¶ The Art or craft of rhetoric.  
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¶ To the reverend father in god & his singular good lord/ the lord Hugh Faryngton Abbot of reading/ his poor client and perpetual servant Leonarde Cocks desireth long & prosperous life with increase of honour.  
considering my special good lord how great lie and how many ways I am bounden to your lordship/ and among all other that in so great a number of cunning men which are now within this region it hath pleased your goodness to accept me as worthy for to have the charge of the instruction & bringing up of such youth as resorteth to your grammar school/ founded by your antecessors in this your town of reading/ I studied a long space what thing I might do next the busy & diligent occupy of myself in your said service/ to the which both conscience and your stipend doth straightly bind me/ that might be a signification of my faithful and serviceable heart which I own to your lordship/ & again a long memory both of your singular and beneficial favour toward me: and of mine industry and diligence employed in your service to some profit: or at the least way to some delectation of the inhabitants of this noble realm now flouryshynge under the most excellent & victorious prince our sovereign Lord king Henry the. viii.  
¶ And when I had thus long prepensed in my mind what thing I might best those out: none offered itself more convenient to the profit of young students (which your good lordship hath always tenderly favoured) and also metre to my profession: than to make some proper work of the right pleasant and persuadible art of Rhetoric/ which as it is very necessary to all such as will either be advocates and Proctors in the law: or else apt to be sent in their princes Ambassades/ or to be teachers of god's word in such manner as may be most sensible & accept to their audience/ and finally to all them having any thing to purpose or to speak afore any company (what somever they be) So contrarily I see no science that is less taught & declared to scholars/ which ought chief after the knowledge of Grammar once had to be instruct in this faculty/ without the which oftentimes the rude utterance of the Advocate greatly hindereth and apeyreth his clients cause. Likewise the unapt disposition of the preacher (in ordering his matter) confoundeth the memory of his hearers/ and briefly in declaring of matters: for lack of invention and order with due elocution: great tediousness is engendered to the multitude being present/ by occasion whereof the speaker is many times ere he have ended his tale: either left almost aloon to his no little confusion: or else (which is a like rebuke to him) the audience falleth for weariness of his ineloquent language fast on sleep.  
¶ willing therefore for my part to help such as are destrouse of this Art (as all surely aught to be which intend to be regarded in any communalty) I have partly translated out a work of Rhetoric written in the Latin tongue: and partly compiled of mine own: and so made a little treatise in manner of an introduction into this aforesaid Science: and that in our english tongue. Remembering that every good thing (after the sayings of the Philosopher) the more common it is: the more better it is. And furthermore trusting thereby to do some pleasure and case to such as have by negligence or else falls persuasions be put to the learning of other sciences or ever they have attained any mean knowledge of the Latin tongue.  
¶ which my said labour I humbly offer to your good lordship/ as to the chief maintainer & nourisher of my study/ beseeching you/ though it be far within your merits done to me/ to accept it as the first assay of my poor and simple wit/ which if it may first please your Lordship/ and next the readers/ I trust by the aid of almighty god to indite other works both in this faculty and other to the laud of the high godhead/ of whom all goodness doth proceed/ and to your lordship's pleasure/ and to profit and delectation of the Reder. ❧   

WHo somever desireth to be a good Orator or to dispute and commune of any manner thing/ him behoveth to have four things.  
¶ The first is called Invention/ for he must first of all imagine or Invent in his mind what he shall say.  
¶ The second is named judgement. For he must have wit to deserve & judge whether tho things that he hath found in his mind be convenient to the purpose or not. For oftentimes if a man lack this property/ he may aswell tell that that is against him as with him/ as experience doth daily show. ¶ The third is Disposition/ whereby he may know how to order and set every thing in his due place/ least though his invention and judgement be never so good/ he may happen to be counted (as the common proverb saith) to put the cart afore the horse. ¶ The fourth & last is such things as he hath invented: and by judgement known apt to his purpose when they are set in their order so to speak them that it may be pleasant and delectable to the audience/ so that it may be said of him that histories make mention that an old woman said once by Demosthenes/ & sins hath been a common proverb among the Greeks 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which is as much to say as (This is he) And this last property is called among learned men (Eloquence. ¶ Of these four the most difficile or hard is to invent what thou must say/ wherefore of this part the Rethoricieus which be masters of this Art: have written very moche & diligently.  
¶ Invention is comprehended in certain places/ as the Rhetoricieus call them/ out of whom he that knoweth the faculty may fetch easily such things as be meet for the matter that he shall speak of/ which the Orators calleth the Theme/ and in our vulgar tongue it is called improperly the Anthethem. ¶ The theme purposed: we must after the rules of Rhetoric go to our places that shall anon show unto us what shall be to our purpose.  

¶ Example.  
IN old time there was great envy between two noble men of Rome/ of whom the one was called Milo/ & the other Clodius/ which malice grew so far that Clodius laid wait for Milo on a season when he should ride out of the City/ and in his journey set upon him/ and there as it chanced: Clodius was slain/ where upon this Clodius friends accused Milo to the Senate of murder. Tully which in though days was a great Advocate in Rome should plead milo's cause. Now it was open that Milo had slain Clodius/ but whether he had slain him lawfully or not was the double. So than the Theme of Tully's oration or plea for Milo was this/ that he had slain Clodius lawfully/ and therefore he ought not to be punished/ for the confirmation whereof (as doth appear in Tully's oration) he did bring out of places of Rhetoryque arguments to prove his said Theme or purpose. And likewise must we do when we have any matter to speak or comun of. As if I should make an oration to the laud & praise of the Kings highness: I must for the Invention of such things as be for my purpose go to places of Rhetoric/ where I shall easily find (after I know the rules) that that I desire. ¶ Here is to be noted that there is no Theme but it is contained under one of the four causes/ or for the more plainness four kinds of Orations.  
¶ The first is called logical/ which kind we call properly disputation. ¶ The second is called Demonstrative. ¶ The third Deliberative. ¶ The fourth judicial/ and these three last be properly called spices or kinds of orations/ whose natures shall be declared separately hereafter with the craft that is required in every of them. All themes that pertain to Logic either they be simple or compound. As if a man desire to know of me what justice is. This only thing justice is my theme. Or if disputation be had in company upon religion/ and I would declare the very nature of religion/ my theme should be this simple or one thing religion. But if it be doubted whether justice be a virtue or not/ and I would prove the part affirmative/ my theme were now compound/ that is to say/ justice is a virtue/ for it is made of two things knit and vn●…ed together/ justice and virtue. ¶ Here must be noted that Logic is a plain & a sure way to instruct a man of the troth of every thing/ & that in it the natures/ causes/ parts/ & effects of things are by certain rules discussed & searched out/ so that nothing can be perfectly & properly known but by rules of Logic/ which is nothing but an observation/ or a diligent marking of nature. whereby in every thing man's reason doth consider what is first/ what last/ what proper/ what improper.  
¶ The places or instruments of a simple theme are.  

The definition of the thing.  
The causes.  
The parts.  
The effects.   
¶ Example. If thou inquire what thing justice is/ whereof it cometh/ what parts is hath/ & what is the office or effect of every part/ than hast thou diligently searched out the hole nature of justice/ & handled thy simple theme according to the preceptis of Logicians/ to whom our author leaveth such mats to be discussed of them/ howbeit somewhat the Rhetoricians have to do with the simple theme/ & asmuch as shall be for their intent he will show hereafter. For many times the orator must use both diffinitions & divisions. But as they be in Logic plain and compendious/ so are they in Rhetoric extended & painted with many figures & ornamentis belonging to the science. Nevertheless to satisfy the readers mind/ & to alleviate the tediousness of searching these places/ I will open the manner and fashion of the handling of the theme aforesaid as plainly as I can/ after the precepts of Logic.  
¶ First to search out the perfit knowledge of justice: I go to my first place distinict on/ & fetch from Aristotle in his Ethius the definition of justice/ which is this.  
¶ justice is a moral virtue/ whereby men be the workers of rightful things (that is to say) whereby they both love & also do such things as be just. This done: I search the causes of justice (that is to say) from whence it took the first beginning/ and because that it is a moral virtue: and Plato in the end of his Dialogue Menon concludeth that all virtue cometh of god: I am assured that god is the chief cause of justice: declaring it to the world by his Instrument man's wit/ which the same Plato affirmeth in the beginning of his laws. The definition and cause had: I come to the third place called parts to know whether there be but one kind of justice or else many. And for this purpose I find that Arystotle in the fift of his ethics divideth justice in two speces or kinds. One that he calleth justice legitime or legal/ an other that he called equity.  
¶ justice legal is that that consisteth in the superiors which have power for to make or statute laws to the iferiours. And the office or end of this justice is to make such laws as be both good and according to right and conscience/ & than to declare them/ & when they are made & published as they ought to be/ to see that they be put in ure/ for what availeth it to make never so good laws: if they be not observed and kept. ¶ And finally that the maker of the law apply his hole study & mind to the wealth of his subjects and to the common profit of them. The other kind of justice which men call Equity is where by a man neither taketh nor giveth less nor more than he ought/ but in giving taketh good heed that every man have according as he deserveth. This Equity is again divided into Equity distributive of common things & Equity Commutative. By Equity distributive is distributed and given of comen goods to every man according to his deservings and as he is worthy to have. As to divide among such as long to the church of the church goods after the quality of their merits: and to them being Civil persons of the common treasure of the City according as they are worthy.  
¶ In this part is comprehended the punishment of misdoers and transgressors of the law/ to whom correction must be distributed for the common wealth according to their demerits/ after the prescriptions of the laws of the country/ made & determined for the punishment of any manner of transgressor. ¶ Equity commutative is a just manner in the changing of things from one to another/ whose office or effect is to keep just dealing in equity/ as buying/ selling/ & all other bargains lawful. And so are herewith the spices of justice declared their offices/ which was the fourth & last place.  
¶ Our author also in a great work that he hath made upon Rhetoric/ declareth the handling of a theme simple by the same example of justice/ adding two places more/ which are called a●…ines and contraries on this manner.  
¶ what is justice? A virtue whereby to every thing is given that that to it belongeth.  
¶ what is the cause thereof? Man's will consenting with laws & manners.  
¶ How many kinds? Two.  
¶ which? Commutative & Distributive/ for in two manners is our meddling with other men/ either in things of our substance & wares/ or in gentle and civil conversation.  
¶ what thing is justice commutative? Right and equity in all contracts.  
¶ what is justice distributive? justice of civil living.  
¶ How manifold is justice distributive? Either it is common or private. The common is called in latin Pietas/ but in english it may be most properly named good order/ which is the crown of all ver tues concerning honest and civil conversation of men together/ as the heads with the mean comonalty in good unity and concord. ¶ private or several justice distributive is honest and amiable petition & conversation of neighbours.  
¶ what are the offices? To do for every man/ rich or poor/ of what estate so ever he be/ and for our country/ for our wives/ children/ and friends/ that that ought to be done for every of them.  
¶ Affynes or virtues nigh to justice are constancy/ liberality/ temperance.  
Things contrary are fere/ covetise/ prodygalytie.  
¶ And this is the manner of handling of a simple Theme dialecty call. But yet let not the reder deceive himself/ and think that the very perfit knowledge is showed him all here. And that which hath been showed now: is somewhat general and brief. ¶ Moore sure and exact knowledge is contained in Logic/ to whom I will advise them that be studious to resort & to search every thing in his own proper faculty.   

¶ Of a Theme compound.  
Every Theme compound: either it is proved true or false. Now whether thou wilt pu●… or improve any thing: it must be done by argument. And it any Theme compound: be it Logical or rhetorical/ it must be referred to the rules of Logic by them to be proved true or false. For this is the difference that is between these two sciences/ that the Logician in disputing observeth certain rules for the setting of his words being solicitous that there be spoken no more nor no less than the thing requireth/ & that it be even as plaily spoken as it is thought. But the Rhethorician seeketh about & borroweth where he can asmuch as he may for to make the simple and plain Logical arguments gay & delectable to the ear. So than the sure judgement of arguments or reasons must be learned of the logician/ but the craft to set them out with pleasant figures and to delate the matter belongeth to the Rhetorician. As in milo's cause/ of whom was made mention afore. ¶ A logician would briefly argue/ who so ever violently will slay an other/ may lawfully of the other be slain in his defence. Clodius would violently have slain Milo/ wherefore Clodius might lawfully be slain of Milo in Miloes own defence. And this argument the logicians call a syllogism in Daru/ which Tully in his oration extendeth that in four or five leaves it is scant made an end of/ nor no man can have knowledge whether Tully's argument that he maketh in his oration for Milo/ be a good argument or not/ and how it holdeth/ except he can by logic reduce it to the perfect and brief form of a syllogism/ taking in the mean season of the rhetoricians what ornaments have been cast to for to light and augment the oration/ and to give it a majesty.  
¶ The places out of whom are found arguments for the proving or improving of compound Theme/ are these following. 

definition like  
Cause contrary  
Parts    
OF the places of arguments shall be spoken hereafter. For as touchyuge them in all things the Rhetorician & Logician do agree. But as concerning the craft to form arguments when thou hast found them in their places/ that must be learned of the Logician/ where he treateth of the form of syllogisms/ 〈◊〉 ●…es and inductions.   

¶ Of an oration demonstrative.  
THe use of an oration demonstrative is i praise or dispraise/ which kind or manner of oration was greatly used sometime in common actions/ as doth declare the orations of Demosthenes/ and also many of Thucydides orations. And there been three manners of orations demonstrative.  
¶ The first containeth the praise or dispraise of persons. As if a man would praise the kings highness/ or dispraise some ill person/ it must be done by an oration demonstrative. The second kind of an oration demonstrative is: where in is praised or dispraised/ not the person but the deed. As if a thief put himself in ieopdy for the safeguard of a true man/ against other thieves and murderers/ the person can not be praised for his vicious living/ but yet the deed is worthy to be commended. Or if one should speak of Peter's denying of Christ/ he hath nothing to dispraise that person save only for this deed. The third kind is: wherein is lauded or blamed neither person nor deed/ but some other thing as virtue/ vice/ justice/ injury/ charity/ envy/ patience/ wrath/ and such like.   

¶ Parts of an Oration.  
¶ The parts of an oration prescribed of Rhetoriciens are these.  

¶ The Preamble or exorden.  
¶ The tale or narration.  
¶ The proving of the matter or contention.  
¶ The conclusion.   
¶ Of the which parts mention shall be made hereafter in every kind of orations/ for they are not found generally in every oration/ but some have more parts/ and some less.   

¶ Of the Preamble.  
GEnerally the Preamble not alonely in an oration demonstrative/ but also in the other two is contained and must be fetched out of three places/ that is to say of benevolence/ attention/ & to make 〈◊〉 easy to be known/ which the Rhetoricians call Docilite.  
¶ Benevolence is the place whereby the hearer is made willing to hear us/ and it is contained in the thing that we speak of/ to them whom we speak to/ & in our own person. The easiest and most used place of benevolence consisteth in the office or duty of the person/ when we show that it is our duty to do that we be about.  
¶ Out of this place is fet the pamble of saint Gregory Nazazene/ made to the praise of saint Basyll/ where he saith that it is his his duty to praise saint Basyll for three causes. For the great love and petition that hath been always between them/ and again for the remembrance of the most fair and excellent virtues that were in him/ and thirdly that the church might have an example of a good and holy bishop. ¶ truly by our authors licence me thinketh that in the preamble Nazazen doth not only take benevolence out of the place of his own person/ but allo out of the other two/ when he showeth the cause of his duty/ for in praising his friend he did but his duty. In praising his virtues/ he came to the place of benevolice of him that he spoke of/ as touching the example that the church should have/ it was for their profit/ and concerning the place of benevolence/ taken of them that he spoke to. But our author regarded chief the principal proposition/ which was that saint Gregory Nazazene was bound to praise saint Basyll.  
¶ A like example of benevolence taken out of the place of office or duty/ is in the oration that Tully made for the Poet Archias/ which beginneth thus.  

My lords that be here judges/ if there be in me any wit/ which I know is but small/ or if I have any crafty use of making an oration/ wherein I deny not but that I have meetly excercised myself/ or if any help to that science cometh out of other liberal arts/ in whom I have occupied all my life/ surely I am bound to no man more for them than to Archias/ which may lawfully if I may do any many profit by them/ challenge a chief portion for him therein.  
¶ Out of this place did this same Tully fetch the beginning of his first epistle/ in whom he writeth to one Lentule on this manner: I do so my duty in all points toward you/ and so great is the love and reverence that I bear unto you that all other men say that I can do no more/ and yet me seemeth that I have never done that that I am bound to do/ either to you or in your cause.  
¶ We may also get benevolence by reason of them/ whom we make our oration of: As if we say that we can never praise him to highly/ but that he is worthy much more laud and praise. And so taketh saint Nazianzene benevolence in his said oration for samet Basile.  
¶ Also of them afore whom we speak/ as if we say/ it is for their profit to laud or praise the person. And that we know very well how moche they have always loved him/ and that he ought therefore to be praised the more for their sakes. The manner is also to get us benevolence in the preface of our oration/ by pinching and blaming of our adversary. As doth Tully in the oration that he made for one Aulus Cecinna/ wherein he beginneth his poem thus If temerity and lake of shame could as much prevail in pleas afore the justices/ as doth audacity and temerarious boldness in the fields and desert places/ there were no remedy but even so must Aulus Cecinna be overcome in this matter by Sextus Ebucius impudence/ as he was in the field overcome by his insidious audacity. And these be the common forms of benevolence.  
¶ A man may also fetch his poem out of the nature of the place where he speaketh/ as Tully doth in the oration made for Pompeius for the sending of him into Asie against king Mithridates of Pontus/ and king Tigraves of Armenia on this manner: how be it my lords and masters of this noble city of Rome/ I haveal times thought it a singular rejoice to me if I might once see you gathered together in a company/ to here some public oration of mine/ and again I judged no place to be so ample and so honourable to speak in as this is. & 〈◊〉.  
¶ Or he may begin at the nature of the time that is than/ or at some other circumstance of his matter/ as Tully taketh the beginning of his oration for Telius at the time/ this wise.  
¶ If so be it my lords judges any man be now present here that is ignorant of your laws/ of your process in judgements/ and of your customs/ surely he may well marvel what so heinous a matter this should be/ that it only should be sit upon in an high fecst day/ when all the comonaltye after their old custom are given to the sight of plays/ ordained after a perpetual usage for the nonce for them/ all matters of the law laid for the time utterly a part.  
¶ He began also an other oration for one Sertus Roscius/ out of the danger of the season that he spoke in.  
¶ One may beside these use other manner of prohemes/ which by cause they are not set out of the very matter itself/ or else the circumstances/ as in these aforesaid they are called peregrine or strange prohemes. And they be taken out of sentences/ solemn petitions/ manners or customs/ laws/ statutes of nations & countries. And on this manner doth Aristides begin his oration made to the praise of Rome.  
¶ Demosthenes in his oration made against Eschines/ took his preface out of a solemn peticien/ beseeching the gods that he might have as good favour in that cause/ as he had sound in all other matters that he had done afore for the common wealth.  
¶ In like manner beginneth Tully the oration that he made for one Murena/ & also the oration that he made unto the Romans after his return from exile.  
¶ He beginneth also an other oration/ which he made as touching a law decreed for the division of fields among the commons out of a custom among them/ on this wise.  
¶ The manner and custom of our old fathers of Rome hath been. etc. And this is the manner of prefaces in any oration/ which is also observed in the making of epistles/ howbeit there is far less craft in them than is in an oration.  
¶ There is yet an other form & manner to begin by insinuation/ wherefore it behoveth to know that insinuation is/ when in the beginning/ if the matter seem not laudable or honest/ we find an excuse therefore. ¶ Example/ Homer in his Iliad describeth one Thersites/ that he was most foul and evil favoured of all the Greeks that came to the battle of Troy/ for he was both goggle eyed/ and lame on the one leg/ with crooked and pinched shoulders/ and a long piked heed/ bald in very many places. And beside these faults he was a great foolish babbler/ and right foul mouthed/ and full of debate and strife/ ●…artynge always against the heads and wise men of the army.  
¶ Now if one would take upon him to make an oration to the praise of this lozel/ which matter is of little honesty in itself/ he must use in stead of a preface an insinuation. That what thing poets or common fame doth either praise or dispraise ought not to be given credence to/ but rather to be suspect. For ones it is the nature of poets to say and lie/ as both Homer and Uirgile/ which are the princes and heads of all poets do witness themself. Of whom Homer saith/ that poets make many lies/ and Uirgile he saith: The most part of the seen is but oeceyte. poets have seen black souls under the earth/ poetes have feigned and made many lies of the pale kingdom of Plato/ and of the water of Stigie/ and of dogs in hell. And again common rumours how often they been vain/ it is so open that it need not to be declared. wherefore his trust is that the hearers will more regard his saying than feigned fables of poets/ and fleeing tales of light folks/ which are for the more part the grounders of fame & rumours.  
¶ An example may be set out of the declamation that Erasmus made to the praise of foolishness.  
¶ An other example hath the same Erasmus in his second book of Copia/ which is this: Plato in the fift dialogue of his commonalty willeth that no man shall have no wife of his own/ but that every woman shallbe common to every man. If any man than would either praise or defend this mind of Plato/ which is both contrary to Christ's religion and to the common living of men/ he might as Erasmus teacheth/ begin thus.  
¶ I know very well that this matter which I have determined to speak of/ will seem unto you at the first hearing/ not only very strange/ but also right abominable. But that nat withstandynge/ if it will please you a little while so defer you judgement till ye have heard the sum of such reasons as I will bring forth in the cause/ I double nothing but that I shall make the truth so evident that you all will with one assent approve it/ & knowledge that ye have been hitherto marvelously deceived in your opinion/ and somdele to alleviate your minds/ ye shall understand that I am not myself author of the thing/ but it is the mind & saying of the excellent & most highly named philosopher Plato/ which was undoubted so famous a clerk/ so discrete a man/ and so virtuous in all his deeds/ that ye may be sure he would speak nothing but it were on a right perfit ground/ and that the thing were of itself very expedient/ though peradventure it show far otherwise at the first hearing.  
¶ In all prefaces of preambles must be good heed taken that they be not to far fet/ nor to long.  
¶ These affectuous words/ I rejoice/ I am sorry/ I uleruaile/ I am glad for your sake/ I desire/ I sear/ I pray god/ and such other like/ be very apre for a preface.    

¶ Of the second place of a preface/ called Attention.  
THe hearers shall be made attended or diligent to give audience/ if the orarour make promise that he will show them new things/ or else necessary or profitable/ or if he say that it is an hard matter that he hath in handling/ or else obscure & not easy to be understand/ except they give right good attendance.  
¶ wherefore it is expedient that if they will have the perception of it/ that they give a good care. But as concerning the newness or profit of the matter/ it maketh not all only the hearer to give a good cre (which thing is called attention) but also maketh him well willing for to be present/ which is benevolence.   

¶ Docilite.  
DOcilite whereby we make the matter plain & easy to be perceived/ is not greatly required in this kind of oration/ for it in belonging properly to dark and obscure causes/ in which we must premise that we will not use great ambages/ or to go (as men say) round about the bush/ but to be short and plain.   

¶ Of narration which is the second part of an oration.  
¶ The Narration or tale wherein persons are praised/ is the declaring of their life & doings after the fashion of an history. The places out of the which it is sought are: The persons birth. His childhood. His adolescency. His man's state. His old age. His death and what followeth after.  
IN his birth is considered of what stock he came/ what chanced the time of his nativity or nigh upon/ as in the nativity of Christ shepherds hard angels sing.  
¶ In his childhood are marked his bringing up and tokens of wisdom coming: As Horace in his fourth Satire showeth/ how in his childhood his father taught him by examples of such as were than living to flee from vice and to give himself to virtue.  
¶ In adolescency is considered where to he than giveth himself: As in the first comedy of Terence one Simo telleth his servant Sosia/ that though all young men for the more part give themself to some peculiar thing/ wherein they set their chief delight/ as some to have goodly horses/ some to cherysshe hounds for hunting/ & some are given only to their books/ his son Pamphilus loved none of these more one than an other/ and yet in all these he exercised himself measurably.  
¶ In man's state and old age is noted what office or rule he bore among his citizens/ or in his country/ what acts he did/ how he governed such as were und him/ how he prospered/ & what fortune he had in such things as he went about. Example here of is in Saluste/ which compareth together Cato and Cesar/ saying that both their stock/ age & eloquence/ were almost like & equal/ their excellency & greatness of spirit & wit was also like & equal/ & like fame & worship had they both attained how be it not by a like way. Cesar was had i great estimation for his benefits & & liberality. Cato had gotten him a name for his perfight & upright living. Cesar was praised for his gentleness and pity. Cato was honoured for his earnestness and surety. ¶ The other wan moche bruyt by giving large gyfres/ by helping such as were in distress/ and by forgiving of tres passes done against him. Cacons' fame did spread because he would neither be forgiven of none offence/ neither forgive none other/ but as any man had deserved/ so to cause him to be dealt with. In the one was great refuge to such as were in misery: But the other was fore punishment & per●… to misdoers & evil transgressors of the law. Briefly to conclude it was all Caesar's mind and pleasure to labour diligently night and day in his friends causes/ to care less for his own business than for theirs/ to deny nothing that was worthy to be asked/ his desire was evermore to be in war/ to have a great host of me under his governance/ that by his noble and hardy faicies his valiantness might be the more known and spread abroad.  
Contraryly all caton's study was on tem peraunce/ and to do in no manner other wise than was convenient & sycting for such a man as he was/ and chief he set his mind to severyty/ he never made no comparison with the rich man in richesses/ nor with the mighty man in power. But y●… 〈◊〉 required/ with the hardy man in boldness / with the temperate in moderation/ with the good man in innocency & just day ling. He cared not for the name/ it was sufficient to him to have the deed/ & so/ the less he cared for glory/ the more always he obtained. Many such comparisons very profitable for this intent/ are also in Plutarch in his book of noble men's lives.  
¶ A goodly eusample of this place is in the oration that Hermolaus Barbarus made to the emperor Fredrick and Marimilian his son/ which for because it is so long I let it pass. ¶ A like ensample is in Tully's oration/ that he made to the people of Rome for pompeius/ to be sent against Mithridates.  
¶ Some there be that divide the lands of persons into three kinds of goods/ begyuning the narration at them/ which thing our author doth not greatly commend/ but rather in rehearsing of any per sons deeds/ if there can not be kept an order of history/ and many things must be spoken. It were after his mind best to touch first his acts done by prudence/ & next by justice/ thirdly by fortitude of the mind/ and last by temperance/ and so to gather the narration out of this four catdinall virtues. As if one should praise saint ●…usten/ after that he hath spoken of his parentele and bringing up in youth/ and is come to the rehersale of his acts/ they may be conveniently distributed into the places of virtues. On this manner did Tully praise Pompey.  
¶ I suppose (sayeth he) that in him that should be a head captain over a great army/ aught to be four things. Knowledge of were/ valiantness/ authority/ & felicity.  
¶ Here is to be noted that in rehearsing any persons acts/ we may have our chief respect to some peculiar and principal virtue in him/ enlarging and exalting it by amplification in manner of a digression.  
¶ Our author in this work maketh no mention of the last place that is death and such things as follow after/ but in an other greater work he declareth it thus urtefly. ¶ The death of the person hath also his praises/ as of such which have been slain for the defence of their country or prince.  
¶ A very goodly ensample for the handling of this place is in an epistle that An gele Policiane writeth in his fourth book of epistles to james Antiquary of Laurence Medici's/ how wisely and devoutly he disposed himself in his death bed/ and of his departing/ and what channced at that tyme.  
¶ And so to conclude an oration Demonstrative/ wherein persons are lauded/ is an historical exposition of all his life in order. And there is no difference between this kind and an history/ save that in histories we be more brief and use less curiosity. Here all things be augmented and coloured with as much ornaments of eloquence as can be had.  
¶ Confirmation of our purpose/ and confuting or reproving of the contrary/ which are the parts of contention/ are not requisite in this kind of oration/ for here are not treated any doubtful matters/ to whom contention pertaineth.  
Never the less/ sometime it happeneth (howbeit it is seldom) that a doubt may come/ which must be either defended/ or at the least excused.  

¶ Example.  
THe french men in old time made mighty war against the Romans/ and so sore besieged them that they were by compulcton constrained to fall to composition with the french men for an huge sum of gold/ to be paid to them for the breaking of the siege/ but being in this extreme misery/ they sent for one Camillus/ whom not very long afore they had banished out of the city/ and in his absence made him dietatour/ which was the chiefest digintie among the Romans/ and of so great authority/ that for the space of three months/ for so long dured the office most conveniently/ he might do all thing at his pleasure/ whether it concerned death or no/ nor no man so hardy ones to say nay against any thing that he did/ so that for the space he was as a king/ having all in his own mere power. Now it chanced that while this sum was in paying/ & not fully weighed/ Camillus' of whom I said afore/ that being in exile he was made dictator/ came with an army/ and anon bade cease of the payment/ & that each party should make ready to battle/ and so he vanquished the french men.  
¶ Now if one should praise him of his noble feats/ it should seem that this was done contrary to the law of arms/ to defait the french men of the raumsom due to them/ since the compact was made afore/ wherefore it is necessary for the orator to defend this deed/ & to prove that he did nothing contrary to equity. For the which purpose he hath two places. One apparent/ which is a common saying usurped of the poet. Dolus au virtus quie in host requirat.  
That is to say/ who will search whether the deed of enemy against enemy be either guile or pure valiantness: But for that in war law is as well to be kept as in other things. This saying is but of a feeble ground. The other is of a more strong assurance/ which Titus Livius writeth in his fift book from the building of Rome/ where he rehearseth this history now menetoned/ and that answer is this/ that the compact was made to pay the foresaid ransom after that Camillus was created dictator/ at what time it was not lawful that they which were of far less authority/ ye & had put themself holy in his hand/ should intermeddle them with any manner of treatise without his licence/ & that he was not bound to stand to their bargain. The which argument is deduct out of two circumstances/ whereof one is the time of the making of the compact/ and the other/ the persons that made it/ which two circumstances may briefly be called when/ and who. ¶ Likewise if an oration should be made to the laud of saint Peter/ it behoveth to excuse his denying of christ/ that it was rather of divine power and will: than otherwise/ for a comfortable example to sinners of grace if they repent.  
¶ This is the manner of handling of an oration demonstrative/ in which the person is praised.  
¶ The author in his greater work declareth the fashion by this example.  
¶ If one would praise king Charles/ he should keep in his oration this order.  
first in declaring his parentele/ that he was king Pippin's son/ which was the first of all kings of Frannee named the most christian king/ and by whom all after him had the same name/ and Nephien to martel/ the most valiantest prince that ever was. next/ his bringing up under one Peter Pisane/ of whom he was instruct both in Greek and Latin. Than his adolessencie/ which he passed in excercise of arms under in his father in the wars of Acquitaine/ where he learned also the Sarazynes tongue.  
¶ Being come to man's state/ & now king of France/ he suudued Aquitayn/ Italy/ Swavelande/ and the saxons. And these wars were so fortunate/ that he overcame his adversaries more by authority and wisdom than by effusion of blood.  
¶ Also many other notable examples of virtue were in him in that age/ specially that he edifted the university of Paris.  
¶ Here may by digression be declared how goodly a thing learning is in Princes. Chief such condition appertaineth to virtue and good living.  
¶ Here may be also made comparison of his virtues in war/ and of other agreeing with peace/ in the which (as his history maketh mention) he was more excellent. For his chief delight was to have peace/ and again he was so gentle and so merciful/ that he would rather save ruin such as had done him great offence: and had deserved very well for to die/ than to destroy them/ though he might do it conveniently.  
¶ Beside this/ he was so greatly inflamed in the love of god and his holy church/ that one Alcuine a noble clerk of England was continually with him/ in whose and other ghostly communication he had a chief pleasure. His old age he passed in rest and quyetenes fortunately/ save for one thing/ that his sons agreed evil between them.  
¶ After his decease reigned his son/ holy saint Lewes/ and so the followings of his death were such that they could be no better/ and a very great token of his good and virtuous living. For if an ill tree can bring forth no good fruit/ what shall we suppose of this noble king Charles/ of whom came so virtuous and so holy a son: Truly me thinketh that hither may be not inconveniently applied the sayings of the gospel/ by their fruits you shall know them.    

¶ Of an oration Demenstrative/ wherein an act is praised.  
When we will praise any manner of deed/ the most apt preamble for that purpose shall be to say that the matter pertaineth to the commodities of them which here us.  

●… ¶ Example.  
When the Romans had expelled their king/ whom the hisioriciens call Tarquin the proud/ out of the city/ and fully enacted that they would ne ver have king to reign more over them. This Tarqumus went for aid and succour to the king of Tuscaye/ which when he could by no means entreat the Romans to receive again their king/ he came with all his puissance against the city/ & there long space besieged the Romans/ by rea son whereof/ great penury of wheat was in the city/ & the king of Tuscay had great trust/ that continuing the siege/ he should within a little longer space compel the Romans through famine to yield themself.  
¶ In the mean season a young man of the city named Gaius Mucius/ came to the Senators and showed them that he was purposed if they would give him licence to go surthe of the city to do an act that should be for their great profit and wealth/ whereupon when he had obtained licence/ privily/ with weapon hid under his vesture he came to the Tuscans camp/ & gate him among the thickest/ ingh to the tent where as the king sat with his chancellor/ paying the soldiers the wages. And because that they were almost of like apparel/ & also the chancellor spoke many things as a man being in authority/ he could not tell whether of them was the king/ nor he durst not ask/ least his demand would have bewrayed him/ for as for language they had one/ & nothing was different/ for both Tuscains & Romans were all of Italy/ as in times past/ England hath had many kings/ though the language & people were on. And thus being in doubt whether of them he might step unto/ by chance he struck the chancellor in stead of the king/ and slew him/ wherefore when he was taken and brought before the king/ for to punish his hand that had failed in taking one for an other/ and again to show the king how lttle he cared for his menaces/ he thrust his hand into the fire/ which at that time was there prepared for sacrifice/ & there in the flame let it bren/ not ones moving it. The king greatly marvelling at his audacity & hardy nature/ commended him greatly thereof/ and bad him go his way free: For the which (as though he would make the king a great amends) he feigned that. three C. of the noblest young men of Rome had conspired together in like manner every one after another unwarꝭ to slay him/ and all to put their bodies and lives in hazard till time should chance that one might achieve their intent. For fere whereof the king forth with fell at a pointement with the Romans/ and departed. The young man afterward was named Scevota/ which is as much to say in english as left handed. For as I have rehearsed afore/ he brent his right hand/ so that he had lost the use thereof.  
¶ IF any orator would in an oration commend this deed/ he might conveniently make the preface on this fashion.  

THere is no doubt my lords & masters of Rome: but that the remembrance of seevola's name is very pleasant unto your audience/ which with one act that he did/ endued your city with many and great commodities. etc.  
¶ This manner of preface is most conve nyent and best annexed to such manner of orations demonstratives.  
¶ Never the less it is lawful for us to take our preface (if it be our pleasure) out of some circumstance/ as out of the place that our oration is made in/ or out of the time that we speak in/ or else otherwise/ according as we shall have occasion/ As Tully/ in the oration that he made for the restitution of Marcus Marcellus/ in the which he praiseth Cezare for the calling home of the said Marcus marcellus out of exile/ he taketh his preamble out of the time and Cezares person/ beginning thus.   

THis day my lords senators hath made an end of the long silence that I have kept a great while/ not for any fere that I had/ but part for great sorrow that was in me/ & partly for shanie/ this day as I said hath taken away that long silence/ ye/ and beside that of new brought to me lust & mind to speak what I would/ and what I thought most expedient/ like as I was afore wont to do. For I can not in no manner of wise refrain/ but I must needs speak of the great meekness of Cezare/ of the graciousness that is in him/ so abundant and so great withal/ that never afore any such hath been wont to be seen or heard of/ and also of the excellent good moderation of all things which is in him that hath all in his own mere power. Nor I can not let pass his excellent incredible/ and divine wisdom unspoken of/ afore you at this tyme.     

¶ Of the Narration.  
IN this kind we use but selden hole narrations/ whiles we make our oration afore them that know not the history of the act or deed which we be about to praise. But in stead of a narration we use a proposition/ on this manner.  

Among all the noble deeds Cezare that ye have done/ there is none that is more worthy to be praised than this restitution of Mark marcel.    

¶ Of Confirmation/ which is the first part of Contention.  
THe places of confirmation are honesty/ perfect/ lightness or hardiness of the deed. For after the proheme of the oration and the narration/ than go we to the proving of our matter. first showing that it was a very honest deed. And next/ that it was not all only ho nesty: but also profitable. thirdly as concerning the easiness or difficulty/ the praise thereof must be considered/ part in the doer/ part in the deed. An easy deed deserveth no great praise/ but an hard and a ieoperdouse thing/ the sooner and the lighther it is achieved/ the more it is to be lauded.  
¶ The honesty of the cause is fet from the nature of the thing that is spoken of/ which place lieth in the wit of the orator/ and may also be fet out of the philosopher's books. It is also copiosely declared of Rhetoriciens/ and very compendiously handled of Erafmus in his book/ entitled of the manner and craft to make epistles/ in the chapiter of a persuading epistle. The profit of the deed/ or the commodity may be fet at the circumstance of it. Circumstances are these/ what was done/ who did it/ when/ where it was done/ among whom/ by whose help.  
¶ As if one would praise seevola's act/ of the which mention was made afore/ he may.  
¶ when he cometh to the places of contention/ show first how honest a deed it is for any man to put his life in jeopardy for the defence of his country/ which is so much the more to be commended that it came of his own mind/ and not by the instigation of any other/ and how profitable it was to the city to remove so strong and puissant an enemy by so good and crafty policy/ what time the city was not well assured of all men's minds that were within the walls/ considering that but a little afore many noble young men were detect of treason in the same business. And than also the city was almost destitute of victuals/ & all other commodities necessary for the defence.  
¶ Likewise easiness or difficulty are contained in the circumstances of the cause. As in the example now spoken of/ what an hard enterprise it is for one man to enter into a kings army/ and to come to the kings pavilion in the face of his soldiers to adventure to slay him.   

¶ Of the second part of contention/ called confutation.  
Confutation is the soiling of such arguments as may be induced against our purpose/ which part is but little used in an oration demonstrative. Never the less/ sometime may chance a thing that must be either defended or else at the least excused. As if any man would speak of Camillus' deed/ whereby he recovered his country/ and delivered it from the hands of the French men. ¶ Here must be declared that the bargain made afore was not by Camillus violate.  
¶ The places of confutation be contrary to the places of confirmation.   

¶ Of the conclusion.  
THe conclusion is made of a brief enumeration of such things that we have spoken of afore in the oration/ & in moving of affections.  
¶ In delectable things or such things that have been well dove/ we move our audience to rejoice thereat/ and to do like.  
¶ In sad things and heavy/ to be sorry for them. In ill and perverse actis/ to beware that they follow not them to their great shame and confusion.   

¶ Of an oration demonstrative/ whereu●… are praised neither persons nor acts/ but some other things/ as religion/ matrimony/ or such other. ❧  
THe best beginning will be if it be taken out of some high praise of the thing. But a man may also begin otherwise/ either at his own person or at theirs afore whom he speaketh/ or at the place in the which he speaketh/ or at the season present/ or otherwise/ as hath afore been specified/ and here must we take good heed that if we take upon us to praise any thing that is no praise worthy/ than must we use insinuation/ & excuse the turpitude/ either by examples or by arguments/ as Erasmus doth in his epistle prefixed afore his oration made to the praise of foolishness/ of the which I have let pass the transtation because that epistle is some what long.   

¶ The narration.  
IN this manner of oration is no narration/ but in stead thereof the rhetoricians all only propose the matter. And this proposition is in the stead of the narration.  
¶ A very elegant example is in the oration that angel Policiane made to the laud of histories/ which is this. Among all manner of writers by whom either the Break tongue or the latin hath been in flower and excellence/ without doubt me seemeth that they did most profit to mankind/ by whom the excellent deeds of nations/ princes/ or valiant men have been truly described and put in chronicles.  
¶ Likewise if a man praise peace/ & show what a commodious thing it is/ he may make such a proposition.  
Among all the things which pertain to man's commodity/ of what somever condition or nature so ever they be/ non is so excellent and so worthy to be had in honour and love/ as is peace.   

¶ The confirmation.  
THe places of confirmation be in this oration. The same that were in the other (of whom mention was made afore/ hovesty/ profit/ easiness/ or difficulty. Honesty is considered in the nature of the thing/ also in the persons that have excercised it/ and the inventors thereof. And in the author of it. As in the laud of matrimony be considered the author thereof/ which was god himself/ the antiquity that it was made in the first beginning of the world/ and continued (as reason is) to this hour in great honour and reverence. The persons that have used it/ were both patriarchs/ as Abraham.  
prophets/ as david. apostles/ as saint Peter. Martyr's/ saint Eustache. And confessors/ as saint Edward. And (which thing was first proposed) the nature thereof is such/ that without it: man should be like unto be'st/ whiles all generation should be put apart. And the commandment of almighty god not regarded/ who bad man and woman should engender & multiply.  
¶ Profit and easiness is considered in the circumstances. Examples may be taken out of Policians oration/ made to the laud of histories-And two orations of Erasmus/ one to the laud of physic/ and an other to the laud of matrimony.   

¶ Of confutation.  
Confutation hath contrary places to confirmation.   

¶ Of the conclusion.  
THe period or conclusion standeth in the brief enumeration of things spoken afore/ and in moving the affections/ as hath been above expressed.   

¶ Of an oration deliberative.  
AN oration deliberative is by the which we persuade or dissuade any thing/ & by the which we ask/ or whereby we exhort any man to do a thing/ or else to forsake it/ and this kind of oration is moche in use/ not only in civil ematers: but also in epistles.   

¶ Of the preamble.  
WE may begin our oration in this kind/ even like as we did in an or a tion demonstrative/ but most aptly at our office or duty/ least some men would think that we did it more of a private affection for our own commodity and plea sure: than for any other man's profit.  
¶ And in this manner Sallust in his book of Catheline bringeth in Cezare/ beginning an oration. But let us here now what Caesar sayeth.  

ALl men my lord Senators which sit concelling upon any dovutfull matter/ must be void of hatred/ friendship/ anger/ pity/ or mercy. For where any of these things bear a rule/ man's mind can not lightly perceive the truth. ●….  
¶ Or else we may begin at the greatness of the matter/ or danger of the thing that we speak of/ as in the fift book of Livius Camillus maketh the preamble of his oration thus.   

MY masters of this City of Ardea/ which have been always mine old friends/ and now (by reason of mine exile out of Rome) my new neighbours and citizens. For I thank you of your goodness you have promised that it should so be/ and on the other side my fortune hath constrained me to seek some new dwelling out of the city where I was brought up & inhabited. I would not that any of you should think that I am now come among you not remembering my condition and state/ but the common reopardy that we be all now in/ will compel every man to open and show the best remedy that he knoweth for our succour in this great fere & necessity.  
¶ Nat withstanding this/ a man may take his beginning otherwise/ after any of the fashions afore recited/ if he list.  
¶ Tully in the oration/ wherein he advised the Romans to make Pompey their chief captain against Withridates and Tigranes/ kings of Ponthus & Armeny/ taketh in the preface benevolence from his own person/ showing by what occasion he might lawfully give council to the Romans/ by cause was elect Praetor of the city. we may also touch our adversaries in the preface/ or else we may touch the manners/ either of some several persons/ or of the commons in general. As in the oration that Porcius Chato made against the sumptuousness of the women of Rome/ thus beginning.   

IF every man my lords and masters of this city would observe and keep the right and majesty of a man against his own wife/ we should have ferte less encumbrance now with the hole throng than we have. But now our freedom and liberty is overcome within our own doors by the importunateness of our wives/ & so audacity taken thereof here trodden under the feet/ and oppressed in the parliament house: And because we would not displease no man his own wife at home: here are we now cumbered with all/ gathered to guider on a heap/ and brought in that taking that we dare not once open our lips against them. ●….  
¶ we may also begin at the nature of the time that we speak in/ or at the nature of the place/ or at any other circumstance or thing incident. As Livius in the. ix. book of his fourth decade against the feasts that the Romans kept in the honour of the ydolyssh god Bacchus'/ beginneth his oration at praying on this wise.   

THe solemn making of prayers unto the gods was never so apt nor yet so necessary in any oration as it is in this/ which shall show and admonish you that they be very and right god's/ whom our elders have ordained to be worshipped/ adoured/ and prayed unto.  
¶ Briefly in all prefaces belonging to orations deliberatives the office of the person: and the necessity or commodity of the matter that we treat of are considered. ❧    

¶ The narration.  
IN orations deliberatives we use very seldom narrations/ but for the more part in stead of them we make a brief pro position containing the sum of our intent. As now adays nothing is so necessary as to labour to bring these dissensions that be in the church to a perfect unity & concord/ that according to Christ's sayngis/ there be but one shepherd and one told. Nevertheless we use sometime brief narrations/ when that some thing hath been done all ready of that that we give our counsel upon/ as in the abovesaid oration that Tult made for Pompey/ where he maketh this narration.  

GReat & very perilous war is made both against your tributours'/ and also them that both confederate with you: & by you called your fellows/ which war is moved by two right mighty kings/ Withridates' & Tigranes. etc. ¶ After this manner is a narration in the oration that Hannibal made to Scipio/ & is contained in the x. book of the .111. decade of livius/ right proper & elegant/ without any preface beginning his narration thus. ☞ ¶ If it hath been ordained by my fortune and destiny that I which first of all the Carthaginors began war with the romans/ & which have almost had the victory so often in mine hands/ should now come of mine own mind to ask peace. I am glad that fortune hath prepared that I should ask it of you specially. And among all your noble lands this shall not be one of the least that Hannibal gave over to you/ to whom the gods had given afore the victory over so many captains of the romans/ & that it was your luck to make an end of this war/ in the which the romans have had far more evil chances than we of Carthagene. And whether it were my destiny or chance that ought me this scornful shame. I which began the war when your father was Consul/ and after joined battle with him when he was made Ca pitayne of the romans army/ must now come unarmed to his son to ask peace of him. It had been best for both parties if it had pleased the gods to have sent our fore fathers that mind/ that you of Rome would have been content with the Empire of Italy/ and we Carthaginoys with Africa. For neither Sicil nor Sardinia can be any sufficient amends to either of us for so many navies/ so many armies/ so many and so excellent captains lost in our wars between us/ but things passed/ may sooner be blamed than meuded. we of Carthagene (as touching our part) have so coveted other dominions/ that at length we had business enough to defend our pos sessions. Nor the war hath not been only with you in Italy or with us only in africa: but at the pleasure of fortune/ sometime here and some there/ in so much that you my masters of Rome have seen the standards and arms of your enemies hard at your walls and gates of the city. And we on the other side have herd the noise out of your camp into our city.  
¶ After the narration ought to follow immediately the proposition of our council or advise. As after the narration of Hannibal afore rehearsed/ followeth the proposition of his purpose thus.   

THat thing is now entreated while fortune is favourable unto you/ that we ought most to abhor/ and you surely ought above all things to desire/ that is to have peace. And it is most for the profit of us two/ which have the matter in handling that peace be had. And sure we be/ that what so ever we agree upon/ our cities will ratify the same.  
¶ Next followeth the confirmation of the things that we intend to persuade/ which must be set out of the places of honesty/ pro fire/ casines'/ or difficulty. As if we will per suade any thing to be done/ we shall show that it is not only honest & laudable: but all so profitable & easy enough to perform. Or if we can not chose but grant that it is hard/ yet we shall show that it is so honest a deed/ so worthy praise/ & besides so great commodity will come thereof/ that the hardness ought in no wise to fere us: but rather be as an iustigation to take the thing on hand/ remembering the greek proverb. Scisno●…a ta nasa/ that is to say/ all excellent & commendable thing; be hard & of difficulty.  
¶ In honesty are comprehended all virtues/ as wisdom/ justice/ due love to god/ & to our parent's/ liberality/ pity/ constancy/ temperance. And therefore he that will for the confirming of his purpose declare & prove that it is honest & commendable that he intendeth to persuade him: behoveth to have perfit knowledge of the natures of virtues. And all so to have in ready remembrance sentences both of scripture & of philosophy/ as orators & poets/ & beside these/ examples of histories/ for garnishing of his matters.  
¶ As concerning the place of utility/ we must in all causes look if we may have any arguments whereby we may prove that our council is of such necessity/ that it can not be chosen but they must needs follow it/ for though arguments be of far greater strength than they that do but only prove the utility of the matter. But if we can have no such necessary reasons/ than we must search out arguments to prove our mind to be profitable by circumstances of the cause. In like manner to persuade a thing by the easiness thereof/ or dissuade it by the difficulty of the thing/ we must have respect to possibility or impossibilite/ for these proofs are of stronger nature than the other/ & he that will show that a thing may be done easily: must presuppose the possibility thereof. As he on the other side that will persuade a thing not to be done/ if he show & manifest that it is impossible/ argueth more strongly than if he could but only prove difficulty in it/ for as I said/ many thing; of difficulty yet may be the rather to be taken on hand/ that they may get them that achieve them the greater fame and praise. And these arguments be fet out of the cir cūstances of the cause/ that is to say/ the time/ the place/ the doers/ the thing itself/ the means whereby it should be done/ the causes wherefore it should be done or not/ the helps or impediments that may be therein. In this purpose examples of histories are of great efficacy.  
¶ The confutation is the soiling and reselling of other men's sayings that have or might be brought against our purpose/ wherefore it consisteth in places contrary to the places of confirmation/ as in proving the sayings of the contrary part/ neither to be honest nor profitable/ nor easy to perform/ or else utterly impossible.  
¶ The conclusion standeth in two things/ that is is to say/ a brief and compendious repeating of all our reasons that we have bronght for us afore/ and in moving of affections. And so doth Ulysses conclude his oration in the. xiii. book of Ovid's metamorphosy.    

¶ Of the third kind of orations/ called judicial. ❧  
Orations judicial be that long to controversies in the law and pleas/ which kind of oration in old time longed only to judges & men of law/ but now for the more part it is neglect of them/ though there be nothing more necessary to quicken them in crafty and wise handling of their matters.  
¶ In these orations the first is to find out the state of the cause/ which is a short proposition/ containing the hole effect of all the controversies. As in the oration of tuli/ made for Milo/ of the which I made mention in the beginning of my book. The state of the cause is this. Milo slew Clodius lawfully/ which thing his adversaries denied/ and if Tully can prove it the plea is won.  
¶ Here must be borne away that there be three manner of states in such orations.  
¶ The first is called conjectural. The second/ legitime. The third/ iudiciale/ and every of these hath his own proper places to fet out arguments of them/ wherefore they shall be spoken of severally. And first we will treat of state coiecturall/ which is used when we be certain that the deed is done/ but we be ignorant who did it/ and yet by certain conjectures we have one suspect/ that of very likelihood it should be he that hath committed the crime. And therefore this state is called con iecturall/ because we have no manifest proof/ but all only great lykelyhodes/ or as the Rhetoriciens call them/ conjectures.  

¶ Example.  
THere was a great contention in the Greeks army afore Troy between Ulysses and Ajax/ after the death of Achilles/ which of them should have his armour as next to the said Achilles in valiantness. In which controversy when the Greeks had judged the said armour unto Ulysses/ Ajax for very great disdain fell out of his mind/ & shortly after in a wood nigh to the host/ after he had known (when he came again to himself) what foolish pranks he had played in the time of his frenzy/ for sorrow & shame he slew himself. soon upon this deed came Ulysses by/ which saying Ajax thrust through with a sword: came to him/ and as he was about to pull out the sword/ the friends of Ajax chanced to come the same way/ which saying their friend deed/ and his old enemy pulling out a sword of his body/ they accused him of murder.  
¶ In very deed here was no proof. For of truth Ulysses was not guilty in the cause. nevertheless the envy that was between Ajax and him: made the matter to be not a little suspect/ specially for that he was found there with the said Ajax alone/ wherefore the state of the plea was conjectural/ when there Ulysses slew Ajax or not.    

¶ The preface.  
THe preface is here even as it is in other orations. For we begin to the nature of the cause that we have on hand/ either in blaming our adversaries or else moving the hearers to have pity on our client. Or else we begin at our own person/ or at the praise of the judge. &c.   

¶ The narration.  
THe narration or tale is the showing of the deed in manner of an history/ wherein the accuser must craftily entermengle many suspicions which shall seem to make his matter provable. As tuli in his oration for Milo/ where in his narration he intendeth by certain conjectures to show that Clodius lay in wait for Milo/ he in his said narration handleth that place thus.  
¶ In the mean season when Clodius had knowledge that Milo had a lawful & necessary journey to the city of Lauine the .xiii. day afore the kalends of March/ to point who should be head priest there/ which thing longed to Milo because he was dictator of that town: Clodius suddenly the day afore departed out of Rome to set upon Milo in a lordship of his own/ as after was well perceived. And such haste he made to be going that were as the people were gathered the same day for mats wherein also he had great ado himself/ & very necessary it had been for him to have been there/ yet this not withstanding/ all other things apart: he went his way/ which you may be sure he would never have done/ save only that he had fully determined to prevent a time and place convenient for his malicius entemr afore milo's coming.  
¶ In this piece of Tully's narration are entermengled first that Clodius knew of milo's going/ which maketh the matter suspect that Clodius went afore to meet with him/ for this was well known afore that Clodius bore Milo great grudge and malice. Next is showed the place where as Clodius met Milo/ which also giveth a great suspicion/ for it was nigh Clodius place/ where he might soon take succour/ & the t'other was in least assurance. Thirdly that he departed out of the city/ what time it had been most expedient/ ye/ & also greatly requisite for him to have been at home. And that again maketh the matter suspect/ for surely he would not (as Tully himself saith) in no wise have been absent at such a busy time/ unless it had been for some great purpose/ and what other should it seem than to ●…ce Milo. As surely evident it was that they buckled together/ and this was well known that Milo had a necessary cause to go forth of Rome at that tyme. Contrarily in Clodius could be perceived non other occasion to depart than out of the city: but of likelihood to lie in wait for Milo. ❧   

¶ The proposition.  
OUt of the narration must be gathered a brief sentence/ wherein shall stand the hole pith of the cause/ for Rhetoriciens put incontinent after the narration division/ which is a part of contention/ & doth briefly show wherein the controversy doth stand/ or what things shall be spoken of in the oration. This division is divided into seiunction and distribution.  
¶ Setunction is when we show wherein our adversaries and we agree/ and what it is/ whereupon we strive. As they that pleaded Clodius cause against Milo/ might on this manner have used setunction. That Milo slew Clodius: our adversaries can not denay/ but whether he might so do lawfully or not/ is our controversy. Distribution is the proposition wherein we declare of what things we will speak/ of which if we propose how many they be/ it is called enumeration/ but if we do not express the number/ it is called exposition.  
¶ Example of both is had in the oration that Tully made to the people that pompeius might be made chief captain of the wars against Mithridates and Tigranes/ where after the preface and narracion he maketh his proposition by exposition thus.  

first I think it expedient to speak of the nature & kind of this war/ and after that of the greatness thereof/ and than to show how an heed or chief capitain of any army should be chosen. which last member of his exposition he again distributeth into four parts thus as followeth.   

Truly this is mine opinion/ that he which shall be a governor of an host/ aught to have these four properties in him. The first is/ that he have perfit knowledge of all such things as longeth to war. The second is that he be a man of his hands. The third that he be a man of such authority: that his dignity may cause his soldiers to have him in reverence and awe. The fourth is that he be fortunate and lucky in all things that he goeth about.  
¶ Tully in the oration for Milo/ proposeth all only showing wherein the contro versy of the plea did stand on this manner as followeth. ❧   

IS there than any thing else that must t tried and judged in this cause save this: whether of them both began the fray and intended to murder the tother: No surely. So that if it can be founded that Milo went about to destroy Clodius/ than he be punished therefore accordingly. But if it can be proved that Clodius was the beginner and laid wait for to slay Milo/ and so was the searcher of his own death/ and that what Milo did it was but to defend himself from the treason of his enemy and the safeguard of his life: that than he may be delivered and quit.    

¶ Of confirmation.  
THe confirmation of the accuser is fetched out of these places/ will/ and power. For these two things will cause the person that is accused to be greatly suspect that he had will to do the thing that he is accused of/ and that he might well enough bring it to pass. ❧  
¶ To prove that be had will thereto: you must go to. ii. places. The one is the quality of the person/ & the other is the cause that moved him to the deed. The quality of the person is thus handled. First to look what is his name or surname/ and if it be naughty to say that he had it not for nothing: but that nature had such prive power in men to make them give names according to the manners of every person. Than next to behold his country. So tuli in his oration made for Lucius Flaccus/ to unprove the witness that was brought against him by Brekes/ layeth unto them the lightness of their country. This (sayeth tuli) do I say of the hole nation of Brekes. I grant to them that they have good learning/ and the knowledge ot many sciences. Nor I deny not but that they have a pleasant and marvelous sweet speech. They are also people of high and excellent quick wit/ & thereto they be very facundiouse. These & such other qualities wherein they boast themself greatly: I will not repine against it that they here the mastery therein. But as concerning equity and good conscience/ requisite/ in bearing of record/ or giving of any witness/ & also as touching faithfulness of word and promise: truly this nation never observed, this property/ neither they knew not what is the strength/ authority/ and weight thereof.  
¶ So to Englishmen is attributed sumptuousness in meats & drinks. To French men/ pride/ & delight in new fantasies. To flemings and Almains/ great drinking/ & yet inventive wits. To britains/ Gascoignes/ and Polones/ larrecine. To spaniards/ agility. To ytaliens/ high wit and moche subtlety. To Scots/ boldness/ to Irissh men/ hastiness. To Boemes valiantness and tenacite of opinions. etc.  
¶ After that to look on his kindred/ as if his father or mother or other kin were of ill disposition/ for as the tree is: such fruit it beareth.  
¶ On this wise doth Phillis cntwyte Demophon/ that his father Theseus uncourteously and traitorously left his love Ariadna alone in the desert isle of Naxus/ & contrary to his promise stolen from her by night/ adding Heredem patria perfide frandis agis. That is to say/ untrue and false forsworn man/ thou playest kindly the father's heir/ in deceytable beguiling of thy true lover.  
¶ After that we must look upon the sex/ whether it be man or woman that we accuse / to see if any argument can be deduct out of it to our purpose. As in men is noted audacity women be commonly tymerouse.  
Than next/ the age of the person. As in Therence Simo speaketh of his son Pamphilus/ sayeth unto his man called Sosia/ how couldst thou know his conditions or nature afore/ while his age and fear/ and his master did let it to be known.  
¶ Hipermestra in Ovid's epistles joineth these. ii. places of sex & age together thus.  
¶ I am a woman & a young maiden/ mild & gentle/ both by nature & years. My soft hands are not apt to fires battles.  
¶ After these follow strength of body/ or agility/ & quickness of wit/ out of which may be brought many reasons to affirm our purpose. So tuli in his oration for Milo/ willing to prove that Clodius was the beginner of the fray/ showeth that Milo (which was never wont but to have men about him) by chance at that time had in his company certain Musiciens and maidens that waited on his wife/ whom he had sitting with him in his wagon. Contraryly Clodius that was never want afore but to tide in a wagen & to have his wife with him: at that time road forth on horseback. And where as afore be was always accustomed to have knaves & queens in his company: he had than none but tall men with him/ & (as who should say) men piked out for the nonce. ¶ To this is added form/ as to assay if we can have any argument to our purpose out of the per sons face or countenance/ & so doth Tully argue in his oration against Piso/ saying.  
¶ Seest thou not now thou be'st? dost thou not now perceive what is men's complaint on thy visage? there is none that complaineth that I wot not what Surrien & of their flock which be but newly crept up to honour out of the dunghill is now made con full of the city. For this servile colour hath not deceived us nor hery cheek balls/ nor rotten & filthy teeth/ thine iyes/ thy brows/ forehead/ & hole countenance/ which in a manner doth manifest men's condietons & nature it hath deceived us. ¶ This done/ we must consider how he hath been brought up that we accuse/ among whom he hath lived/ & whereby/ how he governeth his household/ & assay if we can pike out of these aught for our purpose. Also of what state he is of/ free or bond/ rich or poor/ bearing office or not/ a man of good name/ or otherwise/ wherein he delighteth most/ which places do express man's living/ & by his living: his will & mind/ as I would declare more fully/ save that in introductions men must labour to be short/ and again they are such that he that hath any perceiving may soon know what shall make for his purpose/ & how to set it forth. And therefore this shall suffice as touching the quality of the person.  
¶ If we bear away this for a general rule (that what maketh for the accuser evermore the contrary) is sure stay for the defender/ if he can prove it/ or make it of the more likelihood. As Tully in defending Milo/ layeth to Clodius friends charges that he had none about him but choose men. And for to clear Milo he showeth the contrary/ that he had with him singing lads and women servants that waited on his wife/ which maketh it of more likelihood that Clodius went about to slay Milo: than Milo him.  
¶ The cause that moveth to the mischief lieth in two things. In natural impulsion/ and racionation.  
¶ Natural impulsion is anger/ hatred/ covetise ●…etyse/loue●… or such other affections.  
So Simo in Therence/ when he had said that Davus (whom he had pointed to wait upon his son Pamphilus) would do all that might lie in him both with hand and foot/ rather to displease him: than to please Pamphilus mind. And Sofia demanded why he would do so. Simo made answer by raciocination/ saying/ dost thou ask that? marry his ungracious and unhappy mind is the cause thereof.  
Oenone in Ovid's epistles joineth together quality and natural impulsion/ saying. A juvene et Cupido credatur reddita Virgo? which is in english. Think you that she that was carried away of a young man/ and hot in love/ was restored again a maid?  
¶ Tulli in the oration for Milo/ among other arguments bringeth in one against Clodius by natural impulsion of hatred/ she wing that Clodius had cause to hate Milo first/ for he was one of them that laboured for the same Tully's revocation from exile/ which tuli Clodius maliciously hated. Again that Milo oppressed many of his furious purposes. And finally because the said Milo accused him and cast him afore the Senate and people of Rome. ❧  
¶ Raciocination is that cometh of hope of any commodity/ or to eschew any discommodity. As Tully argueth in his oration for Milo against Clodius by raciocination to prove that it was he that laid wait for Milo on this manner.  

IT is sufficient to prove that this cruel and wicked be'st had a great cause to slay Milo/ if he would bring his matters that he went about to pass/ and great hope if he were once gone/ not to be letted in his pretenced malice.  
¶ After raciocination followeth comprobation/ to show that no man else had any cause to go there about/ save he whom we accuse/ nor no profit could come to no man thereof: save to him.    

¶ These are the ways whereby an orator shall prove that the person accused had will to the thing that is laid to his charge.  
TO prove that he might do it: ye must go to the circumstance of the cause/ as that he had leisure enough thereto/ and place convement and strength withal. ¶ Also you shall prove it by signs/ which are of marvelous efficacy in this behalf/ wherefore here must be noted that signs be either words or deeds that either did go before or else follow the deed. As Tully in his oration now often alleged argueth against Clodius by signs going afore the deed/ as that Clodius said three days afore Milo was slain: that he should not live three days to an end. And that he went out of the city a little afore Milo road forth with a great company of strong and mischievous knaves.  
¶ Signs following are as if after the deed was done he fled/ or else when it was laid to his charge: he blushed or waxed pale/ or stutted & could not well speak.  
¶ The contrary places (as I said afore) long to the defender/ save that in signs he must use. two. things/ absolution & invertion.  
¶ Absolution is whereby the defender showeth that it is lawful for him to do that what the adversary bringeth in for a sign of his malice.  

¶ Erample.  
¶ A man is found covering of a deed body/ & thereupon accused of murder/ he may answer that it is lawful to do so for the preservation of his body from ravens & other that would devour him/ till time he had warn people to fetch and bury him.  
¶ Inuereion is whereby we show that the sign which is brought against us: maketh for us. As I would not have tarried to cover him if I had done the deed myself: but have fled and shrunk a side into some other way for fear of taking.    

¶ Of the conclusion.  
THe conclusion is as I have said afore in brief repeating of the effect of our reasons/ & in moving the judges to our purpose. The ac cuser to punish the person accused. The defender/ to move him to pity.   

¶ Of the state iuridiciall/ and the handling thereof.  
AS state conjectural cometh out of this question (who did the deed) so when there is no doubt but that the deed is done/ and who did it/ many times controversy is had/ whether it hath been done lawfully or not. And this state is negociall or iuridiciall/ which containeth the right or wrong of the deed. As in the oration of Tully for Milo/ the state is iuridiciall/ for open it was that Clodius was slain/ and that Milo slew him/ but whether he killed him lawfully or not: is the controversy and state of the cause, as I have afore declared.   

¶ The preamble and narration as afore. ❧  
THe confirmation hath certain places appropered thereto/ but here must be marked that state negociall is double/ absolute/ & assumptyve.  
¶ State negociall absolute is when the thing that is in controversy is absolutely defended to be lawfully done. As in the oration of tuli for Milo/ the deed is stiffly affirmed to be lawfully done in slaying Clodius/ saying that Milo did it in his own defence/ for the law permitteth to repel violence violently.  
¶ The places of confirmation in state absolute are these/ nature/ law/ custom/ equity or reason/ judgement/ necessity/ bargain or covenant. ¶ Of the which places Tully in his oration for Milo bringeth in the more part together in a cluster on this manner. ❧  

IF reason hath prescribed this to learned and wise men/ and necessity hath driven it into barbarous and rude folk/ & custom keepeth it among all nations/ and nature hath planted it in bruit beestes/ that every creature should defend himself and save his life and his body from all violence by any manner of succour/ what means or way so ever it were. you can not judge this deed evil done/ except you will judge that when men meet with thieves or murderers/ they must either be slain by the weapons of such unthrifty and malicious persons: either else perish by your sentence given in judgement upon them.  
¶ State assumptive is when the defence is feeble of itself/ but yet it may be holpeu by some other thing added to it. And the places longing to this state are granting of the fault/ removing of the fault/ or (as we say in our tongue) laying it from us to an other/ & translating of the fault.  
¶ Braunting of the fault is when the per son accused denteth not the deed/ but yet he desireth to be forgiven/ & it hath. two. places more annexed to it/ purgation & deprecation.  
¶ Puxgation is when he sayeth he did it not maliciously: but by ignorance or mishap which place Cato useth ironiously in Salust/ thus. My mind is that ye have pity with you/ for they that have done amiss be but very young men/ and desire of honour drove them to it.  
¶ Deprecation is when we have none excuse: but we call upon the justices mercy. The handling whereof tuli writeth in his book of invention thus.   

HE that laboureth to be forgiven of his fault/ must rehearse (if he can) some benefits of his/ done afore time/ and show that they be far greater in their nature than is the crime that he hath committed/ so that (how be it he hath done greatly amiss) yet the goodness of his fore merits are far bigger/ and so may well oppress this one fault. next after that it behoveth him to have refuge to the merits of his elders/ if there be any/ and to open them. That done/ he must return to the place of purgation/ and show that he did not the deed for any hate or malice/ but either by foolishness/ or else by the enticement of some other/ or for some provable cause.  
And than promise faithfully that this fault shall teach him to beware from thence forth/ and also that their benefits that forgive him shall bind him assuredly never to do so more/ but perpetually to abhor any such offence/ and with that to show some great hope once to make them a great recompense & pleasure therefore again. After this let him (if he can) declare some kindred between them & him/ or friendship of his elders/ & amplify the greatness of his service & good heart toward them/ if it shall please them to forgive this fault/ & add the nobility of them that would fain have him delivered. And than he shall soberly declare his own vectucs and such things as ve in him pertaining to honesty & praise/ that he may by these means seem rather worthy to be avauticed in honour for his good qualities/ than to be punished for his fall.  
¶ This done/ let him rehearse some other that have be forgiven greater faults than this is. It shall also greatly avail if he can show that he hath in time afore been in authority and bare a rule over other/ in the which he was never but gentle and glad to forgive them that had offended underneath him. And than let him crtenuate his own fault/ and show that there followed not so great damage thereof/ and that but little profit or honesty will follow of his punishment. And finally than by common places to move the judge to mercy & pitic upon him.  
¶ The adversary must (as I have showed afore) use for his purpose contrary places.  
¶ Some Rhetoriciens put no more places of deprecation than only this that is here last rehearsed of tuli/ that is to do our best to move the justice to mercy and pity.  
¶ Remotion of the fault is when we put it from us and lay it to another.  

¶ Example.  
THe Venetians have commanded certain to go in ambassade to England/ and thereupon appointed them what they shall have to bear their charges/ which money assigned: they can not get of the treasouter: At the day appointed they go not/ whereupon they are accused to the Senate. Here they must lay the fault from them to the treasoucer/ which dispatched them not according/ as it was ordained that he should.  
¶ Translation of the fault is/ when he that confesseth his fault sayeth that he did it: moved by the indignation of the malicious deed of an other.   

¶ Example.  
hinge Agamennon/ which was chief captain of the Greeks at the siege of Troy/ when he came home was slave of Egistus by the treason of Clitenestra his own wife/ which murder his son Orestes saying/ when he came to man's state/ revenged his fathers death on his mother/ and slew her/ whereupon he was accused. Here Orestes can not deny but he slew his mother: But he layeth for him that his mother's abominable injury constrained him thereto/ by cause she slew his father.  
And this is the handling of confirmation in state assumptive.  
¶ The conclusions in these orations are like to the conclusions of other.     

¶ Of state legitime/ and the handling thereof.  
STate legitime is when the controversy standeth in definition or contrary laws/ or doubtful writings/ or raciocination/ or translation.   

¶ Of definition.  
Definition (as Tully writeth) is when in any writing is some word put/ the signification whereof requireth exposition.  

¶ Example.  
A Law may be made that such as forsake a ship in time of tempest should lose their right that they have/ either in the ship or in any goods within the same vessel/ & that they shall have the ship & the goods that abide still in her.  
¶ It chanced. 11. men to be in a little crayer/ of the which vessel the one man was both owner and governor/ and the other: possessor of the goods. And as they were in the main see/ they espied one that was swimming in the see/ and as well as he could holding up his hands to them for succour/ whereupon they (being moved with pity) made toward him/ & took him up. within a little after arose a great tempest upon them/ and put them in such jeopardy that the owner of the ship (which was also governor) leapt out of the ship into the ship boat/ and with the rope that tied the boat to the ship: he governed the ship as well as he could. The merchant that was within the ship/ for great despair of the loss of his goods/ willing to slay himself: threst himself in with his own sword/ but as it chanced the wound was neither mortal nor very grievous/ but notwithstanding for that time he was unable to do any good in helping the ship against the impetuousness of the storm. The third man (which not long afore had suffered ship wrack) gate him to the stern/ and holp the vessel the best that lay in him. At length the storm seaced/ and the ship came safe into the haven/ boat & all. He that was hurt (by help of chirurgeons) recove red anon. Now every of these three challenge the ship & goods as his own. Here every man layeth for him the law above rehearsed/ and all their controversy lieth in the expounding of three words/ abiding in the ship/ and forsaking the ship/ & what we shall in such case call the ship/ whether the boat as part of the ship: or else the ship itself alone.  
¶ The handling hereof is. first in few words and plain to declare the signification of the word to our purpose/ and after such manner as may seem reasonable to the audience. Ner●…e/ after such exposition to declare and prove the said exposition true/ with as many arguments as we can.  
thirdly to join our deed with the exposition/ & to show that we only did observe the very intent of the law. Than to refel the exposition of our adversaries/ & to show that their exposition is contrary to reason and equity/ and that no wise man will so take the law as they expound it/ and that the exposition is neither honest nor profitable/ and to couster their exposition with ours/ and to show that ours containeth the verity/ and theirs is false. Ours honest/ reasonable/ & profitable: Theirs clean contrary. And than search out like examples/ either of greater matters or of less/ or else of equal matters/ and to manifest by them that our mind is the very truth.  
¶ Contrary laws are where the tone seemeth evidently to contrary the other. As if a law were that he whom his father hath forsaken for his son/ shall in no wise have any portion of his father's goods. And an other law/ that who so ever in time of tem pest abideth in the ship: shall have the ship and goods. Than pose that one which was of his father so abject and devyed for his child: was in a ship of his fathers in time of sore wether/ & when all other for feareof losing themself forsook the ship & gate them into the boat: he only abodc/ and by chance was safe brought into the haven/ whereupon he challengeth the vessel for his/ where as the party defendant will lay against him that he is abdicate or forsaken of his father/ and so can not by the law have any part of his goods.  
Here must he say again for him that this law alleged doth all only private from their father's goods such as be abdicate & yet would challenge a part as his children/ but that he doth not so/ but requireth to have the ship/ not as a son to his father: but as any other stranger might/ seeing the law giveth him the ship that abideth in her in time of necessity. And so the handling of this state/ either to deny one of that laws & show that it hath been afore annulled/ or else to expound it after the sense that is meet to our purpose.  
¶ Doubtful writing is where either the mind of the author seemeth to be contrary to that that is written/ which some call writing & sentence/ or else it is when the words may be expounded divers ways.   

¶ Example of the first.  
MEn say it is a law in Caleys that no stranger may go upon the town walls on pain of death. Now than pose that in time of war the town being hard besieged/ a alien dwelling in the town getteth him to the walls among the soldiers/ & doth more good than any one man again. Now after the siege ended he is accused for transgressing of the law: which in words is evidently against him. But here the defendant must declare the writers mind by circumstances/ what stranger he did forbid/ and what time, and after what manner/ and in what intent he would not have any stranger to come on the walls/ & in what intent his mind might be understanden to suffer an alien to go upon the walls. And here must the effect of the strangers will be declared/ that he went up to defend the town to put back their enemies. And thereto he must say that the maker was not so undiscrete & unreasonable that he would have no manner of exception which should be to the wealth/ profit/ or preservation of the town. For he that will not have the law to be understanden ac 'cording to equity/ good manner/ & nature/ intendeth to prove the maker thereof either an unjust man/ or folyssh or envious.  
¶ The accuser contrarily shall praise the maker of the law for his great wisdom/ for his plain writing without any manner of ambiguity/ that no stranger should pnsume to go upon the walls/ & rehearse the law word for word/ & than show some reasonable cause that moved the maker of the law that he would utterly that no stranger should ascend the walls. etc. Erample of the second.  

A Man in his testament giveth to two young daughters that he hath two hundred sheep/ to be delivered at the day of their marriage/ on this manner. ☞ I will that mine executors shall give to my daughters at the time of their marriage every of them an hundred sheep/ such as they will. At the time of marriage they demand their cattle/ which the executors deliver not of such sort as the maidens would/ whereupon the controversy ariseth. For the executors say they are bound to deliver to every of them an hundred sheep/ such as they that be the executors will. Now vere standeth the doubt/ to whom we shall refer this word they/ to the daughters/ or to the executors.  
The maidens say nay thereto/ but that it was their father's mind that they should have every of them an. C. sheep/ such as they that be the daughters will.  
¶ The handling of doubtful writing is to show if it be possible that it is not written doubtfully by cause it is the common manner to take it after as we say/ & that it may soon be known by such words as partly go before that clause & ꝑtly follow/ & that there be few words/ but if they be considered so alone/ they may anon be taken doubtfully. And first we shall show if we can it it is not doubtfully written/ for there is no reasonable man: but be will take it as we say. Than shall we declare by that that goeth afore/ & followeth/ that it is clearly eum as we say/ & that if we consider the words of themself they will seem to be of ambiguity/ but saying they may by the rest of the writing be evident enough/ they ought not to be ta ken as doubtful. And than show that if it had beu his mind that made the writing to have it taken as the adversary sayeth: he needed net to have written any such words. As in the example now put/ the maidens may say that if it had been their father's mind that the executors should have delivered such sheep as it had pleased them to deliver: he needed not to have added these words such as they will. For it they had not been put/ it would not have been dow but that the executors delivering every of them an hundred sheep (what so ever they were) had fulfilled the will/ and could have been no further compelled/ wherefore if his mind was as they say/ it was a great folly to put in though words which made a plain matter to be unplaine. And than finally show it is more ho nest and convenient to expound it as we say: than as our adversaries do.  
¶ Raciocination is when the matter is in controversy/ whereupon no law is decreed/ but yet the judgement thereof may be found out by laws made upon matters somedeal resembling thereunto.  
¶ As in Rome was this law made/ that if any person were distraught/ his possessions and goods should come to the hands of his next kin.  
¶ And an other law/ what any householder doth ordain & make as coveerning his household and other goods/ it is approbate and confirmed by the law.  
¶ And an other law/ if any householder die intestate/ his money & other goods shall remain to his next kin. ¶ It chanced one to kill his own mother/ whereupon he was taken & condemned to death/ but while he lay in prison/ certain of his familiar friends came thither to him/ & brought with them a clerk to write his testament/ which he there made/ & made such executors as it pleased him. After his death his kynnesmen challenge his goods/ his executors say then nay/ whereupon ariseth controversy afore the justice. ¶ There is no law made upon this case/ whether he that hath killed his mother may make any testament or not/ but it may be reasoned on both parties by the laws above rehearsed. The kinsmen shall allege the law made for them that be out of their myndis/ pnsupposing him not to be in moche other case/ or else he would not have done the deed. The contrary part shall allege the other law/ & show that it was none alienation of mind: but some other cause that moved him to it/ & that he hath had his punishment therefore/ which he should not have suffered of convenient if he had been beside himself. ¶ Translation is which the lawyers call exception/ as if the person accused plead that it is not lawful for the t'other to accuse him/ or that the judge can be no judge in that cause. etc.     

☞ ¶ The conclusion of the Author.  
THese are my special and singular good Lord which I have purposed to write as touching the chief point of the .iiii. that I said in the beginning to long to a Rhetoricien/ & which is more difficulty than the other. iii. so that it ones had/ there is no very great mastery to come by the residue. notwithstanding if I see that it be first acceptable to your good lordship/ in whom next god & his holy saints I have put my chief confidence & trust/ & after that if I find that it seem to the readers a thing worthy to be looked on/ & that your lordship & they think not my labour taken in vain: I will assay myself in the other parts/ & so make & accomplish the hole work. But now I have followed the fashion of tuli/ who made a several work of mention. And though many things be left out of this treatise that ought to be spoken of/ yet I suppose that this shall be sufficient for an introduction to young beginners/ for whom all only this book is made. For other that been entered all ready shall have little need of my labour/ but they may seek more meeter things for their purpose/ either in Hermogines among the Greeks/ or else Tully or Trapesonce/ among the Latins. And to them that be young beginners nothing can be to plain or to short/ wherefore Horace i his book of the craft of Poetry saith.  

☞ Quicquid precipies esto brevis ut cito di●…  
Percipiant animi dociles teneant q fideles.   
☞ what so ever ye will teach (sayeth he) be brief therein/ that the minds of the hearers or readers may the caslyer perceive it/ and the better bear it away. And the Emperor justinian sayeth in the first book of his institutions in the paragraph of justice and right/ that over great curiosity in the first principles/ make him that is studious of the faculty either to forsake it: or else to attain it with very great and tedyouse labour/ and many times with great despair to come to the end of his purpose. And for this cause I have been far less curious than I would else have been/ and also a great deal the shorter. If this my labour may please your lordship/ it is the thing that I do in it most desire/ but if it seem both to you and other a thing that is very rude and scant worth the looking on: yet Aristotle's words shall comfort me/ who sayeth that men be not only bound to good authors: but also to bad/ because that by their writing they have provoked cunnynger men to take the matter on hand/ which would else peradventure have held their peace. Truly there is nothyuge that I would be more gladder of/ than if it might chance me on this manner to cause them that be of moche better learning and in this art than I/ of whom I am very sure that this realm hath great plenty/ that they would set the pen to the paper/ and by their industry obscure my rude ignorance. In the mean space I beseech the readers/ if they find any thing therein that may do them any profit/ that they give the thanks to god and to your lordship/ and that they will of their charity pray unto the blessed trinity for me/ that when it shall please the godhead to take me from this transitory life/ I may by his mercy be of the number of his elect to perpetual salvation.  
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¶ Imprinted at London in Fleetstreet by saint Dunston's church/ at the sign of the George/ by me Robert Redman. The year of our lord god a thousand/ five hundred and two and thirty. ❧  
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¶ Cum privilegio.  
☞ ☜  
❧   


Robert Redman.