MARCUS Tullius Cicero's three books of duties, to Marcus his son, turned out of latin into english, by Nicolas Grimalde.  
¶ Cum privilegio ad imprimendum solum.  
¶ Anno domini. 1556.   

TO THE RIGHT Reverend father in god, & his singular good lord, Thomas, Bishop of Elie, one of the King, & queens Majesties most honourable privy Counsel.  
Having recourse of late (right reverend father) to y● old studies, that I once applied in the university: and getting some fruit of quiet life to the perusing, and recording of those things, wherewith in time passed I felt myself greatly both delighted, and furthered: I gave my mind chief to such kind of learning: as would serve best both to the order of my study, & also to the governance of my life: so that comparing my experience, and reading together, I might make my private diligence in studying do ser●… to the open use ofliving. In following of which intent, what by increase of judgement for years, what by travatling abroad in y● world, I found ever more and more so new profits, & commodities: that whereas, methought, I had seen but the shadow of things, now I begin more to see (as it were) the holle body thereof. And most of all, this proof I have, in the greatest and most profitable part of philosophy, which is concerning manners: and namely in the books, that of duties be written, by Marcus Tullius Cicero: a matter containing the holle trade, how to live among men discreetly, and honestly: and so rightly pointing out the pathway to all virtue: as none can be righter, only Scripture excepted. Insomuch, that when I had well considered altogether: I said with myself, concerning this, as did a certain learned man, not long ago, by Homer: This is the fift time, I have red over this author: and as oft as I read him, so oft somewhat I find, that I marked not before: and that hath need to be deeply pondered: so that I fancied, at the first, he was easy: but now, methinks, he requires a very heedful, & a musing reader. Wherefore, not without marvelous great pleasure, espying: that either in private life, to attain quietness, and contentation: or in officebearing, to win fame, & honour: or in every estate, both to avoid disorder, and enormity, and also to keep a right rule, & commendable behaviour: this book plainly is the mirror of wisdom, the fortress of justice, the master of manliness, the school of temperance, the jewel of commelinesse: I wished, many more to be partners of such sweetness, as I had partly felt myself: & to declare, that I meant nolesse, than I wished: I laid to, my helping hand: endeavouring, by translation, to do likewise for my contriemennes: as Italians, Frenchmen, Spaniards, Dutchmen, & other foreins have liberally done for theirs. So, chief for our unlatined people I have made this latin writer, english: & have now brought into light, that from them so long was hidden: & have caused an ancient writing to beecomme, in a manner, new again: and a book, used but of few, to war common to a great meany: so that our men, understanding, what atreasure is among them, for the fashioning of their life: and being by nature most of all other nations given to civility, & humanity: when they shall be aided, & directed by these perfit precepts: may, in all points of good demeanour, become people peerless.  
Yet judge I all this labour litleworthe, & smally, or nothing able to prevail: without your honourable lordship were patron hereof: to whom I do dedicated both my good heart, & my work also: (I call it mine, as Plautus, and Terence called the comedies theirs, which they made out of Greek) not as to teach your lordship ought, that you have not already: but by your authority, to get it the more estimation with other. For as Tully's treatise, being so full of learning, asketh alerned man's judgement: which whoso refuse, they show themselves to be unwise: even so such a noble counsellor of England seemeth most meet to receive so noble a Senator of Rome into a strange region. Doubtless among so many honourable deeds of your lordships, it shall not be the lest honourable: if ye do Marcus Tullius this honour, to welcome him hither: and to be the very cause, that so famous a Roman may become familiar with our English men.  
So shall a worthy pere be worthily entreated: as very courtesy requireth: so your lordship's judgement must needs be well liked: which is wont to allow lovely knowledge, & goodness: so will the common people more highly esteem the thing: as it is expedient for them to do: and the sooner also will they follow these hollsome lessons: which is full necessary, in a well ordered state: to be short, your lordship, for a chosen patron: my translation, for a welcome work: & Tully shall be taken for such a Tully, as he is. And like as Marcus Cicero, with the authority of a father, commended these books to his young Cicero: so when our English youth shall behold them once authorized by so reverend a father in god: nodoute, they will be the rather in love with them: and will count it pleasant pains taking, here to enrich themselves with enformations of virtue, ensamples out of stories, moral doctrine, politic prudence, antiquity, variety of marvelous matters: so cunningly, & oratorially treated, and indited: as he was able to declare, & express: who was the first, and the chief, that ever clad lady Philosophy in Roman attire. Thus, very loath to let your lordship from your weighty affairs, I make an end: & pray god, long to preserve your honourable lordship in health, with increase of honour.  
Your humble orator, Nicolas Grimalde.   

N. G. to the reader.  
ALl things in the world (good reader) be made for some use, & end: which end is more worth, than all, that doth service thereunto: and where both the end is good, & whatso serves thereto: there the holle doing is likewise good. In us the best end is, to use ourselves well, and worthily: who in the order of natural things are of the best, and worthiest kind. For what is there, that can use itself: unless it be informed with reason, and understanding? Dumb creatures, and lifeless of other be used: but themselves can they never use. Beasts endued with life, and sense, may seem to have some semblant hereof: in that, they use their feeding, lodging, & other necessaries: yet therbi they obtain neither praise, nor dispraise: seeing they do it not of any free choice: but only by the motion of kind, & as their appetite draweth them. But we, who have the great gift of wit, & reason, must not most of all stick still in the appetite: to get nothing else, but pleasure, & profit: but ensuring the heavenly guide of our nature, must be led to the desire of troth, honour, & seemliness: wherewith the more that we be decked, adorned, & beautified: that ●…rder we be from the brutishness of beasts, and the nearer approach we to the nature divine.  
In as much then as every thing is borne to do that, which to his kind is most agreeable: & us it beseemeth most to use ourselves: our part without doubt, & our duty shall we do best: if we employ the using of ourselves to deeds, that be honest, & commendable. Other things when we use: as land, houses, armour, horses, hounds, money, clothes, or stuff: we can not yet use them at all times: and with them we must enforce, and bysie ourselves also: whereas the using of ourselves is in every place at hand, and at no season to seek.  
For whether we be doing somewhat, or at rest: whether we abide in the country, or in the city: whether we be occupied in earnest, or in game: no pause there is at all, but night & day●… we use ourselves continually.  
Which thing scythe in every portion of a man's life it hath place: if it be well, and wisely, and conveniently done: we shall be wealfull, and in a blessed case: if ungraciously, & fond, and wickedly: wretched shall we be, and in a woeful plight. This are we taught too much, by the common life of men: who for default of skill, how to behave themselves, be confounded in deep darkness of error, and ignorance: and wanting the right rule, they take chalk for cheese, as the saying is: they can not frame their affections, nor keep them in temper. But such manner clouds be clearly dissolved, by the beams of Philosophy: which sets before our yiesight the very ends, and marks, that self nature hath appointed us.  
For in this world here beneath, are three kinds of living wights: whereof some have no more, but life: as plants, herbs, and trees, growing out of the ground: some have not only life, but senses also: as sheep, oxen, & other beasts: the third comprehendeth both these: and over life, & senses, hath the sovereign ruler, Reason: as in the nature of man we see them all conjoined. It remains therefore, and meet it is for him, such doings to practice: as may both severally agree with each of these parts, and generally with them altogether. To the parcel inferior (by which we receive our nourishment, our growing, & the state of our body) welfare is appointed the utmost end: wherein the thing consists, that we call profitable: which concerns the getting, maintaining, or recovering of health. Of the soul, or life endued with senses, pleasure is the end, that it would enjoy. The third nature, which is partner of reason, hath this prick to shoot at (if you consider it by itself alone) science, and knowledge of troth: if you behold it with the other two accommepanied: it hath honesty, worship, and honour.  
These be the very ends, whereto man's life, and nature must endeavour to attain: hither doth Philosophy promise to bring a man, by her information. For when she hath told in a generalty, what is honest, commely, vailable, praiseworthy, and in every point convenient: then may men, by intelligence perceiving the troth, truly express the same in every particular deed.  
Wherefore seeing reason contains the holle life of man: and to it, as to their captain, the other parts be obedient, or at lest wise aught to bee●…: first, mark we the peculiar property of reason: then, how with the other powers it exerciseth man: afterward, the commely behaviour, and dutiful dealing in the open resort, & feloushipp of men.  
Man's mind is contented, and satisfied with nothing somuch, as the clear understanding, and the undeceivable science of sooth. Chief standeth his mind in contemplation of immortal, & perdurable things: thereto, in such as fade, and fall, it teacheth, ordaineth, appointeth, commandeth. Whereupon the order, course, figure, light, influence of son, moon, and ●…erres it observeth: conceiveth intelligences, angels, souls, and forms immaterial: proceedeth from them, and so mounteth up to the very author, and prince of this worlds university: whom it knoweth, and knowledgeth to be one, the best, the mightiest, the thetru●…, the most righteous, and everlasting. Yet is the self-same mind by the fellowship, and company of the senses, and desires, many a time called away from that principal office, to consider these unstable, and mutable things: and sommtime to cast in conceit forms dissevered from the matter, mathematically: & sometime to view things sensible, that can in no wise be sondered from the material substance: as eleme●…es, beasts, herbs, trees, metals, stones, and such like: all the which must needs be fenced, & fortified with the trade of debating doubts, and discerning of troth from untruth: which is the art of Logik, the very rule of reason, and instrument of all discourse.  
Now, to speak of the using of the holleman: by the continual tenor, and steadfast rate of bodies celestial, and natural, the mind of man learneth order, obedience, and concord. For like as god governeth things manifold, movable, and falling away, being himself but one, unremoovable, and ever-during: so reason within us aught to rule ranging lusts, & rash motions of the mind, and the other unworthier, and weaker parts: being itself steadfast, sage, principal, and strongly established.  
In case a man love any one part of himself too much: or sew after y● end thereof by a wrong way, and clean out of fashion: he shall not lead a life all even, and straight, but hooked, and crooked: nor easy, and quiet, but miserably distempered. For whoso be overmuch inclined to paumpering, and pleasing of the vital portion: they be all bend to gather good, and holly given to gain. They, that alonely serve their senses, and set their delight to feel the pleasures of the same: be excessive either in ryotting, & banqueting, or in outrageous 〈◊〉 or in other such pa●…aunces, as be sensual. They, which hold them content to lead a life contemplative, having no regard, ne respect to y● forenamed ꝑcels: do prove sour, souring, blockish, rustical, & far from all civilnesse of life. He, in whom reason ●…oynes with the senses, for to do them service: will enforce himself to win worldly glory, and sovereignty. He, that can comprise in his thought no large commepasse, nor deep consideration: but is faint, feeble, wavering, and full of infirmity: will show forth himself chiefly with appareling, or with some outward brag, to supply his want within.  
To such sorts of annoyance, and disconuenience, light, and moderation is brought by moral doctrine: the which, Marcus Lullius Cicero, in these books of duties, professeth. This learning teacheth, somuch to grant the vital part, and the netherest: as will be suffisant to preserve the life in health, and welfare. It willeth also the feeling portion so to take fruition of pleasures: that neither it defraud the lower part of the profits thereto appropriate: nor which importune egging annoy the mind, which aspireth unto verity of opinions, and uprightness of manners.  
Without more words, it assigneth that for to reign, which is borne to reign: & that to be obeisant, which is franied for obeisance.  
Now, when a man is so instructed with philosophy: that he can full conveniently live sole, & at point device by himself: he must be brought forth abroad into the face of the world: to the intent he may procure, not only that becomes himself to do, but also the wealth of other folk. He must remember the three fold state, & diversity, that he hath espied, & practised in himself: and must trans●…erre thesame to the governance both of his household privately, and of the holle commons openly. So shall the meanest sort, like the vital parcel in man, be occupied about the most servile, and needful works: men of middle degree, like the sensive soul, shall attend to affairs, and sciences more liberal: the nobility in the common government, like reason in the nature of man, shall rule all the multitude. That thing also doth lully touch in this treatise: and showeth men in authority their duties, both in war, and peace: whereby they may make themselves, and their subjects happy, and fortunate.  
And not only them, but all sorts of men he admonisheth: what they have to do, through out their life: according to their age, trade, and estate: with respect to the circumstances of times, places, and persons.  
In the first book, he first divideth duty into the perfect, and the mean: leaving the one (which belongeth to the end of good, & is in itself right) to men of perfection: and prosecuting that other, in certain rules, & precepts: so that thereby every man may frame, and order his life. Then he leads us to the finding out of duties, by taking advisement about the choice of honest things, and refusal of the unhonest. Afterward he sets for the the original causes, and the chief parts of honesty, with their duties, & properties. At the last, he warneth us to discern the more, or most honest thing from the less, or le●…: & always, in the use thereof, to prefer the greater. In the second, rehearsing profitable, & unprofitable things: he showeth, how to attain, and to use the profitable, & how to eschew the contrary: and in the end, makes a comparison of profits: teaching to prefer the greater before the smaller, or the more before the fewer.  
In the third, he compareth profit with honesty, & with every part thereof: not as if there could indeed be contrariety between them: but he means the profit, which seemeth not honest, & the honesty, which seemeth not profitable: or of either of them the apparent show: and he tells us, what is to be done, when these seem so to strive, one with an other: that honesty allureth us one way, and profit calleth us an other way.  
Thus the holle matter is referred, and applied to honesty, and profit, two principal points of good: the third (which we call pleasure, and is placed by the Peripatetics in the number of good things) Tully, like a Stoik, doth but briefly ●…ouche, as a thing impertinent.  
But of the other two places, containing all the doings of men, Cicer●… hath told his mind, and left it us in this book: even as fully, as in his lifetime he conceived it in his head.  
For who ever saw in so few leaves so much moral doctrine, and political, set out with so many cunning casts, and feats oratoriall? What a sort of stories be there so notable of themselves, so handsomely applied, so elegantly told? You shall not lightly read the like, within so little commepasse, in any historian, that of purpose doth nothing else.  
How finely, & featly be the poets verses alleged? With what a discretion are some ancient writers reproved? With what subtility, & finesse of wit be certain controversies debated? Either of the chief philosophy, or of all humanity what point is there lacking? Aristotle artificially hath written of manners: but, what for the lightsomeness, & eloquent handling of y● treatise, what for the latin tongue, which we do use more than the greek: ●…llie is above him. Panetius wrote of dutiful demeanour: but though his work in some points was Tully's pattern: yet in all points, by all their iudgemets, that ever saw them both: Tully is above him. 〈◊〉 the 〈◊〉 wrote of duty: but seeing divers Greeks, who are Tully's inferiors, were as good as he: certes Tully is above him. Posidonius, a Khodiane, meddled with the same matter: but nothing to Tullius. So did Hecato: but nothing to Tullius. And many other more of later time: but, lord, how far be they from Tullius? Tullius, in his grave years, after he had heard a number of learned men: after he had red the most approved authors: after he had indited so many volumes: and his style was waxen ripe, his wit sage, his 〈◊〉 full, his judgement perfect: enterprised to draw this draft, & made it of such excellence: as we may well wonder at in viewing, & yet not attain in following. Tullius, having done many glorious acts, in a state of government most triumphant, learned the most part of these lessons by experience. Tullius out of the Greek authors, of whom also some had been gouer●…ours in flourishing empires: translated a great deal. Tullius to Marcus, his well-beloved son, abiding even at Athenes, among the best philosophers, was not afraid to send this parcel of philosophy. Nodoute, as welcome it was to y● learned Athenians: as y● Greeks doings were to the Romans: or as now adays, the French, & Italians welframed writings be to those English men, that understand then: yea and somuch the more wellcomme: as it was a rare thing then, to see that kind of knowledge expressed in pure latin. But in Rome, in Italy, in Europa, in all quarters, where latin speech had place: O, so it was embraced at all times, of all men, in every degree, order, & estate. Rulers have here found much witty policy, appertaining to the governance of realms. Householders, & parents have piked out of these books virtuous instructions for their children, & their servants. Doctors, & divines have here met with moral sentence, and ensamples very excellent. Civil lawyers have espied, touching justice, and equity, both rules appointed, and cases discussed. Schoolmen have taken here-hence problems, and questions, to debate at large: and have fetched from hence philosophical conclusions, with reasons, and arguments to prove, and to disprove. Orators have been well furnished hereby, with sundry graces, and ornaments of speech: and in the like manner of matter, have marked, how to bestow their style. Rhetoricians, who for their exercise, do use declamations: have taken out of this, common places, like large fields, where men may walk at liberty. Schoolmasters never witted of finer phrases, for to make their scholars acquainted with the very vein of the latin language. At few words, all men, that of wisdom be studious, may get somewhat herein to sharp the wit, to store the intelligence, to feed the mind, to quicken the spirit, to augment the reason, to direct the appetite, to frame the tongue, to fashion the manners: moreover to rule, to obei, to dispute, to determine, to teach, to persuade, & to every needful purpose in a man's life. unless themself thing witness as much, as I say, let me not be credited: but in case both the book speak for itself: & to my testimonial I am able to adjoin princely peers, wellbeknowne, and well approved: then shall both the worthiness of the work, & also the weight of the authority win credit, & assent. Tully's duties when Cesar August us had red over, still standing on his feet: as he again delivered them to his nephew, of whom he had them: Eloquent (quoth he) was this man, eloquent he was indeed: & one, that loved well his country. Tully's duties had Severus, the noble emperor, in so great price, and reputation: that of all the Romans books, to read them, he thought him best apaid. Tully's duties have I known good clerks, and well learned men bear about in their bosommes: laying it full near their hearts, that they would have lodged in their heads: and entirely loving Tully's heavenly commepanie, which way so ever they went. Tully's duties did Erasmus, the Roterodame, so greatly commend: that in making mention of them, he could not choose but break forth into thes●… words. What? writeth an ethnic all this to ethnics? a profane man, to the profane? Yet in his precepts of conversation, O lord, what an equity? what an holiness? what sincerity? what verity? How well doth all together accord with nature? how is all framed even by good reason? What a conscience requireth he of such, as govern that state? How plainly sets he before our eyes the marvelous, & the amiable beauty fullness of virtue? How much, how religiously, yea how like a divine doth he teach of helping, & relieving other men? of getting, and maintaining of love, and friendship? of the contempt of those vanities: for which the common sort of Christian folk will either do, or suffer, they care not what? Finally, he deemeth them full worthy, & full meet both for schoolmasters in their schools to read unto the youth: and also for old men again and again to use, and to peruse.  
These richesse, & treasures of wit, and wisdom, as Cicero transported out of Greece into Italy: so have I fetched from thence, & conveyed them into England: and have caused also Marcus Tullius (more, than he could do, when he was alive) to speak English. marvelous is the matter, flowing the eloquence, rich the store of stuff, & full artificial the inditing: but how I, in our manner of speech, have expressed the same: the more the book be perused, the better it may chance to appear. None other translation in our toug have I seen, but one: which is of all men of any learning so well liked: that they repute it, & count it as none: yet if ye list to compare this sommwhat with that nothing: peradventure this somewhat will seem somewhat the more. How be it look, what rule the Rhetorician gives in precept, to be observed of an Orator, in telling of his tale: that it be short, & without idle words: that it be plain, and without dark sense: that it be provable, and without any swerving from 〈◊〉 troth: the same rule should be used 〈◊〉 examining, & judging of 〈◊〉. For if it be not as brief, as the very author's text requireth: whatso is added to his perfit style, shall appear superfluous, & to serve rather to the making of some paraphrase, or commentary. Thereto, if it be uttered with inkhorn terms, & not with usual words: or if it be phrased with wrested, or farrefetched forms of speech: not fine, but harsh, not easy, but hard, nor natural, but violent it shall seem to be. Then also, in case it yield not the meaning of the author: but either following fancy, or misled by error, forsakes the true pattern: it can not be approved for a faithful, & sure interpretation: which ought to be taken for the greatest praise of all. These points as I have studied to perform: so where I have not always attained unto them: I shall desire you, gentle reader, gently to consider both the excellence of the author, who is a perfect orator: and also the greatness of the matter, which is profound philosophy.  
Nevertheless, such as be exquisite in both the languages already: may (and that with some profit, & pleasure) try, what I have done, & what they can do, all under one: if, laying my translation apart, they will set the latin before them, & so assay their own vein. Either they shall like themselves the better: when they confer it with my poor workmanship: or else perchance con me the more thank, for attempting, following, & accomplishing of this enterprise. Be it so, one hath neither the latin, nor the english eloquence: yet, by the benefit of nature, sith a man may do much: namely if he thereto adjoin use, & exercise: here is for him occasion both to whet his wit, & also to file his tongue. For although an English man hath his mother tongue: & can talk apace, as he learned of his dame: yet is it one thing to title tattle, I wot not how, or to chatter like a jay: & an other, to bestow his words wisely, orderly, pleasantly, & pythiely. Such as have english meatly well, & but a smattering, or small taste in y● latin: which number is great, among the scholars of this realm: may hereby fail into such acquaintance, and familiarity with this most excellent latin man: that neither shall his devise seem hard, nor his art obscure, nor his style strange. I dare well say, if this work hap into a good student's hand: he will not think it enough to run over it once: as we far with trifles, and toys: but advisediy, and with good leisure, three, or four, or five times, he will read it, and read it, and read it again: first, by the principal points, by the definitions, and the divisions: to see, what is treated, how far forth, in what order, and with what variety: then, to mark the precepts, reasons, conclusions, & common places: after, unto the said places to refer all the stories, with the verses poetical: finally, as well in the english, as the latin, to weigh well properties of words, fashions of phrases, and the ornaments of both. Moreover, many clerks have I known, ere this: which could conceive, & understand full well: whose tongue nevertheless in utterance, and use of speech, was in a manner maimed: yea and some, that could also speak latin readily, and wellfavordly: who to have done as much in our language, & to have handled thesame matter, would have been half blank. What need more words? I desire, my tranail none otherwise to be taken in worth: than the diligent peruser shall in effect find fruit thereof.  
Now therefore, good reader, far you well: and remember, how unfit (as Aristotle sayeth) and unprofitable hearers of moral science youngmen be: as long as either they follow their youthly affections: or do continue unskilful, and rude in y● deeds, that of duty belong to man's life. For, all the while, they yield themselves to be led away of their mad moods: if you talk to them of virtues, and of manners, ye do but sing the deaf a song. And how shall they be able to judge, what is discreetly, rightfully, valiantly, moderately, & worthily done: who neither have any such quality, nor understand by experience any point of the same? Yet forasmuch as it of necessity be known, what is virtue, & vice: before a man can well, & wisely live, embracing the one, and eschewing the othe●…: either to make sound the sick●… mind (in case it be miseased, & hath a will to be relieved) take this doctrine, as a medicine: or else to confirm the holle: that is to mean: in case you have been well, & honestly trained up: more perfitly to perceive the path of good manners: wherein you may walk with entire delight, and come to the honour of a laudable life. Thus have I holden you, good reader, which my homely tale: now will I not borrow your patience any longer: but, for your gentleness, and studious disposition, will straightway send you from the scholar to the master: and from me, to the speech of this di●…ine orator, and worthy philosopher.   

MARCUS TVLlius Cicero's first book of duties, to Marcus his son.  
ALthough you son Mark, 
The preface.  having now 
1. Parie.  a year herd 
why he writes to his son of philosophy in latin.  Cratippus, & y● in Athenes, must needs flow full of rules, and lessons of philosophy: because of the passing great excellency both of your teacher, & of the city: whereof the one may store you with knowledge, the other with ensamples: yet as myself, to mine 
The study of both tongues.  own furtherance, have evermore joined the latin with the greek: and have done y●, not only in philosophy, but also in the practice of oratory: I think it ●…ere for you to do thesame, that alike you may be 
Two ki●…des of eloquence.  in the readiness of both the kinds of eloquence. To the which purpose 
Example of h●…elfe.  verily, we (as we suppose) have brought great aid to our countrymen: that not only the ignorant of the greek tongue, but also the learned reckon themselves thereby to have attained somewhat, both to speech eloquent, & also to judgement Wherefore you shall learn in deed 
His masters help.  of the prince of philosophers in this age: and you shall learn so long, as you will: so long perdie ought you to be willing, as it shall not repent ye, how much ye profit. But yet 
Tully's philosophy.  reading my books, not greatly vigilant from the peripatetics (because we will be both Socratians, & Platonians) of the very matters use your own judgement: for I nothing let you: but of troth, by reading my works, you shall make 
The latin tongue.  your latin tongue the fuller. Nor yet I would have this supposed of a vaunt to be spoken. For giving place to many in the knowledge of philosophy, if I take upon 
Tully's eloquence.  me that, which is an orators property, aptly, orderly, and finely to speak: because I have passed my time in that study, I seem, after a certain sort, as in mine own right, to calenge it. For which cause, I earnestly exhort 
Conclusion o●… this pa●…e.  you, my Cicero: the diligently you read not only my orations, but these books also of philosophy, which now wellnigh to those have eevened themselves in quantity. For there is a greater force of eloquence inthose: but this even, and tempered kind of style is also to be regarded. And this truly I see, hath 
Enlargement, by comparison.  happened to none of the Greeks, as yet: that one man travailed in both the kinds: and followed as well the lawierlie trade of pleading, as this quiet form of reasoning: 
D. Phalereus.  except perchance Demetrius Phalereus may be counted in this number: who was a subtle reasoner, no vehement orator: pleasant ●…et, so as you may know him for Theophrastus scholar. But how much we have profited in both, I refer it to other men's judgement: certes we have followed both. I think verily, Pla●… 
Pla●….  could have spoken very gravely, & plentifully, if he would have practised the law like sort of pleading: & also Demosthenes could have done 
Demosthenes.  full finely, and seemly: if he h●…d kept still, and would have uttered those things, which he learned of Plato. And after the same sort I judge of Aristotle, and Isocrates: 
Aristoteles.  either of which, delighted with his 
Isocrates.  own study, despised the other.  
But when I had determined 
2. part.  to write somewhat unto you at this 
What point of philosophy he will treat upon.  season, and many things hereafter: I was most willing to begin with that, which both for your age 
Commendation of his matter.  should be fittest, and for my authority the gravest. For whereas many matters in philosophy, both weighty, and profitable, be diligently, & plentifully disputed by philosophers those seem most largely to spread, which of duties by them have been 
Duties.  taught, & prescribed. For no part of man's life, neither in common, nor private affairs, neither in matters abroad, nor at home, neither if ye do aught alone, nor if ye contract which an other, may be without duty: and in regarding thereof resteth all honesty of life, and in despising the same, dishonesty. And this no doubt is a common matter with all the philosophers. For who is he, which giving no rules of duty, dare name himself a philosopher?  
But there be sundry doctrines, 
3. part.  
How he will teach.  which in setting forth the ends of good, and bad, do misturn all duty. 
Sects of philosophers.  For who in such wise appointeth the ●…erayn good, that it hath 
Epicurus.  nothing adjoined with virtue: and 
Aristippus.  measureth the same by his commodities, 
〈◊〉  and not by honesty: it cometh to pass, that this man, if in himself he agree, and be not sometime overcome with the goodness of nature: can use neither friendship, neither justice, nor liberality: and in no wise doubtless can he be a manly man, who judgeth pain the utterest evil: nor he a temperate man, who counteth pleasure the greatest good. Which points, though they be so apparent, that the thing needeth no disputation: yet they be debated by us in an other place. These doctrines then, if they will in themselves accord, can say nothing of duty: neither of duty can there be given any precepts, sure, steadfast, and with nature agreeable: but by them, who maintain, that either 
stoics.  only, or chiefly, honesty for 
〈◊〉  itself is to be embraced. And therefore the teaching thereof properly belongs to the stoics, and Academiks, and Peripatetics: because 
〈◊〉.  Aristoes', Pyrrhoes, and Herillus opinion long sins hath been hist out of the schools: who nevertheless should have their lawful liberty to reason of duty: if they had left any choice of things, that to the outfynding of duty there might have been an entry. We will follow therefore at this season, and in this matter, chiefly the stoics: not as a translator: but, as we are accustomed, we will draw out of their fountains, after our own mind, and judgement, as much, and in such sort, as shall seem good.  
It liketh me them, sithence all my 
The treatise.  
〈◊〉 to be 〈◊〉.  discourse must be of duty, to define before, what is duty: which I marvel, was overskaped of Panetius. For every teaching of any matter, that by an orderly trade is taken in hand, must begin the process at a definition: that it may be perceived, what the thing is, whereof the treating goeth.  
All the question of duty is twofold. 
Duty 〈◊〉.  One kind there is, the belongs to the end of good: an other, that standeth in precepts, by the which the trade of life may be fashioned in every condition. Of the former kind such examples there be: Whether all duties be perfit, or no? Whether one duty be more than an other? and such, as be of the same sort. But those duties, whereof precepts be given, though they appertain to the end of good, yet the same doth less appear: because they seem rather to belong to the framing of life: of the which, in these ●…kes, we have to open our 
another wa●… of dividing duty.  mind. And also, there is an other division of duty. For there is said to be both a certain mean duty, and a perfit. I suppose, we may call the perfit, or the right duty, Rectum, which the Greeks do term 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: and this mean, or common duty, Commune, which they call 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  
And those they do thus define: 
Duty de●….  that thesame, which is Rectum, they define to be the perfect dutie●… and that, they say, is the mean duty, for the which, a provable reason may be rendered, why it is done.  
Advisement then in counsel taking is threefold, as seemeth to Panetius. 
Outfynding of duties, by choice of things.  For first, men doubt, whether it, that falleth in advisement, be honest to be done, or dishonest: in weighing whereof, many times, men's 
Honest.  minds are diversly drawn into contrary opinions. next, they search, and cast, whether it whereupon 
Profitable  they take advisement, avail or no, to commodity, and pleasantness of life, to riches, and plenty of goods, to power, and swe●… of rule: whereby they may help both themselves, and theirs: all which advisement falleth into the nature of profit. The third kind of doubting 
Honesty, and profit compared  is: when it, that appeareth to be profitable, seemeth to strive with honesty. For whereas profit doth seem to draw to her, honesty contrariwise, to call back to her: it cometh to pass, that the mind in advising is haled to and fro, and it bringeth a perplexed study of imagination. Whereas in dividing, it is a fowl fault to leave out any thing: two things be overslipped in this division. For not only whether y● thing be honest, or dishonest, is used to be advised upon: but also two honest things laid before us, whether is the honester: and likewise 
More hone●….  two profitable things set before 
More profitable.  us, whether is the more profitable. So the way, which he took to be but threefold, is found meet to be divided into five parts. First then we have to treat of honesty, 
The sum of these. 3. boke●…  but that in two sorts: next, as many ways, of profit: lastly, of the comparison of them both.  
From the beginning, to every kind of 
Gifts of nature.  living creature it is given by nature, to defend himself, his life, and his 
Things common to beas●… and men.  body: and avoid those things, which may seem likely to be harmful: and seek, and get all things, that be necessary to live withal: as feeding, as cooverts, as other of the same sort. The appetite also of coming together for engendring sake, and a certain tenderness over them that be engendered, is a common thing to all living creatures. But bitween man, and beast, this chief is the 
Beast.  difference: that a beast, so far as he is moved by sense, bendeth him 
Sense.  self to that only, which is present, and at hand: very smally perceiving aught past, or to come: but man, 
Man.  who is partaker of reason, whereby 
Reason.  he seeth sequels, beholdeth grounds, and causes of things, is not ignorant of their procedings, and as it were their foregoing: compareth semblances, & with things present joineth, & knitteth things to-come: doth soon espy the course of his holle life, and to the leading thereof purveyeth things necessary. 
Grounds of justice.   
And the said nature, through the power of reason, winneth man to man, to a fellowship both in talk, and also of life: & engendereth a certain special favour chiefly to themward, that are of them begotten: and stirreth up the companies of men, that they be willing both to be assembled together, and also to be serviceable one to an other: and for those causes, that they study to purvey such things, as may furnish them for their apparel, and for sustenance: not only for themselves, but for their wives, children, and other, whom they hold dear, & aught to defend. Which care stirreth up also men's spirits, and makes them of more courage to do their business.  
Also searching, & tracing out of 
Principles of wisdom  troth, is chief man's property. Therefore when we be void of necessary cares, and business: them we ●…oouet to see, to hear, and to learn somewhat: & we think the knowledge of things either hidden, or wondrous, very necessary to good and blissful life. Whereof is gathered, that whatso is true, simple, and pure, is fittest for the nature of man.  
There is joined to this love of 
Sparks o●… manliness.  espying the troth, a certain desire of sovereignty: so as a wellframed mind by nature is willing to obey noman, but him, that instructeth, and teacheth: or him, that, for cause of his weal, justly, and lawfully governeth: wherein standeth the greatness of courage, and the contempt of worldly vanities.  
And that truly is no small power 
Certain sedes of sobermode  of nature, and reason, that this creature only perceives, what is order: what it is, that becometh in deeds, & words: and what is measure. And therefore, of those same things, which be discerned by sight, no other creature perceiveth the beauty, the grace, and the proportion of parts. Which form nature, and reason conveying from the eyes to the mind, doth much more judge a beauty, a steadfastness, and an order in counsels, & deeds fit to be observed: and is heedful, that it do nothing uncomely, or womannishlye: and thereto both in all thoughts, and deeds, that nothing wanton either it do, or imagine. Of which things is forged, and 
Honesty.  made that honesty, that we seek: which though it be not advanced, yet honesty it is: and we truly say, though of no man it be commended, is yet commendable by nature. You see, son Mark, the very form doubtless, & (as it were) the face of honesty: which in case it might be beholden with the eyes, would stir up (as saith Plato) a marvelous love of wisdom.  
But all, that is honest, springeth out 
Dutiful demeanour.  of some one of the four branches. For it is occupied either in the insight 
wisdom.  of troth, and skilfulness: or in preserving the fellowship of men, 
justice.  and giving every body his own, & keeping a faithfulness in contracts: or in the greatness, & mightiness 
Manl●…sle.  of haute, and unconquerable courage: or else in the order, & measure 
Temperance.  of all things, that are done, and said, wherein resteth discretion, & temperance. Which four, though they be linked, and tangled together: yet certain several kinds of duties do grow out of every one of them: as out of that branch, that first was described (wherein we place wisdom, & prudence) issues 
Properties of wisdom.  the searching, and trying out of troth: and this is the very proper work of that virtue. For whoso thorowseeth most, what in every case is truest: and who most wittily, and readily is able both to see, & give the reason: he worthily is wont to be reputed the wittiest, and the wisest. Wherefore to this virtue troth is appointed, as the matter, whereupon to work, and wherein to be occupied. But to the other three virtues are assigned necessities, 
Duties of justice, and man●…nesse.  to get, and keep those things, whereby the trade of man's life is maintained: to the intent the fellowship, and neighbourhod of men be preserved: and the worthiness, and greatness of courage may shine abroad: not only in augmenting of substance, and procuring of commodities both to him, and his, but also much more in despising of the same.  
But order, and steadfastness, & measure 
Properties of tempera●…nce.  keeping, & such like, have to do●… in the kind: whereunto must be joined a certain doing, and not only an earnest occupying of the wit. For applying a certain mean, & order to such things, as be meddled with in man's life, we shall observe both honesty, and comeliness.  
Now of those four places, wherinto 
Wisdom●….  we have divided the nature, & strength of honesty, the same first, y● 
Knowle●…ge of ●…routh.  〈◊〉 in knowledge of troth, toucheth man's kind nearest of all. For we be all drawn, & led to a desire of knowledge, & science: wherein to pass other, we think it a goodly matter: but to slide, to err, to be ignorant, to be deceived, we count it both evil, & dishonest. In this kind 
faults to 〈◊〉 avoided.  of virtue, which is both natural, & honest, two fauts must ●…e avoided: one, that we take not things, we 
〈◊〉 of rash●… iudg●…ment.  know not, as though we knew them, & rashly assent to them. Which fault whoso will esch●…w (all certes aught 
The remedy  to be willing) must employ to the considering of matters both leisure, and diligence. another fault there is, that some bestow over great 
Main curiosity.  study, and to much travail, in dark, and difficult things, and thesame nothing necessary. Which 
Duty in thi●… behalf.  faults avoided, whatsoever labour, and diligence shall be spent in honest things, and worthy of knowledge, thesame of right shall be commended: 
Good kno●…ledge.  as in Astrology, we have herd, what Caius Sulpitius was: in Geometry, we knew, what Sertus Pompeius could do: many in Logik, more in the civil law: which sciences be all occupied in tracing out the troth: with the study whereof to be drawn from traveling in matters, it is against duty. For virtues holle praise consisteth in doing: from which yet 
Practice.  oftentimes there is had a resting while, and there be granted many recourses again unto study: yea and the musing of the mind, that 
Speculation.  never ceaseth, may continue us in the studies of contemplation, even without our travail. But let every thought, & moving of the mind be occupied either in taking of advisement about honest matters, & pertaining to the good, and blissful life: or else in studies of science, and knowledge. And thus have we spoken of the first fountain of duty.  
But of the other three virtues 
Of justice, as it is general.  remaining, that kind extendeth farthest: wherein is contained the fellowship of men among themselves, and (as it were) the enterpartening of man's life.  
Whereof there be two parts: 
Particular justice.  justice is one, in the which is the greatest brightness of virtue, whereof good men bear their name: and to this is joined bountiefulnesse, which same we may term either 
Liberality.  gentleness, or liberality.  
But the principal duty of justice is, that no man hurt an other, 
Duties of justice.  unless he be provoked by wrong: the next, that he use things common, as common, and things private, as his own. Howbeit by nature things 
Private things.  private be none: but either by ancient possession, as of theirs, who in old time came into waste grounds: or by victory, as of theirs, who got things in war: or by law, covenant, condition, or lot. Whereof it comes to pass, that the ground Arpinas is counted the Arpinatians: the ground Tusculane, the Tusculanians. And after this sort is the pointing out of private possessions. Whereupon seeing there is made a man's own of every one of those things, which by nature were common: let every one enjoy, that to every one is befallen. More than that, if any man will covet to himself, he shall break the law of man's fellowship. But because (as it is notably written of Plato) we be borne 
●…lato to Architas.  not for ourselves alone: but somedeal of our birth our country, somedeal our parents, somedeal our friends do claim: and (as liketh the stoics) whatsoever is bred 
The Stoics  upon earth, all to the use of man is created: but man for man's own cause is begotten, that they among themselves, one may help an other: herein we be bound to follow nature 
Common fellowship.  our leader: and to set abroad, that may serve for common commodities, by interchange of duties in giving, & taking: and also by arts, by travail, by riches, to knit the fellowship of man with man.  
But faithfulness is the foundation 
Faithfulness  of justice: which is in word, and covenant, a troth, and steadfastness. Whereupon though this shall seem to some perchance overhard: yet let us be bold to follow the Stoics: which heedfully search out, from whence words be fetched: & let us think, that it is called faithfulness, because it is fulfiled, which was faithed.  
Contrariwise, there be two kinds 
Injustice.  of injustice. One of such, as offer it: an other, of those, who, though they be able, do not defend wrong from them, to whom it is offered. For whoso vniust●…ie doth make assault upon any man, either stirred by choler, or any passion, he seemeth as with violence, to kill his fellow: & whoso defendeth not, nor withstandeth iniuri●…, if he be able, is as far in fault: as if he should forsake his parents, his friends, or his country.  
And in deed those injuries, that 
Occasions of wrong doing.  〈◊〉 done of purpose to hurt, do oftentimes arise of fear: when he, who intendeth to hurt an other, is afraid 
Fear.  that unless he do it to the other, he may himself be touched with some discommodity.  
And for the most part many men take occasion to do wrong, of intent 
covetousness  to comepasse those things, that they have coveted: in which kind of vice, covetousness most largely showeth 
The use of riches.  herself. Notwithstanding riches be coveted, both for necessary uses of the life, & also to enjoy pleasures. But in those, in whom there is a greater courage, coveting of money hath an eye to power, and ableness of pleasuring: as of late Marcus 
Crassus' the rich.  Crassus denied any substance to be great enough for him, that in a common weal would be a prince: while he were not able with his revenue to maintain an army. Sumptuous furnitures do also delight, & countenance of life, with fijnnesse, and plenty. By which means it is come to pass, that endless is the desire of riches.  
And truly the enlargement of a man's private goods, hurtful to nobody, is not to be dispraised: but evermore injury is to be shunned. But the most part of men chiefly 
Ambition.  be brought to forget justice: when they fall into the desire of rule, honour, or glory. For that, which is in Ennius,  
In empire is no godly fellowship, nor no faith, 
Ennius.  reacheth further. For whatsoever is of such sort, wherein many can not be chief: therein commonly happeneth so great contention, that very hard it is to keep a godly society. The storm of Caius Cesar 
Caius julius Caesar.  declared that of late: who turned topset toruie all the laws of God, and man, for that soverainties sake, which he to himself, by the error of his own conceit, had imagined. And in this kind, it is a greefful case: that desires of honour, rule, power, and glory be commonly in the greatest courages, and goodliest wits. Wherefore the more heed must be taken, that we offend nothing in that behalf.  
But there is a great diversity in 
Of two sorts in wrong doing, whether is the worse.  all injustice, whether the wrong be done of any stir of the mind, which commonly is but short, and for a season: or else of purpose, and advisedly. For the harms be easier, that befall of some sudden mood, than such, as be done being devised, and prepared for. And thus we have said enough of doing injury.  
But there are wont to be many causes, why we refuse to defend an other, and do leave our duty. For 
〈◊〉, why some do 〈◊〉 duty, in not resisti wrong.  men be unwilling to take upon them either displeasure, or travail, or charges: or else they be so given to negligence, slothfulness, idleness, private studies, or certain bisinesse: that they suffer them to be helpless, whom they ought to save harmless. Wherefore we must look, lest it 
Idle Philosophers disallowed.  be not sufficient, that is spoken of Plato, touching the Philosophers: y● therefore they be just, because they be occupied in tracig out troth: & because they despise, & set at nought such things, as the most part of men greedily desire, and among themselves are wont to be at daggers drawing for the same. For while they attain one kind of justice, that they hurt noman with doing of injury, they fall into the other. For being letted with the study of learning, they forsake them, whom they ought to defend. And therefore he thinks, they would not enter into the commonweal, were they not compelied. But it were more reason, that voluntarily it should be done. For whatso is rightly done, thesame thereby is just, if it be voluntary. There be also, who either for love of saving their substance, or a certain hatred to men, do say, that they meddle only with their own matters: lest they may seem to do any body wrong: who, while they be void of one kind of injustice, do run into the other. For they forsake the fellowship of life: because they bestow no study, no labour, nor substance upon it.  
Seeing then after the declaring 
Brief rehearsal of things afore.  of the two kinds of injustice, we have thereto joined the causes of either kind: and have set out those things afore, wherein justice is contained: we may easily judge, what is the duty of every season, except we favour ourselves to far. For 
Care of other men's mater●…  it is hard to have a carefulness over other men's matters: although that same Chremes in Terence counteth nothing strange to him, of aught that perteins to man.  
Nevertheless because we perceive and feel those things more: that do happen to ourselves, either luckily, or vnfortunateli●…, than such as befall to other: which (as ye would say) we behold a great way of: we judge otherwise of them, then of ourselves. Therefore they teach well, that forbid to do any thing, which ye doubt, whether it be right, or wrong. For the very right shineth of itself: but doubting declares an imagination of wrong. 
Exceptions in duties pertaining to faithfulness.   
But often there befall seasons, that those duties, which seem to be most meet for a just man, & him, whom we call a good man, be changed, and become contrarious: so that sometime it is just not to restore, that is laid to keep: also, not to perform promise with a mad man: and to deny those things, which concern one's troth, and honesty. For it is meet, they be referred to those foundations of justice: which I laid in the beginning: first, that no man be hurt: next, that common profit be served. When these be changed by time: changed is duty, that it remains not always alike. For there mai chance some promise, and covenant: that may be unprofitable to be performed, either to him, to whom it is promised: or else to him, that promised it. For (as it is in the fables) if Neptunus 
Of These●…, & Neptunus.  had not done, that to Theseus he promised: Theseus had not been bereft of his son Hippolytus. For of the three bones (as is written) that was the third, which in his fury he asked, for the death of Hippolytus: and when he had obtained it, he fell into heavy wailings. Therefore neither those promises are to be fulfilled, which are unprofitable to them, to whom you made them: nor if they hurt you more, than they profit him, whom you promised.  
It is against duty, the greater harm to be rather admitted, than the less: as if you have appointed yourself with any man, to come, as his counselor in his matter, that is in hand: and in the mean season, your son begins to fall sore sick: let it not be reckoned against duty, not to perform, that ye promised: yea and he more should serve from duty, to whom the promise was made, if he would complain himself to be disappointed.  
Now who seeth not? that it is not meet to stand to those promises. which a man hath promised being constrained with fear, or deluded with guile. Which things, for the most part, be discharged by the praetors court: & many of them, by statutes. 
〈◊〉 ought to lean to the equity of the law.   
Wrongs also oftentimes do rise upon a certain cavillation, and over crafty, & subtle misconstruing of the law: whereupon the saying, Extreem law, extreem wrong, is now made a welworne proverb in communication. In which kind many things be done amiss, even in the commonweals 
Cleomenes, a Lacedaemonian.  matters: as he, who, when the truce was taken with the enemy, for thirty. days, overran his land in the night: because the truce was taken for days, & not for nights. No nor yet our countreiman is to be allowed: 
Q. Fabius Labeo.  if it be true, that Quintus Fabius Labeo, or any other man (for I have nothing, but by hearesaye) being by the Senate appointed dayman to the Nolanes, & Neapolitans, about the bounds of their land, did common with either of them apart, when he came to the place: that they should not do, nor covet any thing greedily: & that rather they would serte back, than encroach upon each other. Which when either of them had so done: there was a parcel of ground left in the mids. And so he caused their bounds to be staked out, even as they had told him: the residue, that was in the mids, he adjudged to the people of Rome. This plainly is to deceive, and not to judge. Wherefore such wiliness in every case is to be avoided.  
There be certain duties also to be 
Ponnishing of 〈◊〉.  observed even toward them, of whom you have received wrong. For in revenge, and chastisement, there is a measure to be used. And I wot not, whether it be sufficient for him, that began, to repent him of the wrong: 
Hitherto o●… civil justice.  but that he be punished, that he commit not the like offence again: & that other also may be the slower to do wrong.  
And the law of arms must in any wise be kept, in the commonweal. For whereas there be two kinds 
Of justice in war.  of contention, one by reasoning, an other by violence: & the first is the property of man, the second, of 
Speech.  
Force.  beast: we must flee to the latter, if we may not use the former.  
Wherefore to this end, and purpose 
The end of war, peace.  we must enter in war: that without injury we may live in peace: & 
Duties in the end of wars.  when the victory is gotten, they must be saved, who have not been cruel, nor unmercieful in fight: as our ancestors even into the city received the Tusculans, the Equianes, the Uolscianes, the Sabines, and the Hernikes: but they utterly razed Cartage, and Numance. Corinth I would, they had not: but I believe, they chiefly respected the situation: lest the very place might encourage them, at any time, to move war.  
After my mind certes, it is 
Peas always to be sought.  meet always to give counsel to peace, that shall have in it no fraud, nor guile. Wherein if men had agreed to me: we should have had, although not the best, yet some commonweal, which now is none. And 
The vanquished.  not only for them ye must provide, whom by force you have subdued: but they also, who come in with 
The yielded.  yielded weapons, upon affiance in the captain (although the Ramme hath battered the wall) are to be received: In which point, justice hath been so greatly regarded 
Example of the ancient Romans.  with our men: that they, who had taken cities to mercy, or nations conquered in war, should be their patrons, by the custom of our auncete●…s. And the justice of war is 
The ●…eciall law of bidding 〈◊〉.  most sincerely described, in the fecial law of the people of Rome. Whereby may be perceived, that no war is just: but which either for things in claim is moved, or is proclaimed before, and bidden by defiance. Pompilius the Romans general kept a province: in whose army, Cato's son went for a 
Conscience in keeping their oath of warfare.  young soldier a warfare. And when it liked Pompilius to discharge one legion: he discharged Cato's son also, who served in that legion as a soldier. But when he, for love of the wars, remained in the camp still: Cato did write to Pompilius, that if he would suffer him to remain in the army, he should swear him soldier again: because he might not lawfulli fight with the enemy, the former oath being discharged. So passing great regard they had in making their wars. There is a letter abroad, of Marcus Cato, the old man, to Marcus his son: wherein he wrote, that he herd, he was discharged by the Consul, being a soldier in Macedon, at the Persian wars. He warns him therefore to beware, that he enter not the battle: for he denieth, that it is lawful for him, that is no soldier, to fight with the enemy.  
And this also I note, that he, 
Their gentle naming their enemies, Hostes.  which by his proper name was Perduellis, that is to meanen, an open enemy, was called Hostis: the mildness of the word assuaging the heinousness of the thing. For he was called Host, with our ancestors, whom now we name Peregrinum, a stranger. That the twelve tables declare, Aut status dies cum host: and again, Aduersus bostem eterna auctoritas. What may there be added to this kind of gentleness? to call him by so fair a name, with whom you make war.  
Notwithstanding process of time 
Hostis is now taken for an enemy.  maketh that name now more odious: for it is gone from the signification of Peregrinus, that is to say a stranger: & properly it stands for him, that beareth armour against one. But when there is fight for empire, 
Duties in wars holden for honour, or life.  and glory is sought by war: yet it behoveth always, that the very same causes be therein, which I declared a little before to be y● just causes of war. But those wars are not so cruelly to be made, which be purposed for the glory of empire. For as, when we strive in the city, we do otherwise, if one be our enemy, otherwise, if he be but suitor against us: for with the one the strife is for honour, & dignity, with the other, for life, & honesty: even so war was held with the Celtibers, and with the Cimbers, as with our enemies, whether should live, and not whether should rule: but with the Latins, the Sabines, the Samnites, the Penes, and with Pyrrhus, the fight was about empire, & dominion. The Penes were leagbreakers, Annibal was cruel, the rest were juster men. That is a noble saying 
Pyrrhus' answer to the Romans.  doubtless of Pyrrhus, about the restoring of prisoners.  
No gold do I crave, no price offer me: 
Verses of Ennius.  No huckster's of war, warmen as we be, With dint for our life fight we, not with gold●…. Whether you for to reign, or me the lady would Chance tryie we by force. This answer eke bare: Whose manhood the hap of battle will spare, Their freedom I purpose to favour also. Them give I, them take: the gods will it so. A princely saying forsooth, & wellbeseemig the lineage of the Aiacidans.  
Likewise if private men, driven 
Private pro●…es to the enemy.  by occasions, shall promise aught to the enemy: they must keep their promise therein. As Regulus did, 
Example of Regulus.  that was taken of the Carthaginers in the first Punik wars: who, when he was sent to Rome, about the interchanging of prisoners: & had sworn, that he would return: first, as soon as he came, his advise was in the Senatehouse, that the prisoners should not be restored: afterward, when he should have been stayed of his kinsfolk, and friends: he was more willing to return to ponnishment, than to break his promise given to the enemy.  
And in the second Punic wars, after Cannas' field, the 
How the Cesors ponm.  ●…sors sessed at a yearly fine all 
s●…ed certain 〈◊〉.  those ten (as long as any of thē●…ued, that tarried still, and were forsworn) which Annibal sent to Rome, upon their oath, that they should return: except they obtained the ransoming of those, that were prisoners there: & no less they sessed him, which for the deceiving of his oath, had devised an excuse. For when by Hannibal's licence, upon his oath to return, he was gone without the camp: he returned within a little while after, making his excuse, that he had forgotten, I wo●… not what. Afterward, being gone out of the camp, he thought himself discharged of his oath: and in words he was, but not in deed. For 
A gener●… rule.  alwa●…S in promise must be considered, what ye mean, not what ye say. But the greatest example 
A notable e●… ample of the Romans equity.  of justice toward the enemy was showed by our ancestors. When a runaway traitor from Pyrrhus 
T●…ochares  had promised the Senate, that he would give the king poison, and kill him: the Senate, and Caius Fabritius did deliver the rūaw●… traitor to Pyrrhus. In such sort, with treachery, they allowed not the death of their enemy: & such a one, as was both mighty, and moved war unprovoked. Thus of warrefaring duties there is enough spoken.  
Let us remember also, that even toward the basest sort there is a justice 
justice in housholding.  to be kept. The basest degree, and state is of slaves: whom they, 
Slaves.  that will ye so to use, as hired men, in requiring their work, & giving them their due, do teach you not amiss.  
But whereas injuries may be 
hurts.  done two ways, that is to sai●…, other by force, or by guile: guile seems 
Force, Gyle.  as of the for, force as of the lion: both introuthe are very unfit for man, yet guile deserveth the greater hatred. But of all injustice none is more pestilent, than theirs: which when they beguile a man most, yet 
False semblant.  so handle the matter, that they will 
Hitherto, of the particular justice.  seem to be wellmeaning men. Of justice here is said enough.  
Let us now speak, as we purposed, 
Of liberality 2. part of the gen. justice.  of bountiefulnesse, and liberality, for nothing without doubt is to the nature of man more agreeable.  
Notwithstanding it hath divers exceptions. 
Exceptions.  For first, we must see, that our bountiefulnesse hurt not both 
How.  those, to whom bountiefullie it shall seem to be done, & also othermo: next, that our liberality be not more, 
How much.  than our ability: thirdly, that to everienian be given, according to his 
To whom.  worthiness. For that is the foundation of justice, whereto all these must be applied. j For both they, that pleasure any body with that, which may hurt him, whom they would seem willing to profit: ought to be deemed not bounteous, nor liberal, but pestilent flatterers: and they likewise, who do hurt some, that they may be liberal to other, do fall into thesame injustice: as if they should turn other men's goods into their own. But there be many, and namely the desirous 
Partia●…  of honour, & glory: who do catch from some, that they may lavish to an other: & these suppose, that they shall seem bountiefull to their ●…endes, if they may enrich them any manner way. But that is so far of from duty, that nothing may be more cont●…arious to duty. We must see therefore, that we use such liberality, as may profit our friends, and hinder nobody. Wherefore 
●…annie.  Lucius Sulla's, and Caius Caesar's conveying of g●…odes from the just owners to strangers must not be thought liberality. For nothing is liberal, which same is not just.  
The second point of exception was, that our liberality should not be more than our ability: because whoso 
Foolelarge.  will be lavisher, than their goods will bear: they chief offend in this, that they be injurious unto their next akin. For they convey those same riches to fre●…ne folk: which it were more reason both●… to be dealt, and left to their kinsfolk.  
And there is in such liberality a 
●…ortion.  greediness oftentimes of catching, and pulling awa●…e with injury, that there may be sto●…e to lash out. A man may see some also do much, not by nature so liberal, as led with 
〈◊〉.  a certain glory, that they may seem bountieful: which things may be thought to come rather of a brag than of a free heart. Such a fa●…sse fainig is a nearer neighbour to vanity, than either to liberality, or to honesty.  
The third restraint, we s●…ake of, is that in liberality there be a choice of worthiness. Wherein are to be considered both his manners, upon whom y● benefit shall be bestowed, & also his good will toward us: and the enterpartening & fellowship of life, & friendly turns done before to our commodities: all which be 〈◊〉 to meet together: if not, the more causes, and the greater shall have in them the more weight.  
Howbeit because we lead not our life with perfit men, and thoroughly 
The first 〈◊〉 of the third rule, touching manners.  wise: but with such, as in whom it is a goodly matter, if there be resemblances of virtue: I 〈◊〉 this also meet to be considered, that we despise no manner man, in whom any sign of virtue doth appear: and specially, that everyman so be regarded, as echeman chiefly shall be garnished with these gentler kinds of virtues, sobermoode, temperance, and this same justice, whereof already much hath been spoken. For a manly courage, and a great is commonly somewhat to fervent in a man, that wants of perfection, and wisdom: but those other virtues seem rather to pertain to a good man. Thus much in manners may be considered.  
But concerning love, that any 
●…ction toward us.  man beareth toward us, this is the chief point of duty: that we give most to him, of whom we are most beloved. But we must measure good will, not after the guise of youngmen, by a certain heat of love: but rather by assur●…nesse, and steadfastness. 
Of r●…iting a good turn.   
But in case a man's derseruing be such, that we have not to seek to creep in favour, but to requite his kindness: a certain greater care is then to be used. For there is no duty more necessary, than requiting of kindness. And if H●…siodus wills ye, with larger measure (if ye may) to restore such things, as ye have borrowed to occupy: what then ought we to do, provoked by benefits? Must we not do like the fruitful fields, that yield much more, than they received? For if we stick not to bestow pleasures upon them, who, we hope, will profit us hereafter: what manner men ought we to be toward them, that have done us good already? For whereas there be two kinds of liberality: one, of doing a benefit, an other of requiting: whether we will do it, or no, is in our own choice: but to leave aught unrequited, is not law full for a good man: so he may do it without injury. But there 
Choice in 〈◊〉.  be respects to be had of benefits received: and there is nodoute, but most is due to the greatest.  
Wherein specially yet is to be wesed 
Measure the gift by the givers good heart.  of what mind, affection, and good will, a man hath done it. For many men do many things of a certain heddinesse, without discretion, or measure, toward everiman: or●…ls with a certain sudden bray of mind carried, as with the wind: which benefits are not to be counted alike great, as those, that be offered with judgement advisedly, & constantly. But in placing of benefits, 
A general 〈◊〉.  and requiting kindness (if all other things be correspondent) this is a principal point of duty: that as everyman most needeth help, so him most of all we aid. Which contrariwise is done of a great meinie: for of whom they hope most, although he hath no need of them, yet to him they are most serviceable.  
But the fellowship, and neibourhod of men shall best be maintained: 
The felo●…ship of life.  if as everyman shall be nearest us, so on him we bestow most liberalitic.  
But what be nature's principles of neibourhod, and the fellowship of man, I think good, to fetch somewhat farther of.  
For the first is that, which is to 
The fir●… degree of fellowship.  see in the fellowship of all mankind. The bond whereof is reason, and 
Reason, and speech,  speech: which by teaching, learnig, conferring, reasoning, & judging, winneth one man to an other, and joineth them in a certain natural fellowship. Nor by any thing further we differ from the nature of savage beasts: in whom we say oftentimes there is an hardiness: as in horses, and lions: but we never say, they have justice, equity, and goodness: for they be void of reason, and of speech. And surelic this is y● fellowship, that spreadeth most largely with men among themselves, and with all among all: in the which there must be kept a commonness of all things, the nature hath bred to the common use of man: so as the things, which be appointed 
Civil lawe●…,  by statutes, & the civil law, be observed in such sort, as it is ordained: beside which, all other things 
The l●…we of nature,  are so to be observed, as is in the Greek proverb: among friends 
Things common.  all things be common. But all those things seem common to all men, which be of that kind: as, being 
Ennius,  put for example by Ennius in one thing, may be applied to many.  
The m●…n, that gently shows th●… way unto the ●…andering wight,  
Doth●…, as if 〈◊〉 a candle should at his own candle light,  
That nevertheless ' it light himself, when lighted is the other.  
For enough is taught us by one example: that whatsoever we may lend without hindrance, it be granted to every body, yea to the unknown. Whereupon these things be common: Not to forbid one the running water: To suffer one, that will, to take fire at our fire: To give faithful counsel to him, that asketh ad vice: which things be profitable to those, that receive them, & nothing burdenous to the giver. Wherefore we must both use these things, & somewhat always must we do to further the common profit. But sith each private man's substance is small, and the multitude is endless, that 
A measure in common lib.  need it: common liberality must be referred to that end of Ennius: That nevertheless it light himself: so as there may be an ability, wherewith we may be liberal to our own.  
There be more degrees yet of the fellowship of men. For, to leave that 
Nearer degrees offe●…ouship.  endless number: there is a nigher degret to be of one country, of one 
C●…untrieme.  nation, of one language: by the which, men be chiefly knit together.  
A nearer also it is, to be of one city. For there be many things common 
Citiezen●….  to citizens among themselves: as lawcourts, churches, galereywalkes, hyewayes, statutes, laws, judgements, voices, customs: and besides these, familiarities, and having to do in sundry matters, and bargains with sundry folk.  
But a faster knitting of men together is the fellowship of kinsfolk. 
●…red.  For out of that innumerable fellowship of mankind, it is driven to a little, and a narrow comepasse. For whereas by nature this is common to all living creatures, to have a lust to engendering: the first fellowship is in very wedlock: the next, in children: & after that, one house, & all things common. And this is y● original of a city & as it were the seedplotte of a commonweal. Then follow the kindreds of brethren: after, of brothers and sisters children: who, when they now cannot be contained in one house, get them abroad to other houses, as into neew towns. Then follow entermariages, and alliances, of which also more kinsfolk do arise. Which multiplication, and succession is the root of commonweals. Surely the matching of bloods, and good will that riseth thereof, knitteth men in love together. For it is a great matter to have the like monuments of aunceters, to use all one religion, and to have the same burial places.  
But of all felouships there is none better, none more assured, than when 
Friendship among good men.  good men alike in conditions be enfeloushipt in familiarity together. For that honesty (which we have often mentioned) although we see it in an other, yet it moveth us & maketh us friends to him, in whom the same seemeth to dwell. And though all virtue allureth us to her, & causeth us to love them, in whom she seemeth to harbour: yet justice, & liberality worketh that most of all. But there is nothing, that winneth more love, nor surelier knitteth men together, than a likeness in good conditions. For in whom be like desires, and like minds: it happeneth among them, that either with other is as much delighted, as with himself: and it is brought to pass, that Pythagor as requires in amity, that man●…e become one.  
That common fellowship also is great, which groweth of benefits 
Good tur●… done from one to an other.  to and fro give, and taken. Which while they be common from one to an other, and pleasurefull: they among whom those happen, be tied in a fast fellowship.  
But when ye have per used all these things in your reason, and 
Love of comon●…eale.  mind: of all felouships there is none more acceptable, nor dearer, than the same, which every one of us hath with the commonweal. dear be our parents, dear be our children, dear be our kinsfolk, and familiars: but our country contains in it alone all the dear love of them all: for the which, what good man doubts to take his death, if he may profit the same? Whereby their beastly cruelty is the more to be abhorred: who have rend a sunder their ●…ountrey with all manner of mischief: and both be, and have been occupied in y● utter overthrowing thereof.  
But if question, or comparison 
Comparing of degrees.  be made, to whom the greatest duty ought to be yielded: our country, 
Country.  and parents be the chief, by whose 
Parents.  benefits we are most bound: our children, and all our holle family be the next: which hang all upon us 
Children.  alone, and can have none other refuge: 
Family.  then be our kinsfolk, that agree 
●…insfolke.  well with us: which commonly stand in the like estate. Wherefore the necessary aides of life be due to them chiefly, whom I spoke of before: but conversation, and commonness of table, counselinges, communications, 
Friends.  exhortations, comfortings, yea and chidings otherwhile among friends be most used: and that is the pleasantest friendship, which likeness of conditions hath yoked in one.  
But in doing all these duties, 
This order ●…s often altered, as psones and times require.  we must mark, what is most need full for every man: and what every body is able, or unable by us, or without us, to attain. So the degrees of friendships shall not d●… alike with the degrees of times: and there be duties, which are due to some, more than to other some: as you shall sooner help your neighbour 
Example●…  in inning his corn, than either your brother, or your familiar friend: but if there be a travers in law: you shall rather defend your kinsman, and friend, than your neighbour. These therefore, and su●…h like must be thoroughly considered in every duty: and we must 
Use, and exercise.  so use, and practise ourselves, that we may be good countmakers of duties: and see by adding, and deducting, what sum riseth of the rest: whereupon we may understand, how much is due to everyman. But as neither physicians, nor captains, nor orators, although they have conceived the rules of their science, can attain any thing worthy great praise, without use, and practise: so those rules of keeping duty are in deed taught us, that we ourselves should put them in ure: but the hardness of the matter also requireth use, and exer●…se.  
And how honesty, from which, ●…utie springeth, is setched out of those things, that be within the law of man's fellowship: we have in a manner said enough.  
But we must note, that, whereas there be four general kinds of 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉  virtues pointed out, from the which, honesty, and duty should flow: that 
〈◊〉 of the ●…ame.  seems to shine brightest: which is wrought with a great, and lofty courage, despisig worldly vanities. And therefore in reproach it is commonly ready, if any such thing may be said, as this:  
You youngmen iwis carry women's hearts, That virgin, a man's.  
Likewise if ought be like to this:  
A goodly great spoil at Salmacis won: Without any blood, or sweat was it done.  
And on the other side, in praises, those deeds, that be done manfully, notably, & with great courage, I wots not how as with open mouth we commend. Hereof came the rhetoricians large field upon Marathon, Salamis, Plateians, Thermopylanes, Leuctrians, and Stratocles: hereof our Cocles, hereof the Occians, hereof Cneus, and Publius the Scipiocs, hereof Marcus Marcellus, and other innume rabble, and specially the people o●… Rome did exceed in greatness o●… courage. And their desire of martia glory is declared: in that we see their images of honour be set up, f●… the most part, in warlike array.  
But if that hawtienesse of courage 
Māh●…d 〈◊〉 justice falleth into divers extreems.  which is seen in perils, and travails, be void of justice, and doth not fight for a common safety, but for a private profit: it is to be reckoned faulty. For that not only is not the property of virtue, but rather of brutishness, setting all 
Brutishne●…,  humanity aside. Therefore manliness is well defined of y● stoics: where they say, it is a virtue, that 
〈◊〉 hat is manliness,.  fighteth in defence of equity.  
Wherefore noman, that hath attained the glory of manliness, ever got praise by wily trains, and craftiness. For nothing may be honest, that is void of justice. A worthi●… saying therefore is that of Plato's, who saith,  
That not only the knowledge, which is severe, from ius●…ee, is rather to be called subtlety, 〈◊〉 wisdom: but also the courage, which is forward to danger, if it be set on for ones own greediness, and not for a comem profit: may rather 
foolhardiness.  bear the name of lewd hardiness, than of man: linesse.  
Wherefore who be manly men, & stouteherted: those same we would have also be good, and plain, lovers 
The manly must be plain.  of troth, and nothing at all deceitful: which come out of the midst of all the praises of justice.  
But this is odious, that in such 
Impediments of this virtue.  hawtienesse, & greatness of courage, there groweth a wilfulness veriesoone, 
Sturdiness.  
Desire of sovereignty.  & an overseeking of rule. For as it is in Plato, that it was all the manner of the Lacedæmonians, to be inflamed with desire of conquering: so as every man doth most excel other in greatness of courage, he will likewise be the very highest over all, or rather without peer. And when you covet to be above all, it is hard to keep au equity, which is most proper to justice. Whereof comes topasse, that they can not abide to be bridled neither with reasoning, nor with any common, and rightful order of law: and they become in the commonweal for the most part giftgivers, and partmakers: that they may attain to y● greatest power, and be rather by might superior, than by justice equal. But the harder it is to master the affection, the worthier is the mastery.  
For there is no season, that aught to be without justice. They therefore be counted manly, & of great courage, not who do anic wrong, but who withstand it. But a true, and wise stoutehert judgeth that honesty, which nature chiefly followeth, to stand in deeds, and not in glory: and had rather 
The most part likes not the best things.  be, than seem the chief. For whoso hangeth upon the wavering of the unskilful multitude, he is not to be counted among the number of manly men. But as every 
Glory.  man is of the highest courage, and disirous of glory: so is he soon egged to unjust doings.  
Which is indeed a very slipper place: because scase there is any man found, who when he hath sustained travails, and adventured dangers, doth not desire glory, as reward of his doings.  
A manly courage, and a great 
The duties of manliness.  is always by two things chief discerned: whereof the one stands in the contempt of outward things: 
Contempt of casual things.  when it is persuaded, that a man ought not either to esteem, either wish, or desire any thing, but that is honest: and unseemly to yield to none, neither man, nor affection, nor chance of fortune. The other 
Doing of great entrep●…ses.  thing is, that when you be so disposed in courage, as I said before: ye do great enterprises, and those same right profitable: but yet very hard, and full of travail, and danger, both for life, & for many things, that to life do belong. All the glory, and honour of these two things, I add there to the profit, stands in the latter: but the cause, & mean, that makes manly men, is in the former. For in it is that, which maketh e●…cellent courages, and such 
Contempt of outward things.  as despise the worlds vanities.  
But this same resteth in two things: if both you judge that only to be good, which is honest, & also 
●…nlie honesty good.  be free from all moodiness of mind. 
Uoiding of affections.  For it is to be counted the part of a great, and manly courage, both to set light by those things, which do seem precious, and gorgeous to the greater number: and also to despise the same, with a stead fast, and grounded judgement: and likewise it is a sign of mighty courage, and great stead fastness, so to bear those things: which seem bitter, and be much, & sundry ways tossed in man's life, and fortune: as nothing you serve from the order of nature, nor the worthiness of a wiseman. And it is not meet, that he be subdued 
The manly man is never vanquished of his own affections.  with desire, who is not subdued with fear: nor that he be overcome with pleasure, who hath showed himself unable to be overcome with travail. Wherefore both these faults are to be avoided, and also 
Covetise of money.  covetousness of money is to be eschewed. For nothing is so much a sign of a small, and slender courage, as to love richesses: nothing there is honester, and nobler, than to despise money, if you have it not: & if you have it, to bestow it in bounteousness, and liberality. We must also beware of desire of glory, as I said tofore. For it pulls away the freedom 
Love of glory.  of the mind: for the which, all the endeavour of stouteherted men 
Desire of rule.  should be. And verily we ought not to seek for rule, but rather not to receive it sometime, or otherwhile to give it over. And we must be free from all troublesome stir of mind: 
Uoidaunce of evil affectious.  from desire, & fear, from hertsicknesse, and voluptuousness, & angriness: that we may have quietness of mind, and voidness of care: the which may bring both steadfastness, and also a worthy estimation.  
But divers there be, and have 
Of officebea●…ing, or refusing.  been: who desiring that same quietness, that I speak of, have withdrawn themselves from common affairs, and have got them to quietness. Among these, both the noblest philosophers, and the very chief, and also certain upright, and grave men neither could abide the manners of the people, nor of the rulers: and many of them have lived in desert places, as delighted only with their homematers. These shoot at the same mark, that kings do: that is, to have need of nothing, to obey noman, and to use their own liberty: whose property 
Liberty.  is, to live asye list. Wherefore sith this is common both to the desirous of power, & those (whom I spoke of) that lead the quiet life: the one sort do think themselves able to comepasse it, if they have great wealth: the other, if they be contented with their own, and a little. Wherein verily the opinion of neither of them is utterly to be despised: but the life of 
The philosopher's life.  the quiet livers is both easier, and safer, and less grievous, or 
The magistrates life.  troublesome to other: and theirs is the profitabler for mankind, and fit for fame, and honour: who have applied themselves to the commonweal, and going thorough with great matters. Wherefore peradventure both they are to be borne withal, that take 
Refusing of government in the commonweal.  not in hand the commonweal, who of an excellent wit have applied themselves to learning: and also they, who being letted either by sicklines, or some other more weighty cause, have conveyed themselves away from the commonweal: when they were well content to leave to other the authority, & praise of ruling thesame. But to whom there is no such occasion: if they say they set nought by those things, that most men have in admiration, as rule, and officebearing: to these I think it worthy to be counted not only no praise, but also a fault. Whose judgement it were very hard to disallow, in that they despise glory, & esteem it as nothing: but they seem to fear the troubles, and 
I fear contrary to manliness.  grieves both of giving offence, & having repulses, as a certain reproach, and defame. For there be, who do little agree with themselves in things, that be contrary: as some most earnestly contemme pleasure, and in pain be somewhat tenderer: some regard not glory, and be broken with slander: & these things they do not with sufficient steadfastness. But all linger set aside, offices are to be taken, and the commonweal to be served of 
Such as 〈◊〉 meet, must serve the commonweal.  those: who have by nature the helps of dispatch of matters. For otherwise can neither the state be governed, nor the greatness of courage be declared. And of such as take upon them the commonweal, no less than 
Magistrates ought to avoid pass●…s of min●…e, noles●…e than philosophers.  of philosophers, yea and I wot not whether more, must be used both a majesty, & a contempt of worldly things (which I often repeat) and also a quietness of mind, & voidness of care: for so they shall not be thoughtful, and with gravity, and stead fastness they shall lead their life. Which things be so much the 
Philosopher's minds be not ●…pted so ma●…e ways, as magistrates.  easier to philosophers: as the fewer things lie open in their life, that fortune may strike: and as the fewer things they stand in need of: and because they can not take so sorè a fall, if any adversity betide. Wherefore not without cause, greater motions of minds be stirred up in them: and greater enterprises are meet to be compassed, by the governors of the commonweal, than by the quiet livers: and therefore the more greatness of courage, & voidness of greeucs ought they to use. But whoso doth come to the doing 
Undertaking of enterprises.  of matters, let him take heed: that not only this he consider, how honest the matter is: but also that he have an ableness to discharge thesame. In the which point must be considered: that neither oversoon he despair for dastardliness, nor 
Despair.  overmuch have affiance, for greediness. 
Presumption.  And in all matters, before 
A lesson.  ye go about them, there must be used a diligent preparation.  
But whereas most men suppose 
Citiematers above martial feats.  martial feats to be greater, than citiecauses: this opinion is to be abated. For many have sought war oftentimes, upon desire of glory: & it commonly befalleth in great wits, & courages: & so much the more, if they be men fit for chivalry, and desirous of warfare. But if we mind to judge truly: there have been many citiematers greater, & nobler than martial. For though Themistocles 
examples of Greeks. Themistocles Salamis.  be rightfully commended, and his name is more famous, than Solon's: and Salamis is cited a witness of his most glorious victory: & it is preferred above that counsel of Solon, wherewith he first ordained 
Solon.  the Areopagites: yet no less 
The Areopage.  praiseworthy is this, than that, to be adjudged. For that but once availed, this shall for ever avail the city. By this counsel, the laws of the Athenians, by this, 
The Athenians.  the orders of their elders be preserved. And Themistocles can allege nothing, wherewith he furthered the Areopage: but Solon furthered Themistocles. For that war was maintained by the advise of that Senate, which by Solon was established. We may say as much of Pausanias, 
Pausamas.  & Lysander: by whose deeds 
Lisander.  of arms, though the empire of the Lacedæmonians is thought to 
The Lacedæmonians.  have been enlarged: yet verily they are not to be compared in the lest part, with Lycurgus' laws, 
Lycurgus.  and order: yea moreover by these occasions, they had their armies both forwarder, and valianter. Neither when I was a child, methought, 
Examples of Romans.  Marcus Scaurus gave 
M. Scaurus.  place to Caius Marius: nor when 
C. Marius.  I had a 〈◊〉 in the commonweal, Quintus Catulus, to Cneus Pompeius. 
Q. Catulus.  For of small force is the 
●…n. Pompeius.  war abroad, unless theridamas be good 
Africanus.  advise at home. Nor Africanus, both a singular man, and captain also, did more profit the commonweal in razing of Numance: than at that time, Publius Nasica, a private man 
P. Nasica.  did further it, when he sleew Tiberius Gracchus. Nowbeit this case in deed is not only a citiemater. For it belongeth also to the nature of martial feats: sith it was wrought by force, & by strong hand. But yet that same was done by citicounsell, without an army. And that is a goodly saying, where with I hear, that I am wont to be touched of envious, & lewd persons.  
To the rob above arms let glory belong, And the laurel yeeve place to the orators tongue. For, that I may pass over other: 
Tullie●… Con●…ship.  did not arms yield unto the rob, when I governed the commonweal? For neither in the commonweal was ever a sorer peril, nor yet a greater quiet. So by our counsel, & diligence, the very weapons, full soon s●…iding out of the boldest citizens hands, did fall to the ground. What enterprise, I pray you, in war was ever done so great? what triumph is there with it to be compared? For I may, son Mark, glory before you: to whom both the inheritance of this glory, & the imitation of my deeds doth pertain. Cneus 
Cn. Pompeius triumphed thrice, over the A fers, an●… the Sp●…rdes, & 〈◊〉 dates.  Pompeius, a man flowing full of martial praises, gave me this commendation, in the hearing of many: that he said, he should in vain have borne away the third triumph: except, by my furtherance, in the commonweal, he should have had a place, where he might have triumphed. Homemanhod then is not inferior to martial: in which also we must bestow more labour, and study, than in this. For always that honesty, which we seek in a 
The cause of manliness.  haughty, and a princely courage, is wrought by the strength of the mind 
Strength o●… the mind.  and not of the body. Yet the body 
Labour of the body.  must be exercised, and brought in such plight: as it may be able to follow counsel, and reason, in executing matters, & t●…steining travail. But that honesty, whereafter we search allholle consists in y● care, & casting of the mind: wherein they bring nolesse commodity, who robed do govern the commonweal: than they do, who armed do make the wars. And therefore, by their advise oftentimes, wars be either not begun, or ended, & many times attempted: as by Marcus Cato's counsel, 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  was the third Punik war wherein the authority of the dead man availed. Wherefore rather wisdom in determining, than manliness in fight is to be desired: but we must beware that we take not up the matter by advise, more to avoid war, than for cause of profit. And so let war be taken in 
war.  hand, as no other thing may seem, but peace, to have been sought.  
And it is verily a token of a manly 
The properties of a manly man.  courage, and a constant, not to be disquieted in rough storms: nor in making a hurl, to be thrust from his place, as they say: but to follow the counsel of a present courage, nor yet to serve from reason. Notwithstanding, the one comes of courage: the 
Corage.  other proceeds of a great wit, to 
wit.  tofore in mind things ●…ocōme: & somewhat before to appoint upon, what may befall on both sides: & what is to be done, when any thing shall happen: nor to commit aught, that at any time one should have cause to say, Had I witted. These be the works of a great, & lofty courage, & leaning upon prudence, & counsel. But for a man to use himself rashly 
Rash●…  in field, & so to buckle with y● enemy hand to hand, it is a certain brutish, & beastlike thing: but when time is, & necessity requires, a man must 
Necessity.  fight hand to hand, & preserre death before slavery, and shame.  
But touching the razing, and 
Razing o●… cities.  sacking of cities, this greatly is to be considered: that nothing rashly, nothing cruelly be done. And it is 
Justice toward the 〈◊〉.  y● condition of a stouthertedman, in the end of broils, to ponnish the offenders, to save the multitude, in every estate to maintain right, and honesty. For like as there be (as I said tofore) who do prefer martial feats before citiecauses: so may ye find many, to whom dangerous, and hotebrained devices seem gloriouser, and greater, than quiet counsels. We must never by seeking to es●… 
Fleel. ing of peril  peril, deserve to seem cowards, dastards: but this we must ta●… 
Assailing of ●…tures.  heed of, that we put not our selue in danger, without cause: for th●… can be nothing foolisher, than so 〈◊〉 do. Wherefore in adventuring da●…gers, the guise of the physicians is 〈◊〉 be followed: who do lightly cur the lightly diseased: but to sor●… sicknesses they be driven to ministe dangerous, & doubtful medicines, Therefore in a calm to wish a sor●… tempest, it is a mad man's part: bu●… to make shift in a tempest, by all manner means, it is a wiseman's property: & so much the more, if ye attain more good, when the thing is past, than harm, when it was in doubt. But the doing of matters be dangerous 
Dangers.  
〈◊〉.  partly to those, which take 
Common.  them in hand, & partly to the commonweal. And also some be brought in 
Of life.  hazard of their life, some of their glory, 
Of glory.  some of the people's favour. We 
Of favour.  ought therefore to be readier to adventure 
A precept of duty.  our own, than common perils: & to fight sooner for honour, & glory than for other commodities.  
But there have been found many, 
Against them that more e●…eme their own glory. than commonwealth.  who for their country were ready to spend not only their substance, but also their life: & those same yet would not be content to lose one jot of their glory: no not though the commonweal would require it: as Callicratides, who 
Callicratides  when he was captain of the Lacedæmonians, in the Peloponnesian war, & had done many things worthily: in the end, ●…uerturned all: when he did not follow their advise: who thought good to transport the navy from Arginnuses, and not to fight with the Athenians. To whom he made answer, how the Lacedæmonians, that navy being lost, might make for the an other: but he could not flee with out his dishonour. And this was nodoute to the Lacedæmonians a meetly sore plague: but that was a pestilent plague, whereby the Lacedæmonians power fell flat to the ground: when Cleombrotus, fearing 
Cleombrotus  envy, had rashly encountered with Epamivondas. How much 
Q. Fabius.  better did Quintus Fabius Maximus? of whom quoth Ennius: 
Ennius.   

One wight there is, that hath our wealth  
restored by delays:  
For he before all rumours did  
our safety set always:  
wherefore, in longer course of time,  
the greater is his praise.   
Which kind of misdoing must 
Manly courage in citiematers.  be also avoided in citiematers. For there be men, who, be it never so good, that they think, yet for fear of envy they dare not utter it.  
Whoso shall be governors of 
Affections, which rulers ought to resist.  the commonweal, let them observe two precepts of Plato's: one is, that they so maintain the profit of the commons: that whatever they do, they refer it thereto, 
minding of private profit.  always forgetting their own commodities: the other is, that they have care over the holle body of the commonweal: l●…ste while they 
Injustice.  uphold some one part, the rest they leave destitute. For like as gardenshippe, even so government of the commonweal ought to be used to the profit of them, who are co●…itted: and not of them, to whom it is committed. But whoso provide for part of the people, and of part be reckless: they bring in sedition, and discord, the thing most hurtful to the commonweal: 
Discord.  whereby it befalleth, that some do●… seem peoplepleasers, some affectionate to nobility, but few to the holle. Hereof sprang great diss●…on among the Athenians: and in our commonweal, not only sedition, but also sore civil war: the which a grave, and stout citizen, and worthy of rule in the commonweal, will flee, and hate: and give himself holle to the commonweal: and neither hunt after riches, nor power: but will so defend the holle state, as he may provide for all men. Nor by false accusations 
False accus●…tion.  will he bring any man into hatred, or envy: but always will so cleave to justice, & honesty: y●, while he may maintain it, although he sore offend other he would desire death rather, than forsake those things, that I have spoken of. Ambition nodoute, 
Ambition.  and striving for promotion is a very miserable thing: whereof it is notably said in thesame Placo: the semblably far they, who would strive together, whether of them should rather rule the commonweal: as if the mariners should be at variance, which of them should thiestie govern the helm. And thesame man hath taught us: that those we take 
Dissension.  as enemies, which would bear armour against us: & not those, who, by their discretion mean to preserve the commonweal: as the dissension between Publius Africanus, and Quintus Metellus was without all bitterness of malice. Neither are they worthy to be herd: which hold opinion, that we should be throughlie angry with our enemies: 
Ange●….  and do think, it is the property of a stoutherted, and a manly man. For there is nothing more commendable, nothing more seemly for a great and noble man, than pleasablenesse, and mercy. But in free cities, and where there is an equality of law, there must be used also a mildness, & noble courage, as they call it: lest, if we be angry either with comers out of time, or cravers without shame: we fall into a testifenesse of mind both unprofitable, 
frowardness  and hateful. And yet meekness, and mercy is so to be allowed: that, for the commonweals sake, a severity be used: without which, a city can not be governed. But all ponnishment, & chastisement must be void of malice: and not be applied 
Malice.  to serve his tnrn, who ponnisheth, or rebuketh any man, but to the commonweals behoof.  
We must also be ware, that the 
rigorousness  ponnishment be not greater, than the fault: and lest all for one matter, 
Partiality.  some be corrected, some not once spoken unto. And in ponnishing we must chiefly refrain from 
Anger.  anger. For the angry man, that goeth about ponnishment, shall never keep that measure, that is between to much, & to little: the which measure liketh the peripatetics: and of good cause it liketh them, were it so, they would not commend angriness: and say, that it is profitably 
angriness.  given of nature. But in all cases, that affection is to be refused: and it is to be wished, that such as govern the commonweal, be like the laws: which be moved to ponnish offenders, not upon any wrath, but upon equity.  
Moreover in prosperity, & when 
Prosperity.  things flow even at our will, let us earnestly flee pride, disdeinfulness, 
Pride.  and arrogancy. For as it is a point 
Disoein.  of lightness, unmeasurably to bear 
Arrogancy.  adversity: so it is no less, unmeasurably 
unmeasurableness.  to use prosperity: & a continual 
Socrates and Lei●…us kept ever one countenance.  evenness in all a man's life, and one cheer evermore, & one manner of face is commendable: as we have herd of Socrates, and also of Caius Lelius. certes I see, how 
Alexander over ●…refull his father of more humanity.  Philip, king of the Macedonians, was excelled of his son, in prowess, and glory: yet in mildness, & gentleness, he was far above him. Wherefore y● one was always noble, the other oftentimes full beastly: so that they seem rightly to teach, which warn us: that how much the higher we be in degree, somuch the lowlyer we bear ourselves. 
PanetiusAfricanes saying.   
Panetius reporteth, how Africanus, his scholar, & familiar friend, was wont to say, like as horses, by reason of the divers fights of wars waxing overhotte, and courageous, men use to put to riders, that they may have them the readier: even so men unbridled with prosperity, and overtrusting to themselves, should be brought as it were within the commepasse of reason, and learning: that they might thorousee the trailnesse of the world, and the wavering of fortune.  
Moreover in our highest prosperity, 
Counsel of friends.  we must most of all take the advise of our friends: and we must give them also a greater authority, than we did before: and in those seasons, we must take heed, that we open not our ears to flatterers: nor 
Flatterers.  suffer ourselves to be clawed with flattery: wherein it is an easy thing to be beguiled. For we think ourselves 
Self-love.  such, that of right we may be praised. Whereof do springe innumerable faults: when men puffed up with opinion be shamefully scorned, and be wrappeth in foolish errors. But of these matters thus far we treat.  
This then is to be taken thus: that 
Rehearsal of things afore.  the greatest deeds, and of the greatest courage, be done by them, which govern the commonweal: because 
Magistrates  their ministration reacheth farthest, and to most men appertaineth. And that there be, and have been many, 
The quiet livers.  even in the quiet life, of great courage: which either would try out, or take in hand certain great enterprises: and would keep themselves within the bounds of their own matters: or else, placed between philosophers, 
Private house holder's.  and those, that rule the commonweal, would be delighted with their homegoodes: not heaping up the same, by all manner of means, nor barring theirs from the use thereof: 
Private substance.  but rather emparting than both to their friends, & to the commonweal, if at any time there should be need. Which good, first, let it be wellgotten, and with no dishonest, or hateful gain: next, let it be ready to do good to many, so they be worthy: lastly, let it be increased with discretion, diligence, & thrift: and not lie open rather to lust, and riot, than to liberality, and bountifulness.  
These foresaid lessons whoso observeth: 
Conclusion.  may live both honourably, gravely, & stoutly, & also plainly, faithfully, and friendly for y● trade of man's life.  
It follows, that we speak of the 
Of 〈◊〉.  other part of honesty, which remaineth: wherein shamefastness, & temperance, as it were the certain ornament of man's life, and sober mood, and all appeasment of passions of the mind, and the measure of things is seen. In this place 
Commelinesse.  also comeliness is contained: the which may be named Decorum in latin, for in Greek it is called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. The nature hereof is such, that from honesty it can not be sundered. For both what becometh, is honest, and also what is honest, becometh. But what difference there is between honesty, and comeliness, it may sooner be conceived, 
Cōme●… a water upon 〈◊〉.  than expressed. For whatsoever it is, that becometh, it than appeareth, when honesty is gone before.  
And therefore not only in this ●…rte of honesty, whereof in this 
●…nesse of ●…eraūce.  place we have to dispute, but also in the three former parts it doth appear, 
Comeliness in wisdom.  what becometh. For as it becometh one to use reason, & speech discreetly: to do, that he should do, advisedly: to espy, and maintain whatsoever is in every thing the troth: so contrariwise to be be, guiled, to err, to fall, to be deceived, as much it misbecommeth: as to dote, and be distraught in mind. Thereto all just things be comely: 
Commelinesse of justice.  all unjust things again as they be dishonest, so are they uncommelie. Like is the nature of manliness. 
A comely ●…sse.  For whatso is done manfully, and with a great courage, that doth seem meet for a man, and comely: whatso goeth contrary: that as it is dishonest, even so it is uncomelye. Wherefore this commelinesse, whereof 
Commelinesse in all honesty  I speak, doth pertain to all honesty in deed: and so perteins, that not after a certain hidden sort it is seen, but stands in open sight. For a certain thing there is, that becometh: and the same is perc●… in every virtue: which more by imagination, than in deed, may be severed from virtue. For as goodliness, and beauty of body can not be parted from health: so this 
Honesty, 〈◊〉 health of body commelinesse, like beauty.  commelinesse, whereof we treat, is altogether blended with virtue: but yet in ones mind, and thought it may be divided.  
But the description thereof is on 
Division.  two sorts. For both we conceive a general commelinesse to be, which in all honesty hath to do: and an other special commelinesse under this, which belongeth to every particular part of honesty. And that former thus 
Definition.  in a manner is wont to be defined: that it is comely, which is agreeable 
General commelinesse.  to man's excellency in that, wherein his nature is different from other living creatures. But 
Particular commelinesse.  they define the part, which is under the general, in such wise: that it they will have to be counted comely, which is so to nature agreeable, as in it may appear both measurableness, and temperance, with a certain honest show. That these be thus meant, of the philosophers, we may guess 
Comeliness ●…call.  by that comeliness, which the poets follow: whereof, in an other place, we are wont to say more. But then, we say, the poets keep that grace, which becometh: when it, that to each person is sitting, 
The person.  both is done, and said: as if either Aeacus, or Minos should say:  
Well, let them hate, all while they stand in fear●… or this,  
His children's grave the parentself now is:  
uncomely it should seem: because we have herd, that they were just men. But Atreus saying so, it is liked of y● hearer's: because the speech is fit for the person.  
But poets will judge by the person, 
Natural comeliness.  what is comely for every body: howbeit nature herself hath put upon us a parsonage of great excellence, and pre-eminence above all other living creatures. Wherefore poets, in the great diversity of persons, will espy: what is fit, even for the wicked sort, and what becometh them. But seeing the parts of steadfastness, measurableness, temperance, and shamefastness be appointed us by nature: and seeing the same nature teacheth us, not to be reckless, after what sort we behave ourselves to every man: it comes to pass, that both it appeareth, how far that commelinesse which apperteins to all honesty, doth reach: and this also, which is marked in every sear kind of virtue. For as the beautifulness of the body with proportionable making of the limbs moveth a man's eyes: and delighteth them even with this, that all the parts with a certain grace agree together: rightso this commelinesse, that shineth abroad in our life, winneth their liking, with whom we live, by an order, steadfastness, and measurableness in all our words, and deeds. There must be used therefore a certain reverence toward men, both to every one of the best sort, & also to the rest of meaner degrees. For it is not only a sign of an arrogant body, but also of one altogether lawless, to be reckless, what every man thinketh of him.  
But there is a difference between justice, and shamefastness, in every respect, that is to be had. It 
〈◊〉.  is the part of justice, to offer men no violence: of shamefastness, to 
Shamefastness.  offend nobody: wherein the nature of commelinesse is most thoroughly seen. These things th●… declared: I think it sufficiently conceived, what thing that is, which we say, becometh.  
But the duty, that proceedeth of 
Duties out of commelinesse  commelinesse, chiefly taketh this way: which leadeth to the agreeableness, & preservation of nature: whom if we will follow as guide, we shall never go amiss: and shall follow both y●, which hath in it wittiness, and thorousight by nature: and that, which is agreeable for the fellowship of men: and that, which is earnest, and manly. But the greatest effect of commelinesse standeth in this part of virtue, whereof we now treat. For not only the movings of the body, which agree to nature are to be allowed: but much more 
Motions of body, and mind.  the motions of the mind, that likewise be agreeable to nature, are to be commended.  
For the power of the mind, and of nature stands in two parts. 
In the 〈◊〉 is appetite, and reason.  The one is placed in apperite, which in greek is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: and this hither, and thither haileth a man: the other hath place in reason: which teacheth, and showeth plainly, what is to be done, and what to be refused. So falleth it, that reason ruleth, and appetite obeyeth. But all our doings must be without rashness, 
〈◊〉.  and negligence: neither ought 
negligence  a man to do any thing, whereof he 
Dutiful ●…ing.  is not able to render a proovable cause. For this in a manner is the definition of duty. But we must 
●…ow appetites must be framed.  bring to pass, that our appetites obey reason: & neither run before it, neither for sloth, or dastardliness, drag behind it: and that they be quie●…, and void of all stir, and trouble of the mind. 
〈◊〉.  Whereby all steadfastness, and measurableness 
〈◊〉.  shall appear in sight. For appetites, which go overfar astray: and (as it were) overhatte 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  either in longing after things, or in fleeing from things, be not st●… enough by reason: these without doubt exceed their bounds, & measure. For they forsake, and set aside obedience: nor yet do yield to reason, whereunto they be made subject by the law of nature. By such motions not only men's minds be troubled, but also their bodies. We may see it in the very faces of the angry: or 
Uncomely behaviour of the body, by reason of troublesome affections.  of them, who either with any lust, or with fear be stirred, or in overmuch pleasure do rejoice: for there with the countenance, voice, moving, & r●…stīg of them all is changed. Of which things this is gathered (to the intent we may return to the form of duty) that all appetites are to be pulled in, & assuaged: & that we must take good heed, and diligence, 
Our doings.  that we do nothing rashly, and venturously, nor unadvisedly, and negligently. For we be not to this end engendered of nature, that we should 
Pleasantness.  seem to be created for play, & jest: but we be rather borne to sageness, 
Gravity.  & to certain graver, & greater studies. Yet we may lawfully use jesting, & pastime: but even as we do sleep, and other restinges: at such time, as we have sufficiently ended grave, and earnest causes. And the 
Ies●…ing.  very manner of our jesting must not be to large, nor unsober, but honest, and plea●…aunt. For as we give not children all manner liberty of playing, but such as swerveth not from honest exercises: so in our very jesting let there appear some light of 
Kinds of i●…stin●….  honest wit. To be short, after two sorts is the manner of jesting: the one, unhonest, railing, hurtful, bawdy: that other, fine, ciull, witty, pleasant. With the which kind, not 
Plautu●….  only our Plautus, and the old 
The Attiks.  comedy of the Attiks, but also the 
Socratians.  books of the Socratical Philosophers be well stored: and there be of many men many merry said saws: 
Cato's short and feat sa●…engs.  as those, that of old Cato be gathered, which be called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 easy therefore is the difference between honest, and unhonest jesting. The one is meet for an honest ma, if it be done in season, and with a light heart: the other, meet for no man, if the uncleanliness of the matter be increased with filthiness of words.  
Also in pastime, there is a certain 
Pastime.  measure to be kept: that we be not therein altogether excessive, & puffed up with pleasure, fall into some dishonesty. But both our Martial field, and also our exercises of honting do find us honest examples of pastime.  
But it belongs to the holle discourse 
●…he excel●…ce of man's nature.  of duty, evermore to have in mind, how far man's nature exceedeth the nature of beasts.  
For they feel nothing, but pleasure, 
Pleasure of the body.  and thereunto be carried with their holle sweygh: but man's wit is fed with learning: and by studying either searcheth, or doth always somewhat: & is led with the delight of seeing, and hearing. Yea moreover if there be any somewhat with the most inclined to pleasures: so he be not of the beastly kind: (for some ther be not men in deed, but in name) but if there be any man, that is somewhat more uprightly minded: though with pleasure he be caught, he hideth, and dissembleth his appetite of pleasure, for very shamefastness. Whereof it is soon perceived, that pleasure of the body is n●…t worthy to be matched with the excellence of man: and that it ought to be despised, and rejected. But if there be any man, who sommedeal yieldeth unto pleasure: he must very warely keep a measure, in enjoying the same.  
And therefore let the feeding, and 
we must feed to live, & not ●…ue to feed.  apparailing of the body be referred to health, and strength, not to voluptuousness. And thereto if we will consider, what an excellence, and a dignity there is in nature: we shall 
A general cōmelines●….  understand, how fowl it is to overflow in riot, and live deliciously, and wantonly: and how honest it is, to lead our life savingly, chastely, sagely, and soberly.  
We must understand also, that we be clad by nature (as it were) with two persons: whereof the o●…e 
A common parsonage.  is common: because we all be partakers of reason, and the preeminece, whereby we surmount beasts: from which reason all honesty, & commelinesse is derived: & out of the which, the way of finding duty is sought: 
A person proper to ech●… man.  the other is that, which properly to echeman is assigned.  
For as in bodies there be great differences (for some we see pass other in swiftness to run, some in strength to wrestle: & likewise in faces, some have a portly look, some an amiableness) so also in minds 
Difference of natures.  there be far greater diversities.  
There was in Lucius Crassus, & 
Romans.  Lucius Philippus much pleasantness: 
Pleasantness.  but greater, and more of set purpose, in Caius Cesar, Lucius son. And at those days, in Marcus Scaurus, and in Marcus Drusus the youngman, there was a singular gravity: in Caius Lelius, 
Gravity.  
Mirt●….  much mirth: in Scipio his familiar, 
Henourseeking.  both greater honourseeking, & a sadder life. But of the Grecians, 
Greeks.  Socrates, we have herd, was pleasant, and feateconceited, a merry 
merry conceits.  talker, and in all his words a mocker, whom the Greeks named 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: 
Dry moches.  contrariwise, Pythagoras, and Pericles attained very high authority, 
Ernestnesse.  without any mirth at all. Of the 
Craftienesse.  Penes, Annibal was crafty: of our captains, Quintus Maximus, we have herd say, had a marvelous cunning in cloaking, in keeping in, in dissembling, in making a stolen, in preventing the devices of the enemy. In which kind, the Greeks before all other do prefer Th●…mistocles the Athenian, and jason the Pheraian. And chiefly the subtle, & crafty deed of Solon: who, that both his life should be y● safer, and somewhat the more he might further the commonweal, feigned himself to be mad. There be other far unlike to these, plain, and open: which do 
Plainness.  think nothing in secret, nothing with guile, meet to be wrought: & be lovers of troth, and enemies to deceit. And again, there be other, who would any thing endure, and do service to any man: so they 
A far fetch to commepasse matters.  might obtain that, they desire: as we did see Sylla, & Marcus Crassus use themselves. Of which sort, we have herd, Lysander the Lacedaemonian 
A subtle sufferance.  was the suttellest, and could most abide. And contrariwise, of Callicratides: who was 
Plain dealing.  admiral of the navy, next after Lysander.  
And likewise we see an other man 
Familiarness in talk.  in talk, though he be of great authority, so order the matter, that he seemens one of the common sort. Which in Catulus, both the father, and the son, & thesame in Quintus Mutius Mancinus, we have seen. I have herd moreover of mine elders, the same to have been in Publius Scipio Nasica. And contrariwise, his father, even him, that avenged 
Sadness.  Tiberius Gracchus wicked enterprises, to have had no gentle grace of speech. No nor Xenocrates, who was the sagest of the Philosophers, & for the self-same thing became great, and famous.  
Innumerable other diversities there 
Commelinesse according to each man's nature.  be of nature, and of manners, nodeal yet dispraisable. But everiemans' own gifts, not such as be faulty, but natural, are earnestly to b●…e maintained: whereby the sooner may that commelinesse be kept, which we do seek. For in such wise we must work, as against all nature 
Nature.  we never strive: which thing avoided, let us follow our own proper nature. So that though their be●… other studies graver, and better: yet let us measure our own, by nature's rule. For neither is it to any purpose ●…o fight against nature, nor to ensue any thing, that ye can not attain. Whereupon it more appears, what manner of thing this commelinesse is: because nothing becometh, m●…ger Minerva, as they say: that is, nature withstanding, and resisting it.  
In brief, if ought be comely, of 
A continua●… evennesie of life.  troth there is nothing more seemly: than an evenness in all a man's life, and every of his doings: which you can not keep, if you counterfette an others nature, and let pasie your own. For as we ought to use that speech, which is known to us: lest, as some men chopping in greek words, we be worthily mocked at: so in ou●… doings, and all our life, we ought to show no con●…rarietie.  
And this di●…ence of natures hath so great a power: that otherwhile 
Going to death.  some one man ought to kill himsellf, somme other in thesame quarrel ought not. For Mar●…us 
Cato of Utica.  Cato was not in one quarrel, and the rest in an other, who yielded themselves unto Cesar in Africa. Yet to the rest perchance it should have been counted a reproach, if they had slain themselves: because their 
Dainty life. ●…de manners.  life had been daintier, and their manners milder: but when nature had given Cato an uncredible gravity, and thesame he had strengthened with a continual steadfastness: and always had remained in his intent, & determined purpose: it was meet for him rather to die, than to look 
Cesar noted for a tyrant.  upon the tyrants facé. How many 
Ulysses, for a tune, suffered every thing.  pains sustained Ulysses, in that long wandering? when both to women he did service (if Circe, and Calypso are to be named women) and to all men in all his talk he would 
Fair speech  be fairespoken: and also at home did bear the spite of the slaves, and n●…efes: that he might once attain to the thing, which he desired. But Ajax, 
Ajax.  with the courage, that he is reported of, had rather die a thousand deaths, than to suffer those things of an other man. Which diversities when we behold: it shall be necessary to weigh, what each man hath of his own: and to order those gifts: and not to have a mind to try, how other men's graces would become him. For that becometh echeman, which is most of all echemannes 
Know yo●… self.  own. Let every man therefore know his own disposition: and let him make himself a sharp judge both of his vices, and of his virtues: le●…e 
Players.  players may seem to have more discretion, than we. For they do choose not the best interludes, but the fittest for themselves. For who upon their voices be bold, they take Epigones, and Medea: who upon gesture, do take Menalippa, & Clytaemnestra. Evermore Rupilius, whom I remember, took Antiopa: not often Esopus took Aiar. Shall a player then see this in the stage, that a wiseman shall not see in his life? We shall chiefly therefore labour 
A rule.  in those things, whereunto we shall be most apt. But in case necessity shall drive us sometime to those things, which shall not be for our disposition: all care, study, and diligence must be employed: that, if we do them not comely, yet with as little uncommelinesse, as may be: neither ought we somuch to endeavour ourselves to follow the virtues, which be not given us, as to flee vices.  
And unto these two persones, which 
persons.  before I named, there is a third person joined: which some chance, or 
Commelinesse coming by fortune.  time casteth on us: the fourth also is that, which we shall fashion to ourselves, after our own mind. For kingdoms, empires, nobility, honour, 
Commelinesse taken of set purpose.  riches, power, & those, which be contrary to these, being placed in fortune's hand, be ordered according 
Examples of the former.  to the times: but what person we ourselves list to bear, proceedeth 
The fourte.  of our own free will. And therefore some to philosophy, some to that civil law, some to eloquence do apply themselves: & for the virtues, some have a more mind to excel in one, & some in an other: & whose fathers, 
Followers of their aūcet●…rs  or ancestors in any commendation have been notable: the most part of theirs do study in the same kind of praise to excel: as Quintus Mutius, Publius son, did in the civil law: Africanus, Paulus son, in f●…ates of arms. But divers do add sōm●… of their own unto those praises, that they received of their fathers: as this same Africanus with eloquence increased the heap of his martial glory: which self-same Timotheus, Conon's son, did also: who, when in praises of war, to his father he was not inferior, did join to that commendation the glory of wit, and learning. But it so falleth now 
Men newly coming up.  and then: that some letting go the imitation of their aunceters, do follow a certain trade of their own: and th●…rin, for the most part, they chiefly travail: who appoint themselves great enterprises, being borne of scaceknowne parents. In our mind, and thought then we must cast all these things, when we search to know, what becometh. But first of all we must determine, 
Appointing upon the kind●… of life.  whom, & what manner men we would have ourselves, & of what kind of life. Which advisement is that hardest of all. For at the entering in to the years of discretion, when there is most stendernesse of counsel: every man doth appoint himself that trade of leading his life, which he hath loved most of all: & so he is entangled with some certain kind, and course of life: before he was able to judge, what should be best. For whereas Prodicus sayeth, that Hercules (as is in Xenophon) as soon as he waxed wheyberded, which time is granted of nature, to choose, what way of living each man will enter: went forth into desert: and there sitting, much, and a long while doubted with himself, when he beheld two ways, the one of pleasure, the other of virtue: whether of them it were better to enter: this might peradventure happen 
Hercules had a divine gift above nature.  to Hercules, that was borne of jupiter's seed: but not so to us: who do follow those, that everieone of us list to follow, and be alured to their studies, and fashions. 
Following of parents.  And for the most part, being traded with our parents precepts, we incline to their guise, and manner. 
Following of the multitude  Other be carried after the judgement of the multitude: and long after those things most, which to the greater part seem goodlie●…. Many 
The right trade.  nevertheless, whether of a certain luck, or of a goodness of nature, or by the instruction of their parents, have followed the right trade of life.  
But that kind of men is seldomest 
Few take the best 〈◊〉.  found: who after they be either of excellent profoundness of wit, or of a famous learning, and knowledge, or with both these adorned, have got a time to take advisement: what race of life they would the rathest run: in the which advise, all a man's counsel is to 
Nature.  be applied to echemans' proper nature. For sithence in all things, that be done, out of that nature, wherewith everyman is borne (as before is said) we search, what becometh: then, in pointing out the holle life, much more regard thereof must be had: that in the continuing of our life we may agree with ourselves, and never halt in any duty. 
Nature, and fortune.   
But to this choice seeing nature hath the greatest power, & fortune the next: there must consideration be had of them both always, in choosing the kind of ones life: but of nature, more. For nature is much the surer, & the stedfaster: so that fortune many times, as mortal herself, seemeth with immortal nature to fight. Whoso then will apply all the purpose of his life, according to the kind of his nature not corrupted: 
Stedfas●…ness.  let him keep a steadfastness: for that becometh most of all: except perchance he shall perceive, that 
Misgoing.  he hath gone amiss, in choosing his kind of life. Which if it befall (as it may befall) there must be made a 
Change of life.  change of manners, and purposes. That change then, if time shall further, we shall the sooner, & more conveniently bring to pass: if not, fair & softly, and by little & little it must be done: like as friendships, which do not delight us, & are not well liked, wisemen do judge more convenient stitch after stitch to rip, than suddenly to cut asunder. And when we have once changed our kind of life: we must by all means take heed, that we be thought to have done it upon good advisement. 
The ●…ertues, not the vices of elders must be followed.   
But forasmuch as a little before it is said, that we must follow our ancestors: first, be this excepted: that their ●…ices are not to be followed: next; that we follow them not in some things, that 
Nothing ●…gainst nature  our nature will not bear: as the elder Africanus son, who adopted this our Paulus son, could not be so like his father, because of sickly weakness, as y● other was like his. 〈◊〉 case therefore one be not able either to plead causes, or to retain the people with orations, or to follow the wars: those things yet he ought to perform, which shall lie in his power: as justice, faithfulness, liberality, sobermoode, & temperance: to th'intent the thing, which he lacks, may be the less miss in him. Truly the best inheritance, the 
〈◊〉  father's leave to their children, and more worth, than all livelihood, is the glory of virtue, & worthy deeds: whereunto to be a stain, it is to be accounted both vice, and shame.  
And because not alike duties are 
Comeliness. according to age.  assigned to unlike ages: and some there be for youngmen, and some for the elder sort: somewhat also we have to say of this diversity. It is 
Yongmenne●… ou●…es.  therefore a youngman's part, to reverence 
Reverence o●… elders.  his elders: & of these to choose out the best, and most commended: whose counsel, & authority he may lean unto. For the unskilfulness of tender years, must by oldemen experience be ordered, and governed.  
And this age specially from lusts 
staidness.  is to be waned: and to be brought 
Labour.  up in labour, & pains taking both 
Patience.  of mind, & body: that both in martial, and civil duties, their diligence 
Endeavour.  may appear. Also when they will refresh their wits, and give themselves to pastime: let them beware 
Temperance Shamefastness.  of intemperance, and remember shamefastness: which shall be done the easilier, if at such things also their elders will be in presence.  
But for old men labours of the body 
what is come lie for old m●….  are to be diminished, and exercises of the mind seem meet to be 
Exercise of ●…nde.  increased: and they must give their 
Profiting of other.  diligence, that much they aid their friends, & youth, & specially the commonweal 
Counsel.  with counsel, & wisdom. 
wisdom.  But nothing more of age is to be taken heed of, than that it give not 
sloth.  itself to litherness, and idleness. 
〈◊〉.  As for riot, to every age it is reproachful, and for old age most shameful. But if the intēperauc●… of lust be joined with it, ●…er is a double inconvenience: because both age self taketh shame by it, and it causeth yongmennes intemperance to be more shameless.  
And this truly is not out of the 
what becomes a magistrate.  matter, to speak somewhat touching the duties of magistrates, of p●…uate men, of citizens, and of strangers. It is therefore the proper office of a magistrate, to consider, he representeth the person of the city: & that he ought to maintain the honour, 
The hon●… of the 〈◊〉.  and reputation thereof: and to keep the orders of thesame: and to serte out laws fit therefore: and to remember, they be c●…mitted to his charge.  
A p●…uate man it behoves to live in 
A private man.  an equality, and likeness of law with the citiezens: neither as an underling, 
Equal law.  and abi●…, nor bearing himself to high: and also in the commonweal to seek those things, that be quiet, and honest. For such 
Quietness.  a one we are wont both to call, and 
A citizen,  count a good citizen.  
But it is the duty of a stranger, & 
A stranger.  alien inhabitant: to meddle nothing beside his own business: nor to inquire any thing touching an other man: & no whit in a strange commonweal to be curious.  
Thus, for the most part, duties 
Conclusion.  shall be found out: when it shall be sought, what becometh: & what is agreeable for persons, times, & ages. And there is nothing, that becomes a man so much: as in every 
Steadfastness  doing, and taking of advise, to keep a steadfastness.  
But because the same comeliness appeareth 
Comeliness in three points.  in all deeds, & words, & in the moving, & staying of the body: & thesame consisteth in three things, 
well-favourdness.  wellfavourdnesse, order, & furniture meet for ones doings (somewhat 
Order.  hard it is to express: but it 
Furniture.  shall suffice, so it be conceived) & in these three contained is that care also: that we be allowed of those, with whom, and among whom we live: of these matters likewise a few words let us say.  
First, very nature seemeth to have had a great respect of our body: 
Of wellfavourdnesse.  which hath set most in sight our phisnomy, and the rest of our shape, wherein there is an honest show: but she hath covered, and kept close the parts of the body, given for nature's necessity: which else should have an evilfavourd, and fowl sight.  
men's shamefastness hath followed 
Shamefastness, nature's scholar.  this so cunning a frame of nature. For whatso nature hath hidden: thesame all men, who be well in their wits, do keep from the eye: & they do their endeavour to serve very necessity, as closely, as they may: and of what parts of the body the use is servile, neither those parts, nor their service by their names they do call: and so, that, which to do it is no shame, if it be secretly, to tell it is uncleanly.  
And therefore neither the open doing 
unshamefastness.  of those things is void of unshamefastness: nor the talk, without 
filthiness.  filthiness.  
Neither truly are the Cynikes worthy 
Cynikes.  to be herd, nor any of y● Stoics, which are almost Cynikes: who do reprove us, & mock at us: because 
Things, words.  we call those things, in words shameful to be spoken upon, which be indeed not dishonest: and yet those things, that be unhonest, we term by their names. As to go a thieving, to beguile one, to commit adultery, is a thing indeed dishonest: but it is told, without dishonesty: likewise to get children indeed is honest, but to be uttered in talk it were uncleanly. And more things, for that purpose, be reasoned by that said philosophers, against shamefastness. But let us follow nature: and shun all things, that 
Nature.  abhor the very pleasing of our eye, and ear. Let our standing, going, 
Gesture.  sitting, lying, cheer, eyes, and moving of hands keep that same comeliness. In which things, two faults we must specially take heed of: that nothing womannishly, 
Deintynesse.  or deyntily, and nothing blockishly, 
Blockishness.  or cartarly we do. Neither must we agree, that these things should be seemly in players, and orators, 
Players.  and left loosely in our selves. The custom of the stage-players, even of an old order, hath so great regard to shamefastness: that noman cometh on the stage, without breeches. For they are afeard: lest, if it chance by any mishap, that some parts of the body be discovered, they should be seen uncomely. And, as the fashion is with us: children growing to man's 
Baines.  state be not bathed with their parents: nor sons in law, with their fathers in law. Therefore this kind of shamefastness is meet to be observed: namely when nature herself is guide, and mistress.  
But whereas there be two kinds 
Of fairness.  of beauty: and in one of them there is a loveliness, in the other, a majesty: loveliness, we must think, 
Loveliness.  longs to the woman, and majesty 
Portelynesse  to the man. Therefore all manner trimming, that is unfitting for man, must be kept from his outward form: and the like fault to this must be taken heed of in 
Gesture.  ones gesture, & moving. For both that stirring like wrastelers is oftentimes misliked: and also many gestures like players are not without foolish toys: & in both these kinds, those things, which be right, and natural, be commended. 
Visage.  But the majesty of the favour is preserved 
Colour.  
Exercise.  by goodness of colour, & colour, 
cleanliness.  by exercises of body. There must a cleanliness be used besides: that is not odious, nor curious, but only escheweth cartarly, & unnatural slovenry. The like regard we must have of apparel: wherein a 
apparel.  mean, as in most part of things is best. We must take heed also, we use neither to nice a slowness in our pace, like pageants in triumphs: 
Going.  neither too much haste in speed making, like wyldebraines. For when it happens, that men do so: there follows short breathing, the countenance is changed, & the face disfigured: whereof comes a great presumption, that they have no staidness.  
But we must much more study, that the affections of our mind serve 
Commelinesse in motions of the mind.  not from nature: which we shall attain, if we will beware, that we fall not into moods, and mazes: and if we will continued in having heedful minds to the keeping of commelinesse. But the motions of minds be of two sorts: some proceed of intelligence, some of appetite. Intelligence 
Intelligence  is chief occupied in searching 
Appetite.  out of truth: appetite stirreth a man to be doing. We must provide therefore: that we use intelligence about the best matters: & that we make our appetite obedient to reason.  
And because the power of speech is 
Commlynes in speech.  great, and thesame is in two sorts: the one of vehement speech, that other 
Uehement speech.  of common talk: let the vehement speech serve for plead in judgements, orations in assemblies, & debating in 
Common talk.  y● Senatehouse: let talk be used in companies, in disputations, in meetings of familiars: & let it also be at feastings. Of vehement speech the Rhetoricians have rules, of talk none at all: notwithstanding I wot not, whether such also may be. Howbeit for their studies, that will learn, there be teachers found: but none there be, that study this: which the rout of Rhetoricians all places be replenished. Nevertheless the same precepts, which be of words, and sentences, shall appertain to talk. But sithence we have our voice to 
Speech.  utter speech: and in voice we seek 
Uoice.  two things that it be clear, & sweet: 
clearness. Sweetness.  they both are to be fetched from nature evermore: but exercise will increase y● one: imitation of treatable, and soft speakers will help the other. 
Catuli, the father, and the son.  What was in the Catuli, that ye should suppose them to use a perfit judgement in pronouncing of letters? Howbeit they were learned: but so were other to: yet these were thought to use the latin tongue best. Their sounding was sweet: their letters neither to much mowthed, nor drowned: lest either it should be unheard, or over harsh. Their voice was without straining, neither faint, nor shrill. The speech of Lucius Crassus was 
Lucius Crassus.  more plentiefull, and no less feateconceited: but, for well speaking, the Catuli were in as much estimation. Cesar was sauced with mirth, & 
Cesar.  merry conceits: Catulus uncle exceeded 
Catulus uncle.  all: so that in that lawyerly kind of pleading, he with familiar speech passed the vehemence of other. In all these therefore we must labour, if in all we search, what becometh.  
Let then this familiar talk (in 
Talk.  
Gentle.  which the Socratians most excel) be 
Not obs●…inate.  gentle, & nothing obstinate: let there be therein a pleasantness. No nor 
Pleasant.  let a man keep out other, as though he were entered into his own possession: but as in other matters, so in common talk, he must think an 
changeable cour●…e.  enterchaunged course oftentimes meet to be used. And let him see, first of all, of what matters he speak: 
applying to the matter.  if they be earnest, let him use a sageness: 
Sageness.  it they be merry, a pleasantness. 
〈◊〉.  Specially let him foresee, that his talk bewray not some vice in his manners: which then chief is wont to befall: when either in mockage, or earnest, men do bysie themselves to speak raylingly, & spitefully of the absent, to their slander. 
Sclaunde●…ig  But this common talk, for the 
The matter of talk.  most part, is had either of household matters, or of the commonweal, or of learning, and teaching arts. We must therefore give good heed: that when the communication begin to stray to other things, to these it be returned: yea howsoever the matter falls out, that is in hand. For neither all with one matter, nor at every season, nor alike we are delighted. We must mark also, 
Delectation.  how far our talk hath in it a liking: and as there was a way to begin it, so let there be a measurable 
Measure.  mean to end it. But because it is very well taught: that in all our life we flee passions, that is to say, 
〈◊〉 of the mind.  unmeasurable moods of mind, not ruled by reason: likewise our talk must be void of such moods: lest either anger arise, or some greediness, or slothfulness, or cowardliness, or some such thing appear. And most of all, we must have regard: that those, with whom we keep talk, we seem both to reverence, & to love. 
chiding.  chiding also many times comes in place, as necessary: in which, one must use peradventure both a greater straining of voice, and a sharper gravity of words. It must also be provided: that we seem not to do those things, as ireful: but as physicians do come to searing, & cutting: so let us seldom, & unwillingly fall to such manner of rebuking: and not at all, unless it be of necessity, when there will be found none other remedy. But 
Anger.  yet let it be clear without anger: wherewith nothing rightly, nothing discreetly can be done. And for the most part, we may use a gentle 
Rebuking.  manner of rebuking: yet tempered with a gravity: so as both a sourness be showed, and all spite refrained. Yea and that same bitterness, which chiding hath in it, must be declared, to be used for his sake, who is chidden. It is good 
Brawls.  also, even in those brawls, which be made with our utterest enemies, although we hear words unmeet to be spoken to us: to keep yet a gravity, and to suppress the 
Gravity.  angry mood. For those things, that be wrought with any passion, neither can be constantly done, nor allowed of those, that are present. Euilfavourd also it is, to tell praises of a man's self, specially if 
〈◊〉.  they be untrue: and, with the mocking of the hearers, to resemble the glorious soldier.  
And because we go through all ma 
Of furniture.  ters, or at y blessed be minded so to do we must tell also, what manner of house, it liketh us, an honourable 
A prince's house.  man, & a prince should have. Whose 
The use.  end is the occupying thereof: according to the which, the plat of the building must be made: and nevertheless there must respect be had to 
The buyldig  a stateliness, and handsomeness in thesame. We have herd say, it was an honour to Cneus Octavis, 
Cneus Octavius.  who the first of that family was made Consul: because in the palace, he had builded a gorgeous house, & full of stateliness: which, when people resorting thither had seen, was thought to further the master, a man neewly comen up, to the attaining of the Consulship. This did Scaurus pull down, & 
〈◊〉.  enlarge the room of his houses. And so Octavius into his house first brought the Consulship: this other, a noble, and famous man's son, into his enlarged house not only brought repulsse, but also a stain, & misery. For a man's honour must be set out by his house, and ●…ot all his honour sought by his house: nor by the house the master, but by the master the house must be honested. And as in all things else, regard is to be had not of a man's self only, but of other also: likewise in a noble man's house, into the which both many guests are to be received, and a number of men of every sort is to be admitted: there must be made a provision 
Large 〈◊〉  for roomethinesse. Otherwise, a large house proveth to the master oftentimes a shame: if there be in it a solitariness: and specially if once, with an other master, it was wont to be well filled. For an odious thing it is, when of the bygoers it is said:  
O ancient house, alas, we may see, How unlike a lord hath lordship on thee.  
Which, a man may truly say now a days of many. Ye must beware also, namely if yourself be a builder, that beyond measure, in sumptuousness, 
costliness.  and great cost, you do not exceed: in the which kind, even of the ensample much harm ariseth. For diligently moste men, specially 
Ensample.  in this point, do follow the doings of princes: as, of Lucius 
Lucius Lucullus.  Lucullus, a singular man, who ensueth the virtue? how many yet have followed the great costliness of his manourplaces? In which things there must doubtless be used a measure, that to a meankeping must be reduced: and thesame meankeping must be referred to the common use, and countenance of the life. But of these hitherto.  
Now, in every deed, we take in 
Three rules ●…n men's do ●…nges.  hand, three points are to be kept. First, that appetite obey reason: for nothing is meeter than that, 
Reason.  for the maintaining of duties. Next, that it be considered, how great a thing it is, which we mind to bring to pass: that neither less, neither more care, and 
Care.  pain be taken, than the case requireth. The third point is, that we have an eye to use a measure in those things, which pert●…in to an 
Comeliness.  honest show, and seemly grace. The best measure is to keep the very seemlynesse, whereof we spoke before: and not to pass those bounds. But of these three the chiefest is, that appetite obey reason.  
Hereafter, touching order of things, and opportunity of times, we 
Of 〈◊〉  have to say. And this knowledge containeth that, which the Greeks do name 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: not this, which we interpret Modestia: in the which word, Modus is comprehended. But that is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, wherein is meant a keeping of order. And therefore, that we may call the same Modestia, thus it is defined of the stoics: the 
〈◊〉  Modestia (that is to say) discretion is the knowledge of setting those things, which are done, or said, in their proper places. And so of order, and placing there seems to be all one 
Placing.  
Order.  property. For thus also they define order, to be a framing of things in 
Place.  apt, & convenient places. And place, 
Opportunity.  they save, concerneth the doing, opportunity the time. And time convenient for the doing, in Greek 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, in Latin is called Occasio. 
Occasion.  So falleth it, that this discretion, which we interpret, even as I 
Discretio●…  said, is the knowledge of opportunity of fit season to do a thing. But the same definition may be of 
Prudence.  prudence: whereupon we treated in the beginning. But in this place, we search after measurekeeping, & temperance, & other like virtues. Therefore, what were y● properties of prudence, in their place we have spoken. But what properly belongs to these virtues, whereof here we have begun to speak, which pertain to shamefastness, and to their liking, with whom we live: we must now declare.  
Such an order therefore in our doings 
Circumstances.  is to be used: that as in an oration well builded, so in man's 
agreableness  life all things be accordant, and agreeable together. For a fowl hearing it is, and very faulty, in a sage matter to bring in any table talk, or wanton words. Pericles said well, when he had Sophocles 
Pericles.  joined Praetor with him: and they were commoning about their office: &, as by chance a well favoured child passed by, Sophocles 
Sophocles.  said: Oh, there is a fair boy, Pericles: he answered: It becomes a Praetor, Sophocles, to have not only for bearing hands, but eyes also. If Sophocles had said this same, where wrastelers be allowed: he had been free from just reproof.  
So great a force there is both of place, and time. As for example, if a man, that shall plead a cause, be musing to himself in his journey, 
〈◊〉.  or inhis walk: or if any other thing he mindeth heedfully: he is not reproved: but if he do the like, at a feast: he may be thought uncivil, for having no regard to the time.  
Howbeit those things, which far disagree from all humanity, as if 
〈◊〉.  any mansing in the street, or if any other great disorder there be: by & by they appear: and they greatly need not our admonition, or rules: but from these, which seem to be small faults, and of many can not be perceived, we must the more diligently refrain. As in instruments sounding by strings, or blast, though never so little they jar, yet 
Deeds mus●… be like tunes.  that of a cunning man is wont to be found: so must we live in this life that nothing chance to jar: yea and so much the more, as the concord of deeds is greater, and better, than of tunes. Wherefore as in instruments, musicians ears do feel even the lest discord: so, if we will be sharp, & quick judges, & markers of faults: we shall understand oftentimes great things by small. We shall soon judge by the setting of the eye, b●… smooth looking, 
Countenance.  or bending of y● browse, by sadness, mirth, laughter, speaking, silence, 
Speaking.  straining, & falling of the voice, & other such like: what is sittingly done: & what from duty, & nature swerveth. 
Others life our glass.  In which kind of things, it is not unconvenient to judge by other, of what sort each of the is: that if aught misbecommeth an other, we shun it also in ourselves. For it comes to pass, I wots not how: that we see more 
Others li●…e.  in other, than in ourselves, if ought be done amiss. And therefore veriesoone those scholars be corrected: whose faults their masters do counterfeit, for to make thenamended. Nor truly out of the way it is, in 
The judgement of the ●…kilfull.  choosing of things, which bring a doutefulnesse, to take learned Men'S advise, or skilful by experience: & so to search, what liketh them, concerning every kind of duty. For the greater part is commonly wont thither to be carried, whither of very nature they be led. In which, we must see, not only what echeman sayeth: but also, what each man thinketh: and for what cause, each man so thinketh. For as painters, & they that grave images, & the right poets also, be willing to have their works seen of all sorts of men: that in case 
The commo●… people.  ought be reproved of many, it may be corrected: & therein both with themselves, & with other, they examine, what is done amiss: so after the judgement of other, many things of us both must be done, and left undone, and also changed, and amended. 
Civil manners.   
As for things, which are done after custom, and civil ordinances: there is no precept to be given of them. For they be precepts of themselves: neither it behoveth any man to be led with this error: 
Philosopher's  if Socrates, or Aristippus have done, or spoken any thing again●… civil order, & custom: that he shoulda think thesame lawful for him to do. They obtained such a large liberty of faultefynding, by their great, & heavenly gifts. But the holle fashion of the Cynikes is utterly to be refused.  
For it is enemy to shamefastness: without which, there can be nothing upright, nor nothing honest.  
But those we ought to reverence, 
Men of deserts.  & give attendance upon them: whose life hath been tried, in honest, and worthy matters: who do mean well to the commonweal, & have well-deserved, or do deserve well thereof: & to anyhonour, or rule be advanced: 
Old age.  also we must have old age in great estimation: and must give place to those, that bear office: and make difference 
Officers.  between a citizen, & a stranger: 
The citizen.  
The stranger  & in the very stranger also we ought to consider, whether he came of private business, or for the commonweals affairs. In a sum (that I treat not of every particular) we are bound to love, mayntein, and preserve the common atonement, 
Felou●…ip.  and fellowship of all mainkinde.  
Now, concerning occupations, and gainful sciences, which are to 
Of occupations ●… 〈◊〉.  be counted honest, and which are of base reputation, thus commonly we 
Gainings.  have learned. First, those gaynyngs be disallowed, that run in hatred with all men: as the gain of tollfarmers, 
Tolfarmers. Ufurers.  and usurers. Out of estimation also, and base be the gains that men in wages do take: whose labour is bought, & not their cunning. For in them the very hire is as 
hirelings.  it were y● obligation of their bondage. They moreover are to be counted of y● 
Retailers.  base sort: who buy of merchants, that out of hand they retail again. For, nothing they profit, unless they lie apace: & truly dishon●…ster thing is there none, than a vain tongue. 
Handycraftesmen.  And all kind of handycraftsmen serve in mean occupations.  
Neither can the workshoppe truly have in it any gentlemanly doing: and nodeal to be praised are these occupations, 
Belliseruers.  which be servers of pleasure: as Trinkermen, butchers, cooks, puddingmakers, fishermen, which Terence speaketh of. Put to these, if ye list, 
Pleasurefeeders.  perfumers, dancers, and all hazarders.  
But those sciences, wherein is greater 
Physi●….  
Building.  wisdom, and no mean profit 
Learning.  fought: as physic, casting of buildings, & learning of worthy knowledge: be honest for them, with whose 
Merchandise.  estate they agree. And merchandise, if it be small, is to be counted of little estimation: but if it be great, and well stored, conveying many commodities round about: and disparsing those same into many men's hands, without vain words: it is not much to be dispraised: and furthermore, if being satisfied with gain, or contented rather, as it hath often come from the sea to the haven: so it change from the haven into lands, and possessions: it seemeth, of very good right it may be commended. For of all things, whereout any gain 
●…ulbandrie.  is sought, nothing is better than groundtilth and trimming, nothing yeeldinger, nothing sweeter, nothing meeter for a freeborn man. Whereof because in Cato the elder we have spoken enough: thence shall you take, whatso to this place shall appertain.  
But how duties do proceed from those parts, which belong to honesty: I think it sufficientiie declared. Now in those same things 
Comparison of honest things.  which be honest, there may befall oftentimes a question, and comparison, of two honest things whether is y● honester: which point is passed over of Panetius.  
For whereas all honesty springeth out of four branches: whereof one is of knowledge, an other of common feloushippe, the third of great courage, the fourth of measurekeeping: it must needs be, that in choosing of duty these be often compared together. We think therefore, those duties be more agreeable with nature, which be 
Common fellowship ●…ust be preferred before knowledge.  borrowed from common fellowship: than those, which be fetched from knowledge: and that may be proved by this argument: because 
The. ●…. argument.  if a wisemanne happen on such a life: that he be enriched with a flowing plenty of all manner substance: though with very great leisure he consider, and alltobeholde with himself those things, which are worthy of knowledge: yet if his solitariness be so great, that he can not have the sight of a man: he would wish to be out of y● world. And the wisdom, which the Greeks do term 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, is the princess 
The. 2: arg.  of all virtues. For prudence, which the Greeks do call 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, we take to be of an other nature: 
Prudence.  which is the knowledge of things to be desired, and things meet to be eschewed.  
But that wisdowe, which I named 
Sapience.  the princess, is the science of heavenly, and worldly things: wherein is contained the commonness of gods, and men, & their society together. Which virtue in case it be the greatest, as it is in deed: it must needs follow, that the duty, which is borrowed of commonness, also is the greatest. For the knowledge, 
Knowledge.  and consideration of natural causes should, after a certain sort, be maimed, and unperfit: if no performance of deeds should follow. 
Doing.  And deeds must appear in defending of men's commodities. They belong therefore to the fellowship of men: and for that cause are to be preferred before knowledge. 
The. 3. arg.   
And this every bestdisposed man, 
The common judgment o●… men.  when it comes to the point, doth show, and declare. For who is so desireful of thorowseeing, & learning the nature of things? but, in case while he were treating, & viewing of matters most worthy of knowledge: in the mean season he should suddenly hear tiding of the hazard, and danger of his country, which he is able to secure, and withstand: he would leave, & set aside all those studies: yea though he thought, he were able to number the stars, or to measure the huge comepasse of the world: & the same man also would do as much, in his parents, and in his friends cause, and peril.  
By which things it is gathered: that before the studies, & duties of knowledge, the duties of justice are to be preferred: which do belong, to y● profit of men: than the which, a man ought to hold nothing dearer. 
The. 4. arg.   
Also they, who have spent their 
The end o●… contemplation.  holle life, and study in knowledge of things, have not yet withdrawn themselves from helping to increase men's profits, and commodities. For they also have instructed many, 
The ●…udētes life profitable to the commonweal.  to make them the better citizens, and the more profitable in their commonweals: as Lysis the Pythagorean 
L●…s scholemai●…er to Epaminonvas, Plato to Dion.  schooled the Lhebane Epaminondas: Plato taught Dion the Syracusian: and many other, many more: and whatsoever we ourself brought to the commonweal, (if any thing we have brought) we came to it, informed by teachers, and furnished with lexning. And 
Lorlled men profitable, even after their death.  they, not only while they live, and be present, do school, and teach the studentesof learning: but after their death also, by their monuments of learning, they ●…o thesame. For they have not ou●…passed one point, that concerneth laws, customs, ●… the commonwealth knowledge: so as they may seem to have employed their quiet studies to our common affair●…s.  
Thus they being themselves given to the studies of learning, & wisdom, do chief bestow their wisdom, prudence, and understanding to men's commodities. For thesame cause also, it is better to utter plentifully, so it be discreetly, than without eloquence to conceive never so wittyly: because 
Conceiving of matters.  ones conceit serveth only within itself: whereas eloquence gets 
Eloquence.  within her reach those, with whom we are joined in common fellowship. And as swarms of bees do cluster together, not to this end, to make combs: but being swarming by kind, they work their combs: so men much 
Common fellowship.  more, than they, by nature swarming, do use their cunning of doing, and devising.  
Therefore unless that same virtue, which consisteth in defending men, that is to say, the fellowship of mankind, doth meet which the knowledge of things: it may seem a very bare, and alonewandering knowledge: and likewise greatness of courage, severed from common 
〈◊〉.  feloushippe, and neybourhod of men, must needcs be a certain savageness, and beastly cruelty. So it falls out, that the accompanying, & common fellowship of men far surmounts the study of 
Prudence.  knowledge.  
Neither is it true, which is said of some: that this common knot, and fellowship is had among men, even for necessity of life: because without other, we might not get, & bring to pass those things, the nature doth desire: and that, if all things were found us, even by the grace of god (as they say) which appertain to food, & furniture of life: then would every one of a good wit, all business laid aside, settle himself holly in knowledge, and science. But that is not so. For he would both flee solitariness, and choose a companion of study: both teach, & learn: both hear, & speak. Wherefore all duty, 
Conclusion.  which availeth to maintain neybourhod, & fellowship of men, is to be preferred above the duty, which consisteth in knowledge, & science. 
〈◊〉 sometime is above the particular 〈◊〉.   
This question peradventure may be well moved: whether this common fellowship, which is most of all agreeable to nature, be also always to be preferred before mean, and measure keeping. I think not so.  
For there be some things partly so filthy, partly so heinous: that a wise man would not do them, no not to save his country. Very many such, Possidonius hath gathered together: but some of them so fowl, and so filthy: that even to be spoken they seem shameful.  
Those therefore ought noman to take in hand, for the commonweals cause: neither would the commonweal for her sake have them enterprised. But this matter stands in better case: for that there can befall no time: that the commonweal should need to have a wiseman do any of them.  
Wherefore let this be concluded, in 
Ju●…ice ge●…rallie above all.  choice of duties: that such kind of duties most excel, as concern the felou●…ippe of men. For advised 
Aduise●… doing.  doing will follow knowledge, and wisdom. So it comes to pass, that to do advisedly is more worth, than wisely to devise. And hereof thus far. For this place is plainly enough set out: that it is not hard, in searching out of duty, to perceive, among them all which afore other is to be preferred.  
Yet even in common fellowship there 
Degrees of duties longing to justice.  be degrees of duties: whereby may be known, what one is above the other: so as the first duties be due to the gods immortal: the second, to our country: the third, to our parents: and so forth by degrees, the rest to the rest.  
Of the which matters, briefly debated, 
The order of his treating.  may be gathered: how men are wont not only to doubt, whether a thing be honest, or dishonest: but also two honest things laid before them, whether is the honester. This point (as I said before) is overslipped by Panetius.  
But now to the residue let us proceed.   

¶ MARCUS TULLIUS 〈◊〉 second book of duties, to Marcus his son.  
AFter what sort, duties 
The preface.  should be taken out of 
1. part.  honesty, son Mark, and from every kind of virtue: I suppose it sufficiently declared in my former book. It follows, that we go forward with these kinds of duties: which belong to power, to riches, to y● furniture 
The content●… of this book.  of mamns life, & to the pleintie of those things, that men do occupy. Wherein, I said, it is sought: both what is profitable, what unprofitable: 
Profit.  & also of profitable things which is the more profitable, or which the most profitable. Of the which I will entre to speak: if I shall say a word, or two before, of my purpose, and meaning.  
For though our books have stirred 
2. part.  up many men to y● study not only 
why he gave h●…self to ●…udie philosophy.  of reading, but also of writing: yet other while I fear, lest the name of philosophy be hateful to some good men: & that they marvel, I be●…owe in it so much travail, & time. In deed as long as the weal was governed by them, to whom she had committed herself: I did employ all my care, & study upon it. But when one man kept all in thraldom: & there was no place at all for 
Caesar's monarchi●….  counsel, & authority: & I besides had for gone my companions of preserving y● state, who had been singular men: neither I gave myself to grieves, where with I should have been wasted, unless I had resisted than: nor again, to pleasures unseemly for a learned man. And would god, the commonweal had stood in y● state, wherein it begun: & had not light upon men, who were not so desirous of altering, as overthrowing of things. For first, as we were wont to do, when y● commonweal was standing: we would take more labour in pleading, than in writing: afterward, in very writing we would not put the things, 
●…ullies orations.  that we do now, but our plead, as we have done divers times.  
But when y● commonweal, in which all my care, study, & travail was wont to be bestowed, was none a●… all: verily those la●…ierlie, & Senatehouse learnings were hushed.  
But seeing my mind could not 
The euer●…irring soul.  ●…hoose, but be doing: having been occupied in those studies, from the beginning of my young age: I thought, sorrows might be put away most honestly, if I returned myself to philosophy. Whereunto when being young I had given much time, to learn it: after that I began to attend honours, and betook myself holle to the commonweal: so much leisure was left for philosophy: 
Time borrowed for ●…udie  as remained of the times spent about my friends, and the commonweals causes. And that was all bestowed in reading, for writing I had no time. In our most miseries ther●…re, we seem to have gotten this so great a commodity: that we might put those matters in writing: which were not sufficiently known to our men, & yet were most worthy of knowledge. For what is there in 
Praise of p●…losophie.  faith more wish full, than wisdom? what more excellent? what to a man more worth? what for a man more honourable? They then, who do desire this, be named philosophers: neither is philosophy ought else, if if ye will tell the meaning of the word, but y● study of wisdom. And wisdom 
wisdom.  (as it is defined of ancient philosophers) is the science of heavenly, & world lie things, & of the causes, whereby these things be upholden. And whoso dispraiseth the study thereof: I wot not verily, what there may be, that he would dame praiseworthy. For whether y● deliting of y● mind be sought, & quieting of cares: what may be compared with their studies, who always gather somewhat, that tendeth, & availeth well, & wealfullie to live? or if the way of steadfastness, & virtue be sought, either this is the art, or there is none at all, whereby we may attain them. To uphold, there is no art of the greatest things, seeing none of the lest be without art: it is a token of men speaking with small advisement, and erring in the greatest matters. But if there be any science of virtue: where shall it be sought, when you be gone from this kind of learning? But these things 
Tully's book called Hortensius, now lo●….  are wont to be more exactly discoursed, when we exhort men to philosophy: which in deed we have done, in an other book. But at this present, only it was to be declared of us: why we got us chiefly to this study, when we were bereft of our commonwealth offices.  
But it is gainsaid us, and that of skilful, and learned men, demanding 
Of his sect & his liberty in writing.  whether we seem to do constantly enough: who although we hold, that nothing can be surely known: yet both we are wont to dispute of other matters, & at this same time we prosecute precepts of duty. To whom I would our opinion were wellknowne. 
As the Pyrrhonians.  Forwe are not they, whose mind wandereth in error, & hath not at all, what to follow. For what a mind should this be, or rather what a life? where the mean not only of disputing but also of living is ●…aken clean away. But as other, who do say some things be certain, some uncertain: so we, dissenting from them, do say again, some things be proovable, some unproovable. What is there then, that should let me to follow those things which to me do seem proovable? which contrariwise, to disprove? & to void the presumption of affirming? and to flee rashness, which disagreeth from wisdom most of all? But by our men there is disputing against all things: because this same thing, that is proovable, can not shine for thee: except there should be a conference of reasons expressed upon 
Tully's Academical disputations.  both sides. But these matters, as I suppose, be diligently enough made plain in our Academiks.  
But although, my Cicero, you 
Exhortation to his son.  be exercised in the most ancient, and most noble philosophy, Cratippus being your author: a man full like unto those, who have teemed these notable things: yet I would not, these of ours, very near unto yours, to you should be unknown. But now let us go on to our purpose.  
Seeing then five ways be sets 
The treatise.  
Account of his order in the holle work.  out of treating upon duty: whereof two do pertain unto commelinesse, and honesty: other two belong to the commodities of a man's life, to abundance, power, riches: the fift doth serve to the judgement of choosing, if ever those, which I spoke of, should seem to strive together: the part touching honesty is made an end of: which truly I desire to be veriewell known to you. But this, whereof we treat 
The present purpose.  now, is the veriesame, that is called profitable. In the which term custom failing, hath swerved out of 
The nature of profit.  the way: and by little and little is brought to this point, that it would sever profitable from honest: and would make sommething honest, which should not be profitable, and sommething profitable, which should not be honest: than the which, no greater danger could be brought to man's life. Philosophers surely of very great authority do, gravely no doubt, & honestly, in imagination sunder these three confused kinds. For whatsoever is just, they also judge thesame to be profitable: and likewise, whatso is honest, they take thesame to be just: whereof is concluded, that whatsoever is honest, the same is profitable. The which thing who smally foresee: they oftentimes having in admiration suttlewitted men, & crafty, do repute their wiliness for wisdom. Whose error must be taken away: and their holle opinion is from that to be brou●…ht unto this hope: that by honest counsel, and good deeds, not by guile, & craftiness, they under stand themselves in possibility to attain such things, as they would.  
Some things then, which appertain 
A division of things profitable and unprofitable.  to the maintenance of man's life, be liveless: as gold, & silver, as those, which are gotten out of the earth, as other of thesame sort: some be living, and feeling: which have their 
lifeless.  motions, & appetites to things. And 
Living.  some of them be void of reason, some have the use of reason. Uoide of reason 
Uoide of reason.  be horses, oxen, and other cattle, & bees: by whose work, somewhat is made for man's use, & life. But 
Having reason God.  of those tha●…●…aue use of reason, two kinds there be put: one of gods, an other of men. Devotion, and holiness will make the gods favourable. But next of all, and after the gods, men to men may be most profitable. And again, there is thesame division of those things, which 
Man to man doth most hurt or profit  annoy, and hurt. But because men do not think, the gods do harm: these excepted, they suppose men to men to do most hurt, or profit. For 
Things lifeless.  the most part of those same, which we called lifeless, be the effects of man's work: & neither we should have them, except hand, and craft had been put thereto: neither, without men's service, we should use them. For neither preservation of health, nor sailing, nor ground tilth, and 
Helth.  trimming, nor the inning, and saving 
Navigation.  of corn, and other fruits, 
Husbandry.  without labour of men, could have been any at all. Now moreover, both carriage out of those things, 
merchandise  wherewith we were stored, and conveyance in of those, which we should need, there could be doubtless none: e●…cept men should do these offices. And in like manner, neither stones 
Stones.  should be hewed out of quarreiss, necessary to our use: neither iron, 
Metals.  gold, brass, silver deep hidden could be digged up, without the labour, & hand of man. Houses also, 
Houses.  whereby both y● sharpness of cold might be def●…nded, & the noiaunce of heat might be assuaged: from whence either at y● beginning, mought they have been given to mankind? or after do ease, if either by violence of tempest, or by earthquake, or oldeness, they had gone to wrack? except common life had learned of men to ask the aid for these things. Add hereunto conduits of water, turning of rivers, letting in water 
Water.  over grounds, wharts' made against streams, havens cast by 
Havens.  hand: which, without men's work, we might not have. By all which, and many other things, it is evident: that by no means, without man's hand, and travail, we could have received the fruits, and profits: which be gotten of those things, that be lifeless. What fruits also of beasts, 
Living things  or what commodity could there be taken? but if men should help thereto. For even they doubtless were men: who were the chief in devising, what use we might have of 
The use of 〈◊〉.  each beast: nor at this season, without men's service, might we either keep horses, or break them, or save them, or of them take seasonable commodities: and by men also both those beasts be killed, which do hurt, and those be taken, which may do service. What 
Arts.  should I number up a heap of arts? without which, man's life could have been none at all. For who should ease the sick? What delight should there be among the 
Physi●….  healthful? what diet? what apparel? unless so many arts should serve us. With which things man's life being furnished, is become so far different from the feeding, and cote of beasts. City's also, 
Cōm●… government.  without the assemble of men, could neither be builded, nor peopled. 
Cities.  Whereupon ordinances, and customs 
Laws.  were made: also an indifferent 
Customs.  setting out of law, and a sure rule to live after: by which, the life is led well, and wealfullie. Which things both the mildness of minds, and shamefastness hath followed: and it is brought to pass, that our life should be the more safegarded: and that, by giving, and taking, and enterchanunging of goods, & pleasures, we should want nothing. We be longer in this place, than need requires. For who is he, to whom those things are not manifest, which in more words be recited of Panetius? that neither any captain in war, nor prince at home, could have achieved great feats, & available, without men's endeavour. Kehersed of him is Themistocles, Pericles, Cyrus, Agesilaus, Alexander: whom he denieth to have been able to commepasse so great thirgs, without the aid of men. In a matter no whit doubtful, he useth witnesses no whit necessary.  
And as we obtain great commodities, by the like mind, and consent 
The eruelnes of men, one against another.  of men: so there is none so lothesomme a pestilence, which doth not grow to man by man. Theridamas is a book of Dicearchus, 
Dicearchus' book of the death of men.  upon the death of men: who was a great Peripatetik, and plentiful: and after the other causes gathered together, as of waterbreakes, of pestilence, of destruction, yea and of the sudden flocking together of beasts, by whose violence he showeth, how certain kinds of men were consumed: afterward, he makes comparison, how many more men have been destroyed by men's violence (that is) by war, or rebellion, than by all other misery.  
Seeing then this place hath no manner of doubt, but that men both profit, and hurt men veriemuch: 
By virtue must men be won to our use.  I point this to be a property of virtue, to win men's hearts to her, and bind them to her use. Therefore whatso in things lifeless, and whatso in the use, and occupying of beasts is done profitably to man's life: it is all appointed to the laboursomme trades. But men's good wills, that be pressed, and ready to the advancement of our estate, be stirred up by the wisdom, and virtue of excellent men. For all virtue in a manner 
Virtue släds in three points.  consisteth in three points. Whereof one is in thorowseeing 
Wisdow.  what in every thing is true, and perfect: what agreeable to each thing: what is the sequel: whereof all things grow: what is the cause of every thing. The other, to keep in 
Temp●…ūce.  the troublesomme moods of the mind, which the greeks name 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: and to make the appetites, which they call 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, obedient unto reason. The third, to use them soberly, 
〈◊〉  and skilfully, with whom we be conversant: by whose good wills, we may have those things at fill, and heaped, which nature desires: yea & by them, if any harm be brought upon us, we may it avoid: & may be wreaked of those, which have gone about to hurt us: and may pay them with so much ponnishment, as equity, and man's gentleness doth bear. But by what means we may attain this power, that we may commepasse men's good wills, and retain the same: we shall say, and that, not long hereafter. But a few words are to be said before.  
That a great power there is in fortune, on either side, either for 
The stroke of for●…ne.  welfare, or evillfare: who is ignorant? For both when we enjoy her prosperous blast, we are carried to our desired ends: and when her wind is turned, we are afflicted. This same fortune than hath other chances, which be seldomer: first, that come from things lifeless: as seastormes, tempests, shipwrecks, dounfalls, burnings: then, from beasts, as stripes, bitings, overrunnings. These therefore (as I said) be seldomer. But the destruction of armies, as o'late of three, often of many: slaughter of captains, as lately of a noble, and singular man: the enu●…engs moreover of the multitude: and by reason of thesame, oftentimes the banishments, the miseries, the fleeinges away of the welldeseruing citiezens: and again, prosperity, honour, empire, victory, although they be in fortune's hand: ●…et without men's travails, and studies, on neither side they can be brought to pass. This then known: we must declare, by what means we may allure, and stir up men's good wills to our profits. The which process if it be somewhat long, let it be compared with the greatness of the profit: so perhaps even somewhat to short it shall seem. What 
Causes moving men's good wills.  soever then men give to a man, to enrich, and advance him: either they do it for good will, when for some cause they bear affection to any: or else for honour's sake, if they reverence any man's virtue, & think him worthy of most fortunate estate: or in whom they have a trust, and do suppose them to provide well for their matters: or else whose power they fear: or contrariwise of whom they look after somewhat: as when usurpers and peoplepleasing men lay large gifts before them: or at last, they be led by meed, and reward. Which indeed is the vilest way, & the foulest both to them, who are caught with thesame, and to those, who do seek to have refuge thereunto. For the matter goeth not well: when thesame that should be wrought by virtue, is attempted by money. But because many times this help is necessary: we will tell, how it ought to be used, if first we shall have spoken of those things, which be nearer to virtue.  
And likewise men make themselves 
Causes of Obedience.  subject to the rule, and authority of an other, for divers causes. For they be led either with good will, or gretness of benefits, or excellence of honour, or hope, it shall be profitable to them: or fear, lest by power they be driven to yield: or as taken with hope of large gifts, and promises: or at last, as we see often in our commonweal, even hired for meed. 
Of good will and fear.   
And certes of all things neither is there any fit to maintain a power than to be loved, neither any unfitter than to be feared. Notably saith Ennius:  
whom they fear, him they hate always the most: whom any man hateth, he wisheth him lost.  
But if afore it was unknown, 
Against Caesar.  since o'late it is well known, that no power can withstand the hatred of many. And truly not only the death of this tyrant, whom the city being oppressed with force of arms did suffer, doth declare, how much the hatred of men prevails to destruction: but the like ends of other tyrants do show as much: of whom 
The ends of ●…aunts.  scaselie any hath escaped the like death. For, fear is an evil keeper 
Fear.  of continuance: and contrariwise, good will is faithful, yea for ever. But let a roughness hardily be used of them: who by rule do keep strait such as be brought under by force: as of masters over servants, if they can not otherwise be stayed. But who in a free city so order themselves, that they be feared: there can nothing possibly be madder, than they be. For although the laws be sounke by some man's might: although liberty be alltoshaken: yet at length they swim out again, either by secret judgements, or by privy voices in advancing to honour: and certes the stings of ceased liberty be sharper, than of liberty continued. Let us then embrace that, which most largely spreadeth: & moste availeth not only to safety, but also to wealth, & power: that fear be banished, and love retained. So most easily we shall obtain what we desire, both in private matters, and in the commonwealth. For whoso will themselves to be had in fear: it must needs be, that they themselves fear those same, of whom they be feared. For what think we of the first Dionysius? 
Dionysius the tyrant, a 'mong the Syracusians.  with what torment of fear was he wont to be troubled? who, fearing the barber's razers, with a reddehot coal singed of his own beard.  
What of Alexander the Pheraian? 
Alexander the Pheraian.  with what an heart, do we suppose, he lived? who (as we read written) when exceedingly he loved his wife, Thebes: yet coming to her from banqueting 
Thebes, this 〈◊〉 wife.  into the chamber, he commanded a kern, and him also (as it is written) beprinted with Thracian marks, to go before with a drawn sword: and he sent of his guard afore, to ransack the women's coffers: and seek, that no weapon were hidden in their garments.  
O miserable man, who thought both a kern, and an yronbronded slave faithfuller, than his wife. And his opinion did not deceive him: for by her he was slain for a jealousy of spousebreache. And truly there is no strength of empire so great, which with suppressing by fear can be long continuing. 
Phalaris.   
Witness is Phalaris, whose cruelty is famed above others: who perished not by treason, as this Alexander did, whom even now I spoke of: nor by a few, as this our man: 
Cesar.  but against him the holle commons of the Agrigentines rose with violence. What the Macedonians? did they not forsake Demetrius, & allholle 
Demetrius.  got them to Pyrrhus. What the Lacedæmonians, ruling unrightfully? 
Lacedæmonians.  did not wellnigh all their leagfrendes suddenly forsake them? & showed themselves idle lookers on of the overthrow at Levetra? Foreign examples gladier, than homedeedes I rehearse, in such a case. Nevertheless as long, 
The Romans state.  as the empire of the people of Rome was upholden by worthy acts, not by wrongs doing: & wars were made, either for defence of leagfrendes, or for empire: then were the ends of wars, either merciefull, or necessary. The Senate was the haven, & refuge of kings, of peoples, of nations. And our magistrates, and captains endeavoured to get great praise, by this only mean: if provinces, if leagfrendes, in right, & truth, they had defended. Therefore it might have been named the protection more truly, than the empire of the world. By little and little we abated this custom, and order, somewhat a●…ore: but after Sylla●… victory, utterly we lost it. For men ceased to accounted 
Sylla the vic tors cru●…ltie against the ●…arians.  any thing unreasonable toward leagfrendes: when so great cruelty was showed even against citizens. Therefore there followed in him of an honest quarrel an unhonest victory. For when the 〈◊〉 was pight: and in the market place he sold the goods both of goodmen, and rich, and those even citizens: he was so bold to say, that he made sale of his lawful booty. One succeeded, who in a wicked cause, and a more shameful victory, not 
Cesar crueler than Sylla.  only put the goods of every one of the citizens to open sale: but in one state of misery enwrapped holle provinces, and regions: and so foreign nations being vexed, & undone: we saw Mastilia borne about 
Mastilia, a goodly city of Gallia Narbonensis, by Cesar borne about in triumph.  in triumph, for a show of our empire lost: and triumph made over that city: without which, our captains of wars never got any triumph, beyond the alpes. I could rehearse many more cursed deeds beside, done against our leagfrendes: if the son had seen aught, more heinous, than this one. justly therefore are we scourged. For, had we not suffered the wickedness of many to be unponnished: such a lawless liberty had never come to the hands of one: from whom soothelie the inheritance of his goods come to few, but of his greedy desires, to many naughty men. Nor truly the seed, and cause of civil wars shall ever fail: as long as mischievous men shall both remember, & hope after that bloody sales●…affe: 
Sulla's, and Caesar's salestaffe.  which when Publius Sylla had shaken, his nigh kinsman being Dictator: thesame stepped not once back from the shaking of a like more mischievous staff, the sixth & thirtieth y●…re after. But the other, who in that Dictature had been Secretary, in this was Treasurer for the city. Whereupon aught to be understanded: that while such booties be laid afore men, civil wars shall never want. And so, only the walls of the city do stand, & remain: yea and those same evennow dreeding their last mischief: but the commonweal we have utterly lost. And into these destructions we are fallen (for we must return to our purpose) while we had rather to be feared, than to be dear, and well-beloved. If all this could befall to the people of Rome, ruling unrightfully: what ought every sear man to think? Which thing sith it is evident, that the power of good will is great, of fear, 〈◊〉: it follows, that we make discourse: by what means we may soonest, with honour, and uprightness, attain that love, which we desire.  
But all we do not alike stand in 
Certain exceptions.  need of the same. For to the trading of echemans' life it must be applied: whether it be needful, of many, or sufficient, of few to be beloved. Let this therefore be certain: as that thing, which is both principal, and most necessary: to have faithful familiarities of friends, loving us, and 
Friendship,  highly esreeming our virtues. For this is the only mean in deed: that there be not much difference between great, and mean men: and it must be procured, in a manner, of them both. Not all perchance do stand in like need of honour, & glory, and citizens good will: but yet whoso hath them: they ●…urder somewhat both to other things, and also to the purchasing of friendships. 
Tully's book of friendship.  But of friendship we have spoken in the book, which is entitled Lelius: now let us speak of 
His books of glory be ●…ost.  glory, though of that matter also there be two books of ours: yet let us touch it, because thesame availeth much, in executing of greater matters. 
Things per te●…ing to glory.   
The highest therefore, and perfit glory standeth of these three: if the multitude favour us: if they have a 
Good will.  trust in us: if with a certain admiration 
Credit.  they count us worthy of honour. 
Admitation.  And, if we must speak it plailie, and briefly: as these be gotten at the hands of every sear man, by thesame meancs in a manner they be obtained of the multitude. But there is also a certain other entrance into that multitude, that we may (as ye would say) flow into the hearts of the holle. And first, let us see touching those three, which before I called the precepts 
Of getting good will.  of good will: the which nodout 
Benefits.  is caught most of all by benefits. And secondarily good will is alured by a welwillig mind, although 
Good heart.  perhaps ability sufficeth not.  
But wonderoustie the love of the 
Estimation for honesty.  multitude is alltosrirred with the fame, & opinion of liberality, bounteousness, justice, faithfulness, & of all those virtues, which appertain to the mildness of manners, & gentleness. For that veriesame, which we name comely, & honest, because ofit self it liketh us, and with his own nature, and beauty moveth all our minds: & principally shineth (as it were) out of those virtues, which I have rehearsed: therefore by very nature we are enforced to favour them, in whom we think those virtues to be. And these verily be the weightiest causes of favouring: for othermo lighter theridamas may be beside.  
But, that a trust may be had in us, by two things it may be brought 
How to get a credit.  to pass: if we shall be thought to have attained prudence joined with justice. For both to them we have 
Prudence with justice.  a trust, whom we suppose to understand more, than ourselves: and also to them, who, we believe, be able both to foresee things tocomme: & also to dispatch the business, and forth with to take counsel: when the matter is in hand, and stands in hazard. For all men do judge this the profitable, and true prudence. But in such wise credit is given to just, and trusty men (that is) to good men: that in them there is no suspicion of deceit, and injury. Therefore to these our life, to these our goods, to these our children we suppose very well to be committed. Of these two then justice is of more power to widow a credit: because it without prudence hath sufficient authority, prudence without justice is nothing worth 
Prudence, without justice, is suspected.  to get credit. For, the sutteler, and the craftier that a man is: so much the more he is hated, and suspected, when the opinion of his honesty is pulled away. Wherefore justice joined with understanding, shall have as much power, as it list, to purchase credit: justice without prudence shall be of much power, prudence without justice shall be nothing worth. But lest some man have marvel: seeing amongst all philosophers it 
why he severeth virtues, coupled by nature.  is plain, and by myself disputed often: him, that should have one virtue, to have all the virtues: why I do now sunder them so, as though there may any man be just, which same is not prudent: of one sort, is that suttlenesse, when very troth is leveled in disputation: & of an other sort is that talk, when it is all applied to the common opinion. Wherefore we speak so in this place, as the common sort do: that we call some one sort manly, some other good men, some other prudent. For with the people's words, and usual terms we must treat, when we speak of the ●…onron people's opinion: & that did Panetius, after thesame sort. But to the purpose let us return.  
Of the three therefore, which should 
That we may be reckoned worthy of honour.  appertain to glory, this was the third: that with admiration of men, we might by them be thought worthy of honour. generally then they have in admiration doubtless all 
〈◊〉 things  things: which they have noted to be great, and beyond their weening: and severally in every sear man, if they perfectly see good things unlooked for. Therefore they honour those men, and with highest praises set them aloft: in whom they think themselves to behold certain passing, & singular virtues. But those 
Despisement.  they despise, & set at nought: in whom 
Despisement.  no virtue, no courage, no strength they judge. For all men do not despise them, of whom they think evil. For whom they deem dishonest, misreporters, guileful, and redieframed to do wrong: those they despise not certes, but of them they think evil. Wherefore (as I said afore) they be despised: who neither to themselves, nor to other do good, as they say: in whom there is no painfulness, no diligence, no caring: but they 
Admiration, for ●…tayedness.  be reverenced with a certain admiration: who are thought to go before others in virtue: & to be without both all unseemliness, and also those vices, which other can not easily withstand. For both pleasures, full flattering 
Pleasure's ●…ter●…g dames.  ●…ames, do oftentimes wrest the greater part of the mind from virtue: and also when the brands of 
Brands of pains.  pains be laid unto them, most men beyond measure be alltofrayed.  
Life, death, riches, poverty, most 
Admiration for 〈◊〉.  mightily move all men. Which things whoso on either side, with a lofty, & great courage do despise: and when before them is offered any goodly, & honest thing, it turneth, & haileth them holle to itself: than who doth not marvel at the brightness, 
Admiration for justice.  & beauty of virtue? Therefore both this despisig mind causeth a great wondering: and specially justice, of which virtue alone good men be named, seemeth to the multitude a wonderful thing: & not without cause. For none can be just, who dreedeth death, pain, banishment, or poverty: nor any, that before equity preferreth the contraries. And most of all, they wonder at him, 
Admiration, for despising of money,  who is not tempted with money: ●… in what man that is well tried, him think they worthy to be regarded. Therefore justice doth work all 
justice, a worker of love & glory.  those three, which be pointed out for glory, and gets good will also: because it means to profit very many: and for the same cause, it worketh credit likewise, and admiration: because it despiseth, & nough●… regardeth those things, whereunto most men enkindled with greediness be haled. And surely, after my judgement, every trade, and order 
Man's aid.  of life requireth the aids of men: ●… chiefly that ye have some, with whom you may debate in familiar talk: which is hard, unless ye bear upon you the show of an honest man. Therefore opinion of justice is necessary 
How necessary it is, to be taken for just.  even to the aloneliver, and one that leads his life in that fields: yea and so much the more, because if they have it not, unjust they shall be counted: and being guarded with no defence, shall be vexed with many injuries. And to these also, who do sell, buy, hire, let, and be entangled in bargaining business, justice, to go thorough which their matters, is necessary. Whose power is so great: that even they, who be fed with evil doing, and mischief, can not possible live without some parcel of justice. For who stealeth, or privielie 
Robbery.  piketh any thing from any of them, with whom he goeth a thieving: he leaveth not himself a place, no not in robbery. And unless he, who is named the archpirate, divide the prize egallie: either he shall be slain of his mates, or else forsaken.  
Yea and it is said, there are laws among 
Lawe●… o●… thieves among themselves.  thieves: whereto they obey, and do observe them. And so, by reason of the even portioning of 
Bargulus.  the prize: both Bargulus, the Illyrian robber, of whom mention is made in Theopompus, had great 
Uiriatus.  riches: and much greater had Uiriatus the Lusitane: to whom of troth even our armies, & ●…aptains 
Caius' 〈◊〉.  gave place: whom Caius Lelius, he that was commonly called the wise, being Praetor, did discomfit, and abate: & so allayed his fersnesse, that he left an easy war to other. Seeing then the strength of justice is so great: that it also stablisheth, & encrcaseth robbers richesses: how great suppose we that power thereof to be, among laws, & judgements, and ordinances of a common weal? certes methink, not only among that Medes (as telleth Herodotus) but also 
The Mebes.  among our aunceters, in old time, wellconditioned kings have been ordained, 
Kings.  for that end of enjoying justice. For at the beginning, when y● multitude was oppressed by them, who had y● greater power: for refuge they fled to some one, excelling in virtue: who, when he saved the weaker from injury, by p●…inting out an equity, 
Laws.  kept the highest with the lowest in indifference of law. And the like cause there was of making laws, as of kings: for evermore an equal right hath been sought: for otherwise it were not a right. If they obtained y tsame 
Right.  at the hands of one just, & good man, with him they were contented: when that chanced not, laws were devised: which with all men always, in one, & alike voice should speak. Wherefore this is doubtless a clear case: that they were wont to be chosen to govern: of whose justice the opinion of the multitude was great. And this thereto adjoined, that they also might be counted wise: there was nothing, that men, under those guides, should ween themselves unable to attain. justice therefore is by all manner means to be regarded, & maintained: both it for itselfsake (for else it were not justice) & also for y● enlargement of honour, & glory. But as there is a way not only of getting money, but also of bestowing it: which may suffice for continual charges, not only such as be necessary, but also liberal: so glory must be both gotten, & ordered by a mean. Notwithstanding 
Socrates.  notably Socrates did say: this 
The high way to glory.  to be the nearest, and (as it were) the gain way to glory: if a man would endeavour this, to be in deed such as he would be counted. And if any do deem themselves able to attain steadfast 
Feigning.  glory, by false pretence, & vain 
Bragging.  outshow, both with feigned speech, & coum tenaunce: they be far out of the way. The true glory taketh deep root, and also shoots abroad: all counterfeit things do soon shed, as do the little flowers: neither can there any forged thing be durable. Witnesses very many there be on both sides: but for shortness sake, we will be contented with one family.  
For Tiberius' Gracchus, Publius 
Tiberius' Gracchus.  son, so long shall be praised, as remembrance of the Roman state 
Tiberius & Caius Gracch●…, both siayne for sedition.  shall stand. But his sons neither tiving were liked of good men, and dead go in the number of men rightfully pu●…e to death. Let them then, whoso the true glory will attain, perform the duties of justice. What those were, it was told in y● former book. But to y● end that soon we may seem such manner men, as we be: although the greatest effect is even in this point, that we 
Precepts of purchasing glory.  be such, as we would be counted: yet certain precepts are to be given. For 
Youth.  if any from his first entered age hath cause of name, and fame: either received of his father, which to you, my Cicero, I suppose to have 
Nobility.  happened, or by any chance, and fortune: on him all men's eyes are cast: and of him there is searching, what 
Noble men mus●… not slain their s●…ocke, with re●…rochefull life.  he doth, and how he liveth: and so, as though he should lead his life in mo●…e open light, neither word, nor 〈◊〉 of his can be unknown. But whose first age is 
New comers up need great vertue●…  passed without men's knowledge, by reason of baseness, & unknown name: these, as so●…ne as they begin to be youngmen, aught to look after great things: and 
Great c●…rage  to press unto thesame with direct studies. Which they shall do with so much the better courage: because that age is not only not 〈◊〉, but also favoured.  
The chief setting forth 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ●… 
Rules of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  youngman to glory is, it an●… 〈◊〉 may be gotten by seats of 〈◊〉 wherein many have showed themselves, 
〈◊〉,  among our ancestors: for wars were almost 〈◊〉 
〈◊〉 son.  kept. But your age chanced upon that war: where the one side had 
Caesar's side.  too much mischief, the other, little 
〈◊〉 side.  good fortune. In which war yet, when Pompeius had made you captain of the one wing: both of a m●… most noble, and of the army, you got great praise, with riding, with throwing the dart, and sustaining all things with a souldiourlike painfulness. And verily that your praise, and the commonweal fell together. But of me this treatise is not taken in hand touching you, but touching the holle generalty. Wherefore let us go forward to such things, as do remain.  
As then in other matters, the works 
works of the mind.  of ●…he mind be much more, than of the body: so those things, which with wit, and reason we go thorough, be of more grace, than those, which we do with strength. The first commendation than proceedeth 
Soberness.  of sobermoode: the next, of 
〈◊〉 love.  
Good will.  natural duty toward parents: the third, of good will toward theirs. But to the best commendation, youngmen be known soonest of all: who 
jinitation of worthy men  have bestowed themselves with noble, and wise men, well counseling the commonweal: on whom if they be attendant, they bring the people in belief: that they will prove like them, whom they have chosen themselves to follow. Publius 
But●…s.  Mutius house did set out Publius 〈◊〉 ꝰ youthstate, for 〈◊〉 
〈◊〉  〈◊〉 of harmless life, & of knowledge in the law. For as for Lucius 
〈◊〉. in 〈◊〉 youth, go●… a great fame. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Caius 〈◊〉.  Crassus, when he was a very youngman, he 〈◊〉 not from any other place, but wan himself a very great praise, by that noble, and glorious accusation. And in 
Eloquence.  which age, they, who have exercises, are 〈◊〉 to be 〈◊〉 with praise: as we have heard by 〈◊〉: in thesame age Lucius Crassus did show himself in open court, to do that veriewell, having forestudied: which 〈◊〉 then at home with praise he might have exercised.  
But whereas there be two ●…ortes 
Talk.  of speech: whereof in the one is familiar talk, in the other, 〈◊〉: 
〈◊〉 speech.  it is no doubt, but the 〈◊〉 of sp●…he may do mos●…e, and hath the greater furtherance to glory. For that is y● thing, which we do call eloquence: but yet it is hard to tell, 
Eloquence.  
Genile 〈◊〉.  how much a gentleness, ●… familiarnes of speech winneth ménes minds. There be letters abroad of Philippus 
Letters of Philippus, Antipater, & Antigonus.  to Alexander, and of Antipater to Cassander, and of Antigonus to Philippus, three very wisemen (for so we have heard) in which they give rules: that with gentle speech they allure the hearts of the multitude, to owe their good will: & that they please their soldiers, by speaking to them with fair words. But the oration, which is made among the multitude, with vehemence, oftentimes raiseth an universal glory. For great is the wonderment 
Admiration, for 〈◊〉.  at him, that plentiefullie, & wisely speaketh: whom the hearers do judge also to understand more, and to be wiser, than other. And if in the oration ther be a graveness 
Gravity.  mingled with sobermoode: 
Soberness.  nothing there can be done more wonderful: & somuch the more, if those be in a youngman. But whereas there be very many kinds of causes, which do require eloquence: and many youngmen in our commonweal, both before the judges, & before the Senate, have attained praise, by speaking in matters: the great test admiration is in judicial causes: 
judicial causes.  the nature whereof is in two parts. 
Accusation.  For it standeth in accusation, & 
Defence.  defence: of which albeit defence is the more commendable, yet also accusation is oftentimes allowed. I spoke of Crassus, a little before: 
L. Crassus.  the like did Marcus Antonius, being 
M. Anton.  a youngman: an accusation also 
P. 〈◊〉  brought Publius Sulpitius' eloquence to light: when into judgement he called the seditious, & unprofitable citizen, Caius Norbanus. But this sothelie is not often to be done, nor at any time: unless either for the commonweals cause: as did the two Luculli: or for protection 
Luculli.  sake: as we did for the Sicilians, 
Cicero's accusation of Uerres.  and for that Sardines: julius Cesar, for Marcus Albutius did that 
Julius Cesar.  like. Also, Lucius Fusius diligence was known in the accusing of 
L. Fusius  Marcus Aquilius. Once then it may be done, not often certes. But in case a man must needs do it often: let him ascribe this office to the commonweal: whose enemies to revenge often, is not to be reproved: yet let there be a measure present.  
For of a hardherted man, or rather scarce a man it seems, upon many to bring the danger of life: for that both is dangerous to himself, and also a shameful blot in his name: to give cause, that he be named a promoter. Which chanced to 
M. Brutus, a ●…ore accuser.  Marcus Brutus, borne of a noble stock, his son, who was very well skilled in the civil law. And thereto, this rule of duty must be diligently kept: that ye bring no innocent, at any time, in judgement upon life: for that can in no wise be done without heinous wickedness. For what is there so unnatural, as to turn eloquence, being given of nature for the safeguard, and preservation of men, to the harm and destruction of good men? And yet, as thi●… is to be ●…schewed: so is it not to be counted contrary to godliness, to defend the guilty otherwhile, and mischievous, and wicked. This the multitude desireth, custom beareth, humanity also worketh. The judges part is, evermore in causes to follow the troth: the counsellors part, many times to defend the trouthlike, though it be not so true: which to write I would not be bold, namely seeing I treat of philosophy: but that thesame liked Panetius, 
Panetius.  the gravest of the stoics. But most of all, by defending, both 
Defence.  glory, and favour is gotten: and so much the more, if ever it befall, that he be defended: who doth seem to be beset, and pressed with the richesse of any man of power: as ourself did, both often 
Cicero's oration at. 27. yea res of his age, for 〈◊〉 Roscius.  at other times, and also being young, for Sextus' 〈◊〉 the Amerine, against the might of Lucius Sylla, bearing sway: which oration (as ye wot) is abroad.  
But now we have set forth 
Liberality.  young men's duties, which avail to the attaining of glory: hereafter we must speak of bountiefulnesse, and liberality. Whereof two manner ways there ber. For liberal dealing is showed to 
Travail.  such, as need, either by travail, or with money. This latter is the 
Money.  easier, specially to the possessioner:  
but that other is the goodlier, and more glorious, & meeter for a manly, and a noble man. For though there is a liberal will of pleasuring in both: yet the one out of the coffer, the other out of virtue is taken: and the lavishing, which is made 
Lavishing.  of a man's housegoodes draweth dry the very fountain of liberality: so liberality is by liberality wasted: and toward y● more that you do use it, the less ye can be able to use it toward many. But whoso 
●…ing.  shall be bountiefull, and liberal of travail (that is) of virtue, and diligence: first, the more they have profited, the more furtherers they shall have toward dealing liberally: afterward, by customable using of bounteousness, the readier they shall be, and (as it were) the more practised to deserve well of many.  
Princely doth Philippus, in a 
Philiphus to Alexander  certain epistle, accuse Alexander, his son: that, by lavishness, he hunteth after the good will of the Macedonians. What reason, in a mischief, quoth he, hath brought you into this hope? that ye should think, those would be to you faithful, whom you had corrupted with money.  
Why? go ye about this, that the Macedonians may think you not their king, but their servant and briber?  
Well, he said, servant, and briber, because it is vile for a king. Better also he said, in that he called largegiving corruption. For he, that receiveth, is made the worse thereby, and the readier always to look for the like. This said he to his son: but let us think it given in precept to us all. Wherefore this certainly is no doubt: but that same liberality, which standeth in travail, and diligence, both is honester, and also spreadeth farther, and is able to profit more. Oftentimes yet a man 
Gifts giving.  must give largely: and this kind of liberality is not to be utterly cast of: and we must many times give part of our substance to meet men, that have need: but we must do it heedfully, and measurably. For divers have spoiled out their livelihood, by lavishing it unadvisedly. 
wastefulness.  But what is foolisher, than to cause, that you can no longer do the thing, which ye love to do? And also spoil followeth of lavishness. For when by giving they begin to be needy: they be driven to lay hand on other men's goods: so when 
Extortion.  they would be beneficial, for cause of goodwill getting: they purchase not so great love of theirs, to whom they gave: as of them they get hatred, from whom they took. Wherefore neither a 
Covetise.  man's substance is so to be 
Prodigality.  shut up, that liberality can not open it: nor so to be unlocked, that it lie abroad for every body.  
A measure is to be kept, and let it be referred to ability. In any wise we must remember that: which with our men is very oft in usage, and now is come into the custom of a proverb: that Lavishness finds no bottom. For what 
Lavishness.  stay can there be? when both they, who are wont to it, and other do desire one thing? In all, there be two sorts of largegivers: of which the one be called foolelarge, 
Large givers  the other liberal. Foolelarge we call them, who with open feasts, 
Foolelarge.  and fleshgiftes, and fenseshowes, and furniture of sights, and hontinges, power out their money on those things: whereof they shall leave a memory either short, or none at all. But liberal they 
Liberall●…  be named, who with their riches do ransom men taken by preyeseekers: or for their friends sake, do become sureties for debt: or do aid them, in their daughter's preferment of marriage: or else do help them either in getting, or increasing their goods.  
And therefore I marvel, what 
Theophrastus praiseth sumptuousness.  camme in Theophrastus' mind, in that book, which he wrote of riches: wherein he spoke many things notably, but this, out of course. For he is much in praising great sumptuousness, and furnishment of peoplepleasing shows: and he deemeth the ableness of such charges to be the fruit of riches. But methinketh that fruit of liberality, whereof I have put a few examples, is both greater, and more certain.  
How much more gravely, & truly doth Aristotle reprove us? who 
Aristotle's judgement, of sumptuousness.  are not in a wondermet at these lashings out of money, which be done to claw the multitude: but in case they, who are besieged of enemies, should be driven to buy a quart of water for ten crowns: that this, at first hearing, seemeth to us uncredible, and all make a marvel at it: but when we have given good heed thereto, we hold with necessity: yet we make no great marvel at these exceeding losses, and endless charges: when specially neither necessity is relieved, nor worship increased: & that self-same clawing of y● multitude shall endure for a short, & a small while: yea and that, with every of the lightest minds: & yet in the very same, even together with the fullness, the remembrance also of the pleasure dieth. It is also well gathered: that these shows be wellliked of Children, and women, and slaves, and freemen most like unto slaves: but that no ways they can be allowed of a sage man, and one, that with a grounded judgement weigheth those things, that be done.  
Nevertheless I perceive, in our 
The ●…lles office.  city, it hath grown into use, now in this good world: that the gay shows of the Aediles office is looked for, ●…uen of the best men. Therefore 
Publius Crassus, the rich.  Publius Crassus, both by surname rich, and also in substance, kept his Edileoffice marvelous sumptuously. And soon after, Lucius 
Lucius Crassus, the orator.  Crassus, with Quintus Mutius, the greatest meanekeper of all men, 
Q. Mutius Scevola.  kept the time of their Edileoffice most royally. Then, came Caius 
C. Claudius.  Claudius, Appius son. afterward 
Lucullus.  succeeded many, as Lucullus, 
Hortensius●…  Hortensius, Silanus. But 
Silanus.  
P. Lentulus.  Publius Lentulus, when I was 
Scaurus.  Consul, passed all his predecessors. Scaurus followed him.  
But our Pompeius shows, in his 
Pompeius.  second Consulship, were y● costliest of all: in everiedeale whereof, you see, what liketh me. We must yet avoid suspicion of covetousness.  
For the refusal of the Edileship 
Mamercu●…  brought to Mamercus, a very rich man, a fall for the Consulship.  
Wherefore the thing is to be done, 
Large gifts, with measure and for honest causes.  both if it be called for of the people: & good men, though they do not require it, do yet allow it: so it be according to one's ability, as we ourself have done: and also, if any greater, and more profitable thing is won at any time, by peoplepleasing largesse: as of late, 
Orestes feasted the people.  a great honour to Orestes were the dynings in open ways, in name of his tenths. No nor it was not 
M. Seius, liberal to the people.  counted a reproach to Marcus Seius: that in a dearth of corn, he gave to the people for four pennies a bushel. For from a great, & a longefestred envy he delivered himself, neither by a dishonest loss, seeig he was Aedile, nor yet very great. But o'late, it 
Milo suppressed Clodius attempts  was pawning high honour to our Milo: because for the commonweals sake, which in our safety consisted, with hired fensmen he suppressed all Publius Clodius attempts, and rages. There is therefore cause of largesse, if 
Necessity.  either it be necessary, or profitable. 
Profit.  And yet in thesesame, the rule of meankeeping is best. certes Lucius Philippus, Quintus son, a man of great wit, and most 
L. Philippus who without any large gifts came to great digni●…ies.  famous, was wont to glory: that he, without any gift giving, had attained all manner dignities, which were counted most honourable.  
The like said Cotta Curio. We 
Cotta Curio.  
Cicero's Edileship.  also in this may glory, after a certain sort. For doubtless small was the cost of our Edileship: in respect of such large honours, as by all-mennes' voices we attained, even in our year: which hath befallne to none of them, whom I named ●…while. And also these expenses 
In what things such cost is better bestowed.  be better: which are bestowed upon citiewalles, shippedockes, havens, conduits, and all, that appertain to the use of the commonweal. Although that is more pleasant, which presently is given (as it were) in hand: yet for time to come these be more acceptable. Sightcourts, galereywalkes, and new churches, the more reverently I find fault with, for Pompeius' sake: but the best learned men do not allow them: as both this same Panetius, whom I have followed much in these books, 
Panetius,  & yet not translated him: & also Phalereus Demetrius: who dispraised 
Demetrius Phalereus discommended. Pericles.  Pericles, the prince of Greece, because he laid so much money upon those goodly porches. But of this kind universally, it is 
Tully's books of a commonweal. now lost.  diligently disputed, in those books, which I wrote of a commonweal. The holle manner then of such largesse generally is faulty, yet for certain times it is necessary: & then the same is both to be referred to one's ability, and to be tempered with a meankeeping.  
But in that other kind of largegiving, 
Liberality.  which proceeds of liberality, not all alike in causes unlike, we ought to be disposed. Otherwise is his case, who is pressed with misery: & otherwise his, who seeketh more wealth, having no adversity. Toward the miserable, liberality 
relief to the miserable.  ought to be forwarder: except peraveture they shall be worthy of misery. We ought yet in no wise to be altogether pinching toward those: who would have themselves to be helped, not that they may feel no affliction, but that they may rise to higher degree: nevertheless in choosing 
Worthiness.  out meet men, we ought to use a discretion, and a diligence. For notably sayeth Ennius:  

Good deeds, in case they be evil placed, 
Ennius●…   
Evil deeds I count, and clean disgraced.   
But whatso is given to a good man, and a thankful: thereby both there comes fruit from him, & also from other. For so rashness be avoided, liberality is very pleasureful: and somuch the more earnestly most men praise it: because every great man's goodness is the common refuge of all. Our endeavour therefore is to be done, that we reward them with very many benefits: to whose children, and offspring a memory may be left: so that of good right they can not be unthankful. For all men do hate the forgetter of 
〈◊〉nesse.  a good turn: and do deem that wrong even to themselves to be done, in fraying away ones liberality: and they take him, who causeth it, to be a common enemy of the poor. And this liberality also is profitable to the commonweal, to have prisoners redeemed out of captivity, and the poor enriched.  
Which we see written at large in the oration of Crassus: that it was wont to be 
Crassus' oration.  done abroad by us of y● equestrial order. I place therefore this usage of liberality before lavishness in shows. This is for grave men, & great: that other, (as it were) for flatterers of the people, tickleling, as ye would say, the lightness of the multitude with pleasure. But it is meet for a man, both to be liberal in giving, and nothing eyger in requiring: & also in every matter of bargaining, selling, 
justice.  buying, hiring, letting, nyedwellinge, 
Gentleness.  and partieboundes, to be just & gentle: and to remit much of his due to many: but from traverse in law to refrain as much, as he may: and I wot not, whether 
S●…mewhat to remit of a mans own right.  somewhat more also, than he may. For it is not only a liberal point, to for go sommwhat of his right otherwhile, but sommtime also profitable. But regard of a man's wealth must be had: which verily to suffer to decay, is a foul fault: but so, as suspicion of niggardlienesse, and covetousness, be avoided. For nodoute it is the greatest fruit of money: that a man be able to use liberality, not making spoil of his livelhod. Well also, is hospitality praised of Theophrastus. 
Hospitality, Theoprhast●….  us. For it is (as methinketh) very seèmlie, noble men's houses to be open for noble guests. And that also is an honour to the state: that outelandish men in our cite do not want this kind of liberality. It is also exceeding profitable to them, who honestly desire to be able to do much: to prevail in power, and favour, by their guests, among foreign nations. Theophrastus' indeed writeth: 
Cimon●…  the Cimon at Athenes also was a good housekeeper, for the Laciadans of his ward. Because he took order so, & commanded his bayleiss: that all things should be offered to whatsoever Laciadan turned ito his manor. 
Liberal endeavour.   
But these benefits, which be bestowed by travail, & not by largegiftes, are employed both upon the holle commonweal, and upon every 
Advise.  citizen apart. For in law to give 
Counsel●…  advise, with counsel to help, & to further very many with this kind of science: it availeth veriemuch, both to the increase of riches, & also to favour. Therefore as there were many worthy things of our ancestors: so always in great price was the knowledge, & the opening of the right 
Ciull law, had in price with aunci●…t rulers.  well ordained civil law: which truly, before this turmoil of times, rulers retained in y● due estimation: now as honour, and as every degree of worship, so the glory of this science is blotted out. And that is somuch the shamefuller: because this happened at that time: when he reigned, 
Ce●…ar.  who in knowledge clearly exceeded all his foregoers, to whom he had been peer in honour. This travail therefore is pleasurefull to many, & very fit, to bind men with benefits. And the graver, & gracefuller, 
Eloquence, a grace most commendable.  and trimmer feat of oratory is near cousin to this science.  
For what is more praiseworthy, & better, than eloquence? either for y● admiration of the hearers, or the hope of the needers, or for their cause, who have been defended.  
Therefore to this likewise a pre-eminence in all honour was given of our elders. The benefits then, and the pleading of a finespoken man, and gladly taking pains, and (as it is in his country fashion) both not unwillingly, and also freely defending many men's causes, be far spread abroad.  
The matter hath put me in mind: 
discontinuance of eloquence.  that in this place also I should bewail the discontinuance, I will not say the destruction of eloquence: but that I feared, lest touching myself somewhat I should seem to complain. Notwithstanding we see, what notable orators have been put out of the way: and how in a few a hope, in fewer a skill, in many a boldness there remains. But 
Of smaller travail also how favour is won.  seeing neither all, nor yet many can be either cunning in the law, or wellspoken men: one yet with his travail may further many: that seeweth for their commodities: that speaketh in their favour to the judges, and magistrates: that sleepeth not out an others cause: that entreateth those same, who either be counsellors, or defenders: which whoso do, they attain very much favour, and their painefullnesse fioweth all abroad.  
Now they are not to be admonished of this (for it is wellknowne) that they 
Justice.  
O●…ence.  take heed: when they will help other, that they offend none. For oftentimes either they hurt them, whom they should not: or them, whom it is not behooveable: if unwarely they do it, of negligence it is: if wittingly, of rashness it comes. You must use also to them, whom you offend against 
Offence must either be ●…uoided, or ●…uaged.  your will, such an excuse, as ye may: for what cause the same, that you have done, was necessary, and you could not do otherwise: and the which was done offensively, shall be recompensed with other travails, & friendly doings. 
Travail for the poor rather, than the rich.   
But whereas, in helping men, either their conditions are wont to be considered, or their estate: indeed it is soon said, & so they do commonly speak: that in bestowing their benefits, they regard Men'S manners, 
Manners.  and not their estate. An honest 
Estate.  saying it is: but who is there at all, which in bestowing his travail, doth not prefer the favour of a richman, & one of power, before the poors, & a right good man's cause?  
For from whom, we think, a speedier, and readier recompense will come: to him ward commonly our good will is the more inclined. But we must mark more diligently, what is the nature of things. For verily though that pooreman can not render due thanks: yet if he be a good man, own them for sooth he may. This surely was in place, whosoever said it: Money who haveth in hand, hath 
To pa●…e money.  not paid: & who hath paid, haveth in mind: but thanks both who hath 
To render thanks.  paid, haveth in mind: & who haveth in mind, hath rendered. But these, 
The rich.  who count themselves rich, honourable, & wealfull, will not be once bound to a man for a pleasure: but they think rather, that they have done a pleasure: when, yea although they have taken some great thing, they suspect somewhat likewise of them either to be craved, or looked for: but they rechen it even like a death: that they should seem to have used ones furtherance, or should be called hangers on. But that other poreman, thinking himself regarded, & not his state, when any thing is 
The poor.  done unto him: desires, that he may be thought thankful not only to him, who have deserved it: but also to them (for he stands in need of many) of whom he looks for aught. Nor yet which words he sets out his service, if perhaps he do any, but also abaceth it. And this same point is to be considered: that if you defend a rich, and a wealthy man: the thank remains in him alone, or perchance in his children: but if you do it for him, that is poor, and yet honest, & discrete: all the mean degree, being not dishonest, (which is a great multitude among the people) do see succour prepared for them. Wherefore 
Set the good before the rich.  I think a benefit better to be bestowed upon good men, than upon rich. Yet always we must give our endeavour, that we may content all manner of men: but if the matter shall come into comparison: verily Themistocles is to be taken for an 
Themistocles  author: who, when he was asked counsel, whether one should bestow his daughter upon a good pooreman, or a rich man not so honest: I (quoth he) do rather like a man, who lacketh money, than money, which wanteth a man.  
But manners be corrupted, and 
Love of riches.  marred, by overregarding riches. What do the the great store thereof pertain to every one of us? peradventure it helpeth him, that hath it: and that, iwis not always. But grant, it helps: indeed he may be the mightier, but which way may he be the honester man? And if the richman be also a good man: let not his riches hinder him, & cause him to find the lesse help, so they 
Discern men by their virtue, not by their fortune.  further him not: & let a man's holle judgement Bee, not how rich, but what manner man eachone is.  
And in bestowing benefits, and 
In a shameful cause no travail is to be spent.  travail, the last lesson is: that you labour nothing against equity, & nothing with wrong.  
For justice is the ground of a continual commendation, and fame: without which, nothing can be praisable.  
But seeing we have spoken of such 
Benefite●… upon the commonweal.  kind of benefits, as belong to each several man: hereafter we must treat of those, which pertain to all men, and to a commonweal.  
And some of those same be of such sort, that they pertain to the holle 
The hol●…e  nonmbre of citizens: some that they 
Euer●…eone.  concern every sear man: which be also more favourfull. A diligence doubtless there must be given, if it may, that it be provided for both: & no less also, for everieone: but so, as the thing either may further, or at lest not hinder the commonweal. 
Caius Gracchus, to large a giver.  Caius Gracchus cornedole was great: he wasted therefore the treasury: Marcus Detaviꝰ made such 
Marcus ●…ctauius, in large gifts measurable.  a one, as was measurable, and as the commonweal might bear, & necessary for the people: & therefore wealfull both to the citizens, and also to that state. But specially it must be seen to of him, who shall govern the commonweal: that everyman keep his own: and that there be no impairing of private Men'S goods, 
Philippus, a people-pleaser.  for common charges. For Philippus did dangerously in his Tribune●… ship, when he made the law concerning lands: which yet he soon suffered to be repealed: & therein marvelously he showed himself a sober man: but as he did evil, in setting for the many things people pleasingly: so this he spoke evil: that ther were not in the city two thousand men, who had any substance.  
It is surely a mischievous saying, 
Making of goods common.  & sounding to the making of goods common: & what greater pestilence can there be, than that? For commonwelths, 
Countries.  & countries are ordained to this end specially, that men may keep their own. For although men assembled together, nature being guide: yet they sought the defences of cities, 
Cities.  for hope of safe-keeping of their goods.  
There must also good heed be given: 
Exacting of tributes is to be avoided.  that (as often it happened among our ancestors) for the poorness of the treasury, and continuance of the wars, a tribute be not needful to be paid. And long before it must be provided, that it may not befall. But if any necessity of this duty shall happen upon any commonweal: (for I had rather prophecy to some others, than to ours: & yet I reason not of ours, but of every commonweal) there must be given a diligence, that all men may understand: that if they will be in safety, they must obey necessity.  
And moreover all such, as shall 
Store of necessary things.  rule the commonweal, aught to provide: that there be store of those things, which are necessary. Of which it is not needful to dispute, what a provision is wont, & aught to be made: for the matter is manifest: this place was no more, but to be touched.  
But the chief point is, in all administration 
Covetousness.  of matters, and commonweal offices: that even the lest suspicion of covetousness be avoided. Would god, quoth Caius Pontius th●… Samnite, fortune had 
Caius Pontius.  reserved me to those days, and I had then been borne: when the Romans 
Bribes.  begun once to take bribes: I would not suffer them any longer to rule. He needed not iwis to have tarried for many worlds.  
For of late this mischief entered into this commonweal. Therefore I am well content, that Pontius rather lived then: if there was in him somuch manhood indeed.  
Not yet a hundred, and ten years be passed: sins the law of pillage 
A law for pillage.  was made by Lucius Piso: whereas none before had been. But 
Lucius Piso●…. Tribune of the people, when Censorinus, and Manilius were Consuls.  afterward followed so many laws, and every of the later, the harder: so many accused, so many condemned: so great an Italian war, raised for fear of judgements: when laws, and judgements wertaken away, so great polling, & robbing of leagfrendes: that by the weakness of other, not by our prowess, we do prevail. Panetius praiseth Africanus, 
Panetius.  
Africanus, praised for ●… refraining hand.  because he was no taker.  
Why should he not be praised? But other greater things there were in him. For the praise of restraining from taking is not only the man's, but also that times. Paulus got all 
Paulus Emilius.  the Macedonians treasure, which was exceeding great: he brought somuch riches into the treasury, that one captains booty made an end of tributes: but he bore nothing into 
Scipio Emylianus, who was called Africanus minor.  his house, save an everlasting memory of his name. Africanus followed his father, no whit the more enriched by Cartage razed. What of Lucius Mummius, who was his 
L. Mummius Achaicus.  officefelow in the Censorship? was he aniedeale the richer, when by the ground he had overthrown the most rich city? He was willing 
Cori●…thus.  rather to beautify Italy, than his own house: although Italy being beautified, his very house seemeth to me the beautifuller. No vice then is their fowler (that thither my talk may return, from whence it is strayed) than covetousness: specially, 
Covetousness, a very fowl vice.  in princes, & commonweal rulers. For it is not only dishonest, but wicked also, & shameful, to make a gain of the commonwealth. Therefore whereas Apollo Pythius 
Apollo's answer, that Sparta's fall should come by covetise.  gave out by oracle: that Sparta no other way, but by covetousness should come to destruction: the same he seemeth to have prophesied not only to the Lacedæmonians, but also to all wealthy peoples. For they, who rule over the commonweal, may by no means sooner win the good will of the multitude: 
A refraining hand.  than by a refraining hand, & staidness. But woso will be peoplepleasers: 
Staidness.  and for that cause, do 
The law for laying out of lands.  either attempt the matter of lands, that the owners may be driven from their holds: or else do think meet, that loved money be remitted to the debtors: they shake the foundations of the commonweal: first, they take away concord: which can 
Concord.  not be, when money is pulled from some, & forgiven to other some: next, they banish equity: which is holly 
Equity.  rooted out: if it be not lawful for every man to have his own.  
For that is the proper end, as I said before, of a city, and borough: that there be a free, and no troublesome keeping of every man's own good. And in this mischief of the commonweal, they do not attain such favour, as they suppose 
Favour.  they do. For he, from whom goods be taken, is become an enemy: he also, to whom they are given, makes, as though he is not willing to take them: and moste of all he hides his joy in loved money forgiven: lest he may seem to have been unable to pay it.  
But surely, he that receiveth the wrong, both beareth his grief in remembrance, and showeth it in sight: neither if they be more, to whom wickedly it hath been given, than they, from whom unjustly it hath been taken: it followeth, that therefore they be also more in power. For these things be judged not by number, but by weight. And what equity is in this? that he should have land, who hath had none: and he should forego land, who hath had it many years, yea or hunderds of years before continued in possession. 
The Lacedæmonians.  But, for this kind of injury, the Lacedæmonians drove out Lysander 
Lysander expulsed.  the Ephorean: and they sleew Agis the king: which had never happened 
Agis, slain.  among them before. Whereof followed, at that time, so great dissensions: that there arose tyrants: and their noble men were exiled: & a very well ordered commonweal went to ruin. Nor truly their state only had a fall: but also it overthreew the rest of Greece, with the infections of mischiefs: which springing from y● Lacedæmonians, did flow farther abroad. What of our Gracchi, Tiberius Gracchus, 
Gracchi, lost by landstrifes.  the noble man's sons, Africanus childerns children? did not landstrives bring them to destruction? But in deed Aratus the Sicyonian 
Aratus the ●…icyonian, a right good comm●… eaithman.  is rightfully commended: who, when his c●…tie was fifty years withholden by tyrants: being departed fr●…m Argos to sition, with a p●…sto●… entry, g●…tte possession of the city: and when, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, he had ouer●…●…n the tyrant, Nicocles: he 〈◊〉 h●…me again six hundred ba●…sht men, who had been the greatest possessioners of that city: and, by his coming, set the ●…ommōweale at liberty. But when he perceived the great inconvenience in the goods, and possessions: because both he thought it very unreasonable, that they should ●…acke, whom he himself had restored, wh●…se goods other had possessed: & again to remove fifty years possession, he judged it not very indifferent: because that in s●… l●…ng a space, much by inheritance, much by sale, much by dower, was holden: which out wrong he thought it was necessary: neither the goods to be taken from them, nor those to be unsatisfied, whose they had been before. When he had then determined, that he should need money, for the ordering of y● matter: he said, he would make a voyage to Alexandria: and commanded, the matter to remain untouched, until his return. And he with spe●…e went to Ptolemeus, who had been his entertainer: which then reigned the second, after the building of Alexandria: to whom when he had declared, that he was minded to set his country at liberty: and had informed him of the case: the noble man soon obtained of the rich king, to be aided with a mass of money. Which when he had brought into sition, he took to him in counsel fift●… one of his nobles: with whom he examined the cases both of them who did withhold othermennes, & of theirs, who had lost their own: & did put these fifteen in commission for the valueing of possessions: and to persuade some, that they would be willinger to take money, and ●…ease their possession: and other some, to think, that to have as much paid them in valeew, it were more profit, than to recover their own. So it came to pass, that they all departed without complaint, by a wellordered concord. O man of much honour, and worthy to have been borne in our commonweal. Thus it is meet to deal with citizens: and not (as twice already we have seen) to pitch a salestaffe in the marketplace: & to put the goods of the citizens in the criers mouth. But that Greek thought meet to provide for all: which was the part of a wise, and a worthy man. And that is the greatest discretion, and wisdom of an honourable citizen, to defend, not to pull away the citizens commodities: and to contain them all within one manner of equity. But some will say, men 
Equity.  may dwell rentfree in an others house. Why so? That when I have bought it, have builded it, do repair it, do lay charges upon it: thou shouldest have the use of mine, against 
Unlawful pa●…ting of lands.  my will? What is this else, but from some to take their own, & to some to give other 〈◊〉? And 
The neew tables for relea●…ing of det.  as for the neew tables, what reason have they? but that you may buy land with my money, and possess it yourself: and yet I may not have my money. Wherefore it must be provided: that ther be no debt, which may hinder the commonweal: which thing may be looked too, maniewaies: if this be not suffered: that possessioners lose their own, nor debtors gain other men's. For nothing more strongly preserveth a commonweal, than faithfulness: which can be none at all, except 
Faithfulness  there be of necessity a payment of things loved. For never more earnestly it was gone about, than when I was Consul, that there should be 
Cicero Consul.  no payments. The matter was attempted with spear, and shield, by every sort, and degree of men: whom in such wise I withstood, that this so great a mischief was rooted out of the commonweal. Never was there more derte, neither better, nor easilier paid. For when hope of defrauding was taken away, necessity of payment followed. But this our conqueror, now verily 
Caesar.  conquered, hath commepassed those things, which he purposed: whereas now he is never a whit the be●…ter. So great was his desire to do 〈◊〉: that even the very doing of noughtiness delighted him, although he had no occasion. They then, who shall uphold the commonweal, must keep them away from this manner of large gifts: that to some they be given, and from other they be taken: and specially must give their diligence: that by equity of law, and judgement, everyman may hold his ●…wne: and neither the poorer sort, for their sma●…l ability, be deceived by covin: nor envy may hinder the rich, either to keep, or recover their own: moreover, by what means soever they can, either in war, or peace: let them enlarge the commonweal, with dominion, land, and custom. These be the deeds of 
Conclusion.  noble men: these were practised among our ancestors: these kinds of duties whoso follow: shall, with very great profit to the commonweal, get themselves both great favour, and glory. 
Way prepared to the res●…   
But in these precepts of profit, Antipater of tire, the Stoik, who 
Antipater.  o'late died at Athenes, thinks, that two precepts be overscaped of Panetius: tendering of health, and provision of money. Which things I 
Panetius defended.  suppose to have been overpassed by the noble philosopher, because they were light matters: yet without doubt they be profitable.  
But health is preserved, by knowledge 
Of helth.  of ones own body: & marking those things, which are wont either to do good, or harm: & by a staidness both in all a man's diet, & apparel, for cherishing of the body, & also in forbearing pleasures: & lastly, by their cunning, to whose science these things pertain.  
But a man's substance must be 
Private goods.  gotten, by those things, which be far from dishonesty: and must be saved, by diligence, and honest sparing: and by those same means also, it must be increased. Xenophon 
Xenophons' book o●… ordering an household.  the Socratian hath gone thorough these things very handsomely, in the book, which is entitled Economicus: the which we turned out of greek into latin, when we were at the same age in a manner, as you are now.  
But comparing of profits (because 
Of two profitable things w●…ether is the more profitable.  this fourth place was overpassed by Panetius) is oftentimes necessary. For both ●…he gifts of the body are wont to be compared with fortune's gifts: & also fortunes gifts, with the bodies gifts: & those of y● body, one with an other: & those, that fortune gives, likewise one with an other. The body's gifts be compared with fortunes, after this sort: that ye had rather be in health, than be 〈◊〉: fortunes gifts be compared with the bodies, in this wise: that you had rather be rich, than of very great strength of body. Those of the body be compared one with an other, thus: that good health be preferred before pleasure, & strength before sw●…ftnesse. But fortunes gifts be compared together, this way: that glory be esteemed before riches, and ●…itietribute before the 
〈◊〉 t●…lde, what is the  countries. Of the which kind of comparison is 〈◊〉 ●…aying of Cato, the oldeman●… of whom when it 〈◊〉 demanded, what 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 for a man's substance: he made answer, To feed well: what the second, To feed sufficiently well: what the third, To cloth well: what the fourte, To blow: and when he, who had moved the question, had 
Usury.  said: What, to lend upon usury? then, What is it, quoth Cato, to kill a man? Whereupon, & of many other things it ought to be gathered, the comparisons of profits are wont to be made: and that this is veriewell adjoined for the fourth point of searching out of duties.  
But of this holle matter, of getting 
Referring of the matter to 〈◊〉.  money, of bestowing thesame, & also of using it: far better it is disputed by certain honest men, sitting 
A place in Rome, so called, because janus images were there to be seen.  at the middle jane, than of any philosophers in any school. Yet are they to be known, and of them in this book we have treated. The rest will we prosecute hereafter.   

MARCUS TVLlius Cicero's third book of duties, to Marcus his son.  
THesame Publius Scipio, 
The preface. 1. part.  son Mark, who the first Africanus was 
why he sp●…ds his vacant time in philosophy.  named, would commonly say: as Cato hath written, who was in a manner his like in years: That he was never more leasurelesse, than when he was 
A ●…eate saying of Scipio, touching leisure, and solitariness.  leasurefull: and never less alone, than when he was all alone. A noble saying surely, and meet for a worthy, and wise man: which declareth, that he both in his leisure was wont to muse of matters to be done: and also in his solitariness, to debate them with himself: so as he was nothing idle at any time, and sometime needed not the communication of other. And so these two things, leisure, and solitariness, which bring a dullness upon other, 
His own vacation compared with Scipios.  made him the quicker. I would wish, that we likewise might truly say the very same. But although by 〈◊〉 we are not able to attain so great excellence of wit: yet doubtless in desire we come very near him. For both by wicked war, and power, being put of from commonweal matters, and judicial causes, we take our quiet leisure: & for that cause leaving the city, and walking abroad in the country, oftentimes we be alone. But neither this leisure is to be compared with Africanus leisure: nor this solitariness, with that of his. For he ceasing from the goodly ministration of the commonweal, took himself leisure otherwhile: and from the press, and resort of men, now and than into a solitary place, as into a haven, withdrew himself. But our leisure comes 
leisure.  not of desire of rest, but for lack of hysinesse. For seeing the Senate is deposed, and judgements abolished: what is there, that either in court, or in place of plea, meet for us, we may do. Therefore we, who in the greatest assemble, and in the eyes of the citizens sometime have lived: now ●…leeing the sight of the wicked, with whom all places swarm: do 
Solitariness●….  withdraw ourselves, as much as we may, and are oftentimes alone. But because thus we have herd of learned men: that not only we ought of evils to choose the lest: but also if there were any goodness in them, 
Good out of evil.  to pike it out: therefore both I enjoy quietness: not such iwis, as he ought to have, who once procured quietness to the holle city: and also do not suffer that solitariness to wax idle: which necessity brings upon me, and not mine own desire. Although Africanus did get greater praise, even in my judgement: yet no monuments of his wit put in writing, no work of his quiet life, no fruit of his solitariness remains abroad. Whereof it must needs be gathered: that he, by earnest occupying of his mind, and by beating out those things, which by musing he attained: 
〈◊〉.  was neither idle, nor at any time alone: but we, who have not so great deepness of wit, that by secret musing we be drawn from solitariness: do turn all our study, and endeavour to this travail of 
Writing.  writing. And therefore we have written more in a short space, sins the state was overthrown: than in many years, when it stood.  
But whereas all philosophy, my Cicero, is very good, and f●…utefull: 
Exhortation to his son. Philosophy.  nor any part thereof is barren, and waste: yet no place therein is more yielding, nor more plentiefull, than the place touching duties: from which be borrowed 
Duties.  the precepts of living constantly, and honestly. Wherefore although I trust, you daily hear, & receive this same of our Cratippus, 
His sons schoolmaster.  prince of Philosophers in these days: nevertheless I hold it profitable, that I ring about your ears with such sounds, on every sid●…: and that they, if possibly it may be done, hear none other thing. Which both is to be done of all those, that mind to enter the honest life: and I wot not, whether of any man more, than of yourself. For you carry an expectation, not small of following 
His 〈◊〉.  our trade, great of coming to our honour, some peradventure 
His bringing up.  of attaining to our fame. You have taken upon you moreover a great charge, both by reason of Athenes, and also of Cratippus: to the which seeing, as to the mart of good sciences, you have t●…auailed: to return empty, a g●…eate reproach it is, st●…ining the worship both of the city, and also of your master. Wherefore as much as by wit you are able to commepasse: as much as by pain●… 〈◊〉 can endeavour (if to study be rat●…er a pain, than pleasure) so ●…uch ●…ee, that you do in deed: and give no occasion, that seeing all thing●… a●… sufficed by us, you should seem to have disappointed yourself. But of these matters hitherto. For we have oftentimes written much unto you, in wa●…e of exhortation. Now to the part remaining of the foresaid division let us return. 
The treatise. He removeth 〈◊〉, suppl●…eng the perceil, ●…hat his au●…hour did not prosecute.   
Panetius therefore, who without doubt of duties hath most viligentlie disputed: and whom we, using 〈◊〉 certain correction, have chiefly folowe●…: when h●… h●…d setteforthe three 〈◊〉, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 men w●…r w●…nt to counsel, and advise themselves 
How ' 〈◊〉 wrote of duties.  of duty: the one, when they should doubt, whether it, wherewith they were in hand, were honest, or 〈◊〉: the other, whether it were profitable, or unprofitable: the third, if that, which should have the ●…howe of honesty, should strive with it, that seemed profitable: how it should be necessary those same to be discerned: of the first two kinds, in three books he opened his mind: and of the third kind, he wrote, he would speak afterward: and that did he not perform, which he had promised. Where at I mar●…aile 
Possidonius, Panetius scholar.  the more: because it is written by his scholar Possidonius: that Panetius lived thirty years after he had set foorth those books. Which place I wonder, it was so briefly touched of Possidonius in certain 〈◊〉: specially seeing he writes, there is no place in all ●…hilosophie so necessary. But in nowise I agree with them: which deny, this place did overskape Panetius: but that of purpose it was left out: and that it was not to be written at all: because profit might never strive with honesti●…. Touching the which, the one may have in it a doubt: whether this part, which in Panetius division is the third, was to be added, or utterly to be left out: the other can not be doubted of: but of Panetius it was taken in hand, and yet left untreated. For whoso of a threeparted division two parts hath finished, to him the third must needs remain. Moreover, in his third book, toward the end, he promiseth, that afterward he will speak of this part. Hereto cometh a substantial 
P. Rutilius Ru●…us, Pane●…us scholar.  witness, Possidonius: who also writeth in a certain letter, that Publius Rutilius Rufus, which 
The notable image of Venus: whose head only Apelles finished and left her body no more but shadowed.  had herd Panetius, was wont to say: like as no painter might be found, who could finish up that part of Venus, which Apelles had left unfinished: (for the beauty of her face took away the hope of counterfeiting the rest of her body) so those things, that Panetius had overpassed, & had not finished, there was no man to prosecute: because of the excellence of those matters, which he had gone thorou withal. Wherefore of Panetius judgement it can not be doubted: but whether he to the searching out of duty this third part adjoined well, or no: thereof peraventure it may be doubted. For whether honesty be the only good, 
The Stoics appoint one thing only good: the Peripat●…tiks make an order of good things.  as liketh the Stoics: or else honesty in such sort be the sovereign good: (as seemeth to our peripatetics) that they count all things, set on the other side, of ve●…y small weight in comparison: it is not to be doubted, but that profit can never be 
Profit.  at strife with honesty. Therefore, 
●…onestie.  we have herd say, Socrates was wont to curse them: who first parted a sunder in opinion these, that by nature were coupled together. To whom doubtless the Stoics so assented: that whatso were honest, the same also they judged to be profitable: nor any thing to be profitable, which were not honest. If Panetius were the man, who would say: the virtue therefore should be honoured, because it is y● causer of profit: as they, who measure things meet to be desired either by pleasure, or ungreffulnesse: he might maintain, that honesty sometime strives with profit. But seeing he is 
Good.  the man, who judgeth that only good, which is honest: and that man's 
Honest.  life is made neither the better, by increase of such things, as be repugnant to honesty under a certain show of profit: nor by decrease of them, the worse: it seems, he should not have brought in such manner taking of advisement: wherein that, which should seem profitable, should be compared with that, which is honest. For that, which of the Stoics is called the sovereign good, as to live agreeably to nature: it hath (as I suppose) this meaning: which virtue 
To li●…e agreeably to nature.  always to agree: & other things, which should be according to nature, so to choose: if to virtue they were not repugnant. Which seeing it is so: some suppose, this comparison was not well brought in: nor any thing at all, touching that branch, should have been taught. And surely that honesty, which is properly, and truly so called, is in the wise only: and from virtue can never be severed: but in those, in 
The true virtue is only in perfit wisemen.  whom is not perfect wisdom, doubtless that same perfect honesty can in no wise be: semblances of honesty there may be. All these duties therefore, whereupon in these books we dispute, the stoics call the mean 
The mean duties.  duties: and those be common duties, and do spread far: which many attain, both by goodness of wit, and by going forward in learning. But that, which they call R●…etum, 
The perfit duty.  is the perfit, and absolute duty: ●…, as they also say, it hath all his parts: neither can happen to any, but a wiseman. And when any thing is done, wherein the mean duties may appear: it seemeth to be fully perfit: because the common people all most understandeth not at all, what it wanteth of perfit: but as far as they understand, they think, nothing is left undone. And where as it commonly chanceth in metres, & paintings, & in other things more: that the vn●…kilfull be delighted, & praise those things, that are not to be praised: for the 
Of arts none can 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 judge, but the craft●…master: and of virtue none but the wi●…e.  cause, I believe, they do so: that in those there is some good grace, that catcheth the ignorant: who in deed be not able to discern, what fault is in every thing. And therefore, when they be taught of the skilful, they soon fall from their opinion. The Stoics then say, that these duties, whereupon in the●…e ●…okes we treat, be (as who saith) certain second sorts of honesty: not proper only to the wise, but common also to all manner of men. Therefore all be alured with these, in whom there is a forwardness of virtue. 
●…ecii, the father, and the son.  And when the two Decii, or the two Scipios be vouched for manly men: or else when Fabritius, or Aristides 
Scipio's bre the●….  be alleged as just: neither of them for manliness, nor of these for 〈◊〉 
Fab. a despi●…er of gold.  the example is brought, as of perfit wisemen. For none of these 
〈◊〉 of a thence deier ●…ed this surn●…me, ●…ust.  in such sort is wise, as in this place we will have a wise man taken: nor Marcus Cato, and Caius Lelius, 
Cato. & Lelius, surname ●… the wi●…e.  who were counted, and called wise, were perfit wise men: no nor those seven sages of 〈◊〉 
The. seven. wise masters of Greece.  but by the often using of the mean, & common duties, they bore a certain semblance, and show of wisemen. Wherefore neither it is lawful, that the thing, which in deed is honest, be compared with the contrariety of the profitable: neither y●, which commonly we call honest, and which is exercised of them, who will have themselves good men to be counted: with commodities at any time is to be compared: and as well that honesty, which falleth into our understanding, is of us to be maintained, and kept: as that is, of the wise: which properly is called, & indeed is honesty. For otherwise it can not be holden on, if there be attained any proceeding to virtue. But this we say by them, who by keeping of duties are esteemed for good men. 
Epicureans.   
But who do measure all things by profits, and commodities: and will not the same to be overweighed with honesty: these are wont in advisement taking to compare honesty with it, which they reckon profitable: good men use not so to do. Therefore I think, Panetius, when he said, men 
Panetius.  are wont in this comparison to doubt: meant the veriesame, that he spoke: that men only are wont, but not, that 
To be wont.  they must needs. For not only to 
To do of necessary.  judge the thing, that seemeth profitable, more worth than that, which is honest: but also to compare these together, & in them to cast doubts: a very fowl shame it is. What is it then, that many times is wont to bring a doutefulnesse? and seemeth meet to be considered? I suppose, it is, if at any time there befall a doutfullness: what manner of thing it is, whereof consideration is taken. For often, by the time, it comes to pass: that it, which for the most part is wont to be counted dishonest, is found not to be dishonest. For example's sake, let there be put some case, that more largely extendeth. What greater mischief can there be, than one to kill not only a man, but also his familiar? Hath he then giltied himself of murder, who hath slain a tyrant, all were he his familiar? To the people of Rome doubtless it seemeth not so: who of all worthy deeds esteemeth that the noblest. With them therefore profit passed honesty: yea rather honesty followed after profit.  
Therefore, that without any error 
what to determine, ●…here profit seems to strive with honesty.  we may be able to judge: if ever that, which we call profitable, shall seem to strive with it, which is known for honest: a certain rule is to be appointed: which if we will follow in the comparison of things, from duty we shall never serve. And this 
why he follows chiefly the S●…oikes.  rule shall be most agreeable with the trade, & doctrine of the Stoics: which verily, in these books, we therefore follow: because although of the ancient Academiks, and our Peripatetics, (who were once all one with the Academiks) those things, 
Honest.  which be honest, be preferred before such, as seem profitable: yet these 
Profitable.  more goodlily be disputed of y● Stoics: to whom whatso is honest, the same seemeth profitable: & nothing seems profitable, which is not honest: than it is of those: who reckon somewhat to be honest, and not profitable, or somewhat profitable, and not honest. 
The Academian school.  But to us our Academia gives great liberty: that whatsoever most provable ●…ōmes in place, thesame by our prerogative we may lawfully defend. But I return to y● rule.  
To pull away then any thing 
A precept of justice.  from an other, and a man to increase his commodity with an other man's 
Profit by an other man's does commodity.  discommodity, it is more against nature: than death, than poverty, than pain, and other things, which may happen either to the body, or to the outward state. For first of all it takes away the conversation, & fellowship of men. For if we shall be so disposed: that every man, for his own commodity, spoil, & wrong an 
The fellowship of men.  other: that fellowship of mankind, which is most according to nature, must needs be broken. As if every 
Comparison between man's society, & the parts of his body.  part of that body should have this imagination: to think, it might be strong, if it had conveyed to itself the strength of the next limbs: of force it should follow, that the holle body should be weakened, & perish: evenso if everieone of us catch to himself the commodities of other, and pulleth from each man what he can, for his own profits sake: the fellowship, and common company of men must needs be overthrown. For it is sufferable, and nature not against it: that everyman be more willing for himself, than for an other man, to get whatso pertaineth to the use of his life. This doubtless nature doth not suffer: that, with the spoil of other, we increase our riches, substance, and wealth. And not only it is ordained by nature, that is to wit, by the universal law of nations: but also in like 
Laws.  manner, by the laws of people, whereby in every city the commonwealth is upholden: that it should not be lawful, for a man's own profits sake, to hurt an other. For the laws tend to this, and this they mean: that y● fellowship of citizens be in safety: which whoso rive a sunder: those with death, banishment, prisonment, and penalties, they ponnish. And this much more doth the very course of nature require, 
The law of nature.  which is the law of God and man: the which whoso is willing to obey (all truly will obey it, that have a mind to live according to nature) shall never so offend: that an other man's goods he would covet: and take to himself, that he hath pulled from an other. For much more according to nature is the hynesse, and greatness 
Great courage.  of courage: and likewise common fellowship, 
Common 〈◊〉.  justice, & liberality: than pleasure, than life, than richesse. Which things doubtless for a man to despise, and set at nought, in comparison of common profit: is a sign of a great, and haught courage. But to pull from an other, for ones own 
wrong doing is against nature.  profits sake, is more against nature: than death, than sorrow, than the rest of the same kind. And in like manner, more according to nature it 
Common safety.  is, for the saving, and aiding of all nations (if it may possibly be done) to undertake great travails, and pains: following that notable Hercules, 
Hercules, for his worthy deeds, was taken as a god.  whom men's report, the recorder of deserts, hath placed in y● company of them above: than to live in solitarienesse, not only without any pains, but also in great pleasures, flowing full of all richesses: yea though moreover you may excel all other, in beauty, & strength. Wherefore everyman of the best, & most noble disposition, preferreth that life far before this. Whereof it comes to pass, that a man obedient to nature can not hurt a man. Furdermore, 
Doing of injury.  whoso wrongeth an other, that himself may get some commodity: either believes, that he doth nothing aghasted nature: or wenes, that he should shun death, poverty, sorrow, the loss also of children, kinsfolk, friends, rather than the doing of injury to any man. If he thinketh nothing to be done against nature, in wronging of men: what should you reason with him, which clean takes away man from man? But if he plainly thinketh that meet to be avoided: & yet these he deemeth much worse, death, poverty, sorrow: he is in this point out of the way: that he taketh any discommodity either of the body, or of fortune to be sorer, than the vices of the mind. Therefore there must be in all men one intent: that alike may be the profit of every sear man, and of all universally. Which 
The law, and right of man's fellowship.  profit if each man pluck unto himself, all man's fellowship shall be 〈◊〉. And if nature doth also appoint this: that man woloe have 
The law of nature.  man provided for, whatsoever he be: yet even for this same respect, because he is a man: it must needs follow, that according to thesame nature, the profit of all be in common. Which if it be so: we all be contained in one, and the like law of nature. An●… if the same be so: doubtless, by the law of nature, we are forbidden one to wrong an other. Now, the antecedent is true: therefore true also is the consequent.  
For that verielie is reasonless, that some say: from their parent, or brother, they will take nothing away, for cause of their own profit: but of other citiezenes', that there is an other respect to be had. 
The right of man's society mu●… be kept, not only with 〈◊〉, but also with all men universally.  These be in opinion, that they have no law, nor fellowship to keep with citizennes, for a common profits sake: which opinion doth rip a sunder all the society of a city. And they, that say, there must regard be had of citie●…enes, and none of foreigners: do ry●…e asunder the common fellowship of mākinde●… which being destroyed: all bountiefulnesse, liberality, goodness, and justice is utterly rooted up: which whoso take away, even toward the god's immortal are to be counted irreligious. For such do overthrow the fellowship by them among men ordained.  
Of the which fellowship the surest 
The bond of man's fellowship.  bond is: to think it to be more against nature, for one man to use extortion to an other, for his own profits sake: than to suffer all discommodities, either outward, or of the body, yea or of the mind: which happen without just deserving. 
justice.   
For this virtue, justice, of all virtues is the lady, and queen.  
peradventure, ●…me will say: Shall 
Questions 〈◊〉.  not then the wiseman, if he be driven by famine, take away meat, from an other man good for nothing? No doubtless. For my life is no more profitable to me: than such a disposition of mind, that I wrong vobodie for my profits sake. What if a good man could spoil the cruel, and beastly tyrant Phalaris of his clothing: that he should not d●… for cold himself? might he not do it? These be full easy to judge. For if you take aught, from a man on no behalf profitable, for love of your own commodity: ye shall do unkindly, and against the law of nature: but if you be the man, who may bring much profit unto the common weal, & the fellowship of men, if you remain alive: in case ye take away aught from an other, upon that consideration: it is not to be reproved: but if the matter standeth not even so: every man must rather bear his own discommodity, than pull away of an others commodities. Sickness then, or poverty, or any such like is not more against nature: than extortion, and greediness of an other man's goods. But to leave alone the common profit, is against nature: for it is unjust.  
Therefore the very law of nature, which preserveth, and maintaineth men's profit: appointeth without doubt: that from the ●…dle, and unprofitable man, necessary things to live with be conveyed to the wise, the good, and the manly man: who, if he should die for want, should draw away with him much of the common profit: and yet so he must do it: that neither by overweening in himself, 
Selflyking.  nor loving of himself to well: 
Self-love.  he make this a pretenced colour to do wrong. Therefore always let him do his duty: providing for the profit of men, and that fellowship among men, which I oftentimes repeat. For as touching Phalaris case, the judgement is very easy. For with tyrants we have no society, 
〈◊〉.  but rather be at extreme dissension with them: neither is it against nature to spoil him, if ye can, whom it is honest to kill: and all such pestilent, & wicked rabbles are to be driven out of the companies of men. For even as certain limbs be cut of: if they once begin both to lack blood, and life (as ye would say) and also do hurt the other parts of the body: so this savageness, & cruelness of a beast, under the shape of a man, must be parted (as it were) from the common naturalness of man's body.  
Of this sort be all those questions, wherein duty is sought out by circumstance of time. Such matters 
He excuseth Panetius.  therefore I believe, Panetius would have treated: had not some chance, or business prevented his purpose. Concerning which manner of taking advisement, in my books afore, many things be sufficiently taught: by which, it may be per●…iued, what is to be avoided, for dishonesty: & what is not to be shonned, because it is nothing dishonest. But for as much as of our work begun, yet almost ended, now (as who saith) we set on the roof: as the Geometers are wont not to prove all: but to require, that certain things be granted them: to the intent, they may more easily set out their purpose: so do I require of you, my 
He requireth one principle to be granted him.  Cicero: that ye grant me, if ye may, that nothing but that, which is honest, is for itself to be desired. But if it may not be granted, 
Ponessie, for itself, either one●…y, or chief lie to ●…e desired.  because of Cratippus: yet this nodoute you will grant me: that the thing which is honest, is chiefly for itself to be desired.  
Whether ye will, is enough for me: and both the one, & the other seems the more provable: neither any thing else appeareth provable. And first, in this point, Panetius is to 
Panetius defended.  be defended: because he said not, that profitable things at any time strive with honest (for it was not lawful for him so to say) but those, which seem profitable, might strive with honesty. But he often witnesseth, that nothing is profitable, whichsame is not honest: nor honest, whichsame is not profitable: and he denieth any greater pestilence to have crept into man's life: than their opinion, who have divided these two asunder. Therefore he brought 
repugnance in seeming, & not in deed, between honesty & profit,  in that repugnance: which did seem to be, and was not in deed: not that, at any time, we should prefer profitable things before honest: but that without error, we might discern them, if ever they fell in place. This part therefore, left untouched, we will supply: which no others aid, but (as they say in war) even with our own force. For touching this percel●…, there hath, been, sins Panetius wrote, not●…g 〈◊〉, that liked me: of all, that ever ●…me to our hands.  
Therefore, when any show of profit 
Profit from 〈◊〉 is not t●… be se●…ered.  is offer●… us, we must needs be stirred: but if, when ye give good heed, ye see dishonesty ●…yned wi●…h 
Dishonesty. A ●…owe of profit.  that thing, which bringeth a show of profit: then the profit is not to be desired: but we must think, where dishonesty is, there profit can not be. Now, if nothing there be so much against nature, as dishonesty: (for nature doth desire good, and convenient, and stead fast things, and despiseth the contrary) & again there is nothing so according to nature, as profit: dout●…lesse in the same profitable thing dishonesty can not be. And also, if we be borne to honesty: & it is either 
Honesty.  only to be desired, as to Xeno it seemed: or in all estimation, is to be counted of more value, than all other things: as pleaseth Aristotle: it must needs be, that the thing, which is honest, is either y● only, or that sovereign good: & what so is good, the same doubtless is profitable. And so all, that is honest, is profitable. Wherefore when the error of men not honest hath caught hold of somewhat, that seemeth profitable: by and by it divides thesame from honesty. Hereof 
●…inhonest profit, mother of all ivischief.  murders, hereof poisonings, hereof counterfeit wills do spring: hereof felony, hereof robbing the treasury, pillage, and extortions from leagfrendes, and citizens: hereof groweth the power of to exceeding richesse, not to be suffered: and finally in free cities th●…r be the des●…res of ruling: whereas nothing either more cruel, than they, or more detestable can be imagined. For with deceivable iyes they see the gain of things: but the ponnishment, I will not say, of the laws, which they often break through: but of dishonesty itself, which is sorest of all, they see not. Wherefore 
The 〈◊〉 of shame.  let such takers of advisement be driven from among us (for they are altogether wicked, & ungodly) who use ad visement: whether they may follow that, which seems to be honest: or wittigly stain themselves with dishonesty. For in y● very doubting a great fault 
In a shameful matter,  there is, although they never come to the doing of it. Therefore those th●…ges 
shameful is the very deliberation.  are ●…ot to be advised on at all, in which the very taking of advisement is dishonest. And also in all deliberation, the hope, & opinion of concealing, & hy●…ig of matters is to be put away. For fully (in case we have aniwhit profited in philosophy) we ought to 
A golden precept.  be persuaded: though we could hide it from all gods, & men: that nothing yet covetously, nothing unjustly, nothing wanton, nothing unstayedly is meet to be done.  
hereupon that Gyges is brought in by 
The tale of the 〈◊〉 ●…oyges.  Plato: who, when the earth had opened in certain great storms, went 
In pla●…oes second book of a commonweal.  down into that gaping hole: and spied a brazen horse, (as the fables tell) in whose sides were doors: which being opened, he saw the corpse of a dead man, of an unwonted hugeness: & a gold ring upon his finger: which as soon as he pulled of, he put it on his own finger. This Gyges was the kings shepherd.  
Then he got himself again to y● company of shepherds. There when he had turned the head of that ring toward the palm of his hand: he was seen of nobody, yet he saw every thing: & he was seen again, when he had turned that ring in sight. And so usig this vantage of the ring, he lay with the quecne: & by her aid, he sleew the king, his master: and made dispatch of them, whom he thought to stand in his way. Neither could any man see him, being about these mischievous dcedes.  
So, by the commodity of his ring, he became suddenly king of Lydia. This same ring than if a perfect wiseman should have: he would think it no more lawful for him to offend, than if he had it not. For honest things, not secret things by good men be sought. And in this place, certain philosophers, and those not of the worst, but yet not all of the finest say: that Plato told a feigned, and devised fable: as though he defendeth, that either the thing was done, or was po●…ble to be done.  
This is the effect of this ring, and 
The meaning of this fable.  of this example: if noman should know, or noman should once suspect: when you should do any thing, for regard of riches, power, rule, or lust: yea if it should be unknown for ever both of god, & man: whether you would do it, or no. They deny it possible to befall: and although it can not so befall in deed: yet I demand, in case that might befall, which they deny to be possible, what would they do? They force on, grossly in good sooth. For they hold, it is unpossible, & therein they stay still. What this word (if) importeth, they see not. For when we demand, if they be able to conceal, what they will do? we do not demand, whether they be able to conceal it, or no: but we lay before them as it were that rack, & certain manikles: that if they answer, they would do, what then liked, being sure to scape scotfree: they confess themselves to be wicked: if they say, they would not: they grant, all dishonest things, for themseluꝭ, meet to be eschewed. But now let us return to our purpose.  
There do oftentimes befall divers matters, which trouble men's minds, under a show of profit: not when this is advised upon, whether honesty is to be left for the greatness of profit (for that plainly is 
The thing. that 〈◊〉 profitable.  wicked) but whether the thing, which seemeth profitable, may be done without dishonesty. 
Br●…tus did well-enough, in expulsing 〈◊〉.   
When Brutus took away the rule from Collatinus Tarquimus, his officefelowe: he might have 〈◊〉 thought to do it unjustly: for, in driving out the kings, he had been Brutus assist aunt, & aider also of his counsels. But when the rulers had agreed thus in counsel: that the kindred of Superbus, & the name of the Tarquinians, and the memory of the kingdom should be utterly driven out: because it was profitable to provide for their country: thesame was in such wise honest, that even very Collatinus ought to have liked it. And so profit prevailed, because of honestrie: without which, profit could not have been at all. But with the king, who builded 
〈◊〉 did not well ●…n that he slew Remus.  this city, it fared not so. For a show of profit struck in his mid: to whom when it appeared more profitable, for him to rule alone, than with an other: he slew his brother. This man forgot both godliness, and naturalness: that he might obtain the thing, that seemed profitable, and was not so indeed: and yet his brothers leaping over the wall he alleged, for a colour of honesty, neither allowable, nor sufficient 
Romulus Quirinus.  enough. He offended therefore: that by Quirinus, or Romulus favour, I may say it. Notwithstanding 
we must seek our own pro fit, without others hurt.  we ought not to leave our own commodities, & give them to other, when ourselves do need thesame: but every man must serve his own profit so far, as without an others injury it may be done. Featly said Chrysippus in this, as he did in many things more: Whoso, quoth he, runneth in the 
A feat comparison, made by Chrysippus.  race: aught to endeavour, and labour, as much as he may, that himself may win the game: but in no wise he ought to trip him, with whom he runs, or to keep him of with his hand. So in this life it is not unlawful for every man to get himself, that may serve his use: but to pull from an other, it is no right.  
But most of all, duties be put out 
Nether deny, nor grant your friend every thing.  of order in friendships: in the which, it is aghasted duty: both not to do, that rightfully you may, and to do, that is not lawful. But of all this matter a short, & no hard rule there is. For these, which seem profitable, 
Set not your profit before friendship.  honours, riches, pleasures, & other of thesame kind, are never to be preferred afore friendship. And 
〈◊〉.  a good man, for his friends sake, neither will do against that commonweal 
Oath.  neither against his oath, & promise: no not though he shall be judge upon his own friend. For he puts of 
judgement.  the parsonage of a friend, when he takes upon him the person of a judge. Thus much he shall lean to friendship: that he had rather, his friends cause were true: and that he will grant him time thoroughly to plead his cause, as much as by the laws he may. But when by his oath he is to give sentence: he must remember, he taketh god to witness, that is to mean (as I suppose) his conscience: for nothing more godlike, than it is, hath god himself given to man. Therefore of our ancestors we have received a goodly 
The old manner of requiring the judges favour.  manner of desiring the favour of a judge: if we would keep it: To do what he may, saving his oath. This request is referred to those things: which, a little before is said, might honestly be granted by a judge to his friend. For if all things should be done, which friends would desire: such were to be counted not amities, 
Amity.  but conspiracies. I speak now 
Conspiracy.  of common friendships. For in men wise, and perfit, there can be no such thing. Men say, that Damon, and 
Damon, and Pythias, a notable couple of friends  Pythias, the Pythagoreans, were so affectioned, one toward an other: that when Dionysius, the tyrant, had appointed one of them his dying day: & he, who was condemned to die: had required certain days of respite, for the disposing of his things: the other becamme bound body for body, for his forthcoming: upon condition, that if he returned not at his day, he would himself die for him. Who, when at his day he was come again: the tyrant wondering at their faithfulness, required, that they would take him in for the third in their friendship.  
When therefore that, which in friendship seemeth profitable, is compared with that, which is honest: let the show of profit yield, and honesty 
For your friends sake, do nothing against honestly.  prevail. But when in friendship those things shallbe required, which be not honest: let religion, and uprightness be preferred before friendship: and so shall that choice of duty be had, which we seek after.  
But under the show of profit, in 
For a commo weal howfarreforthe we must do.  the commonweal there is oftentimes doing amiss: as our men did in the razing of Corinth. Sorer also dealt 
Cruelty of Athenians to Egine●…es.  the Athenians: who made a decree, that the Eginetes thumbs, who were skilled in navigation, should 
Egina, an isle right over against Attica.  be cut of. This was thought profitable: for Egina did too much over look Pireun, by reason of the near 
port Pireun, by Athenes.  bordering. But nothing, that is cruel, is profitable. For to man's nature, which we ought to follow, cruelty is most enemy. They also do evil, who bar strangers from using 
Strangers.  their city, & do banish them: as did Petronius, in our father's days: & Papius, of late years. For, one to go for a citizen, who is no citiezen, it is reason, it should not be lawful: the which law the very wise Consuls, 
Crassus, and Scevola, Consuls.  Crassus, & Scevola did make: but to forbid strangers the use of the city, it is doubtless an uncivil 
Profit.  part. Those doings be notable, 
Honesty.  wherein show of common profit is despised, in respect ofhonestie. Our commonweal 
The Romans stoutn●…e in the second Punik war  is full of examples, both often at other times, & chief in the second Punic war: which, after the overthrow taken at Cannai, had greater courages, than ever in prosperity: no token there was of fear, no mention of peace. So great is the force of honesty, the it dimmeth the show of profit. When the Athenians no way were able to withstand the 
Athenians assaulted of the Persians.  assault of the Persians: & were determined, that leaving y● city, & setting their wives, & children in Tro●…, they would take their ships: and defend the liberty of Greece, with 
Cyrsilus.  their navy: one Cyrsilus they stoned to death: who persuaded with them, to keep still the city, and receive ●…res. And he seemed to follow profit: but that was none, where honesty gainstood it. Themistocles, after that victory of the battle, which was holden with the Persians', said in the open assemble: that he had wealfull counsel for the state: but it was not expedient, it should be openly known: he required, that the people should assign some man, to whom he should tell it. Aristides was appointed. He told him, the 
〈◊〉, a notable harbrow for ship pes, with the Lacedæmonians.  navy of the Lacedemonias, which was conveyed to Gytheum, might privily be set a fire: by which act, the Lacedæmonians strength should of necessity be abated. Which thing when Aristides had herd: he come to the open assemble, with their great expectation: and said, it was very profitable counsel, which Themistocles did give, but nothing honest. Therefore the Athenians, the thing, 
The Athenians refused Themistocles counsel, in a general sum 〈◊〉 by Aristides.  that was not honest, did not count profitable at all: and, being advertised by Aristides, they rejected the holle matter, which they had not once herd. Better did they, than we do: who have pirates unponnished, and leagfrendes tributary. Let this therefore stand for a conclusion: 
A conclusion that no unhonest thing is profitable.  that y● thing, which is not honest, is never profitable: no not even then, when ye attain the thing, which you reckon to be profitable. For thesame to think profitable, which is dishonest, a miserable case it is. 
In bargains what is honest, or profitable.   
But oftentimes (as I said before) there so befall cases, when profit seemeth to strive against honesty: that it is to be considered: whether altogether it doth gainstand it, or may be made agree with honesty. Of 
A question, of a cornmerchaunt.  that kind be these questions: If, for example's sake, a good man departing from Alexandria, shall bring to Khodes a great quantity of corn, in the time of scarcity, and famine, and extreem dearth of corn among the Khodians: in case thesame man know, that many merchants be all ready set for the from Alexandria: and saw their ships, freighted with corn, in their course making toward Khodes: whether he ought to declare it to the Khodians, 
buying.  or with silence should sell his 
Selling.  own for as much as he might. We put the case here, of a wise, and good man: touching his deliberation, and taking of advisentent, we question: who would not hide it from the Rhodians, if he thought it dishonest: but he doubteth, whether it be dishonest, or no.  
In such manner cases, ove thing 
A pleasant disputation bitten ween Diogenes, and Antipater.  Diogenes the Fabyloniaan, a great, & grave Stoik, is wont to think: an other thing, Antipater, his scholar, a very sharpwitted man. Antipater holdeth, that all must be opened: 
Antipater's opinion.  that the bier be ignorant of no manner thing, which the seller knoweth: Diogenes saith, the scller 
Diogenes.  ought to tell the faults, as far as is appointed by the civil law: & 
Civil law.  the rest to do without deceits: and sceing he selleth, to desire with the best advantage to sell. ●…ither have I brought it, I have set it forth to sale: I sell mine for no more, than other do: perchance also for less, seeing I have greater store: to whom is the wrong done? There 
Antipater.  groweth a disputation by Antipater, of the contrary side: What go ye about? Sithence ye are dounde to profit 
Law of nature.  men, & to serve the fellowship of 
Common profit.  man: & year born under such a law, that ye should keep those principles ofnature, which ye ought to obey, and always to follow: that your profit should be common profit: again, and as well, common profit should be yours: will you hide from men both what commodity, & what store also is at hand for them? Diogenes peradventure will answer 
Diogenes.  thus: It is not all one thing to hide 
To hide.  from men, and to hold one's peace: 
To hold one's peace.  neither do I now hide it from ye: though I tell ye not, what is y● nature of gods, what is the end of good: which things well known would profit you more, than the cheapness of wheat. But it is not necessari for me to tell, whatsoever is profitable for you to hear. Yes 
Antipate●….  verily, saith he, it is necessary: if so be, you remember the fellowship knit 
Common.  among men by nature. I remember 
Diogenes.  it, sayeth that other: but is this fellowship such, that echeman may have 
Priuat●…  nothing of his own? In case it be so, nothing doubtless is to be sold, but to be given.  
You see, in all this controversy, this is not said: though it be unhonest, yet because it is profitable, I will do it: but that in such wise it is profitable, as it is not dishonest: & of the contrary side, that therefore it is not to be done, because it is dishonest.  
Put the case, a good man sell a 
A question, of selling a house  house, for certain discommodities, which he knoweth, & other know not: set case it be contagious, and is taken for wholesome: be it so, it be unknown, that in all the chambers do appear venomous creeping beasts: and that it is evilltimberd, and ready to fall: but this none knoweth, but the owner: I demand, if the seller open not this to the buyers: & sells the house for much more, than he thought, he should have done: whether he doth justly, or unhonestly? He verily doth dishonestly, saith Antipater. For what other 
Antipater.  thing is it, than not to show the wanderer his way, (which at Athenes was forbidden, upon pain of common curses) if this be not it? to suffer the buyer to rush suddenly, & run headlong by error into a great deceit? Yea it is more, than not to show a man the way. For it is wittingl●… to lead one out of the way into a false belief.  
Diogenes replieth again: did he 
Diogenes.  compel ye to buy, who not once moved ye to it●… He set to sale, that liked him not: you bought, that liked ye. If they, who offer to sell a good farm, and well builded, as they set it out, be not thought to have deceived: although it be neither good, nor wellbuilded: much less than they, who have not praised their house. For where the buyers eye is his chapman, there what deceit can there be of the seller? and if every saying is not to be performed: think ye that meet to be performed, that was not said? But what is more foolish, than the seller to tell the faults of the thing, which he put●…es to sale? And whatso fond a hearing is there: as if, at the owner's commandment, the crier thus should make a noyes●… I have a contagious house to sell.  
Thus therefore, in some doubtful cases, of the one part is honesti●… defended: of the other part, there is speaking of profit: that it is not only honest to do, but also dishonest not to do it, that seemeth profitable. This is the dissension, which seemeth often to befall between profitable things, & honest: which points are to be discussed. For we have not set them for the to make questions, but to open them.  
Methink then, neither that same Rhodian cornmerchaunt, nor this 
〈◊〉 opinion, touching these questions.  houseseller ought to have hidden the foresaid things from the buyers. For whatsoever you keep in silence, you do not fully so much, 
One thing it is, to hide, & an other, to keep silence.  as it is to hide: but when, for your profits sake, ye would have those ignorant of that, you know, whom it stands upon to know it. Now this kind of hiding of what nature it is, and what manner of man's, who seeth not? Doubtless it is a part not of a plain, not of a simple, not of a gentlemanly, not of a just, not of a good man: but rather of a suttlewitted, close, wily, deceitful, guileful, crafty, foxlike, and a very dubbler. These so many, and other more names of vices to enter into, is it not unprofitable? If they be dispraisworthie, 
Shame, to hide a thing, that is: more ●…ame, to lie in a thing, that is not.  who have held their peace: what is to be thought of those, who have used a vainness of talk?  
Caius Canius, of the equestrial order in Rome, a man not unpleasant, 
A merry tale, how a greek 〈◊〉 a Roman.  and well-enough learned, when he had got him to Syracusai, even for pleasure, and not for business 
C. Canius.  (as he was wont to tell) he bruited, that he would buy some place of pleasure: whither he might bid his friends: and where he might delight himself without troublers. Which when it was spread abroad: one Pythius, who kept a bank of 
Pythius.  exchange at Syracusai, said: that he had in deed a pleasant plat, howbeit not to sell: yet Canius, if it pleased him, might use it as his own: & therewith bade him to supper, against the next day. When he had promised: then Pythius like a banker, who was well in favour with all degrees, called unto him certain fishermen: and required them, that the next day they would fish before his ground: and told them, what he would have them do. Canius camme at his time to supper. Sumptuouslie the cheer was prepared. A number of fissherbotes were before their eyes. Each man, for his part, brought, that he had taken. The fish was powered down at Pythius feet. Then quoth Canius, I pray ye Pythius, what is this: that there is so great store of fish, so goodly a sort of botes? What marvel? quoth he again: for whatsoever fish there is about Syracusai, it is in this place: here is the watering place: this ground these citizens can not well spare. Canius kindled with a desire to it, was earnest with Pythius, that he would sell it him. He made it strange, at the first. What need many words? He obtaineth it: the man being in love with it, and rich, bought it for so much, as Pythius would ask: & bought it furnished: he putteth in sureties: & makes up the bargain. Canius, the next day, desired his acquaintance thither, and came himself bitimes: he saw never a boat: he inquired of his next neighbour, whether it were not some holiday with the fishermen, because he saw none of them. None, that I know, quoth he: but here none of them are wont to fissh: and therefore yester day I marveled, what ●…haunce was befallne. Canius began to chafe: but what could he do? For as yet Aquilius, my officefelowe, & familiar, had not setforth the cases, that should be counted covine. 
Aquilius definuion of covin.  In the which same, when I demanded of him, what was Covine: he answered, when one thing is pretended, and an other done. This doubtless was very plainly answered, as of a man skilful in defining. Therefore both Pythius, and all, that do one thing, and pretend an other, be false, wicked, and guileful. No deed then of theirs can be profitable, when it is with so many faults bespotted. If Aquilius definition be truc: out of all man's life must false pretending, and dissembling 
False pret●….  be banished. So every 
D●…mulatiō.  good man shall neither falsely pretend, nor dissemble, that he may buy, or sell the better. And this covin also was ponnishable by the 
Covine ponnishable.  laws: as deceitful guardianship, in the twelve tables: and crafty beegyling youngmen of their goods, by the law Plectorian: and without law, by judgements, where the bill is put in, Upon good conscience. But of all other judgements these words be most notable, that be of course in a case of arbitrament of marriage: The better, The juster: and in a 
Terms of law.  case of trust, or confidence: That among honest men there be honest dealing. What then? Either in that, which is, The better, The juster, can there be any point of covin? or when it is said, Among honest men let there be honest dealing: can any thing deceitfully, or gilefully be d●…e? But covin (as saith Aquilius) 
wherein covin standeth.  is contained in feigned pretence, and dissimulation. All lying therefore in making of bargains is utterly to be excluded. Let not the seller set a raiser of the price against the bier: 
Lying in bargaining.  let not the bier set one, that may low the price again for him. If they both come to communication: the●… shall talk but once of the matter. When Quintus Scevola, Publius son, 
scevola's conscience in ●…yeng.  had required: that the price of the ground, whereof he was a cheaper, should once be showed him: & the seller had so done: he said, he valued it moreworthe, and gave him more by. xxv. ninety crowns. There is noman, that can deny, but this was the part of a good man: a wise man's part 
Good. wi●….  they deny it to be: even as if the other should have sold it for less, than he might have gotten. This therefore is the mischief: because they reckon good to be of one sort, and wise, of an other. Whereupon quoth Ennius:  

The wiseman his wit very vain he may call, 
Ennius in Medea.   
If profit he can not himself therewithal.   
It were true indeed: if I agreed with Ennius, what it is to profit. I see, Hecato, the Khodian, 
Hecato, 〈◊〉 scholar, wrote six books of duties.  Panetius scholar, sayeth in those books, which of duties he wrote to Quintus Tubero: that it is a wise man's part, doing nothing against customs, laws, and ordinances: to have a respect to his substance. For we covet not only 
Increasing of private goods.  for ourselves to be rich: but for our children, our kinsfolk, our friends, and specially for the commonweal. For the substance, and wealth of every sear man is the richesses of a city. scevola's doing, whereof I spoke a little before, can in no wise like Hecato: for Scevola utterly denieth, that he will do aught, for his own gaynesake, that is not lawful. To this man neither great praise, neither thank is to be given. But whether both false pretending, and also dissembling be covine, or no: few matters there be, wherein this covin hath not a do: & 
covin.  whether he be a good man, who 
Good.  profits whom he may, and hurts nobody: full well a just man, but 
just.  not lightly a good man we shall find. It is never profitable then to 
Profitable.  do evil, because it is evermore dishonest: and because it is always honest to be a good man, it is always 
Honest.  profitable.  
And surely touching the title of 
Selling of land.  land, it is ordained with us by civil law: that in selling of it, the faults also should be told, which were known to the seller. For whereas by the twelve tables it was sufficiently provided: that those things should be performed, which were declared in word: which whoso would deny, should forfette double damages: there was also, by the judges of the law, a pain set for concealment. For whatsoever fault 
Concealment  were in the land: if the seller knew it, except expressly he had declared it: they decreed, that it ought to be made good. As when in the tower the 
The Augurs. Cl. Centimalus, commanded to pull down certain houses.  Augurs were about their prophesying by fouleflight: & had commanded Titus Claudius Centimalus, who had houses in mount Celie, to pull those down, whose height should let their prophesying: Claudiusdid set them to sale, & sold the island: Publius Calphurnius Lanarius bought it. He was commanded the veriesame by the Augurs. And so, when Calphurnius had pulled them down: & 
Calphu●…us drove Claudius to arbitrament, for concealment.  understood, that Claudius' had set the houses to sale, after he had been commanded of the Augurs to pull them down: he drove him to arbitrament: 
Cato.  For all, that he ought in that case, to recompense him, of good conscience. Marcus Cato, this our Cato's father, made the award. For as other are named from their fathers: so this, who begat such a star, is to be named from his son. He therefore, as 
In Claudius' concealment was condemned for deceit.  judge, gave sentence thus: that seeing he knew the thing, at the putting of it to sale, and did not declare it: he ought to tender the bier his damages. 
Cato's judgement.  He therefore judged, it stood with good conscience: that the fault, which the seller knew, should be known to the bier. That and if he gave a true judgement: neither well did the cornemerchaunt afore, neither well did this contagious houseseller in holding his peace. But such manner of concealments can not all be comprehended in the civil law: but such as may, be perfectly contained. Marcus 
How Marius sold Ser●…us a house.  Marius Gratidianus, our kinsman, had sold to Caius Sergius Orata that house, which he had bought of him a few years before. This house did a certain service to Sergius: but Marius had not declared thesame in the livery of seisin. The matter was brought to the law. Crassus' pleaded for Orata, Antonius for Gratidianus. Crassus' stood upon the letter of ●…he l●…we: ●…ause the 
The ●…etter of the law.  seller, knowing the discommodity, had not told it: that it ought to be made good: Antonius enforced the equity of the law: because 
The equity of the law.  that discommodity was not unknown to Sergius, who had sold thesame house, that it was nothing needful to be declared: and that he was not deceived, who understood, of what title it was, that he had bought. To what purpose tends all this? That ye may perceive, that covin liked not our ancestors. 
covin.  But one way the laws condemn covine, an other way the philosophers: 
Laws.  the laws, as far as by 
Philo●…ophie.  open deed they can gather upon matters: the philosophers, as far as by reason, and understanding they can comprehend. Reason therefore re●…uireth this: that nothing subtly, nothing feignedly, nothing deceitfully be done. Is it then any deceit, to pitch the toil, although you go not about to rous●…, nor chase the game? For the very game lights upon it oftentimes, when nobody follows them. So when you offer your house to sale: you set up your bill, as a net: you sell the house, because of the faults: some body haps upon it, unware of them: though I see, this through corruption of use neithr by custom is couted dishonest, neitherby ordinance, or civil law decreed: yet by the law of nature it is forbidden. For there 
The fellowship of men.  is a fellowship of men amongst men (which thing although it hath been oftentimes spoken of, yet oftener it must be spoken) which in deed very largely extendeth: and a nearer there is of those, who be of one nation: and a nigher, of them, who be of one city. Therefore our ancestors 
The law of nations.  would needs have the law of nations to be one thing, & the civil 
The civil law  law an other. For what so is the civil law, the same is not consequently the law of nations: but whatso is the law of nations, thesame must needs be the civil law, But we keep no sound, and express form of very law, and 
justice.  mere justice: we use the shadow, and images thereof: yea and even those same I would, we did follow. For they be taken out of the best principles of nature, and patterns of troth. For how precious be those words?  
That not by you, or your promise, I be snared, or 
Forms o●… law drawn out of divine, and natura●… reason.  deceived. How golden words be those? That among good men good dealing aught to be, and without de●…uing.  
But who be good men, and what is good dealing, it is a great question. 
O. Sevola.  Quintus Scevola, the chief bishop, said, there was great substance of matter in all those arbitrementes, in which there should be treating according to good conscience: and the name of good conscience he judged to reach very far: and that it had ado in gardeinshippes, commepanies, matters of trust, commandments, things bought, sold, hired, and let out: by which, the fellowship of man's life is upholden: in these things, he said, it was the office of a great judge to determine, what echeman should do to an other: specially seeing the judgements in most men be contrary one to another. Wherefore covin must be utterly avoided: & the wiliness, which will 
wylin●…e.  needs have itself seem to be prudence: but it is tarr from it, & differs very much. For prudence is placed in that choice of good, & evil: wiliness, if all things be evil, which be dishonest, pferreth evil before good. And not only in matters of land: the civil law, that hath his original of nature, doth ponnishe wiliness, & covin: but also in the sale of slaves & niefs, all covin of the sellers is forbidden. For he, that should have known of their helthfulness, of their fugitiveness, of their thevishness, doth make satisfaction by the Aediles decree. Otherwise is the case of inheritors. Whereof is done to understand: because 
Nature.  nature is that fountain of law, that 
Law.  this is according to nature: that no●… go about by an others ignorance, to make his own gain. Nor any greater destruction of mamns life can be found, than of a wiliness, falsely 
False sainig.  to dissemble one's understanding. Whereof those innumerable inconveniences do grow, that profitable things seem to fight which honest. For how many will be found: who being sure to be free from ponnishment, & knowledge of all men, can refrain from doing wrong? Let us make a proof (if it please ye) in those examples, wherein the common sort of men perhaps do not think, they do amiss. For it falleth not in this place to speak of murderers, poisoners, willforgers, thieves, & robbers of the common treasury: who not with words, & reasonings of philosophers, but with chains, & prisomment are to be punished. But these things let us consider: which they do, who be counted good. Certain men 
A counte●… will.  brought out of Greece to Rome a counterfeit will of Lucius Minutius Basilius, a very rich man: and to the intent they might the easilier prove it: they did put in as heirs with them, Marcus Crassus, and 
Crassus, and Hortensius.  Nuintus Hortensius, men of most power in thesame city. Who when they suspected it to be forged, and were not guilty of any fault in their own conscience: they refused not the pretty reward of an others falsehood. What say we then? Is this enough, that they seem not to have done any fault? To me truly it seems not so: although the one I 
He loved Hortensius, in his life: he forgives Cras ●…us, after his deat●….  loved being alive, the other I hate not being dead. But when ●…asilius would have had Marcus Satirius, his sister's son, to bear his name: & had made him his heir: I mean 
Fowl gapers for others inheritances.  him, who was protector of the country of Picene, & Sabine (O shameful stain, in those days) it was not reason, that the rulers of the city had the goods, and nothing but the name descended to Satirius. 
To fence of injury.  For if he, that doth not fence of injury, and keep it away from his, when he may, doth unjustly: as in my first book I have disputed: what manner a man is he to be counted: who not only doth not fence of, but also 
Inheritance.  furthereth an injury? And true inheritance also seems to me not honest if it be purchased by wily flattering duties: & not by truth, but by false feigning. But in such cases, one thing is wont sometime to seem profitable, an other, honest. Yet untrue it so seemeth: for alike is the rule of profit, as 
Profit.  of honesty. Who foreseeth not this: 
Honesty.  no guile, no mischief shall fail in him. For thus imagining, This in deed is honest, but this is profitable: he will take upon him by error to sunder things coupled together by nature: which is y● wellspring of all deceits, wicke●… deeds, & mischiefs. Therefore 
A good man.  if a good man have such power: that if he do but beck with his finger, his name may creep into the testament of the rich: let him not use this power: no not though he know for certainty, that no man at all will once mistrust it. But if ye should give this power to Marcus Crassus: 
M. Crassus.  that with a beck of his finger, he might be put in as heir, being no heir indeed: he would (believe me) leap for joy in the open street. But a just man, and he, whom we count a good man, will catch nothing from anieman, to cast it upon himself. Whoso hath wonder at this: he confesseth himself not to know, who is a good man. But if a man will unfold the secret knowledge of his mind: by & by he may ●…nfourm himself: that he is a good man, who 
A good man.  doth good to whom he may: and hurteth nobody, but provoked by injury. How then? doth not he hurt another, who works (as it were) which a certain poison: that the true heirs he may displace, and make himself succeed in their room? May he not then do that, will some say, which is profitable, & which is available? Nay let him know: that nothing 
Nothing profitable which is unjust.  neither availeth, nor is profitable, which is unjust. This whoso hath not learned, can not be a good 
Fimbria, Consul.  man. I herd of my father, when I was a boy: that Fimbria, sometime 
〈◊〉. Luctatius Pythias.  Consul, was judge to Marcus Luctatius Pythias, one of the equestrial order of Rome, in deed honest: when he had put in sureties to answer the action, if he were not found a good man: that therefore Fimbria said unto him, he would never give judgement of the case: lest he should either rob a tried man of his good name, if he had judged against him: or else should seem to have determined, that there is some good man: whereas that thing consisted in duties, & commendations innumerable. To this good man then, whom also 
Socrates.  Fimbria, & not only Socrates had conceived: can no way ought appear to be profitable, that is not honest. Therefore such a man will not be so bold to do, no nor purpose an●… 
dread.  thing, which he dare not aver. Is 
●…ent.  it not a shame for Philosophers to doubt in these things, whereof the closones of the coūri●… do make no doubt at all? From whom is sprung the proverb, which now is well worn by continuance. For when they praise any man's conscience, & goodness: they say, he is such a man, as ye may play with him blyndfolde.  
What other meaning hath y●, but 
Nothing expedi●…. which is not commely.  this? that nothing is expedient, which is not comely: although you may obtain it, without any man's r●…aūce. Do ye not see than by this proverb: that neither the same Gyges', can be borne with, nor this other, whom 〈◊〉 I feigned which the wagging of his finger to be able to turn to himself all men's inheritance? For as the thing, which is dishonest, although it ●…e closely kept, can no wai●… yet be made honest: so the thing, which is not honest, can not be brought to pass to be profitable, even nature being against it, & withstanding it. But yet where veri great 〈◊〉, there is occasion of evil doing. When 
Marius, to attain to the Consulship, did against his dut●….  Caius Marius was far of from hope of the Consulship: & seven years after his Praetorship, lay still: nor seemed as one, that ever would labour for the Consulship: to the people of Rome he accused Quintus Metellus, a noble man, and citizen, whose ambassador he was: when he was sent to Rome fronhim, being his captain: how that he prolonged the wars: & said, if they had made him Consul: he would in a short space have brought Jugurtha, either quick, or dead, into the subjection of the people of Rome. And so in deed he was made Consul: but he swerved from all trust, and justice: who by faisse accusation brought in an envy a very good, & gr●…ue citizen: whose ambassador he was, & from whom he was sent. No nor our ●…atidianus truly did 
●…tidian reproved, who ●…red to himself alone the 〈◊〉, that was nolesse due to the officers his fellows.  then the duty of a good man, when he was Praetor: & the Tribunes of the people had ●…alled unto them the company of the Praetors: that theridamas might be set●… a standard of the coin by a common consent. For in those duies the money was made so to fall, and rise: that noman could know, what he had. They penned a decree by a common agreement upon a pain, and condemnation: and appointed, that they all together, at after noon, would go down into Rostra. And then all the rest went echeman his way: Marius from the Senators bench got him straight to Rostra: and alone proclaimed that, which by a common consent was made: and that thing, if ye desire to know, was to him a great honour: in all the streets, images were made him: and to thefame offered was incense, and lights of war. What need mame words? Noman was there ever more beloved of the multitude.  
These be the things, which trouble men oftentimes, in taking of advisement: when the thing, wherein equity is broken, is not counted so great: but that, which is gotten by such dealing, seemeth ●…aruailous great. As to Marius it seem●… not so dishonest, to get away the ●…oples favour from his ●…lowes, 〈◊〉 Tribunes, but to be made Consul for that doing, which then he had set before his eye, it seemed very profitable. 
A rule.  But one rule there is of all, which I would feign have you thoroughly to know: either the thing, 
Look, the sho●…e of profit be not dishonest. & that no di●…honest thing seem profitable.  which seemeth profitable, let it not be dishonest: or if it be dishonest, let it not seem profitable. What shall we then save? May we either take this Marius, or that other, for a good man? ●…end, and strain your understanding, to see what shape, form, and image of a good man is in it. Doth it then commonly befall in a good man to lie for his profit, to●… accuse, to prevent, or deceive? Of a surety nothing less. Is there 
To deceive.  then any thing so precious, or any gain so much to be desired: that ye should therefore lose the glory, and name of a good man? What is there so much, that this profit (as they call it) is able to bring us, as it may pull from us: in case it take away the name of a good man, & spoil us of troth: & justice? For what difference is there? whether one shapeturn himself from a man to a beast, or under the 
Man.  ●…ourme of man, bears in him the brutish cruelness of beast? What of them, 
Beast.  who set at nought all good & honest things, so they may attain to power? do they not, even as he did: who 
Pompeius' ●…oyned in alliance with 〈◊〉.  would needs have him to his father in law: by whose bold enterprises he might bear a swe●…? For to him it seemed profitable to be of much power, by a others enuic: but he saw not how unjust, how unprofitable, how unhonest it was for his country. But as for his father in law, he had 
C. ●…ulius 〈◊〉 dei●…ed much to reher●…e these verses of Euripides.  always in his mouth Euripides greek verses of the Phenissians: which I will express, as well as I can: perchance which out their grace, but yet so as the meanig may be concei●…ed. If breach of laws, a man shall undertake: He must them boldly break, for kingdom's sake: In each thing else, look you regard the right. heinous was y ● ●…teocles, or rather Euri●…ides: who excepted only this, which was most detestable. Why do we then gather these 〈◊〉 cases, as concerning inheritance, merchandise, and deceitful sale? Nay behold him, that sought to be King over the people of Rome, and all nations: and brought it to pass. This kind of ●…esire whoso counteth honest, he is not well in his wit: for he alloweth the overthrow of law, and liberty: and the cruel, and detestable oppression of them he reckons a glorious matter.  
With what kind of chiding then, or rating rather may I attempt to turn him from so great an error: who confesseth, it is not honest to reign as king in that city, which both hath been, and aught to be free: and yet accounts it profitable for him, that can bring it to pass?  
For, O ye gods immortal, can the most shameful, and cruel mnrder of a man's own country be profitable? yea though he, that hath imbrued himself in such blood, be cleped of y● oppressed subjects parent of the commonweal? Profit therefore 
Profit.  is to be directed by honesty: & 
Honesty.  y● so, as these two words may seem to differ in themselves in terms, and yet to sound all one in meaning.  
Now to the opinion of the common people. What greater profit can there be, than to reign, and to rule? C●…trariwise I find nothing more unprofitable for him, who 〈◊〉 hath attained it: when I apply reason to the troth. For can grieves, cares, daily, and nightly ●…eares, & a life full of snares, and dangers be profitable to any man?  

About the seeking of the crown 
Empire.   
many evil, and faithless be: 
Verses of Accius.   
But few good men, in such a case,  
a man shall lightly see.   
quoth Accius. But to which crown? 
Tantalus,  Thesame, that from Tantalus, & 
Pelops.  Pelops descending, was by just title possessed. For how many more, think 
C. Cesar.  ye, were untrue, & untrusty to that king: who with an army of Roman people oppressed the people of Rome: and forced that city to be subject to him: which was not only free of itself, but also a ruler of othernations? What blotts of conscience, suppose you, had he in his heart? what wounds of remorse? But whose life can be aught worth to himsel●…: when y● state of his life is such, that whoso takes it from him, shall be in most favour, & fame? In case these things he not profitable, which specially seem so to be: because they be full o●… shame & reproach: we ought now to be fully 
Nothing profi●…able, which is not honest.  persuaded, that nothing is profitable, which is not honest. Notwithstanding the same, both at divers other times, & namely in the wars with Pyrrhus, was so adjudged by Caius Fabritius in his second Consulship, 
●…ow Fabri●…ius, & the Se. nate scent the traitor home again to Pyrrhus: who for a reward offered to poison his king.  & also by our Senate. For when king Pyrrhus unprovoked had moved war agaist the people of Rome: & the fight was all about empire with the noble, & puissant prince: a runaway traitor went from him to Fabritius camp: & promised, that, if Fabritius would offer him a good reward: as he came privily, so he would return 〈◊〉 to Pyrrhus' pavilion: & dispatch him with poison. Fabritius caused him to be carried back again to Pyrrhus: & that deed of his was well commended of the Senate. But if we seek the show, & respect of profit: true it is, this one runneawaye might have made an end●… of the great war, & that grievous enemy of the empire: but it had been a great shame, & fowl deed, to have had him subdued not by prowess, but by trecheri: with whom y● fight was all for glory. Whether then was it more profitable 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Fabritius, who was such a one in our city, as 〈◊〉 was at Athen●…s: or for our Senate: who 
Profit not to be severed f●…om honour.  never 〈◊〉 profit from honour: to war agaī●…t their enemy with arms, or wi●…h poison? If empire be to be sought, for cause of glory: let treachery 
No glory is in treachery. Riches coming with 〈◊〉 can not be profitable, The unprofitable adui●…e of L. Philipp.  ●…e eschewed, wherein can be no glory: again, if riches be sought any manner way: they can not be profitable, if they come with infan●…ie. Therefore that advise of Lucius Philippus, Quintus son, was not profitable: that those cities, which Lucius Sylla, for a certain sum of money, had discharged of tributes, by decree of the Senate, should again be tributary: & yet we should not res●…ore them the money, which for their beeig free they had disbursed. The Senate-house agreed all with him. A 〈◊〉 it was to the government. For of Pirates better is the promise, than of the Senate. ●…ea but the tributes (they will say) were 〈◊〉 augmented: there fore it was profitable. How long will they be bold to call any thing profitable, that is not honest? Can hatred, & infamy be profitable to any●… state: that should be upholden with glory, and good will of their 〈◊〉? I myself oftentimes have disagreed 
Cato overstiffe.  even with my Cato: for overstiffly, methought, he defended the treasury gain, and tributes: and denied all manner alowaunces to the farmers of our customs, and many, to our leagfrendes: whereas toward these we should be beneficial: & so deal with those: as we were wont to do with our citizens, sent to inhabit new townes: & so much the more, because the knitting together of those degrees of men did pertain to the safety of the commonwealth. Curio 
curio's calling on profit  also did evil, in that he said, the Transpadanes matter was just: but yet evermore he cried, Let profit prevail. He should rather have said their matter was not just, because it was not profitable for the commonwealth: than when he said, it was just, he should grant, it was unprofitable.  
Hecatoes' sixth book of duties is full 
Questions out of Hecato  of such questions: Whether it be fit for a good man, in a very great dearth 
In a great dearth, to give over housekeeping.  of corn, to give over housekeeping? He disputes the matter on both ●…ides: but yet at last he thinketh, ●…uite is directed rather after profit, than after humanity.  
He puts the case, if one must needs take loss by sea: whether should he 
To lose a good horse. or a 〈◊〉.  rather bear the loss of a horse much worth, than of a slave little worth. In this case, private profit leads a man one way, & humanity, an other. If a fool in a shipwreck catch hold of a board: shall a wiseman take it 
Shall a wise man drown a fool to save himself?  from him, if he can? He sayeth, no, because it were injurious. What may the owner of the ship do? shall he take his own? No, no more than 
what the owe ner of the ship may do.  he may cast a passenger out of the ship into the sea, because it is his. For until they arrive at the place, whether the ship was hired: the ship is not the owners, but theirs, that sail in it. What if two in a shipwreck light upon one board: and 
wisemen shif thing for th●…ir lives.  they both be wisemen: should either of them pull it to himself? or one give over his hold to the other? Yea, he should give over: but to him, whom it were more expedient to live, either for his own, or the commonweals sake. 
Men alike in wisdome●…  What if these be alike in both? Then there s●…all be no striving b●…twene them: but the one must yield to the other: as the i●…ser doth in lots, or at the Italian p●…ay with the fingers, called Tocco.  
What if the father rob churches? 
whether the son may open his fathers felome, or no?  or undermine the walls of the treasury? should the son open it to the magistrates? That were surely a ●…ur sed deed: yea rather he should 〈◊〉 his father, if he were accused thereof. Is not our country then above all duties? Yes truly: but it is profitable for one's country, to have the inhabiters reverence their parents.  
What if ones father will go about 
whether the ●…onne may conceal the father's treason, or no?  to usurp, as a tyrant, or to betray his country: shall the son conceal it? Nay he shall desire his father, not to do it: if he nothing prevail, he shall blame him, & threaten him also. And last of all, if the matter tend to the distraction of his country: he shall prefer the safety of ●…is country before the safety of his father.  
He puts a question also: if a wiseman 
Counterfeit money.  unwares received counterfeit money in stead of good: after he perceives it, whether he should pay it ●…ute again for good money, if he were indebted to any●… body? Diogenes saith, he may: Antipater den●…es it, to whom I rather agree.  
He, that wittingly selleth wine, that will not last: whether ought he to 
●…ine, that will not last.  declare it? or no●… Diogenes thinks, it is not need full: Antipater reckons it the duty of a good man.  
These be (as ye would say) the cases, 
more cases in 〈◊〉.  in controversy, in the stoics matters of law. Whether, in selling a 
Selling of a bondman.  bondman, his faults are to be told, or no? I mean not those, which unless you declare, the bondman may be turned home again by the civil law: but these, that he is a liar, a dicer, a pyker, a drunkard: some think meet to be told, some other, not so. If one selling gold, supposeth he sells but copper: should a good man 
Selling pure gold, in ste●…e of copper.  of duty tell him, that it is gold? or may he buy for a penny, that is worth a thousand? It is already very plain, both what I think: and what the controversy is among the philosophers, whom I named. Whether 
Of covenants, & 〈◊〉.  are covenants, and promises always to be kept: which be (as the praetors use to speak) made neither by compulsion, nor by covin. If one minister to an other a medicine for the dropsy: & binds the patient 
A medicine ministered upon condi●…ion, the patient shall use it no more.  by covenant, that he shall never after use the same medicine: in case he be made holle by that medicine: & within a few years after, do fall into the same disease: & can not obtain of him, with whom he made the co●…enaūt, that he may 〈◊〉 i●… likewise again: what is to ●…e 〈◊〉: seeing he is so 〈◊〉, & w●…ll n●…t grant him to use it: and yet he should take no harm thereby? 〈◊〉 ●…●…ust have regard to his 〈◊〉 li●…e an●… health. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ●… 〈◊〉 be required of one, who ma●…es 〈◊〉 his heir: where 
thing.  tw●… millions, & five hundred 〈◊〉 crowns be left him by 〈◊〉: that, before he have the possession of it, he 〈◊〉 openly, on the daytime, in the mar●…et: and he promiseth, so to do, b●…cause otherwise the man 〈◊〉 not put him i●…, as his heir: should he 〈◊〉 th●…n, ●…hat he promi●…ed? or 〈◊〉 I would 〈◊〉 he had made no such 〈◊〉: a●…d that, I think, had bee●… a 〈◊〉 of gravity: but 〈◊〉 he promised it, if he count it dishonest to dance in the market: he shall with the more honesty go from his word, if he take nothing of the inheritance: except 〈◊〉- peradventure he will bestow the same money upon the commonwealth, in some time of great necessity: that it may be no shame for him cven to dance, when he shall procure the wealth of his country. No nor those promises are to be kept: 
Certain promi●…es not to be kept.  which be not profitable 〈◊〉 for them, to whom you made them. Titan (that we may return to ●…ables) said 
Of Sol, and Phaethon, his son.  to Phaethon, his son: he would do, whatsoever he would desire. He desired to be taken up into his father's charet: the mad fool was hoisted up: and on the side, where he stood, with a flash of lightning he fell all on a fire. How much better had it been, his father's promise had not been in this performed?  
What shall we say to the promise, 
Of Theseus, & Neptunus.  that Theseus required of Neptunus? to whom when Neptunus had granted three bones: Theseus asked the death of Hippolytus, his son: when his father had him in a selousie for his steppmother: which boon being obtained, Theseus fell into very great lamentation. What of Agamemnon? When he had vowed 
Of Agamemnon, who offered up his daughter in sacri●…ice.  to Diana the fairest creature, that should be borne that year in his kingdom: he offered up in sacrifice his daughter, Iphigenia: who was the fairest creature, borne the year. The promise rather should not have been kept, than so heinous a deed should be committed. Wherefore promises also, many times, are not to be performed.  
Nor at all times, things laid to 
Things laid to keep.  keep are to be restored. As if one, well in his wit, shall leave a sword with ye to keep: and ask it again, when he is mad: it were a sin to restore it, and duty, to keep it.  
What if one, who hath left money with you to keep, would make war against your country? shall ye restore, that was laid ye to keep? No, as I suppose: for ye shall do against the commonwealth, which ought to be most dear unto you. So, many things, which by nature seem to be honest, by change of times, become dishonest. To perform promises, to stand to covenants, to restore that is laid ye to keep, when it otherwise behoveth: it becometh dishonest. And of these, which seem to be cases of profit, contrary to justice, under pretence of wisdom: I think it sufficiently declared.  
But for as much as, in our first book, we have drawn all duties, out of four fountains of honesty: we shall continue still in the same: when we teach, what enemies of virtue those things be: which seem to be profitable, and are not so in deed.  
And thus of wisdom, whom wiliness would resemble: and likewise of justice, which is always profitable, we have discoursed.  
The other two parts of honesty remain: whereof the one is seen in the greatness, and worthiness of an excellent courage: the other, 
Manliness.  in the framing, and measuring of staidness, and temperance. 
Temperance.  It seemed profitable to Ulysses (as 
Comparing of profit with manliness Ulysses.  some tragical poets have set it out: for in Homer, the best author, there is no such suspicion of Ulysses) but the tragedies do lay it as a reproach to him: that, by counterfeiting madness, he would have scaped going a warfare. It was no honest devise. Yet profitable it was (as some peradventure will say) to rule, and to live quietly at Ithaca, with his parents, with his wife, & with his son. Think you any honour, got in daily dangers, & travails, 
〈◊〉.  is to be compared with this 
Quietness.  quietness of life? I verily judge it meet to be despised, and rejected: because whatso is not honest, I count it in no wise to be profitable. For what, think you, Ulysses should have herd, if he had continued still in his counterfeiting? who, having done great feats in war, yet herd these words of Ajax.  

For all the conscience of that oth●… 
Ajax.   
be passed not a fly,  
which he himself procured firs●…:  
●…e 〈◊〉, as well as I,  
He could put on a feigned face,  
and far, as he were mad:  
And not to go with them, he wrought  
with all the wiles he had.  
His sly boldness but that Palamede  
by deep policy did spy:  
The sacred law of solemn oath  
the freke would still deny.   
For him nodoute it was better to fight not only with his enemies, but also with the waves of the sea, as he did: than to shrink from them of Greece, who had concluded together to make war upon the Tro●…anes. But let us leave of both fables, and foreign examples: & come we to troth, and deeds.  
When Marcus Attilius Regulus, 
Marcus Regulus.  being second time Consul, was taken by a train in Africa: Xantippus the Lacedemoniam being the guide: and Amilcar, Hannibal's father, the general: he was sent to the Senate upon his oath: that except certain gentlemen taken prisoners were restored to them Penes, he should himself return to Carthage. When he was come to Rome, he saw well the show of profit: but, as the matter proveth, he judged it very vain: which was but on this sort: to tarry still in his country: to be at home with his wife, and children: to keep his degree of Consular estate: and to take the misery, which he had felt in war, to be common to warrefaring fortune. Who can deny these things to be profitable? What think you? Greatness of courage, and manliness saith nay to it. Look ye for more substantial authorities? For of these virtues it is the pr●…pertie, to be afeard of nothing, to despise all worldly vanities, to think nothing unsufferable that to man may befall. Therefore what did he? He come into the Senate: declared that he had in commandment: refused to give his sentence: and said, he was no Senator, as long as he was bound by oath ministered by his enemies. Yea and this moreover he said (O foolish man, will some say, and against his own profit) that it was not expedient to have the captives restored. For he alleged, they were young, and good captains: whereas he was worn, and spent with age. Whose authority when it had prevailed: the captives were kept still: he himself returned to Carthage: and neither love of his country, nor of his kinsfolk stayed him. Yet was it not unknown to him, that he returned to a very cruel enemy, and to extreme torments: but he thought his oath meet to be performed. Wherefore, even at that time, when he was put to death with continual waking: he was in better state: than if he had remained an aged captive, and a persured Senator at home.  
But fond, will some say, 
Folse objected against 〈◊〉.  he did: who not only judged it unmeet, that the captives should be restored, but also dissuaded it. How, I pray ye, did he fondly? 
〈◊〉 defended.  Did he so, seeing he availed the commonwealth? May y● be profitable for any citiezen, which is unprofitable to y● state? Men dowrest those foundations which nature layeth: when they s●…uer profit from honesty. For we all covet profit, and to it be carried, nor by any means otherwise can we do. For who is he, that fleeith profit? or who rather is there, that followeth not thesame most diligently? But because nowhere we can find things profitable, but in praise, seemlynesse, and honesty: therefore we esteem those, as chief, and highest: and the commendation of profit we count not so honourable, as necessary. 
Touching an oath ●…ondrie 〈◊〉.   
What is there then in an oath? will some say. 
〈◊〉 first.   
Are we afeard, jupiter will be angry? Nay, this is common among all philosophers: not only those, who hold, that God himself hath nothing to do, & nothing appoints to an other body: but the also, who will needs have God always doing, and meddling with somewhat: that God is never angry, nor ever hurteth any creature.  
What greater harm could jupiter have done, being offended, than Regulus did to himself?. There was then no respect of religion, that might overturn so great a profit.  
What? should he have done dishonestly? First, of evils the lest were to be chosen. Shall then this dishonesty have in it so much discommodity, as had that torment?  
Moreover this saying, that is in 〈◊〉,  

Hast thou thy faithed promise broke?  
My faith I neither gave, nor give  
To any faithless, while I live.   
though of a wi●…ked king it be said, yet is it 〈◊〉 said.  
Hereunto they add: that as we say, some things seem profitable, which are not so in deed: that they in like manner say, some things seem honest, which are not so in deed: as for example, this same seemeth honest, that he did return to torment, for the saving of his othe●… but it becamme dishonest: because that, which had been wrought by the violence of his enemies, should not have been by him confirmed.  
They lay also to this: that whatso is very profitable, the same groweth likewise to be honest, although it seemed not so at first.  
These things commonly be alleged against Regulus. But let us consider the first.  
Jupiter was not to be feared, lest he should hurt him in his anger: because 
Answer to the first objection.  neither to be angry, nor to do harm he is accustomed. This reason surely maketh no more against Regulus, than against all kind of oaths. But in an othemaking, not what the fear, but what the virtue of it is, aught to be considered, 
An oath.  For an oath is a religious assuring of any thing. And whatso assuredly you have promised, as taking god to witness: it ought to be observed. For y● oath now respects not the wrath of the gods, which is none at all: but justice, and faithfulness. For notably said Ennius.  

O heavenly Faith, tie to thy wings  
the oath of jove also.   
Whoso then staineth his othe●… he staineth Lady Faith: whom, as it appears in Cato's oration, our ancestors would needs have to stand in our capitol, next unto that great, and mighty jove.  
Yea but Jupiter, being displeased, could not have done more harm to Regulus, than Regulus did to himself.  
That is true: if there were nothing evil, but to feel pain. But the philosophers, 
Pain.  that be of the greatest authority, do affirm: that it not only is not the uttermost evil, but also no evil at all. For whom, I pray ye, do not refuse to take Regulus, as no mean witness, but (I believe) the gravest of al. For what more substatial witness do we look for, than a peer of the commonweal: who, for the continuing of his duty, did willingly enter into torments?  
For whereas they say, of evils the least are to be chosen: meaning it is better dishonestly, than miserably to live: is there any greater evil, than dishonesty? Which if in the 
Dishonesty.  deformity of the body it breedeth some offence: how much must needs that corruption, and filth of a defiled mind appear? Therefore they 
Stoics.  who more pithily debate these matters, are bold to call that the only evil, which is dishonest: and they, who dispute them not so earnestly, do not 
〈◊〉  stick to call the same the utterest evil. As for that saying,  

My faith I neither gave, nor given  
To any faithless, while I live.   
it is therefore well brought in of the Poet: because when Atreus part should go in hand, it was meet, the speech should serve for his person. But if hereof they take themselves a rule, that it is no promise, which is made to a promesbreaker: let them 
Promise.  take heed, there be not sought a starting hole for perjury. The law of 
A gap open for perjury.  arms, and the promise of an oath is many times to be kept with our enemy. For whatso in such sort is 
Promise to be kept with ●…ust enemies, not with pirates, and thieves.  sworn, that the mind of the swearer conceiveth, it is necessary to be done: the same is to be observed: whatso falleth otherwise: the same if one do not, it is no periuri●…. As if you bring not the sum of money, that ye promised rovers for your life: there is no deceiving in it: no, though, being sworn thereto, ye do it not. For a pirate is not counted in the number of enemies to one's country, but a common enemy to all men. With luch a one neither promise, neither oath ought alike, as with us to be kept. For, to swear an untruth, is not to forswear: but not to perform 
〈◊〉.  that, which according to the meaning of your heart ye have sworn, as by our custom is expressed in a certain form of words: surely it is perjury. For featly said Euripides:  
In word I swore, but heart ●…nsworne I bore.  
But it was not fit for Regulus with perjury to disturb the conditions, and covenants with his enemies, and of war. For with a just, and lawful enemy the thing was done: toward whom both all the feciall law, and divers other laws be in common. Which if it were not so: the Senate would never have delivered to their enemies, noble men being prisoners. But yet 
The Romans ho●… subdued by the Samnttes, at 〈◊〉.  Titus Ueturius, and Spurius Posthumius, the second time, they were Consuls: because when they had not fought it well at Caudium: & our legions being subdued, they had made a peace with the Samnites: they were delivered unto them: for without commission of the people, & the Senate, they had done it. And at the same time, Titus Numitius, and Quintus Emilius, who were then that Tribunes of the people, because the peace was made by their authority: were delivered also: that the peace with the Samnites might be refused. And Posthumius self, who was delivered, was the persuader, and cavier of thesame delivery. Which likewise Caius Mancinus did, many years after: who, that he might be delivered to the Numantines, with whom without authority of the Senate he had concluded a league: persuaded that particular law: which Lucius Furius, & Sertus Attilius made by the decree of the Senate: and when it was received, he was delivered to the enemies. This man dealt more honestly, than Quintus Pompeius: by whose intercession, when he was in y● same case it was brought to pass, that the law was not received. With him, the thing which seemed profit, prevailed more 〈◊〉 honesty. With the other aforesaid, the false show of profit was suppressed by the authority of honesty. But that, which was done by violence, needed not to have been confirmed. As who should say, violence could be done to a manly man. Why then did he go to the Senate: namely seeing he was purposed to dissuade them from the delivery of the captives? That in him was most commendable, the same ye disallow. For he stood not to his own judgement: but took the matter in hand, that it might be the judgement of the Senate: whereunto if he had not been a counsellor, the captives no doubt had been restored to the Cartaginers. So had Regu●…us remained safe in his country. Which thing because he took it not to be profitable for his country: therefore he thought it honesty for him, to be of that mind, and so to suffer. For where they say, that it, which is very profitable, doth become honest: nay they should say, it is in deed, and not becomes honest. 
Honesty.  For there is nothing profitable, which same is not honest: and not because 
Profit.  it is profitable, it is honest: but b●…cause it is honest, therefore it is profitable. Wherefore of many marvelous examples, a man shall not lightly tell either a more commendable, or a more goodly ex●…mple, than this. But in ●…ll this praise of Regulus, this one thing is worthy of admiration: that he thought it best, the prisoners should be kept still. For in y● he returned, I think it no wonder at all: because in those days, he could not do otherwise. Therefore that commendation is not the man's, but the times. For our annceters were of this mind: that there is no straighter bond to bind a man's promise, than an oath. 
The virtue of an oath in ●…ide time.  The laws in the twelve tables declare that: our holy orders declare the same: and our leagues declare nolesse, whereby bound is the promise made even with the enemy: the enteries, and ponnishmentes of the Censors declare as much: who about no matter more heedfully gave judgement, than about keeping of oaths. Marcus Pomponius, Tribune of the people, did summmon Lucius Manlius, Aulus son, when he was Dictator, to appear 
Manlius' 〈◊〉 by Pompo●…us.  at a day: because he had taken upon him the occupying of his Dictatorship, a few days longer, than he should: and accused him also, that he had driven his son Titus, who afterward was called Torquatus, 
How Titus 〈◊〉 ꝰ Torquatus did for his father being in trouble.  from commepanie of m●…n: and had commanded him to dwell in the country. Which when the youngman, his son, once herd of, that his father was brought in trouble: it is said, he ran to Rome: & by break of day, came to Pomponius house. To whom when it was told: because h●… thought, that he being offended would bring some matter unto him against his father: he arose out of his bed: and all hearers being voided out of the place, he commanded, the youngman should come to him. But he, as soon as he entered, by & by drew his sword: and swore, he would kill him out of hand: except he made an oath unto him, that he would discharge his father. Pomponius, 〈◊〉 with this terror, made an oath so: he opened that matter to the people●… he informed them, why it was necessary for him to let fall the action. He discharged Manlius. So gracatiy was an oath had in regard, at those days. And this Titus Manlius is 
what manner man Titus 〈◊〉 proved.  he, who got his surname, at the river of Anien, of a chain, that he pulled from a Frencheman: whom he slew, being begged by him: in whose third Consulship, the Latins at Ueseris were discomefited, and put to flight. A very noble man doubtless: and one, who not long afore being loving toward his father, becamme sour, & severe aghast his son. But as Kegulus is to be commended, in 
He 〈◊〉 we his son with the axe. for breaking law of arms.  keeping his oath: so those ten, whom Annibal, after the Cannensian fight, sent to the Senate, upon their oath, that they should return into that 
Ten messengers from An nibal to the Senate.  camp, whereof the Carthaginers were then in possession: except they obtained his request, for the ransoming of certain prisoners: are to be dispraised, if they did not return. Touching whom, all men writ not after one sort. For Polybius, a special good author, writeth: that of y● ●…enne chosen gentlemen, who then were sent, nine returned: when y● matter could not be obtained of the Senate: & that one of the ten, who a little after, he was gone out of the camp, returned back, as though he had forgotten somewhat: remained still at Rome. For by his return to the camp, he took himself to b●…e discharged of his oath: but y● was not true. For guile confirmeth, & not dischargeth perjury, It was then a foolish craftiness, that did peevishly counterfeit wisdom. Therefore the Senate made a decree: that thesame subtle & wily fox should be carried pynniond unto Annibal. But this is a marvelous matter: Annibal had i hold eight thousand of our men: whom he took not in battle, nor as fleeing away for fear of death: but they were left behind in the camp, by Paulus, & Uarro, the Co●…suls. The Senate did not think it good to ransom them: whereas they might have done it, for a little money: that it might sink into our soldiers hearts, either to win the victory, or manfully to die. Which thing when it was ●…knowne, the said Polybius writes, that Annibals heart was daunted therewith: because the Senate, & people of Rome, even in chances of adversity, were of so lofty a courage. Thus the things, which seem profitable, be overweighed by comparison of honesty. But that same Acilius, who wrote the story in greek, saith: there were more, which returned to y● camp, under thesame guile: that they might be discharged of their oath: & that they were noted by the Censors with all manner of infamy.  
Here an end of this parcel. For it is evident, that such things, as be 
Conc●…usion of the comparison of profit with 〈◊〉.  done with a fearful, servile, dastardly, & weak heart: as the doing of Regulus had been: if either he had thought, concerning the prisoners, that he saw expedient for himself, & not for the commonweal, or else would have tarried still at home: be not profitable: because they be reproachful, ●…ile, and dishonest.  
The fourth part is now behind: 
Comparing of profit with temperance.  which consisteth in seemliness, measurekeping, sobermode, staidness, and temperance. May then any thing be profitable, that is contrary to such an assemble of virtues? But the 〈◊〉, & Annicerians, 
〈◊〉.  who had their name of philosophers 
〈◊〉.  from Aristippus, placed all 〈◊〉 
〈◊〉.  in pleasure: & therefore they judged virtue to be commendable, because it was a causer of pleasure. And when 
Pleasure.  these were worn out of estimation: then flourished Epicurus, a furderer, 
Epicurus.  & an author well-nigh of the same opinion. Against them must we strive with tooth, & nail (as they say) if 
Reasoning against Epicureans: who placed feliciti●… in voluptuou●…nesse, contrary to temperance.  we mean to defend, & preserve honesty. For if not only profit, but also all happy life consisteth in the good complexion of the body: & in a sure trust to thesame complexion: as by Metrodorus it is written: doubtless this manner profit, yea and the very chief (for so do they hold) will strive with honesty. For first of all, where shall there be a place appointed for wisdom? What? mean they, that on every side she should seek after delicacies? How miserable a service were it for virtue, to be a waiter upon pleasure? But what should be the office of wisdom? Skilfully 
wisdom.  to choose out pleasures? Admit, there be nothing pleasant, than so to do: what can there be imagined more dishonest?  
Now with him, who sayeth, that pain is the utterest evil, what place 
Manliness.  shall manliness have: which cares not for any pains, or travails, that be offered? For although Epicurus speaks in many places, touching pain (as he doth in this) stoutelye enough: nevertheless it is not to be regarded, what he saith: but what is meet for him to say: who hath pointed out the limits of good things to be in pleasure, & of evil things, in pain: as, if I should hear 
T●…peraunce.  him speak of staidness, and temperance. He talks in deed in many places many things: but he is myered by the way, as they say. For how can he praise temperance, the sets the sovereign good in pleasure? For temperance is enemy to lust: & lust is a waiting servant to pleasure. And yet in these three kinds, not without subtlety, they fall to their shifts. Theibring in wisdom, 
The Epicures wisdom.  as a science ministering pleasures, & voiding pains. They set us out also 
The Epicures 〈◊〉.  manliness, after a certain sort: when they teach a way to despise death, and endure pain. They also fetch 
The Epicures temperance.  in temperance, which much ado doutless, but yet as well as they may. For they hold, that the greatness of pleasure ariseth by putting of all pain. 
justice by the Epicures is 〈◊〉.  justice staggereth with them, or rather lieth under foot: and all those virtues, the show themselves in the common knot, and fellowship of men. For there can be neither goodness, neither liberality, nor 〈◊〉, no more than friendship may: if they be not sought after, for themselves: but be referred to pleasure, or to profit. Let us then drive our matter into few words. For as we have taught, that theridamas is no profit, which is contrary to honesty: so we say, all voluptuousness is contrary to 〈◊〉. And so much the more I take Callipho, and Dinomachus worthy to be reproved: who thought, they should end the controversy: if they made a joining 
Uoluptuousnesse contrary to honesty  of voluptuousness with honesty, 〈◊〉 of beast with man. Honestieadmitts not this knot, but doth abhor, & reject it. Nor truly the end of good, & evil, which ought to be after one sort, may be mingled, and tempered with things disagreeable. But hereof hitherto: for it is a weighty matter, & in an other place discoursed more at large. Now to the purpose.  
After what sort then the matter is to be resolved, if at any time profit in appearance doth strive with honesty: it is before sufficiently debated. But if voluptuousness also be counted to have a show of profit: it can have no fellowship with honesty. For be it so, we somewhat esteem pleasure: some sauce perhaps it shall have in it, but surely no profit at all.  
You have from your father a present, 
The conclusion, and 〈◊〉 of his work, with an 〈◊〉 to his son.  son Mark, in my opinion verily muchworth: but it shall be even so, as ye take it. Notwithstanding these three books are, as strangers, to be entertained of you, among Cratippus notes. But as ye should once have herd me also, if I had come to Athenes: which had been done in deed: but that my country called me back with open mouth, in the midst of my journey: so seeing in these volumes my voice is conveyed unto you ye shall bestow as much time upon them, as you may: and so much you may, as you will. But when I shall understand, that you take pleasure in this 〈◊〉 of knowledge: then I both present there shortly, as I trust, and in your absence, absent will speak with you. Far you well therefore, my Cicero: & assure yourself, that you are to me doubtless right dear: and yet far dearer shall be: if in such books, and lessons, you will set your delight.  
The end of Tully's books of duties.   

The Table.  

A.  
Academians school. 116. b.  
Accius' verses, 142. a.  
Accusation. 82 a.  
〈◊〉. 74. b.  
Admiration for despising of money. 77. b.  
Admiration for 〈◊〉. 81. b  
Admiration for justice. 77. a.  
Admiration for 〈◊〉. 77. a.  
Admiration for staidness. 77. a.  
Advise. 〈◊〉 a.  
〈◊〉 doing. 63. a.  
Affection toward 〈◊〉. 19 b.  
Affections, which rulers ought to resist. 33. b.  
Africanus. 30. b.  
Africanus praised for a refraining hand. 104. a.  
Africanus saying. 35. b.  
Against Cesar 71. a.  
〈◊〉, who offered up his daughter. 146. b.  
〈◊〉. 105. b.  
agreeableness. 56. b.  
Atax. 44. b. 14. 7 b.  
Alexander over ireful, his father of more humanity 35. b.  
Alexander the 〈◊〉. 72. a  
Ambition. 10. b. 34. a.  
〈◊〉. 156, a  
Amity. 126. a.  
Anger. 34. b. 35. a. 54. a  
angriness. 35. a.  
〈◊〉, 108. b.  
Apollo's 〈◊〉, that Sparta's fall should come by 〈◊〉. 104. b.  
Apparel. 51. b.  
Appetite. 52. a.  
Appetite and reason in the mind. 40. a.  
Appetites how to be framed. 40. a  
Appetites outrageous. 40. a  
applying talk to the matter. 53. a,  
Appointing upon the kind of life. 46. a.  
〈◊〉 definition of covin. 132. a.  
Aratus the Sycionian, a right good commonwealth man. 106. a.  
Areopage. 30. a.  
〈◊〉 of Athenes 〈◊〉 this surname, Just. 115. a  
Aristippus. 3. a 156. a.  
Aristotcles. 2. b.  
Aristotle's judgement of sumptuousness. 85. b.  
〈◊〉. 35. b.  
Artes. 68 a.  
Arts, none can 〈◊〉 judge of, but the craftelmaster, etc. 115. a.  
Assailing of aucntures. 32. b.  
Athenians. 30. a  
Athenians assaulted of the Persians. 127. a.  
Athenians 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 counsel. etc. 127. b  
Attikes. 41. a.  
Augurs. 134. a.   

B.  
Baines. 51. a.  
Bargulus. 78. a.  
Beast. 5. b. 141. a.  
Bellieseruers. 59 a.  
Benefits. 75. a.  
Benefits upon the common weal. 102. a.  
Blockishness. 50. b.  
Bond of man's fellowship. 119. b  
Bragging. 79. a.  
Brawls 54. a.  
Bribes. 103. b.  
Brands of pains. 77. a.  
Brutishness. 25. a.  
Brutus did well enough in expulsing Collatinus 124. b.  
Building. 54. b. 59 b.  
buying. 128. a.   

C.  
Caius Canius. 131. a.  
Caius Claudius. 86. a.  
Caius' Gracch a large 〈◊〉. 102. b.  
Caius Cesar. 11. a. 52. b. 82. a. 89. b. 〈◊〉. a. 142. a.  
Caius Julius Cesar 〈◊〉 to rehearse certain verses of Euripides. 141. a.  
Caius Lelius. 78. a.  
C. Marius. 30. a.  
Caius Pontius. 103. b.  
Callicratidas. 33. a.  
Calphurmus drove Claudius to arbitrement for concealment. 134. a.  
Care. 55. b.  
Care of other men's matters. 12. a.  
Carneades. 3. a.  
Cato. 134. a.  
Cato and Lelius surnamed the wise. 115. a.  
Cato of Utica. 44. a.  
Cato overstiffe. 143. b.  
Cato's judgement. 134. b.  
Cato's short and feat sayings. 41. a.  
Cato told, what is the most profitable thing in nusbandrie. 19 a.  
Catuli, the father, and the son. 52. b.  
Catulus uncle. 52. b.  
Cause of manliness. 31. a.  
Causes moving men's good Wills. 70. b.  
Causes of good will, and fear. 71. a.  
Causes of obedience. 71. a.  
Causes why some break duty in not 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. 11. a.  
Cesar. 11. a. 52. b. 72. b. 89. b. 107. a.  
〈◊〉 crueller than Sylla. 73. a.  
Cellar noted for a tyrant 44. b  
Caesar's monarchy. 64. b.  
〈◊〉 side. 80. a.  
Change of life. 47. b.  
changeable course in talk 53. a.  
Chivalry. 80. a.  
〈◊〉. 53. b.  
Children. 23. b.  
〈◊〉 in requiting. 20. a.  
crysippus' feat comparison. 〈◊〉 a  
Cicero Consul. 107. b.  
Cicero's accusation of Ver res 82. a.  
Cicero's Edileship. 〈◊〉. a.  
Cicero's Oration at. 27. years of age. etc. 83. a.  
Cicero's son. 80. a.  
Cicero's 〈◊〉 compared with Scipios. 110. a.  
Cimon. 89. a.  
Circumstances. 56. b.  
Citiematers above 〈◊〉 seats. 29. b.  
Cities. 69. a. 103. a.  
Citizen. 49. a. 58. b.  
citizens. 22. a.  
Civil law had in prlce with ancient rulers. 89. b.  
Civil manners. 58. a  
Claudius Centimalus commanded to pull down certain houses. 134 a.  
cleanliness. 51. b.  
Cleombrotus. 33 a.  
Cleomenes a 〈◊〉. 13. b.  
clearness 60. b.  
Cn. Octavius. 54. b.  
Cn. Pompeius. 30. b.  
Cn. Pompeius triumphed thrice. etc. 31. a.  
Colour. 51. b.  
Commelie for 〈◊〉. 49. a.  
Comely for old men. 48. b  
Comely manliness. 37. b  
Comelienesse. 37. a. 55. b.  
Commelinesse according to age. 48. a.  
Comelienesse according to each man's nature. 43. b.  
Comelienesse a waiter upon honesty. 37. a.  
Comelienesse coming by fortune 45. b.  
Comelienesse defined. 38. a.  
Comeliness divided. 〈◊〉. a.  
Comlienesse general. 38. a. 42, a.  
Commelienesse in all honesty. 37. b.  
Comelien●…sse in motions of the mind. 51. b.  
Comelieness in speech. 52. a.  
Comelienesse in 3. points 49. b.  
Comeliness natural. 38. b  
Comeliness of justice. 37. b.  
Comeliness of temperance. 37. b  
Comeliness of wisdom. 37 b  
Comeliness particular. 38. a.  
Comeliness poetical. 38. b.  
Commelienesse taken of set purpose. 45. b.  
Commendation of his matter. 2. b.  
Common. 129. a.  
Common dangers. 32. b.  
Common fellowship. 9 b. 62. a. 118. a.  
Common felows●…ip to be preferred before knowledge. 60. a.  
Common judgement of men. 61. a  
Common people. 〈◊〉. a.  
Common profit. 128. b.  
Common safety. 118. a.  
Common talk. 52. a.  
Common things. 21. a.  
Common thing●…s to b●…astes and men. 5. a.  
Common weal. 125. b.  
Common weals government. 68 a.  
Comparison of honest things. 60. a.  
Conceiving of matters. 62. a  
Concealment. 134. a.  
Concealment in Claudius condemned for deceit. 134. b.  
Concord. 105. a.  
Conscience in keeping oth●… of warfare. 15. a.  
Conspiracy. 126. a.  
Contemplation's end. 61. a  
Contempt of casual things. 26. b.  
Contempt of outward things. 26. b.  
〈◊〉. 104. b.  
Cost, in wh●…t things better 〈◊〉 87. a.  
Costlin●…sse. 55. a.  
Cotta Curio. 87. a.  
covenants, and promise●…. 145. a.  
Covetise. 84. b.  
Covetise of money. 27. a.  
Covetousness. 10. a. 103. b  
Covetousness a very foul vice. 104. b.  
covin. 133. b. 135. a.  
Covine ponnishable. 1●…2. a.  
covin wherein it standeth 132. b.  
Counsel. 48. b. 89. a.  
Counsel of fr●…ndes. 36. a.  
Countenance. 57 b.  
Counterfeit money. 144. b.  
Counterfeit will. 137. a.  
Countrymen. 22. a.  
Countries. 103 a.  
Courage 31. b.  
Craftiness. 42. b.  
Crassns & Hor●…ensius. 137. a  
Crassus and Scevola Consuls. 1●…7. a.  
Crassus' in his youth got great fame by accusing C. Carbo. 81. a.  
Crassus' cration. 88 b  
Crassus the rich. 10. b. 86. a  
Cre●…it. 74. b.  
Credit how to be gotten. 75. b.  
Cruelness of men one against an other. 6●…. b.  
Cruelty of A●…kemans to Eginetes. 126. b  
curio's calling on profit. 143. b  
Customs 6●…. a.  
Cynikes. 〈◊〉. a  
Cyrenaikes. 156. a  
Cyrsilus. 127. a   

D.  
Damon and Pythias, a notable couple of fr●…ndes. 126. a.  
Dangers. 32. b  
Dangers common, and pri●…ate. 32. b  
Dangers of life, glory, favour. 32. b  
to Deceive. 140. b  
Decii. the father, and the son. 115. a  
Deed. 139. a.  
Deeds must be like tunes 57 a.  
Defense. 83. a. 83. a  
Degrees compared. 23. b.  
Degrees of duties longing to justice. 63. b  
Degrees in order altered with persons & times. 23. b  
Dainty life. 44. b  
daintiness. 50. b  
Delectation. 53. b.  
Delectation shameful in a shameful matter. 122. b  
Demetrius. 72 b.  
Demetrius Phalerens. 2. a  
Demetrius Phalereus discommended Pericles. 87. b.  
Deny not. nor grant your friend every thing. 125. b.  
Desire of rule. 27. b.  
Desire of sovereignty. 25. b.  
despair. 29. b.  
Despisement. 76. b.  
Dicearchus' book of the death of men. 68 b.  
Difference of Natures. 42. b  
Dyonisius the tyrant among the Syracusians. 72. a  
Discern men by their virtue not be their fortune. 10●…. d.  
discontinuance of Eloquence. 100 a  
Discord. 34. a.  
Disconuenience. 57 a.  
Discretion. 56. a.  
Disdain. 35. b  
Dishonest●…e. 122. a. 151. a.  
Disputation between Diogenes, & Antipater. 128. b  
Dissension. 34. b.  
Dissimulation. 132. a  
Doing. 60. b  
Doing of great enterprises. 26. b  
Doing of injury. 118. b.  
Doings. 40. b.  
Dry mocks. 42. b  
Duty defined. 4. a  
Durie divided. 4. a.  
Duty divided an other way 4. a.  
Dutiefull demeanour. 7. a.  
Dutiful doing. 46. a.  
Duty in study of knoweledges. 8. a  
Duties. 2. b  
Duties in the end of wars. 14. b.  
Du●…ies in wars holden for honour, or life. 16. a  
Du●…ies of i●…stice. 9 a  
Duties of justice, and manlienesse. 7. b.  
Duties out of comeliness. 39 b.  
Duties of manlienesse. 26. b  
Duty to be 〈◊〉. 3. b   

E.  
Earnestness●…. 42. b.  
Aediles office. 80. a.  
Equal law. 49. a.  
Egina an 〈◊〉. etc. 126. b.  
Eloquence. 62. a. ●…1. a.  
Eloquence, a grace most commendable. 89. b.  
Of Eloquence. 2. kinds. 1. a  
Empire. 142. a.  
Increasing of private goods. 1●…3. a  
Endeavour. 48. b.  
Enemies gently named hos●…es. 15. b.  
Ennias. 10. b 21. a. 33. b. 88 &  
Ennius in Medea. 133. a.  
Ennius' verses. 16. a.  
Epicureans. 115. b.  
Epicurus. 3. a. 156. a.  
Epicutus confuted. etc. 156. a  
Epicurus manlineile. 157. a  
Epicurus temperance. 157. a.  
Epicurus wisdom. 157. a.  
Equity. 107. a.  
Equity of law to be leaned unto. 13. b.  
Equity of the law. 135. a  
Error of ra●…h judgement. ●…. a  
Estate. 100 b  
〈◊〉 of glory above common weal. 33. a.  
〈◊〉 for honesty. 75. a  
〈◊〉 of life. 44. a.  
Euerstirring loule. 64. a.  
Exacting of tribu●…es to be avoided. 103. a.  
Example of Greeks. 29. b.  
Example of himself. 1. a  
Example of Regulos. 16. b.  
Example of the 〈◊〉 Romans. 15. a  
Example of the Romans equi●…ie. 17. a.  
Examples. 24. a. 55. a.  
Examples of Romans. 30. a  
Excellence of man's nature. 41. b.  
Exceptions in duties perteinig to 〈◊〉. 12. b  
Exceptions in fear or love. 74. a.  
Exceptions in liberality. 18. a  
〈◊〉. ●…1. b.  
〈◊〉 of mind. 48. b.  
Exhortation to his son. 66. b. 111. b.  
〈◊〉 nothing is, which is not come●…y. 139. a.  
〈◊〉. 18. b. 84. b.   

F.  
〈◊〉 a despiser of gold 115. a.  
Fabritius and the senate s●…t back the trairour to Pyr thus. 142. b.  
Faming. 79. a.  
Fairness. 51. a.  
Fair ●…peeche. 44. b.  
Faith. 1●…0. b.  
●…aithfulnesse. 9 b. 107. a.  
〈◊〉 accusation 34. a.  
〈◊〉 〈◊〉. 136. b.  
False 〈◊〉. 1, 2 a.  
False semblant 17. b.  
〈◊〉 in ●…alke. 73. a.  
〈◊〉. 23. b.  
far 〈◊〉 to compass matters. 43. a.  
〈◊〉 to be 〈◊〉. 8. a.  
〈◊〉 1●… a.  
Favour. how it is 〈◊〉 e by ●…malier 〈◊〉. 100 a.  
Fear. 10. a. 71. b.  
Fear 〈◊〉 to 〈◊〉. 〈◊〉. b.  
〈◊〉 law of 〈◊〉 battle. 15. a.  
Feed to live, not live to feed. 42. a.  
Felows●…ip. ●…8 b.  
Fellowship of life. 20. b.  
Felo●…ship of md. 126. a. 135. b  
〈◊〉 fi●…st degree. 20. b  
fellowships 〈◊〉 degrees. 21. b.  
Fensing of murie. 13●…. b.  
Few take the best way. 47. a  
Filthienesse. 50. a  
〈◊〉 Consul. 138. b  
Flatterers. 36. a  
fleeing of peril. 32. b  
followers of ancestors. 45. b  
Following the multitude. 46. b  
Following parents. 46. b.  
foolhardiness. 25. b.  
Foolelarge. 18. b. 84. b  
For a commonwealth how farforth we must do. 126. b  
Force. 14. a. 17. b  
Forms of law drawn out of divine, and natural reason. 136. a  
Fortune's stroke. 69. b  
friends. 23. b  
Friendship. 74. b  
Friendship among good men 22. b  
Frowardness. 35. a  
Furniture. 49. b. 54. a   

G.  
Gaininges. 59 a  
Gap open for perturie. 151. b  
General rule in liberality. 20. b  
General rule in promisekeping. 17. a  
Gentleness. 88 b  
Gentle speech. 81. a. b  
Gesture. 50. b. 51. a  
Getting goodwill. 75. a  
Giving over housekeeping in dearth. 143. b  
Gifts giving. 84. ●…  
Gifts of nature. 5. a  
Gile. 17. b  
Glory. 26. a  
Glory there is none in 〈◊〉. 143. a  
God. 66. b  
Going. 51. b  
Going to death. 44. a  
Golden precept. 123. a  
Good. 114. a. 133. a. b  
Good heart. 75. a  
Good knowledge. 8. a  
Good man. 138. a  
Good out of evil. 111. a  
Good to be set before rich. 101. b  
Good turns done of one to an other. 23. a  
Good will. 74. b. 80. b  
Governments refusing in the commonweal. 28. a  
Gracchi, lost by landstrifes. 105. b  
Gratidian reproved. etc. 139. b  
Gravity 40. b. 42. b. 54. a. 81. ●…  
Great courage. 81. a. 118. a  
Great things. 76 b  
Greeks. 42. b  
Grounds of justice. 5. b  
Gyges, 123. a  
Gyges tale expounded. 123. ●…  
Gytheun, a notable harbrow for ships. etc. 127. b.   

H  
Handicraftsmen. 59 a  
Havens. 67. b  
Health 67. a. 108. b  
Hecato, Panetius scholar, wrote. 6. books of duties. 133. a  
Hercules, for his worthy deeds, was taken for a God. 118. a  
Hercules had a divine gift above nature. 46. b  
to Hide. 129. a  
hirelings. 59 a  
to Hold ones peace. 129. a  
Honest. 4. b. 114. a. 116 b. 133. b  
more Honest. 5. a  
Honesty. 6. b. 113. b. 122. a. 127 a. 137. b. 14. 1. b. 1●…3. a  
Honesty, & profit compared. 4. b  
Honesty, & profit repugnant in seeming, not in deed 121. b  
Honesty for itself, either one lie, or chief to be desired. 121. a  
Honesty like health of body. 38. a  
Honesty only good. 26. b  
Honest, or profitable in bargains. 128. a.  
Honour of the city. 49. a  
Honour ●…eking. 42. b  
Hortensius. 86. a  
Hortensius Cicero loved in his life. etc. 137. b  
Hospitautic. 89. a  
Hostis now taken for an enemy. 15. b  
Hou●…e of a prince. 54. b  
Houses 67. a  
How he will teach. 3. a  
How necessary it is to be taken for just. 77. b  
Hurt●…. 17. b  
Husbandry. 59 b. 67. a  
Hyeway to glory. ●…9. a   

I.  
janus, a place in Rome. etc. 109. b  
Idle philosophers disallowed 11. b  
jesting. 41. a  
kinds of jesting. 41. a  
Imiration of worthy men. ●…0. a  
Impedimenrs of manliness 2●…. b  
Inheritance. 48. a. 137. b  
Inheritance, with condition to do an unsemeiy thing. 145. b  
Injustice. 10. a. 33. b  
Intelligence. 52. a  
Intent. 139. a  
Isocrates. 2. b  
judgement. 125. b  
judgement of the skilful. 57 b  
judicial causes. ●…1. b  
just. 133. b  
justice. 7. a. 39 b. 69. b. 88 b. 100 b. 119. b. 135. b  
justice, a worker of glory, and 〈◊〉. 77. b  
justice civil 14. a.  
justice general. ●…. b  
justice general, above all. 63. a.  
justice in 〈◊〉. 17. b  
justice in war. 14. a  
justice particular. ●…. b  
justice 〈◊〉 by Epicures 157. a.  
justice toward the vanquished. 32. a   

K.  
Kindly love. 80. b.  
Kings. 78. b.  
〈◊〉. 22. a.  
Kin●…folk. 23. b  
Knowledge. 60. b.  
Knowledge of troth. 8. ●…  
Know yourself. 45. a.   

L.  
Labour. 48. b.  
Labour of body. 31. a.  
Lacedæmonians. 30. a. 72. b. 105. b.  
Large gifts with measure & for honest causes. 86. b.  
La●…gegiuers. 84. b.  
Large room 55. a.  
Latin tongue. 1. b.  
〈◊〉. 83. b. 84. b.  
Law and right of man's fellowship. 118. b.  
Law for laying out of lands. 104. b  
Law for pillage. 103. b  
Law of nations. 〈◊〉. b.  
Law of nature. 21. a. 117. b. 119. a. 128. b.  
Laws. 68 a. 78. b. 117. b. 127. a. 136. b.  
laws civil. 21. a. 128. b. 135. b  
Learned m●…n profitable 〈◊〉 after their death. 61. b.  
Learning. 59 b. 68 a.  
Leisure 110 b  
Lesson in all doings. 29. b  
Letter of the law. 135. a.  
Letters of Philippus, Antipater & Antigonus. 81. b  
Liberal. 85. a.  
Liberal endeavour. ●…9. a  
〈◊〉. 9 a. 83. a. 87. b  
〈◊〉 the second part of general justice. 17. b  
Liberty. 28. a.  
Lycurgus. 30. a  
Lying in bargaining. 132. b.  
Lisander. 30. a  
Lisander expulsed. 105. b  
lifeless things. 66. b. 67. a.  
Living agreeab●…ye to nature 114. a.  
Living things. 66. b. 67. b.  
Loss of a good horse or 〈◊〉. 144. a.  
Loveliness. 51. a  
Love of commonweal. 23. a.  
Love of glory. 27. b.  
Love of 〈◊〉. 101. b  
Lucius Crassus. 52. b. 81. a.  
L. Crassus the orator. 87. a  
Lucius Fusius 82. a.  
L. 〈◊〉. 55. b. 86. a  
Lucius Mummius Achaicus 104. a  
Lucius Philippus unprofitable advise. 143. a  
Lucius Philippus, wi●…hout large gif●…s, came to great dignity. 87. a  
L. 〈◊〉 Tribune. etc. 104. a.  
〈◊〉. 82. a  
〈◊〉 schoolmaster to Epaminondas. 61. b   

M.  
Magistrates. 36. b  
Magistrates life. 28. a  
Magistrates ought to avoid passions. etc. 29. a.  
Malice. 35. a  
Making of goods common. 103. a  
Mamercus. 86 a,  
Man. 5. b. 140. b.  
Manners. 19 a. 100 b.  
Manhood without justice, falleth into diverse extremes. 25 a  
Manly courage in citiema: ter 33. b.  
Manly man not vanquished of his own affections. 27. a.  
Manly man's 〈◊〉. 31. b  
Manly must be plain. 25. b  
Manitnesse. 7. a. 24. b. 62. a. 147. a. 156. b.  
〈◊〉 praised. 24. b  
Manitnesse, what it i●…. 25. ●…  
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 his son, for breaking array. 154. b  
〈◊〉 summoned by Pomponius. 154. a  
Man to man doth most hurt or profit. 66. b.  
Marcus' 〈◊〉. 82. a  
Marcus Brutus a sore accuser. 82 b.  
M. Cato. 31. b.  
Marcus Crassus. 138. a.  
M. Luctatius Pythias. 138. a  
Marcus Octavius in large 〈◊〉 measurable. 102. b  
Marcus Regulus. 148. a  
M. Scaurus. 30. a. 54. b. ●…6. a  
Marcus Seius libe●…all to the people. ●…6. b.  
Marius' sold Sergius a hou●…e 134. b  
Marius, ●…o attain the 〈◊〉, did against 〈◊〉, 139. b  
Maisilia a goodly city o●… etc. 73 b  
Mater of talk 53. a  
Mean duties 105. b  
Mea. 〈◊〉. 40. a  
Measure in common liberality. 21. b  
Measure of talk. 53. b.  
Measure the gift, by the givers good heart. 20. a  
Medes 78. b  
Medicine ministered on condition. 145. b  
Men alike in wisdom. 14. 4. a  
Men newly come up. 46. a  
Men of deserts. 58. b  
Merchandise. 59 b. 67. a  
Merry conceits. 42. b  
10. ●…essagers from Annibal to the Senate. 154. b  
〈◊〉 es. 67. a  
M●…te men mus●… serve the commonweaie. 29. a  
Mild manners. 44. b  
〈◊〉 suppressed 〈◊〉 attempts. 86. b  
〈◊〉 of private yfit. 33. b  
M●…rth. 42. b  
Misgoing. 47. b  
〈◊〉. 83. a  
Most part likes not the best things. 26 a  
Motions of body & mind, 39 b  
Musing. 57 a. III. a  
Mutius. 81. a   

N.  
Nature. 43. b. 47. a. 50. b. 136. b  
Nature and fortune. 47. a  
Nature of profit. 66. a  
Nature's gifts. 5. a  
Navigation. 67. a  
〈◊〉. 32. a. 86. b. 116. a  
Negligence. 40. a  
New comers up need great virtues. 80. a  
New tables for releasing of det. 117. a.  
〈◊〉. 79. b  
Noble men must not stain their stock with 〈◊〉 life. 80. a  
Nothing against honesty for your friends sake. 126. b  
Nothing against nature. 48. a   

O.  
Occasion. 56. a  
Occasions of wrongdoing. 10. a  
Occupations and sciences. 59 a  
Office bearing, or refusing. 27. b  
Officers 58. b  
Old age. 58. b  
old manner of requiring the judges favour. 126. a  
One thing to hide, an other to keep silence. 130. b  
Opport unity. 56. a  
Order. 49. b. 56. a  
Offence. 100 b  
〈◊〉 must either be annoyed, or assuaged. 100 b  
o'er 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the people. 86. b  
Oath. 125. b. 150. b  
Oath of warfare. 15. a  
of Oath, sundry objections 149. b  
Others faults. 57 b  
Others life, our glass. 57 b  
Outfinding of duties by choice of things. 4. b  
Owner of a ship, what he may do. 144. a   

P.  
Patience. 48. b  
Paine. 151. a  
Panetius. 35. b. 83. a. 87. a. 104. a. 116. a  
Panetus defended. 108. b. 121. b  
Panetius excused. 121. a  
Panetius how he wrote of duties. 112. b  
Partiality. 18. a. 35. a  
Pastime. 41. b  
Paulus Emylius. 104. a  
Pausanias. 30. a  
Payment of money. 101. a  
Peace always to be sought. 14. b  
Peas the end of war. 14. b  
Pelops. 142. a  
Perfect duty. 105. b  
Pericles. 56. b  
peripatetics. 3. b. 151. b  
Peripatetics make an order of good things. 113. b  
Perjury. 152. a  
Person. 38. b  
Person proper to each man. 42. a  
persons. 45. b  
〈◊〉. 72. b  
Philippus a peoplepleaser. 102. b  
Philippus to Alexander. 83. b  
Philosophers. 58. a  
Philosopher's life. 28. a  
Philosophers minds not tempted so many ways as magistrates. 29. a  
Philosophy. 135. a. 151. b  
Philosophy praised. 64. ●….  
Physic. 59 b  
Place. 56. a  
Placing. 56. a  
Plain dealing. 43. a  
Plainness. 43. a  
Plato. 2. a  
Plato scholcmaister to 〈◊〉. 61. b  
Plato to Architas. 9 b  
Plautus. 41. a  
Players. 45. a. 50. b  
plesantness. 40. b. 42. b. 53. a  
Pleasure. 156. a  
Pleasurefeders. 59 a  
Pleasure of the body. 41. b  
Pleasures, flattering dames, 77. a  
Pompeius. 86. a  
Pompeius side. 80. a  
Poor. 101. a.  
〈◊〉. 51. a  
Possidomus, Panetius scholar. 112. b  
Practice. 8. b  
Precept of d●…tie. 32. b  
Precept of justice. 117. a  
Precepts of purchasing glory. 79. b  
Presumption. 29. b.  
Pride 35. b  
Principles of wisdom. 6. a.  
Private. 129. a  
Private dangers. 32. b.  
Private goods. 108. b  
Private householders. 36. b  
Private man. 49. a  
Private promise to the enemy. 16. b  
Private substance. 36. b  
P●…iuate things 9 a  
Prodigaluie. 85. b  
Profit. 64. a. 86. b. 113. b. 127 a 137. b. 141. b. 153. a  
Profitable. 4. b. 116. b. 133. b  
More profitable. 5. a  
Profitable and unprofitable things divided. 66. b.  
Profitable is nothing, which is ●…s. 138. b. 142. b.  
Profit compared with 〈◊〉. 147. a.  
Profit 〈◊〉 with 〈◊〉. 156.  
Profit from honesty not to be severed. 122. a  
Profiting of other. 48. b  
Profit not to be set before friendship. 125. b.  
Profit not to be severed from honour. 143. a.  
Profit seeming to strive with honesty, what to determine. 116. b  
Promise. 151. b  
Promise breakers punished by the Censor. 16. b  
Promises not to be kept. 146. a.  
Promise to be kept with just enemies. etc. 151. b  
Prosperity. 35 b  
Prudence. 56. b. 60. b 62. b.  
Prudence with 〈◊〉. 75. b  
Prudence without justice is suspected. 76. a  
Publius Lentulus. 86. a  
P Nasica. 30. b  
Publius Rutilius Rufus, Panetius scholar. 113. ●…  
Publius 〈◊〉. 82. a  
〈◊〉 of 〈◊〉 14. a  
Punishment of shame. 122. b  
Pyrthonians. 65. a  
Pyrrhus answer to the  
Romans. 16. a  
Pythius 131. a   

Q.  
¶ Question of a cornemerchaunt. 128. a  
Question of selling a house. 129. b.  
Questions out of Necato. 143. b  
Qu●…stions resolved. 110. b.  
Quiet livers. 36. b  
〈◊〉. 49. d. 147 b  
Quintus 〈◊〉. 30. b  
Quintus Fabiu●… 33. a  
Quintus Fabius Labeo. 13. b  
Quintus 〈◊〉 Scevola. ●…6. a  
Quintus Scevola. 136. a   

R.  
¶ Rashn●…sse. 32. a. 40. a  
Razing of cities. 32. a  
Reason. 5. b. 55. b  
Reason and speech. 20. b  
Rebuking. 54. a  
Refraining hand. 104. b  
〈◊〉 charged with folly. 149. a  
Regulus defended. 149. a  
Relief to the mi●…erable. 87. b.  
Remedy of rash judgement. 8. a  
〈◊〉 somewhat of ones own right. 88 b  
Rendering of thanks. 102. a  
Requitiug a good turn. 19 b  
Retailers. 59 a  
Reverence to elders. 48. a  
rich. 102. a  
Riches coming with infamy not profitable. 143. a  
Right. 78. b  
Right of men's society, to be kept 〈◊〉. 119. a  
Right trade. 46. b.  
rigorousness. 35. a  
Riot. 48. b  
Robbe●…ie. 78. a  
〈◊〉. 42. b  
Rom●…nes host subdued by the 〈◊〉 at Caudium. 152. a  
Romans ●…late. 72. b  
Romans stoutness in the second puni●… war. 127. a  
Romulus did not well in that he slew Remus. 124, b  
Romulus 〈◊〉. 125. a  
Rule. 45. a  
Rule for profit and honesty. 140. b  
3. Rules in men's doings. 55. b  
Rules of glori foryouth. 80. a  
〈◊〉. 81. a   

S.  
¶ Sadness. 43. b  
Sageness 53. a  
Salamis. 29. b.  
Sapience. 60. b  
Scaurus. 30. a. 54. b. 86. a  
〈◊〉. ●…. b  
Sce●…olaes conscience in buying. 132. b  
Scipio Emilianus, who was called Atricanus Minor. 104. a  
Scipios, brethren. 115. a  
Scipios saying, touching leisure, and solitariness. 110. a  
slandering. 53. a  
Sects of philosophers●… 3 a.  
Seeds of lobermoode. 6. b.  
Self 〈◊〉. 54. a  
Selfliking. 120. b  
Self-love. 36. a. 120. b  
Selling. 128. a  
Selling of a bondinan. 145. a  
Selling of land. 133. b  
Selling pure gold in s●…ede of copper. 145. a  
Sense. 5. b  
Seven wisemasters of Grece 115. b  
Shamefastness. 39 b. 48. b  
Shamefas●…ness, nature's scholar. 50. a  
Shame to hide a thing, that is: more shame to lie in a thing, that is not. 131. a  
Show of profit. 122. a  
silanus. 86. a  
Slaves. 17. b  
Sloth. 48. b  
Soberness. 80. b. 81. b  
Society of man, & the parts of his body compared. 117. a  
Socrates. 79. a. 138. b  
Socrates, and Lelius keep ever one countenance. 35. b.  
Socratians. 41. a  
Sol & Phaeton his son. 146. a  
Solitariness. 111. a  
Solon. 30. a  
if the son may conceal the father's treason. 144. b  
if the ●…onne may open his father's felony. 144. b  
Sophocles. ●…6. b  
sparks of manliness. 6. a.  
Speaking. 57 b  
Speech. 14. a. 52. a  
Speculation. 8. b  
Staidness. 48. b. 104. b  
Steadfastness. 40. a. 47. b. 48. b  
Stirs of the mind. 53. ●…  
Stoics. ●…. ●…. 9 b. 147. b.  
stoics appoint one thing only good. 113. b  
Stoics why he chiefly ●…olowes. 116. b  
Stones. 67. a  
Store of necessary things. 103. b  
Stranger. 49. a. 58. b  
Strangers 126. b  
Strength of mind. 31. a  
Students life profitable to the commonweal. 61. b  
Study of both tongues. 1. a.  
Sturdiness. 25. b  
Sum of his. 3. books. 5. a  
Suttlesufferance. 43 a  
sweetness. 52. b  
Sulla's and Caesar's salestaffe. 73. b.  
Sylla the victor's cruelty agains●… the Marians. 73. a.   

T.  
Tale of a Greek that beguiled a Roman. 131. a.  
Talk 82. a  
Talk gentle, not obstinate, pleasant. 53. a  
Tantalus. 142. a  
Temperance. 7. a 37. ●…. 48. b 69. b. 147. a  
Temperance sometime above particular justice 61. b  
Temperance's properties. 7. b.  
The be Alexander's wife. 72. a  
The 〈◊〉. 29. b. 101. b  
The ophrastus. 89. a  
The ophras●…us praiseth 〈◊〉. 85. a  
Theseus & Neptunus. 13. a. 146. a  
thieves laws among themselves. 78. a.  
Things. 50. a  
Things having reason. 66. b  
Things laid to keep. 146. b  
Things pertaining to glori●…. 74. b  
Things void of reason. 66. b  
Thing that seemeth profitable. 124. b  
Tiberius & C. Gracchi both stain forsedition. 79. b  
Tiberius Gracchus. 79. b  
Time borrowed for study. 66. a  
Timochares. 17. a.  
Titus Manlius Torquatus doing for his father in trouble. 154. a  
Titus Manlius, what manner man he proved. 154. b  
Tollfariners. 59 a  
Travail. 83. a. b. 147. b  
Travail for the poor, rather than for the rich. 100 b  
Travail not to be spent in a shameful cause. 102. a  
True virtue is only in perfect wisemen. 114. b  
Tully's Academical disputations. 65. b  
Tully's book called Hortesius now lost. 64. b  
Tully's book of friendship. 74. b.  
Tully's books of a common weal, now lost. 87. b  
Tully's books of glory be lost. 76. b  
Tully's Consulship. 30. b  
Tully's eloquence. 1. b  
Tully's orations. 64. b  
Tully's order in his holle work. 65. b  
Tully's philosophy. 1. b  
Tully's sect, and liberty in writing. 65. a  
Tully's sons bringing up. 112. a  
Tully's sons schoolmaster. III. b  
Tul●…ies sons stock. III. b.  
Two profitable things, whether more profitable, 109. a  
Tyranny. 18. b  
tyrants. 120. b  
tyrants ends. 71. b   

V  
Vain 〈◊〉. 8. a  
Uainglorie. 19 a  
vanquished men. 14. b  
Uehement speech 52. a. 81. a.  
Uenus notable image. etc. 113. a  
by Uer●…ue must men be ●…onne to our use. 69. a  
Virtue of an oath in old time. 153. b.  
virtues. 76. b  
virtues, not vices of elders to be followed. 4. 7. b  
Virtue stands in. 3. points 69. a.  
〈◊〉. 78. a  
U●…sage. 51. b  
U●…ysses. 147. b.  
〈◊〉 for a time suffered eve rye thing. 44. b  
Uncomely haviour of body, etc. 40. b.  
Undertaking of enterprises 29. b.  
Unhonest profit mother of all mischief. 122. b.  
Unhonest thing not profitable. 1●…7. b  
Unlaw●…ull parting of lands 107. a  
Unmesurablenesse. 35. b.  
Unshamefastnesse. 50. a  
Unthankfulness. 88 a  
Uoice. 52. a  
Uoidance of evil affections 27. b  
Uoiding of affections. 27. a  
Uoluptuousnesse contrari●… to honesty. 157. b.  
Use and exercise. 24. a  
Use of 〈◊〉. 67. b.  
Use of riches, 10. a  
U●…urers. 59 a  
Usury 109. b.   

W.  
War. 31. b.  
wastefulness. 84. a  
water. 67. b  
welfavordnesse. 49. b  
what point of philosophy  
he will treat upon. 2. b  
why he gave him●…elf to philosophy. 64. a  
why he seuer●…h virtues, coupled by nature. 76. a  
why he spends his vacant tune in philosophy 110. a.  
Wh●… he writ●…s to his son of philosophy in latin. 1. a  
wiliness. 136. a  
wine that will not last. 145. a  
wisdom. 7. a. b. 48. b. 64. b. 69. a. 1. 6. b  
wisdoms properties. 7. a  
wise. 133. a  
if a wi●…eman may drown a fool to save himself 144. a  
wisemen shifting for their lives. 144. a  
wit. 31. b  
wont. 116. a  
words. 50. a  
works of the mind. 80. b  
worthiness. 87. b  
worthiness of honour. 76. b  
writing. III. b  
wrong doing is against nature. 118. a  
●…. sorts of wrongdoing, whether is the worse. II. a   

X.  
Xenophons' book of ordering a household. 108. b   

Y.  
Yielded men. 14. b  
Youngman's duties. 48. ●…  
Youth. 79. b   
FINIS.   

¶ Imprinted at London in Fletestre●…e within Temple bar, at the sign of the hand & star, by Richard ●…ottel.  
Cum privilegio ad imprimendum solum.