THE FIRST Book of Tully's Offices translated Grammatically, and also according to the propriety of our English Tongue; For the more speedy and certain attaining of the singular Learning contained in the same, to further to a pure Latin style, and to express the mind more easily, both in English & Latin. Done chiefly for the good of Schools; to be used according to the directions in the Admonition to the Reader, and more fully in Ludus lit. or Grammar-Schoole. At LONDON, Printed by H. Lownes, for Thomas Man, dwelling in Pater-noster-rowe, at the Sign of the Talbot. 1616. TO THE RIGHT worshipful Master Doctor Hunton, D. of Physic, and his most reverend and worthily respected friend, I. B. wisheth all true happiness in Christ both now and evermore. COnsidering with myself (right worshipful) to whom I should dedicate this small part of my school endeavours, I could bethink me of none to whom it might be more justly due, then to you; sith I owe unto you even mine own self and all my later travels: for I must needs acknowledge your unfeigned love and tender care for me, to the glory and praise of our blessed God, and to bind myself still more unto his heavenly Majesty, and even unto your own self to testify my thankfulness, all my days. Because, besides all your regard which you have ever had of my health, when as through long affliction by sundry most heavy trials, and by over-toyling both mind and body (in lack of all meet helps and means, to perform that service which I had entered into, and so much desired for the good both of Church and common weal) my life was become most miserable and a burden unto me, by changing the best humours of my body into lumpish melancholy, it pleased him, to make you his principal instrument for my recovery and restoring. Whereby in stead of that heavy dumpishness, by which I was made unfit for my calling, and almost utterly overwhelmed, as you well know; that our holy and most gracious God, to be praised for evermore, hath caused me to find even heaven upon the earth, so that I can again rejoice in all my labours, and especially in my calling: by which, my joy in him, is unto me indeed a continual feast, yea my strength and health, and such a portion, as in regard whereof I can account basely of all earthly things. And secondly, for that love and favour, which you have continually showed to all my poor labours, so encouraging me therein. And moreover also, for that you are able to judge of the hope of this Work, for the perpetual benefit of Schools, by the more speedy and certain attaining both of the singular matter and latin contained in that book of Offices, which I have thus far proceeded in. For the book itself I cannot but admire, according to the high commendations given unto it, by the most learned: who prefer it before all others of this kind, which have been written by the light of nature alone; for that it doth so divinely point out the true pathway to all virtue, and guide unto a right course of life, as if it had received direction from the sacred Scriptures themselves. So that it i●… graced, as a mirror of wisdom, a fortress of justice, the teacher of valour, a school of temperance, the jewel of comeliness, containing in so few leaves, so many excellent instructions, as no other the like. Whence, Erasmus wonders tha●… a heathen man should write so much to heathens; admireth the equity in it, holiness, verity, sincerity, agreement of every part with right nature & amongst themselves, as also the conscience he requireth especially in governors, the amiable beauty of virtue which he setteth before the faces of all. Yea, he thinketh it strange, that he should write so religiously and so like a Divine, of helping and rele●…uing one another, of procuring and maintaining friendship, of the contempt of those vanities which the common sort of Christians do so dote after. And finally judgeth it most worthy and meet for schoolmasters to teach, and scholars to learn; and not only for all young men, but even old men themselves again and again both to use and peruse. Inregard of all which, so many learned men have not disdained to bear it in their bosom, lay it under their pillows, make it their companion, which way soever they have gone. Now what I have done herein, that all who are truly studious of good learning, though children in years, may more easily behold and be more fully partakers of these rich treasures, for which the Learned have had this Work in so high estimation, I refer to all who are truly learned to judge, and chiefly to yourself who are better acquainted with my endeavours in it. For myself, my hope is, that whereas it hath formerly seemed to sundry so obscure, as that they have read with very little fruit or delight, because they have not understood it; that they may now at the first view, livelily behold the true lustre thereof, and receive most sweet content, to cause them ever to delight therein. Which if the Lord shall vouchsafe, as I undoubtedly trust, I shall receive the end of my desires, and be encouraged to proceed to the accomplishing of the rest of it, and ever to be employed for the common good, until I have spent my last breath for the same. In which unfeigned desire, I rest & ever shall Yours in the Lord most beholden, john Brinsley. An Admonition to the loving Reader. Understand, first, the matter contained in each Chapter, by reading over and observing well the inmost column. Then, try so far as need is, for the true construing and resolving thereof out of the Author itself, both for Grammar and phrase; and also to read it into a good english style, by the help of the second column and the margins. And lastly (which is the principal) practice, out of the same (viz. the second column and margins alone) to read daily some part of it, out of the translation into the Latin of the Author, studying it out of the English alone; trying by it, and a little help of the latin book, where need requireth (as I have advised chiefly for Corderius) how near you can come to express Tully livelily for Latin, phrase, composition, and whatsoever elegancy beside. After each sentence, reading the Author, to see how near you came, marking where you failed, with the reason of it. So in a School, causeevery one in a Form, or so many as you would have to practise this together, thus first to construe extempore daily every one a piece out of the Latin books alone, without the English; only one of them by the English to ask and direct, where any one fails. Afterwards, or every other day, let every one read his piece out of the English book alone, none having any Latin book, but only some one to be in the place of the Master, to observe, and where they fail to direct; first, by ask of him who readeth, and then of others, after helping; so posing for sense phrase, latinisme, both out of the Latin, & English, as is directed in the Grammar-schoole. And then, I hope, you will in time seal with me upon experience, what●…oeeuer I have written, concerning the benefit of such Grammatical translations in this behalf. For the worth of the books of Offices themselves, I refer thee to the Epistle Dedicatory. For the slips which thou shalt meet with herein, which I know to be very many (as in all the rest of my labours, chiefly through want of meet helps of books and conference, and also time to peruse in the midst of my continual employments in my Calling, wherein I am still labouring as God vouchsafes mercy, not only for the private, but for thine and the public good, as also thorough my absence from the Press) let me entreat thy courteous advice and direction to the Printer, that he may convey it unto me, as some lovingly have done: future Editions may reform it. So shall I be both more encouraged, and furthered for performing my promise in finishing my intended labour, for the general good; and the blessing thereof shall return into thine own bosom. And thus desiring ever the assistance of thy prayer for me, to his heavenly Majesty whos●… all my travels are, I commend thee to hi●… grace; and rest Thine wherein his goodness shall enable I. B. The letter q, prefixed to words, directs to the Grammar order, in such places wher●… the Grammar order would not stand wel●… with our tongue; the Star *, to variet●… of phrase, the better to express the matter, The first Book of Marcus Tullius Cicero, q [Written or de●…icated] to [his] son Marcus, of Duties. concerning Duties, to Marcus [his] Son. CHAPTER 1. The * sum. Argument [of thi●… first chapter] q [gathered or set down] by D. Erasmus. by Desiderius Erasmus of Roterdame. TVlly] exhorteth * Cicero, his son. his son●…e Cicero by his own example, that he * give not himself wholly unto. addict not himself to any q simple study [or any one kind of ●…earning]. one studi●… alone; but that he q ●…oyne together Greek [studies] with Latin [studies]. join Greek with Latin, & q the virtues of speech. eloquence of speech with the q science or skill. knowledge of Philosophy. * And then. Afterward q science or skill. to the * to the intent that he may make him etc. end to make him * to m●…ke it better. more attentive, he commendeth [unto him] thi●… part of Philosophy, which is concerning Duties; q ch●…fly by two names or commendations layeth open most largely [or most w●…de] to every respect [viz. part or purpose] of life. for two causes especially; either for that the use o●… it, q ch●…fly by two names or commendations layeth open most largely [or most w●…de] to every respect [viz. part or purpose] of life. extendeth itself most largely to every condition of life: or because q this one is comm●…n to ●…ll philosophers amongst themselves. this alone is common to all sorts of Philosophers. Lastly, q he witnesseth himself to follow the Sto●…ks chiefly in this disputa●…ion. he affirmeth, that he chiefly followeth the Stoics in this discourse, because these have q appointed the very b●…st, the end or limit of etc. determined the very best of the end of goodness, q unto which ●… end. whereunto all Duties are referred: whereas Epicurus measuring the chief good by pleasure, and Aristo, Pyrrho and Herillus taking away [all] * election or difference. choice of things, have q overturned also. subverted * the very nature of duty. even the nature of duty. 1 * Albeit ALthough (son Marc.) ●…t q behoveth or is meet for you concerneth you, q hearing. having heard Cratippus now a year, & that at q Athens a famous City & university in Greece. Athens, q to abound or flow. to be throughl●… furnished with * rules and instructions or lessons. precepts & institutions of Philosophy, for that q chief. singular authority both of your * reader Cratippus, viz. your teacher. teacher & also of the City; q of which the one. the one whereof may q increase or furnish you. store you with knowledge, q the other viz. the City may store you with, etc. the other with examples; 2 yet as I myself q have joined together. always Latin to Greek for my profit. have ever for my benefit joined Latin studies with greek q exercise of speaking [eloquently] or practise of pleading. neither have I done that only in Philo sophy, but also in the q exercise of speaking [eloquently] or practise of pleading. practice of oratory; q I think the same to be done of you. so I think you aught to do the same that you may be * equal. alike in the * skill or knowledge. faculty of both kinds of speech: q to which thing indeed. unto which purpose we (as we q do seem or are thought. suppose) have brought great * furtherance. help to our q men. countrymen; that not only [they who are] q rude or unskilful of Greek letters or learning. ignorant of the Greek tongue, but also the learned, may think * that they themselves have gotten something, themselves to have attained somewhat, q both to speak [〈◊〉] and also to judge. both to further their eloquence, & also their judgements. 3 Wherefore you shall learn indeed, of the q prince. chief of the Philosophers of this * time. age: & you shall learn as long as you * please. will; yea & you q shall owe to will or be willing. ought to be willing, ●…o long as it shall not repent you how much you * increase in learning. profit. But yet q you reading reading q our works [or writings.] my books * greatly. not much diss●…ting from the q disagreeing. * Philosophers of Aristotle's ●…ect. P●…ipateticks (because * we both desire. we desire to be both * followers both of Socrates and Plato, who was Aristotle's schoolmaster and Socrates scholar. Socratians and Platonians) q do as you think good. use your own judgement▪ concerning the mat●…ers themselves. (For q I hinder nothing. I do not hinder you) q but you. but surely you shall make [your] Latin q speech. tongue more q full or copious. flowing by reading q our writings. my works. Neither q verily. yet would I have this q to be thought [or deemed] spoken proudly or vauntingly. thought to be spoken arrogantly [of me] for q granting [or giving place] to many the skill of playing the Philosopher. yielding unto many the knowledge of Philosophy, if I * take upon me that. assume that unto myself, which q is the property of an Orator. properly belongeth unto an Orator, [that is] to speak * fitly or properly. aptly, distinctly & q finely. eloquē●…ly, bec●…use I have q consumed. [my] age. spent [my] time in that study, q I seem to challenge it as by mine own right, in some manner. I seem after a sort to challenge it [as] by my own right. 4 * wh●…refore. For which cause (son Cice●…o) q I Exhort you very greatly. I earnestly exhort you, that q studio●…sly or diligen●…ly. you read q my Cicero. carefully not only my orations, but also these books [which I have 〈◊〉] of Philosophy, which q have equalized themselves almost o●… wel-n●…ere unto those. viz. are become so many as the other. have now almost made themselves equal unto those: for there is a greater q power of speech. force of eloquence q in those [orations.] in those, yet this q equal of one ●…ort. even & q temperate or mean, viz. not too lofty nor too base. middle kind of style is also to be * ado●…ned or practised. regarded. And q truly I see that to have happened as y●…t to none of the ●…recians the rather because I do not see, that it hath happened as yet to any of the Grecians, that the same man trauel●…ed q in either kind in both those kinds [of speech] & followed bo●…h q that kind of speaking belonging to the pleading place or the bar. that lawyerlike manner of pleading, and this q quiet. m●…lde kind of q disputing or reasoning. discoursing: except peradventure Demetrius Phalerius may be q had or reckoned. accounted in this nū●…er; [who was indeed] * a sharp disputant. a subtle disputer, q an orator smally [or nothing] vehement. but no great Orator, yet * pleasant. sweet, that you may know [him to have been] * Theophrastus-his scholar. the scholar of Theophrastus. But how much we have profited in both [kind's] q let it be the judgement of others. let others judge: certainly we have followed both. q I truly do judge also Plato to have been able to speak most grau●…ly and most copiously, if he would have ●…ndled [or followed] that lawyer like kind of speaking. And I think verily, that Pla. also (if he would have practised that Lawyerlike kind of pleading) could have spoken most gravely and * with great variety of words. most copiously: and q Demosthenes' t●… have been able to do ●…rimly and glitteringly [or notably]. that Demosthe. could have done elegantly and finely, if he had ●…ept those things which he learned of Plato, and q had been willing to pronounce them. would have pronounced them. q Also I judge after the same manner. So I judge likewise of Aristotle and Isocrates, q both of whom. either of which being delighted with his own * course. study, despised the other. 5 But q when as. whereas I had * decreed or appointed. determined to write somewhat unto you at this time, and many things hereafter, I have q been most willing. desired q to make my entrance from that. to begin with that especially, which was both most q apt. fit for your age, and most q weighty, or of most importance, or most beseeming. grave for authority; q For whereas many things in philosophy both weighty, & profitable, are disputed. For whereas there are many things in philosophy both weighty and profitable, disputed of q accurrately, or very curiously very exactly and * at large. copiously by the Philosophers, those which have been q delivered by them and given in precepts. delivered & prescribed by them concerning Duties, do seem q to lie open [or reach the furthest] to extend most large lie. For no part of [our] life, neither in q common matters. public [affairs] nor * belonging to a man's self, or some few. in private, nor [in matters] * common pleas where matters are pleaded for all sorts, or the judgement Hall. pertaining to the * common pleas where matters are pleaded for all sorts, or the judgement Hall. pleading place, nor in * common pleas where matters are pleaded for all sorts, or the judgement Hall. domestical businesses nor if you do q matters at home aught alone, neither if you q my thing with or by yourself. have dealing with another, may q contract [or make bargain]. be without Duty. Also all honesty of life q is set. doth 〈◊〉 in * practising or exercising it. regarding it, and [all] q filthiness or ●…hame. dishonesty in neglecting it. 3 And indeed this question is common q of. to all the Philosophers. For who is he, that q in no precepts of duty to be given, or being delivered. giving no precepts of Duty, dare name himself a Philosopher? 6 But there are some q disciplines [viz. Sects of Philosophers]. sects, which * overturn. pervert all duty, having determined the q ends [or limits] of good things and evil. bounds of good & evil. For he that so determineth the sovereign good, that it hath nothing q agreeable to con●…oined with virtue, and measureth the same by his own commodities and not by honesty, it cometh to pass, that this man if he * be very like himself. consent unto himself, and be q not overcomne sometimes. not sometimes overcomne by the goodness * of his nature. of nature, can neither q love, use or exercise. practice friendship, nor justice, nor * bounty. liberality. And certainly he can by no means be a valiant [man] q judging. who judgeth grief to be the greatest evil, or temperate q determining or setting down. who determineth plea sure to be the chief good: which things, although they are so q in readiness, or evident. apparent, that the matter needeth * not further debating. no disputation, yet they are * debated. disputed q of us. by us in another place. These q Disciplines. Sects therefore, * unless they will 〈◊〉 from, themselves. if they will be agreeable to themselves, can say nothing concerning Duty. q neither any precepts of duty can be ●…et down [as] firm, stable, etc. Neither can any precepts of Duty [which are] * sure. firm, stable, & q conjoined or coupled. agreeable to nature, be set down but either q of them. by them who [affirm] only [honesty] [to be desire●…] or by them who q say. hold q honesty to be most earnestly desired for itself. that honesty is especially to be desired for itself. And therefore q that doctrine [or the right of giving precepts] of duty, doth p●…oly belong. the giving precepts thereof, is q proper of. peculiar to the Stoics, and Academiks. and Peripatetics, because the opinion of Aristo, Pyrrho and H●…rellus, hath been * hissed out of the schools. hissed out long ago; who nevertheless q should have. might have had their q right or due. lawful liberty, of q disputing. discoursing concerning Duty, if they had left any choice of * matters. things, that there might q be. have been an entrance to the finding out of duty. 7 q Therefore truly we do follow chiefly the Stoics at this time, and in this question. We therefore at this time, and in this question, do chiefly follow the Stoics: not as * expounders or translator. Interpreters, but as we are * accustomed. wont, we will draw out of their fountains, so much as q shall seem good by any means. by any means shall seem good, q in our judgement and arbitrement [or opinion] according to our mind and judgement. This first chapter cō●…ineth the exordium or entrance into the whole work: and in it T●…ully directing all his speech to his ●…onne, 1. Putteth him in mind what knowledge in Philosophy might be looked for at his hands; to wit, that he should be fully furnished with the grounds thereof. 1. Because of the excellenci●… of his reader, viz Cratippus. 2. In regard of the time wherein he had heard him▪ viz. ●… whole year. 3. For the place where, viz. at Athens a famous Vniuersi●…ie. And that because as his reader might store him with precepts, so the place with examples; 2 He exhorts him to join the study Greek and Latin together; 1. For that he himself had done so, both i●… the stndie of Philosophy and Rhetoric; 2. To the end that he might be equal in both tongues, viz. both Greek and Latin; 3. That thereby he might benefit his countri●…men; not only the rud●…r sort, but even the l●…arned also, as he himself had done before, both for speech & judgement▪ 3 He willeth him that (though he was a hearer of Cratippus the chief Philosopher of that age, and do encourage him thereunto that he should he●…re him as long as he would, & as he perceived hims●…lf ●…o profit by him, yet) ●…ee would ●…ade his writings also: and that 1. Because his writing●… did not much diff●…r from the philosophy of the Pe●…ipatetiks, which his son followed▪ (●…ith they desired to be both followers of Socrates & Plato) though concerning that sect, he leave him to his own judgement. 2. For that reading his writings he should make his latin tongue more copious. 3. Because howsoever he yielded unto others the superiority in the knowledge of Philosophy, yet he challenged unto himself a pre-eminence amongst Orators; for that he had spent his whole time therein. 4 To this purpose he persuades him further, to the diligen reading not only o●… his orations, but also of these his three books of Offices, which were now equa●… in number ●…o those three volumes of Orations: and this likewise, 1. Because though his Orations were more lofty, having more power of eloquence in them; yet this middle kind of style, which he useth here in his Offices is also to be regarded. 2. for that he observed that none of the Grecians had attained hereunto, to excel in both these kinds of style. Except peradventure Demetrius Phalerius, who was no great Orator, though a subtle disputer, and yet of sweet speech, that he might be known one of Theophrastus' scholars. But for his own skill in both kinds, he referreth it to the judge meant of others. Also he thinketh that Plato could have done excellently, if he would have followed that kind of style. And in like manner Demosthenes, if he would h●…u pronounced those things which he had learned of Plato. So likewise Aristotle and Isocrates, if they had not despised one another, being either of them too much conceited in his own study. 5 He showeth why he purposing to write many things unto him, began with these books of Offices. 1 For that this work was most meet for them, both for the age of the one of them, and the gravity of the other. 2 Because although there are many other things in philosophy very profitable, yet none so profitable as this concerning duty; nor any that extendeth itself ●…o largely; Sith no part of our life can be without duty, in what matters soever, or howsoever we are to deal in private or in public. And moreover for that all honesty of life is in regarding duty, all dishonesty in the neglect of it; 3 Because this question of Duty belongs to all Philosophers, Neither dare any assume the name of a Philosopher, unless he have given some precepts of Duty; 6 He giveth him warning of some sects of Philosopher's 〈◊〉 pervert all duty in setting down 〈◊〉 the limits of good and evil. Because ●…e that determineth the chief good to be in any thing but in virtue, or in that which is agreeable thereunto, cannot be virtuous, nor so much as put any virtue in ure, unless he be overcomne by the goodness of nature. Neither he that judgeth the chief evil to be in a●…y thing but in vice, or that which belongs thereunto, or followeth thereupon. These things he omitteth; as both apparent▪ and handled by him in another place. And moreover he showeth, that these Sects can say nothing concerning Duty; Nor that any can set down any right precepts of Duty, but Nor that any can se●… down any right precepts of duty, but o●… lie they who hold 〈◊〉 tue to be the chief good. And therefore th●… only the Stoics, Ac●…demiks, and Peripa●…cians can give p●…cepts of duty; for that the opinio●… of other Philosophe as of Aristo, 〈◊〉 and Herillus, 〈◊〉 been hissed out o●… t●… schools long befo●… 7 He therefore professeth that he chiefly followed the Stoics in these books so far as he thought ●…t, for his purpose, to set down the truth; and so drew out of their fountains, what so ever seemed necessary hereunto. Chap. 2. q It pleaseth [or liketh] therefore. * ay think it therefore meet, sith q all my disputation [or the whole dispute following] all my discourse shall be q concerning duty. of Duty, to * describe or set down. define q before. first what duty is: 2 which I * wonder. marvel q to have been omitted of Panetius. that Panetius pretermitted. 3 For every q institution or book of giving precepts. treatise q of any. concerning any matter, which is * taken in hand. undertaken q from reason. viz by an orderly course. according to reason, aught to q come or proceed from a definition. begin with a definition, that it may be understood, what it is * concerning which the discourse is. whereof it is q disputed or entreated. discoursed. Chap. 2. In this chapter T●…ly first declareth h●… purpose to began w●… the definition of D●…tie, as most meet; ●…r the whole disputatie is to be of Duty. 2. Reproveth Pan●…tius for omitting it. 3. Teacheth that eu●…ry treatise ought to ●…gin of a definition, ●… the end that the who discourse may be b●…ter understood. Chap. 3. The Argument. BEcause the q word, term denomination. name of Duty is not q simple: v●…z. of one kind only. of one sort, neither could be fitly defined q in the general, or according to the general. in general▪ he expreseth it by a division, which q being twofold in deed. in truth is double in word, but the same q indeed or in effect. in substance. He maketh also two kinds of Duties, q of. according to the q sentence. opinion of the Stoics. * The one kind. The one, which they call a perfect duty, and is joined with the end of goodness, neither doth it q agree to or belong. appertain to any man q except or save only. but only to a wise man. q The other is a middle Duty or begun. The other is of a middle kind, or only begun, which is neither good of itself nor evil, but is q taken or done to to some necessary purpose. undertaken for some use of life: as for example, q to restore aright. Rightly to restore that which hath been committed to our trust to keep, q is of a perfect Duty, or a property or part of etc. is a work of perfect Duty: * to restore, but not aright. [only] to restore that which hath been committed to us in trust, q [is] of. of * 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 perfect [Duty]. an unperfect; * si●…h that. whenas no man save only a wise man can restore * as right and honesty requires. aright, q but. though eu●… fools also may restore. And Saint Ambrose thinketh, those Duties which are q done. performed according to q counsels or advice, viz. of ourselves, without command or enforcement. counsel, to be of the former kind; q those [duties.] those which are done * only according to the commandment of others or laws. according to precepts, q [to be] of etc. of the latter: as for example▪ to q ●…mploy, govern or order husband our substance well, * may belong to. appertaineth to the q Duty begun. imperfect Duty; to bestow upon the poor q appertaineth to the perfect. to the perfect. * All the question. EVery question concerning Duty, q is double [or of two sorts. belongeth to one of these two kinds▪ One kind is which appertaineth to the * determinat, one of good. end of good things: q the other [kind] is. the other which * is placed. consisteth in precepts; by which q the use of life may be confirmed into all parts. the course of [man●…] life may be framed for every condition thereof: q Examples of the former kind are of this sort▪ or there are such like examples of, etc. Of the former kind, there are such like examples▪ as these following. ●…hether all Duties be perfect? Whether one Duty be not greater than another? q and which are of the same kind. and such as are of the same kind. But q of What Duties precepts are delivered those Duties whereof precepts are given, although they appertain to * the attaining of the greatest good. the end of good, yet that doth less appear, because they seem rather q to belong rather to ●…e institution [or orderin●…] of the common life. to belong to the framing of the common kind of life: concerning which q it is to be expressed of us. we are * entreat. to show our minds in these books. q And also there is another division of Duty. There is moreover another division of Duty. For there is said [to be] a certain * mean. middle and a perfect Duty. I suppose we may call [that] the q right. perfect Duty which the Grecians mame 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: q but they call this common office 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. but this [we may call] a * mean or common. middle [Duty] which they call 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. And they define those [Duties] thus: that they define that which is right, to be a perfect Du-Dutie. But they say, that * that is a middle Duty. to be a middle Duty, q which wherefore it is done, etc. for which a probable reason may be rendered, wherefore it is done. Before he defines Duty, he declareth that there are two sorts of questions concerning it. One sort of them about the end of good things: The other, concerning precepts of Duty for framing the whole course of life. And first he sette●… down precepts 〈◊〉 the former kinde●… 1. whether all D●… ties be perfect, & And in the seco●… place, he shewe●… his purpose to ha●… dle in this boo●… the later sort of th●… former question viz. concerning precepts of Duty f●… ordering and framing the life 〈◊〉 man. Afterwards he propoundeth an other division of Duty, to wit, that Duty is either meant▪ viz. of a middle nature, or else perfect. The perfect he thinketh to be that which the Grecians call 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; & the middle, that which they name 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Then showeth how they define both of them, viz that they define the perfect Duty to be a right Duty. The mean to be that, for which a probable reason may be rend●… why it is done. Chap. 4. What q way of deliberaliberating [or advising] in choosing things. manner of delibe●…on [aught to be] in the choice of things. q Therefore there is a triple [or threefold] advisenent [or manner of advising] in taking counsel, as it seemeth to Panetius. THe deliberation then of taking counsel is of three sorts, as Panetius thinketh. For first [men] do doubt, whether that which q falleth into deliberation, or cometh to be considered of [or to be weighed.] cometh to be consulted of, be honest to be done or dishonest. In considering whereof, their minds are oft distracted into contrary q sentences. opinions. q And then or in the next place. Secondly, they * search out or advise. inquire or consult, whether the thing whereof they take advice, may farther [them] for the commodity and pleasantness of life, for q riches and store or abundance. ability and plenty of [all] things, for wealth and power, q by which things. whereby they may both help themselves & q their friends. theirs; all which deliberation falleth q into the respect. under the consideration of profit. 3 The third kind of doubting is, whenas that thing which seemeth profitable, is thought to * be contrary to honesty. fight with honesty. For whenas profit doth seem to snatch to itself, [and] * of the other side, contrarily honesty, to q recall. call back again unto itself▪ it cometh to pass, that the mind is * haled to and fro. distracted in q deliberating or advising. deliberation, and bringeth a q doubtful. perplexed * study. care of q thinking or deliberating. imagination. 2 Whereas, to q pass by. omit any thing in dividing, is a very great fault, two things are * ouer●…lipped. pretermitted in this division: q for neither are wont to deliberate only, etc. for men are not only wont to deliberate whether the matter be honest or dishonest; 1 but also q two honest things being propounded. of two honest things propounded, whether is the honester; 2 and also of two profitable things laid before [us] whether is more profitable. So q what reason [or manner of advising] he thought to be etc. that consideration, which he thought to be three fold, is found q to owe, or that ●…t aught. meet to be divided into five parts▪ First, than q we must dispute. we are to entreat of honesty; but, two manner of ways: then q by a like reason, or as many ways. in like sort of profit; q afterwards. lastly, of the q comparison of them. comparing of them together. Chap. 4 In this chap●… Tully in the fi●… place setteth dow●… three question which are usual taking counsel, a●…cording to Pane●… us. 1. whether the matter to be consult●… of be honest or d●… honest: in wh●… consideration h●… showeth that th●… are many difficu●…ties. 2. whether it be profitable or no, viz. whether it may further our commodities or pleasures; or more enable us to help ourselves and others. 3. when profit seemeth to fight with honest●…; whether is to be chosen. Because when our profit draweth us one way, and honesty another, o●… minds come to 〈◊〉 exceedingly d●…cted and perplex●…▪ 2 In the second pla●… reproving Pane.▪ 〈◊〉 omitting 〈◊〉 in this division, 〈◊〉 addeth other 〈◊〉 questions where men are wont deliberate also, 1. Of two ho●… things whether more honest. 2. of two profit●…ble things wheth●… is more profitab●… So that he maketh five general questions in each deliberation▪ The two first concerning honesty. The two next concerning profit. The fifth of comparing them both together. Of the two first he disputeth in the first book; of the two next concerning profit in the second; of comparing them both in the third. Chap. 5. The Argument. q Tully doth teach in this chapter according to the sentence of etc. In this Chapter [Tully] according to the opinion of the ancient Academy, and of the Storks (who think the chief good to come from Nature, and do q mention this only to be to live blessedly. affirm, this to be the very thing to live blessedly, [viz.] to live according to Nature) doth teach, what seeds Nature hath sown in us, and what helps it hath q added. given, wherl●… q by which, industry and use coming thereunto. through dili●…nce and practice w●…e may attain to felicity, * whereunto. whither all things are referred. For, * first. in the first place it hath * given. put into every living creature an q study or earnest desire. endeavour of defending itself; which is common to men with beasts by the law of Nature, and it is called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, q that is. that is to say, the first according to Nature; q an appetite is following. then followeth a●… earnest desire of those things, which are q friendly to safety. furtherers of safety▪ [●…nd] * an avoiding. a flying of those which are hurtful. But moreover q nature hath added it hath given to man (because he consists not only of body but also of * soul. mind) a * force or ability. power of reasoning, that he may be q whole or all. wholly safe; from whence all q arts or sciences. disciplines, and those moral virtues do q go or come. proceed. IT is given to * every kind of living creatures by Nature * in the beginning or first of all from the beginning, * each creature should save itself. to defend itself, life and body, and * avoid or fly from. to shun those things which seem hurtful; and also to seek out & prepare all things whatsoever are necessary * to preserve life. to living: as, feeding, q as dens or hiding places. dens, and q other. other things of the same kind. 2 An q appetite. earnest desire also of q conjunction, copulation or engendering. coming together for the cause of * breeding. procreation is q common thing of all. common to all living creatures, and also a certain * love. care of those * creatures. things which are q pro●…reated or brought forth. bred. Buth this q doth differ chiefly is the special difference between man and beast. 1 q because this. For that the beast q applieth. bendeth itself so much as it is moved by sense, unto that thing only which is at hand, & which is present, very little perceiving * that which is past. what is past or to come: but man because he is * endued with reason o●… understanding. partaker of reason, whereby he seeth q things that follow, or consequents or sequels. what will follow, * he. perceiveth the beginnings and causes of things, q also he is not ignorant. neither is ignorant of the q progresses. proceedings of them, and as it were q foregoing or forerunners. things going before them, he compareth q similitudes or semblances. things that are like, and adjoineth & knits together things to come q to. with things present, * considereth or observeth. seeth easily the course of [his] whole life, and prepareth thin●…s necessary q to rule or govern it. to the leading thereof. 2 q to the living of it. Moreover the q And. same Nature doth q reconcile or gain. win man to man by the * power. force of reason, to q both to a fellowship of speech and a fellowship of life. a society both of speech and of life, & doth breed q first of all. 〈◊〉 a certain q chief. special love towards them which are q procreated. begotten; and enforceth that q a company. companies of men are willing to be q celebrated or gathered by many together. assembled amongst themselves, and q obey themselves. be also serviceable unto▪ one another: and for those causes [enforceth them] to study to provide those things, which may q minister sufficiently. furnish them both q to clothing and food or living. for apparel and also for sustenance; and that not for themselves alone, but for their q wife. wives, children and others, * whom it hath dear and aught to defend who are dear unto them, and whom they ought to defend: which care q also doth stir up the minds. doth also stir up men's spirits, and doth make them q greater to manage their affairs. more courageous to do their business. 3 Also the the inquiry and searching out of the truth * is a special or chief property of man. is especially proper q of man. unto man. Therefore when we are * void of necessary free from necessary businesses and cares, than we q covet. desire to see, hear and learn * somewhat. something; and we account Al. cogitation. the All knowledge of things either * secret. hidden or * wondrous. admirable [to be] necessary * to a blessed life. to live well and blessedly. q of which it i●… gathered, that what is true. etc. Whereupon it is understood, what thing [soever] is true, simple, and * pure. sincere, q that to be. that is the fittest to the nature of man. 4 q There is adjoined to this. There is a certain q earnest longing for. desire of sovereignty adjoined to this q covetous desire. love of * espying or finding out. seeing the truth, that a mind well * framed of nature. informed by Nature, is willing to obey no man, but one q instructing. commanding q [a man] or teaching, or q commanding. governing justly and lawfully q for the cause of [his] commodity, wherein standeth. for [his] commodity sake: whereof * ariseth. appeareth [that] greatness of courage and the contempt of q human things. worldly vanities. 5 Neither indeed is * that. this a small * force. power of Nature & Reason, that this one living creature doth perceive what Order is, what q becometh. is seemly in deeds and in words, * what measure [is to be observed] in de●…ds and words. what a measure is. And therefore no other living creature perceiveth the * beauty, grace. fairness, comeliness and q convenience or agreement. proportion of the parts of those same things which are perceived by sight. Which q similitude or proportion. resemblance, Nature & Reason q transporting. conveying from the eyes unto the mind, doth think q fairness or beauty. comeliness, * steadfastness. constancy [and] order q also to be kept. to be also observed, much more in counsels and in deeds; and q bewareth or taketh heed. is heedful q lest 〈◊〉 do any thing. that it doth not any thing uncomlily or q womanishly. ffeminately; also that it q do not nor think any thing. neither do not * imagine. think any thing * sensually. wanton, both in all opinions q and. or deeds. Of which things, that q honest thing. honesty which we seek is * framed. forged and made: which although it be not q made noble. honoured, yet let it be honourable: * que for enim. for we say truly, though it be praised of no man, yet q it to be laudable. it is praiseworthy by Nature. q you see indeed. You see doubtless (son Mark) the very form and as it were the face of honesty: which if it could be beholden with the eyes, it would stir up (as Plato saith) q admirable loves. a marvelous love of wisdom. Chap. 5. In this fifth chapter Tully teacheth first what is common to all living creatures by nature: as namely, 1. To defend themselves, lives and bodies, to shun what appeareth hurtful, to follow after that which seemeth good for them. 2. An earnest desire of going together for procreation, with a care of their young. In the second place he declareth the special difference between man and beast. 1. That the beast followeth only that which is present, & whereunto it is moved by sense, little perceiving what is past or to come. But man carried by reason, in considering circumstances and comparing things together, followeth what he taketh best for the life, and prepareth things necessary for the leading thereof. 2. That men by th●… means 〈◊〉 reason ar●…●…ore sociable and desirous to live in assemblies together, having a special care of their progeny. And that they a●… also more serviceable one to another studying to provide all necessaries for themselves, and theirs, and so for all other whom they love, a●…d aught to defend, as their wives and children and all others who are near and dear unto them. Hereby their spirits are stirred up, & they are made more cheerful to their businesses. 3. A third difference is, that man only searcheth out the truth, whence he 〈◊〉 by all means desirous to learn; and accounteth the knowledge of all secret and admirable things necessary to a blessed life. The consequen●… hereof. 4. That there is i●… man a certain desire of soueranti●… 〈◊〉 bearing rule and 〈◊〉 obey none but 〈◊〉 that governeth for his benefit. Hence springeth in man that greatness of courage & contempt of human things. 5. A fifth difference i●…, that man only observeth order measure and com●…nesse in words and deeds: and taking a proportion from the fairness 〈◊〉 things that are seen it conveyeth it to th●… mind for framing all speeches and actions accordingly that it do all thing comelily, no thing unseemlily. Hence ariseth that honesty which is here sought out: which though it were not seen nor praised of any, yet is praise worthy by nature. And this he teacheth to be the very form of honesty, which seen with ●…he eyes would stir ●…p in us a marue●…us love of virtue. Chap. 6. The Argument. Of the four * chief or cardinal virtues. Virtues, from whence all the Duties q of the common life, or belonging to life. of the common course of life do q flow abroad or proceed. spring: [as] wisdom, justice, q fortitude. valour and temperance, and of the matter of every one of them. But q All which is honest. * every part or duty of honesty. whatsoever thing is honest, q ariseth out of some [part] of the four parts. springeth out of some one of [these] four * branches or heads fountains. 1 For it is q occupied or conversant. exercised either in the q full perceiving or in●…ght, o●… searching out. wise perceiving of the truth and q cunning or policy. skilfulness: or in preserving the * fellowship. society of men, and giving to * every body his right. every one that which is his own; and in the q faithfulness of things contracted; viz faithful dealing in all manner of covenants. faithful keeping of contracts; or in the q strength or worth greatness & power of a q high and inconquerable mind. haughty & invincible courage; or else in the order and measure of all things which are done q and which are spoken. & spoken, q in which is in. wherein consisteth * moderation or discretion. modesty and tempetance. 2 Which four although they be q tied or linked, knit wrapped and * folden one within another. entangled together amongst themselves, yet q certain kinds certain several kinds of Duties * spring or proceed. do grow out of every one of them: as, out of that part which was described first, wherein we place wisdom and prudence, q is in, viz. issueth out. there is the searand q invention. finding out of the truth; and this is the proper q office or work. function of that virtue. For as eveone perceiveth q most of all or especially. most clearly, what is truest in every matter, and q he that can. can both se●… and q express or render give a reason most wittily and most readily, q he is wont q to be reputed worthily. to be rightly accounted the most prudent and wise. 3 Wherefore truth * is the subject thereof. is subject to his, as the matter which it handleth, and in which it is q conversant or occupied. exercised. But necessities are * assigned or are the subject. propounded to the other three virtues, to get and keep those things, q in which the action of life is contained. whereby the trade of [man's] life is maintained; that both the society of men and q conjunction. neighbourhood may be preserved, and his excellency and greatness of courage may * appear. shine abroad, both in increasing of q riches or wealth substance, and getting commodities both to himself & * his [friends] his, and also much more in despising these same things. Also order, & constancy, and moderation, q stead fastness, keeping of a measure. and those things which are like unto these, are exercised in that kind, unto which a certain action is to be * added. adjoined, not only an q tossing or exercising. occupying of the mind. For we q adding or keeping measure. applying a certain mean and order to these things which are q handled or meddled with. practised in [our] life, shall * keep. observe both honesty and comeliness. In this sixth chapter Tully teachete that there are som●… chief and cardin●… virtues, out 〈◊〉 which all other duties do proceed: 〈◊〉 wit, Prudence, Justice, Fortitud●… Temperance. Of every of whic●… he first setteth dow●… the definition, the the subjects abo●… which they are conversant. 1. As, that prudence is a virtue, exercised in spying out the truth, & in cunning. 2. justice, is in preserving the society of men, and giving every one their own. 3. Fortitude, in the greatness of an in●…cible courage. 4. Temperance, in keeping order and measure in all speeches and actions. Secondly, he showeth how certain several duties issue out of each of these: as, out of prudence the finding out of the truth. Because as every one best seeth the truth, and can best give a reason thereof, so he is accounted the most prudent. 3. Thirdly, declareth the subjects of these virtues; that truth is the subject, about which prudence is chiefly exercised. But certain necessities are the subjects of the other three virtues. As for example; To get and keep these things whereby man's life may he maintained, society & neighbourhood preserved, the excellency and greatness of his courage may be seen, by increasing substance, getting commodities for himself and his, & in disposing these human things; are the subjects about which both justice and Fortitude are exercised. And fourthly that Temperance is exercised in keeping order, constancy, and moderation: whence do chiefly proceed both honesty and comeliness. Lastly, he noteth a difference between Prudence and the other three duties. That Prudence is only in the exercise of the mind, the other three are chiefly seen in outward actions. Chap. 7. Of Prudence the q princess or principal. chief of all virtues, and what is to be avoided in it, also what is to be q followed. embraced. q And or but. NOw of the four * chief heads or common places. places into which we have divided the nature and q force or strength power of honesty; that first which consisteth in the knowledge of the truth, doth q touch chiefly. especially concern q the human nature or man's nature mankind. For q we all are drawn we are all drawn and led to a desire of knowledge and q science. skill. q In which to excel we account it, etc. Wherein we think it a goodly thing to q pass others. excel. q But we account it both evil & dishonest, etc. But to ship, to err, to be ignorant, [and] to be deceived, we account it both q an evil thing. evil and dishonest. In this kind [of virtue] q both natural. being both natural and honest, two q vices. faults * must be shunned. are to be avoided: the one, that we q have not or account not. take not things * which we know not, as though we knew them. unknown for known, and q assent unto them rashly. rashly assent unto them. Which fault he who will q fly from. escape ( q and. as all aught * to desire. to be willing) q shall add. must bestow both * leisure. time and diligence to the q matters to be considered. considering of matters. q There is another fault. The other fault is, that some [men] q confer, or bestow. employ overgreat study, & q much diligence. too much travel q upon things obscure, etc. viz. in dark and ha●…d matters. upon obscure and difficult matters, and the q same [things.] same q nothing necessary, or needless. not necessary▪ Which fault's being q shunned or eschewed. avoided, q what, etc. whatsoever diligence and care shall be q put. spen●… in things honest and worthy of knowledge, q it, the 〈◊〉. shall be q pra●…led by right. rightly commended: q as we have heard ●…. Sulpit●…s [to have trauel●…ed much o●… been very excellent] in Astrology. as, in Astrology, we have heard of Ca●…us Sulpitius; in Geometry, we ourselves have known Sextus pompeius, many in Logic, more in the Civil Law; all which q conversant or occupied. Arts are exercised in the q tracing or finding out. searching out of the truth: * through the. by the study whereof, to be drawn away from q doing things, or following necessary business. necessary employments, it is against Duty. For the q all the commendation. whole praise of virtue doth consist q in doing or performing good duties. in action: from which yet oftentimes q an intermission is made, or may be. there is an intermission, & q many returns are given. there are granted q many returns are given. many recourses * unto the former studies. unto studies: q and also the tossing. yea and the stirring of the mind which never * ceaseth. resteth, may q keep us. continue us in the studies of q thinking or contemplation. meditation, even without our q labour. travel. But eve▪ q thought and moving. cogitation and motion of the mind q is conversant. ought to be occupied either in q consulting. taking advice q concerning honest things. about honest matters, and pertaining * to the good and blessed life. to live well and blessedly, or in the studies of science and knowledge. q And indeed. And thus have we spoken of the first fountain of Duty. In this chapter Tully speaketh of Prudence: which consisteth in the knowledge of the truth. 1. showing it to be the chief of all the four virtues, and to concern mankind especially: And that, because we are all drawn to a desire of knowledge, thinking it a goodly thing to excel therein, and contra●…ily as dishonest to be ignorant or deceived. 2. He teacheth, that in prudence two faults, contrary thereunto, are to be avoided. 1. That we take not things which we know not, as though we knew them, and so assent rashly unto them: and to this end, to bestow both time & diligence to consider of matters. The second is, that we bestow not too much study & travel in matters both obscure & difficult, and also needless. And these two faults being e●…chewed, that all care and diligence bestowed in searching out things honest and worthy of our knowledge, shall deserve due commendation: As, Caius Sulpitius is commended for his knowledge and pains in Astrology, Sextus Pompeius in Geometry many in Logic and the Civil law, & so in other good studies. Yet here giveth another C●…ueat, viz. That by such ●…udies we suffer not ourselves to be drawn away from more necessary employments. And that because all the praise of virtue consists in action o●… performing Duties, from which yet there may be intermissions and returning to study. And also for that the very meditation of the mind is a kind of study; though without any great travel. Lastly, he concludeth this point with one other caution. To wit, that all our thought●… be employed either in advising about honest matters and which app●…tain to a blesse●… life or in the studies of science and knowledge. Chap. 8. Of justice. But of q three other virtues. the other three [virtues] remaining, q that reason [or consideration] doth extend itself most largely. that part extendeth itself the farthest, q wherein there is conta●…ned the society, etc. wherein the society of men amongst themselves and (as it were) the community of life is contained; whereof there are two parts: justice, q in which. wherein is the greatest q splendour. brightness of virtue; * whereof. which good men q ●…re named. have their name, and * bountifulness. Beneficence joined q to this. hereunto, which s●…me q it is lawful to call. we may call either * gentleness. bounty or liberality. But the q first. principal duty of justice is, that q not any man hurt any one. no man hurt another, unless [he be] provoked by an q wrong. injury: * The next, or secondly. And then that he use common [things] as common, and private [things] as * his own, peculiar for himself, or private. his own. q But no. Howbeit no things are private by nature, but either by ancient * possession or tenure. occupation, as [of them] who in time past came into * waste grounds or places without inhabitant. empty [places:] or by victory, a●… [of them] who q obtained in war. got [things] by war: or by law, covenant, condition, lot. q of which it is done. Whereupon it is come to pass that the q field called Arpinas. ground Arpinas is * accounted the Arpinatians [field] Thusculan, of the Thusculanes. said▪ to be of the Arpinatians, the q field called Arpinas. Thusculan [ground] of the Thusculanians. And the * setting out. description of private possessions is q like. of this sort. q like. Whereupon, * sith that because part of those things which q had been. were common by Nature, * the own of every one. is becomne proper to every one; let every one * enjoy. hold that, which hath * chanced. befallen q to every one or to himself. to each. If any man will covet greedily * befallen him. unto himself more than that, he shall * break. violate the law * of fellowship amongst men. of human society. But because (as it is notably written q of Plato. by Plato) we are born not for ourselves * only. alone, q que for enim. but our Country doth * claim. challenge a part of our birth, q our parents' [claim] a part. our parents a part, our friends a part, and ( * as the Stoics hlode. as it pleaseth the Stoics) * that all. all things which are bred in the earth, * are created. to be created for the use of men, and men to be q begotten. borne * for man's cause. for the cause of men, that q some may profit others. they amongst themselves may * benefit or help. profit one another: q In this. Herein * we are bound. we ought to follow nature [as] q a leader. a guide, and q to bring into the midst. to bring abroad common commodities, by exchange of Duties, in giving and q receiving. taking, [and] to * knit. bind together the q fellowship of men amongst men. society of man with man, both by arts and by travel, and also by riches. In this chapter Tully 1. setteth out the nature of ●…ustict that by it all human society is preserved, and how it extendeth itself most largely of all the other three virtues. 2. He showeth that there are two parts of it, viz justice properly to called, wherein is the greatest glory of vertu●…, and whereof good men are specially named: and Beneficence▪ which we m●… call bounty or liberalive. 3. He declareth some special functions of justice: as, That no man hurt another but upon just c●…use. That men use common things as common, private as their own▪ 4. He teacheth hereupon, how by nature all things were common, but made private by these means following, or the like: as▪ By ancient tenur●… or ocupation, by victory, law, covenant, condition, lot, etc. Hence also he showeth how things have had their names of their owners, as the field Arpinas, of the Arpinatians, etc. Hereupon also he gathereth these rules; 1. That every one should content himself with his own so gotten: and that whosoever coveteth more than his own, violateth the law of human society. 2. That for so much as we are not borne for ourselves alone (as Plato writeth notably) but partly for our country, partly for our parents, partly for our friends▪ and each for the good of others; like as all creatures are bred for the good of man, so men especially for the benefit of men to profit one another; that we should herein follow Nature as guide, in communicating our commodities to one another And so by exchanging of kindnesses, by giving & taking, by our cunning, help, and riches to bind all sorts unto us in society and good wil Chap. 9 q fidelity or faithful dealing. Faithfulness [is] the foundation of justice, from the Etymology of the word. Al But the foundation Al And faithfulness is the foundation of justice. of justice is faithfulness: that is to say, a constancy and truth of words and * all agreements. covenants: Whereupon, although this peradventure shall seem * more difficult. hard to some man, yet we may be bold to imitate the Stoics, who search out q studiously. diligently from whence words are derived, and we may q believe. think * that faithfulness is named thereof. faithfulness to be called, because q that which was said is done. that is * performed. done which was promised. In this 9 chapter Tully 1. teacheth what is the foundation of all justice, viz. faithfulness. 2. He defineth faithfulness, that it is constancy & truth in all our speeches and agreements. 3. In imitation of the Stoics, who search out diligently the derivation of words, he showeth whence fides is named, viz. a fio & dico, because that is performed which was promised, so to show the nature of it. Chap. 10. q [Tully teacheth that there are] two kinds of, etc. [There are] two kinds of injustice, as [there are] * two kinds of. of justice: and from whence they q may arise or be derived. come. 1 But there are two kinds of injustice. The one [ * belongeth. is] of those men who q bring in or do injury. offer [injury:] The other of those who do not * put or drive away beat back an injury from them to whom it is offered, if they be able. 2 For he that makes an assault upon any man unjustly, being stirred up either by * choler. anger or any * perturbation. q passion, he seemeth as it were q to bring violent hands to his fellow. to lay violent hands upon his fellow: and he who * doth not defend no●… 〈◊〉 injury to be done to others defendeth not nor resisteth injury if he can, is as well in fault, as if he should forsake [his] parents or friends, or country. 3 And indeed those injuries which are done of set purpose q for the cause of h●…rting. to hurt, do oft times q come or proceed. arise from fear: whenas he who q thinketh. intendeth to hurt another, feareth * that except. lest unless he do that to another, himself q shall incur some damage. should be q affected or touched. anno●…ed with some discommodity. And [for] the most part, q some. many men q attempt. take occasion to do * injury. wrong, that they may obtain those things which they q have coveted or earnestly desired. do earnestly desire: in q which vice. which kind of vice, covetousness doth q lie open or extend itself most largely. show itself most evidently. Riches also, are earnestly desired, both for necessary uses of life, and also to enjoy pleasures. But in those in whom there is q a greater courage or stomach. more lofty mind, the coveting of money q belongeth or hath a respect. hath an eye unto q gratifying. power, and ability of q riches. p●…easuring [others:] as of late M. Crassus denied q that any money or any sum of money was sufficient, etc. any substance to be sufficient for him, who desired to be a Prince in the common wealth, q with the fruits [or increase] whereof. * if he were not able to maintain an ar●…ie with his revenue. with whose revenues he could not q nourish. maintain an army. q Also. Moreover, sumptuous q preparations. furnitures do delight, and the q tricking or adorning. bravery of life with * fineness. elegancy and plenty; by which * means. things q it is effected. it cometh to pass, that the desire of money q should be. is infinite. 4 Neither indeed the q amplifying or inc●…rease of the goods of a man's family. enlargement of a man's private estate hurting no body, is to be dispraised: but injury is evermore to be q fled or shunned. avoided. 5 And q very many. most men are q brought especially. exceedingly brought q that a forgetfulness of justice should take them. to forget justice, whenas they q have or shall fall. fall into a desire of rule, q honours. honour, or of glory. For that which is in Ennius (There is no q sacred fellowship. holy society, nor fidelity of a kingdom) * reacheth further. doth extend itself more largely. For whatsoever is q of that sort. of such sort, in which more cannot * be chief. excel, * therein falleth out for most part so great contention. so great contention q is made or happeneth. cometh to pass for most part therein, that it is a very hard thing to keep a holy society. The * storm raised of late by Caius Cesar, etc. rashness of Caius Caesar declared that of late, who q perverted or turned topsy-turvy. overturned * the laws of God and man. all divine and human laws, * for the cause of that principality for that sovereignty which he had imagined to himself by the error of [his] q opinion. conceit. And it is a grievous thing in this kind, that the desires of honour, rule, power, and glory, are for the most part in the * stoutest stomachs or bravest minds. greatest courages▪ and goodliest wits. By how much more q it is to be looked to. we are to take heed, q lest it be any thing offended in that kind or behalf. that we offend not at all in that kind. Tully in this chapter teacheth 1. that there are two kinds of injustice, as there are of justice. The one is of such as do injury. The other of such who do not save others from wrong when they may. 2. He declareth the greatness of these faults by comparison. For the first: That he who assaults another upon anger or any like passion, doth, as it were, lay violent hands on his fellow. For the second: That he that saveth not another from wrong if he can, is aswell in fault, as if he should forsake his parents, friends or country. 3. He noteth the usual causes of wrongs: as of those done rashly; anger or some sudden passion. Others done of set purpose, arise from fear of some evil to themselves unless they hurt others. Or from covetousness of getting riches, or a greedy desire of pleasures. Or else from ambition: as when men desire riches, either to be come great thereby, or to pleasure others. As in M. Crassus: who thought no man meet to be a prince or chief man in the commonweal, unless he were able with his reveneves to maintain an army▪ Moreover, he showeth that wrongs are committed for stately buildings, maintaining sumptuous furniture, for gorgeousness & plenty of all things: for which ends and the like, the desire of money is infinite. 4. He giveth a Caveat, that the increase of a man's pri vate estate is not to be dispraised▪ but only the wronging of others by it. 5. He teacheth that the principal cause of injustice is ambition, when men fall into a vehement desire of honour & glory, and chiefly of bearing rule. This he proveth 1. By the testimony of Ennius; That there is no holy society nor fidelity in seeking or ruling a kingdom. 2. By reason. Because in things wherein more cannot excel together, such contentions fall out, as it is hard to keep a holy society. This point he also further illustrateth by the example of Caius Cesar, who had very lately before overturned all laws both of God and men, for obtaining that rule which he had formerly conceited. Lastly, he giveth another Caveat in regard hereof, that sith these ambitious desires of rule and honour are for the most part in the greatest courages and goodliest wits, therefore all noble minds and excellent wits should chiefly take heed hereof. Chap. 11. One injury [is] lighter than another. But q it very much concerneth. it is especially to be considered in all injustice, whether the * wrong. injury be done with q any perturbation, or upon a hot blood as it is called. some passion of the mind, which for most part is short & q to a time. for the present time, or else * of set purpose or consultation. of purpose and advisedly. For those q things. wrongs are * easier. less, which * happen q befall. upon some sudden q motion or passion. mood, than such as are done * devised & thought of before. being premeditated & * p●…epared for. prepared. And thus * enough hath been spoken. have we spoken of q bringing in or offering injury. doing injury. In this chapter 1. he teacheth that the nature & kind of the wrong is to be wisely considered: whether the injury was done upon some sudden passion, or mature deliberation & advise. 2. He giveth the reason of the necessity of this consideration, viz. Because those injuries which are done upon any such sudden passion are lighter & to be accounted less, the those which are done upon deliberation & as it were of set purpose. Chap. 12. He rehearseth the causes from whence the second kind of injustice may q spring or grow. arise. 1 q And. Moreover there are wont to be q more. many causes of q ●…termitting. omitting * to defend one another. [our] defence, and of q forsaking. leaving [our] Duty. 2 For either q they will not. men are unwilling q to take upon them or undergo. to undertake q enmities or ill will. displeasure, or travel, or q cost. charges: or else they be so hindered with negligence, sloth, q slugg●…shnesse▪ ignorance or cowardliness. idleness, or else by their own private studies, or by certain q occupations. bu●…nesses, that they suffer them to be * helpless. forsaken, whom they ought q to save harmless. to defend. 3 q Therefore we must look. We must therefore take heed▪ that we do not think, q lest it be not sufficient. that to be sufficient, which is spoken q in Plato concerning the Philosophers. of Plato in behalf of the Philosophers; q [them] to be just therefore. that they are therefore just, because they are q conversant or exercised. employed in q tracing or searching out of the truth. finding out the truth, and because they q depise. contemn and q account for nothing or make no reckoning of. set at nought those things which q most part of men most men do * greedily seek after. vehemently desire, [&] q concerning which. for which they are wont q to fight with swords, contend or braul●…. to be at daggers drawing amongst thē●…elues. For whilst they attain the one kind of justice, that they hurt no man in q offering injury. doing of wrong, they fall into the other: for being q letted by a desire of getting learning hindered by the study of learning, they forsake [them] whom they ought to defend. Therefore q in truth he thinketh. he indeed thinketh, q them not about to come to the commonweal, or to intermeddle in. that they would not enter into the affairs of the common weal, q but compelled or enforced, or were they not compelled. unless they were compelled. But it were * more reason that it should be done. more equal to be done q with good will, without constraint. voluntarily. For whatsoever is q well done. rightly done, q that same is just to▪ if it be done voluntarily. the same is thereby just, if it be voluntary. There be also, who either for a * love. desire of * looking to their household affairs. saving their substance, or q by a certain hate or some grudge. for some hatred to men, do say, q themselves to do, or to follow. that they q themselves to do, or to follow. look unto their own business; lest they q may be thought. should seem to do wrong to any man: who whilst they are free from the one kind of injustice, do run into the other. For they forsake the * fellowship. society of life, because they bestow q nothing of study, nothing of labour, nothing of substance. no study upon it, no labour, nor substance. q Because therefore after we have declared the two kinds of injustice. Seeing then that two kinds of injustice being propounded, we have adjoined the causes of q either kind. both kinds, and have set down those things before, in which justice is contained▪ we shallbe able q to judge easily. easily to judge (unless we will exceedingly * love or flatter ourselves too much. favour ourselves) what is the duty of every season. For q it is hard to take care of other men's matters. the care of other men's matters is difficult, although that q Terentian Chremes. Chremes in Terence q thinketh nothing to be strange to him of that which appertaineth to man. accounteth nothing appertaining to man, to be * estranged from. strange to him. q But yet. Nevertheless, because we perceive and feel those things more, which happen unto ourselves, q euther prosperous or cross. either luckily, or unfortunately, than those things [which q befall happen] to others, which we behold, * as ye would say. as it were, a great way off; we judge otherwise of them, then of ourselves. Wherefore they q command or teach well. give a good precept, who forbid to do any thing, which you doubt of, whether it be right or wrong. For, q equity itself. the rig●…t it * is apparent. shineth q by itself. of itself: but doubting q declareth. signifieth q a cogitation of in●…urie. an imagination of wrong. Tully declareth in this chapter. 1. That there may be sundry causes of the second kind o●… injustice, viz. of omitting the just defence of our neighbour. 2. He setteth down divers of those causes: as, for auoi●…ing either the ill will of others, or of their travel or charges. Or else for that they are hindered by neg●…gence sloth or by their own private studies or businesses. 3. He warneth that men do not therefore think themselves just, and that they have done their duties (as some philosophers do) because they are employed in the study of learning, or for that they contemn the world, which most men so dote upon, and so leave the defence of others. And then giveth the reason hereof; Because hereby, whilst that they avoid the one kind of i●…iustice, that they hurt no man, they fall into the other, viz. to forsake them whom they ought to defend. And that thereupon they cannot be drawn to any service in the commonweal, but by constraint; Whereas of the contrary, he teacheth, that all such service for the good of others, especially for the commonwealth, aught to be voluntary, & that then only it is just. After, he rehearseth some other causes why men use to leave the defence or helping of other●…: as for saving their substance▪ or upon some hatred, grudge or the like. And yet, that they to this end pretend their own business, orlest they should seem to do wrong to others. So that hereby they forsake the society of life, whilst they will neither bestow any of their study, travel or substance for the helping of others. By these things rightly considered, ●…e teacheth that men may be able easily to judge, what duty is required at every time and season; unless they be too partial and over much love themselves. Yet herein he showeth that it is a very ha●…d matter, to take care of other men's business as we ought: howsoever Chremes in Terence thinketh otherwise; and after giveth the reason hereof which is this; for that we have more feeling of those things which hap to ●…ur selves, the●… of those which befall others: because we behold other men's estates as it were a great way of, but our own more nearly. Lastly, for a conclusion, he commendeth that precept of such wise men, as, who forbid a man to do any thing whereof he doubteth, whether it be right or wrong. Because the right is apparent of itself, but the very doubting intimateth an imagination of a wrong. Chap. 13. Tully teacheth * that duties are. Duties to be carried q for circumstances in regard of circumstances; and that which was q officious. agreeable to Duty, to be made against duty two ways especially: if either q it be departed. there be a departing from profit, or the less profitable be preferred before the more profitable; moreover to be sometimes basides Duty to stick too much in q Apex is taken for the highest top of any thing; here for ●…ice quiddities or extremities of law. the strict words of law. But the * seasons. time doth q fall out often. fall out, when those things which seem most q worthy of. meet for a just man●… and him whom we call a good man, are changed & * become clean otherwise. made contrary: q as, it may be just, etc. as, not to restore a thing committed to us to keep; also not to perform a promise made to a q furious. mad man; and sometimes to deny and not keep those things which appertain to truth and unto fidelity, may be just. For q it becometh. it is meet q [them] to be referred. that they be referred to those foundatitions of justice▪ which I laid down in the beginning: 1 First * that hurt be done to no man. that no man be hurt▪ * next. and then that q it be served to the common profit, viz. that the common commodity be preferred. there be a respect had to the common commodity. q duty is changed when as etc. When these things are changed by the time, Duty is changed, that * remains not. it is not always q the same alike. q for some promise may fall out and covenant. For there may fall out some promise & covenant, q that it may be unprofitable to be effected. which to be performed, may be unprofitable either to him to whom it is promised, or else to him * that. who promised it. For if (as it * reported in stories. is in the Fables) Neptune had not * performed. done that, which he had promised to * See the marginal note in the latin books. Theseus, Thes. had not been q deprived. bereft of his son Hippolytus. For of [his] three * bones. wishes (as it is written) this was the third, which q he being angry. in his fury he * asked. wished * for the death. concerning the death of Hippolytus: which being obtained he fell into q the greatest mourning. most grievous lamentation. Therefore q neither those promises are. neither are those promises to be * fulfilled. kept, which are unprofitable to them, to whom you have q promised. made them; nor if they hurt you more, than they q profit. benefit him to whom you have * made the promises. promised. It is against Duty, * that the greater loss should be. the greater * harm. damage to be q put before or preferred to the less. rather admitted then the less: as, if you q shall appoint or promise. have appointed * that you will come to be an advocate or counsellor to speak for another in his matter which is in hand. yourself to come as an advocate to any man upon a present occasion, and in the mean time your son shall begin to be grievously sick, it cannot be against Duty, not to q do. perform that which you * promised. said; and he to whom the q it was promised. pro mice was made, should more q depart. swerver from Duty, if he q complain himself to be left destitute. should complain that he was disappointed. Now who seeth not q not to be stood to, or that we are not to stand to, or that it is not meet to etc. that it is not necessary to stand to those promises, which q any man. a man hath promised, being either constrained by fear, or deceived by guile? * most of which things. which things indeed, q most of them are freed. for most part, q most of them are freed. are discharged by the * Chancery or Court of conscience. praetors Court, and many of them by q Laws, or statute-lawes. statutes. In this chapter he teacheth, 1. That Duty may be altered in regard of circumstances; & that which seemeth meet for a just and good man, may become clean contrary: as for example; That it may sometimes be lawful & meet, not to restore a thing committed to us in trust: as also, not to perform a promise made to mad men: & sometimes to deny those things, which other wise truth and faithful dealing would require. And then giveth the reason hereof. Because it is meet that all such matters be limited by tho▪ two foundations of justice laid down before; viz. 1. That no man be hurt. 2. That there be a respect had to the general good, or commonweal. And that so, duties may be altered according to times and occasions a●… these fall out. 2. He showeth what promises and covenants a man is not bound to keep. As first, such promises as the performance-of proveth hurtful either to him to whom they are promised, or to him that hath promised them. This he illustrateth by the evil that came upon the performance of that promise which Neptune made to Theseus for granting him three wishes. The last whereof was the death of his own son Hippolytus, which in his fury he had desired: which promise being performed accordingly, he fell into most grievous lamentation. Hence he concludeth, that neither such promises are to be kept; nor such as may more hurt him who promised, than then they can benefit him to whom they are promised. And then giveth a reason of both. For that it is against Duty, to admit ●…ather of the greate●… evil than the less; and also giveth an instance of the later kind. As, if an advocate should promise his client that he would plead his cause at such a time; & in the mean while his son falls grievously sick that he cannot be for him; that it is not against Duty for the advocate to be absent in th●…s case: and that the client should more serve from Duty, if he should complain that he was disappointed, than the other by his absence. So likewise he teacheth that men are not bound to such promises as they made, enforced by fear, or drawn into by deceit. Lastly, he showeth that for such promises men are discharged of them either by the court of conscience, or some statute law. Chap. 14. q Equity is to be looked to in law matters. In Duties belonging to the law, we are not to stick in the q Offices or matters. words [of the law] [but] equity is to be looked unto. q Also wrongs are oft times. Moreover, there do oft times injuries arise by a certain cavillation, & too crafty q but. and q naughty or wrested misconstruing. subtle interpretation of the law. 1 Whereupon that [saying] viz. q The chiefest or utmost, or the vigour of law. Extremity of law is the q chief. extremest injury, is now * made. becomne a q worn. common proverb in [our] q speech or communication. talk. 2 In which kind many things are done amiss, even q in the commonweal. in the commonweal matters: as he who when q league of peace. truce was q truce of a hundredth and thirty days were covenanted with the enemy taken with the emie for a hundredth and thirty days, q destroyed, wasted or ouer●…anne. spoiled his q fields by night. land in the night, because q the truce of days and not of nights were covenanted the truce was taken for days, and not for nights. q neither truly. No nor yet indeed q ou●…s. our countryman is to be q allowed of. approved of, if it be true, q Quintus Fabius that Quintus Fabius Labeo or any other (for I have nothing but by hearsay) being q given. appointed by the Senate to be an * umpire or daies-man. arbitrator q to the Nolanes. between the Nolanes * and them of Naples. and Neapolitans * about. concerning the bounds of their Land, when he came to the place, q to have spoken with either of them severally. did commune with them both apart, that they should not do nor desire any thing * greedily. covetously, and that they would rather q set back or retire go back then * encroach one upon another. go forward. * which when either of them had done. When All both of them had done it, * there was a parcel of ground, etc. set out or bounded. some ground Al on both sides. was left in the midst. Therefore he so q limited their bounds, as they had * yielded. said; [and] adjudged that which was left in the midst, unto the people of Rome. This verily is to deceive, not to judge. Wherefore such subtlety is to be * eschewed. avoided in every q thing, or case. matter. There be also certain Duties to be observed even towards them, of whom you have received wrong. For there is a measure both * in revenge and chastisement. of revenge and punishing. And [indeed] I * wot not. know not whether it be sufficient q him who began to repent of his injury. that he who q provoked. begins should [only] repent of his injury, but [that he be] punished, that he commit not q any like thing. the like offence after, and other also may be the slower to do wrong. Tully in this chapter declareth, how injuries oft-times are committed by cavilling & subtle misconstruing or wresting of the law. This he proveth, 1. By that common proverb: That the extremity of law is the extremest ini●…rie. 2. By usual experience in the commonwealth, whereof he giveth two notable examples of crafty dealers. One of which (whose name he omitteth) having made truce with the enemy for thirty days, spoiled his land in the nights; pretending that the truce was taken only for the days, and not for the nights. The other example is of Quintus Fabius Labeo: who (as the report went) being appointed by the Senate of Rome, for an arbitrator between the Nolanes and the Neapolitans about the setting out of the bounds of their lands, communed with both sides apart, persuading them to do nothing covetously, & that either side would rather give back then forward, in regard of peace, and that they might not seem to encroach upon one another. Which when both sides had yielded unto, there was a piece of ground left in the midst between them: which he adjudged from both to the people of Rome. But this dealing he accounteth to be rather▪ to deceive then to arbitrate; & so admonisheth all to beware of it. Lastly, he teacheth that there are Duties of justice to be executed upon them who do such wrongs and giveth the reason thereof; That it is not always sufficient that he who ●…ath done the wrong be sorry for it, but that he be punished also sometimes; and that for two causes. 1. That he may not do the like after. 2. That others also may be terrified from doing wrong by his example. Chap. 15. Hitherto [Tully hath spoken] of civil justice: now [he discourseth] of warlike Duties; And maketh two kinds of war, to both of which these things are common; that q the wars. they be not undertaken but upon just causes; that they be not entered into, but q matters required or challenged, viz. the things which they who begin, would require. their demands first made, [nor] unless [they be] solemnly proclaimed: that they may be rightly achieved, that * we use no cruelty we be not cruel above measure against them who are ouercom●…. Also that they who yield themselves be received more courteously; that fidelity performed to an enemy even privately, not only in solemn q covenants. agreements. But these things are proper; that we deal more * mercifully or courteously. ●…ildely with this kind of enemies who strive for sovereignty; more severely with them who seek our life. 1 q Also. Moreover the laws of q war. arms are to be q preserved in any wise. specially kept in a common weal. 2 For whereas there are two kind●… of contention, one by q disputing or debating the matter. reasoning, another by * violence. force; and whereas that is q proper. the property of man, this of beasts; we must fly to the later, q is. when we cannot use the former. 3 Wherefore q truly. in very deed, wars are to be q undertaken. taken in hand * to this end and purpose. for q that. this, that q it may lived [of us.] we may live in peace without injury. 4 And the victory being gotten, * they ought to be saved. they are to be preserved who have not q been cruel in war. been cruel nor q fierce, savage or outrageous. unmerciful in fight: as our ancestors received even into [their] City, the Thusculans, q Equys. Equians, Volscians, Sabines, [and] Hernicks; but they q took away [or spoilt] utterly. utterly razed Carthage and Numance. q I would not Co●…inth. I would they had not so razed Corinth: but q I believe them to have followed the opportunity of the place especially. I take it, that they chiefly respected the situation of the place, lest the very place might at any time q provoke them to make war. encourage them to move war. q Truly in my opinion. Certainly in my mind, q we are alway to consult for peace. we ought always to advise for peace, q which shall have no deceit. which may be free from fear of treachery. Wherein q if it had been obeyed unto me, or if I had been obeyed. if they would have yielded unto me, we should have had, although not the q best [commonweal.] best, yet some Common weal, which now is none. But whereas q it is to be provided for them. you are to provide for their safety whom you q have overcomne. shall subdue by force; q than they who their weapons being laid away fly to the fidelity of the Emperors. them they especially, who yielding up their weapons, fly unto the mercy of the governors, are to be received, although q Aries, is an engine called a ram: which served in war to beat down walls. the ram hath q smitton down. battered the wall. q in which thing. In which point, justice hath been q so very greatly. so much regarded q at or with ours amongst our men, that they who had received * unto their fidelity. to [their] mercy Cities or Nations q overcome, subdued. conquered in war, should be patrons q of them, viz. of those cities and nations. of the same, * after the manner. by the custom of [our] ancestors. And q truly. in very truth the q equity. justice of war is * set down. described most * sincerely. holily in the q law of the heralds who were to proclaim war. feciall law of the people of Rome. q of which. Whereby it may be understood, q no war to be just. that no war is just, but which either is q done. moved, q things being first claimed. demands being first made; or which is proclaimed before, and q denounced solemnly or published. bidden by defiance. Pompilius q the Emperor. the General [of the Romans] kept a Province, in whose army q the son of Cato, a novice. Cato's son, being a young soldier, q did play the soldier. did serve. q But. And whenas it q seemed good to. pleased Pompilius to q send away or discharge. dismiss one q legion of soldiers. band, he dismissed also Cato's son, who served in the same band. But whenas he remained still in the army, for the love q of fight. of the wars, Cato writ unto Pompilius that if he q should suffer. suffered him to q tarry. remain in the army, he should q bind him by a second oath of warfare. swear him again; because q the former [oath] being lost, he might not fight by right etc. he being discharged of his former oath, might not lawfully fight with the enemies. So q chief observation they had. great regard there was in q moving or managing their war. making war. There is q an epistle [extant] a Letter of Marcus Cato q being an old man. the elder, to Marcus his son; wherein he wrote q himself to have heard. that he had heard, q him to have been dismissed. that he was does charged by the Consul, q whenas he was a soldier. being a soldier in Macedonia in the Persian war. He therefore q admonisheth him to. warneth him that he * take heed. beware, that he enter not q into the battle. the battle: for he denieth * that it was lawful. it to be lawful [for him] who is not * a sworn soldier. a soldier to fight with the enemy. 2 And q in good truth do observe. certainly I note q that. this, that he q who was a stubborn enemy by a proper name or by a propriety of speech. who by his proper name was perduellis [id est] * an open enemy. a stubborn enemy, was called hostis [meaning] q a soldier or man of war. a stranger; the mildness of the words assuaging the q sorrowfulness. haynousness of the * matter. thing. For he was called hostis * amongst. with our ancestors, whom now we name peregrinus, [a stranger.] The twelve tables declare [the same] * in these words, Aut, etc. Aut status dies cum host; and again, Aduersus hostem aeterna authoritas. What may be added to this q gentleness or moderation. mildness, to call him by so q soft or mild. fair a name, with whom you * wage war. make war? Although q long continuance process of time hath now made that name more * odious. hard: for it q hath. is departed from the name of Peregrinus, [that is to say, a stranger] and * standeth. q remained properly remaineth properly * in him, viz. stands for etc. for him who q 〈◊〉 armour of the contrary part. beareth arms against any one. 3 q But. Also when q it is contended, viz. the contention is there is fight q concerning empire, viz. about governing or ruling, who shall rule. for sovereignty, and glory is sought by war; yet it behoveth always, q the causes to be the same altogether which I said a little before, to be the just causes of war. that there be the very same just causes of war, which I spoke of a little before. But those wars q to which. in which the glory of q empire or bearing rule. sovereignty is propounded, are to be made q less bitterly. with less cruelty. For as when we contend q civilly. in civil matters, we do one way * if it be against an enemy: otherwise if against a competi●…. if he be an enemy [●…ith whom we contend]: otherwise if * a ●…uter against us. a competitor: [for] q the strife of honour & dignity is with the one. with the one the strife [is] for honour & dignity, with the other q of the head. for life and honesty. Thus war was * waged. holden with the Celtibers, and with the Cimbrians as with enenemies, whether should q be. live, not whether should ●…eare rule: but q war was holden with the ●…atines. with the Latins, Samites, Samnites, q Pe●…os. carthaginians, [and] with Pyrrhus, q it was fought. the fight was about the q 〈◊〉, viz. who should beat rule. Empire. The q Penes. Carthaginenans [were] truce-breakers. Hannibal [was] cruel, the rest [were] more just. q That indeed is, etc. That is doubtless q a worthy sentence or speech. a noble saying of Pyrrhus, q concerning captives to be restored. about restoring of prisoners. Neither require I gold q to myself. for myself, neither shall he give me any * sum of money or hire. price; Neither q playing the hu●…sters with war. [are we such as] q making war. make a gain of war, but q making war. warriors. Let both of us q try out or fight for our life. make trial for our life, with the q iron. sword, not with gold. Whether q the mistress will have it, etc. Lady Fortune will have you or me to reign, q or what fortune may bring. or what may betide; Let us try by q virtue. valour, and withal take this q speech. answer; q the virtue of whom. Whose manhood the fortune of war q shall be spared. shall spare, q Account it for a gift. I have determined to spare their freedom. q It is determined, me to spare. Accept it: q and I give it, with the great Gods willing. for I give it, with the good liking of the great gods. q Truly a rega●…l [or kingly] sentence, and worthy the stock of the Eacidanes. A Princely saying indeed, and well beseeming All the lineage of See the margin Latin. the Eacidanes. 4 q And also if every one by themselves. Likewise also if q And also if every one by themselves. private men, q led or drawn by the times, viz. upon such extremities. enforced by occasions, shall promise any thing to the enemy, q fidelity is to be kept in the same very thing. they must keep their promise therein: as Regulus, being taken by the carthaginians in the first * war of Carthage Punick-war: [who] when he q had been sent. was sent to Rome q concerning the interchanging. about the exchanging of prisoners, and had sworn q himself to return. that he would return; first, q as he came. as soon as he came, q he thought not in the Senate, the prisoners to be restored. his advice was in the Senate Senate house, that the prisoners should not be restored: afterwards, when * he should have been retained or stopped of his. he was stayed by his kinsfolks and friends, q choosed rather. he was more willing to return to punishment, then to q deceive or frustrate his fidelity. break his promise given to the enemy. And in the second Punic war, after q the Cannas' battle or field, viz. battle fought the●…e. the field at Canes, q left in the common treasure, or to pay to the common treasure, or disfranchiled & put from their freedom to pay as strangers. verb. which ten Annibal sent to Rome bound with an oath themselves to return, except they had obtained concerning the redeeming of those which were taken; the Censor●… left them all in fines [or to pay yearly fines] who had fors●…orne, so long as any of them lived. verb. the Censors q left in the common treasure, or to pay to the common treasure, or disfranchiled & put from their freedom to pay as strangers. verb. which ten Annibal sent to Rome bound with an oath themselves to return, except they had obtained concerning the redeeming of those which were taken; the Censor●… left them all in fines [or to pay yearly fines] who had fors●…orne, so long as any of them lived. sessed all those ten at a yearly fine so long as any of them lived, who had forsworn themselves: which Hannibal sent to Rome bound by oath, that they should return, except they obtained the ransoming of those that were prisoners [at Rome:] q nor less [or and no less] him who had found a fault by the decerning of his oath. & him likewise who had found an excuse by deluding his oath: For when as he had q gone out by Hannibal's licence. gotout of the Camp by the permission of Annibal, * within a little while after. he returned a little after, b for that he said, q because. q himself to have forgotten. he had forgotten I know not what. And then being gone [again] out of the camp, he thought himself * discharged of his oath. freed from his oath; and [●…o] he was in words, but indeed he was not. For q you ought to think in fidelity [or giving your faithful word] it is to be considered always in promises, what a man q have meant [or aught to have meant.] meant, not what he said. But the * most notable example. greatest example of justice towards an enemy, q is constituted or appointed. was showed by our ancestors. Whereas * a traitor having run away from Pyrrhus. a runagate traitor from Pyrrhus had promised the Senate, q himself to give poison to the king, [or to poison the king.] that he would give the king poison and kill him, q He, or the Senate. the Senate and Caius Fabricius delivered that runagate traitor to Pyrrhus: so as it did not not approve * by treachery or wickedness. the treacherous q the death. death no not of an enemy, both mighty and moving war * of his own accord. unprovoked. And thus q it is spoken. have we spoken sufficiently of q warlike or warfaring or military Duties. Duties appertaining to war. Let us also remember, that there is a justice to be kept even towards q the lowest men, viz. the meanest. the basest. And the condition and q fortune. estate of q servants. slaves is the basest: whom they that command to use so, as q hirelings or mercenary. hired servants to q exact. require [their] labour, and q perform just things unto them give them their due, do not q give precepts amiss. command amiss. q But. Moreover, whereas injury * is. may be done two manner of ways. that is to say, either by * violence. force or by * fraud. guile: guile seemeth to be * the property of the fox. as of the Fox, force of the Lion; both of them most q alienated or 〈◊〉ged from man. unbeseeming man: yet guile * deserveth. [is] worthy the greater hatred. But of all injustice none is q more worthy grievous punishment or more heinous. more capital, than of them, who then when they deceive most, yet * so handle the matter. do it to the end that they may seem good men. q Concerning justice enough is said. [So likewise] enough is said concerning justice. Tully here discourseth of military duties, and teacheth; 1. That the laws of Arms are chiefly to be observed in a Commonweal. 2. That whereas there are two kinds of contention, the one in debating matters by reason, the other by force; and that the first of these being proper only to man, the other more belonging to the beasts; that we are then only to fly to the later when we cannot prevail by the former. 3. showeth, for for what cause wars are undertaken. viz. That men may live in peace without injury. 4. What is to be done when the victory is gotten, viz. That they be preserved who have not carried themselves cruelly in the fight. This he illustrateth by the example of their ancestors, who received some such even into the city, as the Tusculans, Equys, etc. when as they utterly razed and spoiled other cities, as Carthage and Numance. And so likewise Corint; though he thinketh that this was done only in regard of the situation of it; lest the place might have encouraged them to new war. Here he giveth this general advice; That men should always consult for peace, so 〈◊〉 as it may be free from danger of treachery. This he teacheth by the effects, that if they had done this as he would, they had had a flourishing commonweal, which now was none in respect. 5. That as the conquerors are to provide for the safety of all whom they shall subdue, except such who have carried themselves cruelly; so more specially for them who yielding up their weapons have betaken themselves to the mercy of the governor, though there hath been no remedy but to yield or die. This he commendeth by the example and custom of their ancestors, that made such conquerors as had received to mercy cities or nations, to become patrons of the same. 6. He declareth that the justice of war, is most holily let down in the law of the heralds of the Romans; & that therein it may be seen what war is just, viz. No war but which is moved upon demands first made, or proclaimed solenaly, or b●…dden by open defiance. 7 He setteth down certain other special Duties to be observed in war. 1. That no soldier be admitted to fight with the enenue, but being first solemnly sworn. This he showeth by the authority of Cato, writing to Pompilius the General, under whom his son was a young soldier: That, whereas he had heard, that he had dismissed his son, upon the occasion of dismissing that band 〈◊〉 he was; he should not suffer him to remain in the army much less to fight, unless he swore him again; Because he being discharged of his former oath might not lawfully fight, unless he was sworn again. Also by another Letter of his, to his son; That whereas he heard that he being then a soldier in the Persian wa●… was discharged by the Consul, he should not enter the battle to fight: because it was not lawful for him who was not a soldier, to fight with the enemy; signifying that none indeed were soldiers but those which stood sworn. A second is, that there be as much mildness showed to the enemy as may be. This he proveth by the example of their ancestors; who gave to the enemy the fairest name they could: as by calling him who was properly perdu●…llis, viz. a stubborn enemy, hostis, meaning, a stranger or foreigner, according to the ancient custom; so mitigating the heinousness of the thing by the mildness of the word. This he proveth moreover by the laws of the twelve tables wherein the obstinate enemy is usually called hostis, intimating a stranger. Although he showeth that through process of time the word hostis is used properly for the open enemy, who proudly beateth arms against us. A third Duty is, That when the war is only for sovereignty and glory; as there must be the same just causes of war, mentioned before: so that war must be made with as little cruelty as may be. This he illustrateth 1. by an argument from the like, taken from the manner of our contention in civil matters. That is in civil strife we deal one way with an enemy, with whom we contend for life & honesty; and another way with a competitor who contendeth with us only for honour & dignity: so must it be in warlike matters. After, he further manifesteth it by particular examples: As by the war against the Celtibers & Cimbrians, which was as against enemies for life: and contrarily against the Latins, Sabines Samnites, carthaginians & Pyrrhus for the empire only wherein they dealt fairer, though some of these enemies were truce breakers and too cruel. Thirdly, he showeth it by a noble saying of Pyrrhus, about the restoring of pr●…soners, 〈◊〉 in very by En●…ius, to this effect; That he sought not gold but victory; neither would be ha●…e the tri●…ll made with gold. but with the sword. So that he who should win it by the sword should wear it, with as hearty good will as the great Gods gave it. This he commendeth for a princely saying, and well beseeming one descending from Achilles. A fourth precept is, That the very private soldiers perform their word to the enemy, though they promised, being enforced thereunto, by the occasion of the times and straits whereunto they were driven. This ho●… declareth also by examples; first of Regulus a worthy Roman: who in the first Punic war, being taken prisoner by the carthaginians, and by them sent to Rome about the ex changing prisoners, having sworn that he would return unless he obtained the exchange of them; he both dissuaded the matter [as incommodious] and choosed rather to return to the enemy, to endure any punishment (though he was much stayed by his friends) then to break his promise given to them. The second example is of the Censors of Rome: who fined all those ten at an yearly fine, during their lives, who had falsified their oaths, whereby they had bound themselves to Hannibal the enemy that they would return to him, unless they obtained the ransoming of certain prisoners at Rome. And so dealt they likewise with one other, who deluded the oath which he had taken, by a kind of equivocating, so imagining himself free. For he having sworn to return; so soon as ever he was gotten without the camp, he returned presently, as if he had forgot something: & then getting himself out of the camp again, he thought himself quit from his oath; as he seemed in words, though indeed he was not. Which Tully proveth by a general rule for all promises; That the true meaning, not the bare words, is ever to be respected therein. A fifth precept is this, That there be ever kept a special hatred of treachery. This he teacheth by a notable example of justice even towards the enemy and against such dealing: That when as a runagate from Pyrrhus had promised the Senate to poison him; the Senate sent the traitor back to Pyrrhus signifying his treachery: Thereby showing their hatred of such a fact, though against an enemy both mighty, and moving war unprovoked. Thus far he hath spoken of warlike Duties. Next, he speaketh of justice to be kept, even towards the basest sort and condition of people, which he maketh to be the slaves; that we are as well bound to give them their due for their labour, as to require their labour of them. Lastly, he setteth down two manners of doing injury: One by force, which is most proper to the lion; A second by fraud, the property of the fox: both of them be unbefitting man; but guile the worse of the two. And here he teacheth what is the most heinous kind of all injustice, viz. when men intend the most deceit, yet do it under a pretence of honesty, and to the end that they may seem good men. Chap. 16. The Argument. Of liberality the second part of justice, which yet Aristotle seemeth to q knit. join to Modesty: wherein Tully q teacheth three things to be looked unto chiefly. showeth that three things [are] to be looked to especially. The first [is] that we give not any thing which may be hurtful to the receiver; nor that we take from q others. some by wrong that which we * would give. may give to others. The second [is] that we * use. exercise our liberality q for the measure of our substance. according to our ability. The third [is] that we give not to whom we ought not. But we must give either q to [men] being commendable or praise worthy. to them who are commended for virtue, or to them who q prosecute us in honest good will, are lovingly affected towards us; or with whom q some band of society doth come between to us or pas●…e between us. we have some special band of society: or to conclude, [to them] who [have] deserved well of us; to whom a kindness is to be q measured back. repaid even with usury: Last of all, repeating the degrees of human society from the q chief fountain or spring. first original, he compareth them amongst themselves, that so much may be performed q how much. as is due to every one. But Seneca hath written most * carefully. diligently in many books concerning this part. q Let it be spoken furthermore, as it was purposed, of bounty and liberality. LEt us now speak, as we had q determined. purposed, of bounty and liberality, than which certainly nothing is more * beseeming or agreeable to. befitting the nature of man. q But. Not withstanding, it hath divers q 〈◊〉. cautitions. For 1 First [we] must q see. take heed q lest our bounty. that our bounty hurt not both q those themselves to whom it shall seem to be done bountifully. those to whom we would seem to be ●…ountifull and also others: * afterwards. Secondly, that our q liberality. bounty be not q greater than our substance. more, than our ability: q Then. Thirdly, that we give to every one, according to their dignity. For that is the foundation of justice, whereunto all these things * must be applied. are to be referred. For both they that do a pleasure to any one which may hurt him, whom they would seem q to will or desire pleasure. willing to profit, are not to be q judged. deemed bounteous, nor liberal, but q pestilent. pernicious flatterers. And also they q who. that hurt q others. some, that they may be liberal to others, q do fall into. are in the same injustice, as if they should turn other men's goods into their own. * For there are: autem for enim. And indeed there are many q and [those] indeed. and namely [those who] are desirous of honour and glory, who * forceablely take. catch away from some, that which they * give vainly. lavish to others. These also suppose that they shall seem bountiful towards q their own. their friends, if they enrich them by * any way. any means. But that is so far off from Duty, that nothing can be more contrary to Duty. We must therefore take heed, that we use q we must see therefore that. such liberality, as may profit our friends, and hurt q no body. no man. Wherefore q of L. Syll●…. L. Sil. 'las and C. Caesar's q translating. conveying of q money. goods from the just q Lords or maister●… owners unto * others. strangers, ought not to be thought q liberal. liberality. For nothing is liberal q which same. which is not just. q the other place of caution was, or the second caution. The second point of caution was, that the * liberality. bounty should not be q greater. more than our ability; for that they that will be more q bountiful. liberal, than their q substance. ability doth suffer, offend first in * that. this, that they are injurious q neighbours or kinsmen, next any way. to their next kin. q for what riches it were more equal, etc. For they convey those riches unto q fremfolkes. strangers, which it were more reason to be dealt and left q to their kinsfolks. to these. There is also for the most part in such liberality a greedy desire of catching and q taking away. pulling away by injury, q that store may abound. that they may have store to q give prodigally. lavish out to others. q we may also see. Moreover, we may see q the most part. very many, not so liberal by nature, as led with a certain q glory. vain glory, that they may seem bountiful: which things may seem to q come. proceed rather from ostentation, then from a q good will. free heart. And such a q dissembling, a nearer neighbour. counterfeit show is nearer to vanity, then either to liberality or honesty. The third q thing propounded. caution is, that in [our] liberality there should be a q choice. regard of q dignity. worthiness: wherein both his manners upon whom the benefit shall be bestowed q shall be looked unto. are to be looked unto, and also his q mind or good will. affection towards us, and community and fellowship of life, and kindnesses q conferred. performed before q good turns, or services or duties. for our commodities: q to our profit. All which, it is q a thing to be wished. to be wished that they may q meet together, that all which may concur it is to be wished. concur: If not, the more causes and the greater, shall have more weight [in them]. In this chapter Tully discourseth of bounty or liberality; 1. Giving it this commendation, that nothing is more be seeming man. 2. He teacheth that three things are to be looked unto in it: as, 1. That our bounty neither hurt them to whom we would seem bountiful, nor others. 2. That our bounty be not above our ability. The third is, That we give to every one according to their dignity: for this he counteth the chief foundation of justice, whereunto all these are to be referred. Concerning the first of these three; he teacheth us to beware of it: first, because they, who pleasure others with that which may hurt them, are not to be deemed bountiful, but pernicious flatterers. And secondly, because they who hurt some to be bountiful therewith to others, run into the same fault, as if they should take from others to i●…rich themselves thereby, Now he showeth that there are many of this later so●…t; as namely all desirous of glory: who suppose that they shall seem bountiful to their friends, if they may enrich them by any means But this he teacheth to be so far from Duty, as that nothing can be more contrary unto it. Whence he giveth this general direction for our liberality to our friends, That it be such as may do them good without the hurt of any man. And so concludeth, that the conveying of goods by Sylla and Cesar from the just owners to others, ought not to be thought liberality; because nothing is liberal which is not just. Concerning the second caution, viz. That our bounty be not above our ability, he giveth these reasons of it: 1. Because such as will give beyond their ability, are injurious to their next of kin: for that they convey those riches to strangers, which it were more reason, should be dealt & left to their kinsfolks. 2. Because there is commonly in such liberality a greedy desire of pulling from some injuriously, that they may have to lavish to others: 3. Because this kind of liberality springeth rather from vain glory then good nature, only to the end that they may seem bountiful; and so rather from ostentation, than a free heart. So that he accounteth ●…uch a counterfeit show, nearer to vanity, then either to liberality or honesty. For the third caution viz. That we give to every one according to their dignity; he directeth, that herein we have a special regard of the worthiness of each towards whom we use our bounty; and therein to consider both his manners and affection towards us, as also his neighbourhood, society, friendship, & kindnes●…es to us. All which he teacheth, that it were to be wished they might concur; otherwise the more of them and greater to have the more weight and respect with us in our liberality. Chap. 17. q manners to be looked unto. Manners are to be considered, not according to the exact q reason. consideration of the wise Stoic, but the civil * pattern or resemblance. image of virtue. ANd because q it is lived, lead our life. we live not with perfect men, and * thoroughly or absolutely wise. fully wise, but with q those. such in whom q it is done very well. it is very well, * if they be. if there be [in them] resemblances of virtue; I q think. take this also meet to be q understood. considered, q no man to be despised. that we despise no man, in whom any q signification, or show. sign of virtue doth appear. q And every one to be so honoured especially. Also that every man be specially so regarded, as each shall be q chiefly adorned more specially graced with these milder virtues, [viz.] * moderation. modesty, temperance, and that same iuslice q we have spoken much before. of which * many things are spoken already. For q a valiant mind and great. a haughty & a great * spirit. courage is for the most part more fervent, in a man q not perfect nor wise. who is too short in perfection and wisdom: [but] these * viz. modesty, temperance and justice. virtues seem rather to q touch. appertain to a good man. And these things [may be considered] in manners. Tully declareth in this chapter, what is to be considered concerning men's manners spoken of before, for the guiding of our liberality. And first, that we neglect no man, in whom there appeareth any show of virtue. Hereof also he giveth this reason; Because we live not with men who are perfect & absolutely wise; but with such as in whom, we think it very well, if there be but resemblances of virtue. 2. That we regard every one the more as he shall be more graced with the mild virtues of modesty, temperance and justice: and then giveth the reason hereof; Because haughty courages and hot spirits are not usually in the wisest men; but contrarily those milder virtues, viz. of Temperance & justice, seem commonly to follow a good man. Chap. 18. * how we are to consider. How the good will of others towards us, is to be * esteemed. considered. q And. NOw concerning the good will which every one * beareth. hath towards us; that is the chief point in Duty, that we give most to him, of whom we are beloved most. But q let us judge we must measure good will, not after the q guise or fashion. manner of young men, by a certain q fervency. heat of love; but rather by * assuredness and steadfastness. stability and constancy. here Tully teacheth how we are to consider of men's affections towards us. And first, that this is to be looked unto principally; that we give most to him of whom we are most beloved. 2. That we measure men's affections towards us, not by a certain heat of love for a fit, as young men are wont to do; but by the stability & constancy thereof. Chap. 19 How kindness is to be requited to them who have q if there shall be deserts. well deserved of us. But if the deserts [of men] be such, that q favour is not to be gone into or to besought, but to be requited. we are not to seek to creep into favour, but to requite kindness; a certain greater care is to be q added. used, * for. because there is no Duty more necessary than * thankfulness. requiting of * thankfulness. thanks. For if hesiod commands to restore those things which you have q received to use or occupy. borrowed for your use, with a q greater. larger measure, if that you can; what then ought we to do being provoked by a q benefit. kindness? Ought we not to imitate the * fruitful. fertile fields; which bring much more than they have received? For if we q doubt not. stick not to bestow kindnesses upon them, whom we hope will q profit us. do us good hereafter; q what one's. what manner of men ought we to be towards them, who have done us good already? For whereas there be two kinds of liberality, one of q giving. bestowing a benefit, the other of requiting, q whether we will give or no is in our own power, choice it is in our own power whether we will give or no: [but] q not to restore is not lawful for a good man. it is not lawful for a good man not to restore, if so that he can do it without injury. There are also q choises. respects to be had of benefits received: neither [is there any] doubt, but most is due q to each greatest, or who hath done us the greatest kindness. to every the greatest. Wherein yet it is especially to be * considered. weighed, with what mind, affection, and good will q every one. any man * doth it. hath done it. For many men do many things * of or through. in a certain q rashness. headiness, without q judgement, reason discretion or measure, towards all [alike:] or else being q stirred up by force of mind. carried with violence of affection, as with a certain * rushing. sudden wind: which * kindnesses. benefits are not to be accounted so great, as those which are q deferred or given offered with judgement, q considerately. advisedly and constantly. But in * gratifying any. bestowing of a benefit, and in requiting kindness, (if [all] other things be q alike. correspondent) q this is chiefly of Duty. this is a principal point of Duty; that as q every one. any one standeth q especially. most in need of [our] * aid. help, so to help him especially. Which is done q by the most. of very many * chose. clean contrary. For q from whom. of whom they hope for most, although he have no need q of these things of them, yet they * respect him. serve him * chiefly. especially. Tully in this chapter giveth directions for requiting of me●…s kindnesses to us; & first teacheth that we ought to have a special care hereof. Because there is no Duty more necessary than it. 2. That we ought to repay such kindnesses with a greater measure than we received them. This he proveth first, by the testimony of hesiod, commanding to restore things borrowed for our use, with fuller measure, if we can; and therefore much more such good turns, as have been done us frankly, and whereby we have been provoked; herein imitating the fertile fields. Secondly, he showeth it by another reason from the less thu●…; That if we stick not to bestow benefits on them who (we hope) will do us good hereafter, much more ought we on them, who have done us good already. 3. Whereas there are two kinds of liberality, one of bestowing a benefit, the other of requiting; he teacheth, that howsoever it is in a man's own power whether he will freely give a benefit or no; that yet it is not in any case lawful for a good man, not to requite a kindness, if he can do it without injury to any. 3. For kindnesses received, that we have special regard: because howsoever we owe most to him of whom we have received most; yet we are to weigh with what mind & affection any one hath benefited us. Because many men do such things upon a certain headiness without discretion, & towards all alike, or carried with some violence of affection: which benefits he teacheth not to be so great, as those which are bestowed with judgement, advice and constancy. Lastly, that in all these, this is a principal part of Duty; that (all other things being answerable) we help him most that stands in most need: though men commonly deal clean contrarily; giving to them most, of whom they look for most, although they have no need. Chap. 20. What order [is to be observed] in the q joining together o●… familiari●…e. neighbourhood of life: and first concerning the universal society of all mortal men. But the q fellowship, love. society, and neighbourhood of men shallbe q preserved best. best maintained, if as q each, or any one. every one shall be the nearest [unto us] so q most liberality shall be bestowed on him. we shall bestow most * kindness. liberality upon him. But it seemeth we must q to repeat more deeply. fetch somewhat further, what are the q beginnings of. natural * first things or principles of nature principles of neighbourhood & q the fellowship of man. human society: for, q the first [principle.] the first is that, which * appeareth. is seen in the society of all mankind. And the bond thereof is reason & speech: which q winneth one man to another. reconcileth men amongst themselves, and joineth them together in a certain natural society by teaching, learning, q communicating. conferring, q disputing. reasoning, and judging. Neither q are we further away in any thing. do we differ more in any thing from the nature of * savage. wild beasts: in which we say oft times q strength to be i●…. that there is fortitude, as in horses, [and] in lions; but we do not say [ q justice, equity, or goodness to be in them. that there is in them] justice, equity [or goodness:] for they are void of reason and speech. And surely this is the q society. fellowship which q this is the largest spreading fellowship. extendeth most largely to men amongst themselves, & to all * amongst themselves. amongst all: in the which a community of all things, which Nature hath * given or afforded. bred to the common use of men, is to be kept so, as those things which are q described. appointed by Statutes and the Civil law, be so * kept. holden as it is ordained: q of which same things. besides which [all] other things are to be so observed, as it is in the Greek proverb; All things q to owe to be. to be common among friends. q And. Likewise all those things do seem to be common q of men. to all men, which are of the same kind: which being put [for example] by ●…nnius in one thing, may be q applied. transferred unto many; [thus.] A man who courteously showeth the way to one out of his way, Doth, as if he should light a q light. candle q of his light. at his candle; That nevertheless it may light himself, when he hath q kindle it to him. lighted the other. For * that one precept is sufficient. there is sufficient commanded by one thing, that whatsoever can be lent without * loss or hurt. hindrance q it. be granted to every one, q even unknown. yea though unknown. Whereupon q those things are common. are those common sayings; Not to forbid q the running water to any. [forbid any] the running water: to suffer [any that will] to take fire from [our] fire; to give faithful counsel q to one deliberating. to him that asketh advice: which things are profitable to those who receive [them] [and] not q troublesome or burdensome. hurtful to the giver. Wherefore we must both use those things, and * do something to further the common commodity always bring somewhat to the common commodity. But because the q of every one by himself. substance q riches. of each private man is small, and the multitude of them who need q these riches. it is infinite, common liberality must be referred to that end * which Ennius speaketh of. of Ennius, that nevertheless it q may shine to himself. light himself; That we may have ability, wherewith we may be liberal to our own. Here Tully setteth down certain things concerning the neighbourhood and society of men, and how it may be best maintained. And first giveth this general precept; that as every one is nearest unto us, so we bestow most on him. Secondly, noteth the degrees of neighbourhood and society in nature. And therein the first is, that which is seen in the general society of all mankind: the bond whereof he showeth to be reason and speech. Because these join men together in a certain natural society, by teaching, learning, conferring, reasoning, judging and the like: and also because these make men to differ most from the nature of beasts: which though they may have hardiness as in Lions, horses, etc. and other such like qualities: yet can they not have justice or goodness, because they want reason & speech. Thirdly, he showeth that this society extendeth itself most largely to all men amongst themselves; & that to this end, a community of all things which nature hath made to the common use, be kept according as they are appointed by Statutes and the Civil law; And for all other things, that they be so observed, as it is in the Greek proverb; That all things be common among friends. Fourthly, he noteth more particularly, what Duties ought to be common to be performed to all, besides those appointed by laws; viz. what good soever we may do to others, without hurt to ourselves: and that we are to perform the same even to them whom we know not; according to the saying of Ennius: as, To show the way courteously to one going out of his way. To light another man's light from ours. So, not to for- So, not to forbid any the running water. To suffer any one to take fire from our fire. To give faithful counto each ask ou●… advice. And generally to yield whatsoever things are profitable to the receiver, not hurtful to the giver. Whence he concludeth that as we are to use these things ourselves; so ever to have respect to the common good of all: Yet here he giveth another caution. That because the substance of each private man is small, and the multitude of them that stand in need is infinite; that every one so order his liberality that first he look to himself and his, and so to all other in their place, and as they are nearer to him or further off in degree. Chap. 21. THere be also more degrees of society of men. * for to leave that endless number. For that we may depart from that infiniteness, there is a nearer [degree]; To be of the same q country or people. stock, nation, [and] q tongue. language, q by which. whereby men are q chiefly. especially knit together. It is also more q inward. near, to be of * one. the same City. q for there are many things common to citizens among themselves. For citizens have many things common amongst themselves; the q place where the court is kept or the market. Common Hall, q temples. Churches, q porches or galleries. Gallery walks, q ways. High ways, Laws, q rights. Privileges, judgements, Voices in election, Customs q beside. likewise and Familiarities, also many matters and q reason's [covenants or dealings] contracted. Bargains with many. But q sundry. a faster k●…ting [of men] together, is q a straighter binding together or nearer. of the fellowship of kinsfolks. For from that * infinite or innumerable. unmeasurable society of mankind, q it is shut up into very little and straight [place.] it is driven into a little and a narrow compass. For q sith. whereas this is common q of all living creatures. to all living creatures by nature, that they have q a lust of procreation, breeding or engendering. a desire of procreation; the first society is q in wedlock itself. in the very wedlock, the next in children q and then. and after that one house, q to which. whereto all things are common. And q that. this is the q beginning. original of a City, & as it were the q seminary. seed-plot of a Commonweal. [Then] follow the q conjunctions or societies of brethren do follow. kindreds of brethren; after, of q cousin germans, viz. brethren and sisters children. brother's children & sisters children: which when they cannot now be q taken or holden. contained in one house, get them abroad into other houses, as into q new towns. Colonies. [Afterwards] do follow q marriages. entermariages and q affinities. alliances, of which also q more. many kinsfolk [do * spring. arise.] Which * multiplication. propagation and q issue or offspring. succession is the original of common weals. And so the * fellowship or matching of bloods. conjunction of blood & good will [thereupon] * bindeth. knitteth men in love together. For it is a great matter to have the same monuments of our ancestors, to use the same q holy rites. religion, to have q sepulchres, or places of burial common. the same burying places. But of all societies there is none q more excellent. better, none more * sure or stable. firm, then when good men like in q manners. conditions, are q conjoined. linked together in familiarity. For that honesty, (which we have oft times q spoken of. mentioned) although we see it in another, yet it * allureth us. moveth us; and maketh us * to be friendly. friends to him, in whom it seemeth to q be in, or to dwell. be. And although * every virtue, or all kind of virtues. all virtue allureth us to * her. itself, and q maketh that we love them. causeth us to love them in whom it seemeth to be; yet justice and Liberality q effecteth it. q to be in, viz. dwell or harbour. worketh that q especially. most of all. * And indeed. But, there is nothing q more amiable. that winneth more love, nor q more coupling together. that linketh men more surely together, than q similitude of good manners. a likeness of good conditions. For in whom there are q like studies. the same desires, the same q wills. minds, q it is done in these. it cometh to pass amongst these, q that each is delighted equally with, etc. that either is as much delighted with the other as with himself: and that q is effected or cometh to pass. is brought to pass, which Pythagoras q willeth. requires in friend ship, that q one be made of many. many become one. Also that q community of fellowship, or societies common fellowship is great, which q is made of. groweth of q benefits or good turns. kindnesses given and q taken. received to and fro. q which kindnesses. Which whilst they are * common from one to another, and such as pleasure one another. mutual and pleasuring, they amongst whom q those [kindnesses] are. those happen, are q tied in fast fellowship. linked in a firm society. But when you have q viewed or perused. considered all things, in q reason and mind discourse and reason; q there is none of all societies. of all societies there is none more acceptable, none more dear, then that q which is to every one of us. which every one of us hath with the Commonweal. q [Our] parents' [are] dear, [our] children [are] dear. Dear are our parents, dear are our children, [our] q [our] kinsfolks & familiar [friends] [are] dear. kinsfolks, and familiars: but our Country alone contains [in itself] all the loves of all [these.] For which, what good man q can or would. could doubt q to ofter himself to death willingly, or to die. to take his death, if he may q profit the same. do it good? q By which [or by how much.] Whereby the beastly cruelty of these men is q more detestable more to be abhorred, who have q torn in pieces, rend their country in sunder. rend in sunder their Country with q all horrible wickedness. all manner of mischief, and both are and have been occupied q in blotting it out [or destroying it] utterly. See here the powder traitors & all of that bloody faction. in the utter overthrow thereof. But if q any contention and comparison be made. question and comparison be made, to whom most duty ought to be yielded; our Country and q most or duty ought to be given. parents are the q principal. chief, by whose q by the benefits of whom we are bound chiefly. benefits we are especially bound: All Our children All next our children and our whole house. [are] next, and our whole family; which q looketh to us and can have no other refuge. hangeth upon us alone, neither can have any other refuge. q And then. Afterwards our kinsfolks agreeing well [with us] q with whom for most part a common fortune. who also commonly have the same estate. Wherefore the necessary * comforts. aids of life, are due to those especially whom I spoke of before: but q life & commonness of table. conversation and common living, counsels, * communications speeches, exhortrtions, * comfort. consolations, and q sometimes. otherwhiles ch●…dings, q do flourish especially. are most usual amongst friends. And q that is the most pleasant friendship. that friendship is the pleasantest, which q the similitude of manners. likeness of conditions hath q yoked together. linked in one. Chap. 21. In this chapter he setteth down sundry degrees of the society of men. And first, how after the general society with all, these are nearer degrees; 1. To be of the same stock, nation & language, whereby men are more specially knit together. 2. To be of the same city, is a nearer degree. These also have many things common among themselves, as common-hals, churches, walks, highways, laws privileges, judgements, voices in election, customs, dealings, and the like, to join them together. 3. A nearer degree is of kinsfolks, to be of the same kin, wherein the society of men is brought into a narrow compass. And here he teacheth, what is the▪ very first and ●…ighest society; and so how that ascendeth and spreadeth. That whereas there is in all living creatures a natural desi●…e of procreation, so also in man: whence the first society is in wedlock, the second in children, a third in one house whereto most things are common. This he showeth to be the original of a city, & as it were the seed plot of a common weal. A fourth society he noteth to be of cousin germans, viz. of brethren and sisters children: which when they so increase that they can not be contained in one house, do get them abroad into other houses as into colonies, or new towns. After do follow entermariages: Whence ariseth a fifth society; viz. of alliances of kinsfolks by marriage, of which many kin do spring. And this propagation he noteth to be the original of commonweals. Also, that this conjunction of blood and good will knitteth men in love together; And that so much the more, because they have the same monuments of their ancestors, religion, burying places, etc. which he noteth to be a great matter to knit the hearts of men in one. 5 But of all other societies he teaches that the excellentest and most firm, is of friends; viz. when good men like in conditions, are linked together in familiarity. The reason hereof is, first, because the virtues which we see or imagine in others, do most firmly bind us unto them, & especially justice & liberality. And secondly, for the likeness of conditions in right friends; then w c● he showeth that nothing winneth more true love, nor linketh men more firmly: for that in whom there are the same desires & minds, either of them is as much delighted with the other as with himself; & thence a●…iseth that which Pythagoras requires in friendship; That many become one. Furthermore, he teacheth here, that the fellowship which groweth of kindnesses given and taken to and fro, is very great; because these being mutual and pleasuring one another, must needs link men in a firm league. Sixtly, he teacheth, that yet all things being rightly considered, the most acceptable & dear society of all others, is that which which every one hath with the common wealth. This he proveth by an argument from the less, thus; That howsoever our parents are dear unto us, and so our kinsfolks & familiars, yet our country alone contains in itself the loves of all these, and therefore aught to be dearer to us then all these. So that no good man should doubt to lay down his life for it, if he may do it good. Whence he noteth that the beastly cruelty of such men who seek the utter overthrow of their countries, or the rending the same in pieces by any mischief, aught to be abhorred of all. Lastly, he declareth, that if yet comparison and question be made, to which of these societies most duty ought to be yielded; That, 1. Our country & parents are to be preferred, because we are specially bound with their benefits. 2. That our children and whole family are next, because they depend upon us alone. 3. Our kinsfolk carrying themselves well and lovingly towards us. And to these principally he teacheth, that the necessary aids of life appertain; but that familiar conversation, counsels, speeches, exhortations, consolations and otherwhile chide, are most usual amongst friends. And in a word, that of all friendships that is the pleasantest which is linked by likeness of conditions. Chap. 22. The Argument. q It behoveth the Duties of liberality to be looked unto not only, etc. The Duties of Liberality ought to be considered, not only q from. by these degrees of society, but also by other circumstances. 1 But in q distributing or performing all these doing all these Duties, q it is to be seen. we must mark what is most * needful. necessary for every man, and what every one q can attain or cannot. is either able or unable to attain with us or without us. Therefore the degrees of friendship * must not be alike to the degrees of times. shall not be the same, which [are] of times. 2 All There are Al. And there are Duties. certain Duties which are q due rather. more due to some then to others: as, you shall sooner help your neighbour in q getting. inning [his] corn, then either your brother, or your familiar friend. But if there be a q controversy in judgement. traverse in law, you shall rather defend your kinsman and friend than your neighbour. These things therefore, and the like are to be q warily looked unto. thoroughly considered in every Duty; also custom and q exercise. practice q is to be taken. are to be used, that we may be * able to give up a good account. good q reckners. makers of account of Duties: to see by adding and deducting q what may be the sum of the rest or remainder. what sum remaineth of the rest. Whereupon q you may understand, viz. a man may understand. we may understand how much is due to every one. But, as neither Physicians, nor Captains▪ nor Orators, although they have q perceived [or attained] the precepts gotten the rules of [their [art, can attain to any thing worthy great q praise. commendation, without use and q exercise. practice: so indeed those rules of * observing. keeping Duty are q set down or delivered. taught us, that we ourselves q may do them should put them in ure. q But. For the q greatness or difficulty. hardness of the matter requireth also use and exercise. q And we have said almost enough. And thus have we spoken almost sufficiently, how honesty from which [all] Duty q ariseth or cometh springeth, is q drawn or fetched. derived from those things, which are in the law of q right of man's fellowship. human society. Tully in this chapter setteth down some other Duties, concerning our bounty and liberality: as, 1. that in performing Duties to each society mentioned, we must still consider, what is most necessary for every man; and than what each is able to attain of himself, & what he cannot without our help: and that the degrees of friendship and of times are not always alike. 2. That there are certain Duties more due to some further from us in degree than others nearer. As, that we are sooner to help out neighbour in inning his corn then our brother, or familiar friend; but in a traverse of law a man is rather to defend his kinsman or friend than his neighbour. 3. That as we are thoroughly to consider these things in every Duty, so also to put them in ure: that by long custom and practice we may become expert to know what is due to every man. This he maketh plain by a similitude taken from Physicians, Captains and Orators; who although they have gotten the rules of their art, yet cannot attain aught worthy any great commendation, without use and practice. And also that all the rules of Duty are taught us that we may practise them; and for that the hardness of the matter requireth use and exercise. And thus concludeth this point, how honesty is derived from those things which are in the law of human society. Chap. 23. The Argument. The third fountain of Duty [18] of q valiantness of courage, nobleness of stomach or fortitude. Magnanimity: which q doth come from. is bred of a contempt of human things, and a certain q amplitude or greatness. nobleness of mind: and it is declared especially in q going to [or attempting] perils. dangerous attempts, and q going about. achieving difficult matters. q There is to this at the right [hand.] This hath at the right hand q foolish hardiness or ouer●…entrous boldness. a●…daciousnesse, q 〈◊〉. obstinacy, q proud presumption. outrageous fierceness, q confidence's [or presumption.] arrogancy, cruelty, q frowardness. rash confidence, q cruelty or tyranny weiwardnesse, anger, q an immoderate desire of honour. rigour, q timorousness. ambition; at the left hand q slothfulness. fearfulness, q blockishness. cowardliness, q that. stupidity, and [other] vices of q that. the same kind. Also Magnanimity is * practised. exercised partly in * martial business or matters of war or chivalry. warlike matters, but more in civil affairs, and to conclude in the private life, concerning all which q Cicero. Tully q disputeth. discourseth diversly. But we must understand, whereas four kinds [of virtue] are propounded, from which Honesty and Duty should q slay. pro ceded; q that to seem most bright, or most glorious. that seems to shine most brightly, which is q done. wrought with a great and q haughty courage. lofty spirit, despising q human things. worldly vanities. Therefore [that] is q especially in readiness. commonly ready in q reproachful speeches. reproach, if any such thing may be said. For in truth ye young men q do bear. carry q womanlike minds. womanish hearts. And that q maid. virgin [the heart] of a man. And if there be any thing like to this. O Salmacis * thou givest. give spoils without blood or sweat. And contrarily in praises, I q wot. know not how, we praise those things, as with a more full mouth, which are done with a * noble. great courage, q both. valiantly and excellently. Hence is the [large] * discourse. field of the Rhetoricians, concerning Maratho, Salamis, the Plateans, Thermopilanes, Luctrians, and [concerning] Stratocles. Hereby our Cocles, hereby the Decians, hereby Cneius & P. q the Scipios. Scipio, hereby M. Marcellus & innumerable others, & especially the very people of Rome * hath the commendation to excel. excelleth in * valorousness or nobleness. greatness or courage. And [their] desire of q warlike. Martial glory is declared, for that we see even [ * their images of honour set up or statues. their] pictures for most part q in military attire, or the attire of soldiers. in warlike array. here Tully entereth to speak of fortitude, showing itself in a brave mind, despising these external things; teaching that it seemeth the most glorious of all the four cardinal virtues. This he proveth first by the usual reproaches & taunts which are cast upon men for their lack of courage: As the speech of the General in Ennius' taunting the cowardliness of the soldiers; That they bore but womanish hearts, and that a maid by her valour put them all to shame. And again: That the Salmatian spoils were without sweat or blood. Secondly, by the contrary praises, & the exceeding commendations of such exploits as are done valorously and with a noble spirit. This he further illustrateth, 1. By the ample praises of the Rhetoricians both of his own and former times, concerning sundry valorous persons, their noble acts, and places where; especially of the people of Rome, whose chief fame was for their valour. And lastly, for that whom the people of Rome would chiefly honour, they erected them pictures in honour of them, for most part in warlike attire. Chap. 24. q valour or manhood. Fortitude if it depart from honesty, q to lose. loseth q the name of fortitude. the name. 1 But that loftiness of q mind or courage. spirit which is seen in perils and in q labours. travels, if it q want of justice. be void of justice and fight not for the common * good. safety, but for q the own commodities [or a man's private gain] private commodity, * is in fault [or is to bereckoned faulty] is faulty. For that is not only q not the property of virtue. no property of virtue, but rather of q fierceness. brutishness, q repelling all humanity. setting all humanity apart. 2 Therefore q valour therefore. fortitude is well defined of the Stoics, when they say, q it to be a virtue. that it is a virtue * contending. fight for * in defence of equity. equity. Wherefore no man that hath attained the glory of fortitude, [ever] got [that] praise, by q wily trains and naughty dealing. treachery, & naughty deceit: for nothing can be honest which is void of justice. q That therefore of Plato is worthy. Therefore that is a worthy saying of Plato: Not only (quoth he) [that] knowledge which is q removed. severed from justice is rather to be called q craftiness. subtlety then wisdom; but also a courage which is q prepared. forward to danger, if it be q enforced or thrust forward. set on q by the own covetousness or desire of gain. for ones own greediness, and not for the common q profit. good, may rather have name of q rash or lewd hardiness. audaciousness then of q manhood. fortitude. And therefore we would have q valiant and noble minded men. men who are valorous and puissant, to be good and q simple. plain hearted, q friends. lovers of truth, and nothing at all deceitful; which are q of the middle praise of justice of the midst of all the praises of justice. 3 But that is odious, that in q this such haughtiness and greatness of courage, there groweth * very soon. most easily q obstinacy. a wilfulness, and and overgreat desire of bearing rule. For q as it is in Plato. as Plato writeth, that the general fashion of the Lacedæmonians, was to be inflamed with a desire of conquering: even so every one as he doth most excel in greatness of courage, so he specially desireth to be q prince. chief of all, or rather q to be alone. without p●…ere. And when q you shall earnestly desire. a man coveteth q to excel all. to be above all, it is a difficult thing to keep equity, which * belongeth properly. is most proper to justice. Whereupon it cometh to pass, that they cannot * abide that they should be overcomn or bridled. endure themselves to be overcomn, neither by reasoning, nor q by any public & lawful right. by any common and right order of law. And they become for the most part q givers of great gifts. bribers & q makers of factions. factious, that they may attain the greatest wealth, and be rather superiors by power, then equal by justice. q but by how much that is more difficult, by so much [it is] more famous. But the harder it is [to master this affection] the worthier it is▪ For there is no * season. time that ought q to want. to be without justice. They therefore are to be accounted valorous & of a worthy courage, q not who do, but who drive away injury. not who do wrong, but withstand it. But a true and wise valour of mind judgeth that honesty which▪ nature chiefly followeth, q to be put. to consist in deeds and not in glory; q himself to be chief. and had rather q himself to be chief. be the chief, then to seem so. For q whoso. he that dependeth upon the q error. erroneous conceit of the q unskilful multitude. rude multitude, q he is not. is not to be accounted q in great men. in the number of valiant men. But as every man is of courage most high and desirous of glory, [so] is he most easily q enforced or eged on. driven on to unjust q doings. matters. q which is indeed a very slippery place Which place is indeed slippery, because there is scarce any man found, who, q labours being undertaken and perils gone into or a●…chiued. when he hath sustained travels, and adventured dangers, doth not desire glory as a reward of his labours. Tully in this chapter teacheth, how to discern of true fortitude. And first, that boldness in dangers, if it be either void of justice, or fight for a man's private commodity and not for the common good, is not true fortitude: because it is no property of virtue, but rather of brutishness, setting aside all humanity. Secondly, he commendeth that definition of fortitude, given by the Stoics; That it is a virtue fight for equity. And thereupon inferreth first, that no man ever attained the praise of true fortitude by treachery or naughty dealing: for that nothing can be honest which is not just. Secondly, commendeth a worthy saying of Plato's to this end; That as knowledge severed from justice is rather called subtlety then wisdom; so a courage, though forward to perils, yet if it be set on for greediness of gain or other private respects, and not for the common good, ought rather to be termed audaciousness then valour. And thirdly thereon exhorteth all who would be truly valorous, to be good men and of plain hearts, lovers of truth, and free from all deceit; because these virtues rightly deserve the praise of justice. In the third place, he reproves another odious fault which attends upon too great haughtiness of mind: that commonly such men become heady, and are over-desirous of ruling. This he proveth by the testimony of Plato, showing this to be the general fashion of the Lacedæmonians, to be inflamed with a desire of conquering: and that hence; because as any one more excelleth in courage, so he more desireth to be chief of all and without peer. And then declareth other mischiefs following in them hereupon: as first, injustice; because it is hard for such to keep equity. 2. Pride, so as they cannot endure to yield to others either in reasoning or any right trial of law. 3 Bribing or corrupting others by gifts and making factions, whereby they may attain the greatest wealth and become rather superiors by wealth, then equal by justice. But yet he teacheth that the harder it is for such valorous minds to be just, the more excellent it is in them who attain it. Lastly, he concludeth hereupon that they only are to be accounted valorous, not who do wrong to any; but they who save others from wrong. And that true valour judgeth that excellency, which nature aimeth at chiefly, to consist in deeds and not in glory. Also that all who are truly valorous had rather be the chief indeed then to seem so. Because he who dependeth on the erroneous conceit of the rude multitude, is not to be reckoned in the number of val●…ant men. And beside, because the bravest minds and most desirous of glory are the easiliest over carried to unjust actions. And finally, that therefore valorous minds do stand in a very tickle & slippery place: because it is hard to find a man, who haviug achieved great exploits & dangerous adventures, desireth not glory as a reward of his labours. Chap. 25. True q magnanimity. valour of mind doth consist in two things chiefly: in contemning both q prosperous and adverse things. prosperity and adversity, and in q performing hard matters. achieving hard enterprises. A Valorous and great mind is q altogether. always discerned in two things especially: whereof the one consisteth in the q contempt. despising of outward things: when q it is persuaded to a man. one is persuaded▪ q a man to owe to admire, wish or to desire earnestly nothing but that, etc. that a man ought not either to admire, or to wish, or earnestly to desire any thing, but what is honest and comely; q and to yield to none, neither man. neither to yield to q no. any either man, or q passion or affection. perturbation of mind, nor to fortune. The other thing is, that when you are so q affected. disposed in mind, as I said before, you q do. undertake great q matters. enterprises, and those indeed most profitable, but q vehemently. very hard, and full of travel and danger both of life, and also of many things which * to life do belong. appertain unto life. All the q splendour or shining brightness. glory and q dignity. honour of these two things, I add q also. moreover, the profit * stands. is in the later; but the cause and means making worthy men, is in the former. For q that is [or consists] therein. therein is that which maketh excellent courages, q and despising worldly vanities. and such as despise all human things. And this q same thing. same q is seen. appeareth in two things; if you both judge that thing only to be good which is honest, and also be free from all q perturbation or vexation of mind. disquietness. For it is to be accounted the part of a valiant and worthy mind, both to q account small, or make small reckoning of. set light by those things, which seem to most men q picked out, or most notable or choice. singular and q very famous. excellent; and also to contemn the same with a * steadfast. stable and q firm reason. grounded judgement. And likewise this is [a token] of a valiant courage and of great constancy, so to bear those things which seem bitter, q which being many and divers are conversant [or fall out.] whereof there are many and diverse in the life & and q fortune [or condition] of men. state of man, q that you depart nothing. as that you nothing swerver from the q state. order of nature, q nothing from. nor from the dignity of a wise man. Moreover, it is not q agreeable or likely. suitable q him to be broken that he should be subdued with q covetous desire. inordinate desire, who cannot be q broken. subdued by fear. Nor q him to be overcomn of pleasure. that he should be conquered by pleasure, who hath showed himself q i●…uincible. unconquerable q by labour. by [any] travel. Wherefore both these [vices] are to be q shunned. avoided, also covetousness of money is to be q fled. eschewed. q for nothing is of ●…o strict and little a courage. For there is no such a sign of a base and ignoble mind, as to love riches: q nothing honest nor any thing more q commendable. honest and q magnificent. noble, then to q contemn. despise money, if you have it not; [and] if you have it to q employ it unto. bestow it in bounty and liberality. The desire likewise of glory is to be taken heed of, as I said before. For it plucketh away q liberty. freedom of mind, for the which all contention ought to be q to courageous men. amongst men of worthy spirits. q Neither verily [are] empires to be earnestly desired, & rather not to be received sometimes, or now and then to be laid down. And indeed we ought nor to seek for rule; but rather, sometimes either not to receive it, or otherwhile to give it over. We must also be free from all * passion or disquietness of mind. perturbation of mind, both from desire, and fear, and also from q sickness of mind. grief, and q pleasure of mind. voluptuousness, and angriness; q that quietness of mind may be preserved and voidness of care. that we may enjoy tranquillity & security, which may bring both q steadfastness and also dignity. constancy, and also worthy estimation. But many there are and have been, who earnestly desiring that same q quietness. tranquillity of mind, which I speak of, have q removed. withdrawn themselves from q public removed common affairs businesses, & have q fled or got themselves away. betaken themselves unto q idleness, quietness or ease. a quiet life. q In these. Amongst these, both the noblest Philosophers, q and far the princes or chief. & even the very chief [of them] q others also constant or upright. and indeed both severe and grave men, could neither q bear. endure the manners of the people, nor of the q princes. rulers; & q some of them. many of them have lived in q fields or desert places, or the fielden country. manor places, delighted [only] with q matter belonging to their family or private business. their home matters. q The same thing hath been propounded to these which also [hath been] to kings. These aimed at the same end, which kings do; that they might need nothing, q that they might not obey any man, that they might use liberty. obey no man, use their own liberty: whose property it is, to live q so as you will. as they list. Wherefore, ●…ith this is common q of them who are covetous. both to them who are desirous * of ruling or to be great. of power, q with those (whom I spoke) leading the quiet life [or idle.] and those seeking a quiet life, whom I spoke of; the one sort think q themselves to be able to obtain it. that they can attain it, if they have great wealth; the other, if they be content q both. with their own q and with a little. and a little. q In which indeed. Wherein verily the opinion of neither [of them] q is to be contemned altogether. is utterly to be despised. q But. For the life of q the idle or free from great business those who have betaken themselves to live quietly, is both more easy & more safe, and less grievous or troublesome to others: but [the life] of them who have q fitted themselves to the commonweal. applied themselves for the good of the Commonweal, and to q do worthily or go through with achieve great matters, is more q fruitful or beneficial to the kind of men. profitable for mankind, and q more apt. fitter for fame and q greatness. honour. Wherefore q peradventure it may be yielded to those not going to take, etc. it may be that both they are to be borne withal, who do not q taken in hand or meddled with the commonweal, viz. to deal in such matters. undertake the affairs of the Commonwealth, who being of an excellent wit, have * applied. given themselves wholly to quietness and to learning: & q and also to those. also they who being hindered by q imbecility of their health. sickness, or some other more weighty cause, have q gone back [or departed] from the common weal. retired themselves from businesses of the Common— weal, when as they q granted. yielded unto others both the * authority or liberty. power and * commendation. praise of managing of the same. But to whom there is no such q cause. occasion, if they say, q themselves to despise. that they contemn those things which most men q admire have in admiration, [as] rule & q bearing office. magistracy; q I think it to be given to those not only not for praise, but also for a fault. to those I think it worthy to be accounted not only no commendation, but also a fault. q The judgement of whom, in that they contemn glory and count it for nothing, is a thing difficult to be done not to allow or approve. Whose judgement it is very hard to disallow, in that they despise glory, and esteem it as nothing. But they seem to q think. fear the q travels and. troubles & griefs both of q offences. giving offence, and also of * having repulses. repulses, as a certain reproach and infamy. For there be [some] who q are little constant to themselves. do not agree with themselves in contrary matters; who do most severely contemn pleasures, are more tender in grief●…s, regard not glory, [and] be q broken. overcomne with infamy. And these things indeed [they do] q not constantly enough. very unconstantly. But q magistracies or governments. offices are to be q obtained. gotten, and the Common— wealth is to be q governed by them. served of them, who have q helps of dispatch of business by nature. by nature helps of dispatch of business, all lingering q cast away. set aside. For otherwise neither can q a city. the State be governed or the greatness of courage be declared. Moreover, both a q magnificence. majesty and q contempt. despising of worldly things (which q I speak of oft. I oft repeat) also q quietness. tranquillity of mind and q voidness of care. security is to be q added or practised to them going to take the common wealth. used of them, who take up-them [any] government in the commonweal, nothing less than of Philosophers, I q wot not. know not whether [not] q yea much more I suppose. more also; if so be that they will not be q careful. overmuch oppressed with cares, q and. but will q lead their life. live with gravity and constancy. Which things be so much more easy to Philosophers, q by how much not so many things in their life lie open, which fortune may strike. the fewer things they have in their life, which fortune may strike; q and by how much they less need many things. and for that they do not stand in need of many things, and also because they cannot fall so grievously, if any adversity q shall fall out. betide. Wherefore, not without cause, greater motions of [their] minds are stirred up, & greater * enterprises q matters are q meet to be compassed. to be done by q them who manage the commonweal. the governors of the Commonweal, then by them who live quietly. And q the quiet or private. therefore q by how much both greatness of courage & freedom from griefs is more to be added to these the more greatness of courage and freedom from vexations is to be used of them. Moreover, whosoever cometh q to perform a business. to achieve any great matter, let him take heed, 1 That he do not only q consider that thing. consider, how honest the matter is, but also, q how it may have a faculty or ability to be effected. how it may be discharged. 2 In which q same thing. thing q it is to be considered. a man must consider, that he neither q be out of hope. despair thorough q sluggishness, or lack of courage. cowardliness, q or trust overmuch nor be over confident thorough a greedy desire. 3 Also a diligent preparation is to be q added. used in all businesses, before you q go into them or go in hand with them or undertake them. go about them. here Tully noteth wherein a valiant mind is discerned: to wit, in two things especially. The first whereof is, in despising outward things. When as a man is persuaded that he ought neither to admire, not so much as to wish any thing but that which is honest and comely: nor yet to yield either to man or passion of mind or to fortune, but only to right reason. The second is, that when a man is thus disposed in mind, he undertake the achieving of great enterprises, & those such as may be most profitable; but very hard and full of travel and danger, both unto life, and other things appertaining to the come for't thereof. Now, he showeth that all the glory, honour and profit arising of these two things, is in this later of them: but the cause and means of making wo●…thie men, is in the former of them; because the despising of all outward things, as riches & honours, is the way to make excellent courages. This again he teacheth to appear in these two things: First, if a man judge that thing only to be good which is honest; and secondly, if he be free from all passion and disquietness of mind. Because this is, first, to be accounted the true property of a valiant mind; not only to set light by those outward things, which ●…eem to most men excellent and singular, but also to contemn them with a stable judgement. And secondly, because this declareth a valiant courage and rare constancy, for a man so to bear the hardest & bitterest things that can fall out in this life, be they never so many, as that he never serve one jot from the state & order of nature; nor from the dignity of a wise man, to do any thing against either of these. And this again, because it is not meet that he should be overcomne by any inordinate desire, who cannot be overcome by fear; much less be conquered by pleasure, who hath showed himself unconquerable by any travel. Therefore he teacheth that these things are carefully to be shunned of a valiant man; & also that covetousness of money is chiefly to be eschewed of him. Because there is no such sign of a base mind, as to love riches; & contrarily nothing more noble, then to despise money if a man have it not; & if he have it, to bestow it in bounty and in liberality. And secondly, that he is to beware of a desire of glory: because that plucketh from him freedom of mind, for which all noble spirits ought chiefly to contend. Thirdly, that he do not proudly seek for sovereignty; but sometimes not to receive it being offered, otherwhile to give it over, being had. Fourthly, that he labour to be free from all perturbation of mind, as namely desire, fear, grief, voluptuousness, and angriness; that so he may enjoy both tranquillity of mind & also security, which may bring him both constancy and a worthy estimation. here he taketh occasion to speak of some, who earnestly desiring to attain this tranquillity, have withdrawn themselves from public businesses, and betaken them to follow a quiet life. And amongst others some of the noblest and very chief Philosophers, and some most severe & grave men, because they could neither endure the manners of the people, nor the rulers, have chosen to live in remote and solitary places, delighting themselves only in their domestical occasions. Also for these he showeth what ends they aimed at herein; viz. the same ends which kings do: that is, That they might need nothing, obey no man, use their own liberty, and indeed live as they list. Now both these sorts, viz. both Philosophers and great men aiming at this tranquillity & freedom from all disquietness; the one sort, viz. the great men think that they can obtain it, if they can get great wealth; the other, if they can be content with their own and with a little. And for these two sorts he declareth that neither of their opinions are utterly to be despised. First, because the life of tho●…e who have betaken themselves to live privately and quietly, is both more easy & safe, and also less grievous and troublesome to others. But the life of those who apply themselves to government, for the good of the commonwealth, or to achieve great matters: for the same, is more profitable to mankind, and also more▪ fit for attaining fame and honour. Moreover, he teacheth that many of them who have chosen the private life may be borne withal in another respect; because being of excellent wits they betake themselves to the study of learning. As also such as being hindered through infirmity of body, or some other more weighty cause, have left the managing of the affairs of the commonwealth to others. But for them who, have no such occasion, and yet withdraw themselves from public services in the common wealth, only upon pretence that they contem●…e those things which most men so admire, as namely rule & magistracy; he showeth that he taketh it to be not only no commendation to them, but a fault in them: for that howsoever their judgement may seem not to be altogether disallowed for despising glory, yet they may withal be thought to fear the troubles and griefs which follow such callings, as a certain reproach and infamy. And then giveth the reason hereof; because some are of such a disposition, as that they agree not with themselves in contrary matters: as, who severely contemning pleasures, cannot yet endure grief; and despising glory, are yet overcomn with infamy. And therefore he teacheth that such men who have the best helps of dispatch of businesses are rather to sue for offices, that they may serve the commonwealth, all delays and excuses set aside. Because otherwise neither can the state be gouer●…ed, nor their greatness and worth declared. Moreover, he showeth, that all such as take upon them any government in the common weal, are to despise worldly things, and to seek after quietness of mind and security, as well as the Philosophers, or more, if that they will not be overmuch oppressed with cares, but live with gravity and constancy. And thereunto they must strive more earnestly, because the fewer things of the world the Philosophers have to lose, the more easy is it, to despise it; and also for that they do not stand in need of so many things, as the magistrate & great man, neither can fall so grievously whatsoever adversity doth betide. Likewise, because such great commanders have occasions of greater stir of their minds, and for that greater matters are to be done by them, then by Philosophers: whereupon they have need of more greatness of courage & freedom from vexations. Lastly, he giveth three caveats to all that are to achieve any great matters. 1. That they take heed, they do not only consider, that the matter be honest, but also that they have ability to perform it. 2. That they weigh all things so wisely, as that they neither despair, through cowardliness of the effecting thereof, nor yet be over confident through a greedy desire. 3. That as in all businesses, a man is to use a diligent preparation; so likewise, as the matter is greater, to be more careful therein. Chap. 26. The Argument. [Tully] q teacheth. showeth by many q arguments. reasons [in this Chapter] that it is q more valiant. a matter of greater valour, to excel * in businesses belonging to the city then to the war. in civil then * martial feats. warlike affairs, and [speaketh] somewhat concerning himself. 1 But whereas q very many men. most men think q things belonging to war, viz. martial feats. martial affairs to be greater than * city causes or matters. civil, this opinion is to be q diminished or abated. altered. For many have oft times sought wars, for the desire of glory; and that falleth out for most part in great q minds or courages. stomachs and [excellent] wits: and so much the rather, if they be [men] fit for q military service. chivalry, and desirous of warfare. q But. Yet if we will judge q truly. aright, there have been many q matters belonging to the city. City businesses greater and q more famous. nobler, than the q 〈◊〉. martial. 1 For although Themistocles be q be commended by right or rightfully or justly. rightly commended, and his name be more famous than [the name] of * Solons. Solon; and also Salamis be cited [as] a witness of [this] most * famous or noble. glorious victory, which is preferred before the counsel of Solon, [even] that whereby he first ordained the q judges which determined weighty matters concerning the commonwealth Areopagites: [yet] q this counsel of Solon. this is to be * thought. adjudged no less * commendable. praiseworthy than that. 1 For that q profited or did good once only. availed only once: this q shall profit the city for ever. shall for ever do good to the City. q the laws of the Athenians [are preserved] by this counsel, the institutions of the elders are preserved by this. By this counsel the laws of the Athenians, by this the ordinances of [their] ancestors are preserved. q And truly. Moreover, Themistocles in very deed said nothing, wherewith he helped q the village of Mars where the Areopagites ●…at in judgement or counsel. Areopagus. But it is true q Themistocles to have been helped. that Themistocles was helped by * Solon. him. For the war was q managed. maintained by the q counsel or direction. advice of that Senate which was q constituted or appointed. ordained by Solon. 2 We may say q the same thing the same q concerning. of Pausanias and Lisander: by whose q valorous acts. deeds of arms although q the empire is thought to have been enlarged to the Lacedæmonians. the Empire of the Lacedæmonians is thought to have been enlarged; yet in very deed they are [not] to be q compared to the laws, etc. not in the least part. compared, no not in the least part to the laws and * order. discipline of Lycurgus. q moreover they had, etc. Moreover, * upon these occasions. for these same causes, they had [their] armies both more q prepared or forward. ready and q more valiant for these same causes. valiant. 3 Neither indeed q we being children or when I was a child. when we were children, Marcus Scaurus seemed q to yield or give place. to be inferior to Caius Marius; q nor Q. C. etc. nor when we q were conversant or employed. had to to do in the Common— wealth, q Q. C. seemed to give place, etc. Quintus Catulus to Cneius Pompeius. For q weapons or wars do little avail. arms are of small force abroad, unless there be q counsel. good advice at home. 3 Nor Africanus, being both a singular man, and a worthy q an emperor or commander. Captain, q did profit more did more service to the Common wealth in q cutting down, destroying, beating down or sacking. razing of Numance, q then P. N. being a private [man] did] at the same time when, etc. then at the same time, Publius Nasica a private [man] did] when he slew Tiberius Gracchus. q Although this thing in truth is not only of the domestical reason, [or a civil matter] for it toucheth also the warlike [or belongeth to martial feats] etc. Howbeit this case indeed is not only of a civil consideration. For it concerneth also the warlike; because it was done by force and by q hand. strong hand: yet the very same was done, by q city counsel. the counsel of the City, without an army. That also is q the best. a worthy [speech] wherein I hear q me to be wont. that I am wont to be q invaded, set upon or touched. taxed of envious and lewd [persons]. * Let wars give place to peace, let the laurel branch [or garland] be granted to the orator. Let q weapons or wars, because weapons are a sign of war. arms give place to the q gown put for peace whereof it is a sign, or for civil magistracy. gown; Let the q the laurel branch a sign of eloquence or a reward thereof. laurel yield to the [Orators] tongue. For, that I may * pass over. omit q other [men]. others, did not q armed men. arms yield unto the q gown or magistracy in the city. rob, q we governing or when I governed. when we governed the Common- weal? For neither was there ever q a greater peril. a sorer danger nor greater hatred in the Commonweal: so that the very weapons q slidden speedily out, etc. by our counsel and diligence fell. slipping forthwith out of the hands of the boldest Citizens, fell [to the ground] by our counsels & diligence. q Therefore what so great a matter in war was ever done. What so great an exploit I pray you, was ever done in war? what triumph [is] to be compared [with it?] q For (son Mark) I may boast with you, For I may be bold to glory before you son Mark; * who are to be the inheritor or heir of my glory and imitator of my acts. unto whom both the inheritance of this glory, and also the imitation of [my] deeds doth appertain. In very truth, Cneius Pompeius, a man q flowing full. abounding with all martial praises, * gave me this commendation. attributed this unto me q many hearing. in the * audience. hearing of many, q that he said. whenas he said, that q himself to bear away in vain. he should in vain have borne away the third triumph, * had he not had unless he had had a place in the Commonwealth by my * means. benefit, where he might q triumph. have triumphed. q domestical fortitudes, or courage at home. Home-valorous acts, then, are not inferior unto * military exploits. martial; wherein also q more labour and study is to be put. we are to bestow more labour and study, then in these. For that * reputation, credit. honesty which we seek by a q lofty and great. haughty and princely courage, is * wrought. effected by the q strength. power of the mind, not of the body. Yet the body must be exercised and q so affected. brought into such order, as that it may be able to obey counsel and reason, in executing businesses, & q sustaining or abiding travel. enduring travel. But that honesty which we q search for, or earnestly require. search out, doth wholly consist in the care and q devising. casting of the mind. Wherein they bring no less commodity, who govern the common— wealth q being gowned or robed. in peace, than they that make war. And therefore wars are oftentimes either not q undertaken. begun, or ended, and now and then attempted, by their q counsel. advice: as the third q war of Carthage. Punic war [was] by the counsel of Marcus Cato: in which the authority of him prevailed, even q being dead. after his death. Wherefore certainly q reason or wisdom of decerning or decreeing is to be desired more, or of. wisdom in * ending the war. determining is rather to be desired, than q fortitude of striving. valour in fight. But we must beware, that we do it not rather for the q flight of fight. avoiding of war, then q for the reason of profit. in regard of commodity. q And let war be taken in hand so. And so let war be taken in hand, that no other thing but peace may seem to have been ●…ought. q And 'tis of a valiant and constant mind. It is moreover, indeed a token of a valorous and * resolute. constant courage, not to be q troubled in sharp matters. disquieted in rough storms; nor * utterly out of order. making a hurly burly, q to be cast down from the degree or stair. to be cast down from his place, as it is said; but to q use the counsel of a present mind. follow the advice of a present resolution: nor yet to q depart. serve from * wisdom. reason. Although q this is of a [great] mind or courage, that also of a great wit. this proceedeth from a worthy resolution, that also from an excellent wit, q to perceive by casting things to come. to conceive aforehand of things to come; and to q appoint. determine somewhat before, what may q happen or betide, on either part. fall out on both sides, & what is to be done when any thing shall hap pen, nor to q commit any thing. do aught that at any time q it should be said I had not thought; or had I thought of such a matter▪ I had done thus or thus. a man should say, Had I witted. These are the works of a great and lofty courage, and q trusting to or leaning upon. relying upon prudence & counsel. But q to be conversant rashly in the edge or forefront of the battle. for a man to thrust himself rashly into the forefront of the battle, & to q skirmis●… with the enemy with hand fight with the enemy hand to hand, is a certain q outrageous or fierce. brutish and q like unto beasts. beastly thing. q But. Yet when time & necessity doth require, a man must fight hand to hand, and * must prefer death. death is to be preferred before q servitude or bondage. slavery & shame. Heer Tully (about to teach that to excel in civil affairs, is no less commendation, then in martial exploits, but rather greater) showeth 1. That whereas most men think the contrary, their opinion is to be confuted. And this he doth, 1. By propounding the end which most men aim at in war, to wit getting glory and renown; especially if they be of high stomachs and excellent wits, and withal fitted for chivalry and desirous of warfare by nature. 2. By sundry examples both of the Grecians and Romans, of city businesses which have been greater and nobler than the martial. The first whereof is taken from the Athenians, by comparing and preferring Solon's counsel for Athens before Themistocles victory. That although Themistocles be rightly commended, and his name more famous than Solon's; and also that the victory of Themistocles namely at Salamis be extolled before that worthy counsel of Solon whereby he first ordained the Areopagites: Yet he thinketh that indeed, this is to be adjudged no less praise worthy then that, but more, and that for these reasons; 1. Because that victory did good to Athens once only, but this counsel should do it good perpetually; for that by this, their laws and the ordinances of their ancestors should be preserved inviolable. Secondly, for that Themistocles said nothing whereby he helped that counsel concerning the Areopagites: but he was helped by Solon & by them; because that war was managed by the counsel of the Senate which was was obtained by Solon. The second example, is from the Lacedæmonians, in preferring the discipline of Lycurgus the lawgiver, before the victories of Pausanias & Lisander. Because although the Empire of the Lacedæmonians is thought to have been enlarged by their noble exploits yet those are in no part to be compared to the laws and discipline of Lycurgus. Besides that by the means of these, they had their armies more ready and valiant. A third sort of examples is taken from themselves, in sundry particulars: as in comparing and closely preferring M. Scaurus before C. Marius; and more lately, Quintus Catulus before Cneius Pompeius, the government & counsel of the one before the Martial acts of the other. And then giveth the reason of it. Because arms are little worth abroad, unless there be good counsel at home. 3. By comparing P. Nasica a private man, to Africanus. That although Africanus was indeed a singular man and a worthy Captain, yet he did not more service to the common wealth in taking and razing Numance, than Publius Nasica when he slew Tib. Gracchus. And howbeit that act of Nasica might seem not only civil but martial, because it was done by force and strong hand, yet it was done by the counsel of the city alone without any army. This point he further confirmeth by a worthy and general approved speech of his own, howsoever some envious and lewd persons did carp at him for it: to wit, this; Let arms give place to the gown, the laurel to the Orators tongue. The truth whereof he verefieth, instancing in his own example, to omit others, By an interrogation to his son, as of a matter notoriously known; viz. whether in his government, arms did not yield to the rob, whenas (though there was never sorer danger no●… greater hatred in the commonweal: yet the very weapons seemed to fall out of the boldest enemies hands, all being hushed by his own counsel and diligence. Now he asketh him, what so great an exploit was ever done i●… war, or what triumph was to be compared with it. And then giveth a reason of this his bold glorying therein; That it was but unto him, his son, as unto whom both the inheritance of his glory, & the imitation of his deeds did appertain. And secondly he declareth further the truth hereof by the frank testimony & commendation of C●…. Pompeius' a singular man for all martial praises, who ascribed thus much unto him whenas he said, That it had been in vain for him to have had a third triumph, but for that he had a place in the common weal through ●…ullies wi●…e government, to enjoy the same. Whence he concludeth, that it is no less but even a greater matter, to excel in civil government, then martial acts: and that therefore we are to bestow more labour and study in those then in the other. And secondly teacheth, that the honour which is sought by valour, is achieved chiefly by the power of the mind, and not of the body; although the body must be brought in order, to become serviceable to the mind for executing businesses and enduring travel. But the honour which is sought by civil government, doth wholly consist in the care and casting of the mind. Thirdly, that they bring no less commodity who govern in peace at home, than they that make war abroad. And fourthly also, that by the advice at home, wars are usually ordered and managed abroad, for the attempting, beginning and endding of them. This he instanceth in the third Punic war guided by the counsel of M. Cato, which they obeyed even after his death. Whereof he inferreth, that wisdom in advising & determining or ending war, is to be preferred before valour in fight. Yet herein he giveth this caution: That we do not advise for the ending of war, only for avoiding the present danger and trouble thereof, but for the good of the commonweal. And that war is ever to be ●…o undertaken, as that nothing may seem to have been sought in it, but an honest & safe peace. Lastly, he noteth one other token of a true valorous and constant courage, viz. for a man not to be daunted or disquieted so, as to do any thing swerving from reason, whatsoever dangers or evils shall betide; but ever to follow the wise advice of a present resolution. And therefore that he have not only courage to resolve, but also an excellent wit to conceive of whatsoever may be likely to fall out; & so to determine afore what to do; and never to do any thing, whereof he may say, Had I wist. These things he teacheth to be the works of a great & worthy courage, guided by prudence and counsel. But contrarily for a man to thrust himself into danger, as into the forefront of the battle, or to fight with the enemy hand to hand rashly & without just cause, he counteth it a certain brutish and beastly thing; Although when time and necessity doth require it indeed, a man is to fight hand to hand, and to prefer death itself before slavery or shame. Chap. 27. [here he teacheth] q cruelty and also rashness [to be] far off from the duty of a worthy stomach. that cruelty and also rashness are unbefitting a valorous man. But q of or touching the overturning & spoiling of riches, that is greatly to be considered. as concerning the razing and sacking of Cities, this is principally to be considered, that q not any thing. nothing be done rashly, nor any thing cruelly. And that q is [the part] of. is the condition of * a noble mind. a valorous man, q matters being tossed or ended. in the end of broils, to punish the offenders to q save the common sort. preserve the multitude, to q retain right and honest things in each fortune. maintain right and honesty in every state. here Tully teacheth, how valorous men are to car rye themselves in the razing and sacking of cities. That they are then to take heed of two faults principally, viz. rashness, and cruelty. 2. That in the end of all, the victory being fully gotten, they look to these three things chiefly: viz. to punish the chief offenders; to preserve the multitude or common sort; and finally, to maintain right and honesty in each state and degree. Chap. 28. How perils are to be q undertaken of a valiant man. adventured by a valiant man. FOr as there are some (as I said before) who prefer q martial matters or affairs, to civil. martial prowess before City businesses: So you shall find many, to whom * dangerous. perilous and * subtle. crafty q counsels. devices seem q more bright. gloriouser & greater then quiet q cogitations or counsels. consultations. 1 q we must never at all. Indeed we must never q commit for flight of peril. so carry ourselves for avoiding danger, that we should seem q cowardous, and timorous. cowards and q but. dastards; 2 q that also is to be 〈◊〉. Yet q we must also take heed of this, that we q offer not ourselves to. thrust * that. not ourselves into dangers without cause; than which, nothing can be more foolish. 3 Wherefore in q going unto or adventuring. attempting dangers, q the custom [or guise] of Physicians is to be imitated. we are to imitate the course of Physicians, q do lightly cure. who use light cures to q men being sick lightly. them who are lightly diseased; but are enforced q to use pe●…ilous & doubtful cures. to minister dangerous and doubtful medicines to * sorer sicknesses. more grievous diseases. q wherefore to wish an adverse [or boisterous] tempest in a calm, is of a mad man. Therefore in a calm to wish a sore tempest is the part of a mad man; but to q help the tempest [or make shift in a tempest] by any means. prevent the danger of the tempest, by all manner of means, is the part of a wise man: and so much the rather if you may obtain more good, q the matter being dispatched, then good the matter being doubtful. when the matter is dispatched, then hurt while it is in doubt. 4 q and the doing of things. Moreover, the managing of * great attempts. things is dangerous partly to them who undertake, partly to the Commonweal. And also some q are called into danger. are brought into hazard of [their] life, others of [their] * reputation and favour of the people. glory, and goodwill of [their] Citizens. We ought therefore to be more ready, q unto our own perils then common [dangers.] to adventure our own then common perils; and to fight more readily q concerning or about honour. for honour and glory, then for other commodities. But there q had. have been many found, who q had. have been ready to spend not only [their] * substance. money, q but also their life. but even [their] very life for their Country, [& yet] the same q would not make the least loss [or hazard] of their glory, not the commonweal requiring. would not lose, no not the very lest jot of their glory; no though the Commonweal required it: 1 As, Callicratides, who when he was Captain of the Lacedæmonians in the Peloponesian war, and had done many things q egregiously or very worthily. very notably, overturned all q at the last. in the end, when he q obeyed not the counsel of them followed not their advice, who thought good to * transport. remove the Navy from Arginuse and not to fight with the Athenians. To whom he answered, q the Lacedæmonians, that navy being lost, to be able to prepare another. that the Lacedæmonians, though they should lose that Navy, might * make forth. prepare another, q himself not to be able to fly. [but] that he could not fly without his q reproach or shame. dishonour. And this was q indeed. no doubt a q mean or meetly ●…ore plague. pretty blow to the Lacedæmonians: 2 [but] that [was] a pestilent q blow. plague, whereby the q wealth. power of the Lacedæmonians q fell down or were spent. fell flat to the ground, whenas Cleombrotus fearing envy, had rashly q skirmished or combated. encountered with Epaminondas. How much better [did] Quintus Fabius Maximus? Of whom Ennius [wrote thus;] One man hath restored [our] q matter or wealth to us. State by q pausing or prolonging of time. delaying: For, he q put not before men's speeches. preferred not rumours before our safety: Therefore q the glory of the man is famous both after & more. ever the longer his renown is more famous. Which kind of q offending or misdoing. fault must also be avoided in q city businesses. civil affairs. For there are [some] who although that which they think, be * never so good. the very best, yet they dare not q speak it. utter it for fear of envy. Tully, being here about to set down some other duties of valour in war, showeth, that as there be some such, as prefer martial prowess before city businesses; so there are many who think subtle and dangerous plots, more glorious than quiet and safe consultations. And here teacheth, 1. That we never so carry ourselves in war, as that for avoiding dangers, we should seem cowards & dastards. 2. That we never thrust ourselves into dangers without just cause; for that, that is, of all other, most foolish. 3. That in dangers we imitate the courses of good Physicians, who use but light cures in light diseases; whereas in more grievous and desperate diseases, they are enforced to use more desperate cures. The contrary practice he showeth to be the part of a mad man rather than of one wise; & to be as if a mariner should in a pleasant calm wish a sore tempest; which a wise man should by all manner of means seek to prevent. And for this he teacheth, that we are the rather to labour unto it; if we may obtain more good by it, when the matter is quietly and safely dispatched, them we could whilst it was doubtful. 4. Whereas the undertaking of such may be dangerous partly to them who undertake them, & partly to the commonweal: also that thereby some hazard their lives, others their glory, & good will of their citizens; he teacheth for the first, that we are to be more ready to adventure of any peril to ourselves then to the common weal: And for the second, that we are to fight more readily for honour and glory then for other commodities; and so rather to lose life and all, then true glory. And yet here he giveth warning of a great fault in sundry against the former of these two. That there have been many, who though they would readily adventure not only their money but even their very lives for their countries; yet would not lose, no not the very lest jot of their own glory for the same, although never so great damage should come to it thereby. This he confirmeth by three memorable ensamples: 1. ●…e of Callicratides a famous captain of the Lacedæmonians, in the Peloponesian war: who having there done many things very worthily, yet in the ●…d overturned all utterly hereby, when he would needs fight with the Athenians contrary to all advice, and adventure rather the loss of their whole fleet as it came to pass, then by withdrawing his ships a little and avoiding that fight, to be thought to flee with disgrace; saying that although they should los●… their navy they might provide another, but he could not fly without his dishonour. A second ensample is of Cleombrotus another captain of the Lacedæmonians; who upon the like surmise of disgrace, would needs encounter rashly with Epaminondas; wherein his army being overcomne he utterly overthrew that whole estate. But for the contrary, he showeth how much better it is, by one worthy ensample in Q. Fabius Max. who deferring to join battle with Hannibal until he saw that he was able to overcome him; howsoever by delaying he received some present disgrace, yet at length setting fiercely upon him and overcoming him▪ recovered eternal glory to himself & safety to his country, for which he is so highly extolled by Ennius in verse. Lastly, he giveth warning of the like fault in civil affairs: for that therein some dare not utter their minds for fear of envy, though they think that which is the best. Chap. 29. q They that shall govern the common weal, let them altogether [or ever] keep two precepts, etc. Whosoever shall be governors in the commonweal, let them ever observe two precepts of Plato. 1 One [is] that they so maintain the profit of the q citizens. commons, that whatsoever they do, they refer it thereunto, q forgetful. forgetting their own private commodities. 2 Another [is] that they q care for or look to have care for the whole body of the Commonweal: lest whilst they q defend [or maintain] any part, they forsake the rest. uphold some one part, they leave the rest destitute. For as a q wardship or custody of a child. gardianshippe, even so the q procuration or administration. government of the Commonweal, is to be q done. used to the commodity of them who are committed [to q the government of others. be governed] and not of them to whom q the government is, etc. it is committed. q But they that provide for part of the citizens, and neglect part. But who so provide for [one] part of the people, that they neglect [another] part, do bring in a most pernicious matter into the Commonweal, q city. [to wit] sedition and discord: whereupon it q happeneth. falleth out, that some seem q peoplepleasers. popular, some q studious of every best [or greatest] man. affectionate to the nobility, [but] few to the q few of all. whole. Hereupon great q discord or breaches. dissensions sprang amongst the Athenians; and not only seditions, but also q pestiferous or sore. pestilent civil wars in our Commonweal. Which a grave & stout citizen, and worthy of q principality or dominion. rule in the Commonweal, will fly and hate, and will give himself wholly to the Commonweal, neither will he q follow after or pursue. hunt after riches or power; * but. and will so defend q it wholly. the whole estate that he may provide for all [men.] Neither in truth will he q call. bring any man into hatred or envy by false accusations; but will q so cleave altogether. always so cleave to justice and honesty, that q so long as, or whilst. so that he may maintain it, he q may. will q grievously offend any one. incur the grievous displeasure of any; and desire death rather, then forsake those things which I have spoken of. Chap. 29. Tully here, about to set down some Duties of civil governors, teacheth that they must ever observe two precepts of Plato. 1. That they always prefer the common good before their own private, and refer all that they do, thereunto. 2. That they ever have care for the whole body of the common wealth; lest upholding some one part, they leave the rest destitute. For the first of these he showeth it by the example of a guardianship: That as it is to be used for their commodity who are committed to be governed, not of them to whom they are committed; so it must be in the commonweal. For the second he confirmeth it by a dangerous effect that otherwise may ensue; That providing for one part with the neglect of an other, cause sedition and discord, which are most pernicious to the commonweal. And moreover that some of them seem popular, others set to please the nobility, but few that regard the whole. The mischief he manifesteth by particular instances, both amongst the Athenians and themselves: That hereupon great dissensions sprung among the Athenians; and not only seditions, but also pestilent c●…uill wars fell out in their own commonweal. Now these things he teacheth to be such, that a grave and stout citizen, fit to bear rule will sly, and give himself wholly to the care of the common wealth, without hunting either after riches or greatness; and will so defend the whole state, as he may pro vide for the good of each one. Lastly, he noteth this as another property of a worthy magistrate, that he will not bring any into hatred or disgrace by false accusations; but contrarily will ever so cleave to justice & honesty, as that he will rather incur displeasure or danger, yea even death itself, then leave the maintenance & just defence thereof Chap. 30. * That it is contrary to the duty [or condition] of a valiant mind, to contend, etc. To contend vehemently about honours, to be contrary to the duty of a q magnanimous [man] or one of a high mind. valorous mind. q Ambition no doubt [or verily.] AMbition & striving for q honours. promotion, is of all other most miserable. q whereof. Concerning which it is notably q said. spoken in the same Plato; q them who. that they who would contend among themselves, whether of them should rather rule the Commonweal, q to do. should do q ●…emblablely or even in like manner. after the same fashion, as if Mariners should strive, which of them should chiefly * hold [or guide] the helm. govern. 2 And the same * Plato. man hath q commanded. Al taught us, that we Al. doth teach. should q think them adversaries. take them for enemies, who * take up arms or armour. bear arms against us, [and] not those who desire to pre●…erue the commonweal by their q judgement or advice. discretion; q what a one the dissension was, etc. as was the dissension between Publius Africanus, & Quintus Metellus, without [any] bitterness. In this chapter, Tully teacheth that m●…n of worthy resolutions, aught to beware of ambition, and all bitter contending for promotion & bearing rule, as a thing very miserable. This he teacheth by two testimonies of Plato; 1. Comparing their contentions to the contentions of mariners striving which of them should govern the ship, & in the mean time endanger all. And secondly, directing that we should take them only for enemies who bear arms against us; notthose who strive to help to preserve the commonweal by their discretion. This later sort of contention Tully approveth by the example of the dissension between P. Africanus and Q. Meteilus, which was for the more safe preservation of the common weal, without any bitterness. Chap. 31. [It is] q To moderate anger is the property of fortitude. the property of fortitude, to moderate anger. 1 NEither q indeed. certainly are they q to be heard. worthy to be heard, who shall hold opinion that we are to be q grievously, exceedingly, vehemently. furiously 〈◊〉 angry q at our enemies. with our enemies, and do judge it the property of a * courageous or generous. magnanimous and valiant man. 2 For there is nothing more commendable, nothing more q worthy or beseeming. seemly for a great and q famous man. noble parsonage, than q easiness to be appeased, & gentleness placability and clemency. 3 Moreover q in free people or cities. amongst free people, and q in equality or equity of law. where there is equality of law, there must be used also * mildness. gentleness, and q loftiness of mind. nobleness of courage, q which is said. as they * term it. call it; lest if we be q anger at either. angry either with [those] q comers unseasonablely, or cravers without shame viz. impudent askers. who come out of time, or who ask impudently, we fall into q weywardnesse. testiness [both] unprofitable and odious. And yet q mildness and mercy. gentleness and clemency * are. is so to be * allowed. approved, that severity be used for the q cause of the commonweal or good of it. Commonweals sake, without which a City cannot be q ordered. governed. Chap. 31. Heer Tully, about to teach that it is the property of true fortitude to moderate anger, 1. Reproveth them as unworthy to be heard, who hold this opinion, That we are to be exceedingly angry without enemies, and judge it to be the property of a valiant man. 2. showeth that contrarily nothing is more commendable, nor more beseeming a great & noble parsonage, than placability & clemency. Thirdly, that among all free people, and which enjoy equality of law, mildness & gentleness must be joined with nobleness of mind. Because otherwise the magistrates, being angry either with such as come at unfit times, or who are too bold or importunate, fall into testiness or rage, which is both unprofitable and odious. Lastly, giveth this caution, that yet gentleness and clemency are so to be approved of, that severity be also used sometimes for the common good, for that without it a city cannot be governed. Chap. 32. q we must temper ourselves especially from anger in punishing. We must especially abstain from anger in all kind of Correction. q But both all punishment. ALL punishment ought to be void of q taunting reproach or contempt. contumely; q neither to be referred to the commodity of him who punisheth any. and not be done to serve his turn who punisheth or q chastiseth in words. rebuketh any, but to the * behoof. commodity of the Commonweal. 3 We must also beware, q lest the punishment be greater than the fault, and lest some be punished for, etc. that the punishment be not greater than the fault; 4 And that some be not punished for the same causes, others q be not indeed called, [or spoken to.] not so much as spoken to. 5 q Also anger is to be prohibited [or avoided] in punishing. Likewise, we must chiefly refrain from anger in punishing. For he that * goeth about to take punishment. goeth to punish [others] being angry, shall never keep that q measure. mediocrity which is between q overmuch. too much and too little. Which q mediocrity. [moderation] pleaseth the * Peripatetics. Peripatecians: and it q pleaseth. liketh them * justly or well. rightly, so that they would not commend angrynesse, & say, q it to be profitably given of nature. that it is profitably given of Nature. But that [ q affection of angrynesse. affection] is in all * cases. things to be q refused. eschewed: and it is to be wished, that q they that are over such as govern the Commonweal, q be like of laws. be like the laws; which are q led or drawn moved to punish not by * wrath. angriness, but by equity. In this chapter, Tully setteth down certain Duties to be observed in all manner of correction: as, 1. That all punishment and chastisement ought to be done without contumely, viz. without taunting or bitter speeches or contempt to the party punished. 2. That it be not done to serve his turn only who inflicteth the punishment, but for the good of the commonweal. 3. That there be special care had, that the punishment be not greater than the fault. 4. That all offending alike, be punished alike; & not some punished, others not so much as spoken to. Lastly, that they who are to punish others do refrain from anger; and that for this cause chiefly; Because he that goeth to punish others being angry, can never keep the true mean which is between too much & too little. And for this keeping a moderation, he commendeth the opinion of the Peripatetics, only does liking them for their approbation of angriness, affirming it to be profitably given by nature. But for this passion of angriness he teacheth, that it is in all things to be eschewed: and that it were to be wished, that such as govern the common weal should be like the laws; which punish, not by angriness, but only by equity and justice. Chap. 33. It is [the condition] q of a valorous man of a noble courage, neither to wax q arrogant, disdainful, proud. insolent q in prosperous things, nor to be east down in adverse. in prosperity, nor to be dejected in adversity. q And also let us fly greatly pride, disdainfulness, & arrogancy in prosperous 〈◊〉 and flowing to our will. Moreover, in prosperity, and when things flow even at our will, Let us earnestly fly pride, disdainfulness and arrogancy. For as it is q a part of inconstancy to bear adverse things, so prosperous immoderately. a token of lightness, to take adversity [impatiently]; so likewise to use prosperity immoderately. q And an even proportion [or equalness] in all the life For a continual evenness in all a man's life, also the same countenance ever, q and the same forehead. and one manner of cheer, is q famous or notable. very commendable, as we have q received. heard concerning Socrates and concerning Caius Lelius also. I see indeed Philip king of the Macedonians to have been q excelled or gone beyond. surmounted by his * Alexander. son in * noble exploits, or prowess. valorous acts and glory, q to have been superior. [yet] in q facility or gennesse and humanity mildness & courtesy to have been far superior. Therefore the one [was] always q great. noble; the other oft times most q filthy or dishonest. beastly. That they seem to q give precepts or teach well. advertise aright, who warn us, q that by how much we are superiors [or higher] we carry ourselves more sub●…isly by so much. that the higher we are, the lowlyer we * demean. carry ourselves. q Indeed Panetius saith. Panetius reporteth, q Africanus his hearer [or scholar] to have been wont to say. that Africanus his hearer & familiar friend, was wont to say, that like as [men] q are wont. use q to deliver to tamers [or horsebreakers] horses vaunting with fierceness for their often contentions of battles. to put to riders, horses waxing over fierce for their often fights in battle, that they may q use. have them the * readier. more gentle; even so should men * heady, headstrong. unbridled through prosperity, & q trusting too much to [or overweening of] themselves to owe to be brought, as it were, into the circuit of etc. over much trusting to themselves, be brought as it were, within the compass of reason and learning, that they might thoroughly behold q weakness. the frailty of * the world. human things, and the q variety or inconstancy. wavering of fortune. q And also we must use most of all the counsel of our friends in our most high prosper●…tie. Moreover, also in our greatest prosperity, we are especially to use the advice of our friends; q and a greater authority is to be given to them then before. and we must give them also a greater authority than before: and at q those same. those times we must take heed, that we open not our ears to flatterers, nor suffer ourselves to be * clawed with flattery. flattered, wherein it is an easy thing to be deceived. For we then think ourselves q to be such as we may be praised by by right. such, that of right we may be praised: whereof innumerable faults do * arise. spring; whenas men puffed up with q opinions. conceits, are shamefully scorned, and are q conversant [or entangled.] wrapped q in the greatest errors. in very gross errors. q But truly these matters hitherto. But of these matters thus far. Tully, here proceeding to teach other conditions of a noble courage, showeth, 1. That in prosperity, and when all things flow according to a man's will, he is carefully to shun these vices viz. pride, disdain, arrogancy, which usually attend upon prosperity & great courages. Because as it is a token of inconstancy and levity, to bear adversity impatiently; so of the other side to use prosperity so immoderately, as to fall into these vices. 2. He teacheth that a continual evenness kept in all a man's life, and as it were the same countenance, and one manner of cheer, is very commendable. This he proveth, first, by the examples of Socrates & C. Lelius. Secondly, of Philip king of Macedonia; who howsoever he was inferior to Alexander his son, in valorous acts & glory: yet for continual gentleness 〈◊〉 courtesy was so far superior unto him, that he was always noble; whereas Alexander by the contrary carriage was oft very base & ignoble, through the vices mentioned. Hence he gathereth this, as a worthy advertisement; That the higher we are, the lowlyer we carry ourselves. Thirdly, he illustrateth it by the testimony of Panetius, concerning a speech of African his hearer and famili●…t friend, who was wo●…t to say, and so to urge this point, by this similitude, That like as men are wont to put their great horses to riders, to the end to have them more gentle, whereas otherwise they would prove over fierce, through their often fights in battle; even so men being too unbridled through an overweening of themselves, are to be brought within the compass of reason and learning, that they may thoroughly behold the frailty of all the things of this life, and the inconstancy of fortune. Lastly, he directeth that in our greatest pro●…peritie we be especially careful to v●…e the advice of our friends, & then also to give them greater authority over us then ever before, for the free advising of us. And, of the otherside, to take heed chiefly at such times, that we hearken not to flatterers; nor suffer ourselves to be flattered in any case; because it is so easy a matter to be deceived by them. for that, listening to them, we think ourselves worthy of what praise soever they give us: whereof he showeth, that innumerable evils do spring; and namely this, that being puffed up with conceitedness of ourselves, we are oft times scorned and abused very shamefully, & wrapped in very gross errors. Chap. 34. The duty of a noble mind in an honest q vacation or freedom from business. private life. q But that. THis than is to be * taken thus, that the. so judged; The greatest q things or deeds. acts, and of the greatest courage to be q done. undertaken by them, who govern the commonweal; because their q administration. government q lieth open or reacheth most largely. extendeth the farthest, and appertaineth unto most. q And to be, and have been. Yet there be, and have been many of great courage, even in the * private. quiet life, who would either q trace or try out. search out or q take in hand. endeavour certain great * enterprises. matters, and q contain. keep themselves within the bounds of their own businesses; or else being * placed or set. cast between Philosophers, and those that rule the Commonweal, would be delighted with their own q household business goods domestical or private estate. household substance; q not heaping it up indeed by every way. not heaping up the same by all manner of means, nor * barring. excluding theirs from the use thereof; but rather imparting it both to [their] friends, & to the Commonweal, * if at any time need should require. if there should be need at any time. q which substance or goods. Which first let it be q gotten well. well gotten, q neither by no filthy, etc. by no dishonest nor q filthy. odious gain. q then that it showeth itself profitable to very many, so that worthy. Secondly, let it be in readiness for the good of many, so they be worthy: q afterwards. Lastly, let it be increased by q discretion. discretion, diligence and q sparing. thrift; q neither let it lie, or neither that it lie open to, etc. and let it not lie open rather to lust and riot, then to liberality and bounty. q It is lawful for a man observing these prescripts to live. He that observeth these precepts may live q magnifically, etc. royally, gravely, and q courageously or stoutly. stoutly, and also plainly, faithfully, and friendly, q to the life of men for the life of man. Chap. 34. Tully here (being about to teach that there may be a noble mind, even in a private life, & some Duties thereof) declareth first, That although the noble acts & which beseem best the greatest courages, are to be undertaken by them chiefly who govern the commonweal, because their government appertaineth to the most; yet that there be and have been many of noble minds who have lived a private and a quiet life, Who would still be either searching out or endeavouring some great matters, yet keeping themselves within the bounds of their own callings & businesses; Or else being of a middle rank between Philosophers, & those that rule the commonweal, have delighted themselves with their own domestical affairs and estate; not heaping up riches by any ma ner of bad means, nor excluding others from the use the●…eof; but rather imparting their goods both to the use of their friends, and of the common weal, if there have been need at any time. Secondly, he giveth certain precepts concerning the substance of such. 1. That it be well gotten▪ and not by any dishonest or odiou▪ game. 2. That they have it ever in readiness for the good of all who stand in need thereof being worthy, and to whom they are more specially bound. 3. That it be increased by discretion, diligence and thrift, & be ready always to be bestowed not on lust and riot, but on liberality and bounty. Lastly, he declareth the benefits of observing these precepts; that a man may live royally, bravely and stoutly; and also honestly & profitably for the life of man. Chap. 35. The fourth fountain of duty [is] Temperance: which Aristotle thinketh to be a moderation of q affections or lusts desires, [viz.] of those only which are q conversant or occupied. employed about the pleasures of the q throat, and parts about the secrets. gullet and of the groin. A temperate man, quoth he, desireth those things which he ought, and as he ought, and when he ought. The q head. principal point hereof, is, that the desire obey reason, as the child [his] Scholomaster. From thence ariseth that q comeliness. decorum, q which Tully delivereth divinely, how &c. which, how it is q drawn. derived from nature and other circumstances, and q honesty. graceth every * action. duty of life, Tully sets down divinely. IT followeth, that we speak of q that one part of honesty remaining. one other part of honesty which remaineth, wherein q shamefastness. bashfulness, and temperance, as it were a certain ornament q of life. of man's life, and also of modesty, and all q quieting of the perturbations. appeasing of the passions of the mind, and the measure of things, is seen. q That [comeliness] is contained in this place. In this place is contained that [comeliness] which may be called in Latin decorum; for it is called in Greek 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. The q force of this. nature hereof is, that it cannot be separated from honesty: For both that which becometh is honest, & also that which is honest becometh. q But what a difference there is of honesty and comeliness. But what difference is between honesty & comeliness, may q more easily. sooner be q understood. conceived then q explained. expressed. For whatsoever it is which becometh q it than appeareth. doth then appear, when honesty q is. hath gone before. Tully, coming to speak of the fourth fountain of Duty, viz. temperance, which he calleth the other part of honesty; showeth first what parts it containeth under it: to wit, bashfulness & temperance, which he termeth to be a special ornament of man's life: and withal, modesty & calmness in appeasing all passions of the mind, and moderation in keeping a measure in all things: and finally that comeliness which is called in Latin decorum, as it is called in Greek●… 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Secondly, he teacheth the nature of this comeliness to be such▪ as that it cannot be separated from honesty: because that which becometh is honest, & that which is honest becometh; But for the difference that is between these two viz. between honesty and comeliness, that it may sooner be conceived in our minds then expressed in words; And that comeliness doth then only appear when honesty hath gone before. Chap. 36. q There is a double decorum. Comeliness is double: general, which consisteth in every duty; and special, which properly * ariseth of or attendeth upon temperance. followeth temperance. Saint Ambrose taketh that to be the general comeliness, which q is. ariseth of a q agreement. harmony and q agreement. consent of all virtues, amongst themselves, and shineth brightly in the q concord. agreement of the q universal world. whole frame of the world: the special [to be that] which shineth in any one part [thereof] but especially in Temperance. Therefore it appeareth what is q becometh. decent, not only in this part of honesty, whereof q we must dispute. we are to discourse in this place but also in the three former. q for both it becometh one. For [as] it is decent q both. to use reason and speech discreetly, and to do that which * a man should do advisedly. you do, considerately; and also both q to see and to defend in every matter that which is true. to espy and maintain that which is true, in every matter; [ q and. so] contrarily q it doth as much disgrace to err [or miss.] to err, to slip, to be deceived, doth as much disgrace, as to dote, and to be q taken [or distraught] in mind. distracted in mind. All just things also are comely; and chose all unjust things, as they are dishonest, so they are uncomely. q There is a like reason of fortitude. The nature of valour is like hereunto. For q what thing. that which is done manfully and with a great courage, q that seemeth. seemeth meet for a man, and comely: q and what. and that which [is done] * otherwise. contrarily, as it is dishonest, even so it is uncomely. Wherefore in truth, this comeliness, which I speak of, doth appertain to all honesty; and doth so appertain [thereunto] that it is seen not * after a certain hidden sort. in a certain hidden manner, but q may be in readiness. appeareth openly. For there is a certain q thing that becometh. decency, & the same is q understood. perceived in every virtue: which may be separated from virtue rather by q cogitation. imagination, than * in very deed. indeed. For, as * comeliness and beauty. beautifulness & fairness of body cannot be q parted. separated from health; so this comeliness whereof we q speak. entreat, q also it is indeed confused or mingled. is indeed wholly mixed with virtue, but is distinguished in [ones] mind and q cogitation. conceit. q ●…nd the. Moreover, the description thereof is q double. of two sorts. For both we q double. understand a certain gerall q mean. decorum, which q comeliness. is in all honesty; and another q is conversant or exercised or hath to do. under this, which appertaineth q subject to this, viz. a special comeliness. to every several part of honesty. And that former is wont q almost or for most part to be defined thus. to be commonly thus defined; q That thing to be comely. That, that is comely, which is agreeable to * man's excellency. the excellency of man, q in which thing. wherein his nature * is different. differeth from other living creatures. q But which part is subject unto the general, they define it thus, that. But they define that part which is under the general [viz. the special]▪ in such sort, that they will have that to be comely, which is so agreeable to nature, as both moderation & temperance may appear in it, with a certain * comely appearance honest show. [Now] we may q think. conceive q these things to be so, or thus meant. that these things are so q understood. meant by the Philosophers, by that comeliness which the Poets follow: concerning which q more things are wont to be, etc. more is wont to be spoken in another place. q But then we say. But we say that Poets do then observe q that which is decent. that grace which becometh, when that which is q worthy or befitting every person. fitting to every person, is both done and said. As if Aeacus or Minos should say; q Let them hate, 〈◊〉 shall hat. so that they fear. Or [this.] The father himself is a grave to his children: It should seem uncomely, because we have heard, q them to have been just. that they were just. But Atreus saying [so,] q applauses [or clapping of hands] are stirred up. it would cause a great applause: for q the speech is worthy the. it is a speech beseeming the person. But Poets will judge q of. by the person, what q may b●…e. is comely for every one. q And. Moreover, nature itself hath put upon us q a pers●… great ex●… surmou●… their cre●… a parsonage of great excellency & pre-eminence, above all other living creatures. Wherefore Poets will q see. discern in great variety of persons, what is befitting even to the * wicked sort. vicious, and what becometh [them.] But sith that the parts of * constancy, q settledness. moderation, temperance, and q shamefastness. modesty, are given [us] by nature, and seeing that the same nature teacheth us not to q neglect. be careless, * 〈◊〉 what manner how we q ca●…. behave ourselves towards q me●… every man; * it is b●…ht to pass●… It cometh to pass, that it both appeareth, how far that comeliness, which appertains to all honesty, q doth extend ●…or itself, and also q this comeliness this which is seen in every several kind of virtue. For as the q beauty. fairness of the body, with a fit composing of q the members or limbs. every part, doth move the eyes, and delighteth [●…hem] q in this same th●… even in this, that all the parts consent together amongst themselves with a certain q pleasant grace or comeliness. grace: even so this comeliness which shineth in [our] life, q moveth. q shineth out or bright. winneth * the good liking. the approbation of those with whom we live, by an order q and. constancy, & * measure. moderation, of all [our] words and deeds. q Therefore a certain reverence is to be given. There must be used therefore a certain reverence towards men, both q of every best [or chief] man. to every one of the best sort, and also * of the rest of meaner degree. to others. q for it is not only [the part] of an arrogant man but also dissolute, to neglect what every one 〈◊〉 of him. For to be reckless what every one thinketh of him, is not only a sign of an arrogant body, but also of one altogether q reckless or out of all order. dissolute. But there is q that differeth. a certain difference q that differeth. Al in each respect Al. in having a respect of men. to be had, between justice & q shamefastness. modesty. q The parts of justice are. It it is the part of justice q not to wrong any by violence. to offer men no violence; of modesty, not * to give offence to to offend [them]: wherein the q force. nature of comeliness is q most thoroughly seen. seen especially. These things therefore thus declared, I think it q understood or plain. sufficiently understood, q what a one that thing is. what it is which we * affirm to be decent. say, to become. here he, proceeding to handle this matter of comeliness, showeth, 1. How in a general manner it appertaineth to every part of honesty, viz. to every of the other three virtues as well as to temperance. And first, how it belongeth to prudence, by a comparison, Because as it is decent to use reason & speech discreetly, & to do whatsoever a man doth advisedly, and withal both to espy & to maintain only that which is true in every matter; so contrarily, to err & to be deceived, doth as much disgrace as to dote or to be distracted in mind. Secondly, how to justice: because all just things are comely; and contrarily all unjust things, as they are dishonest, so they are also uncomely. And thirdly, for valour: because that which is done manfully and with a valiant courage is comely for a man; & contrarily, what soever is done otherwise is dishonest and uncomely. Whence he concludeth this first point, that this comeliness appertaineth to each part of honesty; & that so, as it may be seen therein not darkly or in a hidden manner, but openly. Yet so, as that it can hardly be separated from the several virtues themselves; but that it is rather distinguished, by imagination and in a man's conceit; then indeed. This he also illustrateth by a fit resemblance: That as fairness of body cannot be separated from health; so neither this comeliness can be distinguished from virtue, but only in our mind and conceit: because it is so wholly mixed therewith. In the second place he cometh to divide this comeliness, making it to be of two sorts, viz. general and special, & then defineth them severally. And first, for the general he showeth that it is wont to be defined thus; That it is such a comeliness as is agreeable to the excellency of man in all things; wherein his nature differreth from other living creatures. The special comlilinesse is that, which is so agreeable to nature, as that both moderation & temperance may appear in it, with a show of honesty. That the philosophers did take these things so, he proveth it by the testimony of the Poets in that comeliness which they follow: Of whom we say, That they observe a right decorum; whenas they bring in every person both saying and doing that, which is fit thing unto him. And contrarily that they should utterly misle this decorum (As for example) if they should bring in Aeacus or Minos wickedly, it would be very absurd, because they were known to be just men: Whereas bringing in Atreus so speaking, it would be very comely and move a great applause, because he was a vile man. Also the reason why they observe this decorum is, Because they judge by the persons what is comely for every one. Secondly, he declareth it from the work of nature itself: because it hath given man a parsonage of great excellency & pre-eminence above all other living creatures. Whence the Poets will, in great variety of persons, discern what is fitting and what unfitting to each. And moreover, for that nature hath given us the several parts of constancy, moderation, temperance and modesty, and teacheth us withal, that we be not careless how we behave ourselves towards every man; it showeth us likewise how far that general comlineste, which appertaineth to all honesty doth extend itself; and also that special comeliness, which is seen 〈◊〉 every several kind of virtue. For the excellency of this comeliness kept in every action, and how it winneth the approbation of all, he illustrateth by a very familiar and notable ensample. That as the fairness of the body and comely proportion of every part moveth the eyes of others, and delighteth them with the grace appearing therein; even so a comeliness shining in our life, winneth the good will and liking of all with whom we live, by observing order, constancy, and mode▪ ration, in all our words and deeds. Also for the more full accomplishment of this comeliness, he teacheth moreover that we must use a certain reverence towards all sorts, not only them of higher rank, but also others of meaner degree. Because this will bring us a good estimation with all men. Whereas contrarily to be reckless what every one thinketh of us, is not only a sign of an arrogant body, but also of one altogether dissolute. Lastly, to this purpose he setteth down a difference between justice & modesty: That it is the part of justice not to offer violence to any; but of modesty, not to offend them; & that herein the nature of comeliness is seen especially. And so endeth this point, what comeliness is; as being plain enough by that which hath been said. Chap. 37. q Comeliness to be Comeliness is according to nature, & q to avail. availeth very much both in all * kinds. parts [of virtue] and especially in Teperance. q And the duty which is. Moreover, also the duty which q drawn from it proceedeth from that [comeliness] * followeth first. hath first of all this way, which leadeth unto the q agreeableness. convenience and preservation of nature: which if we will follow as a guide, we shall never q go awry. err. And we Al. And 〈◊〉 both followeth that which is. shall q sharp, and quick sighted. follow that which is both acute, and witty by nature, and that which q is agreeable to the fellowship of men. serveth fitly for the consociation of men, and also that which is q vehement. forcible & manly. But the greatest q force. efficacy of comeliness, q is in this. standeth in this part whereof we dispute. For not only the motions of the body, which q are apt, or befitting nature. agree unto nature, but much more the motions of the mind, which are likewise agreeable unto nature, are to be approved. Chap. 37. In this chapter T. setteth down the efficacy of true comeliness; that it leadeth unto the convenience and preservation of nature, being agreeable thereunto: And that following nature, we cannot err; but we shall both follow that which is acute & witty, viz. prudence; and that which serveth for the increase of human society, to wit justice; and likewise that which is truly valorous. So that he showeth that there is a comeliness in all these three parts of honesty; yet so, as that the greatest efficacy of it consisteth in this fourth part of honesty, to wit in temperance. And that, because all motions not only of the body, but much more those of the mind, if they be agreeable to nature, are approved and liked of by all. Chap. 38. The fountain of all modesty q to be. is, that the appetite obey reason: q But. And Ambrose thinketh this same to be the q primary, or chief first fountain of all duties. FOr the power of the mind & of nature q is double. consisteth in two parts. The one part q is put or placed in appetite. consists in appetite, q which is in Greek which in Greek is called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, which q snatcheth or haileth. pulleth a man hither and thither. The other q [consisteth] in reason. in reason: which teacheth and showeth plainly what is to be done or to be q fled. au●…ided. So it cometh to pas●…e that reason ruleth, and appetite obeyeth. q And. Moreover, every action ought to q be without. be free from ●…ashnesse and negligence: neither indeed [aught a man] to do any thing, whereof q he cannot give a provable cause. he is not able to render a probable reason. For this is * almost the definition. in a manner the * almost the definition. description of Duty. We must also q effect [or bring to pass this] look to this that our * desires be ruled by reason. appetites obey reason, and neither run before it q for. through rashness, neither * leave it. forsake it, thorough sloth or q dastardliness, or lack of courage. cowardliness; and that they be quiet, and q void of. free from all * trouble or passion perturbation of mind. Whereupon all constancy & q all moderation shall shine bright. moderation shall plainly appear. For, what q appetites. desires q go too far astray. stray q further. overfarre, and as it were insulting too much, either in q coveting. longing after [things] or flying [from them] are not sufficiently stayed by reason, these without doubt q pass over or exceed. pass their q bound. bounds and measure: for they * forsake. ●…eaue and q cast away or set aside. reject obedience, neither yet obey reason, whereunto they are subject by the law of nature. q Of which motions. Whereby not only q the minds are troubled, but also the bodies. the minds, but * even. also the bodies are disquieted. We ●…ay see the * in the very faces. very faces of angry [men,] or of those who are moved by any lust or fear, or [who] q gesture, leap or skip. rejoice with too great pleasure: all whose countenances, voices, motions, & q stations or hehaviours. standings are changed. Of which q that is understood this is gathered (that we may return to the form of Duty) q all appetites to be that all appetites are to be q drawn in or plucked in, assuaged. restrained and abated, and q and all heed and diligence to be stirred up. that we must stir up all q and all heed and diligence to be stirred up. care and diligence, that we do not any thing rashly and at q venturously o●… by chance. adventure, [nor] q vnadu●…sedly. inconsiderately, and negligently. q for neither are we For we are not so bred of nature, that we should seem to be made q to play. for play and for q ●…est. sport; but rather to severity, and to certain more weighty and greater studies. And as for q those [viz.] sport or jesting. play and jesting, we may indeed use them, but e●…en as [we use] sleep, and other q rests. recreations, q then. at such time when we have q satisfied. dispatched [our] weighty and earnest businesses. And the very manner of [our] q jesting or pastime sport aught to be q not immoderate. neither excessive, no●… immodest, but * honest. ingenuous and * merry. pleasant. For as we q give. grant not to children all liberty of play, but such as is not q strange from the actions of honesty. estranged from honest exercises: so in our very jesting there should appear q let some light of an honest wit appear. some light of an honest disposition. Chap. 38. Here 〈◊〉 (about to s●…t ou●… the ●…ountaine of all modesty and comeliness, therein; to wit that the appetite obey reason) teacheth first, That the motions of the mind which he spoke of, are of two sorts: The one sort consisting in appetite, which appetite the ●…recians call 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, which haileth a man hither or thither. The other sort consisting in reason: which reason teacheth and showeth plainly, what is to be done and what to be avoided. Whereupon it is that reason is to rule, appetite to obey. And thence he showeth that these properties ought to be in every action: 1. That it be free from rashness and negligence; and that so far, as that a man ought never to do any thing whereof he is not able to tender a probable reason. For that this is almost the definition of Duty. 2. That our appetites or wills must neither run before reason through rashness, nor leave the following of it through sloth or cowardliness. 3. that our desires and motions must be quiet & free from all perturbations & passions of mind; and so thereby all constancy and moderation shall plainly appear. Then he giveth this reason hereof: Because what desires or motions st●…ay over far from reason, or are too vehement in longing after any thing or flying from it, those pass their bounds, for that they therein do not obey reason, whereunto they ought to be subject by the law of nature. And that thence ariseth the disqu●…etting not only of the minds, but of the bodies also. This he proveth by experience: giving instance in the sudden changes wrought in men by such 〈◊〉 motions and desires. How in angry men and those who are vehemently moved through lust, fear or any tickling joy, their very countenances, voices, motions and standings are changed. Whereupon he concludeth, that all our appetites are ever to be restrained & guided according to reason; a●…d that we must use all care and dil●…gence, that we never do any thing rashly or at adventure, nor in considerately & negligently. And lastly, he further declareth this even from nature itself: That we are not bred by nature for play and spor●…; but rather to severity & to great and weighty studies. And here he taketh occasion to show the right man●…r of sport●… and play, how we may use them aright: 1. For the time; That we use them as sleep and other recreations, only at such times, when we have dispatched our weighty & earnest businesses. Secondly, for the manner of them; That they be not excessi●…e or immodest, but ingenuous and pleasant. This he teacheth by a comparison in an instance of that liberty which we grant to children: That as we grant not to them liberty of all manner of play, but only of such plays and sports as are not estranged from honest exercises; so likewise in all our own jesting and sports, some light of an honest disposition should ever show itself. Chap. 39 Of scurrility and q witty conceitedness. pleasantness of spe●…ch. q There is altogether a double kind etc. TO be short, there is a double kind of jesting: one q illiberal or homely. base * saucy, wanton. malapert, q ungracious or wicked. lewd, q bawdy or dishonest. filthy: the other elegant, civil, witty, [and] * conceited. pleasant. With which kind not only our Plantus, and the ancient Comedy of the q Atticks. Athenians, but also the books of the * Philosophers of Socrates sect. Socratical Philosophers are * well stored or full fraught. full. There are also q many things spoken pleasantly and wittily of many men. many witty speeches of many men, as those that are gathered by ●…lde ●…ato, which be called q short and witty sentences. Apothegms. The difference therefore * of an honest and an unhonest jesting. of an ingenuous and a q unhonest [or base] is easy. homely jest is plain. The one is q beseeming a free man. meet for an honest man if it be done in q time. seaso●… & q with a remiss or a mild mind. mildly: the other is not indeed meet for [any] man, * if uncleanness of the ma●…ter, being increased with filt●…inesse of words. if uncleanness of words be adjoined to the filthiness of the q things. matter. Chap. 39 In this chapter T. proceedeth to discourse of jesting & of the manner & use thereof. And first, he divideth it, teaching that there is a double kind of jesting. One very base, malapert, lewd & filthy; the other elegant, c●…uil and pleasant. This later he commendeth by the testimony of Plautus, in his practice of it, and by other ancient comedies 〈◊〉 are generally approved of; and more specially by the books of the Socra●…ical Philosophers, which he showeth to be full of it. And to this kind of jesting he teacheth that all witty speeches of learned men do appertain; as namely those called Apothegms, gathered by old Cato and others. Thence he concludeth, that the difference between these two kinds, viz. between an ingenuous and base jest, is plain: Also that the one of them, viz. an ingenuous jest is befitting an honest man, especially if it be done in season and mildly; but that the other, viz. a base ●…est, is not at all meet, no not for any man; chiefly, if base & odious matters be uttered, and made worse by base and filthy words. Chap. 40. q T●… be a certain measure ●…uen of honest play. That a measure must be kept even in honest pastimes. THere is also a certain measure of q playing or recreation. pastime to be kept, that we do not q pour out or spend all too much lavish out all too excessively; and being q lift up with too much pleasure, or too merry. over merry, slip into some dishonesty. But both our [martial] field, & also the exercises of hunting do q minister unto us. afford us honest examples of q playing. pastime. Chap. 40. here ●…ully proceedeth to give directions likewise for our pastin●…es & recreations; teaching, 1. T●…at there m●…st be a measure kept even therein, & that for two special causes. The 1. whereof is: Lest thereby we should la●…ish out our goods too excessively. The second; lest being over carried with the pleasure of the recreation we fall into some kind of dishonesty. Second he directeth what exercises are most commendable and safe for avoiding these evils: as ●…amely, 1. Exercises of feats of arms, such as were practised in Mars field at Rome 2. Hunting. Chap. 41. The delight of the mind is to be q required. sought from honest q studies. exercises: the pleasure of the body, because it is * meet for beasts. belonging to beasts, is either to be rejected altogether, or to be q added most sparingly. used very sparingly. But it belongs q to every question of duty. to the whole discourse of Duty, to have evermore q in readiness. in mind, how far the nature of man exceedeth * the nature of cattle. cattle and all other beasts. For q the beasts. they perc●…iue nothing but pleasure, and are carried thereunto * with q with their whole sway. all violence. But the mind of man * is fed with learning. is nourished by learning; and doth ever either * study out or inquire some matter. search out some matter by devising, or doth perform something; and is led with a delight of seeing and hearing. Moreover, if there be any one * a little more ready somewhat too much q inclined unto pleasures, so that he be not of the * beastly kind. kind of beasts (for q there are certain. some there be [that are] men not in deed, but [only] in name) but if there be any somewhat q erect or lifted up from pleasure. less addicted to pleasure [then these,] although he be * caught with pleasure, carried, overtaken he hideth & dissembleth his q appetite. longing desire of pleasure, for * modesty or bashfulness. shame fastness. Whereupon q it is understood. we may observe, q the pleasure, etc. to be. that the pleasure of the body is not * befitting. beseeming the excellency of man; q and that. but that it ought to be despised and rejected. But if there be any man who q attributeth somewhat unto pleasure. yieldeth somewhat unto pleasure [let him know] q the measure of enjoying it, to be holden diligently of him. he must very warily keep a measure of enjoying thereof. And q therefore. for that cause, q the diet, etc. must be, etc. let the diet and apparel of the body be referred to health & strength, not to q pleasure. voluptuousness. q And also. Moreover if we will consider what an excellency and All dignity Al. dignity of nature there is in man. there is in the nature of man, we shall understand how unbeseeming it is to * lavish out in riot or run to riot. overflow in riot, and to live deliciously and * nicely. wanton; and how q honest. comely a thing is is to live q sparingly. frugally, * temperately. continently, q severely or strictly. sagely [&] soberly. Chap. 41. Here he showeth the means how we may keep a measure in our play and sports. And this point he teacheth to belong to every question of Duty. The first means is this; By having evermore in mind, how far the nature of man exceedeth the nature of beasts. Which he teacheth to appear herein especially, for that they perceive nothing but pleasure, & are carried thereunto with all violence: whereas contrarily the mind of man is nourished by learning, and is ever searching out some matter by meditating and devising or performing something of more worth; and is evermore led with a delight of seeing or hearing some great matter. Secondly, for that i●… there be any one who is by nature more inclined to pleasure (if he be not a very beast as some such beasts there are who are not men in deed but only in name) although he be sometimes too violently carried after pleasures, yet for very shame he will hide and dissemble his overlonging desire after the same Whereby he showeth that it is most evident, that very nature teaches, that the pleasures of the body are not beseeming the excellency of man. A second means, to keep a measure in our pleasures, especially if we be too much given thereto, is; So to moderate our diet and apparel, as that we use them only so, as they may be best for our health and strength, and not for voluptuousness. A third means is, by considering aright what an excellency and dignity there is in the nature of man: by the due meditation whereof, we shall see plainly, how unbeseeming it is for man to lavish out all riotously, & to live deliciously & wanton; and contrarily, how comely it is to live frugally, continently, sagely and soberly. Chap. 42. The Argument. Reader, mark the order: first [Tully] showeth [in this chapter] what is comely according to nature * as it is common. common with beasts: and then, what q [becometh.] * in regard of. according to the excellency of man: afterward, what becometh q the person [or condition] of every one either given, etc. every one's person, either given by nature, or imposed by chance, or assumed with i●…dgement. * advise or consideration. q Also we must understand. WE must further understand, that we * have on us as it were [or sustain] two persons. are as it were clothed by nature with two * estates or conditions. persons: whereof one is common, q thereupon, * of that. because we are all partakers of reason, and of that * pre-eminence or dignity. excellency, whereby we q excel. surmount beasts: from which all honesty and comeliness is q drawn. derived: and out of which the way of finding out of Duty is sought out. q But. And the other [is that] which is properly q attributed. assigned to every one. For as there be great q dissimilitudes. differences in bodies, (for we see some to q prevail or excel. surpass others in swiftness for q to run. running, * some. others in strength q to wrestle. for wrestling: & likewise in q ●…ormes, shapes or 〈◊〉. countenances, q dignit●…e to be in som●…, comeliness in others. that some have a majesty, other●… amiableness: so there are in minde●… also greater * differences. varieties. There was in Lucius Crassus and Lucius Philippus much pleasantness; but greater and more of set purpose, in Caius Caesar q the son of Lucius. Lucius his son. q But. And q in the same times at the same time, q there 〈◊〉 a singular severity in, etc. there was in Marcus Scaurus and Marcus Drusus being a young man, a singular gravity; q much mirth in Caius 〈◊〉. in Caius Lelius much mirth, q 〈◊〉 Scipio his familiar. in his familiar friend Scipio greater * more seeking of honour. ambitition, * more sorrowful or full of discontent, or auster●…. a sadder life. Also among the Grecians we have heard of Socrates, to have been sweet & pleasantly conceited, and of a merry q speech. discourse, and also [to have been] an q dissembler. * a pleasant ●…ter or jiber. E●…ronist in all his speech, whom the Grecian●… named 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: chose P●…thagoras and Pericles to have attained q the highest authority. very great estimation, without any mirth at all. We have heard of Hannibal, q of [the Captains] of the Carthaginians. of the nation of the Carthaginians, to to have been q crafty. subtle; Quintus Maximus of our Captains, q easily to conceal, hold his peace, diss●…mble, ●…rap, prevent the counsels of the enemies. to have been very cunning in concealing matters, in silence, dissimulation, plot thing, preventing the devices of enemies. In which kind the greeks prefer Themisto●… cles the Athenian and jaso the Pherean before all other; and especially the subtle and crafty deed of Solon: q who feigned himself to be mad, to the end his life might, etc. who to the end that his life might be the safer, and that he might * do better service to the commonwealth. All somewhat more Al. sometime or in time to come. further the Commonwealth, feigned himself to be mad. There be others much unlike to these; plain and open: which think q nothing to be done, [as] of a secret plot, by laying in wait. that nothing ought to be done secretly, nothing by guile, being lovers of truth, enemies of deceit. And again there be others, who can endure any thing, do service to any man, so that they may obtain what they * aim at. desire: as we saw Sylla and Marcus Crassus. In which kind we have heard of Lysander the Lacedaemonian to have been most subtle and q most patient. most able to endure any thing; and chose Callicratides, who was Admiral of the Navy next after Lysander. And likewise q we see another man to effect by [his] speeches. in speech we see indeed another man, although he be * of great authority. very mighty, yet so to order the matter, that he may seem to be [but] one q of many. of the common sort. Which thing we have * observed. seen both in Catulus the father, & q in the son. the son, and also in Quintus Mutius Mancinus. I have heard also of [mine] ancestors, q the same thing to have been. that the same was in Publiks' Scipio Nasica; And contrarily q his father, even him. that his father, even who avenged the mischievous enterprises of Tiberius Gracchus, q to have had no gentle [or courteous] manner of speech, or no pleasing grace. had no affability of speech: no no●… indeed Xenocrates q being the most ●…euere of the Philosophers. who was the sagest of all the Philosophers, and for that very cause q to have been both etc. both great and famous. Innumerable other diversities there be of nature and manners, yet not at all to be dispraised. But every man's own q things. [gifts] are q very greatly to be defended. carefully to be maintained; [tho] not such as are * faulty. vicious, q but yet the pro per. yet those which are natural, whereby that comeliness which we do seek may be more easily retained. For we must so deal, that we contend not at all against q the universal nature, or belonging to all. that nature which is universal: yet that being preserved, let us every one follow our own proper nature; [So] that although there be q other studies more weighty, etc. other graver and better studies, yet q ●…et us measure. we measure q own studies. our own by the rule of Nature. For neither q availeth it to resist nature. is it to any purpose to fight against Nature, nor to q follow. ensue any thing which you cannot attain. Whereupon it more appeareth q of what sort. what manner of thing this comeliness is: sith that nothing becometh, q Minerva though god●… of wisdom and all good sciences being vowilling maugre Minerva, as they use to say: that is, * against nature. nature with standing and resisting. q If there be any thing at all. And verily if there be any thing comely, certainly there is nothing more, than an q evenness. even and constant * carriage. course of our whole life * and also. and of every action: which you cannot keep, if you * follow. imitate the nature of other men, [and] * let pass. omit your own. For as we ought to use that * kind of speech. speech which is known untous, lest q inculcating, thrusting in or beating upon, or repeating now and then. chopping in [certain] Greek words, as some [v●…e to do] we be worthily q mocked or laughed at by very good right. scoffed at: q so we ought to bring no disagreement [or variance] into our actions and all our life. so we should show no contrariety in our doings or in our whole life. And this difference of natures hath so great q force. power, that sometimes one man ought q to procure death to himself, viz. to kill himself. to procure his own death, another ought not, in the same * quarrel. cause. * for M. Cato. was not in one quarrel, the rest in another etc. For was Marcus Cato in one q quarrel, the rest which yielded themselves to Caesar in afric, in another? Yet peradventure it had been q given [or imputed] for a fault [or a reproach] to the rest. accounted for a fault in the rest, if they had q killed. slain themselves, because their life had been * less austere. more pleasant, & their manners more q easy. mild. But whenas Nature had given unto Cato an incredible gravity; and himself had q strengthened. confirmed the same by a perpetual constancy, and ever remained in his q purpose & counsel taken to die rather, then that the face of the tyrant was to be looked on. intent and determined purpose, he ought rather to die then behold the tyrant's face. How many things q suffered. endured Ulysses in that q long continued wandering. long travel, when he both q served or became serviceable. did service unto women (if Circe and Calypso are to be named women) and desired to show himself * fair spoken. affable and courteous to all men, in all his speech? and also q endured the spiteful taunts of, etc. at home. at home endured the * reproachful or spiteful speeches. con●…umelies of q servants & handmaids or wenches. slaves and girls; that he might * once. at length at●…aine to that which he desired. But A●…ax ( q with what courage he is reported. being of that courage wihich is reported) had rather die a thousand * times. deaths, then to endure those things of another man. q which things we beholding. Which diversities when we behold, it shall be q meet. necessary to weigh, * what gifts. what eachone hath of his own, and to order those aright; q neither to be desirous to try. and not to have a desire to try, how q other men's things may become. others men's gra▪ ces would become him. * for every ones pr●… 〈◊〉 ●…ts do 〈◊〉 of all become him. For that especially becometh each man, which is * most of all q the own of every one. every ones own. q Therefore let, etc. Let every man therefore know his own disposition: and let him * make. show himself a sharp 〈◊〉 both of his own vices, & q good things. virtues; lest q players in comedies & interludes. players may seem to have more q wisdom. discretion than we. For they choose not the best q comedies. interludes, but the fittest for themselves. They that * enjoy [or delight in] their voice, viz. who have excellent voice●…. rely upon their pronunciation, choose Epigonus and Medea. They [who rely upon their] gesture, q choose. [take] Menalippa, or Cl●…temnestra. Rutilius, whom I remember, ever q choosed. [made choice of] Antiopa: Aesop q not often. very seldom [choosed] Ajax. Shall a player then see this in the stage which a wise man shall not see in his life? q Therefore unto what things we shall be most, etc. We are therefore q we shall labour chiefly in those. to labour especially in those things, whereunto we shall be most apt. But if at any time necessity shall q thrust us forth or drive us. enforce us unto those things, which shall not be q of our wit. fit for our disposition, q all care, meditation and diligence is to be given. we must use all care, meditation & diligence, that we may q do. perform them, if not comelily, yet q as little uncomlily with as little uncomeliness [as may be.] Neither ought we so much to endeavour ourselves q that we may follow. to follow the virtues which are not given unto us, as q that we may fly. to fly the vices. Chap. 42. Tully (still going on to set out more fully the nature of comeliness, and the fountain thereof) teacheth. 1. That every one har●… by nature, as it were two persons. The one of them common; which is in that we are all partakers of reason and of that excellency whereby we surmount brute beasts: & from this he showeth that both all honesty & comeliness are derived, & the way of finding out Duty. The other proper: to wit, that which is properly assigned to every one in regard of the special constitution both of his body and mind, and therein the special differences amongst men. This he noteth by experience, 1. In the bodies, for that we see some to excel in swiftness for running, others in strength ●…or wrestling, some having in their countenances a majesty, others being amiable. 2. By experience in the minds, & that therein also are greater varieties and differences. This he proveth by sundry particular examples, and first, amongst themselves: as, That there was much pleasantness of speech in L. Philippus, but greater and more of set purpose in C. Caesar L. his son. Likewise at the same time, that there was in M. 〈◊〉 sus, though but a young man, a singular gravity; much mirth in Caius Lelius; In Scipio his familiar friend greater ambition with more austerity. Secondly, amongst the Grecians, as he had heard by report; As that Socrates was sweet & pleasantly conceited, and also of a merry discourse, an Eironist in all his speech. Contrarily, that Pythagoras and Pericles were of greater esteem, yet without any mirth at al. So amongst great Captains: as, that Hannibal of Carthage was very subtle; Q. Maximus one of their own Captains, very cunning in concealing his purposes, dissimulation, plotting and preventing the devices of the enemy. And that among the Grecians, Themistocles the Athenian Captain, and jaso the Pherean are renowned for the like. Finally, that Solon the lawgiver is famous for policy; & namely in that act, where in to the end, that his life might both be safer, and he do the better service to the common weal, he feigned himself mad. Sundry other examples he brings to this purpose not unlike to the former, to show the great variety of dispositions amongst men. As that there are some plain and open hearted, enemies to all deceit: Others who can endure any thing, serve any man, so they may obtain their desire: as Sylla, M. Crassus, and Lysander the Lacedaemonian; though Callicratides, who succeeded Lysander in the admiralty of the navy, was of a contrary disposition. Others excelling in courtesy of speech, and in affability; so as though they were very great men, yet could frame themselves to the common sort so, as to win the hearts of all; like as they had seen in the Catuli both in the father and the son, and also in Q. Mutius Mancinus. The like he showeth to have been reported of P. Scipio Nasica, though his father, otherwise a worthy man (as who avenged the mischievous enterprises of Tiberius Grachus) yet had no affability of speech at all. No nor Xenocrates who was the very sagest of all the Philosophers, and for that cause a great & famous man. And thus he showeth that there are innumerable diversities of natures and dispositions; yet not to be dispraised. Now in these several varieties and all other he giveth this rule; That every ones own proper gifts are carefully to be maintained; though not any such qualities as are vicious, yet all such gifts as are natural, and whereby that comeliness which we seek may be retained more easily. And so long as we strive not against that nature which is universal, that each of us follow our own proper nature. Whence he teacheth this as a second lesson; That although there might be other graver & better studies to be followed of us, yet that we are to measure & limitour studies by the rule of nature, to do nothing against it. Because it doth not avail to fight against nature; or to pursue any thing▪ which we have no hope by nature to 〈◊〉. And that hereupon it appeareth more fully wherein true comeliness consisteth; that we do not any thing as it were, against nature; but only that whereto we are fitted by it. Because, if we ever follow nature, we shall be able to keep an even and a constant course, both of our whole life▪ & of e●…erie action; than which there is nothing more come lie: whereas if we imitate the nature of other men omitting our own, we cannot keep that euennes●…e which we ought. This he 〈◊〉 plain by a certain similitude: That as we are to use that speech only, which is known vn●…o us, lest chopping in Greek or other strange words (as some do) we be worthily scoffed at; so we are to keep an evenness in all our actions & our whole life, that no contra●…ietie appear at all. Again, he teacheth that the differences of natures are of so great power, that that may be commendable in one, which should be faulty in another. As for example: that one man ought to lay violent hands upon himself, which should be reprovable in others in the same cause. This he instanceth in M. Cato slaying himself, rather than to yield up himself to Cesar in Africa as others did; whereas it had been faulty in the rest of them, to have done the like, because their lives had been more pleasant, and their manners more mild: yet in him it is commended, for that he was of such an uncredible gravity by nature, and had confirmed the same by perpetual constancy, and also had ever remained in this determinate resolution, that he would rather die, then behold the tyrant's race. 2. In comparing the faults of Ulysses and Ajax together: That whereas this was an honour to Ulysses to have endured the things which he did, in his long travels, and that he had been able to yield himself to do service to women, as to Circe & Calypso, (if they were worthy to be named women) & to show himself so affable & courteous to all; yea after his return home, so to endure the contum●…ly of slaves and wenches, to the end that he might attain to that which he desired: yet contrarily this is Ajax his honour, that he being of an unconquerable courage by nature, had rather die a thousand deaths▪ then to endure such contumelies or injuries from any. Hence he concludeth, that we are necessarily to weigh what gifts each of us hath properly, & to use the same aright; and not to have a desire to tr●…e how other men's gifts would become us: because that especially becometh every one, which most properly belongeth unto him And secondly, he aduis●…th each man to know his own disposition, and to show himself a sharp judge of his own virtues, and vices; and so to choose and follow that course which is fittest for him. This also he urgeth by a reason taken from players; Lest they should seem to have more discretion herein then we. Because they chufe not the best interludes to act; but those that are fittest for them, in regard of their pronunciation, or gesture, and which they can perform the best; as he showeth in sundry particulars: Whence he inferreth again what an absurd thing this is, that a player should see that on the stage, which a wise man cannot in his life. And so shutteth up this point, That we are chiefly to labour in those things whereunto we are most apt. Yet here he giveth two cautions. 1. That if at any time necessity shall enforce us unto those things to which we are not apt by nature; that then we specially use all care, meditation and diligence that we may perform them, if not comlily, yet with as little uncomeliness as may be. 2. That we do not so much endeavour to attain the virtues to which we have no aptness by nature; as to shun those vices to which we are by nature strongly inclined. Chap. 43. The Argument. Comeliness from those things, which fortune hath given us, or which we have q gotten to ourselves. gotten by [our own] q judgement. discretion. q And there is a third person adiouned unto those two, etc. Moreover, unto those two persons which I spoke of q above. before, a third person is adjoined which some chance or time q putteth or casteth on us. imposeth [on us.] And also a fourth which we shall q fashion or frame. fit unto ourselves after our own q judgement. mind. For kingdoms, empires, q nobilities. nobility, honours, riches, q wealth. power, and those which are contrary to these, q being placed in fortune [or in the power of fortune] consisting on fortune, q are governed by the times. are ordered according to the times. But it proceedeth from our own q will. free will, * what calling we will follow. what person we q will. list to bear. And therefore some apply themselves unto Philosophy▪ others the Civil law, others eloquence: and q another or some had rather. some one chooseth to excel in one of those virtues. [another in another.] * And. But whose fathers or 〈◊〉 q have excelled or ●…in notable in any commendation. have been famous in any kind of glory, * 〈◊〉 for the most part. most of theirs do study to excel in the same kind of q praise. commendation: as Quintus Mu●…us q the son of Publius Publius his son [did] in the Civil law: Africanus q the son of Paulus. Paulus his son, q military business or feats of arms. in chivalry. Also q certain or sundry divers do add some q some their own. of their own unto those praises, which they have receive▪ from their * ancestors. fathers: as this same Affricanus increased his martial glory by [his] eloquence. Which self same thing q Timotheus Conon's son did. did also Timotheus Conon's son: who * whereas. when as he was not inferior q than his father. to his father in q the praise. praises of war, yet * added. adjoined unto that commendation the glory of learning & wit. Sometimes also it q cometh to pass. falleth out, that certain q the imitation of parents being omitted or let pass. having omitted the imitation of their parents, follow some q trade or determination. course of their own; and those especially travel therein for most part, who being borne of q scarce known or base. obscure parents, * appoint to attempt. propound unto themselves great * enterprises. matters. Therefore when we seek what things q do become. are comely, we ought to q comprehend. cast all these in our mind & q thought. cogitation. Chap. 43. In this chapter Tully teacheth▪ that besides those two persons spoken of before, which every one hath by nature, we have other two also. The first whereof is that, which every one hath imposed upon him, by some chance, or in regard of the times: as to be Kings, Emperors, nobles, honourable, rich, mighty and the like, or such as are contrary to these: which as they consist in fortune, so are they ordered according to the times The later is that which we fit unto ourselves, according to our judgement applying ourselves thereunto; for that it proceedeth from our own will, what course of life we will follow. Hence are the divers studies of men; that some apply themselves to Philosophy, others to the civil law, others to eloquence, and that one chooseth to excel in some one of these virtues, another in another. More specially, that those whose fathers or ancestors have been famous for any kind of glory, do for most part 〈◊〉 to excel in the same: as Q. Mu●…us Publ. his son in chivalry. Hence also it is that sundry increase the glory of their ancestors: as he instanceth in Affricanus that he increased his martial glory by his eloquence; and in Timotheus Conous son who by his wit and learning augmented the renown which he had received from his ancestors by their martial praises. And moreover, that certain leaving the imitation of their parents follow some course of their own; and especially they who borne of obscure parents, yet propound unto themselves great matters. And thus he concludeth, that when we seek what is comely, we ought to think of all these things. Chap. 44. We must determine the kind and q purpose or appointment. course of our life. But first of all we must determine whom and what manner of men we would * be. have ourselves, and q in. of what kind of life: Which * consultation or advice. deliberation is the hardest of all other. For in the entrance into the q youth which is from 12. or 14. to 25. or 30. youthful time, q to which the greatest weakness of counsel is. wherein there is the greatest weakness of counsel; then every man q most slenderness. appointeth unto q determineth. himself that kind of q passing his age or living. life, which he q he hath loved most of all. chiefly liketh. And therefore he is entangled with some certain kind and course of living, before q then. that he q could. be able to judge, what should be best. For q that Prodicus saith whereas Prodicus saith, q Hercules. that Hercules (as it is in Xenophon) so soon as he q began to have a beard, or came to maturity or ripeness of years. began to come to man's estate, (which time is granted by nature, to choose what q course or trade of life each will follow way of living every man will enter) q to have gone forth. went forth into q solitary place or wilderness. a desert place, and sitting there, doubted * long and much with himself. long with himself and much, when he beheld two ways, the one of pleasure, the other of virtue, whether of them it q should be. were better to enter into. This peradventure might * fallout. happen unto Hercules being q bred of the seed of jupiter. borne of jupiters' seed; but not so to us, who imitate whom it seemeth best to q every one. every of us; and are * alured. enforced to their studies & and q determinations. fashions. And for the most part we being * instructed. trained up by the precepts of our parents, q we are led or do incline. are drawn unto their * customs. guise and q manner. manners. Others are carried * after the. by the judgement of the multitude, and q most wish for long after those things especially, which seem q fairest. goodliest to the greater part. q Some notwithstanding have followed a right course of life, whether by, etc. Yet some, whether by a certain happiness, or by goodness of nature, or by the instruction of their parents, have followed the right course of life. q But that is the most rare kind of those men. But that kind of men is most seldom found, who being * endued. adorned either with excellent q greatness. profoundness of wit, or else with famous learning & knowledge, or with both of them, have q also. yet taken a time of q advising. delibe ration, what course of life they would especially follow. In which deliberation, q the whole counsel or advice. all a man's counsel is to be q recalled. applied to each man's q own. proper nature. For ●…ith that q we search out in all things, etc. in all things that are done, we search out of that q manner. nature, * whereto every one is naturally inclined. wherewith every one is borne (as is said before) what q becometh. is comely; then q a greater care by much of that matter is to be added, in determining our whole life. a far greater care thereof must be had in setting down the whole course of our life; that we may q be constant to ourselves in the continuance of our life, nor to halt in any duty. ever agree with ourselves in all our whole life, and never halt in any duty. But seeing that Nature hath the greatest q force. power unto this choice, [and] Fortune the next; there must ever be had a * consideration. regard of both of them, in choosing the q kind. course of our life, but of Nature more. For q nature is. it is both much * surer. more firm and * stable. constant: In so much, that sometimes fortune, as being q itself mortal or mortality itself. mortal, may seem to fight q immortal nature with nature being immortal. He therefore that will apply q all counsel, or the whole course of his life. his whole course to the kind of his nature no●… corrupted, let him kee●…e q steadfastness. constancy; For that becometh chiefl●…: except peradventure he shall perceive that q himself have erred. he hath erred in c●…using * his course of life. the kind of [his] life. Which if it sh●…ll fall out ( q and it may fall out. as indeed it may) there must be made a change of manners and purposes. We * may. shall make that change more easily and commodiously, if the times shall q help. further us; but if not, it must be done q by little and little and foot by foot, or 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉. leisurely, & by little and little: like as wise men do judge is to be more q 〈◊〉 or 〈◊〉. 〈◊〉 or 〈◊〉 or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as it were stitch by stitch convenient, to q break off by little and little, those friendships, which do not so much delight us, and are less approved of us, then to cut them off, q suddenly. of a sudden. q 〈◊〉 the kind of our life being changed, we must care by all reason. And when we have changed our course of life, we must by all means take ●…eed, that we be thought to have done it upon good q counsel. advice. But for●… as q it is said. we 〈◊〉▪ a little before▪ q 〈◊〉 ancestors 〈◊〉 be imitated. that we 〈◊〉 * follow. imitate out 〈◊〉▪ ●…et q that. this first ●…e ex●…, that their vices q be not. are not to be imitated▪ * 〈◊〉, that we seek 〈◊〉 ●…o follow them 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 against our nature. And then it Nature will not bear, that q they can. we can imitate certain things; ●…s q the son of the elder 〈◊〉. the elder Affricanus son, who adopted q this ●…on to Pau●… 〈◊〉. this ou●… 〈◊〉 his son, could n●…t, for his q infirmity of his health. sickliness, be so like unto his father, as the * other Affricanus son. other q was like his father. was his: If therefore one be not able, either to * 〈◊〉. defend causes, or * to make orations or 〈◊〉 to the people. to retain the people with orations, or to q make war. follow the wars, yet q it shall be his duty he ought to perform those things, which * he can. shall be in his power: as justice, q faithfulness. Fidelity, ●…iberality, Modesty▪ [&] Temperance; q to the end, that that thing may be less required. that that thing, which is lacking in him, may be the less miss. q And the best inheritance is left from the fathers to the children, and better than all patrimony [or livelihood or childspart] [viz.] the glory of, etc. And indeed the best inheritance [which] is left by fathers unto their children, and more worth than any patrimony [is] the glory of [their] virtue, and of worthy deeds: whereunto to be a * shame, disgrace or di●…paragement. stain, q judge an unjust thing [or dishonest] and a fault. is to be accounted [both] a fault and shame. And because the same duties q are not given obefitting. do not belong to unlike ages▪ but q there are some [●…uties] of young men, others of old, something also is to be said of this distinction. some are for young men, others for old men, somewhat is also to be spoken of this diversity. Chap. 44. here T. proceedeth to teach, how to determine of the course of our life, which every one is to follow as most fit for him. And first he showeth that this deliberation is exceeding hard in regard of the time, when men are to determine hereof. Because they are to resolve of it in the very entrance into their youthful age; at what time they are at the weakest for counsel & iudge●…ent to determine aright: and so e●…ch followeth that which he liketh or fancieth to himself without any grounded reason. Whereupon it cometh to pass that they have entangled themselves with some certain course of life, before they are able to judge what were the best: And that howsoever Hercules (as Xenophon reporteth) at this age of youth, when he began to come to man's estate, going into a desert place, and there beholding two ways, the one the way of plea sure, the other of virtue, & after long deliberating with himself whether of them he should take, made choice of the better; viz. the way of virtue: Yet, this he thinketh might befall to Hercules being sprung of the seed of jupiter, & so of a divine understanding and judgement: but that there is not any hope that any of us should make such a choice. 1. Because we use rashly to imitate whomsoever we like best of, and so follow their studies and fashions. 2. For that we being for most part trained up by the precepts and advice of our parents, are drawn unto a liking of their guise & manners. Or thirdly, for that we use to be carried by the judgement of the multitude, & so to long after those things which the greatest part do most admire. Yet notwithstanding how hard soever it is, he acknowledgeth that some indeed have followed a right course of life, whether a certain happiness betiding them, or the goodness of their natures, or through the right institution of their parents. But for this kind of men who 〈◊〉 so, he noteth that they are very seldom to be found, which (if they be of profo●…d wits, of excellent learning and knowledge) will take a due time for delibe●…ing hereof, what course to choose. Thus having showed the difficulty of his deliberation he now cometh to set down the right manner of it; that we ought chi●…fly to con cider to what we are most fit by nature. Because sith that we seek in every thing particularly, what is comely, by doing it according to nature; then much more care ought we to have hereof in determining the whole course of our life; and that chiefly to this end, that we may ever agree with ourselves in all our whole life, and never halt in any duty. And whereas, next unto nature, fortune hath the greatest power for making this choice, he teacheth that we are to have a regard even of fortune also therein; but yet of nature more. For that it is more firm & constant, than fortune; in so much as fortune sometimes, as being mortal may seem to fight with nature as being immortal. In the third place he 〈◊〉, that a man thus applying the whole course of his life to the kind of his nature vnco●…rupted, aught to be constant in it. Because constancy principally becometh a man, unless he shall afterwards perceive that he hath 〈◊〉 in his choice: which if it happen (as he showeth it may well) he directeth what is to be done, viz. that he must the●… make a change of his course & purposes. And for the manner of effecting hereof, that if the 〈◊〉 serve and 〈◊〉 thereto, it may then be made more easily & commodiously▪ 〈◊〉 if not, it is to be made more leisurely, and as by little and little. And that we are to do herein as wise men in breaking off their friendship with such as they would ●…aine be shut of; who think it more convenient to break off with than by little & little, then to cut them off, of a sudden: And yet ever to observe this caution in our change; That when we have thus changed, we may be thought to have done it upon good advice. Here also 〈◊〉 two other 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ●…ration of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 thers or ancestors in our courses of life, spoken of before. 1. That we 〈◊〉 that we do not ●…tate their vices. 2. If through nature, or any other imped●…ment, we cannot 〈◊〉 certain things which were commend●…ble in them, like as he instan●…eth in the elder 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, who could not to imitate his father, as the other 〈◊〉▪ son did his, through ●…ickliness; Or if we be not ●…o fitted for pleading or defending causes, or for making orations & like speeches to the people, or to follow the wars or the like▪ that yet we are to ●…e careful to perform those things which are in our power (as justice▪ fidelity, liberality, modesty and temperance) in the best ●…ort that we can, that so what is lacking in us may be less miss. Finally, he concludeth this point, urging the care of it; That sith indeed the best inheritance, which can be left by fathers unto their children, & which is more worth than any patrimony, is the glory of their virtues and worthy deeds; and for that cause, seeing to be a stain thereunto, is both a foul fault & a great shame: therefore eu●…rie one should the more warily look to the right imitation of them. And thus he endeth this matter, making an entrance to the discourse following of the diversive of Duties in regard of ages, etc. Chap. 45. What things do properly become * young men. youth. IT is therefore q [the Duty] of a young man. a young man's duty to reverence his elders, and to choose out of them the best and most approved; whose counsel and authority he may q ●…eane unto. rel●…e upon. For the unskilfulness of q entering age, or the tender years. youth, is to be q ordered & guided directed and governed by the * experience. wisdom of old men. This age is also to be specially q driven away or weaned. refrained from * pleasures. lust, and to be exercised in labour and * patiently enduring toil both, etc. patience both of mind and body, that their industry may q flourish or be of chief strength, or they may be most fit for. excel both in martial and civil duties. q And also. Moreover, when they will refresh their * wits. minds and * betake. give thems●…lues to q pleasure. pastime, let them beware of intemperance, and remember q shamefastness. to observe modesty; which q shall be more 〈◊〉 they may do more easily, if they will q their elders will be presen, or amongst them. have their elders also p●●sent at such * times. things. Chap. 45. Here ●…. teacheth the special duties of young men, & what things do become them: as, 1. That they reverence their elders. 2. That they choose out, amongst the ancienter, the best and most approved, whose counsel and authority they may use and rely upon. The reason whereof ●…s, because the v●…skilfulnesse of youth is to be directed by the wisdom of the ancient. 3. That this age is specially to be re●… from lustful●… pleasures, and to be exercised in labour and patience both of mind and body, that they may excel in martial & cruall duties, & their industry be s●…ene therein. 4. That when they desire to recreate themselves with sports, they carefully beware of intemperance, & remember modesty. And to this end he thinketh it fit, that they should have some of the ancienter present at such recreations wherein otherwise might be danger of any intemperance or immode●…ty. Chap. 46. What things q become especially do chiefly become old age. * But for old men, labours of, etc. But the labours of the body are to be q lessened. diminished in old men, and exercises o●… the mind q do seem. seem mere to be increased. And q their diligence must be given. they must do their endeavour, that they q help as much as they can, or assits very much. principally 〈◊〉 both their friends, and the youth & chiefly the Commonweal with counsel and wisdom. But * old men are to beware of nothing more. nothing is more to be taken heed of to old age, then that it give not itself over to litherness & q slothfulness. idleness. * But as for riot. Riotous●…esse also q is both filthy, as it is dishonest to every age, q and also most foul to old age. so to old age most shameful. But if the intemperance of lust shall q also come unto it. moreover be joined therewith, there is a double q evil or inconvenience. mischie●…; because both age itself q conceiveth. receiu●…th * disgrace. shame [thereby] and it causeth q the intemperance of young men. the young men's intemperance to be more q impudent. shameless. Chap. 46. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 setteth down some Duties of old men, as especially concerning them: as, 1. ●…hat they diminish the labours of their bodies, and increase the exercises of the mind. 2. That they use all endeavour to help both their friends & the younger sort, and chiefly the commonweal, by their counsel & wisdom. 3. That they beware in any case that they give not themselves over to litherness and idleness. 4. That they take heed of riotousness: because as it is dishonest to every age; so in old men it is most shameful. 5. That they more heedfully avoid all intemperance of lust: because that, joined with riot or sloth, is a double mischief; for that both age itself receiveth shame thereby, and also that it maketh the younger sort to be more shameless and ou●…ragious in all intemperance. Chap. 47. What things q become. are befitting the person of the Magistrate. ANd * that. this indeed is not q strange or besides the matter. from the purpose, to speak * concerning, or touching. of the duties of Magistrates, [&] of private men▪ of citizens [and] of stranger's. It is therefore the proper office of a Magistrate, q to understand himself to bear to consider that he represents the person of the City, q and to owe. & that he ought to maintain the q dignity and honour. honour & reputation thereof: q to keep laws. to see the statutes observed, q 〈◊〉 describe or set down. to make laws, and to rememb●…r q those things to be, etc. that those things are committed to his q trust or fidelity. charge. 〈◊〉 behoveth also a private man, to live q with an equal & like law with the citizens. under the like law, as the rest of the citizens (neither q 〈◊〉 and base as an underling and ab●…ect, no●… q li●…ting up himself. hearing himself too high) and also to q will or desire. seek those things in the Commonweal, * which concern peace and honesty. that are quiet and honest. For we are want both to * esteem. think and to call such a one a good citizen. But it is the duty of a stranger and q one of another country inhabiting in the city, a ●…ner. alien inhabitant, to ●…eddle with nothing 〈◊〉 his own ●…ulinesse. q to inquire [or ask buf●…ly] nothing of, etc. 〈◊〉 to inquire of another man's matter; and to b●…e q 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 all. no whit * more busy 〈◊〉 is 〈◊〉, or over meddling. curious in a * 〈◊〉. strange Commonweal. q So almost. Thus for the most part Duties shall be found ou●…, when it shall be q sought out. inquired what q becometh. is decent, and what is q apt, 〈◊〉, or agree●…ble. befitting persons, times and ages. And there is nothing that * doth so much become. can so much grace a man, as to keep constancy in q doing or performing. managing every matter, and in * consultation. taking of advice. Chap, 47. here T. proceedeth to set down certain Duties of Magistrates, private men, citizens and strangers; as which are most comely and commendable in each of th●…m. And first, for the magistrate. 1. That it is his proper office to consider ever, that he represents the person of the city, and that therefore he carefully maintain the honour and 〈◊〉▪ on thereof. 2. That 〈◊〉 see the 〈◊〉 of the 〈◊〉 observed. 3. That he help to make laws. 4. That he ever remember all things committed to his trust and 〈◊〉. Secondly, for the private man. 1. That he live orderly, submitting himself to the same laws and orders as other 〈◊〉. 2. That he neither demean 〈◊〉 ●…oo ba●…ely, as an ●…derling, or 〈◊〉, nor bear himself too high. 3. That he follow those things only which concern peace and 〈◊〉; for that such are esteemed good citizens. Thirdly, for the 〈◊〉 and then inhabitant, he pre●… this, as most be●…eeming & 〈◊〉; 1. That he meddle only with his own business, without enquiring into other men's matters; and much more withou●… intermeddling in 〈◊〉 of the commonweal. And to conclude, thus he ●…heweth that duties may be found our; when there is a wise consideration what is befitting to people, 〈◊〉 and ages. And finally, to the end that we may be constant in good duties, he ●…etteth this down as a general rule. That nothing can so grace a man as to keep constancy in managing every 〈◊〉, and also in taking of advice. Chap. 48. q what is comely. Comeliness in the ordering and motion of [our] body. But because q that. this comeliness q is seen. appeareth in all deeds & words, and finally in the motion and q form. gesture of the body, & the same q is put. consisteth in three things, q well favouredness fairness, order [and] q adorning or garnishing. setting forth, meet q to action. for ones doings: it is more difficult to * express. utter, but it will be easy enough to be * conceived. understood. That care also is contained in these 3. things, that we be * allowed. approved of them with whom, and amongst whom we live. Let q a few words. some few [words] be spoken q also. likewise of these things. Chap. 48. In this chapter ●…. showeth, that 〈◊〉 is not only to be observed in all our words & deeds but also in the very motions and gestures of our bodies. And that this same consisteth chiefly in these three things, viz. fairness, order, and handsomeness of the gesture meet for the thing done. Also that howsoever this point be somewhat difficult to utter, yet it is plain enough to be understood. Finally, that in these three things consisteth chiefly that care that we may be approved of them with whom and amongst whom we live. Chap. 49. q Certain parts of the body to be showed, uncomely: also certain things either to be done dishonestly, openly; or to be named openly. That it is uncomely for certain parts of the body to be showed; and likewise that it is unbeseeming either to do certain things or so much as to 〈◊〉 them, openly. q In the beginning very nature. FIrst of all, nature itself seemeth to have had a great * regard or consideration. respect of our body, which hath set q in readiness that our. etc. in open view our q favour, face or physiognomy. countenance and the rest of our shape, wherein there is a q honest. comely show: but she hath covered and hid those parts of the body, which being given for the necessity of Nature, would have an ill-favoured & q unoomly. ●…oule sight. The modesty of * men. man hath followed this so q diligent. cunning a frame of Nature. q for all men, who are of a sound 〈◊〉 remove from the eyes those things which nature hath hid. For what things Nature hath hid, those all men, who are well in their wits, do keep from the eyes: and they do their endeavour to q obey. serve * necessity of nature. very necessity as q secretly. closely as they can: also of what parts of the body there are q necessary or base. servile uses, they neither * term. call those parts nor [their] uses by their own names: q and that. and so that which it is no shame to do, if it be q closely or in a secret place. secretly; it is q filthy to speak of it. uncleanly to report. And therefore neither the q open acting or doing of. doing of those things openly 〈◊〉 void of q shamelessness. impudency, q nor the speech [is void of] filthiness. nor the speaking of them [free from] dishonesty. Neither yet indeed are the Cynics q to be heard. worthy to be heard, or if there have been any Stoics in manner Cynics, who * find fault with & mock or 〈◊〉 at us. reprove and scoff at us, because we say, q those things to b●… 〈◊〉 [or shameful] in words. that those things are shameful to be uttered in words, which are not dishonest in deed: and yet we ●…earm those things which be * unhonest. filthy, by their own names: q as it is a thing dishonest indeed to rob [or go a thieving,] etc. as, to rob by the high ways, * deceive or cousin. beguile, commit adultery, is a thing dishonest indeed, but it is q reported [or told] not obscenely. spoken of without any dishonesty: q to give he inde●… for children. to beget children is indeed honest, q obscene in name. but uncleanly to be uttered. q And more things are disputed by the same▪ Philosoph●…rs▪ to that sentence etc. And so these Philosophers bring many things to that purpose against q shamefastness. modesty. But let us follow Nature, and q fly. shun every thing which q abhorreth from [or cannot receive so much as] the approbation, etc. abhorreth the very * pleasing. approbation of the eyes & ears. Let our standing, * gate. going, sitting down, sitting at the table, countenance, eyes, moving of [our] hands keep that same q decorum. In which * comeliness. things, two [fault's] * faults. are to be q fled. 〈◊〉 especially: q effeminate [or womanish] and nice or wanton. that we do nothing effeminately or nicely, q and not any thing ●…ard [or rude] or carter-like. nor rudely or clownishly. Neither indeed may we yield unto * stage player's. players & orators, that these things should be q fit for them, dissolute [or left loosely] to us. seemly done by them, dissolutely by us. The very custom of stage-players, hath so great q shamefastness. modesty from the ancient q discipline. order, that no man cometh on the stage without breeches. For they are afraid, lest if it should fall out by any chance that * some. certain parts of the body should be q opened. discovered, they would be q be beholden. seen uncomely. q And indeed after our manner. And as the fashion is with us, children growing to q ripeness of age. man's estate, are not q washed. bathed with their parents, nor sons in law with their fathers in law. The q shamefastness or bashfulness. modesty therefore of this kind is to be q retained. observed, especially Nature herself being Mistress and guide. Chap. 49. here T. proceedeth to show more specially how comeliness may be retained in all these, viz word, deed, motion, gesture, that we may be approved of all. And first, that we are chiefly to follow nature herein likewise: That as it seemeth to have had a great respect of our body, having set in open view our countenance and the rest of our shape, wherein the principal comeliness is; but hid those parts which being given only for necessity of nature would be uncomely to look upon so the modesty of man doth & aught to follow this so cunning a work of Nature: which he declareth evidently he●…reby; Because what things nature hath hid, those all who are well in their wits do keep fo●…th of sight; and do what they can to serve the necessity of nature as secretly as may be. Likewise, of what parts of the body there are more servile and base uses, they do not somuch as call them or their uses by their own names. So that, that which it is no shame to do so it be secretly, yet it is uncleanly to report. Whence it is, that the doing of those things openly cannot be without impudency, no nor the very speaking of them can be free from dishonesty. And here he confuteth & reproveth the Cynics as unworthy to be heard and also the Stoics who were almost Cynics in this point, who used to scoff at them for this; because they affirmed that these things are shameful to be uttered, in words, which are not dishonest indeed: and yet they used to term other things by their own names, which were dishonest & vile indeed, as namely to rob, cos●…n, commit adultery, and could speak of them with out dishonesty; ●…ut to beget children a matter honest in itself, they accounted uncleanly to be uttered. This and other like reasons they brought against modesty. But for answer hereof he setteth down this as a sure rule; That we are herein to follow nature, & to shun every thing which our eyes dislike to behold, or our ears to hear. So likewise that our standing, going, countenance, eyes & gestures keep the same decorum, as that they may be approved of all. And here he giveth warning of two principal faults: 1. To beware that we do nothing e●…feminately or too nicely. The other, that we do not any thing rudely or clounishlie. After, he urgeth this point for observing comeliness: 1. By the examples of players, by whom it is shame to be reproved herein. Amongst whom there is so great regard of modesty, in this behalf even according to the ancient custom, that none of them come upon the stage without breeches, and that because they fear lest by any chance some parts of the body should be discovered and seen undecently. 2. By the fashion in bathing, in use amongst them; That children growing to man's estate might not be bathed with their parents, nor sons in law with their fathers in law: only for this modesty which nature hath taught. Hence, finally he concludeth, that the modesty in this kind is carefully to be observed; especially nature herself be●…ing such a strict mistress and guide herein. Chap. 50. What q form or favour. beauty becomes a man, what a woman, and how q either of them. both of them are to be q decked or preserved. adorned: in like manner, what gesture, and what motion is comely. But whereas there are two kinds of q amiableness or comeliness. beauty, in the one of which is fairness, in the other Majesty: q dignity. we ought to account fairness to belong to the woman, and majesty to the man. All q adorning or tricking. manner of trimming therefore q not worthy man. unbefitting man, must be removed from his q beauty. outward form: and let a fault like unto this be taken heed of in the gesture and in the motion. For both q wrastler-like motions. the stir like wrestlers are oft times * too too. more q odious. misliked, and also q some. many gestures * 〈◊〉 players. of players are not without * follies. foolish toys: also in both kinds those things are commended which are right & q simple. plain. But the majesty of the favour is to be preserved by the goodness of the colour, [and] the colour by the exercises of the body. q There is to be added beside. There must moreover be used a cleanliness, [which is] not odious, nor too curious, but only which escheweth all q countrie-like and inhuman negligence. rude and uncivil slovenry. * we must have. The same regard is to be had of [our] apparel; in which as in most things a mean is the best: we must also take heed that we neither use q too so●…t slownesses, or too much niceness. over nice slowness in our q going or gate. pace, that we should seem to be like the * pageants borne in triumphs or shows to be seen. Pageants in triumphs, q either that we take up. nor too much q swiftnesses. speed in our haste. Which things when they q are done. fall out, q the breathe are moved. there followeth shortness of breath, the q countenances are changed. countenance is changed, q the faces are writhe. the face is disfigured: of which q a great signification is made, no constancy to be present. ariseth a great presumption, that they have no staidness. But we must * study. labour much more, that the * affections. motions of our mind q depart not. serve not from Nature: which we shall attain, if we beware that we fall not into q perturbations or moods. passions and q amazedness. mazes, and if we will keep our mind●… q attended. heedful to the * keeping. preservation of comeliness. But the motions of the mind are q double. of two sorts; some of the q cogitation. * understanding. thoughts, others of the appetite. The thought is q co●…uersant or exercised. especially busied in searching out the truth: the appetite * stitreth a man to be doing. enforceth a man to action. q Therefore we must care or provide. We must therefore be careful, that we q use our cogitation unto the, etc. employ our tho●…ghts about the very best matters, [and] that we q give. make [our] appetite obedient to reason. here T. declareth yet more paticularly, what things become a man, what a woman, what both, so as they may be approved of all. And first teacheth, that whereas there are two kinds of beauty, to wit fairness and majesty; that fairness belongeth more properly to the woman, as more comely for her, majesty to the man as more gracing him. Whence he giveth these lessons: 1. That men beware of too much tricking their outward beauty. 2 That they neither use over, violent motions like wrestlers, nor too much gesture or other foolish toys like players; but that such as are most plain are best. 3. To preserve the 〈◊〉 of the favour by ●…he good good ▪nes of the co●…our; & 〈◊〉, by the exercise of the body. 4. That they carefully use cleanliness, and that such as is not any way odious or too curious, but only which eschews all uncivil slovenry. 5. For apparel that it likewise be cleanly; and that in it, as in most things, a mean is best. 6. For our pace. That we neither use overnice slowness, to seem to go like pageants borne in triumphs, as it were, not moving, nor yet too much speed in our haste. This later he giveth special warning to prevent by the inconveniences following thereof; as shortness of breathing, changing of the countenance, disfiguring the face; whence ariseth a great presumption of lack of staidness in the party. 7. That yet above all these, we look to the motions of our minds, that they serve not from nature. And withal teacheth how we may attain thereunto; viz. if we bew are that we fall not into passions, and apply our minds to preserve comeliness. Lastly, he giveth this advice, That whereas the motions of the mind are of two sorts, some of the thoughts others of the appetite; that we carefully employ our thoughts about the very best matters, and ever make our appetites obedient to reason. Chap. 51. There is * two sorts of speech. a double kind of speech, * eloquent. rhetorical and q daily. common. ANd because q there is great 〈◊〉 of speech. the power of speech is great, and that q double. also [〈◊〉] of two sorts, the one of q contention. vehement speech, the other of q talk. ordinary talk. Let the * eloquent speech. vehement speech q let it be given. serve for plead in q of judgements, assemblies [or solemn meetings] the Senate house. judgements, orations in assemblies, & speeches in the Senate house: q speech let it be used in circles [or common meetings.] Let the ordinary speech be used in companies, q disputations. reasoning about matters, meetings of q ●…amiliar [friends. 〈◊〉, and q 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 [or 〈◊〉 ●…pon] feasts. let it also be at feasti●…gs. * There are many q the rhetorician●… give m●…ny precepts concerning vehement speech. precepts of Rhetoricians, of vehement speech, none of ordinary talk▪ although I * wot. know not whether q these also may be there may not be such also. H●…wbeit there are q But masters [or teachers] are found for the studies of learners. masters for their studies that will learn: but there are none that study this: all places are q full with the company of etc. replenished with store of Rhetoricians. Although those same precepts which are of words & sentences, q will appertain to talk. may serve for talk. But sith that we have [our] voice the * declarer the utterer, or to utter. of [our] speech, q and we follow two things in our voice. and in our voice we seek two things, that it be clear and sweet, q both of them is to be required, etc. they both are to be fetched altogether from Nature; but exercise will increase the one, and imitation q of men speaking. of them that speak q presly & mildly [will increase] the other. pithily and pleasantly, the other. What was there in the Catuli, that you should think them q to use an exquisite judgement of letters, or pronouncing. to be of an exquisite judgement in learning? Although they were learned, q but and others. so were others also. But these were thought to use the Latin tongue the best, their q sound. pronunciation was sweet, their letters neither q expressed nor oppressed. too much mouthed nor drowned, lest it should be either q obscure. dark to be understood, or * unpleasant or too much affected. over harsh. [Their voice was] without straining, neither q fainting. faint nor q shrill. too shrill. The speech of Lucius Crassus [was] more q plentiful. flowing, and no less * pleasant. conceited. q But the opinion concerning Catuli, of well speaking, was not less. Yet for eloquence the Catuli were in no less estimation. But Caesar, the brother of the father of Catulus, q overcame. went beyond all in q salt. wit and pleasant conceits, that in that very lawyerlike kind of speaking, he q overcame the contention. surpassed the vehemency of others, [even] in q speech. [his] familiar talk. q we must labour therefore. We must therefore take pains in all these things, if we seek out what q becometh. is decent in every matter. Chap. 51. In this Chapter and the next. T. giveth directions for the manner of our speech. and here fi●…st for the rhetorical or mo●…e vehement speec●…; That whereas there are two ●…orts of sp●…ech, the one more eloquent and vehement, the o●…her ordinary, he directeth that the vehement speech serve for plead, orations, speeches in the senate house, and the like: the ordinary in usual meetings and debatings of matters at feasts & the like. 2. He showeth that the Rhetoricians give many precepts for the vehemē●… sp●…ech, none for the ordinary: Howbeit he thinketh there may be for this also; (although there are none tha●… study it, and so no such teachers for it, as there are for the veheme●…t, all places being replenished with store of Rhetoricians: and that ●…he same precepts which serve for words & sentences may serve for ordidinarie speech. 3 For the more vehement; that sith our voice is given us to be the declarer of our mind, and that in it we seek these two things, that it be clear and sweet; he teacheth that although both of them are to be fetched from nature, yet they may be much helped; the clearness by continual exercise, the pleasantness by imitation of them who speak most pithily & pleasantly. That these two do exceedingly commend the voice, he proveth by instances in the Catuli, who were thought to be of exquisite learning, & to excel others, who were as learned; and to surpass others in the Latin tongue, only because their pronunciation was so sweet. Their letters were neither too much mouthed, nor drowned their pronunciation, lest their speech should have been either dark or unpleasant. Their voice also without straining, neither too weak nor too shrill. So that although the speech of L. Cr. was more flowing & no less conceited, yet for eloquence the Caruli were in as great estimation. Lastly, he teacheth by the example of Caesar, Catulus father's brother, that each should labour to excel in wit and pleasant conceits; that hereby, in his very familiar talk he went beyond the eloquence of others; And therefore concludeth that we are to take pains in every one of these, if we seek to attain what is decent in every matter. Chap. 52. [How our] familiar talk is to be * guided, ordered or directed. moderated. LEt then this * familiar talk. talk (in which the Socratians most excel) be * mild, and not at all obstinate. gentle, and not froward. Let there be therein q a pleasant grace. a pleasantness. Neither yet indeed q let him exclude. let a man exclude others, as though he were q come. entered into his own possession: but let him think that he ought q now and then. oft-times to use an interchange— able course, as in other matters so also in common talk. And let him q see. consider first of all of what matters he speak: if [it be] of earnest bus●…esses, let him q add. use q severity or gravity sageness; if of merry matters, pleasantness. Especially let him q foreset. look unto it that his talk do not q declare. bewray some vice q to be in his manners. in his manners. Which is wont to fall out then especially, when as q it is spoken studiously of the absent, for the 〈◊〉 of detracting. men do speak purposely of them who are absent, to their reproach, q either by a mock or severely, or reproachfully or con●…umeliously. in scorn or earnest, either railingly, or spitefully. q And [common] speeches are had for the most part. Moreover, ordinary communication is for the most part, ei●… of domestical businesses, or of the Commonweal, or of the studies of good arts, and of learning. q Therefore our diligence is to be given. We must therefore do our endeavour▪ that q although our speech. howsoever our communication shall begin to stray unto other matters, [yet] it be called back q unto these things. hereunto. But howsoever, the matters q shall be present. be (for neither are we [all] delighted with the same things, nor at every season, nor alike) [ye●…] we must also q mark. consider how our speech may q have delight. be seasoned with delight: and as there was a way to begin it; so let there be a q measurable mean or good fashion. good manner of the ending thereof. But because this is most rightly q commanded. enjoined, in our whole life, that we fly [all] q perturba●…ions. passions, that is to say, all q over great stir. unmeasurable moods of mind, q not obeying reason. not ruled by reason▪ so 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 must be 〈◊〉 of such passions, lest 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 [in it] either anger, or any * greedy desire. covetousness, or q ●…lothfulnesse. laziness, or cowardliness, or lest any such thing appear. And above all, q we must care. we are to be careful, that we seem both to reverence and love them with whom q we confer speech. we talk. Also now & then, there q happen or come by chance. fall out necessary chide, wherein peradventure we are to use a greater straining of voice, and a sharper gravity of words. q That is also to be done. We are also to loo●…e to that, that we do not seem to do those things q irefully. angrily: but as Physicians [do come] to searing & cutting, so we come seldom and [as it were] unwillingly to q this kind of chastising. such kind of rebuking; q and not at any time but upon necessity. nor ever but necessarily, if no other remedy will be found. But yet q let anger be far away. let it be altogether void of anger, with which nothing can be done well, nothing q discreetly or advisedly. considerately. q And for a great part. For the most part likewise q it is lawful to use we may use a gentle manner of rebuking, yet q gravity being adjoined. tempered with gravity, that both * austerity be added. severity may be showed, and all q reproachful ●…peech be repelled. contumely avoided. And also that q same thing of bitterness which chiding hath. same bitterness which is in chiding, must be signified to have been q undertaken. used for his * sake. cause who is chidden. It is q right. good also, even in those * brawls or quarrels. contentions, which are made with our greatest enemies, although we hear [words] q unbefitting us, unfashionable. unfit to be spoken to us; yet to * keep. retain a gravity, [and] to q repel angriness. suppress the angry mood. For those things which are done with any * perturbation. passion, can neither be done constantly, nor be approved of them that are present. It is also * a matter unbefitting or unbeseeming. an uncomely thing, [for a man] to report [great matters] of himself, especially being false; and to imitate the * Thraso in Terence. glorious soldier, with the q laughing at o●… scorning. scorning of the hearers. Chap. 52. here he giveth sundry precepts for ordinary talk; Wherein the Socratians did most excel: as, 1. That it be gentle, not froward, but having 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. 2 That 〈◊〉 grant others 〈◊〉 due course 〈◊〉 free ●…betie of 〈◊〉, as 〈◊〉 ●…s we wish to ourselves. 3. To consider well of the matter of the communication, that if it be about earnest business 〈◊〉 use lagen●… or 〈◊〉: in 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 itters, pleasantness. 4. That our speech bewra●…e not some vice in our manners. And this he teacheth to fall out then especially, when we speak of set purpose, of them that are absent to their reproach, whether in scorn or good earnest, either railingly or spitefully; and therefore to be wary how we speak of such, who being absent are not able to defend themselves. 5. Our ordinary communication being for the most part of some more serious matter, as of domestical businesses, or things concerning the commonweal, or some matter of learning; that we endeavour to call back and keep our speech to the point in hand till it be finished, if upon occasion any begin to divert from it. 6. That whatsoever we talk of (as there are varieties of matters and occasions) yet we consider and look well to this▪ how our speech may be seasoned with delight to give contet to them that hear us. 7. As we are to be careful to take a meet occasion for the entrance into our discourse; so for the ending of it▪ to do it in the best manner. 8. That as we are enjoined to fly all pa●…siōs in our whole life, so more specially in our talk we are to beware of all moody fits not ruled by reason, that there appear not in any part of our speech either anger, covetousness, laziness, or cowardliness, or any such unbeseeming fault. ●…. That above all we be careful that we may be thought both to reverence and love them with whom we talk. 10. If it fall out that we are necessarily occasioned to chide any, and therein to use more loudness of voice & more sharpness in words, yet that we are to look to this, that we seem not to do it irefully or headily: but, as the wise & disc●…eete Physicians who come to searing & cutting but very seldom and as it were unwillingly, when no other means will serve; ●…o we come likewise to this kind of rebuking, & that never but necessarily▪ when no other remedy will be found. Here he giveth also four other cautions for our rebuking of others, that it may be comely and profitable. 1. That it he altogether void of anger, because in it nothing can be done well or advisedly. 2. That it be done in as mild a manner as may be, yet tempered with gravity, that a wholesome severity may be showed, & all contumely avoided. 3. If there seem to be any bitterness in it, that it be signified that it was used chiefly for his good who was chidden. 4. Even in those contentions which fall out to be with our enemies, howsoever they give us very unbefitting speeches, that yet we ever retain gravity and suppress our angry mood, because we cannot otherwise carry ourselves wisely therein, nor be approved of them who are present. Lastly, he giveth this advice, that in speaking of our own matters, we beware how we report any great things of ourselves especially false, seeming to imitate therein the glorious soldier, with the scorning of the hearers. Chap. 53. What order is to be kept q in building up edifices. in buildings. ANd because we pursue q all things. every point ( q we will it in very deed. at least certainly we desire to do it) we must show also what a one q it pleaseth or it liketh us, that the house etc. it becometh the house of an honourable man and of a Prince to be: the end whereof is the * occupying it. use, whereunto the q description. plot of the building must be q accommodated or fitted. framed; and yet [withal] q a diligent care is to be added or used there must be a respect be had of the q dignity. stateliness and * handsomeness. commodiousness of it. We have heard q it to have been, etc. that it was an honour to Kneius Octavius ( q who was made the first Consul of that family. who was the first Consul of that family) that he had built a q famous [or gorgeous] and full of dignity. goodly and very stately house in the palace: Which when it was q visited commonly seen of all the vulgar sort [re●…orting thither] it was thought q to give the voice in election. to further the master [of i●…] (being q a new man. a man newly come up) unto the Consulship. S●…aurus q having demolished or th●…owne down this, ●…ade an 〈◊〉 to his, etc. plucked this down, [and] enlarged 〈◊〉 own houses. * ●…nd so. Th●…rfore * the Emperor. Octavius first brought the Consulship into his house: q this the son of a chief and famous man. this othe●… a noble and famous man's son▪ brought into his enlarged house, not only a repulse but also q ignominy and calamity. shame and misery. For a man's honour is to be q adorned. set out by his house, and not his whole honour sought * by. from his house: Neither is the Master to be q honested or adorned. graced by [his] house; but the house is to be q honested or honoured. graced by the Master. And as in all q other things. things else, a regard is to be had not only of a man's own self, but also of others; so * in a noble man's house. in the house of a q famous. noble man, into which both many guests are to be * entertained. received, and a q multitude. number of men of * all sorts. every sort [is] to be admitted, q there is to be ●…ad a care of largeness or wideness. there must be made a provision for roomth. Otherwise, a q ample. large house oft times q is made. proveth a disgrace to the Master q if it be but little▪ frequented. if there be in it solitarin●…sse, and especially if at any time it was wont to be q much frequented. well filled by another master. For it is an odious thing, when it is said of q them that pass by the passers by: O ancient house, alas with how q unequal or vnme●…te. unbefitting a master art thou governed? Al. q Al. which same thing it is lawful to say. Which indeed a man may [truly] say of many q in our times. nowadays. You must take heed also, q especially if yourself build or be a builder. namely if you build, that you * exceed not. go not beyond measure in q cost. sumptuousness & * gorgeousness or stateliness. magnificence: in the which kind, there is q much evil * much hurt cometh even by the example. even in the example. For * the most men do imitate studiously the deed●… etc. of the chief men. very many do earnestly imitate the doings of Princes, especially in this q part. behalf: as, Who [doth imitate] the virtue of Lucius Lucul. a q chief. singular man? yet how many have imitated the q magnificence [or sumptuousness] of his farm houses. stateliness of his manor places? q Of which things doubtless a mean is to be v●…ed. Whereof yet in very deed a measure is to be kept, and to be q recalled. reduced unto * keeping a mean. a mediocrity, and that same mediocrity to be referred Al. q Al. to every use, & handsomn●…sse or conveniency. to the common use and ornament of life. q But [we have prosecuted] these things hitherto. But of these hitherto. Chap. 53. Here T. desirous to pursue every point wherein comeliness may consist, cometh to buildings, for the order and decency to be observed in them. And first, for the house of a Prince or an honourable man, he giveth this precept, That although for the frame and form of it, it must be fitted especially according to the end of it, which is chiefly the use thereof: yet notwithstanding that there must be a due respect had, to the state and comeliness of it, meet for the place and honour of the owner. This he showeth, 1. By the example of Kn. Octavius, the first that was Consul of that family: who by reason of a goodly house which he had built in the palace, yet such as was befitting him, is reported, not only to have received much honour, but also through the concourse of the vulgar sort to view it, and of other beholders, to have been advanced to the Consulship; being otherwise a man but new lie comen up. 2. By another example of Scaurus contrary to this, who building beyond his est 〈◊〉 overthrew himself ther●…y For ●…owsoeuer ●…ee was made by Octavius the first Consul of h●…s family for it, and was a noble man's son; yet he brought into his ●…nlarged house together with the Consulship, not only a repul●…e, but also shame and misery in the end, when he was not able to maintain it. And therefore here he giveth two rules to this purpose. 1. That a man's honour is to be set out by his house, and not to be wholly sought from his house. 2. That the master is not to look to be graced by his house, but his house by him. A second precept for such buildings is this, That a man therein have regard not only of himself, but also of others. And therefore in great men's houses into which many strangers are to be received, & a great number of all sorts to be admitted, there must be special provision for convenient room, so as it may be large enough, and the owner able to main tain the port▪ that it may ever be well filled; for that otherwise a large house may prove a disgrace to the master if it come to be solitary, especially if it was ever well filled by another master. This disgrace he exaggerates by the odious speeches of the passers by, as might be truly verified of many in his days. A third precept is, that in such buildings a measure be kept for sumptuousness and magnificence. Because thereby otherwise ariseth much evil, even by the example. The reason is: for that very many do earnestly imitate the works of princes chiefly, in this behalf, although they never regard their virtues. This he instanceth in L. Lucullus a singular man for virtue: yet none imitated him in that; but very many in the sumptuousness of his man our places. And therefore he concludeth, that in all these things a measure is to be kept, and all to be reduced thereunto: and finally that that same mediocrity is to be referred to the common use and ornament of life. Chap. 54. Three things q are to be observed to be observed in the whole life. q And. Moreover, in every action q to be undertaken. we undertake, three things are to be q kept. observed. First, that appetite obey reason: than which, nothing is more * fit to preserve duties. meet to preserve Duty. q And then that it be considered. Secondly, that we consider how great the matter is, which we desire q effect. to bring to pass; and that neither * less. greater nor less care & * pain. diligence q be undertaken. be used then the cause requireth. A third thing is, that we take heed, Al. q Al. that those things which appertain to an honest show be moderated by dignity. that we moderate those things which appertain to liberality, by an honest show and q dignity. seemly grace. And the best mean is, to keep that comeliness, whereof we spoke before; q no●… to proceed any further. & not to go beyond it. Also the chief of these three is, q appetite to obey. that appetite obey reason. Chap. 54. In this chapter T. setteth down three things to be carefully observed in a man's whole life; as, much tending to the gracing thereo●… and so of every particular action. 1. That appetite & will ever obey reason; than which he teacheth that nothing can be fitter to preserve us in the way of virtue. 2. That we consider wisely of each matter which we desire to bring to pass; and so also of a meet diligence for the sure effecting thereof, and neither more nor less care then the matter requireth. 3. That in things which chiefly appertain to honesty, we ever moderate all, by retaining a decent show and seemly grace according to our place & estate; and in all things ever to strive to keep that comeliness which hath been taught; & and not to go beyond it. Finally, he concludeth, that yet of these three this is the chief, That appetite ever obey reason. Chap. 55. Comeliness from the place and time. q furthermore we must speak. NOw we are to speak of the order of things and opportunity of times: and herein is contained that q science or skill. know ledge which the Grecians q name. call 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; not this, which we * expound. interpret q modesty. moderation, in which worde●… modus [viz. a mean] q is in. is comprehended. But this is [that] 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, in which is q understood a preservation. meant a keeping of order. As therefore we call the same q modesty or moderation. discretion is thus defined of the Stoics: that * moderation. discretion is q a science. the knowledge of q placing or disposing. setting those things which shall be done or said, in their q own. proper place. And so it seemeth there will be the same q force or property. power of order and q placing or disposition. disposing things aright. For thus also they define Order, to be q a framing or ordering things. a composing of things in apt and * fit. convenient places. q Also they say, place to be of the action, opportunity of the time. And place they say belongeth unto action, but opportunity unto time. Also * the seasonable [or fit] time of an action. the time convenient for the doing of any thing [is called] in Greek 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, in q it is called in Latin occasio Latin it is called occasio. So q it cometh to pass. it is, that this discretion, which we interpret, as I have said, is a knowledge of the opportunity of fit q times to do a thing. seasons to do any thing. q But. Yet there may be the same defini●…ion of prudence, whereof we spoke in the beginning. But q we ask in this place. in this place we dispute concerning moderation and temperance * and other like virtues. and [other] virtues like q of these. unto these. * And so. Therefore what were the properties of prudence have been * spoken. showed in their place. But what * properties. things of these virtues, whereof we have q spoke a good while ago. begun to speak, do appertain to q shamefastness. discretion, and q to the approbation of them. to their liking with whom we live, are now to be showed. Chap. 55. Here T. about to teach how comlines●…e is to be kept i●… regard both of place & time, viz. in observing the right order of doing things, and fi●…test opportunities of times, for the same, showeth, 1. That therein is contained that knowledge which the Grecians call 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, meaning the●…eby not that which the Latins expour d●… modesty, viz. moderation, in which word modus, to wit a mean, is compre●…ended; but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, viz. discretion, or keeping order. 2. He teacheth how this is defined by the Stoics, viz. That discretion is a science of setting those things, which are done or said, in their proper place and order. And so maketh it nothing but a faculty of ordering & disposing things aright. Because thus they define order also; That it is a composing of things in apt and convenient places; And say that place belongeth to action, but opportunity to time. 3. For the time convenient for the doing of things, he first showeth it by the names; that it is called in Greek 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉▪ in Latin o●…casio and then defineth it, that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is a knowledge of the opprotunities, or fit seasons to do any thing, Also that prudence (spoken of before) may be defined after the same manner. To conclude this chapter, he showeth that here he speaketh concerning discretion and temperance, and other virtues like unto them, having spoken before of prudence and the properties thereof, in the right place; and that now he is only to speak of such other virtues, as appertain to modesty, and to gain the good liking of them with whom we live. Chap. 56. What q becometh. is decent in every place and time, and what q becometh not. not. * we are therefore to keep such an order. Such an order then of our actions is to be q used. observed, q that all things be fit and agreeable among themselves, as in a constant oration, so in the life. that as in a well framed oration, so in [our] life all things be * fit. apt and agreeable among themselves. For it is a dishonest thing and very faulty, in a q severe. sage matter q to bring in any speech meet for a feast, or delicate. to bring in any table talk, or wanton speech. Well spoke Pericles, when he had Sophocles the Poet q his colleague or fellow. joined with him in the Praetorship▪ q and they had talked of the common Duty. and these two were communing about their office; q and a fair boy passed by, by chance. as by chance a well favoured boy passed by, and Sophocles had said, Oh fair boy ●… Pericles, [he] answered: q But for. But Sophocles, it becometh a Praetor to have not only q abstaining or forbearing. continent hands, but eyes also. q And. Now if Sophocles had spoken this same q in the approbation of wrestlers, or where wrestlers are allowed or tried. in a place of approbation of wrestlers, he had q wanted. been free from just reproof. So great force there is both of place and time, that if any man, when he is to plead a cause do q muse. meditate with himself in his journey, or in his walking, or q devise any matter more attentively. think of any other thing more seriously, he may not be reproved; but if he do q the same thing the like at a feast he may be thought vn●…iuil, q for the ignorance of the time. for having no regard to the time. Howbeit those things which far dasagree from q humanity. all civility (as if any man sing in the q pleading place, or in the street. market place, or if there be any other great q peruer●…enesse. disorder) do * soon or plainly. easily appear, neither do they greatly need admonition or precepts; q but what faults seem to be small, neither can be understood of many, we must decline from these more diligently. But we are more carefully to shun those faults which seem to be small, and cannot be perceived of * most. many: as, q in instruments with strings, as harp or lute. in stringed or q pipes. wind instruments, though they q differ, disagree or be out of tune. jar never so littl●…, yet q it is wont to be marked. it is vsu●…dly observed of a * cunning. skilful [man.] q we must live so in [our] life, or to demean ourselves. We are so to carry ourselves in our life, q lest peradventure any thing jar. that nothing chance to jar; yea and by much more also, q by how much a consent [or concord] of actions. as an harmony of deeds is greater and better then of * tunes. sounds. And therefore as q the ears of musicians. the Musicians ears do perceive even the least discords q the least things. in instruments: so we (if we will be sharp and * quick. diligent judges, and * censurers or correctors of vices. markers of faults) shall oft understand great things of small; We shall easily judge by the q looking or steadfast beholding or fixing. setting of the eyes, q either by the remission or contraction of the eyebrows, by heaviness or dumpishness, by mirth, by etc. by either the smooth looking or bending of the brows, by sadness, mirth, laughter, speech, silence, q contention and submission. straining and falling of the voice, and other like things, * what is done. which of them is fitly done, which q disagreeth. swerveth from Duty and Nature. In which kind it is not * amiss or inconvenient. incommodious to judge by others, q what a one. of what sort each of them is: that if any thing be undecent in others, we ourselves also may avoid it. For it comes to pass, q I know not by what means. I wot not how, that we see more in others, then in ourselves, if any thing be done amiss. q And so they are corrected most easily in learning. Therefore in learning, [those scholars] are very soon corrected, whose faults the masters do q imitate for the cause of amending [them.] counterfeit, to the end to amend them. Neither indeed is it amiss q to add learned men, or also those who are skilful by practice, to choose those things, which may bring doubt, and to search diligently concerning every kind of duty, what liketh them to use the advice of learned or experienced men, for the choosing of those things, which may be doubtful, and to q inquire what liketh them concerning every kind of Duty. For the greater part q is wont almost. is usually wont to be carried thither, whither it is led by q ●…ature itself. very nature. In which things we are not only to consider, what every one speaketh, but also what every one * judgeth. thinketh, and also * why each man thinks so, or what their reason is. for what cause each man thinketh so. For as painters, & q they who frame signs or make pictures. picturers, and also the true Poets q every one desireth his work to be considered of the common people. are desirous to have their works seen of all sorts of men, that if any thing be q reprehended. found fault with by many, it may be corrected; and they do diligently * examine. inquire both with themselves and others, what is * miss or faulty therein. done amiss in it: So very many things are to be done and left undone of us, q by th●…●…udgement according to the judgement of others, and also changed and q corrected. amended. q but what things are done. As for those things that are done q by custom. after the custom and civil q institutions. ordinances, q nothing is to be given in precepts concerning them: for these very things are precepts. there is no precept to be given of them: for they are precepts of themselves. Neither ought any man to be q led. carried with this error, that if Socrates or Aristippus have done or spoken any thing against q the [usual] manner and civil custom. civil order and custom, he should think the same thing to be lawful for himself. For they obtained this * freedom of doing and speaking as they thought best. liberty by their great and divine gifts. But the q whole reason [o●… guise] of the Cyniks is to be utterly cast out [or refused] fashion of the Cynics is wholly to be rejected. For it is q an enemy to shamefastness. contrary to modesty, without which * nothing q there can be nothing right, nor any thing honest. can be right, nothing honest. q And. Moreover, we ought to * attend upon or mark. observe and to * honour. reverence them, whose life hath been thoroughly tried in honest and great matters, [being men] q thinking or meaning well. having a good opinion of the Commonwealth, and having deserved or deserving well [thereof,] [and] q affected [or graced] with any honour or dignity. advanced to any honour or place of government: & also * to have old age in high estimation. to give much unto old age. * [we aught also] to etc. To give place to those which q have a magistracy [or be in authority.] bear office; q to have a choice [or difference] of a citizen, etc. To make a difference between a citizen and a stranger; and also [to consider] in the very stranger, whether he came q privately [or as a private person] or publicly [as a public person.] of his own private business, or about the commonwealths affairs. q To the sum [or summarily] that I may not deal of every one. In a word (that I may not entreat of every particular) we are bound to love, maintain and preserve the common q reconcilement and consociation of the whole kind of men. agreement, and society of all mankind. Chap. 56. In this chapter T. being to show what is decent in every action, time and place, teacheth, 1. That such an order is to be kept in all our actions, that in our whole life, all the parts and every thing therein, be apt both for place and time, & agreeable amongst themselves; like as in a well framed oration. And secondly, that of the contrary it is dishonest and very faulty, to do that which is unbeseeming in any action. As for example: If a man in a sage matter, should bring in table talk, or any wanton or idle speech. This he confirmeth by a witty speech of Pericles: who when Sophocles the Poet was joined with him in the praetorship, and they two were of a time communing about matters of their office; as by chance a fair boy passed by, Sophocles said, Oh fair boy! Pericles reprehending him, spoke thus unto him again: But Sophocles it becometh a praetor to have not only stayed hands, but continent eyes also. Now concerning this speech T. showeth, that if Sophocles had used it in some other place, as where masteries are beholden or the like, he had been free from any just reproof: whereas doing it in this place and at this time, he was justly reproved, for that there is such great force of time and place herein. 3. He setteth it forth by another example illustrated by a comparison of contraries, thus; If any man when he is to plead a cause, do meditate of it in his iour●…ie or as he is walking, or do then think●… more seriously of any other matter, he is not disliked: whereas if he should do the like at a feast, he would be thought very uncivil, for having no regard of time or place. 4. He teacheth, whereas some disorders are so gros●…e, and so far disagreeing from all civility, as they need not greatly any admonition or precept, as to sing in the pleading place or the like; that we are therefore to shun more carefully those faults which seem to be but small, and cannot be perceived of every one but only of the wise, for that they are to judge even of the least disorder. This he teacheth by a fit similitude taken from musicians; who avoid the least jar in their instruments, because the very lest is easily observed, of the skilful: and so we likewise are to demean ourselves in our whole life, that nothing chance to jar therein. And that this we are to do so much the rather, as an harmony of deeds, is greater and better than a harmony of sounds. Then, where as it may be said, But how shall I come to discern of these little faults; he answereth it by a fit similitude; That as the musicians ears do perceive even the least discords, in instruments, by a diligent observation and comparing of sounds; so we, if we will be●… diligent markers & judges of faults, shall be able to understand even the least. Secondly, he giveth special direction how we may judge by others: viz. by observing the fixing of their eyes, the smooth looking or bending of their brows, their dumpishness, mirth, laughing, speech, silence, or over much lifting up or falling of their voices, or the like; so in them to judge what was done fitly, what otherwise, And then what we have observed to be undecent in others, to avoid the same in ourselves. After, he giveth the reason hereof. Because it usually cometh to pass, that we see more in others then in ourselves if any thing be ami●…se, and so do better amend our faults thereby. This he confirmeth by an instance in scholars, who are the eas●…yest corrected, by their masters counterfeiting their faults, to let them see the ill favouredness of them. 5. He directeth what means are best, to know what is the fittest in every kind of duty, and so in all doubtful matters; viz. To use the advice of learned or experienced men herein. Because the greater part of men is usually carried whither they are led by nature. Therefore we are not only to consider what every one speaketh▪ but what he thinketh▪ & why he thinketh so; which wise men can give the best reason o●… and so to use them chiefly. And that we are to do herein as painters, pictureres and Poets; who are not only desirus to have their works seen of all sorts, that if any thing be generally or justly disliked, it may be amended: but also to this end do diligently inquire, what is amiss in the same. Even so that we are to do, or leave undone many things, according to the judgement of others, and likewise to change and to amend them. 6. He giveth this rule: That in what things we have customs & civil ordinances to follow, we carefully observe them; For that they are precepts of themselves, and so need not to have any precepts given of them. And that we are not by any private man's ensample, though never so wise or of the greatest authority, to be drawn to do or speak any thing against civil orders and customs; no not by the ●…nsample of Socrates or Aristippus. Because they might have that liberty by their great and divine gifts, which we cannot have. Yet here he giveth a caveat, That for the fashion & guise of the Cynics, it is wholly to be rejected, as contrary to all modesty, without which nothing can be right or honest. Lastly, he giveth some few other particular directions, concerning this point, and so concludeth: as, 1. That we ought specially to observe and reverence them whose lives have been thoroughly tried in honest and great matters; chiefly being sound lovers of the commonweal, having already deserved well of the same, & advanced to any honour or place of government. 2. That we much respect old age. 3. That we yield & submit ourselves to them that are in office. 4. That we put a difference between citizens and strangers; and yet in the very strangers to consider whether they came of their own private busisinesse, or about the affairs of the commonweal: And in a word to look carefully to this general, as comprehending many particulars; That each know himself bound to love, maintain & preserve the common agreement & society of all sorts Chap. 57 What q arts. trades, and q what gains. what kinds of gain are base: what contrarily are q liberal, meet for a free man [or an honest man.] honest. NOw concerning q occupations and gains [or manner of gaining.] trades and commodities, which are to be accounted q liberal. honest, which base, q we have received these things almost. thus commonly we have heard; First, those q gains. kinds of gains are disallowed q which run into the hate of all. which are odious to all, as [the gain] of q customers taking toll of havens. tolefarmers, and usurers. The gains also of q all who serve for hire or wages. all hirelings, q whose labour and not their arts are bought. whose labour is bought & not their cunning, are servile & base. q for the very hire in them. For in them the very q wages. hire is [as it were] the q obligation or press-money. bond of their q bondage. servitude. They moreover, are q to be thought. to be accounted * of the base sort. base, who buy of merchants that which q they sell strait way as by retail. they presently retail again. q for they profit nothing. For these gain nought, unless they lie q very greatly. exceedingly. q neither in truth is there any thing more filthy than vanity. And indeed there is nothing more dishonest than lying. Also all kind of q workmen or craftsmen. handicrafts men q are employed in a base art [or trade] serve in base occupations. Neither in truth can the * workhouse. shop have in it q any ingenuous thing. any thing beseeming a gentleman; and in no wise are those trades to be approved which be servers of pleasures; [as] * Trinkermen. fishmongers of great fish, butchers, cooks, puddingmakers, fishermen, as, Terence speaketh: add to these, if q you * it please you. please, * list. perfumers, dancers, and all * makers of sweet oils, or perfumers. play at dice. But in * players at plays ●… standing on hazard. what q arts. sciences there is either greater wisdom, or * great gain. no small gain is sought, as Physic, q the art of building or carpentry. casting plots for buildings, the learning of q honest. worthy things, these are honest for them * for whose degree they are convenient to whose estate they agree. Ma●…chandize also, if it be small, is to be q thought. accounted base: but if it be great and q copious, well fraught. abundant, q conveying to us. bringing in from every side many commodities, & q imparting it to many without vanity or vain words. dispersing the same into many men's hands, without lying, it is not much to be dispraised. And furthermore, if it being * satisfied. satiate or rather content with gain, as it hath oft comen from the q deep. sea to the haven, so [it shall * change or be changed into lands and possessions to settle thereon. betake] itself from the haven q into fields. to lands and possessions, it seemeth * to deserve due commendation. that it may be commended * very justly. by very good right. q for nothing of all things. For of all things from which any [gain] is q gotten. sought, nothing is better than q till age of the ground. husbandry: nothing q more plentiful. yielding greater increase, nothing more q sweet. pleasant, nothing meeter for q a free man. a free borne man. * whereof. Concerning which, because we q spoken things cnow. have sufficiently spoken q in Cato the elder or the elder Cato. in our book called Cato maior [or de senectute] from thence you * may fetch. shall take q what things shall appertain to this place. whatsoever shall appertain to this place. Chap. 57 T. in this chapter still pursuing this point of comeliness and honesty, cometh to speak of trades and kinds of commodities; and teacheth in the first place, what sorts of them are to be accounted liberal and honest, what base according to the common esteem of men. And first he reckoneth up sundry of those kinds which are disallowed as base and odious: As, 1. The trades and gains of tolefarmers & usurers. 2. The gains of all sorts of hirelings, whose labours are bought, & not their cunning. Because in them their hire is, as it were, the bond of their servitude. 3. They who buy of the merchants such commodities, as they presently retail again. For that these usually gain little or nothing, unless they lie exceedingly: then which he showeth that nothing is more dishonest. 4. He teacheth that all kind of handicrafts men serve in base occupations; because that in truth, the shop cannot have, in it, any thing beseeming an ingenuous or free man. 5. Above all other, he accounteth those trades most base, which are for serving the pleasures of men: as of fishmongers, butchers, cooks, pudding makers & the like, and more specially perfumers, dancers, and all gaining by dicing and such unlawful games. In the second place he showeth what arts are to be accounted liberal and honest. As first, All arts & sciences, wherein there is either greater wisdom required, or no small gain sought: as namely physic, casting plots for buildings; and so all manner of learning of honest & worthy matters; for that these are comely for them, for whose state and degree they are convenient. 2. Merchandise, which howsoever being small, it is accounted but base; yet if it be great, bringing in commodities from foreign countries, and dispersing the same into many men's hands for the common good, so that it be without lying, is not much to be dispraised, but rather commended. And especially if the merchant, being thereby sufficiently enriched, shall content himself and buy lands & possessions therewith, to settle himself thereupon, for the good of his country. 3. Of all things from which gains are sought, he preferreth husbandry, for that nothing yieldeth greater increase, nothing more pleasant, nothing meeter for a free borne man. But for this matter of husbandry, he referreth us to his book de senectute, where he hath written of the delight of it at large, that from thence we may learn whatsoever we desire in this behalf. Chap. 58. Of two honest things, whether is the more honest. But q it seemeth expounded sufficiently. I think it sufficiently declared, how duties should q be drawn or proceed. be derived, from those parts which q are of honesty. belong to honesty. q But a contention of those very things which are honest, may oft fall out. Yet of those same things which are honest, there may fall out oft times a question, and a comparison q whether of two honest things is the honester. of two honest things, when there is the honester: q which place is pretermitted by Panetius. which point is passed over of Panetius. For whereas all honesty q floweth or streameth. springeth out of four●… q parts or fount. heads, whereof one is of knowledge, another is of q common society. community, the third of * valorousness or couragio●…snesse. magnanimity, the fourth of * temperance. moderation; it is q necessary that these be compared oft together in choosing duty. of necessity, that in choosing of Duty, these be oft compared amongst themselves. q It pleaseth therefore, those duties to be more apt to nature. We think therefore that those Duties are more agreeable to Nature, which [are q drawn. borrowed] from q common society. community, than those which are q drawn or derived. fetched from knowledge. And that may be * proved. confirmed by this argument: because, q if that life shall happen to a wise man. if a wise man shall happen on such a life, that he be enriched with q flowing plenty or store. abundance of * all manner of substance. all things, although he consider with himself with the greatest * advice. leisure, and * view. behold all things which are worthy q knowledge. to be known; yet if his solitariness q be so great. should be so great, that he q cannot. could not * have the sight of a man. see a man, q he would depart out of life, or wish to die. he would wish to be out of this life. And that wisdom which the greeks * term or name. call q sapientia. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, is the princess of all virtues. q for we understand another certain prudence, which the greeks call 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, which is the science, etc. For we take prudence, which the greeks call 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to be another certain thing, which is the knowledge of things to be q earnestly desired. desired, and [things] q to be fled. meet to be eschewed. But that wisdom (which I named the princess) is the q science of heavenly and worldly things, or things belonging to Gods and men. knowledgè of divine and human things: where in is contained the the q common conversing o●… intercourse, or fellowship. community of gods and men, and their society amongst themselves. [Now] if * that virtue. that be the greatest ( * as certainly it is. as it is indeed) q it is necessary that duty to be the greatest which is drawn from community. it must needs follow that the Duty which is borrowed from community, is the greatest also. For knowledge and q view [or consideration.] contemplation of * natural things. Nature q is in a certain manner. is after a sort q ●…ame and begun [only.] maimed and imperfect, if no q doing of things. performance of deeds follow: and that q doing is seen especially. performance doth especially appear, in▪ defending q commodities of men. men's commodities. It than appertaineth to * this community of men. the society of mankind; and for that cause, is to be preferred before knowledge. And every q best man. best disposed man doth declare and show the same thing, q in very deed. when it comes unto the point. For who is so q desirous. studiously set in q through seeing. the searching out and knowing the nature of things; that if q the peril & danger of [his] country which he might etc. tidings q should be brought suddenly to him handling [o●… treating upon] and viewing matters most worthy [his] knowledge. should be brought him of a sudden, of the peril and hazard of his country, which he might be able to succour and help; although he were handling and contemplating matters most worthy q knowledge. to be known, would he not leave and q cast away. cast aside all q those things. these [studies;] yea although he thought q himself to be able that he was able to number the stars, and to measure the greatness of the worlds? q And the same man would do this thing And he would do the very same thing in the cause o●… peril of [his] q parent. parents or friends. By which things q it is understood. we may plainly gather, q the duties of justice. that the duties of justice which appear ta'en to the profit of men, than which nothing ought to be q more ancient. dearer unto man, q to be preferred or put before. are to be preferred before the studies and duties of knowledge. q Also they themselves. They moreover, whose studies and whole life hath been q occcupied o●… employed. spent in the knowledge of things, q yet have not. have not yet withdrawn q gone back or departed. themselves from increasing the profits and commodities of men. For they also have instructed many, * to make them the better citizens, etc. to the end that they might be the better citizens, and the more profitable in their Commonweals; as Lysias * a follower of Pythagoras, or a Pitha gorean philosopher. the Pythagorean [instructed] * Epaminondas of Thebes. the Theban Epaminondas; Plato taught Dion * Siracusa. the Syracusian, & q many [have taught] many. many other have done many more. And q what soever thing whatsoever benefit we ourselves have brought unto the Commonwealth (if so be that we have brought any thing) we have q come unto it, instructed and adorned by teachers and learning. attained unto it, being instructed by teachers, and furnished with learning. q Neither only they living and present do instruct and teach etc. Neither do they only instruct and teach them that are desirous of learning, while they are alive and present; but they attain the very same thing also, even after their death by [their] monuments of learning. q for neither. Neither is there any q place. point q pretermitted or overpassed by them omitted of them, which might q apperaine to the laws, which [might appertain] to the manners, etc. concern the laws, customs and * government. discipline of the Commonweal: so that they may seem to have employed their * quiet studies for our business or commodity. leisure unto our affairs. Thus they themselves being given to the studies of learning & wisdom, q do confer especially do chiefly bestow Al. their Al. their prudence and understanding. wisdom, prudence and understanding, to the commodity of men. And for that cause also, it is better to * utter the mind plentifully. speak copiously so that it be * discreetly. wisely, then to q to think [or conceive] most sharply without eloquence. meditate even most wittily without utterance; q because cogitation [or conceit is 〈◊〉 or employed] 〈◊〉 in itself, but 〈◊〉. for that, meditation serveth only within oneself, but eloquence q 〈◊〉 those 〈◊〉 whom etc. serveth for the benefit of all those, with whom we bejoined in q 〈◊〉 common society. And as the swarms of Bees q are not gathered together ●…or the cause of framing honey combs. do cluster together not to this end to make combs, q but whereas they are congregable [or soon assembled] ●… by nature they fashion [th●…ir] comb●… but being swarming by nature they work their honey combs; So & much more also, men being * of an assembling▪ or sociable nature, do add the cunning of doing and devising. gathered by nature, do use their cunning in doing and devising. Therefore unless that virtue which consisteth q of defending. in defending men, that is to say, q of the society of mankind. in maintaining the society of mankind, q touch or be joined with. do meet with the knowledge of things, it may seem a lone-wandring and barren knowledge And in like manner, greatness of courage, separate from human q community and neighbourhood. society & friendship, is a certain * beastliness. savageness and * beastly. untractable cruelty. So it cometh to pass, that the q consociation. accompanying together of men & common society, far surmounts the study of knowledge. Neither is it true which is said of q certain. some, q therefore this. that therefore this community & society with men, q to be for the necessity. is for the necessity of life, because we could not attain nor q bring to pass. effect without others, those things which nature might desire. For if so be that all things which appertain to the food & * ornament of life. furniture of life, were q afforded or found. ministered unto us as is were, by the q divine rod. grace of God, as they say; then every one q of the best wit [or of an excellent wit.] of a good wit, q all businesses omitted or▪ set aside. omitting all other businesses, would q place or bestow. employ himself wholly in knowledge and science. But it is not so. For he would both fly solitariness, and seek a companion of his study; & q he would. would both teach and learn, also hear and speak. [And] therefore every duty which appertaineth q to maintain the conjunction, etc. to the maintenance of the neighbourhood & society of men, is to be preferred before that duty which q is contained. consisteth in knowledge and science. Chap. 58. T. having finished the first main question concerning honesty, to wit, how Duty may be derived from the four chief fountains thereof, and also whether the thing to be deliberated of be honest or dishonest; cometh now to the second question, arising from the comparing of honest things amongst themselves: viz. Of two honest things propounded whether is the more honest: which point he showeth as before, to have been omitted by Panetius. Secondly, he giveth the reason hereof: That all honesty springeth from out of these four fountains, viz Prudence, justice, Fortitude, Temperance; that in the making choice of what duties we are to perform, we use oft to compare these among themselves. And 〈◊〉 he teacheth, that those dut●…es are more agreeable to nature which spring from our community with others, viz. from justice, than those which are fetched from prudence; and so to be preferred before them. This he confirmeth by sundry argumē●…s from the necessity of human society, from which the duties of justice do proceed. Which society he showeth to be so necessary, That if a wise man should happen on such a life, that he should be enriched with all abundance of good things, and should have both ability & leisure enough to contemplate and consider of all things worthy the knowledge of mortal man; yet if his solitariness, should be such that he could not see a man, he would wish much rather to die then to live. Secondly, from that wisdom which is called in Greek 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and in Latin sapientia, from which these duties of justice & community are likewise derived: This wisdom he showeth to be the princess of all virtues, and distinct from that which is called in Latin prudentia, & in Greek 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, which is defined thus, viz A knowledge of things, meet to be desired or eschewed: Where as this wisdom called sapientia is the knowledge of divine and human things, wherein is contained the community of Gods and men, and their society amongst themselves. Whence he reasoneth thus: If that virtue of wisdom from which these duties proceed be the greatest and as it were the princess of all virtues, that then these duties flowing from it must needs be the greatest also. And that they do proceed hence, he proveth further; for that the contemplation and knowledge of nature is maimed and unperfect, if no performance of deeds follow●…: which performance he declareth to appear especially in defending the commodities of others, and so appertaineth to the society of mankind; & therefore to be preferred before mere knowledge. Thirdly, he proveth it by the examples of the best disposed men; who use to cast aside all duties of getting knowledge, whatsoever, that they may help their country in any extreme peril. For example, he asketh this question, who there is so studiously set in searching out the nature of things, if tidings should be brought him of a sudden, of some great imminent peril of his country, which he might be able to prevent; though he were contemplating matters most worthy of all other to be known, which would not yet cast aside all those studies: yea although he thought he should be able by his searching, to number the stars, and to measure the greatness of the world. And moreover, for that he would not only do this for his country, but even in the very cause of the peril of his parents, or friends. Whence he concludeth evidently again, that the duties of justice appertaining to the profit of mankind, than which nothing can be dearer unto us, are to be preferred before duties of knowledge. Fourthly, he further demonstrateth it by other general ensamples in this kind. As, First, in that they whose studies and whole life have been spent in seeking out the knowledge of things, yet have not withdrawn themselves from endeavouring to inincrease the commodities of men. As those who have instructed many, to make them the better citizens, & more profitable to the commonweals. Of this sort he giveth sundry ensamples: as, 1. Of Lysias the Pythagorean philosopher, who instructed Epaminondas of Thebes. 2. Of Plato, who taught Dion the Syracusan, and many other have done the like. 3. He showeth for himself, that whatsoever benefit he had brought to the commonweal (if he had brought any at all) he had attained unto it by being himself instructed by teachers, and so furnished with learning. Secondly, in that such do not only instruct them that are desirous of learning, whilst they are alive and present with them; but they also effect the same even after their death much more effectually, by the monuments of their learning left behind them. Thirdly, in that they omit no point which might concern the laws, customs & discipline of the commonweal: so that they may seem to have employed all their leisure for the benefit of posterity. Thus he showeth, that they being given to the studies of learning, bestowed all their wisdom and understanding for the good of the commonweal, and so did ever prefer duties belonging to the society of men. Fourthly, he proveth it by this instance▪ That for this cause alone it is better to speak copiously, so it be wisely, then to meditate most wittily without utterance. Because meditation serveth only within one's self, but eloquence serveth for the good of all with whom we converse, and many others. Fiftly, because we could not devise nor effect matters sowel alone as with others. This he proveth by a fit similitude taken from Bees: That as they swarm together, not to the end to make combs, but being thus swarming by nature do make their combs more ea●…ily; even so and much more also, men being of a sociable nature, do use their cunning in doing and devising much the better & more speedily. Sixtly, in that know ledge separate from justice or employment for the common good, remaineth fruitless and barren. And so likewise fortitude or valour separate from human society & friendship, viz if it be not used for the good of others, is nothing else but savageness & cruelty. Whence he concludeth, Duties appertaining to the society of men to be far greater than the studies of know ledge. Lastly, he answereth an objection of some, who affirmed, that we use duties appertaining to society, for our own necessity (for that we could not effect nor attain with out others, those things which nature might desire) & not for the good of others. Whereunto he answers; That if this were true, then if a man had all things necessary for living, ministered (as it were) by the grace of God, without any labour or help of others; if the same man were of a good wit, he omitting all other business would wholly employ himself in knowledge and science. But he teacheth that this is false; Because even such a man would still fly solitariness, and seek some companion for his studies, and would desire still both to teach and learn, to hear and speak. And therefore upon all these grounds he concludeth this point, That every duty which appertaineth to the maintenance of human society, is to be preferred before such as consist in knowledge and science. Chap. 59 Whether justice or Temperance be better. q That peradventure may be asked. THis question may peradventure be well asked, whether this community which is q especially apt. most agreeable to nature, be also ever to be preferred before moderation and q modesty. temperance? q It pleaseth not. I think not so. For there are q certain things. some things partly so q filthy. dishonest, partly so heinous, that a wise man would not do them, no not q for the cause of preserving of, etc. for the preserving of his country. Possid. hath gathered many of them together; but * some. certain of them so q foul. vile [&] so filthy, that they may seem q filthy or dishonest. shameful even to be spoken. q Not any man therefore shall undertake these things for the cause of the commonweal. These things therefore ought no man to undertake for the cause of the Commonweal, neither indeed would the Commonweal q them to be undertaken. have them undertaken for her * sake. cause. But this matter q hath itself more commodiously. stands so much in better case, for that there q a time cannot happen. can befall no time, that it should * benefit or further concern the Commonweal, for a wise man to do any of them. Wherefore let this be concluded in choosing of Duties, q such kind of Duties to excel especially, which is kept in the society of men. that such kind of Duties excel most, which concern the society of men. For q considerate dealing. wise performance will follow knowledge & prudence. So it cometh to pass, that q to do advisedly to perform [our] actions considerately, is * better. of more [worth] then q to devise or think of, or ponder wisely wisely to meditate. q And indeed let these things [suffice] hitherto. And thereof thus far. For q the place itself is set open. this point is sufficiently laid open, that it is not q a difficult thing. difficult in the searching out of Duty, to * perceive. see q what is to be preferred of every one or what [duty] is to be preferred before every other. what every one is to prefer. Moreover, in q that the community itself. that very common society, there be degrees of Duties, * whereby it may may be known what one is above the other. of which it may be understood what excelleth every other: * so as. that the first [Duties] be due] to the immortal Gods, the * next. second, to [our] country, the third to [our] parents', q furthermore the rest are due to others by degrees. & so forth by degrees, Al. the rest are due q to the rest. to others. Al. some. Of which things q disputed briefly, or handled shortly. thus briefly discoursed of, it may be understood, q men to be wont. how men are wont not only q to doubt that thing. to doubt, whether a thing be honest or dishonest, but also q two honest things being, etc. of two honest things q set before them. pro pounded, whether is the q more honest. honester. This q [common] place. point (as I said before) is q omitted of etc. overslipped by Panetius. But now let us q go forward to those things which remain. proceed to * the residue of duties. the rest. Chap. 59 here ●…. proceedeth to speak of the comparing of duties; and first, somewhat in comparing the duty's of justice & Temperance, showeth that this question may chance be propounded; Whether duties of society be ever to be preferred before others of moderation & temperance. Whereunto he answereth, that he thinketh not so; and giveth his reason, for that there are some things partly so dishonest partly so heinous, that a wise man would not do them, no not for the preserving of his country. Of this sort he saith, that Possidonius hath gathered many: certain whereof are so odious that they are shameful to be uttered. Now, these he teacheth that a wise man ought not to undertake, no not for the cause of the commonweal, neither that indeed the commonweal would have them undertaken for her cause. But for these he showeth that there cannot befall any time wherein it can concern the good of the commonweal for a wise man to do any of them. And therefore, notwithstanding all these, he concludeth this point concerning the choosing of duties; That evermore such duties be preferred which concern the good of others; And that wise performance of our actions will ever follow knowledge & prudence. Whereupon it cometh to pass, that considerately to per form our actions for the good of others, is more worth than to meditate wise ly. So he shutteth up this whole matter as sufficiently laid open, that in the choosing of duties it is not difficult to see what every one is to prefer. Lastly, for the ending of this whole treatise, & the right performance and preferring of duties, he adviseth to remember that which was taught before; That in the common society, there are degrees of duties, whereby it may be best understood what duties are especially to be preferred and and performed first and chiefly. As first those which are due to God; next, such as are due to our country; thirdly, those to our parents, and so the rest according to degrees as they are due to others in order. And thus finally he showeth, that we may easily understand by the things handled before, both these questions, whereof men are wont to doubt, viz. first, whether a thing be honest or dishonest▪ Secondly, of two honest things propounded, whether is the honester; which was overslipped by Panetius. And so prepareth himself to proceed to that which followeth. Finis.