The Complete CAPTAIN, OR, An Abbridgement of CAESAR'S wars, with observations upon them; Together With a collection of the order of the Militia of the Ancients; and A particular Treatise of modern war: Written By the late great General the Duke of Rohan:  
Englished by J. C.  
CAMBRIDGE, Printed by ROGER DANIEL: Printer to the University: And are to be sold at the Angel in Popes-head-alley in London. 1640.   

April 24. 1640.  
Imprimatur per Typographum Academiae Cantabrigiensis,  
Jo. Cousin, Procan.   

To his worthy friend Captain Cruso upon his excellent translation of the Duke of Rohan's Le parfaict Capitaine.  

CAesar, whose brain contrived at once the fate  
Of his great self and of the Roman State,  
With mighty action caused, where-ere he stood,  
The trembling place to sweat forth humane blood.  
Who tamed rebellion so, as in that sin  
His own contrivance had the traitor been.  
How nimble-eared! and with what piercing sight  
He could discern advantage! and then fight.  
Cold, waves, winds, hunger, watching, labour, war  
Were accidents through which he oft did dare.  
How patiented for his ends! How quickly he  
Unthought of could defeat his enemy!  
Whose expedition, as an engine hurled  
Him from one side to th'other of the world;  
Whose way of victory begot the fame,  
That he but went, and saw, and overcame.  
Dark stratagem, quick action, and the all  
Of him built up a mighty General.  
And to make wonder gaze more, he could be  
Th' Historiographer and th' History:  
As if his mighty acts to vanquish men  
Had been on purpose done to try his pen.  
Oblivion so threw dust upon what he  
Most fairly wrote unto posterity.  
And thou, brave man at arms, great Rouen, hast ta'en  
His lively portrait out of Mars his fane,  
And armed thyself by him: yea, shown to all,  
Thou knewest to write, and be a General.  
See with what art the Chemist deals, and how  
Spirits from bodies he extracts, so thou.  
How smart he gives his stratagems, and where  
Their hidden virtue lies he makes appear!  
Mark with how curious hand he those doth try  
And fit unto our times, and so apply.  
The Grecian tactics Cesar brought to Rome,  
And this brave Duke to us, as from their tomb.  
What weapons and what forms may fit again  
He well revives which seemed before but vain.  
If e'er Pythagoras were right to hold  
A transmigration, he doth it unfold.  
But view his own directions, quick and wise;  
He makes towns strong, but strangely doth surprise:  
He rouzeth lazy minds, and seems to write  
Men into field, and teach them how to fight.  
Mirror of manhood, that art here, though gone;  
Then Virtue's self a better tomb there's none.   

And Thou, my Friend, that freely dost discover  
So rich a jewel, and hast brought it over,  
Meritest not mean applause. Me thinks, I see  
Each noble mind admire thy industry,  
And cherish thy rare worth; since few there are  
That for the public undergo such care.  
Mount still in thy endeavours, and shine bright:  
His glory's great that lends to others light.    

To the right worshipful, 

Sir John Hobart Knight and Baronnet,  
Sir Thomas Woodhous Knight & Baronnet,  
Sir John Holland Baronnet,  
Sir Hamon le Strange Knight,  
Sir Edward Waldgrave Knight,  
Sir Charles le Gros Knight,  
Sir Robert Kemp Knight, Deputy Lieutenants of Norfolk and Norwich; And Clement Corbet, Doctor of the Civil law, Chancellor, and Deputy Lieutenant of Norwich.    
Right Worshipful,  
A Great book is a great mischief (as it is in the Greek Adagy) and therefore it was well said of Seneca, Magni artificis est clausisse multum in exiguo. Such an Artist the late great General the Duke of Rohan hath here proved himself, in his excellent abbridgement of Caesar's wars, with his own observations upon them; and his Militia of the Greeks and Romans. His work is like fruits which are dried in the sun; contracted to a small bulk, but full of substance and virtue. The transcendency thereof moved me to communicate it to our Nation in these times of action. May it please you to afford it your Patronage, and to accept it as a testimony of all due respects from  
Your most humble Servant, J. C.   

The complete Captain, OR An Abbridgement of Caesar's wars. The I. Book.  
CESAR having the government of the Gauls for the space of five years, the first war that he made there was against the Swisses, 
Helvetii.  caused by the ambition of Orgetorix, who was a rich, noble and powerful man in that Nation: He persuaded this people (which were hardy by nature, and exercised in arms by the wars which they had with their neighbours) to enlarge themselves into Gallia, a country more spacious and better than their own. For this effect (resolution being taken) they take three years' space to make their preparations: In which time they furnish themselves with wagons and horses of burden, taking order that all their country be employed to all sorts of grain to make their provision of victual, and name Orgetorix to be their General and conductor, who for his part employeth that time in fortifying himself by the assistance of his neighbours, 
Sequanus.  persuadeth Casticus a Burgundian to make himself Lord of his country as his father had been, 
Aeduus.  draweth in Dumnorix of Autun, brother to Divitiacus to the same design, the most powerful man of his city, and giveth him his daughter in marriage. But the Swisses, being ever jealous of their liberty, and perceiving that Orgetorix aspired to bring them under subjection, seized on his person; and during the contestations about his trial (having a great train of kinsfolks and partakers) he died in prison. This abated not the design of this people; which on their appointed day having taken as much victual as would serve them for three months, burned the rest of their corn, and all their cities to the number of twelve, and 4. hundred villages, and having persuaded those of Basil, 
Rauraci. Tulingi. Latobrici.  Distalingen, and Clacky, their neighbours, to do the like, they depart and march towards Geneva, there to pass the Rhosne. Cesar having intelligence thereof goeth speedily to Geneva, assembleth what forces he can, causeth a bridge to be broken down which lay upon the Rhosne, 
Rhodanus.  and maketh a ditch and rampire of eighteen miles long from the lake of Geneva to the hill Jura, to hinder their passage over the Rhosne. Which the Swisses understanding send deputies to him to desire passage: he holdeth them in suspense, and promiseth them answer at another time; mean while he prepareth to hinder them: and they (after refusal, and having attempted the passage in vain) take their way through Burgundy which Dumnorix procured for them. Which Cesar observing, leaveth Labienus at Geneva, goeth and levieth new Legions, followeth them, and lighting upon them at the passage of the Saosne defeateth the fourth part of their troops, 
Arrar.  which were not as yet passed over. After that, he maketh a bridge over the river, and pursueth them: but his victual beginning to fall short, and perceiving that Dumnorix hindered those of Autun from affording him such provisions as they had promised, he acquainteth Divitiacus with it, being his great friend and brother to Dumnorix; who confesseth it, intercedeth for him, and obtaineth his pardon. After that, having learned that the Swisses were encamped at the foot of a hill, he causeth it to be viewed, and finding it to be of easy access, he sendeth Labienus thither (causing him to march all night) to gain the top of the hill: and in the morning, having put his forces into battalia, he dispatcheth Considius to discover; who, having taken the alarm of Labienus, returneth to Cesar that the enemy had seized the top of the hill, which stayed him that day from defeating the Swisses. The day following he taketh the way of Beaulne to distribute corn to his army: which the Swisses perceiving, 
Bibracte.  follow him. Cesar seeing them coming possesseth himself of a hill, embattelleth his army about the middle of the descent, & on the top he quartereth two new levied legions and all the baggage, alighteth and sendeth away his horse, and causeth all the rest to do the like, to show them that they must overcome or die. The Swisses charge him; he defeateth them and pursueth them hotly, forbiddeth those of Langres to assist them with victual, 
Lingones.  and in the end constraineth them to submit to his discretion: He disarmeth them, receiveth hostages, and forceth them to return to inhabit their country, and re-edify their houses. And of three hundred sixty eight thousand persons (whereof there were ninety two thousand bearing arms) there returned in all but an hundred and ten thousand.  

Observations.  
THe resolution of this people, which seemeth to be barbarous, and which for the bad success is universally condemned, hath nevertheless the same principles which all Conquerors have, namely, the desire of command and enlarging themselves: and they are remarkable in their forecast of three year's preparation, in their constancy for not deficting from their design after the death of their General; and in the execution thereof, burning their goods and houses to the end they might leave themselves no hope of safety, but only in the sharpness of their swords. Whence we may gather, that we ought not to undertake any great design timorously, nor to look to the means of escape but rather of overcoming. For if in the beginning of a dangerous design you make known a way of escape, the impatience or natural timorousness of men maketh them find out that way upon the least accident that befalleth. And if the Swisses had not met with the incomparable virtue of Cesar, who by his valour, industry, diligence and good fortune stayed their fury, they might have atteined the scope of their enterprises.  
In the managing of his war Caesar hath showed (as in all other) that that which hath made him fortunate in his exploits hath principally been his invariable order of encamping strongly, always entrenching himself, that so he might never be compelled to fight but when he pleased, and that he might lay hold on such occasions as offered themselves to defeat his enemies; also his providence in taking care that his provision of victual failed not; and his continual keeping of his soldiers in exercise and in breath, to make them able to execute his designs readily and in good order.  
The pardon of Dumnorix is observable: his natural clemency induced him to it, suffering himself to be overcome by the entreaties of his brother Divitiacus whom he loved: Nevertheless he caused heed to be taken to his deportments, that so he might receive no new inconveniences by him afterward.  
The error of Considius showeth how much it concerneth to send men of experience to discover an army: And the commanding of the Swisses to return and reinhabite their country was an act of prudence, thereby hindering the Germans (being a most powerful nation) from preoccupation thereof, and by that means their neighbourbood to Provence.   

The second war.  
THe subject of the second war was this: The division of the Auvergnats and Autunois puissant people in Gallia had called in the Germans, 
Averni & Aedui.  by the help of which the first had overcome the other; nevertheless they all found themselves oppressed, and the conquerors much more than the conquered: for these were discharged for some tribute and hostages, and from the other the Germans took away the greatest part of their lands, insomuch that all seeing themselves subdued, they hold an assembly of States by the permission of Cesar to desire his aid, which he promiseth. But having sent to Ariovistus, the General of the Germans, to this end, he received replies so insolent, that at last they fell fowl; where Cesar defeated him, and chased both him and all the Germans out of Gallia, forcing them to pass the Rhine again.  
These two wars were finished in one summer.  

Observations.  
Whereby we may observe how dangerous such auxiliary succours are, especially when you require them of a people more powerful than your own. Cesar hath indeed driven out Ariovistus, but the Gauls have done nothing but changed master. He embarked himself in this war for two reasons: the first, because be suspected that this puissant nation, taking footing in Gallia, might come to gain upon Provence, and so draw near to Italy; and the other, that thereby he insinuated himself insensibly into the conquest of the said gaul's. Which business he managed so dextrously by entertaining their divisions amongst them, that by the aid of the one he conquered the other, and in the end subdued all.  
We must further observe his diligence (so much recommended in all his actions) to possess himself of Besancon, having prevented his enemies, and by this means provided for the nourishment of his army. There it was that a panike fear seized upon his soldiers, which began by the volunteers: who desiring to departed discouraged the rest, that so they might cover their own shame by the general delinquency of the army: which is a most dangerous thing, and whereof a General of an army ought to take extraordinary care, never to hazard any battle until he hath recovered his soldier's spirits again; which Cesar did at this time by making an oration to them, wherein he excelled. He further helped himself (as many other commanders, especially Marius) by encamping strongly before this terrible army, and making his soldiers know by small skirmishes that their enemies were not invincible nor more valiant than themselves; and causing them to conceive that joining order and military discipline to the prudence of their General, they were their superiors. For the Romans have never conquered other nations by their great number, nor by their valour, but by their knowledge in war, (which they always exercised) by the observation of their order, and entrenchment of their camp. Whereupon we must consider that Ariovistus being encamped between Cesar and the place from whence he had his victual, and that Cesar not being able to draw him to battle in five days, after that he had well fortified that camp be goeth with all his army in battaglias to fortify a small one, in a place of advantage, two miles distant from the first, and which favoured the way for his victual, making the third part of his army to work whilst the other two thirds stood in battaglias, which repulsed the troops which Ariovistus sent to hinder the said fortification: which being made he leaveth two legions there, and leadeth away the rest into his old camp. The next day Cesar putteth himself into battaglias between the two camps, but being retired, Ariovistus assaulteth the small one, and is repulsed. Cesar having thus reconfirmed the courages of his soldiers, sallieth out with his whole army in battaglias, and goeth up to the very trenches of Ariovistus, provoketh him to fight; who sallieth out, and is defeated.     

The third war. The II. Book.  

Cesars' third war was against the Belgae, the third part of Gallia, and at that time the most warlike. The principal causes were, that, seeing the rest of the Gauls in peace with the Romans, they feared an assault; besides they were solicited by certain Gauls discontented, or ambitious: the one of which took as little pleasure to see the Romans as Germans in their country; and the other apprehensive that during their abode they should not be able to possess themselves of any principality or dominion. The number of their forces amounted to two hundred eighty and one thousand fight men. Cesar, having understood these great preparations, 
Bellovaci.  causeth those of Beauvais to be assailed by Divitiacus and those of Autun; and being assured of those of Rheims, which declared themselves for him, he goeth & encampeth upon the river Daisne near to Soissons, relieveth Brenne, 
Axona. Suessones. Bibrax.  and (the enemy attempting to pass that river) he opposeth and killeth a great number of them. After that, victual growing short for so great an army, and they of Beauvais understanding that Divitiacus harried their country, they resolved to return every man to his own home, and be in a readiness to relieve the first that should be assaulted: But they retreated in such disorder, that Cesar had leisure to overtake them; who charging on the rear, routed them, where he made a great massacre; 
Noviodunum.  and in pursuit of them he besiegeth and taketh Noyon. All these submitted, except they of Tournay, 
Nervii.  esteemed the most valiant of all; who having disposed of their old men, women, and children, resolved to defend themselves. Cesar goeth to them: who assault him so furiously as he was going to his quarters, that they had like to have defeated him: so that he confessed, that in this conflict his good fortune had equal share with his valour and industry. Nevertheless he defeated them, after which he findeth no more resistance; the renown of whose victories made him dreadful even as fare as Germany, and gained him all Normandy and Bretain, which Publius Crassus one of his Lieutenants subjected to the Romans with only one Legion.  

Observations.  
WE must here observe the judgement of Cesar, who by his diligence assured himself of those of Rheims, by his industry and affability held them faithful, and by his foresight prepared a diversion against those of Beauvois, (a bold and stout people) which redounded much to his profit. Further it is to be considered that an army of thirty or forty thousand men trained and well disciplined, is able (with patience well entrenching and encamping itself) to discomfit the most numerous armies, which for want of victual destroy themselves; and if they fight (provided that you avoid being surrounded on all parts) their disorders and confusion will also break them. The wars of the Romans do prove this true; who have never defeated their enemies but with lesser number; nor were ever forced to sally out of their retrenched camp, to give battle against their wills: and particularly this present, wherein Cesar hath had more to do against one Province ●lone of the Belgae then against all the rest together, having very particularly described the battle which he had against those of Tournay, as one of the most dangerous which he ever had; wherein there be divers things worthy consideration.  
The first, That those of Tournay being advertised that Cesar caused every Legion to march with its baggage after it, they resolved to lay an Embuscado and to fight with them, truly judging that the baggage separating the Legions in an enclosed country, they should not be able to relieve each other, and that otherwise they might (with all their forces) set upon each Legion apart.  
The second, That they found themselves deceived in their presupposition; because that though Cesar commanded his army to march so in a country of security for the commodiousness thereof; nevertheless when he was in a suspected country, he caused six Legions to march together, than all the baggage, and in the rear of that two Legions newly levied. And it was in this order, and upon his encamping, when they charged him.  
The third is the confession of Cesar: who freely acknowledgeth that his army was assaulted so unexspectedly and courageously, and in a country so enclosed, that it was neither his customary order which saved him (for he had no leisure to embattel) nor his exhortations, nor his appearance in all parts (for he was forced to fight in the place he then was in) but he attributed the safety thereof only to the continued discipline of his soldiers, which knew of themselves to range where they ought, & to that that he ever made all his officers exactly observe the performance of their duties, whilst the entrenchment of the camp was a making; so that in all parts were found some ready to command, and others to obey; which made good the resistance, and hindered the affrightment.  
The fourth, That a rash resolution is oftentimes to be feared; and to avoid it, must never be omitted whatsoever dependeth on military discipline.  
And the fifth, That the treason which those of Bolduc (whom he had besieged in the best of their fortresses) would have committed against him after they had yielded themselves, 
Aduatici.  should teach us that we should always distrust an enemy, and keep ourselves so much the more upon our guards, the nearer we are to overcome.     

The fourth war. The III. Book.  

THe first exploit of arms was against Servius Galba one of Caesar's Lieutenants, who having sent him with a Legion and some horse into the countries of Aelen, 
Antuates. Veragri. Seduni. Allobroges Lacus Lemanus.  Valias, and Zion (which extendeth from Savoy to the lake of Geneva) to assure the traffic of merchants, after some successful combats, made peace with that people, received their hostages, and having left two companies in the country of Aelen, he goeth with the rest of the Legion to quarter at the town of Martanach situated in a valley, 
Octodurus.  and divided into two by a little river called the Branse: on the one side whereof he intrencheth his camp, and on the other he quartereth the Gauls which were with him. The small number of soldiers which he had in his camp (as yet not in good defence) emboldened those people to revolt; hoping that they should at the first assault defeat him. For it was insupportable unto them that he should have their children in hostage: and they feared also that the Romans would annex those places to Provence, which was near at hand. So that he saw himself assaulted on all parts, before he had leisure to understand the danger he was in; and finding his affairs in great extremity, having neither victual to subsist nor men to make a long resistance, despair made him follow the counsel of Publs us Sextius Baculus first Centurion of that Cohort, 
Tribunus.  and of Caius Volusenus Colonel of a thousand men, which was to sally out from all parts upon the enemy: which they did so violently, that they which thought they were not able to defend themselves in their trenches defeated them in open field. That done, he maketh use of their discomfiture to retire his Legion into a place of safety.  
But the occasion of the fourth war was this. Publius Crassus one of Caesar's Lieutenants having sent divers Tribunes to make provision of corn necessary for the feeding of his army, into the countries of Perch, Cornoaille, and Vannes; 
Vaelli. Curiosilitae. Veneti.  they retained them contrary to public faith, in hope thereby to recover their hostages. By this example their neighbours did the like, and all sent word to Crassus that they would not deliver them up unless he restored their hostages. Cesar, having heard of this combination, prepareth diligently for a war, truly considering that if he suffered this he should open a gap to a general revolt; for he well knew the readiness of the French to take arms, loving their liberty and abhorring servitude. He provideth in the first place to hinder the increasing of the league; to this end he sendeth Labienus into the country of Triers with the cavalry, 
Trevori.  giving him order to visit those of Rheims and the Belgae; 
Aquitania.  Publius Crassus into Gascongne with 12 legionary ensigns, and good store of horse; Quintus Titurius Sabinus with 3. Legions into Perch, Allencon, and Lysieux; 
Lexobii.  giveth the command at sea to D. Brutus, & himself with the land-forces resolveth to charge those of Vannes, the chief cause of this war. Their country is maritime, of difficult approach, and strong in shipping; insomuch that when with much labour he had brought a place to the extremity of being taken, the inhabitants embarked themselves with their goods, and removed to another: so that what he did was little worth, until his navy being arrived he gave them battle, and defeated them: after which they yielded themselves to Cesar, who put to death all the Senate, and caused the people to be sold. At the same time the Lieutenants which Cesar had distributed amongst the Gauls had their hands full: Q. Titurius Sabinus was set upon by Viridonix, commander of several nations, with strong forces; but by his patience and subtlety he drew him on to assault him in his camp, and overcame him; which reassured all that country. P. Crassus on the Guyenne side defeated the Sontiates, besieging them in their city, and took it. After capitulation Adcantuannus their Governor made a sally with six hundred of his trustiest soldiers, and attempteth to master the Roman camp; but being repulsed, Crassus nevertheless holdeth himself to the capitulation before agreed upon. During the time of this siege the people of Spain and Gascongne about the Pyrenean hills make a league together, and choose their commanders out of those Captains which had been trained under Sertorius, Crassus assaulteth them: they entrench and cut off his victual, in so much that he is constrained to fight with them within their trenches, wherein (as good luck served) he found some defect, by means of which he defeated them. This victory caused all that people to submit. Cesar seeing none in arms but only those of Terovenne and Gueldres, 
Mori●i. Menapii.  though the summer were fare spent, marcheth thither; where he findeth a new way of warring, the people holding themselves within, he goeth to find them out, and being near approached, as he was fortifying his camp they assaulted him, and were repulsed: after which, Cesar advanceth into the forest itself, causeth the trees to be cut down, and made use of them in stead of a rampart; and by an incredible labour and diligence he was already advanced to the place where they kept all their  and last baggage; but the season grew so stormy and wet that he was constrained to draw his army into their wintergarrison.  

Observations.  
SO ended this war: where we will observe first the profitableness of the intrenchments of camps, which in entire countries' serve for a bridle, as citadels to cities; the Romans having never been able to have held so many conquered States under their obedience, but only by that means: For armies garrisoned in sever all towns may by being so separated be defeated totally, or in part, by conspiracy; besides, the delicacies of cities do overthrow all military discipline, and abase all generous courage. Howsoever if there be more fortresses than can well be maintained, you must demolish them, to the end that nothing may be able to resist the army: which being always in an entire body, opposeth itself against all combines of conspirators; it being most certain, that not only for the keeping reliefs out of a conquered Province, but also for the conservation of your country against greater forces than your own (giving order that there be no want of victual) it is to be done by entrenching strongly: for whosoever putteth himself wholly upon the defensive, and shutteth himself up in walled towns, must in time necessarily perish, unless he receiveth foreign reliefs: for that by two or three year's spoil of the increase of the champains the cities must of necessity starve, and thereby know your inability to preserve them; so that they will rather yield to your enemy then perish.  
In the second place we will consider how Crassus was put to it, when he had to do with commanders which had been trained under Sertorius, and which (according to the custom of the Romans) could make benefit of the advantage of grounds, fortify their camp, and cut off their enemy's victual: for by such a manner of warring they had brought the said Crassus to such a pass that he was constrained to assault their camp; which albeit he forced (whether by having better soldiers, or by finding some part of it ill fortified) yet it is certain that he undertook that task out of despair rather than judgement, as being in danger to perish for want of victuals.  
We will further observe that Cesar in all these actions by no diversity of making war was ever astonished, whether he were assaulted in open field or in his camp, whether surprised, or whether his enemy retired into places inaccessible; always finding them out in all places, and that without omitting one only point of military discipline. For though our enemies sometime do actions which have show of fear, the better to circumvent us; yet must we not therefore disesteem them: no profession being like to that of a soldier, wherein one fault can never be repaired, and wherein one hour causeth the loss of that reputation which hath been thirty years acquiring.  
To conclude this discourse I will only add this, That the cruelty which Cesar used towards those of Vannes ought not to blemish his clemency manifested in the whole course of his life; but we must rather believe that he forced his disposition in this severe action to chastise the violatours of the law of nations, in that they imprisoned those which (under promise of safety) went to negotiate with them; and also to give a terror to all that people so subject to revolt, by letting them taste the sweetness of a mild government while they kept within the lists of obedience, and by using them rigorously when they departed from it.     

The fifth war. The iv Book.  

THe Germans of Francfort and Hessen, 
Usipetes. Tenchtheri  to the number of four hundred thousand souls, finding themselves persecuted by the Suevians (the most puissant and hardy people of Germany) abandon their native homes; and after, wand'ring through divers countries, they approach the Rhine about the Provinces of Gueldres and Gulick: out of which they drive the inhabitants, and possess themselves of their territories on both sides of the river. Cesar (which knew the humour of the French to be turbulent and ready to shake off the yoke of servitude) resolved not to suffer the Germans to settle themselves on this side the Rhine. And though he well perceived that they had begun a treaty with them, he dissembled it, and (anticipating the time which formerly he used for his going into the field) hasteneth directly to fight with the foresaid Germans: Which (being astonished at this diligence) send Ambassadors to him to treat of peace. He giveth them fair audience and courteous answer, but holdeth on his march still towards them: at last they come to accord, conditioning with Cesar to remain where he was three days; he granteth them one: whereupon his cavalry (to the number of five thousand) advancing to forage, encountreth with eight hundred German horse; which charge them bravely, rout them, and chase them even to the Roman camp: but the next day sending all their principal commanders to Cesar to excuse this action, and to make appear unto him that it was by mere accident. He retaineth them prisoners, marcheth with his army towards the Germans, surpriseth them, and cutteth them all in pieces. Which done he makes a bridge over the Rhine, goeth into Germany, relieveth the city of Cullen, 
Ubii, or Colonia Agrippina.  granteth peace to such as would deliver hostages, burneth and wasteth the rest, and at the end of eighteen days breaketh down his bridge and returneth into France.  

Observations.  
WE must here observe Caesar's wise conduct, who by his ready and unexpected march dissolved the practices which were in agitation between the Germans and Gauls; by his dissimulation towards the Gauls (pretending not to know their plottings, and testifying his confidence of them) held them in fair quarter and hindered them from precipitating themselves into a league with the Germans; by his industry delayed them by treaties, whilst he still marched towards them; and when occasion served took his advantage to take them in disorder and destitute of commanders, making them believe they had first broke the treaty.  
Next we must consider, that upon the fame of this great defeat he caused the Roman Eagles to fly on the other side of the Rhine, to strike a terror into the Germans, and be a means to retain them for the future from further attempting: Besides, he would not pass over the Rhine by boats, as a thing too full of hazard, but he made a bridge, which he caused to be fortified and guarded on both sides of the river: neither stayed be longer in that country than was necessary for the reputation of his army; and at his return broke down his bridge, taking away by that course the means from the Germans of making use thereof.  
I add further, that the defeat of five thousand Roman horse, by eight hundred of the German cavalry, and the day after, the defeat of four hundred thousand Germans by thirty or forty thousand Romans, showeth plainly that it is not the natural valour of one nation above another, nor the greater number above the smaller, which giveth the conquest; but the exact observation of military discipline, and the continual exercise of arms: which instructeth men not only to fight well, but also to take advantages, and to know when to fight and when not.    

The sixth war.  
Cesars' sixth war was against the Britain's, because the inhabitants of that Island did oftentimes assist the French against him. To this end he enquireth of merchants which trafficked there, what nations did inhabit it, what their manner of warring, under what laws they lived, and which were their best havens. Then he dispatched C. Volusenus to discover the coast: Then sent for his shipping, which he had used in his war against those of Vannes, and prepared all things necessary for his design. The noise of this preparation gave occasion to many cities of Britain to send Ambassadors to him, to promise obedience, and to offer him hostages; which he returned with fair language, and with them Comius (whom he had made king of Arras) under which pretext he might the better discover the country: Nevertheless, 
Atrebates.  Comius, not daring to trust himself amongst the Britain's, stayed only five days upon their coasts, and then returned to give an account of what he had discovered. Mean time Cesar makes peace with those of Terovenne, 
Morini.  that so he might leave no war behind him, taketh two Legions and part of his cavalry, sendeth the rest of his army into the country of Gueldres, 
Menapii.  under the command of Q. Titurius Sabinus, and Arunculeius Cotta, giveth the guard of the Port from whence he embarked unto P. Sulpitius Rufus, and putteth to sea. He arriveth safely upon the coast of Britain (with his Infantry only) which he findeth all in arms; he attempteth to land there, where finding too much difficulty, he goeth and doth it eight miles further, and yet not without danger: Nevertheless he so affrighted the Britain's that they sent to him to desire peace. But a tempest arising, which battered many of his ships, and drove aground all those which carried his horse, gave them new courage; and in stead of giving him hostages, they armed all the country against him, ill entreating one of his Legions which went to forage; which he relieveth, and bringeth safely off. In these extremities Cesar taketh care for the repairing of his navy, for provision of victual, and for the securing of his camp; and being again assailed by the inhabitants of the Island, he giveth them combat, and defeateth them: Which forceth them afresh to desire peace: he granteth it, taketh hostages of those that would readily deliver them, and carrieth back his army into Gallia safe and sound; only two ships with three hundred soldiers, which landed a little lower, were set upon by those of Teraenne; which Cesar being informed of, hasteneth thither with his cavalry, rescueth them, and defeateth the enemies.  

Observations.  
IT is to be observed, that to begin a war in autumn, without apparent advantage, in a country undiscovered, not having any intelligence there, and the Ocean to pass, is an enterprise (in my opinion) well worthy the invincible courage of Cesar, but not of his accustomed prudence. Nevertheless, this escape must be attributed to his good fortune, which he had subjected to his will. For in this design, where it seemed that men and elements were conjured against him, the earth refusing him victual, the sea battering his ships, the air furnishing tempests, and the country where he landed conspiring his ruin, he constantly resisted all this; opposing against famine his providence of making provision for his army; against the wracks of the sea, his diligence in repairing his vessels; against the assaults of his enemies, his armies to resist them, insomuch that he constrained them to beg for peace: and so he returned gloriously from a bad country, where any else would have suffered extremely. Let us also consider, that before he departed from France he took care to provide what was necessary to keep it in obedience, and for the security of his return. Let us further note, how abundant Cesar was in his inventions, for the advantageous taking of his time, in the very occasion itself: for perceiving that his soldiers (not accustomed to sea-fights) were distracted at their landing▪ he (in the very action) changeth his first order, and with his galleys approacheth nearer the coast, and in spite of his enemies landeth; and they (seeing a kind of vessels they knew not) were affrighted, and betook themselves to their heels. Also we ought to admire in Cesar two things which he had to perfection, and which render a commander excellent; namely that he forecast and provided for all things which might either further or hinder this design before he undertook it; and that in the very execution be sailed not to take his advantage when occasion presented it, or to remedy upon the instant such unexpected accidents as befell; wherein he hath been inimitable.     

The seventh war. The V Book.  

CEsar not satisfied with his first voyage into Britain employeth the winter to cause such equipage to be prepared as was necessary for his passage thither the second time, and according to his custom goeth into Lombardy, from whence (before his return) he passeth into Sclavonia to quiet some seditions which were there befallen: 
Illyricum.  afterwards returneth to his army, findeth all in good order, commendeth every man for their diligence in getting all things in readiness. But before his departure he goes to Triers, a very powerful people, about a division fallen between Induciomarus and Cingentorix, the two great men of the town: The last cometh to him and promiseth him all obedience: the other prepareth for war; nevertheless, fearing to be abandoned, yieldeth himself; Cesar receiveth him, but diminisheth his authority, and augmenteth that of Cingentorix, whom he believeth best affected to him: which done, he continueth his design, takes along with him the principal men of Gallia in this war. Dumnorix of Autun makes difficulties; Cesar presseth him, he excuseth himself; then attempts to seduce the Gauls, at last he flies; Cesar sendeth after him, but refusing to return, 
Iccius.  is slain. He embarked at Calais, where he left Labienus with three legions and two thousand horse; he passeth into Britain, and landeth without resistance: he fortifieth a camp to guard his vessels, leaveth Q. Atrius there, and passeth further; forceth the camp of the Britain's not fare distant from thence. The next day Atrius sendeth him word that the tempests had shattered the greater part of his navy; he returneth thither, employeth ten whole days about repairing them, draws them on shore, causeth the camp to be well fortified, commandeth Labienus to cause n●w ships to be built, then advanceth towards Cassivellanus, declared General for the Britain's, who dares not assail him but when he goes to forage, which causeth him to go strong and in good order; & after he had trial of his manner of fight by some skirmishes, he defeated him by C. Trebonius one of his Lieutenants, who went thither with three legions and all the cavalry. After this defeat there appeared no more enemies in gross; and Cesar, being come to the river Thames passeth it at the only place where it was fordable, in despite of the Britain's, who endeavoured to their utmost to hinder him: which so astonished Cassivellanus, that all his care was to hid himself in the woods; & seeing that divers towns had yielded themselves to Cesar, he also sent to him; who received him, giving hostages, imposing a certain tribute upon the country. Then seeing the season much spent, and fearing some tumults in France, he repasseth the sea, bringing back his army gloriously, which (contrary to his custom) he was constrained (by reason of the barrenness of the year) to separate into divers garrisons to keep it alive. But before he could go into Italy, Ambiorix and Cativulcus instigated by Induciomarus take arms, assail Sabinus and Cotta two of his Lieutenants, defeat and kill them as they were removing from their camp; from thence they go and assail Cicero in his camp, another of his Lieutenants, which defendeth himself with much difficulty; Cesar relieveth him, and defeateth the Gauls. The report of the defeat of two Roman legions inciteth the other Gauls to revolt; insomuch that Labienus is assaulted in his camp by Induciomarus: he withstandeth the assault, afterwards conquereth and killeth him. As the first defeat of the Roman legions moved all the Gauls to revolt, so these two last overthrows made them lay down their arms.  

Observations.  
IN this second voyage of Cesar into Britain, though he went thither with greater forces and better prepared then at first, having supplied those defects which were wanting before; nevertheless going into a country which he could not come to but by sea, where he had no intelligence, and going from another newly conquered, subject to revoltings, and which grudgingly endured subjection, he rather therein satisfied his own ambition, then that he added any great profit to the Romans. Wherein we will first observe his dexterity and prudence, in that he carried along with him (as voluntaries) all the stirring spirit●▪ amongst the Gauls, which served as hostages for him. But it appears, his natural clemency made him commit an error, in contenting himself to have diminished the authority of Induciomarus, when indeed he should have ruined him; whereof he found the inconvenience afterward.  
Secondly, that he never was moved at any unexpected accidents, for which he was prepared as if he had foreseen them, which he made to appear to good purpose in this great tempest, which shattered all his ships, and would have driven any but himself to desperation.  
Thirdly, though he were renowned for the Captain which best knew how to make use of his victories, and which hath pursued them homest; he would not do it here, because he was in an unknown country, and his camp not as yet well fortified.  
Let us consider also, that howsoever the scarcity of corn compelled him (contrary to his custom) to cause his army to make their winter-garrisons in several places, and not all together, to the end that they might with more facility be furnished with victual; yet he did it with such judgement, as that the places where they quartered were not so far distant, but that they could easily relieve each other; nor so near, but they held divers States in obedience. Nevertheless the success showeth us evidently, that it is not so good as to be quartered in an entire body, because it is easier to assail a small troop then a great; which gave encouragement to the Gauls to revolt and to assail the camp of Sabinus & Cotta: where the artificial oration of Ambiorix persuading them that the revolt was so general, that at the same instant all the other camps were assaulted, and could not relieve each other, put them into such a confusion in matter of counsel, that fear made them choose the worst, which was to forsake their camp and retreat. Whence we may learn, That he never speedeth well that followeth the counsels of an enemy; and, That a retreat in view of the enemy is the most dangerous action that can be undertaken.  
Cicero his resistance ●ithi● his camp, which refused to follow his enemy's counsel, and resolved to defend himself within his trenches, proved for his safety and great glory; and gave time to Cesar to relieve him: wherein there be two things remarkable; The first of Cesar, who having understood that the Gauls came towards him to give him battle, finding himself weak maketh choice of an advantageous place, fortifieth it, maketh his camp very small, to the end he might the better defend it, and make his enemies believe that he was exceeding weak; whom (after they had many times provoked him to fight) they began to disregard, which begot a neglect of all order amongst them; so that they assaulted him ever after disorderly: having thus lulled them asleep, on a day he chargeth them so furiously, that he defeateth them without resistance And Lab●enus one of his Lieutenants by a like stratagem did the like to Induciomarus. The second of the Gauls, who not being able to force the camp of Cicero, shut him up by a retrenchment which contained ten miles in circuit, made in three hours, and by men which had nothing to dig with but their swords, and nothing to carry earth with but their clothes: which argueth they were a great multitude, and showeth what may be done by armies well regulated and well provided.     

The eighth war. The VI Book.  

CEsar, perceiving the affairs of the Gauls to incline to war, fortifieth himself by three Roman Legions, and as many other soldiers as he could get; which fell out very happily for him: for after the death of Induciomarus the Trevois put their government into the hands of his kindred, which made league with all that would revolt, and particularly with Ambiorix; whereof Cesar being advertised, joins four legions together in winter, surprises those of Tournay, forceth them to yield & deliver hostages. And in the spring following causeth the Gauls to assemble at Paris, 
Lutetia.  from whence, on the same day that the assembly broke up, he goeth and assaulteth those of Sens, 
Senones. Carnutes.  than those of Chartres, who (finding themselves surprised) yield. From thence he prepareth to set upon Ambiorix and those of Triers, but first he laboureth to draw away from them their allies: To which end he discardeth all his baggage, which he commits to Labienus (who was in the country of Triers) with two legions to guard it, and himself with five goeth to assail the Gauls. For execution whereof he divided his army into three parts; for that he well knew they were not able to dispute the champain with him, and so burnt and pillaged their country, that he constrained them to yield, to deliver hostages, and to forsake Ambiorix. At the same time they of Triers assail Labienus; who making a show of fear, and retreating as if he had fled, draweth them in disorder into places of disadvantage, where he defeateth them, and taketh the very city of Triers. This expedition being finished, Cesar maketh a bridge over the Rhine, and passeth it: they of Cullen adhere to him; he fortifieth his camp, and maketh provision of victual, attempteth to compel the Suevians to battle; but seeing them retreat into vast and deep forests, he forbeareth to pursue them; repasseth the Rhine, cutteth off (on the German side) only 120 foot of his bridge, maketh a good tower on the end thereof, at the other end on the side of Gallia he buildeth a fort, leaving twelve cohorts to guard that and the said bridge. (In this place Cesar maketh a description of the manners and customs of the Gauls and the Germans) That done he goeth to continue the war against Ambiorix; and the better to surprise him he sendeth L. Minutius Basilius before, with all the cavalry, forbidding him the making any fire in his camp to the end his approach might be undiscovered, by which means he thought to have seized upon Ambiorix; who saved himself miraculously by flying from one place to another, & Cesar (the better to follow him) conveys again his baggage into a castle of the Liegeois called Vatucca, 
Eburones. Wachtendonck.  for guard whereof he left Q. Tullius Cicero with one legion, commanding him for seven days (the time which his expedition would take up) to look carefully to his guards, and not to stir out of his trenches. Then divided he his army into three parts to harrasse all that country; who meeteth with nothing in the form of an army to oppose him, insomuch that his greatest care was to prevent that his soldiers (covetous of booty) straggled not too far abroad, for fear of being cut off by the enemies, which lay hidden in forests and bogs. The report reached presently to the other side of the Rhine, that Cesar exposed the country of Gueldres to pillage; 
Menapii.  which occasioned the Westfalians to participate of the booty: 
Sicambri.  they presently get together two thousand horse, pass the Rhine, pillage without resistance, & are so well pleased with taste thereof that they resolve to set upon the Roman camp; when by misfortune, that day being the seventh from Caesar's departing, Cicero (which had observed his command very exactly, and having no news, nor suspecting an enemy) suffered himself by the importunity of his soldiers to give way to them to forage, and at the same instant was (unexpectedly) assaulted by the Westfalians, against whom he had much ado to defend himself; until that his soldiers returning from forage, part of them made their way through the enemies, and regained the camp; but the rest were cut in pieces. Nevertheless this relief bereft the enemies of all hope of forcing the camp; and so they returned to their country with their booty. A while after arrived Cesar, who rebuked Cicero for transgressing his command. Then he resolveth afresh to expose the country of Gueldres to fire and sword, and to pursue Ambiorix, who had yet escaped: after that he sendeth his army to garrison, which he supplieth with corn, and then goeth into Italy.  

Observations.  
IN this war Cesar had no great resistance, all fleeing before him, having nothing to do but to pillage and burn the country; notwithstanding there be very good observations to be made thereupon: for though you learn not hence how to fight a battle, or to expugn fortresses, yet you may here learn how to deal with such as save themselves by flight and by retiring into inaccessible places: wherein many Commanders have failed for the not observing of three principal things, which Cesar did: First, to prevent the enemy by such extraordinary diligence, as to surprise them before they be able to retire themselves or their victual into the forests; so that by this means you may constrain the one to yield, and the other to perish through famine. The second, to divide your army into as many parts as you can with safety, that so assailing a country in several places all at once, the inhabitants thereof will be doubtful to what part to retire unto. And the last is, to hinder the soldiers from disbanding when they go to pillage, for fear they be cut off by the enemies. By which oversight many great inconveniences have often befallen conquering armies; which should teach us never to slacken the severity of military discipline, though we believe ourselves far from an enemy, and in great security. The example we have in this book of Q. Cicero is excellent in that kind, who received a great loss, and had like to have been utterly defeated, by suffering himself to be persuaded by the importunity of his soldiers, which (contrary to Caesar's command) would needs go out of their trenches to forage.  
We 〈◊〉 further see the difference between old soldiers and new, who (for want of experience) knew not how to choose what was for their safety and honour, but retreated to a hill and there were cut in pieces: but the other, knowing there was no safety but by recovering the camp, made their way with their swords, and saved both themselves and their camp. Here we may observe how ingenious sear is to seek out subjects to augment itself; for because this place was the same where Titurius and Cotta had been defeated the year before, they took it for an ill omen.  
Let us further observe, that Cesar (when he would make an expedition for seven or eight days, where was diligence required) discharged himself of his baggage, which in truth is a marvellous impediment in a champain; & it is impossible to conduct an army well, if (according to occasions) you do not strongly entrench your camp, or march without baggage.  
Let us also admire the good intelligence Cesar had by spies; a thing of such utility, as that a Prince or General ought to spare no cost for, it being the most powerful means to undertake brave designs, and to avoid great ruins.  
Neither must we forget his dexterity in dividing those which were entering into a combination against him, and his assaulting them severally, nor his customary d ligence in surprising them; having atteined to the end of the most part of his great designs by these ways.  
We will conclude the observations of this book with the stratagem of Labienus: who, desirous to fight with those of Triers before the Germans were joined to them, resolved to make it publicly believed that he was afraid of them, and that he would retreat; knowing right well that there were gaul's in his own army which would discover it to them; and in the mean time gave order secretly to retreat with a great noise, & making show of much fear: whereof they of Triers having intelligence, without staying for the Germans, conceiving they ought not to let slip the occasion which offered itself unto them, passed the river, and came disorderly as to an assured victory: but Labienus turneth upon them in good order, and defeateth them. Yet would I not counsel you at any time to attempt such a stratagem with new-levied soldiers, which usually are fearful when they see men running towards them and without order; which (on the contrary) assureth those which are experienced.     

The ninth war. The VII. Book.  

THe affairs of Gallia quieted, Cesar goeth into Italy, according to his custom: where he heareth of the death of Piso, and the garboils of Rome; which gave new occasion to the Gauls of revolting. Chartres began, the Auvergnats followed, and at length many others. Vercingetorix an Auvergnat is chosen General for all. Cesar hearing this cometh away in the depth of winter, 
Gaballi.  passeth the mountains of Genaudan covered with snow, and appeareth in Auvergne before it was known that he was come from Italy: which caused many to hold for him, and startled those which were revolted. With the same diligence he passeth into Burgundy and Champagne, where he assembleth his army, cometh to Berry, and besiegeth it; 
Bituriges.  and taketh Vellaudunum (from whence he takes 600 hostages) then forceth Gien (or Orleans) where was made a great slaughter: Vercingetorix, 
Genabis.  seeing the success of his enemy, and conceiving his army insufficient to deal with him in the field, endeavoureth to conquer him by taking away all means of subsistence; and to this purpose burneth more than twenty towns, 
Avaricum  preserving only Bourges (and that too against his advice,) Cesar besieged it, where he suffered much, and found himself in great difficulties and necessities; at length having overcome them, he taketh the town, putteth to the sword forty thousand men, & there refresheth his army. During this siege he attempted to surprise Vercingetorix his camp, but was repulsed yet was not discouraged at all with all this ill success, but continueth the war with much resolution and prudence; and Vercingetorix, to hinder his enemy from passing the river of Alier, 
Elaver.  breaketh down all the bridges: nevertheless Cesar making show to pass in one place, taketh advantage to do it in another; then goeth and besiegeth Clairmont. 
Gergobia.  Vercingetorix encampeth on the other side, where were many assaults and brave combats: nevertheless Cesar is constrained to quit the siege, whether for that he made doubt of taking the town, or whether to prevent the revolt of the Autunois artificially procured by Litavicus; who having procured himself to be chosen Commander of a relief sent to Cesar, being but ten leagues from him, pretended to have received news from the army, that all the Autunois there were put to the sword; which news he presently conveyeth to Autun, so that both there and in his camp all that was Roman suffered the like, with the loss of their goods to boot, but chief the corn which they carried to relieve the army withal: Whereof Cesar being advertised by Eporedorix, without consultation taketh four legions and all his cavalry, marcheth day and night, overtaketh Litavicus with his forces, maketh known his fraudulent dealing to the soldiers, and without striking stroke reduceth them to obedience, and with great diligence sendeth to those of Autun, to give them knowledge of what had happened; & with the same celerity returneth very opportunely to his camp, which he relieveth, finding it strongly assaulted and hardly put to it by Vercingetorix. That done, he taketh his way again towards the river of Alliers and passeth it; mean time Litavicus (who was fled towards Vercingetorix) procureth a league of the Autunois with him; 
Noviodunum.  Eporedorix and Viridomarus seize upon Nevers, where Cesar had left his hostages, corn, and public treasure, which they pillage and burn: Which drove him into great straits, because that Vercingetorix always coasted him, and cut off his victual. At last he resolved by great marches to gain the river Loire, 
Ligeris.  which he passed over to join with Labienus, to whom (in the beginning of this war) he had given four legions to go towards Paris. Whilst things passed in this manner, Labienus was much distracted by the garboils of all these revolts: 
Melodunum.  notwithstanding having possessed himself of Melun, he gave jealousies to his enemies in many places, insomuch that by this trick he passed the river Seine, 
Sequana.  & before that all these revolted people could join forces, he defeated the first which opposed themselves, took Prouvins, 
Agendicum.  and from thence joined with Cesar. At the same time the Gauls renew their conspiracies and intelligences, they hold an assembly, where almost all the Gauls are present, they again choose Vercingetorix General, who maketh provision of great store of cavalry to the end he might disaccommodate the Romans by cutting off their victual. On the other side Cesar maketh his provisions, payeth his German cavalry; but Vercingetorix being carried away with good opinion conceived of his cavalry, adventureth a battle with Cesar, where he was defeated. After that he retireth himself to Alexia, whither Cesar followeth him and resolveth to besiege him: Vercingetorix perceiving his design gathereth together all the victual of the town, causeth it to be distributed by measure, and judgeth that by well managing thereof there would be enough for near upon two months, dischargeth his cavalry, sendeth every one into his country to procure him relief in time, and he with eighty thousand fight men shutteth himself into Alexia: which Cesar surroundeth with double & triple trenches, then maketh a second circumvallation, to keep out reliefs from without, with an incredible labour and diligence, and maketh a provision of victual sufficient to make the besieged consume theirs; which suffer great extremity. At length relief cometh under the conduct of Comius, to the number of two hundred and fifty thousand; he maketh three strong assaults at divers times, two in the day and one in the night, is repulsed, and retreateth: whereby they of the town are constrained to yield themselves to the discretion of Cesar, who retained the Autunois and Auvergnats, to regain those towns which were necessary for him, and distributeth the rest amongst his soldiers. After this, all the rest submitted. Thus ended this war, the greatest and most dangerous of all that Cesar had in Gallia.  

Observations.  
ALl Caesar's other wars in Gallia have been made by divided parts, having made use of their divisions to ruin them; but this, by a general consent of almost all: they chose one supreme Commander, great in prudence & courage, who, well perceiving that the good discipline of the Romans and their knowledge in the art military, made them invincible by way of battles, changed his own way of making war against them, and by prolonging time without hazarding a general battle, finding himself superior in horse, and the country to friend, not ready to supply their armies with victual, made just account to have ruined them: whereupon we may make very good observations.  
First, upon Vercingetorix, who having been by a general consent chosen General of divers States (which had emulations one towards another) hath known so well how to govern them, that what adversity soever he met with in his affairs, he hath always maintained himself in great authority and awe amongst them; not sparing to be severe where occasion required (fear being the most powerful means to keep men in order:) ill successes never being able to deject him or diminish his confidence. Even at that time when he was accused to have had intelligence with the enemy, he so boldly defended himself by an oration, that he came off more authorised then before. Also it is an efficacious means to continue several people in a fair obsequencie, to parley often with them upon such affairs as happen. He had the power to make them set fire on above twenty cities to discommodate their enemies, which argued his great judgement, for it was the only way to have overcome the Romans (stronger than they in battle) to have fought with them by famine. And in such affairs all moderate counsels, or but half executed, are ruinous: as the taking of Bourges serveth us for a memorable example, for the saving of it from burning preserved it for the benefit of the Romans; which (by taking thereof) found therein such commodious things as they stood in need of. His great credit is very remarkable: for to a free people at the beginning of a war, before they had tasted of bad success, and in their hope to be able to overcome without being driven to so smart remedies, he prevaileth with them to fire their houses and goods, for the conservation whereof war is for the most part made. It was a very hard enterprise, for that the loss of things certain and present which we see and feel, is preferable (with the ignorant) to things whereof the events are uncertain, and the benefits remote; and no man can well apprehend this difficulty that hath not experimented it in the government of the people. He hath besides showed his constancy even to the end, and made no scruple (being the chief of so many several nations) to be shut up in a city, where he did all that a provident and brave General ought to do, and hath surmounted hunger and the discommodities of a siege, having held out even until his relief was repulsed and defeated; but because histories make not but for the victorious, we see usually none had in esteem but the sons of fortune.  
Now let us examine Caesar's carriage in this war, which broke out he being in Italy, in the depth of winter, his army dispersed in several countries, far distant from each other, and the revolted States so in his way, as it was almost impossible for him to unite his legions. In so great difficulties he findeth no other means but to surmount them by incomparable labour, wherewith he maketh way over the mountains covered six foot thick with snow, and affrighteth his enemies more appearing in the midst of them (when they believed him still in Italy and out of possibility to get to them) then by his great forces. He also added to this astonishment by industry, causing his cavalry to show itself in several places at one and the same time, to cause a belief that he was very powerful.  
Let us further consider that Cesar seeing the fashion of the war changed, and that the enemy avoided battle, applieth himself to sieges, wherein he showeth himself no less a master then in his other actions of war. For all that which the most excellent modern Generals put in practice, is drawn from his actions: and whatsoever we admire of Ostend, Breda, 
The Buss.  ● Bolduc, and many other sieges of the late Prince Maurice (who hath surpassed all others in that matter) is infinitely inferior to the two circumvallations of Alexia, where the industry, the labour, and the short time in which they were finished, fare exceedeth all that hath been done elsewhere. I am not ignorant that the invention of powder and of artillery hath changed the manner of fortifications, of assaults, and of the defence of towns; but not in such sort, but that the principal foundations whereupon they are established are particularly taken from Cesar, who in that hath far surpassed all the Roman Generals.  
He is also admirable in his inventions and stratagems, & in the undauntedness of his enterprises, who when he intended an assault upon the trenches which were about Clermont, he put a jealousy into them by a body which he made of the horse-boyes and baggages of the camp, which he caused to march in their sight towards that part which he meant not to assault, but not at so near a distance that they might discover what kind of people they were; and having laid a legion in embuscado in the nighttime, and caused some selected soldiers to convey themselves into the little camp which was nearer to the town, he assaulteth them so at unawares that he made himself master of all their trenches.  
When he would have passed the river of Alliers, which Vercingetorix attempted to oppose, he caused some legions to lie in ambush near to a bridge which had been broken, and with the rest of the army (which he made show as if it had been entire) he passeth along the river, as if he had sought some other passage, by which means he so deluded the enemies, as that he caused the bridge to be repaired before it could be taken notice of, and so passed over without any hindrance.  
When Vercingetorix (in the time of the siege of Burges) was gone out with his cavalry, he departed by night, and went and assaulted his infantry within the camp, and wanted little of defeating it.  
When at the siege of Clermont he understood of the revolt of ten thousand Autunois which came to his relief, he taketh four legions, marcheth day and night to overtake them: which he doth, and took them all, and returneth time enough to defend his camp, which was assailed by Vercingetorix. Whereby we may observe by the way the benefit of having a camp always well fortified, to the end we may be ever in a readiness to attempt upon the enemy as occasions shall offer themselves.  
I cannot forget his great modesty. Comius (whom he had favoured, raised to wealth & honour, and on whom he much trusted) he rather excuseth than blameth for revolting; alleging that he was forced to comply with the general resolution for recovering the liberty and glory of all Gallia.  
Let us speak a word or two of Labienus, one of his Lieutenants; who finding himself in a straight with four of Caesar's legions, in this general revolt, encircled on all parts with enemies, and being to pass the river Seine upon boats, to join himself to Cesar, opposed by strong forces which increased every hour, in this extremity be employeth both his courage and industry, divideth his troops into three parts, maketh great appearance of passing over in two places, where indeed he intended it not; by which means having separated their forces into divers troops, not knowing where to attend to oppose him, he passeth over by night with three legions, or less, with which he fought with the first troops that came against him, and defeated them; insomuch that having passed the rest of his troops at their ease, joined them (without further inconvenience) to Cesar. Whereupon I will make this observation, namely, That he which is not very careful and diligent in the guarding of a passage of a river or mountain, is for the most part circumvented: because he which hath the possession thereof sleepeth securely upon the advantage he hath; and he which would have it searcheth out all possible means (and at last findeth them) to remove all obstacles.     

The tenth war. The VIII. Book.  

THe Gauls desirous to make one attempt more to shake off their yoke of servitude, divers towns conspired together to revolt: whereof Cesar being advertised, surpriseth them so unexpectedly, as that he continued those in their fidelity which were not as yet revolted, and reduced the rest. Eighteen days after his return to his winter-garrisons, they of Bourges gave him knowledge that they were assaulted by those of Castres'; he goeth to relieve them, & (notwithstanding the unseasonable weather) bringeth them to submission. After that those of Rheims desired his assistance against the people of Beauvois, the most powerful and valiant of Gallia, led by Corbeius and Comius two brave Commanders; he marcheth thither, taketh care to get intelligence from them, encampeth himself before them, where his soldiers receive an affront going to forage; but after that Corbeius had charged his camp, and better fortified his quarters, he understood that he had laid an embuscado for his soldiers which went to forage; whither he goeth so strong that he defeateth and killeth him. This victory obliged those of Beauvois to yield themselves. But Comius fled, not daring to trust himself amongst the Romans, because that a little before Labienus would have caused him to have been made away by Vollusenus contrary to public faith. This war thus ended, Cesar goeth and wasteth Ambiorix his country, to procure him hatred amongst his own people, under the command of Fabius one of his Lieutenants; he relieveth Lymoges which was assaulted by Dumnacus, 
Lemovicum.  whom he pursueth; and as he hasted to gain the river Loire to put himself into safety, he defeateth him. Then subjugated those of Chartres and Bretagne with great promptitude and alacrity. Under the command of Caninius he besiegeth Drapes and Luterius in the city of Cadenac: 
Uxellodunum.  who sallying out to provide corn for the town, Luterius going about to convey it in is defeated; and at length Drapes is assaulted and taken in his camp. After this, he really form the siege, whither Cesar came in person, who found means to hinder them from water, so that this poor people yielded themselves to his discretion; with whom he dealt rigorously, causing their hands to be cut off which had born arms; which so went to the heart of Drapes (than their prisoner) as that he wilfully starved himself: and a few days after Luterius was taken and brought to Cesar. At the same time Labienus defeated those of Triers, and the Germans, and took all their Commanders.  
After so many happy victories of Cesar, obtained by himself or his Lieutenants, he finisheth that summer by visiting the towns of Gallia, the better to assure his conquest, especially in Gasconie, where he had been but little, and disperseth his army (composed of ten legions) into such places as he conceived most advantageous; which served him for a strong support to maintain himself in the civil broils of his native country, which he was going into.  

Observations.  
SOme attribute the so frequent revolts of the Gauls to their changeable and impatient humour, which cannot endure to be lorded over by strangers: and others, to the too great clemency of Cesar. I grant that clemency apt to pardon emboldens to revolt; for that we easily forget all benefits which do not entirely establish our liberty; but if cruelty causeth them less frequent, yet it renders them more dangerous; for that when despair driveth men thereunto, and that the hope of safety resteth only in victory, the revolted become all valiant, obstinate, constant, and faithful to the end; which never falleth out where there is hope of the enemy's clemency. We have here plentiful examples thereof. Cesar in the greater part of the revolts of the Gauls hath often found great facilities to reduce them to his obedience, by reason of his clemency; which hath been a powerful means for him to make divisions amongst themselves, and to prevent obstinacy in their revolts: and if sometimes it hath so happened that he hath used severity, it hath been occasioned by fowl and unworthy acts; as when they of Vannes under public faith imprisoned the Roman officers which came to them to buy corn for the sustenance of the army, (but I cannot excuse that of Cadenac.) On the contrary, the cruelties of the King of Spain executed by the Duke of Alba drove poor fishermen so into despair, that they have shaked off his insupportable yoke; and with an admirable constancy have maintained and enriched themselves, and are grown so potent as that they are able to resist him by land, and by sea take from him his treasure in the Indies.  
Cesar showeth us also by ●●s care and industry to get intelligence of the enemies proceed (whether by taking prisoners in the field, or by having good spies) the advantage which may be made thereof; many of his successful designs having been founded thereupon, there being great advantage in the attempting them; for that he which assaileth hath more courage than he which is assailed, and always believeth the assaliant to be the stronger, not knowing what part he will assail, and ever jealous that he hath some secret intelligence. Briefly, all that a well exercised and well disciplined army is able to do in such a case, is to defend itself; but where are new-levied soldiers fall out great disorders: which was the reason he took so much care to fortify his camp very strongly, to the end he might defend it & all his baggage with a few men, & might without danger execute many brave designs, being always assured of his retreat. Let us further take view of the siege of Cadenaci which Cesar judging to be impregnable by force, and knowing it to be well provided of corn, undertaketh by a great and dangerous labour to keep them from water, which was from a fountain without the town, from whence they were only supplied: which the besieged perceiving, having set fire on Caesar's works, by a sally they hindered him from quenching it. Cesar not being able to repulse them by reason of the advantage of the place, resolveth to make an assault upon the town; which apprehension caused them to retreat.     

The Abbridgement of the civil wars of Caesar's Commentaries. The I. Book.  
THe true cause of the civil war between Pompey and Cesar was, because the one would have no companion, and the other could not endure a superior: but that which appeared, was the refusal made to Cesar of admitting his solicitation for the Consulship being absent (though it had been promised him) or else because they would have him alone disarm, and that they which were his declared enemies should continue still armed: a forced resolution, and contrary to the will of the Commons; insomuch that the Tribunes of the people were constrained to quit the city, and to go find out Cesar: Who taking occasion by the forelock, of his private cause he maketh a public; declaring to his soldiers that he is not in arms to other purpose but to restore the people (now oppressed by the Senate) to their liberty; and having well encouraged them thereupon, he departeth from Rimini, 
Ariminum.  which was yet part of his government, and possesseth himself of all the marches of Ancona; which caused a great astonishment at Rome. Pompey and the Consuls forsake the city, and dare not gather their gross nearer than Capua: mean time Cesar continuing his march besiegeth Domitius Aenobarbus within Corfinium: who with all the Senators which accompanied him were delivered unto him by his own soldiers, which adhere to Caesar's party. He gave leave to Domitius and the Senators to dispose of themselves where they pleased, causing all to be restored that belonged unto them. Following his design he besiegeth Pompey in Brundisium: who unwilling to sustain the siege, crosseth the seas with his army, which he could not do but at two times, for want of shipping; yet used he much art and precaution to conceal his retreat from Cesar, and to prevent those of Brundisium from giving means to his enemy to entrap him. Cesar, not being able to follow him for want of vessels, sendeth Valerius into the Island of Sardinia, and Curio into that of Sicilia; Cotta abandoned the one, and Cato the other; complaining that Pompey had very inconsiderately embarked them in this war, and so went into Africa. Mean while Cesar cometh to Rome, justifieth his actions, and offereth to condescend to a reasonable peace: but seeing that his enemies protracted time, he passeth into Gallia, to strengthen his army with Gauls. 
M●ssitia.  Marseilles refuseth him entrance; he besiegeth it, and in the mean time sendeth C. Fabius to possess himself of the passages of the Pyrenean mountains; which he doth bravely. Then approacheth to Petreius and Afranius, which had their camp below Ilerda, and encampeth on the river Segre, 
Sicoris.  where he maketh two bridges. At first there passed only slight skirmishes between them, until that two of Fabius his Legions being gone to forage by that bridge which was furthest from the camp, it happened to break; whereof the enemies being advertised, they go with four Legions and all their cavalry to give on upon them; but being retreated to a hill of advantage, and Fabius misdeeming something, going to relieve them, delivered them out of that danger. While these things were a doing, Cesar having left C. Trebonius Lieutenant General at the siege of Marseilles, and D. Brutus' commander of his naval army, arrived in his camp; where being, he would encamp himself between Ilerda and his enemy's camp; bu● after a long fight (whereof either of them made advantage) both the one and the other retreated into their camp. Presently after, the continual rain carried away both these bridges, and made the river altogether unpassable, which drove him to extreme necessities, not being able to supply himself with victual, nor receive those new forces which came to him out of Gallia, nor repair his bridges by reason of the violence of the waters, and the hindrance which his enemies gave him, which were on the other side of the river: At last he caused boats to be made, and whilst the Pompeians busied themselves to entrap certain gaul's which came to join with him, he carrieth boats on wagons twenty miles from his camp, putteth them into the river, causeth some soldiers to pass over to the other side, and without losing time conveyeth thither two legions more, by favour whereof he maketh his bridge: and by that means recovereth his way, and safe passage for his victual, and receiveth those troops which came to relieve him. This action reassured his army, astonished the enemy, and gave so much reputation to his affairs (with the news which he received at the same time, that Brutus had defeated the Marseillians at sea) that five good cities yielded themselves, and divers others came to parley. But following this good success, he maketh divers trenches to cut off the water from his enemy's camp, and to make the Segre fordable. Afranius and Petreius, fearing the prosperity of his designs, resolved to gain Octogesa, sited upon the river Iberus, whither they had beforehand sent to have a bridge made: To this end they depart at midnight; Cesar causeth them to be pursued by his cavalry, which he maketh to ford over, because his bridge was a great way off: afterward (leaving his baggage within his camp) he followeth with his Infantry, and pursueth them so hotly that he overthroweth their design, hindering them from going whither they intended, and returning from whence they came, insomuch that he drove them into such extremity of hunger and thirst that (without striking one blow) they were constrained to yield themselves to his mercy. He dismisseth them all, and winneth them by incredible courtesies, never used elsewhere towards enemies. Thus he remaineth master of Spain, sending away his enemies laden with disgrace, and also with obligations to publish (though unwillingly) his clemency and valour.  

Observations.  
IT is a most dangerous thing for a people, a General of an army, or an army itself, to be surprised with fear for that it is always seconded with perverse and ruinous accidents: which all Leaders and Commanders of armies ought to foresee and carefully to prevent. There be three not able examples in this book on this subject; The first, when Cesar passed the Rubicon; for before that they declared him enemy to the weal-public. Pompey undertaketh with a stamp with his foot to raise an army to him; that at his approach Caesar's own soldiers shall deliver their General into his hands; neither doth he think him worthy consideration; such as dare but name Cesar are driven out of Rome; briefly, he is proceeded against as a criminal offender. Notwithstanding so soon as he had but set the first step to declare the war, and though he did the same at Pezaro which he did at Rimini, having not the fourth part of his army, every man was amazed; Pompey and the Consuls betake them to their heels; the care of levying of soldiers is cast aside, and Rome itself abandoned. The causes of this great change proceeded from this, that Pompey never imagined that Cesar durst have undertaken so high a design; grounding upon a presumption which his virtues and good fortune had added unto him; which made him rather thoughtful how to maintain his party in the city, then provide for defence thereof: Insomuch that when he saw things go otherwise then he had published, he stood amazed. It was therefore no great wonder if an ignorant people (which took assurance or fear from the good or bad countenance of him into whose protection they had delivered themselves) did the like. Whereupon I will say, that in affairs of such importance we ought (in imitation of Cesar) before we enter into them, to consider maturely the worst that can befall, so that evil success dismayeth us not; but when we are embarked, we must not check at whatsoever happeneth, but with constancy go on to the end.  
The second example is, when Domitius Aenobarbus (being out of hope of being relieved by Pompey) took a resolution to save himself within Corfinium, where he was besieged: but for that his countenance was sadder than usual, his speeches less resolute than the time required, and by some neglect of the necessary works for the common defence, he discovered to his soldiers that which he would have concealed from them, so that (preventing his flight they delivered him unto Cesar. It is a fair lesson for a commander, to teach him that in greatest danger he ought to show most resolution; for his soldiers become courageous or fearful according to that they observe in his countenance.  
The third is, when Cesar discovered the fear of Afranius and Petreius soldiers, in that they seconded not each other, that they scarcely had received the brunt of the cavalry but their ensigns were all on a heap, that they made not good their ranks nor distances, and that they stirred not from the field of battle where they could not subsist for want of water. And howsoever in these times armies approach not so near each other as then they did, by reason of the canon; nevertheless, experimented Captains will make profitable use of such judgements. I have seen Henry the Great chase eight hundred horse with less than two hundred; judging they would not dare to combat him because of their confusion and not observing distance● which fell out as he had foretold it.  
And howsoever to retreat from a besieged city by a port of the sea seemeth to be no very hard matter, nevertheless the precautions which Pompey used to retire himself into Brundisium, was that which saved him. For having to do with a people which he abandoned, and an enemy vigilant, he had been lost if he had not walled up the gates and barricadoed up all the entries into Brundisium, except only two (which were covert enough) by which his men issued to the haven; because when his last men departed from the walls, the inhabitants at the same instant of time cause● those of Caesar's to mount them; for which reason in all kinds of retreats a captain cannot take too much care t● make it safe and orderly: and though he may do it whe● he pleaseth himself, yet must he do it in so good time an● so readily as that he be not engaged to fight. In this place I will relate a dispute between Afranius and Petreius; the one being for retreat by night, the other by day: They which were for the night alleged that they should gai● the mountains and places of safety before they should be discovered: but the others judged that having to do with Cesar, and he strong in cavalry, they should never be able to get off from him without fight, and in such a case the day was to be preferred to the night, which always causeth disorders in retreats; which opinion prevailed, but not at all to their advantage. For my part I hold the other opinion the better: for besides that it is a most dangerous thing to retreat in the day time, in the presence of an enemy; a well advised Captain will never engage himself to pursue an army by night; for that it is hard for him to prevent falling into an ambush.    

The second Book.  
Whilst things passed thus in Spain, Caius Trebonius continueth the siege of Marseilles; to the relief whereof Pompey sendeth L. Nassidius, who joining his naval forces with those of the Marseillians, gave battle to Brutus, where he was beaten. The loss fell upon the Marseillians, because they fought more obstinately than the rest, as being more interessed, having to conserve both goods and liberty; and that which afflicted them most was, that they had conceived too great hope of deliverance; howsoever they forbore not to continue a resolute resistance. Nevertheless, the industry of Trebonius was such, that with mantilets and other engines he approached a Tower, which he sapped, 
Vincae.  and overthrew part of it: which so affrighted the Marseillians, as they promised to yield themselves so soon as Cesar should return, and desired a truce till then: Trebonius granteth it; whose soldiers negligent of their guard upon confidence of the truce, on a very windy day the Marseillians make a sudden sally, and burn all the engines of the Romans. Trebonius was but little discouraged for all this, and diligently repaireth them, whereby Domitius was forced to save himself by sea, before Cesar's arrival, who (though the affairs of Italy called upon him) would not leave Spain until it was all at his devotion. There only remained M. Varro, who at first spoke of Cesar with great respect; but when he conceived his affairs stood doubtful, he alienated himself and those of his party from him: in so much that after the defeat of Afranius and Petreius he found himself engaged to sustain the war. But Cesar having called an assembly at Cordova, 
Corduba.  all came thither to attend and acknowledge him, and divers towns forced from them Varro's garrisons: who found himself so fare forsaken, that of two Legions which he had, the one fell absolutely from him, insomuch that he was constrained to have recourse to Caesar's mercy as well as the rest. That done, he left L. Cassius Longinus in Spain, and passeth to Marseilles, which yieldeth to him; then goeth to Rome. At the same time Curio passeth from Sicilia into afric with two Legions only and five hundred horse, encampeth himself in a place called Cornelius camp, near Utica, where Petreius Accius Varus had his camp; against whom he had an advantageous battle with his cavalry. Nevertheless, upon some discourses which one S. Quintilius Varus had with Curio's soldiers, there grew a panike fear amongst them; which taken away by an oration he made unto them, he went and presented battle, and beat Varus again, and drove him to retreat into Utica; where (with help of the ill will the inhabitants bore him) he put him hard to it; and understanding that king Juba was coming to relieve him, Curio retireth himself into his camp, with resolution there to attend the coming of the rest of his army which was in Sicily. But having intelligence that king Juba came not in person and that he only sent a weak supply under the command of Saburra, it caused him to change that so good a resolution. Then puffed up with his former victory, and having been more exercised in making orations to the people of Rome then in commanding their armies, he marcheth night and day to encounter this relief: his cavalry in the night meeteth with some of the Numidian horse, and beateth them. This success heighteneth him more and more, insomuch that he marcheth as if he had pursued a victory; but thus wearied and in disorder, he meeteth with a fresh and complete army, which defeateth him: whereupon he concludeth it his best course to expiate his rashness by his death, and so died a better soldier than commander.  

Observations.  
IT is a maxim held by all, and neglected by most, That in the time of truce there ought to be a better guard than at any other time. We have here a notable example thereof: Trebonius by a marvellous labour had brought the Marseillians to the last gasp, when during the time of a truce (which out of pity he had granted them) his soldiers so neglected their guards that they invited the enemy to their ruin, and he saw in one hour burnt what had cost him the labour of many months. Which should teach us in war never to slacken the severity of military discipline, though the soldiers grumble never so much: for you ought rather to content them by any other means then that; and when they shall see their commanders share the dangers and labours of the war with them, they will undergo them cheerfully. For we may read that by the exact observation of military discipline many commanders have surmounted great difficulties and obtained glorious victories, and that many others for disregarding it have been shamefully defeated; but it hath never been read that the observation thereof hath been the cause of the loss of one battle or of the overthrow of any one enterprise.  
A great courage without experience is likelier to commit a great error in war then a more temperate one: for the first is usually accompanied with presumption, and is more incapable of counsel then the other; especially when he hath made his entry into armies by some happy success. Curio is a fair example thereof, who of a Tribune of the people seeing himself a General of an army, committed many errors, and those not small ones: for after that he had the good hap to beat his enemies, to shut them up into Utica, and upon the news of king Juba his coming to resolve for the best, which was to retreat into his camp on the seaside, well fortified and well provided of munitions, there to attend the rest of his army; upon the first news that was brought him that the relief was weak, and that Juba was not there in person, without staying for confirmation thereof, refusing to advise with, or give credit to any, he crosseth his first resolution, and goeth to give them battle; after which his cavalry meeting with some of Juba's horse, of which four were brought prisoners to him, he asked who commanded them; they answering that it was Saburra, he presupposeth that Juba was not there; so confirmeth himself in the first error, and marcheth so fast and so fare as that he findeth himself five and twenty miles from his camp, in a country which he knew not, with part of his forces (the rest not being able to follow) much hurried and in disorder: which was the cause that Juba easily defeated them. Which showeth us plainly, that neither a great courage alone maketh a good commander (however it helpeth well thereto) nor the reading of books, nor ability of discourse; but it must be atteined by long experience, and the being present at many overthrows as well as victories: for he that hath not had his share therein, is not able to imagine what belongeth thereto, the bravest soldiers sometimes doing the poorest actions, as it happened here; where (though the residue of this army was retreated into a well-fortified camp, and not assaulted, yet these embarked themselves so confusedly and disorderly as that a great part of them were drowned. Therefore I conclude that it is much better to make less haste and to know whither to go then to be forced shamefully to run away or perish.    

The III. Book.  
CEsar being chosen dictator provideth for the affairs of the city of Rome, causeth himself to be published Consul with P. Servilius, giveth over his dictatourship at the end of eleven days, and after imbarketh himself at Brundisium, whither he had sent seven legions to attend him; but found not shipping enough for half his army; insomuch that he was constrained to pass over with fifteen thousand foot and five hundred horse, leaving Marcus Antonius there with the rest, to whom he promiseth to send back the shipping. Pompey (who had all the year to prepare himself) had gathered together great store of men, victual, and shipping, so that Cesar passed over not without trouble and danger; and instantly sent back his vessels to Antony: but Bibulus, chief Commander of all Pompey's navy, took a squadron of thirty of them, which he fired, and put to death all the mariners to the end to deter the rest from undertaking that passage; and did so obstinately continue his design (notwithstanding the winter-season) as that he hindered Antony from passing over. At the same time M. Octavius (Pompey's Lieutenant) besiegeth Salones in Dalmatia, which defendeth itself so courageously as (without help of any) it compelleth him to raise his siege, and by a sally beateth him shamefully from thence; from whence he retireth to Pompey at Durazzo. 
Dyrrachium.  On the other side, Cesar having possessed himself of divers towns upon the shore, hindered him also from refreshing himself. At last Bibulus dieth: and the sea not being so exacty guarded, Antony passeth over; where the winds so favour the good fortune of Cesar, as that they change in the just instant to put his navy into safety, & to cast away that which pursued it. This news coming both to him and to Pompey at one and the same instant, (because they were encamped near each other) the one goeth to join himself to Antony, which he doth; and the other to oppose him; which though he might have done, yet returneth to encamp himself at Asperagne, 
Asparagus.  belonging to the territory of Durrazo, and sendeth to Scipio to bring his forces, and join with him. Cesar seeing that the war was like to be drawn out at length, sendeth part of his army into Macedonia and Thessaly to make provision of corn; because that Pompey having the command of the sea, he was to expect none from out of Italy. But Scipio in his passage meeting (at the same time) with an opportunity, thought to have cut in pieces L. C. Longinus, with some of Caesar's legions; which he had done had not M. Favonius (whom he had left to guard his baggage with eight cohorts) sent to him that unless he made haste to relieve him, Domitius was coming to defeat him: So he desisted from than purpose, and arrived opportunely for the relief of Favonius. At the same time young Pompey having understood that Cesar (now the third time) was sending his shipping to Brundisium, and having left some few at Oricum under the charge of Caninius, with three cohorts he came and assailed them, and either took or fired them all. That done, Cesar goeth and encampeth himself between Durazzo and Pompey's camp, to hinder him the benefit of Durazzo: but Pompey encamped at a place called Petra on the seaside, where being a small haven, by means of his shipping he receiveth some benefit by it. Then Cesar attempteth to enclose him by trenches, and Pompey by other trenches enlargeth himself as much as possibly he could; who finding himself the stronger in forces assaileth the trenches, and in two encounters had the best on't, and hoped to have defeated him. Cesar, not being able to abide here longer, retreateth towards Apollonia and Oricum, where having mustered his army, and taken order for those two places, he passeth into Thessaly to join with Domitius his army. Pompey followeth him, who also joineth Scipio's forces to his own. The two armies (whereon the decision of the whole Roman Empire depended) encamp themselves in sight of each other. Cesar sought all occasions to fight, and Pompey evaded them; at last he suffered himself to be overruled, first by the revile of his soldiers, and afterward by the valour of Cesar, who pursued him so fiercely after the victory of the battle of Pharsale, 
Pharsalia.  as he gave him no leisure to rally his forces, arriving in Egypt almost assoon as himself, where king Ptolomee, violating the right of hospitality, & forgetting the benefits which his father had received from Pompey, caused him to be murdered, thinking by this wicked act to gain the victor's favour; who revenged it, as we shall see in the book following. At the same time Cassius General of the forces of Syria, Phenicia, and Cilicia set on fire the shipping which Pomponius kept in the port of Messina; and Lalius took a little island before the port of Brundisium, as Libo had done in former times. But the news of Pompey's defeat overthrew all the designs of the Lieutenants.  

Observations.  
IF the clemency and liberality of Cesar be so much recommended in all the course of his life, it seemeth that in this civil war he hath outdone himself. To refuse to defeat whole and entire armies in Spain by the sword, and having reduced them to yield to his mercy, to let them go with their Commanders, not so much as binding them from making war against him any more: To satisfy his enemies their stipends, whilst he borroweth money of his captains to pay his own soldiers; restoring to Domitius Aenobarbus a hundred and fifty thousand crowns at a clap, which Pompey had given him out of the public treasury to make war against him: To release all the prisoners he took without ransom, and even to cause all to be restored which belonged unto them, whilst Bibulus, Labienus, and others, put to the sword as many of his as they could take; are actions in my observation rather to be admired then like to be imitated, especially in an age whose practice is much contrary to this generosity, and even to that which he used in Gallia: where (sometimes) he practised great severity. Therefore searching into the reasons which caused in him this blind clemency, who seemed cruel to his own, I conceive we ought to distinguish the designs. In Gallia he was a conqueror, in such sort as when they abused his first and natural clemency, he used severity; to keep those in awe through fear which by affability could not be made pliant. But here is a civil war, wherein (under pretext of maintaining the liberty of the people) he intendeth to bring both people and Senate into subjection. For this end he depresseth all passions to attein the height of his designs. The m●●e cruel his enemies are towards him, the less he spleeneth them: insomuch that they which make war against him, fear him not but in battle, and not despairing of pardon, become the more inclinable to yield upon the first reverse of fortune which befalleth them. It is not so in a civil war, which we make not but for the defence of our person or religion: for then having no design to possess yourself of the State, you are obliged to repel cruelty by cruelty, otherwise you should find none to take part with you. But when you fight for rule and domination, you must (to attein it) appear such a one as that they may not suspect either revenge or cruelty in you, and that they believe you to abound in liberality and all other sorts of virtues: for no man at any time desireth change of condition, but to better his own. So by this liberal resolution and clemency, not continuing his Dictatourship above eleven days, doin nothing but by the usual order, always justifying his actions as a Protector of the Commonwealth, showing himself so much the more affectionated to peace by how much Pompey held off from it, that so he might the easilier work the indignation of his citizens and soldiers against him, and by that means go the better through with the wars, he attained the end of the highest and most glorious design that ever was undertaken by man.  
Cesar having drawn all his forces together, attempteth to fight with Pompey: and not being able to draw him to it, he undertaketh a high design, namely, to besiege him in his camp, though he were the weaker of the two. This was near Durazzo, where he goeth about to enclose him with trenches, helping himself with the advantage of little hills of difficult access, which in my opinion induced him to this design. The reasons which he allegeth are, that being weak in cavalry, and wanting corn, he could not get it if Pompey's horse were at liberty; from which he should also take away the benefit of foraging, and render it unprofitable to all the offices of war. Besides, it was a way to diminish the reputation of Pompey throughout the whole Empire, and increase his own, when it should be reported that Cesar kept him besieged, and that he durst not fight with him: a matter of great consequence, for that men usually turn to that side which is strongest. On the other side, Pompey, being unwilling to quit the seaside or Durazzo where he had made his Arsenal & Magazine, resolveth not to budge: and seeing that his cavalry might suffer too much if it were hindered from forage, he maketh an enclosure of trenches of fifteen mile's compass on his side. So both Generally omit nothing that maketh for their designs. In the end Pompey finding himself discommodated by being thus cooped up, setteth upon one of the angles of Caesar's trenches; where he had such advantage in two encounters which fell both in a day, that Cesar confessed, if he had known how to have prosecuted his victory he had defeated him. By this may be seen how necessary retrenchments are, & how by means thereof may be prevented to fight with an army one is fearful of: one may also reassure affrighted forces, and famish a more potent army then one's own. For the art of war consisteth principally in not fight but when men are willing; and to this end you must take good order for your victual, you must well exercise your soldiers in the use of their arms, and in the observation of all orders, and know very well how to make their retrenchments. And if Cesar had had to do with any but Pompey, who shut himself up from the very beginning, he had either ruined his army, or else compelled him to fight.  
Cesar seeing that he could not continue Pompey longer in that straight, nor stay so near him without a great discommodity for want of victual, he undertaketh to make a long retreat and for many days. To this end he causeth all the baggage to be sent away overnight with one legion, about midnight all the rest of his army saving two legions, and his cavalry (wherewith himself marched) at break of day. Pompey followeth him with all diligence, finding him quartered where he had been encamped before, and lodgeth himself also within his own old camp close by him. But upon Caesar's making show of sending his cavalry to forage (causing them to return secretly into the camp again) Pompey sendeth out his horse to the same purpose in good earnest; and then also the greatest part of his soldiers being returned to their old camp to look for baggage which they had left behind them, Cesar departeth suddenly in the same order as the day before. Insomuch that Pompey, not being able to pursue him for the present, & he continually marching by great journeys in the same order, leaving him no possible means to overtake him, at the end of four days gave over his pursuit. This is a fair lesson to teach us how dangerous it is for armies to retreat in view of an enemy; besides, how carefully we ought to avoid fight when we retreat, and what order ought to be given that we be not pestered with the baggage; and that also a retreat is better made with a part of the army then with the whole. For if Cesar were afraid to retreat in the view of Pompey, with an army so ●ell exercised and accustomed to overcome, being redoubted by Pompey himself; what should then the captains of these times do, which command armies newly levied, without order, without obedience, overlaid with baggage, the soldiers not knowing how to use their arms, nor the captains themselves to teach them? Yet nevertheless they would think it a blemish to their honour to make a private retreat. Certainly presumption and ignorance are two bad counsellors in war.  
At the battle of Pharsalia Pompey was twice as strong as Cesar, especially in cavalry, whereupon he principally grounded his victory; but he had not an army so well disciplined nor so exercised to fight as Cesar had: insomuch that fearing that if his gave the charge they would do it disorderly, he commanded them to attend the giving on of the enemy, with charge not to ●●rre from their places. Cesar, disliking that course, commanded his soldiers to give on upon the adverse army, alleging that this exciteth the courage of soldiers to play the men, which ought rather to be increased then abated, not disapproving the ancient custom of beginning the fight with a general shout. And experience teacheth us that in all actions of war, he which giveth the charge redoubleth his courage, and he which is charged diminisheth his.  
Touching Pompey's order of battle; Having a river on his right hand, he placed all his horse on the left, promising to himself that after he had repulsed Caesar's cavalry, he should enclose his army. Cesar, judging his cavalry not of sufficient strength to resist that of Pompey, strengtheneth it by foot, which were fitted for that purpose, and mingled amongst them. Besides that, he taketh from every battalion one troup, whereof he composed a battalion to be as a reserve, which he placeth without the ranks of the three orders of infantry, and commandeth them not to stir to the conflict until he appointed: so that when Pompey's horse had repulsed Caesar's (which they could not do without putting themselves into disorder) they met with this battalion, which put them to a sudden stop, and afterward to show their backs, and wholly to abandon the left wing of Pompey's army; by which means Cesar following his advantage easily putteth all the rest to rout. Whereupon we ought to observe two things: the one, That we ought never to hazard all our troops upon one only charge, but make a reserve of the one to relieve the other: and the other, That we ought so well to observe the distances or intervals, as well to the flanks as the rear, that the first troops happening to be reversed, they reverse not those which should relieve them; but to leave them a convenient space to fall back, and to rally themselves again in the rear.  
If Cesar knew how to conquer, he knew better how to prosecute and make his benefit thereof, but in none like to this of Pharsalia; where he contented not himself to force the camp, to besiege the rest of the army on a hill whither they retired, nor to pursue Pompey's person certain day's journeys, but with three or four thousand men only followed him so close both by sea and land, that he found him dead in Egypt, where he arrived almost assoon as the other; never giving him leisure to recollect himself, or reinforce his troops. Which serveth to teach us to make use of occasion when it offereth itself favourable unto us, & not to defer that to another time which may be presently executed: for the affairs of the world are subject to great revolutions. And the affairs which Cesar yet had after the death of Pompey give us occasion enough to judge, that if (in imitation of many great personages) he had gathered the fruits of his victories before they had been ripe, or tasted of repose before he had been secured, he might full well have repent thereof.    

Of the Alexandrine war written by Aulus Hircius, or Opius. The FOUR Book.  
ASsoon as Cesar was arrived in Alexandria with three thousand two hundred foot, eight hundred horse, ten Rhodian galleys, and some ships of Asia, he understood of the death of Pompey; and upon the bad quarter he perceived was between the soldiers of Pompey and the people of the city he sent for new Legions into Asia. Mean time he required to be informed of the testament of the late king Ptolemee, who had made the people of Rome his executours; and to this end ordained that Ptolemee the eldest son & Cleopatra the eldest daughter should discharge their army, & come to him to give an account of their rights. But Ptolemee's Counsel did not approve of this way of accommodation, and underhand sendeth for his troops which were at Pelusium, under the command of Achillas: whereof Cesar being advertised, and that the King himself had intelligence with the said Achillas, he detaineth him, and prepareth for defence: he giveth them the repulse at their first approach, than cantons himself in one part of the city and the rest in the other part. Arsinoe the King's second sister causeth Achillas to be slain, putteth Ganymedes into his place, and possesseth herself of the authority, who continuing the former design putteth Cesar to great extremities, infecting his fresh waters; which he readily remedied by digging great store of pits. He also sendeth for soldiers, ships, and arms from all parts; and upon the news which he received that the thirty seventh Legion with great provisions of victual and arms was arrived on the coast of Africa, but could not get to him by reason of contrary winds, he putteth himself alone into a ship, taketh all his shipping with his mariners only, and putteth to sea in the very face of them. The enemies, knowing him to be without soldiers, assail him; he beateth them, and without other relief getteth to his legion; then returneth to Alexandria. This first conflict affrighted the Alexandrians; nevertheless they make their naval army stronger than ever, which Cesar defeateth the second time; where Euphranor Captain of the Rhodian galleys behaved himself very bravely. There is an isle before the haven of Alexandria built and inhabited, which sheltreth the town, and is joined to the city by the peer, which is 900 paces long and 60 broad, upon which there were two forts. Cesar thinketh it necessary to take this isle, that so he may have the sea at liberty. He taketh it, then taketh one of the forts of the peer: but at the other he had a hot skirmish, and was repulsed with so great disorder as not being able to hinder the soldiers from casting themselves aboard, he saveth himself by swimming rather then to perish. The Alexandrians, astonished by these brunts, betake them to their subtleties, demand of Cesar their King, who delivereth him to them, hoping it would be a means to facilitate agreement. Whilst these things were in agitation Mithridates a Pergamenian, a man of high descent, a great soldier, of great valour and most faithful to Cesar, arriveth to his relief with goodly forces, taketh Pelusium in his way, & cometh to pass the Nile at a place called Delta. Whereof Ptolemee being advertised goeth in person to oppose him; and Cesar on the other side goeth to relieve Mithridates, who, before the arrival of either of them, had already encountered with and beaten Ptolemee's forces; and Cesar also before he could come to Mithridates had defeated others. After which he goeth and assaulteth a small fort which was between his camp and that of Ptolemees, which he taketh; and the day after he assaileth the camp, which he also ●●●ceth; and the King attempting to save himself by water, is drowned. After which returning victorious to Alexandria, all submit to him. Mean time the provinces of the Empire rested not quiet. Domitius Calvinus Caesar's Lieutenant was defeated by Pharnaces, who possessed himself of the kingdom of Pontus. In Illyricum Gabinius Caesar's Lieutenant was defeated, and died at Salona: And Octavius one of Pompey's party, intending to possess himself of that province, found Cornificius to oppose him in that design. So did Vatinius; who being a● Brundisium and hearing this news putteth to sea, meeteth Octavius, giveth him battle and defeateth him in Spain. Cassius Longinus, whom Cesar had left there, had made himself hateful through his covetousness as well to those of the country as his own soldiers. They combine against him and sorely wound him, and believing him dead each one discovereth his joy: he recovering rigorously punisheth the conspirators; nevertheless that hindered not the revolt of his army. And as he thought to have remedied it in one place it breaketh out in another, and by a general consent they choose Marcellus for their commander, who encamped himself beneath Cordova, which was at his devotion. Longinus sendeth to desire aid of the King Boguld, who sendeth him a great recrute: nevertheless Marcellus maintaineth himself without fight; and Lepidus coming with fresh forces to labour a reconciliation between them, Longinus mistrusteth him, and withdraweth himself from them; but upon the approach of Trebonius his successor in the government, he embarked for Africa where Cesar had designed him, and was drowned at the mouth of the river Iberus. Let us return to Cesar: who though he were much pressed to visit Rome, yet would he first revenge the defeat of Domitius; he departeth from Egypt with the sixth Legion only, leaving the rest of his army for the guard of that kingdom: and with those forces which he gathereth together in Asia he giveth battle to Pharnaces, defeateth him, taketh from him what he had possessed himself of, and giveth the kingdom of Bosporus to Mithridates the Pergamenian as a recompense for the good service he had done him in the Alexandrian war: then triumphantly after so many victories he returneth to Rome.  

Observations.  
OF all the wars which Cesar hath made I find not one less necessary, more dangerous, and wherein he hath showed less foresight then in this. For having understood the death of Pompey at Alexandria, to set down there with three or four thousand men, and in this weak estate to attempt to force a young king to make restitution of part of his kingdom in favour of his sister Cleopatra, was an argument that he trusted much to his good fortune, or was very amorous. But as this beginning was much short of his ordinary prudence, so the progress and the end thereof surpasseth all his other actions; and it seemeth that he hath not here erred but to make his virtues shine so much the brighter. This hath been a war without rule: for he hath been put to defend cross ways of streets, and to barricado himself there, to dispute the one half of the town against the other, to remedy unthought of accidents, to reassure his soldiers, to fight with a naval army without soldiers, and to beat them; and, as if he were fallen into another world, to make a war after a new manner. Which showeth that he excelled in three things principally; namely, that he was never left hopeless, that he was of great experience, and that he confounded not himself in his commands.  
This war finished, he goeth against Pharnaces; wherein we will only observe two things: the first, that howsoever he desired to finish this war speedily, because his business required him elsewhere, yet he goeth not to assault him rashly, but always beginneth by encamping himself strongly; then (having left his baggage in safety) he goeth with all his army to make another camp near to Pharnaces, leaving a great valley between both; to the end that if he would hinder him from fortifying there, and assault him, he could not get to him without great disadvantage. The other is to show the advantage which he hath that assaileth: for Cesar himself observeth, that though Pharnaces assaulted him rashly, yet his soldiers were struck with fear, and put into some disorder upon their first approach. Which may serve to confirm that he which assaileth hath a great advantage, and that there is nothing more necessary in war then retrenchments.    

Of the African war, written by Aulus Hireius, or Opius. The V Book.  
THe broken forces of Pompey's party being rallied in Africa under Scipio, Cato, and king Juba, Cesar goeth thither in the month of December, and arriveth there at the beginning with no more than only three thousand foot and some few horse. He presenteth himself before Adrumetum, but Considius seeing him so weak standeth upon his guard: and Cesar in his retreat was assaulted by a sally from the town, and by the horse which were come to their aid, which he repulseth: where it was observed that thirty French horsemen put above two thousand Moors to the recoil. The fame of his arrival opened the gates of many cities and castles, which furnished him with victual. He made choice of the site of Ruspina to encamp himself, and there to expect the rest of his army; but not having patience to attend, he goeth to the port, imbarketh himself, and goeth to find them out; and as he was about to hoist sail a good part of them arrive. After that he goeth with thirty cohorts to look about for corn, and in the way meeteth with Labienus, with whom he had a great skirmish, and had the best on't, and so retired himself into his camp, which he fortified more than ever, because he found himself weak. He drew two trenches from the town to the port for his better security: then he dispatcheth into Sicilia, Sardinia and Italy, for supplies of men and corn. On the other side Scipio and Cato, desirous to fight with him before he should gather more strength, hasten Juba to come with his army: but he, being on his march towards them, is constrained to turn back the same way he came, by reason that P. Sitius Caesar's Lieutenant, and king Bogud assaulted his kingdom. Mean time Labienus joineth with Scipio; they come and encamp near Cesar: both sides attempt to take advantages, and divers skirmishes pass between them, yet without hazarding a battle. Caesar's necessities increased daily, which he supported with great constancy, and only maintained the hopes of his own side by cheerful words and looks: he dispatcheth others to hasten his troops and victual: some of his ships are cast away; and hearing that others were chased even into the port of Leptis, he posteth thither with all speed possible, imbarketh, and with what he could there gather together goeth and relieveth his men, chaseth his enemies, taketh some of their ships, and recovereth his own which were taken. At last his troops come from divers parts, he beginneth with purging his army of some seditious persons and libertines; then resolveth upon a definitive battle. To this end he goeth and encampeth before Thapsus, which he environeth with trenches, not doubting but Scipio would come and relieve the town: who having caused king Juba to return again, they come and encamp near Cesar in three several camps. And there was the battle fought, which Cesar gained with loss of fifty soldiers only, and some few hurt: but on the other side were ten thousand slain, and the three camps taken. Thapsus on the report of this victory was yielded to C. Rebilius. Cato seeing he could not prevail with his men to resolve to defend themselves killeth himself. Utica openeth her gates to the Victor: Adrumetum doth the like. Zama shutteth hers against her conquered king, and calleth in Cesar: all the rest of Juba his kingdom revolteth: he and Petreius kill each other through despair. Sitius having defeated and killed Saburra Juba's Lieutenant, and coming to Cesar, meeteth with Afranius and Faustus Sylla, which were going for Spain: these he defeateth and taketh prisoners, who afterwards in an uproar were both slain. Scipio and divers Senators, having embarked themselves for Spain, were by a tempest cast amongst Sitius his fleet, where all perished or killed themselves. This was the sequel of that battle, wherein all things concurred (as if by consent) to smooth the way to Caesar's absolute victory, who pardoned all that had recourse unto his clemency, and after that returned to Rome.  

Observations.  
CEsar hath done three things in this war which came near to rashness: the first, to pass into Africa in the dead of winter with a small force, not having any assured port there, for which cause he was not able to appoint any Rendezvous for his shipping; which thing was imputed him as a want of foresight. Nevertheless after his passage his manner of proceeding was altogether admirable: He maketh choice to encamp himself near the city Ruspina, which was within half a league of the port, which he joineth to the city and his camp, and fortifieth it exceedingly: for from thence he had one foot on land and the other on the Sea, and could (as occasions should require) act by either sea or land, and be secured from being shut up, whatsoever should befall. This is a good lesson for such as enterprise upon a foreign country, being weak at the beginning: for in this posture great attempts may be withstood, and in all extremity a good retreat may be made. The second, to leave his army near Ruspina, and without giving knowledge to any man to cast himself aboard to go seek his shipping. And the third, having news of the defeat of his fleet, to leave his camp, to hasten in full carrier to Leptis, to cast himself into a ship, and to rally others, and assault the enemies: and although he perished in none of them, there can be nothing said in his defence, but that he trusted wholly to his good fortune, and that he never was wearied or disheartened in the most dangerous or laborious designs.  
It is observable that Cesar in all his wars hath always been inferior to his enemies in number; for which cause he hath always helped himself by fortifications, more than ever any other hath done, which he made much the better when he found himself not sufficiently strong to give battle, as he was a long time in Africa; insomuch that Scipio himself wondered at his coldness: nevertheless he always continued his soldiers in exercise, and himself exercised new-levied men, and entered them by small skirmishes, wherein by his industry for the most part he had the best; and always attempted something upon his enemy. Which is an excellent maxim to give courage to your soldiers, and secure you from being surprised.    

The Spanish war against Pompey's sons. The VI Book.  
THe relics of the African troops reassemble themselves once more in Spain under Cneus and Sextus, the sons of Pompey. Cesar goeth thither: He findeth the one laying siege to Vlla, and the other in Cordova. He sendeth relief into the first, and goeth and encampeth himself before the other: which enforceth Cneus to quit his siege to relieve his brother. Some skirmishes passed between both armies: but Cesar, not being able to draw his enemy to battle, goeth and besiegeth Ategua, and after a bold resistance he taketh it in view of Cneus. Afterwards both armies had divers encounters and combats, but to little purpose: at last they encamp themselves in a champain near Munda, both resolving not to refuse battle: nevertheless ●neus took a high an● advantageous ground for his field of battle, where Cesar making difficulty to assail him was put upon it by the fury of his soldiers. The fight was long and doubtful, even by his own confession, and with much ado he got the victory, which was bloody. Thirty thousand on Pompey s part died upon the place, and a thousand on Caesar's: they which saved themselves into Munda were constrained to yield themselves. Sextus Pompeius abandoneth Cordova: Cneus is swiftly pursued, overtaken and killed. All places yield themselves to the victor. This was Caesar's last battle, and the deadly wound to Pompey's party.   

The military order of the Grecians: and particularly of their Phalanx.  
THe order of the Grecians is but obscurely to be found amongst their authors, because the most part of the books which they have written thereof are lost, and none have come to our hands but fragments, so that it is hard to collect it very exactly. The Phalanx was form after this manner.  
Zugos, Jugum, signifieth two men in front, and more joined together make a rank; and so the word is often taken.  
Stichos, Versus, signifieth two men one behind the other, and more behind each other make a file; and versus is often taken for a file.  
Lochos, Decurio, signifieth a file, which the Grecians made of several depths, but never exceeded the number of sixteen, as being sufficient to sustain the violentest charge: conceiving that to give a greater depth to their Phalanx was but to employ men unprofitably; and that it was better to extend the battalia into breadth, to prevent overwinging, and so to be charged on the flanks, or else by this means to overwing the enemy, then to give so great a depth to their Phalanx.  
The Phalanx was compounded of hoplitae only (that is, heavie-armed) with sarissas (that is, long pikes) and their bucklers: for the archers, slingers, and other casting-weapons had their orders apart.  
In a Lochos or file of 16 men, there were five which had command; namely, the first, fifth, ninth, thirteenth, and sixteenth; as we may see by the figure following, and their names.  

The first figure.  
Lochagos o File-leader. 1. Enomotarcha oh  2. Enomotarcha o Half-file-leader. 3. Enomotarcha oh  Vragos o Bringer-up.  
They made the most valiant the File-leader, and the most prudent the Bringer up.  
Now to begin their order; They joined two files together, which made 32 soldiers; & those two files so joined they called Dilochia, and the Commander of these two files they called Dilochites.  
Then they doubled the number of those two files, which made four files and 64 soldiers; and this troup they called Tetrarchia, which had a Commander called Tetrarcha.  
After that they doubled the number of these, which made eight files and 128 soldiers; and this body was called Taxiarchia, and their Commander Taxiarcha.  
Then they doubled those eight files, so made them 16: and this body was called Syntagma, and the Commander of this body was called Syntagmatarcha.  
To this body they appointed five general officers: An Ensign, a Lieutenant, a Trumpeter, (for they had no Drum) a Crier, and a Sergeant.  
The Ensign was placed in the middle of the first rank, as all will appear by the figure following.   

The second figure.  

Syntagmatarcha.  
Taxiarcha.  
Tetrarcha.  
Dilochites.    diagram 
The Phalanx was composed of sixteen bodies, like to the foregoing figure.  
This body of 16 files they doubled, which made 32 files, and called it Pentacosiarchia, and the Commander of it Pentacosiarcha.  
Then these 32 files they doubled, which made 64; and this body they called Chiliarchia, and the Commander Chiliarcha.  
These 64 files being doubled made 128 files, and were called Merarchia, and their Commander Merarcha.  
And 128 files being doubled make 256, called Phalangia, and the Commander Phalangiarchos; so that the Phalanx is composed of 4096 soldiers, and of one Phalangiarchos, which commanded in chief, two Merarchas, four Chiliarchas, eight Pentacosiarchas, 16 Syntagmatarchas, 32 Taxiarchas, 64 Tetrarchas, and 128 Dilochites, as the next figure showeth.   

The third figure.  
 diagram  
Now according to the ability of their Commonwealths they augmented this army by doubling the Phalanx, which was called Diphalangarchia, and the Commander Diphalangarcha: or by doubling the Diphalangarchia, and this they called Tetraphalangarchia, and the Commander Tetraphalangarchos: who then was the highest Commander: And this they held to be a complete army, which afterward hath been called a Phalanx. Nevertheless it was always divided into four bodies as four Phalanges, and was composed of 16384 soldiers.   

The fourth figure.   diagram 
This is the order of the Grecian phalanx for the heavy-armed, called hoplitae, namely, of pikes and targets; which took up (allowing six foot for each soldier, and without accounting the three intervals) six thousand one hundred forty four foot in breadth, and ninety six foot in depth.  
To this army they joined half that number of light-armed soldiers, called Psyllagi, which fought from afar off with flying and casting-weapons, and were ordered into battalia behind the Phalanx in equal front (but that their files were but eight depth) in the same order, and with the same officers: And when they were to begin the battle, they passed through the intervals and assailed the enemy; when the armies were drawn so near each other as to come to the shock, they retreated by the same intervals into their places behind the heavy-armed, and over their heads poured a shower of stones, darts, and arrows upon their enemies, and fortified the depth of the Phalanx to sustain the shock, being now of 24 men in depth.   

The fifth figure.   diagram 
Concerning the cavalry, they always placed them on the wings: and whether it were the cavalry or the infantry, they changed the form of their order according to the site of the places, or to the number of the enemy's forces with whom they had to do, or to the order wherein they were ranged into battalia, enlarging the front by lessening the depth, & doubling their front by the half files, as Cyrus did in the battle which he fought aghast Croesus; for fearing to be overwinged, he made his files (which were 24 depth) but 12, and so augmented the front of his army by the one half.  
Besides they made use of several orders of battalia according to occasions; as the Orb, and the light-armed in the middle, to sustain a strong charge on all parts; or the Wedge, the better to enter into a battalion; or a Halfmoon to enclose or overwing; and others, which are of no great use in these times.  
And that they might not confound themselves in such orders when occasions served, they had public Schools, where all the younger sort of men went to exercise themselves, which they called Gymnasia, and had Masters to teach the use of arms and motions, called Tactici. Now to perform all the motions they allowed to every soldier six foot of ground square; and for fight, three foot; and to sustain a violent charge they serried them so as they took up but a foot and a half.  
By this means it was that so many small Commonwealths of the Grecians maintained their liberties so long, & have performed so brave actions, having repulsed so great armies with so small forces, and having even planted their trophies in Asia and elsewhere; until their divisions overthrew them: which Philip dextrously laying hold on brought them to subjection; and after that, Alexander his son with them and their Militia conquered a great part of the world.  
It is true indeed that the constitution of those Commonwealths was more proper for a happy maintaining of their liberty then to increase themselves: for howsoever they all addicted themselves to arms, so that none were exempted from them, yet their poverty, and the small number of soldiers of every Commonwealth apart by itself, hindered them from making any great progress; so did their divisions; it being a hard matter that so many sovereign Commonwealths should agree together, unless it were in a common necessity, to defend themselves, as they did divers times against the Persians; but not for a conquest, where men cannot agree, neither about places of command, nor about sharing of what is gotten.  
Concerning their retrenched camp, which they called Aplectos', they chose rather strong sites, then that they fortified them by industry neither had they any certain form, as the Romans had, but according to the advantage of places they fortified one part more than another: and hereof there is nothing certain to be found in writing amongst ancient Authors.    

The Military discipline of the Romans.  

CHAP. I. Of the election of soldiers, and their arms.  
Romulus' having built the city of Rome divided it into centuries and military orders; every body contained four thousand foot and three hundred horse: Now because the most valiant were chosen, it was called Legio, which signifieth as much as a select company.  
The city being more populous by the addition of the Sabines, the Legions were doubled, which then became to be of six thousand foot and six hundred horse; yet after that they have been of a greater number.  
Tullus Hostilius third king of the Romans established military exercise, and distinguished all the people into five Classes or orders. They of the first Classis (as being the richest) were bound to mount and arm themselves to serve on horseback. The three following Classes were employed on foot, and (according to their means) were Hastati Principes, or Triarii, and were bound to arm themselves according as their order required. The fifth and last Classis, as being too poor, was exempt from going to the war. Nevertheless, after that the Romans made war by sea, which was four hundred eighty nine years after the foundation of the city, they chose out the ablest of this fifth Classis to make them serve at sea; and yet they obliged them (in case of necessity) to serve twenty years amongst the land-forces.  
None could attein to the office of a civil magistrate in Rome unless he had served ten years in the war; nor by that could be capable of any such office, unless he were twenty seven years of age: for at seventeen years of age they were enrolled, and then entered into the war, and ended their service at forty five years of age. They were obliged during these twenty eight years to serve fifteen: and when they had accomplished their service, they were no more tied to take arms, but only for the guard and defence of the city.  
After that the kings were driven out of Rome, they chose every year two Consuls in their stead: Then those Consuls chose twenty four military Tribunes, but afterwards the people would choose them: fourteen of them were to have served already five years in the wars, and the other ten a longer time; namely in the infantry, eleven years; and in the cavalry, fifteen years: which showeth what esteem they had of their foot above their horse.  
The Consuls every year called out of all the Tribes such as were from seventeen years of age to forty five to the Capitole or to Campus Martius: and such as dd not there make their appearance were rigorously punished; which was easily discovered, for by the ordinances of Tullus Hostilius they kept a register of all that were born, and that died: now they of the territory were reckoned into the number of inhabitants as well as they which dwelled within the city.  
They always chose four Legions, two for each Consul; sometimes they levied more, but very seldom, and that according to the necessity of their affairs: And even in the time of Hannibal they had twenty three Legions, and yet every Consul had but two, the rest being commanded by Praetors, Proconsul's, and other officers. But after that the Commonwealth grew more powerful, and their laws grew weaker, there have been under Cesar in the wars of Gallia ten Legions.  
Before they proceeded to election of their soldiers, they divided the twenty four Tribunes amongst the 4. Legions: namely, of the fourteen youngest of them they gave four to the first Legion, three to the second, four to the third, and three to the fourth: and of the ten eldest they gave two to the first, three to the second, two to the third, and three to the fourth. By this means there were six military Tribunes for every Legion, and in every one both old and young ones.  
The Tribunes being thus disparted and divided into four parts, the Tribes were drawn by lot; and of the first they chose four men of a like quality as near as could be: of these four the six Tribunes of the first Legion chose one; the six of the second chose the second; the six of the third, the third; and the six of the fourth had the fourth man Then they chose four more, whereof the Tribunes of the second Legion began to choose the first; they of the third, the second; they of the fourth, the third; and they of the first Legion took the fourth man which was left And so successively they made their cho●ce throughout all the Tribes: Insomuch that by this choice the soldiers of the first Legion had no advantage over those of the last, but were all equally form.  
After the election thus made of the Infantry, the Censor elected the Cavalry.  
Concerning the number of soldiers of every Legion, it hath differed at divers times. For the Infantry, it hath been 3000, 3200, 4000, 4200, 5000, 5200, 6000, 6200, always following that proportion of number, for the convenience which they found in it for the ready dividing them and forming of their Maniples, Centuries, and Cohortes.  
So in their Cavalry, it hath been at divers times 200, 220, 250, 300, 320, 330, 350, and 400.  
The election being thus made, the Tribunes of every Legion made them take the oath one by one, (holding up their right hand, and raising up the thumb of that hand) to obey and perform whatsoever should be commanded them by thei● superiors.  
At the same time the Consuls commanded the magistrates of Italy to make their elections after the same manner amongst the Allies of the Romans, amongst which there was chosen a like number of Infantry, and double the number of Cavalry: so that in a Consular army there must be four Legions, two Roman and two Auxiliars.  
That done, they were suffered to departed, having a set day given them to meet at a place appointed without arms, where the Tribunes chose the youngest and the poorest to be Velites; the next, to be Hastati; the more vigorous, to be Principes; and the elder sort, to be Triarii.  
Then they were armed, and therein they sometime varied: but most usually the arms of the Velites were a morion, a small target, darts, and a sword. Their archers and slingers were called extraordinary, and were auxiliars. The Hastati bare targets of four foot high, an head-piece, and a small breast of the cuirace: The richer sort of them bore the whole cuirace, a sword on the right thigh, (being short, broad, and sharp-pointed, and cutting on both sides) and two darts to cast. The Principes and Triarii bore the like arms; only the Triarii in stead of darts had javelins.  
Concerning the Cavalry; that was but ill armed at the beginning; but it learned of the Grecians afterwards to be armed with a cuirace, a buckler, and a casting-javelin.  
The Allies (aswell horse as foot) were armed and disciplined as the Romans.  
Besides the four bodies of Velites, Hastati, Principes and Triarii, the ancient authors also make mention of Tirones, Rorarii, and Accenses, all which were young soldiers, either Romans or Auxiliars, and (in my opinion) fought not but with casting-weapons. And in effect there was no other body of the Infantry amongst the Romans but of those three orders, the Hastati, Principes, and Triarii: for even the Velites had no body apart by themselves, being both in the orders of batallions, as also in the encamp, intermixed amongst the other three orders, and began not to be employed by the Romans but at the siege of Capua.  
The election being made, the soldiers armed, and the orders form, the Tribunes separated every order by Centuries or Cohorts, than made two elections of ten men apiece: they of the first were the more honourable, assisted at the counsel of war, and were as the Captains of our time; they of the second represented our Lieutenants. Indeed all of them were called Centurions, but they of the first election were called first Centurions, and the other, second Centurions. After that, the Centurions chose their Vexillarii, which are the Ensigns of our times, and there were two of them in every Cohort. Then they chose twenty Tergiductores, which were Rear-commanders of the troops: so that in every Cohort there were two commanders for the front, and two for the rear.   

CHAP. II. The division of a Legion of 4200 foot and 300 horse.  
A Legion was always divided into five bodies: namely the Infantry into four bodies, called Velites, Hastati, Principes, Triarii; and the Cavalry into one. Every body was divided into ten troops, which amongst the Infantry were called Cohorts or Maniples, and amongst the Cavalry were called Turmes.  
In the three first orders of Infantry were 1200 soldiers apiece, each of which make ten troops of 120 soldiers: and in the last, namely the Triarii, there were only 600 men, which make ten troops of 60 men apiece.  
The body of Cavalry was of 300, which maketh ten troops of thirty soldiers apiece.  
Amongst authors there is a diversity in the names of Cohorts, Centuries, and Maniples, which here do signify one and the same thing; but in some places of Titus Livius you may see the distinction from a Legion to a Cohort, from a Cohort to a Centurie, from a Centurie to a Maniple. Which I conceive grew from this, that when the Legions grew to be of 6000 and 7000 men, they then made those subdivisions.   

CHAP. III. Of marching.  
WHen they were to march, at the first sound of the trumpet they took down their pavilions, and packed up the baggage; at the second they loaded it; and at the third they parted away from their quarter: But none were allowed to take down their pavilion, until the Consuls and Tribunes had taken down theirs. The extraordinaries marched first; then the right wing of the Allies, and their baggage in their rear; then the second Legion, and their baggage after them; then the left wing of the Allies, and their baggage following them: the cavalry was in the van and rear, and sometimes in the flanks, thereafter as the enemy was to be suspected.  
Every Roman Legion with one wing of the Allies marched in the van by turns, that so every one might have the commodity of arriving first at the camp.  
If in the march there were greater suspicion on the rear then on the van, or on the flanks, they strengthened themselves there accordingly. This was their ordinary manner of marching; but I find in Cesar, that when he marched in an enemy's territories, and particularly in a country enclosed with hedges and woods, he made all the Legions to march in one body, than all the baggage together, leaving only some new-levied troops on the rear thereof to guard it. When the army marched in three equidistant bodies, namely all the Hastati, aswell Romans as Allies, together, having their baggage before them, than the Principes and Triarii in the same order, the extraordinaries and cavalry were to be on the flanks and on the van to secure the baggage, or at least on those parts where the most danger was: And being so ordered, when an occasion of fight befell, on what part soever it were, on a sudden all the troops could be drawn out very easily (without being troubled by the baggage) to go and affront the enemy.  
When the army drew near to the quarter, the Tribunes and Centurions ordained for that work marched before to consider of the site of the camp: Which being made choice of, they first marked out the place for the Consul's lodging, or of the General, with a white banner; then they distinguished his lodging from others by a red banner; then with a second red banner they marked out the Tribunes quarters; then with a third they divided and distinguished the lodgings of the Legions from the  one's: after that they gave to every one their proportion of ground, which they marked with banners of other colours: then with a line they quickly marked out and divided all the lodgings, because they never changed the measures nor form of the camp; and that they were exceeding well accustomed thereunto, by having always the same way of encamping.  
When the army arrived, every troup took notice of their lodging by the marks and banners; so that all went to them without confusion, and without mistaking.   

CHAP. IU. Of embattelling the Army.  
THey quartered their four bodies of Velites, Hastati, Principes, and Triarii, under the name only of the three last; and they divided and intermixed the Velites amongst the three other bodies: as may be seen in that which followeth.  
Hastati 1200 Velites joined with the Hastati 480  1680 Principes 1200 Velites joined with the Principes 480  1680 Triarii 600 Velites joined with the Triarii 240  840  
The Romans allowed ten foot square of ground to lodge two soldiers; insomuch that allowing 100 foot breadth of ground, and 1000 in depth, there was sufficient to lodge 2000 soldiers: and so ten cohorts of Hastati, which made but 1680 soldiers, were lodged sufficiently, and had room enough besides for their baggage.  
The same proportion of ground was allowed to the Principes, because they consisted of the same number.  
And the moiety of that ground was given to the Triarii, because their number was but the half of that.  
To the cavalry they allowed for thirty horses 100 foot square; and for 100 Turms 100 foot in breadth and 100 foot in depth apiece.  
For the allies they allowed the same proportion of ground to their infantry as they did to the Roman legions; but because the Consul took the fifth part of the legions of the allies near to himself, they cut off also the fifth part of ground in this place, which they allowed them elsewhere.  
Concerning the cavalry of the allies, it was always double to that of the Romans: but the Consul taking a third part of them to lodge round about him, there remained in the ordinary lodgings but one fourth part more of them then of the Romans: and because the space of ground was more than sufficient for them, their ground was not enlarged, but they had 100 foot in breadth and 100 foot in depth, as the Romans.  
This quarter was divided by five streets, each of them of fifty foot in breadth; and divided in the middle by a street called Quintana, of the same length as the other.  
At the front of the quarter there was a great street of 100 foot broad, next which the twelve Tribunes were lodged, just over against the two Roman legions; and the twelve Prefects were quartered just over against the two legions of allies: there was 50 foot square allowed to each of these lodgings. Then there was the Consul's lodging, called the Praetorium, which contained 200 foot square, and was placed in the middle of the breadth of the camp. On the right and left hand of the Consul's lodging, there were two void places, the one for the marketplace, the other for the Quaestor. On each side of these they lodged the 400 horse and 1630 foot which the Consul drew out of the two legions of the allies, as also the voluntaries: and besides that some lodgings were reserved for the extraordinaries which might happen to come to the army, as well cavalry as infantry; and these together made a perfect square.  
After all the lodgings were appointed, there was a space left round about them of 200 foot broad: then they made a retrenchment, whereof the moat was more or less in depth & breadth, and the rampart higher or lower, thereafter as the enemy was more or less to be feared.  
It is to be observed that the infantry was always quartered the nearest to the trenches, as they which were to defend them, and which were to shelter the horse, which were lodged in the middle of the quarters. The figure following will make all this more plain.  
The quartering of the four Roman legions.  

A. The Pretory, which contained 200 foot square.  
B. The Treasury, 200 foot long, and 100 foot in depth.  
C.D. The two Legates tents, the ground for each of which contained 50 foot in depth and 100 in length.  
E. The Prefects over the Allies, whose lodgings were square; each side having 150 foot: their tents were twelve in all.  
T. The Tribunes of the two Roman legions: their lodgings were square, of 150 foot aside, and 12 tents.  
F. The lodgings of the cavalry of the Evocati amongst the Allies, having 80 foot to 125 in breadth.  
G. The Ablecti amongst the Allies, having 120 foot to 112 in breadth.  
H. The quarter of the foot of the Evocati amongst the Allies, having 80 foot to 238 in breadth.  
I. That of the foot of the Ablecti amongst the Allies, containing 120 foot, upon 252 in breadth.  
K. The extraordinary cavalry, every lodging containing 80 foot in depth, for 167 in length.  
L. The extraordinary Infantry, having 70 foot for 200 in breadth, every quarter.  
N. The quarter of 20 turms of the Roman cavalry, each having 100 foot square.  
O. The Triarii of the Roman legions; the quarter of each Maniple had 100 foot in front and 50 in depth.  
P. The Principes of the Roman legions; the quarter for every Maniple was 100 foot square.  
Q. The Hastati of the Roman legions; each Maniples quarter was 100 foot square.  
R. The cavalry of the Allies; the quarter for their turms was 34 foot in length and 100 broad.  
S. All the Infantry of the legions of the Allies, every cohort having 100 foot in front and 200 
a Observe that from the Decumane gate there runneth a street which divideth the two legions, which have all their quarters facing outward, and their backs meeting at that street, both fronting to their alarm-places X.  in depth.  
V The streets, being 50 foot broad.  
X. The alarm-place, being 200 foot broad.  
Y. Z. Two streets, each of them being 100 foot broad.  
♉. The Praetorian gate.  
♀. The right hand gate.  
♂. The left hand gate.  
♊. The Decumane gate.  
♎. Void places reserved to lodge strangers.   
When the Consul's army was composed of more than four Legions, they were quartered after the same manner, the one on the side of the other; so that in such a case the camp was a long square. And when both the Consuls armies were joined and made but one camp, they took up the room of two squares. Sometimes both camps were near each other, but separated.  
Here Polybius hath omitted the number of the gates of the camps, and their names, and where they were placed, how the enclosure of the camp was made, the lodgings for the Consuls two Lieutenants (one for each Legion) of the Quaestor (who was their Treasurer) of the Perfect of the camp (who was the fiscal or marshal judge) of the twelve Prefects of the Allies, of the victual, the arms, and the engines for war, of the apparel, and what the tents were made of; which (with the help of some authors, and according to probability) we will here supply.  
First we find in several histories that the camp had four gates, placed and called as is showed in the foregoing figure.  
Concerning the enclosure of the camp, we read also that they made the rampart of the earth which they took out of the moat; and to make the earth hold together they planted two or three rows of stakes, about which they interlaced brush-wood, after the manner of hurdles.  
For the lodgings of the Consul's Lieutenants, it is probable that they were lodged about the Praetorium.  
And for that of the Quaestor, who (besides the money) had charge of the arms, of the engines for war, of the victual and apparel; I conceive that that great and spacious place which was given him, was to lodge all therein.  
Concerning the tents, we find that even to Caesar's time they were made of the hides of beasts.   

CHAP. V Of the orders and guards of the camp.  
BEsides the oath which was required of the soldiers after their election, they were made to take another in the camp, namely not to steal any thing, and if they found any thing to carry it to the Tribunes. Polybius reporteth that it was thus done between the hands of the Tribunes; and Cicero saith that they did it at the beginning of the election of soldiers between the hands of the Consul.  
That done, they divided the Cohorts of the Principes and Hastati as followeth: two to take care to keep clean the great street which was between the Tribunes and the rest of the soldiers, and to cast water on it in summer, to avoid the discommodity of dust; for that was a place where every day a great part of the army met: The other eighteen were divided to serve the Tribunes, namely three for every Tribune; of which they took every day eight soldiers for the guard of their lodging. The Cohorts of the Triarii made the guard for the Cavalry; and one Cohort every day kept the guard before the Consul's lodging.  
The moats and the ramparts were made on the one side by the Romans, and on the other side by the Allies. The Centurions made the soldiers to work at them, and two Tribunes had the charge to see the work well done.  
The authority of the Tribunes in the camp was very great, and two of them together exercised it over their Legion for two months, after each other successively.  
Concerning the Word; a soldier of the last Cohort of the Infantry, or of the last Turm of Cavalry, was to come to the Tribunes lodging, and there to take it upon a writing-tablet, where also was written the name of the soldier which took it, and the place of his lodging; and this he delivered before witnesses to the commander of his troup: That officer delivered it to the commander next him; and so the tablet was delivered from hand to hand to the first Cohort near to the Tribune, to whom it was brought back before night, so that by this means he was assured that all the army had the word. And if any tablet were wanting of being brought back again, it was easy to find where it had failed. It must be observed that here only one Tribune is mentioned; which causeth me to believe that the two Tribunes which had the authority for two month's time did agree to command every day by turns. Concerning the guard, it was kept day and night: and the four and twenty hours were divided into eight watches.  
First the Consul was guarded by his ordinary Cohort; then every body made their guard round about his lodging; and besides there were three guards kept, one at the Questors lodging, and the two other at the lodgings of the Consuls two Lieutenants.  
The Tergiductours or Rear-commanders ordered the guards, which drew by lot which should begin first: and they which were to begin were led to the Tribune which then commanded, who gave them the order of the guard, and (besides that) a little tablet with a mark; and all the guards were set after the same manner. The rounds were made by the Cavalry, whereof the chief officer commanded four for the day and four for the night: the first went and took their orders from the Tribune, who gave them in writing what guards they were to visit.  
The relieving and visiting of the guards was done eight times in four and twenty hours, at the sound of the trumpet, and the first Centurion of the Triarii had the charge to cause them to march when occasion served.  
When the trumpet gave them warning, the four forementioned soldiers drew lots, and he to whom it fell to begin, took some of his friends with him, and if in going the round he found the guards in good order, he only took from them the mark which the Tribune had given them, and carried it him back again next morning: But if he found the guard abandoned, or any sentinels asleep, or any other disorder, he made his report thereof to the Tribune with his witnesses: and presently a council was called to prove the offence and to punish the delinquent according to his desert.  
The Velites made the guard round about the retrenchment, on the outside and inside of it, and at the gates. The Allies had the same order.  
We find not in writing the number of their Corps-du-guard, how they placed their Sentinels round about the camp, and how many a day were free from the Guard.   

CHAP. VI Of punishments and rewards.  
NOne but the Consul could condemn any to death, and he had this authority as well over the principal commanders of the army as over the meanest soldiers thereof.  
The Tribunes administered military justice, which was rigorously practised. The manner of their ordinary punishing was thus,  
So soon as the Tribune had touched the party condemned with a staff or a rod, every soldier laid on upon him with cudgels, or battered him with stones, and oftentimes before he could get out of the camp he was killed: but yet if he escaped, he was not received into his country again, and none of his kindred durst give him entertainment.  
He that opposed or neglected the orders given for the guard, or for the rounds, or other service concerning the security of the camp; or falsely pretended to have done some signal act; or had forsaken the place where he had been placed; or had lost his arms in the battle; or had stolen any thing in the camp; or born false witness; or else had forsaken his ensign, was punished after this manner; as also he which committed smaller faults thrice.  
If it happened that many Legions or one Legion, or a gross troup had run away, they were punished two ways: the more rigorous way was to make them all draw lots, and to punish every tenth man; or more or fewer according to the exigence of the cause: by this means all were partakers of the fear, and a small number of them were punished. The more gentle way was, to cause them to lodge without the camp, and to give them barley in stead of wheat, which was a mark of ignominy; which many troops have wiped out by performing valorous and memorable acts.  
Concerning their rewards, they excited those soldiers by honourable acknowledgements and public commendations in presence of all the rest, which had performed some valorous and extraordinary act. Besides that, to him that had wounded an enemy in some light skirmish, or that voluntarily had gone and assaulted him, they gave a dart: To him which had killed and disarmed him (if he were one that served on foot) they gave a target: if he were a horseman, a horse-furniture.  
To him that (at the assault of a town) was first got up upon the wall, they gave a crown, which they called Muralis: to him which had rescued a Roman citizen, a crown called Civica, which was set upon his head by him which was so rescued, whom he respected and honoured all his life after as his father.  
The commanders had also their shares of honour, by the several triumphs which they obtained, according to the greatness of their actions and the felicity of their victories.   

CHAP. VII. Of their Pay.  
COncerning their pay; It began not until three hundred forty eight years after the foundation of Rome: before that every soldier armed and victualled himself at his own charge, which was no hard thing in those times, because their war was then extended no further than Rome: But when they began to go out of Italy, it was necessary to give them pay, which at the beginning was very small: afterwards it increased as the Roman empire grew in greatness. I will not trouble myself to make the valuation of it according to our money, it being a thing of no utility: only I will say, that the soldier's pay must be so proportioned as he may maintain himself well thereby. I will further observe here, that the Romans charged themselves with the furnishing of bread, apparel, arms, and tents for all their soldiers; and besides, barley for the horsemen's horses (abating these things out of their pay) which I find to be a good order, and above all things necessary to make an army subsist: for besides that the greater part of soldiers are bad husbands, and such (as if a care be not taken) will never be well clothed nor well fed, it is impossible that a soldier should everywhere find bread to be bought, and that he should carry all things with him which he standeth in need of.   

CHAP. VIII. Of their order of battalia.  
THere is a diversity of opinions about the order of battle of the Romans. Some would have it that when the Hastati be not able to sustain the enemy's charge, in their retreat they should fall into the order of the Principes by files; and both they into the order of the Triarii; and so to renew the fight three times. Others will have it to be done by troops, whereof I conceive there is much the greater probability, holding the first way not only impossible to be put in practice but also most dangerous, & the other exceeding feisible and profitable. For to fall one into another in that manner by files, the Hastati must then fight at so wide a distance, that between two files they might receive two other files, which showeth the weakness of this first order, which being so ranged in battalia could not be able to repulse nor sustain the adverse battalion. And even the files, being at so wide a distance from each other, were not able to keep themselves right in fight nor to observe their distances; but in the other way there are many conveniences to be found. First many bodies of a hundred and twenty men apiece (or thereabouts) assaulting a battalion, they may very well defeat it; at the worst they may retreat without disordering themselves or losing their distances. And the second order, which is embattelled behind the first, just over against their intervals, may easily fill them: as also (in case of necessity) the third body may supply those distances which are reserved for them, renewing the fight three times. And that which confirmeth us the more in this opinion is, that in reason it ought to be so: next, the description of the battle of Zama which Scipio fought against Hannibal, where it is said that Scipio to hinder Hannibal's elephants from routing his soldiers, caused the Cohorts of the Principes (which were placed just over against the intervals of the Hastati) to stand just behind them, so to leave streets for the passage of the elephants: which showeth plainly that the order of battalia was disposed by Cohorts, and not by files.  
I speak not of the Velites in this order of battalia, nor of all other light-armed soldiers, because they fought not but with casting-weapons, and afar off, and when the armies approached to give the shock, they retired themselves behind the heavie-armed.  
Now to form the said order, I will say that the file was always of ten men in depth; that a Cohort or Maniple of a Legion of four thousand two hundred men consisted always of one hundred and twenty soldiers, and consequently the Cohort made ten ranks and twelve files, containing (at six foot square of ground for every soldier) seventy two foot in breadth and sixty in depth: and the moiety of it when they were at three foot distance.  

The first figure of a Cohort.  
 diagram 
This figure in the Authors copy hath 13 files & 11 ranks, which I conceioee to be a mistake   
In each of the three orders, howsoever the Legions were weaker or stronger, there were always ten Cohorts or Maniples; but the Cohorts were either increased or diminished according to the proportion of the Legions.   

The second figure of ten Cohorts.  
 diagram  
The two first orders are of an equal number, and the last of half as many; and by this example of one Legion, you may see how all the troops passed into each other.   

The third figure, of a Legion.   diagram 
I conceive that between the Legions there was a far greater distance then between the Cohorts, that so they might prevent confusion amongst them; which I judge to be so necessary, as that without the observation thereof it was altogether impossible to observe any good order.  
Concerning the cavalry; seeing it was divided into the like number of troops as the Infantry, it is like they fought in the same order; but the one half were on the right flank, and the other on the left: Thus the army was composed of six great bodies, namely four bodies of infantry, and two bodies of the cavalry; and every body divided into small troops, as hath been showed before.   

The order of Battalia of a complete Army. The fourth figure.  
 diagram 
So in this figure; the intervals should be 4 times wider, if the bodies must be so large; but I conceive a general mistake in the figure, and that in Praissac pag. 190. to be much better.     

CHAP. IX. Of Sieges.  
NO Roman Commander hath made braver sieges than Cesar, nor described them more perfectly. He hath left examples for the assailing of all sorts of sites, and to maintain a siege against all kinds of reliefs. At Brundisium, which is upon the sea, he constrained Pompey to abandon it, for that he shut up the haven by which that town was to be relieved. At Cadenac, which was a site inexpugnable, he constrained the garrison to yield it, by taking away their water. At Alexia, where were 80000 soldiers within the town, and which expected two or three times as many, he so fortified himself before it, both against the town and against the enemy without, as he famished it. And at Bourges and Marseilles he took the first by assault, and constrained the other to yield, when it was upon the point of being taken by assault. I will not here particularise the engines which they then made use of to force places of strength, because the cannon hath taken away the use of them. Yet I will only say that they approached to the walls by degrees, as much sheltered as they could, and then attempted to batter them down by their engines, or by mines to force an assault, or at least to lodge upon the breach: which I the rather speak, to show that howsoever we have changed the manner of fortifications, the better to make resistance against our new thundering engines, nevertheless the ancient maxims for the taking of towns are the same, which we make use of at this day. Concerning the siege of Alexia, it is the model by which the Prince of Parma, the Prince of Orange, and the marquis Spinola have directed themselves to make theirs. And all these great works and circumvallations which we admire, and by the help of which they have taken many great cities in sight of greater armies than their own, which have not been able to relieve them, are nothing in comparison of those which Cesar made at this siege of Alexia. To conclude, they which come nearest to the manner of warring of the ancient Romans, as well in sieges as in the field, are they which prove the most excellent Commanders.   

CHAP. X. Observations upon some battles of the ancients.  
NOw that we have showed the ancient Militia of the Grecians and Romans, by means whereof they have obtained so many brave victories, we must yet observe two principal causes, which their most excellent Commanders have successfully observed to obtain victories in battle: namely, to strive to overwing their enemy, and never to cause their army to fight all at once. Cyrus, to keep himself from being overwinged in the battle which he fought against Croesus, doubled the front of his army by as many more as they were, by making the files of his infantry but 12 deep, which before were 24: and to enclose his enemy, he placed his best men on the wings; who having defeated the wings of the adverse army, came to assault the body of the battle on their flanks and on their rear. At the battle of Cannae Hannibal placed all his best soldiers on the wings, and the meaner ones in the middle, that so the Romans finding but little resistance there, might insensibly sink into them, and by that means they found themselves enclosed on both flanks. At the battle of Pharsale, Cesar sheltered one of the flanks of his army by a little river, and fortified his Cavalry (which was on his other flank) by a body of Infantry, to resist Pompey's horse, which exceeded his own by much; so that having routed it by this means, he assailed the army on the flank, and easily defeated it. At the battle of Zama Hannibal made a body of all his old companies of Italy, which he divided from all his army, that so when all the rest (as well of the one part as the other) should be weary with fight, this body being fresh, might carry away the victory. So that Scipio, after that he had defeated all that were before him, found himself astonished to see a second army for him to fight with afresh.  
Here may be an objection made, that the armies might be so unequal in number, as all these maxims might prove unprofitable; whereunto I answer, that when an army passeth a certain number of forty or fifty thousand men, the surplusage serveth for no other end but to famish the army: for it is an easy thing by retrenching to avoid battle. And if you should resolve to give battle, if you would observe the forementioned orders, there is no plain so smooth but you may find something wherewith to shelter one of the flanks of your army; either by a river, wood, hill, or a ditch; and the other with wagons: nor nothing that shall be able to hinder you from having some body of reserve which shall not fight at the beginning; nor from placing those troops on the wings which you esteem to be your best soldiers. Which things if they be exactly observed as they ought, they may avail very much for the obtaining of victory.   

CHAP. XI. A comparing of the arms and military orders of the Romans with those of the Grecians.  
THe arms of the Grecians were the buckler, the pike, and the sword. Their order was of great bodies of battalions of 16 deep of the heavie-armed, and then strengthened by eight in depth of the light-armed: so that the battalions came to be 24 in depth, and fought all at once, making all one front.  
The arms of the Romans were the target and the sword; their order was to make small bodies of 150 or 200 soldiers at the most, which were only ten in depth, and to make three orders of battalia, that so they might fight three times, one after another.  
Concerning the arms of the Grecians; it seemeth that their long pikes had a great advantage of the Roman targets, because they reached fare; and even at this day we find no weapon comparable to the pike against the violence of the horse: and for their order, those great bodies met with nothing that could resist them. On the other side those great Roman targets covered the soldiers so well as the pikes could not hurt them; and if once they came to join, they made a great slaughter with their short & broad swords; for then the pike was unuseful. Moreover, their small troops gave them this advantage, that they brought more hands to fight at once. Concerning their disposing of their three orders one behind another, to the end they might relieve each other, and to be able to begin the fight again by all three, they had this advantage by it, that all were not wearied nor disordered at once. In so much that oftentimes they have carried away the victory after the defeat of their two first orders: for that their third order being fresh, and having rallied all the rest, gave the last charge against an army which was tired and in disorder, and so gained the battle.  
There be two discommodities more in those great bodies; namely, that they must ever have a very smooth field for the battle, else they are not able to keep their order; and that they cannot agitate on the right or left, but only fight just before them. But the small troops wield themselves on all sides, and continue their order in all places. It is true that the Romans sometimes joined all their forces together, making but one body of all their army, in an Orb; but this was but to save themselves in a retreat, and not to charge an enemy: for as these great bodies are as it were unmoveable and of little use in assaults; so when they will only defend themselves, they are hard to be broken.  
And yet they used not this last order bu● when they were persecuted by the arrows of a great Cavalry, as that of the Parthians: for not being able to come to hand-blows with them, they were constrained to put themselves into this order, and to shelter themselves with their targets. So that I conclude that the arms and orders of the Romans were better than those of the Grecians; because small troops accommodate themselves better to all sites then great ones, and fight at several times they continue the fight with more obstinacy than when all fight at once; and that it is more easy of many small troops to make a gross readily and without disorder, then of a gross to make many small troops.    

A TREATISE OF Modern War; Written By the late great General the Duke of Rohan:  
Englished by J. C.  
CAMBRIDGE, Printed by ROGER DANIEL, Printer to the UNIVERSITY, 1640.   

To the right worshipful Sir Thomas Glenham Knight, one of the Deputie-Lieutenants, and Colonel of a Regiment in the county of Suffolk.  
Right Worshipful,  
I Make bold (incited by your many favours) to present you with a short Treatise of War. How well the Author hath acquitted himself therein, Your worthy self (by reason of your known abilities, both for Theory and Practice, in that profession) are best able to judge. And for my translation, your studies and travels having made that language natural to you, I might justly fear a severe censure; but that I know your candour such, as you will excuse  
Your obliged servant, J. C.   

A Treatise of War.  
IVndertake not here to treat of all the functions of war in particular, because so many have written thereof as it would be a thing superfluous. I content myself to make general observations upon all those things which depend thereon, and which may in these times be put in practice: being loath to touch upon any thing but what experience hath taught me, and in all to be so brief as I may not weary the Reader.  

CHAP. I. Of the election of Soldiers.  
THe election of soldiers was by the Ancients and is by Moderns made after divers ways. The Grecians and Romans contented not themselves to enrol the soldiers which of their own accord were willing to go to the war, but chose out of them such as they judged to be fittest for that service; which is the cause they had so good soldiers. The Carthaginians for the most part employed strangers, and therefore had no worse soldiers than their own countrymen. The Turks choose their soldiers, and train them. The Swisses make use of their own men. The Venetians and Hollanders, in imitation of the Carthaginians, are served by auxiliary soldiers. The French and Germans abound in good soldiers, and may well forbear auxiliaries. England alone, of all the States of our time, may choose them, and take such as she pleaseth. Whereupon we must consider the constitution of these States, on what maxims they be founded, and what either of them may best do to have good soldiers. The greater part of States at this time are more founded upon policy then upon war, and endeavour rather to conserve themselves then to grow greater. Wherefore we see that learning flourisheth there, and arms degenerate; in so much that those States which are founded upon war do devour the other.  
The example of the Turk to the shame of the Christians, and that of the king of Spain to the prejudice of Germany and Italy, are two manifest proofs. That which causeth this mischief is, that men of the gown have possessed themselves of the government of almost all States, which (for that they hate soldiers) cause them always to be ill dealt with, and do advise Princes to employ auxiliars rather then their natural subjects: which is a most pernicious maxim. But this being no fit place to treat of it, we will only speak of the election of soldiers.  
England, which hath right by the laws of that kingdom to make choice of her soldiers, may observe the form of the election of the Romans, which is very good. The other kingdoms which have not that power must incite their men which are ambitious of honour to cause themselves to be enroled, aswell for the hope of being advanced to other honours by embracing the profession of war, as by shutting up the means of attaining thereunto by any other way then that▪ For example, not to bestow any office of the kingdom, nor of the king's house, nor any charge amongst the soldiers, to any but such, as have served in the wars a certain number of years; nor to make any man Colonel of horse which hath not been a Captain and other officer of the Cavalry; nor any to be Marshal of the field, which hath not honourably born lesser charges; nor any to be General of the army, which hath not been a worthy Marshal of the field: briefly, that none may be advanced to any office, which hath not passed through the degrees of war. And as the hope of advancement is a strong spur to encourage every man to exercise the profession of arms; so the fear of finding one's self poor and needy after long service is a sharp bit to keep men from ●●. Therefore I would prevent that by establishing a foundation for men of that profession, so that they might live out the rest of their days commodiously and honourably. Those States which by reason of their form of government are fearful to arm their own people (as Venice) or where their subsistence dependeth on traffic (as the Low-countrieses) and which for these reasons are constrained to help themselves in their wars by auxiliars, must principally be careful to choose good Commanders; next, to have a certain body of well exercised and disciplined sould●ers always in readiness, sufficient as well to guard them from a surprise as to give them time ●o assemble greater forces. For an army form ●nd disciplined at leisure, though but small, is more capable to defend itself, yea to conquer, ●hen those armies which assure themselves only in their great numbers. And great conquests are almost always made by small armies, as great Empires are always lost with their innumerable forces. For that they which were to fight against such numerous armies, opposed them with an exact discipline and good order; and the other, having neglected all discipline and order, have endeavoured to supply that defect by their great number of men; which hath brought upon them the greater confusion and hath served them for no other end but to make their loss the more disgraceful. Whence I conclude, that the best means to have good soldiers is to choose such as are most fit for war; the second, to incite men of ambition and virtue freely to enrol themselves, by shutting the door of any other way to advancement; and lastly, to entertain a body of an army▪ and to be careful (as well in peace as in war) to keep them under an exact discipline, without relaxation One of which three ways all sorts of States may make use of.   

CHAP. II. Of Arms.  
THe most usual arms of the Infantry at thi● present time, are (for the defensive) th● head-piece, the cuirace, and the tasses: and fo● the offensive, the sword, the pike, and the musket which are rather the arms of the Grecians then o● the Romans. Whereupon we must observe, that ou● muskets serve us as the casting-weapons did th● Ancients; so that the body of the battle consisted of pikes, which is a very fit weapon to resist th● Cavalry, for that many of them joined together make a very solid body, and very hard to be broken on their front, by reason of their length, whereof four or five ranks extend the heads of their pikes beyond the first rank of men, and do always keep out the squadrons of horse from them twelve or fifteen foot of. Maurice Prince of Orange had a great desire to make use of the target, and having caused divers trials to be made thereof, hath found that it hath not only resisted the pike, but that half the number of targets hath always entered into twice the number of pikes, and hath routed them. Nevertheless, being but General of the armies of a State, and not a sovereign and absolute Prince, he durst not make so great a change; whether it were that he feared the Cavalry, which nowadays is exceeding well armed or else the reproach of some evil success; not being ignorant that the people Judge of the actions of such as serve them rather by the event then by reason. For my part, I would add this kind of arms to our discipline, making always the principal body of my Infantry to be of pikes, and to have for every battalion a small body separate of one hundred or one hundred and twenty targets to charge on the flank, which would work a marvellous effect on the day of battle; and this should be the true place of volunteers, and of very brave Nobility, which often prove to be but troublesome to an army. Concerning the offensive arms of the Cavalry, there be of five sorts; namely, the lance, the pistol, the sword, the carabine, and the musket: the two first are given to the heavie-armed calvarie, which must have for defensive arms the cuiracecask, vambraces, tassets, cuisses, and guard-rein, and (not many years since) some horses have been armed with barbs. Of the two other kinds, they which serve with carabines have the head-piece and cuirace; and because they fight on horseback, they must be well mounted: but they which serve with the musket have no defensive arms. Of these five sorts of offensive arms there be but three much in use; namely, the pistol, sword, and carabine. The Spaniards only have continued some few companies of lances, which they keep rather for gravity then reason; for the lance doth no effect but by the violence of the carreir of the horse, and besides there is but one rank which can make use of it; so that their order must be to fight by single ranks, which cannot resist the squadrons: and if they should fight in squadrons, they would rather be troublesome then serviceable. And for musketeers on horseback or dragon's, they are also in a manner left off, for that in the civil wars they ruined the Infantry, every man desiring to have a nag, that so he might be the fit to rob and pillage: nevertheless some well-ordered troops of this kind in an army are of very great service; either for executions, to gain bad passages, to guard the quarters of horse, or else (on a day of battle) to cause them to dismount as forlorn hopes before the squadrons of Cavalry.  
Now the Cavalry must be proportioned with the Infantry; which may be distinguished according to the situation of the country where the war is made, or else according to the enemy against whom you are to fight. For if you you be in a champain full of forage, and if ye be to make war against a great Cavalry, as that of the Turk, in such a case you must fortify yourself with the greater number of horse. But if the war be in a country enclosed, either by mountains, forests, moors, or hedges and ditches, and that hath many fortified places, for that the war is rather reduced to sieges then to battles and field-combats, in such a case you must strengthen your Infantry. And these two bodies are so necessary the one for the other, as an army cannot be held to be good nor subsist unless it be equally provided of both. Nevertheless, if I were not induced by some extraordinary reason, I would make the proportion of my army for the open country of a fourth part of horse to three fourth parts of Infantry; as to twenty four thousand foot, eight thousand horse: in an enclosed country, of a sixth part of horse to five parts of foot; as to twenty four thousand foot, four thousand horse. It remaineth to give to these two bodies such arms as were before mentioned with the most profitable proportion. The Swisses have many more pikes than muskets, and for this they have made themselves to be much feared in a champain country; for in a day of battle where you come to hand, the number of pikes hath much advantage of that of muskets. Other nations do equally divide the pikes and muskets; and because the war in these times is reduced to sieges rather than battles, we desire to have a greater number of muskets then of pikes. For myself, which add the targets to them, my opinion should be to have the regiments of 1440 soldiers, namely of 600 pikes, 600 muskets, and 240 targets. For the Cavalry; I would proportion it after this manner: I would compose the regiments of 500 horse, whereof I would arm 400 with Cuirassiers arms; 50 with carabines, and 50 to be dragon's.  
But this is not all, to provide good arms for your soldiers, unless you oblige them to wear them; it being an unsufferable shame to see their delicateness in these times, and how they disesteem them: and to cover this fault, they publish that it is want of courage to go armed, and that they will go in their doublets into the most dangerous places, aswell as they which are armed. It is not enough to go into a place to cause one's self there to be knocked on the head; we should go thither to conquer, and not to be beaten. Besides this inconvenience groweth of it, that if you use not yourself to wear your arms, you are so pestered with them as you cannot fight in them: on the contrary, if you accustom yourself to them, they are no more troublesome to you, and you are at as much liberty in them as if you were in your doublet. But the greatest mischief that cometh of it is, that the ruin of military discipline followeth on it; which a good Captain ought to cause to be exactly observed in every part. For if he slacken it in one, or in favour of some persons, the consequences which follow on it by little and little will be such as they will wholly overthrow it: and then he shall find himself without obedience and without respect; which he shall never recover without incurring the hatred of those whom he hath too much spared; it being most certain that it is easier to prevent a mischief then to help it when it is befallen.   

CHAP. III. Of Military Discipline.  
BEsides that which hath been said to incite every one to take upon him the profession of arms rather than any other, we must make other observations to make a man worthy thereof, which consist in three things: namely in the recompense of commendable actions, in the punishment of bad ones, and in the continual and exact exercise of military discipline; for there is no profession in the world which hath more need of such helps than that of war, where for the single pay (which hardly affordeth livelihood, and with which the meanest artisan would not be contented) the soldier abandoneth himself to all sorts of perils and labours: but none are instigated thereunto unless it be by emulation of honour, or by licence to do evil; and as the first aim is virtuous, so you shall have good service of such as enter into it for that end. But of the other you shall reap nothing but shame; for in stead of a good and obedient army you shall find that you have no better than a troup of pillaging rogues, which without order or obedience forsake you, either after a good boot-haling, or in any eminent danger. For this reason the election of soldiers is a better way of forming an army, then only to receive voluntaries; where all the vagabonds and evil livers, and such as cannot live but by robbing, cause themselves to be enroled. Therefore to incite such as are virtuous to well-doing, and to deter the vicious from doing evil, recompenses and punishments are principally necessary. The Romans have made very profitable use of these two means: and if we follow not their way we shall never have good nor well-disciplined soldiers. It matters not though we use not the very same remunerations and the same punishments they did; it sufficeth that they be equivalent, that so we may receive the same benefit by them: and these things are diversely done, according to time and custom. The principal is to be an exact observer of them, that so the remunerations may excite brave men to worthy actions, and the rigour of punishment may keep cowards from doing basely. The manner of decimating the soldiers which the Romans had, is held to be cruel: nevertheless there be sometimes so infamous actions committed, as you are constrained to use great severity, to give a terror to all; finding it very good to strike a fear into all those that have escaped by the means of the lot, and to put but few to death. For you must imprint this belief into your soldiers, that by base flight they escape not death, but they only exchange a glorious death which they should have acquired by fight valiantly for an infamous one. After that the soldier be encouraged by the honour of being esteemed valiant, and brought to a hatred of being held a coward, it must be made a like degree of honour for every one to know how well to obey his superior, from the private soldier to the Lieutenant general: for on this obedience all the functions of an army depend, and without it you can keep nothing in rule, nor do any thing that is good. This must be ingraffed into the hearts of the soldiers, as being one of the principallest virtues required in them. From hence groweth order; by this military exercise is maintained; briefly, by this brave designs are executed, and without this all goeth to confusion and ruin. I will not trouble myself here to speak of the particular military exercises which the soldier is to be exercised in, because divers books are full of them, and that custom doth always change something or other in them. I will only say that there is nothing so profitable as to exercise every soldier to carry his arms properly, to use them soldierlike, to keep his rank well, and therein well to execute all the motions and charges which are commanded him. So much concerning the soldiers: But concerning the recompense of Generals of armies, I will say the same which I said for the soldiers, namely, that according to the time, or the constitution of kingdoms or commonwealths, such courses ought to be taken as the honour of such as have done brave actions and great services be not diminished nor blemished: For that the most generous spirits (which will easily excuse all want of other recompense for their services) will never endure to be rob of the honour due to their brave actions, and will sooner stomach such a want of due honour then any other thing whatsoever: whereupon very often great mischiefs have followed.   

CHAP. IU. Of the obedience of soldiers.  
NOw as the General of the army requireth of the soldiers that obedience which is due to him, so he must have a care to give them no just cause to exempt themselves from it: to this end he ought to keep them in continual employment, for that idleness engendereth corruption of manners and discipline, whence proceed luxury, neglecting of exercises and the guards, and disobedience to superiors. It was the ease and idleness of Capua that destroyed Hannibal's army, and the delicacies of Babylon which corrupted Alexander himself, and from whence he drew away his army to prevent the total ruin of it; there being no means of greater efficacy to keep it in due order, and to prevent seditions, then to employ it in war. It is therefore a maxim which must be exactly observed, never to suffer your soldiers in any place to be idle, especially when the army is brought together in a body; for if you employ them not in that which is good, they will busy themselves in that which is naught. This course must be taken aswell in the time of securest peace as of open war; particularly, to exercise them to use their arms well, and to observe good order; and though there be no need, yet to use them to make retrenchments of the camp, and to make their huts: that so they may be so accustomed to remove the earth, that when necessity shall require, it may be no trouble to them. I would further employ them to make fortifications and other works of this kind, not only to keep them in exercise, but that also they may get (besides their pay) wherewith the better to maintain themselves, and that they accustom themselves to that which in time of war is as profitable to them as to fight well, there being nothing impossible for twenty or thirty thousand men which will work in the earth; for in eight days they will make fortresses which shall be impregnable: And Cesar hath made himself as much redoubted and admired by the great works which he hath caused his soldiers to make, as by his great battles. Moreover, the General must take care that they be well clothed and well fed; especially that (out of their pays) they be furnished with clothes and shoes, otherwise he will soon find his army to decay, and diseases to rage in it for want thereof. He must also have a great care of those which are sick and hurt, and therein to spare for no cost; that so the soldiers may not excuse themselves from going on upon dangerous services, or to undergo laborious employments, because they are abandoned when they are sick or wounded. The General ought also to take a particular care not to overlabour his soldiers, nor to put them to extraordinary hard marches without great necessity: but when need requireth it, he must be the first to undergo the labour; for the example of the commander maketh all things easy to the soldier. The examples not only of the greatest Captains amongst the Ancients, but even of the greatest Monarches and Emperors, should shame our delicate Captains of these times, which are afraid to spoil their fair complexion in the sun, and their goodly plumes in the rain, which would believe themselves to be dishonoured if they should march on foot at the head of their companies: and those great men have not scorned to march at the head of their armies, and have refused to quench their extraordinary thirst, because there was not water enough to make all the army to drink; and so making themselves companions of the dangers and labours of their meanest soldiers, have made themselves masters of the greatest part of the world, and have gained an immortal glory.   

CHAP. V Of Marching.  
THere are divers considerations to be made upon the marching of an army; which may be assaulted in the daytime, or at its dislodging, or even in the night when it is lodged. If it be not encamped, but lodge in villages, you must (to cause it to meet in one body) give it a Rendez-vous on the way which it must take; which if the enemy learn time enough to be there first, or that he meet with it there by chance, he will put the army to run a great hazard, which cometh to its Rendez-vous at divers times and by divers ways. The best means to guard one's self from such an accident are, to keep your Rendez-vous very secret, to have good spies amongst the enemies, and to send out many discoverers for intelligence. When you encamp you are not subject to that danger, because the army is always together. For the march you must consider the country where you are, and the number of soldiers which you have. If you march in great plains, you may (for the most part) march in battalia; or at least with form battaillons and squadrons: than it is very easy to put yourself readily into a good form to fight well, because you march not in a long order. But when you march through a straight country, where but few can march in front, than you must compute the discommodity of the way, and the time you have for your march, with the number of soldiers whereof your army consisteth; for 10000 foot marching 10 in front, and 1000 horse marching 5 in front, with the lightest baggage they can possibly have, and ten cannons, with equipage for every piece to shoot 100 bullets, take up about 28000 foot of way in length; whereby you may judge how much way in file 30000 foot and 6000 horse will take. Therefore when so great armies find themselves in such a troublesome way, you must of necessity divide them into several bodies, which may march one after another, and lodge severally; or rather cause them to march by divers ways, some miles distant from each other; or howsoever, to make ways through the fields for your soldiers to march in, leaving the great road for your cannon and baggage. If there be a river to pass where you can make but one bridge, or some passage over a mountain, moorish ground, or forest where you cannot make several ways, than you must march one after another, and on several days. I trouble not myself to show how you are to pass through such bad passages in view of the enemy, because many have written thereof: yet when it cometh to execution, few will get off well, if they be charged home; but I will only say that the best way is to calculate the time so well as you may avoid such encounters. Concerning the march; I find it almost impossible that two armies should meet each other, if one of the two Generals be desirous to avoid it, especially in an enclosed country: but whatsoever happen, the best way is to have the baggage wholly separated from the soldiers, leaving only on the rear some few troops to keep it from disbanding: for if in time of alarm every body have their baggage behind them, it causeth a great confusion, and hindereth the soldiers from rallying themselves and helping each other. The time of lodging is also a dangerous time to be assaulted in, because the army is then tired, and every man (desirous to be lodged) hasteneth to the quarter in disorder, which is a thing hard to avoid, if (before you enter your lodgings) you cause not your army to stand in battalia, and so cause them to lodge troup after troup, without suffering any to lodge but by command, mean time sending out on all sides upon discovery.  
There remaineth the assaulting of a quarter, which is that which is more frequently attempted, especially when the army is not encamped; because it being lodged in several quarters, the enemy may attempt to surprise some one quarter without hazarding a general combat: fo● which I do not find the ordinary guard alone (how exactly soever it be performed) sufficient to remedy such an accident; because it canno● give the alarm but at too near a distance, and tha● ofttimes you have not leisure to put yourself in order to fight; therefore you must be careful to send out discoverers every night, by divers small troops, which (if they do well perform their task) will not suffer you to be surprised; for an army or a gross troup capable to assail a quarter of an army cannot march so secretly that it be not perceived. And when you have to do with a vigilant enemy, and that you fear such assaults in the night, there is nothing so good as to prevent him, if it be not in earnest, at least to give him alarms every night, that so he may be more troubled about keeping himself upon his guards, then about assailing you. If it be in an entrenched camp, where all the army is in one body, it is a high enterprise to assault it. And this one chapter showeth the security of an entrenched camp▪ which I will end with this conclusion, That all the forementioned things to assure the quarters must never be omitted, though you believe yourself to be far off from any enemy; for that, besides the profit you draw from hence in accustoming your army to do their duties, there may such an occasion befall you as it may be the safety of your army, of your life, and of your reputation.   

CHAP. VI Of encamping.  
I Will not here describe the form of entrenched camps, but only the profitableness of them, not being able to wonder enough that they have been wholly discontinued. No people made so exact use of them as the Romans; and in our time Maurice Prince of Orange hath revived the use of them, or at least hath given them a great perfection. The entrenchment of a camp assureth an army, in that it is never dispersed in the villages, where some quarter or other is ever in danger to be surprised, but lodgeth all in one body, and in such fashion as being assailed it may fight with great advantage. The entrenchment saveth a great deal of trouble, because by it there is need of the fewer guards by many, & those less toilsome, especially to the Cavalry, which when they are lodged in open villages, are constrained to be on horseback almost all night. The entrenchment encloseth your army as a walled city; from whence you may march privately with such troops as you please, to execute all sorts of brave designs, leaving your baggage in safety. The entrenchment hindereth the enemy from constraining you to fight, unless when you please. The entrenchment causeth you to be without danger at the head of the most dreadful armies. The entrenchment causeth you to take strong cities in the face of more puissant armies than your own. Briefly, the entrenchment is less subject to infection then the villages where you lodge, because you choose a wholesome place to sit down in, and in villages you must take them as they fall out: Also, because this is more airy, the lodgings are here better divided, those things which may cause bad air are more easily removed; and in effect an army encamped and entrenched will rather subsist three months in health in a camp, than a fortnight in the best villages. Whence I conclude, that one of the most necessary parts of war is, well to know how to incamp and entrench.   

CHAP. VII. Of Battles.  
OF all the actions of war the most glorious and most important is to give battle: the gaining of one or two acquireth or subverteth whole Empires. Anciently all wars were divided by battles, which caused such speedy conquest: For the present, wars are managed more foxlike then lion-like; and are rather founded upon sieges than combats. Neverthethelesse, there be divers nations at this day which decide the most part of their wars by battles, as the Turks and the Persians: and even amongst the Christians we have seen of late divers battles given in Germany, whereof only one had almost enthralled all the Protestant Princes. And an army well-disciplined, and which feareth not battle, hath a marvellous advantage in all designs of that which feareth it. For this reason (howsoever the manner of warring at this time be not so frequent in the hazarding of battles as in times past) the knowledge of them must not be neglected. And a General of an army cannot be said to be a good Captain, which knoweth not all advantages which may be taken on a day of battle, and all disadvantages which ought to be avoided; that so he may well disentangle himself. I will not speak of dust, the sun or rain, whereof it is observed that many Captains have made use, driving them on the face of the enemy by gaining the wind of them; because they are casual things which may change in a moment, and which by consequence happen rather by hazard then come by design; but of things more solid.  
He than that will give battle must have regard to seven principal things. The first is, never to suffer himself to be forced to fight against his will. The second, to choose a field for the battle fit for the quality and number of his soldiers: for if he feareth to be enclosed by a great number, he must shelter his flanks▪ or at least one of them, by the nature of the place; as by a river, wood, or some other thing equivalent: and if he be weak in his Cavalry, he must avoid the plains; as he must straight passages or enclosed places, if stronger. The third, so to range his army in battle, as according to the quality of his soldiers it may be within its own advantage, sheltering his horse by his foot, if therein he be the weaker; and if the contrary, his foot by his horse; disposing all his soldiers in such order as they may fight divers times before they be wholly defeated: for if we well observe the small troops of soldiers which fight not all at once, and believe that a hundred horse in two troops will beat two hundred in one entire troup, and have observed in our times that divers battles have been won by him which had made a troup of reserve, which was not to fight until all the rest had fought, how much greater effect will a second order of battle produce, which will come to the charge after that all the adverse army hath fought against the first order▪ and yet after that a third, in imitation of the Romans, if the two former be defeated It is a maxim, That every troup (how gross soever i● be) which hath fought, is in such a disorder as the least troup that chargeth it, is able to defeat it absolutely: so that that General which can reserve some troops to the last without fight, will with those bear away the victory: it being a long work and difficult to go about to rally an army that hath fought into good order to fight afresh; some gazing about for pillage, others being vexed to return to the danger again, and all being so distracted as they do not or will not understand any command: on the contrary, such as have not as yet fought, are under obedience, and ready to do whatsoever their General shall command them. So that the knowledge of a General of an army is not so much to rally disordered and defeated troops (which is properly but an action of courage) as to make his troops fight to good purpose, the one after the other, and not all at once: for he must consider that he cannot be well obeyed by his soldiers, but only until the hour that he sendeth them to the combat. After that all the orations of the world will not stay them when they fly; but this troup which is in good order will easily do it. The fourth is, to have many good commanders, it being impossible that a General should suffice for all places. After that he hath made a good choice of his field for battle, and put his army into good order, it is altogether impossible for him (when it cometh to blows) to give order, more than in that part where he is present: so that if he be not well assisted  else, aswell amongst the horse as foot, though he should work miracles in that place where he himself is, he cannot make good the ignorance of those officers which command in the other parts of his army. Therefore there must be at least five principal commanders to make an army fight well, namely for three bodies of Infantry, distinguished by vanguard, battle, and rearguard, and two for the horse which are on the wings. The fifth is, so to observe your distances in your order of battle, that the foremost troops being put to recoil, may not fall upon those which should come up to relieve them, nor the second upon the third. The sixth is, to place the most valiant soldiers on the wings of the army, and to begin the battle by that wing which you think to be strongest; for if you once break one of the enemy's wings, you fall upon his flank and rear, and it is impossible for him to resist you. The seventh and last is, not to suffer any to pursue the enemy, nor fall to pillaging, until he be routed on all parts; and although it be good to give him a hot chase, you must ever have some troops in order, which must not disband, that so you may avoid all inconveniences. I will not speak of the advantages which may be met with in a field of battle, whereof a good Captain often maketh use with great profit; because there can no certain rule be given for it, by reason the diversity of situations is such, that you shall never find two every-way alike.   

CHAP. VIII. Of Fortresses.  
BEcause the gain and loss of battles draweth such consequences after it, as it giveth or taketh away whole Empires at once, it hath caused a resolution of opposing the conquers by fortified places, to stay their first fury with few men, and to ruin their armies: But since the invention of the cannon they have been enforced to change their manner of fortifications; and even by reason of the invention of petards we have been constrained to assure the gates of cities by portculices, pallisadoes, draw-bridges, and other inventions; because there was no place, how strong soever it were, which did not run a hazard to be surprised by this new invention. Now the best fortresses against the cannon are those which are made of earth; because (when they have a sufficient thickness to make resistance) they are not subject to endamage the besieged, as those fortifications are which are made of masons work, the shivers whereof do much mischief. Nevertheless, when a Prince can be at the cost to line them as high as the rampart, leaving the parapet upon it to be of earth cannon-proof, it maketh the work to last the longer.  
In fortresses you must observe four principal things: namely, that the line of defence be within musket-shot; that the flanked angle exceed not ninety degrees, nor be less than sixty; that the gorge of the bulwark be not too narrow; and that the flank be as great as may be. And these four general maxims must be so proportioned amongst themselves, as that to make one of them exceeding good you destroy not the rest. You must also avoid tenailles in the principal body of fortification, unless the ground be so small as it will not suffer you to make good flanks. For the interior angle of such a fortification raised as it ought to be cannot be defended by any flank, and men may lodge themselves at the foot of it without receiving any hurt, unless it be by stones thrown over. This is the reason why tenailles are not used but in the counterscarps. The moats are usually proportioned according to the earth necessary to make the fortifications; and such as are full of water are best to hinder a surprise, and the forts defend themselves the best against an assault: their breadth must have a due proportion; for when they are too broad the outworks are too fare distant from the defence of the principal fortification; but depth never spoilt a moat. The false brays are joined to the body of the fortification. It is anew invention and excellent to hinder the approaching to the bulwarks by galleries. The counterscarp, halfmoons, ravelins, and horn-works are beyond the great moat; all the outworks (if it be possible) must be commanded by the body of the fortification. These are in gross the principal observations which are in fortifications in a place which is level and approchable: the rest dependeth on the judgement of the Engineer, which must make profitable use of the situation of the place which he is to fortify, either in taking what serveth for his advantage, or in avoiding whatsoever is to his hindrance. I add further, that there be situations so favourable, as nature itself defendeth them, and maketh them more inexpugnable than all the art in the world; as an inaccessible rock, a quagmire or a lake: But every commodity hath its discommodity; seldom you shall meet with such situations on frontier-places, or upon any important passage, or capable to contain a garrison of sufficient strength to give jealousy to an enemy which would invade your country; or else they are found so easy to be blocked up, as five hundred men without are able to besiege five hundred within.  
They which desire to know the particularities of fortification, may find them amongst an infinite number of books where they are described; but much better in the exercise of war, where expe●●ence causeth every day something to be added.   

CHAP. IX. Of defence against surprises.  
NOw that we have spoken of fortresses, we must come to the way of guarding them, and not suffer them to be surprised. It is most certain that men will always attempt to take them by surprise rather than by open force; for that thereby they save charge and time. But because surprises are grounded upon some defects which they find in the place, or in the guard thereof, I will begin with that which must be observed to defend yourself against such surprises.  
The Captain which shall have a place to guard must provide for six principal things, whereon all the rest depend: namely, to see that the walls be out of danger of a scalado; the gates not subject to the petard; the way for the rounds easy and convenient; the sentinels well set; the guard very exact; and to hinder intelligences and treacheries. For the five first, the way is beaten for them, there be books full of instructions, a●d there be now so many Prince's orders in writing and in practice, as he must be very negligent which is not careful therein. But for the last it is not so easy to give rules. Treachery may be wrought by the townsmen or soldiers: the mingling of them together, whether it be on the guards, rounds, or patroullies, may much hinder it; as also the drawing all the functions of the guard by lot, the keeping a guard without the town, and the having of spies amongst the enemies. You must double your guards at times of fairs and markets, in harvest and time of ●intage, because men use to spy out such times to frame a design. You must observe to be in arms at the opening and shutting of the gates; and in whatsoever time of peace it may be, you must never neglect the observation of any of these particulars. There is also a way to avoid intelligences, namely, by making double enterprises yourself, feigning to discontent an officer, private soldier, or townsman, who running over to the enemy, causeth him to undertake some design probably feisible and facile: for besides the profit which you gain by it, by getting the boldest of them in a trap, you reap this advantage by it, that your enemy dreameth on no other so long as he hopeth in that; for that every one always undertaketh that which he believeth will succeed most assuredly. Whereby we may see how doubtful those enterprises are which are grounded upon intelligence, either for that they may be double, or else by the fault of traitors, which in the very point of execution may lose courage and discover all; or by their indiscretions and not keeping secret their negotiations. For these reasons in enterprises made upon intelligence both the defendant and assailant must be very suspicious and exceeding diligent to observe the words, actions and behaviour of such as promise to serve them by betraying their own side, and to omit no precautions to assure themselves of their persons, so that they may not catch them; the hostages of women and children being not always sufficient (as Montluc observeth at the enterprise of Darges) for that some traitors are so resolute as they will hazard all to attein the height of their designs, and make account to release their pledges by such prisoners as they intent to take.  
There remaineth a word to be spoken of alarms. You may therein use two ways: the first and usual way is to put yourself in order in the allarm-place, where the governor must be present, that so from thence he may lead to the place of danger; the second is, for every company to repair to their colours, and from thence to go and find out their squadron which is upon the guard. If the garrison be weak, the scalado easy, and the place large, this last way of going to the alarm is the best, because they go more readily to the defence of the walls; but in this case they must have no suspicion of the fidelity of the inhabitants.   

CHAP. X. Of assaults by surprises.  
THe enterprises of fortified places are made after several fashions, either by petard, or by scalado, or by some holes in the walls, or by saucidges, or by some such other ways and inventions which men seek every day to increase, according to the measure of the remedies against such as are already invented. But to make them take good effect you must be very careful of three things; namely, intelligence, conducting, and execution: for for want of one of these we see all enterprises miscarry; either by being prevented by the daylight, or being discovered too soon, or for want of some petard or ladder, or by some disorder in the execution. For the first, which is intelligence, they which are employed in it must inform themselves exactly of the form of the garrison, number of the townsmen, and of their affections. They must observe at the gates whether there be a bridge dormant to come at them; whether it be of wood or stone; and if of wood, whether they use not to take away some planks in the nighttime; whether this bridge hath not rails: whether the moat be deep and broad, and whether by a commodious descending into the moat you may escape the drawbridge, which is usually made upon the bridge dormant: or whether by the benefit of the moat the gate or draw bridge of the town may be petarded without carriages or rolling-bridge. They must well observe all the hindrances which may be before the bridge dormant, whether they be gates, bars, pallisadoes, or portculices, there being usually a ravelin: and whether there be a corpse du-guard kept in the night, either on the outside or upon the bridge dormant: taking notice how many gates, bridges, bars, pallisadoes, portculices, trapdoors, grates, iron-pinnes, chains, and other impediments whatsoever there be from the field to the inside of the town, and how all these things are fastened: how many paces of distance there may be from one piece to another, and (as near as may be) the length, breadth and thickness of all those things, and in what places they are: whether there be loopholes over the gate, or holes in the roof of it: how many corpse du-guards there be, in what places they are, and how situated; whether the entrance be strait on, or winding; observing the place of the flanks, whether they be on the side before, behind, above, or below; whether they keep any ordinance there, and how many; or whether they be only for musketeers; what number may be lodged on them, and at what distance they flank the ●ate; discovering the way by which you are to go from the town you go from to that which you intent to assail: To spy out a fitting place within half a league of it to alight, and to distribute the petards and other instruments: they must also observe the places and streets within the town which must be seized upon, all the corpse du-guards to be forced; and well consider the condi●ion of the soldiers, and other necessary things, to surmount all obstacles which might be met with. If it be to give them a scalado, they must well observe the dvenues, the counterscarp and the moat; to know whether you may come at it undiscovered, go down into the moat, and come up out of it easily, especially over against the place where you would make the scalado, or near it. For if you must go fare about the town after you be entered into the moat, the enterprise becometh much the more dangerous and difficult. It must be known whether the moat be dry or frozen, or that the water be but shallow, without mud and easy to pass; whether the wall be low or weak, so as it may easily be scaled or pierced, or whether there be some hole or drain or other means for the water to pass in or out which are ill guarded or weak. You must judge what height your ladders must be of, and regard how they may be set on sure footing, and whether there be a scarp or not; whether the place where you mean to give on be far from guards or sentinels; whether the place of scalado be capable to raise good store of ladders, and for store of men to enter at once: as if it were very straight, you must see if the first being entered can accommodate themselves upon the rampart to subsist so long until the rest mount. You must also observe the distances of the wall to enter into the town, and to go and set upon the corpse du-guard.  
For the second, which is the conducting, it may be made two ways, by parts or in gross: by parts, when they are designs upon places of importance, and which are fare within an enemy's country, and whereof the enterprises are held to be very f●isible in the execution; for they may not fail, without putting all the soldiers which go on that service into eminent danger: therefore there must be great prudence used, and none employed in it but resolute men and secret, because they must either there overcome or perish; which happeneth not in such enterprises where there is as great care taken of the safety of retreating as of giving on. The Marshal of Brisac made one (being in Piedmont) upon the castle of Milan, which was excellently well conducted, and deserveth to be here taken notice of, to serve for a lesson for such as may desire to undertake the like. He made choice of eighty French men and forty Italians, the bravest and resolutest soldiers of all his army, and made Salvaison Captain of the French, and Peter Maria of Recuperat of Bresignolle commander of the Italians, which two only knew whither they were to go: then he caused them to come by five at once to his Secretary's lodging, and caused twenty five crowns to be given to each of them, and to the chief man of every five there was a note given, wherein was specified the way they were to take, and the day's journeys they were to go, that so the brigadoes might not meet each other. The first rendezvous was at an outhouse (or farmhouse) on the confines of Milanese, whither Lodowick Birague had conveyed himself some days before very secretly in disguised apparel, to give such order to this design as should be necessary. The manner of meeting at this farmhouse was thus; At the parting from the valley Camonica or Bergamasque, the first five or brigado (and so by turns all the rest) found a country-fellow having a straw-hat with two pheasants feathers on it; to whom the chief man of every brigado was to say, O buon compagno, voi tu vender my quella capelina! that is, Ho, good fellow, wilt thou sell me that hat? to which he was to answer, Messer no, ne ho bisogno per me; that is, No sir, I must use it myself. That was the watchword; which being so known, the chief (without speaking a word) followed the country-fellow, which conducted him with his brigado to the farmhouse where Lodowick Birague was; and in this wise the Marshal of Brisac his hundred and twenty soldiers passed very secretly to that place. From this farmhouse they were to get to the house of one of Sienna near Milan, who was the plotter of the design: to this end they passed along as before, by five and five together, and after they had passed the river Add at the haven of Vaure, they had measured the time to arrive towards night at the bridge Navilio of Milan, near the Monastery of Angels; on which bridge being arrived, the chief of the brigado shaked a little bell, at the sound of which he was answered by another like it, and presently there came (from below the bridge) the man of Sienna (the author of this design) who conducted the brigado to his own house, and continued after this manner every night, until the whole troup was passed: which is a matter worth the observing, to cause a hundred and twenty soldiers to go by stealth from Piedmont to the very gates of Milan, without being discovered, and not a man of them (except only Salvaison and Peter Maria of Recuperat) until then, knowing whither they went or where they were. Concerning the conducting in gross, which is the more ordinary, you must measure the length of the way to the place upon which you have your design, with the time which you must have to arrive at the just time to execute it: wherein many deceive themselves very often, for that usually there befall unexpected casualties which prolong the time; insomuch that what measures soever you take (without great experience in such actions) you shall commonly find the time too short, especially if you have a gross troup to lead. For to make two thousand men to march by night in their long order, the Altes which must be made at the head to stay for the rear, or those which a narrow or troublesome way, or that is cut off by a river compel you to make, are such, and cause you to lose so much time, that unless you be very diligent to make them march, and that you have caused good intelligence to be taken of the way, and provided for all these things, you will find you have not half time enough. I speak not of the great showers of rain, nor of frosts, which sometimes happen so unlooked for and extraordinary, that, what foresight soever you may have used in all other things, it is impossible to overcome them. After that you have proportioned the time with the way, you must provide yourself of good guides, and as many of them as may be: than you must form your order before you depart, as it should be at the execution, giving to every man your commands in writing of what he is to do, and keeping a register thereof. For if you defer to do it until you come upon the place where you are to alight, and where all the equipage is to be accommodated (which is usually about half a league from the place) may hinder you therein, the place haply will not be spacious enough nor commodious to make the order, contentions which may befall, jealousy of honour amongst the soldiers, and divers unthought-of accidents which arise, are able to frustrate the design: which things being resolved on before your going out, and there being nothing to be changed in your order, this (most certainly) is the means to avoid such obstacles. I add this, That if it be a city from whence you go out, you must keep the gates shut long before and after; and cause the troops to march by day, that so you may see that not a man go out but they of the enterprise. And afterwards to cause the troops to make Alte, beyond the gate or in some private place near hand. Concerning the order; you must cause some horse to march foremost, whose scouts must have charge to ride fare enough before, and to seize upon all sorts of persons wheresoever they go, that so they may hinder the giving of intelligence to the town which you intent to surprise; especially if there be some bridge or passage by which avoidable you must pass, you must gain that. Then must fifty musketeers follow; next the train, the petards or ladders, being followed by those men which are chosen to carry them; whereof there must be a triple number, to ease and succeed each other, in case any be hurt or killed: and these must be men of execution, the most resolute and adventurous of the troup; for on these foremost usually the good or bad success dependeth: you must also carry double equipage of petards, because all work not that effect which you purpose they should; and often the want of one petard hath caused brave enterprises to fail, and so of ladders, which are often broken by the enemies, or break by being too much laden. In the pursuit you must not make any troup of above fifty soldiers, namely fifty muskets, than fifty pikes, and so successively: for you must consider that the first encounters are in narrow streets, and in the night; so that the gross troops cause but disorder. And if you find streets that are broader than the order which you have framed, you must join two troops together, that so they may take up the whole breadth of the street. Every troup must have officers at the front and rear of it, and the sergeants on the flanks, to keep them to their duties, and to hinder them from straggling and pillaging. You must also observe in the order you make (when you part from your quarter) that if you make several assaults, the commanders, soldiers, and equipage must be distinguished into so many troops as you will make assaults, and that they march according to the order they should assail in. In all enterprises (especially in those where the retreat is dangerous and long) you must more regard to have good soldiers then many; for a small troup may come from farther off, march more secretly, and retreat with less danger and confusion than a gross troup. Besides, a small troup with good store of officers, is more obedient in execution, and begetteth less disorder than a gross, I add further, that in enterprises by night you affright an enemy as much with a small troup as with a great one: for it is a maxim, That they which are surprised and assailed fight in fear, always persuading themselves that you assail them with forces sufficient. Briefly, if you overcome with a small troup you get more honour than if it had been with a great, which ofttimes disturbeth you both in fight, in march, and in their retreat: and if you be beaten, the dishonour is the less. Concerning the third, which is the execution, all the order must be given in writing, that so none of them which have any command in the enterprise may excuse themselves by pretending they misunderstood you. If it be by scalado, there must be 2 men to carry every piece of a ladder; and because it is almost impossible to do the execution upon a place where there needeth more than five pieces of ladders in height, it is sufficient that there be ten men for every ladder, and one man to command them: The men for every ladder must be mentioned in a roll by their names and surnames, and of what company they be. You must command them on pain of death to bring back their ladders if you cannot get the town: for they seeing the danger and trouble of bringing them back again, will rather desire to do their uttermost endeavour to enter the town moreover you must command ten other men to enter after the first ten, which must be led by an officer, and another to be on their rear to take care to see them mount without losing of time and without making too much haste: otherwise the ladders will be so much laden as that they will break; after this, ten more must follow, commanded and divided as the former: and every file of ten must know by which ladder they must mount, and in what order, that so al● may be done without confusion. The first te● which follow their ladder must carry another, though they have no order to raise it; that so if any piece of the first should break, there may another be raised in the stead. If it be by petard, the petardier shall call him that is to carry the madrier or planchier; then he is to call three for the petard (two to carry it, and the third to assist in time of need) and if the planchier be fastened to the petard, then four men may carry it interchangeably by two and two: and those two which carry not the petard with the planchier shall each of them have a great smith's hammer. After these four, the petardier shall call two men, each of them carrying a great axe; after them one with a crow-lever, than another with a dark-lantern, than one with three or four pieces of lighted matches: besides these there must be one to command them, which shall carry a piercing instrument, or a coopers turrell, or some good hooks with steeled points, and a weighty hammer. So that to attend every petard well there must be ten men; this file of ten for the first petard shall be led by some brave Sergeant, which shall have the name of every man of his file in writing, and shall also know what every of them is to carry. The men must know the Mule which carrieth their equipage, and so soon as they come to the place where they are to unlade, they must place themselves about the Mule, that so each of them may receive what he is to carry. If the second petard must be applied to a gate or bars, they which shall carry it must be in the same order as they of the first petard: but if it be for a drawbridge, the rolling-bridge or carriage goeth foremost, with seven or eight men which are employed as well to carry it as to push it forward: after this the planchier and petard must be carried, after the same manner as the first; then shall they follow (in file and in close order) which carry the ladders and planks to cast upon the breach which the petard shall have made upon the drawbridge; then shall they follow which carry hammers, hatchets, pinsons, instruments to pull out bolts and to cut chains; then some with fire-lances and granadoes, and some dark lanterns. The officer which shall have the leading of them must take care that not a man lose his rank, and shall divide them into files, and shall take care to cause the spare men to carry such portions of the equipage as they did carry which shall happen to be hurt or killed, which he shall only cause to be laid out of the way, without suffering those which are to be employed about the service of the petard to trouble themselves about carrying away any man that is killed or hurt. At all the gates and bridges the men must be disposed in the same order. But when you go against iron-grates or portcullises, you must cause those to march first which carry the tresses or iron-hooks; then marcheth the planchier and the petard; after which follow hammers, hatchets, crows of iron, and other instruments which may be thought fitting: you must not forget to carry fire-balls, granadoes, or fire-lances, if you have observed that you may make use of them; every man must carry a hatchet at his girdle: you must rather have a supernumerary number of instruments, then want one. Having thus put all into order, and officers at the head and on the flanks of every file, you must have besides some petards, planchiers, and other instruments for reserve, which must be carried in the same order as the ●ther: For you must always have a double equipage. When you come near the place where the execution is to be done, you must distribute to every man what he is to carry. The Sergeant ordereth them in file, and commandeth every one duly to follow his leader: then he causeth them to march forward to give room to those of the second petard; and so consequently of all the rest, there being a guide for the first file to show them the way. And that you may not be entangled, sometimes you may cause ten cuiraciers to march before one foot, to discover whether the enemy be not on the advenues; then follow three men bearing good targets, to shelter (amongst others) the petardier; then march they which carry the petards and the other train, in such order as hath been said, which shall be followed by fifty muskets led by a Captain, to give fire for their defence (if need be) with large hailshot. He must look that no man stay by the way as they march; when the enemy asketh, Who goeth there, they must hasten their pace, and then the petardier taketh the first petard with him, and the rest must follow very close, that so when the first is fired the second be ready to be put into his hands. The ten horsemen which have marched before all the equipage so fare, shall not advance further than the distance of pistol-shot from the first bars; then they shall fall back to the Captain which leadeth the fifty musketeers. The first petard being fired, the officer shall cause his men to be placed on the right and left hand, to give room for the second petard; then that shall do the same, to give passage to the third; then that maketh room for the rolling-bridge, and they for the petards and other instruments, and consequently all the rest. And they which are unladen must help the rest, without making any noise. And if the petardier calleth for any thing, he that carrieth it must be ready to give it him, and no man upon pain of death must stir out of the place where he was placed, but only to give to the petardier what he calleth for, or to supply some body's place which in carrying something to the petardier was hurt or killed. The officers must take care that the petardier be presently served, and all be done without noise or confusion. The ouverture being made, they which shall be commanded for the first attempts must be ready to enter, and to force whatsoever shall resist them; they which are to follow them must do the like, and so consequently all the rest which are to act any thing: And when they are within, they which first entered must not scatter themselves in the town (whilst they are yet weak) whether it be in pursuing the enemy, or though they meet none: but they must make two bodies, the one to act, the other only to be put into battalia to sustain the rest. This done, they must march in good order, the one to force that whereunto they are appointed, the other to go and embattel themselves in the streets and market-places which you had resolved aught to be seized upon, by the plat or draught of the town, by which the whole enterprise ought to have been designed. For howsoever it hath sometimes succeeded well to fo●low the enemy speedily with such few men as are entered, yet is it not the surest way, because they may be repulsed by a few men; which hath often caused brave enterprises to be frustrated.  
There must also be a third body which must stand in battalia without during the execution, to the end that if they which entered should be repulsed, they may sustain them; or else to remedy such accidents which might befall them by some of the enemy's troops, which casually might arrive in that place. If you be wholly repulsed, that troup which is without shall make the retreat, and shall remain firm in battalia until that the repulsed troops be recollected and put in order: but if they which entered become masters of the town, to hold it they must disarm the townsmen before they disarm themselves. And being well assured of all the corpse du-guards and commodious places, the houses must be shared, that so every man may have his proportion of the booty, they being not suffered to take it any other way; and they which shall begin to pillage must be severely punished. By this means you may appoint the best houses to them which have best deserved, and do the rest by lot, whereof no man shall have cause to complain but of his own ill fortune. If it be needful, in such places as are assailed by scalado, you may dispose some troops of musketeers, which shall give fire perpetually upon the flanks; and if you can, you may add to them some fire-lances: and such as give fire at the top of the ladder, must cease so soon as their men begin to mount. I have been more particular in this chapter then in any other; but so many enterprises have failed by the not observing of the least of these things, that I rather chose to be somewhat long herein then to omit them.   

CHAP. XI. Of assaults by sieges.  
IN the two chapters of surprises I have begun with the means to defend one's self, for that we must never undertake to attempt the surprise of any fort, but upon the defects which are to be found in them: so that he which knoweth not on which part nor after which manner he ought to make his assault, must be prepared for all manner of accidents. In these two I will begin to treat of the assailing of towns by sieges, for that you must observe by what place and after what manner you are assailed, to make a good defence against it.  
Sieges are undertaken either by blocking up of towns to famish them, or by taking them by force; for both the one and the other you must be master of the field, and you must have two armies, the one to hinder the enemy from undertaking any thing, and the other to form your siege. Or in any case you must be the first in the field, that you may so fortify yourself before the town you besiege as you may be able to maintain yourself there in spite of the furious attempts of the enemy. To get the town which you mean to besiege at the easier rate, you must attempt to surprise it when there is but a small garrison in it: to this end you are to use all manner of inventions to keep them from the knowledge of your purpose to besiege it; then all on a sudden you must go and block it up. But if (notwithstanding all your stratagems) you be not able to surprise it at unawares, or that you apprehend the charge to be too great, it will be better to make some other siege of less importance: for a town well and obstinately defended is the ruin of an army; and if it be not taken, it often diminisheth the reputation of the commander which assailed it.  
For this cause, before you undertake any such thing, it must be well considered on; and you must provide yourself abundantly of all things necessary to effect it. When you form a siege, you must appoint your quarters (as much as may be) in healthful places, and be careful to make them spacious enough, and to keep them clean: for you must account upon your time of abode there, that your army be not wasted by diseases. You must make the quarters of your army so near the town besieged as may be, yet so as they be not discommodated by their artillery: And if the ground be level and lie open round about, the quarters must be out of reach of the cannon. You must make as many quarters as the places are which you intent to assault, or at least as the bigness of the town besieged, or the situation thereof requireth. Nevertheless I would have the General's quarters to be so large, as (in a case of necessity) it might receive all the troops of the other quarters; If you make a siege with a small army, and that the garrison be strong, you must fortify the quarters one after another, with the whole body of the army; and in this case you must make the fewer quarters, and attempt the fewer places. But if you find yourself strong enough you may abridge the business and make them all at once. Besides this, you must make a circumvallation with forts and redoubts without reach of cannon of the besieged, which shall join all the quarter's one to the other, behind which your army may present itself in battalia, and this line must be led in such manner as it may possess all the commanding places. And if the garrison of the town besieged be so strong as you may fear to be assailed on both sides, you must make another circumvallation about the town, the nearest that may be, that so it may require the fewer men to guard it: for it being made to oppose yourself against the town, you need not take care to make it out of the reach of the cannon. For the opening of the trenches, you are to use the more or fewer ceremonies, according as the garrison is strong or weak. If it be strong, you begin by a good fort, and continue by good redoubts along the trenches, leaving only sentinels in them. For it is an old error to think to defend trenches. If the garrison be weak, you need not make so much ado to gain time. The batteries must be well strengthened by good moats, and flanked by good corps-du-guard, to preserve them against the sallies of the besieged. If there be any outworks which are not yet in good defence, and which may be carried by force, you must attempt them; otherwise you must approach them by little and little: for it is there where the bravest defence is made, because that at the beginning they can easiliest make their sallies. When the outworks are taken, and the cannon is planted on the counterscarp, and you sap into the moat, and prepare yourself to lay over your galleries to get over to the bulwarks, you must then place your musketeers all along the counterscarp, that so under favour of them and of your cannon you may pass over your galleries. If the moats be dry, they will dispute it with you, but at last the stronger overcometh the weaker. If they be full of standing water, that hindereth you not from making your cawsie whereupon you place your gallery: If they be full of running water, you must make use of floating bridges to put over your miners. When you are got close to the bulwarks, you are to use mines (great or small) so by little and little to get into the ground, and the retrenchments which may be made behind the bulwarks. I trouble not myself here to show how to make the quarters, forts, circumvallations, the trenches, (that they lie not open to the enemy) the batteries, (that they be well assured) the descents into the moat, how to assail the false brays, how the galleries are to be made, also the mines, and the lodgings which are to be made after they be sprung; because whatsoever may be said on that subject is already written, and it must be experience that must perfect the rest; where every day something is altered or some new thing is added.   

CHAP. XII. Of the defence of towns against sieges.  
TO withstand a siege well, the town must be well fortified, it must have a sufficient number of soldiers to defend it; it must abound in victual; and it must have good store of arms and munitions of war: And these four things are so necessary, as that if there were an abundance of three of them, if the fourth be wanting the rest will serve for nothing. For what will a well fortified place serve for if there be not soldiers to defend it? or what good will soldiers do if they have neither arms nor munitions of war to fight? neither will arms nor munitions avail, if they want bread to live by; to which I add instruments to work in the earth, without which it is impossible to make any great resistance. But it is not enough to have all that is necessary for resistance; there must be a good order and rule kept, otherwise it will all be dissipated by those which will desire to get out of danger quickly, and will find some pretext to yield upon terms which shall not be dishonourable; the number of such being always greater than of those which will re●●st stoutly. You must proportion the labour an●●●st amongst the soldiers and the townsmen, that so they which are well affected be not suppressed, and that the rest grow not lazy through idleness. They must be distinguished by companies of pioneers, miners, carpenters, smiths, and all artificers useful for a siege, appointing a commander to every of them. You must take an inventory in the town of all the iron, wood, linen, instruments to work in the ground, drugs fit for artificial fires, and other such things necessary for a siege: and take care that there be always of them in the magazines to serve for the present necessity: and to avoid disorder in the distribution of all these things, there must be a counsel which must have the oversight thereof, and which shall cause all to be delivered out and received in according to the order of the Governor and the Counsel of war. These things thus put in order, you must think upon defence, which is done principally after two ways, by holding the enemy off by retrenchment, and by hindering him (when he approacheth) by sallies.  
For the first; it is approved and practised by all; and he which breaketh ground best, and beginneth to dispute it the furthest off, is he which maketh the longest resistance. For the smallest retrenchment without (accommodated with pallisadoes) is hard to be forced. But if it be mined, and that there be another made behind it, it is a dangerous piece to enter, and you constrain the enemy to approach by little and little, and with the same ceremonies which are used to fall upon the bulwarks and the great moat; so that by divers retrenchments you keep off the enemy at a distance a long time before he can come to fall upon the counterscarp, who cannot take away your outworks but by mines, which taketh up good store of time. The moat also may be defended if it be dry by portable casemats (which are called coffers) encircled by little moats or pallisadoes to hinder the approach, which are placed in several places of the great moat to defend it, and not to be discovered by the cannon of the assailant. The bulwarks are also to be defended by retrenchments, which you are to make either at the point, or at the middle, or at the gorge, according as they are capable, and that the mines of the besiegers do enter forward within the bulwarks. And when all that is forced, the last defence is a retrenchment of the whole town, reducing it to keep only one part of it.  
For the second way of defence; in stead of many sallies to drive back them that work in the approaches some would have only some few to good purpose, in great necessity; alleging that the besieged there always lose some men, and of the best of them, which they ought to conserve against a strong assault; and that oftentimes they which would have a fair pretext to yield the town cause their soldiers to be maimed by continual sallies, to show that they yield not themselves but through necessity. For mine own part (which do approve of the quantity of sallies, and which have always seen the works of the assailants retarded by them more in one hour then in eight days by other defences) I answer, that these reasons would carry some show if the town were attempted by assault; for they not taking any other but that way at that time, it were fit to preserve the soldiers to withstand them: but whilst the assailant getteth ground by little and little, if you defend not the town otherwise then by retrenchment, you must lose it at last: wherein your quantity of soldiers standeth you in no stead at all, in so much that the care you have taken to preserve your soldiers doth not prolong the taking of the town one day; but if by your brave sallies you ruin batteries, throw down trenches, force the redoubts which defend them; and when they are within the moat you burn their galleries, they must be enforced to begin their work anew as ofttimes as you overthrew it; insomuch as the besieger finding himself so entertained, he approacheth with much more ceremony, and at last his soldiers draw back. So that in my opinion it is very fit that the besieged should make frequent sallies; but they must make them at several hours, that so they may the better surprise the enemy with few men (but resolute) to avoid the disorder in the retreat, and to do no other thing but what is commanded. For though you find not resistance at the falling on, as is usual, if you stay to little purpose, you run the hazard to be ill led off at the retreat. The other particularities of defence depend upon those of assailing, the besiegers teaching you by necessity what you are to do; wherein there is nothing but practice and experience which can well direct you.   

CHAP. XIII. Of Artillery.  
IT is fit to speak of Artillery after sieges, since it is principally by means thereof that towns are taken; and that since this hath been in use, there are no places found impregnable, if they be not inaccessible: It hath changed all the form and matter of fortifications: for in stead of towers and ancient walls, which have not been able to resist it, we now make bulwarks and other works of earth. We may say that it hath even in a manner altered the manner of making war. Anciently they began their approaches to towns where now we end them: for on the first day they lodged on the brim of the moat; and now adays we must go a great way before we come at it: then the circumvallation was made out of reach of arrows only, now they must be made beyond reach of cannon: than it mattered not though the fortresses of the encamped armies were overtopped, so as they had their other conveniences; nowadays there must be care taken above all things that they be not. In those times two armies were quietly led in battalions at two or three hundred paces distance from each other, and remained there whole days without being able to be dislodged but by a hazard of a general battle; now one cannot be before another but out of the reach of the cannon, otherwise he that hath most of them, or that hath planted them best, beateth out the other without fight. At that time a General of an army could know the order of his enemy at a near distance, and form his own according to that, seeking his advantages upon the defects of another, and all without danger; now these things can no more be observed but so fare off as you must rather trust to your own good order then upon any defect in that of your enemy. Then one army could charge another without losing their order, because they had not above two or three hundred paces to march; in these times it is impossible to observe it in sight of the enemy for half a league together, and to find a plain which shall be even and without hindrances. Whereunto I add further, that without a great exercise of marching in battalia you are not able to march a thousand paces without losing all your distances of battalions and squadrons, and by consequence without being in confusion. Since therefore the cannon is of so great use in war, and hath so great a share in the victory, it is necessary that you know how to make good use of it. It is an engine which all cannot well employ, for it is of great expense, and belongeth only to great and puissant States to make ordinary use of them. They tie them to a great charge for draught, there being a hundred draught-horses required to draw one cannon for battery through all kinds of ways, and to shoot only a hundred bullets. By this you may judge according to the number which you mean to employ what length of ground it taketh up. To manage one piece of battery well, there must be eighteen men: besides, how many smiths, carters, farrier's, and other workmen must there be in the train to repair the carriages? how many carpenters to make bridges? how how many pioneers to accommodate the highways? Briefly an army which carrieth cannon with it cannot march but leisurely, and that which hath none can do no great effect: therefore in these times the artillery is an essential part of an army; but withal, if the General suffereth himself to be approached too near, without entrenching himself it is impossible for him to disentangle himself without fight, or losing it; which cannot so happen without losing much of his reputation. For this reason he ought to inform himself very particularly of all that dependeth on the artillery: and that he may not be deceived, he must know the least even of the smallest things, namely, of the mixture, founding, proportion, weight, calibre, and carriage; of what would it must be, how it must be conducted according to the several ways, miry or mountainous; how to pass rivers, how to secure the batteries, as well against the cannon of the enemy as against his sallies; what ground the cannon must have for his reverse, what distance between piece and piece; in what manner the platform must be made, at what distance the batteries are sufficient, and other things, whereof I do not here specify the particulars, because others have written of them. It sufficeth me to show the use of artillery, the chargeableness of it, the turmoil of it, and whereunto it engageth you, to incite Generals not to rely upon others; and to know the benefit and discommodity thereof so well, that they may make use of the one to their advantage, and avoid the other by their foresight.   

CHAP. XIV. Of the baggage and pioneers.  
AFter the great turmoil of the artillery, I will speak a word of that of the baggage. It is a great shame to lose it, but it is also a hard matter to preserve it when it is excessive; there being nothing that bringeth so much disorder to an army: therefore it is highly necessary to reduce it to the smallest proportion that may be, and to make a review of it every month; for it groweth in the twinkling of an eye. We are so delicate now a days as we will hardly carry our arms, much less would we carry a weeks victual about us. So long as such an abuse be suffered in an army, it will make itself incapable to do any thing that is good. For as in a battle he which can last preserve some troops which have not fought, carrieth away the victory; so he that last keepeth his army in health, complete, and accustomed to labour, doth the like: which he cannot do if the soldiers be so delicate as they cannot carry their baggage. Besides that, sickness and famine getteth not into an army, but by this rascalli●ie of soldier's boys: and this thing which seemeth to be a thing of nothing, is of such importance, as it is for the most part the dissipation of the most flourishing, yea I dare say, of the most victorious armies. It is principally in the time of prosperity that men grow effeminate, and give themselves to take their ease; and in that time it ought least to be done, if after the example of the delicacies of Capua where Hannibal's army embased itself, they would not do the same. Whilst we are about cutting off unnecessary things from the army, I will say a word concerning pioneers. There be Captains of our time which will have an unbridled number of them, and say, that it were better to cut off some regiments of soldiers, and to take pioneers in their stead, which are necessary to make the enclosures of the camp, the trenches in a siege, the accommodation of the ways; briefly, to take away all employment from the soldiers of working in the ground, for that they in these times cannot be brought to be subject to such labours as the ancient Romans were: alleging further, that the soldier when he arriveth at his quarter, is sufficiently tired, though he be not employed a new to cast up earth. An opinion whereat I cannot wonder enough, and which strengtheneth me in that which I hold, that we spoil our soldiers by sparing them too much. There must be care taken for their livelihood, for their clothing, for such as are sick and hurt: but they must be hardened to labour, and their General and other Commanders must be examples to them. For if you will reduce them to content themselves with a little whilst you burst yourself with excess of meat, and to labour whilst you glory it, and live in laziness; I confess they will murmur. But to return to the pioneers: it is necessary you should have them to accommodate the ways, for the artillery principally; for which five hundred may serve for a great equipage. Concerning the enclosing of the camp, the soldier is bound to make it; for that this labour procureth him a means to rest himself and to sleep in safety. I say further, that it is a work which must be done in three or four hours; to this end all the army worketh at it, or at least half of it, when the enemy is near hand. So that if we must needs have it done by pioneers, there had need be as many of them in an army as there are soldiers, which would be a means to famish a whole country, and to increase the turmoil, which we would diminish. Concerning the trenches; I never saw it succeed well when pioneers did it; and whilst the danger groweth, the most valiant soldiers are not too good for that employment; and further they must be incited to that work by the gain of it: which will serve to assure themselves the better in that danger, and to give them a means to spare something to cloth themselves; and no money is so well employed as that in an army.   

CHAP. XV. Of spies and guides.  
THere be yet two sorts of people whereof (contrary to the pioneers) there cannot be too many in an army; which are spies and guides. The first advertise you of the deportments of the enemy, upon whose report either you enterprise something upon him, or you guard yourself from his designs. The second give you knowledge of the country, of the ways and passages by which you are to pass, or else by what way your enemy can come to you. Both the one and the other must be faithful, for that in advising you falsely, or guiding you maliciously, they may cause you to fall into great dangers. You must have good store of guides: for that (especially if you march by night) every gross troup (or at least every body) hath need of their own; and before you set forward, they must all be agreed on the way which they will take. There must be a Captain of the guides, a man of spirit, and vigilant, and that may take care to get guides from place to place. Concerning spies, there must be something more observed in them, and you must be always suspicious of them: for that as it is a dangerous task for him that undertaketh it, so it is also for him that employeth them. To this end it is necessary that no man know them but he which employeth them; and that spies may not know each other, that so they may not agree to give false advices: for by this means by examining them severally, by the agreement or disagreement of their advices, you may judge whether they be good; and by the verification of those which speak true or false, you shall know who betrayeth you, or doth you true service. And howsoever when you discover traitors, yet I say you may make a profitable use of them, by feigning that you believe them to be faithful, and giving them commissions which they may discover to the enemy, that you have some design quite contrary to that which you intent to put in execution; that so whilst he is preparing himself for one side, you may attempt something upon him on the other. But this is not all, to beware of your own spies; you must also take heed of those of the enemy; which you must presuppose you have within your camp, as the enemy hath of yours. For this reason besides the secrecy which must be used in all enterprises, it is good to give a charge, by publishing (in a still way) that you have a quite contrary design to that which you purpose to put in execution, that so those spies may so report it to the enemy. But the most essential means to be well served by this kind of men, is to be very liberal to them; for they are faithful to them which give them most.   

CHAP. XVI. Of victual.  
BUt seeing it is to no purpose to have an army composed of good commanders and valiant soldiers, well disciplined and obedient, well furnished with artillery and munition, if they have not what to eat; I will distinguish this chapter into five parts: the first to make provisions of corn; the second to provide for the carriage of it; the third of the safe conveying of it; the fourth of the making of good bread; and the fifth of the distribution of it. To this end the Commissary general of the victual ought to be a man of authority, faithful, vigilant, and active; and this office ought not to be despised (as nowadays it is) nor given to men of mean quality; for it is of such importance, that according as it is either well or ill discharged, it causeth an army to subsist, or go to ruin. And the Romans always committed it to some eminent person. To come to particulars, I will say that the provision of corn ought to be made in due time, in sufficient quantity, in a commodious place for transportation, and that choice be made of very good corn. For you must not conceive any hope of finding it, either in the champain or towns where you are to go, because the enemy may either hoard it up or burn it; and so on that hope you shall find in this only point all your designs frustrated. In the second, you must make Magazines in divers places, that so you may not be in danger to lose all at once, both in towns and castles which are nearest and most commodious for the transporting of corn into your army; and (according to the situation of the country) you are to make provision of wagons or mules to carry it to the camp, where must always be a Magazine for a fortnight, which should not be meddled with but in extremity, or for some extraordinary enterprise. In the third place, the carriage of it ought not to be performed without a good convoy; and never on any prefixed day, to prevent the preparation of taking of it whilst it is on the way. In the fourth, to hinder the abuses which are ordinarily used (and I dare say, ever, unless there be a very narrow looking to it) about the bread. For, for their private gain, they mingle bad grain with it, yea even earth, and use other base tricks, whence for the most part proceed diseases in an army; which is a mischief which cannot be too severely punished. And in the last place, that it may be well distributed and not wasted; for if you trust the Sergeants, they always take for double the number of soldiers they have in their companies: to this end it is necessary that the Commissary general of the victual from week to week should have an exact list of those that are in the army, signed by the General, that so he may order the distribution of bread according to it. Besides, you must cause them to be punished rigorously which pillage those victuallers and other persons which bring victual to the camp; whereof the price must be regulated, that so the soldiers may not be sharked upon. When you are at a well retrenched siege, where the hope to make you quit it consisteth in nothing else but in cutting off your victual, you must have that foresight to cause so much to be brought within your camp as you judge to be necessary to serve your turn for the time you believe you shall stay to take the town besieged; as Cesar did before Alexia. There be many rules to be given on this subject, to hinder the abuses which may be used therein, which I omit to avoid prolixity: besides they are petty order which are changed according to the places and occasions; all which should tend to no other end but to draw victual to the army, and to hinder the excessive prices of it.   

CHAP. XVII. Of the general officers of an army, and of their functions.  
THere is nothing more necessary in an army then to have the offices therein well regulated, and that every man may know whom he is to command, and whom he ought to obey; and yet I never saw that absolutely decided in any, which is the reason why I have been willing here to make a project, how things therein ought to be established. The General ought to have absolute power, which ought not to be communicated to any: for in war more than in any other profession the command ought to be singular: and it is a very bad introduction to make Generals which command the army by the day, or by the week, or by the month. At all times when the Romans did so, they sped the worse for it.  
Then there must be a Lieutenant general, or Marshal of the field general, which ought to take care to cause all the General's commands to be put in execution as absolutely as himself, thereby to ease him: it being too hard a thing for the General to do all, especially when the army marcheth; for that (of all necessity) there must be a man of eminent authority at the head of an army, and whom all the other commanders do acknowledge. Sometimes there is a Lieutenant general and a Marshal of the field general to perform these two offices; nevertheless these two places, being born by two men in an army, oftentimes bring confusion, and cause that which we desire to avoid: for in the functions thereof they never agree; because the Marshal of the field general doing his office, must distribute the commands of the General to all the other commanders; he must march in the vanguard, order the lodgings and encamp: insomuch as I know not what function the Lieutenant general shall have unless he usurp the others office, or else that he serve only as a shooting trunk, that so through him the General's commands may be delivered to the Marshal of the field: which is the reason I conclude that there ought to be but one of these two offices.  
That done, I divide all the functions of the army into four principal parts, namely the cavalry, the infantry, the artillery, and the victual, and will treat of each part one after another.  
The cavalry is a body which often lodgeth separated from that of the army, and requireth a principal commander to whom all the rest should yield obedience, which must be of great authority and eminent quality, or of such experience and virtue that all the other commanders may voluntarily obey him. For it is in the cavalry, where you shall meet with more men of wealth and good families, and consequently more difficult to be made to obey; and therefore this authority ought not to be divided. And because in marching the cavalry is ordinarily in the front and in the rear, and that in lodging you are ofttimes compelled to make two fronts, and for that in time of battle the horse are at least on the two wings, it is necessary that there be a Lieutenant General, a man also of great authority. There must further be a third commander, whom the most part call a Commissary general, who distributeth the orders, keepeth the list of the guards, of the convoys, and other functions; and aught to go and take the orders from the Marshal of the field general, to carry them to his General of the horse, who distributeth them to the Quarter-masters, which come for them from every quarter. All the cavalry must be divided into companies, of which regiments are form; not after the manner of the infantry, under the command of a Colonel; but only to maintain the order of the lodgings and of battle. To form these regiments you put four or five companies together, with one of carabines, and the ancientest Captain commandeth that body; and so all the cavalry is divided: which maketh it plainly evident how merely unprofitable an office it is to have a general commandder of the carabines; for the carabines cannot make a body, for that their want of fight permitteth it not, neither were they instituted but to serve the cavalry, either at their quartering, or to discover, or for intelligence, or to give a charge in the flank in time of fight, or in a retreat to harry them whom you chase, or to keep you from being so when you are pursued. In effect, good carabines mingled amongst the caval●●e are of very good service; but alone are unprofitable.  
If you make more quarters than there be general officers, the ancientest Captain commandeth in the quarter, and therein taketh the most ancient quartermaster of his quarter. Insomuch that the General of the horse giving his orders to the Commissary general, he to the Quartermaster general, and he to the other Quarter-masters which come for them from the other quarters (where the same order is observed) the commands are carried without confusion, and pass through the hands of few persons; and when there is any deficiency found, it is easy to be verified whence it arose.  
The infantry is the more solid body of an army: that of the artillery and victual always are quartered with it. There is not that diversity between the companies which is between the horse; they are all of the same fashion, composed of half-pikes half-musketiers. Many companies make a regiment, which hath its commander; and many regiments make a body, which we call a Brigado of the army. The army is usually divided into three bodies, Vanguard, Battle, and Rearguard. Every brigado hath its commander; and besides it ought to have a Sergeant Major of a brigado, and a Quartermaster of a brigado; The first to go and take the orders from the Marshal of the field general, to carry them to the commander of his brigado; then he giveth the word to the Sergeant Majors of the regiments: and the other to give to every Quartermaster of a regiment, either his quarter, or the space of ground which is necessary, for him to encamp in; and he divideth it to the particular Quarter-masters, or to the harbingers of every company, which afterwards lodgeth them. If there be a Colonel general of all the infantry, he may have a care in general of all the government thereof; but in an army he must only command a brigado, otherwise we should not be able to establish the order which we have propounded. Moreover, there be divers nations which do not judge a Colonel general of the infantry to be necessary, but content themselves with particular Colonels for every regiment, which acknowledge only the commands of the General, or of his Marshal of the field general.  
The artillery ought to have a General, a Lieutenant general, a Quartermaster, than other officers. And for that all pioneers, miners, enginiers, conductours of works, smiths, carpenters, wheelwrights, and other workmen depend on him, I would establish a commander for every sort of these men; which I would take either out of the commissaries of the artillery, or other persons apart, to address myself to them when I had need of such men. The Quartermaster must every night go to receive the orders of the Marshal of the field general. The charge of the victuals ought to be performed by a General; he ought to have his Lieutenant, his Quartermaster, and his other officers: his Quartermaster must every evening go and take the orders of the Marshal of the field general.  
So than you see how the commands are distributed: the Marshal of the field general receiveth them from the General, then goeth to his own lodging; there the Commissary of horse cometh and receiveth them for the cavalry; the Sergeant Major general for the infantry, who delivereth it to the Sergeant Majors of brigadoes: for the artillery to the Quartermaster thereof; and so to him for the victuals: Briefly, the Marshal of the field general speaking with these four persons, giveth the orders to all the army. All orders and commands ought to be given in writing. The Marshal of the field general, the General of the artillery, the fiscal, the Controller of the Exchequer, the General of victual, the Quartermaster general, the Sergeant major general and the Provost general must always be lodged within the General's quarter.  
If all the army be encamped in bodies, the Quartermaster general giveth to each of these bodies the space of ground which is fitting; which is afterwards distributed (in every body) by the officers thereunto appointed.  
On a day of battle the Marshal of the field general doth assign the place for every body; afterwards the Sergeant major general rangeth the infantry into battalia.  
The Marshal of the field general ought to have three or four assistants for the field, to carry the extraordinary orders; but they must not pretend to command any officer in chief, unless they formerly have been either Colonels or Captains of horse.  
The Sergeant major general must command the Colonels; but that they may the readilier obey him, he ought to be taken out of the Colonels; and none ought ever to have that place unless he hath been one: as also the Sergeant majors of brigadoes ought to be taken out of the Sergeant majors of regiments. Things being thus regulated and established, you shall see a great facility in the commands, and none shall be able to excuse his fault by putting it off upon another, because presently it will be verified whence it proceeded: which obligeth every man to be careful to do that exactly which he shallbe commanded   

CHAP. XVIII. Of the assailing of States, according to their forces and situations.  
AFter that you have form an army, you must employ it, either for the conquest of a new countre●, or for the defence of your own. We will begin with the first. The Prince which putteth himself upon the offensive must be the stronger, or must see some garboils in the State which he assaileth, and that he be called thither by a party: otherwise it would be a rash enterprise.  
If the country which he assaileth be large and open, he must seek in the beginning to hazard a battle or some grand skirmish, that so by the reputation of his arms he may affright the enemies. If it be a country enclosed with mountains, or divided by rivers and ditches, or sheltered with forests, or full of fortresses, it is hard to force an enemy to battle; and in this case you must go to sieges, and make your conquest by little and little. Now he that will make any progress by this way must at least have two bodies of armies; that so with the one he may hold his enemy in play, and with the other he may actuate without impeachment. For it is most difficult to accomplish the design of a siege, so long as you have a good army encamped near you, which shall cut off your victual. If it be a country which is hard to enter, and that hath but few passages whereby to enter into it, you must force one; and before you go further, you must there fortify, and so well assure your way for your victual as you may not suffer though the enemy should have burned or carried away that of his country into his fortresses. If you be called by a faction, that is a very great advantage for you; because you are instructed of the situation of the country, and of the defects which are to be found in the ●●●tified places, and want not spies nor punctual advertisements of whatsoever passeth amongst the enemies. You must also be very careful to use this faction very courteously, and to engage them by little and little into actions which may make them irreconcilable to their Prince. But when you see they make war with respect, and that they will but by halves offend him from whom they have revolted, you must have them in great suspicion, and march with them with bridle in hand: for whether it be the fear of a ruin without recovery, or the hope of a reconciliation that hindereth them from putting themselves upon real extremities, the one and other are equally dangerous; and at last you may fear they may accommodate themselves to your prejudice: wherefore if they will not engage themselves to do extraordinary and irremissible actions at the beginning, you ought not to join with them but under good pledges: You must also use such as do voluntarily yield themselves to you with all humanity, clemency, and liberality, and such as resist you with all severity; for beneficence towards the one and severity towards the other are the two principal means which get you obedience. A town taken by force, and hardly used, or one which yieldeth itself of its own accord, and favoured, openeth the gates of a dozen others: as on the other side, a town taken by force and spared, or which rendered itself voluntarily and is evil entreated, shutteth a great many. Whence I conclude, that a Conqueror must be as good as his word, whatsoever he promiseth, be it in clemency or severity   

CHAP. XIX. Of the defence of States according to their forces and situations.  
TO treat of this subject well, we must divide it into three parts; namely, into small States, those of a middle rank, and those which are puissant. The small ones are of that nature as they subsist not but by the jealousies which their neighbours have one of another; for that if one of them will assail a weak State, the other will defend it: nevertheless, it is but a tottering condition and ill assured; for if the one findeth himself able enough to assail them, the other will not find himself sufficient to defend them. The counsels of Princes and States are not always governed so equally, but for the most part one prevaileth above the other. Besides this inconvenience there is yet another, that sometimes they agree to divide the prey; so that such kind of petty States which have not strength within themselves for their own defence, are always in peril; and they must use very much pliantness to remove all pretexts from their neighbours of undertaking something against them. The only means which they have is to have one or two towns exceeding well fortified, with arms and money enough to defend them well; that so they may give leisure to them which will not suffer the growth of him which shall assail you, to aid you: for if you have no means at all to resist, your country will be taken before they shall have time to assist you: and besides that, the happiness which they conceive of conquering you giveth them a spur to assail you; you shall find many more persons disposed to secure you then to reconquer your country: for that the one is easy with equal forces, and the other without greater strength is very difficult. To which I add, that there is ofttimes as great danger that he which regaineth your country as your friend keep it not for himself, as well as he which had taken it as your enemy: or if he restore it to you, it will be with so hard conditions, as you shall possess but the shadow of a Sovereignty. And thrice happy are they which meet with so good and so generous Princes, which do re-establish them into their lost States, with the same authority and liberty as they possessed them before: for such examples are exceeding rare. Concerning those States of a middle condition, I propound a Prince (or commonwealth) which for his defence is able to entertain an army of 20000 foot and 3000 horse with all necessary equipage. If his country be of a difficult access, and that there be no entrance into it but by certain passages and mountains guarded and fortified, he hath a great advantage: but they which too much do trust and rest upon them, and have neglected other defences, have deceived themselves, and have been lost by those ways wherein they thought themselves most assured. If it be encompassed by the sea, it is a fair moat, notwithstanding he which is stronger will find means to make his descent into the island. If it be environed with moorish grounds and rivers, yet an enemy will find ways to pass them, especially when he hath artillery to favourise such passages; insomuch that the surest way is to trust to your own forces, namely a good army and good fortresses: I say, both joynned together: for that the army without fortresses being weak, and not daring to hazard any thing, leaveth the victual of the champain to the enemy, and so the means to subsist at your charge, and at last to ruin you. And fortresses without an army are not able to preserve you longer than the time you have made your magazines of victual for, within them: but these things being proportioned with judgement, you may make a great resistance. In these things you must not suffer yourself to be led by the fancies of the people, which without considering the situations of their towns, or the public good, when they see their neighbours fortify themselves, will all imitate them; a thing equally dangerous, to have more fortresses than you can guard, or to have none at all. Yet I should rather like the last than the first: for that at least by hazarding a battle you put your enemy to half the fear; but by the other way you must surely perish, without being able to do any other thing but prolong your ruin: for the jealousy which you have to preserve all your fortresses by leaving great garrisons in them, hindereth you of the means of keeping an army in the field: and then the spoil of two or three harvests compelleth you to yield your neck to the halter. I know there are some which ground themselves upon this reason, That when all the principal places of a State be fortified, all the victual of the champain may be drawn into them, so that an army coming thither, if it stayeth there, it dieth through famine; and if it doth but pass through, it doth no great hurt: insomuch that it is almost impossible to make any great siege there. Whereunto I answer, that fortresses are principally invented for the weaker, that so a few men may resist a great number: and if you have so great a number of fortresses, and those requiring great guards (as the great fortified towns do) you must have a greater number of soldiers than he shall have which cometh to assail you; otherwise you were not able to provide them all with sufficient garrisons to preserve them from a siege. And if you be the stronger without any fortified place, you shall preserve your country in keeping the field. There is yet a further inconvenience in the fortifying of great towns; that is, that you make them so proud as they will not acknowledge their Sovereign but upon good terms; and upon the least discommodity they receive in any war the inhabitants desire rather to change their master then to see their goods wasted. Insomuch that I conclude, that you ought to have so few fortresses that they may not hinder you from keeping the field; that those which you have be so well fortified and furnished with munition as they may make a great resistance; and to place them so well as they may bridle the great towns, and that they may assure the frontiers, that so the enemy may make difficulty to leave a place behind him which might discommodate his victual, and that by intelligence or otherwise he may not seize upon some principal town which may serve him for a seat to entertain war within the country. These things thus disposed of, you must regard what enemy assaileth you. If it be a power of confederates united together, it is the more easy to disunite, then when it dependeth on one alone: and in this case it is exceeding good to cause some diffidence to grow betwixt them, by feigning of intelligence with some one of the confederates, to whom showing more respect and less animosity, you may give jealousy to the rest: as also by procuring a diversion upon the country of one of the rest. It being a very difficult thing that many sovereign powers should long hold a league together, without some disgusts to arise amongst them, or mistake, envies, and even enmities, by reason of the diversity of their humours and interests; so that that power which only dependeth upon one State only, is much more to be feared. And because you may be assailed more or less fiercely, I must say a word for that: If it be by forces which are not too much disproportionable to yours, you may preserve your country without forsaking it, and with your army and fortresses tie up the enemy, in hindering him from victual; and by entrenching always so near him as you shall hinder him from making any siege of importance. For if a Conqueror advanceth not forward he recoileth; and it is impossible for him to subsist in a country which he would conquer, if at first he taketh no footing, and doth not strengthen himself by some considerable prize. If also you be assailed by a power altogether disproportionable to your forces; in this case you must leave the field, and burn all the victual which you cannot contain within your fortresses, and also all the towns and villages which you cannot guard: for it is better for you to preserve yourself in a ruined country, then to keep it for your enemy. And it is in this that a Prince, to gain, as he thinketh, the name of being compassionate towards his people (which in such occasions turn their backs upon him) becometh cruel towards himself: But it is rather a vice of irresolution and of weakness of courage which possesseth us, than a true compassion which we have of the misfortune of another: as that of the Emperor Otho, who upon the first ill fortune that befell him (his forces being yet entire) durst not try the hazard of a battle any more. And he who could not afford any pity to Galba in his decrepit age (being his designed successor to the Empire) and which had committed all kinds of villainies to attein it, would persuade posterity, that compassion to see the Roman blood shed had made him resolve to estrange himself from it by killing himself. Thus it is that we oftentimes desire to cover our vices with the virtue which is nearest thereunto. But as it is a maxim, that no public good can be without some prejudice to some particular men, so a Prince cannot disentangle himself from a perilous enterprise, if he will please every man. And the greatest and most usual faults which we commit in matters of State and war proceed from suffering ourselves to be carried away with this complacency, whereof we repent us when there is no remedy left. But to avoid such storms you must hold this for a fundamental law for your own preservation, Never to suffer that neighbour of yours to grow up which maketh himself the strongest: for it is better to offend him by hindering him from enabling himself to destroy you, then to suffer him to grow greater out of fear to offend him. It being a thing certain, that no man preserveth his liberty against a conquering enemy by compliments but only by force.  
It remaineth that we speak of puissant States which (without help of another) have arms, money, and what else is needful to maintain a continual war.  
Of this kind there be but few, and they need to care for none but themselves; for that one sole enemy is not able to assail them, and that it is hard for the leagues of several Princes all to agree in such a design, or for any long time to subsist together: Nevertheless I will say a word on this subject. Great States are either compacted altogether, or spread abroad in several places: the first, which have all their forces united, are able to assail, and to defend themselves more powerfully than they which are so separated; because they carry all their forces where need requireth with more diligence and facility, and less charge: the other put a great part of the world into an alarm and jealousy, because they frontier upon the greatest number of States. Nevertheless, if the one or the other be assailed, they must make use of the defences we propounded before: only I will say that they ought to have no fortresses but good ones, and few in number, and only on the frontiers, and none within the heart of the country; for that having more cause to fear civil wars then foreign, and without which no man will ever assail a great Empire, it is the way to take away the main root from them which maketh them to undertake the enterprise and to subsist. Besides, you ought not to perpetuate any governments, neither to families, nor yet for life. But the principal and most able remedy against civil war is to entertain a foreign war; which chaseth away idleness, setteth all on work, and particularly giveth satisfaction to ambitious and stirring spirits: it banisheth luxury, it maketh your people warlike, and maintaineth you in such reputation amongst your neighbours, as you are the arbitrator of all their differences. It is true that this maxim is not good to be observed but by such States as are of this last sort. For as it is necessary for them, I find it hurtful for petty States, which must fear all sorts of war; for being too weak to gain by it, they run the hazard to be the pray of such as are the stronger,   

CHAP. XX. Of the means how to assure a conquest.  
A Sovereign Prince is more capable to make great and ready conquests than a commonwealth; for that finding himself secret in his counsel, courageous in his resolution, ready in his execution, and not fearing to be contradicted by any, he maketh more conquests in ten years of his life, than a commonwealth which is less secret, which is long in resolving, which bridleth the authority of her Captains, and which every hour contradicteth their actions, shall be able to do in a hundred years: So also a commonwealth which goeth always upon her own maxims, which is not subject to the want of one person, and whose government receiveth no alteration by the death of any of them, conserveth much better and for a longer time that which she hath conquered then a Prince; which ofttimes (and almost always) hath a successor as much a heartless dullard as himself was virtuous. Nevertheless, I will here establish (as well for the one as for the other) the true maxims for the well assuring of a conquest: which consist in two things; namely to take away the desire of revolting from those whom you have conquered, and the means of being able to do it.  
For the first, it is a thing very certain, that if you conquer a free people, you shall not take away (at least during the life of those which have lived so) their desire to recover their liberty. If they be subjects to a Prince and a State, and that they have only changed their master, they will rather desire to remain under the authority of him which shall use them the most courteously. Therefore you must always begin by a fair way, and to establish a condition for them which you have conquered which may be sure, both for their life and for their goods. For if even your own subjects find not this assurance, it is to be feared they will revolt; how much more they which are newly conquered? it being a law of nature imprinted in every creature, that the meanest and least animal taketh care for its own conservation; to which man endued with reason addeth the conservation of his honour and his welfare, which he ofttimes preferreth before his own life. Therefore a Prince must govern according to exact justice, uphold the oppressed in his due right, abstain from all violence himself, aswel concerning the honour of their wives as for their goods: for without this it is impossible to make a conquered people tractable. You must also (so much as may be) maintain them in the form of their government, & exclude none of them out of the possibility of attaining to those offices, dignities and honours which they may possess without prejudice to your safety. And if it be a Prince which maketh this conquest, the means to assure himself well therein is there to establish his residence the most that may be; for that his presence doth hinder many disorders, the splendour of his court imprinteth a certain veneration into the minds of the people, and it bringeth gain to the artificers and citizens where it is kept.  
If it be a commonwealth which cannot change the seat of their government, it is therefore necessary that such as they should send thither to govern live there with splendour. For the people is sometimes more taken with appearance than reality. These are the means which do insensibly insinuate obedience into a newly conquered people: but because this is not sufficient, and that ofttimes the facility of revolting impunely causeth men to have a desire to it, it is necessary for you to precaution yourself by requisite assurances, which consist in having their arms and fortresses in your own hands: I mean not that all the people shall be wholly disarmed, for if it be possible it must not come to that; but to assure yourself of great commonalties by good fortresses; to have arcenals in several parts, and not all in one place; and not to leave any town or castle (except your fortresses of garrison) so strong as to be able to endure 100 cannon-bullets. There is a last means, whereof the ancients made a profitable use, and is now wholly left, which I do marvellously approve of; which is, to establish colonies, and to transport the people from one country to another. For besides that it is a great bridle to keep a conquered country in awe, you recompense by this means the nearer part of those soldiers which have done you good service. And I find not the reason to be sufficient which some allege, that it is cruelty to make this permutation, and that it is against charity; but to the contrary I find indeed those remedies to be cruel which are commonly used, to keep the people so under as they have nothing but their life, and cannot hope for any honour within their own country. For myself I profess freely, that I had rather be driven out of my country into another, where I should have a hope for myself and mine to be able to attein to something more than now I am, then to remain in mine own country to be deprived of that hope; finding nothing to be so hard as to take away hope from a man, which is that which in this world, and for the goods of this world, maketh him undertake all things; and which for the goods of the other world furnisheth him with constancy to suffer all things: Moreover, there is nothing which distinguisheth a man so much from a beast, nor yet a regenerate man from a sensual, as hope. Which maketh me conclude, that you should never take from a man the hope of being able to obtain a better condition then that which he possesseth, that so he be not cast into despair.   

CHAP. XXI. How you must proceed to relieve your ally and confederate.  
ONe of the most honourable actions which a Prince doth, and which bringeth him most reputation, is to secure his allies in their necessities: but it is a thing which for the most part is very difficult. When you will make war, you choose your advantages, and you take your time and your measures according to that which you can and will do: it is not so in the succouring of your ally, which must be assisted with such difficulties and discommodities as you meet with. If his country be joined to yours, and that nothing hindereth you from assisting him with all your forces united, you cannot excuse the not doing of it, unless it be that you fear his enemy, and would not offend him; which is an unmanly and no judicious reason. For by this excuse you escape not the danger which your neighbour's loss will draw upon you. It being much better for you to resist jointly, then suffer yourselves to be undone one after another. But if it be an ally separated from you by other Princes and States (which ofttimes so happeneth) and that you meet with great difficulties to get into his country, you must then well consider after what manner you should secure him: for if the States which are between you both refuse you passage, and that you must be enforced to give them battle before you be able to assist your ally, it is to be feared that you shall not be able to secure him timely enough. And if your neighbour, either for fear of you, or of him which assaileth your ally, do offer you passage, you cannot accept thereof with safety, unless he put you in possession of those places which are necessary to assure your return; which being refused you, you must go no further. But if the enemy of your ally hath territories near you, and such as you may easily assail; you must do it stoutly; and that secure which can be given by diversion is (in my opinion) the surest and that which succeedeth best; because you do it with all your forces and conveniences, and ordinarily that country which you assail is not well provided, because he which assaileth another State leadeth out with him the best Captains and soldiers which he hath. But if you want all these means, there is no other left but that of money, wherewith you may assist him; which ofttimes is not sufficient to save him.   

CHAP. XXII. Which is best, whether a great Prince make war in person, or by his Lieutenant.  
IT is to the purpose in this place to treat whether a Prince ought to manage his warre● in person or by Lieutenants: for that the practice thereof being different, every man bringeth his best reasons to maintain his opinion. They which disapprove of his doing it in person allege, that by going out of his territories he openeth the door for disorders, and robbeth himself of the means to prevent them; that it is more necessary for him to keep peace within then to make war abroad, for which nothing can do so much good as his presence, which keepeth in awe the most stirring spirits; that holding them which are within in obedience he may give the better order to his affairs abroad; that there befall greater inconveniences and less remediable, when the Prince is engaged in person out of his country, then when he is within it; that if he shall receive some check in his person being fare from his own territories, those busy heads are more daring to make innovations, every man emancipateth himself and shaketh off his obedience; if he be slain there, his subjects are affrighted, and his enemy is encouraged by it, and thence draweth great advantages; if he be taken, that is still worse; for none being able to declare himself Prince, and the great ones, desiring to make their benefit of his calamity, put all affairs into such a confusion that nothing is done in the State with authority, because they which seize upon the government tyrannize over the other great ones which might pretend the same, which ofttimes love rather to call in the common enemy then to obey their fellows. Whereunto they add, that a Prince cannot free himself without giving great advantages to his enemy, which turn to a notable and irremediable prejudice both to himself and his State: So that all things being balanced, they conclude that the inconveniences are much greater of hazarding the person of the Prince in the wars then to cause them to be managed by his Lieutenants. This opinion is principally maintained by men of the gown, natural enemies to soldiers; who for that they can better preserve their authority in peace then war, do not only dissuade from going in person to the war, but even do advise the suffering of all sorts of ignominy rather than to make war. Whereunto flatterers, panders, and all the plagues of Princes do adhere, which entertain them within their country in a laziness which bringeth them to all sorts of luxury, making them believe that their States are but made for them, and not they for their States; that the taking of a maidenhead is more honourable than the conquest of a Province; that there belongeth more industry and trouble to the well-ordering of a feast then of a battle; that labour is not appointed but only for porters; and that great Kings should cause all things to be acted without moving themselves: which is the usual way of the loss of kingdoms and empires. They which counsel a Prince to make war in person, allege that the command of an army is a morsel so delicious that it ought not to be imparted to others without great necessity: for that to acquit a man's self well in such a charge, he must be very absolute; and ofttimes the General of an army doth not contain himself within his duty, especially when the Prince performeth not his own. For in this case he is naturally envious of the glory of another, and cannot support the good actions of his Lieutenant, though they tend to his own profit. In which humour they do entertain him which govern the affairs at court, with this fear, lest that an eminent virtue should supplant them. And from hence proceedeth the infelicity of the most part of brave designs, how well soever undertaken, which are made to perish either for want of money or of victual, or by restraining the authority of the General, or by putting officers upon him which oppose him, and which prove rather shackles to him then assistants: and when affairs have not succeeded as men imagined, the fault is cast upon him which is innocent, and the blameworthy triumph: and thus great Princes shall be served which make war by their Lieutenants: That the reputation of a Prince who is a good commander himself is much greater than a Princes which hath good commanders: that the first is feared for his own worth, and the other only through others: that the first cannot betray himself, but that the commanders of the other may be corrupted: that the first can make choice of such as are fit for war, and the other hath no good commanders but by hazard: that the authority of the one is not so envied nor crossed, seeing he is master, and is to give account of his actions to no man; but that the General of the army of another is subject to a perpetual jealousy, and thrice happy is he that escapeth it: that the means to prevent civil wars is to employ the most stirring and courageous spirits in foreign wars, where they shall find wherewith to satisfy their ambitions; as also to be always armed, because that will cool those which are hottest: and that the Prince be at the head of his army, that so none may use it against him. They allege further, that never Prince hath founded a great Empire, but by making war in person; nor hath lost any, but when he made war by his Lieutenants. It is now left to the choice of Princes what is to be done upon these two advices. If he be a drone, which contenteth himself to be admired by his grooms, which taketh no delight but in voluptuousness, and which leaveth off the acting of the part of a King to act that of a scoundrel, he will never take that counsel to command his armies himself. If he be a wise Prince, which loveth tranquillity to maintain his people in justice, nevertheless he will not omit to be prepared for war, and to inform himself therein, that so when occasion shall serve he need not commit the command of his armies to others. But if he be a generous Prince which hunteth after glory, and desireth to imitate those great men which live still 2000 years after their death, and whose venerable names at this day do honour those which mention them, he will doubtless choose for his principal employment that of war; wherein he will endeavour to make himself expert, that so he need not depend upon others for the leading of his armies, and will make that his chief delight. And this is the true pleasure which contenteth the spirit, which is particular to man, and common to great men: for corporal pleasure hath more of the beast then of man; and so he that wholly addicteth himself thereunto is worse than a brute beast.   

CHAP. XXIII. Of reputation.  
IT is a thing which cannot be conceived, how available the reputation of a General of an army is; and how hard it is to be preserved. For after that you have acquired the estimation of being a wise man, and of great managing, if you will conserve it by prudence, men will say you are become a coward; and if by hazarding some battle you receive a check, they will hold you to be rash. So that there is no function in the world more subject to blame then that of a General of an arm●; and very happy is that commander which keepeth his reputation entire until the the end. Nevertheless so long as it lasteth it worketh marvellous effects: for when he hath gotten the name of being prosperous in war, the soldiers believe that he cannot be beaten; and go upon his word so securely to the combat, as they take no more knowledge of the danger; persuading themselves that he never commandeth them to fight, but that he is assured of the victory: which doth so encourage them as they fight with much the more resolution. Moreover, the enemies meeting with such a man, fight not but in fear, as being assured to be beaten. There be a thousand of ancient and modern examples of this truth. When the army of Alcibiades (even when he was absent) was beaten, the Athenians believed that it was with his consent. The one●y report of the arrival of Cesar and Alexander, howsoever but with small forces, hath oftentimes caused the yielding of provinces and the defeat of armies. The sole reputation of Henry the fourth, who was taken notice of in the combat of Fontaine Francoise, arriving there the day before in post, made the Spaniards abandon Burgundy. I have observed the Dauphinois to have this belief, that the Constable le Desdiguires could not be beaten. But as this opinion is of great profit to a General of an army when he hath atteined it, so to be thought unlucky in war is a great hindrance to him: for it is impossible for him to assure himself on those soldiers which have such an opinion of their Commander. Therefore a General of an army must make it his principal aim to begin well; than not to omit any thing for the preserving of what he hath gotten: resolving rather to die gloriously in some great action then to linger out a shameful life after that he hath committed some unmanly act. For as the profession of war is that of all others which conferreth most honour upon a man which therein acquitteth himself well, so it draweth the greatest infamy upon him that demeaneth himself ill.   
FINIS.   

A Table of the books of the Abbridgement of the wars of Gallia.  

THe war against the Swisses. page 1  
2 Against Ariovistus. page 5  
3 Against the Belgae. page 7  
4 Against the people of Vannes and their allies. page 10  
5 Against the Germans of Francfort and Hessen. page 15  
6 Against the Britan's. page 17  
7 Against the same. page 20  
8 Against Ambiorix. page 24  
9 Against Vercingetorix. page 28  
10 Against Corbeus and Comius. page 35   

The second Table, of the Civil wars.  
THe war between Pompey and Cesar, the siege of Corfinium, Brundisium, and Marseilles. page 39  
The continuation of the siege of Marseilles, truce violated, a panic fear, the relief of Juba. page 45  
The siege of Salones. Caesar's camp, his retreat, the battle of Pharsalia, the defeat of Pompey. page 48  
Of the Alexandrian war. page 56  
Of the African war. page 61  
Of the Spanish war against Pompey's sons. page 64   

A Table of the Grecian and Roman Militia.  
THe military order of the Grecians. page 66  
Of the military discipline of the Romans. Chap. 1. page 73  
Of the division of a Legion of 4000 foot and 300 horse. Chap. 2. page 78  
Of marching. Chap. 3. page 79  
Of embattelling the army. Chap. 4. page 81  
Of the orders and guards of the camp. Chap. 5. page 87  
Of punishments and rewards. Chap. 6. page 90  
Of their pay. Chap. 7. page 92  
Of their order of battalia. Chap. 8. page 93  
Of sieges. Chap. 9 page 96  
Observations upon some battles of the Ancients. Chap. 10. page 98  
A comparing of the arms and military orders of the Romans with those of the Grecians. Chap. 11. page 100   

A Table of the Chapters of the Treatise of war.  
OF the election of soldiers. Chap. 1. page 105  
Of arms. Chap. 2. page 108  
Of military discipline. Chap. 3. page 113  
Of the obedience of soldiers. Chap. 4. page 116  
Of marching. Chap. 5. page 118  
Of encamping. Chap. 6. page 121  
Of battles. Chap. 7. page 123  
Of fortresses. Chap. 8. page 127  
Of defence against surprises. Chap. 9 page 129  
Of assaults by surprise. Chap. 10. page 132  
Of assaults by sieges. Chap. 11. page 146  
Of the defence of towns against sieges. Chap. 12. page 150  
Of artillery. Chap. 13. page 154  
Of the baggage and pioneers. Chap. 14. page 157  
Of spies and guides. Chap. 15. page 159  
Of victual. Chap. 16. page 161  
Of the general officers of an army, and their functions. Chap. 17. page 164  
Of the assailing of States according to their forces and situations. Chap. 18. page 170  
Of the defence of States according to their forces and situations. Chap. 19 page 172  
Of the means to assure a conquest. Chap. 20. page 180  
How to proceed to relieve an ally or confederate. Chap. 21. page 183  
Which is best for a great Prince, to make war in person, or by his Lieutenant. Chap. 22. page 185  
Of reputation. Chap. 23. page 189   
FINIS.