupiers: wherein he complained, that the crown lands and revenues were so dismembered and wasted, as that which remained did not suffice for the charges that were laid upon them. But our king hath far greater cause to complain now, when as there scarce remains any thing that is to be sold. In the general accounts of the treasure made in january, in the year 1572, there was 
In the year 1572  no receipt made of any revenues, although there were six & thirty thousand crowns a year in the receipt, when as king Francis died, as it appeareth by an account of the treasure made in the year 1569: and by the same estate the alienation of the revenues, 
What the alienation of the revenues of France amount unto. A liure is two shillings.  impositions, and subsidies amounted to fourteen millions nine hundred sixty and one thousand four hundred and seventy liures, fifteen sou, and eight deniers; not comprehending twelve hundred thousand liures for the fourth and half fourth, and four hundred and fifty thousand liures, in regard of fifteen liures upon the strike of salt, the which the country of Guienne redeemed in the years 1549, and 1553. whereby is plainly appears, that the king's revenues are almost all engaged and made away, for fifteen or sixteen millions at the most, the which is worth above fifty millions: for that Earldoms, Baronies, and other signiories have not been sold for above nine years purchase: and if it were redeemed and let to farm, it would amount yearly to almost three millions, the which would suffice to entertain the king's house in state, and to pay most of the officers their wages, not meddling with any of the other ordinary or extraordinary charges. And if we may compare a small kingdom with a greater, the revenues of the crown of 
The revenues of the realm of England. Herein the Author is deceeived.  England, comprehending the land subsidies, taxes, customs, imposts, and all other charges, amount to little more than sixscore and ten thousand pounds starling a year, having a good part of the temporal lands of the church annexed unto it, and yet the Queen doth maintain her Court and the estate of her realm very royally and redeemed the revenues.  
True it is, that a settled peace for these fifteen years hath much prevailed for the maintenance of the state of England; and war for the ruin of France, if God had not sent our King Henry 3 from heaven to restore it to his first beauty. But we must observe that for the preservation of the revenues of a commonweal, most commonly that of a monarchy is better husbanded than in a popular state, or in 
In a popular state the revenues are ill husbanded.  that which is governed by few of the better sort; whereas the magistrates and overseers of the treasure convert the public to their own private profit: and every one strives to gratify his friends, or to purchase the people's favour with the prejudice of the commonweal: as Caesar did in his first Consulship, who divided the territory of Capua among the people, and abated the rents of the farms a third part, after that he had been well bribed. And ten years after Quintus Metellus Tribune of the people, to win their favour, published a law to take away the tolls in all the ports of Italy. In like sort, Pericles to have credit with the people of Athens, made distribution of great sums of money, the which had come into the treasure. This happens not in a monarchy, for Monarches which have no more certain revenues than their lands, and that have no power to impose subsidies or other charges upon their subjects but with their own consents, or upon urgent necessity, are not so prodigal of their crown lands. It is not needful to discourse any further of revenues, being impossible to order it better than was by the edict of king Charles 9 if it were duly executed.  
The second means to gather treasure together, is by conquest upon the enemy 
The second means to gather treasure.  to recover the treasure wasted in war: So did the ancient Romans; for although the sack and spoil of towns forced, belonged to the Captains and soldiers, yet the treasure was carried into the treasury of Rome. And as for the towns yielded or taken by capitulation, the army had but their pay, and sometimes a double pay, (before that the discipline of war was corrupted) & the treasure of the vanquished was carried to Rome, if they had not otherwise capitulated. All the gold and silver (saith Titus Livius) and all the brass that was taken from the Samnites, was carried to the treasury. And speaking of the Gauls beyond the Alps, he saith, That Furius Camillus carried into the Capitol 170000 pounds of silver which he had taken from them: and that Flaminius caused to be brought out of Spain of the spoils of Greece, the value of three millions & eight hundred thousand crowns, besides silver, rich movables, arms and ships. Paulus Aemilius brought thrice as much out of Macedony. Caesar caused above forty millions to be delivered into the public treasury, by the report of Appian. We may see from the 33 book of Titus Livius to the 34, infinite treasures brought to the Treasury of Rome of the spoils of conquered nations. And although all were not brought in by the Generals, yet fearing to be charged with corruption, or to be frustrate of their triumphs, they always delivered in great sums: for Scipio Asiaticus was accused and condemned of corruption, in a great fine, and yet he brought into the treasury above two millions of gold: and Scipio the African his brother, was also included in the accusation, although he had brought above five millions of gold of his conquests into the treasury, besides the value of ten millions and five hundred thousand crowns: wherein king Antiochus was condemned: by means of the victory they had obtained, and yet both of them were exiled and died poor. And although that Lucullus was the first (as Plutarch saith) that enriched himself with the spoil of his enemies, yet did he bring more into the Treasury than any of the rest, except Caesar: the which I thought fit to observe, for that commonly we employ the treasure for the charge of the wars, and yet in all victories and conquests there never comes a crown into the Exchequer, and oftentimes the sack & spoil is given before the towns be taken or yielded.  
The Romans were not contented with their treasures and spoils, but they condemned 
The punishment of the vanquished.  the vanquished to lose a part of their territories, the which commonly was the seventh part. Since, some have been condemned to lose a fourth or a third part of their lands, as in Italy, being subdued by Odocres king of the Herules. And soon after Hortarius king of the Lumbards' condemned the vanquished to pay him yearly the moiety of their revenues: as also the Romans had done unto the Doriens long before. But William the Conqueror, after he had conquered the realm of England, declared all the country in general, & every man's inheritance in particular forfeited unto him by the law of arms, entreating the Englishmen as his farmers. Yet the Romans have always showed themselves courteous and affable in that point, sending Colonies from their city to inhabit the conquered countries, distributing to every one a certain quantity: and by this means they freed their City from 
The great benefit which grows by Colonies.  beggars, mutinies, and idle persons, and did fortify themselves with their own men against the vanquished, the which by little and little did link themselves in marriages, and did willingly obey the Romans, who by this means also have filled the world with their Colonies, with an immortal glory of their justice, wisdom, and power: whereas most part of conquering princes plant Garrisons, which serve only to spoil and oppress the subjects. If our kings after the taking of Naples and Milan had practised this course, they had yet continued in obedience to our kings. And it is no marvel if they revolt against the Spaniard upon the first occasion, as 
Pessimus diutur●… custos est metus.  well as the country of Flaunders hath done, having nothing but Garrisons there without Colonies. Yet we found, that Sultan Mahumet king of the Turks, found means to enrich his treasure by means of Christian slaves, which he sent in Colonies into conquered countries, giving to every one fifteen acres of land and two oxen, and seed for one year: and at the end of twelve years he took the moiety of 
The Turks order to make many, & for the war.  their first-fruits, the which he continued for ever. Amurath the first dealt more mildly with the Timariot, giving them certain lands and rents, to some more, and to others less, upon condition they should attend him in the wars when they were called, with a certain number of horse: and if the Timariot chanced to die, the first-fruits should accrue unto the Prince, until that he had advanced some other, by way of gift. And generally the tenth of all successions belonged to the prince (the which grew by the law of arms, and by the prince's conquering another man's country) and not by way of imposition upon the ancient subjects. Whereby it appeareth, that the greatest and clearest revenues which the Turk hath, are in manner casual, and the war is defrayed without any new charge.  
The kings of Castille have done in manner the like at the West Indies, and namely the Emperor Charles 5, having conquered Peru, gave the lands to the Captains and Spanish soldiers by way of gift only; and being dead, they returned to the 
The Emperor's order at Peru.  Emperor, until that another were advanced in his place: taking moreover the fift of all the pearl and mines; so as every two years there comes clearly into the king's treasury in Spain, near four millions of gold, the which is called, The port of Civil. But it is reason, that the conquests which are made upon the enemy, and which augment their treasure, should also ease their subjects: as they did in Rome after the conquest of the realm of Macedon, the Romans were freed from taxes, imposts, and subsidies.  
The third means to augment the treasure, is by liberality of friends or subjects, be it by legacy, or by donation during life: the which we will speak briefly of, for 
The third meones to gather treasure.  that it is uncertain, beside there are few princes that give, and fewer that receive without requital: for if a prince gives to one that is more rich and mighty, it seems it is for fear, or upon some bond, & sometimes he that receives it, accounts it as a tribute. The Emperor of the Turks sets to the view of all the world, as 
The magnificence of the Emperors of Turkey.  well those presents which are sent him from his friends, as those that come from tributaries, to show how much he is feared of strangers, defraying the Ambassadors charges with great bounty, the which never prince nor people did. But we found that the Ancients used an other kind of bounty and liberality than they do at this day: for at this day they give not often but to such as are in greatness and prosperity, and the Ancients gave in adversity. When as Hannibal had in a manner quite vanquished the Romans, and taken from them almost all Italy, the king of Egypt sent the value of 400 thousand crowns to Rome in pure gift; the which the Romans refused, giving great thanks to the king. They did the like to Hierom king of Sicily, who gave them a crown of gold weighing 320 pound, and a Victory of gold, with five thousand bushels of wheat: but they accepted nothing but the image of Victory as a happy presage. They showed the same resolutions to the Ambraciotes, and to many other Princes and signiories, who at that time offered them great presents, although they were in extreme necessity: so as there was a combat of honour, in the one to give, and in the other to refuse. But the Romans have surmounted all other nations in courage and resolution in their adversities: as for other princes and people they were not so nice to take, yea oftentimes they demanded; as the Signiory of the Rhodes, when their Colossus fell down & broke some of their ships, they sent Ambassadors to kings and princes 
A good policy of the Rhodiots.  to beg, having small means, and it succeeded well: for king Hierom sent them threescore thousand crowns in gift, and many others imitated him: yea the king of Egypt gave them in gold the value of eighteen hundred thousand crowns, and in silver much more, with twenty thousand bushels of wheat, and three thousand beasts for sacrifices, besides great store of stuff, and an infinite number of Architects and workmen the which he entertained at his own charge for the building of a College: so as the Signiory of Rhodes for an old broken image, and some crazed ships, were greatly enriched by the bounty of other princes.  
It was common to the kings of Egypt to glory in their bounty to others: for we read in a manner the like of Ptolemy the first, toward the city and inhabitants of jerusalem, to whom he sent the value of two hundred threescore and sixteen 
joseph in anti●….  thousand crowns, to redeem a hundred thousand slaves of their nation; and ninety thousand crowns for the sacrifices, besides a table of massy gold to set in God's Temple: and the great presents he gave to the 72 Interpreters, which translated the Bible out of Hebrew into Greek. And as it was and will be always tolerable for petty princes and small Siegniories to accept the honourable gifts of great princes and monarches: so was it convenient for the Romans to refuse such liberalities (and to beg it had been infamous) and to accept, by gift or legacy, great realms and royal successions; which they gave them which had reigned peacefully under their protections, for an honest recompense of their justice, when as they died without heirs males lawfully begotten. By this means Ptolemy king of 
Six kingdoms given to the Romans by legacy.  Cyrene, Attalus king of Asia, Eumenes king of Pergame, Nicomedes king of Bithynia, Coctius king of the Alps, and Polemon king of Pontus, left the people of Rome heirs of their goods & kingdoms. As for gifts from the subject, the which the ancients called oblations, there were few or none at all: for charitable gifts which be 
Voluntary gifts of the subjects.  voluntary, are now demanded: and although the kings of Spain, England and others use entreaties to obtain them, yet most commonly there is more force in these requests, than in commissions and letters of commandment. I understand by the word Gift, that which is liberally offered by the subject unto his prince; as the gold which they called Coronarium, the which the jews gave unto the Emperors, to be maintained in the privileges of their religion; and the magistrates of the towns and commonalties of the empire: the which in time proved a forced subsidy, until that this force was taken away, the gifts remaining voluntary to gratyfie the Emperor, when as he had obtained any victory against his enemies.  
The like may be said of the imposts which in Spain they call Service, the 
Service of Spain.  which was freely granted to the kings of Spain to entertain their estate more honourably; and since it was almost converted into an ordinary charge. We found likewise that the kings of Persia contented themselves with the voluntary gifts and presents of divers kinds that came from their subjects: but Darius Histaspes (he that got the kingdom by the neying of his horse) changed those kinds into coins of gold and silver, and the gifts into tributes and necessary charges, appointing Treasurers 
The revenues of the realm of Persia under the first Darius.  and receivers in every government (which were 127 in number) to make a division of the taxes and subsidies, which amounted then to fourteen thousand five hundred and threescore Euboique talents, the which is valued at ten millions one hundred fourscore and twelve thousand crowns. But this ancient custom of Persia is maintained at this present in Aethiopia, whereas the governors of fifty governments bring unto the Negus, king of Aethiopia, the gifts and oblations of 
The custom of Aethiopia.  his subjects in grain, wine, cattle, handy works, gold and silver, without any other commission, or letters patents: so as for the greatness of his majesty, it is more befitting to have them obedient unto him, than to sand forth his commissions to exact and beg of his subjects. As for successions and testamentary legacies given to princes by their subjects, it is at this day very rare, and yet in old time it was one of the greatest means whereby princes did augment their treasures: for we read that the Emperor Augustus having given by will the value of eleven millions and two hundred thousand crowns to be distributed among the people of Rome, and the legions; he withal protested, that he left not to his heirs but three millions and seven hundred thousand crowns, although he showed, that he had received from his friends not many years before his death, the sum of thirty and five millions of crowns. True it is, that he was accustomed to leave unto the children of the Testators, the legacies and successions that were given him, never taking any thing of their testaments whom he had not known: wherewith Cicero reproached Marc Antony in open Senate, That he had enriched himself by their testaments whom he had never known; and yet Cicero confesseth that he himself had gotten by testaments a million of crowns. But tyrants took all without any distinction: for there was no better means for any one to assure his testament, than to give somewhat unto the tyrant: but if the testament were imperfect, the tyrant seized upon the whole succession, the which is reproved by the law, for which cause the custom to make Emperors and Princes their heirs, ceased.  
The fourth means to augment and entertain the treasure, is by pensions from their allies, which are paid in time of peace, as well as in war, for protection and 
The fourth means to gather treasure.  defence against their enemies; or else to have counsel, aid, and comfort at need, according to the tenor of the treaty. I say, that a pension is paid by friends and allies; for a sovereign prince which hath capitulated with another to pay him some thing yearly to have peace without any treaty of amity or alliance, is a tributary: 
Who be tributaries.  as Amiochus king of Asia, the Seignory of Carthage, the kings of Sclavonia, and many other princes and states were tributaries to the Romans, the kings of Arabia and Idumea to David, and the princes of Asia to the kings of Persia. And for this reason the treaties of alliance betwixt the house of France, and the Cantons of the Swissers, specify, That the king shall give an ordinary pension of a hundred pounds to every Canton for a peace, and two thousand for an alliance, besides all extraordinary 
The difference of a pension and tribute.  pensions, and their pay in time of war, & they to do him service in his court for the guard of his person: which doth show, that the Swissers and Grisons are pensioners to the king, considering the mutual alliance, and the service they own for this pension. In like sort he is no tributary that corrupteth his enemy's Captains, as Pericles did to the Lacedaemonian Captains, not (as Theophrastus said) to purchase a peace, but to defer the war. But we may say, that the Cantons never made a more profitable league for their estate, both to enrich themselves, & to train 
The Swissers pensions came to 14000. pound sterling a year.  their subjects up in arms at another man's cost, and also to sand swaggerers and idle persons out of their country. By the account of him that paid the Cantons, the ordinary and extraordinary pensions came yearly at the lest to six score or seven score thousand liures: and in the year 1573 they came to two hundred eighteen thousand liures. The pensions that were paid to the German Commanders 
21800 pound.  the same year, amounted to six score and twelve thousand liures, besides their 
12300 pound.  entertainment in war.  
It is necessary for great princes to give pensions to the Secretaries, spies, Captains, Orators, and household servants of their enemies, to discover their counsels and enterprises: and experience hath often taught, That there is no greater means to maintain his estate, and to ruin his enemies: for the strongest place is easily taken, so that an ass laden with gold may enter it; as Philip the first king of Macedon said, who by his gifts & liberality subjecteth almost all Greece unto him. And the kings of Persia had no better means to keep the forces of Grece out of Asia, than by goodly pensions: for it is hard that he which receiveth should not do some service 
Plut in Lisand▪ & Agesilao.  in requital of his money; for he is tied by bond, or forced through shame, or moved with hope of a greater benefit, or with fear lest he that had corrupted him should accuse him: for princes do seldom give any great pensions unto strangers, unless they first swear against their native country: as a German prince said at 
Whereunto pensioners are bound.  a diet at Worms in the year 1552. There was the same year a prince, who since is dead, the which offered to an Ambassador in his master's name, that for two thousand crowns a year pension, he would discover unto him all the secrets, practices, and negotiations of his country, and to employ all his means to prevent any thing that might be done in prejudice of him that should pay the pension. These men are much to be feared, especially in a popular estate, in the which it is more easy for a few private men that govern the commonweal to betray it, than in a monarchy, wherein the prince accounts all that is public his own, and therefore hath care of it as of his own. But such rewards and corruptions can never be profitable to them that give it, if it be not kept secret, the which is impossible, if there be many.  
The kings of Persia and Macedon gave none pensions but a small number of Orators and Captains of the Grecians: and the king of Egypt for seven thousand crowns pension, which he gave to Aratus, had the whole estate of the Atheians at his devotion. And therefore it seems strange to me, why our kings (besides the ordinary pension of the Swissers) have given extraordinarily to about two thousand of them which exceeded the rest in credit and dignity; as king Henry the second did, the which were known by their names and surnames, and gave their acquittances; beside the private pensions, the which were paid by roll, and came yearly to 49299 liures: happily it had been better to have given the moiety of these pensions to few men of authority, and secretly without any acquittance: for sometimes 
4929 pound 4 shillings.  a pensionar had rather loose the greatest reward of any prince, than to give a note of his hand for the receipt of the money: as that English lord Hastings, to whom king Lewis 11 gave 2000 crowns pension, the bringer demanded an acquittance for his discharge only unto the king as he said; whereunto the lord Hastings answered, That he would receive his pension, but he would give him no acquittance: the which the king demanded earnestly, to make use of it in time, and to bring him in suspicion of a traitor to his country. There are also somethings not only secret, but also dishonest, for the which pensions are given, although some hold nothing foul nor unlawful that is done for the benefit of his country; for my part I hold this fact no less odious, that shall suborn the household servants of princes to murder their masters, or if they cannot kill them by force, to poison them, than he that shall take a reward for so fowl a fact. Wherein Pericles was commended, who giving up his accounts, set down an article of ten thousand crowns disbursed without warrant, showing neither acquittance nor cause of it: the which the people allowed without any further inquiry, knowing well the wisdom and loyalty of the man in the government of the commonweal. It is most certain, that a secret pensionar giving 
Plut. in Pericl.  an acquittance, is always in fear to be discovered, whereby he shall neither dare, nor be able to do any thing in favour of him that gives him a pension. Besides, it is dangerous when pensions are given publicly, the jealousy of such as have none will be a cause of quarrels and partialities, as hath oftentimes happened in Switzerland, in such sort, as those which had less than others, or none at all, were very vehement to have the private pensions put into the receivers hands with the general pensions: the which the king denied, saying, That he would rather restrain his liberality.  
The fift means to gather together treasure, is by traffic, which the prince or the state useth by his factors; although there be few princes that do use it: and by the 
The fift means to gather treasure.  laws of this realm, England, and Germany, it is not lawful for the gentry to trade in merchandise, else must he loose his quality: and by the law Claudia, no Senator of Rome might have a vessel at sea containing above forty bushels. Questus omnis (inquit Lavius) patribus indecorus visus est, All gain (saith Titus Livius) was held unseemly for the fathers. And afterwards by the emperors decrees it was generally defended for all gentlemen and soldiers, and by the Canons for all church men to trade in merchandise. And the Persians' in a mockery called Darius, Marchant, for that he forced them to those charges, which at the first they gave him voluntarily. But yet in my opinion it is more seemly for a prince to be a merchant, than a tyrant; and for a gentleman to traffic, than to steal. Who is ignorant, that the kings of Portugal being restrained within strait limits, and not well able to maintain their estates, yet loath to oppress their subjects, have for these hundred years traded without reproach, and to the great enriching of their states? In the year 1475 they discovered the rich mines of gold in Guinee, under the conduct of john bastard of 
The traffic of the kings of Portugal  Portugal; and twelve years after the spices of Calicut, and of the East; and continuing their course to the Indieses, have so well traffiked there, as they are become lords of the best ports of Africa, and have seized upon the I'll of Ormus in despite of the king of Persia: they have taken a great part of the kingdom of Morocco, and of Guinee, & forced the kings of Cambar, calicut, Malache, and Canavor to do them homage, treating a league & commerce with the great Cham of Tartary: they have pulled from the Turks & Sultan's of Egypt the greatest riches of the Indieses, and filled Europe with the treasures of the East, passing even to the Molucques: which the kings of Castille pretend to belong to them, by a division made by pope Alexander 6, notwithstanding the merchants of Genua & Florence desired to free it for 35000 ducats, which john 3 king of Portugal had paid unto the emperor Charles 5, & to give 100000 ducats more that they might have free passage to those islands which; the K. of Portugal would not yield unto, making account of the profit he draws from thence as of an infinite treasure, besides the gain that comes to his subjects, having much impaired the wealth of the princes of the East, & of the Venetians, who have endured so great a loss, as of all the calamities they endured during their wars with king Lewis 12, they received no such loss as from the Portugals, taking from them their gain of the Eastern parts. Neither doth the Trade of Merchandise engross dishonour, or embase the 
The Gentlemen of Italy trade in marchandi●…e.  the Signiories and nobility of Italy, neither did Tully disallow of it, but of such as sold by retail, whom he termed Sordido. As for the traffic which Princes practise upon their Subjects, it is no traffic, but an impost or exaction: which is, to forbidden them to trade, and to put his subjects corn and wine into his receivers hands, to pay them at an under rate, and to cell it unto strangers, or to the Subjects themselves, at his own pleasure. This was one of the reasons 
The tyrannical and ba e traffic of king Alphonso.  which made Alphonso King of Naples most odious; for that he gave his Swine to his Subjects to make fat, and if by chance they died, he made them pay for them: he bought the oil in Apulia, and gave his own price; and the wheat in grass, and sold it a gain at the highest price he could, forbidding all others to cell until he had sold his. But of all the traffics and merchandise which Princes 
The most pernicious traffic.  use, there is not any more pernicious nor base, than the sale of honours, offices, and benefices, as I have formerly said, the which may never be tolerated, but in the extreme necessity of the Common weal, as the Venetians did, having spent in seven years, that Lewis 12 made war against them, five Million of ducats, whereof they had made 50000 ducats of the sale of Offices. The like reason moved King Francis 1 in the year 1527, to divide the Civil from the criminal Magistrates, setting all Offices to sale to them that would give most. The which was more soul and dishonourable in Pope Adrian, who three years before, not only sold offices, but also benefices, as he did the Bishopric of Cremona for 20000 ducats, and had also resolved to leave two hundred and twenty thousand ducats, by half a Ducat for every chimney within the territories of the Church, making his pretext of war against the Turk. But for that these traffics are so filthy, and of such dangerous consequence, the which being once begun, do never cease, it were better to try all other means, than once to give way unto them.  
The sixt means to increase treasure, is upon the merchandise that are brought 
The sixt means to make money.  in, or carried out, the which is one of the ancientest and most usual in every Commonweal, and grounded upon equity; which kind of custom the Latins called Portoria, as they did the tribute of the public farms Decimas, and of pastures Scripturam, and it is reason, that he that will gain by another man's subjects, should pay some right to his Prince or Common weal. Whereof there be divers kinds, the which were reduced within this Realm to one impost of twenty Deniers upon the liure or pound, by an Edict made by King Henry the 2. 
Anno 1551. 1556.  and after revoked, jest the customs and imposts should be confounded, the which might prove prejudicial. King Charles' 5 abated the custom half, but afterwards he restored it, the which was the twentieth part of the price, or five in the hundred, and so the ancient Romans took for custom of foreign merchandise: but afterwards the Emperors exacted the eight part, the which they called Octuarium vectigal, as in our time they have demanded the twelve part of the price. The Emperor of Turkey takes ten of the hundred of all Merchant strangers going out of Alexandria, and of his Subjects five in the hundred. But in this Realm the contrary is practised touching the salt, for the which the stranger pays nothing, but the duties of a Merchant, and the subject pays forty and five liures upon the measure, contrary to the merchants rights. And although the Salt of France be the best and most plentiful in all Europe, wherewith the low Countries, England, and Denmark do store themselves, yet is it far dearer to us, than to them: for since that the Store houses of Salt were let out, and the officers of the Custom suppressed, the measure of Salt which the Merchant sold for ten shillings starling, is now come to fifty four shillings: and since these wars, to eight pounds besides the King's rights, and the carriage: so as all comprehended, it hath been sometimes sold for a hundred and eighteen Crowns the measure, whereby the poor subject hath been ruined and the stranger enriched, yea sometimes the stranger brings it again secretly to cell in France. This privilege was given unto strangers by Francis the 1. that they might bring commodities and money into this Realm, rather than into Spain: notwithstanding since it hath been very manifest, that the stranger cannot be without the Salt of France: for Charles the 5. having forbidden his subjects of the low Countries not to fetch any Salt in France, the estates of the country made it known, that their fish (which is their greatest merchandise) grew dry, and was spoiled with the salt that came from Spain and Bourgongne, getting leave with great importunity to fetch their salt out of France, being the sweeter. It is most certain that no salt can be made of salt water on this side the 47 degree, by reason of the cold: and the salt of Spain is too corrosive: so as if the stranger paid but a fourth part of that which the subject pays for the King's rights, there would come an infinite mass of money into the Treasury, for we often see the ships of England and the low countries come into France, only with their ballast (having no commodities to exchange with them) to buy salt, wine, and corn, the which abound in this Realm, and 
The mines of France are never wasted.  will never fail; whereas the Ours of metal, which grow in the bowels of the Earth, are wasted in few years: yet strangers seek it in the centre of the earth to bring into this Realm, and to carry away commodities necessary for the life of man: which a wise Prince should not suffer to be transported, but for the ease of his subjects, and increase of his Treasure, the which cannot be done without raising of the foreign custom: for the greater the foreign custom shall be, the greater benefit shall come into the Exchequer: and if the stranger fearing the impost, shall buy the less, than the subject shall have it the better cheap; for all wares, the greatest treasures will be where there are most things necessary for the life of man: although there be neither Ours of gold nor silver, (as there are few or none at all in this Realm,) yet notwithstanding doth feed a great part of Europe as King Agrippa said; and the country of Egypt hath neither Ours of gold nor silver, and yet both Africa and Europe, are much relieved with corn which grows there. If anyone will say, that by the treaties of traffic betwixt Princes, they cannot raise a foreign custom, I must answer, that this may take place among those which have treated with that condition, but there are few of them; and yet it hath never been much regarded: for even in the low countries and in England, the french Merchants were forced in the year 1557 to pay a crown upon every tun of wine that 
Impost in Eng●…and upon wine.  came into the port, and the subjects paid nine french crowns for the impost, without any regard to the treatise of traffic. And the year following, the the Queen of England did raise the foreign custom a third part, imposing thirteen shillings and a penny upon every piece of cloth, the which is a matter of great consequence: and I have been assured from a Merchant of Antwerp, that in the year 1565 there came in less than three months into the low countries a hundred thousand pieces of cloth, accounting three kerseys or three cottons to a cloth. It is therefore expedient to raise the foreign customs to strangers of such commodities as they cannot want, and by that means increase the treasure and ease the subjects; and also to abate the custom of merchandise coming in, if the subject cannot pass without them, you must raise the custom of things made by hand, and not to suffer any to be brought out of 
Not raw stuffs to be transported.  strange countries, and not to suffer any raw stuffs to be carried out of the land, as iron, copper, steel, wool, flax, raw silk, and such like, that the subject may have the benefit of the workmanship, and the prince the foreign custom, as Philip king of Spain, had forbidden his subjects by an edict made in the year 1563, to requited the queen of England, who had made the like three months before, the like edict was made in France by King Henry the second in the year 1552, concerning wools: but there was a Florentin, who having gotten a passport by a 
A trade forbidden to the subjects, and allowed to strangers, is the ruin of a country.  courtier's means, carried away more wool at one instant, than all other merchants had done before in a year; and having it made into cloth at Florence, he returned it into France, by the which he gained infinitely, the workmanship exceeding the stuff fifteen parts: the which is a great incongruity in matter of state and revenues, to forbidden a traffic unto the subject, and then give leave unto a stranger: for both king & Commonweal in general receive an irreparable loss, and the merchants in particular are ruined. Behold six means to gather together treasure without oppression of the subjects, unless the custom of foreign merchandise that be necessary for the life of man were excessive. The seventh means 
The seventh means to make money.  is upon the subject, the which they must never use, unless all the rest fail, and that necessity forceth them to have a care of the Commonweal, being suddenly oppressed either by the enemy, or by some other unexpected accident; in this case seeing the defence of every one in particular, depends upon the preservation 
The honestest means in time of public necessity to make money.  of the general, it is fit that every man strain himself; then are impositions laid upon the subjects most just and necessary, and those charges which are then imposed upon the citizens are religious and godly, without the which the city were quite ruined. But to the end this extraordinary charge imposed during the war, may not continued in time of peace, it is fit to proceed by way of borrowing; for that money is easilier found, when as he that lends hopes to receive both his money again, and thanks for his willingness. For when as Hannibal was in Italy, and did besiege even Rome itself, the senate having consumed their treasure, would not impose new tributes upon their subjects and confederates, (a very dangerous thing, being then priest by the enemy) but the senators with one consent, brought their gold and silver unto the receivers, being followed by the people with great joy. And Titus Livius saith; Senectatores prosequisque aurum, argentum, aes in publicum conferunt, tanto certamine iniecto, ut prima inter primos sua nomina vellent in publicis tabulis esse, ut nec Triumuiri mensarij accipiendo, nec scribae referendo sufficerent. The senators bought their gold and silver into the public with great contention, who should be enrolled, so as the receivers were not sufficient to tell it, nor the registers to enroll them. After the victory obtained against the Carthaginiens, the senate decreed to pay what had been borrowed; but for that there was not sufficient in the common coffers to satisfy them, the creditors presented a request to have part of the city land's assigned unto them, the which should be valued by the consuls, upon condition, that it might be always redeemed, and to pay an ass of small rent to the receivers for every acre, only for a mark, and as a witness that it was the city lands, the which was done. If the commonweal hath not wherewithal to pay▪ neither in money nor lands, & the enemy doth press it, then is there no readier 
Ceasing used in old old time.  means, than to make choice of those which are ablest to bore arms, which should be armed and entertained at the charge of others, as the ancient Romans' did, so 
Livius lib. 26.  as the common good and health of the citisents was defended by some, with the wealth of others. This kind of tribute is called rash and extraordinary. From hence these extraordinary charges first took their beginning, the which afterwards become ordinary. As we read that Denis the tyrant, sometimes sought occasions of war, or of fortifications, to the end he might have cause to raise new 
Detestable inventions of a tyrant.  imposts, the which he continued, after that he had treated with the enemy, or discontinued the fortresses begun.  
If my wishes might take place, I would desire that such detestable inventions might be buried with the author. There be three kinds of tributes that be levied of the subject, some extraordinary; others ordinary; and the third which holds of both, and is called casual: under which kinds is contained as well the 
Three kinds of impositions.  revenues that rise of jurisdictions, seals, coins, weights, and measure, as the money that is received upon things sold, of what nature soever, or by gifts, legacies, or successions, or by the sale of offices, or in manner of a tax, be it in the regard of every man's person, (which kind of tribute is called Capitatio by the Latins:) be it in respect of the movable or immoovable goods, and of first-fruits which grow above or within the earth, as mines and treasures, or that which is gathered at ferries, or passages, the which is rightly called Portorium vectigal, or of any other imposition that may be imagined, how filthy and beastly soever, for tyrants always think the savour of them sweet; as that tribute which was usually exacted from professed whores at Rome; and the saving of urine commanded by Vespasian, the which his son taking unworthily, the father held the first money that he received next of that tribute, to his nose, ask him if it smelled ill, and he denying it, Atqui inquit è lotio est, But saith he, it comes of the urine. Of which charges and impositions, the most ancient are reputed revenues, as the foreign custom; others are ordinary, as taxes; and the last are extraordinary, the which the Latins called temerarium tributum, a rash tribute: as subsidies imposed upon free towns and privileged persons, tenths, charitable gifts equivalent to tenths, the which are levied by commission. And to speak properly, the taxes, aids, grants, tolles, and such like were mere subsidies and extraordinary charges, before Lewis the ninth, who first levied the tax, as precedent le Maistre hath observed: but he doth not say, that it was as a necessary subsidy during the wars; and that he made an ordinary receipt thereof; but contrary wise adressing himself to Philip his eldest son and successor, he useth these words in his testament, the which is yet found in the treasury of France, and is registered in the chamber of accounts: Fili, religiosus imprimis erga Deum esto: benignus & liberalis adversus egentes, legum ac morum huius imperij custos 
●…. Lewis his testament.  ac vindex acerrimus: à vectigalibus & tributis abstineto, nisi te summa vis necessitatis ac utilitatis publicae iustissima causa ad hoc impellat, sin minùs, tyrannum te potiùs, quàm regem futurum putato, etc. Son, be first devote and religious towards God, be mild and charitable to the poor, observe the good laws and manners of thy realm severely, exact no taxes nor subsidies of thy subjects, unless that urgent necessitieor the profit of the Commonweal press thee unto it; if thou dost otherwise, thou shalt be esteemed a tyrant and no king, etc. Some one will say unto me, That king Clotaire did exact the third part and revenues of churches: and Chilperis the 8 part of every man's wine growing, and it seems that the impost of the 8 part of the wine, the which now is imposed upon vintner's, took his beginning from hence: and that Lewis the young during 4 years, took the twentieth part of his subjects revenues in the year 1167; yet it is most certain that this was but an extraordinary subsidy during the war, as that temerarium tributum imposed by king Charles the sixt, for it was decreed in our open Parliament, called by Philip of Valois in the year 1338, that no impost should be raised upon the people without the consent of the three estates: and in stead of three hundred and forty thousand pounds starling, which king Lewis the eleventh did levy the year that he died, besides the ordinary revenues of the crown, the deputies of the three estates held at Tours, offered unto Charles the eight, his son coming to the crown, in manner of a benevolence for two years, the like grant that was made unto Charles the seventh, and for his entrance a hundred thousand crowns to be paid for once only, the which he might not afterwards challenge as a due, nor call the grant a tax or impost. The which hath been always, and is still observed in Spain, England, and Germany: as Philip Comineus said in open parliament, in the reign of Charles the eight, That no prince had power to lay any imposition upon his subjects, nor 
No Prince can lay any subsidy upon his subjects without their consents.  to prescribe that right without their consents. And we see in all commissions sent out for the levying of taxes, and subsidies, the king useth that ancient protestation to free them, as soon as necessity would suffer him.  
And although that Philip the long did exact but the fift part of a penny upon every 
The beginning of the custom of salt.  two shillings worth of salt that were sold, yet he publicly protested to discharge the subjects of it. Philip of valois used the like protestation, being forced by the extremity of war to double the said custom, declaring by his letters patents in the year 1328, that he meant not to have the imposition upon the salt incorporate to the revenues; and yet there is no custom seems more easy than that of salt, the which is common to all the subjects: yet in the popular estate of the Romans', and in the hottest of their Punic wars, the impost of salt being set on foot by Livius and Claudius' censures; Livius was called Salinator in derision: but a peace being granted to them of Carthage, it was taken away again: either for that there was nothing more necessary for the life of man, or for that it was done without the people's command. And for that the lightest kinds of tributes and imposts seem heavy and burdensome unto the poor and weak, yet could not the senators maintain the treasury of Rome without new impositions: the people being freed from all taxes and customs by the law Valeria, after the expulsion of their kings: therefore C. Manlius the 
Livius lib. 2.  Consul made a law with the authority of the Senate, (the Army lying at Sutrium) that such as were made free, should pay the twentieth part of all their substance into the Exchequer: with which tribute, although the citizens were nothing oppressed, yet being understood, the Tribune made a defence upon pain of death, That no man should attempt the like without the people's privity. And Augustus made the law julia, That whatsoever should come to any one by inheritance, 
The tribute of the twentieth part most pleasing.  legacy, or gift for death, the twentieth part thereof should belong unto the common treasure, both these impositions were profitable to the Commonweal, and pleasing to either of them: to the one, for that they possess another's inheritance; and to the other, for that they obtain their liberties. But for that the emperors which succeeded Augustus exacted the twentieth part of all inheritances and legacies, Traian therefore abrogated the said law julia, the which many have laboured to revive, changing the name of it: yet had they not then the hundred part of those tributes, which since the necessity of some, and the covetousness of others have invented. And when as Samuel prince of the Israelites spoke unto the people, who demanded a King of him, he added threats of bitter tributes, Ergo inquit regem habituri estis qui decimas fructuum, imperaturus est, Therefore said he, you shall have a King which shall command 
The tenths of the subjects first-fruits was the first tribute.  the tenths of your first-fruits. Neither did Cipselus the first Tyrant of Corinth, exact any other tribute of his subjects, but the tenths of their first-fruits: there were then no taxes, subsidies, tolles, and a thousand such like. So the greatest part of the Inventors of these new Imposts have lost their lives; as Philistus parasite to Dyonisius the tyrant, who being drawn out of the tyrant's castle, was slain by the people of Syracuse: and Parthenius or Proclerus, who was slain by the people of 
Inventors of new impositions most commonly slain.  Treves, for giving counsel to king Theodoret to oppress his subjects with new subsidies: and of late days George Prescon Parasite to Henry king of Sueden, was cruelly put to death in the king's palace, and the king himself expelled his estate. What shall I speak of Achaeus King of the Lidiens, whom his subjects did hung by the feet with his head downward into a river, for the subsidies which he imposed upon his people: and Theodoric king of France lost his crown for it. How comes it that the Netherlanders have revolted from the Spaniard, but for that the duke of Alva would exact the tenth penny of every thing which was sold, whereby he would have gathered an infinite treasure, or rather the wealth of all the country, being most certain that one thing might besold often in a short time, and well known that the merchandise sold in one day amounted to seventy thousand ducats, as a Spaniard himself did writ. The Histories are full of these examples, for nothing doth sooner 'cause changes, seditions, and ruins of States, than excessive charges and imposts. But as the Prince must have a care not to impose any charges, but when war doth force him, so must he take them away when he hath obtained a peace: yet must they not run from one extreme unto another, and abolish all imposts and taxes, having neither lands nor revenues to maintain the Common weal; as Nero 
All Impositions are not to be abolished.  the Emperor would have done, who having wasted all the treasure, sought to abolish the tributes, whereof the Senate being advertised, they thanked him for his good will to the people, yet they dissuaded him from doing it, saying it would be the ruin of the Commonweal. Many seditious citizens, and desirous of innovations, did of late years promise' immunity of taxes and subsidies to our people: but neither could they do it, or if they had could, they would not, or if it were done, should we have any Commonweal, being as it were the ground and foundation of a Commonweal. There were more reasons to have the excessive gifts cut off and revoked, and that an account should be made of the treasure wasted: but to take away all impositions before that the revenues be redeemed and the debts paid; it were not to repair, but to ruin the state. And most of these men which seem to understand the affairs of state so well, are greatly abused with an old inveterate opinion, that all charges and imposts must be reduced to that proportion that they were in the time of king Lewis the 12, and consider not that since that time gold and silver hath come in so great abundance 
Abundance of gold and silver hath made things dear.  from the new found Lands, namely from Peru, as all things are grown ten times dearer than they were; as I have proved against the Paradox of Malestroit: the which may be easily seen in the ancient customs and contracts of this Realm, where we shall found the value of first-fruits and victuals to be ten, yea twelve times less than it is at this day. We found in the Registers of the chamber of Accounts, That the Chancellor of France in the time of S. Lewis, had for the charges of himself, his horses, and servants, seven sou Parisis allowed him a day; the which is not eight pence halfpenny of our money: and if he stayed in any Abbey, or other place where he spent nothing for his horses, it was then abated in his wages. I have showed that Charles the 5. king of France paid but 31000 crowns for the county of Anxerre: and that the duchy of Berrie was bought by Philip the 1 of Herpin, for threescore thousand crowns: and the county of Venice and avignon were engaged for forty thousand Florins. To conclude, I have made manifest that many Earldoms, Baronies, and great Signiories have been sold a hundred or six score years since, twenty times better cheap than they are now, for the abundance of gold and silver that is come from new found Lands: as it happened at Rome, when as Paulus Aemilius brought such infinite store of gold and silver from the realm of Macedon, suddenly the value of lands did rise to be triple in price: and at what time Caesar brought the treasure and spoils of Egypt to Rome, then did Usury fall, and the price of lands did rise: even as it happened to the Spaniards after the conquest of Peru by Francis Pizara, a small vessel of wine in that country cost 300 ducats, a Spanish cape of Frizado a thousand ducats, and a jennet six thousand; the which was by reason of the abundance of gold and silver which they found at Peru, and brought into Spain: and namely of the ransom 
The great treasure taken at thy Conquest of Peru.  of king Atabalipa; who paid the value of ten millions, three hundred twenty and six thousand ducats, besides twice as much that came to private men, captains, soldiers, and even to the receivers themselves, as Augustus Zarata master of the Accounts to the king of Spain doth testify. Since great store of gold and silver hath been brought out of Spain into France to buy corn and other necessary commodities, which are transported into Spain in great abundance, so as the prices of all things have risen: and so by consequence the wages of officers, the pay of soldiers, the pensions of captains, and in like sort every man's employment, and by the same reason the rents of Farms have, risen; for he that had but ten pounds a year rend, hath now a thousand of the same first-fruits he then gathered: wherein they are greatly abused that would reduce the prices of corn and victuals to the ancient orders. We must then conclude, that the account of the revenues under king Charles the 6 in the year 1449, which came but to forty thousand pounds starling; was not much less (in 
The Revenues of France under Charles 6. & 9  regard of the value of things) than the revenues of fourteen hundred thousand pounds' starling, the same year that Charles the ninth died, in the year one 
The Lord of jeinuisle in the life of Lewis. 9  thousand, five hundred▪ seventy & four; and yet the people complained at both times that they were oppressed with tributes. And the ransom which king Lewis the 9 paid to the sultan of Egypt of fifty thousand pounds starling, was not much less than that of king Francis the 1 of three millions of crowns: and although that king john were set at the same ransom by the king of England, yet was it held so excessive, as they were six years in levying of it; but Francis the same year a peace was concluded, sent his ransom into Spain. We must judge the like of the yearly pension of 900. pounds, that was assigned unto Charles the fair, son to Philip, not to be less, than that of ten thousand pounds starling yearly, that was given first to Henry, and then to Francis dukes of Anjou from king Charles the 9 their brother. And much more honourable might they live with that pension, which I made mention of under Philip, than with that which Charles the 9 gave unto his brethren. Nor the Dowries of 400000 crowns assigned to every one of the daughters of king Henry the 2, were not so great as those of sixty thousand crowns assigned to the daughters of France by the law of king Charles the 5. The like may be spoken of other people, as in old time in the East, so at this present in the West. For we read in Strabo, that Ptolemy the piper, the last king of Egypt of that race, did raise upon 
The revenues of Egypt under Ptolemy.  the country of Egypt the value of seven millions, and five hundred thousand crowns a year, and sultan Solyman did levy but a hundred thousand ducats of the same country, as appeared by an extract of the revenues made by Gritty a Venetian, in the year 1520, when as the estate of the whole revenues 
The Turks revenues.  came not to above four millions; for four years after he raised it unto six millions, as Paulus iovius saith, and now he levieth above twelve millions yearly, for the great abundance of gold and silver, that is brought out of the West and East; which sum notwithstanding may seem but little, for that we read in Plutarch, that the dictator Silla did tax the charges of Asia the less, before the conquests of Lucullus and Pompee, at twelve millions of crowns, the which is not above the sixt part of the Turks empire.  
Sometimes the bounty of the land, and the great trade, and oftentimes the unreasonable greediness of princes to heap up treasure, make some richer than others: It is well known that Charles the fift gathered more revenues out of the duchy of Milan; then king Francis the first, at the same time did levy in this his realm, which flowed in all abundance; who doth not know that he commanded more out of the low Countries, than the revenues of England were esteemed in those days. Some one not long since, (seeking to persuade Charles the ninth to increase his taxes) did perniciously maintain in open counsel, that Cosme duke of Florence did raise out of his estate six millions, having 
The revenues of the Du●…e of Florence.  but a small territory: the which was false, for he received out of the estate of Florence, but twelve hundred thousand crowns, and out of that of Sienna two hundred thousand at the most. But a new prince shall do wisely at his first entrance, to cut off the extraordinary exactions of his predecessor, or at the lest a great part of them, as well in regard of his own duty, as to get the good will of the people, if he be required; yea before he be required, and not to imitate Roboam, who following the wicked counsel of wicked men, did not only refuse the humble petitions of his subjects, but vowed openly that he would be crueler than his father had been, whereupon ten tribes fell from him, and created them a new king. True it is, that to hold a certain estate of impositions, they must be made in their proper kinds, as in corn, wine, and oils; and as for merchandise in silver, it is the form which the kings of Poland have always, and do still use, and the king of Ethiopia receives cloth and other merchandise for his custom. But to require to have taxes and subsidies quite taken away, or reduced to the ancient custom, without any regard of the value of things, or the changes that have happened; this were not to relieve, but to ruin an estate.  
It is an ordinary thing in changes from a tyranny to a popular estate, to abolish all imposts, taxes, and subsidies for a sign of liberty, as they did in Rome, at the request of the consul Valerius, after they had expelled their kings: but every man was feign to go to the war at his own charge▪ than afterwards to pay the soldiers, and afterwards to tax themselves by the raising of new imposts. True it is, that the Romans' did therein show themselves very just: for at that time there were none that bore the charges, but the noble and the rich, the poorer sort went free; and now adays we see none but the poor pay, and the rich go scotfree. The like was in Suisserland, and at Lindaw, after they had expelled their Lords. Other do free the chief cities and great Lords, and charge the weaker lort: as the Athenians did, when they were the stronger, they did free their own city against the tenor of the alliance made with the other cities of Grece, and in stead of sixty talents, they so augmented it, as in less than threescore years they made them pay twelve hundred yearly, the which amounts to 
The revenewe●… of the Athenians.  720000 crowns. And when as Themistocles captain of the Athenians, demanded the tribute of the Adriens, saying; That he would bring with him two 
Plut▪ in Themist.  mighty gods, Force and Love: they answered, That they had two more mighty, Poverty and Impossibility.  
And commonly the greater cities lay the burden upon the champain country, and the richest peasants upon the poorer, as it hath been heretofore in this realm, whereas the great cities were freed; and in old time the city of Babylon (the greatest that ever was) remained free from all charges: the which is done jest the greater should hinder the imposts. But it falls out as in man's body, where as the strongest and noblest members cast all superfluous and vicious humours upon the weaker, and when as apostume is so swollen as the weaker part can endure no more, then must it break or infect all the members: even so it falls out when as the rich cities, the nobility and the clergy, lay all the charge upon the poor labourer, he sinks under his burden like unto Aesop's Ass, and the horse which would carry nothing; that is to say, the nobility and the clergy, are forced some to carry the tenths and extraordinary subsidies, others to cell their goods, to make war at their own charge, and to pay the taxes and imposts directly or indirectly. For the like cause, the nobility and clergy of the realm of Denmark have been forced to tax themselves since the year 1563, to maintain the charges of the war; but it was upon condition, that the king should not meddle with the money. The nobility and clergy of England, every man (according to his ability) was subject to taxes & subsidies, according to the ancient custom of the Greeks and Romans'; yea almost of all nations. I except our 
The French contemn the common people.  nation the French, with whom, as Caesar saith rightly: Nihil est plebe contemptius, Nothing is more contemptible than the common people.  
To remedy this inconvenience, the ancients did wisely order, That all charges 
Taxes must be real to ea ●… the poor.  should be real, and not personal; as it is put in practice in Languedoc, and since in Provence by provision, according to the disposition of the laws, to the end that the rich and the poor, the noble and the peasant, the priest and the labourer▪ should pay the charge of their land that is to be taxed: the law exempts neither bishop nor nobleman. In other governments, if there be a clergieman, a noble man, a counsellor, & a vigneron, the last pays for all, and the others are free, 
Unjust distribution of subsidies in France.  not only for their sees, but also for other tailable lands. If then necessity force the prince to raise some extraordinary imposts, it is needful it should be such as every one may bear his part, as is the impost of salt, wine, and such like things. And to take away occasion of seditions, which do often chance for the impost of small things sold by retail, it were expedient to convert that impost into a general sum, as it was put in practice by Charles the fift, with the consent of the 
Not penny farthing.  estates, for the freeing of king john, the which was 12 deniers upon every liure, or two shillings of goods that were sold; the which was changed to an equivalent, first in the country of Languedoc in the time of king Lewis the eleventh, yielding for the said impost 6000 pounds' starling yearly: and the like hath been also done in Awergne for the salt, the which the country hath exchanged into a certain sum: and for the same reason the impost which was taken upon all small wares, have been abolished in many Commonweals, for the complaints, seditions, 
javelleur or Gabelleur.  and exclamations of the poor people against the toll-gatherers, who always took more in the kind than they aught. But if any one shall demand of me, which kind of imposts are most pleasing unto God, most profitable to the Commonweal, and most desired of good men, for the relief of the poor: it is that which is laid on those things which serve only to corrupt the subjects, as all kinds of dainties, perfumes, cloth of gold and silver, silks, cypress, laces, 
What impost is most honourable, profitable, and necessary.  rich colours, women's painting, pearls, precious stones, and all kinds of works of gold, silver or enamel, & such like things, which are not to be forbidden: for such is the nature of man, as they esteem nothing more sweet & goodly than that which is strictly forbidden them; and the more superfluities are defended, the more they are desired, especially of men that are simple and ill bred: you must therefore raise them so in price, by means of the impost, as none but the rich and those that are curious shallbe able to buy them. And therefore these princes that live towards the North, lay great imposts upon wine, the which although it be dear, yet their subjects are so desirous thereof, as they drink themselves drunk. And for this cause Cato the censor was commended, for that he laid a great impost upon the sale of slaves, that should exceed fifty crowns price, for that such merchandise could not be warranted.  
The emperor Augustus did more wisely, who to correct the disordinate 
The wisdom of the emperor Augustus.  lust of his subjects, made laws for marriages, by the which he imposed a tax in manner of a fine, upon those that did not marry after the age of 25 years, or that were married and had no children, enjoining them to bring a part into the treasury of such successions or legacies as were casually left them, giving goodly immunities and privileges to such as had children: by which laws Augustus purchased the commendation of a wise prince. For hereby he did both punish whoredom, adultery, & sodomy, and also force every one to seek him a lawful wife and children, taking away nothing of any man's present estate, but only the tenth part of that inheritance which came unto him accidentally from his friends, filling the treasury with money, and the Commonweal with good and virtuous citizens. Which law justinian the emperor did unadvisedly blame, and likewise Constantin, who abrogated the law for punishing them that lived unmarried, or that had no children. But the emperors Honorius and Theodosius gave the privilege of children to all subjects, which was to give way to adulteries and to all detestable vices, causing marriages and the procreation of children to grow in contempt, whereby the city grew bore of citizens, and the empire being found in a manner waste, was seized on by a deluge of Goths, and other barbarous nations of the North. These kinds of impositions which are invented for the punishment of vice, seem not only just, but very profitable.  
There was also another impost of ten shillings upon every suit in law that 
An impost upon suits.  was not criminal, to punish those that were too apt to pled, the which many have found strange, and in the end have taken it away: but there was never any more needful in this realm, where there are more suits than in all the rest of Europe, the which have much increased since the time of king Charles the sixt, when as an edict was made, to take away the ancient custom, by the which no man was condemned to pay any charges that had lost his suit: for in former 
The cause of many suits in France.  times they were not so apt to pled: and it may be▪ our ancient fathers▪ knowing the dispositions of the French, had brought in this custom (although it were unjust of itself) to divert the subjects from attempting of suits rashly. And although the Romans' in a free Commonweal could hardly bear any imposition or tributes, yet did they willingly endure a tax set upon suits and controversies, much more heavy than that which was imposed in the time of Charles the ninth, by the which, he that did attempt a suit against any man, was forced to consign two crowns into an officers hands; the which he should receive again from the adverse party, if he did recover his suit, or if he were vanquished, to lose them as a punishment of his rashness: but the Romans' took the tenth part in all civil causes, and the fift in criminal, as Pompeius Festus doth witness: yet Marcus Varro writes, that either of the parties did lay down five hundred asses, which comes to about 10 shillings of four money; and he which won, recovered his money which he had consigned, and this was beside the thing for which they contended, the which was called Sponsio & sacramentum, and if any one refused to consign, he yielded to the other. The Hebrews did always 'cause him that did willingly deny a debt, to pay it double, as we read in their pandects. And although the consignations which were made in Rome upon 
The extorsion of Caligula.  suits were divers, yet the emperor Caligula extorted against reason, the fortieth penny of all that was demanded by law, without any prefixion or limitation, whether the cause were just or unjust. But of all merchandise which tend to pleasure▪ lust, and pomp, the imposition is honest and profitable, serving to no other end but to corrupt the simplicity of the subject, the dearest of all (which is Amber gris) the which is valued but at twelve pounds' starling, should be prised at 300 crowns.  
The law sets no impost upon merchandise, but upon spices, and such precious 
Interdum & de vectigal.  merchandise, as are specially named, as skins of Parthia and Babylon, silks, fine linen cloth, painting, Indian hair, wild beasts, and Eunuches. Such impositions are always commendable, and far more supportable without comparison, than that which is laid upon the ass, the ox, wine, and such like. And all good princes have abhorred that impost which they called Capitatio, for to lay a charge upon men's persons for their work, were to make war to good wits, if they have not some great trade, and by that means have gathered together great wealth, for the which they must bear some charge; the which is not properly Capitatio, but with the weaker sort they must deal mildly, especially with the husbandman, which doth not till his own land. Neither are those impositions to be allowed which employ all their studies to invent new taxes & exactions, seeking by all means to encourage princes thereunto; as that multiplier (whose name I conceal for honours sake) who not many years since at a parliament held at Blois, made a declaration, That the king (besides all other ordinary charges) might with oppression or grievance of poor or rich, raise thirty millions: the king sent this man to the three estates, to expound the heavenly gift of God.  
And although we had many excellent wits and of great judgement, yet had he abused many with his opinion, if we had not laid open his error and deceit. He supposed that France was two hundred leagues long from Bologne to Marseilles, and as much from Mont S. Bernard, to S. john de Luz; and by this he concluded that France had forty thousand leagues in square, and that every league contained five thousand acres of ground, which amounted to two hundred millions of acres, of the which he abated the one half for waters, ways and waste land, and of the rest he would have the king take a sou for an acre, the 
A sou is not a penny farthing.  which amounts to five millions: then he made an estimate of six hundred thousand towns and villages, and in them twenty millions of fires, of the which he would have the king take six pence of every fire, which comes to six millions 
625000 pounds' starling.  and two hundred and fifty thousand liures. Moreover he made an account of fifteen millions of all sorts of merchandise, of the which he took a sou of the merchant for every thousand liures, making the former twelve millions. And upon the said six hundred thousand towns and villages, one with another eleven sou apiece, the which comes to twelve millions, and six millions and a hundred of liures more, which then the four tenths came unto, all which make thirty millions, besides the aids, taxes, customs, grants, imposts, subsidies, and revenues of the crown, which came then to fifteen millions, wherein his deceit was very apparent; first making France square, the which is in form of a Lorange much less than a square; next he makes the fertile land equal to that which is waste and fruitless (although there is not any land, be it never so fertile, whereas two third parts at the lest lies not waste) taxing the nobility and the clergy as well as the rest. And as for 600000 towns and villages, it is an impudent lie; for that by the extracts drawn out of the chamber of accounts, and brought to Blois to the estates, there were found to be twenty seven thousand 
In France there are but 27400 parishes.  and four hundred parishes in France, taking the greatest town but for one parish, and the smallest villages having a parish for another: and in truth the number of parishes taken by king Henry the second in the year 1554, came but to 24824 parishes, besides Bourgogne & Poictou, and the impost of three pounds' starling upon every parish, came but to threescore and fourteen thousand four hundred eighty one pounds. jerosme Laski a Polonois, father to the Palatin Laski, whom we have seen Ambassador in France, invented another manner of means than this former, to increase the treasure, giving advise to raise three 
The advise of jerosme Laski for the heaping up of treasure.  imposts upon the subjects, and to make three mounts of piety (for so he calleth them.) The first was in taking the moiety of every subjects revenues, for once: the second was the twentieth part of his revenues yearly; and the third was to have the eight part of things sold in gross, or by retail. But his advise was rejected as pernicious and most impossible: for in matter of impositions there is nothing that doth more kindle seditions, than to charge the subject with many things at once, especially a warlike people, and bred up in liberty, as those of Polonia be. And yet he gave a goodly name to a wicked and pernicious invention, calling the grounds of such impositions, Mounts of piety. For the 
The mounts of piety ●…n Italy honest and profitable.  mounts of piety in the cities of Italy are profitable, honest▪ and charitable, & invented to ease the poor; and those of Laski do ruin them. There are mounts of piety at Florence, Sienna, Luques, and other cities, whereas he that hath one daughter, the day of her birth he may put what sum he will into the mount of piety, upon condition to receive ten times as much to marry her withal, when she comes to the age of eighteen year; but if she dies before, then doth it accrue unto the mount, unless the father hath other daughters, to whom the portion shall come successively. Another mount of piety is, for the lending of money to poor men at five in the hundred, giving a sufficient pawn, and not above ten crowns; if the debtor pays not his ten crowns at the time prefixed, the pawn is sold to him that will give most, and the surplusage delivered unto the debtor: this is done to prevent excessive usuries, (wherewith the poor in those countries are ruined) and the seazure and selling of movables at an under price.  
Notwithstanding I found that the emperor Antonine surnamed the Pius or godly, invented a better mount of piety, which was to deliver out the money that came clear into the treasury, all charges paid for five in the hundred upon 
A commendable institution made by Antoninus Pius.  good and sufficient caution. By whose example Severus restored the treasure that was wasted, and the merchants and poor men gained much by traffic: and the public in a great sum did also gain much: for if they lent a million, at the years end they did get fifty thousand crowns for the public, and private men got twice as much by traffic: and besides all this, the greatest benefit that did arise, the public treasure was assured out of the paws of thieves and horse leeches of the court. And for this reason only as it seems, the emperor Augustus long before, was accustomed to lend the money which came clear 
Tranquil. in August.  into the Exchequer, without any interest, giving good assurance of land; and upon a penalty to forfeit the double, if it were not paid at the day: by this means the public treasure was not idle, nor wasted by the prince's prodigality, nor exhausted by theft, but a great benefit redounded to all in general, and to many in 
A forfeiture of the double forbidden by the law. ●…. pecun. de usur.  particular. And here some one may object, that although Augustus did not lend the public money for interest, yet he imposed a penalty of the double, if it were not paid at the prefixed day, the which is greater than any usury and therefore forbidden by the law. In my opinion, that penalty is then disallowed by the law when we stipulate any thing fraudulently, and above the lawful interest: but he that hath taken the public money, and restores it not at the appointed day, he commits theft; it is therefore the penalty of theft, and not of usury.  
Those princes therefore did wisely in old time, which provided for the necessity of the Commonweal, and the profit of private men. But the contrary is used in our days; for princes in stead of giving out upon reasonable interest, borrow and pay unreasonable usury: and not only princes, 
The ruin of princes is to take up at interest.  but also lords and Commonweals, some more, some less: those which have been held the most frugal, as the Venetians, borrow always at five in the hundred, without any hope to recover the principal, or at fourteen in the hunded, so long as the creditor shall live. The college of Saint George at Genes takes money of all men at five in the hundred, and delivers it out again at the highest interest to princes and merchants; whereby they are so enriched, as they have redeemed the Isle of Corsica, and the lands of the Commonweal. Private men had rather take five in the hundred of the college, to be assured of their principal, than much more of private men, who oftentimes become bankrupts: the Venetians have always lost, and shall lose, so long as they shall take eight in the hundred or more: or else they must abate their interest, as they have by little and little abated Mount Vecchio, cutting the creditors so short, as they dare not so easily put in their money as they were wont.  
This means was also brought into France by the cardinal of Tournon, at such time as he was in credit with king Francis the first, whom he persuaded (by the instigation of certain Italians) that there was no other means 
The original of the bank of Lion.  to draw the money from all parts into France, and to frustrate the enemy hereafter, than to settle a bank at Lion, to take every man's money, and to pay him eight in the hundred, so as in short time he should get into his hands all the money of Italy and Germany: but in effect the cardinal sought to assure an hundred thousand crowns which he had in his coffers, & to get all the interest he could. Letters patents being granted, at the opening of the bank, every man came running from France, Germany and Italy, so as king Francis the first, when he died, was found indebted to the bank of Lion, five hundred thousand crowns, the which he had in his coffers and sometimes more, and a peace concluded with all the princes of the earth. But the reign of Henry his son grew most lamentable, for having wasted his father's treasure, and standing in need of money in the year 1554 borrowed at ten, twelve, and sixteen in the hundred, of the Caponyes, Albicis, and the Foucquers of Germany, and when he was not able to pay the interest, he promised the creditor's interest upon interest. The emperor Charles 5 did the like for his part; true it is, he paid but ten and twelve in the hundred. And the same year Henry the eight king of England, borrowed a hundred thousand crowns of the Germane merchants at twelve in the hundred: every one hoping to draw money and wealth unto him by the desire of usury. And whereas our king Henry the second thought to draw most money unto him by paying of more interest than the emperor or king of England, he began to lose his credit, for the wisest husbands concluded that in the end he would not be able to pay neither principal nor interest; for the interest of sixteen in the hundred, came at the lest to eighteen in the hundred▪ detaining the interest which he could not pay: whereas the emperor made show that he would free himself, giving cities and commonalties for cautions, paying the old debts with new borrowing, and every man lent him seeing him pay so willingly. But at this day many will free both principal and interest, to have but thirty paid them for a hundred; so as after the death of Henry, all was filled with the complaint of creditors: and such princes and Signiories as had money in the bank at Lion, were much altered, and not only the Signiories of the Cantons, the princes of Germany and others had their parts there but also Bassa's & merchants of Turkey were there in their Factor's names for above five hundred thousand crowns; 
The Bassa's of Turquie had money at interestin the bank at Lion.  and nothing did more with hold the great Turk from succouring of the French in their last voyage of Naples, under the duke of Guise, than the not paying of four thousand crowns for interest to Rustan Bassa, besides the ten thousand which la Vigne the ambassador carried him in the year 1556, fearing to lose his principal, as I have learned by letters and instructions from la Vigne, for many did not buy rents for a certain sum of money, but would have the interest pure and simple, and upon condition that they should have their principal again: as many Italians do with private men, to whom they lend their money 
The policy of Italian usurers.  simply having them bound both body and goods, without making any mention of interest, and yet by a verbal agreement, they promise' sixteen or twenty in the hundred; if he fail to pay the interest, they seize upon body and goods for the principal: and although the interest be paid, if they have need of their principal▪ they proceed by way of execution against the debtor, for he hath never any quittance nor witness for the interest which he receiveth. Behold by what means they draw the money out of this realm.  
There are other tricks which I forbear to touch, but for this cause king Lewis the ninth in the year 1254, and Philip the Fair in the year 1300 did banish all 
Ancient laws against▪ Italian usurers.  Bankers and Italian merchants out of France, confiscating their goods: and to discover the debts that were owing them, it was decreed that the debtors should be freed from all arrearages and interests, paying the principal to the treasurers. And since, in the year of our Lord one thousand three hundred forty and seven, Philip of Valois for the like cause did forfeit all their goods: for it was verified by the process that was made, that for four and twenty thousand pounds starling, they had in few years profited two millions and four hundred and forty thousand pounds starling: and in hatred of such usury the Lombard's letters have been always taxed in the Chancery at double▪ and although these people have been often banished the realm, yet there were never more in any place, nor will ever be wanting, so long as princes take up at interest. Since and before that the bank of Lion was broken, most of the cities of this realm have lent unto the king upon the revenues, customs, imposts, and tenths for reasonable interest, and those which held themselves to be of best judgement in matters of state and treasure, advised it for two ends, the one to have money at need; the other to bind the cities and commonalties more unto their prince, yet we have never seen more rebellions since the establishment of this realm. And as for the treasure, it hath been so well husbanded, as in less than twelve years that king Henry the second reigned, he did own more than his 
The debts of king Henry the second.  predecessors had levied forty years before, for all charges: for by an account made in the year 1560, king Francis the second, successor to Henry, did own two millions three hundred twelve thousand six hundred and ten liures, eighteen sou six deniers, of money lent freely, for the which he paid no interest: and fifteen millions nine hundred twenty six thousand five hundred fifty and five liures, 12 sou and 8 deniers, for the which he paid interest: and he aught more for arrearages seven hundred threescore and fifteen thousand, nine hundred threescore and nineteen liures, four sou, and four deniers: besides the debt of Ferrara, and other debts for marriages, which came to eight millions five hundred and fourteen thousand five hundred fourscore and twelve liures, eighteen sou and eleven deniers: and other remainders due, to the sum of fifteen hundred threescore and four thousand, seven hundred fourscore and seven liures, two sou, and six deniers: so as by the last article the king remained indebted one and forty millions, a hundred fourscore three thousand, one hundred threescore and fifteen liures, three sou, six deniers: comprehending fourteen millions nine hundred threescore and one thousand seven hundred fourscore and seven liures fifteen sou and eight deniers, for the aids, revenues, and customs engaged, to cities, corporations, and colleges, and to private men: amongst the which the city of Paris hath had yearly three millions one hundred & so many thousand liures, comprehending the tenths: moreover the clergy hath furnished above threescore millions in the time of king Francis 2, and Charles' 9 Although the emperor Charles 5, and his successor have run the same fortune, for that they took up at interest, being indebted above fifty millions, for the which 
The debts of Spain.  all the lands, and revenues of Naples and Milan were engaged to the Genewais and other private persons, who now are called in question, for that they had taken of the king of Spain in his necessity thirty and forty in the hundred; and to effect it, they have caused the catholic king to be censured by an admonition from the Pope, if he continued those excessive usuries; who embracing this occasion, defrauded his creditors of ten years interest. We must not think that the Spaniards will suffer themselves to be easily gulled by the bankers of Italy, as the French do, who suffer them to enjoy the farms & all the best revenues of France, the taxes, imposts, customs and doanne of Lion, by means of which farms they ransom the subjects, and transport the coins, contrary to the laws of this realm, which forbidden to suffer strangers to enrich themselves by the revenues of the crown: nay, it hath been more insupportable to prefer them before natural subjects, which offered much more, & yet they had an abatement of twenty thousand crowns at one instant out of the custom of Lion, to the perpetual infamy of the French: and lest they should be molested and drawn in question of theft, they have gotten an evocation of all their causes to the privy council. The original of all these miseries grows from Francis the first, who began to take up money at interest, having 1800000 crowns in his coffers, and peace within his realm: no well advised prince will ever take that course, for thereby he shall ruin the foundation of his treasure, if he will keep his faith and pay; but if he will not, or cannot pay, then must he break and lose his credit, which is the ruin of an estate: for he must borrow, levy taxes, impositions, and in the end by slanders, and tyrannies forfeit his subjects goods. Than is it most fit and necessary for a prince to borrow money upon interest of his allies and subjects, if that he be in danger to lose his estate, by some general revolt, or the conspiracy 
Means to assure the estate of a desperate prince.  of some great men against him▪ for extreme remedies are to be sought in extremest dangers: as we read that Eumenes did, who borrowed a great sum of money at extreme interest, of those that had conspired his death. Agrippa king of judea, recovered his realm by the means of his creditors, who troubled both heaven and earth for the assurance they had to be paid: and this was also the chief means to restore Edward the fourth king of England, being expelled his kingdom. But if the prince's creditors have assurance to be paid by his successors, or that they have lands in pawn, than this course is unprofitable. I have set down the means which in my opinion are profitable and honest to gather together treasure, the which is the first point of this chapter: the second is how to employ the treasure of the Commonweal well and honourably, the which we have partly touched in the chapter of rewards and punishments. Let us add hereunto what remains.  
In old time the first article set down in the expenses of the treasure, was for alms deeds; the second for the king's house; and the third for reparations: but the order is quite changed. As for almsdeeds, the wise and ancient princes 
Means to employ the treasure.  of the Hebrews, have left this discipline to posterity, the which they received from the holy Prophets, who said, That the surest preservation and defence of treasure, were Alms deeds, and liberality to the needy; the which they restrained to the tenth part of every man's goods, which should be employed upon the ministers of the church and the poor. And if we will look advisedly into it, we shall not found any prince, state, or family that hath flourished more in riches, honours, and all happiness, than those which had most care of the poor and needy. In old time there were no princes under heaven more charitable than our kings of France, since Robert son to Hugh Capet, who gave the first example to his subjects and successors to be charitable to the poor, feeding a 
The charity of the kings of France to the poor.  thousand daily, giving them horses to follow the court, to bless him and pray for him; and to speak truly, there was never king in this realm that reigned longer and in greater peace. We may justly say of our kings, that there is no race under heaven that hath so entertained the greatness of their majesty in arms and laws, and out of the which there hath issued more princes▪ or that have reigned longer without offence to all other princes, Christians, Turks, Tartars, Persians', Indian's, and Ethiopians. What prince ever was more charitable to the poor, than Lewis the ninth, who hath founded twenty eight hospitals and colleges in this realm; and had commonly in his train six score poor folks, and in Lent twelve score, feeding them with meat from his own table? he also lived in great honour, being feared of his enemies, reverenced of his friends, honoured of his subjects: and after that he had reigned 44 years, he left five sons, and four daughters, and a kingdom flourishing in arms and laws to his successor, recommending unto him above all things to be devout to God, and charitable to the poor. Neither may we forget james the fift king of Scotland, who was called Rex egentium, The king of the needy; who as he exceeded all the princes of his time in bounty, so did he surmount all his predecessors in riches. And contrariwise we see great families, states, realms, and empires come to poverty and ruin, having contemned the poor, and abandoned the subject to the spoil of the soldior, and the thefts of toll-gatherers: when as king Henry the second in the year 1549, did exact that extraordinary tribute which they called Taillon, he promised not to employ that money to any other use, than to the entertainment of his men at arms, and not to confounded it with the ordinary receipts, that the subject might be freed from the spoil of soldiers. The like was said, when as the realm was charged with the payment of 50000 footmen in the time of king Francis the first, the which should be levied upon walled towns and their suburbs, which felt nothing of the oppression of the soldier; but notwithstanding since they have made it equal to town, village, and hamlet, in the year 1555, whereby the poor countryman hath been doubly oppressed, for they pay, and are spoiled of all sides. And yet with all these charges, they would hold themselves happy, if they might be freed in providing corn and victuals for the soldiers at an under▪ rate, what may then be hoped for in those cities whereas the soldiers rob and spoil the poor subjects with all impunity, 
The soldier must be paid to prevent all thefts and insolences.  and insult more over the citizens than against the enemy? but for an excuse, they pretend they are not paid, neither would they be, to the end they might have some colour for their thefts. There is no means to redress these calamities, and to restore in some sort military discipline, which is now quite decayed, but in paying the soldiers: for as Cassiodorus said, Disciplinam servare non potest ieiunus exercitus, dum quod deest semper presumit armatus, A fasting army can never observe good discipline, for what they want, they will presume to take by force: the which cannot be done unless there be a great care had of the treasure. The king's house therefore entertained, the soldiers and the officers paid, and due rewards given to them that deserve them, it is great reason the poor should be remembered. And if the treasury be well furnished, a part would be employed to repair towns, to fortify upon the frontiers, to furnish places of strength, make the passages even, build bridges, fortify the ports, sand ships to sea, build public houses, beautify temples, erect colleges for honour, virtue, and learning: for besides necessity of reparations, it brings great profit 
The benefit of reparations and fortifications.  to the Commonweal. For by this means arts and artificers are entertained, the poor people are eased, the idle are set to work, cities are beautified and diseases expelled: finally hatred against princes (which doth often times stir up the subjects to rebellion) is quite suppressed, when as the impositions which he hath levied, redounds not only to the general, but also to every private man's good. And therefore the emperor Alexander Severus was accustomed to leave many imposts and tolles to cities, to be employed in the necessary reparations thereof.  
This which I have said is more expedient in an Aristocratia, or a Popular state, than in a Monarchy; for that the subjects being many, are with more difficulty maintained in peace and union by few commanders: unless the multitude being employed in the public works, may make some gain, and not to enure them to the distribution of corn and money, as they usually did in Popular states, and especially the Tarentins: the which is not only the ruin of the treasure, but likewise of the city. So Pericles was also blamed, having first accustomed the Athenians to these distributions: the which he did to gain the people's favour. But when he was once master of them, he employed the public treasure, not only to fortify the city, but also to beautify it, and to fill it with 
An infinite treasure in the city of Athens.  good artificers: yet durst he not attempt this before the city was in peace and their treasure full, having then a hundred thousand talents; that is to say, threescore millions of crowns, if we may believe Demosthenes: which sum because 
Demosthenes in 〈◊〉.  it is unreasonable, it may be, we should read a hundred talents, which make threescore thousand pounds, for that we showed before, that the Athenians (when as they had charged their allies with great tributes) did never levy above two thousand talents yearly at the most, and in Pericles' time they did scarce exact a thousand talents. And being accused by his enemies to have misemploied the public treasure, he made this resolute answer unto the people, That if 
Plut. in Pericle.  they were not well pleased with the walls, fortresses, and temples which he built, he would take the charge upon himself, upon condition, that his name should be graven thereon, and that it was his gi●…t: but the people allowed the charge, knowing well that all men in general, and every man in particular, reaped profit and honour thereby, for that the merchant did gain in furnishing of stuff; seamen, and those that brought it, for their carriage; and artificers in working it; so as the profit was distributed to all sorts of people, and the glory of their stately works, gave a perpetual testimony to posterity of the greatness of this Commonweal. But the greatest benefit, and which doth most import the preservation of an estate is, That the two greatest plagues of a Common weal, Idleness and Poverty, are banished: a very necessary thing in a popular and aristocratical state; and especially in those countries, where they have great spirits, and but barren soil, as at Athens: if idleness get footing in such a country, it will never be without mutinies and thefts, which Solon foreseeing, 
Idleness severely punished  he did inflict great punishments upon idle persons: and so did Amasis' king of Egypt, who condemned idle men to be put to death, if they had not wherewithal to live, knowing the Egyptians to be the most ingenuous in the world, and the most subject to mutiny, if they were not employed. We see Pyramids built in that country almost three thousand years since, jest the people should have languished with idleness: we have also precedents of the wisest emperors of Rome, which have in like sort employed their treasure, & given the subjects example to imitate them: as Augustus, who did justly vaunt, That he had found Rome built with brick, but that he had left it built with marble: and in truth he employed four millions and five hundred thousand crowns in building of the Capitol alone: he was followed by the emperor Vespasian, who made great and excellent works throughout the whole empire, rather to entertain the meaner sort, than for any other end: for when as an excellent workman promised him to set up pillars in the Capitol, of an excessive greatness, with small charge and few labourers; he recompensed him very well, saying, Let me I pray you, nourish the poor: and yet he protested in open senate coming to the empire, That there was need of a milliart of crowns to free and restore that Common 
A thousand millions of crowns.  weal.  
What shall I say of the emperor Claudius, who enjoying an assured peace, caused the channel of Fucina to be made, to accommodate the city with good waters, employing daily thirty thousand men for eleven years together. And without search of ancient histories, it is well known that the signiory of Venice doth entertain continual in their Arsenal, three or four thousand persons which get their living by the labour of their hands, the which doth much content the citizens, seeing the public treasure employed so charitably. But these employments are goodly and befitting a great prince which is not indebted, when the revenues are not pawned, when as the Commonweal is in perfect peace, when the soldiers are paid, and rewards duly administered to every one: otherwise to increase the subsidies to build great palaces, more stately than necessary, being indebted, and to suffer the buildings of his predecessors to run to ruin, thereby to purchase vain glory, that were to leave a mark of his tyranny, and a perpetual testimony to posterity, I hat he hath built with the 
A tyrant builds with the blood of his subjects.  blood of his subjects: and often times the subjects ruin the buildings of tyrants, to deface their memory from off the earth, whereas they should by virtuous and charitable actions, grave their names in heaven. The golden palace of Nero, which comprehended a great part of Rome, was contemned by his successors, who would not vouchsafe to lodge in it, for the cruelty and villainy of him that had built it; and soon after it was ruined▪ as being made of spoils, exactions and confiscations, the which follow a prodigal prince at the heels: for of necessity, of a prodigal he must become an oppressor, and of an oppressor a tyrant.  
There were never two tyrants more cruel and prodigal, than Nero and Caligula; 
The strange prod●…galitie of Nero and Caligula.  for the first, in fifteen years that he reigned, had given away the value of fifty and five millions of crowns: and the last, in one year had wasted threescore and seven millions, so as having not where withal to de●…ay his household charges, he was forced to beg the offerings in his own person: then falling to prescriptions of private men, after that he had wasted the public treasure, he filled all with cruel confiscations. This misery of excessive prodigality happens often to princes, through forgetfulness of the gifts which they have be●…owed, not well understanding the bottom of their treasuries. And for this cause, it was wisely decreed by Francis the first▪ that every year the generals of the treasure, should sand unto the treasurer, two briefs of the public revenues of every province: the one by conjecture the first day of the year; the other a true note of the year that was passed: and in like case the treasurer should make two briefs of the whole treasure in general, to the end that the king and his counsel might plainly know what money was in his coffers, thereby to govern his gifts, rewards, and expenses: but most commonly he that hath power to dispose of it, seethe nothing. I will put for an example an estimate of the treasure which was made in lanuarie in the year 1572, where in a chapter of the receipt, there was an article set down of 200000 pounds' starling of casual things: and by a true account 
Articles of parties casual in the year 1572.  made in the end of the year, it was found, that they amounted to two hundred and fourscore thousand pounds' starling, and yet it was verified▪ that there was but fifty thousand pounds employed to the king's profit. Such was the calamity of those times when as children and women ruled. But in my opinion, the king had done better, if he had seen the general account of his revenues, the which is contained in two sheets of paper, and withal had had a register of his gifts and rewards: or if his privy gifts be not enrolled, that he had a small brief or remembrance of that which he had given to whom, and wherefore: which are three chief points, whereof a prince must be very careful, to the end, that if he will be liberal, it should be to such as deserve it. And to this 
A prince should have a list of matters of state and of his chief men.  end, it were expedient the prince had a brief register of affairs of state, and a roll of the worthiest men of his realm, for there is no memory so perfect, but may be confounded with the multiplicity of affairs, whereby he shall commit great incongruities in matters of state: for a brief note of affairs shall put him in mind of that which he hath to do, and of all enterprises, the which oftentimes remain imperfect and ill executed through forgetfulness. There is no better example hereof, than that of king Lewis the eleventh, who was held one of the most politic princes of his age, yet he ran willingly into the snare of Charles earl of Carolois, having forgotten that he had sent his ambassadors into the country of Liege, to stir them to war against him: the earl advertised hereof, detained him prisoner: the which had not happened, if he had kept a register of his former actions. If any flatterers of the court will object, That the register would be too great, that the prince should be too much troubled, and that he could not live long: why then have those princes and great monarches which have been so careful of matters of state, and governed the whole world with their laws, lived so long? as Augustus, Tiberius, Vespasian, Traian, Adrian, and the Antonines, all Roman emperors and politic governors, who themselves made registers of their own affairs, imitating the example of Augustus, who lived 74 years, leaving three Books written with his own hand; the first was 
The diligence of Augustus.  his deeds and public actions; the second was his testament; the third was an estate of all the Roman empire, wherein was contained a particular estate of every province, what troops of soldiers, what treasure, what arms, what shipping and what munition, with a diligence worthy of a great monarch: yet for all this he did not omit to do justice ordinarily and to hear all comers, reading all the books of politic government, that he could get, as Suetonius saith, remembering that which Demetrius the Phalerien said unto Ptolemy Philadelph king of Egypt, that he should found goodly secrets in books, which no man durst tell him. Vespasian in like sort, made an excellent abridgement of the empire, and yet he lived 70 years.  
The empire of Persia was greater than that of the Romans', stretching from the farthest bounds of India, unto Hellespont, and the desert of Libya, having under it 127 Provinces, and yet the kings of Persia carried with them continually a register of their affairs of state and of their gifts: and when as Darius Longuemain had escaped the conspirators hands, by the advertisement which Mardocheus had given him, the king a while after reading this register by night, and finding that Mardocheus had received no reward for so great a service done unto the king he caused him to be sent for, giving him great honours and preferments. But without any further search, the king of Spain doth usually look upon a register of his affairs, carrying an abridgement of letters which he writes to governors, captains, and ambassadors, if the matter be not very secret. For the same cause Charles surnamed the wise, king of France, made a Register of his privy council, and the first was Peter Barrier, who was not busied (as at this day) with expeditions and acts of ●…ustice, but only to enroll the affairs of state. But above all it is necessary for a prince to have a register in his counsel, of gifts, offices, benefices, & exemptions: the which is most commonly in the hands of a secretary▪ and ●…et the hundred part of the gifts are not entered. For the redressing whereof, there are two ancient laws, the one made by Philip of Valois, of the which I have formerly made mention, by the which the gift was revoked, if the donatarie made not mention of the benefits granted to him and his 
Good ●…ss abrogated.  predecessors: the other is of Charles the eight, whereb●… all gifts above ten pounds were of no force, if they were not verified in the chamber of accounts. The first law was soon taken away by another, saying, That it was sufficient by the Letters of gift, if it were derogated from the first decree. And as for the law made by Charles the eight, it is out of practice, under colour of secret gifts and pensions, the which must not be known: so as the ancient laws (decreeing, that the articles set down in the chapter of expenses, shall not be allowed without an order, a commandment, and a discharge) are now of little or no force in that respect: for the treasurer is discharged, bringing the king's hand only, without any mention of him to whom the reward was given, nor wherefore. There was yet a law made by king Francis the first, and confirmed by his successor, whereby it was decreed, There should be four keys to the place where the treasure was kept, whereof the king should have one, and the rest should be in Commissioners hands appointed by him: and the distribution of money should be made by the king's commandment, in the presence of the treasurer and controller of the Exchequer: But king Henry the second by a special edict discharged the treasurers and officers of the treasury, that afterwards they might not be called to any account. True it is, that one of these commissioners had given him at one time a hundred thousand crowns, if the common report were true; the which was much at that time, but little in regard of prodigalities practised 
The revocation of excessive g●… is necessary.  of late. For after that king Francis the first had ordered it by sparing, all the public treasure lay open to the spoil of great men and flatterers. But an edict made in fraud should be no hindrance, but that such as had managed the public treasure might be called to an account; as it was required at a Parliament held at Orleans; and that excessive gifts should be revoked or at the lest cut less: as the Emperor Galba did, who revoked Nero's gifts, leaving but the tenth part to the donatorie; not that they should inquire too curiously of all gifts bestowed by the prince, the which might prove very dangerous.  
Charles the seventh did limit by a law, what sum of money the king might take yearly to dispose of at his pleasure: which sum being very little, seemed in those days exceeding great. There is nothing more profitable for the prince, nor necessary for the subjects, than to have the rewards which they give, known and examined by their officers: for that princes shall always maintain their fafavors, giving liberally, and the officers shallbe subject to the hatred and dislike of such as have their gifts revoked or cut less: so as by means of recovery, the money should return into the treasury again, and few would beg, yea they would scarce take it when it should be offered them, if they knew their gifts should be revoked or examined in the chamber of accounts. If bounty be commendable and worthy of a great and rich Monarch, it is ill beseeming a poor and needy prince, for he must slay his subjects, and rack them to the very bones. King 
Bounty not fit in a poor p●…ince.  Francis the first, leaving a goodly kingdom, flourishing in arms and laws, and in all arts and sciences, to his successor, with seventeen hundred thousand crowns in treasure, and the quarter of March ready to be received; yet did he not give away the hundred part in rewards in 32 years that he had reigned, as his son Henry did in two: for he had scarce closed his eyes, when as the confirmation of offices (which is due to the king at his first coming to the crown) whereof an infinite mass of money was then made, was given to one horse leech in court. And although that Francis the father gave pensions to Germane, English, 
An infinite mass of money given to a woman.  Italians, Swisses, Albaneses, Spaniards, and Grisons; yet all his pensions, besides the Cantons were but 13000 pounds' starling a year at the most, as I have seen by an extract out of the chamber of accounts, the which was made the 
The bounty of great King Francis.  year that he died: and in the same extract there is but 42769 pounds, four shillings starling, which he gave in pension to his subjects, princes of blood, knights of the order, captains in great numbers, lieutenants, councillors of state, men of justice, ambassadors, scholars studying, and many excellent workmen, and learned personages. OH noble prince, who could so well make choice of worthy persons, and moderate his bounty.  
We have entreated of two points of this chapter: first how a Commonweal should gather together, and then how they shall employ: the last point is, what reserve they shall make for any necessity, that they be not forced to begin war 
Re●…nation of treasure.  by borrowing, or subsidies; whereof the Romans were very careful: for although they had continual wars until Augustus' time, after the defeat of Marc Anthony, yet had they never touched the treasure which grew of the twentieth pence of slaves enfranchised, until that Hannibal had reduced them 
The treasure of the Romans' called Sanctius ac●…arium.  to extreme want; then was there found four hundred and fifty thousand crowns in their treasury, the which was one of the chiefest means to save their estate.  
The emperor of Turkey observes this order carefully, for besides the treasury of ordinary receipts, which is in the princes Seraigle, there is another in the castle of seven towers at Constantinople, where the ancient treasure is reserved, 
The Turks treas●….  the which they meddle not with, if the necessity be not very urgent. Our Ancestors were accustomed in time of necessity, when the treasure was wasted to have recourse to the king's forests, where there was an infinite number of tall timber▪ trees fit for all uses, of the which they made great sums of money; but during the civil wars, they are so cut down, as hereafter they will be only fit to make faggots: whereby the commonweal is much damnified, and will be more daily, unless there be some speedy remedy: for there is such want of timber, as they shall be forced to fetch it out of other countries for their ships and buildings; they do also cut them down so hastily, as the trees cannot grow to bear any fruit to feed our swine; and in the end we shall be forced to fetch wood from other parts for firing. And for that it hath been always held a matter of some difficulty to keep treasure safely, being very hard for princes to shake off importune beggars: therefore the kings of Persia and the Romans', that they might preserve this holy treasure from s●…elth, they reduced 
The means how to keep treasure.  a great part of their money into thick bricks. It is also said, that Charles the fift king of France, had caused the great Hart in the palace at Paris to be made after the same form that they should cast one all of gold, of the treasure which he had gathered together. And the better to assure it against thieves, the ancients did lay their treasure in temples, as the Greeks' in the temple of Apollo, Delphique, and Deliaque: the Romans' in the temple of Saturn and Opis: the ancient Gauls in hallowed Lakes: the Hebrews sometimes in temples, sometimes in sepulchers: for we read that the high priest and king of the jews, Hircanus, found great treasures in David's sepulchre. But seeing there are no sepulchers so religious, no temples so holy, that thieves will not force and enter: therefore the kings of Morocco having molten a great quantity of gold in form of a bowl, pierced through with a bar of iron, they did hung it on the top of the pinnacle of the great Church at Morocco. The ancient Egyptians fearing to give occasion to their neighbours and enemies to invade their estate, and make war against them for their treasure (as they did to king Ezechias, having showed his treasures to the ambassadors of the king of Assiria) employed it for the most part 
isaiah 30.  in building of their Pyramids, beautifying of cities, bringing of rivers, and repairing the banks of Nile. The law of God forbids to heap together much gold and silver; jest that thereby the prince should be a●…ured 
Deut. 17.  to oppress his subjects, or the enemy to invade the citizens; inviting the prince thereby to be charitable to the poor and needy: yet a mean is to be used.  
No man in my opinion will allow of the insatiable covetousness of john 22 Pope of Rome, in whose coffers they found (he being dead) twenty three millions of gold, as many have written; or of Sardanapalus, who left forty millions of crowns; or of Cyrus, who left fifty millions; or of Tiberius Caesar, who had gathered together seventy seven millions, the which his successor wasted in one year; or of Darius Ochus the last king of the Persians', in whose treasury Alexander the great found fourscore millions of gold. We read in the holy scripture that David left sixscore millions, the which is the greatest treasure that was ever 
22. Paralip. 〈◊〉. 1. The greatest treasure that ever was.  heard of: but there is some question touching the valuation of their talent; for they writ that he had gathered together a hundred thousand talents of gold, and a thousand thousand talents of silver, which sum, if it be accounted by talents of Attica, although they be small it will seem wonderful: our interpreters of the Bible do falsely think them Attic talons. I found Siclum in the scriptures to be taken two ways, the which the Greeks call Statera, and the Latins Talentum, one way it is a pound of six ounces, as in the first book of Paralip the 21 chapter; another way it is taken for half an ounce, as in the first book of Samuel, the 24 chapter. If David's treasure be numbered by the sickle or talent of half an ounce, the sum will not seem great; if it be referred to six ounces, it will comprehend fifty thousand pound weight of gold, and ten times as much in silver: but if it be valued by the Attic talent, the wealth of the Romans never came near it; as we may see by an extract out of the treasury under the empire of Traian, at which time it was at the greatest; for the whole sum of their treasure (the which was kept in Egypt) came but to 74 thousand talents, the which amounts 
The treasure of the Romans'.  to 44 millions, and four hundred thousand crowns; unless they had another treasury at Rome, as it is likely, (although it appear not by the extract) having 200000 foot, and 40000 horse in garrisons on the frontiers of the empire and in the provinces entertained: three hundred Elephants for the war, two thousand chariots for war, and munition to arm ●…00000 men, fifteen hundred galleys of three and five owers on a side, besides two thousand vessels for the sea, and furniture to arm and rig twice as many, with fourscore great ships stately adorned.  
But our kings of France have not offended in this point against the laws of God, by heaping up of too great treasures, and it is not to be feared that they will hereafter break it: for they which say, that king Charles the fift left in his treasury eighteen millions of crowns, are much deceived, for he found the coffers empty, he paid his predecessors debts, he redeemed the revenues of the crown, conquered Guienne from the English, purchased the county of Anxerre, and a great part of the earldom of Eureux, restored Henry king of Castill being expelled his realm, maintained and succoured the kings of Scotland, against the kings of England, and reigned but 17 years, and yet he did not levy for all charges above 43756 pounds' starling yearly, comprehending the revenues of the crown lands: although that in his time the aids and custom of 8 shillings upon every fire were laid upon the subjects: and his successor forty years after did levy but 45000 pounds' starling: and Charles the seventh, the year that he 
The revenues of France under Charles the 5, 6, 7, Lewis the 11, and Charles' the 8.  died, received for all charges and revenues, but 170000 pounds' starling, as it appears plainly in the chamber of accounts, & yet had he imposed the tax in form of an ordinary impost, the which at that time came but to 1800 pounds: and twenty years after when as Lewis the eleventh died, the whole receipt came but to 470000 pounds, the which was reduced to 120000 pounds, at the request of the Parliament, held at Tours at the coming of Charles the 8 unto the crown, 
Diminution of half the cha●…ge at the coming of Charles 8.  besides the revenues of the crown which amounted yearly by estimation to 100000 pounds: so as the whole revenues when as Charles the eight died, came not to above 250000 pounds. The like request was made unto king Charles the ninth, by a parliament held at Orleans, at his coming to the crown: but the necessity was found so great as there was more need to augment than to diminish the the charge. Yet there was great hope to free the king out of debt, and to take away the subsidies & extraordinary charges, (if the realm had not been plunged in civil war) considering the good order was taken the first year: for the interest was moderated to five in the hundred, all officers wages for that year were diminished and half taken away, and the confirmation of offices granted them freely. And as for the expenses, all was so well ordered, as by the accounts of that year, there came into the king's coffers 230577 pounds' starling: so as in few years all had been discharged, without any diminution of the king's household servants, the which were six hundred, besides such as were entertained for hunting & hawking, for they may well be spared without diminution of the majesty of a king or the dignity of his house, by cutting off his ordinary train and household servants, the which oftentimes doth cause strangers to contemn him, and his subjects to rebel against him: as it chanced unto Lewis the eleventh, who having put the nobility from him & discharged the gentlemen of his house, used his tailor for an herald at arms, his barber for an ambassador, and his Physician for chancellor, (as Antiochus king of Syria did his physician Apolophanes, whom he made precedent of his counsel) & in mockery of other kings, he ware a greasy hat, and very course cloth in his apparel: and even in the chamber of 
The baseness of Lewis the eleventh in his apparel.  accounts, there is set down in a note of expenses two shillings for a new pair of sleeves to an old doublet: and in another Item three half pence for a box of grease to black his boots withal; and yet he raised the charges more than his predecessor did by 300000 pounds' starling a year, and sold much of the revenues. As for the officers of the crown, it was wisely advised at the estates of Orleans, to reduce them to the ancient number, as they were in the time of king Lewis the twelve, by suppression without any disbursement. But there were some good husbands which gave them afterwards to understand, that the suppression of offices was a decrease of parties casual, whereby the number was afterwards much augmented: And bailey precedent of the accounts told the king boldly and plainly, being at S. Maur desfosses, that the suppression of those officers which had been created by the new law, was both pernicious to the public, and hurtful to his treasure, seeing but for three augmentations in the chamber of accounts 
Anno 1566. 20 May.  only, they had paid above threescore thousand pounds starling: but he doth not say that it is like unto cold water which increaseth the fit to him that hath a burning Fever: for it is well known that the king or people pay wages to most of these officers after ten or twenty for the hundred, which was the principal cause of the suppression of subalternal offices by a law made by Francis the second. Moreover they set not down the prerogatives which belong to the officers of the chamber of accounts, that is to say, their ordinary wages, their rights of wood, their livery at Easter, their rights at Hallontide, their roses, their prerogative 
The right of the offices of the chamber of accounts.  of herring, their rights at Twelfetide, their rights of the stable of virtue, and of white salt, besides paper, parchment, pens, counters, purses, wax candles, read wax, penknives, bodkins, scrapers and strings: they did not show also that the other profits of offices came to much more than their wages: they will not confess that whereas there be now seven chambers of accounts, there was then but one; and whereas now there be two hundred officers or thereabouts in the chamber of accounts at Paris, there 
Erection of the chamber of accounts.  was wont to be but one Treasurer of France Precedent of the chamber, and ●…oure masters of accounts that were Clarks, by an erection that was made at Viviers in Brie in the year 1319, afterwards they added four lay men, which sufficed for all that were accountable: the kingdom of Navarre, and all the Lowcountries being then in the hands of the kings of France. And yet we have seen in our da●…eses, that those which have stolen the king's treasure and the subjects wealth, have escaped, being indebted in great sums of money; and infinite others which have never accounted. And which is more, not long since an accountant had gotten into his possession a great and notable somme of money, wherewith he stood charged by his account, who by collusion with a nobleman that should have a third part, he obtained the rest by gift, and for his discharge, he produced the kings b●…l signed to the nobleman. So as to call accountants to their duties, they must oftentimes depute Commissioners with double charges, and the fault cannot be imputed to any other, but to those officers that are created to that end. And although that all treasorers, receivers, controllers, and other accountants should make a good and loyal account, and pay what remains due; yet notwithstanding there is so great a number in this realm, as a third part of the receipt is spent in gauges, charges, vacations, riding voyages, and the conduct of money; as hath been well verified by the estates of the country of languedoc in the year 1556, where I was then present: who for that cause deputed Martin Durant, Syndic or Procurator of that country, to present a request unto the king to be discharged of all officers of receipt, 
An offer made by the estates of▪ ●…anguedoc, to king Henry th●… 〈◊〉.  making offer to bring all the money that was to be levied upon the subject freely into the king's coffers, without any charge either for officers wages, or for carriage: showing also particularly that the third part of the receipts went to officers, promising to deliver unto the king a full crown, whereas he did not receive four shillings, whereby he should save 20000. pounds' starling yearly in the two generalities of Languedoc, only for ordinary charges: for then the charge of Languedoc came to threescore thousand pounds yearly. But since the officers of the finances or treasure are so increased, as Maximinus' Lullier, Provost of merchants at Paris, and Precedent of the chamber of accounts, said in open Parliament at Blois, That of the crown there came not eighteen pence clear into the king's co●…erss: the which seems incredible, yet he was held a man most expert in accounts. We must then conclude, that the subject was much oppressed by the polling of officers, seeing they made these offers: which we may not think new, for that in old times they had no other receivers but the Viconts, Bailiffs, and Seneshals. That request made by the Syndic of Languedoc did much please king Henry, but it displeased the flatterers in court, and the officers of the accounts, so as it was rejected, for the frivolous difficulties they made which had interest therein, the which is not here needful to rehearse, so as it was concluded that receivers and treasorers were necessary. Seeing then that accountants and masters of accounts is a necessary evil (as Alexander Severus said) The ●…ewer there are, the better shall it be for the Commonweal; for the king's treasure will still decrease when it passeth through the hands of so many officers. These were the complaints and expostulations which the estates of France made unto king Charles the 6 in the year 1412, for that he had five Treasorers, and that in old time there were but two: and that in like sort there were but three judges of the revenues in the year 1372, and now there are almost three hundred within this realm. And in the year 1360 there was but one Receiver general, who did reside at Paris, & now there are 34, what would they now say to see so great a multitude. The Romans in old time had but one receiver in every Province: all customs and duties were let out to farm, and the farmers brought in their rents to the receiver. The first office that was given to gentlemen of good families, and that aspired to greater dignities, was the office of Questura, or Receiver for a year only, and without any controller to make trial of their diligence and loyalty. He that was found guilty of extorsion, was declared incapable never to bear any honourable 
A mean to make deceivers true and just.  charge, besides infamy and the loss of his goods, the which was a wise course to assure their treasure. But it is a strange thing and very absurd in this realm, to see so many men give money to their master to pick his purse. The Emperor of Turkey doth otherwise, for he never sells office, and for so great an Empire there are very few 
The order of the receipt in Turkey.  Treasorers: the Collectors (which they call Protogeres) give the money unto the Subachis (which are as it were the Viconts of Normandy, who in old times had the same charge) than they deliver it to the Sangiacs (who are as it were governors of the country) who convey it unto the Bellerbeiss, and they sand in safety unto the Defrerderlers, which are two generals of the treasure, the one in Asia, and the other in Europe, who deliver it to the great controller, and he gives it to Casmander Baschi, great master of the treasure, who hath ten commanders or deputies under him for extraordinary payments, there is but one treasurer, and for all officers of accounts, there are but 25 controllers which examine the accompts. One thing is worthy observation, that they have no treasorers nor receivers but Eunuches, after the Persian and old Graecian manner, and that wisely, for they that neither have children, nor can be seduced with the flatteries and enticements of women, it is not to be feared that they will steal the public treasure with the hazard of their lives and ●…ame. As for Treasorers in France, it is more than necessary that such offices be given to gentlemen of honour and of noble houses, as it was usual in old time, and is yet practised in England for the reason that I have said. By an Edict made by king Henry the second in September in the year 1554 it was decreed, that the chief Treasorers should take their places before the Stewards of the king's house, of the counsellors of the court of Parliament, of the accounts and aids, if they be not in their assemblies: and by an Edict made by Charles the 9, he commands all vassals which hold directly of the king, to do homage and fealty unto the Treasorers of France, the which would much discontent an infinite number of Dukes, Earls, Barons, and great personages, who would not for any thing kneel before a base fellow that had bought his office. Thus much concerning treasure, and for that it consists in coin of gold, silver, copper and buillon, it is necessary to writ something thereof.  
  

CHAP. III Of Coins, and the means how to prevent that they be not altered, nor falsified.  
LOoking well into the best grounds, and strongest supports of a Commonweal; in my opinion, he must exactly understand this point, that will wisely settle an estate, or reform the abuses: for that there is nothing that doth more trouble and afflict the poor people, than to falsify the Coins, and to altar the course thereof: for both rich, and poor, every one in particular, and all in general, receive an infinite loss and prejudice, the which cannot precisely in every point be described, 
Dangerous to a state to altar the coin.  it breeds so many inconveniences. The Coin may not be corrupted, not not altered, without great prejudice to the Commonweal: for if money (which must rule the price of all things) be mutable and uncertain, no man can make a true estate of what he hath, contracts and bargains shall be uncertain, charges, taxes, wages, pensions, rents, interests, and vacations shall be doubtful, fines also and amercements limited by the laws and customs shall be changeable and uncertain: to conclude, the estate of the treasure and of many affairs both public and private shall be in suspense: whereof the Edict made by Gratidianus the Tribune at Rome is a good argument, who (contrary to the opinion of his fellow Tribunes) set a certain price of a kind of coin called Victoriatus, upon a penalty, whereby he purchased so great glory to himself and his posterity, as they did erect his statues in every street, and offered frankincense and wax unto them. And Tully saith, Neminem unquam multitudint ob id unum fuisse cariorem, Never any man (for that cause only) was dearer to the people. The Prince may not make any false money, no more than he may kill or rob, neither can he altar the weight of his coin to the prejudice of his subjects, and much less of strangers, which treat with him, and traffic with his people, for that he is subject to the law of nations, unless he will loose the name and maiesti●… of a king, and be termed a counterfetter of money: as Dante the poet called Philip le Bel, for that he did first among our princes corrupt the coin, and mingle copper with silver, which was the cause of great troubles among his subjects, and a pernicious precedent to foreign Princes: whereof he repent himself too late, restoring the coin, and enjoining his son Lewis Hutin not to abate the goodness of his coins. And for this cause Peter the 4 king of Arragon did confiscate the estate of the king of Maiorque and Minorque, whom he pretended to be his vassal, for that he had abated the coin: and yet the 
The prince cannot altar his coin.  kings of Arragon themselves did err in that point, so as pope Innocent the 3 did forbidden them as his vassals not to use it: whereupon the kings of Arragon coming to the crown doth swear not to change the weight and price of their money, which hath been allowed. But it is not sufficient to make such protestations, unless the value and weight of money be ordered as it aught, to the end that neither prince nor subject may falsify it if they would, the which they will always do, having the means, what punishment soever be inflicted. The ground of all these counterfeit coiners, washers, clippers, and boilers of money, grows by the mixtures which are made of metals, for one metal being pure and simple cannot be supposed for another, differing by nature in colour, weight, substance, and sound. To prevent all these inconveniences, you must ordain that in every Commonweal the coins be of one metal without mixture, and publish the Edict of the Emperor Tacitus, who defended upon loss of life and 
Counes' should be simple without any mixture.  goods, to mingle gold with silver, nor silver with copper, nor copper with tin or lead. But we may except from this law the mixture of copper with tin, which makes the sounding metal, whereof bells and ordinance are cast, not so much used in old times as now: for it is not necessary to mix the twentieth part of lead with pure tin to make it more malleable, seeing it may be cast and put in work without any such mixture, the which hurts the bounty of the tin, and can never be drawn from the lead. This law must not only hold in coins, but in all plate and works of gold or silver, in the which falsehood and corruption is more ordinary than in coins, for that the trial is not so easy, and oftentimes the workmanship is as dear as the substance itself: wherein Archimedes' is much deceived, seeking to found out what the goldsmith had stolen out of that great crown of king Hieron, and not to deface the fashion, (for as then they had no use of the touchstone) he took two lumps or masses one of gold, and another of silver, putting either of them into a vessel full of water, and by the effusion of the water he judged the proportion of the gold and silver, then filling it 
Archimedes' error in trial of metals.  again with water, he put the crown into it, the which cast forth less water than the mass of silver, and more than that of gold, whereby he conjectured that the goldsmith had stolen a fift part: but his judgement was uncertain, for he supposed the mixture or allay to be of pure silver, when as the goldsmith to make the gold more firm, and to give it the better lustre, makes it most commonly of copper, being also of less charge, the which is much lighter than silver, which makes the gold look paler; and so by consequence copper hath a greater body than silver in a mass of an equal weight, and differs as much as thirteen do from eleven: and if the allay or mixture were of copper and silver, it was impossible to make a true judgement, unless he could distinguish how much there was of either; and although it were known, yet shall he err insensibly in measuring the drops of water, through the difference of the mass and proportion of the metals: there is no refiner nor goldsmith in the world so cunning that can precisely judge by the touchstone how much silver or copper is mixed with gold, if the allay be not of one pure metal. And although that goldsmiths and jewellers have falsely complained that they cannot work in gold under two and twenty Carrats without loss, or in fine gold above 23 Carrats and three quarters, according to the decree of king Francis the first published in the year 1511: yet notwithstanding all good orders they make work at twenty, yea oftentimes at nineteen Carrats, so as in twenty four marks there is five marks of copper or silver, the which in time is made into base money by those which use to counterfe●…. It is therefore necessary to observe the same proportion and mixture in gold that is wrought, as in coins upon the like penalties, to the end that the use of gold in plate and movables may be pure. And for that it is impossible (as refiners say) to refine gold to 24 Carats, but there must be a little of some other metal with it; nor silver at twelve deniers, but there must be some allay, and even the purest refining according to the laws is of 23 Carrats and three quarters, and hath a fourth part of a Carrat of allay, and of silver eleven deniers, two grains and three quarters, such are the royals of Spain, or else eleven deniers and eighteen grains, as is the silver at Paris, the which is of all others the best, for that it hath but a forty sixt part of copper mixed with it. And in the best Spanish silver there is a thirty sixt part of copper, and without any great charge (besides the difficulty and length of time) they may work gold in plate, or in coin of 23 Carrats, and silver of eleven deniers twelve grains pure, without any allay: for in so doing, the proportion of gold to silver shall be equal, for the allay shall be alike in the one and the other, that is to say, that in 24 pounds of silver at eleven deniers and twelve grains; and in 24 pounds of gold at 23 Carrats: there is a pound of other metal in the gold which is not gold, and so likewise in the silver which is not silver, be it copper or any other metal, and such silver is called in this realm, the king's silver, in the which the 24 part is copper, and by this means the coins of gold and silver shall be stronger, and more durable, whereby they get much in the working in the fire, and in soldering, and they keep it from wasting and brittleness.  
And to the end the just proportion of gold to silver, observed in all Europe & neighbour nations, (of twelve for one, or thereabouts) may be also kept in the weight of money: it is needful to coin money of gold and silver of the same weight of sixteen, two and thirty, and threescore and four pieces to the Mark, without any alteration either in raising or abating; to avoid on the one side the difficulty of stamping it, and on the other side the brittleness of fine gold and silver, if the coin were lighter than one denier. Whereas on the other side also, if they make any come weighing above half an ounce, it is easily counterfeited, by reason of the thickness thereof: as we see in the Portuguese of gold, and the collars of silver, which weigh above an ounce: as also that coin of three Marks and a half, which the emperor Heliogabulus caused to be made: and that which was coined with the stamp of Constantinople, weighing a mark of gold, whereof the emperor Tiberius presented fistie to our king Childeric. By which means neither chaungers, nor merchants, nor goldsmiths, shall ever be able to deceive the common people, which is ignorant of the bounty and weight: for they shall be always forced to give twelve pieces of silver for one of gold; and every one of the pieces of silver, shall weigh as much as the piece of gold of the same mark: as we see in the single Royals of Spain, which weigh as much as the French Crown, which are (according to the weight set down in the year 1540) two deniers sixteen grains; and that twelve single are just the value of a French Crown. Why then may not all coins of gold and silver be equal in weight? and all of one weight of both metals have one stamp, or caracture? Why may there not be the same likeness & proportion of both metals? If this might be effected (as I hope it will) all means to falsify money would be taken away. And to the end the simpler sort may not be abused in the change of the said pieces, as well of gold, as of silver; nor to take the single for the double (as they do oftentimes in Royals of Spain, and in the new coin of king Henry the second) it is needful that the stamps be divers, and not alike as those of Spain. And yet as touching silver, to the end they shall hold the certain titles of Sou, petty Denier, and Liure, as it is specified in the edict of king Henry the second, made in the year 1551; and by reason of the payment of rents, amercements, and the lords rights, according to the customs and ordinances; the Sou shall be of three Deniers weight of the king's silver (as it is said) and of sixty three to the Mark: so four shall be worth a Liure, as it hath go heretofore, the which is the justest price that can be given: and every piece may be divided into three, so as every one shall weigh a Denier, and shall go for four small Deniers or Pence, and shall be called a common Denier, to the end the Sou may always be worth twelve Deniers: & that the complaints of the lords for their rents and rights, being usually paid in blanche, or copper money, may cease, being now converted unto Soulzes, such as they were in the time of Saint Lewis▪ that is, sixty four to a Mark of the king's silver. And as for other growing out of annuities, purchased for money, the rent must be paid according to the value of the Sou which it held at that time, when as the rent was purchased; the which was but four Deniers an hundred years since, and is now but the third part of the ancient Sou: the which it will be needful to put in use. Such was the Drachma, or Groat of silver, used throughout all Greece, which was the eight part of the ounce, which we call a Gros, and of the same weight with the Sou which Saint Lewis caused to be coined, the which were called Gros Tournois, or of Tours, and Sou Tournois: By the which Sou Tournois, or of Tours, all ancient contracts are ordered, and many treaties not only within the realm, but also among strangers: as in the treaty made betwixt the Bernois, and the three small Cantons of the Swissers, where it is said, That the Soldiers pay, should be a Sou Tournois. The like was in this realm, and for that cause it was called Sold, and it was like unto the pay of the Romans, as Tacitus said, and of the Grecians, as we read in Pollux. For the Drachma, or Groat, is of the same weight with the Sou Tournois. The Venetians have followed the ancients, and have made the ounce of eight Groats, or Drachmas, and the Drachma of 24 Deniers, and the Denier of two Halfpences, or twenty four grains: as we use in France, from which order we may not stray, as being most ancient in all Greece, and the Oriental regions.  
True it is, that the ancient Romans having their ounce equal with the Greeks, that is to say, of 576 grains, they divided it into seven Deniers of their money, and their Denier was in value an Atticque Drachma, or groat, & three seven parts more. Wherein 
Drachma Attica seven pence starling.  Buda was deceived, saying, That there were eight Deniers in the ounce, and that the Romans Denier, or Penny, was equal with the Attic Drachma, and the Roman pound like unto the Attic Mine; being most certain that the Roman pound had but twelve ounces, and the Greek Mine sixteen ounces, according to the merchants pound weight within this realm: the which George Agricola hath well observed by the calcull of Pliny, Appian, Suetonius, and Celsus. But at this day it is strange to see the great diversity of pounds and ounces in all nations, nay in one and the same kingdom there are in a manner an infinite sort of pounds: whereof I will make mention of some few. An hundred weight at Paris, make 116 pound at Lion, at Rovan 96⅔, at Tholouse 121 pound, at Marseilles 123, at Geneva 89, at Venice 165½, at Genoa 155, at Basil 98, at London 109½. That of Pa●…is and Strausbourg agrees, so do they of Basil, Nuremberg, and Francford, and they of Thoulouse, mompelier, and avignon, agreed in the same pound weight: but they of Tours have a lighter pound, for fifteen ounces at Paris makes sixteen at Tours. The like difference of weight is to be observed in the East, and in Africa, for 100 rowls at Thessalonica, make 91 pounds at Paris: 100L rowls at Damascus, make 120 pounds at Paris, 100 rolls in Syria, make at Paris 503 pounds and fourteen ounces: the like may be written of many others. But the lightest pound weight of all, is that of Naples, for there an hundred pound weight, make but seventy four at Paris. But all this diversity of weight may easily be reconciled in coins, if they coin their pieces of gold and silver of the same weight, the same name, and the same bounty, that is to say, that there be no more abatement in the gold, than in the silver, whereby they can neither raise nor abate the price; as they do oftener than there are months, either at the people's pleasure, or of those that have authority and credit with princes, who borrow all the money they can, and then they raise the price of money: so as one having borrowed an hundred thousand crowns, raised it suddenly six pence in the crown, whereby he gained two thousand and five hundred pounds' starling. Another abated the course of money in March, and raised it again in April, after he had received the quarters rend. By this means also you shall cut off all falsifying and counterfeiting of coins, and the most ignorant shall know the bounty of the one and the other coin by the sight, the sound, and weight, without either fire or touchstone. For seeing that all nations for these two thousand years and more, have always kept, and still do keep an equal proportion from gold to silver, it will be impossible either for the subject or the prince, to raise, pull down, or to altar, the prices of coins of gold or silver, if base money be banished the Commonweal, and gold set at 23 carats. And yet for that the smallest coins are profitable to the poorer sort, it is needful to coin a third kind of money of copper, without any other mixture, as they have begun, and as it is practised in Spain and Italy: or else divide the mark of silue in 15036 pieces, every piece weighing nine grains, that the poor may buy the smallest things therewith. For whereas the queen of England hath banished all base and copper money, and reduced all her coins to two kinds only, the lest piece of money, which is a penny, being in value about ten Deniers, she takes from her subjects the means to buy any thing at a less price; and which is worst, they cannot give less alms to a poor body, than of a penny, which holds many from giving, as I have showed in the Paradox against Malestroit: the which the chancellor of England caused to be translated in the year 1569, hoping to redress it. But it were far more expedient, to have no other coin but of gold and silver, if it were possible to coin any money less than the penny, and that they would divide the Mark of silver (as in Lorraine) into a thousand 
The French copy saith 8000.  pieces, which they called Andegavenses: for that Rene duke of Anjou and of Lorraine caused them to be coined, two hundred whereof make but sixpences; and forty, one Sou of our base money: and yet they are of reasonable fine silver. But making it but half so little, it would be more firm, and of the same hieght that I have spoken, and they may be cut and stamped at one instant. For the price of copper being uncertain in all places, it is not fit to make money of, the which must always be kept as certain as may be: beside, there is no metal so subject to rust, the which doth consume both the stamp and substance: and contrariwise neither gold nor silver do ever rust. And as for the price, we read, that during the Punic wars, the pound of silver was worth eight hundred and forty pound weight of copper, after twelve ounces to the pound; & then the Denier of pure silver, which was but the seventh part of an ounce, was raised from ten pounds of copper to sixteen (as Pliny saith) which was after the rate of eight hundred ninety six pounds of copper, for one pound weight of silver, the pound weighing twelve ounces. Afterwards the lest coin, which was a pound of copper, was half abated by the law Papiria, so as the price of copper was double that which it was 
Fest. lib. 17. in verb. sestertius.  before: and when as silver came in great abundance, it was reduced to a fourth, remaining in the same value, which was 224 pound of copper for a pound of silver: the which is near the estimation of copper in this realm, whereas one hundred pounds, at sixteen ounces to the pound, are worth but thirty six shillings starling: and in Germany it is better cheap, although their movables are thereof; yea in some places the churches are covered with copper: but in Italy it is dearer, and in Spain and Africa much more, for it is very scant there.  
Some one may object, That the abundance of silver may also 'cause an abatement of the price, as we read in Titus Livius, that by the treaty made betwixt the Aetolians and Romans, it was said, That the Aetolians should pay for ten pounds of silver one pound of gold: and yet by a law made by Constantine, the pound of gold is esteemed at 41 pound⅖: for he would have them pay five Sou of gold for one pound of silver, making seventy two Sou of gold in a pound; so as five Sou is just the fourteenth part of a pound, and two fifts more: and now the price is twelve for one, or little less. True it is, that heretofore the 
* 18. lib. 10. sh.  Mark of pure gold was esteemed one hundred eighty five Liures; and the 
* 31. sh. 6. d. starling.  Mark of silver fifteen Liures fifteen Sou Tournois: so as for one Mark of pure gold unwrought, they must have eleven Marks, five ounces, twenty three Deniers, and five grains, of the king's silver unwrought. Towards the North, where there are many mines of silver, and few of gold, gold is somewhat dearer. The pope of Rome more greedy of gold than of silver, did value the Mark of gold at 12 Marks and four fifts of silver: the which is at this present the price of gold and silver, and was almost two thousand five hundred years since. For we read in Herodotus, that the pound of gold was valued at thirteen pounds of silver: and the Hebrews in their Pandects, set a Denier of gold for five and twenty of silver, the coins of gold being double to them of silver; which were twelve and a half for one. We read also, that in the time of the Persians', & when as the Commonweals of Greece did flourish, that an ounce of gold was worth a pound of silver: for Stater Doricus of the weight of an ounce, was valued at a pound of silver, as julius Pellux saith. And in Augustus his time, the king of the Indian's, had the same estimation of gold to silver, the which was then brought to Rome: and therefore he commended the justice of the Romans; as we read in Plini●…. Whereby we may conjecture, that the price of these two metals holds in a manner throughout all Europe, after the ancient estimation. But the value of gold was raised under the last emperors, by reason of the spoil thereof which had been made for the guilding of things: as Nero his great palace all guilt, the which had galleries of one thousand paces long: and after him Vespasian, who employed 
A wonderful mass to gild the Capitol,  seven millions and two hundred thousand crowns, to gild the Capitol. And Agrippa covered all the temple Pantheon with copper, and then guilt it, to keep it from rusting. And oftentimes silver is guilt, although of itself it will never take rust. Doubtless we may well allow the holy ornaments to be of gold, for that the law commands it: but to have vessels of gold, beds, books, yea and their bridles guilt, argues the madness of frantic men: the which if the prince doth not punish very severely, the price of gold must of necessity rise: whereof our nation did vehemently complain unto the prince, at the estates held at Blois. Moreover silver having no hold, is little employed to silver withal: beside, the mines of the North yield great store of silver, & no gold: yet the alteration of price which is made, in process of time is insensible, which can be no let but the valuation of coins made of these two metals shall be equal in all states, banishing away all base money. Moreover a general traffic dispersed more now over the face of the whole earth than ever, cannot allow of any great alteration of gold and silver, but by a common consent of all nations. But it is impossible to hold the price of things, retaining this base money, the which is altogether divers and unequal: for even as the price of all things doth fall, as the value of money decreaseth, (as the law saith) so doth it rise in raising the price of money. And it must rise & fall, for that there is no prince which holds the laws of mynting equal with other Commonweals, nor yet in his own: for that the Aloy of the Sou differs from that of the Teston, and of petty Deniers Doubles, Lyards, & pieces of six, and three blanks, the which continued not long in one estate. The first beginning in this realm to abase the silver coin, and to mix the 24 part of copper therewith, was to give occasion to merchants to bring silver into this realm, where there is none growing: for eleven Deniers and a half in France, was as much as twelve Deniers in another country. But this devise was needless, considering the great riches of France, the which they will always fetch bringing gold and silver from all parts. This mischief took deeper root in the time of Philip the Fair, who did impair the blanched money the one half, in the year 1300, adding as much copper unto it, as there was silver: a while after it was brought to a third, so as the new Sou was worth but a third part of the ancient. And in the year 1322 the Aloie of Soulzes was so weak, as the Mark of silue●… was worth 80 
* 8. lib. starling.  Liures Tournois, and had 1600 pieces for a Mark of copper. True it is, that in the same year that Charles the seventh recovered his crown which had been taken from him, he caused a new coin to be made in the month of October, the which was strong and good, so as the Mark of silver was set at eight 
* 16. 〈◊〉.  Liures: but in the year 1453, ●…e caused Soulzes to be coined of five Deniers of Aloie, and since they have still decreased: so as king Francis the first, in the year 1540, caused some to be coined of three Deniers of sixteen grains: king Henry at three Deniers and twelve grains: so as the ancient Sou of the king's silver was worth almost four: and king Charles the ninth brought it to three Deniers, the estimation still continuing alike: for that the price of the crown did arise. And in the year 1577, under king Henry the third, they decrease almost half in weight, and a fourth part in goodness, from those of Francis the first. Other princes have done no better; for the Crutzer of Germany, which in old time was silver at eleven Deniers & four grains, is now at four Deniers and sixteen grains: the Sou of Wirtzburg, and the Reiches groschem at six Deniers, that is half silver, and half copper. The Scheslind, the Rape, the Denier of Strausbourg, at four Deniers and twelve grains: the Rapephening at four Deniers three grains, and the Florines of silver at eleven Deniers four grains: as also the pieces be of five and of ten Crutzers, the Sou of Flanders or Patars, whereof twenty are worth twenty and four of ours, are but three Deniers and eighteen grains of Aloie, and more than two third parts is copper: the piece of four Patars is at seven deniers ten grains: the Brelingues of Gueldres, are at eight deniers, and the third is copper. In former times the Sou, or Groat of England, was at ten deniers twenty two grains: and never did all this base coin continued above twenty or thirty years at one rate or standard, or at the same weight; and from thence grows the difference of the great Liure Tournois, of the less, and of the mean, the Liure or pound of Normandy, the Liure of Brittany, 
A Liure is two shillings starling  and the Liure of Paris, the which are all different, as we may yet see it in the taxes of the pope's chamber. And in Spain the Liure or pound of Barcelona, Toledo, Molorque; In England the pound starling is worth ten of ours: And in Scotland there are two sorts of Pounds, the one starling, the other ordinary. There is no prince in Italy, that hath not his Pound different from others: as in like case the Mark hath generally eight ounces: but the ounce of the Low countries is weaker by six grains than ours, and then that of Cologne by nine grains, that of Nuremberg six grains, and contrariwise that of Paris is stronger by an ounce. The Mark of Naples hath nine ounces, that of Salerne hath ten: and there is no town almost in all Italy, but differs in his Mark, which makes the value of their coins so divers, being so different in their weight & standard: the which troubles the poor people much, who lose greatly by exchange, and generally they which understand not the poier, as they say, or the difference, as the Bankers speak: that is the value of money of exchange from one place to another. And therefore they say of a man that is well practised in affairs, That he understands the poier, as a matter of hard conceit. For they have made the matter of coins so obscure, by reason of their mixtures, as for the most part they understand nothing therein. For even as artisans, merchants, and every one in his faculty, disguiseth oftentimes his work: and as many Physicians speak Latin before women, using Greek characters, and Arabike words, and Latin words abridged, yea some times they blot their paper that it may not be read, fearing that if their secrets were discovered, they should be little esteemed: so these Mynt-maisters, in stead of speaking plainly, and to say, that the Mark of gold of twelve parts, hath two of copper, or of some other metal, they say, It is gold of twenty carats: and in stead of saying, that a piece of three blanks is half copper, they say it is silver of six deniers fine, two deniers of weight, and fifteen deniers of course, giving to deniers and carats, the essence, quality, and quantity, of gold and silver against, nature. And in stead of saying, the Mark hath threescore pieces, they say, it is of five Sou currant. Again they make some coins certain or stable, some uncertain and variable, and the third imaginary, when as nothing can be called firm in matters of coin, having so diminished the weight, and impaired the bounty of the gold and silver. For the Ducat which goes currant at Venice, Rome, Naples, Palermo, and Mess●…na, is an imaginary coin; it was in old time the same piece of gold weighing an Angel, or else a Medin of Barbary, or an Imperial of Flanders, almost of the same weight and touch with the ancient Ducat, worth ten Carlius of silver, and the Carlin ten Sou of the country, at 46 pieces to the Mark of gold, and six to the ounce, the which they divide into thirty Tarijs, and the Tarij into twenty grains, the which is one gross upon the ounce, more than the common ounce, which hath but eight gross. The law calleth this coin of gold Solidus, the which (as the Angel) hath forty eight pieces for the mark, and seventy two for the Roman pound at twelve ounces, the which hath long time been currant; as it appeareth by the laws among the Grecians, Germane, English, French, and Burguignons, and it is nothing else but our French Crown of the Sun. But our Mynt-maisters having not well understood the word Solidus, have within these fifty years set the Sun upon it, terming it erroneously Aureum Solarem: but the common people retaining their old speech, call it yet the Crown Sold, of Solidus; the which in old time weighted four deniers, as the Angel. But since princes by little and little, and by grain and grain, have brought it to three deniers, the which is the old Crown. And in the time of king john the old Crown being diminished by little and little, as by the ancient Crown Sold of three grains, they did coin Crowns of two deniers and twenty grains weight, of the same standard with the ancient, the which they called Francs, on foot, and on horseback (for then they called all French men Francs, as yet in all the East all the nations of the West are called Franques) at which time the Crown of Burgongne, which they call Ride, was also coined of the same weight and goodness: the which have continued until the time of Charles the eight, that the Franc Crown was diminished six grains in weight, and three quarters of a Carat in fineness: for the old Crowns were of twenty three and three quarters of a Carat, and the Crowns with the Crown at twenty three Carats. Afterwards king Francis the first correcting somewhat the Crown with a Crown, caused the Crown Sold to be coined at two deniers and sixteen grains, and of the same goodness with the other, having an eight part of Aloie put to it: the which continued unto king Henry, who added four grains of weight unto it: and by Charles the ninth it was diminished five grains, in the year 1561. But the old Crowns, or Ducats of Venice, Genes, Florence, Sienna, Castille, Portugal, and Hongarie, have kept twenty three Carats three quarters, and two deniers, and eighteen grains of weight, until the year 1540, that the emperor Charles the fift impaired the fioenesse of the Crowns of Spain, of one Carat and three quarters, and three grains in weight, causing them to be coined at twenty two Carats, and two deniers fifteen grains of weight. The Crowns of Castille, Valencia, and Arragon, the which they call Pistolets, giving an ill example to other princes to do the like: as the princes of Italy did, who have caused some to be made at twenty two Carats & under, weighing two deniers and sixteen grains, as be the Crowns of Rome, Luques, Bologne, Salusses, Genes, Sienna, Sicily, Milan, Ancona, Mantove, Ferrara, Florence, and the new Crowns of Venice. True it is, that Pope Paul the third, began to make Crowns to be coined in his name at twenty one Carats and a half, and two deniers, and fourteen grains of weight; and those of avignon, which were made at the same time under the name of Alexander Farneze legate and the Pope's nephew, are base, and five deniers lighter in weight; the which brings an infinite loss to the subject, and benefit to sergeant coiners, myntmen, and merchants, which draw the good money out of the country, and coin base in another place. The which is more ordinary in silver coin of high value, and above eleven deniers pure, as the Royals of Castille, which hold all eleven deniers three grains of pure silver: out of the which other princes heretofore have gained very much: for being converted into French Testons out of ten thousand pounds starling, they did gain six hundred and fifty pounds, nothing impairing the goodness of the Teston of France, which holds ten deniers 17 grains of fine. And by the same means the Swissers which converted the testons of France into testons of Soleure, Lucerne, and Vnderuall, gained upon every mark one and forty 
4. sh. 2. d. ob.  sou and eleven deniers tournois: and for those of Lucerne, Soleure, and Vnderuall, were but of nine deniers and eighteen grains, which is in the whole mark 23 grains of pure silver less than those of France, the which were worth 25 sou tournois. And as for the weight, those of France are at the lest of 25 testons, and five eight parts of a teston to the mark, so as the testons of Soleure, are lighter in weight three eight parts of a teston in the mark, the which was worth four sou three deniers tournois. And for that the testons of Soleure & Lucerne cannot be valued but for silver of base alloy, the which they call Billon, being under ten deniers of fi●…e silver, after the estimation of 
Billon.  fourteen liures seventeen sou four deniers tournois, the mark of pure silver, and the testons of France for that they were above ten deniers of fine silver were valued for silver of high alloy, the which are worth after the same proportion fifteen liures thirteen sou tournois, the mark of fine silver; and by reason of the difference of the bounty of the silver the said testons were less than those of France 41 sou eleven deniers tournois in the mark, abating for every piece of the said testons one sou eleven deniers. Those of Berne for that they were of nine deniers twenty grains of fine silver for the mark were worth one denier tournois in every piece more than those of Soleure, in gaining therefore but twelve pence upon a mark it is a great gain. The Flemings do the like, converting the testons of France in royals of Flanders. Every Prince hath provided well by his laws that neither gold nor silver should be transported unto strangers upon grievous punishments, but it is not possible to have them well executed, but that much will be transported both by sea and land. And although none should be transported, yet the subjects should always have good means to melt, altar and falsify both gold and silver coin, if there be diversity of standards; which grows either by licenses granted to some goldsmiths, or done against the laws; for they purse up that which wants in the fines of the silver which they work, as well for the abatement which is allowed them, as for the enamel and solder which they use, mocking the laws which are made upon the price of the mark of gold and silver, setting what price they please upon their works, so as it is always sold at a higher rate by the goldsmith then the laws do allow, silver by forty and five sou, and gold at twelve or thirteen liures upon the mark, so as gold and silver is bought dearer from the goldsmith and merchant, then from the mint master, who cannot exceed the king's laws, neither in buying of stuffs nor in coining. And as soon as the gold or silver is coined into money of better weight and goodness then that of neighbour princes, presently it is moult by the refiners and goldsmiths to put into plate, or to have it coined by strangers after their standard, wherein the changers serve as instruments, and under colour of furnishing the people with money, traffic with the goldsmiths and merchant strangers: for it is certain and hath been found true, that within these 25 years that the petty sou was decried, there hath been coined in this realm above two millions five hundred thousand pounds' starling, besides the pieces of three & six blanks, 
25. Million of Liures.  which are no more to be found, for that the refiners and goldsmiths found profit in them, so as they which have great store of gold and silver plate, can make more use of it▪ for having bought it dear from the goldsmiths, they are loath to cell it with so great loss: and even king Charles the 9 lost much, having exchanged his plate into coin, whereas before the standard of money coined was equal with that of the goldsmiths, so as they could loose nothing in plate but the fashion, the which continues yet as a proverb, It is silver plate, there is nothing lost but the fashion. Therefore to prevent all these inconveniences, the standard of coined money, and of works of gold and silver, must be all one, that is of three and twenty Carats without any allay or mixture, in gold; and eleven deniers, and eleven grains in silver. They had found some means to reform these abuses, letting out to farm the revenues of the mint, and the confiscations and amercements that should grow by forfeitures, the which was let out in the year 1564 for five thousand pound starling a year: yet it was abolished at Moulins in the year 1566, and the mints were farmed out to such as offered to coin the greatest quantity of marks of gold and silver: by this means some branches were cut off, but the roots of these abuses remained still, so as the fraud will never cease. The root of abuses is the confusion of three metals, gold, silver, and copper; which ceasing, neither shall the subject nor the stranger be able to commit any fraud, but it shall be soon discovered. But even as copper and brass money was not allowed in this realm, for that there was none coined, so billon or mixture being forbidden, the strangers base money 
Billon.  shall be also banished the realm: but so long as the Prince or Commonweal shall coin base money, there is no hope that stranger's subjects will ever cease to counterfeit in private, or to receive all strange coins. There is also another benefit both to the general and particular, which grows (as I have said) by the defence of the mixture of metals, whereby they shall avoid hereafter the loss of silver, the which is accounted for nothing in gold of 14 Carats and upward, and is lost for the charges of the refining, the which is done by strong water: for they must have six shillings starling at the lest, yea eight to divide a mark, yet the loss is very great in a great somme, as all the florins of Germany are but sixteen Carats, or sixteen and a half at the most, so as in a hundred thousand marks there are thirty three thousand marks loss, and of fourteen Carats forty thousand marks and more. And besides that which I have said, the abuses of officers of the mint shall cease in regard of the abatements, cut of the which 
Esc●…arcetes, & ●…blagess.  the officers were paid their wages; for the abolishing whereof, Henry the 2 king of France ordained, that they should be paid by the receivers of the same places: which decree although it were holy and good, yet was it afterwards disannulled by king Charles the 9, for that the chamber of accounts at Paris gave the king to understand that he lost yearly above a thousand pounds' starling, whereas he should reap profit by his mints; for now the officers were paid, and did in a manner nothing. But the true means to prevent all, is to suppress all the officers of mints, but only in one town, where they should coin all sorts of moneys, and to 'cause them to be paid by the receiver of the place, the lords right remaining: the which notwithstanding the ancients did not know, and there was nothing deducted out of the money, not not the right of Brassage, as it were very necessary, or rather that a tax were laid upon the subject for the coining of money, thereby to take away the lords right, or any other duties, as they did in old time in Normandy, and at this day in Polonia, to prevent the notable loss which the subjects do suffer. By this means also the diversity of the price of the mark (which breeds a million of abuses) shall cease, and foreign coins shall not be received but only to melt, without reckoning of any thing for the lords rights, notwithstanding letters of permission obtained by neighbour Princes, to deliver forth their money in his realm at the same rates as in their own territories. And for the taking away of all occasions for the falsifying, altering, or changing the standard received for coins of gold & silver, it shall be needful to have all the money coined in one city only, whereas the judges of the mint shall remain, and to suppress all others (if the monarchy or Commonweal have not so large limits, as of necessity they must have more) in which place all the refiners shall work▪ with a prohibition upon pain of death not to refine in any other place, for from them come the great abuses, and to give notice unto the ordinary judges by prevention to punish all abuses that shall be committed; for it is well known what abuses there have been in this realm in the coining of money. It is therefore necessary to imitate the Romans, who for all the subjects of Italy had the temple of juno only where they did coin three sorts of money pure and simple, gold, silver, and copper, and there had three masters of the mint, who caused it to be resined and stamped publicly in view of all the world. And to the end that no man should be abused in the price of the coins, there was also a place appointed where to take the essay or trial of money, at the request of Marius Gratidianus. We read also that in this realm by a law made by Charlemaigne, it was forbidden to coin any money but in his Palace, although his Empire stretched over all Germany, Italy, and the greatest part of Spain: but since that king Philip the fair, Charles his son, and king john had established many mints in this realm, and many masters, provost and other officers in every mint, abuses have also multiplied. But here some one may object, that the Persians', Greeks and Romans did coin money of pure gold, silver and copper at the highest value that could be, and yet did they falsify it, as we read in Demosthenes' oration against Timocrates. I answer, that it is impossible to purge the Commonweal clean of these people, but for a thousand that are now you shall not then found ten, the value of gold and silver being known to every man as I have declared. And if there be any prince so ill advised as to altar the bounty of his money to gain thereby, as Marc Anthony did, who coined silver that was very base, it will be sooner rejected, besides the blame he shall receive of all men, and the hazard of the rebellion of his subjects, the which was great at such time as Philip the fair embased the money. Whatsoever the reasons be, it is most certain there were never fewer coiners of counterfeit money than in the Romans time, when as they had no money either of gold or silver but of a high standard; and therefore Livius Drusus the Tribune was blamed, for that he had presented a request unto the people to have an eight part of copper mingled with the silver money, or as the mintmen say, they should coin money of ten deniers and twelve grains fine: which shows that even in those days they would not admit any confusion or mixture of gold or silver, and that their silver was of the highest rate, as also their gold, as we may see in their medalles of gold, the which are of 23 carats and three quarters; and we found some marked with the Emperor Vespasian, where there wants but the 32 part of a Carat but it had been 24 Carats; the which is the purest and finest gold that can be seen. But it sufficeth for the reasons that I have alleged, that the gold be of 23 Carats, and the silver at eleven Deniers and twelve grains pure. And let them not excuse themselves that they cannot command the fire, and therefore they demand a fourth or an eight part of allay: the which is the cause of many abuses. Yet some may say that it is more expedient to coin dobles and deniers of base silver, to avoid the heaviness of copper money. I say, that if it be allowed to coin base money how small soever, that it will prove very prejudicial, and will be practised in liards and soulzes. And although they did coin nothing but Dobles and Deniers, yet should they always open a gap for coiners to deceive the common people for whom this money is made, in the which he hath no knowledge, neither doth he care to have any, for the small value, without enquiring of the bounty thereof. I have a letter of james Pinatel written to king Henry the 2, in the which are these words: Sir, I thought good to advertise you that within these six months they have coined in one of your mints, soulzes that are too base by four shillings in weight upon every mark, and four sou in the goodness of the metal: when i●… shall please your Majesty I will show you the work, and I will acquaint you with the loss which you and your subjects do receive, the which will grow greater if you prevent it not with all rigour. It was at that time that he coined the pieces of six blanks, or three pence by the king's commandment, of four deniers of silver, and two deniers of copper, and four deniers and fourteen grains of weight; the which was the best mixture of base money that was then in France, so in like sort they were soon melted, and few of them are now to be seen. Every man knows that the loss which the king and the subject received of two shillings five pence upon the mark, came to above five and twenty in the hundred, and yet the same Pinatel (having gotten under hand a commission from the generals of the mint, in the year 1552) caused Dobles and Deniers to be coined at Villeneufue of avignon, and at Villefranche of Rovergue, which were valued but at twelve sou the mark; and that it was verified that by this means he had stolen little less than forty thousand pounds starling, and had purchased his pardon for five thousand pounds, the which he gave unto a Lady, a favourite of the kings, who did only defer this wicked man's punishment, but not quite free him. I conclude therefore that we must not by any means allow of any mixtures, not not in the smallest coins, if we will purge the Commonweal of all counterfeit money. By this means also the damage shall cease which the poor receive by the decrying of money, or diminution of the price thereof, after they have made them base; neither shall they have any credit with princes which suggest unto them the profit that they may receive by their mints, as a certain officer of the mint did, who gave the council of the treasure to understand, and did also writ unto king Charles the 9, That he might make a great profit of his mints for the ease of his people: and in truth by his computation it was found that every mark of pure gold wrought would yield unto the king sixteen shillings starling, whereas he received but two shillings six pence, and four deniers: and for the mark of silver wrought the king should get four shillings, whereas now he gained but sixteen deniers being wrought in testons. He advised to coin money of the king's silver of twelve sou tournois currant, and of thirty pieces to the mark, of the weight of six deniers nine grains, the half and the quarters after the rate; and of gold coins of 24 Carat, and one Carat of allay, of thirty pieces to the mark, & of the same weight with the silver of six liures tournois. He would also have them coin small base money of three deniers of goodness, and 320 to the mark, and of three deniers currant, and all other kind of billon or base money under ten deniers 
Billon.  fine, rating the mark at fourteen 
* 28. sh. starling.  liures tournois. This was his advice, but it was rejected as it deserved, for it is a very ridiculous thing to think that the king can draw so great a profit from his mints, and yet ease his people, if that be true which Plato saith, That no man gains but another looseth: and the loss by an inevitable necessity fell upon the subject, seeing the stranger felt not of it. It is very necessary that some great prince should mediate that by his ambassadors with other princes, to the end that all by a general consent should forbidden the coining of base money, setting the value of gold and silver as it hath been formerly said, and using the mark at eight gros or drachmas, and of 570 grains to the ounce, the which is the most common; and therefore should not be of any great difficulty, for that the Catholic King and Queen of England have already banished all base money, and all the coins of gold in Spain (except the Pistolets, and the money of Portugal) are at the highest value, and their coins of silver at eleven deniers and three grains, the which is the highest that is. And it should be good to have the money cast in form of a medal, as the ancient Greeks, Latins, Hebrews, Persians' and Egyptians did, for the charge should be much less, the facility greater, and the roundness more perfect, to prevent all clippers, it should not be subject to bow and break, and the mark would continued for ever, we should not be troubled with hammering, neither should there be any need of a cutter, of the scissors, or of any help at the weight, which falls not out so in that which is stamped; moreover, they shall make more in one day than they can do now in a year. They should also take away all means from false coiners to mingle metals so easily as they do with the press and the stamp, whereas the piece stretcheth out in breadth which covers the thickness, whereas the mould would make all medals of the same metal equal in bigness, weight, breadth and form: whereas if a counterfetter would mix copper with gold more than the allowance of 23 carats, the volume of copper which is in an equal weight twice as big and an eight part more, than that of gold, or twice and an eight part lighter than gold in an equal mass, would make the medal much greater, and discover the falsehood. For it is most certain, that if a mass of gold equal to a mass of copper doth weigh 1550 ferlins, that of copper shall weigh but 729 ferlins, the which is as seventeen to eight in a gross weight; as I have learned of Francis de Foix that great Archimedes of our age, who first discovered the true proportion of metals in weight and quantity. We will hold the same opinion of silver, which hath a greater mass than gold in an equal weight, and that gold is heavier than silver in an equal mass, once more and four five parts, which is 1551 in comparison of 998, or of nine to five: and of copper to silver, as of eleven to thirteen, or precisely, as 729 to 998, which approach nearer in weight and substance than the rest, except lead, the which is heavier than silver, and differs as fifteen to fourteen, or more precisely, as 998 to 929; but they can make no use of it to counterfeit, for that it flies from all other metals but from tin: and much less can they use tin, being a poison to all other metals, and cannot be cast for silver, for that it is lighter as much as nine is to thirteen, or precisely as 600 is to 929: and much less being disguised for gold, the which is heavier than tin in an equal mass, or of a less volume in an equal weight, as much as is betwixt eighteen and seven, or ●…ustly betwixt 1551 and 600, the which is twice and two seven parts heavier. As for ●…ron, those that do counterfeit can make no use of it by melting, for that it will not be mixed neither with gold nor silver; and the brasing of plates upon iron is not hard to discover. Pliny calls it Feoruminatio, and we, brazing or soldering, the which the counterfetters of his time did use. The Seigneur of Villemor, commissary of the wars, did show me an ancient medal of iron covered with silver, yet the weight and the bigness doth easily discover the falsehood, if they look narrowly into it, for that silver is heavier than iron in an equal mass, or less in quantity being of equal weight, as much as is from four to three, or precisely from 998, to 634. And as for gold, it is impossible that this ferrumination and soldering can any thing avail coiners, seeing that gold is less of body than iron in an equal weight, or more heavy in an equal mass, as much as is from six to nine, or of 1556 to 634. It is not to be feared that quicksilver can falsify these two metals, although it approacheth as near to gold in weight as three to four, or 1558 to 1551, for that they have not so great knowledge to fix it, but it evaporates into smoke. And thus much as touching the form of coins, and the profit that shall come by casting, as it was in old time, and until their mines of gold and silver were worn and spent, and these two metals worn, lost, hidden, and dispersed, then were they forced to make their money so thin, as they could not mark them but with the hammer, the which hath since been the occasion of many abuses; but even as the first man having little gold and silver, stamped it with the hammer, and afterwards having greater store began to cast it, in like sort must we now return to casting. They began to come with a mill, but by proof it appeared that it did not mark well, and that there was always thirty marks of clippings upon a hundred marks of substance, whereas there is but one or two at the hammer, and the sound also did differ from that which was stamped: and which is more, the pieces were found not to be always of one weight, for that the plates were sometimes drawn thinner of one side then of another. As for that which I have said, that the mark of gold and silver should be divided into pieces equal of weight, without fraction of pieces upon the mark, nor of deniers upon the piece, nor of grains upon the denier, the profit is very apparent, as well for the changes of marks of pieces, as for the value, weight, and undoubted course: so did the ancients for the piece of gold or silver weighing four drachmas, the which is half an ounce, shall be equal to the sickle of the Hebrews, and the piece of two drachmas or of 32 to the mark shall be equal to the stater Atticus, to the old Philip, to the rose noble, and to the medals of gold of the ancient Romans, which the law called Aureus: and the piece of one groat, sold tournois or drachma of 64 to the mark, shall be equal to the Attic drachma, and to the Zuza of the Hebrews, the which in Greece, and throughout all the East was a hirelings days work. True it is that the silver penny of the Romans was more in weight than three seven parts, than a soldiers days pay in Augustus' time, the which is a little more than a single royal of Spain. And if the alterations and changes which are made suddenly be hurtful and pernicious, they may proceed by little and little, causing money to be coined as I have said. Upon these difficulties (being deputed for the Province of Vermandois, at a Parliament held at Blois) I was called with the first Precedent and three Generals of the mint, and Marcel superintendant of the Treasure, to repair the abuses of money, and in the end all that I have here said was held to be very necessary, and yet the difficulty and diseases of the Commonweal which were incurable, would not at that time allow of it: which was as much to say, that it were better the sick should perish in languishing, than to 'cause him 
Billon.  to drink a troublesome potion to cure him. I confess that silver mixed will come but to a moiety, being purified to eleven deniers, twelve grains; but it will continued for ever if the standard be once settled as I have said, if it be not done the Commonweal must needs come to ruin.   

CHAP. FOUR A Comparison of the three lawful Commonweals, that is, a popular estate, an Aristocratical, and a royal; and that a royal Monarchy is the best.  
We have hitherto in my opinion discou●…sed at large of all the parts of a Commonweal, it remains for a conclusion to know the commodities and discommodities of every kind of State, and then to make choice of the best, the which was necessary to reserve unto the end, after that we had discoursed both in general & in particular of all the points of a Commonweal. Seeing then there are but three sorts of Commonweals, that is, when as the whole people, or the greatest part commands with absolute power, or else the lest part of the citizens, or one alone; and that either of the three may be honest and commendable, or vicious, we must not only fly that which is most vicious, but also choose the best. The tyranny of one absolute prince is pernicious, & of many much worse: but there is no tyranny so dangerous as that of a multitude; for so doth Cicero call it: yet is it not so bad as Anarchia, where there is no form of a Commonweal, no man commands, and no man obeys. Let us therefore she those that be vicious, and make choice of the best of these three lawful governments: and to the end that all may be made plain, I will set down the commodities and discommodities of every one apart. First, some one may say, that a popular estate is the most commendable, as that which seeks an equality and indifferency in all laws, without favour or acception of 
Reasons for a Popular estate.  persons, and which reduceth their civil constitutions to the laws of nature: for even as nature hath not distributed riches, estates and honours more to one than to another, so a popular estate tends to that end, to make all men equal, the which cannot be done, but by imparting riches, honours & justice equally to all men without privilege or prerogative whatsoever; as Lycurgus did, having changed the royal estate into a popular, he burned all obligations, banished gold and silver, and divided the lands by equal lots; then took he great pleasure to see the shocks of corn equal in the field, thereby cutting off covetousness and arrogancy, two of the most pernicious plagues of a Commonweal, and not only those, but he also banished rapine, theft, extorsion, slanders, partialities and factions, which can have no place when all are equal, and that one can have no pre-eminence over another. If then society betwixt man and man cannot be maintained without friendship, and that the nurse of friendship is equality; seeing there is no equality but in a popular state, of necessity that form of Commonweal must be the best: in the which a natural liberty and justice is equally distributed to all men without fear of tyranny, cruelty, or exaction; and the sweernes of a sociable life seems to draw men to the felicity which nature hath taught us. There is one point that seems very considerable, to show that a popular estate is the goodliest, the most excellent, and the most perfect, which is, That in a Democraty there have always been greater commanders in arms, and worthier men in laws, greater orators, philosophers and handicrafts men than in the other two estates: whereas the faction of few great men among themselves, and the jealousy of a Monarch keeps the subjects from all noble attempts. And it seems that the true mark of a Commonweal consists in a popular estate only, in the which the whole people enjoys the public, dividing the common treasure amongst them, with the spoils, rewards, honours and conquests, whereas few noblemen in Aristocratia, and one in a Monarchy seem to convert all the public good to their own private commodities. To conclude, if there be nothing more to be desired than to have the magistrates obedient to the laws, and the subjects to the magistrates, it seems it is best observed in a popular state, whereas the law alone is lady and mistress over all. These reasons are produced by popular men to maintain a popular 
Reasons against a Popular estate.  estate; they have a goodly show, but in effect they are like unto spider's webs, the which are very subtle and fine, but have no great force: for first of all, there was never Commonweal where this equality of goods and honours was observed, as we have showed before concerning goods; and as for honours, they should do therein contrary to the law of nature, which hath made some more judicious and more ingenious than others, and by consequence hath ordained some to govern, and others to obey; some she hath made wise and discreet, others foolish and mad; to some she hath given excellency of wit to govern and command, to others force of body to execute their commandments. And as for the natural liberty they so much preach of in a popular estate, if that were of force, there should neither be magistrates, laws, nor any form of state whatsoever; else there should be no equality: and yet there is no form of Commonweal which hath so many laws, so many magistrates, nor so many controllers as a popular estare. And as for the public revenues and treasure, it is most certain that there is no Commonweal where it is worse governed than by the people, as we have declared elsewhere. Whereof amongst many others, Xenophon is a worthy witness: I cannot (said he) allow of the Athenians estate, for that they have followed that for me of Commonweal, whereas the wicked are always in greatest credit, and men of honour and virtue trodden under foot. If Xenophon (who was one of the greatest captains of his age, and who then carried away the prize to have happily joined the managing of affairs with arms and Philosophy) hath given such a censure of his Commonweal, which was the most popular, and amongst the popular the most esteemed, and best ordered; or to speak more properly, the least vicious (as Plutarch saith;) What judgement would he have given of other Democraties, and Ochlocraties? Wherein Machiavelli is much deceived, to say, That a Popular estate is the best: and yet forgetting his first opinion, in another place he said, That the only means to restore Italy to her liberty, is to have one prince, labouring to frame the most Tyrannical estate in the world. And in another place he confesseth, That the estate of Venice is the goodliest of all, the which is more Aristocratical: so as no man can judge what this wicked and inconstant man means. If we shall believe Plato, we shall found that he hath blamed a Popular estate, terming it, A Fair where every thing is to be sold. We have the like opinion of Aristotle, saying, That neither Popular nor Aristocratical 
A Popular estate condemned of many great men.  estate is good, using the authority of Homer, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. And the Orator Maximus Tirius holds, That a Democraty is pernicious, blaming for this cause the estate of the Athenians, Syracusians, Carthagineanss and Ephesians: for it is impossible (saith Seneca) that he shall please the people, that honour's virtue. And therefore Photion (one of the wisest, and most virtuous men that ever was) was always opposite to the people of Athens, and the people to him: and as on a certain day the Athenians allowed of his counsel, he turned to his companions, saying, Quid malum mihi accidit, ut populi sensus cum meis congruerent, What ill have I done, that the people concur with me in opinion? And how can a multitude, that is to say, a Beast with many heads, without judgement, or reason, give any good council? To ask council of a multitude (as they did in oldtimes in Popular Commonweals) is to seek for wisdom of a mad man. The which Anacharsis seeing, & that the magistrates and ancients delivered their opinions in open assembly, and then the people concluded; he said, That in Athens wise men propounded, and fools disposed. And admit one might draw a good resolution from a multitude, who is he so senseless, that would think it fit to publish a matter of state in an open assembly? Is it not to profane holy things? and yet holy things being profaned, may be purified: but a secret concerning affairs of estate, being once published and spread abroad, there can nothing be expected but prejudice and dishonour to the Commonweal. And for this cause especially the Commonweal of Athens, of Siracusa, and of Florence, have been ruined. I omit the difficulty to assemble the people in one place, the disorder that is in a multitude, the variety and inconstancy of people gathered together of all sorts: and yet (if it please not the magistrate) neither shall Senate nor people be assembled: as it happened in Caesar's Consulship, who to prevail in his attempts (having terrified Bibulus his companion, and drawn his sword upon him) he would not suffer the Senate to be assembled so long as his office continued. And if the Tribune were united with the Consul, neither there the Senate nor the people could be assembled: so as the authority of the Senate, and the sovereign majesty, was by this means subject unto six or seven: whereby the state was brought into great danger, in not resolving speedily in urgent affairs. For by the laws of Solon, and of the twelve tables, the people must be assembeld three times, before they should allow of any law that was published. Oftentimes it chanced, that the flying of a bird on the right hand, or the crying of a rat, or the falling sickness (it may be of some drunken man) hindered the assembly; or at the lest protestation of some stamering soothsayer, or the opposition of a magistrate, all was dissolved. Whereof Cicero and Cato himself complained very much, for the power and favour of competitors (which were always many in number) to have offices, and being enemies one to another, hindered the assembly of the people, or troubled it being assembled; and the magistrates which were in office supported them, to continued their power: so as sometimes a whole year was spent without the creation of a new magistrate: as it happened when as Pompey the Great was chosen Consul alone. And therefore the Grisons, who maintain a Popular estate, assemble the people but every two years at Coire, for the creating of new magistrates, and 
The Grisons assembled every two years.  the making of new laws. For there is nothing more dangerous, nor more contrary to a Popular estate, than to continued magistrates long in their office. What is more absurd, than to allow of the rashness of a light and inconstant multitude for a law, who in discerning and giving of honours, are commonly carried away with a blind and inconsiderate violence, rather than with any settled judgement? What is more foolish, than in the greatest extremities of a Commonweal, to seek council from a mad multitude? for the magistrate can do nothing without command, and if they might they would not; neither dare they, being terrified with the people's fury, who impute all mischances, and their own errors, unto the magistrates. So as Philip the first, king of Macedon, having invaded and spoiled the confines of Attica, there was not any magistrate that durst assemble the estates, the people came to the place of assemblies uncalled, 
A multitude is amazed in danger.  whereas they found no man that durst speak unto them, as Demosthenes writeth. The like happened at Florence, when as the emperors army approached to besiege them, at the instance of pope Clement the seventh, all the people were so amazed, as they knew not what to resolve: For by the laws of Florence, all the citizens should assemble before the Town house, to resolve upon the articles propounded by the chief magistrate, and then they were quite daunted. It is the weakness of a multitude (saith Titus Livius) to wax proud, and to insult with all licentiousness in prosperity, and to be dejected and amazed with any adversity. And how is it possible that the sovereign majesty of an estate shall be maintained by a multitude, guided by a magistrate, who oftentimes must keep them in awe by severity, Et in qua regenda plus poena, quam obsequium valet (said Titus Livius) In the government whereof punishment more than obedience prevails. So Photion, seeing that the Athenians would not give him audience, he cried out, OH fustuarium Corcyraeum, quou●…s talento pretio sius, OH scourge of Corfu, more 
A multitude cannot maintain●… a majesty.  precious than any talon: Which shows the majesty doth perish and decay in a multitude, whereon the chief ground of a Commonweal consists. But passing on, all men that have written of estates, do hold, That the chief end of all Commonweals, is to flourish in piety, justice, valour, honour, and virtue; by the which human society is preserved. But a Popular estate hath been always opposite, and an enemy to all good men. For the preservation of a Popular estate (if we shall believe Xenophon) is to advance the most vicious and unworthy men to offices and dignities. And if the people should be so ill advised, as to give offices of honour unto virtuous men, they lose their 
The end of Popular estates, is to banish virtue.  power: for that good men would favour none but the good, which are always fewer in number: and the wicked and vicious (which is the greatest part of the people) should be excluded from all honour, and by little and little banished: so as in the end wise men should seize upon the estate, and take that from the people. The Athenians therefore (said Xenophon) gave audience to the most wicked, knowing well, that they would speak pleasing things, and profitable to the vicious, as most of the people be. I cannot 
Xenophon gives a true judgement of a Popular estate.  (said Xenophon) but blame the Athenians, to have chosen the most vicious form of a Commonweal: but having chosen it, I do much esteem them they do so carefully maintain it, in rejecting, chase away, and banishing the noble, wise, and virtuous; & advancing the impudent, wicked, & vicious: for the which vice thou so much blamest (saith he) is the preservation of a Popular estate. And as for justice, the people (saith he) have no regard of it, so as they may get profit by their judgements, which they cell to them that will give most, seeking by all means to ruin the rich, the noble, and the virtuous, whom they torment continually, for the capital hatred they bear against all good men, being contrary to their natural dispositions. And therefore a Popular state is the sink and refuge of all turbulent spirits, mutines, seditions, and banished men, which give council, comfort, and aid, unto the people to ruin great men: For as for the laws they have no respect of them, for that in Athens the people's will is a law. This is Xenophons' opinion, touching the Commonweal of Athens, who saith, it was the best ordered of all the Popular Commonweals in his time: neither would he have them to change any thing to maintain the people in their grea●…neses. The like censure Marcellus the lawyer hath of a strumpet, saying, That she hath not well done to have abandoned her honour; but having lo●…t all modesty, it was not ill done, to get what she could by her trade. So Xenophon concludes, That a Popular estate is nothing worth, but to maintain it so being once settled, they must banish all honour and virtue: that is to say, the greatest tyranny is not so dangerous, as a Popular estate thus governed.  
But there is yet one plague more capital in Popular estates, the which is, Impunity 
Impunity of vice in a Popular estate.  to the wicked, so as they be citizens, that is to say, petty kings: and even in the Popular estate of Rome, it was forbidden to all magistrates upon pain of death, To condemn to death, or to banish any citizen, nor to deprive him of his liberty or privilege of a citizen, nor to whip him with rods. For it is a settled law almost in all Popular estates, Ne civis quisquam quantumcumque scelus sive in deos, sive in homines admiserit, capite feriatur, That no citizen should die the death, what offence soever he had committed either against the gods, or men. Therefore Verres (omitting the rest) being accused and condemned of theft, and of a hundred thousand concussions, extortions, and false judgements; was thought to be severely punished, for that he was enjoined to departed out of Rome: and why, for that Popular states would have their liberty defended with the lenity of laws, and not with the sharpness of punishments. And yet they banished Ruti●…ius, Metellus, Coriolanus, the two Scipions, brethren, and Tully: as in Ephesus they banished the virtuous Hermodorus: in Athens they expelled Aristides the just, Themistocles 
The most virtuous are banished, and ●…he wicked escape, in a Popular estate.  died in exile, Miltiodes in prison, Socrates by poison. And although that Photion the most just and virtuous man of his age, had been chosen General forty and five times, without any reproach or blame, yet (without any accusation or information against him or his companions) a base pleader, of the scum of the people, steps up before the multitude, and demands, If they would have Photion and his companions put to death: wherewith all in general did arise up, and holding up their hands, condemned him, not excluding any slave, woman, nor stranger from this condemnation, for the which many aware garlands of flowers. Which Photion hearing, said, Me quidam a vobis damnari facile patior: sed cur isti? For my part, I am contented to be condemned by you: but why these men? To whom the people being mad, answered, Quoniam tibi sunt amici. Neither was the fury of this mad people pacified, until they were all without sentence, accusation, or cause, put to death. Neither is there any hope, if a multitude begin once to insult over the good, that either shame or reason shall reclaim them from their fury and madness. Yet notwithstanding the wicked do commonly escape the people's hands: which Demosthenes seeing, and that they had absolved Antipaphon, a most capital offender, he proceeded, and caused him to be condemned, and afterwards put to death by a decree of the Areopagits, little regarding the people, for the which he was not blamed. Whereby it appears, that there was neither justice nor majesty in a Popular estate. And as in a Popular Commonweal thus governed, all offices are sold to them that will give most, so the magistrates cell by retail that which they have bought in gross. And even Mar●…us durst carry bushels of silver into the assemblies at Rome, to purchase the people's voices: the like we read of Pompey. It is no marvel then if we read of infinite corruptions and concussions in Rome: but it was more fowl and odious in Athens, whereas when Stratocles and Damoclides entered into their offices, they did openly brag▪ That they went to a golden harvest. If offices, laws, justice, and honours, were so unworthily sold in these great Commonweals, being enriched with the spoils of other people; what shall we judge of Popular estates oppressed with want and need? We have the example of the Megarences, 
Popular estates exceed in all licentiousness.  who having expelled their prince Theagines, established a Popular estate so licentious, as it was lawful for the poor to go and spoil the rich, as it is in Plato. Even so we read, that the Swissers did long after they had expelled the nobility. If they would have any one spoiled by the multitude, they did set the picture of a man with boughs under him at his door, and then was he presently stripped of all that he had, were he the richest or most innocent citizen. And they which do so highly commend the Popular estate of the Romans, should rather have extolled the worthy deeds of noble and valiant men, than the cities form: they should set before their eyes the seditions and civil wars, wherewith that city had been shaken, and represent the people of the one side of a mountain, and the nobility of another, divided three times; and many times the furious Tribunes with their turbulent Orations, to threaten death or banishment to the best citizens: Sometime Saturnine the Tribune, with a rabble of rascals, slaves, and artisans, armed with staves and stones, to come into the open assembly of the people, and to expel the honester party, and kill him that was chosen Consul by the people's suffrages. The which the Tribunes alone did not, being enraged against the Consuls, but even the Consuls among themselves. How many murders of citizens have been seen in the midst of the city, in the field of Mars, in the court, in the temples of their gods, yea in jupiters' capitol, Tiberius and Caius Gracehus, Drusus, Saturninus, and Sulpitius, were cruelly slain: when as the Consul Cassius made a proclamation, That all the Latins, and Heniques, which had no houses within Rome, should departed the city. Virginius his companion made a decree to the contrary, not so much to cross his companions authority, but to set the citizens and strangers together by the ears in the midst of the city. What was more unworthy, or more contrary to civil society, than to see a citizen under an innocent gown, to come armed to the assembly, to sue for offices, as if they went to war, and oftentimes the contrary factions fell to blows. And Tully saith, Lapidationes in foro saepe vidi●…us, non saepe▪ sed tamen nimis saepe gladios, We have oftentimes seen stones cast in the assembly of the estates, and swords drawn, not so often, but yet too often. And a little after, Meministis (inquit) corporibus civium Tiberim compleri: cloacas refarciri, e foro spongijs effundi sanguinem, You remember (said he) that the river of Tibe●… hath been filled with the bodies of citizens, that the common privies have been stuffed full, and the blood sucked up in the market place with sponges. To conclude, if we shall rip up all the Popular estates that ever were, we shall found, that either they have had war always with the enemy, or within the state: or else that they have been governed in show by the people; but in effect by some of the citizens, or by the wisest among them, who held the place of a prince and monarch. Whilst that the Commonweal of Athens did flourish, it was governed by the Senate of the Areopagits: and when as their power and authority was restrained, Pericles (saith Thucydides) was a very Monarch, although in show it were Popular. And Peter Soderin (in an Oration he made unto the people of Florence, to change the estate) said, That in the time of Laurence de Medius, the Commonweal 
Pericles and Lau▪ rinse de Medicis, Monarches of Athens, and Florence.  in show was Popular, but in effect a mere Tyranny, for that Laurence governed all alone: but he doth not say, that it was never more flourishing, and that before they were never ten years free from seditions, and the most bloody factions that ever were. In like sort the Popular estate of the Romans, which had been afflicted with so many foreign and intestine wars, was it not maintained and flourished both in arms, and laws, by the Senate, and was not the authority thereof supported, by Menenius Agrippa, Furius Camillus, Papirius Cursor, Fabius Maximus, Scipio, Cato, Scaurus, Pompey, and divers others? who maintained the beauty of the Senate, and restrained the people, keeping them within the bounds of honour? We do also read, that Pelopidas, and Epaminondas, were as it were lords of the Popular estate of the Thebans, after whose death the people found presently, that they had lost their chief pilots: as it happened in the like case unto the Athenians, after the death of Pericles, Than (said Plutarch) the people did 
A Popular estate is preserved by a few wisemen.  float up and down, like a ship without a helm: and as every one would govern and command, some to set sail, others to go to harbour, a storm came (saith Polybius) and the ship perished. And although the Athenians, after they had lost the soveraignrie of Greece, governed their city & territory popularly, yet Demosthenes spoke plainly, and openly before the people, That the estate of Athens was under the power of Orators and Pleaders, of whom the captains depended, who had at the lest three hundred men bribed, to pass whatsoever they pleased for money. A common disease 
Corruptions common in Popula●… estates.  (saith Plutarch) in all Popular estates. Livius writeth thus of the Popular estates of the Tarentines, In potestate juniorum plebem, in manu plebis, rem Tarentinam esse, The estate of Tarentum was in the people's hands, and the people in the power of the younger sort. And a little before the declining of the Popular estate of Rome, Crassus, Caesar, and Pompey, whom they called a triple head, governed and held all the Senate and people in their power and subjection: but two of them being slain, the third become an absolute Lord Whereby we may gather, that a Popular command cannot subsist without a wise pilot and governor, and leaving it to the most sufficient, in the end they make themselves masters, and the people serves but for a mask.  
But some one will say, Do we not see that the Cantons of the Swissers have settled a 
The reasons why the Swissers▪ maintain their Popular estate.  goodly Popular estate, & have continued their government above three hundred and fifty years, and by this means have not only preserved themselves from tyranny, but have also chased away tyrants their neighbours? The answer hereunto is double: First, the situation of the country, and the disposition of the people agrees best with a Popular estate. Secondly, the most seditious, & mutinous, go to the service of other foreign princes: and the rest of the common people being more mild & tractable, are easily kept in awe. Moreover all the heads of the Cantons & Popular states, having entered into an offensive and defensive league, are strictly tied and united together; like unto those that go by night, or that are in a slippery or dangerous way, holding one another by the hand: and in this sort they maintain themselves against the power of Monarches, as in old time the Athenians and Thebans did. Besides, the foundation of their Popular estate was built and cemented with the blood of the nobility, and of the chiefest, especially at the battle of Sampac; then afterwards at that at Basil, when as king jews the 11 (being then but Dauphin) had the victory: then all the nobility of the country, which had followed him, were banished, and the rest retired themselves willingly, after the treaty of the ten Cantons, made in the year 1510, and at the change of religion in the year 1529: so as there remains but a very few at Berne and Zurich, whereas the estate is Aristocratical. And not only the Cantons, but also those at Strausbourg, Lyndaw, Sienne, Genes, and Florence (to settle a popular liberty) slew or banished the nobility: as they have done in many towns of Germany. After they of Florence had made away their nobility, they divided themselves into three factions, the greater, the mean, and the popular: and as the greater sort entered into factions, and slew one another, the meaner thought to become masters, who were so incensed one against another, as the whole city was nothing but fire and blood, murdering one another, until that the scum of the people took upon them the government, they always hated them that looked like gentlemen, or that ware a sword, or that had gotten to any degree of honour, in what Commonweal soever, or that had gathered together more riches than the rest: which made them of Strausbourg (after they had slain all the nobility, to settle a Popular estate) to decree, That whosoever did aspire to be Grand Bourgmaster, should prove that his grandfather was a day labourer, an artificer, a butcher, or of some such like condition. And the ancients (to assure Popular estates) did strive to equal all citizens in goods, honours, power, and rewards: and if any one were more virtuous, more just, or more wise, than the rest, he was banished, as I have showed before, seeking to make an equality, if it were possible: and even Plato did wish, That wives and children should be common to all, to the end that no man might say, This is mine, or, That is thine: for those words of Meum, and Tuum (said he) were the breeders of discord, and the ruin of states. By the which there will grow many absurdities: for in so doing, a city shall be ruined, and become a household (as Aristotle said) although that a household or family (which is the true image of a Commonweal) hath but one head. And for this cause an ancient 
* Bias.  lawmaker, being importuned by some one, to make his country a Popular estate: Make it (saith he) in thine own house. And if they say, That it is a goodly thing so to unite citizens and a city, as to make one household of it, they must then take away the plurality of heads and commanders, which are in a Popular estate, to make a Monarch, as the true fathers of a family; and to cut off this equality of goods, power, honour, and commandment, which they seek to make in a Popular estate: for that it is incompatible in a family. But the greatest inconvenience is, that in taking away these words of Mine, and Thy, they ruin the foundation of all Commonweals, the which were chief established, to yield unto 
Taking away the propriety of goods, we overthrow a Commonweal.  every man that which is his own, and to forbidden theft; as it is commanded by the word of God, who will have every man to enjoy the propriety of his own goods: and we may not say, that nature hath made all things common, for the law of the mother is not contrary to the commandment of the father (as Solomon said) figuring by an Allegory the commandments of God, and the law of nature. But the true popular liberty consisteth in nothing else, but in the enjoying of our private goods sincerely, without fear to be wronged, in honour, life, wife or family, the which even thieves & robbers labour to keep. And as for the power of command, which popular men would make equal, there is less reason than in goods: for discretion and wisdom is not equally given to all men, and in a Popular estate they must of necessity choose the 
Wisdom is not equ●…ll in all men, to impart offices equally.  most sufficient magistrates, to command, and to administer justice. Moreover, whereas there is no form of sovereignty, nor of a Commonweal, yet a●…e the people constrained to choose a magistrate or captain to command them, and to do justice: as in the country of Gusula in Africa, where there is neither king, nor any form of a Commonweal, the people on their Fair day choose a captain to do justice, and to assure the course of traffic. And on the frontiers of the kingdom of Fez, the inhabitants of the mountain of Magnan (who in like sort have no form of a Commonweal) if they see any stranger to pass by, which seems to excel the rest in wisdom, him they stay by force, to administer justice unto them. It is a maxim in Popular states, 
A rule in Popular states.  That when as the persons are equal which are to undergo a charge, to cast lots: and if one exceeds another, than they choose the most sufficient. And who doth not see the great difference among men, that some have less judgement than bruit beasts; and others have such clear marks of divine light, as they seem rather angels than men? and 
An error in equality.  yet those which seek equality, will have the sovereign power of life, honour, and goods, given unto furious, ignorant, and mad men, as well as unto judicious and wise men: for the voices in all assemblies are numbered, without any due consideration of every man's worth: and always the number of fools, wicked and ignorant men, doth far exceed the good, if that be true which Solomon saith, That there is not one among a thousand: the which is confirmed by the Poet,  

A good man and a wise, one such as out of all mankind,  
Though Apollo sought and searched himself, yet could he scarcely found.   
And yet there is a natural reason, which doth teach us, that the equality they seek, doth ruin the grounds of all love and amity, the which can hardly subsist among equals, for that there are never more quarrels & dissensions, than among them that are equal; either for that the one seeks to supplant the other, or for that the one may live 
All nations have need one of another.  without the other. And it seems that God hath imparted his benefits and graces, to countries and nations, in such a measure, as there is no man but hath need of another: to the end that through mutual courtesy and good offices, every nation in particular, and all in general, should be constrained to contract alliances and friendships together: as it is seen in a man's body, the which is the figure of a well ordered Commonweal, there is no member but receives help and secure from the rest, and that which seems most idle, digests the nourishment for all the rest: as Menenius Agrippa a Roman Senator, 
Equality and friendship are incompatible.  did wisely show unto the common people, which were fallen from the nobility, & did seek to equal themselves unto them in power and authority. Popular governments in the beginning seem pleasing and goodly, contrary to Monarchies: the which are like unto great rivers, which at their first springs have small and weak currents, but increasing by their long course, their streams grow bigger, & more rough, and run with more spacious channels, the farther they are from their heads and springs. But Popular states are like unto the wind, the which is most vehement where it riseth, but at the length it is broken and groweth weak. I have discoursed hereof the more at large, to show the inconveniences which follow a Popular estate, to the end I might reduce them to reason which seek to withdraw the subject from the obedience of their natural 
A Popular estate a pernicious tyranny, i●… not wisely governed.  prince, through a false hope of liberty, in framing of Popular states: the which in effect is nothing else, but the most pernicious tyranny that can be imagined, if it be not governed by wise and virtuous men. And therefore among the Cantons of the Swissers (those which are best ordered) although they have established a form of Popular Commonweal, yet they govern themselves Aristocratically, having two or three counsels, to the end the people deal not in affairs of state as little as may be; assembling seldom but by quarters, or parishes, which they call Schaffes (as in old time the inhabitants of Mantinaea a Popular state did) fearing the tumults and rebellions which 
General assemblies are dangerous in Popular estates.  fall out commonly when they are altogether. But seeing it is not in the power of good citizens, nor of wise politicians, to change a Popular estate into a Monarchy: the chief grounds then of a Popular estate consists in the strict observation of laws and ordinances, being of itself quite different and disagreeing from the laws and order of nature, which gives the commawd unto the wisest: a thing very incompatible with the people: for if a multitude (being impatient of command) have not good laws and statutes before their eyes, as lights to guide them, the estate will be soon ruined. And therefore the Swissers do observe their laws very severely, else their estate had not been so durable: for even as weak & crazed bodies fall soon into diseases, if they leave the good diet and order prescribed them by the Physician; so is it in a Popular state, if they do not observe their laws and ordinances. And thus much to satisfy them which are not contented, although the greatest men that ever were, have disallowed of a Popular estate.  
Let us see now if an Aristocratical government be any thing better than the rest, as many hold opinion: for if a mediocratie be commendable in all things, and that we 
Reasons for an Aristocratical estate.  must fly all vicious extremes; it follows then, that these two vicious extremes being rejected, we must hold the mean, which is an Aristocritie, or a certain number of the most apparent citizens: as if there were ten thousand citizens, let them make choice of an hundred; the which were a just proportionable number betwixt one & a thousand: increasing or diminishing the number according to the multitude of the subjects, wherein they shall hold that commendable & desired mediocrity betwixt a Monarchy and a Democraty. There is yet another argument of no less efficacy, to prove that an Aristocratical estate is the best, which is, That the power of sovereign command, by natural reason, is to be given to the most worthy: and dignity cannot consist but in virtue, in nobility, or in riches, or in all three together. If then we desire to choose one of the three, or to join them all together, the estate shall be always Aristocratical: for the noble, rich, wise, and valiant men, make always the lest part of the citizens, in what place soever; by natural reason then that government must be Aristocratical, when as the lest part of the citizens command the state, or whereunto the best and most virtuous men are admitted.  
A man may also say, that the sovereignty should be given only to the most rich, as 
The government of a Commonweal must be given to them that have the most interest in the preservation thereof.  to them that have most interest in the preservation of the whole state. Without doubt the most rich have the greatest interest, and bear a greater charge than the poor, who having little to lose, abandon the Commonweal at need. And therefore Q. Flaminius did wisely commit the government of the cities of Thessaly, to the most rich, as to them that had most interest in the preservation of the state. Moreover it seems that necessity doth guide us to an Aristocratical estate: for although that in a Popular estate, and in a Monarchy, the monarch or the people in show have the sovereignty, yet in effect they are forced to commit the government to the Senate, or privy Council, who consult, and many times determine of greatest affairs: so as it is always an optimacy. And if the monarch, or people, be so ill advised as to govern otherwise than by a wise council, there can nothing be expected but an inevitable ruin of the state. I omit other reasons less necessary, as every one may conjecture, to conclude, that an aristocraty is the most commendable state. And yet I say, that all together are not sufficient to prove it: for as for that commendable mediocrity which we seek, it is not real, dividing things in the midst, but consists in reason: as liberality a mea●…e betwixt two vicious extremes, yet doth it approach nearer unto prodigali●…e than unto covetousness. The mean which they seek betwixt one and all in general, is real; neither can it ever be alike, for that there are some cities which have not a thousand citizens, and others that have above three hundred thousand: so as an Aristocratical estate shall be always mutable and variable, for the uncertainty of the number: and it will often fall out, that a great Aristocratical estate shall have more commanders, than a Popular state in a small city shall have citizens: as if there be four hundred thousand citizens, to observe a true Geometrical proportion, there must be four thousand governors or commanders: so as by a necessary consequence, the inconveniences which are incident to a Popular estate, will also fall out in an aristocraty, by reason of the multitude 
Many commanders, 'cause many factions.  of lords: for the more governors there be, the more factions will grow, their consultations will be more hard to determine, and are sooner discovered. And therefore those 
Those Aristocratical estates most durable, that have fewest lords.  Aristocratical estates are more durable and assured, that have fewest lords: as the Lacedæmonians, who had but thirty governors, and the Pharsalians twenty; they did long maintain their estates, whereas others decayed soon. It is not then the middle number betwixt one and all, which makes that commendable mean, seeing that there be as many kinds of vicious Commonweals, as of commendable and virtuous.  
As for the other point, That they must give the sovereignty unto the most worthy, It is true; but the argument makes more for a Monarchy, than for an aristocraty: for among the most noble, the most wise, the most rich, and the most valiant, there is always some one that doth excel the rest, to whom by that reason the sovereignty doth belong: For it is impossible to found them all equal in all respects. And as for the Senate, or Council, we have showed before, that it is divided from majesty, and hath no power to command, in what estate soever: else doth it lose the name and mark of a 
No council in any estate hath any power to command.  Senate, the which is ordained to no other end, but to give council to them that have the sovereignty, to whom belong the resolution & decision of the council. But Plato had another argument for an Aristocratical estate, saying, That it was very hard to found any one man so wise and virtuous, as was requisite for the government of an estate, and by that means a Monarchy were not sure. But this argument is captious, and may be 
Plato's argument captious.  used against himself: for if it be hard to found any one prince so wise as he desireth, how shall they found out so great a number as is needful in a signory. And Peter Soderin Gonfalonier of Florence, speaking unto the people against an Aristocratical estate, he used the same argument which Maecenas did before Augustus against Marcus Agrippa, 
The estate of few lords, is the estate of ●…ew tyrants.  saying, That the government of few lords, is the government of few tyrants: and that it was better at all events to have but one tyrant. For if any one will say, that among many there will haply be some number of good men, we must then rather choose a Popular estate, for that in a great number there will be found more virtuous than in a less. But both the one and the other is unprofitable: for as well in all Aristocratical and Popolar estates, as in all corporations and colleges, the greatest part doth still overrule the sounder and the better: and the more men there be, the less effects are there of virtue and wisdom (even as a little salt cast into a great lake, looseth his force:) so as the good men shall be always vanquished in number by the vicious, and ambitious: and 
In all colleges, corporations, & states, the greatest number carries it.  for one tyrant there shall be a hundred which will cross the resolution of the lesser but of the sounder part: as it is always seen as well in the diets and assemblies of the princes of Germany, whereas the spiritual princes of the empire, being the greatest number, have always crossed the princes temporal: so as by their means the emperor Charles the fift, caused the empire to declare itself an enemy to the house of France, the which had not been so in many ages: to the end the temporal princes should have no hope of any succours from France in their necessities, whereinto they soon after fell. And 
Anno. 1543. The princes spiritual of the empire, are more in number than the temporal.  to make short, it hath been always seen, that the more heads there be in a signory, the more controversies arise, and less resolution. And therefore the signory of Venice to avoid these inconveniences, commits all affairs of state to the managing of a dozen persons, and most commonly to seven, especially to keep their affairs secret, whererein consists the health and preservation of an estate.  
But let us suppose, that a privy Council in an Aristocratical estate, be so secret, as nothing is discovered; yet is it a difficult thing for few commanders to maintain their estate against a multitude, which hath no part in honourable charges: for that most commonly the lords scorn and contemn the popular, and the poor carry always a capital hatred against the great: so as upon the lest dissension among the nobles (the which is inevitable if they be men of faction, and given to arms) the most factious and 
The cause that doth most ruin Aristocratical estates.  ambitious flieth unto the multitude, and ruins the state: as I have noted before of the Seigneuries of Gènes, Florence, Cologne, Zurich, Strausbourg, Lindaw, and the ancient Phocians, Samians, Therenecians, Amphipolites, Corcyrians, Cnidians, Mytelenians, and Hostienses; in the which the multitude hath expelled, banished, spoiled, and slain the nobles. And what guard soever they keep, yet do they live in continual distrust, and sometimes in such fear, as they do not assemble together but in places of 
The commanders in an Aristocratical estate are in continual fear and distrust  strength: as in the city of Benize●…e, lying in the realm of Telesin in Barbary, all the lords and commanders keep themselves in forts, fearing the people should mutiny against them, or that one of them should murder the rest. So in old time the inhabitants of Miletum, after they had expelled their two tyrants, they fell cruelly ●…o arms among themselves, the nobles against the people: but in the end the rich having vanquished the poor, they framed an Aristocratical estate, where they lived in such fear, and distrust, as they went into ships to hold their counsels, fearing (saith Plutarch) to be surprised and slain by the people: like unto the lords of the Samiens, who were all massacred by the multitude, at such time as they were in council. So as in an Aristocraty the lords dare not train the people up to arms, nor put weapons into their hands: neither can they go to the war, but they are in danger to lose the estate, if they be once defeated: neither can they assure themselves of strangers, fearing they should be subjecteth by them. To which dangers a Popular estate is not subject, every one having a part in the state. An Aristocratical estate then, is not only in danger of foreign enemies, but of the people, whom they must content or keep in awe by force: to content them without making them partakers of the government, were very hard; & to admit them to charges of honour, without alteration of the state, from an aristocraty to a Popular, were impossible: to keep them in subjection by force, that were not safe, although it might be done, for that were to show an open fear and distrust of them whom they must win by love and courtesy: else upon any foreign war against the state, or among the governors themselves, the people will be easily drawn to arms, and to shake off their yoke. And therefore the Venetians to maintain their 
How the estate of Venice 〈◊〉 been preserved.  Aristocratical estate, impart some small offices unto the people, contract alliances with them, borrow of them to bind them to the maintenance of the state; and disarm them quite: and to make them more mild and pliable, they give them full scope and liber●…ie to all sorts of pleasures: and sometimes they make their richest citizens bourgesses. If they have any war against the stranger, they soon compound it at what price soever: and above all things they labour to quench and pacify all partialities and hatred among the gentlemen: so as the rich being drunk with delights, and the poor having means to traffic, and to exercise themselves in mechanike arts, with the commodity of the place, lying upon the sea, being by nature strong, they have no great occasion, & less power to rebel. By these means the Venetians (next under God) have maintained their estate, and not by the form of an Aristocratical government, as many do hold. And although the nature of the situation of Venice, the honour of the people, the wisdom of the Seigneures, and the laws, be fit for an Aristocratical estate, yet is it not above four hundred years, that they have instituted this form of Commonweal, neither could they avoid many seditions and civil wars; as of the Bochonians, 
Gianot. Donat. de Repub. Vene●….  Faleriennes, Topoliennes, Baiamontaines, and the cruel factions of the justinian's, the Scevoles, Seliens, Bassiens; the murder of eighteen dukes, and of a great number of Senators, as we may read in their histories. Wherein Paulus iovius was deceived, who held, That the estate of Venice had continued eight hundred years: and Paulus Manutius, and du Moulin, have erred more, saying, That it had been of twelve hundred years standing: for it is well verified by the ancient registers of their signory, that before Cebastian Cian duke of Venice, in the year 1175, it was a mere Monarchy: and yet there hath not been any Aristocratical estate, to our knowledge, that hath so long continued, but have been for the most part changed into cruel Tyrannies, or bloody Popular estates, as we have showed elsewhere. And to make it more apparent, I will produce for a new example the state of Genes, who having peace with the Venetians, by means of the protection of France, soon after the Adorns, and Fregoses, divided the state (the which at that time was Aristocratical) into two factions, whence ensued many murders of the chief men: so as the people fell to arms, freed themselves from subjection, and took the government of the state from the gentlemen: and in succession of time made a law, whereby none might be duke of Genes, unless 
Anno. 1506. The estate of Genes, and the change thereof.  he were a Plebeian: and since they have published another law, prohibiting the nobles to have above a third part of all other officers. And soon after in a sedition they expelled all their gentlemen, choosing eight Tribunes, and after they had rejected the protection of France, they chose a Dyer of silk for their duke, whom king jews the twelft caused to be hanged▪ after that he had taken the city: but when as Andrew Doria revolted, and that he had power to dispose of the state at his pleasure, he made choice of all such as had six houses within the city, and of some others of name and mark, which were not so rich, and divided them all into eight and twenty tribes, the which they called Alberghi, making them gentlemen, and giving them the government of the state, and debarred the rest of the common people, only with this exception, To have liberty every year to make ten of the Plebeians gentlemen, and to receive them into the number of the nobility: the which notwithstanding was not well executed. So of four and twenty thousand citizens, there were not above twelve hundred, or thereabouts, that had any part in the state: and of this number it was decreed, That every year there should be a great Council made of four hundred, the which should choose the Duke and the eight Governors, which they call the signory, to manage all affairs of state for the space of two years that they should be in charge, unless matter were of great importance, then to assemble the Senate of an hundred gentlemen. And as for the duke, he might not be chosen but out of the noblest families, with a guard of 500 Lansquenets, besides the general of the army, and the forty centiners. I omit other officers, as the Procurators of the signory, the Podestat, or Mayor, the judges of the Rota, the seven extraordinary judges, the five Syndiks, the Censors, and the officers of Saint George. The estate of Genes hath continued in this sort 43 years, under the protection of the house of Austria. From the year 1528, unto the year 1549, that john Flisco being chosen duke of Genes after Benedict Gentil, would have made his power perpetual, and to effect it, he laboured to subject the signory of Genes unto the crown of France, having already defeated Andrew Dories' army, & slain his nephew, he fell into the seal leaping from one galley to another, the which overthrew all his desseins. Since the signory hath taken again the form established by Andrew Doria, the which was continued unto the year 1574, that it was divided into two factions; the one of the ancient, the other of the new gentlemen, who are yet at civil war: and the ancient seeing themselves expelled by the new, have ceized upon the places of strength, and forts without the city, being in danger to be quite ruined, or at the lest to fall into a Popular estate, as they did in the year 1506. The sedition happened for the quality of their nobility: for after that Andrew Doria had settled the state (as I have said) & excluded the Plebeians from being dukes of Genes, the gentlemen of the ancient houses (which were but four, the Dorias, the Spinolas, the Grimoaldes, and the Fiesques) 
The cause of factions at Genes.  caused their genealogies to be drawn and registered in public acts, dividing themselves by this means from the Plebeians that were newly ennobled; who disdaining thereat, and finding themselves the greater number and the stronger, they have chased away the ancient houses, and if they be not soon reconciled, the people in the end will expel them all.  
I have showed before, that the great Council or Senate in an Aristocratical estate, aught to be perpetual, to the end there may be some firm ground, or foundation whereon the annual change of all officers may rely. And as for the Duke, it were strange if he should not cease upon the Sovereignty, having five hundred men for his guard, seeing that he hath two years to remain in charge: considering the factions that are made to attain unto this dignity of honour. We see then that the chief 
The ground and support of an optimacy.  ground and support of an aristocraty, consists in the mutual love of the commanders: for if they agreed and be of one mind, they will maintain themselves, and govern much better than the people: But if there be any factions among them, than there is no State so difficult to maintain, for the reasons before mentioned; especially, if the Commanders be martial men: for soldiers hate nothing more than peace. And we may not marvel if the aristocraty of the Venetians, Rhagusians and Luquois, have continued some ages: for they are not given to arms, neither have they any thing in greater recommendation than their traffic and commodity. And to conclude 
The best kind of optimacy.  briefly, there is no form of aristocraty more perfect and goodly, nor more assured, than whereas they make choice of men of virtue and reputation to command; or at the lest that they be not infamous: and if any one dies, to substitute another in his place by election, as they do use at Geneva. If any one of the Council of 25 dies, the most ancient of the 60 succeeds him most commonly, although it be done by election: and the most ancient of the great Council of 200 comes into the Council of 60, and the two hundred choose one of the honestest Burgesses or citizens that is without reproach. Whereby few command and govern the state, and yet every man hopes to attain unto it, not by money nor ambition, but by honour and virtue. This may properly be called an aristocraty, the which is lest subject unto dangers, and to the rebellion of Lords or subjects.  
Such a signory will observe the laws duly, and administer justice uprightly: if they be contented with their estate, and seek not ambitiously to wrist from another, as the Lacedæmonians did. For it is impossible that a signory of few Lords and Commanders, should get and maintain a great Empire, as a Monarch may: also the ruin and change of so great a signory is not so much to be feared, as of a great and mighty Monarchy, which draweth after it the ruin of the greatest families, and oftentimes of allies and of neighbour States that are in his protection: Like unto a great building which raised on high, blind the sight of others, and falling, ruins with her weight those that are near it, with a fearful noise to them that hear it. Behold the commodities and discommodities of a popular and Aristocratical estate. Now we 
The discommodities of a Monarchy.  are to speak of a Monarchy, which all great men have preferred before all other Commonweals: yet we found it is subject unto many dangers, whether the change of the Monarch be from bad to good, or from good to better: although there were no 
Plato lib. 4. de Legib. Mutati●…nes in republica putat esse 〈◊〉.  other thing but the change of him that hath the Sovereignty: yet is it much to be feared in all states: for we commonly see in the change of Princes, new desseines, new laws, new officers, new friends, new enemies, new habits, and a new form of living: for most commonly all Princes take a delight to change and altar all things, that they may be spoken of; the which doth many times 'cause great inconveniences, not only to the subjects in particular, but also to the whole body of the state. But if this were not, and the Prince were as wise and virtuous as might be desired, yet the leagues and treaties made with his Predecessor end with him: whereupon alliances being ended, Princes fall to arms, and the stornger assails the weaker, or prescribes him a law. The which cannot chance in popular and Aristocratical estates, when as they make perpetual leagues, for that the people dies not; so as other Princes and private men desire rather to contract with a signory than with a Prince, for the assurance of treaties and bonds, whereunto the successors of Princes are not tied, unless they be their heirs, as many maintain and practise. The other inconvenience in a Monarchy is, the danger to fall into civil war, by the divisions and factions of such as aspire unto the crown, especially if it be elective, the which doth oftentimes draw after it the ruin of the state: Yea, in a successive right there is no small danger, if there be many in one degree, who many times kill one another, or at the lest divide the subjects. We have too many examples before our eyes: and oftentimes the lawful successor is expelled by an usurper. But admit there were no contention for the Monarchy, yet if the Monarch be a child, there will be some division for the government, betwixt the mother and the Princes, or betwixt the Princes themselves. And God (to be revenged of his people) threatens to give them for Prince's children and women. And although the 
isaiah. cap. 5.  infant have a tutor by the appointment of his predecessor, or by the custom, yet is it to be feared, that he will make himself absolute Lord▪ as Triphon did, who cruelly 
The tutors to Monarches do oftentimes make themselves absolute Lords.  slew his pupil the king of Syria, to make himself king. The which is more to be feared, if the tutor marrieth the pupil's mother, as Lewis Sforce did, who by that means murdered the young prince, and made himself duke of Milan. And although for the avoiding of this danger, they give the government to the nearest of kin, and the nourishment of the infant to the mother; yet have there been murdering mothers since, who have not only sold and betrayed the state, but even the lives of their children, as the mother of Charilaus king of Lacedaemon did. And sometimes the tutor 
Plutar. in Licur.  continues his government, and leaves nothing unto the king but the title, as the duke of Northumberland did to Edward the sixt king of England: and Appelles to young Philip king of Macedon, who could not enjoy his estate, until he had slain his tutor. 
Po●…ib. lib. 7.  And if the prince comes to the crown being young and out of government, there is no less danger: for then when as he should have a dozen wise masters to restrain his licentious appetits, the which are then most violent, he is altogether free and at liberty: so as commonly the courts of young princes abound in follies, masks, and licentiousness, and the subjects follow the prince's humour; so as for one vice there multiplies ten, as I have said before. If the prince be warlike, he will hazard his subjects, his estate, and his person, to make proof of his valour. And although he come unto the state being of a competent age and wise, the which is rare, and the greatest gift which a people can crave at God's hands: yet sovereignty hath his mischief, most commonly the wise become foolish, the valiant cowards, and the good grow wicked. It were 
Sovereignty altereth the h●… mors of princes.  time lost to repeat examples, the which are too ordinary. To conclude, if the prince be subtle and wicked, he will plant a tyranny: if he be cruel, he will make a butchery of the commonweal; or a brothel house if he be licentious, or both together if he be covetous, he will pull both hair and skin from his subjects: if he be prodigal, he will suck their blood and marrow to glut some dosaine of horseleeches that are about his person. And yet he will do worse than all this, if he be a sot and ignorant, as we have said elsewhere. Yea, so much the more is a tyranny to be feared, for that a tyrant hath no master nor companion to oppose against him. These be the dangers of a Monarchy, the which in truth are great, but there is greater peril in an Aristocratical estate, and much more in a Popular: for the dangers which we have set down for the most part cease, when as the Monarchy comes by right of succession, as we will show hereafter. But seditions, factions, and civil war, are in a manner continual: yea, 
Comparison of dangers.  sometimes greater for the attaining unto offices, in Aristocratical and Popular commonweals, than for the state in a Monarchy; the which admits no sedition for offices, nor for the state, but after the death of the prince, and that very seldom. But the chief point of a commonweal, which is the right of sovereignty, cannot be, nor subsist (to speak properly) but in a Monarchy: for none can be sovereign in a commonweal 
Commodities of a Monarchy.  but one alone: if they be two, or three, or more, no one is sovereign, for that no one of them can give or take a law from his companion. And although we imagine a body of many lords, or of a whole people to hold the sovereignty; yet hath it no true ground, nor support, if there be not a head with absolute and sovereign power, to unite them together: the which a simple magistrate without sovereign authority cannot do. And if it chance that the lords, or the tribes of the people be divided (as it often falls out) then must they fall to arms one against another. And although the greatest part be of one opinion, yet may it so happen, as the lesser part having many legions, and making a head, may oppose itself against the greater number, and get the victory. We see the difficulties which are, and always have been in Popular states and seigneuries, whereas they hold contrary parts, and for diverse magistrates: some demand peace, others war, some will have this law, others that; some will have one commander, others another; some will treat a league with the king of France, others with the king of Spain, corrupted or drawn some one way some another, making open war: as it hath been seen in our age among the Grisons. Moreover, sometimes it happens by the custom of the country, that a law, the prince, or a magistrate, is not admitted, if all that have voices give not their consent: as in Polonia whereas the lesser part must change their opinion, and join with the greater number, either by love or force, and for this cause they come armed to the field to choose their king, and to force the lesser part to consent: the which cannot happen where there is a sovereign head, of whom depends the resolution of all things. Moreover, in a Popular and Aristocratical estate, always the greater number will be believed, 
In Popular and Aristocratical estates the lesser part is always overruled by the g●…eater, the which is contrary in a Monarchy.  although the wiser and the most virtuous be fewest in number; so as most commonly the sounder and the better part is forced to yield unto the greater, at the appetite of an impudent Tribune, or a brazen faced Orator. But a sovereign Monarch may join with the sounder and the better part, and make choice of wise men, and well practised in matters of state: whereas necessity doth force them in other commonweals to admit wise men and fools and altogether to offices and council. It is also impossible for a Popular state, or an aristocraty, to command with sovereign power, or to do any act which cannot be done but by one person only: as to conduct an army and such like things: but they must created magistrates and commissaries to that end, who have neither the sovereign power, authority, nor majesty of a Monarch. And what power soever they have by virtue of their places, yet Popular and 
Livy lib. 3. Lib. 2. Lib. 7. Lib. 4.  Aristocratical commonweals, finding themselves embarked in any dangerous war, either against the enemy, or among themselves, or in difficulty to proceed criminally against some mighty citizen, or to give order for the plague, or to created magistrates, or to do any other thing of great consequence, did usually created a Dictator, as a sovereign Monarch: knowing well that a Monarchy was the anchor whereunto of necessity they must have recourse, Trepid●… patres, saith Titus Livius, ad summum anxilium decurrunt, Dictatorem dici placet, The fearful father's fly unto their last refuge, they thought it best to name a Dictator. And when as Hannibal made all Italy to tremble, Ad Dictatorem dicendum remedium iamdiu desideratum Civit as confugit, The city fled 
Li●…is lib. 22.  unto the remedy so long desired, which was to name a Dictator. And the reason was, for that they held the Dictator for a god, and his commandments for oracles, Dict●…toris Edictum pro numine semper obseruatum, The Dictator's Edict was always religiously 
Lib. 6.  observed. And even the enemies besieging the city of Rome, abandoned the siege, hearing that they had created a Dictator, Tantus erat Dictatoris terror apud hosts, ut eo creato statim a menibus disceserint, So great was the fear of a Dictator with the enemies, as he was no sooner created, but they departed from the walls. For 
Lib. 5.  oftentimes even the Consuls and their commandments were neglected and trodden under foot: and such as had offended retired to their companions, that is to say, to the people, to whom they might appeal. The which Appius the Consul seeing, he 
Li●…e lib. 2.  said, Minas esse Consul●…m non imperium, ubi ad eos qui una peccaver unt provocare liceat agedum, Dictatorem a quo provocatio non est creemas, They were but the threats, said he, of Consuls without any commanding power, seeing they might appeal unto them who had offended in the like manner, Go to then, let us created a Dictator from whom there is no appeal. The impunity of vices, and the contempt of magistrates in a Popular estate, doth sufficiently show that Monarches are necessary for the preservation of the society of mankind, seeing that the Romans who for the error of one Prince, had all kings in hatred, made a Dictator for the conduct of all their great affairs. So did the Lacedæmonians in their extremities created a magistrate with power like unto the Dictator, whom they called Harmoste: and the Thessaliens, him whom they called 
Dionys. Hali●…. lib. 6.  Archus: as in the like case the Mityleniens their great Aezimnere; to whom the great Providador of the Venetians may be in some sort compared: finding by experience that an absolute power united in one person, is more eminent and of greater effect▪ and that the same power imparted to two, three, or many lords, or to a whole commonalty, declines and looseth his force, like unto a ●…agot unbound and divided into many parts. And therefore Tacitus saith, that for the execution of great exploits the power of commanding must be restrained to one alone: the which is confirmed by Titus Livius, who said, that three Tribunes created with consulary power, gave a sufficient testimony that the force of command imparted to many, is fruitless: and especially in military causes, the which Hannibal did found, having against him an army of 60000 
Plurium 〈◊〉 bell●… 〈◊〉 util●….  men, commanded by two Consuls, Paulus Aemilius, and Terentius Varro, whom he defeated: and Amurath against the Christian Princes at the battle of Nicopolis: and the emperor Charles the fift against the two commanders of the protestants. And we may not marvel if the duke of Urbin with a few hierlings made head against so mighty an army, led by the chief commanders or generals, the which depended not one of another, that is to say, Rance Vitelli, and Laurence de Medicis: for even Leo writes in his history, that the people of Africa hold it for an infallible Maxim, that a prince 
An ancient opinion of the Affric●….  which is but weak in forces, shall always defeat a stronger army that hath two generals. For whilst that Cleomenes king of Lacedaemon did govern absolutely alone, he obtained great and goodly victories, and was never vanquished: but after that he had called home the king which was banished to impart his sovereign authority unto him, soon after he was overthrown and put to flight. And for this cause Aristides the just, being chosen general with Miltiades to command the army either of them 
Plut. in Aristid●….  his day, (as the Roman Consuls were wont to do) he resigned all his power and authority to his companion, who gave the Persians' a great overthrow. There are a thousand such like examples, which do show us the necessity to have one head or commander, not only in war (where there is greatest danger) but also to obey one sovereign 
One sovereign commander most necessary.  prince in a Commonweal: for even as an army is ill led, and most commonly defeated that hath many Generals; even so is a Commonweal that hath many lords, either by division, or a diversity of opinions, or by the diminution of power given to many, or by the difficulty there is to agreed and resolve upon any thing, or for that the subjects know not whom to obey, or by the discovery of matters which should be kept secret, or through altogether. And therefore whereas we said before, that in a well ordered state, the sovereign power must remain in one only, without communicating any part thereof unto the state (for in that case it should be a Popular government and no Monarchy) and that all wise Politicians, Philosophers, Divines, and Historiographers have highly commended a Monarchy above all other Commonweals, it is not to please the prince, that they hold this opinion, but for the safety and happiness of the subjects: And contrariwise, when as they shall limit and restrain the sovereign power of a Monarch, to subject him to the general estates, or to the council, the sovereignty hath no firm foundation, but they frame a popular confusion, or a miserable Anarchy, which is the plague of all states, & Commonweals; the which must be duly considered, not giving credit to their goodly discourses, which persuade subjects, that it is necessary to subject Monarches, and to prescribe their prince a law; for that it is not only the ruin of the Monarch, but also of the subjects. It is yet more strange, that many hold an opinion that the prince is subject to his laws, that is to say, subject to his will, whereon the civil laws (which he hath made) depend; a thing impossible by nature. And under this colour and ill digested opinion, they make a mixture and confusion of civil laws with the laws of nature, and of both jointly with the laws of God: so as they suppose, when as the prince forbids to kill, to steal, or to commit adultery, that it is the prince's law. But for that we have laid open this point at large, I will now pass it over. It shall suffice that we have made apparent demonstration, that a pure absolute Monarchy is the surest Commonweal, and without comparison the best of all. Wherein many are abused, which maintain that an optimacy is the best kind of government: for that many commanders have more 
Aliud est consulere aliud imp●…rare.  judgement, wisdom, and council than one alone; But there is a great difference betwixt council and commandment: The advice and council of many grave and wise men may be better than of one, as they say commonly that many men see more than one alone: but to resolve, to determine and to command, one will always perform it better than many: and then he which hath advisedly digested all their opinions, will soon resolve without contention, the which many cannot easily perform: Besides ambition is so natural among commanders that are equal in power, as some will rather see the ruin of the Commonweal, than acknowledge any one to be wiser than themselves: Others know what is good, but shame keeps them from changing of their opinions, fearing to lose the lest point of their reputations: So as it is necessary to have a sovereign prince, which may have power to resolve and determine of the opinions of his council.  
If then a commonweal be but one body, how is it possible it should have many 
One body cannot have many heads.  heads, but that it must prove a monster, as the emperor Tiberius said unto the Senate, else it were no body, but a hideous monster with many heads. But some one will say that new princes make new laws, new institutions, new ordinances: we will confess that it happens in some, who to show their power make laws sometimes without any reason, but this is more frequent and usual without comparison in Popular and Aristocratical estates: For new magistrates so often created, and which play the petty kings in their Commonweals, would be loath the year should pass away without giving some cause to speak of them, either for good, or evil: for proof whereof we found more laws published at Rome and at Athens, then throughout all the world: For always through jealousy one undid what another had made: and all, as they said, was to make themselves famous, and to rob the honour of their companions, with the prejudice of the Commonweal. But to avoid these inconveniences, and insatiable ambitions in an optimacy, or Popular state, you must not in any sort suffer the law or ordinance to carry the name of the magistrate, as they used in Rome and Athens, which was the cause of so many laws. And to say that treaties and leagues die with the Prince, that happens not always, for most commonly they are continued and prorogued by an express clause, some years after the death of the prince, as it hath been always observed betwixt the house of France and the Cantons of the Suissers, the which have been for the king's life, and five years after. Moreover, we have formerly showed, that it is expedient alliances and leagues should not be perpetual; and for this cause states and commonweals do oftentimes limit their treaties to a certain time. And as for bonds and treaties of peace, they are accustomed for their better assurance to have them confirmed by the estates, or published in sovereign courts, and oftentimes they bind in particular the greatest noblemen: although there be far greater assurance in matter of obligation and promises made by a prince than by a multitude: and the rather for that the laws of honour are in much more recommendation to a sovereign prince, than to a multitude of artisans or merchants, who are kings in a 
The laws of honour are in greater recommendation to a Monarch than to a multitude.  name collective, and nothing in particular. And as for the troubles which the government of a young king do cause, that happens rarely, and is more incident at the election of magistrates: For at the choosing of a Gonfalonier of Genes for two years only, the Commonweal is ever in combustion. There is no reason to balance the cruelties and extortions of a tyrant, with the actions of good princes: we know well that a peaceable optimacy and wisely governed, if it may be, is better than a cruel tyranny. But the question is, whether it be better to have a just and upright king, or many good lords: and whether a tyranny of fifty tyrants be not more dangerous, than of one tyrant alone: And if there be not much more danger in Popular and Aristocratical estates, than in a Monarchy. Yea it is most certain that a tyrannical Monarchy is sometimes more to be desired than a Democraty or optimacy, how good soever: 
Many governors hinder on●… another.  For if many wise and skilful pilots hinder one another in striving to govern the helm; even so will many lords do, every one seeking to govern the Commonweal, be they never so wise and virtuous. Although it be not needful to insist much upon this proof, that a Monarchy is the most sure, seeing that a family which is the true image of a Commonweal can have but one head, and that all the laws of nature 
A Monarchy is natural.  guide us unto a Monarchy, whether that we behold this little world which hath but one body, and but one head for all the members, whereon depends the will, moving and feeling: or if we look to this great world which hath but one sovereign God: or if we erect our eyes to heaven, we shall see but one sun: and even in sociable creatures, we see they cannot admit many kings, nor many lords, how good soever. Solyman emperor of the Turks used this example, hearing the great cries and acclamations 
Anno. 1552.  of joy which the whole army made unto Sultan Mustapha his son returning out of Persia, he put him to death through jealousy, causing him to be strangled in his withdrawing chamber, and his dead body to be cast out before the whole army: then he made a proclamation, that there was but one God in heaven, and one Sultan upon earth: Two days after he put Sultan Gobe to death, for that he had wept for his brother; and Sultan Mehemet the third brother, for that he fled for fear; leaving but one son living, to avoid the danger of many lords. We also see that all nations of the earth from all antiquity, even when they were guided by a natural instinct, had no other form of government than a Monarchy, that is to say, the Assyrians, Medes, Persians', Egyptians, Indian's, Parthians, Macedonians, Celtes, Gauls, Scythians, Arabians, 
Examples of the greatest Monarchies of the world.  Turks, Moscovites, Tartars, Polonians, Danes, Spaniards, English, Africans, and Perusians, where there is no mention of any optimacy, or Popular estate. Yea all the ancient people of Greece and Italy, before they were corrupted with ambition, had none but kings and monarchs, as the Athenians, Lacedæmonians, Corinthians, Acheans, Sicyonians, Candiots, Sicilians, Ethiopians, Latins, and Hetrusques, the which have flourished in arms & laws, four, five, six, & seven hundred years; yea some have continued eight or nine hundred years, others twelve or thirteen hundred years. And yet some wonder that the Popular estate of the Romans▪ or the Seigneuries of Lacedaemon, and Venice, had continued four hundred years, or thereabouts, after they had expelled their kings doubtless they have reason to marvel, to see two or three Commonweals among a hundred, able to continued any time, being instituted against the order of nature: but no man is amazed to see many great & mighty Monarchies continued a thousand, or twelve hundred years, for that it is according to the right laws of nature. And although the name of a king were hateful unto the Romans, yet many of the●… in particular affect to be sovereigns: for not many months before Augustus his birth, it was found out by oracles, that nature should soon bring forth a great Monarch 
Sueton. in August  of the Romans. For this cause the Senate decreed, That all infants should be slain that were to be borne that year: but every one in particular did hinder the carrying of this decree into Saturn's temple, for that every one (saith the history) did hope his son should be a Monarch. In like sort the princes of Persia being assembled together to consult which form of government were the better, they concluded a Monarchy. The same argument was called in question by Augustus among his friends, being desirous to live at rest, and to leave the state, after that he had p●…t the navy of Mare Anthony to flight: but it was resolved, That a Monarchy was the most safe without all comparison, and the effects did verify it: for in former times the Romans could not live ten years together without civil wars, or some sedition: and Augustus maintained them quietly in peace almost fifty years, the which continued long after his death. Experience is the mistress of all things, and as the touchstone, resolves all doubts. Therefore the Capadocians having lost their king, they were persuaded by the Romans, to take a Popular estate: but they refused it, and demanded a king: so as the Romans gave them power to choose one, and they advanced Ariobarzanes; finding the calamities of Popular states▪ To conclude, if we seek authority, we shall found that the greatest scholars that ever were, have held a Monarchy to be the best: as Homer, Herodotus, Plato, Aristotle, Xenophon, Plutarch, Philon, Apolonius, Saint jerosme, Cyprian, Maximus Tirius, and many others. And even in the law of God, it is said, When as the people shall choose a king, like unto other nations, he shall not take a stranger: Whereby he not only showeth, that God approveth a Monarchy, teaching a king how he should govern, but also that other nations in those days had nothing but Monarchies, as Samuel saith. He also made Moses' king over his people, for so he is called 
Sam. 1. 12. Deut. 33.  in the law of God. And although that God governed his people ●…or a time without a king, sending them always by an especial favour certain captains, as princes & judges to free them from the subjection of their neighbours, whom the holy Scripture calls Messies, and saviours: yet was there never any optimacy, or Popular estate among them, 
Nehem. 10.  but contrariwise they were a long time without either prince or magistrate, being guided 
Sam. 2. c. 12.  only by the grace of God, who for this cause is called their king. And after their return out of Babylon, they were still subject to the kings of Persia, or of Egypt, or of 
A Monarchy allowed by the law of God.  Syria: until that judas Machabeus of the family of the Azmoneans, descended from Aaron (having rebelled against Antiochus the Noble, king of Syria) brought the office of high priest, and the sovereignty unto his house, who were afterwards subdued by the Romans. For as for their Senate, which consisted of seventy one, the king making the seventy two, and the most part of the line of David; they busied not themselves in any thing else, but in judging of causes of great consequence, as of the high priest, or of some tribe, or of crimes of high treason, or of false prophets: & for this cause they were only called judges, whom by the corrupt Greek word they called Sanedrim. The chaldean interpreter saith, That although they had power to make laws, even under kings, yet was it no sovereign authority. True it is, that Rabin Magmon calling them Doctors or Informers, saith, That they had also power to created twenty three criminal judges, whom they called judges of souls; and seven judges for civil causes, whom they termed judges of goods in every city; and ten judges for govenment, among the which there was one priest, or as joseph saith, two Levites assistant to every magistrate: and three other Arbitrators, whereof either of the parties did choose one, and the two that were chosen did name a third. The which I have particularly set down, to confute their opinion, which maintain with joseph the Historian, That the Hebrews 
Lib. ●…. c. 6. antiq.  have used a kind of Aristocratical government, taking the Senate of seventy one for sovereign lords: all whom Herod, the eldest son of captain Antipater put to death, for that they had condemned him, and had executed him, but for the favour of Hircanus' king and high priest, who gave him his pardon, or at the least stayed the decree of the Senate; and afterwards he murdered his saviour. Which showeth plainly, that the Senate had no sovereign power, and that it was no optimacy: although that josephus 
joseph. de antiq. lib. ●…4. c. 5.  brings in the jews complaynig, Quod Hircanus & Aristobulus formam Reipub▪ in regnum mutarent, That Hircanus, and Aristobulus, had changed the form of the Commonweal into a Monarchy. In my opinion these reasons, with many others (which are not needful to be here particularly expressed) are sufficient to show, that of the three kinds of lawful governments, a perfect Monarchy is the most excelleu●…: and among the disordered, the Democraty the most vicious. A lawful Monarchy (as a strong and able body) may easily be maintained: but Popular states, and Aristocraties, as feeble and weak, and subject to many infirmities, must be preserved by diet and good government. And for that it is not always in the power of wise and politic statesmen, to choose the best kind of government, nor to altar and change the worst, they must in this case do like unto skilful ship masters, which yield unto the tempest; they strike their sails, and cast forth even their most precious merchandise, to attain unto a safe port. Even so a wise man that seeks to change a state from bad to good, or from good to better; he must first insinuat with the greatest, and by obsequious observation draw them to his will. But if he be not assured to effect it, let him not attempt it: as Dion did, who ruined the Tyranny of Siracusa, suddenly to erect an optimacy, by the council and advice of Plato: and not able to effect it, he was slain: so as it become an estate of a turbulent multitude, much more miserable without all comparison than any tyranny. As also the Pithagorians did, who laboured suddenly to change all the Popular estates of Italy, into mere Optimacies, having not force sufficient to effect it, but they were all slain, or banished. But if this Popular infirmity cannot be cured by any physic, it must be borne withal, being better to have a bad Commonweal than none at all; and attend the time until the tyranny of one, of few, or of many, be mounted to the highest precipice or downfall, from whence at the first storm they may be cast down, or fall of themselves. Else if the tyrant be but shaken, and not quite overthrown, he will commit horrible murders of the best citizens, to fortify and 
A tyrant is insupportable that hath escaped any ●…nspiracie.  settle his tyranny. For a tyrant that hath once escaped the hands of such as had conspired against him, he becomes mad and furious, like unto a wild beast that sees his own blood. We have too many examples, and without any further search, we have seen Cosmo de Medicis (whom the banished men of Florence called Tyrant, although he were esteemed of many others to be a good and a wise prince) build forts, & increased his Monarchy with the ruins of such as had conspired against his life and state, and yet never any one conspiracy took effect. Besides, a Tyranny is much more insupportable, if the tyrant hath no large limits and great territories: for being poor and hungry, he oppresseth and devours his subjects continually; & if he be cruel, he soon attains to his desire: whereas a rich and mighty Monarch hath wherewithal to glut his appetite, 
The subjects are happy under a great Monarch.  and if he be cruel he will stand in fear that some one in so great a multitude will take revenge. Even then as the subjects are happy under a great and mighty Monarch, if he have any spark of justice before his eyes: so a small estate is best befitting an Aristocratical government, who will maintain their subjects more happily than a poor tyrant should do. We see eighteen Cantons of the Swissers, besides the Grisons, whose governments are Popular, and Aristocratical, having in length from Geneva unto Constance but two hundred and fifty thousand paces, and a hundred and threescore in breadth from the Alps unto mount jura, most of which country is full of rocks, and very barren; yet have they maintained their subjects a long time in great happiness: but if they should envy and desire their neighbours estate, they should soon lose their own. And contrariwise the greater the Monarch is, the more goodly and flourishing it is, and the subject more happy, living in an assured peace. But if it chance to be divided into Democraties, or Optimacies, or into many tyrannies, the people are either tyrannized, or in sedition among themselves, or in continual war against their neighbours. Seeing then a Monarchy is the most sure of all Commonweals, and amongst all Monarchies a Royal is the goodliest: let us say, whether it be better to have it by a successive right, or by election.   

CHAP. V That a well ordered Commonweal dependeth not either of lot, either of choice, and much less of women; but by descent to be derived from a most honounourable stock: and that it aught to be given but to one alone, without partition.  
IT is not enough to say, that a Royal and lawful Monarchy is 
What Royal ●…onarchie is best.  better than either a Democraty, or an aristocraty, except a man say also, such a Monarchy as is by successive right divolued unto the next heir male of the name, and that without partition. For albeit that the lawful Monarchy be always to be preferred before other Commonweals, yet nevertheless so it is, that amongst Monarchies that which cometh by a successive right unto the heirs males, of name, nearest in blood, and without partition, is much more commendable and sure, than are the other which come by lot, or by choice, or will, to the heirs male, but not to the nearest; or unto the nearest, but yet by the mother's side; or that is the nearest by the father's side, but yet is to make partition of the whole Monarchy with other the coheirs; or else of some part thereof. All which it is needful for us by necessary reasons, and examples, to declare; to take away the opinion that many imprint into another prince's subjects, and by that means entertain rebellions, so to change well ordered Monarchies, and to move as it were both heaven and earth. All which they do under the vail of virtue, of piety, and of justice. Yea some there are to be found, which have been so bold, as to publish books, and to maintain against their natural prince, come unto the crown by lawful succession, That the right of choice is better in a Monarchy: as was done in England the seventh of September, in the year 1566, the queen then present at the disputation of the scholars of Oxford; the question 
This question was indeed then in Oxford disputed, & the right of succession notably defended, and before election preferred.  being, That it were better to have kings chosen by election, than by succession. Which new doctrine not a little troubled, not the queen only, but even the nobility also of that kingdom, than there present. For why, from such beginnings we see the subjects to proceed unto mutinies, unto rebellions, and at length even unto open wars. And who is he that would not be moved to hear the invective speech of an eloquent man, detesting the cruelties, the exactions, and rapines of a tyrant? who neither hath the honour of God, neither the truth, neither justice, in regard: who driveth away the good men, and joineth himself unto the evil: and in the end joineth thereunto this exclamation, OH how happy is that Monarchy, wherein the estates of the people make 
To possess the people with ●…n opinion, that have the●… king by election, is better than to have him by succession, a thing most dangerous unto sovereign princes.  choice of a just and upright king, who above all things feareth God, and honoureth virtue: who regardeth the good, and chastiseth the evil: who unto the honest appointeth due rewards, and unto the wicked condign punishments: who abhorreth flatterers, who keepeth his faith and promise; who banisheth the blood suckers and devisors of new exactions out of the court, who spareth his subjects blood as his own, who revengeth the wrong done to others, and pardoneth the injury done unto himself; and who in brief more esteemeth of religion and virtue, than of all other things in the world. And so having set these praises, with the counterpoise of a tyranny replete with all vices, the vulgar sort forthwith conceiveth an opinion, that there is nothing more happy, than the Monarchy which falleth into election: yea and not they of the simpler sort only, and such as have small understanding in the knowledge of matters of policy, but even they also which are accounted of all others the most sufficient, are oftentimes deceived, and much mistaken, in regarding nothing but the apparent good on the one side, without respect unto the innumerable absurdities and inconveniences which are to be found on the other. For even Aristotle himself is of opinion▪ That Monarches should be created by election, calling the people barbarous, which have their kings by right of succession. And for which cause he deemed the Carthaginensians more happy than the Lacedæmonians, for that these had their kings by succession from the fathers to the son in the stock and line of Hercules, whereas the others 
Most people to have had their kings by successi on, rather than by election, contrary unto the opinion of Aristotle.  still had them by election and choice. But so he might call the Assyrians barbarous, the Medes, the Persians', the Egyptians, the people of Asia, the Parthians, the Armenians, the Indian's, the Africans, the Turks, the Tartars, the Arabians, the Moscovites, the Celtes, the Englishmen, the Scots, the Frenchmen, the Spaniards, the Perusines, the Numidians, the Ethiopians; and an infinite number of other people, who still have, and always before had, their kings by right of succession. Yea and we found in Greece (the country of Aristotle himself) that the Athenians, the Lacedæmonians, Sicyonians, the Corinthians, the Thebans, the Epirots, the Macedonians, had more than by the space of six hundred years, had their kings by right of lawful succession, before that ambition had blinded them to change their Monarchies into Democraties and Aristocraties. Which had likewise taken place in Italy also, whereas the Hetruscians and Latins for many worlds of years had their kings still descending from the fathers to the sons. Now if so many people and nations were all barbarous, where then should humanity and civility have place? It should be only in Polonia, in Denmark, and in Sweden: for that almost these people alone have their kings by election: and yet of them almost none, but such as were themselves also royally descended. Cicero saith, humanity and courtesy to have taken beginning in the lesser Asia, and from thence to have been divided unto all the other parts of the world: and yet for all that the people of Asia had no other kings, but by succession from the father to the son, or some other the nearest of kin. And of all the ancient kings of Greece, we found none but Timondas, who was chosen king of Corinth, and Pittacus of Nigropont. And at such time as the royal name and line sailed, oftentimes the strongest or the mightiest carried it away▪ as it chanced after the death of Alexander the Great, who was in right line descended from Hercules, and the kings of Macedon, who had continued above five hundred years: whose lieutenants afterwards made themselves kings, Antipater of Macedon, Antigonus of Asia the less, Nicanor of the upper Asia, Lysimachus of Thracia: so that there is not one to be found among them, which was made king by election. So that even Greece itself (the nurse of learning & knowledge) should by this reason, in the judgement of Aristoile, be deemed barbarous. Howbeit that the word Barbarous, was in ancient time no word of disgrace, but attributed unto them which spoke a strange language and not the natural language of the country. For so the Hebrews called also the ancient Egyptians, then of all nations the most courteous and learned, Barbarous, that is to say, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, for that they used the Egyptian tongue, and not the Hebrew. 
Psal. 113.   
But in all Monarchies which go by election, there is one danger thereunto always 
Great dangers incident unto an estate or kingdom, where the king or other ●…overaigne prince, is to be chosen by election.  incident, which is, that after the death of the king, the estate remaineth a mere Anarchy, without king, without lord, without government, still in danger of ruin; as a ship without a master, which oweth the wrack of itself unto the first storm or wind that ariseth: thieves and murderers in the mean time at their pleasures committing their murders, and such other their most heinous outrages, with hope of impunity; as the common manner is after the death of the pope's, of the kings of Tunes, and in former times after the death of the Sultan's of Egypt. For there have been such as have committed 
The great disorders in Rome, in the vacancy of the papacy, and before the new pope be chosen.  fifty sundry murders, and yet have always had the pope's pardon therefore: the pope's at their first entrance into the papacy, still pardoning all men their offences whatsoever: and so murders and revenges commonly referred unto the pope's death, remain then unpunished. So that in the year 1522, there were two executed at Rome, whereof the one termed himself Pater noster, and the other ave Maria, who at divers times had stabbed and murdered an hundred and sixteen men, as was then proved. And the first thing that they commonly do, the Papal seat being vacant, is to break open the prisons, to kill the gailors, to enlarge the offenders, to revenge injuries by all means: which continueth until that the college of cardinals have agreed of a successor, wherein sometime they have been at such discord and variance among themselves, as that the seat hath been vacant two years and four months together: as it chanced after the death of Clement the 5: yea & sometime 10 years, as after the election of the duke of Savoy surnamed Foelix. We read also oftentimes two or three pope's, and as many emperors, to have been chosen at once; and the empire to have stood vacant a year or two together, yea whole eighteen years, after that William county of Holland the emperor, was slain. And albeit that the prince's electors made offer of the empire unto the king of Spain, Alphonsus the tenth, yet so it was that he would not accept thereof, for the manifest danger that he was to put himself into by taking upon him such an estate, exposed unto the will and pleasure of the subjects, unto the envy of princes, and the violence of murderers: all which time of vacancy the wicked nevertheless are out of frame in all kind of lose liberty. Which in some sort to remedy, the Polonians (who have their kings by election) double the penalties for the offences committed during the choice of the king, as I have learned of Zamoschy now Chancellor of Polonia, but as then ambassador in France. So we read also that during the elections of the Sultan's of Egypt (before it was by the Turks subdued, and by them unto their empire united) the poor subjects, and the best towns and cities in the whole kingdom, were sacked and rifled by the Mammalukes: until that some one of them by the consent of all the rest was chosen Sultan.  
Now if some (to remedy the matter) shall say, That in the mean time there might 
Not less dangerous in the vacancy of a kingdom, to make choice of a sovereign governor than of a king himself.  a governor be established: he is therein deceived, it being a no less hard matter, to make choice of a lieutenant or governor, than of a king. But admit he might so be made without any contradiction, by the consent of all the estates to whom it belongeth, to name their governor, yet who should be the surety and warrant for his faith? Who should let him (having the power in his hand) to invade the estate? who should disarm him being not willing thereunto? We see how Gostaws father of john king of Sweden behaved himself, who of a governor made himself a king, without expecting of any other election at all, and so jest the regal power by strong garrisons confirmed unto his posterity. And to leave the government unto the Senate, as they do in Polonia, and did of ancient time in Rome, is no less dangerous, lest in the mean time some of the stronger and bolder sort should possess themselves of the fortresses and stronger places: as did Pompey Columna, and Anthony Savelle, who ceized upon the Capitol at Rome, proclaiming unto the people liberty. And in the time of such vacancy civil wars and dissensions are impossible to be avoided, not only amongst the most warlike nations, but even amongst the church men also: so that it was never 
Many pope's slain or poisoned, about their election.  possible to provide so well, but that two and twenty pope's had their heads chopped off, and many more of them by strong factions driven out of their seats: not to speak in the mean time of them (in number almost infinite) who have by poison (the common death of the bishops of Rome) perished. Yea we read that even in the primitive church, viz. in the year of our Lord 356, there were six hundred persons slain in the very city of Rome, about the election of Damasus and Vrsicinus, whether of them should be pope. Neither was that only done at Rome, but almost in every town and city, 
Why the choice of bishops, and ecclesiastical prese●…mentss was taken from the people.  which had in them any bishops, all places were so filled with so many of Laodicia, that from thence forward it should not be lawful for the people, to meddle with the choice of the bishops and prelates, or the bestowing of the ecclesiastical preferments. Wherhfore Athanasius, and Augustine, both bishops, appointed whom they would have to succeed them in their bishoprics, the one at Alexandria, and the other at Hippona. What should I speak of the Roman civil wars, and after them of the Germane, about the choice of their emperors? their books, their histories, and all their monuments, are full thereof. Wherein we cannot without iudignation and horror, remember the miserable wasting countries, the mutual slaughter of citizens, and sacking of most noble cities, mischiefs still done either by the one side or the other.  
And yet there is another inconvenience also, not to be omitted, which is, That kingdoms 
The public demain most come monly dissipated or embeseled by princes elective.  going by election, have nothing in them which at one time or other is not subject unto all men's spoils: so that even the public domains, and such as before were common, and wherein every man had a common interest: we see them in a little time converted even unto particular men's uses: so as we see it to have happened in the demain of Saint Peter at Rome, as also in the demain of the Germane empire. For the princes elect knowing well that they cannot long reign, nor that they cannot leave unto their children any thing of the estate, more than what they think they can by deceit and fraud purloin and hold, care not to give any thing unto the magistrates their friends: or by open sales and donations, to make their own profit of the public revenues and possessions. So Rodolph the emperor for money exempted all the towns and cities of Tuscanie from the fealty and obedience which they aught unto the Germane empire: Robert also the emperor, gave three of the imperial towns unto his son: Henry the first ceased upon Saxony: Frederick the second enfranchised Nuremberg: Otho the third enfranchised Isne: jews of Baviere did the like for the town of Egre: Henry the fist sold all he could: and Charles the fourth being not able to pay the hundred thousand crowns which he had promised to every one of the prince's electors, sold unto them all the tributes of the empire, to have them to choose his son Charles emperor, as he indeed was: but afterwards again thrust out even by the same princes who had before made choice of him. So that the principal and strongest sinews of that Commonweal being cut in sunder, the whole body of the empire become so weak and feeble, that Charles duke of Burgundy doubted not to wake war upon the German princes. 
Nothing more intolerable than a man of base degree suddenly mounted up unto great honour.   
Another point there is also well worth the consideration, which is, That a man of base degree suddenly mounted unto the highest degree of honour, thinketh himself to be a god upon earth. For as the wise Hebrew saith, There is nothing more intolerable than the slave become a lord. And on the other side such is the fervent love of the father toward his sons, that he will rather confounded heaven and earth together (if he have power so to do) than not to leave unto them the crown, but to let it rest in the voices and choice of the ignorant people,  
But let us yet go further, for why these are not the greatest inconveniences. For 
Another great inconvenience about the election of sovereign princes.  where the people is to choose their king, they must either make choice of a stranger, or of a natural subject: Now if choice be to be made out of the natural subjects, than every the most impudent and audacious fellow will by all right and wrong seek to aspire unto the sovereignty: and if there be many of them of equal power and 
No accord where every man would be a lord.  grace, it is impossible but that there should be great factions, wherein the people should become partakers: or in case they were not equal, neither in virtue nor wealth, yet so it is that they would presume themselves to be equal, and never agreed one of them to obey another, but wishing rather to endure the command even of strange and wicked princes, than of another subject their equal. As it happened in Armenia (as Tacitus reporteth) where the nobility could endure none to be their king but a mere stranger. And of late in Polonia Sigismundus Augustus the king being dead, and a controversy arising amongst the nobility, every one of them longing after the kingdom; a decree was made whereby all the natural subjects were embarred from obtaining of the kingdom: as I learned of the Polonian ambassador, whom I was commanded to attend after they were entered into the confines of this kingdom, to conduct them unto Henry the king.  
And in the remembrance of our fathers when as the Egyptian Sultan's were chosen by the voices of the praetorian soldiers or Mammalukes, & they not able to endure one of them to be greater than another, had slain diverse of their Sultan's: they at last to stint the strife, by their common consent sent their ambassadors unto Campson king of Caramania to become their Sultan, and to take upon him the kingdom of Egypt being by them offered him. With the same calamities the German princes also troubled, after diverse murders of the emperors of their own country, oftentimes made choice of strangers, yea and those right small princes: as of one William earl of Holland, and of Henry earl of Lutzembourg, one while also making choice of the king of England, and another while of the king of Spain: yea, sometime such foreign princes refusing that same empire so offered them: For so Alphonsus the tenth king of Spain refused the imperial crown by the prince's electors offered him, which afterwards stood empty above eighteen years, as we have before said. Sigismond also 
The imperial crown of divers▪ strange princes refused.  the first king of Polonia, refused the kingdom of Hungary, of Bohemia and Denmark, being thereunto invited by the Estates. So also jews the twelfth refused the signory of Pisa: and the ancient Romans (as saith Appian) refused diverse people which would have submitted themselves under their obeisance. But admit that the strange prince do not refuse a kingdom so offered him: which if it be far off from the bounds of his own kingdom, he must then either leave his own, or govern the strange kingdom by his deputies or lieutenants: both things absurd and inconvenient. 
A strange kingdom hard to be governed by lieutenants or deputies.  For who is he so foolish that had not rather to look to his own things than to other men's? and what nation or people can with patience endure to be governed by deputies? so to have him whom they would not, and to want him whom they made choice of. So jews king of Hungary at the request of his wife daughter to Casimire king of Polonia, took upon him the kingdom of Polonia conferted unto him by the voices of the people: into which kingdom he was invested, and received with the greatest acclamations, and applauses of all men that might be: who yet shortly after, whether it were for that he found himself offended with the sharpness of the Polonian air: or that he was alured with the pleasures and delights of Hungary, or that he was by the vows and requests of his own people recalled: returned home, leaving his wife unto the Polonians (her countremen) with a train of the Hungarians to attend upon her: where so it was that the Polonians mindful of the Great Casimire her father, for a space endured the woman's sovereignty, but could in no wise endure her train of Hungarians. And so also not long ago Henry, Charles' the French kings brother called unto the kingdom of Polonia, his brother being dead, withal speed returned unto his own natural kingdom: howbeit the Polonians would by no means endure the government of his deputies or lieutenants, but by voice chose unto themselves a king: although that they could by no right or reason do so, but by the consent of Henry, unto whom they had given all the sovereign rights, whereunto they had not annexed any clause or condition (when as question was of the kingdom of France to fall unto him) that he should not in his absence by his deputies or lieutenants govern that kingdom bestowed upon him: as hath been always lawful for all princes to do. For it is an old axiom, a donation once consummate and perfected not to admit any more conditions. But admit both the kingdoms confine together, as doth Polonia and Hungary; what doubt is there but that he will, if he can, make one kingdom of two? or change an Aristocratique estate into a right Monarchy: yea, and that by force of arms, if the nobility or people shall withstand him, whereof we have an example of the Emperor Charles the fifth, who after the overthrow of the German princes had changed the Aristocracy of the Germans into a kingdom, and had caused his son Philip to be sent for out of Spain into Germany, to have made him king of the Germans, had not Henry the second the French 
Charles the fift about to have made his son Philip king of Germany.  king most mightily withstood him, and so broken his designs. The occasion of julius Pflugius the Bishop is yet extant wherein he laboureth to persuade that one thing especially, viz. that the most sure foundations of the German empire might be laid. And in case that the prince cannot join the kingdom which he hath got by election confining upon him, unto his own natural kingdom: yet will he so much as in him lieth draw all the profits, first-fruits, and revenues of the strange kingdom unto his own: and having taken away the voices from the nobility whom he hath in his power, shall appoint or 'cause them to choose whomsoever pleaseth him to succeed him: as the kings of Denmark, of Thunes, yea and the German emperors also themselves by a custom of long received from their ancestors have used to do: in such sort as that the rights of elections by voices, seem to be utterly taken away. So Ladislaus king of Bohemia, the son of Albertus, and the emperor Frederick the third his nephew, 
kingdoms electiug oftentimes changed into hereditary.  by the voice of the people chosen king of Hungary by a certain bond of fealty, left that kingdom unto his nearest kinsmen all most hereditary. And albeit that Mathias corvinus the son of the noble Huniades (Ladislaus being dead without issue) by the voices of the people obtained that kingdom (they always pretending that the right of the choice of the king belonged to them; and that the succession of the next of kin was not to take place) yet for all that Frederick his nearest kinsman was about both with his own power, and the strength of the whole empire to have invaded that kingdom, and had undoubtedly so done, had not Mathias by his promise put him in hope of the kingdom for himself and his posterity: if he should himself die without issue, as by chance he did. Howbeit, yet nevertheless that Mathias being dead, the Hungarians made choice of another Ladislaus king of Bohemia and Polonia also: without regard of the convention and agreement before made with Frederick, which was the cause of a most great and cruel war for the kingdom of Hungary: which could by no means be appeased: until that by all the degrees of the people of that kingdom it was decreed that it should from thenceforth be hereditary: and that after the death of Dadislaus Maximilian the son of Frederick should succeed in that kingdom, as indeed he did: But his nephew being left under age, and the estates of the kingdom pretending them to have the right to make their choice of his governors; against Frederick who sought to step into the government of Hungary, and to take upon him the guard and protection of the young king his nephew: the people of Hungary, yea, and the sister of Ferdinand (the young king's mother) choose rather to cast themselves into Solyman the great Turk's lap, and so to betray both king and kingdom, rather 
The Hungarians for the maintenance of their elective right now fallen into the perpetual sernitude and sla●…●…f the Turk.  than to endure the government of the emperor Ferdinand in such sort, that they for the maintenance of the right of their election, are now fallen into the perpetual servitude of the Turk: having not only lost the right of their election, which they so strive for; but in hazard also to lose their laws, liberty, and religion: as the common custom of all strange princes is (as much as in them lieth) to change the laws, customs, and religion of the people by them subdued, or oppressed, and to enure them, or otherwise to enforce them to embrace and follow their fashions, manners, and religions: and was as should seem the principal cause why God forbidden his people to make choice of a strange prince to reign over them.  
And yet in matter of election the way being open to many competitors, if the 
Princes by election created still to be in great danger.  matter be to be tried by force, always the most wicked and deceitful: or else the most hardy and adventurous, put all upon hazard to attain thereunto: And if it hap the most virtuous to be chosen, his life is still in danger of the competitors being of greater power: as in Germany it hath been seen: where within this 360 years, since that Monarchy fell into election, there have been eight or nine emperors slain or poisoned, 
diverse electiu●… emperors and prince's murth●…red, or else shamefully deposed.  and among others, William of Holland, Rodolph, Albert, Henry the seventh, Frederick the second, Lewis of Bavaria, Charles the nephew of Henry, and Gunther: besides all them who were most shamefully thrust out of the imperial seat. And of 15 Sultan's which were chosen kings of Egypt, there were seven of them slain: namely, Turqueman, Melaschall, Cothus, Bandocader, Mehemet, Cercasse, and Geapalt. And of the Roman emperors after the death of Augustus, there were seven one after another massacred, poisoned, or strangled: and that three of them in one year, oppressed only by the conspiracy of citizens. Yea, the praetorian soldiers sometimes slew the emperors to have a new, only upon hope of gifts and largesses. But still he of whom the Senators made choice, displeased the legions and men of war: yea oftentimes every army created an emperor, in such sort as that at one time there were thirty Roman emperors chosen in diverse places, and among them one woman, viz. Zenobia: all the empire being in civil wars and combustion who should carry away the state, no end thereof being to be found until that the rest were by the power of one all oppressed. Neither was there any assurance in the estate, if the sons either lawful or adoptive succeeded not their fathers without election, so as did Tiberius, Titus, Traian, 
No assurance in the estate where the succ●…ssion is not established.  Adrian, Antoninus Pius, Marcus Aurelius, and Commodus. But if any of the emperors gave not order for the adopting of his successor, in case he had himself no children, the commonweal always fell again into civil wars. And for this cause the 
The great care the good Roman emperors had for the certainti●… of the succession, jest after their death the empire should fall into the dangers ensuing upon election.  emperor Adrian fearing jest the estate should fall into election, he himself having no children, thought it not enough to adopt Antoninus Pius, but also caused him to adopt Marcus Aurelius, and Aelius Vetus: following therein the wisdom of Augustus, who to prevent the wars oftentimes arising about election, adopted his two little nephews Caius and Lucius: who both dying without issue, he adopted also his third nephew Agrippa, and with him Tiberius his son in law: yet with condition that he should first adopt Germanicus. And they which were so adopted and appointed heirs of the empire, were called principes iwentutis, or princes of the youth: and afterward of the Germans; reges Romanorum, or kings of the Romans: to the end that even in estates and Monarchies going by election, there might yet be some certain successor. For so Henry the third the emperor whilst he yet lived caused his son to be chosen king of the Romans, and his grand child to be also by him adopted. And Charles the fourth after that caused his son Wenceslaus by the electors to be designed to the empire, but not without a great sum of money: unto whom succeeded his brother Sigismond, who afterward adopted his son in law Frederick the third; who again caused Maximilian his son to be adopted emperor. Neither was it to be doubted but that Philip, Maximilian his son, should have reigned over the Germans, had not his untimely death prevented his father's hope. And all be it that the estates and princes of the empire, the imperial sea●…e being as then vacant, had many great princes competitors in the same; yet so it was that they deemed the grand child of Maximilian (Charles, than a very young man, and nearest unto Maximilian in blood) by a certain successive right worthy to be preferred before the rest of the princes. And albeit that 
Great regard had of succession, even in kingdoms going by election.  the Bohemians, the Polonians, the Hungarians, Danes, and Tartars, will by no means suffer the election of their kings to be taken from them; yet they think that their king's sons aught still in their choice to be preferred before all others, that so by the benefit of succession all the occasions of civil wars might be prevented and taken away. For which cause Sigismundus Augustus' king of Polonia and last of the house of jagellon, having but two sisters, assembled the estates of the kingdom to consult concerning his successor; having before united the dukedom of Lituania unto the kingdom of Polonia: whereunto for all that the estates would not consent, fearing to lose their right of election; or that he should have given them a king contrary to their good liking. And at the same time as it were, the parliament of England was holden at London in October 1566, where the estates preferred a request unto the Queen for the providing of a successor unto the crown, to avoid (as they said) the evident dangers whereinto the kingdom was like to fall, if it were not foreseen and provided for; and that they were resolved not to speak of any subsidy, or other thing whatsoever, until that matter were determined. With which request howbeit that the Queen was much troubled; saying, That they would make her grave before she were dead: yet so it was that she promised them therein to follow the counsel and advise of such as were the wisest in her land. For a kingdom going by succession still falleth into election when there is none left near of kin, neither of the father's side nor of the mothers; 
kingdoms going by succession how they sometimes fall into election.  in which case it is necessary to provide before that the matter so fall out, whereas otherwise the estate is in great hazard to be quite overthrown: as it happened unto the estate of Milan in the year 1448, after the death of Philip Maria the last of the ●…eiress male of the house of Anglerie, which in successive right had holden Milan sour hundred years: when as the people seeing themselves in full liberty without any lord or sovereign, resolved to maintain a Popular estate: razed the castle jove, 
The duchy of Milan dismembered the line of the visecounties of the house of Anglerie failing.  burned the last duke's testament, chose twelve Senators; and after that having made choice of Charles Gonzaga for their general, most cruelly butchered all them which took part with Frances Sforce, who being a man but basely borne aspired to the sovereignty, as having married the base daughter of Philip the last duke, as also by the adoption which the duke had made of him. At which self same time the emperor Frederick the third claimed that duchy, as a fee devolved to the empire for default of heirs males. And Charles of Orleans on the other side claimed it as belonging unto him in the right of his mother Valentine, both the natural and lawful sister of the last duke. During which quarrels the Venetians (as their usual manner is) to fish in troubled water, without any right at all, possessed themselves of Cremona, laud, & Placence, all members of the duchy of Milan. The duke of Savoye took also Novarre and Versel: Sforce, Pavia, and Derthone: and the people of Milan unable now to manage their estate at home, or to defend their territory abroad; and yet abhorring the government of one, and not well knowing unto what Saint to commend themselves, voluntarily submitted themselves with their city unto the Venetians, by whom for all that they were rejected. So that in fine all the Christian princes and states their neighbours, were up in arms and together by the ears for the estate; and for all that the last duke provided not for his successor as he aught to have done, in following that which was resolved and agreed upon at the treaty of the marriage made betwixt jews duke of Orleans and Valentine his sister: neither in taking unto him Charles of Orleans his nephew, and right heir of his dukedom so to have adopted him, and brought him up near unto his person, but adopted Sforce who had married his base daughter, being but the first gentleman of his house.  
But the royal stock being extinct, the last thereof may by right adopt unto himself 
Whether the last of the royal stock may by right adopt unto himself his successor.  his successor, except the nobility or people claim the right of the choice of their prince to belong unto themselves. For if the last prince of the blood shall appoint no man to succeed him, the sovereignty is to fall unto the people. It being a common matter for Monarchies never to fall into election, but when the Monarch dying without heirs hath not provided a successor. For so the line of Charles the great being utterly extinct, when as the last king of the Germans had adopted none to succeed him, Henry the Falconer duke of Saxony was by general consent of all men created emperor: wherein for all that the German writers are at variance among themselves: one of them thinking Arnulphus; and another Charles the son of jews king 
About what time the seven princes electors were first appointed for the choice of the emperor. The error of them which have thought the kingdom of France to have in ancient time go by election, rejected.  of the Germans to have been chosen emperor, and that not by the voices of the people, but of the fifty princes only: and that elective right to have been at length conferred unto seven of them who were thereof called the prince's electors: and that to have happened about the year 1250. But let us now come unto our own histories. Many there be which have reported the kings of France in ancient time to have been created by choice, and so that kingdom to have fallen into election: but all that untruly. For why that must needs have been done in the reign of the Merovignes, or the Carlingues, or of the Capets.  
Now concerning the first line which is of the Merovignes; Agathius a Greek author of great authority and antiquity (for he flourished about the year 500) writeth the French nation having chosen the best form of a Commonweal that was possible (that is to say the royal Monarchy) to have therein surpassed all their neighbours: neither to have had any other kings but by the right of succession. And the same author in another place saith, Theodebert the son of Theodoric and nephew ●…o Clodoveus, being yet under age and the government of his tutor, to have been called unto the crown according unto the manner and fashion of their ancestors. Cedrinus also another Greek author, and he also very ancient (who writ in the year 1058 in the time of Philip the first the king of France) reporteth the French men to have had no other kings, but by a successive right, after the ancient manner of their ancestors. Wherein he showeth the aforesaid three lines of the kings of France to have used the right of succession. And if so be that first Charles, and after him Carlomaine the children of Pipin caused themselves to be both chosen by the nobility (as indeed they were) yet was not that done but only so by the power and favour of the nobility to assure their estates, & to stop the mouths of such as were yet left of the house of the Merovignes, as in like case some of them did also of the house of Capet, who had thrust out them of the house of Charlemaigne. As for that which is reported of Otho, him by the consent and voices of the nobility to have been created king: he at the time of his death having called together the princes of the kingdom, protested him to have so done, not so much that he himself might reign, as to keep the kingdom and the Commonweal wherewith he was put in trust, in safety unto jews the Stammerer to whom he was appointed tutor. Robert Otho his brother in challenging the kingdom as it were in the right of succession after him, was slain in the battle of Soisson. Rodolph also son unto the duke of Bourgundie caused himself also to be chosen, to exclude Charles the Simple, from whom in the castle of Berone wherein he then was kept prisoner, Harbert county of Vermandois had in favour of this Rodolpe extorted his resignation of the crown. And after that Hugh Capet had wrested the sceptre out of the hands of Charles of Lorraine, he caused his son Robert whilst he himself yet lived, to be crowned; and he likewise his son also, Henry the first; and Henry, his son also: and so until that one of the daughters of Baldwin earl of Holland and regent of France, descended from the eldest daughter of the aforesaid Charles of Lorraine, and so lineally from Charlemaigne, was married unto Philip the first, and was mother unto jews the Gross: whereby the secret grudge & hatred of the people against the Capets were appeased, & the fire of joy and bliss kindled, to see one of the race of Charlemaigne, and so of the blood of Saint Arnulph, joined with the stock of Capets. And if any conjecture there be, wherefore any man should think the kings of France to have been by election created; it may best seem to be drawn from the manner of the coronation of the kings: For before the king that is to crowned take his oath, the two Bishops of Laon and 
The ancient manner of the coronation of the kings of France.  Beawois standing on both sides of the king, and lifting him up a little from his throne, and then turning themselves unto the people there present, demand of them whether they will have that man to reign over them or not: whereunto they giving their consent, the Archbishop of Reims taketh his oath. So that they which writ the kingdom of France to go by election, have had no further regard but only unto the manner and form of the choosing of the king (if it aught at all to be called a choice) the manner whereof isyet to be seen in the Library of Beawois, and which I have also taken out of the Library of Rheimes, and deserveth well to be set down at large, whereby it is to be understood, in what sort our kings have been in ancient time crowned.  
The title of the ancient written book of Rheimes is this, LIBER JULIANI AD ERRIGIUM REGEM: The book of julian unto king Errigius: (meaning Errichius the father of Philip the first) The words of the book are these, Anno 1058 indictione xii Henrico regnant xxxij, & iiij Cal. Junii, in die Pentecostes Philippus rex hoc ordine in maiore ecclesia ante altar sanctae Mariae à venerabili Archiepiscopr consecratus est incoata Missa antequam epistola legeretur, Dominus Archiepiscopus ver●… ad eum, & exposuit ei fidem catholicam, sciscitans ab eo utrum hanc crederet, & defendere vellet: quo annuente delata est eius professio; quam accipiens ipse legit, dum ad huc septennis esset, eique subscripsit: erat autem prosessio eius haec: EGO Philippus, Deo propitiante mox futurus rex Francorum, in die ordinationis meae promitto coram Deo, & sanctis eius, quòd unicuique de vobis commissis canonicum privilegium, & debitam legem, atque justitiam conseruabo, & defensionem adiwante Domino, quantum potero, exhibebo, sicut rex insuo regno unicuique Episcopo & ecclesi●… sibi commissae per rectum exhibere debet: populo quoque nobis credito me dispensationem legum in suo iure consistentem, nostra auctoritate concessurum. Qua perlecta posuit eum in manus Archiepiscopi, ante stante Archiepiscopo Suessionensi, etc. Accipiens Archiepiscopus baculum S. Rhemigij, disseruit quietè & pacifice, quomodo ad eum maximè pertineret electio regis & consecratio, ex quo sanctus Rhemigius Ludovicum baptizavit & consecravit. disseruit etiam quomodo per ìllum baculum hanc consecrandi potestatem & totum Galliae principatum Ormisdas papa sancto dederit Rhemigio: & quomodo victor Papa sibi & ecclesiae suae concesserit. Tunc annuente patre eius Henrico, elegit eum in regem post eum. Legati Romanae sedis, cùm idsine Papae nutu fieri licitum non esse dissertum ibi sit: honoris tamen & amoris gratia tum ibi assuerunt: Legati Lotarius Sol; Archiepiscopi, Episcopi, Abbates, Clerici; Dux Aquitaniae, filius, Legatus Ducis Burgundiae, Legati Marchionis, & Legati Comitis Andegavensis: pòst Comites Vandensis, Vermadensis, Ponticensis, Suessionensis, Aruer nensis, pòst milites & populi tam matores quàm minores uno ore consentientes laudaverunt, ter proclamantes: LAUDMUS, VOLV MUS, FIAT. In the year 1058, the twelft of the indiction, of the reign of king Henry the xxxij, the iiij of the Calendss of june, on Whitsunday, king Philip was in the great church, before the altar of blessed Marie, by the most reverend Archbishop in this order crowned: Mass now already being begun, & before the reading of the Epistle: the Lord Archbishop turning himself unto him, declared unto him the Catholic faith, ask him whether he believed the same, and would also defend it? Whereunto he granting, his profession of the same was brought forth, which he taking read it, (being as then but seven years old) and subscribed to the same, whose profession was this, I Philip, by the grace of God, by and by about to be the king of France, upon the day of my investing do promise before God and his saints, to keep canonical privilege, with due law and justice to every one of you the committees: as also so much as in me lieth by the help of God, to defend you, as a king in this kingdom of right aught to do unto every Bishop, and to the church committed to his charge: as also by our authority to grant unto the people committed unto us, the administration of our laws, standing in their full power. Which profession so read, he 
The archbishops of Rheims pretend to have the choice of the French kings.  put it into the Archbishop's hands, etc. (Here are twenty Bishops and many abbots by name reckoned up, and immediately aster) The Archbishop taking the staff of Saint Rhimigius, calmly and quietly declared, How that unto him especially belonged the choice and consecrating of the new king, ever since that Rhemigius baptised and consecrated king 
* This jews is r●…her to ●…e calle●… C●…o iove●…s, other●…se in ●…ntient ti●… called H●…ndwich.  jews: declaring also, how by that staff of Hormisdas the pope gave unto Saint Rhemigius this power of consecrating the kings, with all the kingdom of France: and how the Pope Victor granted the same also unto him and his church. And so his father Henry consenting thereunto, chose him to be king after him. The Legates of the See of Rome having there reasoned it, not to be a thing lawful without the licence of the Pope, were yet for love and honour's sake there present: as were also other ambassadors, as Lotarius Sol, with other Archbishops, Bishops, abbots, Clarks, the young Duke of Aquitane, the ambassadors of the Duke of Burgundy, the ambassadors of the marquess, the ambassadors of the Earl of Angiers, after them the Earls of Vandosme, Vermandoise, Soisson, and Awerne: after that the soldiers, and people, as well the greater as the lesser, with one consent commended him, crying ●…ut thrice aloud, We praise him, We will have him: Let it be done. These things we have word for word written, the which were never yet put in print. They therefore which think the kings of France to have been in ancient time created by the voices of the people, understand not the bishops of Rheimes to have affirmed, that to have been given unto them by a certain singular privilege from the bishops of Rome: howbeit that it can in no wise agreed with the faith & obedience which the archbishops of Rheims have used to give unto the kings of France. We read also, that Charles (he which for want of wit was surnamed the simple) was crowned by Fulke the archbishop of Rheims, in the right of his nearness of blood, and not in the right of any election by voices. Whereby Otho so chosen, prerended himself to be king: and unto whom complaining of the injury done him by the archbishop in crowning of Charles: Fulke answered, That he had made choice of Charles, according to the manner and custom of his ancestors, who had not used to choose kings, but of the royal stock & race of kings. Whose letters written unto that effect to Otho are yet extant. Whereby it appears, that if ever any man had the right of election, it belonged unto the archbishop of Rheims, or that at leastwise he was in the possession thereof: and yet for all that, that he could not make choice of any other king, but of the princes of the blood. But to show that the right of the crown of France still descended unto the heir male next of blood and name, it appeareth not only by the authority of them whom we have before noted, but yet more also by the cruel and bloody war, that was betwixt Lotaire, jews, and Charles the Bald, grounded upon this, That their father had given the better part, and the regal seat of France, to Charles the Bald his youngest son: howbeit that all the three brethren were kings, governing their divided kingdoms with royal sovereignty. And for that Henry the first, king of France, the younger son of Robert, had been chosen by his father, and his elder brother the duke of Burgundy rejected: he fearing lest the children of his elder brother, should in their father's right lay claim unto the crown, and so put all France into civil wars, as it had before been in the wars betwixt him and his brother; to prevent the same, he caused his son Philip, so soon as he was but seven years old▪ to be crowned king of France. Which yet was done without any form of election at all: except perhaps, that some would absurdly say, The election of the kings to belong unto the archbiships of Rheims, as given them by the pope, mistaking the consecration, for the creation of them. Howbeit that the very consecrating of them, properly belonged not unto the archbishops of Rheims alone: king jews the Gross being consecrated by the archbishop of Sens, in the city of Orleans. Besides that the archbishops of Rheims foolishly pretend them to have that from the pope: wherein the pope's themselves have no right, no more than they have unto the empire, which they have made subject unto their elections; and by thrusting the sickle into another man's harvest (as saith Albericus the lawyer) have against all right made laws concerning the estate of princes, binding the emperor to give unto him the oath of fidelity: challenging unto himself the power to depose him; as all other kings also. Howbeit that the bishops of Rome do themselves by their decrees confess, the French kings to be altogether free from the pope's obedience & servitude: neither to acknowledge any one greater than themselves, next unto God. And that is it for which they say in this realm, That the king never dieth. Which ancient proverb 
How it is to be understood. That the king never d●…eth.  showeth well, that the kingdom never went by election, & the kings thereof hold their sceptres neither of the pope, neither of the archbishop of Rheims, nor of the people, but only of God alone. And I remember a lawyer, a most famous pleader of his time, who to serve the cause he had in hand, said in his pleading, That the people of France had given the power unto the king: alleging therefore the words of the great lawyer Ulpian, where he speaking of the Roman emperor saith, Lege Regia de eius imperio lata, populus ei & in eum omnem suam potestatem Contulit, By a royal law made concerning his power, the people conferred unto him and upon him all his power: whereat the king's people suddenly arise, requesting the court in full audience, That those words might be razed out of the plea; showing that the kings of France had never received their power from the people. Yea the court therefore sharply reproved the said lawyer, causing the words, at the request of the Attorney general, to be razed out of the plea, forbidding him any more to use such speeches: who never after, as every man knoweth, pleaded cause in that court. But yet this is made more plain by the solemnity commonly used at the king's burials, where the king's garments, weapons, sceptre, and arms, are so soon as the king is buried cast away; an herald at arms with a loud voice proclaiming thrice, Rex est mortuus, or, The king is dead. And even he the same man, presently after advancing a banner with the Lilies in it, the proper arms of this nation, crieth likewise, Vivat Rex N. eique vitam diuturnam ac felicem Deus largiatur, God save king N. and grant him long and happy life. The like manners and customs use the English, the Scots, and Spaniards, with whom (as with us) the kingdom is by right of succession given unto the nearest of kin. The like ceremonies are used also amongst the Bohemians, the Danes, and Polonians, but yet not before that another king be by voices created.  
But now those dangers which we have said to follow the election of a prince, belong 
Election no l●…sse dangerous unto the electors, than u●…o the kings and sovereign princes themselves so elected.  not more unto the kings and princes themselves, than unto them that choose them: for if the king be to be chosen by the voices of the whole people, all must needs be full of seditions, factions, and murders. But if the nobility, or some other estate only, shall challenge unto themselves alone the right of choosing of the prince, the rest of the estates will grudge and repined thereat, that which is of right due to all, to be given to some few. 
Election of prince's b●…tter to be made by some few, than by many.  yet could nothing be devised more commodious or expedient for the avoiding of the factions of the seditious, and of civil wars, than to take from the multitude of princes and magistrates, the election of the sovereign prince or king, & to communicate it with some few. For so the Germane princes (who in ancient time were fifty four, and now almost four hundred) have given all the right of their voices, for the choosing of the emperor, unto the seven Prince's Electors. Neither yet in so great fewness of them, do they still well agreed, but sometime being at discord among themselves, have chosen two emperors at once: as namely Albert of Austria, and jews of Bavaria, who for the space of eight years made most cruel wars, which of them should as emperor rule and reign one of them over the other, all that while one of them still spoiling and ruinating the towns, castles, and villages, of the others fauourits and part takers. So in like manner the cardinals (who were but twelve) after the death of pope Clement the 4, for the great dissensions and factions of the mighty, differred the election of the next pope three years▪ and in fine chose the archdeacon of Leedes▪ who was then go to Jerusalem, and was afterwards called Gregory the tenth: & who for that cause bound the college of cardinals unto most straight laws in the choice of the pope, and yet could he not so provide, but that after his death, they at once made choice of three pope's, and oftentimes of two; insomuch that at the last it was needful to shut them up, and to starve them with hunger, if within a certain appointed time, they did not denounce him pope, who had at the most two parts of the voices: which yet is more straightly kept in the choosing of the Grand Master of the Knights of the order of Saint john: for they mure up the twenty four electors, before nominated by the knight, without 
The straight order observed in choosing the Grand Master of the knights of Malta  either meat or drink, who must choose one who is not of that number of the twenty four, and that within a short time limited them. There have been seen also such factions, suits, and murders, to have happened in this realm, about the election even of the inferior bishops, as have oftentimes troubled the state even of the most famous cities, and wherein he that was the most vicious and ignorant most commonly carried away the matter: than which no greater cause seemeth to have been, wherefore the voices for the choosing of bishops have been taken from the colleges of priests and monks, and given to princes: as the Chancellor Prat declared, at such time as question was in parliament, for the verifying of the agreement made betwixt king Francis the first, and Leo the tenth: For which cause also the bishops and abbots in Moscovie, are drawn out by lot.  
And yet nevertheless the only colour that men have to maintain election, is to 
Evil men more commonly preferred than the good, where men are by election promoted.  say, That the more worthy men are so chosen to be emperors, pope's, bishops, and prelates. Wherein I refer them unto the histories of all ages, which will say the contrary: and that there have seldom been more vicious and wicked men, than were the most part of them who were by choice and election preferred; which we need not now by examples to verify: but thus much only I say, that if the right of succession had taken place, Nero, Heliogabalus, Otho, Vitellius, and such others, the monsters of nature, had never come unto the Roman empire: Augustus, Traian, Adrian, both the Antonines, with other the emperors excelling in virtue and wisdom, who by adoption (as by the lawful right of succession) obtained the empire, should have been excluded. But were it so that the better princes were still to be chosen by the suffrages and voices of the nobility, or of the people, or of other the wiser sort: yet so many and so great inconveniences are on every side attending, as that it were better to want good princes (howbeit that we cannot by this means have them) than to have them with so great danger of the subjects created and chosen, especially so long as the right of succession may take place. But the line of the monarches failing, and the right devolved 
A good means, the line of Monarches failing, to prevent the dangers still attending upon election.  unto the estates: in this case it is much surer to proceed by lot, having made choice of the most worthiest persons, or of such as be equal in nobility, or in virtue, or in power, to the end that one of them may be drawn by lot, rather than to enter into terms of election: provided that the name of God be first called upon, in following the form of the ancient Hebrews, who still said, Lord God direct thy lot, to the end that all sorcery and witchcraft may be from hence absent. So the great Prophet Samuel, when question was for the making of a new king, caused all the people to be assembled, and the lot to be drawn for all the twelve Tribes, which falling upon the Tribe of Benjamin, and lot cast also upon the families of that Tribe, in the family of Cis 
Some kings first chosen by lot, & yet their children to have obtained their kingdoms as by a successive right.  the lot fell upon Saul, whom Samuel by the commandment of God had before anointed, to the end that the people should not think that the kingdom was unto him by chance only fallen. But after that the Monarchy is once established, men have commonly had regard unto the prerogative of successive right, without using either of election, or lot. So the seven great princes of Persia, Cambyses being dead without issue, used lot, or rather the neying of an horse for the choosing of their king. Yet we see Darius having once by lot got the kingdom, the sovereignty of the state to have been afterward by successive right derived unto his posterity.  
Now it is not enough that successive right take place in the descending of a kingdom, 
The successive right of the eldest son, common to all people  but that the nearest of kin unto the sovereign monarch succeed him also: my meaning is, among the males, and those of his name, which is (to speak properly) the elder, as the first descended of him. For so the order of nature willeth that the elder should go foremost next after the father, and that the rest should every one of them follow in their degree, and so by consequence, that he should be preferred before the others. And this law a man may say to be natural, and such as hath been always almost to all people common. For so said Perseus, that by the right of nature common unto all nations, and by the custom inviolably observed in the kingdom of Macedon, the elder was still to succeed into that kingdom. And for that reason (as saith Diodorus) Alexander the Great carried away the crown of that kingdom, from the rest of his brethren. As the manner was also in the kingdom of Parthia, where the eldest of the house of Arsaces' their first king, and the nearest of his blood succeeded: following therein (saith justin) the ancient custom of the Parthies'. In like manner amongst the Hebrews, the kingdom of juda was given to joram, for that (as saith the Scripture) he was the eldest. And so Herodotus himself (the most ancient of all the Greek historiographers) saith, That generally in all kingdoms the custom was, that the elder should by right of succession have and enjoy the sceptre and diadem: yea and more than four hundred years before Herodotus (as saith corvinus Messala, in his book dedicated to Augustus the emperor) Ilus as the elder brother, was preferred unto the kingdom of the Latins, before Assaracus the younger brother. We read them also of the West Indieses (although men of all others most devoid of humanity) to have also used this same natural▪ law, for the eldest to succeed before the younger. And that when Francis Pizarra General of the Spaniards, conquering the kingdom of Peru, caused Attabalippa the king to be put to death: all the people thereat rejoiced, to see him die that had caused his elder brother to be slain, so to become king himself, contrary to the custom of the country, and his father's will conformable thereunto: who having two hundred children, yet by his will appointed that Gaca his eldest son should alone succeed him in his kingdom, without dividing of the same. And albeit that the children were twins, yet so it is, that the prerogative of the kingdom is to be kept unto him that is first borne, & so to be left, witnessed by most manifest proof: lest such like quarrel should arise for the prerogative of birthright, as did betwixt james king of Scots, and the duke of Albany, being twins: which kingdom the duke complained to be wrongfully taken from him: king james maintaining the contrary, for that he was the first borne. And so always when men would force and violate this natural successive right, great troubles and civil wars have thereof ensued: as it happened for the kingdom 
Great troubles to have still arisen, where the natural successive right of the eldest hath been violated, and the younger brother preferred.  of Alba, invaded by Aemulius, being of right due unto Numitor the elder brother: & to Aristobulus king of judea, thrust out of the kingdom by the sentence and doom of Pompey the Great, to make an end of the civil wars and seditions: the kingdom being so restored unto his elder brother Hircanus, without respect to that which Aristobulus alleged, his said brother not to have been fit to bear arms, neither yet to govern a kingdom. A reason and colour for which the fathers and fauourits have often time troubled the right of their children, to set the crown due unto the elder, upon the head of the younger. As did Ptolomey the first of that name king of Egypt, who contrary unto the law of nations (as saith justin) preferred the younger brother unto the kingdom before the elder, which was the cause that one of them slew the other. In which error Ptolomee surnamed Physcon offended also, who persuaded by his wife Cleopatra, preferred the younger brother before the elder: but was no sooner dead, but that the people expulsed the younger, and restored the sceptre unto the elder. Anaxandrides also king of Lacedemonia, preferred Dorieus before Cleomenes his elder brother, for that he was the more civil: and yet the history saith, that the people thereof grievously complained, as of a thing done contrary to the law of nations. And albeit that king Pyrrhus said, That his will was, that he of his children should succeed him, which had the sharpest sword; meaning thereby the most valiantest of them: yet the people after his death preferred the eldest, although unfittest for wars. For whatsoever valour, courtesy, beauty, or wisdom there be in the younger more than in the elder; yet should not the father therefore, contrary unto the law of nations, prefer the younger before the elder: howbeit that the exterior form and feature of the body hath deceived many. Foolishly therefore do those parents, which overcome with the flattery of their younger sons, and disinheriting the elder of their kingdoms, have incensed their children most cruelly to murder one another: so as did the father of Atreus, 
Great murders & civil wars to have ensued, for having preferred the younger brother before the elder.  and Thyestes, who willing to prefer the younger before the elder, as the fit for the managing of the affairs of state, so filled and foiled his house with most cruel and horrible tragedies. But more foolelishly do they, which search into the nativities of their children, so to bestow the kingdom upon him whom the stars seem to favour most: as did Alphonsus the 10, king of Castille, who by this means would have preferred the younger brother before the elder: who for the disgrace so offered him, slew his younger brother, and caused his said father for grief to die in prison. In like case almost Gabriel the younger son of the marquess of Salusse, by the consent of his mother cast his elder brother into prison, pretending that he was out of his wits: who yet breaking out of prison, recovered his principality, & having chased out his brother, cooped up his mother in the same prison, wherein he himself had but a little before been shut up. And not to seek further from home, we have seen all this realm on fire with civil wars, for that jews the Devout, at the entreaty of his second wife, had preferred Charles the Bald, before Lothaire his elder brother. Wherhfore pope Pius the second did wisely, in rejecting the request of Charles the seventh the French king, desirous to have preferred Charles his younger son before jews the 11 his elder brother: howbeit that the king had reason so to do, considering that jews had without any just occasion, twice taken up arms against him, so to have taken from him the crown, and to have plucked the sceptre out of his hand.  
Now it is so far from that the first begotten, or eldest son, should for cowardice or want of courage, be imbarred to succeed unto the crown, as that if he be miss shapen and deformed also, yet aught not the prerogative he hath unto the crown by his birthright for that to be taken from him. Howbeit that it much concerneth the Commonweal to have kings that be not deformed. Whereunto Lycurgus and Plato, would great regard to be had, and especially Lycurgus, who willed the deformed children to be slain. But the 
* Deut. 21. The elder brother even by the law of God to be preferred before the younger.  law of God hath decided this doubt, commanding the younger not to be preferred before the elder, for what love or favour soever. Which is not only to take place when question is of the right of the elder, but also when the next heir male of the father's side is to succeed unto the crown, albeit that he be deformed. For one aught not for one inconvenience to break so good a law, or to open a gap so dangerous unto Monarchies: which to be so the estates & people of Hungary showed by a most 
A notable example.  notable example: contrary unto the will & disposition of Ladislaus their king, who having no issue, adopted Alme his brother's youngest son, so to make him king after him, rejecting Coloman his elder brother, whom he in a sort banished, sending him a great way off, to study in Paris: causing him also afterwards to enter into the orders of priesthood, & withal bestowing upon him a bishopric, so to take from him all the hope for him to succeed unto the crown. For he was a man altogether deformed, goggle eyed, evil spoken, lame, & crooked backed; & yet for all that Ladislaus being dead, the estates of that kingdom drove out the younger, refusing to have any other king but the elder brother, whom they called home, and by their ambassadors afterward obtained of the pope, to have him dispensed with, and discharged of his orders, and married also. In like case Agesilaus, a law dwarf, having by the means of Lysander a prince of the same blood excluded Leotichides as Alcibiades his bastard, succeeded into the kingdom, not as the king's son, but as next of the father's side, and of the blood of Hercules: his adversaries in vain complaining the kingdom to haut. And howbeit that Lysander who had preferred Agesilaus to the kingdom afterwards did what he might to have abrogated the ancient royal law, and to have published an edict whereby the nearest of blood should not have succeeded into the kingdom, but that the most sufficient of the blood royal should still be chosen; yet was there none found of his opinion. 
Whether a kingdom aught to descend unto the younger son borne whilst his father was king: or to the elder, borne before his father had obtained the kingdom.   
Some there be which would adjudge kingdoms unto the younger being borne kings sons, their elder brethren being borne before that their fathers were king: as was judged for Xerxes, declared king against Artabazus his elder brother begot by Darius before the kingdom of Persia fell unto him: which judgement was yet grounded upon equity: For that the kingdom was but lately fallen, not by any successive right, but even by lot or rather as it were by chance unto Darius. But where the kingdom is descended by a lawful succession from former ancestors, the eldest or nearest of the father's stock is to succeed, although he be borne before his father was possessed of the kingdom. Whereby is understood what is to be judged of the question, which Bartholus writeth to have happened in his time; as whether Philip earl of Valois his son borne before his father was king of France, should as king succeed him in the kingdom; or else his younger son which he had after that he was king? Howbeit that I read in our histories him to have left behind him none but his only son john. But this same question might well have been disputed in the time of king Charles the second, who before he was king had his son jews: who yet without any question obtained the kingdom, although he had his brother Charles borne whilst his father was king. For now question was of an ancient kingdom devolved unto the next of name: whereas otherwise the young son of a king conquering a new kingdom should be preferred before his other brethren borne before their father was a king. For as the children of base men are not ennobled, being borne before their father was made noble; neither he to be accounted a priest's son, which was borne before his father was a priest: so he also which is borne of a father before that he was king, not capable of the kingdom by right of succession, cannot pretend any right to the crown, although he be the eldest or nearest of kin: but if he be enabled to attain thereunto by lawful succession, the kingdom of right belongeth unto him, how be it that he were not the soon of a king. As was observed in the kingdom of Persia whereinto Artaxerxes succeeded, although he was borne before his father was king: as claiming the kingdom from his great grandfather. And albeit that his mother Parysatis thrust all Asia into civil war to turn the estate unto her best beloved son the young Cyrus, yet so it is that by the judgement of God he was in battle by his elder brother overthrown and so slain. In like sort and upon the same doubt which happened about the succession of the kingdom of Hungary, Geica the elder brother borne before his father had obtained the kingdom, was by the consent of all the estates proclaimed king: which never after was called in doubt, in what kingdom soever. Whereas otherwise there would ensue many intollerabe absurdities: for if the king should leave but one son borne before that he was king, he could not succeed him. But yet whereas we have said, The sovereignty to be due to every one that is next of kin; extendeth far, not only unto them who the eldest being dead come in stead of the eldest, but unto their infinite posterity also. For so Demetrius reasoned in the Senate at Rome, his brother Antiochus king of Syria being dead: for as (said he) the right of nations hath before given the kingdom unto mine elder brother, even by the self same right aught I now to succeed him in the same.  
But it may de doubted if the grandfather yet reigning, the eldest son shall die leaving 
Whether the elder brother's son (his father being dead before he was king) be●… to succeed into his grandfathers kingdom before his uncle, his grandfathers younger son.  a son, the grandfathers nephew; Whether the kingdom be due unto the next brother or to the nephew, who is one degree farther off. Upon which question many have resolved it to be due unto the next brother. And indeed Scipio Africanus willing as an umpire to have appeased the like controversy betwixt Corbis and Orsua the uncle and the nephew, for the kingdom of Numidia, and not knowing what in this point to resolve upon, appointed the kingdom to be tried by combat betwixt them two: they both of themselves refusing to have any other god or man for judge but Mars: In which combat Corbis being both the elder and the cunninger overcame his nephew, as Livy writeth. Which like kind of combats betwixt the uncle and the nephew 
Livius li. 38.  have ofted in ancient time been undertaken among the German princes: which was the only cause that stirred up Barnard king of Italy to take up arms against the emperor jews the Devout; alleging that the empire of right belonged unto him as the only son of Pepin the eldest son of Charlemaigne, and not to jews the Devout the younger brother of Pepin: howbeit that jews yet carried it away, though not so much by right as by force of arms, and so prevailing against Bernard kept him 
The manner and order of the succession of the kingdom of Moscovie.  shut up in perpetual prison. And even yet at this present the kingdom of Moscovie is always given unto the younger brother, after the death of the grandfather, without respect unto the children of the elder brother: and that more is, the younger brother succeedeth in the kingdom unto the elder brother, although the elder brother being king leave behind him a son yet under age: For so Basilius the Great, king of Moscovie succeeded in the kingdom after his elder brother who had children. For which reason also Henry of Lancaster the son of john of Gaunt deposed Richard the eldest son of Edward the Black prince: alleging that his father being by death prevented, he could not succeed Edward his grandfather in the kingdom: which yet was but an unjust quarrel picked. So in like case Robert of Naples the younger brother, by the sentence of the Pope and of the college of cardinals, obtained the kingdom of Naples: the son of the elder brother king of Hungary being so excluded. An usual matter amongst the Vandals, as Procopius writeth: for so Honorius got the kingdom of Gensericus his grandfather, howbeit that Gerso his eldest son dying had left sons; which he obtained not so much by his grandfathers will, as by the ancient law of almost all the Nomads and Northern nations.  
And which I see to have been common even unto our ancestors also: for so Gontran prevailed against Childebert the eldest son of Sigisbert in the obtaining of the kingdom of France. So Mauld overcame Robert her nephew, the son of Robert her elder brother, for the county of Arthoise, the Senate of France desciding the matter; and so obtained her father's whole inheritance. Henry also son to Theobald earl of champaign in like suit overcome his eldest brothers son. But when john Montfort in like suit for the dukedom of Britain was overthrown, by his aunt the daughter of Vide of Britain; what by right he could not, he by force obtained, not without a most cruel and bloody war. And so (as we said) Robert the son of Charles the second, by the judgement of the Pope obtained the kingdom of Naples, Charles his nephew the elder brother's son, king of Hungary, in vain reclaiming. Sanxius also the son of Alphonsus the tenth king of Castille, his father favouring of him thrust his elder brother's sons out of the hope of the kingdom. john also having slain Arthure, Godfrey his elder brother's son, took upon him the kingdom of England. Unlike was the quartel of silvius, who after the death of Ascanius, in the right of his mother took from julus, Ascanius his son, the kingdom of the Latins: For that Lavinia had silvius by Aeneas but not Ascanius. But not fewer, yea and I know not whether more nephews to have obtained their grandfathers kingdoms, their uncles yet living, according to the ancient law of the Lacedæmonians. As for Lycurgus, he gave unto Charilaus his eldest brothers son, his kingdom, which he might easily have taken unto himself, the child's mother consenting thereunto. Arcus also the elder brother's son, after the death of his grandfather obtained the same kingdom, his uncle Acrotatus yet living. So also john the son of Ferdinand succeeded to Alphonsus his grandfather king of Portugal, Henry his uncle being yet alive. And not long after Sebastian the son of john the eldest brother took upon him the kingdom of Emanuel his grandfather, and not Henry his uncle, jews of Nivers also after the death of his grandfather got the counties of the Low countries his uncle yet living and looking on. But Robert the second, king of Naples (whose father by the sentence of the Pope had overcome his elder brother's son) when question was betwixt the uncle and the nephew for the county of S. Severine, by the council of the lawyers gave sentence on the nephew's side. The like sentence was given by the judges of the court of Paris betwixt the heirs of john Vast the son of the earl of Foix, and the heir of Francis Phebe, who being the son of the elder brother had got his grandfathers inheritance, his uncle yet living. So also was it judged for the dukedom of Britain against john Montfort. Others have left it as a thing doubtful to be tried by combat. For as Scipio Africanus permitted the combat betwixt Orsue and Corbis whom he could not by law appease: the same we read to have happened first under Otho the Great, and after that under Henry the first in Germany; and the uncle to have been overcome by their brother's sons. But the nephew of Agathocles king of Syracuse slew his uncle, going about to have taken upon him his grandfathers kingdom.  
Neither want there probable reasons on both sides. For the nephew it availeth 
Reasons for the succession of the nephew before his uncle.  that his father being dead he falleth into the power of his grandfather, & so is made his heir by the law of the twelve tables: and together with his uncles is admitted into his portion of his grandfathers inheritance, he dying intestat. And if the father substitute an heir unto his son, that substitution ceaseth if the son beget children, only upon the conjecture of the father's kind affection towards his son, as Papinian the lawyer hath answered. Yea, by the Roman laws, brother's sons are admitted unto their uncles inheritance: but then how much more true and just is it for them to be admitted unto the inheritance of their grandfathers? That is also moreover, that by the ancient customs of Fees the nephew may by right receive the whole benefit, his uncles being quite excluded. But no reason is more effectual, than that an inheritance neither entered upon, neither so much as yet fallen, is not only derived from the grandfather to the nephews; but even the very uncertain hope of a matter in trust being so but under a condition conceived.  
Neither yet for all this is the uncles cause on the other side altogether without reason, 
Reasons for the succession of the uncle before his nephew.  if a man will but more nearly look into these matters, and without guile interpret the law of the twelve tables. For why this law still admitteth the nearest of kin unto the inheritance: but now the son is nearer unto the father than the nephew, who but by a false supposal and fiction is deemed to be the same person with his dead father. But admitting that a feigned supposal is in some cases to be borne withal: yet seemeth it not reason that such a false fiction should prevail against the truth, especially unto another man's harm or prejudice of his right. Neither doth the kindness of nature suffer the sons to be spoiled of their father's wealth and goods, that all might be given unto the nephew, who is farthest off from the grandfather: which must needs be not only in the obtaining of a kingdom, but also of a dukedom, or of an earldom, or of an indivisible fee, by reason of that imaginary fiction whereof we have spoken, the nephew to be supposed to represent the person of his dead father. And so far it was from that the Roman laws should suffer the sons to be disturbed by the nephews, as that things committed even but upon trust come not unto the nephews before that all the sons one of them substituted unto another, be dead. But admit that the sons, contrary unto the laws both of nature, and of the Romans, may be disinherited, that so way may be made for the nephew (which we see in indivisible succession to be still done) yet is it an unreasonable, and unjust thing, an infant, a child, or one under age, of no experience in matters of war, or in the other civil and weighty affairs of the Commonweal, to be called unto the sovereignty of a kingdom; and another nearer than he, that excelleth both in years and wisdom, to be in the mean time debarred of his father's kingdom. For which reason the lawyers have given the tuition of the father's enfranchised slave unto the uncle, the nephew being excluded: but by how much more than is the tuition of the kingdom to be committed unto the uncle, rather than unto the nephew? And last of all so it is, that uncles unto whom the tuition of their young royal nephews is almost still committed, commonly think of nothing else, but of the murdering and kill of them: whereof innumerable examples (and yet not all) are in histories reported, all which if I should go about to gather together, I should so become tedious. Besides that, it is in sacred writ set down, 
* Easie. 3.  That Commonweal to be miserable and unfortunate, where children bear rule.  
Howbeit that the old received custom of our ancestors, and judgements in this case often given, have called me back from this opinion. For those inconveniences which we have spoken of, happen but seldom: which being such, the lawmakers are not greatly to respect. For if we would rehearse all the kings of France even from the time of Charles the Great, we shall scarcely, or else not at all, in the space of twelve hundred years, found the uncle and the nephew, after the death of the grandfather, to have met together as competitors in the succession of this kingdom. We read it in the space of about five or six hundred years to have happened once in England, once in Castille, twice in Portugal, and once in Sicilia. Wherhfore let the sentence as well of the ancient, as of the later lawyers prevail for the nephew against the uncle: not only in direct, but even in obliqne, and collateral succession also. Which we have somewhat the more curiously reasoned of, for that succession of the kingdom of France, which seemeth to be even near at hand. But if cousin Germane, or the uncle and the nephew, shall in the right of themselves without any feigned supposal of representation, lay claim unto the crown of a king their kinsman, dead without heirs male, be it that they were fifty degrees off, yet he that is descended of the elder, albeit that he were himself the younger, shall carry it away from the elder: as it may and hath oftentimes enough happened in this realm. And yet nevertheless in particular successions in collateral lines, they shall equally divide the divisible inheritance into parts: but if the inheritance be indivisible, the elder of the two in like degree is to be preferred before the younger, and to enjoy the right of his eldership, albeit that the younger be descended from the more ancient ancestors: as was adjudged in the court of Paris, betwixt Villiers, and Baynecourt, cousins germane, for the inheritance of Francis Bloqui, without any regard unto the race of the elder ancestors, considering that they came unto the succession of their chief ot head, and not by false supposal, or by the way of representation.  
And yet is it not sufficient, that the next heirs male of name succeed, but it is needful also, that the kingdom, how great soever it be, with all the sovereign rights thereof, be wholly given to one without partition: as Gensericus king of the Vandals wisely appointed. For otherwise if a Monarchy be divided, it is no more to be accounted 
That a kingdom how great soever is not to be divided, but to be wholly given to one without partition.  a Monarchy, but rather a Poliarchy, or Monarchy divided into many Monarchies. Which was not by the law Salic with us (as some suppose) provided for, or fooreseene. For we found that Aribert, brother to Dagobert the eldest son of Clotaire the second, was also king with his brother, one of them holding nothing of the other. Clodoveus also the eldest son of Dagobert, was king of Paris, and Sigebert his brother king of Metz. And after the death of Clodoveus his four sons divided the realm into four kingdoms: for Childebert was king of Paris, Clodoveus king of Orleans, Clotaire of Soisson, and Theodoric of Metz. But the rest being dead, all in fine came to Clotaire, whose eldest son Cherebert was king of Paris, Chilperic of Soisson, Gontran of Orleans, and Sigebert of Metz, all kings: which multitude of kings were scarece ever quiet from civil wars. For which it was wisely provided by the successors of Hugh Capet, who ordained three kings of great consequence for the maintaining of this Monarchy in the greatness thereof. First they excluded the bastards of the house of 
Three things of great consequence ordained for the maintenance of the kingdom of France in the greatness thereof.  France, from all entrance unto the kingdom, not allowing them so much as to be accounted in the number of their natural children: that so from thenceforth they might think of the begetting of lawful children, their base born children being now quite excluded from the crown. Howbeit that it was permitted unto the bastards of other princes of the blood, and of other noble houses, to be by their fathers avouched, and to bear the name, the arms, the style and noble titles of their natural fathers: providing also better, by taking away of the masters of the palace, whose power was now become dreadful unto the people, and dangerous unto the kings. Secondarily they ordained all the sovereign royal rights, to be wholly and entirely given to the eldest brother alone, and from thenceforth not to be communicated with the younger brethren, but to be all enforced to yield unto their elder brother all obedience and fealty. And lastly, that such lands as by the king's appointment were assigned unto the king's sons, to be holden in fealty, they dying without heirs male, should again freely return unto the crown. And the king's sisters to have their dowry in money only: that so not only the rights of sovereignty, but even the crown lands also, might so much as possible was be kept whole & entire unto the eldest brother. And as for the bastards of France, we found them in former times to have had their parts in the kingdom together with the kings other lawful sons: as the bastard brother of Charles the Simple, had part in the kingdom, and so after the manner of our ancestors was called a king. True it is, that Theodoric the king's bastard was excluded, for that he was begot of a bondwoman, who yet nevertheless demanded his part of the kingdom, unto whom for all that answer was given, That he must first be made a free man.  
And as for dividing of a Monarchy, I have said, that being divided, it is no more a 
A Monarchy divided, no more▪ to be accounted a Monarchy.  Monarchy, no more than a crown or rob divided into parts, is any more to be acconnted a rob or a crown: the inviolat nature of unity being such, as that it can abide no partition. Neither found we the ancient kings of Persia, Egypt, Parthia, or Assyria, at any time to have divided their most great and spacious kingdoms: neither yet any other kings to have used any such partition of their realms. josaphat king of the jews having six sons, left his kingdom whole and entire unto his eldest son joram, assigning unto the rest certain yearly annuities, or pensions. The first that opened this dangerous gap, was Aristodemus king of Lacedemonia, who yet divided not his kingdom unto his two sons, Proculus and Euristhenes, but left the kingdom undivided unto them both: and so thinking to have made them both kings, took from them both all sovereign authority and power. After whose example the kingdom of the Messenians, near unto the Lacedæmonians, was by the father given undivided unto Leucippus and Amphareus, being brethren: the chief cause why those two kingdoms were changed into Aristocraties. And yet two inconveniences propounded, it is better 
To divide a kingdom, a thing dangerous  two kingdoms to be given unto two kings, than one kingdom to be given to many: as it hath sometimes happened, the father to have divided unto his sons divers kingdoms, before they were into one united: for so james king of Arragon appointed Peter his eldest son to be king of Arragon, and james his younger son to be king of Maiorque: howbeit that afterward the elder brother took the younger prisoner, and in prison starved him, whom much less he would have endured to have been partner with him in the kingdom, and so united both the kingdoms into one. So it befell also the children of Boleslaus the second, king of Polonia, who having divided the kingdom unto his four sons, and leaving nothing unto the fift, kindled such a fire of sedition, as could not afterward be quenched, but with much blood of the subjects. Yet 
How the division of kingdoms may be borne.  this division of kingdoms is well to be borne withal, when it is made by him which hath conquered them, who may give his conquests got by his own prowess and valour, unto his younger sons, as he seethe good, according to their age or deserts: leaving yet still unto the eldest, the ancient kingdom or territory: as did William the Conqueror, who left the dukedom of Normandy, and the other countries which he had from his father, unto his eldest son Robert Curteyse, who succeeded him not in the kingdom of England, for that he was not the son of a king (as saith the Norman history) but left that kingdom which he had conquered unto William Rufus, which he had not as yet united unto his other countries: leaving unto Henry his third son nothing but a yearly pension: and yet for all that Robert the eldest brother, desirous also to have had the kingdom from Henry the third brother, who after the death of William Rufus his brother, had seized thereon, in seeking too greedily thereafter, lost both the one and the other: and being taken by the third brother (who now carried away all) was by him cast in prison, and so deprived of his sight there miserably died. And albeit 
That a new conquered kingdom with all the sove reign rights thereof, is better left wholly unto one, than to be divided among●… many.  that this disposition of the Conquerors was right just, as grounded both upon reason and authority, yet had it been much more safety, to have left the whole kingdom, and all the sovereign rights thereof unto one alone: as was done amongst the children of Charles County of Province, and of Philip Valois king of France, where the eldest had all: which is by far the surest for the estate, without respect unto the other legitimat children, which are not to have place, where question is of sovereignty, or of domains united to a Monarchy. For if honourable fees be not to be divided, by how much less can kingdoms themselves, and sovereign rights so be? As dukedoms, counties, and marquisats, yea and in many places baronies also, are not suffered to fall into partition: provided yet that the younger brethren be in some sort recompensed: which recompensing is not in a Monarchy, which suffereth neither division nor estimation to take place. But well of long time the use hath been, to give certain lands 
How the kings younger sons are provided for in France.  and fees for the maintenance of the younger brethren of the house of France: which have been again adjudged unto the crown, they which had them being dead without issue: as was decided for the inheritance of Robert earl of Clerimont brother to saint jews, unto whom that inheritance was adjudged: his other brethren Charles and Alphonsus earl of Poitiers both excluded. The like judgement being also given against Charles, concerning the succession into the inheritance of Alphonsus, dying also without issue: Charles his brother enjoying no part thereof, the inheritance by a decree of the Senate, being adjudged from him, and given unto the crown. For which cause the succeeding kings better advised, and to the intent that the matter should be no more doubted of, have provided, that in the letters patents concerning the lands and pensions given unto their younger brethren, it should expressly be comprised, that they dying without heirs male, those lands unto them so given should again return unto the crown: as was done in the grant of the lands given to jews duke of Anjou, king john his son. And albeit that Renate the younger son of jews the third, duke of Anjou, succeeded his elder brother into the inheritance, yet was it rather by sufferance, than for any right he had so to do as heir male. For otherwise the earl of Nivers after the death of Charles duke of Bourgundie (his nigh kinsman dead without any heirs male) might justly have claimed the duchy, considering that in the letters patents of Philip the Hardy, the dukedom of Bourgundie was given unto him and to his children, as well females as males, without any exception of sex. Yet pretended the earl no right thereunto, but the duke being dead, king jews the eleventh in his own right claimed the dukedom of Bourgundie. True it is, that the French kings in that point sometime favour the princes of the blood, suffering them to enjoy the inheritance of their kinsmen, dying without heirs male. So Philip of Valois obtaining the kingdom, resigned the earldom of Valois unto his younger brother Charles. And Charles the sixt the French king being dead, Charles' of Angoulesme succeeded unto the duchy of Orleans, and yet his sons son john of Angoulesme succeeded not unto the said duchy of Orleans, jews the twelft having got the kingdom, annexing the same dukedom unto the crown. For they are deceived which writ Peter of Bourbon, lord of Beavieu, to have succeeded his brother john into the lands which he had received from the kings his ancestors, by lawful right rather than by the grant and favour of king jews the eleventh, whose sister Anne the said Peter had married, whom he most entirely loved. And so jews the twelft was content also, that Susan of Bourbon the only daughter of Peter of Bourbon, marrying Charles of Bourbon, should hold such lands, long before given to the crown: but the said Susan being dead without issue, those lands were forthwith ceized upon, and again annexed unto the crown, namely the counties of Auvergne, and Clermont, and the dukedom of Bourbon, howbeit that it was not in the letters patents comprised: which thing is thought especially to have moved Charles of Bourbon to have entered into rebellion against the king. So also we found, that after the death of john the third, duke of Alencon, the duchy of Alencon was at the motion of the king's Attorney general ceized upon for the king; howbeit that the duke had left two daughters his heirs, unto whom were reserved only the lands by their father purchased. All which was done to the intent so much as was possible, to keep the kingdom undivided, and so to come whole and entire unto the kings, and not rend and torn, with the parts thereof as the limbs plucked away: as it hath also been wisely foreseen, and provided for, in the duchies of Savoy, Milan, Lorraine, Mantua, 
The reason why women inherit not land▪ by thei●… ancestors descending unto them, which lands sometime belonged unto the crown of France.  and Cleve, which indivisibly belong unto the next of kin. And albeit that the Germane princes do equally divide all the fees of the empire, excepting the prince's electors, yet is that contrary unto the custom and manner of their ancestors (who as Tacitus writeth) gave all their lands and inheritances unto the eldest, and their movables & money only unto the rest. And so we read Abraham the Patriarch to have done, giving his whole inheritance unto his eldest son, and money unto the rest, whom he sent from him whilst he himself yet lived.  
But haply here some man may say, it to be expedient if the Monarchy be great, as 
Great kingdom and monarchies, not to be with any safety divided into many.  were those of the Persians', the Romans, the Frenchmen, and the Spaniards; and that the prince or monarch have many children, or that there be many competitors, that then the surest way is to divide it: so as did Augustus, Marcus Antonius, Sextus Pompeius, who by lot divided the Roman empire, and so of one great Monarchy made three. And this expediency should seem unto me good, if that princes after that they had bounded out their frontiers, could bond out also their desires. But there are no mountains so high, no rivers so broad, nor seas so deep, that were ever yet able to stay the course of their ambitious and insatiable desires: as these three great men of whom I but even now spoke, by proof showed: not only the island of Sicilia (although it were but a most straight province) but even the air which we breathe, together with life itself, being taken from Sextus Pompeius, the bonds of confederacy being in short time broken amongst the consederats. Neither could Antonius endure the government of Augustus, neither Augustus the government of Anthony, although he were a great way off from him▪ So that one of the three being before slain, the other two could never be at quiet, until they had one of them quite ruinated the other. And if at any time it have happened, some of the emperors of the East, and of the West, in so great an empire to have lived in peace, it was not long, but almost a miracle, neither such as to be drawn into examples for us to imitate: whereas to the contrary for one example of them, which have in unity and concord governed together, there are to be found an hundred which have massacred one another. Whereof there is no more notable example, than the mighty Ottoman family, wherein many most horrible murders have been for the empire committed, the parents not sparing their own children, neither the children their parents: insomuch that within this two hundred years past, they have not ceased still to kill one another, until there be but one of them left alive. And in the 
Sovereignty admitteth no partnership.  little isle of Gerbe, six kings have in less time than fifteen years been slain one of them by another, being not able to endure a companion or partaker one of them with another in the sovereignty. And albeit that Galeace the second, and Barnabas, two most loving brethren, brought up even from their cradles together, having oftentimes endured like dangers; being both banished, and both at one and the self same time called home again, and both two established lieutenants of the empire, and always companions in arms together; had equally divided the principality of Milan betwixt them, which they so held and defended, as that it seemed a thing impossible to separate them a funder: yet at length Galeace only for the ambitious desire of sovereignty, most cruelly slew his said brother, together with all his children. So Abimelech the bastard slew threescore and nine of his brethren, that he might all alone reign. And Berdeboc king of Tartary with like slaughter, and for like cause, slew his twelve brethren. Sephadin also caused the ten sons of his brother Saladin to be all murdered, that he might himself alone reign in Egypt. The successors of Alexander also most part of them slew one another, not sparing either their parents, or children. For as for one brother to kill another, it was so common a matter (as Plutarch writeth) as that it seemed almost a miracle unto the ambassador of Ptolomey, that Demetrius standing on the right hand of Antigonus his father, with a boar spear in his hand, could abstain from kill of his father. But yet greater was the cruelty of king Deiotarus, who at one time slew twelve of his sons, for no other cause, but so the better to assure his kingdom unto the thirteenth, whom he best loved▪ For always amongst equals, the ambitious desires they have to be one of them greater than another, still armeth them one against another: Whereas in a Monarchy, where there is but one sovereign, and unto whom the princes of the blood are all subject, being provided of yearly pensions, or lands given them for their maintenance; it is certain, that to have always some farther favour from their sovereign, they will still yield them more obeisance. And therefore our kings which 
Places of too much power and command, not to be committed unto princes of the blood, or otherwise great lords.  have been better advised, have not given unto their brethren, or the princes of the blood, the places of lieutenants general of their armies, either of the high constable: but rather unto some other of the meaner nobility, such as were Bertrand, Gueschlin, Oliver Clisson, Simon earl of Montfort, with others of like quality, men of great service, and under whom the princes of the blood might march; and yet nevertheless without all hope of aspiring to the sovereignty. So as did the ancient Romans, and namely Augustus, who amongst other the secrets of his government, had this for one, Not to give the place of a General, or of a Governor of the frontiers, and especially of Egypt, unto any the noble Senators of ancient houses, but only unto men of meaner estate. And albeit that the kings of the Northern parts have as it were always called the princes of their blood unto their council; yet so it is, that other monarchs keep them back so much as they can: whether it be for the distrust they have in them, or to keep their council in such liberty, as that it may not be diminished by the greatness of the princes of the blood: or that it is to take away the ambition and jealousy which is inevitable amongst princes of the same blood, if the king shall chance to favour one of them more than another. And although there be many princes near unto the Ottoman blood, as namely the Michaloglies, the Ebranes, the Turacanes; yet are they never of the privy council, either yet admitted to any great place of honour, or command. And in the Monarchy of the Aethiopians (which is one of the greatest, and most auntientest 
A right strange custom used among the Aethiopians.  in the world) there is no prince of the blood, which cometh near the court, but are all trained up in all honour and virtue, within a most strong castle, built upon the mountain Anga (one of the highest in all Afrique) kept with a perpetual & strong garrison: from whence at such time as the king dieth, he which excelleth the rest in virtue, is from the mountain called unto the kingdom. Which (as they say) was first ordained by one Abraham king of Aethiopia, by divine revelation, to avoid the factions and civil wars of princes among themselves; as also the massacres which often times happen in other kingdoms, about the sovereignty; as also to have always princes of the blood royal, whom they call The Children of Israel (assuredly supposing them to be of the blood of the Hebrews: beside that, the Aethiopian language taketh much of the Hebrew) to the intent the estate should not fall into combustion, the king's line failing: or else for that the princes of the blood should not at liberty seek to advance themselves by force: or being advanced, should not seek to invade the estate. For a 
Master of the forces, master of the estate.  man may hold it for a maxim, That in every Commonweal, if too much power be given unto a prince or great lord of the blood, it is always to be feared, lest he should at one time or other seize upon the estate; seeing that even the basest companions mounted unto high degree, are not without cause to be feared. So Sultan Solyman made Abraham Bassa of a slave so great, by heaping honours upon honours upon him, as that in fine fearing his power, he was glad to 'cause his throat to be cut as he was sleeping, and afterwards found him be worth thirty millions of gold. But this is more to be feared in a little kingdom or estate, than in a great: for that the subjects cooped up as it were all in one place, are the more easily kept under by the power of the stronger. So when james Appian prince of Sienna, too much favouring Peter Gambecourt, a man of base degree, had made him too great in honour and wealth, he was by him (before he was ware) thrust out of his estate. The like prank Calippus served Dion; Brutus, Caesar; Macrin, Caracalla; Maximinus, the emperor Alexander; Philip, the young Gordianus: and an infinite number of others, who exalted from most base degree, have driven out their masters by whom they grew, and so made themselves lords. Who would have thought that Agathocles a Potter's son, of a common soldier chosen a General, durst have slain all the nobility and richer sort of the citizens of Syracuse, & made himself a king? Now if such a base companion as he durst do so much, how much more warily is it then to be foreseen, that too great a command or power be not given unto princes or great men, either at home, or in service abroad? And this is it for which many have holden, that by law the points reserved unto the majesty of a sovereign prince, are never to be communicated unto a subject, not not so much as by commission, to the intent that no gap by any way be opened for the subject to enter by into the sovereign estate of his prince.  
We have said also, that a Monarchy aught to descend unto the heirs male, considering 
That a Monarchy, in the opinion of the author aught to descend only unto the heirs male.  that the rule and government of women, is directly against the law of nature, which hath given unto men wisdom, strength, courage, and power▪ to command; and taken the same from women. Yea the 
* Genes. 3.  law of God hath expressly ordained, That the woman should be subject unto the man, and that not only in the government of kingdoms and empires, but also in every particular man's house & family: he 
* Easie. 8.  threatening of his enemies, To give them women to be mistresses over them; as of all miseries and calamities the worst. Yea and the law itself forbiddeth women all charges and offices proper unto men; as to judge, to sue, and other such like things: and that not only for lack of wisdom (as saith Martian, when as amongst all the goddesses only Pallas had no mother, but was borne of jupiters' brain, to show that wisdom proceeded not from women) but also for that men's actions are contrary unto their sex, and to feminine modesty and chastity. Neither was there any thing which more incensed the Senate of Rome, against the emperor Heliogabalus, than to see his mother to come into the Senate, though she came but only to see, & not to say any thing. Which was also thought a right strange thing to our ancestors, that Maud, grandmother to 
This French opi nion is by the examples of many worthy women, and experience of their most happy governments so fully refelled, as that there needeth no further reasons to be used, to prove the contrary.  Philip the Long, should be assistant unto Robert Contie of Artoise, and Margaret County of Flanders, at the judgement of the County of Clairmont. Now if it be an absurd and ridiculous thing, for women to busy themselves in men's public actions and affairs, belonging properly unto men: much more unseemly is it, those things which belong unto sovereignty, to lie open unto women's pleasure. For first the woman unto whom the sovereignty is devolved, of these two things must do one; either she must marry, or else continued unmarried, and so herself rule. If she shall marry, yet is it still a Gynecocratie, or woman's government; for that the marriage is made with that condition, That the sovereignty is still with the woman, and not with the husband: as was expressly excepted at such time as Isabel queen of Castille marred Ferdinand king of Arrogon: and in our time, betwixt Mary queen of England, and Philip prince of Spain, whom they called the queen's husband. And in like case in the matrimonial contracts betwixt Sigismond archduke of Austria (who was afterward emperor) and Mary queen of Hungary, whom the subjects in scorn called King Marie. In which case the husband is chief of his family, and master of his domestical household; and yet for all that in public affairs remaineth subject unto his wife. For why, the public power (as saith the law) is never bound unto the domestical power. And for this cause the Consul Fabius caused his father (the great Fabius) to alight from his horse to do him honour, as to the Consul in public: who yet for all that by virtue of his fatherly power, might without giving cause or reason why, have put him to death at home in his own house. But if the queen shall remain unmarried (which is the most true woman's 
All these dangers with many more incident unto women's sovereignty, are and have been right well avoided and prevented, by the wisdom of worthy women, who with no less discretion▪ than many men, have maintained the majesty of their sovereignty, with the reputation of their sex.  sovereignty) the Commonweal must needs so be in great danger: For that the people being of a great and courageous spirit, will deem a woman's government but ignominious, and not long to be endured; some both by their speaking & writing, scoffing and deriding their sex, othersome their womanly wantonness, and others their womanish intollerablenesse: whereas nothing is more dangerous unto an estate, than to have them which bear the sovereignty contemned and derided of their subjects, of the maintenance of whose majesty, dependeth the preservation both of the laws, and of the estate, which should be trodden under foot for the woman's sake, against whom there shall never want mockings, reproaches, slanderous libels, and so in fine rebellions & civil war, especially if she (impatient of such unworthy reproach) shall seek to be thereof revenged, which can hardly without civil tumult be done. But if she shall chance to bear but the lest extraordinary favour to any one of her subjects, beside the envy which he is to endure, to whom such favour is shown, men will still on her part misconstrue the same. For if the wisest, and most chaste have even in that respect had much ado to keep themselves from false reports, much less can a sovereign princess cover her favours; no more than can a light firebrand set upon an high watch tower: which may serve for cause enough to kindle the fire of jealousy among the subjects, and to arm them one of them against another▪ Besides that, it is almost natural unto women, to take pleasure & delight in the number and quarrels of their suitors. But if the subjects be so minded, as by force or otherwise to suffer in the sovereign estate a woman's government, then is it not to be doubted, but that every one of the subjects shall be constrained to endure the like in their own private houses also. For it 
What▪ so is good in public, is always good in particular.  is a rule in policy, that whatsoever thing is found good, and sufferable in public, the same is to be drawn into consequence and example in particular. Which was the cause the Persian princes preferred a request unto Darius Memnon (whom the holy Scripture calleth Assuerus) That the disobedience of the queen Vasthi his wife, should not remain unpunished, lest her pride should give occasion unto the other subjects wives to he disobedient unto their husbands. For as the family is out of order, where the woman commandeth over the husband, considering that the head of the family hath lost his dignity to become a slave: even so a Commonweal (to speak properly) looseth the name, where a woman holdeth the sovereignty, how wise soever she 
The evil examples of some few aught not to be prejudicial unto others that be good.  be; but so much the more if she be unjust withal, and not able to rule her own immoderate lusts and desires. I suppose there is none which knoweth not what tragedies jone queen of Naples (who of her unchastity was called Lupa, or a she wolf) stirred up of herself, who most cruelly murdered three kings her husbands, and was therefore herself also strangled, as she well deserved. I speak not of the horrible and brutish lusts of Semiramis, the first that by a strange means set foot into the Assyrian Monarchy. For having obtained of the king, to have the sovereign command but for one day, she the same day commanded the king himself to be slain. What should I say of Athalia queen of juda, who seeing her husband slain, put to death all the princes of the blood (excepting one which escaped) and so by force held the sovereignty, until that she was at last by the people herself also murdered. With like wickedness also Cleopatra slew her brother, that so she might alone enjoy the kingdom of Egypt. There was also one Zenobia, who styled herself an empress (together with the thirty▪ usurping tyrants) and was by the emperor Aurelian overcome. And in like case did Hirene empress of Constantinople, cooped up at last into a monastery herself. In brief I found no people to have liked of the sovereignty of woman's government: howbeit that many have endured the same: as did the Neapolitans the government of Constance, last of the race of the Norman kings, that reigned in Naples. And after that of joland the daughter of john burn, married to the emperor Fredrick the second, who gave that kingdom to Manfred his base son, whose daughter Constance marrying into the house of Arragon, kindled the fire of the wars which continued two hundred years, betwixt the houses of Anjou and Arragon; and could never be quenched but with the great effusion of the blood of many most valiant and worthy men; and all for having▪ given an entrance unto a daughter into the succession of the kingdom of Naples. But when the college of cardinals saw the Christian Commonweal, and especially Italy, to have endured so many and so great slaughters, in so long and such mortal wars, and all for distaff sovereignty; it was by them decreed, That from that time forward, the kingdom of Naples should no more descend unto women; as in the investitute made to Alphonsus' king of Arragon, in the year 1455, and afterward to Ferdinand king of Arragon, in the year 1458, it is expressly set down, That the daughters should not succeed unto the kingdom of Naples, so long as there were any heirs male, either in the direct or collateral line, even unto the fift degree. But that gap for the succession of daughters being opened in Italy, was afterwards also put in practice in the kingdoms of Hungary, and of Polonia, which fell to Marie and 
The kingdoms of Hungary, Polonia, Sweden, Norway, & Denmark, Castille, Arragon, Navatie, and England, to have fallen into Gynecocraty, or women's sovereignty.  Hedwige, the daughters and heirs of jews king of Hungary, and of Polonia; which had never before been seen. At which self same time almost, Marry Volmar (contrary unto the laws and ancient customs of the countries) succeeded into the kingdoms of Norway, Sweden, and Denmark. The like example was after also followed in the kingdom of Castille, whereinto Isabel of Castille succeeded her father, having gained the favour of the nobility: who albeit that she was one of the wisest princesses that ever were, yet did the estates of the country thereof complain, and the people thereat grudge, complaining themselves, Never before to have endured a woman's government. And whereas she alleged Socina the daughter of Alphonsus, to have before in like manner brought the kingdom of Castille unto Sillon her husband: answer was thereunto made by the subjects, That to have been done rather by force, than by any right; and that from that time the estates of Castille had protested, That it was contrary unto the laws of the country. Which hasted the marriage betwixt Ferdinand and the said Isabel, so to keep the people under. And albeit that Henry king of Castille, had by his last will and testament at the time of his death declared, That the kingdom of Castille after him belonged unto jews the ninth the French king▪ in the right of his mother Blanch of Castille; and that the barons of Castille had writ unto the said French king, that he should come to take possession of the kingdom: yet so it was, that he never durst undertake to lay claim unto the same, howbeit that he had the consent of the nobility of the kingdom by letters under their hands and seals, which are yet to be seen in the records of France. Now by the same craft that Isabel had wrested unto herself the kingdom of Castille, did Ferdinand the son of Leonore also gain the kingdom of Arragon: as did also after him the earl of Barcelone, having married Petronella the daughter of the king of Arragon. Which happened also in the kingdom of Navarre, whereunto Henry the Large, earl of champaign succeeded in the right of his wife, the king of Navarres daughter: whose daughter and heir joane, married unto Philip the Fair the French king, brought unto him the carledome of champaign, with the kingdom of Navarre: but the heirs male of Philip the Fair failing, that kingdom of Navarre in the right of three women fell unto the houses of Eureux, of Foix, of Albert, and of Vendosme: so that this kingdom in less than four hundred years, was transported into six strange houses, and unto seven strange princes, the queen's husbands. But yet by the way it is worth the noting, four women all of one name to have opened the way unto women's sovereignty, in the kingdoms of Hungatie, of Norway, of Sweden, of Denmark, of England, and Scotland. True it is, that Maud daughter to Henry the first, king of England, before brought the kingdom of England unto the house of Anjou in France: but that was after the death of 
* But what troubles ensued upon this intrusion of Stephen, and the wrongful excluding of Maud, the Croni ●…less will declare.  Stephen earl of Bolloine nephew oh Henry, in the right of his sister Adela; in such sort, as that a cousin descended of a daughter was preferred before the kings own daughter: which daughters son yet succeeded king Stephen, in such sort as that no woman's government seemed at all to have been. For which reason Edward the the third, king of England, upon the difference which he had for the crown of France, alleged the kingdom of France by the right meaning of the law Salic, to belong unto him: saying, That law to stand in force and take place, when the next heir male descended of the daughter (as was he from Isabel sister to Charles the Fair) was preferred before him, who was descended of the heirs male farther off. Which exposition for all that was rejected by the council of France, as never to take place, but when heirs male of the same name and stock, in what line and degree soever it were utterly failed: & that the kingdom were in danger to fall into election. And so albeit that the emperor Charles the fift marrying of his sister unto Christiern king of Denmark, and caused this clause to be inserted into the matrimonial contracts: That the males failing, the eldest daughter issuing of that marriage, should succeed unto the kingdom: yet so it was nevertheless, that the estates of that country had thereof no regard, for that the kingdom went by election: yea so far off was it, that such the kings private agreement could take from the nobility of Denmark, the power to choose their kings: or yet never any one of the same kings three daughters to reign over them: as that the said king himself was by the estates thrust out of his kingdom banished, and so afterwards also miserably died in prison. The Polonians also after the death of Sigismundus Augustus, excluded not only the king's sister, but even his nephew the king of Sweden his son also, who gave a million of gold unto the Commonweal, to have his son afterward chosen: howbeit that their predecessors had before received Hedwig the daughter of jews: and that when as there was no heir male, neither in the direct nor collateral line of the house of jagellon, they nevertheless made choice of Henry of France.  
Now if the princess the inheritrix shall marry (which is necessary, so to have an 
The inconveniences by the author supposed to ensue of a Gynecocratie, or women's sovereignty.  assured successor) her husband must either be a stranger, or a subject: if a stranger, he will instruct the people in strange laws, in strange religion, in strange manners and fashions: yea and give the honourable places and commands unto strangers also. But as for a subject, the princess would think herself much dishonoured, to marry her servant, seeing that sovereign princes still make great difficulty to marry a subject. join hereunto also the jealousy that is to be feared, if she shall marry him whom she best loveth, rejecting the more noble and greater lords, who always contemn them which are of base degree.  
And not to speak of many difficulties which fell out about these matters, even the very same, yea and greater too, presented themselves at the treaty of the marriage agreed upon betwixt Philip prince of Castille, and Mary queen of England: wherein the first article contained, That no stranger being not a natural English man borne, should be preferred to any office, benefice, or charge whatsoever. And in the fourth article it was set down, That Philip prince of Castille should not carry the queen his wife against her will out of the realm of England, neither the children begot betwixt them two: the which articles were confirmed by the estates of the land, the second of April, in the year one thousand five hundred fifty three, where beside that which I have said, it was also more solemnly provided, That the queen alone and of herself should enjoy all the royalties, and sovereign rights of the said realms, lands, countries, and subjects, absolutely; without that her husband should by the courtesy of England pretend any thing unto the crown and sovereignty of the realm, or other right whatsoever: and that the letters and mandates should be of none effect, if they were not signed by the queen, whatsoever sign or consent they had of her husband: and yet without which the consent of the queen should suffice. I have also learned by the letters of Novaile ambassador of France, who then was in England, that it was also decreed, That no Spaniard should have the keeping of any fortresses or strong holds belonging unto the Crown of England, either on this side, or beyond the sea: neither that the Englishmen should by the Spaniards be constrained to go unto the wars out of the realm.  
And albeit that a most gallant & mighty prince flourishing with kingdoms, wealth, youth, and friends, had married an old woman (for why, he seemed not to have married a wife) and such an one as by whom he was not to hope for any issue, yet could not the Englishmen patiently endure the Spaniards to set any foot into England, with whom for all that they had never before had any hostility, but had always been great friends. Yea the emperor Charles the fift on the other side wisely foreseeing all things, and fearing lest some treason might be wrought against the prince his only son, whom alone he had begot unto the hope of so great an empire, required to have fifty young noble English gentlemen delivered unto him to be kept as hostages, so long as his son Philip was in England: howbeit that as such distrust drew after it the hatred of the English nation, so was also that article taken away, and nothing thereof obtained. But the marriage made, shortly after above 18 hundred English men, for religions sake went out of their country, into voluntary exile and banishment. And yet beside all this, the fame was, how that the English men had conspired at one and the very self same instant, to have slain all the Spaniards: for that (as the report went) they under the colour of a marriage, and of religion, went about to aspire unto the sovereignty of England. Neither was it to have been doubted, but that the conspiracy of the English men had sorted to effect, or else that the Spaniards had effected their designs, and so taken unto themselves the sovereignty, had not the death of the queen (very profitable for the kingdom) given an end unto the designs both of the one and of the others.  
For never strange prince can be assured of his life, commanding in a strange country, 
The gre●…e dangers strange prin ces commanding in a strange country, are still exposed unto.  if he have not strong guards, for the assurance of his person, and sure garrisons for the keeping of his castles and strong holds. For being master of the forts, he must needs be also master of the estate: for the more assurance whereof he must always advance strangers; a thing intolerable to every nation in the world. Whereof we have a million of examples, out of which we will remember but one of our own: what time king William reigned in Sicily, in the year 1168, the people of the kingdom of Naples were so incensed to see a French man promoted to the honour of the Chauncellourship amongst them, as that they conspired at once to kill all the Frenchmen that then were in the kingdoms of Naples and Sicily, as indeed they did. But if the domestical servant of a strange prince, shall chance to kill a natural subject in a strange 
Small occasions serve to stir up the natural people of any country against strangers dwelling amongst them.  country, or pass himself in any insolence, dannger by and by hangeth over all the strangers heads, the lest quarrel that may be serving to cut the stranger's throats, if they be not all the stronger. As it happened in Polonia during the reign of the daughter of Cazimire the Great, king of Polonia, and wife to Lewes' king of Hungary, chosen also king of Polonia, to the great contentment of all the estates of that realm: and yet nevertheless for one Polonian slain by an Hungarian gentleman, all the people of Cracovia ran upon the Hungarians, and in that hurl slew them all, except such as by chance saved themselves in the castle, who yet were there besieged together with the queen: neither was there any means to appease the people's rage, but that the queen the inheritrix and mistress of Polonia, must with all the Hungarians her followers voided the realm. But yet greater butchery was there made of them of Austria, in Hungary, when Mary the eldest daughter of jews king of Hungary, had married Sigismond archduke of Austria, who going about to take upon him the government, was by his wives mother (a most ambitious woman) driven out of the kingdom: who not able to endure to see him reign▪, to be sure to shut him quite out, was about by her ambassadors to have called in Charles the French king, and so to have put the kingdom into the power of the French. Which the Hungarians perceiving, sent for Charles the king of Naples, and uncle to Mary, Sigismond his wife, to take upon him the government of the kingdom of Hungary: who was no sooner come, but that he was by the practice and command of the cruel queen Mother (whom he least feared) slain: which murder was with like cruelty also revenged, she herself being by like treason by the governor of Croatia slain, and her body thrown into the river. After whose death Sigismond returning with a strong army, put himself in full possession of the kingdom, whereof he now disposed at his pleasure, and filled all places with the slaughter of them which were of the faction against him. But let us come to our own domestical examples, and unto those wounds which but lately receeived, bleed with the lest touching, neither can but with most bitter grief be felt. Frances duke of Alencon being sent for, came to take upon him the government of the Low countries, where he was with great joy and triumph received: but having no strong garrisons, no strong castles, nor cities to trust unto, neither could by my entreaty (who foresaw what would afterwards happen) be persuaded so to have; received such a slaughter and disgrace, as I cannot without much grief remember the same. And to go farther, we have examples of the Scots yet fresh in memory, who for the space of seven hundred years, had with the straightest alliance that might be, been allied unto the house of France, and from thence received all the favours that it was possible for them to hope for: yet when Mary queen of Scots had married Frances the Dalphin of France, and that the Frenchmen went about to domineer over the Scots, they forthwith chose rather to cast themselves into the lap of the English, and so to put themselves into the protection of them with whom they had not before so well agreed, than to endure to see the Frenchmen to command in their country: neither ceased they until that by the help and power of the English, they had driven the Frenchmen again quite out of Scotland. Neither are strange princes to hope, by reason to rule the desires of sovereign princesses their wives: from whom if they will seek to be divorced, they must also banish themselves. For what prince ever bore himself more modestly, than did the wise emperor Marcus Aurelius? And yet when he with too much patience bore with the wantonness of his wife Faustine (as some of his friends thought) who for her too dissolute life▪ would have persuaded him to have been divorced from her; Than must we (said he) again unto her restore her dowry: which was even the Roman empire, howbeit that he had the empire in the right of himself also, by the adoption of Antoninus Pius the father of Faustine.  
And yet there is another danger also, if the princess heir unto a sovereign estate 
neighbour princes jealous of the marriage o●… a sovereign princess their neighbour.  be disposed to marry a stranger; which is, that the neighbour princes and people also, as wooers, enter into divers jealous conceits one of them against another: & so striving for another body's kingdom, oftentimes turn the queen from marrying at all. Yea sometimes also seeking even by force of arms to have her: as did the wooers of Venda queen of Russia, who having long ●…ought who should have her, the victor thought at last by force to have obtained that which he by long suit and entreaty could not gain: howbeit that she seeing no other remedy, but to fall into his hands, for despite drowned herself, choosing rather to lose her life, than by force to lose her chastity. Neither are queens marriages so easily made as are kings: for why, kings are oftentimes deceived with painted tables, and counterfeits, marrying them by their deputies whom they never saw: whereas queen's will most commonly see the men themselves alive, talk with them, and make good proof of them: yea and oftentimes refuse them also 
Women commonly more curious in choice of their husbands, than are men in choice of their wives.  after that they have seen them. For neither would Isabel queen of Castille, marry Ferdinand before she had seen him: neither could Elisabeth queen of England be by any man persuaded to promise' marriage unto any man, but unto himself present. And so it was answered unto Henry king of Sweden, seeking the long embassage of john his brother, who now reigneth, to have married her: answer (I say) was made, That of all the princes in the world, there was none unto whom (next unto almighty God) she was more in kindness beholden, than unto the king of Sweden, for that he alone had requested to have had her for his wife, whilst she was yet a prisoner, and so out of prison to have brought her unto a kingdom: nevertheless to have so resolved and set down with herself, never to marry any man whom she had not before seen. Which answer made also unto the archduke of Austria, suing unto her for marriage, in part broke off the hope which both of them had conceived of marriage, both of them fearing in presence to suffer the disgrace of a denial; and especially he, lest he should be enforced with shame to return home. As afterwards it happened unto Francis duke of Alencon, seeking to have aspired unto the same marriage, who although he had twice passed over into England, and thought the queen by long and honourable ambassages, as it were affianced unto him, yet returned he, fed up but with a vain hope, and the matter left undone.  
Now if the law of nature be violated in the sovereign government of women, yet much more is the civil law, and the law of nations thereby broken, which will that the wife follow her husband, albeit that he have neither fire, nor dwelling place. Wherein all the lawyers and divines in one agreed; and that she aught to reverence her husband: as also that the first-fruits of the wives dowry, yea even of all the wives goods, belong unto her husband; not only such as arise of the lands themselves, but even such as fall unto her by escheat, or confiscation of the goods of the condemned; howbeit that such goods be a thousand times better, or more worthy, than the wives fee brought in dowry unto her husband: yet nevertheless do all such things in propriety belong unto the husband, what lordship soever that it be, which is so fallen by escheat or confiscation: as also all first-fruits of dowry▪ and the rights of patronage depending of the wives dowry: which we see to have been used not of private men only, but even of kings also: as if a stranger shall marry a queen, the profits of the kingdom shall belong unto the husband, although the sovereignty, and kingdom itself belong still unto the wife. For so the interpreters of the law decide it, and that by the example of Isabel and Socina. Moreover it is holden in law, That the wives vassal aught to secure the husband before the wife, in case they be both of them in like danger: all which is directly contrary to such conditions, and laws, as prince's strangers are enforced to receive from their wives, being princess's inheritors. Besides that, honour, dignity, & nobility, dependeth wholly of men, and so of the husband, and not of the wife: which is so true by the received customs and laws of all people: as that noble women which marry base husbands in so doing lose their former nobility: neither can their children challenge unto themselves any nobility by the mother's side: which Ancaran the lawyer saith to take place even in queens which marry base men, no princes: of which opinion the rest of the lawyers are also.  
All these absurdities and inconveniences follow women's sovereignty in government, 
The beginning of women's sovereignty.  which thereof took beginning: for that they which had no male children, had rather their daughters should succeed in their lands and fee, than such as were not of their stock and house, and especially the heirs male failing, both in the direct & collateral line: after which point so by them gained, they began to succeed also unto lands and fees in the right line, and were preferred before the males in the collateral line: which manner of inheriting was by little and little permitted to be understnod, and extended also unto Honours, Dignities, Counties, Marquisats, duchies, Principalities, yea and at last even unto Kingdoms. Howbeit that by the laws of Fees, women were excluded from all succession in fee, although there were no heirs male either in the direct or collateral line, except it were so expressly set down in the investiture of the fee. But the law Salic cutteth the matter short, and expressly forbiddeth, That the woman should by any means succeed into any fee, of what nature or condition soever it were: which is no late, new, or feigned law, as many suppose, but written and enrolled in the most ancient laws of the Saliens, the words of which law are these, De terra vero Salica nullo portio haereditatis mulieri veniat: sed ad virilem sexum tota terrae haereditas perveniat: In English thus▪ But of the land Salic no portion of the inheritance shall come unto a woman: but all the inheritance of that land shall come unto the male sex. And so also in the edict or decree of Childebert king of France, is even the very same comprehended which is in the laws Salic, where the nephews being in direct line, by way of 
* Representation is▪ when divers children together represent their dead father's person, and so in his right, together with their uncles succeed into their grandfathers inheritance  representation together called unto the succession of their grandfather, the women are still excluded. And yet if there had been no law Salic, at such time as contention was for the kingdom of France, betwixt Philip earl of Valois, and king Edward of England: Philip alleging for himself the law Salic, according to the law Voconia; and Edward defending his cause and right by the ancient Roman laws, concerning inheritance: a decree was made by the general consent of all the Senators and princes of France, Ne quis in ea disceptatione peregrinarum legum auctoritate uteretur: sed legem quisque Salicam pro suo iure interpretari studeret, viz. That 
Poor French shifts, for the avouching and proof of the Salic law.  no man in that controversy should use the authority of foreign laws; but that every man according to his right should interpret the law Salic. And why so if there had been no Salic law at all? And howbeit that after the death of jews Hutin the king of France, the duke of Burgundy called jane the daughter of Hutin, unto the succession of her father's crown and kingdom: yet was it by the general consent of all the estates assembled in parliament at Paris, resolved to the contrary, As that daughters should not succeed unto the crown: & so the opinion of the duke was rejected. About which time, or a little before, Baldus called the law Salic, or the custom for the males only to succeed unto the crown, Ius gentium Gallo●…, The law of the French nation. Neither is it long ago, since that in a suit in the parliament of Bordeaux, betwixt certain gentlemen about the right of their gentry; a will was brought out, written in most ancient letters, wherein the testator divided unto his sons his Salic land; which the judges interpreted to be his predial fees, or revenues in land. Which was always in Germany observed also, until that the emperor Fredrick the second gave this privilege as a singular benefit unto the house of Austria, That the line of the males failing, the daughters or females might succeed. Which thing the emperor could not do, without the express will and consent of the estates of the empire. For which cause Othocarus king of Bohemia, being also of the house of Austria, without regard of Frederikes grant, by right of kindred claimed the dukedom of Austria, and levied a strong army against Rodolph, who by virtue of Frederikes grant, claimed the dukedom as belonging unto himself. Which privilege for women so to succeed, was afterwards extended unto the princes of the house of Baviere also. Yet was there never people so effeminate, or cowardly, as under the colour of succession in fee, to endure that women should step into the sovereignty: and yet less in Asia, and in Africa, than in Europe. Howbeit that with whatsoever madness other princes and people have been astonished, which have endured women's sovereignty, yet have the Frenchmen (God be thanked) by the benefit of the law Salic, always hitherto preserved themselves from this disgrace. For why, this Salic law which M. Cirier councillor of the parliament, said to have been made with a great quantity of the salt of wisdom, was not only alleged and put in practice, in the reign of Philip Valois, and of Charles the Fair, against whom the daughters pretended no claim unto the kingdom: but also in the time of Clotha●…re, Sigebert, and Childebert, who were all preferred before the kings their predecessors daughters, who never laid claim unto the crown. And that is it for which Baldus the notable lawyer, speaking of the house of Bourbon, holdeth, That the male of the ●…ame blood and name, being a thousand degrees off, should sooner succeed unto the crown and kingdom of France, than any woman much nearer. Which is not only to take place in kingdoms, but even in dukedoms and other principalities also, which have the marks and rights of sovereignty belonging unto them. Which laws also we see all people, excepting some few, to have always before embraced. And so the princes of Savoy, by the authority of this Salic law, have always excluded the women from the government: for so we read Constance the daughter of the duke of Savoy, to have by Peter of Savoy her uncle been excluded from the government: and that even by the sentence and doom of the judges and arbitrators, chosen for the deciding of the matter in the year one thousand two hundred fifty six. Yet doubt I not but that many are afraid of women's sovereignty, who yet indeed doubt not to show themselves most obedient unto women's lusts. But it is no matter (as old Cato was wont to say) whether that the sovereignty itself be given to women, or that the emperors and king's Bee themselves obedient unto women's pleasures and commands.  
Seeing then it appeareth plainly enough (as I suppose) the estate of a Monarchy to be of all other estates most sure; a●…d amongst Monarchies, the Royal Monarchy to be best: as also amongst kings them to excel which be descended from the race and stock of kings: and in brief, that in the royal race the nearest of the blood is still to be preferred before the rest that were farther off: and that the sovereignty (the female sex excluded) aught to be still undivided. Let us now also at last see how it 
justice the foundation of all Commonweals:  aught to be governed, as whether by justice Distributive, Commutative, or Harmonical. For why, the fairest conclusion that can be made in this work, is to conclude of justice, as the foundation of all Commonweals, and of such consequence, as that Plato himself hath entitled his books of Commonweals, Books of Law, or of justice, howbeit that he speaketh in them rather like a Philosopher, than a Lawgiver, or Lawyer.  
(▪)   

CHAP. VI Of the three kinds of justice, Distributive, Commutative, and Harmonical: and what proportion they have unto an estate Royal, Aristocratique and Popular.  
LEt us then say in continuing of our purpose, that it is not enough to maintain, that a Monarchy is the best estate of a Commonweal, & which in it hath the lest inconvenience; except we also (as we said) add thereunto, a Monarchy Royal. Neither yet sufficeth it to say, that the Royal Monarchy is most excellent, if we should not also show that unto the absolute perfection thereof it aught to be fast knit together by an Aristocratique and Popular kind of government: that is to say, by an Harmonical mixture of justice, composed of 
That a Royal Monarchy aught to be knit together with a certains kind of mixture of the Aristocratike & Popular government, the royalty yet s●…anding whole and pure, without any mixture of those estates.  justice Distributive, or Geometrical; and Commutative, or Arithmetical: which are proper unto the estates Aristocratique, and Popular. In which doing, the estate of the Monarchy shall be simple, and yet the government so compound and mixed, without any confusion at all of the three kind of Estates, or Commonweals. For we have before showed, that there is great difference betwixt the mingling, or rather confounding of the three estates of Commonweals in one (a thing altogether impossible) and the making of the government of a Monarchy, to be Aristocratique and Popular. For as amongst Monarchies, the Royal Monarchy so governed (as I have said) is the most commendable: even so amongst kingdoms, that which holdeth most, or cometh nearest unto this Harmonical justice, is of others the most perfect. Which things for that they may seem obscure, neither are to my remembrance by any man's writings declared; I must endeavour myself that they may by manifest and plain demonstration be understood. justice therefore I say to be The right division of rewards 
The definition of justice.  and punishments, and of that which of right unto every man belongeth; which the Hebrews by a strange word call Credata: for the difference betwixt this and the other justice given unto men by God, whereby we are justified, which they call Tsedaca. For that by these, as by most certain guides, we must enter into this most religious and stately temple of justice. But this equal division which we seek for, can in no wise be accomplished, or performed, but by a moderate mixture, and confusion of equality, and similitude together, which is the true proportion Harmonical, and whereof no man hath as yet spoken.  
Plato having presupposed the best form of a Commonweal, to be that which was composed of a Tyrannical and Popular estate: in framing the same, is contrary unto himself, having established a Commonweal not only Popular, but altogether also Popularly governed; giving unto the whole assembly of his citizens, the power to make, and to abrogat laws, to place and displace all manner of officers, to determine of peace and war, to judge of the goods, the life, and honour, of every particular man in sovereignty: which is indeed the true Popular estate, and Popularly also governed. And albeit that he had so (as we say) form his Commonweal, yet nevertheless he said▪ That the Commonweal could never be happy, if it were not by Geometrical proportion governed; saying that God (whom every wise lawmaker aught to imitat) in the government of the world always useth Geometrical proportion. The same Plato having also (as some say) oftentimes in his mouth these three words, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, which is to say, God always to be playing the Geometritian: which words indeed savour well of Plato his style, howbeit that they be not in all his works to be found.  
Now certain it is, that Distributive, or Geometrical justice, is most contrary unto the Popular estate and government by Plato set down: the people still seeking after nothing more, than for equality in all things; a thing proper unto Commutative, or Arithmetical justice. Which was the cause for which Xenophon (Plato his companion, 
Plato covertly by Xenophon reproved, for appointing his Commonweal to be governed by Geometrical Proportion.  and both of them jealous one of another's glory) being of opinion, That Commonweals aught to be framed, and the laws administered according unto Arithmetical proportion and equality, bringeth in Cyrus yet a boy, corrected and chastised, for that he being chosen king, had changed but the servants garments, appointing better apparel unto them of the better sort, and meaner unto them of the meaner sort: as having therein regard unto decency, and the proportion Geometrical. After which chastisement, Cyrus is by his master taught, to give unto every man that which unto him belongeth, and to remember that he was a Persian borne, and was therefore to use the Persian laws and customs, which gave unto every man that which was unto him proper: and not the manners and fashions of the Medes, who thought it meet, that to be unto every man given, which was decent and convenient for him. Which writings of Xenophon, Plato having read, and knowing right well that it was himself, and not Cyrus, which had been corrected; forthwith reproved the Cyropaedia, without naming of any party. This diversity of opinions, betwixt Xenophon and Plato (famous among the Greeks) was the cause of two great factions, the one of the Nobility and richer sort, who held for Geometrical justice, and the Aristocratical estate; the other of the base and poorer sort, who maintained Commutative or Arithmetical justice, and therefore wished to have had all estates and Commonweals Popular. Now of these two factions arise a third, which was of opinion, That in every Commonweal Arithmetical justice was to be kept in just equality, when question was of the goods of any one in particular, or for the recompensing of offences and forfeitures: but if question were of common rewards to be bestowed out of the common treasure, or for the division of countries conquered, or for the inflicting of common punishments, that then Distributive, or Geometrical justice, was to be observed and kept, having regard unto the good or evil deserts, and the quality or calling of every man: insomuch that these men used two proportions, and yet for all that diversly, sometime the one and sometime the other: as Aristotle said it aught to be done, but yet not naming either Plato or Xenophon, who yet had both first touched this string.  
But as for Harmonical justice, not one of the ancient writers either Greeks' or 
Harmonical justice of all others the best.  Latins, neither yet any other, ever made mention, whether it were for the distribution of justice, or for the government of the Commonweal: which for all that is of the rest the most divine, and most excellent and best fitting a Royal estate; governed in part Aristocratically, and in part Popularly. But forasmuch as this point we hear speak of, evil understood, draweth after it a number of errors, whether it be in making of laws, or in the interpretation of them, or in all sorts of judgements; and to the end also that every man may understand, that this third opinion of Aristotle can no more be maintained than the other; it is needful for us to borrow the principles of the Mathematicians, and the Lawyer's resolutions. For why, it seemeth that the Lawyers for not regarding the Mathematicians, and Philosophers, as not having judicial experience, have not declared or manifested this point, which is of right great consequence (as I have said) and that as well for the administration of justice, as for the maintaining of the affairs of state, as also of the whole Commonweal in general.  
Now the Geometrical proportion is that which is made of an unequal excess of 
Three kinds of proportion▪ Proportion Geometrical, 3, 9, 27, 81. Proportion Arithmetical, 3, 9, 15, 21, 27. Proportion Harmonical, 3, 4, 6, 8, 12.  like magnitudes among themselves: but the Arithmetical proportion is every way both in progression, and excess equal: and the Harmonical proportion is of them both, by a wonderful cunning (confused and combined together) made, and yet is unto them both unlike: the first of these proportions is semblable, the second is equal, & the third is in part equal, and in part semblable; as is to be seen by the examples in the margin set: where the proportion is triple of 3 to 9, and of 9 to 27, and of 27 to 81: and the proportion Arithmetical following, beginneth of the same number of 3, and the same difference of 3 to 9: but the difference of 9 to 15 is not like, but yet equal: for betwixt these numbers there are always six differing. And the proportion Harmonical beginneth of 3 also, but the differences are not always alike, neither altogether equal also, but therein is both the one and the other sweetly mixed and combined together▪ as may well by Mathematical demonstrations be understood, whereinto it is not needful for us further at this time to enter: howbeit that certain marks of them manifest enough, are in the ancient Roman laws to be found; and by numbers in Geometrical proportion set down and reported. But the difference of the Geometrical 
The difference betwixt Geometrical and Arithmetical proportion.  and Arithmetical proportion, is in this to be noted, That in the proportion Arithmetical are always the self same reasons, and the differences equal: whereas in the Geometrical proportion they are always semblable, but not the self same, neither yet equal: except a man would say, that things semblable are also equal; which were nothing else, but improperly to speak: so as Solon did, who to gain the hearts both of the nobility, and of the people of Athens, promised to make them laws equal for all sorts of men: wherein the nobility and better sort of the people thought him to have meant the Geometrical equality; and the common people, the Arithmetical; and so to have been all equal: Which was the cause that both the one and the other by common consent made choice of him for their lawmaker. Wherhfore the Geometrical 
The Geometrical government of an estate.  government of an estate is, when like are joined with like: as for example, by the laws of the twelve Tables, the Patricij, or Nobility, was forbidden to marry with the commonalty, and order taken, that noble men should marry none but noble women: and they of the base sort such also as were of like condition with themselves, slaves also marrying with slaves, as differing from both the other sort. Which law is also yet inviolably kept among the Rhagusians. So were to be deemed also, if the law were, that princes should not marry but with priuces, the rich with the rich, the poor with the poor, and slaves with slaves, by a Geometrical proportion. But if it were by law 
The government of an estate by Arithmetical proportion.  provided, that marriages should be made by lot; that law would be unto the people most acceptable and pleasing, to make all equal: for that so the noble and rich ladies should by lot oftentimes fall unto the poor and base sort of men; the slave might marry the prince, the base artificer might have to wife a woman honourably descended, most unlike to his estate: So that by lot should the Popular equality be preserved, agreeing with the Arithmetical proportion: but the wealth and dignity of the nobility and richer sort be quite overthrown. And that is it for which Euripides saith, A 
The government according unto the Geometrical or Arithmetical proportion hurtful, the one unto the common people, and the other unto the nobility: whereas the Harmonical government preserveth both the one and the other.  lawful equality to be most agreeable unto man's nature, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. But both these forms of government according to either Arithmetical, or Geometrical proportion, draw after them divers inconveniences: For in the one the poorer and vulgar sort are cast down, and in the other the nobility and richer sort are contemned and disgraced. Whereas the Harmonical manner of government, with a most sweet consent, preserveth both (so much as possibly is) not confounding all sorts of people hand over head together. And not to go out of the example by us propounded of marriages, he that would keep the Harmonical government, should not require in the marriages of the nobility, the noble descent too far fet both on the one 
The wonderful curiosity of the Germane, in the marriage of the nobility.  side and the other: as many of the Germane most dangerously do, who most curiously search out their great great grandfathers fathers, of like nobility on both sides, to join together their nobility in marriage: which is too far to remove and separate the nobility, not from the base sort only, but even from itself also; considering that they content not themselves, that the gentleman be noble by the father only, as it sufficeth in the kingdom of Polonia, by the decree of Alexander king of Polonia: or by the father, and the grandfather, as is sufficient in this realm, by a law of king Frances the 1: or by father, and mother, and grandfather, on both sides, as is set down by the new decrees of the knights of Savoy: but they will that the right gentleman show that he is descended of two hundred and threescore noble persons, if the interpretation that many give of a right gentleman be true: Some others will have seven degrees of nobility to suffice, derived from the fathers and mother's side without disparagement. But such laws are dangerous, and full of seditions: and for this cause the law concerning marriages, which Appius the Decemuir is said to have put into the Twelve Tables, was at the motion of Canuleius the Tribune as dangerous, repealed: for that thereby the subjects love was rend in sunder, and the city by seditions overthrown: which tumults and seditions the law being once abrogated, and alliances made betwixt the nobility and the commonalty, upon the sudden ceased: howbeit that noble women have seldom married from the nobility, but noble men have oftentimes married with mean women: for that nobility is still to be obtained from the father. And indeed it best 
Harmonical proportion good to be in marriage observed, and so likewise in the government of the whole Commonweal.  agreeth with Harmonical proportion, if a rich base woman marry with a poor gentleman; or a poor gentlewoman with a rich common person: and she that in beauty and feature excelleth, unto him which hath some one or other rare perfection of the mind: in which matches they better agreed, than if they were in all respects equal: as amongst merchants there is no partnership or society better, or more assured, than when the rich lazy merchant is partner with the poor industrious man; for that there is betwixt them both equality, and similitude: equality, in that both the one and the other have in them some good thing: and similitude, in that they both two have in them some defect or want. And this is it for which the ancient Greeks' aptly feigned, Love to have been begotten of Porus and Penia, that is to say, of Plenty and Poverty, love growing betwixt them two: so as in song the Mean betwixt the Base and the Triple, maketh a sweet and melodious consent and harmony. For why, it is by nature to all men engrafied, for them still to love most, the thing themselves want most: so commonly the foul seeketh after the fair; the poor, the rich; the coward, the valiant: whereas if the rich and noble should likewise marry with the noble and rich, they should one of them make less account and reckoning of the other, for that one of them little wanted the others help. For as the master of a feast aught not without discretion to place his guests hand over head, as they first came into the house, without any respect had of their age, sex, or condition: so also aught he not to set all his best guests in the highest and most honourable places: neither all the wise men together with the wise, neither old men with old men, nor young men with young men, women with women, nor fools with fools: following therein the Geometrical proportion, which seeketh after nothing else but the semblablenesse of things; a thing of itself foolish and unpleasant. But the wisest master of a feast will place and interlace quiet men betwixt 
Harmonical proportion declared by the order to be kept in a feast.  quarrelers, wise men amongst fools; that so they may by their talk in some sort as with a medicine be cured: so betwixt cavillers shall he set a quiet man, and unto an old babbler join a still and silent man, so to give him occasion to speak, and teach the other to speak less: by a poor man he shall place a rich, that so he may extend his bounty unto him, and he again for the same of the other receive thanks: so amongst severe and tetrical men, he shall mingle others of a more civil and courteous disposition; in which doing he shall not only avoid the envy and heartburning of such as might complain themselves to be placed in too low places, or not in such order as they desired (a thing hardly to be avoided where question is of degree and place;) but also of such a most beautiful harmonical, and orderly placing, shall arise a most sweet consent, as well of every one of the guests with other, as also of them altogether. Which beautifulness of Harmonical order, he which will with Geometrical semblablenesse, or Arithmetical confusion, invert or trouble, he shall so take from out of the feast all the profit, all the sweetness, and love, which should still be amongst guests. And for this 
Scipio blamed for having used the Geometrical proportion in the placing of the Senators in the Theatre.  cause men say, Scipio Africanus to have been blamed by the wiser sort of men, and such as saw farthest into matters of state, for that he first of all others had made laws concerning the Theatre, giving therein the first places unto the Senators, and so in the beholding of the plays separating them from the people; when as by the space of 558 years before, even from the foundation of the city, the Senators had indifferently together with the poor stood to behold the plays: which sepation so made, much alieanated the one of them from the other, and was the cause of many great and dangerous tumults and broils afterwards in that Commonweal. Neither is it enough that the laws and magistrates constrain the subjects for fear of punishment to forbear to wrong one another, and so to live in peace; but they must also bring to pass, that although there were no laws at all, yet they should be at unity among themselves, and one of them still love another. For that the foundation of marriages, as all other human 
Love the foundation of all human societies, not to be preserved by Geometrical, or Arithmetical, but by Harmonical proportion of justice  societies, which are almost innumerable, resteth in love and friendship, which cannot long continued without that Harmonical & mutual concord which I have already spoke of: and which cannot possibly either by Geometrical or Arithmetical justice & government be done, for that the proportion both of the one & of the other, is for most part disjoined a●…d separate: whereas the nature of the Harmonical proportion always uniteth together the extremes, by reason that it hath accord both with the one and with the other: as by the examples propounded we are taught.  
Now the equal government and by proportion Arithmetical, is natural unto Popular 
The equal government of Arithmetical proportion▪ b●…st fitteth Popular estates.  estates, who would that men still should equally divide estates, honours, offices, benefits, common treasures, countries conquered: and if laws be to be made, or officers ordained, or that judgement be to be given of life and death, their desire is, that all the people should thereunto be called, and that the voice of the greatest fool and bedlam should be of as great weight and force, as the voice of the wisest man: in brief, the more popular sort think it best, that all should be cast into lot and weight: as the ancient Greeks', who in three words set forth the true Popular estates, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, which is to say, All by lot and balance: or else to measure all things by a most right rule, and every way with Arithmetical proportion equal. Which for that it is most stern and inflexible, is after our phrase called Right, and to do justice, is said, To do Right: which manner of speech seemeth to have been taken from the Hebrews, who call their books of Law and justice, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, that is to say, The Book of Right, or as the Chaldean interpreter translateth it, The Book of rightness: either for that the way of virtue and justice hath no windings or turnings, nor suffereth us this way or that way to turn out of the right way; or else for that it is the self same unto all men, without respect of any man's person, not to be moved with love or hatred towards any man. Such an one as many have though Policletus his rule to have been, so strait and hard, as that it might more easily be broken than bowed either unto the one side or the other: unto the pattern & straightness whereof all artificers directed their rules. Such is also the form of a Popular government, when all goeth by lot, and by straight and immutable laws, without any just and indifferent interpretation, without any privilege or acception of person: in such sort, as that the nobles are subject even unto the self same punishments that the base sort are; the fines and penalties being alike upon the rich and upon the poor, and the like reward appointed for the strong, and for the weak, for the captain, and for the soldier.  
But now to the contrary, the Aristocratike government according to Geometrical 
The Geometrical proportion best to agreed with the Aristocratical  proportion, is like unto the Lesbian rule, which being made of lead, was every way so pliant and flexible, as that it might be unto every stone so aptly fitted and applied, as that no part (so much as possible was) might thereof be lost: whereas others, who were wont to apply the stone unto the strait rule, oftentimes lost much thereof. So say some, that judges aught in judgement to apply the laws unto the causes in question before them, and according to the variety of the persons, times, & places, so to decline from that inflexible straightness. Howbeit in mine opinion▪ as it is impossible for a rule so pliant every way, as was the Libyan Rule, to keep the name of a rule: so must also the strength and name of the law perish, which the judge may at his pleasure every way turn like a nose of wax, and so become the master and moderator of the law, whereof indeed ●…e aught to be but the upright minister.  
Wherhfore a little to decline from that inflexible straightness of Polycletus his rule, as also from the uncertain pliantness of the Lesbian rule, that is to say, from the Arithmetical, and Geometrical proportion of government of estates; a certain third kind of rule is by us to be devised, not so stiff, but that it may be easily bowed when need shall be, and yet forthwith become also strait again: that is to say, Harmonical justice: which I think may well be done, if we shall conclude and shut up the government of estate within those four terms which we have before combined, viz. the Law, Equity, the Execution of the law, and the Office or Duty of the 
The Law. 4. The Execution of the Law. 8.  
Equity. 6. The Office of the judge. ●…2.  Magistrate or judge: whether it be in the administration of justice, or the government of the estate: which have amongst themselves the same proportion which these four numbers have, viz. 4, 6, 8, 12. For what the proportion is of 4 to 6, the same the proportion is of 8 to 12: and again the same reason is of 4 to 8, that there is of 6 to 12. So the Law also hath respect unto Equity; as hath the Execution of the Law, unto the Duty of the Magistrate: or else contrariwise, For Execution serveth unto the Law, as doth the Duty of the Magistrate unto Equity. But if you shall transpose these numbers before set in Harmonical proportion, and so make the Magistrate superior unto Equity; and the Execution of the Law, to be above the Law itself; both the Harmony of the Commonweal, and musical consent thereof, shall perish. As for Geometrical proportion, the terms thereof being transposed, is yet always like unto itself, whether it be in continual proportion, as in these four numbers, 2, 4, 8, 16; or in proportion disjoined, as 2, 4, 3, 6: convert the order of the numbers, and say, 6, 3, 4, 2, or 3, 2, 4, 6; or in what order soever you shall place them, there shall always be the same proportion of the first unto the second, which is of the third unto the fourth; and again of the first unto the third, which is of the second unto the fourth. And albeit that a continuat proportion is more pleasing than that which ariseth of divided numbers, yet maketh it of itself no consent; as for example, 2, 4, 8, 16: and much less if it consist of Arithmetical proportions, whether that they be divided in this sort, 2, 4, 5, 7, or else joined as 2, 4, 6, 8: both which proportions as far differ from Harmonical proportion, as 
Geometrical or Arithmetical government alone, n●… fit mean ●…o maintain a Commonweal.  doth warm water from that which is most cold, or else scalding hot. And so in like case may we say, that if the prince, or the nobility, or the people, all together having the sovereignty, whether it be in a Monarchy, in an Aristocratike, or Popular estate, govern themselves without any law, leaving all unto the discretion of the magistrates, or else of themselves distribute the rewards and punishments, according to the greatness, quality, or desert, of every man; howbeit that this manner of government might seem in appearance fair and good, as not having therein either fraud or favour (a thing for all that impossible:) yet for all that could not this manner of government be of any continuance, or assurance, for that it hath not in it any bond wherewith to bind the greater unto the lesser, nor by consequence any accord at all: and much less shall it have of surety, if all be governed by equality and immutable laws, without applying of the equity thereof according unto the particular variety of the places, of the times, and of the persons: if all honours and rewards shall be given to all men indifferently, by Arithmetical proportion alike, without respect of honour, person, or desert: in which state of a Commonweal all the glory of virtue must needs decay and perish. Wherhfore as two simple medicines in the extremity of heat & cold, and so in operation and power 
A fit comparison  most unlike one of them unto the other, are of themselves apart unto men deadly & 
Harmonical justice compounded of Arithmetical and Geometrical proportion of government, best for the preservation of a Commonweal.  dangerous; and yet being compound & tempered one of them with the other, make oftentimes a right wholesome and sovereign medicine: so also these two proportions of Arithmetical and Geometrical government, the one governing by law only, and the other by discretion without any law at all, do ruinat and destroy estates and Commonweals: but being by Harmonical proportion compounded and combined together, serve well to preserve and maintain the same.  
Wherhfore Aristotle is deceived, in deeming the Commonweal then to be happy, 
laws necessary for the good government of a Commonweal, although the prince be never so wise or virtuous.  when it shall chance to have a prince of so great virtue and wisdom, as that he both can and will with greatest equity, govern his subjects without laws. For why, the law is not made for the prince, but for the subjects in general, and especially for the magistrates; who have their eyes often times so blinded with favour, hatred, or corruption, as that they cannot so much as see any small glimpse of the beauty of equity, law and justice.  
And albeit that the magistrates were angels, or that they could not in any sort be misled or deceived, yet nevertheless were it needful to have laws, wherewith as with a certain candle, the ignorant might be directed in the thickest darkness of men's actions; and the wicked for fear of punishment also terrified. For albeit that the eternal law of things honest and dishonest be in the hearts of every one of us, by the immortal God written, yet were no penalties so in men's minds by God registered, whereby the wicked might be from their injurious and wicked life reclaimed. Wherhfore the same immortal and most mighty God, who hath even naturally engrafted in us the knowledge of right and wrong, with his own mouth published his laws, and thereunto annexed also penalties: before which laws no penalties were appointed, neither any law maker so much as once before remembered or spoken of. For proof whereof let it be, that neither Orpheus, nor Homer, nor Musaeus, the most ancient Greek writers; neither 
No mention of law, before the law of God was given.  any other which were before Moses (who was more ancient than all the Paynim gods) in all their works so much as once use the word Law: kings by their hand, their word, and sovereign power, commanding all things.  
The first occasion of making of laws, was the changing of Monarchies into Popular 
The first occasion of the making of laws.  and Aristocratique Commonweals: which they first did at Athens, in the time of Draco, and afterward of Solon: and in Lacedemonia, in the time of Lycurgus, who took from the two kings the sovereignty. Whose examples the other cities of Greece and Italy set before themselves to behold and imitate, viz. The Dorians, the jonians, the Cretensians, the Locrensians, they of Elis, Crotona, Tarentum, and Rome, with divers other towns in Italy: in which cities the people were ever at variance and discord with the nobility; the poorer sort still seeking to be equal with the noble and richer: 
Laws hateful unto the rich and mighty.  which could not possibly be, but by the equality of laws; which laws they of the richer on the contrary side utterly rejected, seeking by all means to be therefrom free & privileged: as they who with their wealth & power defended the Commonweal; and therefore thought it reason in honours and preferments, to be above them of the inferior sort: who indeed having so got the great estates and principal charges in the Commonweal, always favoured the richer sort, and them that were like unto themselves, still contemning and oppressing the poor. Whereof proceeded the hard speeches and complaints of them of the meaner sort: which that they might in the city of Rome have some end, Terentius Arsa Tribune of the people, in the absence of the Consuls, blaming the pride of the Senators before the people, bitterly inveighed against the power of the Consuls; alleging, That for one lord now there were two, with an immoderate and infinite power, who themselves loosed and discharged from all fear of laws, turned all the penalties thereof upon the poor people. Which their insolency that it might not still endure, he said, He would publish a law for the creating of Five men, for to appoint laws concerning the power of the Consuls, who from thenceforth should not use further power, than that which the people should give them over themselves, and not to have their lust and insolency any more for law. Six years was this law with great contention and strife betwixt the nobility and people debated, and at length in the behalf of the people established. But here it shall not be amiss out of Livy to set down the very speeches and complaints of the nobility, accounting it better to live under the sovereign power of a king without law, than to live in subjection unto the law, Regem hominem esse à quo impetres ubi ius, ubi iniuria opus sit, esse gratiae locum, esse beneficio, & irasci, & ignoscere posse, inter amicum & inimicum discrimen nosce, leges rem surdam & inexor abilem esse, salubriorem melior emque inopi quàm potenti; nihil laxamenti nec veniae habere simodum excesseris: periculosum esse in tot humanis erroribus sola innocentia vivere: The king (they said) to be a man of whom thou mayest obtain something where need is, in right or wrong: favour to be able to do something with him, as desert also, who knew both how to be angry, and to grant pardon: as also to put a difference betwixt a friend and a foe: as for the law it to be but a deaf and inexorable thing, whholsomer and better for the beggar than the gentleman; to have no release nor mercy, if thou shalt once transgress the same: it to be a very dangerous thing in so many men's frailties, to live only upon a man's innocency: Thus much Livy. After that the laws of the Twelve Tables were made, where amongst others there was one very popular, and quite contrary unto the command and power of the nobility, and was this, Privilegia nisi commitijs centuriatis ne irroganto: qui secus faxit, Capital esto, Let no privileges be granted but in the great assemblies of the estates: who so shall otherwise do, let him die the death. By which strict laws the judges and magistrates for a time so governed the people, as that there was no place left for pardon or arbitrary judgement, to be given according unto equity and conscience without law. As it also happened, after that king Francis the first had subdued Savoy, the new Governors and Magistrates oftentimes gave judgement contrary unto the custom of the country, and written law, having more regard unto the equity 
Nothing more contrary unto the minds & proceed of favourable or corrupt judges, than to have their judgements bound unto the strictness of the law.  of causes, than unto the law. For which cause the estates of the country by their ambassadors requested of the king, That from thenceforth it should not be lawful for the Governors or judges, to judge according unto arbitrary equity: which was no other thing, than to bind them unto the strict laws, without turning either this way or that way, than which nothing can be more contrary unto the minds and proceed of favourable or corrupt judges. And therefore Charondas the Carthaginensian lawgiver (a man very popular) forbidden the magistrates in any thing, to departed from the words of the law, how unjust soever they seemed for to be. Francis Conan Master of the Requests, being commanded to hear the aforesaid ambassador of the Savoyans, writeth himself to have greatly marveled, that they should request so unreasonable a thing: as viz. That it should not be lawful for their magistrates to judge according to the equity of the cause, but the strictness of the law: and reprehendeth also D. Faber, for saying, That in this realm there are none but the sovereign courts, which can judge according to the equity of the cause: saying moreover, That he himself doubted not so to do, when as yet he was the lest judge in France. Howbeit that the ambassadors thought their judges by the strict observing of the laws, to be better kept within the compass of their duties, if the colour of equity being taken away, they should still 
The good council of Accursius unto unlearned judges.  judge according to the very law. Accursius not so elegantly as aptly unto that he meant it, willed the unlearned judges, strictly to stand upon the very words of the law: like unskilful riders, who doubting to be able to sit the horse they are mounted upon, for fear of falling hold fast by the saddle.  
But for the better understanding and explaining of this matter, it is to be considered, that the word Equity is diversly taken. For Equity referred unto a sovereign prince, is as much as for him to declare or expound, or correct the law: but referred unto a magistrate or judge, is nothing else, but for him to assuage and mitigat the rigour of the law: or as occasion shall require aggravat the too much ●…enitie thereof: or else to supply the defect thereof when as it hath not sufficiently provided for the present case offered, that so the purport and meaning of the law saved, the health and welfare both of the laws and Commonweal may be respected and provided for. In which sense not the sovereign 
How even the meanest judges may have power to judge according to the equity of the cause without law.  courts only, but even the lest judges of all have power to judge & pronounce sentence according unto the equity of the cause; whether it be by virtue of their office, or that the proceeding before them is by way of request; or that the prince hath sent them some commission, or other letters of justice for such their proceeding, which they may either accept or reject: following therein the laws of our kings, and the clause of the letters carrying these words, So far forth as shall seem right and just: or that the prince by his express rescript or edict committeth any thing unto their conscience by these words, Wherewith we charge their conscience: as often times we see those things which for the infinite variety of causes, cannot by laws be provided for, to be by the prince committed unto the religion and conscience of the magistrates, without any exception of such judges or magistrates: in which case the lest judges have as much power as the greatest: and yet nevertheless they cannot (as may the sovereign courts) frustrate appeals, neither quite and clean absolve and discharge the accused, but only until they be commanded again to make their appearance in judgement, after the manner and form of the Lacedæmonians (as saith Plutarch) when they are any way attainted of crime: neither can they also relieve, or hold for well relieved, a man appealing 
Many things in judgements lawful for the greater magistrates or judges, which are not lawful for the lesser.  from a judge royal: nor other such like thing. Neither is it any novelty, many things to be in judgement lawful for the greater magistrates or judges, which are not lawful for the lesser: when as in the Pandects of the Hebrews we read it to have been lawful only for the court of the wise and grave Senators (which they properly call Hacanim, and corruptly Sanadrim) to judge of causes according unto equity: but not for the other lesser judges also. 
The judgebound unto the very words of the law, is not yet thereby embarred to use the equity of the law or yet the reasonable exposition thereof   
But now whereas by the orders and customs of all the cities of Italy, it is provided, That the judges may not serve from the very words of the law, excludeth not thereby either the equity, or yet the reasonable exposition of the law: as Alexander the most famous lawyer of his time, according to the opinion of Bartholus, answered: who in that respect put no difference betwixt the great magistrate and the little. For that to say truly, the law without equity, is as a body without a soul, for that it concerning but things in general, leaveth the particular circumstances, which are infinite, to be by equality sought out according to the exigence of the places, times, and persons: whereunto it behoveth the magistrate or judge so to apply the laws, whether it be in terms of justice, or in matter of estate, as that thereof ensue neither any inconvenience nor absurdity 
That the magistrate aught not to break the law although it seem unto him hard.  whatsoever. Howbeit yet that the magistrate must not so far bend the law, as to break the same, although that it seem to be right hard: whereas it is of itself clear enough. For so saith Ulpian, Dura lex est: sic tamen scripta, An hard law it is (saith he) but yet so it is written. A hard law he called it, but yet not an unjust law: for why, it is not lawful rashly to blame the law, of injustice. But yet it is another thing, if the law cannot without injury be applied unto the particular matter that is in question: for that in this case (as the lawyer saith) the law is by the decree of the magistrate to be qualified and moderated. But when he saith the Magistrate, he sufficieutly showeth that it belongeth not unto the other particular judges so to do, but only unto the Praetor, as granted unto him by the Praetorian law, at the institution of his office: whereby power was given him to supply, expound, and correct the laws.  
But forasmuch as that greatly concerned the rights of sovereignty, princes afterwards 
To whom it belongeth to correct the law.  (the Popular estate being taken away) reserved unto themselves the expounding and correcting of the laws, especially in cases doubtful, arising betwixt the Law and Equity; about the true understanding and exposition of the law. And therefore the judges and governors of provinces, in ancient time doubting of the law, still demanded the emperors advise and opinion, when as the case presented, exceeded the terms of equity arising of the law: or that which seemed unto them just, was contrary unto the positive law: in which case if the prince were so far off, as that his exposition was not in time convenient to be had; and that to delay the cause, seemed unto the estate dangerous; the magistrates were then to follow the very words of the law. For that it belongeth not unto the magistrate to judge of the law (as saith a certain ancient Doctor) but only to judge according unto the law: and for that in doing otherwise, he shall incur the note of common infamy. And to this purpose I remember that Bartholemew, one of the Precedents of the inquiries in the parliament of Thoulouze, in that the councillors of his chamber, his fellow judges, would have given judgement contrary unto the law: he having caused all the rest of the judges of the other courts to be assembled, by an edict then made at the request of the king's subjects, compelled the judges his fellows, in their judgements to follow the law: Which law when it should seem unto the court unjust, they should then for the amending thereof, have recourse unto the king, as in such case had been accustomed: it being not lawful for the judges sworn unto the laws, of their own authority to departed therefrom, seemed they unto them never so injust or injurious. Whereby it appeareth the magistrate to stand as it were in the middle betwixt the law and the equity thereof: but yet to be himself in the power of the law, so as is equity in the power of the magistrate: yet so as nothing 
The magistrate to be in the power of the law, so as is equity in the power of the magistrate.  be by him deceitfully done, or in prejudice of the law. For why, it beseemeth the judge always to perform the duty of a good and innocent upright man. For where I say that cases forgotten by the lawmaker, and which for the infinite variety of them, cannot be in the laws comprised, are in the discretion of the magistrate, it is yet still to be referred unto equity, and that the judge aught still to be (as we said) an upright and just man, not in any thing using fraud, deceit, or extortion. Wherein Alexander the most famous lawyer seemeth unto me to have been deceived, in saying, That the judge which hath the arbitrary power to judge according to his own mind, may if he so please judge unjustly: an opinion contrary unto the law both of God and nature, and of all other lawyers also rejected: who are all of advise, That a judge having arbitrary power to judge according to his own good liking, is not to be fined, howbeit that he have unjustly judged: provided that he have therein done nothing by fraud or deceit. And by the law of Luitprand king of the Lombard's, it is set down, That the magistrate shall pay forty shillings for a fine, if he judge contrary unto the law, the one half unto the king, & the other half unto the party: but if he shall unjustly judge in that belongeth unto his place and office without law; he is not therefore to be fined: provided yet that he have therein done nothing fraudulently or deceitfully: as is yet also observed and kept in all the courts and benches of this realm. Howbeit that the ancient Romans thus held not themselves content, but caused their judges to swear, Not to judge contrary unto their own conscience: and still before that they pronounced sentence, the Crier with a loud voice cried out unto them, Ne se paterentur sui dissimiles esse, That they would not suffer themselves to be unlike themselves; as saith Cassiodore. And in like case the judges of Greece were sworn to judge according unto the laws: and in case there were neither law nor decree, concerning the matter in question before them, that then they should ●…udge according unto equity, using these words, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Whereunto that saying of Seneca alludeth, Melior videtur conditio bonae causae si ad judicem quàm si ad are bitrum quis mittatur: quia illum formula includit, & certos ter minos ponit: huius libera, & nullis astricta vinculis religio, & detrahere aliquid potest & adijcere, & sententiam suam non prout lex aut justitia suadet: sed prout humanit as aut misericordia impulit regere, The estate of a good cause (saith he) seemeth better, if it be referred unto a judge, rather than to an arbitrator: for that the prescript form of law encloseth him in, and prescribeth unto him certain limits and bounds; whereas the others free conscience, and bound to no bonds, may both detract and add something, and moderate his sentence, not as law and justice shall require, but even as courtesy and pity shall lead him. Which so great a power the wise lawmakers would never have left unto 
Why so many things are by the wise lawmakers left unto the conscience and discretion of the judge.  the judges, had it been possible to have comprehended all things in laws: as some have been bold to say, That there is no case which is not contained in the Roman law: a thing as impossible, as to number the sand of the sea, or to comprehend that which is in greatness infinite, in that which is itself contained within a most little compass, or as it were within most straight bounds shut up. And therefore the court of parliament at Paris, fearing lest men should draw into the consequence of laws, the decrees that it should make; caused it to be registered, That if there were any notable doubt, or that the matter so deserved, their decree or sentence should not be drawn into consequence, or be in any wise prejudicial, but that it might be lawful in like case to judge otherwise: & that for the infinite variety of things doubtful: whereby sometimes it cometh 
How it cometh to pass, that even contrary or most unlike judgements may be given of the same or very like cases, and yet both just.  to pass even contrary, or most unlike judgements to be given even of the self same or very like cases, and yet both most just: as sometimes it chanceth two travelers coming from divers countries, to arrive at the same place, by ways altogether contrary. Neither aught the judges or lawmakers to join their reasons unto their judgements or laws, a thing both dangerous and foolish, as giving thereby occasion unto the subjects, to forge thereof new suits and delays, or exceptions of error, or otherwise 
That the reasons of laws and judgements aught not to be unto them joined  to deceive the laws. And that is it for which the ancient laws and decrees were most briefly set down, and as it were but in three words, which so cut off all the deceits that could against the same laws be imagined or devised. Wherhfore it is a most pernicious thing, to gather together the decrees or judgements of any court, to publish the same, with out having read them in the records themselves, or knowing the reasons that induced the court to make the decree, which the judges oftentimes cause to be recorded apart from the sentence or judgement, lest any should be thereby deceived. Howbeit that it is a thing of itself also very dangerous, to judge by example and not by laws, such judgements being still to be changed even by the lest and lightest variety and change of the circumstances, of the persons, or of the places, or of the times: which infinite varieties can in no laws, no tables, no pandects, no books, be they never so many or so great, be all of them contained or comprehended. And albeit that Solon was wrongfully blamed for making so few laws, yet Lycurgus nevertheless made 
Few laws made by the ancient lawmakers.  fewer, yea so few as that he forbade them to be at all written, so to have them the better remembered; leaving most part of causes unto the discretion of the magistrates. As did also Sir Thomas Moor chancellor of England, leaving in his Utopia all penalties, excepting the punishment for adultery, unto the discretion of the magistrates: than which nothing can (as many think) be better or more profitably devised, so that the magistrates and judges be still chosen not for their wealth and substance but for their virtue and knowledge. For it is most apparent even to every man's eye, that the more laws there be, the more suits there are about the interpretation thereof. 
More laws, more suits, and more fees.   
Wherhfore Plato in his books of Laws, forbiddeth laws to be written concerning the execution of the law, or concerning jurisdiction, traffic, occupations, injuries, customs, tributes, or shipping. Which although we cannot altogether be without, yet might we of such laws cut off a great part. Which is also in this realm of France to be seen, which hath in it more laws and customs than all the neighbour nations; and so also more suits than all the rest of Europe beside: which began then especially to increase, when as first king Charles the seventh (as I suppose) and other kings after him, to the imitation of justinian, commanded heaps of laws to be written, with a whole train of reasons for the making of the same: contrary unto the ancient manner of the laws and wise lawmakers: as if his purpose had been rather to persuade than to command laws. And this is it for which a certain crafty corrupt judge (whom I remember to have been banished for his infamous and bad life) seeing a new edict or law (whereafter he still gaped) brought to be confirmed, commonly said, Behold ten thousand crowns in fees, or as some others say, Behold more suits and heaps of gold. 
The Frenchmen much given to suits in law.  For why, the Frenchmen are so sharp witted in raising of suits, as that there is no point of the law, no syllable, no letter, out of which they cannot wrist either true or at lest wise probable arguments and reasons, for the furthering of suits, and troubling even of the best judges of the world. Howbeit the just and upright judge, which shall not be constrained to cell by retail what others have bought in gross, may with a right few and good laws govern a whole Commonweal: as was in Lacedemonia, and other flourishing Commonweals to be seen, who but with a few laws right well maintained themselves; others in the mean time with their Codes and Pandects being in few years destroyed, troubled with seditions, or with immortal suits and delays. For we oftentimes see suits of an hundred years old, as that of the County de Raise, which hath been so well maintained, as that the original parties and the beginners thereof are dead, and the suit yet alive: Not unlike that old woman Ptolomais, of whom Suidas speaketh, who so long, and with such obstinacy of mind and delays maintained her suit, that she died before that it could be ended.  
Now certain it is, that of the multitude of laws, with their reasons annexed unto 
The cause of the multitude of suits in France  them, and in this realm published since the time of Charles the seventh, is come the heap of suits; not so many being to be found in a thousand years before, as have been within this hundred or sixscore years, and yet all forsooth full of reasons: howbeit that there is not one reason set down in all the laws of Solon, Draco, Lycurgus, Numa, 
Not reasons annexed unto the untient laws.  nor in the Twelve Tables, neither yet commonly in the law of God itself. And howbeit that some may say, That the infinite multitude of people which aboundeth in this realm, may help to increase the multitude of suits: so it is▪ that there were a great many more in the time of Caesar, and yet more than there was then about five hundred years before, as he himself writeth in the sixt book of his Commentaries. And josephus in the Oration of Agrippa, saith, That there were above three hundred nations in Gaul: And yet nevertheless Cicero writing unto Trebatius the lawyer (than one of Caesar's lieutenants) merely saith, him to have gained but a few in France to his occupation. Wherhfore they which have brought in such a multitude of laws, as thinking thereby to cut up all deceit by the roots, and so to restrain suits: in so doing imitat Hercules, who having cut of one of Hydraies heads, see seven others forthwith to arise thereof. For even so one doubt or suit being by law cut off▪ we see seven others of new sprung up, of that heap of words and reasons without reason heaped together in persuading of the law: it being indeed a thing impossible in all the books of the world to comprehend all the cases which may happen, and ten thousand suits arising upon every reason of the law given. So that Seneca thereof said well, Nihil mihi videtur frigidus quàm lex cum prologo: iubeat lex, non suadeat, Nothing (saith he) seemeth unto me more cold, than a law with a prologue: let the law command, and not persuade: except the reason of the law be from it inseparable. And howbeit that the Decemuiri, 
By laws to provide for all inconveniences, a thing impossible.  or Ten Commissioners, appointed by the Romans to reform the laws, and to establish new, had twelve tables comprehended whatsoever could by man's wit be foreseen: saying and thinking also them to have therein comprised all occurrents that might happen: yet shortly after they found themselves far from their account, and so many things to be wanting in those their laws, as that they were enforced to give power to the Provost of the city, to amend the laws, to heap laws upon laws, to abrogat the greater part of the laws of the twelve tables: and in brief to leave unto the magistrates discretion the greater part of the judgements concerning men's particular causes or interest. And howbeit also, that in respect of public causes, they did what they might to have shut up the judges within the bars and bonds of the laws, yet so it was, that in fine they seeing the inconveniences which continually fell out in all matters, in seeking to do equal justice to all men, according to the Arithmetical proportion, were constrained (after that the Popular estate was changed into a Monarchy) to make a great Provost in the city of Rome, to whom they gave power accordingly to judge of all the crimes committed in Rome, and within forty leagues round about the city: which power was also given unto the Proconsul's, and other governors of provinces every one of them within the compass of his own jurisdiction. Now he which extraordinarily judgeth of offences, is not in his judgements bound or subject unto the laws, but may give such judgement as shall seem unto himself good; provided yet that he therein exceed not measure, as saith the law: which measure consisteth in the Harmonical proportion which we have before spoken of.  
Yet such extraordinary power by the prince given unto the magistrates, whether it 
Many degrees of extraordinary power, by the prince gran●…ted unto the magistrate.  be for judgement, or for managing of wars, or for the governing of a city, or for any thing else doing, hath many degrees: for either his power is given him next unto the prince, greater than which none can be: or else power is given him by virtue of his office, so that he may judge as he seethe cause, or else may judge in such sort as might the prince himself; which power little differeth from the highest, and such as can in no wise by the highest magistrate unto another magistrate or Commissioner be given. But if in the prince's rescript or commission it be contained, That the appointed magistrate shall judge of the cause in question according as reason, equity, religion, or wisdom, shall lead him, or some other such mean of speech, in all these cases it is certain, that his power is still limited and referred unto the judgement of an honest man, and the terms of equity: whereunto the prince himself aught to refer all his own judgements also. Wherein many are deceived, which think it lawful for the prince to judge according to his conscience; but not for the subject, except it be in matters and causes criminal: in which case they are of opinion, that the magistrate may as well as the prince judge according to his conscience: which if it be right in the one, why is it not right in the other? and if it be wrong in the one, why should it not be so in the other? when as 
Not lawful for any man in judgement to serve from equity and conscience.  indeed it is lawful for no man in judgement to serve from equity and conscience, and that injury like an Ape is always like unto itself, filthy still, whether it be clothed in purple, or in a pied coat. And in judging it is one thing to be freed from the law, and another to be freed from conscience.  
But if the variety of a fact in question be not known but unto the prince himself, or 
Whether a prince or magistrate may be judge of a fact the truth thereof being unto none other known but unto themselves alone.  magistrate alone; neither the one nor the other can therein be judge, but witnesses only: as Azo (the great lawyer) answered unto the Governor of Bolonia Lagrasse, who without any other witness had seen a murder done, telling him, That he could not in that case be judge. Which self same answer was also given unto king Henry the second of France, by the judges who were extraordinarily appointed to judge of divers causes at Melun, where the king having himself taken an Italian (one with whom he was familiarly acquainted) in a fact deserving death, committed him to prison; who soon weary of his imprisonment, preferred a request unto the judges, That for as much as he was not convict of any crime, neither yet so much as by any man accused, he might therefore as reason would, be discharged and set at liberty. Whereupon Cotellus chief judge of the court, with three other of the judges went unto the king, to understand of him what occasion he had for the imprisonment of the man, or what he had to lay unto his charge? Whom the king commanded to be forthwith condemned, for that he himself had taken him in such a fact as well deserved death, which yet he would not discover. Whereunto the chief judge answered, Nos iurati sumus, nisi sceleris convictum, & ex animi nostri sententia damnaturos esse neminem, We are sworn (said he) to condemn no man except he be of some capital crime convict, and according to our conscience. With which answer the king (otherwise a most courteous and gentle prince) much moved, for that the judges seemed to doubt of his fidelity and credit, deeply swore, That he himself had taken the villain in a fact deserving death. Wherhfore Anne Montmorancie Great Constable of France, perceiving the judges to be bound by their oath, to judge but according unto the laws, and that in performing the kings command they should rather seem manquellers and murderers, than upright judges: taking the king a little aside, persuaded him to defer the execution of the man until night, lest the people might hap to be troubled with the novelty of the matter. And so the guilty party the night following was by the commandment of the king thrust into a sack, and in the river drowned. Yea the same king also in a civil cause, served but as a witness in the great suit about the inheritance of George of Amboise, where he was before the judges sworn as a private man, and his testimony accounted but for one. Wherhfore Paulus Tertius was not without cause blamed, for that he being Pope, had caused a certain gentleman to be put to death, who had confessed unto him (being then a Cardinal) a secret murder by him done: which thing yet the same gentleman afterward constantly denied him to have either said or done. Howbeit it were much better and more indifferent, the prince or the magistrate to judge according unto their consciences in civil, than in criminal causes: for that in the one, question is but of men's good; whereas in the other still men's fame, yea oftentimes their lives, and whole estates is in danger: wherein the proofs aught to be more clearer than the day itself.  
But yet the difference is right great, and much it concerneth, whether the magistrates in their judgements be bound unto the laws or not, or else be altogether from the laws lose & free: for that in the one, question is only of fact; but in the other, of law, equity, and reason, and especially when question is of matter of great importance or consequence, and wherein the law is to be expounded: which in ancient time was given in 
The exposition of the law, to whom it was by the law of God reserved.  Rome unto the Great Provost, as we have before said; but by the law of God was reserved unto the High Priest; or unto him that was by God chosen to be sovereign judge of the people: or in their absence unto the Levites. Which power in the latter times of the jews Commonweal (and about two hundred years before Christ, under the latter princes of the house of the Asmoneans) was by custom, but not by law, given unto the Senate of the wise Sages. As amongst the Celts our ancestors, the Priests and Druids, for that they were the makers of the sacrifices, and keepers of the holy rites, were made also the keepers and guarders of justice, as of all other things the most sacred. The precedent or chief of which Druids (as Ammianus reporteth) still carried about his neck a precious stone, hanging down unto his breast, with the picture of Truth engraven in it. Which most ancient custom of the Hebrews, and of 
The exposition of the laws, and the deciding of most high and difficult causes both in Asia and Africa, reserved unto the Maho●…tan Priest.  the Egyptians, even yet continueth in all Asia, and in the greater part of Africa also, viz. That the Priests should have justice in their hand, and the▪ Great Bishop the exposition of the Laws, and the deciding of the most high and difficult causes. So the Great Bishops, whom the Turks call their Muphti, hath himself alone the expounding or declaring of the doubts arising of the obscure laws, especially when question is betwixt the written Law and Equity itself. Which exposition of such doubtful laws, the Roman emperors reserved unto themselves, as proper unto the sovereignty of their imperial majesty. So the Persian kings had also their Muphti, as the sanctuary both of their public and private laws, who was still resiant in the great city of Tauris. So had the Tartar's theirs in the famous city of Samarcand: and the kings of Africa every one of them their Great Bishops also: who at Athens were called Nemophylaces, and in other places Thesmothetae. Whereby it is to be understood, that such masters and interpreters of equity when law ●…aileth, aught still to be most wise and upright men, as also in most high authority and power placed.  
And now verily if the laws of Arithmetical justice might take place but even in 
Arithmetical justice unfit to be used even in private judgements.  private judgements only, as when question is of the exchange of things, than no doubt should in such private judgements be seen, but all the question should consist in fact only: so that no place should be left for the opinion of the judges, neither yet for equity, things being holden and shut up within most strict and straight laws: which we said could not be done, and if it could, yet will we forthwith show the same to be most unfit and absurd. But yet first let us show, that public judgements neither can nor aught to 
Geometrical pro portion of justice in public or penal judgements, not to be admitted.  be handled or made according to the Geometrical laws or proportion of justice. Which never to have been before done, is manifest by all the laws which carry with them amercements or fines, which are to be found in the laws of Draco, Solon, or of the Twelve Tables: as also by the laws and customs of the ancient Saliens, Ripuaries, Saxons, English, and French men, where almost all the penalties are pecuniary, and the same fines most often indifferently set down as well for the rich as for the poor, according unto equal Arithmetical justice. All which laws were to be repealed if pecuniary amercements and fines were according to the opinion of Plato, after the Geometrical proportion of justice, to be of the offenders exacted. These words also, Ne magistratibus mulctam poenamue lenire liceas, That it should not be lawful for the magistrate to mitigat the fine or penalty: a clause most commonly annexed unto all penal edicts and laws; were to no purpose, but to be quite omitted, & the matter left unto the discretion of the magistrate, at his pleasure to aggravat or ease the fine or penalty. Yea that law common unto all nations, whereby it is provided, That the party condemned not having wherewith to pay the fine due for the fault by him committed, should satisfy 
An objection against Arithmetical proportion in exacting of fines.  the same with corporal punishment to be inflicted upon him, were also to be abrogated and taken away.  
But here perhaps some man will object & say, It to be great injustice to condemn a poor man in a fine of 65 crowns, for a foolish rash appeal by him made unto any the higher courts (as the manner with us is) and yet to exact no greater fine for the same offence of the richest of all. For why, Geometrical proportion of justice, which exacteth sixty crowns for a fine, of him which is in all but worth an hundred crowns, requireth threescore thousand crowns of him which is worth an hundred thousand crowns. For that the like Geometrical proportion is of threescore to an hundred, that is of threescore thousand to an hundred thousand. Thus we see the rich man by Geometrical proportion of justice, to be much more grievously fined than the poor: and so contrariwise the Arithmetical proportion of justice, in the imposing of penalties and fines, to be the means for the rich to undo the poor, and all under the colour of justice. Which inconveniences our ancestors foreseeing, by laws gave leave unto the judges, beside the ordinary fines, to impose extraordinary fines also upon offenders, if the weightiness of the cause so require: which manner of proceeding the ancient Greeks also used, calling this extraordinary manner of amercement or fine, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, as Demosthenes writeth, and which is yet used by the Roman laws: which draweth 
Harmonical proportion of justice best.  very near unto the true Harmonical justice, if by the same laws it were permitted unto the judges, or at leastwise unto the sovereign courts to diminish also the fine, having regard unto the equality and condition of the poor and simple, as they always do in the parliament at Rouen. And whereas the receivers of the fines requested of the the king, That it might be lawful for the judges to increase, but not to diminish the fines imposed upon such as should rashly appeal▪ Liso●…res the Precedent, and D, Amours the king's Attorney, were deputed & sent from the parliament at Rouen unto the king, to make him acquainted with divers things concerning the demain, & general reformation of Normandy (wherein I then was a party for the king) and amongst other things, to request him, That it might please his majesty, not to constrain them to condemn all such as should rashly appeal unto the superior courts, in the self same fine of threescore pound Paris: which unto me seemed a thing unreasonable, having also in ancient time before been done, by an edict of the emperor Claudius. In which doing the true Harmonical justice should be observed and kept, which in part equal, in part semblable, are alike; there should be an equality betwixt men of the middle sort of wealth, according to the Arithmetical proportion of justice: and a Geometrical proportion also betwixt the great lords and the poorer sort: Whereof the former should in this case be left unto the disposing of the law, and the other unto the conscience and discretion of the judges. For there is nothing more unjust, than the perpetual equality of 
Nothing more unjust, than the perpetual equality of fines and punishments.  fines and punishments. For proof whereof let the law but lately made by king Charles the ninth concerning apparel, serve for an example: whereby a fine of 1000 crowns was imposed upon all such as should either much or little transgress the same, without respect of any the offenders ability, age, or condition: with prohibition for the judges in any sort to mitigat or lessen the same. Which law concerning all men in general, and yet made by Arithmetical proportion of justice, was shortly after by the iniquie of itself rend in sunder, and by the magistrates themselves, as well as by other private men neglected. Whereas the law of Philip the Fair concerning apparel was much more just and indifferent, as near approaching unto Harmonical justice: and appointing divers punishments, according to the diversity of the offenders; as unto a Duke, an Earl, a Baron, and a Bishop, a fine of an hundred pound, the Banaret fifty pound, the Knight and petty Landlard forty, Deans, Archdeacon's, abbots, & other clerks, having dignities or ecclesiastical preferments, 25 pound: unto the other lay men offending, of what estate soever they were, if they were worth a thousand pound, was appointed a fine of twenty five dound: and if they were worth less, they were to pay an hundred shillings: the other clerk without dignity or promotion, were they secular or religious that offended against the law, paid the fine of an hundred shillings, as did the others, Wherein we see unequal punishments appointed for persons unequal, following therein Geometrical justice: and yet for all that we see also equal punishments for persons unequal, following therein Arithmetical justice: and both the one and the other so mixed together, as that thereof ariseth also that Harmonical justice which we so much seek after. The same proportion is observed in the law, allowing of every man's apparel and attire also: as where it is said, That no woman citizen should wear a chain: also that no bourgesse or common person of either sex, should wear any gold or precious stones, neither girdles of gold, nor any crown of gold or silver, or any rich furs; which is not forbidden the nobility, and yet in them also there is some difference: as in that it is said, That the Duke, the County, the Baron, which hath six thousand pound land, may make themselves four new suits of apparel in a year, but no more; and their wives as many: and gownemen, and clerk, which have no dignities nor preferments, should not make them gowns of cloth above sixt●…ene shillings the elne Paris; & for their followers not above twelve shillings. Many other such like articles there were, and yet was there no mention neither more nor less either of silk or velvet, or other such like thing. So that he which would in 
Geometrical proportion of justice not possible to be kept in the making of penal laws.  penal laws particularly keep Geometrical justice, in setting down the penalties according to the equality of the offences, and ability of the offenders, shall never make penal law: For that the variety of persons, of facts, of time, and place, is infinite and incomprehensible; and such as should always present unto the judges, cases still much unlike one of them unto another. So also the perpetual equality of penalties according 
Arithmetical equality in the appointing of penalties, unreasonable and unjust.  to Arithmetical proportion, is as unjust and unreasonable, as if a Physician should prescribe the same medicine to all diseases: as is to be seen by the laws of the Romans concerning the charges to be bestowed at feasts & banquets: whereby the morsels were equally cut unto all even alike, and the penalty also equal without respect of rich or poor, of noble or base: amongst whom yet it had been no hard matter to have kept the Geometrical proportion, as nearest unto true justice, every man's wealth being with them enrolled in the Censors books: whereas with us at this present it were a thing most hard, or rather impossible so to do▪ as having no Censors, by whom men's wealth might be reasonably known. But the Popular estate of the Roman Commonweal still sought after the Arithmetical equality of laws and penalties. Which equality the estate being changed into a Monarchy, the princes by little and little changed, and so moderated the penalties before upon the nobility imposed; as is by the rescript of Antoninus Pius unto the governor of one of the provinces to be seen: who had in hold a noble gentleman convict before him, for murdering of his wife by him taken in adultery: wherein he willed him to moderate the penalty of the law Cornelia; and if the murderer were of base condition, to banish him for ever, but if he were of any dignity or reputation, that then it should suffice to banish him for a time.  
Now it is a notable difference in terms of justice, that the quality and condition of the person should in judgement deliver him from death, who should otherwise have been condemned: for the murderer saith the law, aught to be put to death, i●… he be 
The quality and condition of the person to be in the making o●… penal laws, and inflicting of punishments much respected.  not a man of some dignity and honour. And the Law Viscellia willeth that the stealers of beasts, if they be slaves, should be cast unto the wild beasts; but if they were freemen, they should be beheaded, or condemned into the mines: but if they were of any nobility, it should then suffice to banish them for a time. In like sort also, that the burners of villages or houses should be given unto the beasts, if they were men of base condition: but if they were of any noble house, then to be beheaded, or else confined. And generally, the slaves were ever more severely punished, than were men by state and condition free: for these were never beaten with rods, or with small cudgels, whereas the slaves were still beaten with clubs, or else whipped with whips made of small cords. Howbeit that Plato saith, That the free Citisen aught to be with greater severity punished, than the slave; for that as (saith he) the slave is not so well taught as is he: which his opinion savoureth indeed of a Philosopher, rather than of a judge or of a Lawyer; yea the law of God delivereth from death the master, who in too severe correcting of his slaves, shall by chance kill him. And therefore it aught not to seem strange, if the father were by the people of Rome openly stoned, for whipping his son with whips as a slave, as Valerius writeth. And indeed amongst free borne men, the Citisen is less to be punished than the stranger, the noble less than the base, the magistrate less than the private man, the grave and modest less than the vicious and dissolute, and the soldier less than the countryman. We must not (sayeth Labeo the Lawyer) suffer a base fellow to enter an action of fraud against a man of honour and dignity: neither an obscure and lose prodigal man against a modest man of good government; yea the ancient Romans never condemned any Decurion, or Captain of ten men (for what fault soever he had committed) into the mines, or to the gallows. The night thief saith the law, if he shall with weapon stand upon his defence, is to be condemned into the mines; but men of reputation and quality offending, to be only for a time banished, and soldiers with disgrace cassiered. Neither 
Geometrical pr●… po●…tion of punishing, common almost unto all people.  must we think this Geometrical manner of punishing to have been proper unto the Romans, or to any other people in particular only, but to have been common almost unto all other people also, as namely unto the French, the Saliens, the English, and the Ripuaries: and yet must we do as do the barbarous Indian's, which for the same offences set down most grievous punishments as well for the noble as the base, without any proportion at all; and yet in the manner of the executing thereof make great difference: for of the base sort they cut off their noses and ears, and for the same offence cut off the noble men's hairs, or the sleeves of their garments: a common custom amongst the Persians', where they whipped the garments of the condemned, and in stead of the hair of their heads, plucked off the wool of their caps.  
Neither are we to stay upon the opinion of Aristotle, who would Geometrical 
Aristotle his opinion concerning the execution of Geometrical and Arithmetical justice, rejected.  justice to take place in bestowing of rewards, and dividing of spoils: but Arithmetical justice equally to be executed in the inflicting of punishments, which is not only to overthrow the principles of Philosophy, which will that things contrary, as reward and punishment, should be ordered by the same rules, but also the resolution of all the greatest Lawyers and Lawmakers that ever were: with whom also the Canonists, 
Nobility in penalties to be inflicted, favoured even for the virtues of their ancestors: and the injuries unto them done, more severely punished  the Orators, the Historiographers, and Poets in opinion agreed, and have always more easily punished the noble than the base sort: (howbeit that the most easy punishment of all may unto a noble man seem most great) that so others may be the more inflamed unto virtue, and the love of true nobility, when as they shall understand the remembrance of the infinite rewards of the virtue of most famous men, and such as have well deserved of the Commonweal being also dead, yet still to redound unto their posterity. But here I measure nobility by virtue, & not by money, the flower of youth, the prince's favour, or evil means whatsoever obtained. The ancient nobility of M. Aemilius Scaurus (as saith Valerius) saved his life even in flourishing time of the Popular estate: which respect of nobility was yet much better kept after the change of the estate; for than they began by little and little to behead the nobility with a sword, after the manner of the Northern people, in stead that the Romans before used the hatchet in the execution of all sorts of men. And for that the Centurion sent to execute Papinian (the most famous lawyer, Traian the emperors near kinsman, and before proclaimed the defender both of the emperors and of the empire) had with an hatchet cut off his head, he was therefore sharply reproved by the emperor Caracalla, telling him, That he aught to have executed his command with a sword, as which had less pain, and also less infamy. Wherein Govean the lawyer was deceived, who writeth more grief to have been in the execution with the sword, than with the hatchet, Men die (saith Seneca) more easily with no kind of death, than being beheaded with the sword. And by the same reason and proportion of justice, he that wrongeth a noble man is more grievously to be punished, than he which wrongeth a common person; & he which doth injury unto a citizen, than he which doth injury unto a stranger. For in the laws of the Salians, if a Saxon or Frizlander had any way wronged a free borne Salian, he was almost four times more grievously fined, than if a Salian had wronged a Saxon or a Frizlander. So also by the laws of Alphonsus the tenth, king of Castille, a wrong done unto a noble man was fined at five hundred shillings, and a wrong done unto a common person at three hundred. And by the like law of Charles the Great, he that had slain a subdeacon was fined at three hundred shillings, if a deacon at four hundred shillings, if a priest▪ at five hundred, if a bishop at nine hundred: which penalties (the authority of the bishops being increased) were doubled. I here speak not of the equity or iniquity of these laws, but use them only as examples, to show that Arithmetical justice by the laws of many nations, neither hath had, neither yet aught to have place, when question is of fines and punishments; and that men of honour, and of mark, aught more easily to be punished, and their injuries more severely revenged, than those done to the common sort: whereat they yet oftentimes grudge & murmute, and think themselves to be therein greatly wronged. Yea Andrew Riccee a Polonian writeth it to be a great injustice, That the nobility offending are not punished with the same punishment that the common people are; the rich as the poor, the citizen as the stranger, without any respect of degree or persons: than which nothing could be more absurdly written, of him which would take upon him to reform the laws and customs of his own country and Commonweal. The like complaint was against N. Memmius Master of the Requests in court, for that he being by the king appointed judge in the trial of Vlmeus the precedent, had suffered the man convicted of most capital crimes to escape the punishment thereunto due, and yet had condemned his clerk to be hanged, who had but done his masters commandment: Which king Francis understanding, merirly said, thieves by a wicked consent to relieve one another. Howbeit that Memmius a man most famous not only in his issue, but also for his wealth, honours, virtue, and deep knowledge in the law, is relieved even by the equity of his sentence; whereby he deprived the said precedent of all his honours and goods, and afterward having caused him to be most shamefully set upon the pillory naked, and marked in the face with an hot iron, to be banished. But for that his clerk and domestical servant, and minister of such his villainies, was but a base and obscure fellow, having neither goods nor office to lose, neither much regard of his good name, he could not otherwise worthily be punished than by death, having so well deserved the same. Whereas had he been his slave, he had been more to have been favoured, for that then he must of necessity have obeyed his master. Neihad the precedent been so grievously punished, had he not being a judge, unto his most base and corrupt dealings joined also most shameful forgery and extortion, and that in the administration of justice, which he had as then in keeping. For this prerogative hath always by our ancestors been reserved unto the nobles, and such as otherwise are in honourable place, That being for any offence or crime condemned to die, they should not therefore be hanged, for the infamy of the punishment: wherein all writers agreed. Howbeit that concerning other punishments they are not all of one opinion, Seneca (as we said) accounting heading for the easiest: and the Hebrews in their Pandects, in the 
Hanging the most shameful death, heading the easiest, stoning the most grievous.  Title of Punishments, appointing stoning for the most grievous, the second burning, the third beheading, and the fourth strangling. Howbeit that they deem him most infamous, and by the law of God accursed, which is hanged on the tree.  
and in this Bartholus (the famous lawyer) is deceived, saying, That the manner and custom in France, was to hung the noble or gentlemen condemned: and that that punishment was not there accounted villainous or infamous, seeing that in his time (which was in the reign of Philip the Long, about the year of our Lord 1318) the nobility of France was as famous and as honourable, as the nobility of any place of the world. Yet true it is, that the noble man which is a traitor unto his prince, deserveth to be hanged; so to be more grievously punished than the base companion, who offendeth not 
Noble man for treason against their sovereign prince, why to be more severely punished than other meaner persons.  so much as he, as not so straightly bound to preserve the life and estate of his prince. For the more a man is obliged and bound in fidelity unto his prince, the more grievously he is be punished above the common person: Viri fortes (saith Cicero speaking of Catiline the rebel) acerbioribus supplicijs civem pernitiosum quàm acer bissimum hostem coercendum putant, Worthy men (saith he) judge the dangerous citizen to be with greater punishment chastised, than the cruelest enemy that is. And therefore Livy saith, the fugitive traitors during the Carthaginensian war, to have been more severely punished, than the fugitive slaves: and the Roman traitors more sharply than the Latins, who were then still beheaded, but the Roman traitors hanged. Howbeit that in all other offences the Romans were more easily punished than others. For Scipio Africanus (saith Florius) caused the Roman soldier not keeping his rank, to be beaten with a vine, but other soldiers with a truncheon or cudgel of other sadder wood: the vine (as saith Pliny) being the dishonour of the punishment.  
Yet whereas we said, That the punishment of noble men aught to be more easy than the punishment of the base and obscurer sort, that so others might be the more stirred up unto virtue; it is a common opinion, and almost of every man received: but not yet altogether true. For that in right Geometrical proportion, the noble man for 
The noble man for his offence having lost his honour and reputation, to be as grievously punished, as the common person that is whipped.  his offence having lost his honour and reputation, is as grievously indeed punished, as is the base companion that is whipped, who cannot indeed of the honour and reputation which he hath not, lose any thing: as children and women are no less hurt with a soft ferula, than are the strong with cudgels or whips. And therefore Scipio commanding the Roman soldiers to be beaten with the vine, even for the same cause for which he commanded the Latin soldiers to be beaten with cudgels, followed therein the equality, or rather the Geometrical proportion of punishment. For which cause Galba the emperor caused the Gibbet to be painted white, and set higher than the rest, to lessen the pain of a citizen of Rome, complaining that he should be hanged as other thieves were: howbeit that he had poisoned his pupil. So if a Physician or an Apothecary shall poison a man, he is more grievously to be punished than if another man had done it. And so in the same proportion of justice, the judge which doth injury, the 
He which offende●…h in his own vocation, or in such things as wherewith he is put in trust, to be therefore more severely punished than other offending in the same.  priest which committeth sacrilege, the notary or register which committeth forgery, the goldsmith which coyneth false money, the guardian which ravisheth his pupil, the prince which breaketh his faith and league; and generally whosoever offendeth in his own vocation, and in such things as whereof he is himself a keeper, aught to be therefore the more grievously punished than others: for that his offence is therein the more grievous. And therefore Metius the Dictator of the Alban, was by the commandment of Tullus Hostilius, with four horses drawn in pieces, for having broken his faith with the Romans. And Solon having caused his laws to be published, and sworn by all the Athenians, appointed the Areopagits to be the keepers and interpreters thereof; and if they should break the same, to pay therefore a statue of gold of the weight of themselves. Now had Aristotle himself never so little a while been a judge, or looked into the laws of his country, he would never have written, That the equal Arithmetical justice were to be observed and kept in the inflicting of punishments: but that in all things, and especially in matters of punishments, the Geometrical proportion of justice were much better and more tolerable; as nearer unto the Harmonical justice which we seek after, being partaker of both. Neither by this Harmonical 
Harmonical justice to be indeed unto all men indifferent, howbeit that at the first show it seem more favourable unto some than unto others.  proportion is more favour showed unto the noble than unto the base, howbeit that unto many it seem contrary. For proof whereof, let it be, that a rich man and a poor being guilty of the self same crime, the rich man is in show more grievously fined than the poor: howbeit that in truth the one is not more heavily fined than the other, but both of them indifferently according to their wealth and ability. There is with us a most ancient law extant, whereby the poor common persons which make resistance against the magistrate commanding them to be apprehended, are fined at threescore shillings; but the noble man at a thousand and two hundred. And for that money is 
Fines oftentimes to be changed, according unto the variety of times and places.  more plenty in one place than in another, and in this our age than in ancient time, wise lawmakers have been constrained to change their pecuniary punishments or fines, according to the variety of times & places. In the flourishing time of the Roman Commonweal, & namely under Traian the emperor (who is reported to have extended the bounds of that great empire farthest) he was by the law accounted a poor man, which was not worth fifty 
* A crown was then as much worth as the Ro●…e noble is now. Who was by the ancient Roman laws to be accounted a poor man.  crowns, that is to say a crown of gold. Which decision of the Romans, the Hebrews in their Pandects following, have forbidden all them that are so much worth to beg. The customs of France in many places, call him a poor man, who with two or three witnesses of his own parish, hath sworn himself to be poor.  
But when the laws of the Twelve Tables were made, the poverty of men was so great, as that he was accounted a right rich man, which was worth a pound of gold. And therefore the Decemuiri by those laws set down a fine of twenty five Asses, or small pieces of brass, for him which should with his fist give any man a blow upon the face: which was an heavy penalty (as the world than went) for that it was by Arithmetical proportion indifferently exacted of all men alike. But after that men's wealth increased, one Neratius a rich fellow (as the time than was) and most insolent 
The insolency of Neratius, the cause why the laws of injuries were changed in Rome.  withal, took a pleasure to give such as he thought good, as he met them in the streets, a good and sound buffet or box; on the ear and so by and by commanded a slave, which carried a bag full of such small coin after him, to pay unto him whom he had so strucken twenty five of those small brazen pieces, the ●…ine set down in the xii Tables: which was the cause that the law was abrogated, and order taken, that from thenceforth every man should esteem the injury unto himself done yet with power still reserved unto the magistrate, to do therein as should seem unto him reasonable. Whereby it was then plainly perceived and known Arithmetical proportion not to be good in the imposing of penalties and fines. So also by the ancient customs of the Normans, he that struck a common person with his fist, was fined at a shilling; but he that struck him with his open hand, was to pay the fine of fi●…e shillings: but were he a gentleman that had received such injury, he was not to redress the same by law, but by force of arms and combat: whereby it oftentimes came to pass, that he which had before received the injury, was also in the quarrel slain, without any punishment therefore, and that by the sufferance of the law. The like we may say of the Athenian law, which condemned him in an hundred crowns fine, which should presume to 'cause a galliard to be danced in the Theatre: which Demades the Orator well knowing, 
Demades at Athens wilfully transgres●…eth the law, and pai●…th the fine.  yet to make his plays which he gave unto the people more gracious, amongst the musicans brought in also upon the stage a dancing trull there to dance; yet before she entered, paying the aforesaid fine of an hundred crowns by the law set down, which was indeed nothing else but a mockery of the law, and a cause for others also to tread both it and the rest under foot. Which inconveniences the Polonians to avoid (for that almost all the penalties of their laws are fines in money) always join unto their laws these or like words, Lex haec quia poenalis est annua esto, This law for that it is penal let it be but for a year in force.  
But beside these changes of penalties and fines, some others have been constrained 
Penalties & fines sometimes changed into corporal and capital punishments, and why.  to change such pecuniary penalties or fines into corporal, yea even into capital punishments also: and that especially when the country groweth rich, so that men begin to contemn the fines, or that the offence groweth too common: in which cases the Hebrew lawyers are of opinion, That the penalties of the laws are to be increased, and punishment with rigour executed. And therefore the law of the Britons appointeth thieves to be hanged, yielding therefore this reason, Ne eorum a●…geatur multitudo, Lest the multitude of them should be increased. An unjust law indeed, and the reason thereof foolish; and such a law as by the antiquity of itself is almost grown out of use, for that it hath no distinction either of place, or of the equality of the persons offending, or of the age, or of the sex, or of the time, or of the felony committed; but punisheth all felons alike. When as in all executions of punishments, the lighter offences are the more lightly to be punished, yea and oftentimes also pardoned: as only in respect of age, the indifferent and equal law would that men should in all judgements pardon youth, or at leastwise more easily punish it. So aught the judges also 
Why women are more favourably to be punished than men.  more favourably to chastise women than men: either for that their passions are more vehement than men, or that for want of reason, discretion, and learning, they are less able to govern their affections: or for that they be more tender and dainty, and therefore have the sharper feeling of punishment than men. Which being so, a man may deem the law of the Venetians unjust, which for the first felony committed, condemneth 
The iniquity of the Venetian law in the punishing of women.  the woman to be whipped, and marked with an hot iron; and after that her hand cut off: and for the second offence, to have her nose and lips cut off: whereas the man by the same law, and for like fact, is to loose but one of his eyes and his hand. By which law women, contrary unto equity, are more severely punished than men: & the means whereby to get their living being taken from them, they both have more occasion to steal than before whilst they had their limbs. Wherhfore better it were according to Arithmetical justice (howbeit that in matters of penalties it be unjust) to punish them both alike: or else according to Geometrical justice, which cometh much nearer unto the true Harmonical justice, which hath regard in particular to all the circumstances concurring. But that law and judge is very un●…ust, which more severely punisheth the tender and feeble, young folks or women, the sickly or old, than the strong and lusty. And in brief all laws carrying with them penalties certain, and 
All laws carrying with them penalties certain, which may not ●…y the judge or magistrate be in some sort moderated or aggravated, to be unjust.  such as it is not lawful for the magistrate according to the exigence of the cause, to moderate or aggravat, are unjust. Wherein even the wisest and best experienced may well be deceived, if they have not this Harmonical justice still before their eyes. For where is there in the world so great wisdom, so great justice, such a number of learned lawyers, as in the court of parliament at Paris? who yet without any restriction or limitation at all, published a law against falsi●…ierss and forgers, made by king Francis the first, whereby capital punishment was appointed for forgery, whether it were in civil or criminal causes, without distinction of forgers, ●…udgess, clerk, notaries, soldiers, or plain country men. Which law for all that by the wise connivence of that court is since grown out of use: howbeit that the penalty thereunto annexed yet remaineth to terrify forgers withal: whom for all that the court punisheth with arbitrary punishment, according to discretion, and not according to the rigour of the law, in such sort as that scarcely one of fifty is condemned to die. For why, the same court shortly after perceived the intolerable inconveniences and absurdities which that law drew after it, punishing with death him that had falsified but the lest schedule of an hundred shillings, as well as him that had falsified the decrees of the court, or the king's seal, or borne false witness to condemn the innocent; as also for a mere civil cause, where question were but of five shillings: and all without regard or difference of persons. Neither is the law of Venice any better or upright, which appointeth no less punishment for falsifying and forgery, than the cutting out of the tongue: without any distinction of the manner of the forgery, or respect of the degree, sex, or age of the offendor, or other circumstances whatsoever. But the law of Milan savoureth more of equity and Harmonical justice: for it willeth, That he which forgeth or falsifieth an act, or beareth false witness in a matter which exceedeth not twenty crowns, shall for the first time be condemned in four times the value, and three days shamefully to be carried about with a paper mitre upon his head: and for the second time to have his hand cut off: and for the third time to be burnt. But if the cause exceeded twenty crowns, and so unto the sum of five hundred, that then he should for the first time have his hand cut off, and for the second time be burnt. But if so be that the matter exceeded five hundred crowns, that then the judge for the first time might deal with him according to his discretion, but that for the second offence the forger should be burnt. Wherein both the Geometrical & Arithmetical proportion of justice are in some sort mixed, as in the measure and proportioning of the fine: but without any regard of sex, age, or condition, which it beseemed a lawmaker especially to have marked. The law of God (of all 
The false witne●…▪ how he is by the law of ●…od to b●… punished.  other laws the best) commandeth the man convict of false witness bearing, to endure so much loss himself, as he would have done hurt unto the other: as if he would by his false witness take from another man an hundred crowns, he should be forced himself to pay the self same sum: or if he went about by his false testimony to take away another man's life, that he himselfelfe should therefore lose his own life: as for the rest they were referred unto the conscience of the judges. Neither is it enough for this equality of punishment to answer as did Draco the Athenian lawgiver, who being asked, Why he appointed death as well for stealing of an apple, as for kill of one's father: answered, That he would have appointed a more grievous punishment for kill of a man's father, if he had known any punishment worse than death. But Lycurgus left all kind of punishment, yea and that concerned every man else as well in public as in private judgements, unto the discretion of the magistrates: whom he doubted not to excel in all fidelity and integrity, so long as they should keep his laws and customs: but yet haply fearing that in restraining of the magistrates power unto the straight bonds of laws and penalties, should so fall into such absurdities and difficulties of judgements, as we have before spoke of: and wherewith they are i●… Popular estates, but especially in Italy, much troubled. By the law of the Venetians he that shall so strike any man, as that he shall draw blood of him, is therefore to pay twenty five pound: but if he kill him, he is therefore to be hanged. Which law if it might every where take place, how many men should we found like unto Neratius, who upon such a price would sound buffe●… and bastinado such as they liked not of, as they met them. But how much more wisely did the emperor Adrian in like case take order, appointing 
The wise law of Adrian the emperor.  him that went about to kill a man, although indeed he killed him not, to be therefore worthy of death: and yet that he which had indeed slain a man, without any purpose so to have done, should be therefore acquitted. For that offences are to be weighed 
Offences how they are to be weighed and punished.  according to the will and purpose of the offendor, and not according to the event of the fact: howbeit that the purpose and endeavour is more easily to be punished, than the effect and deed itself; and the conceit of a villainy less than the villainy itself done: wherein all the divines with the lawyers agreed. Howbeit that in truth he more grievously offendeth against almighty God, which persuadeth another man to do a villainy, than he which doth it: for that beside the wickedness first by himself conceived, he leaveth also the lively impression thereof engraven as it were in another man's hart: whereas he which of himself doth amiss, carried headlong with the force of lust or anger, seemeth scarcely to have been willing to have done it: and he which hath against her will enforced an honest woman, whom he could not otherwise persuade, yet leaveth her soul and spirit pure and clean. But judges do one way punish and 
judges and Philosophers diversly do consider offences.  consider of offences, and Philosophers another: they punish such offences and transgressions only as are sensibly to be seen, and which a man may as it were with his finger touch, and such as trouble the common rest and quiet: but these men (viz. the Philosophers) enter even into the most secret thoughts & cogitations of men's minds: wherein Sir Thomas Moor, sometime Chancellor of England, is also deceived, who maketh the intent equal to the effect: and the will unto the deed done.  
But if an offence be not only intended, but effected also, and so the effect joined 
Arithmetical justice not to be used in the punishing of offences  unto the intent; we must not in the punishing thereof use Arithmetical proportion of justice: as in the law of Milan, he that shall without the city steal the value of a crown or more, is therefore to be put to death; but if less, the punishment is left unto the discretion of the judges: and yet for all that in this realm he is punished with death as a thief which hath by the high way rob any man, whether he had money or none: as I have indeed seen one hanged for taking but eighteen pence from a traveler by the high way. The Roman laws command notable thieves and robbers to be hanged, and so left hanging upon the gibbet: which then was accounted the most grievous punishment: but they than by the word Latro, understood him whom we call an Assasin, or Murderer, which killeth men upon the high way: but as for him which but robbeth passengers, the law calleth him Grassatorem, and willeth him also to be condemned to death, but yet not hanged as the murderer. Which we have here the more precisely set down, to note the error of Accursius and some other the learned lawyers, who call him also Latronem, or a robber, whom the Latins call Furem, or a thief; making them as it were all one: and having in part therein given occasion for men to punish thieves with more grievous punishment than haply were meet and convenient, viz. with death.  
The like absurdity is seen almost in all the laws of Italy: as in that of Venice concerning 
The unreasonable law of the Venetians for the punishing of thef●….  theft, which willeth to put out one of his eyes which shall steal any thing worth above five pound, unto ten; and from ten unto twenty, to put out one of his eyes, and to cut off one of his hands: and from twenty unto thirty to put out both his eyes, and from thirty to forty to lose his eyes & an hand: but if he shall steal above the sum of forty pounds, then to be punished with death. An unreasonable law truly, not only for the rigour and hardness thereof, and the confused manner of the persons so to be equally punished, but even in this respect also, that he which having the means out of a great mass of gold, to steal a thousand pounds, and yet contenteth himself with fifty, shall therefore be punished with death: and he that breaketh an empty chest, with an intent to have taken away a great sum of money if he could, shall yet escape unpunished. The same punishments almost are also set down by the law of Parma. Yet hath it oftentimes seemed unto me a thing right strange, why some which use so severe punishment against thieves, yet punished murders but by fines in money. For we see plainly, that the pain of death is too cruel to revenge a simple felony, and yet not sufficient to restrain the same: and yet the punishment of him that doth both rob 
Equality of punishment for unequal offences, the occasion to ha●…s the greater offences committed.  and kill, to be but like: in which doing he hath more surety to commit the murder, as also more hope to conceal the same. So that where the punishment for theft and murder is alike, there it is more saftetie to kill a man, than simply to rob or steal. And yet more strange and absurd are the laws of the Polonians, the Danes, the sweden, and Moscovites, and especially the law of Casimir the Great, king of Polonia, which for 
An unreasonable law for the punishing of murder.  the fine of thirty crowns, acquitteth one gentleman that hath slain another: and if he have maimed him of an arm or of a leg, then to be acquitted for fifteen crowns. But if a base fellow shall kill a gentleman, the fine is double, and if he shall kill a base or common person, the fine is but ten crowns, without any other corporal punishment, although he had lain in wait to kill him. Which impunity for the kill of men being suffered, or rather by law allowed, innumerable murders thereof ensued. Howbeit that afterwards the kingdom increasing in wealth, the penalty of the law was doubled in the reign of Sigismond the first, and order taken, that the murderer being apprehended, should beside the fine be also kept prisoner in the common gail for a year and six weeks. But that which was in that law worst of all, and the head of all mischief, was, that after three years the offendor might prescribe against the murder by him committed, whatsoever it were: neither could the lord which had slain his vassal farmer (whom they call K●…eton) be therefore either civilly or criminally called into question or sued. For a like edict or law made at Milan (at such time as the Torresans held that signory) whereby it was decreed, That a gentleman might for a certain fine be acquitted for the kill of a base or common person: the common people therewith enraged, rise up all in a mutiny, & having driven out the nobility possessed themselves of the signory. As for the author of the law Napus Tarresan, he by them cast in prison, there miserably died eaten up with louse, and that worthily, for having therein so much contemned the law of God, which forbiddeth to have pity upon the wilful murderer, commanding him to be drawn even from his sacred altar and put to death: yet leaving unto the discretion of the magistrate the manner of his execution, according to the greatness of the murder committed; to the end that the equality of capital 
Hainou●… offences to deserve more grievous punishments.  punishment common to all murderers by Arithmetical proportion of justice, should so by Geometrical proportion be moderated, having respect unto the circumstances of the place, of the time, and of the persons, which are infinite. For men right well know, that he which wilfully killeth a man (as lying in wait for him) is more grievously to be punished, than he which killeth a man in his rage and choler: and he which killeth by night, more than he which killeth by day: and he which poisoneth a man, more than he which killeth him with the sword: and the murderer by the high way worse than those: as also he that shhall kill a man in a sacred place, more than in a profane: and before his prince, more than in any other place: (which is the only irremissible case, by the laws of Polonia) & he that shall kill the magistrate executing of his office, more than if he were a private man: and he that shall kill his father, more than he which shall kill the magistrate: and he which shall kill his prince, more than all the rest. Of which variety of cases ariseth an incredible variety of capital punishments to be upon the offenders inflicted. The same we may say also of such persons as are still under the guard and protection of other men, of whom they cannot possibly be ware; as the pupil of his tutor, the wife of her husband, the sick patiented of his physician; the guest of his host, betwixt all whom faith is much more required: in which cases the murderers are still more grievously to be punished. As in like case the breakers of houses, and they which by ladder's clime into houses by night, deserve to be more severely punished, than such as shall steal in, the doors standing wide open. And therefore in Tartary and Moscovie the lest theft of all is punished with death: for that there are but few towns and houses for them to keep themselves and their goods in. And in the West Indies, before the coming of the Spaniards, the thief was still alive upon a sharp stake impaled, for whatsoever theft it was. For why, all their gardens and grounds are bounded about but with a third, beyond which to pass was accounted a great crime: and yet greater than that it was to break the third; and that in secret also than openly and in every man's sight. Howbeit that in other crimes, as whoredom, adultery, incest, and such other like, the offences publicly committed, are more severely 
Open offences to be openly punished.  to be punished, than such as are secret done: for that the evil example and scandal thereof, is worse than the offence itself. Wherein both the divines and layers all agreed.  
All these circumstances, with a million of others like of divers sorts, cannot all after one fashion be cut, or by the self same law be judged, according to the unequal equality of Arithmetical justice: neither can they in special laws and articles be all comprehended, were the volume of the law never so great: so as is in Geometrical justice requisite, which leaveth all unto the magistrates discretion, without any law at all. And yet for all that is this Geometrical justice less unjust than the other, which leaveth nothing unto the power and authority of the judge, more than the examination of the fact, and the numbering of a sort of beans, as at Athens: or of tables of divers colours, 
Arithmetical equality in the administration of justice, and the punishing of offences, the cause of great injustice.  with letters of absolution or condemnation set upon them, as at Rome: or of certain balls and lots, as at Venice: without any power to judge at all. For why, it is the law, and not the judge, which appointeth the same punishment for all: of which equality of justice ariseth the greatest injustice, some such being condemned, as deserved much less than the penalty of the law being equal unto all: and some others again acquitted, which deserved ten times more: besides that, sometimes also divers most unlike crimes some great, some less, and some almost none at all, are under one law passed, and so with the self same pain punished. As by seven articles of the Salic law, robbers, poisoners, adulterers, burners of houses, and such as have slain or sold a natural French man, or have digged up the body of the dead, are all condemned in the self same fine of two hundred shillings. Which law altogether overthroweth the foundation of justice, grounded especially upon that, That the punishment should still be equal unto the offence done. Which the ancients declared by this word, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, that is to say, The law of Retribution, or of equal punishment: which first written in the law of 
That the punishment aught to be equal unto the offence done.  God, set down in the laws of Solon, transcript into the laws of the Twelve Tables, commanded by the Pythagorians, practised by the Greek and Latin cities, and for the antiquity thereof reverent; is yet by Favorinus, Aristotle, and many others, without just cause impugned; they too grossly taking these words of the law, Atooth for a tooth, a hand for a hand, and an eye for an eye. For who is so simple, as to think, that he 
How the words of the law, A tooth for a tooth, a hand for a hand, and an eye for an eye, are to be understood.  which hath maliciously put out his eye which had but one, to suffer the like if but one eye be therefore taken from him also? Wherhfore he is to be quite deprived of his sight, that is to say, requited with like; which cannot be, but by putting out of both his eyes: except the blind man may otherwise be satisfied. As was decreed by the people of Locris, at the request of one which had but one eye, which his enemy threatened to put out, upon the penalty therefore to lose another of his own. Wherhfore then to tender like for like, is to make him also stark blind, who had made another man blind. So that to requited like with like, is indeed nothing else, but to punish offences with punishments answerable unto them: that is to say, great offences with great punishments, mean with mean, and so little offences also lightly: which they also meant, when they said, A hand for a hand, a tooth for a tooth, and an eye for an eye. And so the ancient Hebrews, the best interpreters of God his law, have understood it, expounded it, and also practised it: as is in their Pandects to be seen, in the Title of Penalties. Yea Rabi Kanan denieth the law of like punishment to have any where in the cities of the Hebrews taken place, in such sort, as that he should have an eye put out, which had put out another man's eye: but the estimation of the eye put out, was usually by the discretion of the judges in money valued. For proof whereof let it be, that before the law of like punishment, there was a 
* Exod. 21.  law, whereby it was ordained, That if two men fight, one of them should hurt another, but not yet unto death, he which had done the hurt, should pay the Physicians for the healing thereof. But to what end should he so pay the Physician, if he which did the hurt were in like sort to be himself wounded? It should also thereof follow more absurdly, that many delicate and tender persons, in receiving of such wounds as he had given to others, should thereof themselves die and perish. Besides that also, he which had the harm done him, having lost his hand wherewith he should get his living, if the others hand were also to be for the same cut off; he so wanting his hand wherewith to get his living, might haply so starve. Wherefore such a literal exposition of the law of like punishment, by Aristotle and Favorin devised, is but vain and deceitful. But Aristotle who so much blameth the law of like 
Arithmetical proportion of justice not indifferent in punishing of persons of condition and quality far unequal.  punishment, is himself in such errors entangled as he sought to eschew. For he saith, That in punishing of him which hath deceived his companion, or committed adultery, we are not to respect whether he were an honest man, or an evil liver before or not; but to punish the offence with Arithmetical equality, or Commutative justice, as he termeth it. But what indifferent equality shall that be of the same punishment, if it shall by Arithmetical proportion be inflicted upon persons of quality and condition so far unlike? Or what Shoemaker is so ignorant or foolish, as to shape one fashioned shoe, or of the same last, to every man's foot? Creditors also in time equal, but in the 
Arithmetical proportion of justice not to be admitted even in mere civil cau●….  sum of their debt unequal, are of the goods of their broken debtor to be paid by proportion Geometrical: as if thirty crowns be made of the goods of the broken debtor; he of the two creditors to whom there is but an hundred crowns due, shall receive ten crowns; whereas the other creditor to whom there is two hundred due, shall receive twenty: who if they were by Arithmetical proportion to be paid, should each of them receive fifteen. And yet in this case question is but of a mere civil particular cause resting in exchange; which in the opinion of Aristotle, is always by Arithmetical proportion to be ordered: which is not only in this case here propounded 
Aistotle impugned for saying, no regard aught to be had, whether the offendor we●…e before the offence committed, good or bad.  false, but even in all other also, wherein question is of that which unto every man properly belongeth, as we shall forthwith declare. Yet where Aristotle saith in punishing of offences no regard aught to be had, whether the offendor were before good or bad: it sufficiently showeth him to have had no knowledge of the order and manner of judgements, or of judicial proceed. For why, nothing is more diligently inquired after by the judges, than what the former life of the party accused hath been. Neither is it any new matter, when as the Persians', long before Aristotle's time, not only inquired after the whole lives of them which were accused (as yet they still do) but if their good deserts were greater than their offences, they fully acquitted them also: as Xenophon writeth. And for the same cause the thief taken in the third theft, is almost every where condemned to die, howbeit that the third theft be much les●…e than the first: and so he also which hath the more often offended, is more severely to be punished than he which hath more seldom go astray. Wherein Aristotle is again deceived, in that he deemeth a stolen thing aught by Arithmetical proportion to be made even with particular interest of him from whom it was taken or stolen. Whereas the laws of Solon, the laws of the Twelve Tables, and the emperors by their laws, condemn him which hath stolen any thing, to restore the double or the triple, yea and sometime four fold the worth of the thing stolen, beside the perpetual infamy thereof ensuing. Yea the law of God willeth, That for an ox stolen, restitution should be made ●…ive ●…old unto him from whom he was so stolen: both for that a more profitable beast is not by God given unto man, as also for the necessity there is to leave such beasts often times in the field: where they roaming up and down, have for their more assurance the greater penalty set upon them being stolen: and hereunto some other people have joined corporal punishment, yea even unto the pain of death.  
And not to speak of criminal causes only, but of mere civil causes also, one in the 
Arithmetical justice to fail even in mere civil causes.  self same fact gaineth the cause, & in another place looseth the same: one hath interest for his debt, and another hath nothing: and amongst them which shall in the same case have interest, some one shall pay ten times so much as another: which for that they be matters common unto all such as have any experience in judicial causes, there need not many examples; one therefore shall suffice for the manifesting of the matter. A Lapidary breaketh a diamond which he by covenant should have enchased in a ring; he is bound to pay the price of the stone be it never so great, yea although he therein have used no fraud or deceit, but even for that only that he took it upon him to do it as a workman: whereas yet had he been a man of another condition or occupation, he should not have paid the price of the precious stone so broken, except he had before taken the danger thereof upon him, or by fraud or deceit broken the stone.  
Now all the laws both ancient and new, with the common course and experience 
Harmonical justice to h●…ue place when question is bu●… of priva●… men's right and interest as well as when question is of penalti●… and fi●…eses.  of judgements, teach us that Harmonical proportion of justice aught as well to take place when question is but of private men's right and interest, and so in pure civil causes, as well as when question is of penalties and fines: as also that Arithmetical equality and proportion is therein most of all unjust. And therefore justinian the emperor publishing the law concerning usury, ordained, That the nobility should not take above five in the hundred, the merchants eight in the hundred, corporations and colleges ten, and the rest six in the hundred: and particularly that none should exact of the husbandman above five in the hundred. Which law let it seem in Aristotle his judgement unjust, yet doth it carry a good show of that Harmonical justice which we seek after, tempered of Arithmetical and Geometrical proportion: Arithmetical equality being therein observed amongst the noble men, who are all under one article comprised, the great, the meaner, and the lest: the merchants in another both rich and poor: and the country men in another article, howbeit that they much differ one of them from another: and the rest of the sub●…ects all in another article being of divers qualities and conditions also: And then the Geometrical proportion showing itself betwixt the nobility and the merchants, betwixt the merchants and the colleges, and again a certain of the other subjects compared among themselves, and with their superiors. And this proportion of Harmonical justice is also in some sort kept, and yet cut somewhat short by the law of Orleans, established by Charles the ninth at the request of the people: whereby the debtor condemned for money too long detained, is bound to pay after eight in the hundred interest unto merchants, and unto other less; but unto husbandmen, persons hired, and all sorts of labourers, the double of the money due: both the chief points of which law is now grown out of use, howbeit that it was with the greatest consent of the courts published. For why, that which concerneth every private man's right and interest, consisteth in matter of fact, & not in matter of law; as Paulus the lawyer most wisely answered, which his one reason hath even by the root overthrown all the long discourses of all the interpreters, so divers and so unlike themselves, concerning every private man's right and interest: all which justinian the emperor had thought himself to have been able to have comprehended under 
That which toucheth every private man's right & how far it concerneth him, is not possible to be set down in law, but better to be left unto the discretion of the judge.  one law. And therefore that which toucheth every private man's right and interest how far it concerneth him, is by our laws wisely left unto the discretion of the judges, for that it can no more certainly by positive law be defined or set down, than can the great Ocean sea into a small channel be enclosed or shut up. But yet the inequality is much greater in the law of Venice, which forbiddeth to take interest either in commodities or in money, above six in the hundred: which although it be a thing tolerable, and is called of the Latins Vsura civilis, or, Civil interest: yet is that law not so long ago made, now again grown out of use, and not either publicly or privately kept: for that it in every respect containing Arithmetical equality, regardeth not the most unlike condition and quality of persons.  
And howbeit that in the particular contracts and conventions, and exchange of 
Arithmetical proportion of justice not always observed even in particular contracts and conventions, wherein it is yet best of all to be liked.  things, that Arithmetical proportion of equality be best to be liked; yet is it not even therein always observed and kept, the very country men and labourers, by a certain natural reason well deeming, that they aught oftentimes to take less for their hire of the poor than of the rich, howbeit that they take as great pains for the one as for the other. So the Surgeon which taketh of the rich man five hundred crowns to cut him of the stone, haply taketh of the poor porter no more but five: and yet for all that in effect taketh ten times more of the poor man than of the rich: For the rich man being worth fifty thousand crowns, so payeth but the hundred part of his goods, whereas the poor man being but worth fifty crowns, payeth five, the tenth part of his substance. Whereas if we should exactly keep the Geometrical or Arithmetical proportion alone, the patient should die of the stone, and the Surgeon for lack of work starve: whereas now by keeping the Harmonical mediocrity, it goeth well with them both, the poor man cured with the rich, and the Surgeon so gaining wealth, and the other their health. After which proportion even the judges themselves have used to esteem their pains, and therefore to demand their honourable fees: which we see to have always been lawful for them to do, so that therein they exceed not measure. As I remember it to have happened unto a certain Provost of Paris, whose name I will 
Harmonical proportion to be used by the judges even in taking of their fees.  easily pass over, who for adjudging the lawful possession of a litigious benefice, having for his own fees set down thirty crowns, whereas his duty was but three, and appeal therefore by the party grieved made unto the higher court; was thither sent for; where he being by Ranconet Precedent of the court hardly charged for the wrong by him done: answered, That it was a good fat benefice that he had given sentence for: and that forasmuch as he did many such things for poor men without any fee at all, that it was but right and reason that the richer when they came should make him an amendss therefore in paying of him deeper fees. Whereunto the Precedent pleasantly▪ said, Him in so doing to serve them as his Tailor did him, who took of him twice as much for the making of him a velvet gown, as he did for making of him one of cloth. So the law of Milan, which appointeth, That the judge may for his fee take the hundred part of the value of the suit, so that he exceed not two hundred crowns, would seem unto Ranconet unjust: every corrupt judge so without any proportion at all, extorting from all men, what he saw good. For that such the suit may be for a slight matter but often crowns, as that therein oftentimes more pains is to be taken by the ●…udge than in a suit of ten thousand crowns: the merchant so still gaining by the rich, what he looseth by the poor.  
Wherhfore both in making of laws, and in deciding of causes, and in the whole 
Arithmetical proportion most necessary to be observed in the whole government of the Commonweal.  government of the Commonweal, we must still so much as possible is, observe and keep that Harmonical proportion, if we will at all maintain equity & justice: wher●… as otherwise it will be right hard for us in the administration of justice, not to do great wrong. As doth the law of inheritance, which adjudgeth all unto the eldest, whether he be noble or base; of ancient time used by Lycurgus in the inheritances of the Lacedæmonians, and with us in the country of Caux. Less unjust, and yet unjust too, is the law which giveth all the noble man's inheritance unto his eldest son; and an annuity of the third or of the fift part unto the younger brethren, for them to have during their, lives as they do at Amboise and Anjou; and yet dealing therein more favourably with the women, who hold that unto themselves in propriety, which the younger brethren have but for term of life. Neither is the custom of the Germane much less unjust, who having abrogated the old law, where of Tacitus maketh mention, divide the inheritance equally amongst their sons, making the eldest and the youngest both equal in the succession of their inheritance, according unto Arithmetical proportion, without any difference of persons at all. But how much more uprightly and justly hath the law of God dealt herein? which following the Harmonical proportion 
Harmonical proportion of justice even by the law of God observed in the conferring of inheritance, & inflicting of punishments.  of justice, giveth only unto the sons the land, and unto the daughter's part of the movables, or money to marry them with; to the end the houses should not by them be dismembered: and amongst the males alotteth two parts unto the eldest, and to the rest every one of them a part: and the father dying without heirs male, the same law commandeth the women to divide the inheritance indifferently amongst them, and yet to marry with the next of their house or tribe, that the land might not be carried out of their stock and kindred. Wherein Geometrical proportion is to be seen betwixt the eldest and the rest, as also betwixt the males and the females: and Arithmetical equality betwixt the younger brethren, as amongst the daughters also. So when it is said by the law of God, That he which hath deserved to be chastised or beaten, shall be punished according to the fault by him committed; yet is it by the same law forbidden to give him above forty stripes. Which law is made according to Harmonical justice: For why, it is left unto the discretion of the judge, after such a proportion, to judge unto forty stripes, according unto the equality of the persons and of the offences committed: Wherein the Arithmetical equality is also seen, in that it is forbidden the magistrate to exceed forty stripes, the certain number by the law appointed. Wherein he that hath the more offended, and yet hath not deserved death, is no more punished in this respect of forty stripes, than he which hath less offended. Whereof the law yieldeth this reason, lest the party condemned, lamed with many stripes, should so become unprofitable both unto himself and the Commonweal. For that it might have been objected, That he which more grievously offended, was the more grievously also to have been punished, even above the said number of forty stripes: howbeit that indeed it is better to stay within a measure, than through too much severity to do any thing unjustly, which unto us is a certain argument drawn from the law of God, That the true justice, and the fairest government, is that which is by Harmonical proportion maintained. 
The Aristocratique and Popular estates, not to be maintained by Geometrical or Arithmetical justice, without a mixture of Harmonical justice also.   
And albeit that the Popular estate more willingly embraceth the equal laws and Arithmetical justice: and the Aristocratike estate contrariwise loveth better the Geometrical proportion of justice: yet so it is, that both the one and the other are for the preservation of themselves constrained to intermingle with themselves the Harmonical proportion. Whereas otherwise the Aristocratical signory excluding the common people far from all estates, offices, and dignities, not making them in any sort partakers of the spoils of their enemies, nor of the countries conquered from them; it cannot be that the estate can so long stand, but that the common people being never so little moved, or never so small occasion presented, shall revolt, and so change the estate, as I have by many examples here before declared. And therefore the Venetian signory, which is the most true aristocraty (if ever there were any) governeth itself Aristocratically, bestowing the great honours, dignities, benefices, and magistracies, upon the Venetian gentlemen; and the meaner offices which have no power belonging unto them, upon the common people: following therein the Geometrical proportion of the great to the great, and of the little to the little. And yet to content the common people, the signory hath left unto them the estate of the Chancellor, which is one of the most worthy and most honourable places in the city, and perpetual also: and more than that, the offices of the Secretaries of the estate also, which are places very honourable. Yea moreover an injury done by a Venetian gentleman unto the lest inhabitant of the city, is right severely corrected and punished: and so a great sweetness and liberty of life given unto all, which savoureth more of popular liberty than of Aristocratical government. And that more is, the creation of their magistrates is made part by choice, and part by lot: the one proper unto the the Aristocratique government, 
The estate of Venice Aristocratique, and the government for most part Harmonical.  and the other unto the Popular estate: so that a man may well say, that the estate of that signory is pure and simply Aristocratique, and yet somewhat governed by Proportion Harmonical, which hath made this Commonweal so fair and flourishing.  
Now we have oftentimes said, and must yet again say (for that many have upon 
That the estate of a Commonweal may be of one sort, and yet the manner of government of another.  this rock suffered shipwreck) that the estate of a Commonweal may oftentimes be the same with the government thereof, but yet more often quite different from the same. For the estate may be Popular, and yet the government Aristocratical: as in Rome after the kings were driven out (we said) the estate of that Commonweal to have been Popular, for that then all the sovereign rights were in the power of the whole people in general; and yet the manner of the government of that city and Commonweal to have been from the Popular government most far different. For that the Senators alone enjoyed the great benefices, honours, dignities, and places of command: all the ways and entrances thereunto being by the nobility holden fast stopped up against the commonalty, yea and that so straightly, as that it was not lawful or permitted for any of the common sort to marry with any of the nobility; either for any noble woman to marry but with some one of the nobility, but the noble still marrying with the noble, & the base with such as themselves were: and the chief and principal voices which were given in their greatest assemblies of estate, and most regarded, were still taken by their wealth and years. So that the estate being then Popular, and the manner of the government Aristocratical, according to Geometrical proportion, the people oftentimes revolted from the nobility: neither was the estate ever quiet from civil tumults and seditions, until that the common people had by little and little got to be partakers also in the greatest benefices, honours, offices, and places of command, that were in the Commonweal: and that it was permitted them also to ally themselves in marriage with the nobility, as also to have their voices as well as they. And so long as this Harmonical government (that is to say intermingled with the Aristocratique and Popular estate) continued, the Senate yet bearing the greater sway, so long that Commonweal flourished both in arms and laws; but after that the government (through the ambition of the Tribunes) become altogether Popular, and as the heavier weight in a balance overweighed the lighter, all than went to wrack: no otherwise than as when the sweet harmony of music being dissolved, and the harmonical numbers altered into numbers of proportion altogether equal and like, thereof followeth a most great unpleasant and foul discord: the like whereof there raised amongst the citizens never ceased, until that the estate was quite thereby changed, and indeed utterly overthrown. So may we also judge of all other Commonweals; neither have we thereof any better' example than of the popular estates of the Swissers, which the more that they are popularly governed, the harder they are to be maintained, as the mountain Cantons, and the Grisons: whereas the Cantons of Berne, Basil, and Zuricke, which are governed more Aristocratically, and yet hold the Harmonical mean betwixt the Aristocratike & Popular government, are a great deal the more pleasing, and more tractable, and more assured in greatness, power, arms and laws.  
Now as the Aristocratical estate founded upon Geometrical proportion, and governed 
The Royal estate Harmonically governed, to be the fairest, the happiest, and most perfect.  also aristocratically, giveth unto the nobility and richer sort the estates and honours: and the Popular estate contrariwise grounded upon Arithmetical proportion, and governed popularly, equally divideth the monies, spoils, conquests, offices, honours, and preferments unto all alike, without any difference or respect of the great or of the little, of the noble or of the base and common person: So the royal estate also by a necessary consequence framed unto the harmonical proportion, if it be royally ordered and governed, that is to say, Harmonically; there is no doubt but that of all other estates it is the fairest, the happiest, and most perfect. But here I speak not of a lordly monarchy, where the Monarch, though a natural prince borne, holdeth all his subjects underfoot as slaves, disposing of their goods as of his own: and yet much less of a tyrannical monarchy, where the Monarch being no natural Lord, abuseth nevertheless the subjects and their goods at his pleasure, as if they were his very slaves; and yet worse also when he maketh them slaves unto his own cruelties. But my speech and meaning is of a lawful King, whether he be so by election, for his virtue and religion, by voice chosen, so as was Numa; or by divine lot, as was Saul; or that he have by strong hand and force of arms, as a conqueror got his kingdom, as have many; or that he have it by a lawful and orderly succession, as have all (except some few) who with no less love and care favoureth and defendeth his subjects, than if they were his own children. And yet such a King may nevertheless if he will, govern his kingdom popularly and by equal Arithmetical proportion, calling all his subjects indifferently without respect of persons unto all honours and preferments whatsoever, without making choice of their deserts or sufficiency, whether it be that they be chosen by lot or by order one of them after another: howbeit that there be 
A Royal estate, and yet governed Popularly and according to Arithmetical proportion.  few or rather no such monarchies indeed. So the King may also govern his estate or kingdom Aristocratically, bestowing the honourable estates and charges therein with the distribution of punishmehts and rewards by Geometrical proportion, making still choice of the nobility of some, and of the riches of others, still rejecting the base poorer sort, and yet without any regard had unto the deserts or virtues of them whom he so preferred; but only unto him that is best moneyed or most noble. Both which 
A Royal estate governed Aristocratically, and according to Geometrical proportion.  manner of governments, howbeit that they be evil and blameworthy, yet is this Aristocratique and Geometrical proportion of government much more tolerable and more sure, than is that popular and turbulent government, scarcely any where to be found, as nearer approaching unto the sweet Harmonical government. For it may be, that the king to assure his estate against the insurrection of the base common people, may have need to strengthen himself with the nobility, which come nearer unto his quality and condition, than doth the base artificers and common sort of people, unto whom he cannot descend, neither with them well have any society at all, if he will in any good sort maintain the majesty of his royal estate and sovereignty, as it seemeth he must of necessity do, if he shall make them partakers of the most honourable charges of his estate and kingdom. But such an Aristocratique kind of government is also evil and dangerous, not unto the common peaple only, but even unto the nobility & prince also: who may so still stand in fear of the discontented vulgar sort, which is always far in number more than is the nobility or the rich: and having got some seditious leader, and so taking up of arms, becometh the stronger part, and so sometimes revolting from their prince, driveth out the nobility, and fortify themselves against their prince's power: as it happened among the Swissers, and in other ancient Commonweals by us before noted. The reason whereof is evident, for that the common people is not bound by any good accord either with the prince, or with the nobility, no more than these three numbers 4, 6, 7: where the first maketh good accord with the second, that is to say, a fift: but the third maketh a discord, the most irksome and unpleasant that may be, marring wholly the sweet consent of the two first, for that it hath not any Harmonical proportion either unto the first or unto the second, neither unto both together.  
But it may be, and commonly so is, that the prince giveth all the greatest honours 
Geometrical proportion in distributing of offices, not good.  and preferments unto the nobility and great lords, and unto the meaner and base sort of the people the lesser and meaner offices only; as to be clerk, sergeants, notaries, petty receivers, and such other mean officers of towns, or of some small jurisdictions. Wherein he shall so keep the Geometrical proportion, and Aristocratical government. Which manner of government for all that is yet faulty, howbeit that it be more tolerable than the former Popular Arithmetical government, as having in it some equal and semblable proportion: For as the office of the Constable is proper unto a great Lord, so is also the office of a Sergeant unto a poor base fellow. But forasmuch as there is no sociable bond betwixt the prince and the porter; so also is there not any similitude betwixt the office of the Great Constable and of a Sergeant: no more than there is amongst these four numbers disposed by proportion Geometrical disiunct, 3, 6, 5, 10: where the two first have the same reason that the two last have, and the reason of the first unto third, is that of the second unto the fourth: yet the reason of the second unto the third is discordant and different from the others, and so disjoineth the extremes, which so maketh an absurd and foolish discord. And so also are the orders of citizens and subjects, disjoined one of them from another, so that no fast or sure band can be found amongst them. For that the nobility thinketh it an indignity for them to be busied with the small offices of the commonalty: and the common people again take it in evil part themselves to be excluded from the greatest honours of the nobility. As in Rome it was not otherwise lawful for any of the nobility, whom they called Patricij, to sue for the Tribuneship, but that first he must renounce his nobility, & become a commoner: for as then the Consulship belonged only unto the nobilie, and the Tribuneship unto the commonalty. Which power once granted unto the people, they forthwith let their weapons fall, and all the sedition & tumults before common betwixt them and the nobility ceased: For why, the common sort thought themselves now equal with the best, wherein the welfare of that city consisted: whereas otherwise the force of the furious multitude could by no violence have been withstood. For what the proportion was of the Consulship unto the Tribuneship, the same the proportion was of one of the nobility unto a commoner: & again, the same respect was of a noble man unto the Consulship, that was of a commoner unto the Tribuneship, in Geometrical similitude. But forasmuch as it was not lawful neither for a noble man to obtain the Tribuneship, neither for a commoner to enjoy the Consulship, the people was disjoined from the nobility, and a perpetual discord betwixt the Consuls and the Tribunes still troubled the city: in such sort, as in these numbers thus placed is to be seen, 2, 4, 9, 18: wherein are found two eights by Geometrical proportion disiunct, and which yet mixed together make the most hard discord that is possible, by reason of the disproportion which is betwixt 4 and 9, which is intolerable, and marreth all the harmony. So was there also almost a perpetual discord 
The reasons why the Consuls and Tribunes were always at discord in Rome.  betwixt the nobility & the people, until that the Consulship, the Censorship, the Praetorship, and the chief Benefices, excepting some few, were communicated unto the people also. Whereas might it with the same moderation have been lawful for the nobility to have obtained the Tribuneship also, yet so as that the number of the commoners in that society of the Tribunes might yet still have been the greater, and the nobles not enforced to renouce their nobility: no doubt but that the estate so Harmonically governed had been much the more assured, better ordered, and of much longer continuance than it was, by reason of the sweet agreement of the citizens among themselves, and that Harmonical mixture of the offices and places of authority and command in the estate and Commonweal: as in these four numbers by Harmonical proportion conjoined, is plainly to be seen, 4, 6, 8, 12: where the proportion of the first number unto the second, and of the third unto the fourth, is a Diapente, or a fift: and again the proportion of the first unto the third, and of the second unto the fourth, is a Diapason, or an eight: and the proportion of the second unto the third, a Diatessaron, or a fourth: which with a continual proportion joining the first with the last, and the middle to both, and so indeed all to all, bringeth forth a most sweet & pleasant harmony. But it was so far off, that gentlemen of ancient houses were in Rome received into the Tribuneship (if they first renounced not their nobility, and caused themselves to be adopted by some base commoner) as it was for the base commoners to aspire unto the Consulship: which they never did, except they had before obtained the greatest honours of the field, as did Marius; or else by their eloquence, as did Cicero; or by both together, as did Cato the Censor. Which yet was a matter of such difficulty, as that Cicero boasteth of himself unto the people, That he was the first new man (now they then called him a new man, who the first of his house and family had obtained honours) who of them of his rank had obtained to be Consul: and that the people under his conduct had cut in sunder and for ever after laid open for virtue that honourable place, which the nobility had before with strong garrisons holden, and by all means shut up. So that it aught not to seem strange if the Commonweal were then troubled with the seditions of the people, when as in such a multitude of the common sort, so few of them even in Cicero his time aspired unto those so great honours, the nobility of great and ancient houses commonly still enjoying of them. 
The Royal estate governed H●…rmo nically, the s●…rest and most perfect.   
Wherhfore it becometh a good governor in a Popular or Aristocratique estate, and especially a wise king in his kingdom, to use Harmonical proportion in the government thereof, sweetly intermingling the nobility with the commonalty, the rich with the poor; & yet nevertheless with such discretion, as that the nobility still have a certain pre-eminence above the base commonalty. For why, it is good reason that the gentleman excelling in deeds of arms and martial prowess, or in the knowledge of the law, as well as the base common person, should in the administration of justice, or in the managing of the wars, be preferred before him. As also that the rich in all other respects equal unto the poor, should be preferred unto such places and estates as have more honour than profit: and the poor man contrariwise to enjoy those offices and rooms which have more profit than honour: both of them so resting reasonably contented, he which is rich enough seeking but after honour, and the poor man after his profit. For which cause and consideration, the wise Roman Proconsul Titus Flaminius taking order for the Thessalian Commonweal, left the government and sovereignty of the towns and cities by him conquered, unto them of the richer sort and of best ability: wisely deeming, that they would be more careful for the preservation and keeping of them, than would the poor, who having not much to lose, had no great interest therein. Now if two or three magistrates were to be chosen, it were better to join a noble man with a commoner, a rich man with a poor, a young man with an old; than two noblemen, or two rich men, or two poor men, or two young men together; who oftentimes fall out into quarrels betwixt themselves, and so hinder one another in their charges: as commonly it happeneth betwixt equals. Besides that, of such a conjunction of magistrates of divers state and condition (as we now speak of) should arise this great profit, That every one of such magistrates would seek to maintain 
justice better administered by magistrates of divers sort & condition, than by men all of one estate and degree.  the prerogative & right of them of their own estate and such as themselves were: As in our sovereign courts, and in other corporations and societies also, by our customs composed of men of all sorts, we see justice and right to be commonly better, and more uprightly unto every man administered, than if they wholly consisted of noble men, or of commoners, or of clergy men, or of any one estate alone.  
But these things thus declared, it remaineth for us to know (as the chief point of 
The world to be made and governed also by Harmonical, and not by Geometrical proportion, contrary to the opinion of Plato.  this our present discourse) Whether it be true that Plato saith, God to govern this world by Geometrical proportion: For that he hath taken it as a ground, to show that a well ordered Commonweal aught (to the imitation of the world) to be governed by Geometrical justice: Which I have showed to be contrary, by the nature of the unity, Harmonically referred unto the three first numbers: as also by the intellectual power, compared unto the three other powers of the soul: and by a point compared to a line, a plain superficies, or other solid body. But let us go farther, for if Plato had looked nearer into the wonderful Fabric of the world, he should have marked that which he forgot in his Timeo, viz. The Great God of nature to have Harmonically composed this world of Matter and Form, of which the one is maintained by the help of the other, and that by the proportion of equality and similitude combined & bound together. And for that the Matter was to no use without the Form, and that the form could have no being without the matter, neither in the whole universal, neither yet in the parts thereof: he made the world equal to the one, and semblable to the other: equal unto the matter whereof it is made, for that it comprehendeth all: and semblable or like unto the form, in such sort as is the Harmonical proportion composed of the Arithmetical and Geometrical proportions equal to the one, and semblable to the other, being one of them separate from another unperfect.  
And as the Pythagorians sacrificed the great sacrifice Hecatomb, not for the sustendure of the right angle, which dependeth of the two sides (as many think) but for having in the selfsame figure found the equality and similitude of two other figures, the third figure being equal unto the first, and like unto the second: so do we also own the immortal everlasting sacrifice of praise and thanksgiving unto almighty God, for that he hath by an admirable bond of Harmony, bound together this world of matter and form, equal to the one, and like to the other: equal indeed to the matter, so that there is nothing thereof wanting, or yet superfluous: but yet like unto that everlasting form, which he the most wise workman had in his mind before conceived, before he made that so great and excellent a work: as we read in the holy * Scripture. 
●…ens. 1.   
And as for the motion or moving of the celestial Spheres, we see that God hath made one motion equal, which is the swift motion of the superior Sphere: and another unequal, which is the motion of the Planets (contrary unto the former:) and the third the motion of Trepidation, which containeth and bindeth together both the one and the other. And so if we should enter into the particular nature of other worldly creatures also, we should found a perpetual Harmonical bond, which uniteth the extremes by indissoluble means, taking yet part both of the one and of the other. 
The Harmonical bond wherewith the world and the parts thereof are indissolubly bound and united together.  Which coherence is neither agreeable unto Arithmetical nor Geometrical, but even proper unto the Harmonical proportion only: wherein the sweetness of the consent consisteth in tunes aptly mixed together: and the harsh discord, when as the tunes are such as cannot fitly be mingled together. So we see the earth and stones to be as it were joined together by clay and chalk, as in mean betwixt both: and so betwixt the stones and metals, the Marcasites, the calamities, and other divers kinds of mineral stones to grow: So stones and plants also to be joined together by divers kinds of Coral, which are as it were stony plants, yet having in them life, and growing upon roots: Betwixt plants and living creatures, the Zoophytes, or Plantbeasts, which have feeling and motion, but yet take life by the roots whereby they grow. And again betwixt the creatures which live by land only, and those which live by water only, are those which they call Amphibia, or creatures living by land and water both, as doth the Beaver, the Otter, the Tortoise, and such like: as betwixt the fishes and the fouls are a certain kind of flying fishes: So betwixt men and beasts, are to be seen Apes and Monkeys; except we shall with Plato agreed, who placed a woman in the middle betwixt a man and a beast. And so betwixt beasts and angels God hath placed man, who is in part mortal, and in part immortal: binding also this elementary world, with the heavens or the celestial world, by the ethereal region. And as a discord sometimes (as we said) giveth grace unto the sweetest Harmony▪ so God also hath here in this world mingled the bad with the good, and placed virtues in the midst of vices, bringing forth also certain monsters in nature, and suffering the eclipses and defects of the celestial lights: as also the Surd reasons in Geometrical demonstrations: to the end that there of might arise the greater good, and that by such means the power and beauty of God's works might be the better known, which might otherwise have been hid and folded up in most thick and obscure darkness. And therefore it is, that God having hardened Pharaoes' heart, which the wise Hebrews expound to be the enemy of God and Nature, saith thus unto him, Excitavi ego te ut demonstrarem in te ipso potentiae meae vim ac decus, ut toto terrarum or be gesta mea omnium una commemoratione praedicarentur, I have stirred thee up (saith he) that I might in thee declare the force & glory of my power, that so all my acts might with one report of all men be praised throughout the whole world. And these things truly belong unto the most true report of the things then done in Egypt: but there lieth hidden therein a more divine meaning than that, concerning the great Pharaoh, the worker and father of all mischief, whom the sacred Scriptures declare by the name of Leviathan: and yet in this all the divines agreed, this of all others the greatest enemy of God and man, to be still by the beck, word, and power of God, kept in and restrained: and all the force and power of those mischiefs and evils by him and his wrought (which we so much both fret and marvel at, and without which the power of the good should neither be, neither yet be at all perceived) to be shut up within the bounds of this elementary world: and above the same to be nothing but that which is holy and clean from all filth and wickedness; in such sort, as that that little stain of evils here shall much more profit than hurt. Whereof Augustine speaking, saith well, Qui Deum immortalem ullum mali dedecus perpessurum negat, nisi maius bonum consequi certo sciret, Who denieth that the immortal God would ever suffer any evil or wickedness to be done, but that he most certainly knoweth a greater good to ensue thereof. Wherhfore as of Triple and Base voices is made a most sweet and melodious Harmony, so also of vices and virtues, of the different qualities of the elements, of the contrary motions of the celestial Spheres, and of the Sympathies and Antipathies of things, by indissoluble means bound together, is composed the Harmony of the whole world, and of all the parts thereof: So also a well ordered Commonweal is composed of good and bad, of the rich and of the poor, of wisemen and of fools, of the strong and of the weak, allied by them which are in the mean betwixt both: which so by a wonderful disagreeing concord, join the highest with the lowest, and so all to all, yet so as that the good are still stronger than the bad; so as he the most wise workman of all others, and governor of the world hath by his eternal law decreed. And as he himself being of an infinite force and power ruleth over the angels, so also the angels over men, men over beasts, the soul over the the body, the man over the woman, reason over affection: and so every good thing commanding over that which is worse, with a certain combining of powers keepeth all things under most right and lawful commands. 
Almighty God in the government of the world, to be of all worldly princes imitated in the government of their estates and kingdoms.  Wherhfore what the unity is in numbers, the understanding in the powers of the soul, and the centre in a circle: so likewise in this world that most mighty king, in unity simple, in nature indivisible, in purity most holy, exalted far above the Fabric of the celestial Spheres, joining this elementary world with the celestial and intelligible heavens; with a certain secure care preserveth from destruction this triple world, bound together with a most sweet and Harmonical consent: unto the imitation of whom, every good prince which wisheth his Kingdom and Commonweal not in safety only, but even good and blessed also, is to frame and conform himself.    
Laus Deo uni & trino in secula seculorum. Amen.   

Imprinted at London by Adam Islip. 1606.