A TREATISE OF USE AND CUSTOM.  
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  
LONDON Printed by I. L. Anno. Dom. M. D.C.XXXVIII.  
Thy word is a lamp unto my feet, and a light unto my path.  
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  Arist.  

Mandetur typis hic liber, cui titulus est [A Treatise of Use and Custom,] modò intra 3. Menses proximè sequentes imprimatur.  
Ex aedibus Londin. Apri: 26. 1638. Sa. Baker.   

A TREATISE OF USE AND CUSTOM.  
THat man is not made and brought forth into the World, to eat and drink, and to take his ease, but for some better thing, is acknowledged by all men, who have any thing left in them of men, (that is, of rational creatures;) and have not wholly degenerated into brutes. But whether Action, or Contemplation, be the thing, wherein man's chiefest happiness in this world doth consist, hath been a question of old, and is yet disputed of on both sides. To omit the ancient Fathers, because our purpose is not to insist long upon this point, (whose opinion nevertheless if any desire to know, let him read them upon the words of Christ unto Martha, Luke x. 41, 42.) Aristotle and other Philosophers, that are for Contemplation, go upon this ground: That the nearer every man comes unto God, by way of imitation, (as far as by nature he is capable of it:) the more happy he is: that God doth enjoy himself in the fruition and contemplation of his own goodness, infiniteness, eternity, and the like; and not in, or by any thing external, that he doth cause, or produce without himself. On the other side it is alleged, That man, naturally, is animal politicum; that is, borne and brought forth into the World, not every man for himself only, but for the good of others also; and that it is one of the fundamental principles of all publike-weales and societies of men, that the public is always by every man, to be preferred before his own private, whether profit, or happiness. Both which opinions may easily be reconciled, if both be acknowledged (as I think they must of necessity:) in their several respects to be true. For certainly, if man be absolutely and barely by himself considered, as a rational creature, than Contemplation; if, as naturally sociable, having relation to the World as a City, than Action is his end. Action then his end; yet, even then, not action, without all manner of Contemplation. For as we commonly say of the Sciences, that some are speculative, and some practical; so is it of contemplation too: Some contemplation is merely speculative; and so it is opposed to Action: some may be termed (though there may seem to be some contradiction in the terms:) active, or practical, because it is the ground and foundation of all actions, that tend to happiness. For they are not all actions in general, that make men happy; but such only, as are good and virtuous. Which are such, and which are contrary, cannot be known without the knowledge of good and evil. Neither is this knowledge (in this state of corruption:) to be attained unto without much study and contemplation. And this, all Divines and Philosophers assent unto, that it is not enough, that what we do be laudable of itself, and as the School men speak, materially good; except we know it to be so, and do it upon that ground. Then, and not till then, is our action, as it is ours, truly good and commendable. Hence it is, that in the opinion of Aristotle, (the great wonder of Nature:) a learned and well grounded Physician, though missing of his end, is more praise worthy, than an ignorant Empiricke that hath good success; because, saith he, in his Metaphysics, The one understands what he doth, and goeth upon warrantable grounds, though the ignorance of some particular outward circumstance may hinder the good event: The other doth he knoweth not what, nor upon what grounds, but altogether ventureth upon former experiments. Now experience, we know, is the mistress, as of men, so of brutes too: which, though they be irrational, yet are capable of that knowledge that comes by bare experience; and cannot therefore be the proper commendation of those creatures, which are naturally rational. So that what once a grave Senator (Plin. Sec. in Panegyr, ad Traja:) spoke of one particular virtue, ambitio & jactantia, & effusio, & quidvis potius quam liberalitas est dicenda, cui ratio non constat; that that liberality, that is not grounded upon reason, is rather ambition, vain glory, profuseness, or any thing else, what you will, then true liberality: is as true of any other particular virtue, and appliable to virtue, in general; to wit, That Virtue is not Virtue properly, but as it is the fruit and effect, of true knowledge and sound reason. Which also made Aristotle to maintain in his Ethics (Lib. v. cap. 9) that justa facere was no very hard thing, and incidental unto all men; but justum esse, that is, to do just actions, upon grounds of reason and no otherwise; to be a matter of very great difficulty. For which reason also, Socrates before him maintained, that Truth and Virtue, were but one thing. And truly in the Scriptures, they are often taken for one thing. Hence those phrases, To do the Truth, To commit a lie, and the like. To which if it be opposed, that truth and virtue must needs differ as much as the will and the understanding, truth being the proper object of the one, and virtue of the other; it might easily, according to the authority of Aristotle, and other great Philosophers and School men, be replied, That although the will and the understanding be not all one essentially, yet in matter of action, they come all to one; since that, as they maintain, voluntas necessariò determinatur ab intellectu, the will of man is wholly ruled and governed, by the motions and prescripts of the understanding. Whence is that of Aristotle in the same Ethics, lib. vi. that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, that it is not possible, that he that is truly wise and prudent, should be naught or vicious: And that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, that no man is evil, but through ignorance of that which is most expedient, which is there and elsewhere at large discussed by him and proved; as it is to this day maintained by many acute writers.  
But not to engage myself into these deep mysteries of profoundest Philosophy, which may be thought perchance more abstruse than useful, and admit of variety of opinions; all that I shall infer upon these premises, which no man, I think, will deny, is but this; That Truth and Virtue are of such affinity, that without some more than ordinary insight (by virtue of knowledge and contemplation:) into the one, the other cannot be practised as it should; either to afford that inward content and satisfaction to the conscience, which is the best reward of a virtuous life in this World; or to deserve that commendation from others, (though this be least of all to be stood upon:) that otherwise would be due unto it.  
Now the knowledge of Truth being a matter of such moment to happiness, as we have said; it is much to be lamented, that the search of it should be so difficult, as it is: so beset with sundry rubs and impediments; so shadowed with many false colours and lineaments, as it is to be feared, that many men, after no small pains and study to find out what Truth is; in stead of finding what might satisfy them concerning the nature of Truth, begin to doubt whether there be any such thing, in rerum natura; and by consequent, whether any such thing truly and really, as Virtue and justice: according to that miserable complaint (though uttered by him upon another occasion:) of dying Brutus, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. O wretched virtue! hitherto have I carefully exercised thee as a thing true and real; but now I see, that thou art mere words and wind. And in very truth if a man shall as it were from some higher place, raised with the wings of philosophical contemplation, as an indifferent judge, or but spectator, take a general view of the surface of the earth; diligently observe and look into the actions and endeavours of mortal men, he shall clearly see, that that which all ingenuous men aim at, and most (even wretched worldlings:) do pretend unto, is truth: but that truth so generally professed, both by the one and by the other, for truth, in some, (whose gross and earthly temperature is most uncapable of heavenly both thoughts and hopes▪) to be nothing else, but mere policy, and private secular interests▪ in many others (of a purer mould or metal, whose meaning is good and sincere:) nothing else, in effect, but mere partiality, prejudice, presumption, resolute obstinacy, and the like; being all the fruits and effects of either blind ignorance (the more blind, the more confident, always:) in too much heat, and eagerness; (the natural distemper of most men:) or last, (if not of all these together, yet of some one of them especially:) of long use and custom. Shows, and colours, and appearances, and pretences of truth in great store every where; real and solid truth, he shall see but little any where: and that too, in many places, either silenced, or forced by unjust violence into corners.  
Upon one of these impediments, that I have mentioned, I purpose at this time to fix my contemplation; being one of the chiefest, (if I be not much mistaken myself:) of those many things, that cause truth to be mistaken by men; and that is, Custom.  
That men both in their actions, and in their judgements, are most swayed by custom, hath been the observation of many wise men of old, and is most apparent by daily experience, to them that shall observe it with diligence. Non ratione componimur, sed consuetudine, saith Seneca (Epist. 123 and elsewhere) speaking of the actions of men. As those things are, which men are used unto, so are their judgements, saith Aristotle in his Metaphysics, lib. 1. parte 2. c. 3. Rabbi Ben Maimon, (commonly called Rambam; the most judicious Rabbin, that ever was known to the Christian World;) in his excellent book, called More Nevokim, having insisted out of Alexander Aphrodisaeus, as he professeth himself, of three main particulars, which usually hinder men from the knowledge of truth; adds a fourth of his own observation, as considerable in his judgement, if not more, than any of the former: and that is, saith he, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Custom and Education. What word was used by the Author himself, I know not. For he wrote this book in Arabic; and the Hebrew is but a translation. But the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 here used by the Hebrew translator for custom, is very proper in this place; coming from a simple. Verb, which, among other things, signifieth, fallere, dolosè agere; which is the very thing the Author doth here charge custom of. Amant enim homines, (saith he;) naturâ id ad quod sunt assuefacti, & propendent ad illud. And then after some instances taken from daily experience, goes on thus, (as the late Latin Translator renders him,) Idem planè accidere solet homini insententiis & opinionibus, quibus innutritus est, ut pro amore illarum, ab illis dimoveri nequeat. Quae causa est, ut homo saepe non possit apprehendere veritatem, quia scilicet illa sequitur, quibus assuefactus est, etc.  
Neither is there want of many plausible pretences to make this power, or tyranny rather (as Saint chrysostom doth usually style it:) of custom, to seem as reasonable, as it is general. For first, Naturalists tell us, that, Consuetudo tanquam altera natura; so Aristotle: and Galen, elegantly, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Custom is an adscititious Nature. Both Civilians and Canonists tell us, not only that consuetudo optima legis interpres, (that is much that it should be so:) but plainly, that consuetudo derogat legi, abrogat legem; yea some of them, that, consuetudo, illicita, licita facit. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, was the resolution of the Council of Nice in matters of the Church; and to inquire of the former age, and, to stand upon the ways, and there to look for the good old ways, is the way that the Prophet doth teach us both to truth and righteousness; to wit, to consult with Antiquity; which is nothing else, but a continued custom; as custom is nothing else, but actus saepius multiplicati; as it is defined by Lawyers and Schoolmen. Besides, Philosophers tell us, that, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; that which is in being, and that we call Truth, are all one. And what is custom, but that which is in being? And if any, to show a difference, shall add, that Truth is that, which is, hath been, and shall be; which is as much, as to say, that it is eternal; wise Solomon seems to say as much of custom, when entreating of the variety of men's labours and actions, he useth these words, The thing that hath been, is that which shall be; and that which is done, is that which shall be done; and there is no new thing under the Sun. Is there any thing whereof it may he said, See this is new? It hath been already of old times which was before us. So another, a King too, and as wise a King (of a heathen) as Solomon, He (saith he) that seeth the things that are now, hath seen all that either was ever, or ever shall be. For all things are of one kind, and all like one unto another. And in another place, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, What ever it be that is now done here, is the same that hath always been, and ever shall be, and is now done in all places: which is spoken by him, as appears there, not of things natural, (lest any man should mistake.) but of men's actions and fashions. Anto. vi. 34.x.12.  
To these things if any shall reply, that consuetudo, quae non est rationabilis, is not properly consuetudo, but corruptela; and no wonder, if consuetudo rationabilis, be granted to be equivalent to reason, right, or truth: This, if it be well considered, will rather puzzle the more, then satisfy. For the Custom of men, which they live and are guided by, being different according to differences of places and nations; yea so changeable and variable; (I speak it of Customs, in point of right and justice, as well as of others:) in the same place, as we see they are in all places: if it shall be said of all such generally, as of particulars it is commonly by them that are used unto them, that they are rationabiles; will it not hence necessarily follow, that what is right in one place, is in another wrong: what at one time is reason and Truth; at another time is both false and absurd? And what is this, but to make Truth changeable, Protheus like; and appliable to all times and places? That is, in effect, to say with Archilaus, that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, that nothing is right or wrong, but by custom and the ordinances of men only: or with Epicurus, that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, that righteousness of its self is nothing, but that whatsoever is expedient for the present, as long as it is expedient, it is just; and no longer just, than it is expedient.  
Besides these and the like arguments, taken from the things themselves, some thing may be inferred even from the words, whereby those things are usually expressed. For words have usually some foundation in the nature of things, and therefore (as wisest men, Aristotle and others, have thought:) in all disputes of the true nature and use of things, much observable. Now in most Languages, right and custom, are expressed by the same words. As for example to instance in the three chiefest; in Hebrew, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, signifies properly judgement, but it is as often used for custom. So that Interpreters are sometimes put to it, not knowing, or at least not agreeing among themselves, by which of the two it should be rendered. As for example, Sam. 8.9. show them the manner, etc. and v. 11. This will be the manner, etc. In the Hebrew it is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, which some with the Vulgar and the Septuagint, render jus; others, as we, rationem; the manner or custom. The Chaldey paraphrase expresses it by the Greek word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, which is ambiguous both in the Original Greek (the ambiguity whereof hath caused errors and mistakes of Interpreters not a few in diverse ancient Greek Authors:) and in the derivative Chaldey, for either right or custom. Hence are variety of opinions, as amongst the jews, so amongst the Christians, about the true meaning. But I meddle not with that. Only this I observe, that Homer upon this very subject, speaking of Kings, useth the very word (but that the one is Greek, and the other is Hebrew:) that Samuel doth; This also, as ambiguous in the Greek, as the other is in the Hebrew. His words are Odyss. iv. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Where the Scholiast hath noted 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. i. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. But Eustathius, Archbishop of Thessalonica, more fully, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Aemilius Portus translates it, quod tamen Licet divinis Regibus. And certainly in those words of the Poet in another place, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Galen did understand by the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, somewhat more, than custom, as should seem by him in his de Valetudine conservanda, where he quotes them more than once. Now as in these words, both Hebrew and Greek, right is taken for custom; so in the Latin, is custom taken for right, or Law. Witness, not only the word consuetudo, in latter ages, whereof we shall have occasion to speak more afterwards; but also mos, of old. So Virgil. Aenid. vi.— pacisque imponere morem, i. Legem pacis, saith Servius. As also in the Civil Law, jus and mos, are often joined together to express right; though sometimes opposed, I know. Neither are these two Latin words, mos and consuetudo, used in Latin for right and Law only; but also for nature herself; custom, as it seems, pretending as much to nature, as it doth to right. So mos by the best Latin Authors, often; and so consuetudo, by sacred authors, sometimes. As for example, Gen. 31.35. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, which by the Chaldey paraphrase, by the LXX. and the Vulgar, is rendered, consuetudo; the custom of women. Which word consuetudo, made Augustine the Monk (a very pardonable mistake in a Monk:) to think worse of women, than they had deserved, imputing that unto them as a fault, or voluntary vice, which is their nature. At least he was so understood by Saint Gregory; who therefore both by many reasons, and diverse examples, proves unto him at large, that that consuetudo mulierum, though called consuetudo, is in very truth, infirmitas naturae; or naturae superfluitas, rather; and therefore not culpa, quia naturaliter accidit; no voluntary thing in women, but happening by necessity of nature, and by consequent, no sin; no more then either to eat, and drink; or to be weary, cold; and the like. Greg. Epist. lib. xii. Ind. seven. Epist. 31. ad August. resp. 10.  
By these things that have hitherto been spoken, it should appear, that custom of itself hath no small affinity with Truth and right: and it is but too apparent, that they are, by most men, taken for one and the same thing; as hath already been said.  
But on the other side, we shall find in ancient, both Philosophers and Fathers, as justin. Mart. Cyprian, Greg. Nyss. and others, many serious caveats and admonitions to them that seek the truth, to beware of custom: and to this purpose Tertullian would have us to remember, that Christ called himself veritatem, non consuetudinem: truth, not custom, be it never so general, or so ancient.  
Having therefore oftentimes (not by way of curiosity, but as one that thinks himself bound, to propose unto himself right and reason, to the utmost of his power, in all his actions:) had occasion to meditate upon those things, viz. of the power, variety, validity, of custom in things either natural, civil, (for all those have some relation, and mutual dependence; neither can throughly be understood, if separated,) or Divine: and what in all those is, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 (as an ancient Philosopher speaketh:) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the speculation of Truth; I have here put most of those things, that did offer themselves to my consideration, together: persuading myself, that if men spent less time about particular Questions; as concerning the right or truth of sundry particulars, in point of either Religion or Philosophy; and more time in the due and rational consideration of those general either helps, or hindrances, that offer themselves unto men in the search of what is Truth and right; that there would be, both far less contention, and far more truth in the World, then is at this day. For my part, I shall be careful not to vent any new conceits, or opinions of mine own unto the World. It is too full already of such phantastics, who both in their lives and in their opinions, affect nothing more than singularity. Only what I have met with in best authors concerning this subject, the consideration whereof I thought might be useful unto others, I shall here set down; and this, rather by way of proposition, then peremptory determination.  

TO begin with the power of Custom in things natural, I will first speak of some parts and faculties, which have been formerly, and may yet through use and custom be attained unto, though not contrary to nature, yet so rare and extraordinary, as in the judgement of common sense, and for want of experience, they might seem altogether impossible. By Custom, we understand practice and exercise, as usually others do upon this occasion. So (to instance in one), Plutarch, where he disputes of the power of custom in point of education, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, saith he, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, by custom I mean use and exercise; and afterwards he calls it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; all which words are by him there used as synonimas, or words of the same signification. Now to speak of the power of custom in this kind, and to set out the marvellous efficacy of it, I know not whom we should more properly begin with, then with those, whom the Grecians properly called, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, or wonderworkers; men, whose profession it was to amaze the people with strange sights and wonders, (so called ordinarily by Greek Authors, properly and absolutely, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, wonders:) proceeding for the most part from extraordinary either strength, or agility, or both. I shall mention them the rather, because it is a speculation that diverse Philosphers and Fathers, (but especially Saint chrysostom:) in their moral exhortations often fall upon, and make very good use of it. Hero an ancient Greek Author hath written a whole book of that subject, but I have not yet seen it. And because the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, is somewhat general, and may comprehend them that bring strange things to pass, by the help either of natural, or superstitious Magic, as well as others; I will therefore here set down the definition of such as we understand here properly by the word; as I find it in Nicephorus Gregoras; by which they may be discerned from all others, that have any plea to that common name, He therefore in his eight Book of his Roman History, treating at large 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, of some wonderworkers that came to Constantinople, gives the definition of them, and of their art: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Those things (saith he:) that were done by them, were prodigious indeed, and full of wonder; yet far from Diabolical enchantments, but mere exercises of a dextruous nature, long practised and accustomed unto those things.  
First then to begin with agility, Saint chrysostom in his nineteenth Homily ad populum Antiochenum, hath these particular instances, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to run upon the ground, all parts of the body turning circularly, like a wheel: to draw one's self up and down by the motion and agitation of the arms only, as if it were with wings: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: to cast up diverse swords one after another into the air, and to receive every one by the handle: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: expressed by him again in another place, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: which, in plain English, is no more, as I conceive; than what we commonly say, to dance upon the rope; or, ire the said 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, or ordinary wonderworkers of his time. He doth insist upon this particular at large, calling their heads, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, nailed heads, or heads sticked all over with nails. And lest any should either mistrust the truth of the relation, (though to prevent this I have purposely made choice of such a one as Saint chrysostom for my warrant:) or at least suspect (as I see diverse do without cause in other matters like unto these; because not acquainted with the power of custom in things of this nature:) some imposture in the actors, I will confirm this last instance of nailed heads, with two pregnant testimonies of approved and unquestionable experience of latter times: the one taken from Augerius Busbequius, and the other from johannes Leunclavius; men of good worth, both; and as good credit, among the learned cum jam esset in conspectu Buda (saith Busbequius in his fourth Epistle:) veniunt nobis obviam jussu Bassae ex ejus familiâ aliquot, cum plerisque▪ Chiaussis; sed in primis visenda juvenum in equis multitudo propter novitatem ornatus, qui erat hujusmodi. In aperto capite, quod eis plerumque rasum est, cutem longâ lineâ inciderant, cui vulneri plures pinnas cujusque generis inseruerant: ipsi stillantes cruentis guttis, dissimulato dolore veluti sensus expertes, laeti & hilares ferebantur. Ante me proximè pedites aliquot ambulabant; horum unus veluti ansatus subnixis brachiis ingrediebatur, quorum utrumque supra cubitum cultello (quod genus nos Pragenses vocamus:) transfixum habebat. Alius à superiore parte umbiculo tenus, nudus incedebat, sic scissa duobus locis infra supraque lumborum cute, ut illac trajectam clavam, tanquam è cingulo pendentem haberet. Alius in vertice capitis, equisoleam pluribus clavis fixerat. Sed id vetus erat, clavis ita cum carne coalitis, ut nihil moverentur.  
The passage out of Leunclavius is this: Hos sequebantur tres lymphatici robusti homines, caligis tantum induti, caetera nudi; nisi quod capitis vertex parvo pileolo rubro, & humeri nudi superinjecta, deque collo pendente pelle tigridis, exornabantur. High ad concentum Zinganorum tripudiabant, tenentes singuli vexillum Turcicum rubri coloris, cujus hastile intra cutem & abdomen ventris, emanante multo sanguine, defixum erat. Hos duo pueri sequebantur, qui cuti frontis perforatae pennas gruis insertas ferebant. Secundùm pueros incedebant quatuor virorum paria, pervulneratis lateribus. Primi duo clavas ferreas, quas pusdiganos dicunt: proximi duo nudos acinaces, per cutem transfixos, gestabant. Rursus alii duo sequebantur, quorum unus securim militarem Vngaricam (schacanam vocant) alter oblongum Genizari sclopetum apertis lateribus in transfixo corpore portabat. Vltimo loco viri duo robusti spectaculum hoc claudebant, qui tempora rectis, latis, & oblongis ensibus, quos Vngari palastos vocant, transfixerant. Horum capulos manibus tenebant: In ensium cuspide pomum erat adfixum, & pomo, penna gruis inserta.  
I shall forbear more particular instances concerning the many wonders recorded by the ancients, of those wonder workers: And the rather indeed, because diverse examples in this kind may be excepted against, as examples rather of strange natures, or natural properties; then instances of the power of custom. For though the art, generally, be ascribed by the ancients to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 (which gave occasion to Arrian the Stoic Philosopher to mention some of them by the way in his chapter 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉:) that is, to use and practice; yet in some of them (for aught we know:) it might be nature; or at least, nature concurring. So of prodigious eaters, for example; Suetonius tells us of one, much admired by Nero the Roman Emperor, who by custom had brought himself, crudam carnem, & quicquid daretur manducare; to eat any kind of thing: And doubtless it stands with reason that custom may do much in this kind, as generally in point of eating and drinking: whereof learned Physicians treat at large. Yet that a man should (uno die aprum integrum, centum panes, vervecem & porcellum: in one day (if not at one meal:) eat a whole boar, a hundred loaves, one weather, and a hog, as we read of one in Aurelians time: I dare not ascribe this unto custom only: no more then, to devour nettles, thistles, the pith of artichockes, raw and living birds and fishes with their scales and feathers, burning coals and candles, etc. and all these in very great quantity, as Karew in his Survey of Cornwall, recordeth of one john Size of Cornwall. That which makes me to doubt the more, is, because I read in Columbus, a famous Anatomist, of one Lazarus in Venice, surnamed Vitrivorax, or the glass eater, who made a trade of it, mercede propositâ, vitrum, saxa, lapides, ligna, viva animalia, carbones, pisces è vivario extractos adhuc salientes, lutum, lineos laneosque pannos, &c, vorare. Now this man falling at last, after his death, to the hands of Columbus to be dissected by him, he did his best (as he professeth:) by observing all things in him with more than ordinary curiosity, to find out a reason in nature of this so strange and unnatural quality. And his conceit is, that he did find it; wherein I will not interpose my judgement, but leave the further examination thereof, to professed Anatomists and Physicians. But generally, of such particular examples, so extraordinary and beyond all example prodigious, I hold it (as I have already said) most safe, to take in nature and custom, as concurring. As expressly, for example, we read in Suidas of one Marcellus, who being by nature very watchful, by long use and custom had brought himself to that pass, as to live without sleep; or at least, with so little, as could hardly be observed by any others. For the better satisfaction therefore of the Reader, that he may certainly know what custom alone in this kind, can do, in point of either agility or strength; a sure way will be to consider some particular performances in either kind, that have been more common and general, as either to whole Nations, or to certain professions, together and at one time; and not proper to some few persons, at some times, only.  
In point of agility, Caesar in his Commentaries testifieth of the old Britan's, that usu quotidiano & exercitatione, they had attained to that perfection of horsemanship, ut in declivi ac praecipiti loco incitatos equos sustinere, & brevi moderari ac flectere; & per temonem percurrere, & in jugo insistere, & inde se in currus citissimè recipere consueverint. This is much, and more perchance then some will easily believe, that have seen no such examples of activity in these days. Yet more than that in the same kind of exercise, is averred to be true of some people to this day, by Authors of good credit and authority. So elegant Maffaeus of certain people Occidentalis Aethiopiae, which he calls jalaphos: Hist. Indicae, lib. 1. Exhibitique (saith he:) per eos dies publicè ludi, convivia, venationes, & spectacula equestria; In quibus jalophi desultoriâ arte & peritiâ ita se admirabiles praebuere, ut Numidis ipsis (quorum in celeritate motuque corporis praecipua laus est:) agilitatis palmam omnium judicio consensuque eripuerint. Si quidem tanta erant membrorum vel dexteritate vel robore, ut equi incitatissimi ephippiis nullâ omnino cursus intermissione tum recti insisterent, corpusque circumagerent: tum repentè insiderent, dispositosque humi lapillos ad unum inde colligerent; tum etiam momentò desilirent, resilirentque.  
But if any shall desire to understand the utmost that long use and exercise can attain unto in this kind of Agility, let them read what Martinus a Boumgarten, (no obscure man and of good credit every way;) relates at large in his perigrinations, of the sundry acts and exercises of Chivalry, performed by the Mamaluques before their Sultan. Certainly had they had wings, I do not know what they could have done more in that kind, either upon, or about horses. But because the book is not very common to be had, nor perchance very commonly known, I shall not do amiss I think, to insert here some part of that his relation, His words are:  
Alii in pleno cursu equi, ter desilientes: itemque (equo à cursu suo non cessante:) conscendentes, nihilo minus omnes illos scopos sagittis tangebant, nec vel aliquatenus aberrabant: Alli sellis non sedentes, sed stantes, licet equi volarent, singulos scopos feriebant. Alii inter plenum & jugem equorum cursum ter arcus remittentes, ter eos loco flagelli capiti circumdantes, ac rursum ter intendentes, aequè tamen ut & caeteri singulos scopos jaculis verberabant. Alii in jugi equorum cursu, licet ad utramque partem desilissent non tamen obmittebant, quin & omnes scopos ut & reliqui, singillatim percuterent. Alii ter per equorum terga retrò desilientes, ac rursum currente semper equo, insilientes, à sagittandi munere ad singulos scopos non cessabant. Alii sellis more solito colligatis sedentes, eas interim equo currente, ter solvebant, ac post solutionem sagittantes, ter rursum eas dorso equi colligabant, terque jaculis scopos haud gravatim contingebant. Alii in sellis more consueto insidentes, extra sellam retrò se concitè locabant, ac capite deorsum misso, rursus erecti, sellas insidebant, hocque ter facto, toties etiam scopos jaculis appetebant. Alii in sella justè sedentes, caput in equi ponebant tergum, ac apprehensâ equi caudâ, dentibus eam ingerebant, atque illico se erigentes, scopos nequaquam jaculis praeteribant. Alii post singulos jactus sagittarum, ensem evaginatum circum caput minitabundi rotabant: quo mox vagina recondito, nullum scopum à jaculis esse sinebant immunem. Alii inter nudos & acutissimos enses â dextra ternos, laeva tèrnos, in tenuissimo amictu ita sedebant, ut enses illi (si quò minùs immoderaté se movissent:) corpora eorum crudeliter configerent: tamen ante & retrò admirabili pernicitate & arte ita se vibrabant, ut prae se, & post tergum (quasi discriminis obliti:) nulli scopo parcerent. Inter hos talia agentes tyrones, unus solus repertus est, qui super duos pernicissima velocitate equos currentes, solutis staret pedibus, ac ternas uno impetu, ante & retro simul funderet sagittas. Iterum erat alius, qui itidem solus ex omnibus equo non sellato nec fraenato sedens, ad singulos scopos se in pedes erigens stabat, perculsoque scopo dextra laevaque, iterum sedebat: donec ad secundos & tertios scopos veniens, iterumse in pedes erigeret, ac sagittandi munus egregiè & mirè expleret. Item & alius insuper repertus est, qui solus ex reliquis equo insellato & nudo sedens, ubi ad scopos venisset, in tergo equi supinus jacens, utrumque pedem in sublime porrigebat, sicque concitè erectus sagittandi officium impigrè complebat: Again, Et operae pretium erat videre tyrones illos, corpore proceros, vestitu armisque decoros, gestu ipso admirabiles, ea in rapido equorum cursu agere quae etiam in terra stantibus & factu difficillima, & visu stupenda, denique & enarratu incredibilia penè viderentur, etc.  
And that the unexpert may the better be satisfied, that these things are not altogether impossible to men, who by their profession make it their constant study and practice; I will add by the way what some ordinary men of our own Country with a little practice, have performed in our days. In the year of our Lord 1611▪ in the month of August, the Bishop of Ely (I think I may call him the Bishop of Ely, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and do none of his worthy predecessors any wrong; but, the Bishop of Ely that then was:) going to Wisby in Cambridg-shire, and accompanied with many horses; there met him upon the ways a plain Rustic, standing upright upon his horses bare back; and in that posture did he gallop so fast, that none of the company could outgo him, or so much as keep pace with him. One that was then present made a Memorandum of it in these words: Die primo itineris occurrit nobis rusticus, qui equi sui nudo dorso insistens vehebatur tantâ confidentiâ, ut admitteret ad cursum, neque aliquis nostrum posset consequi eum ita currentem.  
In point of strength, first active, the Turkish archer shall be my instance; A strong Turkish bow (such you must understand as they generally used in former times before they had so much degenerated from their ancient discipline:) the string whereof a lusty strong man (qui non assueverit, saith Busbequius in his Epistles:) that hath not been used unto them, shall not be able to stir with all his might so far, as to loozen a piece of money thrust at one of the extremities between the string and the steel; a well practised archer of that Country and discipline, will make nothing to draw to his ear. And such is the strength of one of those bows, (saith learned Barclay, in his Icon animarum, and professeth to have seen it done,) that with a little arrow it will pierce through chalybem tres digitos altum (I durst not English it, but that I know the Author to be a man famous, and of good credit, in things of this nature at least:) a steel three fingers thick; and even dart an arrow that shall want a head with such force into a reasonable big tree, that the end of it shall be seen on the other side. I bind no man to believe it, that hath not seen it▪ yet I know the Author's credit will go very far with them that have known him; and that he is not the only that hath reported it.  
As for strength passive, I will content myself with that common example of the Lacedaemonian boys, and youths; the more common and the better attested, the more uncontrollable and the fitter for our purpose. One of their solemn yearly exercises, that their laws did oblige them unto, was their 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, as they called it; that is, a public whipping of all their youths at a certain place, to wit, ad aram Dianae Orthiae. Their youth (saith Plutarch:) being whipped and scourged all day long at the altar of Diana Orthia, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, are wont to endure it, even unto death, oftentimes, with joy and exultation, eagerly striving one with another, who shall hold out longest and suffer most. Tully's relation goes yet beyond this. For having said, as Plutarch, ad necem usque, even unto death; he adds, quorum non modo nemo conclamavit unquam, sed ne ingemuit quidem; that none of them (during the time of this bloody exercise:) was ever known, either to cry, or so much as to groan. And both these, in other places, profess to have been eye-witnesses of their patience, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, saith Plutarch; We have seen ourselves many of them dye at the very Altar, with extremity of scourging. Adolescentium greges Lacedaemone vidimus ipsi, (saith Tully,) incredibili contentione certantes pugnis, calcibus, unguibus, morsu, denique ut exanimarentur, priusquam se victos faterentur. But to speak truth, there is nothing more obvious in all Greek and Latin Authors that are ancient: and therefore these two may well suffice. But this is not all that is to be wondered at in this matter; but this also, that whilst these boys were so used, their parents and dearest friends would look upon them with joy and pleasure, yea exhort them themselves unto patience: adstantibus parentibus & propinquis, saith Tertullian, & uti perseverent adhortantibus. The word that is used by Plutarch in his Lycurgus, speaking of these things, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, practice and exercise, puts me in mind of the ancient Christian Asceticks, of whom no less in point of patience, if not more by far, might be related, but that I would not be long.  
In all these several general instances, it is out of all question, and all Authors that write of them are of that opinion, that Custom and long practice, is to be looked upon, as the only cause. The use (which I mentioned before, and therefore will briefly set down here, though it be not the thing that I aim at especially:) that diverse ancient Fathers, Philosophers & others make of these and the like instances, is this: That those great insuperable difficulties, that men usually pretend to meet with in the way that leads unto Virtue and godliness, are rather vain pretences and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 (as Saint chrysostom in a thousand places:) that is, mere want of courage and resolution, than difficulties really hard and insuperable: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 (as Polybius in a place, very elegantly and fully:) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, And therefore that men must not start back from the prosecution of any thing that is good and profitable by reason of those seeming difficulties, but betake themselves to the power of use and custom, by which all that good is and laudable, is made possible unto man.  
Now in all these it is apparent, that custom is rather supra naturam, then contra naturam, directly. We shall therefore in the next place consider the power of it, even in those things, wherein it is directly opposite unto Nature. The discussion of these things at large, I leave unto professed Naturalists and Physicians. Some few instances will serve my turn, and will sufficiently afford unto them, that are both capable and curious, (I take it in the better sense:) matter of further speculation.  
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: all excess is against nature. So Philosophers and Physicians. Yet what excess so unnatural, that a man, by custom, may not bring himself unto? Yea, if a man have once used himself unto excess, it is dangerous for him to return unto nature and mediocrity, because he hath used himself unto excess. For even things naturally and of themselves hurtful, through use and custom become expedient and necessary. Therefore saith Hypocrates, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Those things that we are used unto, though worse of themselves, use to be less dangerous than better things that we are not used unto. And Aristotle doth instance in Dionysius the Tyrant, who in a dangerous siege having forborn for a while his riot, fell into a consumption, of which he could not be cured, until he returned unto his former custom.  
What more contrary to Nature then poison; which therefore among other names is called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, as the greatest enemy of Nature? Yet by custom in diverse ages both men and women have been known to bring themselves to this pass, as not only to take most dangerous poisons without hurt, but also to feed upon them and to receive nourishment from them. We read of some that have lived upon nothing else. Whereof you may read in Galen de Simpl. Med. lib. 3.18. Sennert. lib. iv. c. 3. And lib. iii de Febrib. And although in some of these there might sometimes concur some secret of Nature in the proper constitution (whereof see Libavius de Venenis, and Galen 3. de Sim. Med. who shows a reason in Anatomy, why that poison which killeth men, is a food unto the Stairs:) or otherwise; yet generally (which sufficeth us:) that this is ascribed unto custom as the cause, I appeal unto the forenamed Authors, and diverse others that have treated of it.  
What more natural unto man, then to live upon the Earth, the natural mother (both in regard of their beginning and of their ending:) of all men? Yet we read of some, who by custom of often swimming and conversing in the waters, have made the waters so natural unto their bodies, that they could hardly endure the land, and not without present danger of their health. jovianus Pontanus, writes of one Colon of his times (as I conceive:) a notable Vrinator or diver, who could not indeed continue long together out of the sea, and would swim a hundred miles together and above, from one shore to another, and from one Country to another, with great speed, and at all times of the year. But this I must confess I take upon trust; for I have not read it in the Author himself; but in our learned john Barnes a Benedictine, in his contra Aequivoc. 35.323. Neither do I know whether he had brought himself to this by custom only or no. But if this story be not to my purpose, this other is I am sure, which I shall now produce out of a certain Commentator upon Aristotle his Axiomata: who upon that saying of Aristotle, Consuetudo est altera natura: hath these words: Alibi quanta sit vis consuetudinis explicatiori sermone proditum est: Illis tamen hoc velim additum, quod prae sua novitate & infrequenti similis rei eventu pene incredibile erit, hominem quendam patria Syculum, à puero ita natandi consuetudine usitatum, ut deinceps piscium more sub aquis longo tempore versaretur; quibus cum exiret, ut communi hominum usu frueretur, tanto ventriculi dolore angebatur, ut valetudinis nanciscendae causa, ad aquas esset redeundum. Quibus rursum immersus, ludi & recreationis gratia, si quando naves mari volarent, in eas saliebat, atque post sumptum cibum, iterum descendebat, ubi ad multam usque aetatem vitam protraxit. Whether he means it of the same as Pontanus doth, because I have not Pontanus at this time, I cannot tell. To some such kind of men it is not unlikely, that Saint chrysostom did allude in one of his Homilies (the sixteenth as I remember:) upon the Epistle to the Hebrews, where he tells rich men of their unmercifulness and want of compassion, whose curiosity to satisfy with strange spectacles, among other inventions poor men were driven 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to search and ransack the deepest parts of the Ocean; that some way or other they might extort somewhat from them. But Seneca directly, speaking of the strange inventions of the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, or wonderworkers of his days, reckons among the rest, in immensam altitudinem mergi, ac sine ulla respirandi vice perpeti maria; and again not long after, penetrare in imum mare; which may give much light to that passage of Saint Chrysostom's. And among the sundry kinds of exercises Artis Gymnasticae, I find that one was, continere spiritum; to hold and keep in their breaths: it being one of those things (it seems:) which use and custom can do much in, as well as in other things.  
But it would be infinite to treat of the power of custom from all particular examples and instances that occur in diverse writers, Historians, Philosophers, and others, both old and late. The truth of some of them perchance may be questioned. I deny it not: though I read not scarce any thing in any of them so strange in this kind, but might be averred and paralleled, if not as certainly true, at least as possible, by manifest experience, either in the same kind or very like, even in our days.  
Yet it is not granted by all men, that custom is of such power and efficacy in things natural. Aristotle seems in some place to be one of them, that will not grant it. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, saith he in a place, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. One custom may be removed and taken away by some other custom, but nothing can ever prevail against Nature. And again in his Ethics, Lib. two. c. 1. as peremptorily 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Nothing that is natural can be altered by custom. Others, though they speak not so peremptorily of it, yet they restrain the power of it very much. So Alex. Messaria, a famous Physician, in his Treatise of the plague, Consuetudinem (saith he) plurimum posse negandum non est; sed ita tamen, ut ne limites naturae transcendat, etc. And Sennertus, (an exact judicious writer, as most of that profession,) more punctually yet, Pract. Medicinae lib. iii part 1. sect. two. c. 2. de longa abstin. Consuetudinis (saith he:) maximam vim esse certum est, non tamen in omnibus locum habet: sed certa saltem opera sunt, in quae jus habet consuetudo. Etenim in sensus actiones nullam potestatem habet, neque quis potest assuescere, ut non olfaciat, sentiat, vel non respiret, etc.  
To this many things might be opposed, from certain experience. In this very point de longa abstin. that Sennertus speaks of, Ancient Histories afford examples to the contrary. We read of one jul. Viator, who to save his life having by little and little used himself to abstain from drinking as, being far gone in a dropsy, naturam (saith Pliny:) fecit consuetudine, did at last turn custom into nature, & in senectam potu abstinuit, and so lived to be an old man without drink. And Pliny saith, scimus, as of a thing commonly known and not doubted of by any. And Seneca as peremptorily, that assidua meditatione (that is, by custom) quidam omni humore interdixere corporibus. And Lipsius there averreth, that even in our age, there have been examples of such absolute forbearance, from all manner of drink. Then for the senses; what shall we say to Appianus, who tells us of one Geta, a Citizen of Rome, who in the time of the Civil wars, being one of them that was marked and sought after to death, to the end that he might the better disguise himself, among other things counterfeited himself to be blind of one eye, and wore I know not what over his concealed eye some years. And then his danger being over, when he thought to have restored his long captive eye to his former liberty, he found the eye there indeed, but the sight was gone; and so continued blind of that eye to his dying day. And Appianus saith directly that it was 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, for want of use of his eye (that is, because he did use himself not to see with it) that he lost it.  
But to leave particular instances; how much the ancients did attribute to the power of custom upon the senses, may appear by that opinion which we find in many of them, of the Music of the Spheres, caused as they conceived, by their circumvolution; audible as they affirmed, but not heard, or rather not discerned, because we heard it always. What good grounds they had for this opinion, is not to my purpose to inquire at this time. I dare not say that Saint Ambrose was of that opinion; but that he did not think there was any impiety in it, may appear by his Preface upon the Psalms. But Saint Anselm plainly, Septem coelestes orbes cum dulcisona Harmonia volvuntur, ac suavissimi concentus eorum circuitione efficiuntur, etc. de Imagine. mundi. But that which from that opinion is here pertinent to my discourse, is, that they that maintained it, were also, most of them, of opinion, that the reason why we did not hear it, was merely 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, because our ears were accustomed unto it, as you shall find expressly in Heracledus Ponticus, in his Homerical Allegor. In Aristotle de Coelo. two. 9. and others. Tully also aimed at the same reason, in his Somn. Scipion. when he saith, Hoc sonitu oppletae aures obsurduerunt: though his next words ascribe it rather to magnitudini sonitus, then consuetudini; which would import a total destruction of the sense; and not a deficiency of it to one particular object only. This indeed is another consideration, but apparently false; since that upon that ground, all hearing would be quite taken away; as Pliny in his History, Seneca in his Natural Questions expressly affirm of those inhabitants about Nilus, that he speaks of there; to wit that they are quite deaf. I know there are others yet, that have maintained this celestial Harmony upon other grounds. Philo judaeus saith directly that it is not audible (to us men, that is:) that it doth not reach unto the ears; and the reason why God would not have it audible he saith, is, lest men ravished with the sweetness of it, should give over all care and thought of worldly affairs. Yet for the most, as I have already said, that they grounded, if not their opinions, yet their answers to usual objections against it, upon the power of custom, let Saint Basill tell them that shall make any question of it; Whose words are these: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. But when they that maintain this opinion are required to make it good by some sensible evidence, what say they? Why, this they say; that our ears being used to this noise from our first entrance into the world, through this long use and custom from the beginning they have lost the sense of it. As they who live in Smith's forges, whose ears are perpetually, etc. Which is quite contrary to that of Sennertus, that consuetudo in sensus actiones nullam potestatem habet. And now since that upon this subject of Custom, I have had occasion to say so much concerning the supposed Celestial Harmony of the Spheres, I shall willingly impart unto others what I have met with about it in the written Adversaria (for in any printed Book I have not as yet, that I remember:) of a man well known unto the world by his writings; though at this time, for some reasons, I shall desire to spare his Name.  

Harmonia coelestis 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 viridis supra fidem senectus ultra annum centessimum.  
Obtulit mihi more gentis suae & Germanorum, librum suum amicorum, jeremias Plancius Plancii F. qui nunc Amsterdami ministrum agit verbi divini: sed editione chartarum Geographicarum nomen suum fecit celebre. In eo libro inveni haec verba manu Roberti Constantini scripta.   

Robore & constantia.  
Robertus Constantinus Baro Gymatius, & in Academia Montalbanensi Professor Graecarum literarum, Idemque experientia quotidiana 24. annorum, assertor 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 vocalis audibilisque contra Aristotelem naturalis Philosophiae facile principem omnium, haec 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 occupatiss. exaravi in gratiam hospitis mei, & Auditoris D. jeremiae Plancii, viri tum pietate, tum doctrina spectabilis. Montalbani anno Domini 1605. Aetatis nostrae (summo Dei beneficio hucusque tam animo quam corpore ad miraculum integrae:) centessimo, ut 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, tum amici, tum invidi dinumerare sunt consueti. Senex autem nondum est victus, qui virilia munera 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 obire possit, & viriliter exercere.  
Erat manus illius & elegans & firma, ac plane ejusmodi qualem verisimile est fuisse in ipso aetatis flore. descripsimus vero heic, & quod invenimus in alio libro simili de causa nobis allato.   

〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  
Robertus Constantinus Baro Gymatius & Professor Graecarum literarum in Academia Montalbanensi, Idemque assertor audibilis coelestisque harmoniae experientiâ quotidianâ plusquam viginti annorum.  
Haec raptim exaravi in gratiam amiciss. viri atque eruditiss. D. johannis Davini. Montalbani 24. Febr. Anno 1605. Robore & constantia.  
Hic est Rob. Constantinus, qui olim apud Iulium Caesarem [Scaligerum] vixit, & postea Lexicon publicavit. Caeterùm de hac longaevitate ipsius, haud satis fidem illi habeo, nam video ipsum non planè affirmare. Quare more senum indulget sibi, & annorum suorum numerum, nisi fallor, aliquot supra fidem adauget.   
So far those written Adversaria. Of this Constantinus you may read in Thuanus tom. v. of his great age and good worth as a scholar; and that he was (summus Bezae amicus:) one of Beza's chiefest and dearest acquaintance. But of this pretended sensible knowledge of the Celestial Harmony, not one word there; which hath made me the more willing to insert here, and make public, what I had elsewhere in my private possession about it.  
And so much shall suffice at this time concerning the power of custom in things natural; historically. Now, Philosophically, and speculatively, we thus proceed.  
First that it is not without danger, nor according to exact Truth, to say that Nature is alterable. For what is Nature properly, but the Order of God? If that be mutable and violable; then is no more this World a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; or orderly piece, but a mass of confusion; and that is it, that the Atheists, and the opposers of a Providence would have. Neither can there be any truth properly in those things, the nature whereof is altogether uncertain; therefore uncertain, because unconstant. And where there is no Truth, there can be no knowledge. As to the World therefore, confusion; so to the understanding, ignorance, from this uncertainty and inconstancy must necessarily ensue. As for Miracles, though above nature, yet are they not properly against nature, since they are his proper work, who is the Author of nature, and therefore originally, and suitably to his Nature, did reserve unto himself a power to dispense with his own laws whensoever he thought fit. All Gods works of themselves, and in regard of God, are equally natural, though not in regard of us.  
We say therefore that custom is not always to be considered as opposite unto Nature, since it is the nature of sublunary things, to be altered by custom. And when custom hath once through continuance naturalised herself into any of them, than custom (to speak properly:) is no more custom, but Nature: according to that of old Evenus in Arist. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, that long use and exercise, becomes at last nature. Nature than we say, by the ordinance and appointment of its first Author, is twofold; original, and secundary or adventitious, and so Galen plainly, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, custom is a kind of adventitious, or, adscititious nature. Neither is custom, when it is once become natural, though adventitious, less natural in regard of the common Nature of the Universe, from which at first it received the power and propriety, to turn, in time, into nature; then that original nature: though in regard of the particular subject, that it hath wrought upon, it be but adventitious. When therefore it is commonly said, that such or such a thing hath lost its nature; it must be understood of that particular nature and propriety which it had at the first; not absolutely, as though it had departed from the law of Nature in general; since that Nature itself hath made it so alterable. As of death we say vulgarly, that it is against nature; though it be as properly, and truly the work of Nature, as birth or generation is; and as natural to the nature of the Universe. And so is that true of Aristotle (which we have spoken before:) that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Nature cannot be driven away, being understood of Universal Nature.  
Galen, a great admirer of Nature, and much to be admired himself, for his painful travels in the search of it, hath another way to reduce custom unto Nature. His opinion is, that any man's nature may be known, or at least, probably guessed at, by those things that he is used unto. And therefore prefers those Phycsiians that allow unto their patients whatsoever they have been used to, though contrary to art; before them who keep them strictly to the general prescripts without respect to their proper constitution: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, saith he, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. That is, Most men that use themselves to any thing, whatsoever it be, they must be conceived to pitch upon such things, as are most suitable to their own Nature; for that finding hurt by those things that are contrary unto it, they are forced to forbear them speedily. Yea plainly, that none can 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, long continue in an evil custom contrary to their proper constitutions, who are not extremely mad and senseless. By this, custom and Nature should be all one: or at least custom for the most part, nothing else but the fruits and effects of original Nature. For my part I should easily grant that any man's present constitution (which you may call his Nature, for the time, though improperly:) may not unlikely be judged of, by those things that are customary unto him. But that a man's original temper and constitution (which is it that Galen there speaks of:) may so be known, except we shall extend madness, and senselessness very far, common experience will disproove. For what generally more natural unto all men, than temperance and sobriety? And what more generally practised in the World, among all sorts of men, than excess, and riot, and intemperance, in some one kind or other, if not in all? But by the way; If in the judgement of Galen a heathen, all such are to be reputed as mad men, because they respect their health and corporal welfare no more; what would he have said of them, had he been a Christian, for their wilful casting away of their souls (so much more precious than the body, by how much Heaven doth excel the earth:) by the said courses? Certainly madness is a far more general evil, than most men think. But this, by the way only. When Philosophers dispute (as many do:) whether Nature or education, that is, custom, be more powerful to frame and fashion a man's life; it would be but an absurd question, scarce fit to be proposed by any sober man, much more unfit to be so seriously disputed of by learned Philosophers, if nature and custom in this sense come all to one. But I shall here appeal from Galen unto Galen himself, whose words in his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. upon Hippoc. Prognost. (treating there of the proper and most natural time of sleep▪) are these: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. In the days of Hypocrates indeed, that which is according to nature, and that which is according to custom, was all one. But now it is quite otherwise, etc. And presently again, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. In these days, custom is of more power than nature, etc.  
Tully also his conceit in his Tusculans is not to be omitted; who having spoken of some that had hardened themselves to endure great extremities of heat, and of cold; as also bodily pains in other kinds, intolerable unto others; all this with either no sense; or at least, most wonderful patience; whereas other men ascribe all this unto custom, he would have it to be Nature, even common Nature. For saith he, Nunquam naturam mos vinceret; est enim easemper invicta: It is not a thing possible that custom should prevail against Nature; for nature it unconquerable. How then, say we, comes it to pass that other men cannot endure the said extremities, if not against nature? Because, saith he, we have through custom used our bodies to tenderness, and so made that intolerable unto them, which by nature is very tolerable; His words are, Sed nos umbris, deliciis, otio, languore, desidia animum infecimus, opinionibus maloque more delinitum, mollivimus, etc. We with our shades and other wanton inventions and uses; with our idleness, looseness, long continued laziness, have corrupted our minds, and through the power of false opinions and bad customs have softened and effeminated ourselves into this tenderness: etc. There is certainly, though it seems not perchance so plausible at first, much truth in this opinion. I appeal unto them, (and they are not a few:) that have maintained, that Nature hath sufficiently fenced man (as well as other creatures:) against all excess of either heat or cold; and that clothes seem now necessary, custom to be the cause, not nature. Synesius a learned Philosopher, at first; and afterwards a worthy father of the Church, also; in his de Calvitio, or, commendation of baldness, seems to be of opinion (seriously; though his subject may seem but jocular:) that if men did wear neither hats nor hairs upon their heads, their skulls used to the Sun and to the weather, would in time grow to that hardness, as to become almost impenetrable. To this purpose he first brings a testimony of Herodotus, of the difference of Egyptian and Persic skulls, observed by Herodotus himself by the direction of the natives of the Country; the one being so hard, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, that a stone thrown against them would hardly crack them; the other so brittle, that the least knock would break them; this difference being conceived both by the inhabitants themselves, and by Herodotus, to proceed from this cause, because the one were wont to go bare headed, and shaved from their youths; and the others 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 (to use his own elegant expression:) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, sheltered from the Sun, with hats and other head-attire. This he further confirms by an example of his times, there being then (as Synesius relates it:) in the town, a certain poor bald pate (not by nature, but art:) who did use to go up and down the streets, and to show himself at all ordinary great concurses of people, as at the ordinary razes of the Circus, and the like; so that no man was better known in the whole town. This man with his bare head, would butt with a ram (were he never so stout:) and put him to the worst; suffer tiles to be thrown at his head, and make them fly in pieces: as also endure scalding pitch to be poured upon his head. This, and the like, to show (to the great astonishment of the beholders:) the stoutness and unsensibleness of his head-piece. But it might be so naturally; you may think perchance. No; it was by custom; or rather if you will (which is that Tully would have:) naturally; but no otherwise naturally in him, then in other men that would use the means. For Synesius saith expressly, that himself could for a need have wrought his own head to this, in case he had no other means to subsist by; but therefore gives God thanks, that he needed it not. I say therefore, to return unto Tully, that there is a great deal of truth in that opinion of his. Yet to stretch nature so far, as he doth there, even to them, qui cum ad flammam se applicuerint, sine gemitu aduruntur; who can suffer their bodies to be burnt by degrees, and yet not seem to feel it; (of whom Lucianus in his Peregrinus speaks, as more particularly, so more incredibly; and yet, I think, truly enough:) and the like; I cannot hold that to be according to truth. Neither I think would Tully (as excellent a Philosopher every whit; as he was an excellent Orator:) have affirmed it, but upon such an occasion, having taken upon him in that place, the defence of that unnatural paradox of the Stoics, That no extremity of bodily pain and torments, could hinder or lessen a wise man's happiness in this world; glad therefore of any thing, that had but some colour of truth, though not so solid otherwise. And thus much by the way of Galen and Tully their opinions concerning the power of custom.  
Secondly, that Nature in a general sense is not mutable, that is, cannot exorbitate or go beyond the bounds that were at first set unto it by its author, may appear, first by those laws and orders that God hath set inviolably to some sublunary things▪ as to the Sea, so that it shall not overflow the Earth, job 38.8, etc. and to the World in general concerning the seasons of the year, that they shall never fail, Gen. 8.22. but especially, by those that it hath set to those purer bodies above, which as they are not by nature changeable; so do most firmly and constantly continue in their first office and form. For as for such alterations, that even in them some Astronomers tell us of, till they be better known and agreed upon, we shall not need to take any notice of them; neither indeed are they such alterations, as would cross, but rather confirm, what we shall here say.  
Sol & Lunasuo lustrantes lumine circum  
Perdocuere homines annorum tempora verti;  
Et certaratione gerirem, atque ordine certo: saith old Lucretius. Even they who by reason of the frailty and mutability of sublunary things called this world in scorn, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a mere hotch pot, a mass of confusion, and the like; yet when they looked up, and observed there such glory, such order; such constancy, such immutability; they were driven to acknowledge a rational power and providence over the Whole. And even this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, this mingle mangle, or what ever they will, of sublunary things; had they well viewed it with more rational eyes, than they did; as Pliny well in a place speaking of the gnat (If my memory fail me not,) nusquam natura magis tota, quam in minimis; that the power of Nature was greatest in her lest works; so would they with admiration have said of it, that nusquam potentior natura, quam in maximé fragilibus; or if you will have it in the words of Saint Paul (that ye may know God to be the same God in things natural, as he is in things spiritual, as in truth, there is but one truth both of things spiritual and natural:) that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, that it is the height and perfection of the divine power to show itself most powerful in those things that are most weak.  
Thirdly, it is further to be considered, that where custom makes an alteration, and becomes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, ascititious nature; yet doth it seldom so overcome nature original, but that it hath some force and secret operation in and upon the subject; the less visible, the more powerful; yea the more dangerous; as it proves oftentimes. So through custom a man may bring himself to an habit of intemperance, that it shall not be in his power, nor safe for his body, perchance to return unto sobriety. Yet neither is it at first without danger (it is death unto many to attempt it:) and (if Galen may be credited:) it is a great chance, if at the last (though the inconvenience of it be not presently perceived:) it do not prove some way or other pernicious. What, if some intemperate men attain to 60. or 80? They may thank the strength of their nature for it, which bad custom could no sooner overthrow▪ and had they been sober men, it is more than likely, their life how long soever, might have been longer by 20. years at least. So, a man through continual labour and industry may do much in the pursuit of some art or science; yet if he have not a genius to it, a natural aptitude and disposition, he shall never attain (be his labour never so great:) to any great perfection: whereas less labour in a way more suitable to his nature, might have made him excellent. Hence is that Precept of the Poet, Tu nihil invita, dices faciesque Minerva; that we do nothing invita Minerva, that is, as Tully doth interpret it in his first de Offic. adversante & repugnante natura. I omit many pregnant passages to this purpose of the two great Naturalists, Hipocrates and Galen; which you may read, either in themselves; or, if that will serve your turn, in Huart, his Examen des Ingenios'. They are all for original nature, and without it they think all labour is lost. So saith Seneca too: Inclinandum quò te vis ingenii defert. Malè enim respondent coacta ingenia, reluctante natura irritus labor est. I must confess, I am not altogether of their opinion; neither was Plutarch I am sure; and examples there be (if we were now to argue the case) good store to the contrary. Nevertheless, their admonitions, I acknowledge, are to good purpose, that Parents and Masters should carefully observe the natural inclination of youths, before they design them to any particular profession. This for the most part is the safest way. That's enough, though we say no more.  
Fourthly, beside, in many things, when a man hath done all that art can, and industry; yet cannot he be secure, but that nature Original may return and show herself upon the sudden; and that to his cost, as it may prove. As for example, we read of diverse, that have taken great pains to tame wild beasts, that they might use them as familiarly, as we do commonly those, which are tame by nature. And we read withal of diverse who have found by woeful experience, that forced nature is of those things, which by a wise man may not be trusted. Witness he of whom Marshal speaks, two. 75. 
Verbera securi solitus Leo ferre magistri,  
Insertamque pati blandus in ora manum:  
Dedidicit pacem, subito feritate reversa,  
Quanta nec in Lybicis debuit esse jugis:  and, de spectac. x. 
Laeserat ingrato Leo perfidus ore magistrum,  
Ausus tam notas contemerare manus, etc.  The Poet therefore had some reason, (though it hold not in all things equally:) when he said, 
Naturam expellas furca licet usque recurret,  
Et mala perrumpet furtim fastidia victrix.   
Fifthly, it hath been observed of some free stones, that when they are used in a building if they be laid in that proper posture, which they had naturally in their quarries, they grow very hard and durable against both time and weather; if that be changed, that they consume and moulder away in a short time. Certainly, art may do much, and custom much; but to follow nature (where nature herself hath not degenerated:) is always both the surer, and most commendable. And so I shall conclude this part of the power of custom in things natural, with the words of a Heathen, but such as may become a Christian, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. O nature, from thee are all things, in thee all things subsist, and to thee all tend. What ever it be that fits thee well, fits me likewise, as being part of thee. Nothing that thy seasons bear, is to me, (as either too forward, or too backward,) unseasonable, etc.   

THe ancient Greek Philosophers said, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, This world is but a change; and the Apostle speaking of the World, very elegantly and emphatically calls it, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, rather than 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, intimating thereby, that this World, to speak of it truly and properly, is rather a matter of fashion, then of substance. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 (saith Theophylact upon the place, lately most elegantly printed in London, as the happy first fruits of a greater harvest of Greek Manuscripts to be set out here in England, to the great honour of this Realm, and the no less contentment of all true lovers of learning:) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. He calls it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, or fashion, to teach us, that all the things of this present world, are but objects of the eye only, and serve but for a show, as things merely superficial, without any either stability, or substance in themselves. It is so, if we consider those things, which, both in regard of their form and matter, are merely natural, and it is so if we consider those, which have their existence in, and from the will of man. The body of man is not so mutable, as his will is: nor the persons and outward features of men, so different one from another, as their minds. Nova vita, novos mores postulat, saith the Comic. We have more reason to say, Novus dies, novos mores. And yet that is more than we can truly say of many, who in one day shift themselves often, and are not the men that they were; neither in regard of their mind, nor happily of their fashions. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 (saith excellently Saint Nazianzen to this purpose. Orat. de Spir. Sancto.) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. We are not mixed creatures only, but also contrary; both to others and to our own selves: not continuing truly and entirely the same, not so much as one day, much less our whole lives: but both in regard of our bodies and in regard of our souls (or minds:) perpetually flowing and perpetually changing.  
From this mutability and inconstancy of man's will, we may first deduce Variety of fashions and customs. But secondly, differences of places and times cause difference of fashions and customs; and this of necessity. For it is not possible for many reasons, that men that live under different climates, should all live after one fashion: nor that the inhabitants of one place (the state of things altering often as it doth:) should always live after one sort. Hence are in different places and Kingdoms, at all times; and in the same places and Kingdoms, by certain revolutions of times, sometimes longer, sometimes shorter, different fashions, different customs, different laws. Old fables tell us of one Epimenides, who after a continual sleep of fifty years awaked with amazement, finding a new world, every where (as of men, so of fashions:) since he had seen it last. Let this long sleep go, as well it may, for a fabulous thing: the effects of it, I am sure; (his amazement, I mean) might have been credible enough, though the sleep had been shorter by many years. In some Countries (for all Countries are not equally light and fantastic; and they are happy Countries, that are lest:) if men should but put on those clothes that they left of but four or five years ago, and use those fashions that then were in use, they would seem, even unto themselves, ridiculous; and unto many, little less than monstrous.  
The consideration of this variety affords, as unto the Naturalists, matter of speculation, how even herein nature delights in variety; so unto the Divine, matter of indignation, to see the vanity of mortal men, who for the most part spend themselves wholly, their wits and their lives, upon things so transitory; and spend little or no time at all, upon the only 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, (as both Philosophers and the Scriptures are wont to speak:) God, that is, and his service, and the Knowledge of his Truth; which are the only things that are permanent, and have reality of existence in this World; and therefore commended unto us by Christ, as the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of all our many cares and businesses in this World; the one only thing that is profitable & necessary. But to forbear that which I find already done by diverse Divines, Naturalists, and others fully and sufficiently: I shall here only observe the power and providence of Almighty God, who as he can out of darkness bring forth light, so can turn these wretched effects (in themselves:) of man's frailty and corruption, to be the means, in part, of his happiness. I say therefore, that what in the Heavens, the Sun and the Moon, diverse Stars and Planets are, for the natural division of times, to divide the day from the night, to be for signs and for seasons, and for days, and for years, Gen. i. 14. without which division of times and seasons, there would be no living in this World: so variety of fashions and customs, serve unto man for the Civil or politic distinction of the several times and ages of the World, without which there would be little certain knowledge, and little or no truth amongst men. By variety of customs, I here understand also variety of languages, and dialects, and words, (all which depend of custom as much, if not more than any other thing of the World beside; as elsewhere shall be showed▪) as conducing to the knowledge of the Truth in this World, no less than variety of manners. Now to make this good that I have said, I must first of all suppose, which I think no man will deny, that by books especially we come to the knowledge of Truth. Of truth in general, by books especially; in some peculiar objects of Truth, as in matters of History we have them only to trust to. And in matter of books, the Authors of the books, and the times when the Authors lived, is mainly considerable. For accordingly do we give credit (especially in point of History and truth of religion:) to the Books themselves, more or less, for the most part. In many things, this alone, to know the Author of the book, is enough to decide many controversies. But what if the Title deceive us, and some 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of some idle brain of our age, represent itself unto us upon the stage under the grey hairs of authentic antiquity? Have there not been such impostors at all times, who have attempted (would I could say, they have attempted it only:) to abuse the World with supposititious Titles and Names? What profession so sacred, or so vulgar, that hath not suffered in all ages, by this kind of men? Divines, Lawyers, Physicians, Philosophers, Historians, have in all ages complained of them: and in those ages, when by reason of the ignorance of the times, men have not been able to discover them, what errors and absurdities, both in matter of knowledge and practice, both in the Church and in the Commonwealth, have ensued thereupon, to those that are learned, is not unknown, I am sure; and I may not so far digress at this time, to satisfy the ignorant. Of all noble Impostors in this kind, I will instance but in one. Annius Viterbiensis, a Monk by profession, who lived some two hundred years ago, having attained to more than ordinary knowledge both of the tongues and Histories, applied himself by his knowledge and proficiency, not to help, but to cheat the World. To that end he counterfeited diverse ancient Historians of best note and greatest antiquity, as Berosus, Manetho, Catonis Origines, and the like, which had not been heard of in many ages; and wrote Comments upon them, himself being both Text and Comment, that the World might have the less occasion to suspect his fraud: and passed so current for a long time, that even to this day (though followed and descried by diverse learned men of all nations and professions:) many can scarce persuade themselves, that so many fine Titles and shows, should be but a piece of juggling. Now what shameful errors and mistakes in point of History both Ecclesiastical and Civil, they that have trusted unto him have been led into by this jugglor, any man may imagine, and many have written of it.  
Now the ordinary and surest way generally to find out a counterfeit Author in this kind, is by his style, and by an accurate examination of those particular fashions, and customs that he doth either obiter, (which can hardly be avoided in any book of what subject soever it be:) or purposely speak of, how well they fit and suit to the time and place that is pretended. Take away these two 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, of words and customs, and it will be a hard task for any man to discover and evict the supposititiousnes of any writing. Hence it is, that in the Scriptures both of the Old and New Testament, by God's great providence all things (for the most part:) be so punctually set down with all kind of circumstances at large; which though illiterate men perchance pass over by reason of their ignorance, yet men of learning, to whom the state of the World from the beginning with the several periods, alterations, and revolutions of it (as far as it can be known by ancient books and Records:) is not unknown, receive marvellous satisfaction from them, both for the better confirmation of their faith, and the greater contentment of their minds. For this cause men of judgement, that would gladly make use of their own eyes to see the way that leads unto truth, and not altogether to depend from the ability both and fidelity of others, have taken so much pains about words; as also to be well versed in the rites and customs of all ages and places. Neither can it be denied by men of understanding, but that this way of study hath been, next under God, the chiefest means of this blessed 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, or new birth of learning, which begun not much above a hundred years ago. And I must confess, I have wondered with myself sometimes, that this kind of learning being come to that height or perfection as it is in our days, no man hath yet laboured for the ease of others, to reduce it to some certain Method and rules of art, as it were; as by setting down the proper words and rites of every age and place, whereby they are discernible from another; by the help whereof, even men of ordinary learning might give a good guess at the age of every Author that they have occasion to use, nor be altogether so liable to the impostures or falsaries, as they are. Which certainly is feasable enough, if not to perfection, yet to a good degree of public utility. But on the other side, when I call to mind, that Impostors would be the first that would make use of this art, to make their forgeries the more passable (as certainly they would:) than I think it very happy, that it is not, neither of itself more easy to attain unto, nor made more common by the labour of others, than it is.  
What I have said of the knowledge of old customs and the use thereof, in matter of books, is as true in matter of old writings and evidences of what kind soever. True it is, that nothing should be more sacred and inviolable amongst men, then public instruments, and evidences, whose only end and use, is, to be witnesses unto the truth, and to protect it from her many enemies, as malice, favour, partiality, and the like. Yet how rightly Seneca said, Nihil esse tam sacrum quod sacrilegum non inveniat, may appear even in this particular. For it is well known, that even of old, many evidences have been forged to abuse the World withal: and that sometimes, not by one or two secretly combining, but even by many unanimously conspiring together, against the Truth. For example, I find that about some four hundred years ago, Gregory the ninth being then Pope of Rome, and Saint Edmond, Archbishop of Canterbury, the Monks of Canterbury were convicted to have counterfeited, or adulterated a certain Charter of Thomas of Becket, by which they claimed certain privileges. For which abominable fact and other enormities, that worthy pious Prelate intended great and severe punishments upon the whole Convent. But they having made Otho the Pope's Legate and Edmund's great enemy, their friend, prevailed with the Pope, that the cause might be referred to the said Otho: And in conclusion, but three of the whole Convent were found guilty by Otho. And upon this favourable information, and friendly mediation withal of the Legate, the Pope sent a dispensation unto the Monastery, by which he did acquit them both from present further troubles, and from future deserved infamy for such an infamous Act. Even those three that were found guilty, it was judged they had done it in Spiritu simplicitatis (so runs the Dispensation:) and for this their simplicity, forsooth, they were, not exiled, but confined to certain places to do penance. No wonder if others have made bold in that kind since, if the imputation of simplicity was the worst that would come of it. Simplicitas digna favore fuit, saith one of the old Poets. If we look back unto better and purer ages, we shall not find I am sure that Simplicity, was ever objected unto any as a crime; but in Monckes especially, that once it was thought their chiefest commendation, I find in many Fathers. But since it is as it is, we may thank God, that evidences and old writings as well as other things, have had their proper customs in almost all ages; by the knowledge and consideration whereof the true for the most part, (if the Impostor hath not been very cunning:) may be easily known from the counterfeit. For not to speak here either of the words themselves or form of writing, or manner of orthography, as well considerable in these, as in books; besides these, there are diverse other things, that are observable. There have been times, when Seals have been in use, and times when they were not: when such and such seals, and such and such dates; when such and such subscriptions, and superscriptions; and sundry such particulars; much differing one from another all of them, according to their several times and places. Those therefore take a very good course, who when they have occasion to set out any ancient Records and evidences, keep to their originals in all points, as near as may be, to give the better satisfaction unto the learned: which is the course I see (and am heartily glad to see it:) that Sir Henry Spilman Knight, that learned and painful Antiquary, does take in the publication of the English Synods; which (for the good and honour of our English Church:) he is now about. For in very truth, a very small alteration, is enough sometimes to make a true Record suspected. As for example; That those small Arithmetical figures (which we had from the Maures or Arabs, as they from the Indians:) have not been known or in use amongst us Christians scarce yet four hundred years, hath been observed by men perfectly well versed in the knowledge, both of ancient times and writings. They were much to blame therefore, who setting out some writings of above seven hundred years' antiquity, and professing to follow the Originals very exactly and punctually in all circumstances of writing; made no scruple in lieu of those Roman figures then in use, to put these small ones so lately received, which certainly they found not in those Originals.  
In the same Manuscript, where the Dispensation that I have spoken of concerning the falsary Monks, is registered; I remember to have read a strange Note, (so it seemed unto me:) concerning ancient Charters and evidences, when they first began to be in use in this Country: which Note because it is of great consequence (in case it should prove true:) for the better conviction of many supposititious Charters, pretended to be of great antiquity, I will here set it down as it is there to be seen.  
Sanctus Ethelbertus Rex Angliae qui suscepit Christianitatem a Beato Augustino misso a Beato Gregorio Papa Anno Dom. DXCVI in Ecclesia Christi Cant. dedit eidem August. & successoribus palacium Regium & sedem perpetuam in Civitate Doroberniae, quae nunc dicitur Cant. cum Ecclesia veteri quae ab Antiquo tempore Romanorum ibidem fuerat fabricata, quam ipsemet Augustinus Sancti Salvatoris nomine dedicavit post consecrationem suam Arelatenis factam, Statuit & idem Rex authoritate Sanctae Romanae Ecclesiae, ut in Ecclesia Cantuar. ordinem Monasticum Monachi in perpetuum observarent, ne primorum videlicet praedicatio Monachorum, a memoriâ deleretur, sed semper recens in mentibus succedentium perseveraret. Dedit etiam idem Rex possessiones amplas praedictis fratribus infra Civitatem Cant. & extra. & exinde dicta Dorobernensis Ecclesia, propter primatum, & quia inde primò Christiana Religio emanavit, & Regnum Anglorum illuminavit, sicut Rex ipse tenuit suas terras & consuetudines liberas & quietas in suo dominio, ita Archiepiscopus & Ecclesia praenominata tenuit terras suas & consuetudines suas omnino liberas & quietas in suo dominio, & inconcussé habuit dicta Ecclesia Cantuar. omnimodas libertates & consuetudines suas in possessione pacifica sine interruptione cujusquam ex consuetudine & antiquo more sine cartis vel monumentis Regiis usque ad tempora Whytredi Regis (who died the 23. of April, in the year of our Lord, 725. having reigned 34. years, and six months, according to Beda's calculation:) cujus munumenti tenor talis est.  
This I commit to the further consideration of the learned antiquaries of this land, not willing in a matter of such moment, to interpose my judgement either way; and certain beside, that much may be said, both for it and against it. Only that the matter (to them especially that know nothing but what is now done:) may not appear altogether incredible, I shall put the reader in mind of a passage of Ingulphus, who speaking of the times of William the Conqueror hath this observation. Conferebantur etiam primò multa praedia nudo verbo absque scripto, vel chartâ, tantum cum Domini gladio, vel galeâ, vel cornu, vel cratera. & plurima tenementa cum calcari, cum strigili, cum arcu; & nonnulla cum sagitta. Sed haec initio Regni sui: posterioribus annis immutatus est iste modus.  
So much of the good that comes unto the World, from this variety of fashions and customs; the wretched effects, in themselves, and the means withal, (in this age especially:) of man's vanity and misery. We have touched upon it, rather than treated of it. For indeed to speak of it fully, it would require a large Treatise by itself. But whatsoever the use of this kind of knowledge be, I think there is not (I speak it for the further encouragement of them that will take pains in this kind:) any kind of knowledge that can afford more content and pleasure to an ingenuous mind. For since that the several ages of the World differ little one from another, but by those outward marks and recognizances of different rites and customs: He that knows certainly (as it may be known by a practised Scholar in this kind of learning:) what hath been the particular estate, if not of all (since there are not books extant of all:) yet of most ages of the World, wherein they differed one from another, and wherein they agreed; what peculiar, and what common to every one; he doth as it were enjoy the memory, of so many years, and so many ages past, even as if he himself had lived all those years, and outlasted all those ages. Hence it is, that Antiquaries are so taken with the sight of old things; not as doting (as I take it:) upon the bare either form or matter (though both oftentimes be very notable in old things:) but because those visible superviving evidences of antiquity represent unto their minds former times, with as strong an impression, as if they were actually present, and in sight as it were: even as old men look gladly upon those things, that they were wont to see, or have been otherwise used unto in their younger years, as enjoying those years again in some sort, in those visible and palpable remembrances. As for those men that have not this knowledge, though they be told that such things be ancient, yet for want of that knowledge and judgement, which might satisfy them, that they are so in very deed; and because happily, they know little or nothing of former ages, the present representation whereof, occasioned by those ancient evidences might affect their minds; it is no wonder if the sight of such things, be unto them as either pleasing colours to the blind, or sweet Music to the deaf.  
And now having done with the good Uses of this Variety through God's great mercy; we are to consider the bad use of it, (which I fear is more general:) through corrupt man his wickedness partly, and partly his ignorance. That in things of themselves indifferent, as in matter of eating and drinking; of clothing, of civil compliments, and the like, there should be Variety of fashions and customs in the World, according to differences of either places or times; can be neither occasion of wonder, nor offence unto any, that is not a great stranger unto the World; or rather indeed, unto reason and common sense itself. But in matters of right and wrong; of that which is just, or unjust, lawful, and unlawful; that there should be so much difference among nations (all consisting of men reasonable by nature:) not them only that are of different Religions, but even them that profess but one Truth; yea, in the same nation, at several times; is that which gives occasion both of wonder and of offence unto many; of error and wickedness unto more; and hath wrought so far upon some, as to make them peremptorily to affirm, that there is not any real difference in nature between right and wrong, but only in the opinions of men, grounded chiefly upon custom. cum bonum & malum natura judicetur, & ea sint principia naturae; certè honesta quoque & turpia simili ratione dijudicanda, & ad naturam referenda sunt. Sed perturbat nos opinionum varietas, hominumque dissensio; & quia non idem contingit in sensibus, hos naturâ certos putamus: illa quae alii sic, aliis secus, nec isdem semper uno modo videntur, ficta esse dicimus. So learned and judicious Tully of the vulgar opinions and judgements of his days: and had he lived in ours, it is very probable he would have said as much of ours. Instances to this purpose taken from ancient times concerning the variety of men's judgements in point of right and wrong, we have many in ancient Authors who either of purpose upon this very occasion; or upon some other occasion, and to another end, have treated of the different Laws, and customs of several nations. See Plato in his Politico, or Minoe. Bardesanes, in Euseb. de Praepar. Evangel. lib. vi. 10. Sextus Empiricus, Pyrr. hypot. Nicolaus de Mor. gentium, in Stobaeus; not to mention any more. Certainly should we take all nations of the World (such as have been accounted moralised and civilised nations, I mean; the wild and barbarous being laid aside:) into consideration, we may generally conclude, that there is scarce any virtue so much in request in one place, but will be found to be a vice in another; scarce any vice so much abhorred at one time in one place, but at another time hath been thought in the same place if not a virtue, yet no unlawful thing. Those Authors that I have but now mentioned, shall be my warrant for what I have said, if any will not take it upon my credit. But in point of right and wrong, we need not to go so far, to fetch our instances; nearer times and places unto ourselves, and such as we in many respects are better acquainted with, will afford us sufficient instances. The Civil Law of the Romans, if any Law, might be thought to be grounded upon reason, both in regard of the Authors of it, men of great worth and fame for their learning; and of the credit that it hath found with most nations in Europe, even to this day. That law thought it good reason to give absolute power unto fathers upon their children, power even of life and death, as long as they lived, except by volutary emancipation, or otherwise they had made them free. Children that dispose of themselves in marriage without the consent of their parents, are not by that law, lawfully married, and are liable to great punishments. Neither of these is now any where thought either Law or reason; though Bodinus I know, in his Politics is very eager for the one; and Espenseus a learned Sorbonist, hath written a learned discourse concerning the latter, whereby he doth endeavour to prove, that it is not only against Laws, but even contra aequitatem naturalem, that liberi invitis parentibus, should contrahere matrimonia, sub quorum authoritate, saith he, & in quorum potestate, Natura, Scriptura, Deus, & homines, liberos esse voluerunt. cap. 8. Which I take the rather notice of, because he lays the blame of all this, that it is not so every where as he would have it, upon vim consuetudinis expressly, the power and tyranny of custom: which he treats of in the thirteenth chapter. And to the same power of custom it seems it must be imputed, that some Nations by their laws and customs, have been so favourable to stealers of young heirs, to dispose of them in marriage at their own will, against the will of the parents or guardians (of which kind of men you may read at large, Decr. par. two. Causa. 36.) contrary to the practice of other nations, and to the dictates of reason, and a man would think, of common sense itself.  
By the Roman Laws (at lest in Trajan's time:) the Father, if a son died without Issue, and intestate (but however, he was to have legitimam portionem:) was to inherit, he alone; sine diminutione, ne socium haberet haereditatis, qui non haberet luctus, saith Pliny in his Panegyric; which was thought a good reason. For although according to the course of nature, & votum parentum, it be more proper to children to inherit of their Fathers, than otherwise, yet turbato ordine mortalitatis, as the Civilians speak, when nature herself doth alter her course, and takes the child away before the Father, Curio posteris amplior honor quam majoribus haberetur? curve retrò quoque non recurreret aequitas eadem? saith Pliny; who therefore doth highly extol Trajan for a Constitution of his to that purpose. And Aristotle upon the same grounds of Nature, goes yet further, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. That it is not lawful (in point of right and reason grounded upon nature:) for any son upon any terms, to disinherit (abdicare, is more; but includes, disinheriting:) his Father, though a Father have power to disinherit his son, Arist. Eth. Nicom. lib. viii. cap: ult. Yet in some Countries, though the Son die never so wealthy, and the Father survive never so poor and decayed, the Uncle shall inherit before the Father, by reason of a certain Maxim in Law, that Haereditas descendit, non ascendit, inheritance doth descend and not ascend, not in the right line that is; but in the collateral it may; else the Uncle also were excluded. Yet is the Father granted to be nearer of blood: but nevertheless eo nomine because he is Father, he is conceived uncapable. On the other side, that inheritance which they call jure representationis, whereby the Issue of the Eldest son, doth inherit before the next in blood, to wit the younger son, is Legal by the Civil Law, and approved by the practice of most Country's. Yet till within these few years, it was otherwise in France generally for many ages together, amongst all sorts of persons, both great and small.  
But instances in this kind of the difference of judgements and opinions in point of right and wrong, are so many and so obvious to any man that shall but confer together the Laws of several Countries now in force in the principal places of Europe, that one or two are as good as a hundred, and a hundred, if need were, as easy to be found as one or two. And though some Countries are more constant in their Laws and customs, than some other are; yet I know none that hath been so constant, where diverse things may not be observed, once forbidden and punishable, some; now, legal and lawful: others, now prohibited, which in former times were lawful: in a word, no Nation or Country (neither Medes, nor Persians excepted:) where cancelling, reversing, and repealing of Laws, and enacting of others much different, if not contrary, in their place and stead, hath not been usual. I speak not this of such alterations only, as have necessarily proceeded from alterations of times and circumstances: of which Durantus in his Speculo juris, well and pertinently, Nam secundùm varietatem temporum jura variantur humana, Et nihil pene in semetipso manet, sed currit Natura, multas evolvens mutationes, quas neque praevidere facile est, neque praedicere. Therefore, dicunt quidam (saith the addition there:) quod scientia juris Canonici vel Civilis non est propriè scientia, etc. Such alterations, I know, may happen many, much different one from another, though grounded all upon the same reason. But I speak it of such especially, as proceed from variety of opinions and judgements, in matter of right and wrong.  
Now the power of custom in all these changes, alterations, differences according to variety both of times and places, is twofold.  
First in that most of these differences and alterations have their beginning from custom, which by continuance doth not only get the strength of Law, and goes for Law in all places; but also commonly begets Laws, properly so called. For that is the original of most Laws in most places. And it was both a witty and a true speech of him that first (as I find in Suidas and others:) defined custom to be nothing else, but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, an unwritten Law; as on the other side Law to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a written custom: showing thereby the difference between Law, properly so called; and custom; very well; though it will not hold in all. And those Laws that are thus grounded upon custom, are thought by many as the most acceptable, so the most natural and obligatory Laws that are: as being not the invention of any one single man, but of long Time and experience. Dio Chrysostomus is very rhetorical upon this subject, and more rhetorical than sound sometimes; as when he saith, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, that it is more proper for men that are free, to be governed by custom; as for men that serve, by Laws: whereas indeed true liberty doth consist in this, to be subject unto reason, whether commanded unto us by Laws, or recommended by custom. But certainly it is no new thing for any Kingdom to be governed by custom: and of the two it may generally be said, that customs were, before written Laws, if not in all, yet in most Kingdoms. Which I observe the rather, because some learned men I see, are of opinion that jus consuetudinarium, and consuetudo in point of Law, are phrases of latter ages only; and particularly in England, not known or used till after the conquest of the Normans. But certainly jus consuetudinarium, whether we look upon the word or thing, is of greater antiquity than so. In all Greek Authors, as many as I remember, that write of Laws, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Laws and customs go still together. In the Civil Law you shall read, not only de longa consuetudine, as part of the Law in general; but also the consuetudinibus municipiorum, of particular customs of places, to be kept and observed as Law. But when the word consuetudo came first, either more particularly to be taken pro servitio feudali (which the Civilians call servitutes praediorum:) for a certain right that a Lord may challenge, and a Tenant is bound unto by custom; Or yet more generally, for any Ius or due of what kind soever, that a man hath right unto by custom, I am not able to say certainly. For though this use of the word became most frequent and ordinary since the times of William the Conqueror, yet I find in some ancienter Charters jura & consuetudines in this very sense: as in a Charter of Knutt, de Portu Sandwici, in these words, Nullusque omnino habet aliquam consuetudinem in dicto portu, etc. And among the Laws of King Edmund, confirmed by William the Conqueror, the title of one is, De Baronibus, qui suas habent curias & consuetudines. But whether the title be as ancient, as the Law itself, may perchance be doubted. I am the more inclinable to conceive the Latin consuetudo in this sense, to be of longer standing then so, (than the times of the Conqueror, I mean or there about:) because I am sure the Greek 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, is; as may appear by the Greek Laws and Constitutions: as for example, where 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the customs are taken and used for certain fees (called also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉:) due and payable at the Consecration, or, Inthronization of every Bishop, Archbishop, etc. So Constitut. Novel. justin. Coll. ix. tit. vi. Nou. 123. c. 3. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. These fees (or customs) only we allow as lawful to be paid by every Bishop, etc. and so often in that one Chapter. And since we are treating of custom, and have said somewhat of the Latin word consuetudo, I think it will not be amiss to examine the original of our adopted English custom. The Latin consto hath two significations; to coast, and to continue. From consto, to coast, n being changed into u, is the french couster of the same signification; from consto, to continue, it may be that the french coustume might be derived; coustume, being in very truth nothing else but a continued, or constant use and fashion, whatever be the particular object of it. But I think it more probable, that it came from couster, to coast; and that coustume at first was properly taken for vectigal, tribute, tolle, or impost money. Now because matters of this nature, as tributes and imposts, are matters which concern all men generally to take notice of, and such as go by custom too, (In omnibus vectigalibus ferè consuetudo spectari solet, idque principalibus constitutionibus cavetur. D. 39 tit. 4. l. 4. f. 2.) for the most part; it can be no wonder if custom from that more proper signification, came afterwards to signify consuetudo or coustume as we now used it in common speech. So the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in Hebrew, which signifies a measure, commonly; and sometimes tribute; is by the Rabbins at this day (as it was by the ancient Hebrews, for aught we know, though we have no examples of it in the Scriptures;) commonly used for mores, or consuetudo. And that of this Hebrew middah, not only the Latin modius, for a certain measure, but also modus used for fashion, or custom, in general is derived, is out of all question. And therefore Aristotle, where he treats de jure naturali & positivo, (Ethic. l. v. c. 7.) that right, or Law, which he calls, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, that is, that hath no ground in nature, but wholly depends of men's customs and ordinances, according to the variety both of times and places; he very appositely compares 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to measures; 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 (saith he:) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. And since Grammarians cannot agree about the derivation of the word mos, some deriving it from meo, some from modus, some from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and some from the Hebrew 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, I know no reason why I may not more probably maintain that mos (the rather, because it is a monasyllable:) is the pure Hebrew 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 mas, which signifies tribute. But to return to our English word again; this is observable of it, that when it is taken for impost or tolle, it is expressed in Latin not by consuetudo, but custuma properly: as for example, Registri, p. 259. in a Brief concerning foreign Merchants: where nevertheless I must acknowledge, that I do not understand the difference between Telonium, which the marginal note saith they are free from; and custuma which the Brief itself charges upon them. For otherwise I should have thought that telonium and custuma had been all one; but telonium the more common: And this the rather, because I find in the Laws of Scotland (where the word custuma is more frequent:) telonium and custumam, for the same thing. And thus much concerning the words both English and Latin; though much; yet not too much, I hope, in a Discourse concerning Custom.  
Secondly, whatever be the beginning or occasion of these several changes, alterations and differences, whether custom or any thing else; yet herein appears the power of custom, to be no less strange and marvellous, in that in process of time it makes all these differences and alterations, though never so contrary, to appear in the eyes of men, not only justifiable, but even best, so that all men of all Countries do generally like their own Laws and customs, when once they have been used unto them, best of any other▪ and are ready, if need be, with great confidence and eagerness, to maintain them to be so against any gainsayers. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 (saith Agathias the Historian to this purpose:) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. This is apparently common to all the nations of the earth, that what law or custom soever they have been long used unto, they prefer before any other, and deem them very excellent. Which made Herodotus, that ancient Historian, to blame Cambyses King of Persia, very much, not as uncivil only, but even as a mad man, in that he so freely and tartly derided the customs and fashions, whether Civil or sacred of other Countries, which were dear unto them, and in their judgement very plausible. And why any man or nation should arrogate so much unto themselves, as to condemn and deride so freely and peremptorily whatsoever was contrary to their own customs, eo nomine, because contrary to their own, though practised and approved by other men and Nations, by nature equally reasonable; Herodotus, it seems, saw no reason. Now that men generally think best of their own fashions and customs, be they never so contrary, Herodotus doth show, by relating a trial that Darius made of it, to satisfy himself, which was this: The Indians, those that were properly called Calatians, had a custom to eat their Parents and friends after their deaths; whereas the Grecians did use to burn them: both these being equally contrary to the Persians; who of the two probably, would soon have been persuaded to eat their dead, then to burn them, which could not be without profaning that which they accounted most holy, to wit, fire. Darius therefore, first sends for some Grecians, and asked them by themselves what they would take (and he was well able to give it, though they had asked many thousands,) to eat their Parents when they should be dead. They answered, they would not do it for the wealth of the World. Then he sent for those Indians, and proposed unto them likewise upon what term they would be content to burn theirs. The very moving whereof offended them so much, and seemed so prodigious, that in stead of an answer, they humbly besought, he would forbear such horrible speeches unto them: and so were dismissed. So true is that of Pindarus (adds Herodotus:) that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, that is, custom, is an Universal Monarch, or King of all.  
This of Herodotus, puts me in mind of a strange custom once practised, and in great request among the great ones of Europe; which was this: If a Prince died out of his Country, they would chop his body in several pieces, and boil them in a kettle or some such vessel till all the flesh came from the bones; and so send his bare bones to be buried in his own Country. Bonifacius the eight, speaking of it, calls it, detestandae feritatis abusum, morem horribilem, Deo abominabilem, hominibus abhorrendum, immanem, impium, crudelem, etc. and if it were so indeed, a man might wonder how Princes and Great men of that age came to be so far in love with it, as to take order before hand (as we read of diverse; and particularly of one of our Edward's, King of England, in Froissard:) in their life time, that they might be so used after their death: but that the same Bonifacius tells us plainly, that it was, vitio consuetudinis, that they were bewitched to that mind and opinion of theirs. And not to go from this very subject of the dead, who would not wonder, that Ancient Heathens, having forborn (and detested, I may say of many of them:) the ripping of humane dead bodies as inhuman, cruel, and barbarous; (which is the reason that neither Hypocrates, Aristotle, nor Galen, though great, yea incomparable naturalists otherwise, never saw, as many learned men are of opinion, any dead bodies dissected:) that now in our days the same thing amongst us Christians is ordinarily practised, and is neither matter of wonder nor of scandal unto any; though sometimes it be done in a most unbeseeming manner, and all manner of persons admitted unto it, without respect at all of that Divine fabric, which Saint chrysostom, as I remember, saith in one place is much reverenced by the Angels of heaven themselves, in honour to Christ's body, and his blessed Incarnation.  
The power of custom then by these and the like instances, as in things natural, so in Civil also, being granted to be very great; the next thing that we are to consider, is, Whether we shall grant it such power, as that it can make, if not all things, yet any thing at any time, which is right in reason or by nature, to become wrong, actually in point of practice; and on the other side, that which reason and nature of themselves are against, to become if not laudable, yet allowable, and justifiable sometimes: that is in effect, whether right and wrong are by nature truly, and so absolutely immutable and invariable; or otherwise. To this we answer;  
First, That as there is nothing truly natural, that is not in some sort rational (if not as capable of reason, yet as the effect of reason, in summo gradu; that is, God; and so rational▪) So there is nothing truly rational, that is not as truly natural, both in regard of God, the eternal and infinite cause of all things; and in regard of men, whom God by nature hath made rational. Whatsoever therefore is grounded upon reason, is truly and absolutely natural. And so is the moral Law, which treats of humane virtues, and vices: and therefore altogether and indubitably natural.  
These words nature and natural, are most shamefully mistaken and confounded by some Christians that have treated of this subject, to wit, concerning virtues and vices natural; which have made them to fall into detestable opinions, even such as Civil Heathens themselves would have abhorred in other heathens. To instance in one; Pontus Hunterus of Delfe in Flanders, in his de libera hominis nativitate, seu liberis natalibus, cap. 2.3.4. hath these words; Illud verò liberum populis omnibus (exceptis Christianis:) leges cum Naturâ reliquere, uxores è sanguine junctis acciperent. Nam haec quoque res, Legis est, non naturae: ac qui haec septa transiliunt, non in naturam, sed contra leges peccant. Nullum enim naturae à rerum Creatore datum est, ad animalium generationem impedimentum, modo diversi inter se sexus, sanis corporibus conveniant. Non illa Matrem (horresco referens:) nec Sororem; sed pudor, verecundia, ac honestas, legibus ornatae, rejiciunt: sanguinem non horret, etc. This man, as appears by what follows, takes nature here, and so in all this his Discourse, for Natura vegetativa, and natura sensitiva only; as though there were no such thing in rerum natura as natura rationalis. His rule therefore how we may know things that are contra naturam, is by the present manifest inconvenience, that ensues to our natural healths or lives, by those things. So that by him if a man cut his father's throat, or rip his own mother, as Nero did, and sleep not a whit the worse, nor have the worse stomach to his meat for it, he doth not crimen contra naturam committere. And this is that Natura, which in another place he calls them prudentes that obey, notwithstanding any laws to the contrary. I must confess he is not the first that hath taken nature in this sense. For by those words Lex naturae, some understand in a strict sense, that law properly which is common unto rational and irrational creatures; that is, unto men and beasts. In this sense they say, that Proprium bonum appetere; Vim vi repellere, and the like, is de lege naturae. But it is one thing to speak of the law of nature, as it is common (though in this sense the word Law, is not so proper neither:) to all natural creatures; and another thing to dispute of that Law, which is natural unto man properly, who by nature is rational. Just so some Heathen Nations of old, as Herodotus relates, thought they might lie together in their temples, because they saw that birds, and other dumb creatures, that were kept in them for sacrifices, did it freely; whence they inferred that it was not unnatural, and therefore not displeasing to their Gods; and the reason of this their inference, Herodotus gives, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 (saith he:) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, because they presumed that men and brute beasts, are all of one and the same nature▪ which he for his part thought very absurd. And certainly what Saint jude speaks of some, we may conclude of all men generally, that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, If men though rational by nature, will confine themselves to that natural knowledge, which is common to unreasonable creatures as well as to reasonable, they must needs lead a brutish life. I hope I may say without offence, that the ancient Stoics were far better Christians then so, who maintaining that man's happiness did consist, in a life according to Nature, have written so many accurate tracts and discourses, to prove that all virtues (and among them pudor, verecundia, honestas; which this Hunterus doth most falsely oppose unto Nature:) are natural unto man. They that desire further satisfaction in this point, let them read Saint chrysostom, who in diverse places of his works, but especially in his Homilies add pop. Antioch. handles it at large, proving by many reasons, arguments and pregnant instances, that the knowledge of the Moral Law, or, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, is by nature.  
Secondly, Whatsoever cometh within the compass of reason, properly; belonging as properly to the law of nature; it must needs follow, that the law of nature extends of itself very far; though men through the natural, or rather (to speak more properly and phylosophically:) unnatural corruption of their understanding, apprehend it not in its full extent. Now whatsoever falls within the compass either of reason, or of the law of nature, is of itself immutable.  
Naturalia jura— semper firma, & immutabilia permanent; So saith the Civil Rom. Law; and so all writers generally; Aristotle only excepted, who in a place seems to say the contrary; to wit, that Some natural laws are mutable. His words are, Some because they see 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, laws and judgements concerning that which is just and right, so different and so variable; are of opinion that nothing is right or just in nature, but by opinion only. But this is not generally true, saith he; but in part it is. For however among the Gods it may very well be, that that which is naturally just and right, is altogether invariable: yet among us men, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Some part of that law which is by nature, is naturally mutable: and some part of it, is not. Where first it is to be observed, that Aristotle doth distinguish between jura naturalia, as not being all (in regard of men:) of one nature. And so far we follow Aristotle. For it is well observed by Thomas Aquinas, that there are some jura naturalia, which may be called fundamentalia, or principalia; because evident of themselves unto humane reason. Others as it were secundaria, because not so apparent unto man, but elicible, or demonstrable from those fundamentals by humane ratiocination. The former I suppose are they that Aristotle would have immutable, but the latter not so. Some interpret Aristotle, as though he had meant no more than this, that de facto some jura naturalia are changed or violated among men; though the jure, or naturâ suâ, immutable; because of those words of his, though happily in regard of the Gods themselves immutable. But that this could not be his meaning, may appear, first, because he saith, some only are mutable, not all. Whereas there be no jura fundamentalia, but de facto are violated, not only by particular men, but also by whole nations, as may easily appear to them, that shall peruse the Authors whom we have before mentioned. Secondly, by that instance that he brings of things natural, wherein Nature itself, seems to be unconstant unto herself. The right hand, saith he, is by nature the strongest, and so it is in most men; yet in some it is not so. But more of his meaning, by and by.  
Thirdly, Natural reason being granted, by the fall of man, much impaired and vitiated, it is no wonder if all men reasonable by nature, do not now agree upon the jura naturalia; and it ought to be sufficient unto any reasonable man, to satisfy him, that those jura that are so called, are truly naturalia, that most men and nations (though not all:) that are civilised both by their practice, and their opinions, determine them to be so.  
As for example, Some nations (civilised in other things it cannot be denied:) allowed of theft, some of adultery, or fornication; some made no scruple of incest; what then? Most other nations have condemned them for it; and abstained from these themselves, as being against Nature. That is enough to show that they were things against nature indeed; and enough to make any man inexcusable in the eyes of God, that makes any question of it. The extravagancy of some men, upon this subject, makes me the more earnest herein. For whereas in reason, what is allowed by the most, should be ascribed unto nature; and that which by some is practised to the contrary, to the corruption of nature partly; (which Musonius the Stoic, in Stobaeus calls, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉:) and partly to the power of long custom (tanta est corruptela malae consuetudinis ut ab eâ tanquam igniculi extinguantur à naturâ dati, exorianturque & confirmentur contraria vitia, as Tully very well in a place:) Some go a quite contrary course. What they find practised by some, they take to be natural; and the contrary, though there be a major part for it, they ascribe unto the power of custom. Incest is a thing that true nature doth abhor as much as any thing; and as many good reasons, I dare undertake, may be given to prove the unnaturalness of it, as for any thing that is generally acknowledged most unnatural. And if we may believe some ancient Heathens, men of no small authority in the world, as Aristotle and others, even among the brutes, some of the more generous abhor it naturally. Yet an outlandish writer of Essays in his long discourse of custom would persuade us that all difference and scrupulusnes in this kind proceeds rather from custom, than nature; bringing this among many other particulars, as an argument of the power of custom among men. Many ancient Heathen Philosophers, I must needs say, showed themselves far wiser men, who though they had no certain knowledge (as they could not without revelation:) of the fall of man; yet from this very thing, because they saw many men every where, yea some whole nations, make no conscience at all of some things which they saw by the eye of reason were certainly against nature, concluded that of certainty, the natural reason and understanding of man, had had a fall; though how or when, they could not tell. Many pregnant passages out of Plato, Plutarch, Hierocles, Plotinus, Proclus, and others might be produced here to that purpose, if need were, and had not already upon other occasions been observed and treated of, (all, or most of them:) by others: And all of them agree in this, that in man himself is the cause of this his fall, or blindness of his understanding, not in him that made him. Even he that erreth (in matter of life and practice:) against his will, is impious, in that he disagreeth from the nature of the Universe, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. For Nature had furnished him at first with certain instincts, prenotions and opportunities, by the help whereof he might have attained to the knowledge of truth: which having neglected, hence it is that he is now not able to discern that which is false from that which is true: saith another, (a Heathen too:) not inferior to any of those, whom I have named.  
Fourthly, As in things natural, some things to serve the nature of the universe, forget and forgo sometimes their own particular nature; and are never more natural in a general sense, then when they are so unnatural unto themselves, particularly; (so the water to prevent a vacuum, which nature abhorreth, ascends; and the like▪) So must we conceive in things Civil, a subordination jurium naturalium; and of reason unto reason.  
It is not against reason then, that some things which considered in themselves are against reason, should in a higher and more general consideration, prove warrantable by reason. Even by our laws, some things, (say our Lawyers:) may be done warrantably for a public good, though contrary to the Laws otherwise. Legally therefore in regard of the Laws, and their general end, though illegally, because against the express tenor of some particular law. So the Civil Law too, tells us of a certain Ius singular, quod contra tenoris rationem introductum est; and allows of it. It were neither; neither Ius, nor allowable by law, if it were against all reason; though it be granted against some. I am persuaded, this is it, and nothing else, that made Aristotle say, (as we have noted before:) that quaedam jura naturalia, were mutabilia: but his terms are dangerous, and therefore to be avoided. It is one of the fundamental principles of all Commonwealths, Salus populi; suprema lex esto. How far a man may go pro salute populi, contra tenorem rationis, is disputed at large, by them that have written de juribus Dominationis, whether Monarchicae, Aristocraticae, or Democraticae. Some are too nice; and some go too far; but there is no question, but somewhat there is, that may be done in this kind; both by the Laws of God and of men, allowable; and warrantable by sound reason. Now custom being a thing of great force in a body politic, as well as in a body natural, and of much importance every way, either to the peace or disturbance of any Commonwealth; if any thing may be done at any time rationally, contra tenorem rationis; it is in point of custom especially. Therefore Thomas Aquinas, where he undertakes to prove (which he doth very learnedly and solidly,) that lex and ratio are all one; yet when he comes to the point of custom, he is put to a fortè, not knowing well how to determine it; Si autem adhuc maneat ratio, eadem, saith he, propter quam prima lex inutilis erat, non consuetudo legem, sed lex consuetudinem vincit. Nisi fortè propter hoc solum inutilis lex videatur, quoniam non est possibilis secundum consuetudinem patriae, quae erat una de conditionibus legis. Difficile est enim consuetudinem multitudinis removere. Of many customs therefore we may boldly say, that the unseasonable altering of them is against reason; though considered in themselves they be granted to be not reasonable. And herein is most true, and appliable that Greek sentence, or rather Oracle, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; not easily to attempt the stirring of those things, which cannot be stirred without much stirring; and as much hazard, as stirring. The reason is given by Augustus in Dio, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Those things saith he, that long continue in one and the same state, are to be preferred before those that are ever upon changing, though it be for the best in all likelihood. We see that most things enjoy their happiness in their rest; but above all things, it must needs be more proper unto estates (so called from their stability:) to be happy in their settled consistence and permanency; as being liker unto stages and pageants, than states truly, when always moving and changing. And beside, not only the happy being of an estate, but the very being of it doth depend of its stability, in this kind. For rebus novis studere, hath always been both the mark and the refuge of ill affected malcontents, who have no other hopes to raise their ruined fortunes, but by the ruins of the present estate that they live in. Alcybiades therefore in Thucydides vi. said well, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; That their government is safest, to the Commonwealth, that apply themselves as much as they can to the present Laws and customs, though they be not altogether so good of themselves. In this sense must Saint Gregory the Pope his words be understood, where he seems to ascribe unto custom a power to make things that are bad in themselves to become just and legal. His words are; Si pravae rei aditus antequam diu patescat, non clauditur, usu fit latior; & erit consuetudine licitum, quod ratione constat esse prohibitum. Greg. Reg. Epist. l. seven. Ind. two. ep. 120.  
Another consideration that should make me the more averse from altering old customs is, because the reason of some, though grounded at first upon some weighty consideration, cannot equally appear at all times, those inconveniences happily, which in former ages gave occasion to such and such customs being now removed, and perchance forgotten. Therefore saith the Civil Law, Non omnium quae à majoribus constituta sunt, ratio reddi potest; Et ideo rationes eorum, etc. I remember what answer some Turks made, as it is reported by Busbequius in his Epistles, being asked the reason of a certain custom of theirs, which seemed very senseless; to wit, That their forefathers had done it of old; and as they believed, not without reason; though now not known unto them as they ingenuously confessed. I will not commend this for a good answer to all things; God forbid: In some things I think it may hold very well. If a Turk (to instance in some particular:) should ask a Christian, why when any doth snize in our presences (as it is practised in most places of Europe:) we pray to God to bless them, or to that purpose; well might he answer, that our Christian forefathers have done it of old, and that long before them their Gentle forefathers had used it; but the reason, how, and why it first began, neither Christians nor Gentiles can certainly tell us, though diverse both Gentiles of old, (as Aristotle &c.) and Christians since have written of it, and have done their utmost to find it out. And now that it hath been so long practised in the World, I should, I must confess, be one of them that should make conscience to take it away, though I must acknowledge with the rest, that the reason, or beginning, is unknown unto me. If therefore the reason of many Laws and customs though very good and warrantable, and perchance necessary, be such nevertheless that cannot be found out but by time and experience; It cannot be safe to resolve upon the alteration of any long continued Law or custom, though we can give no reason for it, but after long and mature deliberation.  
For these several respects, it cannot be thought amiss or unreasonable, that all Laws and customs should by them, that are subject unto them, generally be maintained (in a civil respect, at least:) to be just and reasonable. And truly, whatever may be alleged against them considered in themselves, yet in this respect they may be just and reasonable, if they be not partial, but extend indifferently unto all, that is, just in the execution, or application; though not in their nature. But beside, if it be not fit to say unto a King, (be he never so bad a King:) thou art wicked; and to Princes, ye are ungodly, job 34.18. Why should not so much respect be due to any Law or custom from them, (as I said before:) that are subject unto them, who owe their peace and safety (next unto God and the King:) to their protection, as that it should not be lawful for them to vilify them, and openly to declaim against them? Cicero saith well, Vt ex medicinâ nihil oportet putare proficisci, nisi quod ad corporis utilitatem spectat; sic a Legibus nihil convenit arbitrari, nisi quod Reipubls. conducat (and that is as much as if he had said, nisi quod justum est, and there is the same reason for both:) proficisci. However it may not be doubted by any man that is wise, that there be many Laws and customs in all countries, which though they be well tolerated and continued for the peace and safety of the public, yet cannot be practised by particular men, (as far forth as they may avoid it:) with a good conscience, and without great peril to their souls; as being of themselves most unreasonable. And therefore the same Tully, who before did teach us, how we may judge and speak of Laws civilly; elsewhere instructing how to judge, according to truth, saith very solidly, Stultissimum est, existimare omnia justa esse, quae sita sunt in populorum institutis aut legibus: to believe that every Law or custom, that is in force and rigidly stood upon in every country, is therefore just and good, is absolutely to believe with the Epicureans and the like, (whom we have before spoken of:) that reason, and justice, is not a matter of truth and reality, but of mere opinion and conceit. And it must needs follow, quod si populorum jussis, si principum decretis, si sententiis judicum jura constituerentur, jus esset latrocinari, jus adulterare, jus testamenta falsa supponere, etc. as the same Author very well in another place of the same book. These commendations therefore, that ordinary Lawyers of every country give usually to their own proper laws and customs, must cautelously be understood; or else they are very dangerous. Though some of them speak plainly enough sometime; as that incomparable Lawyer and Philologist Cujacius, of the customs of France, though refined and reform again and again; diverse whereof he doth acknowledge to be grounded upon the errors of former Lawyers, though pretended to be right and just of themselves. To which purpose also I understand (with submission to himself, and his interpretation:) the Cujacius of this Island, in his Notes upon Fortescu, that the diverse opinions of Interpreters proceeding from the weakness of man's reason and the several conveniences of diverse States, have made those limitations which the Law of nature hath suffered, very different. And hence it is, etc. Sure I am, that long before either of them, Tertullian taught us, that the ground of many customs, is either ignorance or simplicity. His words are; consuetudo initium ab aliquâ ignorantiâ vel simplicitate sortita, in usum per successionem corroboratur, de virgin. vel. c. i. He might have added (which is added by others:) another ground of many Laws and customs, which is, wilful injustice, and want of a good conscience, the rarest thing of the world, though nothing be more commonly pretended. It doth therefore much concern every particular man, (them especially that take upon them to be men of judgement and understanding:) as not to control the received Laws and customs of their countries, the alteration whereof belongeth not unto them: So to understand as near as they may, what Laws and customs are absolutely good and warrantable in themselves; and which are tolerated and maintained only for the peace and concord of the Commonwealth. Here therefore is a main difference to be made, between those things that the Law doth command, and doth oblige us unto; and those things, which if we do, the Law doth allow, but not command: between those things that we do as good subjects unto the King and his Laws; and those that we do of our own inclination, taking the advantage of the Law. What Christ once said unto his Disciples, If your righteousness exceed not the righteousness of the Scribes and pharisees, (the strictest men for their old laws and customs that ever were:) you shall never enter into the Kingdom of Heaven; is in this sense appliable unto all men; Such a Legal life, will never bring them unto Heaven. Therefore the Canonists teach us that consuetudo may liberare à paenis civilibus indeed; but cannot, à paenis gehennae; if in itself it be unconscionable and unreasonable. And they are not the Canonists only, that teach us this doctrine, but even our own Lawyers, that have taken the greatest pains to uphold the credit, and maintain the justice of our Laws. Many unlearned persons (saith one of them:) believe that it is lawful for them to do with good conscience all things, which if they do them, they shall not be punished therefore by the Law, though the Law doth not warrant them, etc. and so goes on, setting down for example some particular cases, of those things which a conscionable Christian is bound unto, to save his soul though he cannot be compelled unto it by the Law, Dr. and Stud. lib. 1. c. 19 And in such cases (saith the same Author in another place:) he is in conscience as well bound if he will save his soul; as he were, if he were compelled thereto by the Law, etc. If there be not then besides the Law of the Land, a law of reason and conscience to regulat our actions by, we are certainly but in bad case, in point of eternal salvation.   

HAving treated hitherto (in this second part:) of the Variety, first; then of the power and validity of custom in things civil; it will not be improper that I add somewhat of words also, and of the power that custom hath in matter of words and speeches. For though many men for want of knowledge and experience, think that words are but wind, and therefore account no subject that is about words, to be very material, or worthy the study of a serious man; yet wiser men know full well that in very truth, there is nothing that setteth men on work so much, or causeth so much stir in the World, as words, mere words do, and have always done; that words have been the occasion of many wars, by which many great Cities and Countries have been overthrown; that words have caused bloody strifes and persecutions even in the Church; not words only as they were intended, and should have been understood, but even mistaken through ignorance. It was once said of some ancient Philosophers, Sentit idem Aristo, quod Xenocrates, quod Aristoteles; loquitur alio modo, ex hac autem non rerum, sed verborum discordiâ, controversia nata est, etc. A happy thing it were for the World, that words were well understood every where; and all 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, all strifes and contentions about words quite taken away. But that will not be as long as the World endures; it is in vain to wish it; though not to wish it, be the part of either an ignorant, or uncharitable man. But I have nothing to do with words here, but as custom, my present subject, hath to do with them: to wit, to show the power of custom upon words, and some remarkable effects of this power.  
A. Gellius saith well in a place, consuetudo omnium rerum domina, sed maximè verborum; and Quintilian yet more fully, that consuetudo est certissima loquendi magistra, utendumque plane sermone, ut numo cui publica forma est: and again, Ridiculum malle sermonem quo locuti sunt homines, quam quo loquuntur, & sane quid est aliud vetus sermo, quam vetus loquendi consuetudo? So Horace, and diverse others, who all agree in this, that words and all right speaking goes by custom▪ and whereas in other things custom (as hath been showed:) is an usurper upon right, here her sovereignty is acknowledged to be natural; right and custom in matter of words and language, being in the judgement, of wisest men, but one thing for the most part. Now therefore to speak of it somewhat more distinctly.  
First, custom makes words, that were but sounds before, to be words, that is, to signify somewhat. As for example it makes the sound, that those three letters, G. o. and d. being put together, do make, to signify unto us of this nation, the Lord and maker of all things. For of itself why these three letters should represent such a thing, there is no ground in nature; but custom. It is true, the Stoics of old were of another opinion, and it became a great controversy among Philosophers, whether words were 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, by nature: or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, by imposition at pleasure. Origin, in few words, states the question thus; Aristoteles sentit positu nomina, Stoici putant Naturâ esse indita, imitantibus primis editis vocibus res ipsas ad quas & nomina imposita sint: qua ratione & Etymologias inducunt. And A. Gellius to the same purpose, Nomina verbaque non posita fortuito, sed quadam vi & ratione naturae facta esse. P. Nigidius in Grammaticis Commentariis docet, rem sane in Philosophiae dissertationibus celebrem. Queri enim solitum apud philosophos 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 sint, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. Saint Augustine handles it at large in his de Dialectica, to whom and to Gellius I refer them that would know more of it. Hereupon the Stoics did earnestly bestir themselves to find out and penetrate into the Etymology of every word, and to show the reason of it in nature; but to speak truth, their labour tended rather to make sport unto the idle, then to give satisfaction unto the soberly curious. Yet the Stoics were tolerable in comparison of some both of old and of late too, who have proceeded further, laying this for their foundation, that words and syllables are of great power and efficacy, and have (some say:) I know not what affinity and hidden correspondence with stars and planets. Hereupon some by a certain art which they call 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, undertake in the name of every man, to read his fortune, and to foretell great matters. I could not but mention such, coming so in my way; but I will no more than mention them, their opinions being so apparently absurd. But why then doth Aristotle, who determines it so peremptorily, that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, that no words are by nature, in many places stand upon words so much himself, and examine their Etymologies so carefully? To this I say, that though generally words go by custom, yet sometimes they may be said to be from nature, or natural in some sense, that is, set of purpose to set out unto us the nature of such and such a thing. There be many words of that nature, it cannot be denied; in some languages more than others; but in all, some; and in this case, to understand the right Etymology of a word, conduces much to the understanding of the thing itself. Of the nature of it I mean; but not to foretell, or foresee by it any thing future; not more than can be known by the natural knowledge of the thing itself. Some words again may be called natural, because they do when they are uttered and pronounced imitate the nature of the thing itself, which they signify. So for example when we say in Latin, aeris tinnitum, equorum hinnitum, ovium balatum, tubarum clangorem, stridorem catenarum, Perspicis, saith Saint Augustine, haec verba ita sonare, ut res quae his verbis significantur. So most of them that they call voces animalium propriae; for the most part, both in Greek and Latin are natural. Again, custom doth make some words natural, in that it gives unto them the power and efficacy of things that are natural, to produce some natural effects. Such are those words and sounds, whereby dumb creatures are governed; which though of themselves they be but invalid words and sounds, yet 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 (as Plutarch of them in a place:) through custom and skilful education, become so powerful, that what can be done upon dumb creatures with blows, or whips, or any other kind of violence, may be done with them; and sometimes more. So a man may use himself to tremble, or weep, or laugh, and the like, at certain words and sounds, which in time shall have that power over his body, that it shall not be in the power of his will to forbear. Even as the sight of whips and scourges (as we read in ancient stories:) hath been more powerful upon slaves in wars, than the sight of more dreadful and mortal weapons, because the smart of those which they often felt, as slaves, made them in time to abhor naturally and irresistibly the very sight of them; so words also; Long use and custom may turn them into charms, to make them operative upon nature, though of themselves they have no natural power at all. All these things granted (whereof to discourse at large, is not my present purpose:) it holds still nevertheless, as we affirmed at first, that generally and for the most part, words are words, that is, are significant by custom.  
Secondly, all difference of words and phrases in point of elegancy, or barbarism, is altogether from custom. Hence it is, that those expressions which in some language are most proper and elegant, in another are most ridiculous and barbarous, neither is there any reason at all for the most in nature, either for the one, or for the other, but that use and custom hath so determined it, whose will and pleasure stands for reason in these cases. It is true, that Grammarians have taken great pains to reduce ordinary words and speeches to some certainty of analogy, without which Grammar is no Art, and somewhat it is that they have done in this kind for the easier teaching and learning of languages. Yet doth custom herein maintain the power of her sovereignty upon words and speeches, in that when she pleases, she breaks the rules, and strictest bonds of best approved Analogy, and suffers no rule of Grammar to pass without an exception. All matter of elegancy then or babarisme being but a matter of custom, as it is no wonder to see silly people for want of knowledge, either to wonder, or to scoff at the expressions of other languages, when they hear strangers speak the words of the Country perchance, but use their own phrases and expressions; So I cannot but wonder that in all age's men that have been most ambitious to be thought learned, have stood so much upon elegancy, as I find they have done. The ancient Heathens, Philosophers, and others, did object, many things, I know, against the Gospel of Christ; but I do not find that any thing generally did in very truth make them so averse from it, as the language; most of the New Testament being written in Greek words indeed, some few excepted; but for the most part, in phrases and expressions that are merely Hebrew; and the Latin Translation being a mixture of both, both of Hebrew and Greek phrases, rather than Latin, that was Latin truly, according to the custom of those times. So hard a thing it was for them, that had been used to Plato and Aristotle, and the like, to relish such a style; much less to reverence it. A style nevertheless, which they would have thought elegant enough, had they been used to it; as on the other side, that of Plato or Aristotle but course and barbarous, had not the power of custom interposed, and disposed their ears and palates to it. A late writer of Essays treating of the power of custom; after many strange instances, brings this, as I remember, among others, as one of the strangest; That some certain people of the World, should be governed by Laws that are written in a strange unknown tongue. Certainly if the use of a strange tongue in one Country in point of Law (which would not be much better understood, though it were in the vulgar tongue:) be a thing so much to be admired; I think he might have found somewhat that is done in a strange tongue in many Countries against all grounds of sense or reason, much more to be wondered at. But whereas some others, to increase the wonder, deride and defame the said tongue as barbarous, they rather make themselves an instance of the power of custom, that makes them think so strange, and speak so scornfully of a tongue once thought very sweet and elegant, by them that were used unto it; then persuade us to wonder at others, that make no wonder of it.  
Thirdly, custom advanceth or abaseth words at pleasure, making them that once were vile to become honourable; and those that were honourable to become vile; yea words of title, to become words of reproach; and words of reproach to become words of title. What once knave, and ballad were in old English, when David was termed the knave of the Lord; and the song of songs, called the ballad of ballads; is yet too fresh, to be forgotten. Notarius was once a Title for a Secretary of State, when Secretaries of State, were at the highest; and than Cancellarius was an obscure name, and of little respect. Now it is quite contrary, and he would be thought (and reason he should, since custom hath otherwise commanded it:) to commit a monstrous solecism that should now use those Latin words, as they were used when Latin was in use. I do not know any thing to the contrary, but that men were as scrupulous to tell a lie in former ages as they are now; nay for some reasons I should think more. As first, because the art of equivocation was not then known, much less the praises of it; and again, because as Tully hath taught me, the ancient Romans were so cautelous in their solemn attestations, as that, were they never so certain of a thing, yet they avoided as much as they could, religionis & pudoris causa, words of peremptory and confident asseveration; rather using (which he calls verbum consideratissimum:) the word, arbitror. Yet a man might have told another mentiris, that he did lie, (of the Latin word I find it observed by others; and of the Hebrew, we have examples of it in Scripture, as two. Reg. iv. 16.) without any great either offence, or breach of civility; which now to give, though but to another be he never so vile, in the presence of a man of fashion, is greatest incivility. But of all things in this kind, I most wonder at that some tell us of the word Bastard, which they say was once rather a Title of Honour, among great ones; then a note of infamy. So Pontus Honterus: Postremò, saith he, quam long abfuerit nostrorum nasutulorum opinio, ab ejus temporis nobilium sententia, vel ex eo apparet, quod nothi Burgundi è Philippo Bono nati, omissis Ducum, Comitum, Marchionum, Baronumque titulis, aliis omnibus praetulerint BASTARDI nomen, scribentes in armorum Gentilitiis scutis publicè ac privatim hoc tantum modo, Corn. Ant. Phil. Bald. David, etc. Burgundiae BASTARDUS. Ex to supreme powers, whether Civil or Ecclesiastical. Caeremoniae Deorum, sanctitas Regum, saith julius Caesar in Suetonius; that as religious worship is proper unto the Gods, so unto Kings to be styled and accounted sacred. But numen and altaria, and the like, I wonder how Christian ears could away with; yet allowed (time was:) even to Christian Emperors, and used by them speaking of themselves; (as for example in the Code, nostris altaribus suggestio offertur, and, de nostris altaribus petunt, etc.) which is not likely their Christian ears would have borne, had not the power of custom hardened them unto it. He is not a civil man now of late years among us, that thinks much to subscribe himself servant, though it be unto his equal, or inferior. Yet Sulpitius Severus was once sound chid by Paulinus the Bishop of Nola, for subscribing (or rather proscribing, as the custom was then:) himself his servant, in a letter of his. But you shall hear himself speak, if you please, and what he thought of it: In Epistolae titulo, imitari praestantem in omnibus mihi fraternitatem tuam timui; quia tutius credidi verè scribere. Cave ergo posthac Servus Christi in libertatem vocatus, hominis, & fratris, & conservi inferioris servum te subscribere: quia peccatum adulationis est magis, quam humilitatis justificatio, honorem uni Domino, uni magistro super terram, uni Deo debitum, homini cuilibet, ne dicam miserimo peccatori, defer. His words are somewhat ambiguous, whether he means uni Domino, uni Magistro, and uni Deo, all of one; or rather (as I rather believe:) partitively, allowing us the use of this word, to those that are truly our Lords and masters upon earth. But whatever his meaning was, it is certain that the word is extremely abused now adays; and most abused by them that know least, and care as little to learn what belongs unto true humility, and wherein it doth consist. Now in this and the like cases, it were happy if in all places (if all places afford such:) some of the wiser and graver sort of men, would agree by their joint constancy and gravity to resist both in matter of fashions that belong unto clothes, and in those that belong unto words, the vanity, fickleness, foolishness of ordinary worldly men, who have nothing to busy their idle brains with, but to invent and follow new fashions. Then were it an easy thing for any sober man to maintain and embrace consensum prudentum (as wise men prescribe in other things) the consent of some (though fewer in number:) that are wise; than vulgarem consuetudinem, the custom of the common people (ordinary worldlings I mean:) which commonly likes that best, which is worst. And certainly they should be much to blame in my judgement that would not do it. But when a custom in this kind (though vain, yet not absolutely impious:) is become so general that a man cannot avoid it, except he will be singular; a man I think may safely enough (in these things which of their nature are indifferent:) condescend unto it to avoid singularity; which always relishes of some want of charity, and is oftentimes the effects of a worse disease, pride and self-conceit. And so much be spoken concerning words.   

AS God both in regard of his will, and in regard of his Nature, is absolutely immutable, in a transcendent kind of immutability, beyond all comparison; nay beyond all imagination of man; which Saint james to express in some sort, after he had said that there is no variableness with God; not content with that, adds elegantly, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, or shadow of turning:) So it stands with reason, that both the worship of God, and the opinions of men touching God, should be as invariable; at lest more invariable, than any other thing, the object whereof is worldly and mutable. Custom a man would think of all things in the world should have less to do with things of this nature. But it is quite otherwise. For in very truth of all things in the World, there is nothing generally that goes by custom so much as religion doth, both in point of practice, and in point of opinions. So that there is nothing so horrible of itself, or so ridiculous in the judgement of reason and common sense in point of opinions, which long custom (if men be not very wary of it, and with best care and diligence use those means to prevent it, that sound reason and true philosophy do prescribe:) will not make most plausible and acceptable: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, custom having once got the strength of long continuance, insinuates errors and impostures (be they never so gross:) into the minds of most men under the shape and representation of genuine truth: So justin Martyr; who fetcheth hence especially the origine of Idolatry. And Origin adds that of all Customs, none stick so fast in the mind when once settled there, none so hard to be wiped and washed off, as those which he elegantly calls 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, that is, the customs of opinion and doctrine, be they right or wrong. To this we may add the observation of Nicetas the Greek Historian, from domestic experience, who having particularly instanced, in the ancient Christian inhabitants of the Pousgusian pool, then half Turkish in their rites and customs, concludes upon it generally, that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Long custom hath more power than either nature or religion. Hence it is perchance that the Hebrew 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 properly, which often signifies custom, is also taken sometimes for religion or doctrine.  
Now the reason why custom can do more in point of religion, than it can in other things, is first, because the object of religion, is of all others the furthest off both from the senses, and from the reach of humane reason; which makes men the more apt, in things so abstruse and so far exceeding the strength of humane ratiocination, to content themselves with what they have received from their forefathers, presuming that they had it by some revelation, or other from above. This made Aristotle, who did not love to speak of things, but upon demonstrable grounds of reason and nature, not to meddle much in all his writings, with things divine; concerning either God or religion; as he himself gives the reason of it, in his the part▪ animalium, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. professing there that he preferred the knowledge of things divine, far beyond any other knowledge; but could say but little of it nevertheless for want of certain grounds. Plato, he was altogether for Divinity, it is true; the immortality of the soul, and the rewards of a godly life in the world to come, and the like, being his chiefest subject in almost all his Treatises: for which, as he was much admired by the ancient Fathers of the Church, so in all ages he hath been known by the Title of Divine Plato. Yet Plato himself doth ingenuously acknowledge the imperfection of his knowledge in this kind as both deficient and uncertain. Witness this divine passage of his, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. In another place he saith plainly, that without 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, some divine revelation from above, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to know the certainty of these things in this world, is either absolutely impossible, or extremely difficult. If therefore Plato himself, coeteris philosophis gentium longè lateque praelatus, saith Saint Augustine; 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, that admirable Philosopher (saith Eusebius:) who of all Heathen Philosophers and writers, was the only, that reached unto the very porch of Truth's sacrary: if he nevertheless, was so much to seek himself, and so unsatisfyed; no wonder if ordinary men, unto whon the day star of heavenly truth was not, or is not yet arisen, have thought it their safest course in all ages, in point of religion especially, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, (as Athenagoras the Christian Philosopher speaks and shows in the beginning of his Apology;) to keep them closely to the rites and customs of their forefathers, be they never so ridiculous and absurd.  
Another reason why custom is so powerful in matters of Religion, is because men for the most part, every where are for the things of this present World, as profit, or pleasure, or the like; as for those things that belong unto their souls, they think of them as matters of another world indeed; that is, as matters that do not much concern them, and for which they see no reason why they should overmuch trouble their thoughts. It is true, that faction and violent opposition are taken for zeal in most places; and those men thought vulgarly very religious, that hate them most fiercely, that are not of their opinions; of which kind of men there is store enough in all places, and of all professions. But religion, or faith well grounded (and if it be not well grounded, how we can be ready to give an account of it unto others, as Saint Peter would have us, I know not:) is quite another thing. We speak not here of illiterate men or women, whose capacity (for no man is accountable for more than he hath received, so he make good use of it to his utmost:) doth not reach to such either preparation or examination, as both the Scriptures and right reason do require, to proceed rationally and with judgement in such a business. It is to be feared that of them that want not judgement and capacity in other things of the world which they take more to heart, there are but few to be found in no place, that make that use of either (all prejudice and partiality being laid aside:) that were fitting in matter of religion. And so it comes to pass that every where and generally, though few believe it, or suspect it, yet in very truth, the belief of most men if it be well looked into, is rather custom, than any thing else.  
But to the end that the power of custom in matter of Religion, may the better appear unto them that are none of the most quicksighted of themselves, nor disposed to take any great pains by the help of long tedious philosophical speculations to penetrate into the truth of things, we will here take into our consideration some one of the many religions that have been in great use and request among men in former days: and of all the rest, we will make choice of that purposely, which in the judgement of all men that were not bred and obliged unto it, hath ever been accounted the most ridiculous, unnatural and prodigious. I will not therefore here speak of them that have worshipped the Sun and the Moon, and the stars, etc. the most glorious objects that sensual worshippers could pitch upon; and which some ancients grounding upon a wrong interpretation of the words of Moses, Deut. 4.19. seem to be of opinion that it was in some manner permitted to the Nations of the world to do, till the coming of Christ. Nor yet of them, that have worshipped stocks and stones, the work of their own hands, whose plausible pretence for their gross idolatry hath been in all ages, that they worshipped not the figures themselves in sight, but the invisible Deities represented unto them by those figures. Those that I will instance in shall be they, whose religion was to worship those things, which reason and nature in the judgement of all other nations hath made unto man either contemptible or abominable; the ancient Egyptians I mean, whose greatest Deities by them adored with all possible reverence, were dogs, and cats; toads and crocodiles, and the like. Of whom among others the Latin Satirist worthily, 
Quis nescit Volusi Bithinica qualia demens  
Aegyptus portenta colat? crocodilon adorat  
Pars haec: illa pavet staturam serpentibus ibim  
Effigies sacri nitet aurea cercopitheci, etc.  How they came first to resolve upon such horrible worship, they that have most curiously searched into it, as Diod. Siculus, and others, could never, though they purposely conferred with the most learned Egyptians of those days, find out certainly. It is most likely, that they were at first compelled unto it by their princes and governor's for some politic ends and considerations. But in after ages, when this worship, how strange and uncouth soever at first, was once become customary and hereditary unto them, with what approbation of judgement and affection of heart (to the ready forsaking of their goods, lives, and liberties for it:) they then did embrace and practise it, ancient histories, such as cannot by any sober man be questioned, bear record unto this day. I will not bring here what we read in some of them, because it may be questioned with more colour, of great advantages in wars wittingly and willingly forgone by the Egyptians by reason of their superstition; yea how they have chosen rather to yield themselves unto their enemies, when they might have had the best of it, then to violate though but the bare signs and pictures of those beasts which were sacred unto them. But the testimony of Diod. Siculus, (whose words among others, are 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. This superstition of theirs cleaveth so fast unto their souls (or, is so penetratively infused into their very souls:) and so immoovably bend and affected are they every one of them to the worship of these creatures, etc.) and those instances that he brings, whereof he was an eye witness, of their zeal to their religion, no man can question with any colour of reason. And Tully speaks of it, as of a thing known to all the World, and whereof examples were obvious in his days; Aegyptiorum morem (saith he, and mark by the way, that he calls it morem; by which word he closely adscribes it unto custom:) quis ignorat? quorum imbutae mentes pravitatis erroribus, quamvis carnificinam prius subierint, quam ibim aut aspidem, aut felem, aut canem, aut crocodilum violent; quorum etiam si imprudentes quippiam fecerint, paenam nullam recusent. Such was their zeal to their religion, against nature, reason, and common sense, grounded upon custom only: whereby it may appear, that bare zeal, without due observation of other circumstances, is but a weak and uncertain trial of the Truth.  
Now to instance (as I have formerly:) in some things of our days likewise, and in our own practice; it will be hard for me to find an instance that will be generally thought so pertinent, because though the matter be of itself never so strange, yet custom having made it familiar, it will not seem strange unto ordinary men, whose understanding, though they know it not, is blinded by it; the more dangerously blinded, the less they suspect it to be so. But to them that are yet free, or at least will hereafter use the means to vindicat themselves into the liberty of a sound judgement according to truth and reason: to them I dare boldly say, that it is not more strange (not more strange; I say no more:) either that some people of the World should worship no God at all; or that some should with those ancient Egyptians, whom we have spoken of, worship dogs and cats for their Gods; then that Christians, contrary, not only to reason and even common sense itself, but also to the direct example of Christ, the founder of their religion, should behave themselves so profanely in their Churches erected to the honour of their God; and make so little reckoning of them, as they do in many places of Europe; and not only do it, but in some places (which is strangest of all:) think themselves the purer and sounder Christians, that they do so. Were it but for the sake of jews and Gentiles, who cannot but abhor that Religion, that allows of such profaneness in and about places dedicated to the worship of God; were there no more in it then so; Yet it is apparently against the laws of true Christianity (which of all others, are most severe against all wilful scandals:) that such irreverence should be allowed. I am the bolder to say, that it is against true Christianity, because I know it was not so, when true Christianity did most flourish. And truly, he that should have seen in the times of the primitive Church devout Christians not daring so much as to touch a Bible without first washing of their hands in token of reverence; and in their Churches in great humility stooping sometimes to the very ground, (whence as I take it, are those 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, salutations, or kiss of the holy pavements, mentioned in the Ius Orientale:) yea directly, terramfronte concutientes, as Saint Augustine speaks in a place; or as Saint chrysostom, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, prostrating themselves quite down, and beating the ground with their foreheads, (which though it were not absolutely required of any, but such as were either to be baptised, or did solemn penance; whence 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 for prostratio, as Billius hath long ago taught us: yet was voluntarily performed by them of the devouter sort, as appears by Saint chrysostom, tom. vi. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. who calls them there 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, that did it, in opposition to cold careless worshippers:) and the like: And should now see holy Bibles profanely tossed up and down as they are; ordinary men entering into Churches, with such gesture and countenance, rather as if they entered with authority to dispossess God, then to humble themselves before him; and in time of divine service carrying themselves in them accordingly; moreover, diverse making no conscience to do that about and against consecrated walls of Churches, which common civility doth prompt us to forbear about private houses, those of our betters at least; certainly he would hardly be brought to believe that things so contrary could proceed from men of the same Religion; or rather indeed, to believe; that men that had any sense of any religion at all, be it what it will, could be so securely and senselessly profane. However, though it be not unlikely in this atheistical age, that many do it because they have said in their hearts that there is no God; and in this sacrilegious age of purpose, because it concerns their profit and ungodly designs, that consecrated places be made common, and profaned; Yet God forbid we should judge so uncharitably of all that offend in this kind; but rather judge and believe, that it is nothing else but the power of custom, and the want of due consideration, that leads them into it, and makes them insensible of their impiety. One thing I am sure of, what ever we think of the business, that Turks and Pagans (what advantages soever we have over them in other respects:) may sooner hope to bring us in time to their religion, by their outward apparent reverence and devotion in duties of religion; then we hope ever by all our knowledge to do good upon them, as long as we continue so profane. I press it the more, that the power of custom, which makes us so unsensibly (though otherwise, I make no question, many of us affectionately desiring the conversion of jews and Gentiles:) to pass over all these considerations, and to do still what we have done, be it right or wrong, may the better appear.  
So much being spoken hitherto of the power of custom in matters of religion, and having sufficiently (as I conceive) showed it here also to be great; we are now (according to the method that we have followed in the two former parts:) to proceed to the consideration of the validity of it, according to right and reason; and that both in point of doctrine, and in point of practice; that is, in the agendis and the credendis (for there is no Religion but hath these two parts:) of Religion. And herein as of myself I am very willing to be but short; so when I consider the things themselves, I do not see that I shall need to be very long. For Religion, though it go beyond Nature and policy very far, yet it is grounded in part upon the same foundations, as both Nature and policy are. As for example; particulars in things natural, must yield and conform to the general if need be, though it be against their own particular nature. So water to prevent a vacuum; and the like. A main ground of policy, Salus populi suprema lex esto. So in matter of Christianity too: as it is, fully both and very elegantly, expressed by Saint chrysostom in these words, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. This is the rule of perfect Christianity, this the utmost bounds, (or, exact definition:) this the highest top of it, to seek those things that are profitable to the public. Many things therefore formerly delivered, are here appliable. But yet to express myself somewhat more particularly herein also, we thus briefly;  
First, In those things that are of the very substance of religion, and trench upon the principal end of it, whether in matter of practice or doctrine, custom is not considerable.  
The end, as all men know that are wise, is the principal thing in all things. And to this purpose is Aristotle's doctrine in the first of his Ethics of difference of ends, some principal and absolute (which in his phrase we may call 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉:) some secondary and subordinat, of very good use and moment. In the holy Scriptures, though a man meet with many changes, varieties, and alterations, according to variety of times and places; yet he that shall read and observe them with due care and diligence, may observe the great things of the Law, as one of the Prophets calls them; or as it is in the New Testament, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the weightier matters of the Law, to be still the same. These to understand truly, and carefully to practise, is true Religion both and happiness.  
Secondly, In things external conducing more or less (so they conduce, though but in a less degree; and not cross directly:) to the main end, superiors may yield, sometimes if they see occasion; and inferiors if wise and rational, must always submit unto custom; though otherwise of itself, perchance, not so fit and commendable.  
Superiors cannot propose unto themselves a better example to imitate, than God himself. God did indulge many things unto the jews, which otherwise he would not have liked, because they had been long used to the superstitions of the Egyptians. So say diverse of the Fathers; and rightly, I think: and this in God, they call properly, his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, or condescension. Of Christ and his Apostles something might be said, and hath been said by others to this purpose. But certain it is, that the ancient Fathers of the Primitive Church, men Apostolical, and others (as it is acknowledged by all men that know any thing of Antiquity:) in instituting rites and ceremonies Ecclesiastical, had great respect unto those rites and customs, whether sacred or Civil, that the first Christians had been used unto, before their conversion unto Christianisme. Now if this course be warrantable; where the change is absolute from one Religion to another; it must needs be more plausible and expedient in point of reformation; wherein the more we yield unto custom in things not so substantial, the more likely we are to speed in the redress of more material abuses. As for inferiors, to them properly belong the words of Saint Augustine, In iis rebus de quibus nihil statuit scriptura divina, mos populi Dei, vel instituta majorum pro lege tenenda sunt. In those things that are not apparently contrary to the word of God, for private men, though otherwise upon grounds never so plausible to oppose their opinion to either custom or authority, whereby the peace of the Church may be in danger; though it may go for zeal in this World, yet certainly in the world to come, and before an higher judge, it will be found (and for such punished, I fear) either gross wilful Ignorance, or extreme arrogancy.  
Thirdly, In matters of doctrine and truth, though every truth be precious of itself, and ever to be preferred before any private ends, yet all truth is not always seasonable to be divulged, where the error is general, and cannot be opposed without much scandal.  
As there be customs in matter of action, so in matter of opinion too; since (as hath been showed:) opinions go by custom, as much as any thing: Whence it is that in the Ius Orientale, you shall find 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, or, customs divided into 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, that is customs in point of doctrine, and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, customs in point of discipline, or practice; that is, rites and ceremonies. In matter of opinion than the power of custom is in some degree considerable, as well as in other things. Civilians tell us, that Error aliquando jus facit; and our common Lawyers also; that a Common error by their Law, for public quiets sake goeth for a Law. Finch of Law, p. 40. I will not stand to examine upon what ground they speak it; because I do not mean to ground upon them; though I could not but take notice of their words by the way. Nolite sanctum canibus; and, keep thy faith to thyself, (not generally to be understood, we do not mean, but in some cases only:) and some other such passages, are more to our purpose by far, than any thing that the Law either common or Civil can tell us. But the argument is ticklish. I leave the rest to the Angelical Doctor in his 22 ae. q. 43. a. 7. Vtrum bona spiritualia sint propter scandalum dimittenda. So far at least, I could wish all men would take it to heart, as not easily for their own only private ends and purposes (as many are ready to do:) to vent abroad either old things justly and legally antiquated; or new things of their own devising (the unhappy fruits of extravagant brains:) that may any wise tend to innovation, and to the prejudice of public tranquillity.  
My conclusion is this, That it is the part of a wise rational man, as to consider diligently how far forth custom both in matter of Religion and in other things is considerable, lest he trouble himself and others without cause: So to consider as diligently wherein it is altogether against reason, lest conforming to the vulgar in those things, he himself become one of them; that is, a man that is led by custom and not by reason; which is as much (if we may speak freely:) as if we said, a thing that hath the shape of a man, but may more truly & properly be called abrute. And because this cannot be done without much labour and search, I must exhort all men that think truth and reason so much worth, to spare no pains, no study, if they mean to speed. It is true, we live in an age, when Idleness is so much in fashion among all sorts of men, that it is a hard thing for any man of what profession soever, to be industrious more than ordinary, and not to suffer, even in his reputation, for it. Which cannot but be a great discouragement unto many, who otherwise as rational men, have a good mind to improove themselves in their better part. But let them propose unto themselves the examples of men famous in former ages for their indefatigablenes in this kind; and let them consider withal, that the reward is great. Though they adspire not to be famous in the World, nor ever live to benefit others by their pains (which nevertheless all good men must propose unto themselves, if it may be:) yet they shall not lose the fruit of their labours. If others do not, yet themselves (which is the main:) shall reap them. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, for it is the privilege (as is observed by some of the ancient worthies:) of a soul that is reasonable, (a rational man, he means;) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉:) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: that whereas plants, trees, and other creatures, that are not reasonable, bear unto others, and not for themselves, she reaps her own fruits; and whensoever, or wheresoever her life doth end, be it sooner, or later, she may have her own end nevertheless. With which words, we shall here end.   
FINIS.   

An addition to page 85. by reason of a new book, entitled Ethruscarum Antiquitatum Fragmenta, Which came since to the Author's hands.  
SPeaking there of notable Impostors, that have done their best to cheat the World by supposititious writings, by what chance, of all the rest, (there being but too much choice of instances in this kind:) I chanced to instance in Annius Viterbiensis, I know not. But since it was my chance so to do, I think myself bound in many respects to take notice here of a certain book, inscribed, Ethruscarum Antiquitatum Fragmenta, which since this Treatise was written and licenced, came first to my hands, and, for aught I know, into the Realm. It is a book in folio, (as we use to speak:) somewhat larger, than it is either thick or long; consisting of 284. pages, besides an ample Index, and a long Preface; printed upon fair thick paper, and in as fair, or fairer a letter. Besides some maps, it hath many cuts and prints, diverse whereof are in brass. Were but the tenth part of those things that are there exhibited, true and ancient indeed, as they are pretended, the book might very well be worth 30. or 40. shillings to be bought; neither is there, I think, any true Philologist, or lover of learning in general, that would grudge to purchase it at that rate. But in a word, as the Grecians were wont to speak, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the Title indeed, and the specious dress, and furniture of the Book, promise great Treasures; but those Treasures, well looked into, prove but mere trash, and children's babbles: if I may so call such impudent, shameless, unconscionable trumperies and forgeries, such as might have better proceeded from professed Heathens (though I do not think there have ever been many heathens in the world so absolutely godless and void of conscience, but would have been ashamed to have been the authors of them:) than men that profess themselves to be Christians. Me thinks if these impudent jugglors, did so far presume upon the ignorance and simplicity of us Transalpins, (as once they were wont to speak in scorn of all that were not Italians;) as to believe that we would swallow all down readily without any suspicion at all; yet they should have considered, that Italy affords many learned men, (the present Pope himself, a man of excellent humane learning: who as they cannot but presently find, so certainly will heartily detest such abominable practices. But since the attempt was so great and dangerous, (no less than the confounding of almost all Histories and Historians of the world; and in a manner of all truth:) it is Gods great mercy, that the undertakers were such, as had more will than skill to cheat, and so might easily be discovered. For of all those 284. pages, I dare say there is not any one page (scarce any one line of any page:) but upon due examination, will afford, not to a professed Antiquary only, but even to an ordinary Scholar, sufficient arguments and evidences, whereby to evince the spuriousnes and falseness of the Title. If any man would be so idle as to gather together all that can, out of the book itself, be said against it, he might easily make a book in folio ten times as big as it. For my part, all that I have to say here upon it, is but to let you know, (which perchance every body will not presently take notice of:) that Annius Viterbiensis, that infamous Impostor that we have spoken of, though dead himself long ago, is the very first original ground and fountain of all this Imposture. Read him, (if you can have so much patience:) his Catonis Origines and his Comments upon them, and it will clearly appear unto you, to be as I say. So apt are pleasing fables, to propagate; and so hard (be the Truth never so clear and apparent:) to be rooted out of the mind and souls of vulgar men; especially when their vanity and foolish ambition, either for themselves or for their Country, hath some interest in the credibility of those fables. Grounding upon the same Annius Viterbiensis, did one Bernardinus Baldus Vrbinas long ago (for I find, it hath been printed though I never saw it yet myself, but as I have it, that is, Manuscript:) adventure to set out an Interpretation (with Notes upon it:) of that Aenea Tabula Eugubina, or ancient Inscription, found in Eugubium in Italy, and conceived by some to be written in the Ethruscan tongue and character: though Gruterus in his Thesaurus seem to be of another opinion. It was a bold attempt, that too; yet more bold than dangerous, or of any great consequence; and the Author himself, (to do him no wrong:) was so modest yet, as to call it all, but his Divinatio. But these late Ethruscan Impostors, have gone beyond all that ever were heard of in the World, in boldness, and licentiousness of counterfeiting; even beyond Annius Viterbiensis himself, I would say; but that in very Truth, as I have already said, they are but his offspring, and the unhappily continued fruits of his first chimaerical conceptions. Well, if these men (worse than any 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and publici odii victimae:) do not deserve with all possible rigour and severity to be proceeded against, tanquam generis humani hosts, as sworn and professed enemies to that which is the chiefest good, and happiness of rational men upon earth, that is, Truth. I know not who ever did. And so I leave them to the judgement of others, in whose power it is to deal with them according to their desert.   

Imprimatur:  
junii 10. 1638.  
Sa: Baker.