The book of freendeship of Marcus Tully Cicero.  
Anno dni. 1550.    

To the right virtuous, and my singular good Lady, Katherine duchess of Suffolk.  
AS my prisonment and adversity, most honourable lady, was of their own nature joined with great and sundry miseries, so was the sufferance of the same eased, by the chance of diverse and many commodities. For thereby found I great soul profit, a little mind knowledge, some hollow hearts, and a few faithful friends. Whereby I tried prisonment of the body, to be the liberty of spirit: adversity of fortune: the touch stone of friendship, exemption from the world, to be a contempt of vanities: and in the end quietness of mind, the occasion of study. And thus somewhat altered, to avoid my old idleness, to recompense my lost time, and to take profit of my calamity, I gave myself among other things to study and learn the French tongue, having both skilful prisoners to instruct me, and thereto plenty of books to learn the language. Among which as there were diverse notable, and for their sundry matter worthy reading, so none liked me above this Tullius book of friendship, nor for the argument any with it to be compared. The whole whereof when I had perused, and saw the goodly rules, the natural order, and civil use of friendship, where before I but liked, than was I ravished, and in a certain wonder with the heathen learning, which chief for itself I phantasied, and for my state I deemed good to be embraced, as a glass to discern my friends in, and a civil rule to lead my life by. These causes moved me to think it meet for more. Wherapon I (as I could) translated it, and though not so lively, nor yet so aptly, as some would look for, and many could do, yet I trust they will rather bear with my good will, then rebuke my boldness, for that it proceeded more of a good mind than of any presumption of knowledge: and so my enterprise is to be interpreted rather by friends, as a treatise of friendship, then by learned clerkis in an argument of translation. Well, how so ever it shallbe liked of the learned, I hope it shallbe allowed of the unlatined. Whose capacitees by my own I consider, and for lack of a fine and flowing style, I have used the plain and common speech. and to th'end the sense might not be changed, nor the goodness of the matter by shift of tongues, much minished, I caused it to be conferred with the latin auctor, and so by the known well learned to be corrected: after whose handling me thought a new spirit and life was given it, and many parts seemed as it were with a new cote arrayed, aswell for the orderly placing and eloquently changing of some words, as also for the plainly opening and learnedly amending of the sense, which in the Freenche translation was somewhat darkened, and by me for lack of knowledge in many places miss.  
¶ Thus when the thing was perfected, and I beheld the fame of the auctor, the nature of the treatise, and the clearness of his teaching, I could not judge to whom I should rather offer it, than unto your grace, whom the freendelesse daily find their defence, and the helpless repair to as a refuge. This did I not to teach you, but to let you see in learning ancient, that you have by nature used: nor to warn you of aught you lacked, but to set forth your perfection: the proof whereof the dead might witness, and their offspring hath just cause to knowledge it, as more can record it, then can requite it. And such your friendly steadfastness declared to the dead, doth ascertain us of your steadfast friendliness toward the living, which many have felt, and diverse do prove, and few can want. Of which numbered your grace hath made me one, that neither least nor seldomest, have tasted of your benefits, both in my trouble and also liberty. Wherefore your grace in my sight is of all other most worthy this small fruit of my prison's labour, as a fit patroness to the honour of such a work, and a true example, in whom it is fulfilled. Thus the lord of truth preserve you in friendship, increase your friends, and defend you from enemies.  
john Harryngton.   

To the reder.  
THe wise man in his proverbs saith: A friend loveth at all times, that is, as well in the time of adversity as prosperity. And again he saith, The man that is apt to amity, and that hath bend his heart to entreteyne friendship, doth more love, & faster stick to his friend, than one brother to an other. And it is written in the Ecclesiasticus: Do not become a foe of a friend. For such a man obtaineth an ill name, blameworthy and reproachful, even like as the double tonged is infamous. And again it is there written, A faithful and a trusty friend is a strong garrison: he that attaineth such one, findeth a precious treasure. To a sure and trusty friend (saith he) no price is equal. For an assured friend is the medicine of life: Such a one shall they obtain, that reverently honour the lord. He that honoureth the lord, doth stablish and make sure this friendship for even as an other himself shall his friend be to him. Forsake not thine old friend: for thy new shall not be equal unto him. A new friend is like unto must or new wine: the which at length thou shalt drink with pleasure. A friend (he saith) in prosperity can not be judged: nor the enemy in adversities will be hid. In the time of man's prosperity his enemies are sorry: and in adversity his friend forsaketh him. Show thyself trusty and sure to thy friend a poor man, that thou mayest with him rejoice in prosperity: Observe fidelity to him in time of calamity, that thou mayest together with him come into his possession. See (saith he) that thou love thy friend: and show thyself sure and trusty unto him: And if thou babble abroad his secrets, thou losest him. Thus when I remember, in how many places of holy scripture, precepts are given concerning friends and friendship: I do not a little muse and marvel at the divine gefte, that the most noble and excellent learned man, the most worthy Roman Mar. Tul. Cicero had: who in this his book of amity here after following, hath so eloquently, so lively, so pithily, and so plainly described and set out, what amity is, how to choose a friend, how much is to be done for a friend, how friends should ponder requests, what manner of men are m●ete for friendship, the property of true friendship, the principal cause of friendship, the chief point in friendship, the commodities of friendship, what thing trieth friends, the bonds of love in friendship, the dissimulation in friendship, feigned friendship, the profit of freendeship, the fruit of friendship, the ways to prove friends, what is to be attributed to true friends, what a friend ought to eschew, and so forth the end of freendeship, that I think there is no man, but that he may learn out of the said book, all the points needful for him, that will enter into, and continued in that most happy & blissful life of true friendship: whereby he may so order and govern himself, that at length he may attain to that glorious name, to be called a sure & a trusty friend. And certainly no man can climb so high (, by the description of Tully) but he that is both good and wise, and that liveth virtuously. And so, after the determination of Cicero, I may conclude, that he that is a faithful, a sure, and a trusty friend, must needs be a good, a wise, and a virtuous man.   

The book of friendship of Marcus Tully Cicero.  
Quintus Mutius Scaevola Augur was wont to tell readily and pleasantly many things of Caius Laelius his father in law, 
Laelius, father in law to Scaevola the Augur and to Fanius  and not to stick in all his kind of communication to call him wise. But I was so put to Scaevola by my father, when I came to man's state, that as nigh as I well could or might, I should never go from the old man's sleeve. And therefore I bore away many things wisely reasoned, and many things briefly and handsomely told, and sought by his wisdom to grow better learned. When he was dead, I got me to P. Scaevola, whom alone I dare boldly name the chiefest of our city for wit & knowledge, but an other time we shall speak of him, now I return to Scaevola Augur. As he often talked of sundry matters, so I remember, sitting at home in his half round chair (as his manner was) when I and very few his familiars were present, he fell into that talk, which then was almost common in many men's mouths. For you remember (as I think) Atticus (and so much the rather, 
Pom. Atticus. ) because you haunted Sulpitius' company very much. What a wonder of lamentation of men there was, when he being Tribune of the people, 
P. Sulpitius Tribune. Q. Pompeius' Consul.  disagreed from Q. Pompeius with a deadly food, who then was Consul, with whom very friendly and lovingly he had lived. Therefore at that time Scaevola, when he fell in a rehearsal thereof, declared unto us the talk that Laelius had upon friendship with him and his other son in law C. Fannius, the son of Marcus, shortly after africans death. The sum of which disputation I bore away, and have set it forth in this book after my own fantasy. For I have brought in as it were themselves speaking, to the intent, these words that I, and that he, should not be to often rehearsed. And the rather I did it, that the talk might seem of two that were present before you. For where as often times ye were in hand with me Atticus, that I should write somewhat upon friendship, me thought it a thing both meet for the knowledge of all men, and also for our familiarity. And therefore at your request I did it, not unwillingly, that I might profit manies, But as in my book called Cato Mayor, 
Cato the Elder.  which is written to you of old age. I have brought in Cato the old man reasoning, for that there seemed no meeter man to speak of age than he, who had been very long aged, and above others in that his age, had flourished: so for as much as we have understand by our elders the notable acquaintance between C. Laelius and P. Scipio, 
The friendship between C. Laelius & Scipio.  I have thought Laelius a very fit person, to reason the self same things of friendship, which my master Scaevola remembered, was often disputed by him. And certes this kind of talk, set out with the authority of ancient men, 
The authority of ancient noble men.  and the same famous, seemeth I wots not how to have in it a more weightiness and gravity. And therefore I myself reading mine own works, sometime am in that mood, that me thinketh Cato speaketh and not I. But as then age with age did speak of age, so now to his friend the friendly writeth of friendship. Then spoke Cato at those days, in a manner the eldest and wisest: Now speaketh Laelius of friendship, a man both wise (for so was he counted) and for the praise of friendship the chiefest.  
I would for a while you minded not me, but suppose that Laelius himself speaketh.  
C. Faunius, and Q. Mutius cometh to their father in law after africans death, the talk riseth on them. Laelius maketh answer. Whose disputation is whole of friendship, which yourself (when you read) shall understand.  

Caius Fannius.  
fan. These things be true O Laeli, for neither better, neither nobler hath there been any than Affricanus. But you must think all men have cast their eyes upon you, and you only they call & judge wise. This name was given not long sense to M. Cato. We know also, that L. Acilius in our father's time was named wise. 
L. Acilius.  But either of them in a shyer manner. Acilius, because he was thought cunning in the Civil law: Cato, because he had experience of many things, and many of his doing, both in counsel in the Senate, and in the judgement place of justice, were reported to be foreseen wisely, done stoutly, and answered wittily: atteigned now in his old age (as half a surname) to be called Cato the wise. But you in an other kind, not only by nature and conditions, but also by study and knowledge, they account wise. Nether after the common people's reckoning, but as the learned sort are wont to call one wise, that is such a one, as in all the rest of Grece is not the like. For those, which narrowly search out these matters, do not reckon them in the numbered of wise men, which be called the seven sages of Grece. 
seven sages of Grece.  In deed one we have heard of, that was at Athenes, and the same Apollo's oracle adiud●●d the wisest. 
Socrates judged most wise by Apollo  This wisdom then think in you, that you account all your richesses lodged within you, and that all worldly haps be inferiors to virtue. And for this cause (I believe) they inquire of me, and of Scaevola here also, how you bear Affricanes death, and so much the rather, because these last non as, when we came into D. Brutus orchards the Augur, (as the usage is) to reason upon matters, you were not present there, who was wont most diligently to attend both that day and business. Scae. Many truly ask, Caius Laelie, as Faunius saith. But I make this answer, that I perceive, you bear your sorrow soberly, which you take for so noble and friendly a man, and that you could not choose, but be somewhat troubled, and otherwise of your own natural kindness ye could not be. And as to that you were not present at our meeting these nonce, I said, sickness was the cause, and not sorrow. Lae. Well said Scaevola and truly: for neither ought I for any loss to be withdrawn from this duty, which while I was in health, I always performed: neither do I think, that it can happen by any occasion, that there should be any slackness of duty in a constant man. But you Fannie, 
Constant men.  do like a friend, that you tell me, the world ascribeth so much unto me, as neither I acknowledge, neither desire: but yet as me seemeth, you judge not truly of Cato: for either no man there is (as in deed I rather believe) or if any be, Cato it is that is wise. Ah how (to leave the rest unspoken) did he take the death of his son? 
Cato ●erkeded wise if any be wise.  I can remember Paulus, and saw Caius. But these may not be compared to Cato, the great and the noble. Wherefore beware, how you prefer any before Cato, no not him, whom Apollo (as you said) adjudged the wisest. for of this man his deeds, and of that man his sayings be commended. 
Socrates for his sayings, Cato for his deeds commended  But concerning myself (to answer now you both) reaken thus. If I deny to be grieved with the loss of Scipio, let the wise judge, how well it were done: but certes lie I should, for I am troubled, that I am now bireft of such a friend as I suppose never none shallbe, and as I can approve, 
Scipio commended.  never none hath been. But I need no physic, I can comfort myself, and chief with this kind of comfort, that I am not in that error, wherewith most men are wont to be accumbered, at the departing of their friends. For I think that Scipio hath no hurt, mine it is, if any be. And for a man to be grievously troubled for his own losses, it is selfly love, and not friendly love. 
Self love,  But who can deny, that Scipio is not happy? for except he would have wished ever life, (which was farthest out of his thought) what hath he not obtained, that was meet for a man to wish? who in the beginning of this man's state, with unheard virtues, exceeded the great hope the citizens conceived of him, being a child, who never sued for the Consulship, 
Scipio twice consul.  and yet was twice made Consul: first before time, being under age: secondly in time by course, and for the common wealth almost to late: who by destroying two cities, most eager enemies to this Empire, clearly broke up not only wars, that were present, but wars which were to come. What should I speak of his gentle manners, his natural duty towards his mother, his liberality towards his sisters, his goodness towards his servants, his uprightness towards all men? 
All Rome bewailed Scipio's death.  All these be right well known to you. But how dear he was to the city, it was declared by the mourning at his funerals. What then could having of a few years more, have profited him? for old age, although it be no heavy burden (as I remember Cato did the year before his death discourse with me and Scip. 
Old age. ) yet it taketh away that fresh youth, wherein then Scip. was. Wherefore his life was such, either by fortune, or by glory, as nothing could be added more. But his quick departure, took away the grief of death, of the which sort of dying, it is hard to speak any certainty. What men suspect, you see. Nevertheless, this a man may safely say, that amongst many his days, which he had seen in his life time most fair and joyful, that day was the noblest to P. Scipio, 
How honourably Sci was brought from the Senate house.  when the Senate house being broken up, he was brought home again at night, by the eldest senators, by the league friends of the Romans, and also by the Latins, the day before he departed this life, that from so high a step of honour, he might seem rather to have mounted to God, then to have gone down to hell. 
immortality of the soul.  For I can in no wise agree with them, which began of late to reason thus, that the soul dieth with the body, and all things end by death. I way more the authority of old writers, and of our elders, which made so godly laws for the dead. as in mine opinion they would never have done, 
The part of Italy now called Calabria in the kingdom of Naples.  if they had thought there had nothing concerned them. And their authority also I more regard, which were sometime here in this land, and instructed great Grece with their good rules and lessons, which now is destroyed, and at that time flourisshed. And his also I esteem more, which by Apollo's oracle was adjudged the wisest, 
Socra.  who did not affirm sometime one thing, and sometime an other, as in many cases is used, but always held one, 
Man's soul.  that man's soul was an heavenly thing: and that the same, when it departed from the body, had a way to return to heaven very speedy, for every good and just man. Which self same thing Scipio also thought, who seemed as it were to have a forefeling of the thing, a very few days before his death, when both Philus and Manilius being present, 
Phi. Manilius.  and others more: yea, and you yourself Scaevola, commoned with me, he reasoned three whole days upon a common wealth, the latter end of the which disputation, was of the everlasting life of the soul, which (he said) he heard of Affricanus in his sleep by a vision. If that be so, that every good man's soul doth easily make his flight to heaven, as out of prison and chains of the body, whom can we judge to have had an easier passage to God, than Scipio? Wherefore to lament this his good end, I fear were rather envious then friendly. And on tother side, if I were afeard of this, that the soul died with the body, and that there remained neither feeling of weal nor woe: then as in death there is no goodness, so neither is there evilness. For when a man's feeling is once gone, he is made as though he had never been born: yet that Sci was begot, both we do rejoice, and the city (while it standꝭ,) ought to be glad. Wherefore, as I said afore, he is very well, but with me it is somewhat worse, whom reason rather would, as I came before him into this world, so I should have gone before him out of this life: but yet I take such fruit of the remembrance of our friendship, that I think I lived happily, that with Scipio I led my life, with whom I had a joinct care, for the common wealth, and for our private causes, with whom both in peace and war I took like part: yea, and we agreed evermore in love, mind, purpose, and opinion, in which thing the whole pith of friendship standeth. 
friendship.  Therefore this fame of wisdom, which Fannius even now rehearsed, doth not so greatly delight me, (specially being false) as that I trust there shallbe an everlasting memory of our friendship: and the same the rather is an heartjoy unto me, because that in so many hundred years, as have passed, there have he found scarce three or four couples of friends, 
Scase three or four couples of friends.  among the which sort I see there is hope, that Scipios and Laelius friendship shall be known to our offspring.  Fan. 
verily Laelie, this can not otherwise be chosen. But seeing you have made mention of friendship, and we be also at leisure, you shall do a great pleasure to me, and no less I trust to Scaevola, if as ye are wont of other matters, when they are demanded of you, you will so now dispute of friendship, what you think thereof, whom you count a friend, and what good rules you give thereon.  Scaevo. 
It pleaseth me well, and as I was about to be in hand with you for it, Fannius did forespeke me. Wherefore you shall exceedingly pleasure both us.  Lael. 
And I surely think it no pain, if I thought myself well able, for both the matter seems goodly, and we (as Fannius alleged) be at leisure. But who am I? or what eloquence is in me? This is the fashion of learned men, and that among the Greeks, to have a matter proponed unto them, whereon they should reason, although out of hand. It is a busy piece of work, and needeth no small exercise. Wherefore my judgement is, you should seek the points to be disputed of freendeship, of those, which profess this manner of reasoning. As for me, 
Frendeship to be preferred above all thing.  I can no more but exhort you, to set friendship before all kind of worldly things. For nothing is so agreeable to nature, nor so fit for prosperity or adversity. 
friendship only between good men  But first and foremost this I think, that friendship can be but in good men.  
¶ Neither do I so search the matter to the quick, as they which reason this gear more subtly, although perchance truly, and yet little to any common profit. For they deny, that any is good, but he be wise. And be it so hardily Yet such a thing call they that wisdom, as never earthily man attained hitherto. But we must hope for such things as be in ure, and in our daily life, and not for those things, which be feigned or wished after. I will never say, that Caius Fabritius, Mar. Curius, 
C. Fabri.. Mar Cu. ●. Coruucanus.  and Titus Cornucanus, whom our elders deemed wise, were after these men's rule accounted wise. Wherefore let them keep to them selves their name of wisdom, both envied and unknown, so they confess these afore were good men: but yet that will not they grant, for they will deny, that that can be said but by them that be wise. Let us go then even plainly to work like a pack staff, as the proverb is. They which behave themselves, 
proverb  and do so live, that their faith, their honesty, their uprightness and liberality is allowed, and in them neither covetousness, neither treachery, neither rashness is seen to be: and beside this, be of great constancy, as they were, whom before we named: all these like as they be taken for good men, 
Good men.  so we think them worthy to be called, who follow nature, the best guide of welliving, so far as man's power can lead them. For this me thinketh I do spy, that we are so borne together, as there should be among all men a certain fellowship. 
Th'order of friendship.  And the greater the fellowship should be, the nearer that every one cometh to an other. And therefore citizens be dearer to us than forrains, and kinsfolk nearer than frennefolke: for toward these Nature herself hath bred a friendliness: but in this there is not surety enough. for in this point friendship passeth kindred, in that kindred may be without good will: but friendship in no wise can lack it. For take away good will, and friendship loseth, but cozenage keepeth still his name. But how great the virtue of friendship is, it may here of best be understand, that of innumerable companies of mankind, which nature herself hath knit together, it is a thing drawn and brought into such a straight, that friendship is always joined either between two, or else between few. 
What amity is.  For friendship is nothing else, but a perfect agreement with good will and true love in all kind of good things and godly. And I know not whether any better thing hath been given of GOD unto men, wisdom excepted, than this same friendship. Some set richesses before, some health, others power, and others honour, many also pleasures. 
Pleasure.  But certes this last is for beasts, and those other uppermore be fading and uncertain, and be not so much within the compass of our wisdom, as within the fickleness of fortune. But they, which place our chiefest weal in virtue, do therein very well: and yet this same virtue it is, which both engendereth and upholdeth friendship. 
No friendship without virtue.  Neither may friendship by any means be without virtue. Now let us set out, what is virtue, after the manner of our living, and fashion of our talk: and let us not measure it as certain unlearned men do, by the stateliness of the words. And let us reckon them good men, which are so counted, that is to say, the Paul's, the Cato's, the Caians, the Scipions, and Philons. These were contented with this common kind of life. And as for such, which can not any where be found, let us leave them of. 
commodities of friendship.  Therefore among such sort of men, friendship hath so many commodities, as I can scarcely well express. First who can be vita vitalis (to use Ennius' terms) which in english is, living in this life, that liveth not in mutual love with some friend? What sweeter thing can there be, than to have one, with whom thou darest so boldly talk all matters, as with thine own self: how should the profit of welfare, and prosperity be so great, if you had not some, which should rejoice so much thereat as yourself? But as for evil plight and adversity, it were hard to bear them without such an one, as would bear the same more grievously than yourself. To conclude, all other things, that are desired, each one to each man serveth the turn, as richesses for use, wealth for worship, honour for praise, pleasure for delight, health to want grief, and to do the office of the body. Friendship conteigneth more things in it. Whither so ever you turn, it is at hand, it will be kept out of no place, it is never unseasonable, nor never troublous. 
Frendeship is as necessary as the elementis.  Therefore neither water, nor fire, ne air, as they say, do we in more places use, than this friendship. And now do I not speak of the common or mean sort of friendship (which yet delighteth and profiteth) but of the true and perfect, as theirs was, which being few are soon told. For friendship maketh welfare the goodlier, and evil fare, by sondering and parting of griefs, the lighter. And where friendship hath in it many and great commodities, yet this exceedeth all the rest, that she forecomfortes us, with the good hope that is to come. She suffereth men's hearts neither to feint, nor yet to fall: but he that beholdeth his friend, doth as it were behold a certain pattern of himself. 
The excellency of amity.  Wherefore in friendship the absent be present, the needy never lack, the sick think themselves whole, and that which is hardest to be spoken, the dead never die. So great honour, remembrance, and desire breedeth in them toward their friends. By reason whereof their deaths be thought happy, and the others lives be much preisid. But if you should take out of the world the knot of friendship, 
Want of friendship.  neither can there any house, 
want of friendship.  neither any city be able to continue, no not the tillage of the land can endure. And if this can not be understand herebi, yet of strife and debate it may well be perceived, how great the power of concord and friendship is. For what house so steady, or what city standꝭ so fast, but through hatred and strife, 
Hatred & strife.  it may be utterly overthrown? Whereupon, how much goodness resteth in friendship, it may be easily judged. Men report, 
Empedocles.  that a certain Agrigentine, being a learned man, wrote in Greek verses, that all things, having their being in the world and moving, be by friendship kept together, and by debate scattered: and this all men both perceive, and prove in very deed. And therefore if at any time, there hath appeared, any kind part of one friend toward an other, in adventuring of apparel, or else in part wearing the same, what is he that would not set it out with great praises? What a great show was there, the last day all the place over, at the new made play of mine old host and friend M. Pacwius, 
M. Pacunius tragedy amity of Orestes and Pylades.  when the king, not knowing whether of the two was Orestes, Pylades answered, that he it was, that was Orestes, because he would have been put to death for him: and Orestes again, that was so in deed, avowed stiffly, that he it was that was Orestes. The hearers that stood about, praised it with clapping their hands, being but a matter feigned. What think we then they would have done in a true matter? Here nature herself did soon bewray her own ernestenesse, when these men judged the same to be well done in another, which they could not do themselves. And thus far me seemeth, I have thoroughly spoken what I think of friendship. if there be any more things, as A believe there be many, ask it of them if ye think good, which dispute these kind of matters.  Fan. 
But we rather covet to hear it of you, although for my part I oft times have sought it at their handis, and have heard them very willingly: but we look for an other manner of vein in your talk.  Scae. 
You would the sooner have said so Fannie, if you had of late been present in Scipio's orchard, when the reasoning was concerning a common wealth, and had heard, what a defender of justice be was at that day, against a curious oration that Philus made.  Fan. 
That surely was an easy matter for the just to defend justice.  Scae. 
And what say you by friendship? shall it not be like easy for him to do the same therein, who hath gained great honour, for keeping the same with all trustiness, steadfastness, and uprightness.  Lael. 
Nay, this is as though ye would force me to speak. But what skilleth it, by what means you drive me to it, I take it truly, that ye force me. Yet to withstand the earnest desires of a man's friends, especially in an honest matter, partly it is an hard thing to do, and partly not well standing with reason. Wherefore many times thinking of friend ship, this was wont to be chief weighed of me, whether for stay and for need, men ought to seek for friendship, to th'intent that in doing and taking of pleasures, one might receive of another, 
Wherefore friends are sought  that he told not come to by himself, and after that sort might requite others: and whether this were the very property of friendship, or else there were some other cause more ancient, more commendable, and more proceeding of nature. For love, whereof friendly love and friendship cometh, is the chief cause, to fasten good wills together. Commoditees often times also be gotten at their hands, 
love.  which with flattering friendship be sought upon, and as time serveth, be attended upon. But in friendship there is no feigning, there is no dissembling, and what so ever is in it, the same is true and unforced. Wherefore I am of opinion, that friendship took his beginning rather by nature, 
Natural friendship  than for any help of stay, and rather by the casting of one's fantasy toward tother, with a certain feeling of love, then by the thinking, how much profit might ensue of such a thing. The which surely what kind of thing it is, may well be understand, even in certain beasts, which so tenderly love their young ones for a certain space, and be so loved of them again, that their nature soon appeareth: which thing in man is much more evident.  
first of the love that is between the children & parents, which can not possibly without some heinous mischief be withdrawn. And secondarily when a like bearing of love appeareth, as if we have found any body, with whose manners and nature we agree, because we think we see in them as it were a certain spark of honesty and virtue. For nothing is better beloved than virtue, 
Virtue.  nor nothing more allureth men to cast favour, in so much, that for virtue and honesty we favour, after a certain sort even those, whom we never saw in our life. For who is it, that doth not use remembrance of Caius Fabritius, or Marcus Curius, 
C. Fabritius. M. Curius.  whom he never saw, with a certeigne love and good favour toward them. Who again doth not hate Tarqvinius the proud, Sp. Cassius, and Sp. Melius? With the two captains Pyrrhus and Hamnibal, 
Pyrrhus Hannibal.  we fought for the Empire in Italy. notwithstanding from the one, we withdrew not much our hearts, for his honest name, and tother always the city hated for his purveyance. But if the power of honesty be so much, 
Power of honesty.  that we love the same, yea in those, which we never saw, and more than that, we like it even in our very enemies: what marvel is it, if the hertis of men be moved, when they seem to behold the virtue and goodness of such, with whom they may be joined in acquaintance. 
love confirmed by benefits.  Although love be fastened by pleasures received, by good will well tried, and acquaintance had: all which things together when they be laid to the same first fantasy of man's mind and love, a certain wonderful greatness of good will doth kiendle. Which, if any think it cometh of desire, 
Base out spring of friendship.  to have a help of stay, that it should be a mean, whereby every one should come by that he most desireth, truly they leave us a very base, and no gentlemanly out spring of friendship to be, which of lack and need would have it to issue. But if this were so, then as every man felt in himself smallest hability, so should he be most readiest to friendship: which thing is far otherwise. For as every man trusteth most to himself, and as every man chiefly with virtue and wisdom, is so furnished, that he hath no need of any other, and taketh all his own things to lie in his own power: so he doth most exceed all others in seeking and honouring freenshippe. 
Africanus and Lael●us had no need one of an other.  For what, had Affaicanus any need of me? Nothing at all truly, Nor I of him neither: but I, for certain wonder I was in of his virtue, and he perchance again for an opinion he had of my behaviour, loved me, and our daily company increased our good will. But although many and great commodities ensued thereof, yet did not the cause of our loving one the other, come of any hope of such things. For as we be profitable to others and liberal, not of purpose to get thanks, 
Usury of pleasures.  (for in deed we make no usury of our pleasures) but even of very nature be given to liberality: so do we think, that we ought to covet friendship, not led thereto by hope of reward, but because all the fruit thereof resteth in very love self. 
Fruit of amity.  We are far from the opinion of these, which after the nature of brute beastis, do refer all things to pleasure & sensuality. And no marvel at all For they, which have cast all their minds, upon so vile and so loathsome a thing, can have no eye to any heavenly, to any goodly, or godly thing. Where fore those manner of men, we will set a side from our talk, and let us imagine and judge, that loves feeling, and earnestness of good will is engendered of nature, by some proof of honesty declared. Which honesty who that love, do apply themselves to the same, and draw nearer, that they may take the use of the company and manners of him, whom they began to fantasy: and that they may be mates and a like in love, readier to do pleasures than to require any And let this be an honest kind of strife between friends. And thus shall great commodities be taken of friendship, and the beginning thereof shall come of nature, rather than of need, a beginning both weightier and truer. 
Friendship beginning of nature.  For if profit should fasten friendship, than the same being changed, should unlose it again. But because nature cannot be changed, therefore true friendships be everlasting.  
¶ Thus the first beginning of friendship you see, except peradventure ye have some thing else to ask.  Scae. 
Nay Laelius, I pray you go forth with your matter, and as for him here, which is my younger, of mine own head I dare make answer.  Fan. 
In deed you say but well, wherefore let us hear forth. Laelius. Hearken then my friends these things, which many times and oft have been reasoned, between me and Scipio, concerning friendship. 
Continuamce of friendship.  He truly was wont to say, there was nothing more hard than friendship to continue unto the last hour of death. For he would say, it oft times happened, that either it should not avail both parties, to have it continue still, or else that freendis would not be always of one mind, in the matters of the common wealth. He would say also, that men's manners did oft change, sometime by reason of evil luck, sometime as age grew on them. And of these things he would bring an example by a similitude of boys state, which was, that the hot love of children, was oft times cast up with their change of voice. And in case they had continued it, till they became young men of full age: yet that friendship was broken sometime, either by reason of strife, either by some manner of riot, either by some gain and profit, which both of them being friends, could not attain to at once. So that if any had gone on, somewhat longer in friendship, yet they broke often times, if they fell in any contention for honour or dignity. For he would say there was no sorer pestilence in friendship, 
Covetusnesse in friendship.  than covetousness of money, which is in the most part of men, and strife about honour and glory, which is in the best sort of men. Where upon great enmity oft times groweth between right dear friends. He further would say, that great variance, and many times just did spring, when any thing was required of friends, that was not honest, as either that they should be instruments to others treachery, or else helpers to do wrong. The which thing such as would refuse, although they should do honestly in it, yet should they be reproved of them, whose minds they would not follow, as breakers of the law of friendship. But they, which had the face to require any thing, what so ever it were, of their friend, he was wont to say, did by their very asking profess, that for their frendis sake they would attempt all manner of things. And when such men's malice was once long grown and festered in heart, not only their acquaintance was wont to be given up, but also great and continual hatred grew between them. These many things so hang over friendship, even as one should say, by destiny, that he mayed, to escape all these, he thought it to be not only a part of wisdom, but also of very happiness. 
Bonds of love.  Wherefore if ye be pleased, let us first see this point, how far ought love to stretch in friendship, as if Coriolanus had any friends, 
Comotion of Coriolanus.  whether they ought to have borne weapon with him against their country: whether Becillinus friends 
Becillinus  should have ordered him in his enterprise for the kingdom: whether Spu. Melius friends should have holden with him? We saw Tiberius Graccus, when he made an up stir in the common wealth, was forsaken of Quintus Tubero and his companion friends. But Caius Blossius the Cumaine, a jest of your family Scaevola, when he came to me as a sewter, because I sat in counsel with Laenas and Rutilius the consuls, alleged this cause for himself that I should pardon him, which was that he had Tiberius Graccus in such a reverence, that whatsoever he willed, he thought it meet to be enterprised. Than ꝙ I, what and this to, if he would have had you set fire on the Capitol? Nay ꝙ he, 
Capitol.  he would never have willed me to such a thing, but and if he had once bid me, I must needs have done it. You see how shameful a saying this was, 
Wicked answer of Blosius.  and in very deed so he did, yea and rather more than he said. For he did not follow Tiberius Graccus rashness, but was also a ringleader to it, nor made not himself a companion of his fury, but a captain. And therefore in this madness being afeard of a new examintion, he fled into Asia, and got him to our enemies, and in the end, suffered just and grievous punishment of our city. 
Offence in our friends behalf.  There is therefore none excuse for the fault, if a man offend for his friends sake, 
Honest requests.  for seeing the opinion of ones virtue is the breeder of friendship, it is hard for friendship to remain, if one serve from virtue. But if we agree it to be honest, both to grant to our friends what so ever they would have, and to obtain of our friends what so ever we desire: there truly we be of a through tried wisdom, if there can be no fault found with the thing. But our speaking is of these friends that be in our lie daily, of such as we see, or such as we have heard of, and our daily experience teacheth us. Out of these sorts we must take examples, and of them chiefly, who come nearest to wisdom. We know, 
P. Aemilius.  that Paulus Aemilius was of much familiarity with Caius Lucinius, 
C. Lucinius  as we have heard of our fathers, and that they were twice consuls together, and fellows in office of the Censureshippe. And we read also in stories, that in that time Marcus Curius and Titus Coruncanus 
M. Curius C. Coruncanus.  were great freendis with them, and dearest one to tother also among themselves. Therefore we can not so much as suspect or deem, that any of these would have earnestly required any thing of their friend, that should have been against their faith, against their oath, or against the common wealth. For to what purpose were it, to say that these evils were in such men? For if they had earnestly required any thing in that manner, I know they could not have obtained, for asmuch as these we spoke of, were very godly men. But let it be of a like evil to grant, as to make an unhonest suit. Yet Caius Carbo consented to Tiberius Graccus, and so did C. Cato, who at that time was never a whit his brother Caius enemy, 
First law in friendship.  but at this present is his earnest adversary. Let this then be the first law enacted in friendship, that neither we require unhonest things, nor being desired do any. For it is a fowl excuse, and in no wise to be allowed, when a man shall either in private faults, other else in faults against the common wealth confess, 
Fowl excuse.  he did it for his friends sake. For we are now, O Fannius and Scaevola, set in such place, that it behoveth us long afore to foresee the chances that may happen to the common wealth. For the old custom of our fathers all ready is somewhat swerved from her course and race. 
Ambition of Tiberius Graccus.  Tiberius' Graceus went about to have gotten the kingdom, and ruled as a king to, for certain months, did ever the people of Rome hear or see the like? And his friends and kinsfolk also after his death did follow the example of him. What parts they played against P. Scipio Nasica, I can not without tears report. For as for Carbo, whom we spoke of erewhile, we did suffer and bear with, because of Tiberius Graccus new punishment. But what I look to follow of Tiberius Graccus Tribuneship, I lust not to prophecy, for from thence cometh all matters, which be ready for mischief: and after they once begin, they follow headlong on. Ye see already afore hand in the tables of the laws, how great a decay hath happened, first by the law called Gabinia, 
Gabinius law.  and then within two years after, by the law called Cassia. 
Cassius' law.  And methinks I do already see the commonalty of Rome divided from the Senate, and that the greatest matters be ordered after the will of the people. For more men shall learn how such things may be done, then how they may be withstanded. But to what end speak I all this? verily because no man goeth about any such thing without fellowship. The honest sort therefore must be warned, if unwares they light by any adventure in such a kind of friendship, that they think not themselves so bound, but that they may forsake their friend, if in any great matter they conspire against the common wealth. 
Punishment as due to the partners as ryngeleaders.  And for naughty men a punishment must be devised, and no less for such as follow others, then for those which be the very captains and ryngeleaders themselves of all wickedness. Who was nobler, who was of more power in all Grece then Themistocles? 
Themistocles.  who being captain in the war against the Persians, when he had delivered Greece from bondage, and afterward was banished for envy, could not bear the same envy of his unthankful country, which his part was to have borne. He played the like part that Coriolanus did with us twenty years a go. 
Themistocles and Coriolanus slew themselves.  These twain found no aid against their country, and therefore they killed themselves. Wherefore such naughty men's conspiracy, is not to be cloaked with any excuse of friendship, but rather punished with all extremity, that no man may think it lawful to follow his friend, that makes war against his country. Which thing (as the world beginneth to go) I wot not whether one day it will be so or not. But truly I for my part, have no less care, 
A good but a rare care.  what the state of the common wealth shallbe after my death, than what it is at this day. 
First rule of friendship.  Let this therefore be agreed, to be the first rule of friendship, that we ask of our friends things that be lawful, and do for our friends sakes things that be honest. And that we look not upon our friend till he desire us, 
Preventing of honest requests.  but that good will be always ready, and that slackness be not used Let us be glad in deed to give faithful counsel. Let them be of great account in freendeship, 
motions in friendship.  which counsel well. And let us give them a rule over us, to warn us, not only plainly: but also if need be, sharply, and such authority given must be obeyed. For I suppose some wonderful wonders pleased some of them, whom I hear say were taken for wise in Greece. But there is nothing, but that they can descant thereon with their quiditives, as for example we should avoid friendship with to many, 
Few friends.  for that one man thereby must needs be careful for many, and that it is enough to do, every man to care for his own. Also to be overmuch cumbered with other men's matters (they say) is unwieldy, and to have the rains of friendship at length to pluck straighter or make slacker, as one will, they think it a pleasure. For they say, quietness is the chief point of happiness, which the mind can not enjoy, if one musts bear the burdeine, or as it were, travail with child for many. Another sort of them (they say) speak much more beastly yet then this, which place a little above I briefly touched, and that was, that friendship ought to be desired for an help and stays sake, and not for good will and favour to any body. And therefore as every man hath little stay, and little succour, so he should the more seek after friendship. And for this cause (they say) it is, that women seek more the help of friendship than men, and the poor more than the rich, and the wretched more than the fortunate.  

Taking friendship out of the world.  ¶ O gay and goodly wisdom. For they go about to take the son out of the world, that would take friendship out of it, than the which we have of God nothing better, ne nothing pleasant. For what manner of quietness is this? truly to see to, pleasant, but in very deed at many times to be refused. For it is no reason, either not to take in hand or to leave of being taken in hand, 
We must alway do well.  any honest cause or deed, because thou wouldst not be troubled. But if we will refuse pain, we must also refuse virtue, which must of necessity with a certain painfulness despise and hate his contraries, as for example, the good must hate the evil, the chaste the lecherous, the hardy the cowardly. Therefore you see the right, most of all grieved with unrighteousness, the mighty with the weaklings, the honest with the shameless. This therefore is the property of a well stayed mind, 
property of a well staid mind  to rejoice at good things, and to be grieved with the contraries. Wherefore if grief of mind light in a wise man (as in very deed it doth) except we suppose the nature of man is clean rooted up out of his heart, what cause is there, that we should utterly bannysh friendship from the life of man, because we would suffer no troubles for it? For what difference is there, I say not between a beast and a man, but even between a man and a stone, or a dead stock, or any such like thing, if you take away the movings and modes of the mind? 
He meaneth the stoics.  Neither are these to be heard, that will needs have virtue to be an hard thing, & as it were like iron. Which trwely aswell in many things, as also in friendship, is easy and gentle, so that at the good fortune of his friend it spreadeth it s●lfe abroad, and at his misfortune it shrinketh in again. Wherefore this grief of mind, that is oftimes to be taken for friends, is not so great as it ought to take away friendship among men: no more than virtue should be refused, because it bringeth with it many cares and troubles of mind. But for asmuch as virtue knitteth friendship together (as I said afore) if any spark of virtue do appear, 
Where love groweth.  whereunto one of a like mind may apply and join itself, there love must necessarily grow, when such a thing happeneth. 
beastliness.  For what is so trastlie, as to be delighted with these many kind of vain things, as honour, glory, building, apparel, and deckeing of the body, and not marueilousely to be delighted, with such a mind endued with virtue, as both can love and yield love for love again. 
Requiting of benefits.  For there is nothing goodlier, then requiting of benefitis, nor any thing pleasanter, than th' enterchangeyng of love and duty. And also if you put this unto it, which may well be added, that there is nothing, which allureth and so draweth ought unto it, 
'Cause principal of friendship.  as likeness of conditions doth one to friendship. This surely is granted to be true, 
Like will to like.  that the honest, love the honest, and so haunt together, as men near joined by kindred and nature. For nothing more coveteth, or is more eager of his like, than nature. Wherefore this is plain, 
Nature.  O Fannie and Scaevola, in mine opinion, that the honest bear toward the honest, a certain goodwill, as of course, which is appointed by nature, to be the well spring of friendship. But this kind of goodness also should appear toward the common sort. 
Virtue.  For virtue is not churlish, nor empty handed, nor yet lofty: but her custom is to defend all men, and to do the best for them she can. Which thing undoubtedly she would not do, if she disdeigned the common sort.  

profit.  ¶ Furthermore me thinketh those men, that for profits sake dissemble friendship, do clean take away the loving knot of friendship. For the very profit gotten by one's friend, doth not so much like one, as his friends very love doth delight him: and than is that, which cometh from a man's friend a pleasure, when of good will and love it proceedeth. And it is so beyond reason, that friendship should be sought for necessity, seeing that those, which be endued with wealth, richesse and virtue chief, wherein most aid is, have no need of any other, and be most liberal and bounteous. And I know not, whether it be a meet thing, that friends should never need any thing: for where should our good will have appeared, if Scipio had never needed, never favour, never counsel, never our assistance, neither in peace nor in war. Therefore friendship hunteth not after profit, 
profit followeth friendship.  but profit followeth friendship. Men than that swim in richesse, be not to be heard, if they shall at any time dispute of friendship, in which neither by experience, nor by acknowledge, they have any understanding. For who is there (in very sadness) that neither to love any, neither to be loved again, would wallow in all richesse, and live with plenty of all things earthly? For this kind of life is for tyrants, 
A tyrants life.  wherein there is no trustiness, no love, no hope of assured good will, but all things evermore suspected and cared for: 
Love and fear.  nor there is no place of friendship. For who can love one, whom he feareth: orels elles love one whom he dreadeth? Such yet be honoured with feigned friendship only for a time, that if they hap to take 
adversity trieth friends.  a fall (as it doth many times come to pass) than is it well perceived, how naked they be of friends. Which thing the report goeth, Tarqvinius the tyrant said, at such time as he was banished, that he well understood, what friends he had faithful, and what unfaithful, now when he was able to recompense neither of them. And yet I marvel, if in that his pride and loathsome conditions, he could possibly have any at all. And as this man's manners, of whom we have spoken, could not purchase any true friends, so many men's riches, that be in high authority, 
Richesses.  do clean shut out, as it were true friendship. For Fortune herself is not only blind, 
Fortune.  but maketh these also often times blind, whom she most embraceth. And therefore (for the most part) they are puffed up with pride and disdain, and nothing is so irksome, 
A fool fortunate.  as a fool in good fortune. And this a man may see, that such as before times were of indifferent manners, by rule, power, and prosperity, do change and despise their old friends, and lean to new. But what more foolish thing can be, than to study, they may be able with great heaps and plenty, to get other things that be sought for, as money, horses, servants, gay clothing, and costly plate, and yet not to seek for friends, being the best & goodliest riches of this life. 
Friends the best richesses.  For they know not for whom they get other things, when they are gotten, nor to whose use they travail. For every one of these be his, which will win them with strong hand. But friendship once gotten, abideth with every man steadfast and surely. 
gifts of fortune.  And although these things continue, which be as one would say, the gifts of fortune, yet a rude life and destitute of friends can not be pleasant. But here an end of this matter.  
¶ And now we must set out, 
Bonds of love in friendship.  how far the bounds and points of love do reach in friendship. Whereof I see there be three opinions, and I allow neither of them. One is, that we so love our friend, as we do ourselves. The other, that our good will toward our friends, do a like and equally answer their good will toward us. 
●. opinions of friendship disallowed.  The third, that how much every man setteth by himself, so much he should be set by of his friends. But I agree to none of these three opinions. For the first is not true, that every man, is a like hearted toward his friend, as he is toward himself. For how many things enterprise we for our friends sake, which for ourselves we would never do, as to pray and sue to an unworthy man for our friends cause: to be over earnestly bend against one, and to pursue him very sore: which things in our own matters stand not well with honesty, but in our friends causes be most honest. There be many things also, in which the honest sort, both take away and suffer to be taken from their own gains, to th'end their friends rather than themselves, may enjoy them. The second opinion is, that appointeth friendship, to use like benefits, and like good will, but this is to strait and to near, to bring friendship to be weighed in balance, as though there ought to be a like iompe measure of taking and receiving of pleasures. 
True friendship.  Me thinketh true freendeship is a richer and a bountifuller thing, and doth not take so narrow head to give no more than it may receive. Neither is there such fear to be taken in freendeship, that we lease not a good turn, or let it fall in the mire, or that we heap not up more benefits than just measure. The third is the worst, which is, that how much every man maketh of himself, so much he should be made of by his friend. But in some often times either there is a more bashful spirit, or a more comfortless hope of amending their state. It is not therefore the property of a friend, to be toward him, as he is toward himself, but he ought rather to study and find the means, that he cheer up his friends dismayed mind, and bring him in a more hope and better comfort. There is therefore another end of true friendship to be made, so that first I shall tell that which Scipio was wont chief to reprove. He would deny, that any saying could be found more against friendship than this that said, men ought so to love, as at sometime they should hate And he could not be brought to believe, 
A saying most repugnant to friendship.  that this was said by Bias, as it was reported, who was one of the seven wise men: but that it was the saying of some vile and ambitious man, or else of one that would bring all things to his own power and sway. For how can one be his friend, whose enemy he thinks also to be. For first he must needs desire and wish, that his friend might very often offend, that he might give as it were occasions to chide. Again, he must needs be grieved and fretted, or else envy at his friends good hap and doings. Wherefore this rule truly were enough (whose so ever it be) to destroy friendship. But this rather were meet, to have a rule made, that we should use such wareness in providing of friends, that we should not begin to love him, whom at any time we might after hate. Besides, if we had not been most fortunate in choosing of our friends;, yet Scipio thought men should bear that mischance, rather than to seek an occasion of falling out. 
What is to be attributed to honest friends.  These ends in freendeship therefore I think be to be used, that when friends manners be honest, all their goods, counsel, and good will, should be as common among them, without any exception: and also if chance so come to pass, that the unhonest doings of friends, be to be helped in things, where they stand upon life and death, or upon their estimation, they may somewhat serve out of the way, so that great dishonesty follow not of it. For friendship may be pardoned herein. Neither is estimation to be rejected. Nor yet must we think, that the people's voice is a small help to have a doing in things, which to get with flattery & fair words is dishonesty. Therefore virtue, who hath the love of all men following it, is not to be despised. But it was oft demanded (for now I return to Scipio, all whose talk was of friendship,) why in all other things men were more diligent, as that every one could tell how many goats and sheep he had of his own, 
A question worthy the asking.  yet could not number how many friends he had: and that in compassing the one he bestoweth a diligence, and in choosing the other, he is negligent, and hath as it were, no certeigne signs and marks, by the which he should judge who be fittest for friendship. We must therefore choose sure, steadfast, and unwauering friends, of the which sort, there is a great scarcity, and it is hard to know them without a trial. But we must make the trial in freendeshyppe itself, for so friendship goeth before our judgement, and taketh away the occasion of trial. It is therefore a wise man's part, so to stay the earnestness of his love, as he doth his race in runing, to th'extent we may so use our friendship, as men that had assayed their horse, 
Ways to prove friends.  and somewhat tried the manners of their friends. Many men often times in a little money matter, be found how unconstant they be: there be other some again, whom when a little money can not attempt, 
Money.  by a great sum of money may be soon known. But if some may be found, which think it beastly to set money before friendship, where then shall we find them, 
Honour.  that do not set honour, rule, 
Rule.  authority, 
authority  and power, before friendship? that when these be set forth on the one side, & the power of friendship on the other side, who is there, that will not rather chose the first than the last? For man's nature is weak to refuse rule, which if men follow and little regard freendeship, they think they are to be excused, because not without a great occasion, they have broken of friendship. 
Friendship hardly found among great men.  Therefore true friendship is very hardly found in them, which live in honour and rule. For where can you find such a one, as would prefer his friends honour before his own? But to leave these, how grievous and dangerous do most men think it, to be fellows and partenars in miseries, whereto not one is easily found, that willbe content to come, although Ennins said well: 
Sure friend.  The sure friend in things unsure is known. Yet these two things make men for the most part to be noted of unsteadfastness and lightness, if either in their own prosperity they set their friends light, or in their friends adversity they cast them of. Who therefore shall show himself in both these discrete, steadfast, and faithful in friendship, 
A faithful friend.  him ought we to judge of the perfectest kind of men, and in a manner as a god. For the ground work of that steadfastness & constancy, which we seek to be in friendship, is faithfulness. For nothing is steadfast, that is unfaithful. Besides it is fit we chose our friend simple, 
How to choose a friend.  familiar, good to agree with, & one that will be moved with the same things, wherewith we be. All which things belong to the faithfulness that ought to be in friendship. 
wavering mind.  For neither can he be faithful, that will be in many mindis, or that hath a turning head. Nor he steadfast & sure that is not of the same mode that his friend is, and agreeable to his nature. 
What a friend must eschew.  Hereunto must be joined, that he which shallbe a friend, may not take pleasure in accusing, nor lightly believe accusations offered, which things belong to that steadfastness, whereof erewhile I entreated. And so cometh it to be true, which in the beginning I said that friendship can not be but between good men. For it is the property of a good man 
Good men.  (whom we may also call wise) to keep these two rules in friendship.  

Two rules in friendship.  ¶ First, that nothing be feigned nor dissembled: for it is more honest openly to hate, than in countenance to cloak. Next, that not only he clear his friend of faults, whereof he is charged by any other, but also that he him s●lf in no wise be suspicious, or think his friend hath done any thing amiss. There must be besides this, 
Pleasant talk.  a certain pleasantness in ones talk and fashions, which is not one of the worst sauces for friendship, but sourness and solemness must in no wise be had, yet sadness and sageness in all matters have in it surely a certain gravity. 
Sageness  But friendship ought to be somewhat more at large, more free & pleasant, & to all fellowship and gentleness more disposed.  
¶ And here riseth a very hard question, 
Whether new or old friends are to be preferred.  whether our new friends worthy of friendship, be to be preferred before our old, as we use to esteem young horses more than old. A doubt surely unseemly for men, for of friendship as there is of other things, ought there to be no glutting. And our oldest kind of things like good old wines, aught to be most regarded. And that is a true said saw, 
Proverb.  which commonly is said, that we must eat many bushels of salt together, with whom we shall perform the parts of friendship. Yet new acquaintaunces be not to be refused, if there be any hope in them, 
Similitude.  as in good trees where appeareth fruit. And yet old acquaintance must be kept in his dew place. For in old friends, and acquaintance, and custom is no small trust.  
¶ And as to the horse, whereof we made mention erewhile, if nothing let, there s 's none, but had rather use him, whom he hath used, 
Custom.  than a new and unhandled. Neither doth custom much only in living things, but also in things lacking life. For even with hilly places and woody countries be we delighted, wherein we have dwelled long. But it is a chief poinet in freendeship, 
Chiefe-point in friendship.  the higher to be equal with the lower. For often times there be certain graces in it, as was in Scipio toward our company of friends, he never put himself forth before Philus, before Rutilius, before Mummius, or any of his base friends. But he honoured Quintus Maximus his brother, 
The elder in honour preferred.  as his better, because he was his elder, who was surely a notable man, yet nothing like him, and he was desirous, that all his friends might be made richer by him. Which all men must both do and follow, that if they get any betterness of virtue, wit, or fortune, they should part if among their friends, and part it with their kinsfolks, as if they be borne of a low stock, or else have their kindred either in wit or substance worse than the●m selfes, they should enlarge their richesses, and be as an honour and glory to their state, as we read in the plays of some, that were in servants states, by reason their birth and stock was unknown, but after they were perceived, and found either God's sons, or kings children, yet they bore still a love toward the sheapherdꝭ, whom they took many years as their fathers. Which thing we ought much rather do toward our true and well known fathers. For thence chief is the fruits of one's wit, virtue, and all honesty taken, when it is bestowed on him that is nearest allied. Therefore as those which in friendship be the betters in degree, 
Mutual behaviour of friends.  aught to equal themselves with their inferiors, so ought inferiors not to be grieved, if either in wit, either fortune, either worship, their friends do exceed them Of the which the most part either plain themselves of somewhat, or else upbraid men with their benefits, and so much the more if they think they have aught, 
Upbraids of pleasures.  which they can prove to have be done either dewtifully, or friendly, or by any of their travail. But surely these upbraiders of pleasures, be an hateful kind of people. Which pleasures he only, on whom they be bestowed, aught to remember, and not he that did bestow them. Wherefore as the better man must abase himself in freendeship, so after a sort the better must prefer the inferior. For there be some which make freendeship very irksome, where as they think themselves not regarded. Which happeneth almost to none but such as think themselves worthy to be despised. Who must both by words and deeds be brought from this opinion. You must do for every one first so much as yourself can do. 
How much is to be done for friends.  Next so much as he is able to discharge, whom you love and would further. For you can not bring all your friends to high honour, although you be far above other. As Scipio was able to make Publius Rutilius Consul, 
Scipio made Rutilius consul.  but he could never make his brother Lucius. And if you be able to prefer one to what you lust, yet most you take heed, what he is able to discharge. And we must always think friendship to be in full grown ages and well stayed wits. 
Friendship in ages & wits.  Nor those, which in their boistate, have been desirous of hunting and te●esse, must of necessity take them their freendis, 
Companions of youth.  whom they loved and delighted than with their pleasure. For so shall nurssꝭ and youth masters challenge much friendship, by reason of old right, who in deed be not to be despised, but yet after some other sort to be esteemed. For else friendship can not continue steadfast. 
Unlike manners.  unlike manners have unlike studies, whose unlikeness of conditions doth break of all friendship. And for none other cause the good with the wicked, and the wicked with the good can not be friends: but for that there is between them so great difference, as the greatest may be of manners and affections. It may be also a good lesson in friendship, that no man hinder his frendis profit, through unmeasurable love toward him, as it often happeneth. For to come to fables. 
Inordinate love in friendship.  If Neoptolemus would have heard Lycomedes, with whom he was brought up, when he would have stayed his journey with much weeping, he could never have taken Troy. And oftentimes there chanceth weighty matters, why a man must departed from his friends: the which who so ever would let or trouble, because be can not bear well his absence, is to be counted a weakling and cockney natured: and therefore unreasonable for freendeship. And in all things we must take head, 
Friends ought to ponder requests.  both what we ask of our friend, and what we suffer to be obtained of us. There happeneth also many times, as it were a certain necessary lamentation for the parting of friendship, for now our talk turneth from sage men's to the common people's friendship. 
Common people's friendship.  oft-times friends faults burst out, partly upon friends, and partly upon strangers, yet the shame redounds to their friends. Such sort of friendship therefore must be eased with leaving of company, and as I have heard Cato say, must be unhaunted, rather than hastily broken of, except some unbeareable injury shall fire it out, as a thing neither comely, neither honest, neither fit to be, without a present change and a severance. But if there Shallbe a certain change in their manners and likings, a some time there happeneth, 〈◊〉 some variance shall fall abo●● some part of the common wealth (for I spoke as I said a little afore not of wisemen's but common freendeship) a wariness is to be used, 
Wariness to be used in friendship,  least freendeship seem not only to be left of: but malice also to be bred. For nothing is more dishonest, than to be at war with him, with whom thou hast friendly lived. 
Dishonesty,  Scipio for my sake (as you know) had severed himself from Quintus Pompeius' friendship. For the dissension that was in the common wealth, he was also withdrawn clean from our fellow in office Metellus. 
Scipio's alienation from two of his friends,  Both these he did sageli with authority, and no great grief of mind. Wherefore we must first take head, that dissension happen not among friends, and that their friendship seem rather cast of, than oppressed. Also we must beware, that great friendships turn not in to great hatreds: whereof chidings, tauntyngꝭ, and evil reports do rise, which yet be to be borne, if any way they be sufferable. And here is the honour of old friendship to be given, that the fault always be in the doer, and not in the sufferer of wrong. 
Redress of vicis in friendship.  There is one counsel, and ease for all these vices and discommoditees, and that is, that we love not over soon, nor love the unworthy. 
Who be worthy of friendship.  They be worthy of friendship, in whose self there is a cause why they should be beloved. It is a rare kind, and so surely all worthy things be rare, yea and nothing harder than to find a thing in his kind through perfit. But the most part of men in worldly things will knowledge nothing good, but that is profitable, 
Beasts.  and like beasts they love those freendis chief, of whom they hope they shall receive most profit. Therefore they want that fairest and naturallest friendship, which is to be sought even by itself and for itself sake: neither do they show unto th●m selfes any token or example of the strength of this friendship, what and how much it is. For every man loveth himself not as though he would challenge of himself a reward for his love, but because every man of nature is dearest to himself: which kind of love and dearness who so doth not use it in freendeship, shall never be found a true and faithful friend. For he surely is a friend, 
Who is a friend.  that is an other I. That if it appear in beasts, in fowls, in cattle, in fish, in swine, and wild savage, first that they love themselves, 
Comparison between beasts and men.  (for that property is given to every living thing from the first birth) and next that they covet and lust after some other beasts of their kind, with whom they may be conversant, and that they do with a desire, and certain likeness to man's love: how much the more is it by nature in man, who both loveth himself, and gettꝭ him another, with whom he may break his mind, as though of two he would make almost one But the most sort of men even scarcely, (I will not say shamefully) would have such a friend as they themselves can not be, 
Unfrenly request.  and those things, which they do not to their friends, they yet them themselves will crave of them. But it is first meet, that one be good himself, 
A friend must be a good man.  and them seek after for his like: for in such, that kind of steadfast friendship, which I treated of erewhile, may be surely settled, when men joined together with good will, will first rule those affections, which others do serve, and then take a pleasure in uprightness and justice, and the one will take in hand all things for the other, and one will not require of an other, any thing but that is honest and lawful, and they will not only agree and love together, but they will also stand in a shamely awe of each other. For he that taketh away honest bashfulness from friendship, 
Honest bashfulness in friendship.  doth take away freendeshippes chief beauty. Therefore in those men is a very dangerous error, which think that by friendship, a gate is set open to all lust and vice. For friendship is given by nature as an aid to virtue, 
Friendship an aid to virtue.  and not as a guide to vice, to the intent that seeing virtue can not achieve alone to the chief things, she should come as it were in arm and accompanied with another, which kind of fellowship if either it be, either hath been, or shall be amongst any, they must be said best and luckiest accompaigned, for the attaining of nature's chief happiness. For this is (I say) the very fellowship, 
U●●aie fellowship.  wherein all things be, which men think to be wished after, as honestly, glory, quietness, and pleasure of mind, so that where these be, there is the happy life, 
Happy life.  and without these it can not be. The which life seeing it is the best and chiefest thing, we must give our mind to virtue, 
virtue.  if we will obtain it, with out which neither friendship, nor any thing else to be desired we can attain to. And surely where virtue is despised, those which think they have friends, do than feal they were deceived, when any weighty adventure doth drive them to make a trial. Wherefore when you have judged of your friend, 
Witty sentence.  you must love, and not when you have loved, than judge. Yea and this had need yet oftener to be told you. But where as in many things we be much punished for negligence, yet most of all in loving and regarding of our friends. For we use oftentimes the clean contrary counsel, and even forbidded we do and undo, as the old proverb saith. 
Proverb,  For when we be toast hither and thither, either by daily company, or else by some kind of duty, suddenly in the mids of our course we burst of our friendship, when there riseth any little offence. Wherefore such a carelessness of so necessary a thing, 
recklessness in friendship.  is the rather to be despised. For friendship is the only thing in the world, 
Profit of friendship.  of whose profit all men with open mouths do agree of, although virtue self of many is unsetby: and is said to be a certain outbragge or outshewe. 
Richesses.  Many also regard not riches, who being content with a little, right homely fare and homely apparel pleaseth them promotions also, 
promotions.  with the desire where of many be set a fire, a great sort do so little esteem, that they think nothing vainer nor lighter. Also other things, which some even wonder at, very many esteem them as nothing. Of friendship all men have one opinion, both those, which have given themselves to meddle with the common wealth, and those who be delighted with the acknowledge and learning of things, and those which quietly tend their own business, and finally those, which give themselves over wholly to follow pleasures, think there is no life without friendship, if it so be they will live somewhat honestly.  
¶ For friendship I wot not how creepeth through all kind of lives, 
Friendship creepeth through all kinds of life,  and will suffer no part of a man's life that is led to want her. So if there be any, of that sourness and grimnes of nature, that he flieth and hateth the company of fellowship of men, of the which sort we have heard say, one of the Tymons of Athenes was, 
Timon of Athens.  but which of them I know not, yet he could not abide, but must needs seek after one, to whom he might vomit up even the bitterness of his gall. And this chief would be judged, if any such thing might happen, that God would take us out of this press of men, and would set us some where in a wilderness, and giving us there store & plenty of all things, which nature desireth, would take from us the liberty of seeing any man at all, who were there so stony hearted, that could abide that kind of life? And from whom would not solitariness take the fruit of all pleasures? 
Solitariness.  Therefore that is true, which I trow I have heard our elders tell, was wont to be fathered on Archita the Tarentine, 
Archita.  and so they heard say of other old men, that is, if any man should climb to heaven once, and thoroughly behold the nature of the world, and the beautiefulnesse of the stars: it would be an unpleasant wonder unto him, which would have been a most pleasant marvel, if he had any, with whom he might have commoned thereof. 
Nature loveth no solitariness  So Nature (we see) loveth no solitariness, and always hangeth upon another, as upon a stay, which even amongst the freudliest kind of men is had for most delight. But where as the same nature declareth by so many signs, what she meaneth and seeketh, what she coveteth & desireth, yet I can not tell how we wax deaf, and here not those things, whereof we be warned by her. For diverse and many ways the use of friendship serveth, and many occasions of suspicious offences be given, which sometime to shun, sometime to ease, and sometime to bear them, is a wise man's part. And this one manner of offence is to be avoided, that both the profit, and faithfulness of friendship may be kept still. For oftentimes we must both warn, yea and chide our friends to. And the same is to be taken friendly, 
Chiding in friendship.  when it is done of good will. But I know not how it cometh to pass to be true, that my familiar Terence said in his comedy Andria, 
Familiar, because he used to read his books.  that sowthing getteth friends, and truth doth purchase hatred. Truth is noisome, if there grow hatred of it, which is a poison to friendship, 
soothing flattery.  but yet sowthing is much more hurtful, which cokereth up his friend in his faults, and suffereth him to run still on head. But there is great blame in him, that careth not for the truth, and much fault in him, that for deceit is given to sowthing. Herein therefore we must have all our regard and wariness, that our warnings be without bitterness, and our chidings with out spitefulness: but in sowthing (because I delight to use Terence word) let there be an honest liking, 
Flattery.  and let flattery the egger on of vice be set aloof, which not only for a friend, but for no honest man is meet. For men live after one sort with a tyrant, and after an other sort with a friend: but his good days be to be despaired of, whose ears be so shut up from the truth, 
truth is to be heard,  that he will not hear it of his friend. For it is a tried saw of Cato's, that earnest foes deserve much more pleasure of some, 
A tried saw of Cato's.  than those that seem to be fawning friends. For they sometime, but these never tell the truth. And this is to to foolish, 
To to foolish & thing.  that those, who be warned of their friends, be not agreaved at that they ought, but at that they ought not. For they be not sorry they did amiss, but they take it unkindly that be ●hidden, whereas contrary wise they should be sorry for their fault, and glad of the chiding. As then to warn our friend, and to be warned again, is the property of true friendship, 
property of new friendship,  and to do the one honestly, and not spitefully, and to take tother gently, and not frowardly, so must we think, 
Greatest pestilence in friendship.  there is no greater pestilence in freendeship than flattery, fair speech and sowthing, how be it for many causes, this may be noted the fault of light and subtle persons, which speak all to pleasure, but nothing to truth. 
Dissimulation in friendship.  But whereas dissimulation is evil in all things (for it keepeth a man from judging the truth) yet most of all it is contrary to freendeship, for it taketh away all truth in word, without the which the very name of friendship can not continue. 
End of friendship.  For seeing the power of friendship is in a man to none other end, but that of two minds there should be made one, how can it be brought to pass, if in one man there be not one and a like mind always, but a diverse, a wavering, and a changeable. For what thing can be made so variable, so out of course, as his mind, which not only turneth at every man's fantasy and pleasure, but also at every man's beck and look? say ye nay? and nay say I. say ye yea? and yea say I: and to be plain, I have even appointed with myself to hold up all things with yea and nay, 
Gnato the parasite.  as the same Terence saith. But this Terence speaketh in Gnato's person, which kind of speaking to make in a friend, were to to much lightness. But where as there be many like these Gnatoes, and in place, richesse, and estimation above others, 
Flattery very hurtful.  their kind of flattery is very hurtful, when authority is joined with their vanity. But a flattering friend may be aswell discerned and known from a true friend by taking good head, as all counterfeit and feigned things may be tried out from true and right things. The assemble of the commons of a city, which standeth most of unskilful perfons, is wont yet to judge, what difference is between a people pleaser, that is a flatterer, and currifavour, and a constant, a sage, and a discrete citizen. 
Caius Papyrius.  With the which kind of flatteries Caius Papyrius consul stuffed a late the people's ears, when he would have made a law for the restoring of the Tribunes for the commons. We persuaded the contrary, but I will say nothing of myself, of Scipio I will speak gladly. 
Pithy oration of Scipio.  Good lord, how pithy was he that day, how great a majesty was in his talk, that you might well have called him the leader of the people, and not a fellow commoner. But what need I to speak much hereof, ye were present, and the oration is in every mands hand. And by that means 〈…〉, for the getting of the people's favour, by the voices of the people self was dashed.  
¶ And that I may return to the matter, you remember, when Q. Maximus Scipio's brother, and L. Mancinus were Consuls, how the law of C. Lycinius Crassus, concerning the priests dignities, was thought to be favel seeking of the commons. For the choice of colleges was turned to the people's benefit. And he first made this order, to deal more truly with the common people. Yet the religion of the ever living goddes (we defending it by our answer) did soon overcome his oration, which was even a thing peincted for sale work, and was done when I was Praetor five year before I was Consul. Therefore that cause was defended, rather of itself, than by authority of the speaker.  
¶ But if in stage plays, wherein many feigned and resembled matters be used, truth is regarded, so that it be set out and declared: what must it be in friendship, which hangꝭ all on truth? In the which, except you know (as they say) a man's heart to the bottom, and you show likewise yours, there is no trust nor trial in it, and surely you can not love nor be loved, when you know not how truly it is ment. although this flattery be hurtful, yet can it not hinder none but him, that gives ear to it, and is delighted with it. And so it cometh to pass, 
Flatterer harkeneth flatterers. Virtue.  that he openeth his ears to flatterers, which flattereth and best liketh himself. Virtue always loveth herself self. For she best knoweth her s●lfe, and perceiveth how she is so beloved. But I speak not now of virtue, but of the opinion which men have of virtue. For with virtue self so many be not as would seem to be endowed. These sort of men flattery delighteth, when feigned communication is put forth to please them, and they think that kind of bain talk to be a witness of their praises.  
This therefore is no true friendship, when the one will hear no truth, and the other is ready to lie. 
Feigned friendship.  Neither would the clawing of these trencher friends, which be parasites, seem feat and pleasant in comedies, except there were mixed therein some glorious soldiers, which be Thrasoes: as for example saith Thraso: 
In Enucho Terence comedy.  Did Thais my woman give me great thanks. It had been enough for Gnato the Parasite to have answered, Ye sir great, but he said, ye sir exceeding great thanks. Flattery always sets a thing to the most, 
Flattery maketh● much of a little.  which he would have seem great, for whose pleasure it is spoken. Wherefore although this kind of fawning vanity, is much esteemed with them, which embrace and like it themselves, yet the sager and constantee sort of men must be warned, that they take heed, they be not snared with subtle flattery. For every man can see an open flatterer, except he be a very sot. But we must diligently beware, least the subtle and secret flatterer wind himself in with us. For he cannot easily be known. Because even with contrariing of one often times he flattereth, 
Snares of subtle flattery.  and feigning that he chideth, he is fair spoken, and at length he yields & suffers himself to be overcome, that he that is disceved may think he hath got a great victory. But what is more dishonesty then to be scorned? And therefore we must use the more diligence, that it may not hap, as in a play named the Epicure. To day before all my old doting foolish friends, you tossed me goodly, and mocked me gaily: for in plays old men's persons without forecast and being light of belief, be the most foolish. But I can not tell by what means from the friendship of perfit and wise men (I mean in such wisdom as is supposed may be in man) our communication is turned to slight and slender friendship. wherefore let us come again to the first we spoke of, and let us conclude at length upon it.  

Conclusion of the matter.  ¶ I say virtue, O C. Fannius and Q. Mutius, both getteth and keepeth friends. For in it is all agreement, all steadfastness, and all constancy: 
Virtue.  Which when she advanceth herself, and showeth out her light, and both seeth and knoweth the same in another, she giveth herself to that to, and takes likewise that she findeth in another. Where upon love and loving friendship toward each other, is enkindled. For both these two words have their names of this word, to love. But to love is nothing else, but to bear good will toward him, 
To love what it is  whom you love, not for any need or profit that is sought, Which profit flourisheth yet of friendship, although you the less nothing follow it. With this kind of good will, we when we were young men, did love Lucius Paulus, Marcus Cato, Caius Gallus, Publius Nasica, Tiberius Graccus, our Scipides father in law. This friendship also doth more appear among such as be like of ages, as between me and Scipio, Lucius Furius, Publius Rutilius, and Spurius Mummins. And we old men also do take pleasure in young men's love towards us, as you see, I am delighted in yours, and in Quintus Tuberos, being a very young man, and in P. Rutilius Uirginius company. And seeing an order is so appointed in our life and nature, that one age may spring of another, chiefly we should desire, that we might live with our like in ages, 
Living with like.  that even as we came together with them in our swaddling clouts, so we might keep them company to the winding sheet. But because this worldly substance is brickle and fading, we always provide some, whom we may love, and of them be loved again. For if love and frenship be taken from man, 
Scipio being dead lived yet with Laelius.  all pleasure of life is taken away. Scipio surely although he was taken away suddenly from this life, liveth yet with me, and shall live ever For I always loved the virtue of that man, which is not dead with me, neither standeth it daily alone before mine eye, who always have had it in sight, but also to our children's children shall it be noble and notable. No man shall ever enterprise greatier things with hope and courage, which hath not th' image and memory of him before his eyes. 
The image and memory of Scipio.  Truly of all the things which fortune or nature gave me, I have nothing to match with Scipio's friendship. 
Scipio's friendship  In it was my conference for the common wealth: in it was my counsel for private causes: In it was my rest full of all delight. And I never offended him in any thing that ever I could perceive, and I never herd any thing of him that I was against. We had one house, one diet, and that even common: yea not that only, but warfare, and also our journeys and going abroad were a like common. But what shall I speak of our studies in searching always and learning of some what, in the which we bestowed all our leisure and time, when we were out of the sight of men. The remembrance and onthynking of the which things, if with him they had died, I could by no means have borne the lack of so friendly and loving a man. But those neither be dead yet, but rather nourished and increased by the onthynking and remembrance of them. And although I should wholly be bereft of them, yet mine age self would bring my greatest comfort. For I could not very long continue in this state. And all short griefs be sufferable, although they be great. These things be they, which I had to speak of friendship. And I do exhort you, that you so esteem virtue, (with out which friendship can not be possible) as saving it, ye think nothing better than freendeship.   
FINIS.   

The table.  


A  adversity trieth friends. 
36  Affricanus & Laelius had no need one of an other. 
fo. 22.  amity what it is. 
fo. 14.  amity of Orestes and Pylades. 
fol. 17.  Ambition of T. Graccus. 
29.  Hannibal. 
fo. 21.  Archita. 
fo. 56.  authority. 
fol. 3.42.    


B  ¶ Base outspring of friendship. 
fol. 21.  Becillinus. 
fo. 26.  Beastliness. 
fo. 34.  Beasts. 
fo ●1.  Bounds of love in friendship. 
fo. 26.38.    


C  ¶ Cato the elder. 
folio. 2.  Cato reckoned wise. 
fol. 6.  Cato for his deeds commended 
eodem.  Calabria. 
fol. 9  Caius Fabritius. 
20.  Capitol. 
fo. 26.  Caius Lucinius. 
fo. 27.  Cassius' laws. 
fo, 29.  Care good; but rare. 
fo. ●1.  'Cause principal of friendship. 
fol. 34.  Caius Papyrius. 
fo. 59  Chief point in friendship. 
46.  Chiding in friendship. 
fo. 57  Constant men. 
fol. 6.  Couples of friends. 
fo. 11.  commodities of friendship. 
15.  Continuance of friendship. 
24.  covetousness in friendship. 
25.  Commotion of Coriolanus. 
26.  Coriolanus. 
fol. 30.  Companions of youth. 
fo. 48.  Common people's friendship. 
folio. 49.  Comparison between beasts and men. 
fo. 52.  Conclusion of the matter. 
63.  Custom. 
fo. 45.    


D  ¶ Dishonesty. 
fol. 50  Dissimulation in freendeship 
fol. 58.  Do well we must alway. 
33    


E  ¶ Elder in honour preferred. 
fol. 46.  Empedocles. 
fo. 17.  End of friendship. 
fol. 58.  Excellency of friendship. 
16.    


F  ¶ Familiar. 
fo. 57  Feigned friendship. 
fol. 62.  faithful friend. 
fo. 43.  Few friends. 
fol. 31.  First law in friendship. 
fo. 28.  First rule of friendship. 
fo. 31.  Flattery very hurtful. 
fo. 59  Flattery. 
fol. 57.62.  Flatterer hearkeneth flatterers. 
fo. 61.  Fowl excuse. 
fol. 28.  Fortune. 
fol. 37.  Fool fortunate. 
fol. 37.  Friendship between C. Laelius and Scipio. 
fol. 3.  Friendship .10. preferred above all thing, and only between good men .12. without virtue .14. as necessary as the elements. 
fo. 16.  Fruit of amity. 
fol. 22.  Friendship beginning of nature. 
fol. 23.  Freendeship taken out of the world. 
fol. 32.  Friends the best richesses. 
37.  Friendship hardly found among great men. 
fo. 43.  Friendship in ages and wits. 
fol. 48.  Friends ought to ponder requests. 
fo. 49.  Friend must be a good man. 
fol. 52.  Friendship an aid to virtue. 
fol. 53.  Friendship creepeth through all kind of life. 
fol. 55.    


G  ¶ Gabinius law. 
fo. 29.  Geftes of Fortune. 
fol. 38.  Gnato the Parasite. 
fo. 59  Good men. 
fo. 13.44.    


H  ¶ Hatred and strife. 
fo. 17.  Happy life. 
fo. 53.  Honest requests. 
fo. 27.  Honour. 
fo. 42.  How to choose a friend. 
fo. 43.  How much is to be done for friends. 
fo. 48,  Honest bashfulness in friendship. 
fo. 53.    


I  ¶ Image and memory of Scipio. 
fo. 65.  immortality of the soul. 
8.  Inordinate love in friendship. 
fol. 65.    


L  ¶ Laelius father in law to Scaevola the Augur, and to Fannius. 
folio. 1.  Like will to like. 
fo. 25,  love. 
fol. 19  love confirmed by benefits. 
fol. 21.  Love and fear. 
fo. 36.  Lucius Acilius. 
fo. 4.  living with like. 
fo. 64.    


M  ¶ Man's soul. 
fo. 9  M. Pacwius tragedy. 
f. 17.  M. Curius. 
fo. 20.28.  Motions in friendship. 
fol. 31.  Money. 
fol. 42.  Mutual behaviour of friends. 
fol. 47.    


N  ¶ Nature in friendship. 
fo. 20  Nature. 
fol. 35.56.    


O  ¶ Offence in our friends behalf. 
fo. 27.  Old age. 
fo. 8.  Opinions of friendship disallowed. 
fol. 38.  Order of freenship. 
fol. 13.    


P  ¶ Paulus Aemilius. 
fo. 27.  Pestilence greatest in friendship. 
fol. 58.  Philus Manlius. 
fo. 9  Pithy oration of Scipio. 
60.  Pleasant talk. 
fo. 44.  Pleasure. 
fol. 14.  Power of honesty. 
fo. 21.  Pomponius Atticus. 
fol. 2.  Preventing of honest requests. 
fol. 31.  property of a well stayed mind. 
fo. 33.  profit. 
fo. 35.36.  Proverb. 
fol. 45.54.  Profit of friendship. 
fo. 54.  promotions. 
fo. 54.  property of true friendship. 
fol. ●8.  P. Sulpitius tribune. 
fol. 2.  Punishment as due to the partners as to the ringleaders. 
fo. 30.  Pyrrhus. 
fol. 21.    


Q  Q. Pompeius Consul. 
fo. 2  Question worthy the asking 
folio. 41.    


R  ¶ Requiting of benefits. 
34.  Redress of vices in freendeship. 
fol. 51.  recklessness in friendship. 
54.  Richesses. 
fol. ●7. 54.  Rule. 
fo. 42.    


S  ¶ saying most repugnant to friendship. 
fo. 40.  Sageness. 
fol. 44.  Scipio commended. 
fo. 6.  Scipio's death bewailed. 
7.  Twice Consul .7. Honourably brought from the Senate house. 
8.  Scipio made Rutilius Consul. 
fol. 48.  Scipio's alienation from two of his friends. 
fo. 50.  Scipio being dead, lived yet with Laelius. 
fo. 64.  Scipio's friendship. 
fo. 65.  Seven sages of Grece. 
fol. 5.  Similitude. 
fol. 45.  Snares of subtle flattery. 
62  Socrates judged wise. 
f. 5.9.  Socrates for his sayings commended. 
fol. 6.  Solitariness. 
fol. 56.  soothing flattery. 
fol. 57  stoics. 
fol. 33.  Sure friend. 
fo. 43.    


T  Terence comedy. 
fol. 62.  Themistocles. 
fol. 30.  T. Coruncanus. 
fol. 28.  Timon of Athenes. 
fol. 55.  To to foolish a thing. 
fol. 58.  To love what it is. 
fo. 63.  True friendship. 
fol. 39  truth is to be heard. 
fol. 57  Tried saw of Cato's. 
fol. 58.  truth. 
fol. 61.  Two rules in friendship. 
44.  tyrants life. 
fo. 36.    


U  Virtue. 
fol. 20.34.35.53.63.  Ueraie fellowship. 
fo. 53.  Unhonest requests. 
fo. 25.  unlike manners. 
fo. 48.  Unfreendly requests. 
fo: 52.  Upbraydes of pleasures. 
47.  Usury of pleasures. 
fol. 22.  Want of friendship. 
fo. 16.17.  Ways to prove friends. 
42.  Wavering mind. 
fol. 44.  Wariness in friendship. 
50.  Wherefore friends are sought. 
fol. 19  Where love groweth. 
fol. 34.  What is to be attributed to honest friends. 
fo. 41.  What a friend must eschew. 
fol. 44.  Whether new or old friends are to be preferred. 
fol. 45.  Worthy of friendship. 
fol. 51.  Who is a friend. 
fo. 51.  Witty sentence. 
fo. 54.  Wicked answer of Blosius. 
fol. 26.    
FINIS.   

IMPRINTED AT London in Fleetstreet, in the house of Tho. Berthelette.  
Cum privilegio ad imprimendum solum.