An Apology, or Defence, of those English Writers & Preachers which Cerberus the three headed Dog of Hell, chargeth with false doctrine, under the name of Predestination.  
Written by Robert Crowley Clerk, and Vicar of Saint Giles without Creplegate in London.  
Imprinted at London, in Paternoster row, at the sign of the black boy, by Henry Binneman.  
Anno. 1566. Octobris. 14.   

¶ To the Reader.  
BEing openly defamed, in writing set abroad by one that hath no name: I suffered y● same, long time to delight himself in his own blindness, and to boast himself among his secreto maintainers, being in the mean while better occupied, than in wrestling with such a one as is ashamed to set his name to the book he writeth, and causeth to be imprinted.  
I thought that the writings of such one, could not have been hurtful to the estimation that I and others of my calling, should of right have among the true professors of God's Gospel: because such have enough already in print, and in the English tongue, to answer all such blind barking dogs as this is. But perceiving that some men which profess the Gospel, will rather credit such a Railer, than take the pains to read that, wherein they might have wherewith to be able to answer for us that are railed upon, because the same was written, before this Hell Dog began to bark: I have now written a short Apology, or defence of myself and others of my calling, whom this Hell hound doth so eagerly bark at: willing the Christian reader, to read it with indifferent judgement, neither inclining to the one nor the other, till he have read both. And because none shall have cause to complain: I have set down in writing all that this Dog hath written, and then defended that which he findeth fault withal, so that every matter hath it manifest defence joined unto it, that the Christian Reader, may have wherewithal to bring himself out of doubt. And lest any should be offended, for that I term mine adversary by the name of Cerberus or Hell dog: I would all men should consider the cause. He hath taken upon him to reprehend the teachers of the truth, and those, which are or should be, the light of the world: and yet, as one that would not be called to an account of his doings, he hideth his name. Wherefore, I have given him such a name, as is meet for him: till he put his name to that he writeth in the reproach and discredit of such as fear not openly to teach the truth, and when they writ it, to subscribe their names to the same. When this Hell hound therefore shall set his name to his book: I will use none other name but that which by his own writing shall appear to be his. In the mean while, let him & his friends be contented that he bear such a name, as his doings do deserve. Cerberus as the Poets do feign, is a Dog with three heads, which watcheth Hell gates, whose barking is horrible, for he barketh with chrée mouths, and his hairs are snakes. His name by interpretation doth signify a devourer of bodies. Wherefore, it is not a name vile enough for this Hell dog, whose property is to devour souls, and the good names of such as he is not able to accuse of any crime. And with his barking he goeth not about to trouble the Kingdom of Hell (as Cerberus did) but the Kingdom of Heaven, which is the Church of Christ, which by faith in Christ, is assured of her eternal Predestination to everlasting glory after this life, and in this life to deliverance from all evil. Of which comfort this Cerberus laboureth by his barking to spoil her: as shall more plainly appear in the Apology of those, whom he seeketh by his barking to dash out of countenance.  
But lest I should trouble thee Christian Reader, with over many words before the matter: I cease to write any more. Farewell in Christ jesus. And pray to God for the presence of his holy spirit, to lead thee in the reading of this Apology. Amen. Finished the first of March Anno. 1565.  Roman. 8. Those whom God knew before: them hath he predestinated to be made like unto the Image of his son, that he might be the eldest among many brethren.  

An Apology of Crowley and others.  Cerberus. 
THE Copy of an Answer, made unto a certain letter: wherein the Aunswerer purgeth himself and other, from Pelagius errors, and from the error of free will or justification of works: wherewithal he seemeth to be charged, by the said letter: And further he showeth, wherein he differeth in judgement, from certain English writers and Preachers, whom he chargeth with the teaching of false doctrine, under the name of Predestination.  Crowley. 
IT had been very well done of Cerberus to have set down in writing the copy of the letter that he saith he Answereth, and the name of him that wrote it: so might those that he nameth in his answer, have had some way to have found out the Author of the Answer, that this matter being debated privately between them, a mean might have been found for the ending of the controversy and the satisfying of such as by this answer are not only brought into doubt, of the truth of God's everlasting Predestination: but also have conceived an evil opinion of such as be the teachers thereof. But if I shall speak that I think: I must needs say, that I think there was no such letter written. But Cerberus hath saved this, as a ground to set his foundation upon. For otherwise it should have seemed too too maliciously done, upon none occasion to write and set abroad in print to the disfamation of public Preachers and writers: such matter as in this answer he chargeth them withal. But grant there were such a letter written: yet was not that a just occasion for Cerberus to charge by name, me or any other, which knew not of the writing of it. Well, he purgeth himself and other, he saith, of divers errors wherewith he seemeth to be charged in that letter. It had been well, he had not in purging himself charged other, that must fall to purging too. But that was to show what spirit he is of. Not of that spirit which in love seeketh the reformation of other men's errors: but of that spirit that in malice seeketh to maintain his own errors by the defacing of other, which nevertheless, will in the end, be the defacing of himself. For such as use to dig pits for others to fall into: do commonly fall into the same themselves first of all.  Cerberus. 
I desire of God by his grace and mercy, to settle, strength, and stablish you in the truth of his holy word for ever. dearly beloved, where you writ unto me, that you have often heard, that I and other, should hold the errors of Pelagius: whose errors you say are almost unknown unto you what they are. And where further it is reported of us (as you say) that we should deny the predestination of God: and seek a justification by free will, and by deserving of works, which matter you do both understand, and have also found good proof (as you suppose) that we are guilty in the same, laying the whole foundation of your proof, upon this saying set forth in print.  

Although there be but few on earth, that rightly thee deserve:  
Yet thou, O Lord, for their good life, the residue preserve.   
With which filthy saying, to burden me and other whom ye name: I marvel greatly that you could be so much abused, not considering by whom it was written, and set forth in print: for by the titling you see, it was printed beyond the seas, in Queen Mary's time, for that it is entitled, A prayer to God for his afflicted Church in England, and as it there appeareth manifest, it is the work of W. Samuel, which is a man unto me of very small acquaintance: but a Preacher he is. And as for his saying, that a man may deserve God. etc. Which you desire me to prove if I can: it is a doctrine so abominable and blasphemous: as I am sure neither Papist, nor Pelagian, nor any other Heretic, either old or new, hath written or maintained, a more filthy, and execrable saying. For it is the flat and manifest denial both of God the Father & of his Son Christ jesus: neither doth it require any confutation to him that doth but confess, that there is a God: and as for myself, I assure you: I do not love my life so dearly, as I hate this vile saying deadly. But wonder it is, that such a sentence, containing the very filthy dregs, of all Pelagius errors, could so long stand printed, and neither be forbidden, nor by any man written against.  Crowley. 
I like very well, the Prayer that Cerberus beginneth his Oration withal: but his purpose in praying (which appeareth to be, to deceive the simple) I do like nothing at all. The foundation of his friends proof of that he chargeth him with (as he saith) is but slender: for it is but a fault in the print, as every man may see that will read but two verses going before in the same prayer, and six immediately following. And that the indifferent reader may be satisfied, I will write down those verses, because it will be hard for men to find the books wherein the Prayer is printed.  

Of all the Sons that thou hast had, but one thou dost regard:  
And for his sake thou art content, that we shall be preserved.  
So, though there be but few on earth, that rightly thee deserve:  
Yet thou, O Lord, for their good life, the residue preserve.  
If ten in Sodom had been found, the City still had stand:  
And had remained without fall as did the other land.  
And let not now thy mercies slack, but be thou always one:  
And have respect unto all those, that trust to thee alone.  
Those, whom thou hast in prison laid, for breaking of thy law.  
Deliver them and give them grace, to live in better awe.   
If any of Cerberus friends had been Author of this Prayer: he would soon have espied the printers fault, and would have read those two verses thus.  

So, though there be but few on earth, that rightly thee do serve:  
Yet thou, O Lord, for their goodlyfe, the residue preserve.   
And so should the saying have been no more filthy, than was the saying of Abraham to the Angel, when he entreated for the City of Sodom, and said: What if there lack five of fifty, wilt thou destroy the whole City for lack of siue? Or the saying of the Angel, when answering Abraham he said: If I find but ten just 
Gene. 18.  men in the City, I will spare it for their sakes. But Cerberus was so bend to bark at the Preachers of prevestination, that he could not have leisure to read more than the title and those two verses, which being corrupted in printing, seemed to serve his purpose. And surely, I do not yet believe that any man could be so mad as to charge him with those verses. But this I believe, that he hath written them otherwise than they were printed. For the first verse beginning thus: So, though. etc. he hath written it thus. Although. etc. which argueth that either he never saw the book that Samuel made, or else, he supposed that none should come to the sight of it, but such as do favour his faction. And in very deed some of them have made very strange to show that book. But how so ever the matter go otherwise, he hath shamefully deceived himself in triumphing over poor Samuel, as over him whom he compareth with the most wicked Heretics that ever were.  Cerberus. 
And although I deny not but some other there are, which (maintaining the power of man's free-will, & the meritorious worthiness of man's deserving) do deny the free gift of God's grace in Christ jesus, and for his only sake, comprehended in the eternal predestination, and foreordinaunce of God, and declared unto us in his most holy word, yet because I see, there are many in these days, wrongfully and falsely, accused to be enemies of that blessed Predestination, to be Pelagians, justifiers of themselves, and such like: And with those bitter terms, are in open Auditories defaced, and brought into contempt, among the multitude (who being deceived with giving overhasty credit, unto such men, not thoroughly understanding the matter, do use to give sentence, before the cause be heard,) I have thought it good therefore, most dearly beloved, not to them which take more delight in the defamation of other, than in knowing the truth themselves, but to thee, which art willing to understand the matter, before thou justify or condemn either party: in as few words as I possible can, to show what shameful doctrine, under the name and colour of God's Predestination, is now adays set forth and taught of many, which both I and many other mislike, and have divers times with some of them in private and friendly talk, persuaded to leave, both by cause we judge the doctrine to be false, and also the destruction of all virtue to follow thereupon. For which cause, as the manner is of them that fear not so much the shipwreck of a good conscience, as they do the loss of worldly estimation, lest any such diffavorers of their fantasy, should hap to have some credit among the people, with boisterous breath, they blow abroad, that the mislikers of this their doctrine, are enemies to Gods holy Predestination. But right well know they, that those whom they now so specially accuse, to be such haters of God's Predestination, are in deed, most entire lovers of the same. And many of those whom they accuse to be popish Pelagians and justifiers of themselves: have bestowed both their goods and lives, against that filthy and detestable sect And as for those errors which Pelagius that old heretic, with Celestinus and julianus his adherentes, did hold, and also revoked the same in the judicial counsel of Palestine: I think it good to rehearse them: first in Latin & after in English, as they are gathered together by Augustine. And then to show, according to your request, what part of their doctrine which they teach under the name of Predestination, myself and other do mislike. To the end that you and other may the better judge, who are in deed worthy to be called Pelagians: and whether some part of their doctrine, be not for just cause misliked.  Crowley. 
Here Cerberus useth all his rhetoric at once, to persuade his dearly beloved friend, whose letter he saith he answereth, that he and other of his mind be falsely and wrongfully accused to be enemies of Gods holy predestination. etc. And to this end he will in as few words, as possibly he can, set forth what shameful doctrine is now taught. etc. But first he will set forth both in Latin and in English, those errors which the old Heretic Pelagius, with other did hold and also revoke. etc. That men may the better judge, who are in deed worthy the name of Pelagians, (for he thinketh that he hath proved that we against whom he writeth, are those that should be called Pelagians) and whether some part of our doctrine be not for just cause misliked. Now let us see how he noteth Pelagius errors out of Augustine, first in Latin, and then in English. Which when we have weighed, we shall see who are most like Pelagius, he & his, or I and mine. For this is his purpose, I am sure, for that he toucheth me first by name, and setteth himself and such as he is against all such as I am, affirming that whereas we accuse them as enemies of God's Predestination, they are in deed the most entire lovers and we the enemies thereof. My chief labour therefore in this Apology, shall be to make the truth hereof to appear plainly to all the indifferent hearers.  Cerberus. 
The words of Austen are these. Episto. 106. tomo. 2. Obiectum est enim eum dicere. Quia Adam sive peccaret, sive non peccaret, moriturus esset. 2. Et quod peccatum eius, ipsum solum laeserit, non & genus humanum. 3. Et quod infants, in illo statu sunt, quo Adam suit ante praevaricationem. 4. Et quod neque per mortem vel praevaricationem, ●de, omne genus humanum moriatur, neque per resurrectionem Christi, omne genus humanum resurgat. 5. Et divites baptizatos nisi omnibus abrenuntient, si quid boni visi fuerint facere, non reputari illis, nec eos habere posse regnum Dei. 6. Et gratiam Dei atque adiutorium, non ad singulos actus dari, sed in libero arbitrio esse, vel in lege atque in doctrina. 7. Et dei gratiam secundum merit a nostra dari. 8. Et silios Dei non posse vocari, nisi omnino absque peccato fuerint effecti. 9 Et non esse liberum arbitrium, si Dei indiget auxilio, quoniam in propria voluntate habet unusquisque, facere aliquid vel non facere. 10. Et victoriam nostram, non ex Dei adiutorio esse, sed ex libero arbitrio. 11. Et quod poenitentibus veni a non detur secundum gratiam & misericordiam Dei: sed secundum moritum & laborem eorum, qui per poenitentiam, digni suerint misericordia. Haec omnia Pelagius anathematizavit.  
The first of Pelagius errors which Augustine here citeth is, that Adam should have died whether he had sinned or not sinned. This is as you hear, one of Pelagius wicked errors, that sin is not the cause of Reprobation, or casting away, death sprung out of God's ordinance, or some other way & came not of man's sin (saith he) whether man had sinned or not sinned, yet should he have died, contrary to the manifest Scripture which sayeth, that by one man sin entered into the world, & death by the means of sin. Roma. 5. b. And the wise man saith, that God 
Rom. 5. b.  created man to be undestroyed. And again he saith. 
Sapiae.  God hath not made death, neither hath he pleasure in the destruction of the living, he created all things that they might have their being, yea all the people of the earth hath he made, that they should have health, that there should be no destruction in them, and that the Kingdom of Hell should not be upon earth, for righteousness is everlasting and immortal, but unrighteousness bringeth death. Wicked and abominable therefore was this error of Pelagius which affirmeth, that whether man had sinned or not sinned: he should have died.  
And here in the very beginning of Pelagius errors: I report me to themselves, even to themselves (I say) that blow the trumpet of defamation against other, with the terms of pestilent Pelagians, whether those, whom they so accuse now to be Pelagians, hold this error, or whether they themselves which would take some mote of error out of other men's eyes, have not this Pelagius beam sticking fast in their own, let they themselves be judges, or let their own doctrine judge, both in print and preaching, whereof some part shall be hereafter rehearsed. Yea let all the world judge, which have heard the doctrine of both parties: who they are that in this point ought worthily to be called Pelagians.  Crowley. 
After Cerberus hath set down in Latin certain of Pelagius errors, to the number of xi he repeateth the first in English, that is, that Adam should have died, though he had not sinned. And because his purpose is to prove that we are those that hold this Pelagian heresy: he understandeth Pelagius meaning to be, that sin was not the cause of Reprobation, or casting away, but that heath sprung out of God's ordinance: And so at the last he concludeth, that Pelagius and we are all one in this point: for we teach the same doctrine. What moved Pelagius to teach that doctrine, I know not, neither did I at any time so much as once think to hold or desende it. And I think I may be bold to say in the name of all that have written or preached the doctrine that Cerberus misliketh: that not one either hath or will teach it. Although Cerberus do boast, that hereafter some part of our doctrine shall be showed, whereby all men may be able to judge that we are all one with Pelagius in this point. For mine own part I will put all men out of doubt, that I believe, and have, do, and will (if God permit) watch, that if Adam had not sinned, he had never died. And that God did create man to be undestroyed. And that God made not death as the wise 
Sapi. 2.  man writeth. But by one man sin entered into the the world, and by sin, death. And I can not see that any of my brethren have or do teach any otherwise, either in writing or preaching. Wherefore Cerberus doth us open wrong to join us with Pelagius in this error. As for the doctrine that I have written, and Cerberus wresteth top his purpose against me and my brethren: shall (by God's help) be defended in the place where it is produced against us.  Cerberus. 
The second error which Austen rehearseth, is, that Adam's sin did only hurt himself, and not the whole generation of man. This is an other vile and detestable error which Pelagius held, that the sin of Adam brought not misery and death upon all his posterity, contrary to the open Scripture, which saith, that by the sin of one, condemnation came upon all men. And the holy man Esdras 
Roma. 5. 4. Esdr. 6.  saith: O Adam, what hast thou done? for though it was thou that sinned, yet thou art not fallen alone, but all we that come of thee.  
The third, depending also upon the second, is this: That Infants being new borne, are in that state, that Adam was in, before his transgression, which error seemeth only, or chief to extend to the innocency of children. For if his mind were, that in all points infants were in Adames estate, then should it be over brutish. For who seeth not, that babes new borne, suffer of ten-times pain and grief, which Adam did not before his transgression. But to affirm, that Infants are not borne and conceived in sin, is to deny Original sin, which is an old and a devilish error, and utterly against the Scripture, which saith plainly: Behold, I was borne in wickedness, and in sin hath my mother 
Psalm. 51.  conceived me.  Crowley. 
In these two Articles can Cerberus find nothing to burden us withal. For we teach that by their first birth all Infants are inheritors of that possession that our common father Adam purchased by his first transgression or sin. That is, of bodily travail and misery in this life, and everlasting death after this life. And that even as the children of bond slaves, can enjoy none other thing by birth than that bondage which their parents are in: so the children of Adam can by nature enjoy none other thing but that which belonged to their first father, who by his first transgression, made bathe himself and all his posterity, bond slaves to death, hell, the devil and damnation. Well therefore we shall not be Pelagians in this point. But if I would deal as straightly with Cerberus, as he doth with Samuel: I could charge him with breaking of Priscian's head, in the second Article, where he writeth leseret for leserit. Which though it be but a small fault, yet is it as great a fault as that which Cerberus maketh so much of in samuel's rhymes. And the printers were to blame for both, I am sure. And therefore I would not that either Samuel or Cerberus, should bear any blame with them. Who so jousteth to confer the copy of this answer which was first cast about in the streets of London, with this that is written in this Apology: shall easily see that I have amended many such faults, without noting of them to any man's reproach.  Cerberus. 
The fourth error is, that neither by the death & transgression of Adam, all the generation of man dieth, nor that by the Resurrection of Christ, all the generation of man doth rise again. I do not understand that Pelagius did here speak of the last Resurrection at the day of judgement, as though he had, after the manner of the Saduceis, denied the Resurrection of our souls and bodies in the last day, for than were all them disputation in vain, of the manner how we should be saved, whether by the grace of God, or by the deserving of man, if salvation or Rosurrection had on either part been denied altogether. Neither doth the Scripture attribute the last Resurrection unto Christ, as though the souls and bodies of men, should have died like beasts and not have risen again unto judgement, if Christ had not come. Yea no doubt, all men should have risen again, and that to the judgement of everlasting damnation, if Christ had not come. But I understand that Pelagius in this Article, denied the generality of Redemption by the death of Christ, by which we do, as it were arise from death, because of the state of life and salvation, whereunto we are bought in Christ by Redemption, like as we were in the state of death and damnation in Adam by sin. Not that any man is purged from the corruption of sin, unto the innocency of Adam: but because the sin is covered in Christ, and pardoned for his sake. And further here is to be noted, that the first part of this error, is manifestly, the very same, which is in the second and third error, before rehearsed, and by the same Scriptures plainly condemned. But to make the latter part of this error more apparent, it was necessary and thought good of Augustine, to rehearse the first again: that by the comparison of condemnation in Adam, and Redemption in Christ, it might the more plainly be perceived that Christ was not inferior to Adam, nor grace inferior to sin. And that, as all the generation of man is condemned in Adam: even so is all the generation of man, redeemed in Christ. And as general a Saviour is Christ by redemption: as Adam is a condemner by transgression. Which comparison is taken out of S. Paul his Epistle to the Romans, where he saith. Likewise then as by the sin of one, condemnation came upon all men: even so, by the justifying of one, cometh the righteousness that 
Roma. 5.  bringeth life upon all men. Yet shall not all men be condemned by Adam eternally: for there is ordained of God again, away unto life, which way is Christ. Neither shall all be eternally saved by Christ: for there is of God declared a way again unto death, which way is sin, and the wilful contempt of God's mercy in Christ. But this appeareth to be one of Pelagius damnable errors: That Christ was not a general Saviour, that Christ offered not up the sacrifice of redemption for all the whole world, contrary to the manifest Scripture which sayeth. He 
1. john. 2.  it is that obtained grace for our sins, and not for our sins only, but also, for the sins of the whole world. The same is also manifestly declared in these Scriptures following, and many other. john. 1. a. 6. f. & 12. g. Ro. 5. d. & 14. c. 1. Cor. 8. d. 2. Cor. 5. c. Hebr. 2. c. & 2. d. 2. Pet. 2. a. And here it is worthy to be noted again, how justly this error of Pelagius, reboundeth into the bosom of those, which so falsely accuse other to be guilty in the Pelagians errors. Be indifferent, dearly beloved in the Lord, I beseech thee, and way the matter as it is. I desire no more.  Crowley. 
When Cerberus hath framed this fourth Article of Pelagius to his purpose, and persuaded himself that it reboundeth into the bosoms of those that accuse him & his sort to be guilty of Pelagius errors: he concludeth that he desireth no more, but that his dearly beloved: whose letter he answereth, would be indifferent and would weigh the matter as it is. Surely, if I may do any thing with the same party, my hearty request to him shall be, that he will grant Cerberus his request. And further, I will be an humble suitor to all that shall read this Apology, that they setting all affection a side, will weigh both his answer, and this Apology, even as they are, and none otherwise, & then have I enough also. The Article is, that all the generation of man, doth neither die by the sin and transgression of Adam, neither rise again by the Resurrection of Christ. That is, that neither Adam was by his sin, a general condemner of himself and all his posterity: neither Christ by his Resurrection, a general restorer of all mankind. For so doth Cerberus interpret Pelagius meaning. I will not dispute about Pelagius meaning. For I know it could not be good, sith he denieth a truth, plainly affirmed by S. Paul and Esdras both, as Cerberus hath truly affirmed upon the second Article. But that S. 
Roma. 5. 4. Esdr. 6.  Paul meant in that place, as Cerberus doth understand him: I do slatly veny. And will by Gods help prove, both by the Scriptures & judgement of ancient writers. And that the matter I go about may be the more plain to the reader: I will first set down in plain words, what meaning Cerberus gathereth of those words of Paul. He gathereth, that Paul should mind to teach by those words, that Christ restored as many, as Adam lost. Which gathering is very false, and that may be proved by the very circumstance of the place itself.  
First, Paul's purpose is, by comparing Christ with Adam, to show that as Adam was able by disobedience, to make himself and all his posterity bonds slaves to Satan: so was Christ able by obedience, to deliver the same from that bondage, and to make them the free children of God. Now for the manner of speech that he useth in comparing these two together, we must beware that we understand it not so, that we make Christ & Adam like in all points. For than shall we be enforced to grant many inconveniences, whereof this is one. That as Adam lost himself by disobedience: so Christ restored himself by obedience. Whereof should follow that filthy error of them that affirm that Christ died for his own sins as well as for the sins of the people, contrary to the whole course of the Scriptures, which teach that he was without spot of sin, and therefore was able to satisfy to God the Father for sin. Another inconvenience is, that there should be repugnancy between this place of Scripture & other, (wherein both S. Paul & our Saviour Christ, do teach, that not all mankind, that is, not every particular person of mankind, but a certain elected and chosen number, are by Christ restored into the favour of God) which thing may not be granted. For in the Scripture there is no repugnance at all. And the third inconvenience should be, that only original sin, (that is the sin that we have of our parents, even in our conception) is put away by the blood of Christ, and not our actual sin. So that we must either satisfy for that ourselves, or else perish, notwithstanding Christ's death and sufferance. Which is such an inconvenience as cutteth of from Christ as many as die not in Infancy, before they commit any actual sin. These inconveniences considered, we must seek to find another meaning in S. Paul's words, when he compareth Christ with Adam, than that which the bare words seem to give. His meaning is not to make Christ like unto Adam, but to prefer Christ before Adam, & to show that grace is more abundant in Christ, than sin was in Adam. Which thing appeareth in Paul's very words in the same chapter, where he saith. Sed non sicut delictum ita & donum. Si enim unius delicto multi mortui sunt: multo magis gratia Dei & donum, in gratia unius 
Roma. 5.  hominis jesu Christi, in plures abundavit. That is to say, But the gift was not like unto the sin, for if many died by the sin of one: much more hath the mercy & gift of God, in the grace of one man jesus Christ, abounded unto many. If these words of Paul should be understand of the number that were lost by Adam, and restored by Christ: then must we grant, the more were restored by Christ, than lost by Adam. For he saith that the grace or mercy hath abounded unto more. Which words, being understand of the number restored, must be spoken in comparison, of the many that were lost by Adam: & so must it follow that more were restored by Christ, than were lost by Adam. Which can not be, unless we will say that Christ restored more than all. For Adam lost all. The meaning of Paul is therefore, that as the sin of Adam being but one man, was a sufficient condemnation to himself and all his posterity which are many: even so, yea and much more was the grace or free mercy, and gift of God, in Christ being but one, a sufficient restitution of all the chosen Children of God, although the same were never so many. And that this is the meaning of Paul, doth well appear by his words that follow in the same chapter, where he saith. Et non sicut per unum qui peccavit, ita & donum. Nam condemnatio quidem ex uno, in condemnationem: gratia autem ex mult is delictis, in justificationem. Si enim unius delicto, mors regnavit per unum: multo magis, abundantiam gratiae & donationis & justitiae accipientes, in vita regnabunt, per unum jesum Christum. That is to say. And the gift is not so, as is that which entered in by one that sinned. For the condemnation came by one sin, into condemnation: but grace or free mercy, was of many sins into righteousness. For if by the sin of one man, death have reigned, by the means of one man: much more, shall they which have received abundance of free mercy or grace, and of the gift and righteousness: reign in life, thorough one, which is jesus Christ. Here doth Paul plainly express his meaning. Which is, that they which have received abundance of grace, and of the gift and righteousness, are those many, that are restored by Christ jesus, in whom, through the same Christ, lice shall reign. Those are not the whole posterity of Adam. For the same Paul saith in the xj chapter of this Epistle, Quod quaerebat Israell non est consecutus, electio. auten consecuta est. Israel hath not obtained the thing that he sought for: but the election hath obtained. Meaning that the carnal Israelites obtained not righteousness, much less did the whole offspring of Adam obtain it. But the election, that is the elected and chosen children of God, whether they be of the stock of Israel or no, have obtained righteousness through Christ, which is forgiveness of all their sins by his blood shedding, & righteousness, & everlasting life by his resurrection. According to the saying of Paul, Traditus est propter delicta nostra, & resurrexit propter justificationem nostram. He was delivered unto death 
Rom. 4.  for our sins: and he rose again for our justification.  
But Cerberus and his fellows, do urge the universal sign, Omnes. All. Sicut per unius delictum in omnes homines in condemnationem: sic & per unius justitiam in omnes homines, in justificationem vitae. That is. Even as by one man's fault, sin entered into all men, to condemnation, so by the righteousness of one man, is righteousness entered into all men, to the justification of life. This universal sign must needs stretch itself to all Adam's posterity, and therefore all must be made righteous by Christ. These men will not see how such universal signs are used in the Scriptures. They can not perceive how this universal sign should in the first sentence streatche itself to all the generation of the first Adam that sinned, and in the second sentence to all the generation of the second Adam, which is Christ. The generation of the first are all that have or shall be borne of flesh and blood, and the generation of the second, are all they that be borne of God. If we should in all places of Scripture, streatche this universal sign all, so far as Cerberus doth stretch it here: we should make as good a piece of work as the Nun did, which read in s. Paul Omnia probate, prove all things. And therefore having a 
1. Thess. 5.  mind to sir john, the Chaplain of the house, she proved what it was to lie with a man. And being with child, the matter came to the knowledge of the Abbess: she excused herself by Saint Paul, who biddeth us prove all things. If a thief that taketh another man's goods, should excuse himself with Omnia mihi licent, I may do 
1. Corin. 3. 1. Corin. 6.  all things, or Omnia vestra sunt. All things are yours: It would not be found that these universal signs should either make it léeful for him to take another man's goods, or to have right to that that is not his by some just title. I would wish Cerberus and his fellows therefore, to weigh this matter better before they triumph over us in such sort as he doth in this his answer. And I would wish him to consider well whether saint Austen in the Epistle where these Articles of Pelagius be written, do not write clean contrary to this judgement of his. For in the very place that he citeth to make for his purpose, S. Austen saith thus. Infants nuper nati, non sunt in illo statu in quo Adam fuit ante praevaricationem, ut ad ipsos pertineat quod breviter ait Apostolus. Per unum hominem mors, & 
1. Corin. 15.  per unum hominem resurrectio mortuorum. Sicut enim in Adam omnes moriuntur: it a & in Christo omnes vivisicabuntur. unde sit, quod Infantes non baptizati, non solum regnum coelorum, verum etiam vitam aeternam habere non possint. That is, Infants that be lately borne, are not in that state that Adam was before he sinned, that that thing which the Apostle doth in few words affirm, might pertain unto them. By one man came death, and by one man came the resurrection of the dead. For even as in Adam all die: so in Christ shall all be made alyne. Whereby it cometh to pass that Insants which are not baptized, are not only unable to enjoy the Kingdom of Heaven, but also life everlasting. These words me think, are very plain against that which Cerberus would maintain by Paul and Austen. For if Infants unbaptised can not have the kingdom of God nor everlasting life: how doth this saying In christo omnes vivificabuntur: All shallbe quickened in Christ: pertain to all the posterity of Adam? unless he will say, that Infants that die before baptism be not of Adam's posterity? Better matter can I not wish for against Cerberus, than that which hangeth to the foundation that he himself buildeth upon. It were for my purpose to advance the authority of this Epistle, because it helpeth me very much against this Hell Dog Cerberus: but because I would not have the Reader to conceive such an opinion of S. Austen, as to think that he should be of such mind as the Author of this Epistle doth show himself to be in certain points: I will cite the judgement of Erasmus concerning this Epistle & all other of this title. That is, Ad Bonifacium. To Boniface. Speaking of the Book of Epistles, where, in this Epistle. 106. is written, he saith. Nonnullae simplicitor confictae, quod genus sunt illae Bonefacij ad Augustinum, Augustini ad Bonifacium. Some of those Epistles (saith he) are altogether feigned. As are those of Bonifacius to Augustine, and of Austen to Boniface. Now judge gentle Reader what this Cerberus meaneth, that leaving the good and sound works of Austen, where he writeth very well of this matter: setteth his foundation upon such rotten patches as some such as he is, have put forth in Austin's name. No marvel though Cerberus be ashamed to set his name to his book. This might suffice for our defence against Cerberus his assault in this point. But I will add one Scripture or two, and so the judgement of some learned writers, that he take not occasion of a new calumniation, because I promised more than I have yet performed. Saint Paul writing to Timothe in his second Epistle and second chapter, saith 
2. Timo. 2.  thus. Sed firmum fundamentum Dei stat, habens signaculu hoc. Cognovit Dominus qui sunt sui. The foundation of God, standeth firm and sure, having this sure seal. The Lord knoweth who be his. By which words it is manifest, that S. Paul understood not that all mankind were elected in Christ, and so restored by Christ: but a certain number, which though they be unknown unto men, yet doth the Lord (whose they be) know them well, and will not suffer them, no nor any of them, to perish. Wherefore he exhorteth all such as call upon the name of the Lord (that is all Christians) to departed from iniquity. For in a great house (saith he) there be, not only vessels of Gold and Silver, but also of Timber and Earth: some to serve for honourable uses, and some for vile uses. I know how some do wrest these latter words of S. Paul, to prove that it is in man's power to departed from iniquity, because Saint Paul doth will Christians so to do. And especially those words which follow, which are these. Si quis ergo, emund. iverit se ab istis, erit vas in honorem sanctificatum, & utile domino, ad omne opus bonum paratum. If any man therefore, shall cleanse himself from these men: he shall be a vessel sanctified unto honour, and profitable for the Lord, being prepared and made ready for every good work. These words do manifestly declare, say they, that it is in man's power to cleanse himself, and to make himself a vessel meet for the lords use and service. These men will not understand that commandments, admonitions, exhortations, and councils be to any purpose: except those to whom they be given, be able to do the things, that they be commanded, admonished, exhorted, or counseled to do. And so shall the commandments of God be to no purpose. For who hath been, is, or shall be able, to do that God commandeth, when he saith. Thou shalt love the Lord thy God, with all thine heart, with all thy soul, and with all thy mind. And thy neighbour as thyself? Doth not S. Paul say that we are not able of our 
2. Corin. 3.  selves, so much as to think a good thought. And is not this according to that which Christ himself teacheth when 
john. 15.  he saith to his Disciples: without me ye can do nothing? But these men will not understand that the use of these things is, to cause the chosen children of God, to acknowledge their own inability, and humbly to beg at God's hand his help that thereby they may do that which is commanded or taught: and that the reprobate● may be without excuse, yea or pretence of excuse. Saint Austen, whom Cerberus would feign have to take his part, doth understand this place of Paul, clean contrary to Cerberus his purpose: As appeareth in more places than one of his best writings. Namely in the. viz. chapter of the twenty book De Civitate Dei, that is of the City of God, (which is, the Church of Christ) where speaking of that Church called from among all the nations of the world: he saith thus. Has enim elegit Deus ante mundi constitutionem eruere depotestate tenebrarum, & transfer in regnum silij claritatis suae, sicut Apostolus ait. Nam seducere illum gentes 
De Civitate Dei. lib. 20. Cap. 7.  etiam nunc, & secum trabere in aeternam po●nam, sed non praedestinatas in aeternam vitam, quis sidelis ignorat? Nec moveat, quod soepe Diabolus seducit etiam illos, quiian regenerati in Christo, vias ingrediuntur Dei. Novit enim Dominus qui sunt eius, ex hijs in aeternam damnationem, neminem ille seducit. Sic enim novit eos Dominus, ut Deus, quem nihil latet, etiam futurorum, non ut homo, qui hommem ad praesens videt, sic tamen videt, cuius cor non videt, qualis autem postea sit futurus, nec seipsum videt. Ad hoc ergo ligatus est Diabolus, & inclusus in abysso, ut iam non seducat gentes, ex quibus constat Ecclesia, quas antea seductas tenebat antequam essit Ecclesia. Nec enim dictum est, ut non seduceret aliquem: sed ut non seduceret, inquit, iam gentes, in quibus Ecclesiam proculdubio voluit intelligi. That is to say. God did before the beginning of the World, choose these nations, that he might deliver them out of the power of darkness, and translate them into the kingdom of the son of his own brightness, as the Apostle saith. For what faithful man knoweth not, that the Devil doth even now, seduce nations, and draw them with himself into everlasting pain: but not those nations which are predestinated into everlasting life? Neither let it trouble any man, that the Devil doth oftentimes seduce even those, that being already regenerated in Christ, do walk in the ways of God. For the Lord knoweth who be his: of them doth the Devil seduce none, to everlasting damnation. For the Lord doth know them, as God knoweth, from whom nothing is hid, no not of the things to come. Not as a man knoweth, who doth for the present time see a man, but yet so, as whose heart he seeth not, yea, he seeth not himself so, that he can tell what manner a man he himself shallbe hereafter. To this purpose therefore, is the Devil bound, and shut up in darkness: that he do not now seduce the nations of whom the Church doth consist. Which nations he did before hold still in error, before the Church was. For it is not said, that he should not seduce any man: but that he should not now seduce (saith he) the nations, in which nations, no doubt he would have the Church to be understand.  
This Book was Austin's own without all doubt, and therefore, we may be bold to affirmo that this is Austin's mind, not only upon this place of Scripture, but also upon this matter, that is, that not all mankind, but a certain chosen sort, are restored again by Christ. And that none of those that are so restored, can perish, although God do sometime suffer them to fall.  
Again, the same Austen writing against the Donatists, 
August. li. 5. de. bapt. capit. 27.  in his fift book De Baptismo, that is of Baptism, saith thus, in the xxvij chapter of the same Book. Numerus ergo ille justorum, qui secundum propositum vocati sunt, de quibus dictum est, Novit dominus qui sunt eius: ipse est ortus conclusus, fons signatus, puteus aquae vivae, paradisus cum fructu pomorum. Ex hoc numero, quidam spiritualiter viwnt, & supereminentem viam charitatis ingrediunter. Et quum praeoccupatum hominem in aliquo delicto, instruunt in spiritis lenitatis: intendunt ne & ipsi tententur. Et cum fortè & ipsi praeoccupantur reprimitur in eyes aliquantulum, non autem extinguitur, charitatis affectus: rursusque resurgens & inardeseens, pristino cursuirestituitur. Norunt enim dicere. Dormitavit anima mea praetaedio, confirma me in verbis tuis. That is. That number therefore, of the righteous, which are called according to God's purpose, concerning which it is said, that the Lord knoweth who they be that be his: is the same that is the fenced garden, the sealed fountain, the pit of springing water, and the paradisefull of the fruit of Apples. Of this number there be some that live spiritually, & walk in the excellent way of charity. And when they do in the spirit of levity, instruct a man that is overtaken with any fault: they do take good heed lest they themselves be tempted also. And when it happeneth the any of them be overtaken: the affection of love is something repressed in them, but it is not utterly quenched. And when it riseth again, and waxeth fervent: it is restored again to his old course or raze. For these men can say. My soul did ●●omber for very weariness, do thou make me strong in thy words.  
And again in the same chapter, Saint Austen saith thus. Sunt etiam quidam ex eo numero, qui adhuc nequiter vivant, aut etiam in haeresibus, vel in gentilium superstitionibus iaceant: & tamen etiam illic novit dominus qui sunt eius. Namque in illi ineffabili praescientia Dei: multi qui foris videntur, intus sunt, & multi qui intus videntur, fores sunt. Ex illis ergo omnibus, qui, ut ita dicam, intrinsecus & in occulto intus sunt: constat ille hortus conclusus, fons signatus, puteus aquae vivae, paradisus cum fructu pomorum. That is. There be also some of that number, which do yet live wickedly, either do lie in Heresies or in the superstitions of the Heathen: and yet the Lord doth even there know, who be his. For in that unspeakable foreknowledge of God: many that seem to be without, are within, & many that seem to be within, are without. That enclosed garden therefore, that sealed fountain, that pit of springing water, and that paradise of the fruit of Apples: doth consist of all those, that be inwardly & secretly within, if I may so speak.  
And again the same Austen saith in the xlv treatise upon john. Et oves vocem eius audiunt, & proprias oves vocat 
August. Tract. 45. in john.  nominatim. Habet enim nomina eorum scripta in libro vitae. Proprias oves vocat nominatim: hinc dicit Apostolus. Novit Dominus qui sunt eius. That is. And his sheep hear his voice, and he calleth his own sheep by name. For he hath their names written in the Book of Life. He calleth his own sheep by name. Hereof cometh it that the Apostle saith. The Lord knoweeh who they be that he his.  
What should I cite any more places of this Author for this purpose? If these will not satisfy Cerberus: let him bark still till his throat be horse. I know these may satisfy all that be not wilfully blind. For in three several places, S. Austen hath cited these words of S. Paul. (The Lord knoweth who be his) even in the same sense that I have done.  
One other Scripture I will cite also, which is written in the xvij of S. john's Gospel. The words were spoken by our Saviour Christ himself, in that Prayer that he made to his Father the night before he suffered, and they are these Non pro mundorogo, sed probus quos ded●sti mihi, quia tui sunt. I do not pray for the world (saith Christ, but for those that thou hast given unto me, because they be thine. And that Cerberus may know what is meant here by the word World: he shall see what S. Austen writeth in his. 107. treatise upon john, concerning 
August. tractat. 107. super joh.  this text. Mundum vidt modo intelligi, qui viwnt secundum concupiscontiam mundi, & non sunt in ea sort gratiae, ut ab illo eligantur ex mundo: non utique pro mundo, sed pro hijs quos ci pater dedit, rogare se dicit. Per hoc enim quod cos illi pater iam dedit, factum est, ut non pertineant ad cum mundum, pro quo nore orat. Deind●, subiungit. Quia tui sunt. That is. He would now have us understand, that those men be the world which do live according to concupiscence or lust of the world, and are not in that state of grace that they might be by him chosen out of the world: He doth not therefore say that he doth pray for the world, but for them that his father gave unto him. For by that, that his father hath already given them unto him, it cometh to pass, that they pertain not unto that world, that he prayeth not for. And after this he addeth. Because they be thine. If Cerberus were not to obstinately blind, he could not but see and confess, that S. Austen is full against him. For what other cause doth s. Austen allege, why those that Christ prayed for, were not of the world, but only, that the Father had given them unto him? And what cause doth he allege why Christ might not choose them out of the world that he prayed not for: but only that they were not in that state of grace or mercy, that they might be chosen out of the world? And the text itself, might persuade any man but Cerberus and his fellows, that there is a number that be not restored by Christ. For would Christ deny to pray for any of them that are restored by him? I trow not.  
But to bring Cerberus from Hell gate, if it will be: I will city yet one place of S. Austen, wherein he speaketh as plainly as any man can devise to speak, concerning this matter. In his first book that he writeth of the deservings, and forgiveness of sins, and of the baptism of Infants, we read thus in the xu chapter. 
August, de peccatorum meritis & remissione   
Ob hoc etiam dictum est, omnes, & omnes: neque enim qui generantur per Adam, ijdem ipsi omnes, per Christum regenerantur, sed hoc recte dictum est, quia sicut nullius carnalis generatio, nisi p●r Adam: sic spiritales nullius, nisi per Christum. Nam si aliqui possent carne generari non per. Adam, & aliqui regenerari s 〈…〉 tu, non per Christum; none liquid omnes, sive hic, s 〈…〉 ibi dicer tur. Eosdem autem omnes, posteannultos dicit. Possunt quippy in aliquare, omnes esse qui p 〈…〉 ci sunt. Sed multo 〈…〉 ●bet generatio carnalis, multos & spiritalis, 〈…〉 multos haec spiritalis, quam illa carnalis. Verunt 〈◊〉, quem 〈…〉 dum illa omnes habet 〈…〉 s: sic ista omnes iusto● homines. Quia sicut nemopraeter illam homo, sic nemopraeter istam justus homo, & in utrá 〈…〉 multi.  
After S. Austen had said, that it is not the only imitation of Christ, that can make a man righteous, but the free mercy which doth regenerate by the spirit, so is it not the imitation of Adam only that maketh us sinners, but the punishment which engendereth by the flesh: he addeth the words above in Latin, which are in English thus. For this cause also, is it said, all, and all: for not the same all that are begotten by Adam, are by Christ regenerated. But this is well said, that even as the carnal generation of no man, is otherwise than by Adam: so is the spiritual generation of no man otherwise than by Christ. For if there might be some men begotten in the flesh, and not by Adam, and some men regenerated in the spirit, & not by Christ: we might not say plainly all, either in the one place or in the other. And afterward, he doth say, that the same all, are many: for 〈◊〉 some certain thing, those which are but few, may be all. But the carnal generation hath many, and the spiritual hath many also: although this spiritual have not so many, as hath that carnal. But yet for all that, even as that hath all men: so hath this all just men. For as without that, no man is a man: even so without this no man is a 〈…〉 st man, and in each of these are many.  
Now let Cerberus and his fellows, bark at Austen. For he hath made the same interpretation of S. Paul's words, that I have made before. Whereby it is manifest, that that Epistle that Cerberus buildeth upon, is not Austin's own, but feigned by some such as Cerberus is, and put forth in Austin's name.  
But because I promised before to prove mine affirmation as well by the judgement of Ancient writers, as by Scripture: I will add the judgement of one or two more, whose authority and antiquity is not to be despised. Of the which Ambrose shall be one. Writing upon the Epistle to the Romans, he saith. Sicut per unius delictum in omnes homines in condemnationem: sic & per unius justitiam 
Roma. 5.  in omnes homines, in justificationem vitae. Hoc est, sicut per unius delictum, omnes condemnationem meruerunt, similiter peccantes: ita & in justitia unius, omnes iustificabuntur credentes. Si qui autem condemnationem hanc, generalem esse putant: simili modo & justificationem generalem accipient. Sed non est verum, quia non omnes credunt. Sicut enim per inobedientiam unius hominis, peccatores constituti sunt plurimi: ita et per unius obedientiam justi constituentur multi. Quos supra omnes dixit: hic plures & multos significat. Plures enim delictum Adae secuti sunt praevaricando, non omnes, & multi justi constituentur, non omnes. Non ergo in eos regnavit mors, qui non peccaverunt in similitudine prevaricationis Adae. That is to say. Even as by one man's sin, guiltiness came upon all men to condemnation: so did justification of life come upon all men through the righteousness of one man. That is, even as by the sin of one man, all men that do sin as he did, have deserved condemnation: even so all that do believe, shall be justified in the righteousness of one man. And if any do think that this condemnation is general: let them in like manner take the justification to be general. But that is not true, because all men do not believe. For even as by the disobedience of one man, many were made sinners: so by the obedience of one man, many shall be made righteous. The Apostle doth here call those same, many, that he did before call, all. For many have in sinning followed the sin of Adam, but not all: and many shall be made righteous, but not all. Death therefore hath not reigned over them, which have not sinned in like sort as Adam did. These be the words of Ambrose. Which though at the first sight, they seem to incline to the error of Pelagius: yet when they be well weighed, they give a good and sound meaning. That is, that sin never reigned in any of Gods elect. For although the elect of God, in as much as they be the children of Adam, be partakers of Adam's sin, and in Adam condemned: yet are they by Christ delivered from that condemnation, so that sin hath in them no dominion at all: Which thing appeareth in them by the faith in Christ, which when they come to knowledge, they do both by words and works declare. That this is the meaning of Ambros, doth very plainly appear, by that he saith, that all the believers shall be justified. For what needeth justification, where no condemnation was? Thus much I thought good to write concerning the simple meaning, of this ancient Father, lest any man of simplicity mistaking his meaning, might think that he should deny the Elect to be conceived and borne in original sin, from which never any that was borne (Christ only excepted) could be free. But this is his meaning, that in the Elect and chosen Children of God, this sin hath no dominion, as it doth appear by their obedience that they show in believing the Gospel: but in the Reprobates, it beareth rule still: For Christ hath not killed it in them.  
And to make an end of this matter: Saint Paul saith thus in his eight chapter to the Romans. Who shall lay any thing to the charge of God's Elect? It is God that doth justify, who is it that shall condemn? If all mankind, then, be elected in Christ (as Cerberus saith) then shall no sin be laid to any man's charge. For who dare accuse Gods chosen children? And so shall Cerberus doctrine be the destruction of all virtue, as he hath afore affirmed of the doctrine we teach of Predestination.  
As for that which Cerberus citeth out of the second chapter of S. john's first Epistle, & the other places that he sendeth the Reader unto: I do now pass over, as sufficiently answered, by that I have written concerning S. Paul's meaning in the fift to the Romans.  Cerberus. 
The fift of Pelagius errors was, that rich men being baptised, except they did utterly renounce and forsake their riches, though they seem to do some good, yet is it not accepted, neither can they have the Kingdom of God. A filthy, and an abominable error, directly repugnant, both to the state of the common wealth, and also to the word of God, which saith. Charge them that be rich in this 
1. Timoth. 6.  world, that they be not exceeding wise etc. And that they do good and be rich in good works. etc.  
The sixth error is, that the grace of God and the help of God, is not given to every one of our works, but that it is in free choice, in the law, and in doctrine This error is exceeding wicked and execrable, that man by the law, by doctrine, and by free choice, is able to do any manner of good work, whatsoever it be, without the grace and help of God. For as S. Paul sayeth; we are not sufficient of ourselves, to 
2. Corinth. 3.  think any thing, as of ourselves: but our ableness cometh of God. And again. It is God that worketh 
Phillip. 2.  in us, both the will and the deed, even of good will.  
The seventh error is, that the grace of God is given according to our deserving. Vile and abominable is this error also, and contrary to the manifest mind and words of the Apostle, which saith. If it be of works, then is it no more grace, for than 
Roma. 11.  were deserving, no more deserving.  
The eight error is, that none can be called the children of God, except they be all together made without sin. This error is like wicked with the rest, directly repugnant to the open Scripture, where it is written. If we say we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us. For as S. james 
1. john. 1. jacob. 3.  saith of himself and of all other. In many things we sin all.  Crowley. 
In these four errors, Cerberus can find nothing to charge us with all: and therefore he goeth about to get himself credit among the simple Christians, by calling these errors, filthy, and abominable, exceeding wicked and execrable, vile and abominable, and like wicked with the rest. But if a man might come to reason with Cerberus: I think it would fall out in the end, that he is not so clear of the sixth error as he would seem to be, when he calleth it exceeding wicked and execrable. For if he were asked: why feared he to translate Saint Paul's words, according to his meaning, when he said to the Philippians. Deus est qui operatur in vobis & velle & perswere, pro bona voluntate. That is. It is God, that worketh 
Phillip. 2.  in you, both the will and the performance thereof, according to his good will or pleasure. Cerberus can not away with God's good will. And therefore he translateth S. Paul's words, even of good will. He feareth, by like, that some man would conclude, that it is Gods good will, that by such malicious doings, as his is, in strowing of his staunderous writings: some of them that be slandered thereby, should take occasion to open his subtlety, both in the detesting of these errors, and also in the citing of Scriptures to the contrary of that which is affirmed in them. Which is nothing else, but to blind the eyes of the simple. But such as have had to do with such as he is, do know, that as he saith here, that man is not sufficient of himself to think any thing, so he thinketh, and will say if he be urged; that man hath power of himself to withstand the good motions of God's holy spirit, so that God can not draw such as he will, but only such as he findeth willing to be drawn. And to avoid the error of giving of grace according to merits or deserving, he saith that it is given to all mankind indifferently. Let all men therefore, beware of his subtlety: for he mindeth to deceive.  Cerberus. 
The ninth error is, that there is no free choice, if a man have need of God's help, seeing it is in a man's own will to do a thing, or not to do it. This was also the wicked opinion of Pelagius: that if it be granted, that a man hath need of God's help: then must it needs follow (saith Pelagius) that he hath no choice in doing of things, but whatsoever a man doth, that must he needs, and cannot choose but do. This is the devils only way, above all other to lead men to destruction, not to suffer them to walk in the plain path of the Lord, but to turn them to some extremity, either on the left hand, or else on the right, either into the blind path of crooked superstition, or into the wide way of lewd liberty, either to seek justification by deserving of works, or by an only faith, not mighty in love by operation. Such like extremity doth the Devil use in this point of Doctrine, either driving men into the doubting dreams of destiny, or into the absolute free-will of Papistry. Either affirming all things so to be ordained of God, that whatsoever a man doth, be it good or evil: he must needs, and can not choose, but of mere necessity, by the ordinance of God, commit the same. Or else affirming, that man by free-will, or natural strength, can do the will of God, and walk in his law without the continual help and grace of God. Which two extremities, Austen doth very plainly condemn, in these words following.  
Liberum sic consitcmur arbitrium, ut dicamus nos semper Dei indigere auxilio, & tam illos errare qui cum Manichaeo dicunt hominem peccatum vitare non posse, quam illos qui cum Io 〈…〉 iano asserunt, hominem non posse peccare. Augustinus de verbis Apostoli, scrmone. 192.  
We do (saith he) so confess free choice, that we say a man hath alway need of the help of God. And that as well they err, which say with Manicheus, that a man can not eschew sin, as also they which say with jovinian, that a man can not commit sin. Thus saith Augustine  
To conclude therefore, this is numbered among the wicked errors of Pelagius, that if a man have free choice, then hath he no need of the grace or help of God, contrary to the manifest and open Scripture, which saith by the mouth of S. Paul. I can do all things, through the help of Christ, which 
Phillip. 4. 4. Esdr. 9  strengtheneth me. And Esdras saith They that have abhorred my law, whilst they had yet freedom and open room of amendment, and conversion, and understood not but despised it: the same must know it after death, in pain.  
And here, yet once again, I desire thee to mark who they are, which with Pelagius fall into this extremity to affirm, that if a man have choice, then hath he no need of God's help: or if he have need of God's help, then hath he no choice at all. And who they are, which on the other side, with Austen against Pelagius, do affirm and confess: that man so hath freedom or choice, that nevertheless, he hath continually, need of the help & grace of God Who they are, I say, which in this point also, ought worthily to be called Pelagians, let all men judge. The case is so clear, that no lack of knowledge, but only wilful blindness, may help to cloak the matter. I will therefore pass forward.  Crowley. 
Now Cerberus thinketh he hath won the field. This case is so plain (saith he) that no lack of knowledge may help to cloak it, but wilful blindness. And what is the case. Forsooth that he and his fellows be cleared of Pelagian heresy: and I and my fellows proved to be of one mind with Pelagius, who said that if a man have choice, he needeth not God's help: or if he need it, he hath no choice at all. And where hath Cerberus found that Pelagius said so? Not in the ninth Article, written in the 106. Epistle (for there he saith but thus: If our will or choice, have need of the help of God it is not free: for by free choice, every man hath in his own will, either to do any thing, or to leave it undone) but he findeth it in the. 191. Sermon De tempore, that is, of the time. Not as the words or opinion of Pelagius, but as the words of Manichaeus. Here is pretty packing. To make blind men believe, that there is no difference betwixt Pelagius opinion in his ninth Article, and us that now write and preach of the eternal predestination of God: Cerberus bringeth out one of the opinions of Manichaeus, and saith, that forasmuch as we agree with him in that point, and he and his fellows do not, therefore, we be Pelagians, and he and his company are enemies to Pelagius and us to. But as Cerberus hath requested his friend, whom he answereth: even so must I desire thee (gentle Reader) yet once again to mark how Cerberus handleth his matter, that he may seem to purge himself and to charge me and other with Pelagian heresy.  
I will not deal with Cerberus, as he hath done with Samuel: for if I would, I might say that he had shamefully belied S. Austen, when he citeth his words out of his. 192. Sermon De verbis. Apostoli, that is, upon the words of the Apostle, whereas saint Austen writeth but. 35. sermons of that 〈…〉 e. Neither are the works that he citeth found in the. 19●. sermon De tempore, that is, of the time: but in the. 19●. But as I have promised before, I will ascribe all such things to the negligence of the Printer, although therebe just cause to ascribe this in Cerberus himself. For it appeareth by the copy that came to my hands, that he had read it over after it was imprinted, and before it was strewed in ●●e stroates: for he hath emended some faults with his pen, but this fault remaineth untouched. Wherefore it seemeth that he took it for no fault at al. Whereof I gather that he never read the place in S. Austen himself, but had it in some of the patrons of Pelagius error, and had no leisure to seek it in S. Austin's works, and therefore mistoke both the title and number. Which if Cerberus might find in ●e, should be a matter of some thing.  
Well, to the purpose. Cerberus hath belied both Pelagius and us. For he saith that we affirm, that if man have choice, then hath he no need of God's help, or if he have need of God's help, then hath he no choice at all. Let us see the words that are written in the Epistle. 106. even as saint Austen (if that Epistle be his) wrote them in Latin. Et non esse. li 〈…〉 arbitrium▪ si Dei indiget auxilio, ●uo 〈…〉 in propria voluntate habet unusquisque, facere aliquid, vel non 〈…〉 e. Now let us see how: Cerberus himself doth english this Latin. The ninth error (saith he) is, that there is no free choice, if a man have need of God's help, seeing it is in a man's own will to do a thing, or not to do it. Now how agreeth this with the which he chargeth Pelagius withal? Hath Pelagius said that man hath no choice at all? Or can man have no choice at all, unless the same be free to do what it lusteth? I think all men do see that he chargeth Pelagius with more than ever he spoke or wrote in this point. And as touching the former part of his Article, which being truly translated, are thus much. And the choice is not free, if it have need of God's help. Who is able to speak against this? Understanding Liberum, or Free, to signify that which is not under the power of any other. And I trow saint Austen will say no less in the. 13. sermon that he wrote De verbis Apostoli, of the words of the Apostle. Thus saith saint Austen. Cum dico tibi, sine adiutorio Dei nihil agis, nihil boni dico. Nam ad mala agendum, habes sine adiutorio Dei, liberam voluntatem, quanquam non est illa libera: A quo enim quis devictus est, huic & servus addictus est. Et omnis qui facit peccatum, servus est peccati. Et si vos filius liberaverit, tunc veri liberi eritis. That is to say. When I say unto thee, that thou dost nothing without the help of God: I mean, no good thing. For thou hast a free will to do evil without the help of God, although the same be not free. For look of whom a man is overcome, to y● same is he made a slave, and every one that doth commit sin, is become the servant of sin. And if the son shall make you free, then shall ye be free in deed.  
Now if Cerberus will conclude that Pelagius denieth that man hath any choice, because he saith, it is not free, if it have need of God's help: then let him so conclude upon saint Austin's words in this place. For he saith that man's will is not free, no not in doing evil. For it is subject unto sin, and can not but obey that tyrant. And shall we think then that saint Austen would say that it is free in doing good? I think not. For he hath said that in that which is good, we can do nothing without God's help.  
But lest Cerberus should take a new occasion to calunniate, because saint Austen doth often times grant that he denieth not the freedom of man's will, and so set Austen against Austen: I will in few words show how both saint: Austen and we, do understand man's will, both to be free, and not free.  
As man's will is not regenerated, so is it free from y● spirit, and bond to that corruption that entered into all mankind by the sin of the first man, which corruption saint Paul calleth the law of the members, the wisdom of the flesh, the old man and the flesh, so that it cannot once list up itself to any thing that is not agreeing to that corruption.  
contrariwise, man that is regenerate, so far as he is regenerate, hath his will, freed, and set at liberty, from that corruption, so that it cannot lead him further than the spirit of God will suffer him to go; for he is now freed from corruption or sin, and made the ●●ndman of of the spirit, so that he hath now in that regenerated part, no delight in any other thing than the law of God. Yea he cannot have any delight in sin. But as saint Paul saith. As touching my inward man, I have a delight in 
Rom. 7. Rom. 8.  the law of God. And again. Such as are led by the spirit of God, are the children of God. They are therefore called spiritual, and new creatures.  
Again, as man is a reasonable creature, so is his will called, Arbitrium, that is, Choyso, and because the same cannot be enforced by any human or man's power, it is called Liberum, that is, Free. And so is it Liberum Arbitrium, Free Choice. For though man have power over man to restaine the actions of his will, yet hath he not power to restayne the will itself. As for example. Simion, being imprisoned in egypt, had a will to be with his 
Genes. 42.  Father and brethren in the land of Canaan, not withstanding that his body was kept in prison and restrained of liberty to execute his will. For joseph had no power upon the will to turn it, or restrain it. But Simion had, yea, he could not but have his will at liberty, notwithstanding any thing that joseph either did or could devise to do. For to turn or stay the will of man, is the work of God only. And therefore S. Paul saith. I have planted, & Apollo hath watered, but God gave the increase. 
1. Corinth. 3.  And S. Austen saith. Qui plantat, & qui rigat, for inseeus operatur: qui vero dat incrementum, intrinsecus opitulatur. He that 
De verbis Apost. Ser. 4.  planteth, and he that watereth, do work outwardly: but he that giveth increase, doth help or secure withinforth. And this is not done by any bodily force, but by that inward drawing that Christ speaketh of when he saith. No man cometh unto me, except my Father draw him. 
john. 6.  This drawing is not a forcible drawing: but a working of the power of God, whereby the will that strove against, is made ready to follow the drawer. An example whereof we have in Paul. Who willing to go to 
Act. 9  Damascus to persecute Christians, is upon a sudden made willing to preach Christ. This was not wrought by the striking him down to the ground (for then should the like have been wrought in the jews that came to take Christ, for when he said, I am, they all fell to the ground) 
john. 18.  but it was wrought within by the power of the spirit. Saint Augustine therefore, saith very well. Qui fecit te 
De verbis Apost. Ser. 15.  sine te, non te justificat sine te: Ergo fecit nescientem, justificat volentem. He that made thee without thee, doth not justify thee without thee, therefore he made thee, when thou knewest not: but he doth justify thee being willing. To this do the words of Saint Paul agree when he sayeth. Deus est qui operatur in vobis & velle, & operari. 
Phil. 2:  It is God that worketh in you both the will and the work that is according to the will. But first the will. So that before we follow the drawer, we are by the same drawer made willing to follow. Thus doth S. Austen, and so do we (that Cerberus barketh so at) understand the will of man to be free.  
To conclude this matter and to see what man's free-will is able to do: see what S. Austen sayeth. Creatus est primus 
De verbis Apost. Ser. 11.  homo in natura sine culpa, in naturae sine vitio, creatus est rectus, non se fecit rectum. Quid se autem ipse fecerit, notum est. Cadens è manu Figuli, fructus est. Regebat enim cum ipse qui fecerat, voluit deserere à quo factus erat, permisit Deus tanquam dicens. Deserat me, & inveniat se, & miseria sua probet, quia nihil potest sine me. Hoc modo ergo ostendere voluit Deus homini, quid valeat liberum arbitrium sine Deo. The first man was created in nature without blame, in nature without fault, he was created upright, he did not make himself upright. It is known what he made himself. Falling out of the hand of the Potter, he was broken. For he that made him did govern him, but he was willing to forsake him that had made him. And God suffered him so to do, as it were saying thus. Let him forsake me, that he may find himself, and that he may by his misery prove, that without me he can do nothing. By this mean therefore would God show unto man: what free will is able to do without God. This may suffice to as many as will be satisfied. But I fear me that Cerberus and his fellows are none of them.  
By this it appeareth that we run not into the extremities as Cerberus saith we do. For we neither teach fatal destiny, nor popish will liberty, but we affirm that man hath a choice, and that in some meaning the same is free, and yet notwithstanding, God's foreknowledge, predessination, and election, to be infallible. As shall more plainly appear when I shall come to the place wherein I am by Cerberus charged with the setting forth of such a doctrine as is worthily mysseliked of many.  
In the mean while I must say something of y● wherein I with others be charged and plainly affirmed to be Pelagians. And that it may appear whether we be so or no: it shall be needful that we set down the opinion of Pelagius, as we find it written by S. Austen in a book of more authority than is that Epistle that Cerberus buildeth upon.  
Saint Austen being requested by one named Quod vult Deus, to write a catalogue of heresies: he satisfieth his request. And thus he writeth of Pelagius heresy. Pelagianorum est heresis hoc tempore omnium recentissima, à Pelagio Monacho exorta. etc. At this time (saith he) there is the heresy of the Pelagians, which is the newest of all, and sprang out of one Pelagius, a Monk. Which master one Celestius did in such sort follow, that their followers are also called Celestines. These men are such enemies to the grace of God (whereby we are predestinated to be adopted or chosen to be his children through jesus Christ, and whereby we are delivered from the power of darkness, that we may believe in him, and be translated into his kingdom, for which cause he said: No man cometh unto me except it be given unto him of my Father: and whereby, Charity is poured out in our hearts, that faith may work by love) that they believe, that man is able without it, to do all the commandments of God, whereas if that were true, it might seem that the Lord had in vain said, Sine me nihil potestis sacere. Without me, you can do nothing.  
Whether we be of this mind with Pelagius or no: let all the world that seeth our writings or heareth our doctrine, judge. Or whether Cerberus and his fellows be like to be of this mind, which find fault with our doctrine, because we teach that there is an elected and chosen number to whom God hath given faith, and hath poured out love in their hearts, so that they may come unto Christ, and by their works of obedience to Gods will, show forth the lively faith in Christ, that in their election they have received freely at God's hand.  
Let all the world, I say, judge betwixt us. We say that there is a certain chosen number, which in mercy are chosen to be the children of God images of the son of God jesus Christ, and inheritors of his kingdom. And that none can be of this number, but those only to whom it is given freely without any manner deserving, either past, present, or to come. And that they being thus chosen & predestinated, must always acknowledge, that it is God that worketh in them, and that of themselves they are not able so much as to think a good thought. And yet assure themselves, that Hell gates can not prevail against them, that is, that the power of the Devil shall not be able to hurt them. And that though they be still sore assaulted, and sometimes sore wounded: yet they shall never be overcome, but shall overcome in Christ, and triumph with him in immortality for ever.  
But Cerberus and his company, say that all mankind is elected, and that there is no reprobation at all, and consequently, no election. For if there be none refused, then is there none election, but a general acceptation. And this their election they say is so uncertain, that no man can thereby be certain of his salvation, but all men must still remain in doubt of damnation by sin, whereas S. Paul hath said, that there is no damnation to them 
Rom. 8.  that be graffed into Christ. And Christ himself saith, that it is not possible that the elected sort should be seduced. 
Math. 24.  They say also that the power of man's Free will is to receive or refuse the grace of God which is indifferently offered unto al. Which if it be true, then must he be able also of himself to do that God commandeth, which is the plain error of Pelagius. Well, I leave these two opinions to the judgement of the reader, to consider which of them is most like to be that which Pelagius held.  
But to give a little more light to the Reader, I will note one sentence more out of that that S. Austen writeth concerning the heresy of Pelagius. Illam vero gratiam Dei, sine qua nihil boni possumus facere, non esse dicunt nisi in libero arbitrio, quod nullis suis praecedentibus meritis, ab illo accepit nostranatura, ad hoc tantum ipso adiuuante per suam legem atque doctrinam, ut discamus, quae facere, & quae sperare debeamus. Nos autem ad hoc per donum spiritus sancti, ut quae didiscerimus esse facienda faciamus. That is. They say (saith Austen) that the grace of God, without which we are able to do no good thing, is not otherwise than in Frewil; which our nature hath received of him, not by any deservings that was in the same before, he only helping us hereunto by his law and doctrine, that we may learn what we ought to do, and what to hope for. But we say to this, that through the gift of the holy Ghost, we may do those things that we have learned to be meet to be done. Here it is plain, that Pelagius maketh the grace of God nothing else but an help to the Free will of man. Whether Cerberus and his fellows do so too, or not, let them judge that read his words that are written in his answer to this letter, and do weigh them with indifferent minds.  
Now as touching that place that Cerberus citeth out of the sermon De tempore, that is of the time. 191. Although I know what Austen himself writeth of all his Epistles and his sermons, saying that he had not perused or retracted them when he set forth his two books of Retractations, 
Retract. 2. in fine.  neither doth it appear in any of his writings, that ever he did retract them: Yet I will not reject it as none of Austin's words, for the doctrine is sound if it be rightly understand. It is possible for man by the power of God to be preserved from Actual sin, although he can never be without the sin of concupiscence so long as he liveth in mortal flesh. So is it possible also, yea it can not be chosen, but unless God do by his grace stay man, he shall commit Actual sin after his regeneration, and of himself man is not able to stay himself from 
Vide. Lib. 2. De pecc. meritis & remiss. Cap. 6. 7.  it. But what make Austin's words against us? We confess with Austen, that man hath always need of God's help, and we say with the same Austen, that they do err, which say that man can not avoid sin, but yet as I have said before, being stayed by the power of God. For otherwise these words of Austen should be contrary to his own words in his. 13. sermon De verbis Apostoli, Of the words of the Apostle. Where he sayeth thus. In hoc agone cum constigimus, Deum habemus spectatorem, in hoc agone cum laboramus, Deum poscimus adiuterem. Si enim nos ipse non adiwat, non dico vincere, sed nec pugnare poterimus. That is. When we sight in this battle, we have God to behold and look upon us, when we are in danger in this battle, we do pray unto God to help us. But if he do not help us, I say not that we shall not overcome, but that we shall not be able so much as to fight.  
We will not therefore set Austen against himself, but take that meaning of his words in one place, that may agree with his words in another place. And so are we with Austen, and not against him, as Cerberus layeth to our charge. Neither do we hold with Pelagius in any untruth, but if he do in any point confess truth, then do we agree with him, although S. Austen should say to the contrary. Look better upon your conclusion therefore (good master Cerberus) and learn to apply Scriptures better than you have applied the words of S. Paul to the philippians, else men will say ye understand not 
Phil. 4.  S. Paul, for S. Paul doth not there go about to ascribe any thing to the power of his own Free will: but altogether to set forth the exceeding great mercy of God towards him who did stay him from falling both in adversity and in wealth. As it may well appear to all that will with judgement read the place.  
Your sentence also cited out of Esoras: you should 
4. Esdr. 4.  know it not to be of such authority, that it might serve in the trial of such a cause as this is. But grant it were of the greatest authority. What can it make against us which deny not that man hath a choice which in some sort is free (as I have declared) but do confess that man which despiseth the warnings and long sufferings of God in this life, shall after this life, in pains learn to understand what they did then. But proceed as you said you would.  Cerberus. 
There followeth the tenth, and the eleventh errors, which are these: That our victory cometh not of God's help, but of free choice, and that remission of sins is not given to them that repent, according to the grace and mercy of God, but according to the deserving and labour of them, which by repentance are worthy of God's mercy. O blasphemy intolerable, O filthy puddle, and sink most execrable: full of stinking errors, full of damnable presumption, like to the pride of Lucifer most abominable: the detestable vileness whereof is such, that rather by exclamation, I have thought it good to renounce it, than with Scripture or reason to confute it. All reason, and all Scripture, giveth all glory unto God. And this blasphemous error, taketh away all the glory of all goodness, from the father of all mercy, and God of all consolation, and giveth it unto vile and wretched man, which hath of himself nothing that is good, but doth altogether receive it from the mercy and goodness of God. Here concludeth Austen with the errors of Pelagius, and saith, that all these errors he revoked, or renounced in the general Counsel of Palestine.  Crowley. 
I have not sworn to find fault with all that Cerberus writeth in this his answer, as it may seem that he hath, to reprove and deprave, all that I and other that have, or do write or speak of God's predestination, do or have affirmed. I will therefore join with Cerberus in this detesting and renouncing of these Pelagian errors, as one that doth abhor them no less than he doth. And because man can see no further than these things that be outward: I do with all mine heart wish that he would make it known unto men by such means as may be most to his glory: whether we, or Cerberus and his fellows do in the heart detest and abhor these errors most. I will not enter into judgement: but there is cause to suspect that Cerberus and his sort be not so clear, as by these wordess they would seem to be. But let God be judge.  Cerberus. 
Thus have I set forth in english these errors of Pelagius together, that thou which art willing to know the truth, and understand the matter even as it is, mayest be able to judge, who they are that hold of any of these errors, and not to credit the malice of certain, which to cloak their own false opinions, accuse other to be Pelagians, who in deed, from their very heart and soul, abhoral these wicked opinions, and have been many years willing to bestow their lives against all these abominable errors.  
Yet is there one thing whereunto Pelagius was compelled to subscribe, which I have not rehearsed among the errors afore said, because the denial thereof, is of all our Gospelers (as I suppose) received for no error. The Article is this. Quod Infantes non baptizati, non solum regnum coelorum, verum etiam vitam aternam habere non passint. Hereunto did Pelagius subscribe. That infants which are not baptized, can not have the Kingdom of God nor eternal life. Which cruel opinion, that all unbaptised children are damned, Austen in many places of his works doth boldly and vehemently maintain. But Calvin saith, Explodendam esse illorum glossam palam est, qui oes non baptizatos, aternae morti adiudicant. It is clear (saith he) that their gloze is worthy with hissing or clapping of hands, to be driven out of the doors: which condemn unto everlasting death, all those, which are not baptized, & because Calvin is with so many of us, which are Gospelers, in authority fully sufficient to encounter with Austen: I think it good (for shortness) in this article to say no further.  Crowley. 
Cerberus, minding to enter into that which he promised before (that is to show what part of our doctrine he missliketh) doth conclude with his friend to whom he seemeth to write this answer: as though he being willing to know the truth, and understand the matter, could no more give credit to any that writeth or speaketh contrary to that which he hath here written. Whose doings therein, it pleaseth him to term malice, and the accusing of such as are of sound belief, that thereby they may cloak their own false opinions.  
But if it shall please that friend of his (if any such be) or Cerberus himself, to read this my simple Apology with indifferent minds: it may be that they will be of another mind than Cerberus doth in this answer show himself to be, understanding that our doings are neither malicious, nor yet the cloakings of any false opinions, but the true travail of them that seek the glory of God, and the salvation of his people, by the setting forth of the truth of his eternal and everlasting Predestination. Let God give the increase at his good will and pleasure.  
Yet one thing he would not seem to have forgotten, but rather of purpose to have deferred to this place, that he might not seem to agree with Pelagius in any point that might seem to be erroneous. For he hath said before. Here concludeth Austen with the errors of Pelagius. subtly handled of Cerberus. For though he consent to that which Pelagius hath by his subscription confirmed: yet he agreeth not with Pelagius in his error, for he was enforced thus to subscribe, & did afterwards return to his old errors again, as S. Austen affirmeth in his catalogue of heresies. And if he deny it, yet consenteth he not to Pelagius error: but to john Calvin, and us Gospelers, and to make us believe that he is one of us in this point: he calleth that a cruel opinion that Pelagius was constrained to subscribe unto, that is, that Infants which are not baptized can not have the kingdom of God, nor eternal life. And to knit up the knot withal, he setteth john Calvin against S. Austen, affirming, that for as much as in the opinion of very many of us Gospelers (for now Cerberus is one of us) john Calvin is in authority fully able to encounter with S. Austen: he will for shortness sake, say no further of this article. I would I had none occasion here to think that Cerberus useth a figure, which learned men call Ironîa. For what a frump is this? That Calvin is in authority fully sufficient, to encounter with Austen. surely Cerberus may be a gospeler, as he termeth himself: but no Papist could devise to give a more kindly mock to Calvin & us Gospelers, than this is. For who knoweth not, that the authority of writers, is judged to stand chiefly in the ancientness of their writings, and then there is no comparison to be made betwixt Calvin and S. Augustine, who lived ten hundredth year & more before this day. And Caluins' modesty was never so little, as to compare himself with Austen, but in all his writings he doth reverence the judgement of that learned Father, and doth allege his authority in confirming of truths, so far forth as the same doth not dissent from truth. And Austen never desired to have his judgement in matters to be otherwise received, than the same should be found to be sound, & according to the Scriptures. As appeareth in his. 7. Epistle, and in the poem of his third book De Trinitate. Of the Trinity. Whose words concerning this matter, being many, it shall suffice to note this short sentence. Noli meis litteris quasi Scripturis canonicis instruire, said in illis, & quod non credebas cum inveneris, incunctanter crede: in istis autem, quod certum non habebas, nisi certum intellexeris, noli firmiter retinere. That is. Be not bound unto my writings, as unto the Canonical Scriptures: but when thou shalt find in the Scriptures that which thou didst not believe, believe it without any delay or doubting: but when thou findest that in my writings, which thou didst not know certainly before, except thou shalt certainly understand it, do not stisfely affirm it.  
I am sure that john Calvin did always observe this rule in reading S. Austin's works. And if he were now living would give Cerberus the hire of a mocking Parasite, thus to set him against S. Austen. Yea, it might have becomed Cerberus very well, either to have been shorter, and have written no word of this matter: or else to have uttered his judgement of this article, in such sort that the reader might have understand thereby the truth of the article, and how Calvin & we that be Gospelers do hold this article, not setting ourselves against S. Austen, but for good cause dissenting in judgement, both from Pelagius and Austen. And yet having a reverend opinion of the one, do detest and abhor the error of the other.  
Well, I may not be so short in this matter as Cerberus is, but I think it my duty, having this occasion, to do what shall lie in me, to let the reader understand that S. Austen is not so much to be blamed for this cruel opinion, as Cerberus would have men to think that john Calvin doth reckon him to be. Neither doth the worthy instrument of God, mind to make the name of Austen odious to the Christian reader, as it seemeth that Cerberus would make the names of both those men of God.  
Mark therefore, gentle reader, what might cause Austen some thing to serve from the truth in this article. He had to do with such a one as denied Infants to be spotted with Adam's sin, and that therefore they needed no regeneration, and so consequently no sacrament of regeneration. The abomination of this error caused Austen to fly so far on the other side, that he had not such a consideration of the promise of God, as he should have had. And so affirmed more than once, that all that die with out baptism must needs be damned. Let us be contented that God hath by this error showed Saint Austen to be a man. And let us give him thanks for the abundance of good doctrine that this man hath left in writing, not doubting, but that that merciful Lord whom he served, would not suffer him to end his life in that error (no more than he did in the Manicheis heresy, which he did sometime stoutly defend) although it have not pleased him to suffer it to appear in writing, that ever he did acknowledge it to be an error.  
As touching the opinion, that Calvin and we Gospelers do hold concerning Infants that die without baptism: it differeth something from Austen, but more from Pelagius. Yea, we do as much abhor the error of Pelagius, as Austen did. For we affirm, and are able by the Scriptures to prove, that all Adam's natural children are dead through Adam's sin, and that none of them can be quickened and revived again, otherwise than by Christ. And that so many as are not given unto Christ, do still remain in that sin, and cannot be saved. So far off are we from this Pelagian heresy.  
Now that it may appear how we differ from S. Austen: I will cite some matter out of the works of master john Calvin. Not as Cerberus doth, to set him directly against Austen, but to show how God hath revealed unto his servant john Calvin, that secret that he had not revealed unto his servant Austen so fully: so far forth as we can find written in his books. First, we read in the book of master john Caluins' Institutions in the title of Pedobaptisme or baptizing of Children, these words following. Sed omissis cavillis, tenenda simplex est interpretatio quam attuli: neminem, donec renovatus fucrit aqua viva, hoc est spiritu, posse ingredi in Regnum Dei. jam est ex eo, explodendum esse eorum commentum palam est: qui omnes non baptizatos, aeternae morti adiudicant. That is. But, all subtleties set a side, the simple interpretation that I have made, must be holden, that is: that none can enter into the kingdom of God, till he be renewed by lively water, that is, the holy ghost. Now therefore, even hereof it is manifest, that the false opinion or fantasy of them that condemn to eternal death, all that be not baptized, is to be driven out with hissing and clapping of hands.  
Again, the same Calvin saith in his Comment upon the sift Chapter to the Romans. Vt misera peccato haereditate potiaris, satis est esse hominem, residet enim in carne & sanguine. Vt Christi justitia fruaris, sidelem esse necessarium est, quia side acquiritur eius consortium. Infantibus peculiari ratione communicatur. Habent enim in soedere ius adoptionis, quo in Chrissti communionem co●ptantur. De piorum liberis loquor, ad quos promissio gratiae dirigitur. Nam alij à communi sort nequaquam eximuntur. That is. To enjoy the miserable inheritance of sin: it is enough to be a man: for if dwelleth in flesh and blood. But to enjoy the righteousness of Christ, it is required of necessity, that a man be faithful, for the company or fellowship of Christ is obtained by saith. To Infants, it is after a certain peculiar manner communicated. For they have in the covenant, the right of adoption, whereby they are adopted into the communion of Christ. I speak of the children of the godly, unto whom the promise of mercy is directed. For others are not delivered from that lot, that is common to all men.  
By these words of Calvin, it appeareth how we differ from Augustine, for we are of one mind with Calvin, who denieth not, that the children of the unfaithful that die without baptism, do remain in the same state that the sin of the first man brought all mankind unto. We differ therefore, only in that we affirm that the children of the godly do appertain to the covenant of God, and therefore do not perish though they be prevented by death. Whether Austen continued to the end in that mind that he showeth himself in certain of his writings concerning this matter: it is uncertain, for in his Retractations there is no mention thereof. But if he did, this only is the difference betwixt him & us, that we ascribe that to the covenant, promise, and election of God, that he ascribeth to the sacraments. And as it appeareth in his. 3. book of questions upon the old Testament, he himself teacheth the same doctrine that we do. His words be these, in the. 84. Question. Proinde colligitur, invisibilem sanctificatimem quibusdam adfuisse, atque profuisse, sine visibilibus 
August. lib. 3 Questi. vete. test. Quest. 84  sacramentis, quae pro temporum diversitate mutata sunt, ut alia tunc fuerint, & alia medo sint: Visibilem vero sanctificationem, quae fieret per visibilia sacramenta, sine ista iwisibili posse adesse, non posse prodesse. Nec tamen ideo sacramentum contemnendum est: nam contemptor eius, invisibiliter, sanctificari nullo modo potest. Hinc est quod Cornelius. etc. That is to say. We do therefore gather, that certain men have had the invisible sanctification, and have been benefited thereby, without the visible Sacraments, which are according to the diversity of the tune changed, so that then they were of one sort and now of another: And that the visible sanctification, which should be wrought by the visible sacraments, may be present without this that is invisible, but can not be profitable without it. And yet is not the sacrament therefore to be contemned: for he that contemneth it, can by no means be made holy invisibly. Hereof it came, that Cornelius and those that were with him, when they were perceived, to be invisibly sanctified by the holy Ghost that was poured into them, were notwithstanding baptized. etc.  
These words of S. Austen, do plainly declare of what mind he was when he wrote these questions. And this book of questions, with the rest, he hath retracted and 
Retractat. lib. 2. cap. 55.  perused again, allowing this sentence of his therein as it appeareth in the. 55. chapter of his second book of Retractations. Cerberus had no cause therefore, to set john Calvin against Austen, for we take that to be undoubtedly the doctrine of Austen, which we find in his Retractations, and not revoked.  
But Cerberus purpose was, craftily to cause all that would hearken unto him, to esteem both Calvin & us, as most arrogant heretics, that will not stick to compare one of our time with that ancient Father, and to accept his judgement, without either reason or learning, directly against the judgement of him, whom all the Church of Christ hath these many hundred years worthily reverenced. For who seeth not, that Cerberus can not be one of those Gospelers that do account Calvin to be fully sufficient in authority to encounter with Austen: sith he writeth so bitterly, against all them that either write or preach that, that Calvin hath in writing most evidently proved and defended: Yea, he allegeth Austen against Caluins' doctrine, and would seem thereby to triumph over him and all that be of his mind.  
As for the place that he citeth out of Calvin, I leave for Cerberus to seek out at his leisure, and when he hath found it, to note where it may be sounds. But I believe it will be hard for him to find in Caluines works, that sentence in those words.  Cerberus. 
There remaineth then, as before I promised, briefly to note those things, which I think worthy to be reproved, about the doctrine of Predestination, as it is now a days taught of many. Wherein least I should seem to speak without assured ground, and because words in preaching, in talk, or disputation (whereof I have heard great abundance in this matter) may rashly pass with small advisement, and either easily be denied or soon forgotten: I am determined to touch nothing but their very words, which are set forth in Print. And because the taking and answering of their whole books were a matter long and tedious, being commonly stuffed on the one side, with an heap of opprobrious and outrageous words against such private persons as they take in hand to write against: and on the other side filled, rather with obscure subtleties, than with plain affirmations, I have thought it best therefore, to take certain sentences which contain manifest affirmations, out of divers late printed english books, wherein the sum and effect of this doctrine (which many do for just cause mislike, is fully, plainly, and simply declared.  Crowley. 
Now Cerberus beginneth to grow to the performance of his promise, in noting those things in the doctrine of predestination now preached, as seem to him meet to be reproved. And by the way, he will not taunt us, but thus he saith, that in preaching, talking, and reasoning, words may pass us rashly and with small advisement, and be either easily denied, or soon forgotten: Wherefore he will touch nothing but that which we have written and set forth in Print. Well, contented, but yet I would Cerberus should know that we neither preach, talk, nor dispute with such rashness or small advisement, but that we are able, and will, by God's help, stand to all that we have spoken therein, and he is able to charge us withal. As for the outrageous words that we use towards them that we writ against, shallbe found modest enough, when they shallbe compared with the words that in this his answer he useth towards us. Let him therefore proceed in noting those things that he misliketh.  Cerberus. 
I read in an english book set forth by Robert Crowley, and entitled, the confutation of xiii Articles. etc. these words. Adam therefore, being so perfect a creature, that there was in him no lust to sin, and yet so weak, that of himself he was not able to withstand the assault of the subtle serpent: no remedy, the only cause of his fall, must needs be the predestination of God.  
Thou seest, dearly beloved, in the conclusion of this sentence one point declared, wherein the controversy doth consist. For where he plainly affirmeth, that God's predestination is the only cause of Adam's fall, which is the sountayne of all sin: other having a much more reverend opinion of God and of his holy predestination, do set their foot, or rather their heart and soul, against their said conclusion. Esteeming it far better to be torn in many thousand pieces, than to think or say, that God's fore-ordinance or predestination, is the cause of any sin or evil. I beseech thee, let not thine eyes be blinded, or thy mind musfled with malice, either against the one party or the other, but in the balance of upright judgement, way the difference. The one saith (as in this conclusion manifestly appeareth, and as afterward, yet more plainly he affirmeth) that the predestination of God, is the only cause of Adam's sin, and so consequently of all evil. The other affirmeth directly contrary. That God or his predestination, is the cause of no sin or evil, but the only cause of all goodness and virtue. And herewith agreeth the holy and divine Apostle Saint john in his Epistle saying. All that is in the world, as the 
1. john. 2.  concupiscence of the flesh, the lust of the eyes, and the pride of life, is not of the Father. All good things that are in the world, are no doubt of God our heavenly Father: but whatsoever in the world, is concupiscence, lust, sin, evil or wickedness, the same is not of God our heavenly Father: S. john doth piainly and precisely affirm. The like plainness useth also the holy man jesus the son of Sirach, in these words. Say not thou it is the lords fault, 
Eccle. 15.  that I am gone by, for thou shalt not do the thing that God hateth, say not thou, he hath caused me to go wrong, for he hath no need of the ungodly. The very same thing is plainly declared, in these Scriptures following, and in other places almost innumerable. Psal 5. Pro. 19 jeremy. 7. &. 19 Oseae. 13. job. 34. &. 36. Rom. 7. 1. Corin. 14. jacob. 1. Exod. 34. Deut. 5. 2. Reg. 14. Psal. 81. &. 144. Prou. 1. Sap. 1. &. 2 11. 12. 15. Eccles. 2. & 18. Esay. 5. & 30. 55. &. 65. Lament jere. 3 Ezech. 18. 24. &. 33. joel. 2. 4. Esdr. 1. 2. 7. &. 8. Math. 23. Act. 17. 1. Timoth. 2. &. 4. 2. Pet. 3. The same saith Austen also plainly in these words. Non ergo casus ruentium, nee malignitatem iniquorun, neque cupiditates peccantium, praedestinatio Dei, aut exitavit aut suasit, aut impulit: sed plane praedestinavit judicium swin, quo unicuique retributurus est pro ut gessit sive bonum, sive malum, quod judicium futurum non esset: si homines Dei voluntate peccarent. Neither the falls of them that fall, nor the wickedness of them that be wicked, nor the lust of them that offend, hath the predestination of God, either provoked, moved or compelled, but without doubt he hath forcordeyned his judgement, whereby he will recompense every man, according as he hath done, whether it be good or evil, the which should be no judgement, if men did sin by the will of God.  Crowley. 
I do acknowledge that this English book, that Cerberus saith he hath read, was of my writing. I acknowledge also, that Cerberus hath cited the words truly, even as I wrote them. But that I meant by them as Cerberus doth conclude upon them: I utterly deny. For he concludeth that I have affirmed, that God's predestination is the only cause of all evil. Which I never meant to teach, neither do my words, duly considered, give any occasion of such conclusion.  
I grant, my words might have been more explained, and my meaning set forth more at large, and all occasions of such calumniations cut off, if I had seen that before I wrote that book, which I thank my Lord God, I have seen since. Wherefore I mind by the help of God to do that now the I was not so well able to do then, that the Reader may perceive, that I have with Austen profited in writing. My words that Cerberus citeth, are these. 
August. prol. 1. lib. Retract.  Adam therefore, being so perfect a creature, that there was in him no lust to sin, and yet so weak, that of himself he was not able to withstand the assault of the subtle serpent: no remedy, the only cause of his fall, must needs be the predestination of God. Cerberus findeth no fault with any of these words, till he cometh to no remedy. And then no remedy, I must be condemned as one that affirmeth God's Predestination to be the only cause of Adam's sin, and so consequently of all sin. But I have not said that God's predestination was the only cause, or any cause of Adam's sin. My words be that God's Predestination is the only cause of Adam's fall. Now Cerberus can not see how Adam's fall may be good, and therefore he sayeth that it is the fountain of all sin, and that to be the cause of that fall, is to be the cause of all sin. But such as have eyes to see, do see, that as God's predestination is the cause of Adam's fall: so Adam's fall is good. For it is the mean whereby God hath shut up all under unbelief, that he 
Rom. 11.  might have mercy on all. And the mean whereby the 
Galath. 3.  Scripture shutteth up all under sin, that the promise which is of the faith of jesus Christ, might be given to the faithful.  
I writ therefore now, as I wrote before in my Consutation of Shaxtons' Articles: that for asmuch as there was in Adam nothing to move him to sin (for lust to do contrary to God's will, was not yet entered into him) & Satan the enemy had no power then, neither hath any power yet, over any creature of God, further than God doth limit and appoint him: it must needs follow, that the only cause that Adam was assaulted & overthrown by Satan, was the predestination of God, which is ever all one with his unsearchable will & counsel. The fall of Adam thus considered, neither is, nor can be counted sin: for it is the performance of God's purpose, which is ever good, although unsearchable by man's feeble understanding. And yet I do not deny Adam's fall to be sinno in Adam himself: for it was Factum contramandatum Dei. A deed done contrary to the commasidentent of God. And so it had a cause in Adam himself, which was the power of his will, whereby he consented to the enticement of Satan, who used the woman as his instrument therein. Of this will and the power thereof, Saint Austen writeth thus: De libero arbitrio, lib. 3. Cap. 18. Cum autem de libera voluntate rectè faciendi loqui 〈…〉: de illa silicet in qua homo factus est, loquimur. When we speak of the will that is free to do well, we speak of that will wherein man was made. And again in his book De natura & gratia, Cepite. 43. speaking of man, he saith. Quis enim eum nescit, sanum & inculpabilem factum, & libero arbitrio, atque ad justè vivendum libera potestate constitutum? Who knoweth not that man was made found & unblamable, and that he was ordained with free choice, and free power or liberty to live righteously? And again in his book De Correptione & gratia. Cap. 11. Istam gratiam non habuit homo primus, qua nunquam vellet esse malus: sed sanè habuit in qua si permanere vellet, nunquam malus esset, & sine qua etiàm cum libero arbitrio, bonus esse non posset, sed eam tamenper liberum arbitrium deserere posset. Nec ipsum ergo Deus esse voluit sine sua gratia, quem reliquit in suo libero arbitrio: quoniam liberum arbitrium ad malum sufficit, ad bonum autem nihil est, nisi adiwetur ab omnipotenti bono: quod adiutorium si homo ille per liberum non deseruisset arbitrium, semperesset bonus: sed deseruit & desertus est. Tale quip erat adiutorium quod desereret cum vellet, & in quo permancret si vellet, non quo sieret ut vellet. The first man had not this grace, whereby he should never be willing to be evil: but yet he had that grace, whereby he might have been always preserved from evil, if he would have continued therein, and without which also he could not by free will, be good, but yet he was able by free will to forsake it. God therefore would not have him to be without his grace, whom he had left in his own free-will. For free will is able enough to do evil, but to do good it hath no power at all, except it be holyen by the almighty goodness: which help, if that man had not by free-will forsaken, he should have been good for ever, but he did forsake, and was forsaken. For the help was such, that he might forsake it when he would, and such wherein he might remain if he would, not such whereby it might come to pass that he should be willing.  
By these places of S. Austen, we may see of what mind he was concerning the free will of man before his fall. It was such that he might consent to what he would. But the grace to be willing to consent to nothing but that which was good, was not given unto man, that man might have experience of the power of his own will, and so for ever after ascribe all the glory to him that worketh all in all.  
The cause of Adam's fall therefore, even by the judgement of S. Austen (of whom Cerberus maketh such boast) was not in himself: For God had fore appoynted, that by that means man should have experience of himself, and so learn to trust in one stronger than himself. But the cause that made his fall sin, was in himself. For he did willingly consent to the persuasion of his wife, who also had in like manner consented to the persuasion of the Serpent.  
If Cerberus could consider the fall of the first man after this sort: he would never conclude, that I teaching that the Predestination of God was the only cause of man's fall, should withal conclude, that it is the only cause of all sin and evil. For I do not teach that it is the cause of any evil or sin at all.  
In vain therefore, doth Cerberus make his Antitesis or comparison of contraries, when he saith. The one affirmeth that the Predestination of God is the only cause of Adam's sin, and so consequently of all evil: And the other affirmeth directly contrary, that God or his Predestination is the cause of no sin or evil. And much more vain is it, that he citeth so many testimonies of Scripture to that purpose. For I affirm that which he would make men believe I deny, and deny that which he would have men to think I do affirm.  
But one thing I would gladly learn of Cerberus. That is, where he findeth, either in Scripture, or in ancient writer, that Adam's fall is the fountain of all evil. We may manifestly prove by Scripture, that sin was before Adam fell, otherwise there could have been no tempter to entice him to sin. For God tempteth no man to evil. And man had in himself no concupiscence 
jacob. 1.  or lust to sin: therefore evil was before Adam fell. And consequently, Adam's shall was not the fountain of all evil.  
Saint Austen in the ix Chapter of his first book of Retractations saith, that when he with others had diligently searched from whence evil might spring: it was agreed upon amongst them, that it had none other fountain than the free choice of the will. Man's fall can not then be the fountain of all evil: for there was evil in Angels before man was made, and that sprang out of the free choice of the will that was in the Angels.  
But grant, that the fall of man had been the fountain of all evil: might not God's predestination be the cause of man's fall, but it must strait way follow consequently that the same is the cause of all the evil that springeth thereof? Then tell me (master Cerberus) how it may be, that God's predestination is not the cause of all the evil that springeth of the free choice of will. For this ye will not deny, I am sure, that God hath predestinated, both men and Angels to have the free choice of wil And his will alone, according to which he hath predestinated all things, is the cause why men and Angels have the free choice of wil Shall we say therefore, that consequently it is the cause of all evil? because it is the cause of that whereout all evils do spring? No thou hell hound, not so. God is altogether good, and the fountain of all goodness, and from him can spring nothing that is not good. All those things therefore that spring out of the free choice of the will, are exceeding good, as God, or his predestination is the cause of them, and the evil that is in them, cometh of the instrument whereby God doth work those things. I pray you therefore, look better upon your consequently. etc.  
As for the sentence that Cerberus citeth out of S. Austen: Non ergo casus ruentium. etc. I think if a man should upon a month warning, require to see the place where S. Austen writeth those words: it would be hard for Cerberus to show it him. And therefore I blame him not, though he have not quoted the place. But to do him a pleasure, I have sought it in S. Austin's works and found it In decimo. articulo falso Augustino imposito. In the x. of those articles that were falsely ascribed to S. Austen. Of what authority that book of S Austen is, may easily appear to them that will read his Retractations: for it is not mentioned among the books that he retracted, and reform in such points as he himself misseliked. But lest master Cerberus should say (as the Papists use to say of the Protestants, and as some Free will men have said of us that teach the doctrine of predestination) that this is the common shift of all heretics and obstinate defenders of untruths, to diminish the authority of Scriptures and sayings of Doctors that are alleged against them, by saying that the same are not authentic, or that they may be suspected not to be the writings of them in whose name they be set abroad: I will admit this saying of S. Austen as his own, and that therein he meant as he wrote, and that his meaning is true. Let us weigh the words of S. Austen therefore, and see how his meaning may be true, & yet agree with the doctrine that we teach. The predestination of God (saith he) hath neither stirred up, counseled, nor enforced, the falls of them that do rush down headlong, nor the malignity of them that be wicked, nor the desires of them that do sin: but doubtless he hath predestinated his judgement, whereby he will reward every man according to his doings, whether the same be good or evil. Which judgement should not be, if it were the will of God that men should sin. I have translated these words somewhat otherwise than Cerberus doth. But whether of us both better express the meaning of S. Austen, let the learned judge. And whether I have not translated them so that they may serve better for Cerberus' purpose, than as they are translated by himself. Let us therefore look to the meaning, and how they make with us or against us.  
Saint Austen teacheth that God's predestination, doth not stir up, entice or enforce any man to shall, to be wicked, or to have a desire to sin. And which of us doth teach the contrary? Even you sir (saith Cerberus) when ye say that the Predestination of God, must needs be the only cause of Adam's fall. To this I have sufficiently answered before, if any answer will satisfy Cerberus. But yet for further answer I say now, that I have not at any time said or written, that God's predestination did stir up, entice or drive Adam to fall. Wherefore I have not taught contrary to S. Austen in this point. But Cerberus will say that our meaning is not alone with S. Austin's. Let us therefore examine S. Austin's meaning. I understand his meaning to be, that when man doth fall, is wicked, or desireth to sin: his will is not by God's Predestination stirred up, enticed or compelled thereunto, but doth freely consent thereunto being stirred up, provoked and driven forward by the tempter, and by none other mean, if we speak of the first man, for in him was not, before his fall, that concupiscence that is now in us, & was in him after his fall. Whether this be the true meaning of S. Austen or no, let the learned judge. And why may not the same meaning be gathered of my words, when I say, that Adam being so perfect a creature, that there was in him no lust to sin, and yet so weak, that of himself he was not able to withstand the assault of the subtle serpent: no remedy, the only cause of his fall must needs be the Predestination of God. I say not, that God's Predestination did stir, provoke, or drive him forward to fall: And why may I not mean as S. Austen doth in the eleventh chapter of his book, De correptione & gratia, where he sayeth (as I have cited before) Nec ipsum ergo Deus esse voluit sine sua gratia, quem reliquit in su● libero arbitrio: quoniam liberum arbitrium ad malum sufficit, ad bonum autem nihil est, nisi adiuuctur ab omnipotenti bono: quod adiutorium, si homo ille, per liberum non deseruissaet arbitrium, semper esset bonus, sed deseruit, & desertus est. Tale quip erat adiutorium quod desereret cum vellet, & in quopermaneret sivellet, non quo fieret ut vellet.  
God therefore (saith Austen) would not suffer him to be without his grace, whom he had left in his own free choice: for free will is able enough to do evil, but to do good it hath no power at all, except it be helped of the almighty goodness: which help, if that man had not by his free will forsaken, he should have been good for ever, but he did forsake & was forsaken. For the help was such that he might forsake it when he would, and such wherein he might remain if he would, not such whereby it might come to pass that he should be willing.  
Doth not S. Austen affirm here, that the help of God which Adam had, was not such, that by it he might be willing never to forsake it? And what other cause of this can you find: than the Predestination of God, which is according to his everlasting will, unto the which all things are and must be subject.  
If Cerberus will not be satisfied with this: let him remember the saying of S. Paul, which S. Austen doth 
Rom. 11.  so often use, to stop the mouths of the unanswerable enemies of Gods free grace and predestination. O altitudo divitiarum, sapientiae & scientiae Dei. Quám incomprehensibilia sunt judicia cius, & investigabiles viae cius? O the deepness of the richesses of the wisdom and knowledge of God. Now incomprehensible are his judgements, and his ways past finding out? Stay here, master Cerberus, go no further I charge you, lest ye be thrust headlong into hell for your proube presumption.  Cerberus. 
And although there be some places of Scripture, whereupon they would ground this opinion, that men should sin by the will of God, or that God should predestinate or ordain men to sin, as where it is said, that God hardened the heart of Pharaoh, and such like: yet pertaineth it nothing to that purpose, if it be weighed with the rest of the Scriptures. For as Austen saith. Ipse quasi cos indurat, quia justo judicio indurari sinit. Lib. de essentia Divinitatis. He doth (saith Austen) as it were harden them, because, that with his just judgement, he suffereth them to be hardened. And in his book, De libero arbitrio & gratia. Cap. 21. he sayeth: Where at any time we read in the scripture, that men be seduced, or their hearts hardened of God: there may we not doubt, but that their wicked deservings went before, lest ye run (saith he) into the saying of Solomon. Insipientia viri violat vias cius. Deum autem causatur in cord suo. The foolishness of a man defileth his ways, but he sayeth in his heart, God is the cause of this hardening of heart.  
Melancthon, in his common places, speaketh very plainly, saying: Nec figure illae verborum offendunt. etc. Neither, saith he, do these figurative speeches offend. As I will harden the heart of Pharaoh & such like. For it is certain, that in the Hebrew phrase, they signify a permission or suffering, and not an effectual will of God, as, Led us not into temptation, that is to say, Suffer us not to be led into temptation. These are Melancthons' words. And mark what he saith of the Hebrew phrase, for all men know him to be a man learned. But to be short, it is surely to be marveled at, that although they do thus accuse God's Predestination, to be the only cause of Adam's fall (which is in deed, not only sin, but also the very wellspring of all wickedness, and the filthy fountain of all our uncleanness) yet they dare affirm themselves to be the only friends and lovers of God's Predestination, & all others to be the enemies of Gods holy Predestination, which do not subscribe to this their fantastical imagination. Moreover, if it should be said, that they make God the Author of sin, they would cry nay, and say they were slandered. But, whether God be not the author of that, whereof he is the only cause: let the uncorrupted heart judge. Also to say the truth, when they see their time and place, they are bold enough, yea, even to use the term Author, in that same manifest sense, as in a book set forth by john Knox, against an adversary of God's Predestination (as he calleth him) where, in the. 158. pagine he saith thus.  
Therefore, whatsoever the Ethnics and ignorant did attribute unto Fortune, we assign to the providence of God. And strait way he saith. We shall judge nothing to come of fortune, but that all cometh by the determination of his counsel. And further, it displeaseth him when we esteem any thing to proceed from any other, so that we do not behold him and know him, not only the principal cause of all things: but also the author, appointing all things, to the one part or to the other by his counsel.  
Mark well his words, and the very sense thereof. All cometh of God, saith he, God is the principal cause, and God is the author of it whatsoever it be. God appointeth all things, both to the one part and to the other, both to the wicked and to the godly all things, nothing is excepted, aswell damnation as salvation, as well sin as virtue, as well wickedness as holiness, yea, if it happen to be murder itself, for that a little before he rehearseth. Whatsoever it be, it proceedeth from none other (saith he) but from God, God so hath appointed it. God is the principal cause of it. Yea, and not only the principal cause: but also the auctor of it. Here seest thou those plain terms, which sometime for a little nice lisping, they can not, or will not speak, that God is the author of all murder and mischief. As for fortune, I know it to be an Heathenish fable, but where he saith, that God is not only the principal cause, but also the author of all things, without any exception: and that whatsoever the Ethnics attributed unto fortune, that same we ought to ascribe to the providence of God: it is such a wide wandering and large blasphemy, as hath not been lightly heard. For who knoweth not, that unto fortune the Ethnics ascribed treason, and crafty conspiracy. As where they call her Insidiosa, Persida & Malesida. Unto fortune they ascribe cruel murder, and tyrannical mischief. As when they call her Aspera, Dura, Saeva, Truculenta. Unto fortune they ascribed filthy lust and impudent bawdry: as when they call her Lenocinaus, Bruta and Impudens. Unto fortune they ascribed, scornful pride, and vain glory, calling her, Imperiosa, Procax and Superba. Unto fortune they ascribed, beastly blindness, & rude ignorance, calling her Coeca, and Exoculata. To conclude, unto fortune, the Ethnics ascribed all perverse and pestilent wickedness, and all abomination detestable, calling her Nefaria, Abhominanda & Improba. Yet say these professors of destiny: whatsoever the Ethnics ascribed unto fortune, that same ought we to attribute to the providence of God: yea and God is the very auctor, the principal cause, and the only cause thereof.  Crowley. 
Cerberus supposeth now, that he hath pulled from us the foundation of our faith. For he saith, that those scriptures that we would ground our opinion upon, appertain nothing to that purpose, when they be weighed with the rest of the scriptures. For the trial of this matter it shallbe meet for me at this time, plainly to set down in writing, what the opinion is, that I and other of my mind in this matter of Predestination, do hold. And then, what those Scriptures be that Cerberus meaneth of, conferring the same with as many other places of scripture, as have any show of a contrary meaning: so shall it appear what Cerberus hath won by that he citeth out of Austen and Melancthon. First, we hold that what soever hath been from the beginning, is now, or shall be to the end and for ever: was in God's purpose without beginning, and predestinated or foreappointed to be in the time and order that it hath been, is, or shall be: so that nothing hath, doth or shall come to pass otherwise than he hath without beginning purposed and foreappointed the same. The reasons that we stay upon, are these. God's power is absolute, so that what he will do, he is able to do, and what he will have done, can not be letted by any contrary power, & what he will not have done, can not by any power be done. But his power could not be absolute. etc. if aught might be done otherwise than he hath purposed & appointed. Therefore, all things come to pass, even as he hath without beginning purposed & appointed the same. Another reason is thus. God's wisdom is most perfect; so that whatsoever he doth, is so done, that the doing thereof cannot be repent: But if aught that he doth, might fall out otherwise, than he meant it should, when he did it, it should follow that his wisdom were not most perfect, for it is not the point of a wise man to say, I thought not that it would have so happened. Therefore nothing hath, doth, or shall happen otherwise than he meant it should, when he did first ordain it. The third reason is; that his foreknowledge can not be deceived, but even as he did foresee, and know before hand, that things should come to pass, so they have, be, and shall be brought to pass. But this could not be, if things should be done, otherwise than by his appointment. Therefore all things have, are and shall be done by his appointment. These be the chief reasons that we stay upon. The scriptures that we do most stay upon, are these. Conuenerunt enim in civitate ista, adversus sanctum filium tuum jesum quem unxisti, Herodes & Pontius Pilatus, cum gentibus & populis Israel: ad faciendum quaecunque manus tua & consilium tuum prius decreuer 
Act. 4.  unt fieri. There gathered together even in this City, against thy holy child jesus, whom thou haste anointed, both Herode and Pontius Pilate, with the Gentiles and peoples of Israel: to do whatsoever things thy power and counsel had before decreed to be done. Acts the iiij. Chapter.  
Again in the vij of Exod. it is thus written. Dixitque 
Exod. 7.  Dominus ad Mosen. Ecce constitui te Deum Pharaonis, & Aaron frater tuus erit Propheta tuus. Tu loquêris ei omnia quae mando tibi, & ille loquêtur ad Phamonē, ut dimittat filios Israel deterra sita. Se dego indurabo cor eius, et multiplicabo signa & ostenta mea in terra Egypti, & non audiet vos. And the Lord said unto Moses. Behold I have appointed thee to be pharao's God, & Aaron thy brother shallbe thy Prophet. Thou shalt speak unto him all those things that I shall command thee, and he shall speak unto Pharaoh, that he let the children of Israel depart out of his land. But I will harden his heart, and will multiply my wonders and signs in the land of Egypt, and he shall not hearken unto you.  
Moreover, in the xix Chapter of the four book of the 
4. Reg. 19  Kings, we read thus. Venerunt ergo servi Regis Ezechiae ad Isaam, Dixitque eye Isaas. Haec dicetis domino vestro. Haec dicit Dominus. Noli timere à facie sermonum quos audistis, quibus blasphemanerunt pueri Regis Assyriorum me. Ecce ego immittam ei▪ spiritum, & audiet nuntium, & revertetur in terram suam, et deijciam eum gladio in terra sua. And in the end of the same Chapter it is written thus. Cumque adoraret in templo Nesroch Deum suum: Adramelech, & Saraser filii eius, percusserunt eum gladio. etc. The servants of King Ezechia came unto Esay. And Esay said unto them. Thus shall ye say unto your Lord. Thus saith the Lord. Be not thou afraid of the words that ye have heard, wherewith the servants of the King of the Assyrians have blasphemed me. Behold I will put a spirit into him, and he shall hear a tidings, and he shall return into his own country, and in his own country will I overthrow him with the sword. And in the end of the same Chapter it is written thus. And when he was in the Temple worshipping Nesroch his own God: Adramelech and Saraser his own sons slew him with the sword. etc.  
Furthermore, in the xlv of Genesis, we read thus, 
Genes. 45.  Praemisitque me Deus, ut reseruemini super terram, & escas ad vivendum habere possitis. Non vestro consilio, sed Dei voluntate missus sum: qui fecit me quasi patrem Pharaonis, & Dominum universae domus eius. etc. God sent me before, that you might be reserved upon the earth, and have food to live by. It was not by your advise or counsel, that I was sent hither, but by the will of God, who hath made me to be as a Father unto Pharaoh, and Lord of all his house. etc.  
To conclude, in the last chapter of the same book, we read the matter repeated after this sort. Nolite timere, num Dei possumus resistere voluntati? Vos cogitastis de me malum: sed Deus vertit illud in bonum. etc. Fear not, are we able to resist God's will? you did devise evil for me: but God did turn it to good.  
By these Scriptures it appeareth plainly, that all those things that Herode, Pilate, and the jews did to Christ: that Pharaoh did in the hardness of his heart: that the sons of Sinacharib did to their Father: and that josephes' brethren did unto him: were all done by the determinate purpose and Predestination of God. Whereupon, it seemeth to me, that we may conclude that all other actions are done according to the same purpose and predestination. Otherwise, we must needs confess, that God is either disappointed of his purpose oftentimes, or else that he createth many things, not knowing before what shall become of them. Which absurdities may in no case be granted.  
Now what those Scriptures be, wherewith Cerberus would have these and such like scriptures to be weighed, we must guess: for Cerberus citeth not so much as one, I will therefore guess as near as I can▪ what scriptures those be that he meaneth of. One as I suppose, is written by Saint Paul to Timothe. The words are these. Deus vult omnes homines saluos fieri, & ad agnitionem veritatis 
1. Tim. 2.  venire. God would have all men saved & come to the acknowledging of the truth. Let us first weigh this place with the other afore cited, and see how this may make the other to serve nothing to y● purpose that we allege them for. God would have all men saved, and to come to the acknowledging of the truth: But if he did foreappoynt Herode, Pilate, and the jews, to accuse and condemn his son Christ, and did harden pharao's heart, kill Sinacharib with the sword of his sons, and send joseph into Egypt by the treachery of his brethren: he would not have all men saved: for the reward of these works is damnation: therefore God never appointed any of these things to be done. I am sure Cerberus can not apply this place better to his purpose, than it is in this argument applied. Now let us see what may be said to the contrary, without either denying or wresting of S. Paul's words. First, S. Austen doth interpret these words of S. Paul after this sort. Libro de voluntate Dei, Cap. 2. Occurrit enim, cùr pereant ex hijs aliqui, quum omnipotens Deus, omnes homines saluos fieri velit, & in agnitionem veritatis venire. Deinde, cur rursùs induret alios, misertus aliorum, aùt quomodò omnes saluos fieri velit homines, quum ipse nonnullos, nè saluentur induret? Hoc quantum ad humanam justitiam videtur iniustum: sed quis ità desipiat, vel potiùs quis ità blasphemet, ut dicat de justitia Dei, lege humanae justitiae disputandum? Quae profecto, si justitiae Dei adversatur, iniusta est. Ab illo enim qui summè justus est, omne quod qualitercunque justum est, manare manifestum est. Quis ergo crit, qui incommutabiliter manentem, & omnia quae sunt condentem, regentem, atque seruantem Dei sapientiam, pendit humanae sapientiae arbitrio? De qua idem Apostolus dicit, Quia sapientia carnis, inimicae est Deo. Et alibi. Sapientia huius mundi, stulititia est apud Deum. Non est ergo de illa maiestate divinae sapientiae, humanae vanitatis arbitrio disputandum. That is to say. For this is objected. Why should any of these perish, seeing that God that is almighty, is willing that all men should be saved, & come to the acknowledging of the truth? Moreover, why doth he on the contrary part, harden some, taking mercy on other some: or how is he willing that all men should be saved, when he himself doth harden some, lest they should be saved? As touching humane justice, this thing seemeth unjust. But who would be so foolish, or rather who would so blaspheme: as to say, that we should reason of the justice of God, by the order of the justice of man? which no doubt, if it be against the justice of God, it is unjust. For it is manifest, that whatsoever hath in it any justice at all, doth spring from him that is just in the highest degree. Who shall it be therefore, that will weigh by the arbitrament of man's wisdom, the wisdom of God, which remaineth immutable, and hath made, doth govern and preserve all things that be? Of which wisdom, the same Apostle saith. That the wisdom of the flesh, is enemy unto God. And in another place. The wisdom of the world is foolishness with God. We may not therefore, by the arbitrament of man's vanity, dispute of that ma 〈…〉 y of the wisdom of God.  
Again, in his book De spiritu & litera, Capite. 32. the same Austen saith. Si credemus, ut impetremus hanc gratiam: 〈◊〉 utique voluntate credimus, De hac quaeritur, unde sit voluntas. Si natura, quare non omnibus: cum sit idem Deus omnium creator? Si dono Dei, etiam hoc, quare non omnibus, cum omnes homines velit saluos sieri, & ad agnitionem veritatis venire? Prius igitur illud dicamus & videamus, utrum huic satis faciat quaestioni, quod liberum arbitrium naturaliter attributum à creatore animae rationali: illa media vis est, quae vel intendi ad fidem, vel inclinari ad insidelitatem potest. Et ideò, nec istam voluntatem, qua credit Deo, dici potest homo habere, quam nòn acceperit, Quandoquidem vocante Deo, surgit de libero arbitrio, quod naturaliter cum crearetur, accepit. Vult enim Deus onnes homines saluos fieri, & in agnitionem veritatis venire. Nòn sic tamen, ut eis adimat liberum arbitrium, quo vel benè vel malè uterites, iustissime iudicentur. Quod cum fit, infideles quidem contra voluntatem Dei faciunt, cum eius evangelio nòn credunt: nec ideò tamen eam vincunt, verùm scipsos fraudant magno & summo bono, malisque poenalibus implicant, experturi in supplicijs potestatem eius, cuius in donis misericordiam contempserunt. Ita voluntas Dei semper invicta est. Vinceretur autèm, si nòn inveniret, quod de contemptoribus faceret: aut vllo modo possent evadere, quod de talibus ille constituit. That is. If we do believe, to the end that we may obtain this grace, and do also by the consent of our will, believe: hereof a question is moved, whence we have this wil If it be of nature, why is it not in all men: seeing one God is the creator of all men? If we have it by the gift of God, why is it not given to all men: seeing he is willing that all men should be saved, and come to the acknowledging of the truth? Let us therefore affirm the first, and see whether it may satisfy this question, because free-will, which the Creator hath naturally given to the reasonable soul: is that indifferent power, which may either be bowed to faith, or inclined to infidelity. And therefore, it can not be said, that man hath not received this will, whereby he believeth in God, because, when God calleth, it riseth of free-will, which he received when he was naturally created. For God is willing that all men should be saved, and come to the knowledge of the truth: and yet not so, that he would take from them free-will, whereby they may be justly judged, when they use it well or otherwise. In which doing, the Infidels do work contrary to Gods will, because they believe not his Gospel. And yet do they not therefore overcome it, but they do defraud themselves of the great and most excellent goodness, and do entangle themselves with evils, wherewith they are punished, and shall in the punishments have expersence of his power, whose mercy they did in his gifts contemn. So is the will of God always unconquered. But if he could not find how to use these despisers, or if they could by any means escape that which he hath appointed to become of such: then should his will be overcome in deed.  
Again, in his book entitled Enchiridion ad Laurentium. Capite. 103. he sayeth thus. Ac per hoc, cum audimus, & in sacris litteris legimus, quod velit omnes homines saluos furi: quamo vis certum sit nobis, nòn omnes homines saluos sicri, nòn tamen ideò debemus omnipotentissimae Dei voluntati aliquid derogare, sed ità intellegere quod scriptum est: qui vult omnes homines saluos ficri: tanquam diceretur, nullum hominem fieri saluum, nisi quem saluum fieri ipse volverit: nòn quod nullus sit hominum, nisi quem salitum sicri velit, sed quod nullus siat, nisi quem velit, & ideò sit rogandus ut velit, quia necesse est suri si volverit. De orando quippè Deo agebat Apostolus ut hoc diceret. Sic enim intelligimus id quodin evangelio scriptum est: Qui illuminat omnem hominem: nòn quia nullus est hominum qui non illuminetur, sed quia nisi ab ipso nullus illuminator. Aut certè sic dictum est. Qui omnes homines vult saluos fieri, nòn quod nullus hominum esset, quem saluum sicri nollet, qui virtutes miraculorum facere noluit apud cos, quos dicit actitros fuisse poenitentiam, si facisset: sed ut omnes homines omne genus hominum intelligamus per quascunque differentias distributum, Reges, privatos, nobiles, ignobiles. etc.  
That is to say. And hereby when we hear and read in the holy scriptures, that he is willing that all men should be saved, although we know assuredly that all men are not saved? yet may we not therefore derogate any thing from the almighty will of God, but understand that which is written, on this sort. Not that there is no man, but that he would the same should be saved; but that none can be saved, but such as he will have saved. And that therefore he ought to be prayed unto, that he would be willing, because it must needs be, if he be willing that it should be. For when the Apostle spoke these words, he was in hand with the prayers that are to be made unto God. And after the same manner we understand that which is written in the Gospel. Which lighteneth every man. Not that there is no man that is not illumined, or lightened: but for that there is none illumined, otherwise than of him. Or else undoubtedly the words have this meaning. Which is willing that all men should be saved, not that there should be no man whom he would not have saved, which would not work his miracles among them that he saith would have repent, if he had done so: but that we should understand by all men, all sorts of men, by what differences so ever the same be severed, Kings, private persons, noble persons, and ignoble. etc.  
And again in his book. De correptione & gratia. Cap. 14. S. Austen saith thus. Cum autèm homines per correptionem in viam justitiae seu veniunt, seu revertuntur, quis operatur in cordibus eorum salutem, nisi ille, qui quolibet plantante atque rigante, & quolibet in agris atque arbustulis operant, dat incrementum Deus, cui volenti saluum facere, nullum hominum resistit arbitrium? Sic enim, velle vel nolle, in volentis aut nolentis est potestate, ut divinam voluntatem nòn impediat, nec superet potestatem. De hijs enim qui faciunt quae non vult, facit ipse quae vult. Et quod scriptum est, quod vult omnes homines saluos fieri, nèc tamèn omnes salui siunt: multis quidèm modis intelligi potest, ex quibus in alijs opusculis nostris, aliquos commemoravimus, sed hic unum dicam. Ita dictum est. Omnes homines vult saluos sicri, ut intelligantur omnes praedestinati, quia omne genus hominum in eyes est, sicut dictum est Pharisaeis. Decimatis omne olus, ubi nòn est intelligendum, nisi omne quod habebant. Neque enim omne olus quod erat in toto terrarum orb decimabant.  
That is to say. When men do by chastisement, either come or return into the way of righteousness, who is it that worketh health in their hearts, but he who giveth the increase, when any man planteth or watereth, and when any man worketh in the fields or orchards, which is God, against whom, being willing to save, no man's free will doth make resistance. For to be willing or unwilling, is after such sort in the power of him that is willing or unwilling, that it be not a let to the will of God, nor do overcome his power. For of them that do those things that he willeth not, both he make those things that he is willing to make. And where as it is written: that he is willing that all men should be saved, and yet all be not saved: it may be understanded many ways, whereof we have in our other little works made mention of some, but I will now speak of one more. This is the saying. He is willing that all men should be saved, that thereby, all that be predestinated might be understand, for that among them are men of all sorts. As it was said to the Phariseis, ye do pay the tenth of every garden herb. Where we may not understand, ●oe than all that they had. For they did not give the tenth of all the herbs that be in the whole circle of the earth.  
By these places of S. Austen may Cerberus see, how this place of scripture (God is willing that all men should be saved. etc.) being weighed with the places that we build upon, doth make that they serve nothing to our purpose. For in expounding of these words of S. Paul, God is willing that all men should be saved & come to the knowledge of the truth: S. Austen doth affirm as much as we do, as may well appear to as many as will way these places of his, with indifferent judgement.  
One other place for this purpose, is written in the. 33. Chapter of ezechiel. The words are these. Vivo ego dicit Dominus. Nolo mortem impij, sed ut convertatur impius à via sua, & vivat. Conuertimini, convertimini, à vijs vestris pessimis, & quarè moriemini domus Israel? That is to say. As truly as I live, saith the Lord, I desire not the death of the ungodly, but that the ungodly be converted from his own way and live. Be converted, be converted from your most wicked ways, why will ye die, O you house of Israel?  
Saint Jerome expounding this place, beginneth at 
Super. Ezech. Cap. 33.  these words in the same Chapter. Tu ergo fili hominis, dic ad domum Israel: sic locuti estis dicentes. Iniquitates nostrae & peccata nostra super nos. etc. Therefore thou son of man, speak thou to the house of Israel and say: thus have ye spoken, saying: Our iniquities & sins are upon us. etc. By occasion of which words, S. Jerome sayeth thus. Sinegligenter legamus, videtur nobis eadem prophetia esse quae supra, in qua dicitur. Nunquid volens cupio mortem iniqui dicit dominus: nisi converti eum à via sua mala & vivere? Et in fine eiusdem propheti●e. Conuertimini & redite ab universis impietatibus vestris, & non erunt vobis in tormentum iniquitates. Ibi enim ad eos sermo fit qui volunt agere poenitentiam, & justitia peccata delere, ut cum fiducia convertantur, & pleno animo agant poenitentiam. Hic autèm ad eos loquitur, qui magnitudine peccatorum, imo impietatum suarum desperant salutem & dicunt: Iniquitates nostrae & peccata nostra super nos sunt, & in ipsis tabescimus, quomodo ergo vivere poterinites? Et est sensus. Cum semel nobis mors proposita sit: & vulneribus nostris nulla medicina possitrestituere sanitatem: quid necesse est laborare & frustra consumi, & praesentem vitam nòn cum desperatione transigere, ut saltèm hac fruamur: quia futuram perdidimus? Quibus respondet Deus, nòn velle se mortem impij, sed ut revertatur & vivat. Et Apostropham sacit ad impios desperantes: convertimini à vijs vestris pessimis. Atque ut sciamus, qui sint impij ad quos loquitur, sequens sermo demonstrate, Quarè moriemini domus Israel? Vita autem & mors in hoc loco nòn haec significatur, qua omnes communi cum bestijs, lege naturae, vel vivimus, vel morte dissoluimur: sed illa de qua scriptum est. Placebo Domino in regione viventium.  
That is to say. If we read this negligently, it seemeth to be the same prophecy, that is before, wherein it is said, do I willingly desire the death of the ungodly, saith the Lord: or, but that he be converted from his own evil way and live? And in the end of the same Prophecy: Be ye converted and come back again from all your ungodlinesses, and your iniquities shall not turn you to torments. For in that place he speaketh unto those which are willing to repent, and by righteous life, to blot out their sins, that they might with sure confidence return unto God, and with full minds repent. But in this place he speaketh unto them, that through the greatness of their own sins (yea their own impieties) do despair of salvation, and say. Our iniquities and our sins are upon us, and in them do we consume away: how can we therefore live? And this is their meaning. Seeing that death is once set before us, and no medicine is able to heal our wounds: what need we labour and be consumed, and not pass over this life with desperation: so, that at the least way we may enjoy this life? For the life to come we have already lost. Unto whom God maketh answer, that he willeth not the death of the ungodly: but that he be converted & live. And he turneth his speech to the desperate ungodly ones: saying, turn you from your own ways, which are most wicked. And that we might know who those wicked ones were to whom he spoke, the words that follow do declare. O ye house of Israel, why will ye die? And that life and that death, whereby we do by the order of nature, with the brute beasts either live or die, is not in this place signified: but that life whereof it is written. I will please the Lord in the land of the living.  
By these words of S. Jerome: it appeareth, that he understood not the words of ezechiel, in such sort as Cerberus would have us to understand them, that is, that by them is taught a doctrine contrary to that which we teach, and so consequently, the places that we build upon, proved to make nothing for our purpose. For Jerome saith, that in the xviii Chapter of his Prophecy, ezechiel speaketh to them that be penitent, and would by righteous life blot out their sins past. These doth he there encourage, with bold courage and assured hope of forgiveness at God's hand, to go forward with their repentance began, saying: Be ye converted, and return again from all your ungodlinesses, and your iniquities shall not turn you to torment. But in this place, in the 33. of his Prophecy (saith S. Hierom) the Prophet speaketh to the desperate people of the Jews, which said: Our iniquities and sins are upon us. etc. Giving themselves to continue in wickedness, as those that despaired of forgiveness of that which was passed, although they should from thenceforth endeavour amendment. To these (saith the Prophet) speaketh God, saying: Turn from your own most wicked ways. Why will ye die, O ye house of Israel? The greatness of our sins can be no cause why we should despair of God's mercy. Wherefore we teach with Ezechiel, jeremy, isaiah, and the rest of the holy Prophets, that God is ready to receive to mercy as many as by repentance and amendment of life turn to him, believing the promise that he hath made in the death and bloodshedding of his only son jesus Christ. I conclude therefore that this place maketh for our purpose, and not against us. And lest I should trouble the Reader over much, with such places as this: I 〈◊〉 refer all such places to the answer I have here made, not doubting but the diligent Reader, who seeketh nothing but the simple truth, shallbe therewithal satisfied.  
Now, as touching the places of S. Austen, which Cerberus citeth out of his book: De essentia Divinitatis: And De libero arbitrio & gratia: I will first rehearse all the words that S. Austen writeth in those places, concerning this matter, and then weigh them, that we may see how they may serve for Cerberus' purpose. The words are these. Indurare dicitur Deus quorundam malorum corda, sicùt de Pharaone Rege Egypti scriptum est: nòn 〈◊〉 omnipotens Deus, ppotentiā 
Augusti. De essentia Divinitatis.  svam corda corum induret, quod est impium ità credere: sed exegentibus corum culpis, quam duritiam cordis, quam ipsi sibi mala perpetrando nutriunt, nòn ausert: quasi ipse cos induret, quià justo judicio indurari sinit. That is to say: It is said that God doth harden the hearts of certain evil men, as it is written of Pharaoh King of Egypt: not that the Almighty God doth by his almighty power harden their hearts, which thing to believe, is an ungodly thing: but when their faults requiring the same, doth not take from them that hardness, which in committing evils, they themselves do nourish to themselves: he doth as it were himself harden them, because he doth, by his just judgement, suffer them to be hardened.  
If Cerberus would have weighed these words well: he would never have applied them against us. For we teach not, that the almighty God, doth by his almighty power harden men's hearts, for we know that it were an ungodly thing so to teach or believe: but we teach as S. Austen doth, that their sins requiring the same, he leaveth them in the hardness of their hearts, which by committing of evils, they do nourish unto themselves. For by the sin of the first man all men's hearts are hardened, and of themselves they can do nought else but nourish that hardness, and Gods hardening of their hearts, is nothing else but the withholding of the dew of his grace from them, without which they can not be softened. And this he doth in just judgement, for the sin of our first Father hath deserved no less in us all. But here I must let the Reader understand, what places Cerberus picketh for his purpose. Erasmus supposeth, that rather Hugo Victorinus than S. Austen should be y● Author of this book. Well, I will not strive with him for the matter. But let him consider it better before he apply it against us again.  
The words of the other place that Cerberus citeth out of the xxj chapter of S. Austin's book. De gratia & libero arbitrio: are as faithfully handled as that other. Cerberus 
August. De gratia & libero arbitrio. Cap. 21.  feared to set down to many of Austin's words, lest the Reader should see that they make with us against Cerberus and his fellows. I will therefore set down so many of his words as may make his meaning known to the diligent Reader. first, in the beginning of the same Chapter, he saith thus. Quis nòn ista judicia divina contremiscat, quibus agit Deus in cordibus etiàm malorum hominum quicquid vult, reddens eyes tamèn secundum merita eorum? Roboam filius Salomonis respuit consilium salubre Seniorum quod ei dederant. etc. Who would not (saith Austen) tremble at these judgements of God, whereby he doth in the hearts even of wicked men, work what he lusteth, and yet rendering unto them according to their deservings. Roboam, the son of Solomon, refused the wholesome counsel of the Elders which they gave him, which was that he should not deal roughly with the people, and he hearkened rather to the words of them that were of his own age, giving a rough answer to them, whom he should have answered gently. And so forth, citing many examples out of the Scriptures, to prove, that God is he, that worketh in the hearts of evil men, those things whereby his purpose is performed in punishing of sin.  
And towards the end of the Chapter, he saith: Hijs & talibus testimonijs divinorum eloquiorum, quae omnia comemorare 〈…〉 s longum est, satis, quantum existimo, manifestatur, operari Deum in cordibus hominum, ad inclinandas corum voluntates quo▪ cunque volverit, siuè ad bona, pro sua misericordia, siuè ad mala, pro meritis corum, judicio utique suo, aliquando aperto, aliquandò occulto, sempèr autèm justo. Fixum enim debet esse & immobile in cord vestro, quia non est iniquitas apud Deum. Ac per hoc, quamdò legitis in litteris veritatis à Deo seduci homines, aùt obtudi vel obdurari corda corum, nolite dubitare praecessisse mala merita corum, ut justè ista paterentur: ne incurratis in illud Proverbium Salomonis. Insipientia viri, violate vias eius: Deum autèm causatur in cord suo. That is to say. By these and such like testimonies of holy Scriptures, whereof it were too long to make a whole recital, it is, as I suppose, sufficiently showed, that God doth work in the hearts of men, to incline their wills whither it pleaseth him, whether it be to good things, according to his mercy, either to evil things, according to their merits, and according to his own judgement, which is sometime open, and sometime secret, but always just. For this persuasion ought to be fired and unmovable in your hearts: that there is none iniquity with God. And hereby, when ye read in the writings of the truth, that God doth lead men out of the way, or that he doth dull or harden their hearts: do ye not doubt, but that their evil deserving went before, that they might justly suffer these things, lest ye should run into that Proverb of Solomon, which saith. The foolishness of a man doth defile his ways: but in his heart he layeth the blame in God.  
If Cerberus would have set down all these words of S. Austen: I should not have needed to write any answer to that which he did set down. For S. Austin's words are sufficient for answer, when he saith that God worketh in the hearts of men to incline their wills, whether it be to good things, according to his mercy, or to evil things, according to their deservings, & that which way he himself is willing to incline them. Now let Cerberus find contradiction in S. Austin's words, if he can. As form, I can see none. But if Cerberus can find none, then hath he applied S. Austin's words against us, contrary to S. Austin's meaning.  
Now let us see what Cerberus hath found in Melancthons' common places. Melancthon speaketh very plainly (saith Cerberus) and saith, Nec figur● illae verborum offendunt. etc. Neither saith he, do these figurative speeches offend. As I will harden the heart of Pharaoh, and such like: for it is certain, that in the Hebrew phrase, they signify a permission or suffering, & not an effectual will of God. As lead us not into temptation, that is to say, suffer us not to be lead into temptation. These are Melancthons' words, saith Cerberus: and mark (saith he) what he sayeth of the Hebrew phrase, for all men know him to be a man learned. Here Cerberus beginneth to triumph, and seemeth to himself to have won the stelde. Melancthon hath said it, therefore it must needs be so. I reverence Melancthon, and do acknowledge that he was learned: but let us see whether, in this point, Melancthon have not showed himself to loath to offend such as Cerberus is, and therefore seemed to have given them vantage against himself. In the same book of common places, in the first title, which is De Deo: he describeth God after this sort: Deut est essentia spiritualis, intelligens, aterna, verax, bona, pura, justa, misericors, liberrima, immensaepotenti●e & sapientiae. etc. That is to say: God is a spiritual essence, understanding, everlasting, true, good, pure, just, merciful, most free, & of unmeasurable power and wisdom. etc. Now, if God do permit any thing to be done which he is not willing should be done, how is he almighty? Other therefore, as learned as Melancthon, have said, & in my judgement, truly: that to permit and to will is alone, in him that can not be enforced to permit or suffer that which he is not willing should be. But as I have declared before, we affirm not, that the actions, words, and thoughts of man, as they are willed or permitted by God, are or can be sin. For he being altogether good, and nothing else but goodness; can not will or permit any thing that is evil. The evil therefore that is in men's thoughts, words or actions, cometh of the Devil and men's own wills: which God doth will or permit, as a mean, either to set forth his mercy in forgiving, or his justice in punishing, which in that respect can not be other than good. What Cerberus hath won by citing these words of Melancthon: let y● learned that have read other men's writings upon this matter, judge. I have said that I think to be true.  
But now Cerberus thinketh to pay us home. To be short, sayeth he, it is surely to be marveled at, that although they do thus accuse God's Predestination to be the only cause of Adam's shall (which is in deed not only sin, but also the very wellspring of all wickedness, and the filthy fountain of all our uncleanness) that yet they dare affirm themselves to be the only friends and lovers of God's Predestination. etc. Cerberus will be short now. Well let him be answered as shortly. He hath all this while laboured to prove that was never denied, that is, that the sin of Adam in his first fall, is the cause of all the sin that hath been, is, or shallbe committed by his posterity. For we hold, that after Adam had once sinned, neither he nor any of his posterity, being naturally brought forth in this world, could of themselves do any other thing than sin. The cause whereof we say, is that concupiscence and lust to do evil, which entered into him, & from him is descended into his posterity. But what is this to the cause of Adam's fall. This concupiscence was not in Adam before his fall. It could not therefore be the cause thereof. And as I have declared before: Adam's fall could not be the cause of all sin: for sin was before Adam fell. We know that sin is not a creature: but it is a falling away of the creature from that order that the Creator did command the creature to continue in. But this was in y● Angels, Ergo before the fall of man. By y● fall of man therefore was declared what man's free-will was able to do. It was able to admit sin, and so by free-will sin entered into man, and by man into the world, that is into all natural men. And yet we say not, that either man's free-will or man himself is evil, as he is God's creature, and free-will God's gift. I conclude therefore, that as the fall of Adam was the performance of God's purpose, so was it no sin, but exceeding good, as every performance of God's purposes must needs be. And so the Predestination of God being the cause thereof, is no cause of sin. Let Cerberus marvel as much as he will, how we can grant God to be the cause and not the Autour of sin. For we do not say that God's Predestination is the cause of sin. Much less do we say that he is the Autour, as Cerberus doth charge us by occasion of certain words written by john Knox against an adversary of God's Predestination.  
Although john Knox being yet living, & able to defend his own writings, I might refer Cerberus to his answer: yet I will not stick to write a few lines in the defence of his doctrine in this point. Cerberus seemeth to mislike with Knox for two things: one is, for that he saith that we assign to the providence of God, all things that the Ethnics and Ignorant attributed unto fortune. And the other is, for that he saith that we know and behold God to be, not only the principal cause, but also the author of all things, appointing them to the one part or so the other by his counsel. This is (saith Cerberus) such a wide wandering blasphemy, as hath not lightly been heard of. And although Cerberus would have us mark the words, & the very sense of them, as though he would set forth the same so plainly, that all men might easily perceive the meaning of them: yet with his leave, he showeth that he himself did not see that he would have other to mark. For what mad man would write words in such meaning, as Cerberus would have us think that john Knox wrote his? That is, to call God deceyisull, unfaithful, and untrusty? Rough, hard, fierce and cruel? Bawdy, beastly, and shameless? Imperious, malapert, and proud? Blind, and without eyes? Wicked, to be abhorred, and altogether nought? Was there ever man so far beside himself, as to write of God in this meaning? I durst appeal to Cerberus himself (though he be the dog of Hell) whither in conscience he do think that it were possible that any reasonable man may so far forget himself, as to write words in any such meaning. Let Cerberus therefore, look better upon john Knox words, and seek a better sense in them than this. If he will do so, he shall find that john Knox meaning is, that where as the Ethnics and Ignorant attributed unto fortune, a power to give or take away, to preserve or destroy, to help or to hinder. We which know y● there is no such power in any other than in God, do assign all these things to his providence: knowing that nothing cometh to pass by Fortune or chance, but that God by his providence doth govern and rule all things, appointing them to the one part, or the other, by his counsel. And when he appointeth any to that thing which in them is sin (as was the murder of Sinacharib in his own sons) yet in God's purpose it is good, for it is the execution of his just judgement, or the mean whereby his glory shall be the more advanced in showing mercy. If Cerberus be not certified with this answer, let him seek for further answer at the hands of him whose writings he hath so maliciously perverted.  Cerberus. 
But now to return again to Crowley. After that he hath written, that God's predestination is the only cause of Adam's fall, then goeth he forth in the same book, and the same Article, unto the next execrable wickedness, committed in the world, saying: Now, what say we to Cain: was he not predestinated to slay his brother? No, say the free-will men. Here thou seest dearly beloved, who they are that so odiously are noted with the name of free-will men. Not only the Papists, against whom he pretendeth there to write: but namely all those that say, God hath not predestinate any man to commit murder, or such like wicked abomination. These call they free-will men, these call they Pelagians. In deed such as so maintain free-will, that a man by freewill without the grace and help of God, may abstain from evil, or do good, as the blind Papists do, and as before it is proved, that Pelagius did hold, or as before is rehenrsed, that William Samuel saith: that man may deserve God: those I say, might worthily be called Pelagians, because they hold, either all, or some part of his errors. But those which teach, that all murder and mischief springeth out of God's predestination, or that any mansleaer is predestinate of God to kill his neighbour, or any adulterer to lie with his neighbours wife, or any traitor predestinate of God, to conspire against his Prince, or any rebel to rise against his Sovereign, as these men most plainly affirm: they hold in this point the error of the Manicheans, which was as ye heard before, by the words of Austen. Hominem peccatum vitare nòn posse. That a man can not eschew evil, or can not choose but commit sin. These men, I say, which affirm that Cain was predestinate to murder his innocent brother Abel. And as in the same book and the same Article also, he saith, that the most wicked persons that have been, were of God appointed to be wicked even as they were. They hold the error both of the stoics, and also of the Manicheans. That is to say, as Austen declareth in the ninth & xvi chapter of the first book of his Retractations: that evil hath his original of God's ordinance, & not of man's free-will. For if murderers, thieves, adulterers, traitors, & Rebels be of God predestinated and appointed to be wicked even as they are, and can not choose but of mere necessity by the ordinance of God commit, all such wickedness, even as they do: then what is our life but a mere destiny, all our doings Gods ordinances, and all our imaginations, branches of God's predestination? And I doubt not, but the stoics and Manicheans, would also temper the matter with a great discretion of words, as these men will say, that we must speak more reverently of the matter. But seeing they plainly hold these principles, and when they see their time, speak plainly thereof themselves, as you may well perceive by that which hath already, and shall yet be more largely rehearsed: I see no cause why it should not of all men be plainly declared. Again, if it be a truth, why should it not be plainly spoken, if it be a truth, that traitors be predestinate of God to conspire the destruction of their Princes, and Rebels predestinate of God to make insurrection against their sovereigns: If (I say) it be a truth, that God hath so predestinated them, & that they must of necessity, & can not choose but commit such wickedness: why should it not be plainly spoken? except a man should be ashamed to speak the truth. But in what Scripture is that written? Or is it not rather written. For thy life, shame not to say the truth. And surely to say as 
Eccles. 4.  it is: I see not well how any man can speak more plainly in this matter than they themselves do. For what can more plainly be spoken: than that God's predestination is the cause of Adam's fall? And that Cain was predestinate to slay his brother? And that God is both the principal cause, and also the author of all things, both on the one side and on the other, appointing all things to all men. And whatsoever the Ethnics ascribed unto fortune: that same we ought to attribute unto the providence of God. And that the most wicked persons that have been: were of God appointed to be wicked even as they were.  Crowley. 
Here it appeareth, that the chiese quarrel that Cerberus had, when he wrote this answer to his friends letter, was against Crowley. If the spirit of love had led him, he might have had conference with Crowley (for belike he knoweth him well enough) & not thus maliciously by setting out his answer in print, have gone about asmuch as lieth in him, not only to discredit the doctrine that Crowley preacheth: but also to bring him in displeasure with his Prince, as one the teacheth thieves, murderers, traitors & rebels, & all other naughty persons to defend their wickedness by God's predestination & ordinance. But Crowley shall by God's help, be able to clear himself of all this, & to make the malice of Cerberus so known to all men, that he shall from henceforth have little credit among such as do not favour the error of our new Pelagians.  
For answer to all that Cerberus hath in this his return to Crowley, written, I might refer the Reader to that which I have already written. But lest Cerberus should think that that were but a shift, I will answer to his Taùtologie, or repetition of the same words and matter that is before written and answered, and chiefly because he doth here infer more plainly that which before he meaneth to conclude.  
I have said, that God's predestination was the only cause of Adam's fall, that Cain was predestinate to slay his brother Abel, and that the most wicked persons that have been, were of God appointed to be wicked, even as they were. For the first, I refer the Reader to that which I have already written thereof. For the second, I say: that as God predestinated Abel to be a figure of Christ and his Church in suffering, so he predestinated Cain to be a figure of the cruel persecuting jews & other, that have, do, & shall persecute Christ & his Church. And as Cain in slaying his brother Abel was a figure of the cruel persecutors, so was not the murder evil: but as it was the execution of Cain's wicked will, it was abominable sin, and deserved no less punishment at God's hand, than it had in deed. And as concerning the power of Cain's will, whereby he consented to do this deed: it was altogether bound to the will of Satan, by the sin that his Father Adam had first committed, & was not delivered from that bondage, because he was none of them whom jesus Christ, the son of God had delivered and made free: as doth well appear by that he sayeth: My sin is greater than that it can be forgiven. He had not received the spirit of Adoption, whereby he might cry Abba, Father. Wherefore, it is manifest, that whatsoever he did, was abominable in God's sight, for he lacked faith whereby men's works are made acceptable before God. For without it, it is impossible to please God. As it is written. Sine fide impossibile 
Hebr. 11.  est placere Deo. Without faith, it is not possible to please God. And hereof it came, that is written Ad Cain enim & munera eius Deus nòn respexit. God had 
Genes. 4.  no regard to Cain and his oblations. For even his very oblations which he offered, were sin in the sight of God, according to the words of Saint Paul. Quicquid ex 
Rom. 14.  side nòn est, peccatum est. Whatsoever is not of faith, the same is sin. How can it be then, but that the murder of his brother must be sin, as it was the execution of his malicious purpose: but as it is the performance of God's purpose, it can not be but good. The like is to be said of the murder that the sons of Sinacharib committed upon their own father, and the rebellion of Absolom, 
4. Reg. 19 2. Reg. 16.  the whoredom of the same, the theft of the Sabines, and whatsoever wickedness we read of. For God had said before, that he would slay Sinacharib with the sword, and that the sword should not departed from David's house. And job said: The Lord hath taken away. 
2. Reg. 12. job. 1.  In that Cerberus therefore, hath taken upon him to write thus maliciously against me and others that teach the true doctrine of God's everlasting predestination: he is not by our doctrine justified from sin therein, although in the purpose of God the same be good (for it is the stirring up of me and others, to look more diligently to the teaching of that doctrine, in such sort that the weak Christians be not offended, neither the enemies occasioned to blaspheme) but when Cerberus and we shall stand before the judgement seat of Christ together: then shall it appear with what mind we have both written. For his malice towards Crowley can not then be covered.  
And where as Cerberus would know, where it is written that all truth should not be plainly spoken: let him ask Saint Paul why he would first feed his hearers with milk, and afterward with stronger meat. And let him ask our Saviour Christ, why he said that old bottles could not hold new Wine, and that therefore men use to put new Wine into new vessels that both may be preserved together. And as for his place that he citeth out of sirach, (For thy life shame not to say the truth) I reser to the Reader to consider and weigh 
Eccles. 4.  by the circumstance of the place. Whereby it shall appear how well it maketh for his purpose. Sirach saith: For thy life shame not to say the truth, for there is a shame that bringeth sin, & there is a sin that bringeth glory & favour. Now, how can Cerberus prove by this place that a preacher must without discretion utter all truth at all times & in all places? It is manifest that Sirach meaneth to instruct all men, that shame should not stay us from confessing the truth of our own evil, when we are deprehended therein: for that shame bringeth sin. (That is, causeth us to lie in hiding our own faults before committed) but the other shame, that is, to do that which is not honest, bringeth glory and favour. Shame therefore saith Sirach, to do evil: but for thy life, shame not to confess the evil that thou hast once done, and art taken withal, or vehemently suspected thereof. But (saith Cerberus) how can any man speak more plainly of this matter, than they themselves do? For what can be more plainly spoken: than that God's Predestination is the cause of Adam's fall? And that Cain was predestinated to slay his brother? And that God is both the principal cause & also the Author of all things, both on the one side and on the other. etc. All this is sufficiently answered already. But the cause, why in our writings we use so plain words in this matter: is, for that we have not to do with babes that need milk, but with open enemies, that under colour to clear God of iniquity, go about to take from him the glory of his almighty power, and liberty, to do what he will do with his own creatures, without check or controlment: And to ascribe to the power of their own free will, that glory that the free mercy of God deserveth. We do not this therefore in our common order of teaching, but being enforced by the malice of such as Cerberus is.  Cerberus. 
And further, in the same book and the same Article. Yea, I am sure (saith he) that you will grant, that if God do predestinate a man to do things rashly and without any deliberation: he shall not deliberate at all, but run headlong upon it, be it good or evil that he doth. He maketh also an argument after this sort, saying: Whatsoever God foreseeth and prededestinateth: must necessarily come to pass (for his prescience and predestination are infallible) but he foreseeth and predestinateth all things: Ergo all things must come to pass of necessity. The minor of which Argument is apparently false. For though God do foresee all things: yet doth he not predestinate all things. For his foresight doth extend both to good and evil: but his predestination is only of things that be good. As the Scriptures and all ancient writers prove. And here again it is to be noted also: how plainly they make God the Author of sin. For if this mayor be true, that God doth not only foresee, but also predestinate all things: Yea, even sin and evil, as the fall of Adam, and the murder of Cain, and the wickedness of all them that have been most wicked: then may this minor be truly annexed: That God is the Author of all that he predestinateth. And so must this conclusion needs follow: that God is the Author of all sin and evil. The first part, that God: predestinateth all things, or all that he soreseeth: is a proposition of their own assertion, without any ambiguity or doubtful meaning. The second part, that God is the Author of all that he predestinateth, is mine assertion. Which is so manifest and true, that they have scarce any manner of colour to deny it. For what is it to predestinate any thing? but first to purpose, decree, and appoint, and ordain it to be done? Now, he which first purposeth, decreeth, appointeth, ordaineth, or inventeth a thing to be done: is not he the Author of the same? Or is not he rightly to be called Causa, Origo, Fons: Radix, Principium, Author? The Cause, Original, Fountain, Root, Beginning or Author of the same? He which first purposeth, decreeth, appointeth, and ordaineth an Insurrection or Rebellion to be made against his Prince: is not he to be apprehended as the very Author of all the sedition, and worthily and rightly to be judged and called? What man can be so ignorant: as not to perceive it? For all the world knoweth, that for none other cause, one is said to be the Author of any thing, but only, for that he is either the first inventor, or else the first purposer, appointer, & ordainer of the same. And also, whosoever is the first inventor, or else the first ordainer of any thing: most properly he is said to be the Author of the same. Now, mark again the Argument, and see how the conclusion followeth. God predestinateth all things, yea, even sin and evil: And God is the Author of all that he predestinateth, as hath been plainly proved: Ergo, he is the Author of sin. This must needs follow, if the first proposition be granted. That God predestinateth or ordaineth all things, or all that he foreseeth. Wherefore, the old writers, in confutation of the Manicheans, laboured in nothing so much; as to prove, that although God did foresee all things, both good and evil: yet did he only foresee, and not predestinate those things which are evil. As by an infinite number of places, out of the ancient writers, if shortness would suffer, I could easily prove. But one place of Austen, I will rehearse, which doth not only resolve clearly this matter between foresight and for cordinaunce: or between the prescience and predestination: but also most plainly teacheth, all that is to be said of predestination. Prosper. Ad obiectio. Vince. Rehearsing the words, and defending the opinion of Austen, where he proveth that the Devil can scarcely be called the Author of sin, by cause it came of man's own will, and asketh by what madness and frensle men do attribute that unto God, which can not be altogether ascribed unto the Devil. And at the last he concludeth with these words of Austen.  
Nihil ergo talium negotiorum Deus praedestinavit ut suret: nec illam animam nequitèr turpiterque victinam, ad hoc ut taliter viveret praeparavit: sed talem futuram nòn ignoravit, & de tali justè se iudicaturum esse praescivit: atque ita ad praedestinationem eius nihil aliudreserri poiest, nisi quod aut ad debitam justitiae retributionem, aut ad indebitam pertinet gratiae largitatem.  
Therefore (saith he) God hath predestinated no part of any such doings, neither the soul, which afterward lived wickedly and filthily, hath he prepared to that end that it should so live: but he was not ignorant that such a one it would be. And so nothing may be referred to the predestination of God: but only that which pertaineth unto the due recompense of his righteousness, or to the undeserved gift of his grace. These are the words of Austen. which surely are marvelous full of pith, containing the whole sum of that which may be said in this matter of God's predestination, and are therefore most worthy to be noted, yea, and to be committed to heart, or kept in perpetual memory. For being thoroughly weighed, they do plainly set forth, the full resolution of all this question.  Crowley. 
Cerberus is so maliciously bent against Crowley, that he can keep no order in charging him with that that he hath written against Shaxton. For this (yea, I am sure) wherewith he chargeth me here, standeth in my book more than eight whole leaves after the Argument that he findeth such fault with. Yea, it is part of that which I do infer upon the confession of Shaxton himself, in his Article that I confute, after I had by many Scriptures proved the minor proposition of that Argument. But who can hope that Cerberus can with his three mouths keep order in his barking? Let me (if I can) answer him in order, unto that wherewith he doth so unorderly charge me.  
First he saith, that I say that I am sure that Shaxton will grant, that if God do predestinate a man to do things rashly and without any deliberation, he shall not deliberate at all, but run headlong upon it, be it good or evil that he doth. Now let us see what Cerberus hath said to this. He seemeth to make a great matter of it: For he beginneth thus: And further. As though the wherewith he will now charge Crowley, is more to be detested than the rest that is already spoken of. And yet when he hath made rehearsal of the words: he seemeth by silence to allow them. Wherefore, I will be bold to say to Cerberus, as I did to Shaxton. I am sure that you will grant. etc.  
But as one that unadvisedly had gone about to find fault with words that he was not able justly to disprove: Cerberus leaveth these words, and returneth to an Argument that I wrote well most nine leaves before, and saith. He maketh also an Argument after this sort, saying: Whatsoever God foreseeth and predestinateth, must necessarily come to pass (for his prescience and predestination are infallible) but he foreseeth & predestinateth all things. Ergo, all things must come to pass of necessity. Here Cerberus hath found matter to brabble about. The mayor proposition of this Argument he findeth no fault withal. Wherefore I will suppose that he thinketh it to be true, that whatsoever God foreseeth and predestinateth, must necessarily come to pass. But by Cerberus own confession, God foreseeth & predestinateth all good things. Ergo, all good things come to pass of necessity. Thus much have we gotten of Cerberus. So that if it be a Stoical opinion, to say that all things come to pass of necessity: yet Cerberus shall not be so clear from it as he would seem to be.  
But my minor proposition must be apparently false. For though God do foresee all things, yet doth he predestinate only those things which are good, as the scriptures & ancient writers do prove. So that now there remaineth no more to be proved by me, but that God predestinateth those things that be evil. Which thing if I can prove: Cerberus and I are agreed.  
Well, If Cerberus would be entreated to believe all that I have written in the former part of this Apology: then should the controversy betwixt us, soon be ended. For I have said, that even those things, that are worst in man's doings, are good in God's purpose. As the consenting to the persuasion of the Serpent in the first man: the murder of Abel in Cain, & those wickednesses that others have wrought: were in God's purpose good, although in those that did those things, they were exceeding evil. For than hath Cerberus granted, that God doth predestinate them, and so consequently he hath granted that they come to pass of necessity, as those things that God predestinateth must needs do. But whether Cerberus will believe that which I have written or no: I will by Gods help prove that those actions which in man are most wicked, were predestinated by God to be done: And then I trow mine Argument shall conclude aright, notwithstanding aught that Cerberus shallbe able to say to the contrary.  
And lest we should vary about predestination, as not agreeing upon the definition what it is: I am contented to take that description which Cerberus himself hath made of it. He saith, that to predestinate any thing, is first to purpose, decree, appoint, or ordain it to be done. But God hath first decreed to be done all the evil things as ever were done by men: Ergo, he hath predestinated evils. The minor in this argument is proved by that that is written in the fourth Chapter of the Acts of the Apostles. Conuenerunt enim in Civitate ista, adversus filium tuum jesum, quem unxisti, Herodes & Pòntius Pilatus, cum gentibus & populis Israel: ad faciendum quaecunque manus tua & consilium tuum decreverunt fieri. That is to say. In this same City (meaning jerusalem) Herode and Pontius Pilate, with the Heathen and the people of Israel, gathered themselves together, against thy child jesus whom thou hast anointed: to do unto him whatsoever things thy hand and counsel have first decreed to be done. What those things were, it is manifest in the history of the Gospels. They called him a Samaritane, they said he had a devil, they sought to take him in his answers, they went about to stone him to death, they accused him, they condemned him, and fastened him to a Cross, & then railed upon him. What could men do worse than to use themselves so towards the son of God? But S. Peter saith, that all these things were done according as the hand & counsel of God had first decreed to be done: Wherefore I think my minor in my first Argument that Cerberus findeth such fault withal, to be sufficiently proved.  
But now Cerberus hath made of my minor, a mayor, and framed an Argument for his purpose, which I must say some thing to, otherwise will Cerberus glory in his Arte.  
God doth not only foresee, but also predestinate all things, yea, even sin and evil. etc. But he is Author of all that he predestinateth: Ergo, he is the Author of sin. The first part (saith Cerberus) is their own assertion. And for my part, I acknowledge it so to be. But not in that meaning that Cerberus saith it. For it is not our hare assertion without proof, but we are able by plain Scriptures and reasons, to prove that God doth both foresee and predestinate all things, as I have before proved in the confirming of this same proposition, being the minor in mine Argument. But for more ample proof: the Reader may consider that which is written in the Psalm 138. where David the Prophet saith thus. Lord, thou 
Psal. 138.  hast proved me, and hast known me. Thou hast known my downesitting and my uprising. Thou understandest my thoughts long since. Thou hast searched my path and my couch round about, and hast foreseen all my ways. For lo, there is not a word in my mouth: Behold, thou Lord knowest all things. This is sufficient for the proof of the first part of this proposition. Which is, that God foreseeth all things. For the proof of the second part, which is, that God predestinateth all things: I have cited the words of Peter in the fourth of the Acts: wherein is affirmed, that the power & counsel of God did first appoint those things to be done, which were done to Christ by Herod, Pilate, the Gentiles, & the people of the jews.  
Reason's also we have to prove the same, which are these. If God should not foresee all things, he could not be provident in all things: but it must needs be granted that he is provident in all things: Ergo, he doth foresee all things. If God did not predestinate all things, than might his providence be deceived: but his providence cannot be deceived: Ergo, he doth predestinate all things. This may suffice for the proof of our assertion. Now let us see, how Cerberus annecteth his minor to this mayor, which is this. But God is the Author of all those things that he predestinateth. And to prove this doth Cerberus make much a do, yea and much more than needeth. For we will not stick to grant him that God is the Author of all that he predestinateth. Well saith Cerberus, than I conclude, that God is the Author of all sin & evil. I deny that Argument.  
It were but folly to reason much with this bawling Cur, about the rules of Logic: For it seemeth by his conclusion that he knoweth no Logic at all. For if he did, he would not so shamelessly infer a necessary conclusion upon the granting of pure particulars. For it is a general rule among Logicians, that A puris particular ribus nòn necesse est sequi veram conclusionem. It is not a thing of necessity, that a true conclusion should follow upon those propositions that be pure particulars. As in this Argument that Cerberus hath made, the mayor and minor are. Again, he concludeth more than is granted in the Antecedent (which is also contrary to the rules of Logic) For though it be granted, that God is the Author of all that he predestinateth: yet is he not the Author, as Cerberus doth conclude that he is: That is to say, the cause, the spring, the fountain, the root, the beginning and Author of any thing that is not good. For none evil thing can spring of him that is altogether good & nothing but goodness itself. As I have said already therefore: so I say again. God is the cause, spring, fountain, root, beginning and Author of all things that have any being. For he only hath his being of himself: & all other things have their being of him. And he alone is the worker of all actions: Name in eo vivimus, movemur & sumus. In him we live, move, & have our being. And as these things spring of God the fountain of goodness, so are they all exceeding 
Act. 17.  good. And as the actions are wrought by him so are they exceeding good also: although in themselves they be exceeding evil, as is the Devil and all his Angels and members, and all those works that are wrought contrary to the commandment of God. And the words and thoughts that are of the same kind. As I have sufficiently proved before, by examples taken out of the holy histories.  
Let Cerberus therefore look upon his Logiek again, and learn to frame a Syllogismus better. Peradventure being in his mad mood when he wrote this answer to his friends letter: he had quite forgotten the fourteen moods of the three figures, wherein the Logicians do use to form their Syllogismusses. To give him occasion therefore, to call himself to remembrance: I will set down those short memorial Verses which the teachers of Art use to print in the minds of their Scholars, to the end that they should not in disputations be abused by such as Cerberus is, which use to frame Arguments, without either figure or mood. The Verses are these.  

Barbara, Celarent, Primae, Darij, Ferioque.  
Cesare, Camestres, Festino, Baroco, secundae.  
Tertia grandè sonans, recitat Darapti Felapton  
Adiungens Disamis, Datisi, Bocardo, Ferison.   
Now, if Cerberus be acquainsed with these Verses: Let him show in which of these figures and moods his Syllogismus is form. And if he find it in none of them: then let him desire some more skilful than himself, to take this matter in hand. For his Art will not serve him to go thorough withal, so long as he meddleth with them that know what Art is.  
I know that the matter contained in Cerberus' Syllogism, may be brought into the form of a Syllogism in the first figure, and the third mood called Darij. After this manner. Whosoever doth predestinate any thing, is the Author thereof. But God doth predestinate sin. Ergo, he is the Author thereof. Thus far I have helped Cerberus to frame his Argument. But lest Cerberus should think that I have framed against myself such an Argument as I am not able to salute: I will show the fallacy of it. First in the mayor, the word Author is doubtful. For it may be understanded either of him that predestinateth or foreappointeth a thing to be done, or of him that is the doer of the same thing. And therefore in reasoning it must be explained and made void of all amphibology and doubt. For this is a rule in Logic, that the terms which are used in reasoning, must be plain and void of all doubtfulness. If we will therefore make a good mayor in this Argument, we must say, that whosoever doth predestinate or foreappoint a thing to be done, is so the Author of it, that the act or deed done, must be ascribed to him, in as much as it is a deed or an act done. And then may we add this minor, but God hath predestinated and foreappointed the act or deed that is done by the sinner: Ergo, so far forth as it is an act or a deed, God is the Author of it. Here is not God charged with the sin that man committeth, for that springeth of man's choice, which being corrupted and made bond to sin by the sin that the first man first committed, can not of itself choose to do any thing in such sort, that the same shall not be sin. For man's wisdom and choice, which S. Paul calleth the wisdom of the flesh, neither is, nor 
Rom. 8.  can be subject to the law of God. And so all that man thinketh, speaketh or doth in his own wisdom & choice, is against the law & commandment of God, & so sin by the common desinition of sin, as is mentioned before.  
And to make this matter more plain, let us take one example or two, whereof in the holy Histories & books of the Prophets, we have many, and let us see how God is the Author of the act or deed, and not of the sin that is in the act. First in the xix Chapter of the fourth book 
4. Reg. 19  of the Kings, we read, that when Sinacharib had blasphemed God, and Ezechias the King had made his complaint and prayers to God: the Prophet Esay was commanded to say thus unto the King. Be not afraid of the words wherewith ye have heard the King of the Assyrians servants blaspheming me. Behold, I will change his mind, and he shall hear a tidings, and shall return into his own country, & I will overthrow him with the sword in his own land. And in the end of that same Chapter, the History saith thus. And when he was worshipping in the Temple of Nesroch his God: Adramelech & Saraser his own sons, slew him with the sword. Here it is manifest, that God according to his promise made to Ezechias, hath killed Sinacharib: but yet by that sword of his own sons. The act in this murder is Gods, and so it is exceeding good, for it is the performance of God's promise, and the execution of just judgement upon the wicked blasphemer. But the sin of the act, was theirs whose hands were instruments to murder their father. For they minded nothing less than to fulfil God's promise, or to execute his judgement upon the blasphemer.  
The same example we read in the ten chapter of Esay the Prophet, set forth yet more plainly after this sort. 
Esay. 10.  Come Assur, thou rod of my fury, and the staff of my wrath, amongst these men. etc. And a little after. But he will not think so, and his heart will not be so persuaded: but his purpose will be to destroy, and to bring many Nations to nought. etc. Here we see, how God used Sinacharib as his rod in chastising the Nations: and yet did he sin in those actions that God wrought by him. And we see also how God used his sons, in destroying him, and yet they sinned in murdering their Father. So is God the Author of the act, which was good in him, and they Authors of the sin of the act, which was evil in them.  
Another example we have written in the xii chapter of the second book of the Kings, where the Prophet Nathan 
2. Reg. 12.  saith thus to King David. Thus saith the Lord. Behold, I will stir up evil against thee in thine own house, and I will take from thee thy wives, even before thy face, and will give them to thy neighbour, & he shall lie with them in the open sunnelight. Thou haste done this deed in secret: but I will do this that I have spoken of, even in the sight of all Israel, and in the open sunnelight. The fulfilling of this is written in the xuj Chapter of the same book. The act whereof wrought by Absolome, was in God, who used Absolome as his instrument, the just punishment that David's sin, in abusing Uries wife, had deserved. But the same in Absolome, was abominable and incestuous whoredom, whereby Absolome minded to make all Israel think, that he abhorred his father, and that he would utterly root him out.  
Let this suffice for the making plain of that which I have said, concerning that which I have said, touching the act in God, and sin of the wicked act in man.  
Thus much for the matter of Cerberus Argument reduced into form.  
Now let us see what may be said to that one place, that in stead of so many, Cerberus citeth out of S. Austen. Which doth not only resolve clearly this matter between foresight and predestination, but also most plainly teach all that is to be said of Predestination.  
And first, let us set down all the words of S. Austen, even as they stand in the place whereout Prosper doth cite them. They are written in the eleventh of those Articles, which are falsely imposed upon S. Austen. The words of the Article are these. Quòd quando pairs incestant 
Articulo. 11. fals. Aug. imp  silias, & matres silij, vel quando servi Dominos occidunt, ideò fiat, quia Deus praedestinavit, ut ita sicret. That when the fathers do abuse their own daughters, and sons their own mothers, and servants murder their own masters, the same is done, because God hath predestinated that it should be so done. To this Article doth S. Austen answer thus. Si Diabolo obijceretur, quòd talium facinorum ipse Author, ipse esset inventor: puto quòd aliqua ratione hac se posset exo 〈…〉 rare invidia, & talium scelerum patratorem, de ipsorum voluntate vinceret: quia, etsi delectatus sit surore peccantium, proharet tamèn se nòn intulisse vim criminum. Qua ergo insipientia, quaue dementia desinitur, ad Dei referrendum esse consilium, quod nec Diabolo in toto ascribi potest: qui in peccantium flagitijs, illecebrarum adiutor, nòn voluntatum credendus est esse generator? Nihil ergo talium negotiorum, Deus praedestinavit ut fieret, nec illam animam, turpitèr, nequiterque victuram ad hoc ut taliter vi 〈…〉 eret praeparavit, sed talem futuram nòn ignoravit & de tali se justè iudicaturum esse praescivit. Atque ita ad predestinationem eius nihil amplius referri potest, nisi quòd ad debitam justitiae retributionem, aùt ad indebitam pertinet gratiae largitatem. That is to say. If i● should be laid to the devils charge, that he were the Author or inventor of such wicked deeds: I suppose he might by some reason unburden himself of this envy, and to prove that the committer of such wickednesses, cometh of the will of those men that charge him withal. For although he be delighted with the outrage of them that sin: yet might he prove that he had not enforced them to commit the faults. By what folly, or what madness therefore, is it agreed, that that thing should be referred to the decree of God, which may n 〈…〉 be altogether ascribed to the Devil, which may be thought to be an helper forward of the provocations, in the wicked acts of them that sin, but not the begetter of their wills. God therefore hath not predestinated any such things to be done, neither hath he prepared that soul to live filthily and wickedly, of purpose that it should so live: but he was not ignorant that it would prove such a one, and he knew before hand, that he himself should execute just judgement upon such a one. And so, nothing may be referred to the predestinatiö of God, more than that, which appertaineth to the due reward of justice, or to the undeserved gift of grace or mercy.  
These words (saith Cerberus) being thoroughly weighed: do plainly set forth, the full resolution of this question. It is very true, they do so. And therefore, I beseech thee good Reader, weigh them well, that thou mayst by them be resolved in this matter of God's predestination. And that thou mayst so be, thou needest no more but to weigh the words of Austin's conclusion, wherein he saith, that there can no more be referred to God's predestination, but that only which doth appertain either to the due reward of justice, or else to the undeserved gift of mercy.  
When Sinacharibs sons slew their own father: was not the act in this murder that due reward of justice, for that he had blasphemed God? And had not God said before, that he would slay him with the sword for that blasphemy? Why may we not then by S. Austin's words, refer this deed to God's predestination: When Absolom abused his father's wives, was not the act of that incestuous whoredom, the due reward of justice, for that David had abused the wife of his servant Urias? And had not God said before, that he would punish it so? Why should not the act therefore, in that incest, be referred to God's predestination, even by these words that Cerberus citeth for his purpose. In like manner may we say of all other actions, which in the men that do them are wicked, although we know not what sins God doth punish by them, whereby the same deeds in him are exceeding good and just.  
If Cerberus would, he might have seen some other places of S. Austen, wherein this matter is made more plain, than the bare words seem to make it here. First in his xviij book, De Civitate Dei. He saith thus. Elegit discipulos, quos & Apostolos nominavit, humiliter natos, inhonoratos, 
August. de Civit. Dei. 18. Cap. 49.  illitteratos: ut quicquid magnum essent & facerent, ipse in eyes esset & faceret. Habuit inter cos unum, quo malo utens benè, & suae passionis dispositum impleret, & Ecclesiae suae tollerandorum malorum praeberet exemplum. That is to say. He (that is to say Christ) did choose Disciples, whom he called also Apostles, men borne of poor parents, not called to honour, unlearned: that he might be and do in them, what so ever they should be, or do. Among these he had one that was nought, that by using well that evil and naughty one, he might both fulfil the order of his own passion, and also give unto his Church, an example how to bear and suffer those that be wicked.  
Again, in his first Sermon upon the first part of the. 34. Psalm: S. Austen saith thus: Ille videbat traditorem suum, & elegit illum magis adopus necessarium, illius 
August. in Psalm. 34.  malo magnum bonum operatus est. Et tamèn inter duodecem electus est, nè ipse duodenarius tam exiguus numerus esset sine malo: hoc ad exemplum nostrae patientiae, quoniam necesse erat ut inter malos vineremus. That is to say: He (that is Christ) did see and know him that should betray him, and he did the rather choose him as one necessary for that business, and by the evil of that traitor he did work a great good work. And yet was the traitor chosen among the twelve, lest that little number of twelve should be without a naughty one: this was done for an example of our patience, because of necessity we must live among such as he evil. Again in the. 59 tract. upon john he saith. Quod ergo dico, 
August. in john. tract. 59  inquit, beati critis, si feceritis ea, nòn de omnibus vobis dico. Est inter vos qui nòn erit beatus, neque faciet ea, & ego scio quos elegerim: quos? nisi cos qui beati erunt faciendo quae praecepit, ac facienda monstravit, qui efficere beatos potest? Nòn est igitur traditor Iudas electus? Quid est ergo quod alio loco dicit? Nonnè ego vos duodecem elegi, & unus ex v●bis Diabolus est? a & ipse ad aliquid electus est, ad quod utique erat necessarius? Nòn autem ad beatitudinem, de qua modo ait, Beati critis si feceritis ea. Hoc nòn de omnibus di cit, scit enim quos ad societ atem beatitudinis huius elegerit. Nòn est exeis iste, qui panem illius sic edebat, ut super eum levaret calcancum. etc.  
That is to say: Where as I say therefore (saith Christ) ye shallbe happy, if he shall do those things: I do not speak those words of you al. There is one amongst you that shall not be happy, neither shall he do those things. And I do know whom I have chosen. Whom hath he chosen? None but those, that shallbe blessed in doing those things, that he which is able to make them blessed hath commanded & showed that they aught to be done. Is not the traitor judas elected then? What meaneth that then, that Christ saith in another place? Have not I chosen you twelve and one of you is a Devil? Was he also elected to some thing, whereunto even he was necessary? Truly, he was not elected to the blessedness, whereof Christ spoke before, when he said: ye shall be happy if ye do those things. He speaketh not this of all: for he knoweth whom he hath chosen to the fellowship of this blessedness. This fellow, which did so eat Christ's bread, that he did life up his heel against him, is none of that fellowship. etc.  
Again, the same Saint Austen in the. 62. treatise 
August. in job. tract. 62.  upon john saith thus. Nisi ergo se traderet Christus, nemo traderet, Christum. Quid habet Iudas nisi peccatum? Neque enim in tradendo Christo salutem nostram cogitavit, propter quam traditus est Christus: sed cogitavit pecuniae lucrum, & invenit animae detrimentum. Accepit mercedem quam voluit: sed nolenti est data quam neluit. Tradidit Iudas Christum: tradidit Christus scipsum. Ille agebat negotium suae venditionis: iste nostrae redemptionis. Quod facis facito citius, nòn quia tu potes, sed quia hoc vult qui omnia potest. That is say. Except therefore Christ would deliver up himself: no man could betray him. What was there in judas more than sin? For in betraying Christ he minded not to work our salvation, for which Christ was betrayed: but his mind was upon the gain of money, and he found the loss of his own soul. He received the reward that he desired: but that reward which he was not willing to have, was given unto him being unwilling to have it. judas did betray Christ: and Christ did deliver up himself. The one applied his merchandise, the other, our redemption. That thou dost, do quickly (said Christ) not because thou art able to do it: but because he that is able to do all things, is willing it should be so.  
Again, in the hundredth and vij treatise upon john, he saith thus: Quos dedisti mihi custodivi, & nemo ex hijs perijt, 
August. in john. tract. 107  nisi filius perditionis, ut Scriptura impleatur. Filius perditionis dictus est proditor Christi, perditioni praedestinatus, secundum Scripturam, quae de illo in Psalmo Centesimo octavo maximè prophetatur. That is to say: I have kept those that thou hast given unto me, and none of them is perished, save only the child of perdition, that the Scripture might be fulfilled. He that betrayed Christ is called the child of perdition, because he was predestinated to destruction, according to the Scripture, which in the Psalm. 108. chiefly is prophesied of him.  
Assaine in his questions upon Exodus, and the. 18. question. S. Austen saith thus. Assiduè Deus dicit, Indurabo 
August. lib. 2 Quest. sup. Ex. Questione. 18.  cor Pharaonis: & velut causam insert, cur hoc faciat, & implebo signa mea & portenta mea in Aegypto: tanquàm necessaria suerit obduratio Pharaonis, ut signa Dei multiplicarentur vel implerentur in Aegypto. Vtitur ergo Deus benè cordibus malis, ad id quod vult ostendere bonis, vel quod facturus est bonis. That is to say: God doth oftentimes say, I will harden pharao's heart: and he doth as it were bring in a cause why he would do it, saying: And I will fulfil my signs and wonders in Egypt: as though the hardening of Pharaoh should be necessary to the multiplying and fulfilling of God's wonders in Egypt. God therefore, doth use well those hearts that be evil, for the fulfilling of that thing that he is willing to show to them that are good, or of that which he mindeth to do for them.  
If Cerberus had had eyes to see: he might as well have seen these places of Austen, as that one place which he thinketh so sufficient for the declaration of the whole matter. And there is not one of these places, that is not of equal authority with that one place of his. Yea, and the first of these places is of greater authority, as may appear to them that will read the books of S. Austin's Retractations.  
In these places S. Austen saith, that Christ chose to be his disciples, such men as were born of poor parentage, not called to honour, and unlearned: that he might the and do in them, whatsoever they should be, or do. The actions therefore, that were done by them, were his actions, and were in him exceeding good, although the same were in some of them exceeding evil. This thing is made more plain in the other places cited out of S. Austen. First he saith: Christ know him that should betray him, and he chose him so much the rather, as one necessary for his business. And again he saith, speaking of judas, was not he also elected to some thing whereunto he was necessary? And again. Except Christ would have delivered up himself: no man could have betrayed him. What was there in judas but sin? As who should say, the act was Christ's, but the sin in the act was judasses'. Yea, he saith further: That which thou dost, do quickly. Not because thou art able to do it: but because he that is able to do all things will have it so done. And last of all he saith of judas, that he was called the child of perdition, because he was predestinated to destruction.  
I suppose if Cerberus had seen and well weighed these places of Austen: he would not have triumphed so greatly in that one place of his. Neither would he have derided the judgement of those that ascribing the act unto God, do justly ascribe the sin of the same act unto sinful man, from whose free choice consenting unto evil, the sin of the act doth spring, and not from God from whom nothing can come that is not exceeding good (as it cometh from him.) But let us now see how this hell hound playeth with his own tail.  Cerberus. 
But to return again unto those, that contrary to the Scripture, and all ancient writers: do teach, that God doth not only foresee, but also predestinate both good and evil, as well the murder of Cain, as the holiness of Abel: and thereby make God plainly the Author of sin. When they perceive the outrageous blasphemy, to be overmuch apparent and manifest: then do they sometimes closely roll it up in a riddle again. Which yet for the dark speech thereof, may serve at the least, to blind the eyes of some. As where (among many other ways) they plainly make God the Author of sin is, saying that God is not only the principal cause, but also the Author of all things without exception, both on the one side and on the other. If they be then urged with the consequence, that God is the Author of sin: they will answer, that in all abomination, God is the Author of the fact, but not of the crime, as of the fact, deed or work of adultery, sodometry, murder and Idolatry, God is the Author say they, but not of the fault or crime. This Enigma have I heard some men use, and it is also written in a book, entitled, a brief treatise of election and reprobation, lately set forth and printed in the English tongue, where he saith thus. Though we be compelled to say, that God is the Author of the fact: yet we must answer, but not of the crime.  
Areade, areade, what is that? God is the Author of the very fact & deed of adultery, theft, murder, and treason: and yet he is not the Author of sin. And why? The subtility of the Riddle is this. That sin is nothing. The thief is not hanged for the deed that he hath committed (for God is the Author thereof) but he is hanged for the sin, and that is for nothing. For when they say, God is the Author of all things, than nothing is excepted. But sin is nothing, & therefore he is not the Author of sin. The thief is hanged for nothing. The murderer is put to death for nothing. The traitor loseth his head for nothing. The wicked are punished in everlasting fire for nothing. A marvelous sophistication. A strange Paradox, & cautelous riddle. But to be short, though many ways, this subtlety might be answered: I will take only the definition of sin, as I find it written in the same book, where he saith very truly.  
The nature of sin, is defined by the authority of Scripture, to be a thought, word or deed, contrary to the will of God.  
Now, because they say, that God is the Author of all evil deeds, though not of the crimes: let us pace over the evil thought, and evil words, and speak only of the deed itself, which he himself desineth to be sin, and contrary to God's will. If God then be Author of the fact or deed, which deed is sin, and contrary to God's will: how can he then say, that God is the Author of the fact, but not of the fault, soing he himself setteth forth, not only a thought or a word, but also a deed to be sin? And if God be the Author of that same deed, which deed is sin: is it not a thing most plain, that God is the Author of sin?  Crowley. 
Mark gentle Reader, I pray thee, how this Puppy playeth with his own tail. He imagineth that all, even as many as do hold, that God doth not only foresee, but also predestinate all things both good and evil: do therein hold that God is the Author of all sin and abominable wickedness. The contrary whereof is in the former part of this Apology, sufficiently proved. But he hath heard, he saith, yea and seen in an English book, an Enigma, a marvelous sophistication, a strange Paradox, and a cautelous Riddle, which is this. Though we be compelled to say, that God is the Author of the fact: yet we must answer, but not of the crime.  
Areade, areade, what is that? saith Cerberus. The Cur can not smell how the act may be Gods, and the sin that is in the act: his that is the instrument in the working of the act.  
But the subtlety of this Riddle, saith he, is this. That sin is nothing. And then the thief is hanged for nothing, the murderer is put to death for nothing, the traitor loseth his head for nothing, and the wicked are punished in everlasting fire for nothing. But this is some thing. That Cerberus saith that there is some thing whereof God is not the Author. And so it followeth upon his words, that either there is another being besides God, whereof those things that God is not the Author of, have their being: or else that those things have their being of themselves, and are therein equal with God, whose greatest honour is, in that he is and hath his being of himself. But Cerberus must be borne withal, whatsoever be saith. For if he be contraried: all hell shall ring of his bawling. We may not conclude upon his words as he doth upon ours. But for this once I will be bold to say, that if God be not the principal cause and Author of all things without exception: then there be some things, whereof God is not the principal cause and Author. And so must it needs follow, whether Cerberus will or no, that the words in the beginning of S. john's Gospel are not true, Omnia per ipsum facta sunt, & sine ipso factum est nihil quod factum est. By him 
johannis. 〈◊〉.  were all things made, and nothing that was made, was made without him. But we know this saying to be true. Wherefore we are bold to conclude, contrary to the judgement of Cerberus: that God is not only the principal cause, but also the Author and maker of all things. And because Cerberus saith that we hold a Paradox contrary to all the ancient writers: let him read that which S. Austen writeth in the. 26. Chapter of his 
August. lib. Retrac. cap. 26  first book of Retractations. His words be these. Viri 〈…〉 Deus Autor mali nòn sic? ubi videndum est, nè maè intelligatur quod dixi. Mali Author nòn est, quia omnium qua sunt, Author est, quia in quantum sunt, in tantum bona sunt. Et nè hine putetur, nòn abillo esse poenam malorum, quae utique malum est ijs qui puniuntur. Sed hoc ita dixi, quemadmedun dictum est. Deus mortem nòn fecit. Cum alibi scriptum sit. Mors & vita à Domino Deo est. Malorum ergo poena quae à Deo est, mala est quidem malis, 
Sapient. 1. Eccles. 11.  sed in bonis Dei operibus est, quoniam justum est ut mali puniantur, & utique bonum est, omne quòd justum est. That is to say: Whether God be not the Author of the thing that is evil? where men must take heed, that they do not misconster that which I have said, that is: That God is not the Author of that which is evil, for he is Author of all those things that have any being, for in asmuch as they be, they be good. Also men must take heed, that hereby they take not occasion to think, that the punishment of the wicked cometh not of God: which punishment, is also evil unto them that be punished. But I spoke this, even as it is said, that God made not death. Whereas in another place it is written. Death and life are of the Lord God. The punishment therefore of the wicked, which cometh of God, is evil unto them that be evil. But yet it is among the good works of God. For it is right that the wicked be punished, and every thing that is right, is good.  
I suppose that when Cerberus hath read and well weighed these words of S. Austen: he will not say that we hold a Paradox, unless he mind to match S. Austen with us. Which if he shall do, he shall shake his own building very sore. For it standeth well most altogether upon S. Austin's ground, although without Saint Austin's consent.  
But Cerberus will look, that some thing should be said to the answer that he maketh to our subtle sophistication. For he seemeth to himself to have said so much that will we nill we, it must be confessed that God being the Author of the thing that is evil, he is also the Author of the evil and sin that is in the thing.  
Cerberus saw many ways, whereby the subtlety of our Riddle might be answered: but he would use only the definition of sin, which he found written in the same English book that our Enigma is written in. Oh what a valiant champion is this, he will use none of his own weapons: he will be able to wound us, yea utterly to beat us down and conquer us with our own weapons. Very truly hath that English writer said (saith Cerberus) that the nature of sin, is defined by the authority of Scripture, to be a thought, word or deed contrary to the will of God. And because he will not seem to take too much vantage: he passeth over the thoughts & words, and taketh only the deeds done against the will of God. And with them he will beat us down flat to the ground.  
The reason that he useth, is this. If God be the Author of that deed that is sin and contrary to the will of God, how can he say that God is the Author of the fact and not of the fault? Here is a substantial answer. Because Cerberus can not tell how it should be so: therefore it is not so, neither may any man say it is so. And yet I have proved it to be so, both by the example of Sinacharibs death and other. As Cerberus may see, if he will, in the former part of this Apology.  Cerberus. 
And all this their travel is to prove, that the ordinance and predestination of God, doth so carry men even headlong, unto all actions, though they be never so mischievous: that of necessity they must needs and can not choose but commit the same. As though God's predestination were like a tempest of wind, so blowing in the sails of a man's heart, that by it he is carried headlong to all things, whatsoever he doth, according to the saying of the Poet, jam magis atque magis, praeceps agit omnia Fatum. Now, more and more destiny hurleth all things headlong. But surely, this Stoical necessity, maketh such a confusion of all things: that let them colour up the matter, with as much cunning as they can, and qualify it with as fair words as may be: yet shall there never the state of a common wealth in England stand, if this persuasion may once take root among the people, beside that it is utterly repugnant to the holy Scripture, and against all the ancient writers, as shallbe hereafter briefly proved.  Crowley. 
Now Cerberus is bold to affirm, that all that we do, is nothing else but to prove, that God's ordinance and predestination doth carry headlong all men into all actions, be they never so mischievous, as a tempest carrieth all afore it. etc. Surely Cerberus is too bold herein: and doth much mistake the purpose of our travail. If he would, he might see (except the smoke of Hell have marred his sight) that our purpose i●, to prove that God in wisdom doth know, foresee and order all things. And that nothing can be done by any creature otherwise than as by his instruments, which he doth use in wisdom, mercy, and justice, and that so all actions are his, as the chief worker in all things. And that the same actions, as they are wrought by him, are exceeding good: although in the creatures that God useth for his instruments, some of them be exceeding evil. But Cerberus saith, we do maintain Stoical Fatum or destiny. And that if this persuasion may once take place in the people: there shall never state of a Commonwealth stand in England. Besides that, it is contrary to the holy Scripture, and against all the ancient writers, as he will briefly prove. Well good Reader. Mark I pray thee, how Cerberus shall prove that he promiseth to prove: and how he shall be answered again. And then doubt not but thou shalt see how well that blind Cur standeth in his own conceit, and thinketh himself to have a clear sight.  Cerberus. 
And where they deny this doctrine of theirs to be the Stoical opinion, because the stoics (say they) feigned, that nature, with such order of cause as she hath tied together, doth bring all things to pass by necessity. But they affirm, that God by his eternal predestination, foreordinance, and providence, bringeth all things to pass by like necessity. Thus do the best learned of them make the difference. But a plain delusion it is, to blind the eyes of men withal. For (as Priscianus saith) Fatum, (which we call destiny) is derived of the particple Fatus, which is as much to say, as spoken. Because it is nothing else (saith he) but that which is spoken or appointed of God. As if a man should say, it must needs be so, for God hath spoken the word. Eusebius also citing the definition of Chrysippus, saith, that Fatum is nothing else but a certain decree, ordinance or determination of God. Which thing (to make no more rehearsal of many men's sayings) Augustine plainly declared in his book, De Civitate Dei. Lib. 5. Cap. 1. Thus saith he is it proved, that they did call the will of the high God, Fatum. God's will sayeth Austen, they called Fatum, or destiny. It is manifest therefore that the stoics did not imagine, that nature by an order of causes brought all things to pass by necessity. But rather that God, foreordeining and appointing in order all causes in nature or otherwise: brought all things to pass by necessity. Which thing together with the order of causes, Tully speaketh of plainly, saying: Fati necessitas. etc. The necessity of destiny (saith Tully) is that, which of God is ordained and appointed that it come to pass by an everlasting order of causes.  Crowley. 
The stoics & we (as Cerberus saith) do differ only in this. That they affirm all things to come to pass by the necessity of destiny: & we, by the necessitio of God's eternal predestination, foreordinance, & providence. And this is the difference that the best learned amongst us do make. Who these best learned be, Cerberus doth not tell us. But this I am sure, that none amongst us that is learned, will say that there is none other difference between the Stoical opinion and ours, than that which Cerberus hath set down. For the stoics held, that the wills of men are not under the necessity of their Fatum or destiny, because they could not see how it should so be, and yet be free also, as it may well appear by that that S. Austen writeth in the ten Chapter of his fift book. De Civitate Dei. where his words are these. unde, nec illa necessitas formidandaest, 
August. De Civit. Dei. lib. 5. Cap. 10.  quam fermidando Stoici laboraverunt: causas rerum ita distinguere, ut quasdam subtraberent necessitati quasdam subderent: atque in his quaes esse sub necessitate noluerunt, posuerunt etiam nostras voluntates, nè videlicet nòn essent liberae, si subderentur necessitati. etc. That is to say. Wherefore, that necessity is not to be feared, the fear whereof caused the stoics so to divide the causes of things, that they pulled away some things from necessity, and thrust some things under it: and amongst those things that they would not suffer to be under necessity, they have placed our wills, lest they should not be free, if they should be subject to necessity. etc. But we hold, that all things, our wills & altogether, are subject to God's providence: Ergo, there is more difference between the stoics and us, than Cerberus saith that there is. And it is no delusion at all that we use in that we refuse to call it Fatum or destiny: although we know that Priscianus & Tully, Eusebius, Chrysippus & other, do in their sorts speak of Fatum, after such sort, that to the negligent Reader there may seem small difference between them and us, in the matter of God's eternal and everlasting providence and predestination. For we follow herein S. Austen, whose sentence Cerberus would feign frame against us. But I pray thee gentle Reader, mark well the words of S. Austen, even in the same book, out of which Cerberus citeth matter against us. Yea and in the self same Chapter, which is the first of the fift book: where the words that he fathereth upon S. Austen, are not found. But these words are found there. Prorsus divina providentia, regna constituuntur humana. Quaesi propterea quisquam fato tribuit, quia ipsam Dei voluntatem vel potestatem sati nomine appellat, sententiam teneat, linguam corrigat. Cur enim nòn hoc primum decit, quod postea dicturus est, cum ab illo quisquam quaesierit, quid dixerit Fatum? Nam id homines quando audiunt, usitata loquendi consuetudine, nòn intelligunt nisi vim positionis syderum, qualis est quandò quis nascitur, sive concipitur: quod aliqui alienant à Dei voluntate, aliqui ex illa etiam hoc pendere confirmant. That is to say. The Kingdoms of this world, are altogether ordained by the providence of God. Which if any man have given unto destiny, because he doth call the will or power of God itself, by the name of destiny: let the same continue in his opinion, but let him reform his tongue. For why doth he not at the first say that, which afterward he will say, when any man shall ask him what he doth call destiny? For when men do hear that thing: they do not by the common manner of speech understand any other thing, than the force of the position of the stars, as the same is when any is borne or conceived: which some men do separate from the will of God, and some do prove that the one doth hang upon the other.  
In these words S. Austen doth plainly affirm, that even Kingdoms of this world are appointed by God's providence: and yet he denieth that the same should be said to be appointed by destiny. Wherefore in affirming the one, and denying the other, we do but as S. Austen doth.  
How aptly Tully is cited for the purpose of Cerberus: shall plainly appear in mine answer to that which here followeth.  Cerberus. 
The same order of causes also, is not forgotten of our men, that in all points their doctrine might agree with the Stoical doctrine. As in an English book, translated out of French, lately set forth in print, & entitled, a brief declaration of the table of predestination, where he saith. Seeing God hath appointed the end: it is necessary also, that he should appoint the causes which lead unto the same end. As if he should say. Like as God hath appointed some man to be hanged: so hath he appointed him also to steal, as a cause leading unto the same end whereunto he hath appointed him. Or else, it was his destiny to be hanged: Ergo, it was his destiny to steal. Or thus (which is all one) he was appointed by God's predestination to be hanged: Ergo, he was appointed by God's predestination to steal. For seeing God hath appointed the end (saith he) it is necessary also, that he should appoint the causes that lead unto the same end. As for ensaple. If this be true, which they say, that God doth predestinate all things, or that God doth both appoint the end of all things, and also the causes which lead unto the same end: then doth it follow & may truly be said, that Marten Swarth with his men, was appointed and predestinate of God to be slain at the battle of Stoke. And further, it followeth, as God appointed Mart & his fellows to this end: so was sir Richard Simon the Priest, appointed & predestinate of God, to pour in the pestilent poison of privy conspiracy, & traitorous mischief of vain glory into the heart of Lambert his scholar, as a cause leading to the same end. Item that the said Lambert, was appointed & predestinate of God, to consent and agree unto the pestiferous persuasion of his master Sir Richard, in the pride of Lucifer, to aspire unto the high type of honour, in deposing (if it possible were) the right and most noble heir of England, and elevating himself like a traitorous villain, into the royal throne of the same, and that thus he was appointed of God to do, as another cause leading unto the same end which God ordained. Item, that the irish men were appointed of God to be Rebellious traitors against their Sovereign Lord the King of England, and to maintain the false and filthy quarrel of the said Lambert, as another cause leading to the same end. Item that the Lady Margaret sister unto King Edward the fourth, was appointed and predestinated of God, to be a traytouresse to England, and to employ all her wit, source and power, to the utter destruction of her natural country, as another cause leading unto the same end. Item that the said Lady Margaret was appointed of God to conduct and hire Marten Swarth and his men, to invade the Realm of England, as another cause leading to the same end. Item that the said Marten Swarth, the Earl of Lincoln, the Lord Lovel, the Lord Gerarde, and divers other Captains of the Rebels, were appointed or predestinated of God, to be of such valiant courage, in maintaining the false quarrel of traitorous Lambert, that they were slain: on the other side, many a true English man's blood, at the battle of Stoke, which was the end of this woeful Tragedy, and by this, their manifest form of doctrine, was altogether and every part, appointed and ordained of God, both the end and also the causes above rehearsed, and other innumerable, which did lead unto the same end.  Crowley. 
Here are many words and little matter. Great Items and small sums. A great deal of descant and no good plain song. Seing God hath predestinated the end: it is necessary also that he should appoint the causes which lead unto the same end, saith an English book entitled a declaration of the table of Predestination. And what hath Cerberus said here, to disprove this consequence? So far as I am able to judge: we may grant him all that he hath said: and yet affirm still, that if God have appointed the end: he hath also appointed the causes that lead to the same end. But I will understand Cerberus, as I suppose he meaneth: that is, that God doth neither appoint the end, nor causes that lead thereunto. If this be not his meaning: then hath he meant nothing, but to make simple men suppose that he is able to say much. And see, gentle Reader, how well he agreeth with S. Austen, whose authority he would feign use, both in stead of a sword and buckler. In the eight chapter of his fift book. De Civitate Dei. S. Austen saith thus. Qui verè nòn astrorum constitutionem, sicut est eum quidque concipitur, vel nascitur, vel incoatur, sed omnium connexionem seriemque, causarum, qua fit, omne quod fit, Fati nomine appellant: nòn multum cum cis de verbi controversia laborandum atque certandum est: quandoquidem ipsum causarum ordinem, & quandam connexionem, Dei summi tribuunt voluntati & potestati. Qui optimè & veracissimè creditur, & cuncta scire antequam siant, & nihil inordinatum relinquere: à quo sunt omnes potestates, quamuis ab illo nòn sint omnium voluntates. That is to say. As for those men, which do call by the name of destiny, not the constitution or order of the celestial signs, as y● same is at the conception, birth, or beginning of any thing, but the knitting together & order of all causes, whereby every thing that is done, is brought to pass: we need not much to labour and contend with them about the controversy of that word: because they do attribute to y● will & power of God, that order and certain knitting together of causes, which is very well and truly thought to know all things before they come to pass, and to leave nothing unordered: of whom all powers have their being, although all men's wills do not spring of him.  
Here mayst thou see (gentle Reader) how Cerberus falleth out with him, whose authority he would seem chiefly to leave to. Austen saith, that whatsoever is done cometh to pass by that knitting together and continual order of causes which the stoics call destiny. But Cerberus will have all set at six and seven, and that nothing should come to pass by any such order. Austen saith that it is very well and truly thought, that God doth know all things before they come to pass, and that he doth leave nothing unordered. But Cerberus will none of that. For than must Marten Swarth & his men, Sir Richard Simon Priest, and his scholar Lambert, the Irish men, Lady Margaret, the Earl of Lincoln, the Lord Lovel, with the rest that rebelled in King Edward the fourths time, be appointed and ordained of God to do as they did. But rather than it should be so, Cerberus will say with Cotta, that there is no God at all. For so doth S. Austen conclude upon Cicero's disputation that he hath against the stoics. His words be these. Quomodo igitur ordo causarum, qui praescienti certus est Deo, id efficit, ut nihil sit in nostra voluntate, cum in ipso causarum 
August. lib. 5 De Civi. dei. 9  ordine, magnum habeant locum nostrae voluntates? Contendit ergo Cicero cum cis qui hunc causarum ordinem dicunt esse fatalem, vel potiùs ipsum fati nomine appellant, quodnos abhorremus: praecipuè propter vocabulum, quod nòn in re vera consuevit intelligi. Quod vero negat ordinem omnium causarum esse certissimum, & Dei praescientiae notissimum: plus eum quam Stoici detestamur. Aut enim deum esse negat, quod quidem inducta alterius persona in librii de Deorum natura, facere molitus est: Aut si esse consitetur Deum, quem negat praescium futurorum, etiam sic dicit nihil aliud, quàm quod ille dixit insipiens in cord sur, non est Deus. Qui enim non est praescius omnium futurorum: non est utique Deus. That is to say. How doth the order of causes then, which is certain to God that knoweth them before, bring to pass, that there should be nothing in our will: seeing 〈…〉 wills to bear a great sway even in the order of causes itself? Let Cicero therefore strive with them that say that this order of causes is fatal, or rather that do give it the name of destiny, which thing we do abhor: chief for the name, which is not accustomed to be understanded in the thing it self. But where as he doth deny that the order of all causes is most certain and known to the prescience of God: we do detest him more than the stoics did. For either he doth deny that there is a God, which thing in his books concerning the nature of the Gods, he doth under an other man's person endeavour to do: or else, if he do confess that there is a God, whom he denieth to know of things before they come to pass: even so saying, he doth none other thing than did that foolish man which said in his heart, there is no God For he that doth not know afore hand all things that are to come, doubtless the same is not God. If Cerberus had had so much leisure as to read over this ninth Chapter of S. Austin's fift book, out of the which he would feign find matter against us: no doubt he would not have bragged so much of S. Austin's authority. But by like he trusted some other men's notes gathered out of S. Austen, and never saw the books of S. Austen himself. I speak this in his favour. But see gentle Reader, how well Cicero serveth for the purpose that Cerberus doth allege him for. And as thou findest him in this point, so trust him in the rest. Cicero doth not only reason against them that say there is a destiny called in Latin Fatum: but also against all that say there is a God that hath knowledge of things to come. And so consequently he affirmeth that there is no God at all. Spoiling God of his foreknowledge (as S. Austen saith) rather than he would suffer 
August. lib. 〈◊〉 De Civit. 9  man to be spoiled of his free will. But the religious mind (sayeth S. Austen) doth choose both, doth confess both, and with the faith of godliness doth confirm both. That is to say, the foreknowledge of God, and the liberty of man's will. So that whatsoever man doth, we say and believe, that he doth it with the consent of his will.  Cerberus. 
Alas who seeth not the destruction of England to follow this doctrine? who seeth not the confusion of all common weals, to depend hereupon? What Prince may sit safely in the seat of his kingdom? What subject may live quietly possessing his own? What man shall be ruled by right of a law: if this opinion may be perfectly placed in the hearts of the people? But to be short: thou seest here by example, the same which Tully calleth Series causarum, the continual order of causes appointed of God. And our men even in like manner, call it the causes appointed of God, to lead unto the same end which he hath ordained. Whereof followeth the force of cannot choose, which is called Fati necessitas, Fatal necessity, or the necessity of God's ordinance: for as you have heard, Fatum is nothing else but a decree or ordinance of God. Which necessity is set forth of some men under the name of God's predestination, & now oftentimes the same thing is set forth also by this word providence. Which name of providence likewise the Heathen stoics used for the same purpose, as Cicero saith. Pronoca anus fatidica Stoicorum, quam Latinè licet prouidentiam dicere. Pronoca in Greek, saith he, the old wise of the stoics that setteth forth their destiny, which in Latin was called Providentia, the providence of God. But let them call it providence, predestination, preordinance, or what they will: this is (no doubt) the very stoics opinion, that God hath so appointed and preordained all things, that of mere necessity they come to pass. And whatsoever men do, whether it be good or evil: they can not choose but do it. Which necessity Seneca also manifestly declareth in these words. Necessitates omnium rerum quas nulla vis rumpat: fatum existimo. The necessity of all things, saith he, which no force or violence can break: that same I hold to be destiny.  Crowley. 
Now Cerberus can no longer keep it in. He must needs break out in an exclamation against the doctrine of providence, predestination & preordinance. For (saith he) it is none other thing than the very opinion of that Stoics, call it what we will. Who seeth not the destruction of England? etc.  
If God do by his providence govern all things: If God have predestinated or preordained all things, so that they shall come to pass in such time and order as God by his providence, predestination and preordinance hath appointed that they shall: then must no man be so blind as not to see, that England must be destroyed. Then must all Commonweals come to confusion. Then shall no King sit safely in his kingdom, nor any subject in his possession. Yea, no man shall be ruled by the right of a law: but if God do leave the matter to man's discretion, to use the matter as he shall see cause, and do but put to his helping hand when he seeth that man goeth about to bring things to good effect, but in any case determine upon nothing, till the same shall be by man's wisdom devised and enterprised: then shall England and all other Commonweals flourish still, then shall all Princes safely sit in their Kingly seats, then shall all subjects quietly enjoy their possessions, and every man be ruled by the right of a law. Thus much followeth upon the pitiful complaint that Cerberus maketh upon the doctrine of God's providence, his predestination, or preordinance: but I would gladly know, what Cerberus thinketh to be the cause, that in King Edward the fourths days, Marten Swarth, Sir Richard Simon, and the rest, made such a stir in England. Was it for that they were persuaded in this doctrine that Cerberus seemeth to make the cause of all such doings? Surely I suppose there was not one of them that did once dream of any providence of God. For those that take such matters in hand, are commonly as great enemies to God's providence, as is Cerberus himself. And shall Cerberus words make us afraid, to say that God in his providence had predestinated & preordinated all those things to be done? yea, & that it could not otherwise be, but that those things must then be done? Surely, I can see no cause why we should fear so to say: Let Cerberus and his fellows conclude what they wil For I am sure S. Austen in the x. Chapter of his fift book De Civitate Dei: will take our part herein. His words are these. Si autem illa definitur esse necessitas, secundum quam dicimus, necesse esse ut sit aliquid 
August. lib. 5 10. Cap. de civit Dei.  velità fiat: nescio cùr eam timeamus, ne nobis libertatem auserat voluntatis. That is to say. If we call that thing necessity, whereby we say of any thing that it must needs be, or that it must needs be so done, then do not I see why we should fear, lest that should take from us the liberty of our will. When we say therefore that of necessity Marten Swarth and the rest, must make such a stir as they did in King Edward the fourths days: do we take from them the liberty of their will? No saith S. Austen. For they did whatsoever they did, with the free consent of their wills, and felt no constraint at all: But Cerberus is not so satisfied, he will be inquisitive to know what should be the cause why God would in his providence predestinate these men to do these things. I will answer with S. Austen, I can not tell. God doth know a cause: but he hath not made Cerberus and me privy to it. Occulta 
Epist. 59 ad Paulinum.  causa esse potest, iniusta nòn potest. That is. The cause may be secret: but it can not be unjust. Is there any iniquity with God? God forbid. What Seneca thought of destiny, we pass not. But with S. Austen we say. Omnia verò fato fieri nòn dicimus, imò nulla fieri fato dicimus: 
Aug. De civit. lib. 5. cap. 9  quoniam fati nomen ubi solet à loquentibus poni, id est, in constitutione syderum, qua quisque conceptus aut natus est: quoniam res ipsa inaniter asseritur, nihil valere monstramus. Ordinem autem causarum, ubi voluntas Dei plurimum potest, neque negamus, neque fati vocabulo nuncupamus, nisi fortè ut fatum à fando dictum intelligamus, id est, a loquendo. Nòn enim abnuere possumus, esse scriptum in litteris sanctis: semel locutus est Deus, duo haec audivi: quoniam potestas est Dei: & tibi Domine misericordia: quia 
Psalm. 62.  tu reddes unicuique secundum opera eius, Quod enim dictum est, semel locutus est: intelligitur immobilitèr, hoc est, incommutabilitèr est locutus, sicut novit incommutabilitèr omnia, quae futura sunt, & quae ipse facturus est. Hac itaque ratione possumus à fando fatum appellare, nisi hoc nomen iam in aliare soleret intelligi, quo corda hominum nolumus inclinari. That is to say. We say not that all things do come to pass by destiny: yea we say that nothing is done by destiny. For we do plainly show, that the name destiny is of no value, in the place where men use to place it in speaking, that is in the constitution of the heavenly signs, wherein every man is conceived and borne, because the thing itself is vainly affirmed. As for the order of causes, wherein the will of God is of great force and power: we do neither deny, nor call it by the name of destiny, except it be so as we may understand Fatum to be derived of the word For faris, that is of speaking. For we can not deny but it is written in the holy Scriptures: God spoke once, these two sayings, I myself heard it: that power belongeth unto God, and unto thee (O Lord) belongeth mercy: for thou wilt give unto every man according to his works. And where as it is said, he spoke once: we understand that he spoke unmovably, that is unconstantly, even as he did unconstantly know all things that are to come, and that he himself will do. After this sort therefore, we may say that Fatum or destiny, is derived à fando, or speaking, if this name had not now been accustomed to be understanded of another matter, whereunto we are not willing that men's hearts should be inclined.  
Now if Cerberus have aught to say against this, let him make S. Austen one of us. For we are in this point all one with him.  Cerberus. 
And as for that which the Heathen did attribute to the stars or planets, they meant none other, but that God ordained the planets in nature to work such things, as he before had decreed & appointed: Even as we also judge, that God useth the operation of the planets in sending such rain & tempest, fair weather or soul, as his pleasure is, let them say therefore what they can or wil This mere necessity which our men do teach, is the very same which the stoics did hold, which opinion because it destroyed the state of a common wealth, it was banished out of Rome, as Augustine declareth. Lib. Quest. vet. & no. Test. Where he notably refelleth that opinion in these few words, saying. Qua ratione nati dicuntur. etc. By what reason (saith Augustine) were they borne which banished Mathematicos, the setters forth of destiny out of Rome, which law was kept, and they were but Heathen, how were those things done by destiny which make against destiny? But surely if there be a destiny, it doth nothing against itself, saith Aug. For so were destiny, no destiny, or at the least, destiny fight against itself: Or to speak the same in those words, which our men by abuse take out of the Scripture, to maintain the very same matter. If it be God's predestination that men should write and speak against his predestination, as they say some men do, then is God's predestination a Kingdom, not only divided, but also fiercely fight against itself. O miserable absurdity which any child may perceive must needs follow, if all things come to pass with absolute necessity by God's predestination as they teach. This same doctrine also that all evil springeth out of God's ordinance, or that God's predestination was the cause of Adam's fall and of all wickedness, is plainly maintained in an English book lately set forth and entitled against a privy Papist. etc. where among many open and plain sentences upon this matter. I find an argument made in these words: Whatsoever was in Adam was in him by God's will & ordinance: sin was in Adam, Frgo sin. etc. was in him by God's will & ordinance. The mayor of which argument being understand of Adam after his fall, is manifestly false, & therefore the conclusion also is false, for if it may be said of Adam after his fall (as by the minor you well perceive that he so doth understand it) then may it also be said now of any man, that what execrable wickedness so ever is in any man, that same is in him by God's will & ordinance. He goth about also to prove the same by another argument which he maketh speaking of the lying spirit, saying: God commanded him to sin, but God commanded nothing which he ordaineth not, so he ordained him to sin. Which argument it was marvel that any man could be so blind as not to see how it might with more strength and force, and much more manifest truth be turned against him in this sort: speaking of Adam, yea and of all men saying, God commanded Adam, and doth command all men to abstain from sin, but he commandeth nothing which he ordaineth not. Ergo God ordained Adam and all men to abstain from sin. If God then ordained Adam and all men to abstain from sin, than did he not ordain Adam or any man to commit sin, so was not sin in Adam, or in any man by God's will and ordinance, nor God's ordinance the cause of Adam's fall, or of any man's sin. And therefore their opinion is utterly false: also if God in his secret counsel do predestinate, appoint, and ordain man to sin, and yet give unto him a strait law and commandment not to sin: is not then his secret will contrary to his open word? and his eternal ordinance, repugnant to his written law: All their fair words and sine framed fetches can not avoid it.  Crowley. 
Let us say what we can or will (saith Cerberus) the mere necessity that we teach shall be all one with that which the stoics held, affirming their Fatum, or destiny. To this I have sufficiently answered before, showing plainly by S. Austin's words, that we teach none other doctrine herein, than did S. Austen in the same book De Civitate Dei, out of which Cerberus citeth matter against us.  
But now Cerberus hath found another authority of saint Austen against us, in his book (as Cerberus saith) which he wrote, and entitled: Questiones ex utroque Testamento. In the question. 115. he saith thus. Qua autem ratione nati dicentur, qui Mathematicos urbe Roma prohibuerunt, quod ius seruatum non ignoratur? Et certè Pagani fuerunt. Quomodo fato fiunt quae contra fatum sunt? Sed si est fatum, non facit contra se. etc. That is to say. By what order shall it be said that those men were borne, which did forbid the Mathematics (that is to say) the tellers of men's fortunes, or destinies to come within the City of Rome. And it is well known that that law was kept. And doubtless these men were Heathen men. How are those things done by destiny, which are against destiny? But if there be a destiny, it worketh against itself. etc. saith Austen. But stay there Master Cerberus: and prove that Austen was Author of that book. So may it be of some authority with us. But Erasmus hath already proved by sundry good reasons, that S. Austen did never write it. As may appear to as many as will read his judgement set forth before the beginning of this book. Where writing of this part of that book, out of which Cerberus hath cited the words above written, he saith: Disputat contra Mathematicos, quoque altius ingreditur opus, hoc licentius ineptit. That is to say. He disputeth against the Mathematics, and the deeper he doth enter into the work, the more outrageously doth he play the part of a fool.  
But Cerberus will not set a Louse by the judgement of Erasmus. He will conclude upon the words of his Austen, that so destiny should be no destiny, or at the least, destiny fight against itself. Nay, he will not stay there, but as though destiny and God's predestination were all one thing: he will conclude, that it is also a Kingdom, not only divided, but also fiercely fight against itself. And then knit up the matter with his manner of exclaiming. O miserable absurdity. etc. Cerberus his heart would have burst, if he might not have borrowed his fellows babble to fetch one flourish withal. Every child may see (saith Cerberus) what absurdity must needs follow. And every wise man may see (say I) that there can no absurdity follow upon that necessity that we teach. For it taketh away no freedom that man's will hath, or ever had. Neither doth God's predestination sight against itself, because Cerberus with his fellows, were predestinated before the world was in this time of the world, thus to go about to deface those that do truly teach, that God's prescience, providence, and predestination is infallible. For what wise man will say, that the Potmaker is contrary to himself, because he maketh of his clay some vessels to serve in honourable uses, and some other to uses clean contrary? Or who will say that God is contrary to himself, because he hath made, and doth daily make some of his creatures to be devourers and destroyers of the rest: or that nature doth fight against itself: because it doth bring forth both healthsome food and poison? Surely I think there is no man of that mind but Cerberus and his fellows, and that Austen that Cerberus citeth for his purpose. But how worthy credit that Austen is: is afore sufficiently declared.  
But Cerberus hath found in an English Book entitled against a privy Papist, two Argumenes: one in these words. Whatsoever was in Adam, was in him by God's will & ordinance: sin was in Adam: Ergo, sin. etc. The other speaking of the lying spirit, in these words. God commanded him to sin: but God commandeth nothing which he ordaineth not: so he ordained him to sin. Cerberus misliketh much with these two Arguments. The mayor proposition in the first Argument is false, saith Cerberus. Wherefore, the conclusion can not be true. But S. Austen in his Enchiridion ad Laurentium: saith that the mayor is true: Ergo it is like that Cerberus saith not truly. Saint Austin's words be these. Haec sunt magna opera Domini, exquisita in omnes voluntates eius: & 
Enchirid. ad L●tur. cap. 100  tam sapientèr exquisita, ut cum angelica & humana creatura peccasset i non quod ille, sed quod voluit ipsa secisset: etiam per eandem creaturae voluntatem, qua factum est quod Creator noluit, impleret ipse quod voluit, benè utens & malis tanquam summè bonus, ad eorum damnationem, quos justè praedestinavit ad poenam: & ad eorum salutem, quos benignè predestinavit ad gratiam. Quantum enim ad eos ●●tinet, quod Deus noluit fecerunt: quantum verò ad omnipotentiam Dei, nullo modo id efficere valuerunt. Hoc quip ipso quod contra voluntatem Dei fecerunt: de ipsis facta est voluntas eius. Propterea namque magna opera Domini, exquisita in omnes voluntates eius, ut miro, & inestabili modo, non fiat praeter eius voluntatem, quod etiam sit contra eius voluntatem. Quia non fieret, si non sineret: nec vtiquè nolens sinit, sed volens. Nec sineret bonus malè fieri: nisi omnipotens etiam de malis facere posset benè. That is to say. These are y● great works of God, sought out, according to all his wills: and yet wisely sought out, so that when the nature both of Angels and man had sinned: that is, had done, not the thing that he wylled, but that itself willed, even by the same will of the creature, whereby that thing was done, that y●. Creator was not willing should be done, he fulfilled that which he would have done, even as he that is best of all, using well, even those things that are evil, to the condemnation of those whom he hath justly predestinated to pain: and to the salvation of those whom he hath lovingly predestinated to free mercy. As touching themselves, they did the which God was not willing they should do: but as touching the almighty power of God, they were by no means able to bring that to pass. For even in the very same thing that they did contrary to the will of God: his will was wrought upon them. For that cause therefore, the works of the Lord are great, & searched out according to all his wills. So that after a marvelous and unspeakable manner, that thing that is done even contrary to his will: should not be done without his will. For if he would not suffer it, it should not be done: neither doth he suffer it being unwilling, but willing. Neither would he that is good, suffer a thing to be evil done: except the same being almighty, were also able to work a good effect of those things that be evil.  
Thou mayst see here, gentle Reader, how great cause Cerberus hath to mislike with this Argument. S. Austen saith, that after a marvelous and unspeakable manner, that thing that is done contrary to the will of God, is not without his will. And thou mayst be bold, rather to consent unto that which was written against a privy Papist, having Austen also on thy part: than by Cerberus his misliking to be persuaded that that writer hath taught an untruth.  
Of the other Argument, Cerberus saith, that it was marvel that any man could be so blind, as not to see how the same might with much more strength and force, and manifest truth be turned against himself that made it, in this sort. God commanded Adam, and doth command all men, to abstain from sin: But he commandeth nothing which he ordaineth not: Ergo God ordained Adam and all men to abstain from sin. But what hath Cerberus won by this: I grant the Argument to be good. But that the conclusion is against us I deny. For we affirm that when man abstaineth from sin, the same is done by God's will and ordinance, as when he committeth sin, the same is also by the will and ordinance of God: as by the words of Austen afore written doth plainly appear. As for Cerberus his argument, and the conclusion that he inferreth thereupon: I refer to the judgement of all wise men that will weigh the afore written words of S. Austen. Who shall thereby easily perceive, that no such conclusion can follow upon such premises. But to his, Also if God in his secret counsel. etc. I must say some thing. Else will Cerberus say that Gods secret will and eternal ordinance, is contrary to his open word and written law.  
When jonas was sent to Ninive, the open word & commandment of God was, that he should say unto them: Yet forty days and Ninive shallbe destroyed. The effect doth declare, that his eternal purpose was not to destroy them, for they were not destroyed. Neither was this commandment contrary to his eternal purpose: but he did use it as a mean whereby to bring his eternal purpose to pass, which was to show mercy in forgiving the sins of the Ninivites.  
When Moses was sent to Pharaoh, the open word and commandment was thus. Say unto Pharaoh, let my people go, that they may offer sacrifite unto me. But his eternal purpose was, that by the stubbornness of Pharaoh in refusing to do his commandment, he might have just occasion to show his power upon him, in pouring out upon him and his people, the manifold plagues that we read of in the holy Histories, and that thereby his name might be made known in all parts of the earth. So that this commandment was not contrary to the eternal purpose, but did concur & run together with it, to that end, that in the eternal purpose was prefixed.  
When jesus Christ began to preach, the open word was, Repent and believe the Gospel: but the eternal purpose was, that for his doctrine & miracles, he should be hated of his countrymen and kinsmen (for the most part) and by them be delivered to the Heathen to be crucified, and made a sacrifice for the sins of the world. So that this open word was not against the secret purpose of God: 〈…〉 as S. Paul doth term it) it was to them that perished, the savour of death unto death, and to them that be saved, the savour of life unto life. For in the one sort it did work belief, and by belief salvation: and in the other it did manifest and make open the unbelief that was in their hearts before, and so make them utterly without excuse. As our Saviour himself saith: Now have they nothing to pretend for excuse.  
The Law and the Gospel are both written & preached, and the open word is, do this, and thou shalt have this: but the eternal purpose of God is, that those that have cares to hear, should hear and obey, and so enjoy the reward promised: and that they which lack such ears, should have the just condemnation of their own consciences. These two therefore be not contrary the one to the other, but do concur and run together to one end.  
Much more might be said to this effect, without either fair words or finely framed fetches: and so the inconvenience that Cerberus would conclude, clearly avoided. But I will content myself with one saying of Austen, writing upon the ninth Psalm. His words be these. Non in toto cord consitctur Deo, qui de providentia eius in aliquo dubitat. Sed quia iam cernit occulta sapicutiae Dei, quantum sit invisibile premium cius, qui dicit, gaud 〈…〉 in tribulationibus, & quemadmodum omnes cruciatus, qui corporaliter inferuntur, aut ut exerceant conversos ad Deum, aut ut convertantur admoneant, aut justè damnationi ultimae praeparent obduratos: & sic omnia ad divinae providentiae regimen referrantur, quae stulti quasi casu & temere, & nulla divina administratione fieri putant, ait. Narrabo omnia mirabilia tua. etc. That is to say. That man which doth doubt of the providence of God in any thing: doth not show himself thankful or praise God in all his heart. But because he doth now see the secrets of the wisdom of God, how great the invisible reward of him is which saith, we rejoice in troubles: and how all afflictions which are brought upon the body, either to exercise those that be converted unto God, or that they may admonish them to convert, or that they may prepare to the last damnation, those that be justly made hard hearted, and that so all those things might be referred unto the government of God's providence, which foolish men do suppose to be wrought by chance, at adventure, and by no divine providence: he saith. I will declare all thy wondrous works. etc. We may be bold therefore (I think) to say, that this which Cerberus hath done, in writing this spiteful answer to his friends Letter (if any such were) was governed by God's providence. And yet we are not Genethliaci, or declarers of men's fortunes or destinies, such as were banished out of Rome: for we say not that it is Cerberus his fortune or destiny to be hanged or drowned, or that he shall die a natural death before he shallbe as great a favourer of God's predestination, as he doth now show himself to be a mortal foe thereof. But we know, that if God have predestinated any of these things, the same shall undoubtedly come to pass, in such sort as he hath appointed. And yet shall not Cerberus his will be enforced. But if he hang himself, it shall be with the full consent of his will. And if he shallbe a favourer of our side, it shallbe with the free choice of his own will, governed by the providence of God. As there be some yet living, that can testify, that once they were of the same mind that Cerberus is now, and that with consent of will. And now they be of one mind with me: and that with assent of will also.  
We leave Cerberus and his fellows therefore to him that by his providence governeth all things. And yet do we ourselves use the means that God in providence hath appointed to be used, and we teach all other to do the same, committing the success to him that knoweth what he hath determined to work in all his creatures. And we conclude this matter with Austen, saying: Quapropter, 
Aug. De civit. lib. 5. cap. 9  & voluntates nostrae tantum valent, quantum Deus eas valere voluit atque praescivit: & ideo, quicquid valent certissimè valent: & quod facturae sunt ipsae, omninò facturae sunt: quia valeturas atque facturas ille praescivit, cuius praescientia falli nòn potest. Quapropter, si fati nomen, alicui rei adhibendum placeret: magis dicerem fatum esse infirmioris, potentioris voluntatem qui eum habet in potestate, quàm illo causarum ordine, quem nòn usitato, sed suo more Stoici fatum appellant, arbitrium nostrae voluntatis auserri. That is to say. Wherefore, this is the cause why our wills are able to do, as much as God would & did know afore hand that they should do, and therefore, look what they are able to do, that are they most certainly able to do: and what so ever they shall do, they shall in deed do: because he whose prescience or foreknowledge cannot be deceived, did know afore hand that they should do it. Wherefore if I could allow the name of destiny to be given to any thing: I would rather say that destiny were a thing belonging to the weaker, and will to the stronger which hath it in his power, than that the liberty of our will, should by that order of causes, which y● stoics, not after the common custom, but after their own manner, do call destiny. But Cerberus is not yet answered. We must yet solve him one other question. Which now he will propone.  Cerberus. 
Yet would I further ask them a question, seeing it is the decree, ordinance, and will of God expressed in his word, that man should not sin, how crept they into that secret council, where God ordained, decreed, and willed the contrary? that is to say, that man should sin. But I hear their answer already published in print: standing in the third leaf & second page, of the first Blast in that traitorous trumpet, set forth against the regiment of women, where Fol. 2. Pa. 2. briefly and covertly toucheth this close and privy counsel of God in these words. The secret counsel of God excepted. But in Fol. 3. Pag. 2. he saith. I am sure that God hath revealed to some in this our age, that it is more than a Monster in nature, that a woman shall reign and have Empire above man.  
This may be the apocalypse of some men in this our age: but sure I am, it is not the revelation of S. john the Evangelist, nor of any other old Apostle or Prophet. These new revelations which are revealed unto men of our age out of a secret counsel, decree, and ordinance of God, contrary to the open word and commandment of God, are meet for those which delight in the damnable dreams of some doting destiny, and may well be called inspirations of old Arrians, revelations of blind Anabaptists, or unwritten verities of superstitious Papists, rather than the secret counsel of God, revealed unto men of our age. But to conclude: That Angel or spirit, which contrary to the manifest word of God, hath revealed unto men of our age, that a woman bring right inheritor to the Crown of a Realm, ought not to be ruler thereof, that same spirit and Angel of darkness, hath revealed unto men of our age, that Cain was predestinate to murder his brother Abel, and the most wicked traitors, murderers, & thieves that live, are ordained of God, in his secret counsel, contrary to his open word, to be wicked, even as they are, and to commit such murder, these and treason, even as they do. The same conclusion and new revelation, is also plainly set forth in the other late printed English book before named, translated out of French into English, where an on after the beginning, speaking of God's will, he saith: By the virtue whereof, all things are made, yea even those things which are evil and execrable. Yet when he hath plainly affirmed that by the virtue of Gods will evil and execrable things are made, lest the horrible face of Satan should be perceived, in the burning flame of those terrible words: The matter is afterward trimly covered with a cloak of unsavoury subtlety, for he declareth his mind to be, that those evil and execrable things, which are wrought by the virtue of God's will, are not evil and execrable, in that they are wrought by his divine counsel. As if he should say, though they be in deed evil and execrable things, which the counsel of God worketh, yet are they not in that respect or therefore evil, because God worketh them. But for as much (sayeth he) as they proceed from the Prince of air. etc. Or to speak it in more usual terms, because the devil or wicked men do work it, which nevertheless, as they plainly hold and affirm, are the instruments of God appointed her unto, & in doing the same, do nothing else but that which God hath ordained them to do, & so ordained that they can not choose but do it, even as they do, which opinion Prosper, defending the sentence of Augustine, writeth vehemently against, in these words. Praedestinationem Dei siuè ad malum siuè ad bonum etc. That the Predestination of God (saith he) d 〈…〉 work in all men either unto good or unto evil it is most foolishly said, as though a certain necessity should drive men unto both, seeing in good things, the will is to be understand not without grace, & in evil things, the will is to be understand without grace. Respon. ad object. Gal. cap. 6. But that which Prosper, and Aug. do here most truly call a most foolish saying. The same do these men call the most high & profound wisdom, for God say they, predestinateth all things, Ergo all things must come to pass of necessity.  Crowley. 
A man might marvel, what moved Cerberus to move that question, the answer whereunto, he himself saith is already published in print. But when I consider, what spirit it is that hath moved him in this sort to answer his friends letter: I leave off that marvel. For I see his purpose is, by this mean to entangle and trouble us with by matter, neither pertinent to the thing we have in hand, nor tending to any good end. What have we to do with the matter of the Blast (which book I never read of) or with Revelations or apocalypses? We have the question of God's Providence, Prescience & Predestination in hand. To dispute of those matters did neither appertain to Cerberus in his answer, neither doth it appertain to me in this Apology. I will therefore pass over both those questions: and shape him another manner of answer to his demand than y● which he imagineth that he hath seen set forth in print. His question is, how we crept into the secret counsel, where God ordained, decreed and willed, that man should sin? He imagineth that this can not be answered otherwise than by an apocalypse or Revelation. But Cerberus shall well understand, that we can answer him by plain Scripture, & prove that it is not against Scripture, that God should ordain, decree and will, that man should sin.  
First, S. Paul writing to the Romans saith thus. Anon habet potestatem Figulus luti, ex eadem massa facere, aliud 
Rom. 9  quidem vas in honorem, aliud vero in contumeliam? That is to say. Hath not the Potmaker power over his Clay, out of one lump to make one vessel to honour, and another to dishonour? And in the same place he saith thus. Nunquid dicit sigmentum ei qui se sinxit, quid me fecisti sic? That is. Doth the earthen vessel say unto him that made it: Why hast thou made me so? And the same S. Paul writing to Timothe saith. In magna autem domo, non solum sunt vasa aurea & argentea, sed & lignea & fictilia: & quaedam 
2. Timoth. 2.  quidem in honorem, qu●dam autem in contumeliam. That is to say. In a great house, there be not only vessels of Gold & of Silver, but also of Timber and of Earth: some serving to honour, and some to dishonour. These Allegories doth S. Paul use, to show that there is no iniquity with God, though he do appoint his creatures at his good will and pleasure, some to honour, and some to dishonour. To the same purpose doth S. Paul cite the words that are written in the. 33. of Exodie. Miserebor, cuius misercor: & misericordiam praestabo, cuius miserebor. That is. I will have compassion upon him, on whom I have compassion: And I will show mercy, to whom I will show mercy. It lieth not in the willer nor in the runner, saith S. Paul: but in God who taketh mercy. For the Scripture saith unto Pharaoh: Quia in hoc ipsum exitavi t●, ut ostendum in t● potentiam meam, & ut annuntietur nomen meu 〈…〉 ●n universd terra. That is. For this cause have I stirred thee up, that I might show my power upon thee, and that my name might be declared through the whole earth. And then S. Paul concludeth thus. Ergo, cuius vult mi 〈…〉, & quem vult indurat. That is. On whom it pleaseth him, he taketh mercy, & whom he lusteth, he maketh hard hearted. I know the common answer to this. Which is: God doth not hearden the hearts of any: but he doth suffer them to harden their own hearts. But it 〈◊〉 good for them that stand upon this common answer, to consider what S. Austen writeth concerning Gods suffering of things to be done.  
Nec dubitandum est Deum facere benè, etiam 〈◊〉 fieri quae●ū● 
Enchirid. ad Laur. cap. 96.  fiunt 〈◊〉: Non enim hoc nisi justo judicio sinit. Et profecto bonum est omne quod justum est. Quamuis ergo ea qu●● mala sunt▪ in quantum mala sunt, non sint bona: tamen, ut non solam bona, sed etiam sint & mala, bonum est. Num nisi esset hoc honum, ut essent & mala: nullo modo esse sinerentur ab omnipotent bono. 〈◊〉 proculdubiò, quam facile est quod vult facere? tum facile est, quod non vult esse, non sinere. Hoc nisi credamus, periclitatun ipsum nostrae fidei confessionis initium, qua nos in Deum patrem omnipotentem, credere consitemur. Nequè enim venicitèr ob aliud vocatur omnipotens, nisi quia quicquid vult potest, nec voluntate cuiuspiam creaturae, voluntatis omnipotentis, impeditur effectus. That is to say. It is not to be doubted that God doth well, yea, when he suffereth to be done, whatsoever things are evil done. For he doth not suffer this, otherwise than by just judgement. And surely, all that is just, is good. Although therefore those things that be evil, in as much as they be evil, be not good: yet is it good, that there should be things, not only that are good, but also that are evil. For excep 〈…〉 t were good, that there should be things that are evil: the almighty goodness would by no means suffer them to be. To whom, no doubt, it is as easy a thing not to suffer that thing to be which he would not should be: as it is to do that which he is willing● to do. Except we believe this▪ she very beginning of the confession of our saith, wherein we confess that we believe in God the Father Almighty, is in danger & like to be fosid untrue. For he is not truly called Almighty for any other cause, but for that he is able to do what he will, & the effect of his will, being Almighty, is not by the will of any creature letted.  
By these words of Austen it is plain, that God, being Almighty can not be said to suffer aught to be done, which he is not willing should be done. The hardening of hearts therefore, and that wickedness that is wrought by the hard hearted, is not done without his wil And although those things be evil, in asmuch as they are done by those evil persons, yet in as much as the same are done by the will of God, it is good that they be done. By this it is plain, that when God doth ordain, decree, and will that man should sin: he doth not contrary to Scripture, which doth witness, by the testimony of S. Austen, that it is good that man should do evil, in such sense as S. Austen hath declared the same.  
Moreover, Solomon in his proverbs saith thus. 
Proverb. 16.  universa propter semetipsum operatus est Dominus: impium quoque ad diem malum. That is: The Lord hath made all things for himself●● the ungodly man also against the evil day.  
Esay the Prophet saith. Nunquid gloriabitur Securis contra 
Esay. 10.  cum qui secat in ea? Aut exaltabitur Ser● contra eum, à quo trahitur Quomodo si elevetur Virga contra elevantem se, & exe altetur baculus qui utique lignum est. That is to say: Shall the Are boast itself against him that heweth with it? Or shall the Saw set by itself against him that draweth it? That were as much as if the Rod should be lifted up against him that lifteth it, and as if the staff that is but timber, should be advaunted.  
The ungodly man, saith Solomon, hath the Lord made for himself, even against the evil day: that is, against the day of vengeance, wherein the ungodly shall have their just reward at God's hand. By this, not only the ungodly is justly punished for his ungodliness, but the godly is also occasioned to acknowledge, that it is mercy alone that doth preserve him from the like punishment. For he seeth in himself no cause why he should not suffer the same condemnation. Thus by the wicked, both the justice and mercy of God are made manifest unto man. But the purpose of the ungodly is nothing less than that God's justice and mercy should be set forth by him: therefore he is justly punished for his wickedness. And isaiah the Prophet, comparing Nabuchodonosor to an Axe, a Saw, and a Rod: doth plainly teach, that it was God that wrought all the plagues and destructions that were by that wicked instrument brought, not only upon the people of the jews, but upon other Nations also. And that that bloody and ambitious tyrant, was but as an Axe, Saw, or Rod in the Lord's hand. And therefore when he began to boast of his own power and policy, as though he had by his own wisdom and strength overcome kingdoms, and set himself above them: the Lord (to let his people know that it was not nabuchodonosor's power that could have done, or that should do those things to them, which the Prophets did tell them should come upon, by the Kings of Babylon) doth tell them by the mouth of the same Prophets, that the work was his, and that the Kings of Babylon were but his fools or instruments to work withal.  
But this can not Cerberus abide: God must be but a looker on, and no 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 any of these things. For if God should be a worker, he must needs be the Author of the sin that is in the deed. For the old Cur hath his eyes so blinded with the filthy ●●dder of Hell fire: that he can not see how God may be the Author of the fact, and not of the sin that is in it. But when he heareth that saying: he crieth 〈◊〉 Areade, Areade, what is this? In Cerberus his judgement, either job must be a liar, or else God must be a thief. For when word came to job that the Sabeis had slain his servants, and driven away his cattle: he said, the Lord hath taken them away. But to take away jobs cattle was felony, Ergo, either God was a Felon, or job a liar, if Cerberus his opinion believe.  
But how God doth work in the hearts of evil and wicked men, and use them as his instruments, and yet is not partaker of their sin: is sufficiently declared afore, out of S. Austen, De gratia & libero arbitrio.  
Now Cerberus will look that I should say some thing to the words of Prosper. Otherwise he will make reckoning that he hath the victory. For a little occasion maketh him to brag. The objection that the Frenchmen made against the sentence of S. Austen, in the place that Cerberus speaketh of, is this. Quòd liberum arbitrium in homine nihil sit: sed sive ad bonum sive ad malum, praedestinatio 〈◊〉 in hominibus ●perctur. That is to say. That S. Austen should hold that free will in man is nothing: but that God's predestination doth work in men, whether it be to good or to evil. The answer to this objection is thus. Liberum arbitrium nihil esse, vel non esse, perperam dicitur: sed ante illuminationem fidei, in tenebris illud, & in umbra mortis ac gear, nòn rectè nog●tur. Quoniam priusquam à dominatione Diaboli per Dei gratiam liberetur & in illo profundo jacet in quod se sua libertate demersit. Amas ergo langores suos, & profanitate habet, quòd agrotare se nescit, donec prima haec medela conferati● aegroto, ut incipiat nosse quòd langueat, & possit opem medici desiderare, qua surgat. justificatus itaque homo, idest, ex impio pius factus, nullo praecedente bono merito, accipit donum, quo medio, adquirat & meritum: ut quod in illo inchoatum est per gratiam Christi, etiam per industriam liberi augeatur arbitrij, nunquam remoto adiutorio Dei, sine quo, nec prosicere, nec permanere in bono quisquam potest. Praedestinationem autem Dei, sive ad bonum sive ad malum in hominibus operari, ineptissimè dicitur, ut ad utrumque homines quaedam necessitas videatur impellere: cum in bonis, voluntas sit intelligenda degratia, in malis autem intelligenda sine gratia. That is. To say that free will is nothing, or that there is no free will at all, is evil said: but that the same doth wander in darkness and in the shadow of death before it is illumined by faith, is not well denied. For before it is by the grace of God delivered from the domination of the Devil: it lieth in that deep dungeon, into which by it own liberty it did cast itself. It doth therefore love it own sore sicknesses, and doth count it health, not to know that it is sick, until this first medicine be ministered to it being sick, that it may begin to know that it is sick, and be able to desire the help of the Physician, whereby it may arise. When man therefore is justified, that is to say, made godly of ungodly, without any good deserving going before, he receiveth a gift, by which mean he may also get merit or deserving: that that thing which is by the grace of Christ begun in him, may also by the industry of free will be increased, never without the help of God, without which no man can either go forward, or stay in that which is good. But it is most foolishly said, that the predestination of God doth so work in men, either to good or to evil, that a certain necessity may seem to force men forward unto both: seeing that in good, the will is to be understanded to come of grace, & in evil, the will is to be understanded without grace.  
Now (gentle Reader) thou seest what it was that the French men objected against: S. Austen. Thou seest also what Prosper doth answer in S. Austeus defence. Consider now what occasion Cerberus hath to conclude against us as he doth.  
The French men object, that S. Austen should hold that free-will in man is nothing, but that God's predestination doth work in men, whether it 〈…〉 to good or evil. Prosper answereth, that it is an evil saying: to affirm that free-will is nothing, or that there is no free-will at al. And that it is most foolishly said, that the predestination of God doth so work in the hearts of men, either to good or evil, that a certain necessity may seem to force men forward unto both. But we do neither say that free-will is nothing, or that there is none at all: neither that predestination doth so work in men, that a certain necessity may seem to force them forward both to good and evil: No, we do not affirm that predestination doth work in men any thing at all. Ergo, Prosper hath written nothing against us.  Cerberus. 
And further, Crowley in the said book of confutation before named, and the same article, using the very same term of driving, he sayeth that God's predestination hath driven them to it. And yet not therewith content, anon after he sayeth: We are compelled by the necessity of God's predestination, to do those things for the which we are damned, but to repeat the whole sentence. To this must we answer (saith he) in this wise. If God were an inferior to any superior power, to the which he ought to render an account of his doings, or if any of us were not his creatures, but of another creation besides his workmanship, then might we charge him with tyranny, because he condemneth us, and appointed us to be punished for the things we do by compulsion through the necessity of his predestination.  
Mark here by the way, how all rulers be charged with tyranny for punishing of male factors, first grant this proposition which he affirmeth: That all offenders, as murderers, thieves and traitors, commit their offences by the compulsion of predestination. Secondly, this assumpted minor (which he also affirmeth) that it is tyranny for one which is an inferior power, and not their creator, to punish them which do commit crimes by such compulsion. Then must it needs follow, that all rulers are tyrants which punish malefactors, and are no creators, but inferior powers, because all malefactors could not chose but commit such wicked offences, being driven thereunto by compulsion, through the necessity of predestination.  
woe worth the sinful generation of our age, which hath bred and brought forth such a noisome novelty, and strange Paradox, to whom the hands of God's mercy are stretched out all the day long: and yet they are ever defying him to the face, as the Prophet saith. Esay. 65. Consider I desire thee, not the persons of them that speak, be they never so high, never so wise, never so many, but mark the opinion itself: even in thy conscience, and in the sight of of God, whether any thing may be spoken more repugnant to the nature of God, more contrary to the word of God, more defacing the justice and mercy of God, than to say, that God punisheth man with the torments of Hell, in everlasting fire, for doing those things which he himself hath predestinate, ordained, decreed, determined, appointed, willed and compelled him to do: and that which a man can not choose but must needs do, by the force and compulsion of his predestination.  
All which things in those plain terms, they most evidently teach in divers parts of their writings, but of all other this is most odious and horrible, where they affirm that men sin by compulsion, through the necessity of God's predestination.  
And the very same saith Knox in the. 317. side of his book, before named, affirming likewise in those plain terms: that the wicked are not only left by God's suffering, but compelled to sin by power, and he citeth it as the saying of Augustine against julian. Lib. 3. Cap. 5. But very falsely (as I suppose) for I have sought the same place in Augustine, and he hath neither those words, neither any such like, that import the same or any like matter.  
Wherefore, till such time as they make better proof: I must think that they have forged a lie in Augustine's name, supposing thereby to give Authority to falsehood. But to conclude, whether it were the saying of Augustine, or not, you see it is plainly their opinion, not only that men can not choose, but do what wickedness or mischief soever they do, but also they are compelled with the power, force, or compulsion of God's predestination, to commit all those evils and wicked crimes, for the which they are executed with the temporal sword, or damned with everlasting torment.  Crowley. 
It doth here manifestly appear, that Cerberus his chief quarrel is against Crowley. For though there be other that have written as plain, and as open matter for the necessity of Predestination as I have, and to say the truth more plain too: yet doth Cerberus lay the matter to no man charge so often & so openly as he doth to mine. For this is now the fift time that he hath made plain mention of me in this his short answer to his friends Letter. No marvel therefore, though the malice of his mind, do sometimes cause him to misconstrue my words and writings, as in this place he doth, placing my words so in this his answer, that they seem to have a manifest meaning far differing from that which they have in y● place where I wrote them in mine answer to Shaxton. First he saith, the using the term of driving, I have said, that God's Predestination hath driven them to it. Now (Gentle Reader) I must make thee judge of the meaning of these words, in the place where they stand written by me.  
After I had declared, that the Administration of the common weal by public Ministers, laws and ordinances, could not be other than profitable, and always redounding to the glory of God, notwithstanding that the having of such ministers and ministrations, is a thing that cometh to pass of necessity and can not but be: I laboured to make the matter more plain by certain questions, whereof this is one. How could it have been, that so great and rude multitudes of barbarous nations, should have submitted themselves, to be under laws & rulers: had not God's Predestination driven them to it?  
Here be the words in that order that I first wrote them. Now judge (gentle Reader) whether Cerberus meant simply, when he cited them thus: He saith, that God's Predestination hath driven them to it. Adding such words immediately after, that it might seem that I had spoken these words in no such meaning: but rather, that my whole meaning had been, to affirm the God doth by his Predestination, forcibly drive men to do the things that they are damned for. For he saith, that I say: We are compelled by the necessity of God's Predestination, to do those things, for which we are damned. And then to set a show of indifference upon his doing, as though he meant nothing less than to apply my words otherwise than my meaning was, he saith, that he will repeat the whole sentence, in this manner. To this must we answer. etc. As though the answer that I make, were but an answer to mine own words, which I have before affirmed.  
But the thou mayst see (gentle Reader) what words they he that I do there make answer unto: I will set them down here in writing, as they stand in my book against Shaxton. They are these.  
Well, here followeth yet another inconvenience, and that is this. If all things be done of necessity: Why should any man be blamed for missedoing? Why should any man be damned, sithence all they do is but the ordinance of God, and that more is, they can not avoid the necessity, whereby they are constrained to do all that they do. Wherefore if they should endeavour to refrain the evil that they do, it were but all in vain, for they are predestinated either to do it, or else to leave it undone. justly therefore can they not be condemned, because the evil they do, is not of themselves, but of the ordinance of God.  
And then follow the words that Cerberus hath cited. But when he cometh to those words that might some thing show my meaning to be otherwise than he would have it seem to be: he stayeth. I will therefore set down those words which do immediately follow, which are these. But forasmuch as he is subject to no superior power, and we be all his treatures: so that to what end soever he have framed us, we are his instruments to do the work that he hath appointed to be done: why should we stand up and reason with him to know his purpose in creating us, or why he made us to this or that fashion? to this or that use? to be precious or vils? For this one thing we may be sure of, that God hath by his eternal wisdom, created nothing, nor appointed nothing to be done, but the same shall redound to his glory in the end: seem it never so contrary in the mean time. Let us hearken to the words of S. Paul to the Romans 
Rom. 9  in this matter. What if God (saith he) willing to show. etc.  
Here thou mayest see (gentle Reader) what malice may do. I said that so many barbarous and rude nations would never have submitted themselves to live under laws, if God's Predestination had not driven them to it: meaning that God in his wisdom & everlasting providence, had appointed that all multitudes of people's should be governed by laws and orders, and to bring them thereunto, he used such means, that they were driven to choose rather to live under laws, and so to continue and flourish, than to live without laws, and so decay and come to nought. But Cerberus doth maliciously construe my words, as though my meaning were, driven to be under laws, as sheep are driven from the pasture to the fold. But I spoke of men, and not of brute beasts. We use to say that men are driven, some by fear, some by friendship, some by affection, some by infirmity, and some by poverty and need: and yet in all these cases, we mean not that man hath not a will which consenteth to the thing that he doth: but that the will of man is by these means induced to choose that which it consenteth unto, and to leave the other which it refuseth to do. Again, in answering the inconvenience that Cerberus & such as he is, do say will ensue upon the doctrine of the necessity of God's predestination: I said: If God were an inserious to any superior power, or if we were of another creation, and not of his making: then might we charge him with tyranny, because he condemneth us, and appointeth us to be punished for the things we do by compulsion. Not meaning (as Cerberus doth maliciously affirm that I do mean) that man is compelled by force without the consent of his will, to do those actions which God doth condemn him for, and appoint him to be punished for: For that were to deny God to be God, and man to be man. For God is not God, unless he be both just and merciful. But there should appear in him neither mercy nor justice, if he should use such compulsion, as Cerberus would have me seem to teach. And if man should be so spoiled of the liberty of his will, that he should be compelled to do actions without all consent of will: then were man spoiled of his principal part, which is his reasonable soul, without which he is not, neither can be thought to be man.  
I am not so beastly therefore, as to speak of such a compulsion. But I speak of the same that Knox spoke of in the place that Cerberus citeth, I now, for I dare not assirm upon his word, neither have I seen the book myself. But the matter that Cerberus sayeth Knox hath cited out of S. Austen. I have seen in S. Austen, not in the. 3. book and, 5. chapter against julian: but in the. 5. book and. 3. chapter against the same. belike Cerberus had little leisure and less lust to read S. Austin's words. & therefore not finding them at the first chop, he thought it should be enough for him to say, that he must think that we have forged a lie in S. Austin's name. But to put thee out of doubt, gentle Reader, that Cerberus his thought is a lying thought: I will set down S. Austin's words in writing, and request thee to read the rest of that Chapter, wherein I have found them written. And then I doubt not but thou wilt consent to that compulsion that I have spoken of.  
The words of S. Austen are these. Quid est autem 
August. lib. 5 Cap. 3. contr. julian.  quod dicis, cum desiderijs suis traditi dicuntur, relictiper patientiam intelligendi sunt, nòn per potentiam in peccata compulsi: quasi nòn simul posuerit haec duo idem Apostolus, & patientiam & potentiam, ubi ait. Sic autem volens Deus ostendere iram, & demonstrare 
Rom. 9  potentiam suam, attulit in multa patientia vasairae, quae perfecta sunt in perditionem. Quid horum tamen dicis esse quod scriptum est? Et Propheta si erraverit, & locutus fuerit, ego 
Ezechi. 14.  Dominus seduxi Prophetam illum, & extendam manum meam super eum, & exterminabo eum in medio populi mei Israel: Patientia est, an potentia? Quodlibet eligas, vel utrumque fatearis: vio des tamen falsa Prophetantis peccatum esse, poenamque peccati. a & hic dicturus es quod ait. Ego Dominus seduxi Prophetam illum, intelligendum esse, deserui: ut pro eius meritis seductus erraret? Age ut vis. Tamèn eo modo punitus est propeccato, ut falsum prophetando peccaret. That is to say: What is the meaning of thy words, when thou sayest, that those men that are said to be given over to their own lusts, must be understand to be left by patience or sufferance, and not compelled or thrust into sin by power: as though that same Apostle did not set down both these two, both sufferance and power, when he sayeth. And so God being willing to show forth his wrath, and to set forth his power, hath in much patience brought hither the vessels of wrath, which were made meet for destruction. And yet, whether of these things dost thou say that that is which is written? And if a Prophet do err and speak lies: I the Lord have seduced that Prophet, and I will strotch out mine hand upon him, and I will utterly root him out from amongst my people of Israel. Is this sufferance, or power? Which soever thou dost choose: or if thou grant both: yet dost thou see, that the false prophecy is sin, and the punishment of sin also. Wilt thou here also say, that where he saith, I the Lord have seduced that Prophet: it must be understand, I have left him, that being seduced according to his own deservings, he he might err? do as thou wilt. Yet is he in this sort punished for his sin: that by prophesying a lie he might sin.  
Now, I trow, Cerberus will not say, that Knox hath forged a lie in S. Austin's name, supposing thereby to give authority to falsehood. And if Cerberus would take the pains to read the whole Chapter wherein these words of Austen are written: I doubt not but he should understand how God may by power compel men to sin, and yet punish them justly for their sin, which they commit by such compulsion. For they are not compelled without the consent, yea the free consent, of their own will.  
But lest Cerberus should think, that not being able to answer that which he concludeth upon my words, I have slily slipped it over: I must say some thing to that wherewith he chargeth me. That is, the charging of all Magistrates with tyranny, for that they, not being Creators, do punish men for those offences that they commit by compulsion. He frameth an Argument against me, the mayor proposition whereof is not affirmed by me (as Cerberus saith it is) for I have not in any place written, that thieves, murderers. etc. do commit their offences by the compulsion of predestination: but by compulsion, thorough the necessity of predestination, meaning that compulsion and necessity that S. Austen speaketh of in the places that I have before cited out of his works, which is not without the free consent of the will.  
The minor (which is, that it is tyranny for one that is an inferior power, and not their Creator, to punish them that do commit crimes by such compulsion) I do not in any part of my writings affirm. Wherefore Cerberus doth me open wrong, to conclude that I charge all rulers with tyranny.  
The rulers are commanded of God (who is their 
Rom. ●3.  ruler, and to whom they shall render an account of their doings) that they shall punish the breakers of God's commandments, and to that end hath God given them a sword. Woe unto them therefore, if they do not punish such, and defend the innocent. And when they do punish the offenders, and defend the innocent: then do they their duty. So far of do I think them to be from the fault of tyranny.  
But Cerberus would fain have the Rulers angry with us, and especially with Crowley. And therefore he laboureth to make them believe that Crowley saith that which he never thought. The words that Cerberus hath cited out of my book against Shaxton, when they be indifferently weighed, shall be found none other in effect, than are those words that isaiah wrote in the. 45. Chapter of his Prophecies, where he sayeth thus: Vae 
isaiah. 45.  contendenti cum sictore suo. Testa cum testis terrae contendat. An dicet lutum sictori suo, quid facis? & opus tuum manibus destituitur. That is to say. Woe be to him that doth contend with his maker. Let the earthen vessel contend with the earthen vessels. Shall the clay say unto him that made it: what dost thou make? and thy work is not made with hands?  
What other thing can isaiah mean by these words: but that as it is a thing far unseemly for a piece of clay to stand up and reason with him that tempereth it with his fingers, and to say unto him, why dost thou fashion me after this sort: so is it unseemly that man should reason with God, concerning his purpose in making him after this fashion or that, or to this use or that use? But if man will reason this matter: let him reason it with him that is a man as he is: so were there some reason in his doings. For although one man have by God's ordinance, authority over other men: yet may not that man do with the rest what he lusteth, as God may do with his creatures.  
Wherefore, I conclude, that Cerberus his exclamation, with woe worth the sinful generation of our age. etc. is not worth the weighing, neither would Cerberus if he had seen thus much before, have thought it worth the writing as I suppose.  Cerberus. 
Against which error crieth out the word of God in a multitude of places: manifestly proving, that through the grace & help of God, men may choose, and are neither driven by absolute necessity, nor compelled by God's Predestination, to commit murder, theft, treason or any such flagitious offence, nor any manner of sin or evil, whatsoever it be. As for example: Moses saith: Therefore choose life. Deut. 30. And josua sayeth, choose whom you will serve. And after when the people promised to serve the Lord only, he saith unto them, you are witnesses unto yourselves, that ye have chosen the Lord to serve him. josua. 24. But afterward when the people forsook the Lord again, and chose other Gods: the Lord saith unto them. Go, cry unto the Gods which ye have chosen. jud. 10. Christ sayeth, Marie hath chosen her that good part, which shall not be taken from her. Luc. 10. David saith: I have chosen the way of truth: and again in the same Psalm: I have chosen thy commandments: Psalm. 119. But the Lord saith by his Prophet Esay: They did wickedness before mine eyes, and chose the thing that pleased me not. Esay. 65. and in the next chapter he saith. Et elegerunt quae ego nolui. And they have chosen those things which I would not. Esay. 66.  
Thus it is plain, that as choose, and can not choose agree together, so doth their opinion agree with the Scripture, for such direct contrariety is between choice and mere necessity, between violent compulsion and christian liberty, that black and white, may with more possibility, be coupled in a subject.  
But it is marvel to see, how scrupulous some men are in these words of choice. I doubt whether they dare read these & many such like places of scripture, which so plainly speak of choice: But perhaps they always skip over that word, or read some other in stead thereof, as the jews do Adonai in stead of jehovah, for surely many are so afraid of free-will, that they fall as the Proverb saith, out of the lime Kell into the coal pit, from high presumption into deep desperation, fiercely following that old spirit of wicked Pelagi, as before it is touched in the ix of his devilish errors, where he affirmeth, that if a man have need of God's help, then hath he no freedom or choice at all: Thus do they break their ship upon the perilous rock, seeking to escape the dangerous Hurlepole. For an horrible presumption it was of Pelagius, to think that a man by nature, had such power to choose good, and refuse evil, that he needed not the grace and help of God: and a desperate opinion is this of other, to say that the predestination of God worketh all things in man, whether it be good or evil, and that a man can not choose, but do whatsoever he doth. For no doubt, this opinion maketh a very disordered Chaos, and an utter confusion of all things, as it were mixing & thrusting together, both heaven, earth and hell. Making one confused lump, of God, the Devil and the world. Of sin, grace, and nature, turning all doings into dreams, all truth into trances, all verity into sables, all prayer and meditation into vain imagination.  
For if God's predestination be the only cause of Adam's fall and filthy sin, and consequently the only cause and worker of all evil, yea even with compulsion & source, as they shamefully and plainly affirm, then will no man deny, that on the other side: God's predestination worketh as violently in all things that are good.  
So than if God's predestination work all, without all exception, both in evil and good, than all other things, whatsoever they be, although they appear to work, and do some thing, yet do they in deed utterly nothing. So that the Devil doth nothing, man doth nothing, laws do nothing, doctrine doth nothing, prayer doth nothing: but God's predestination doth altogether, & is the efficient cause, yea and, the only cause of all things.  
Against this opinion, the word of God is exceeding plain and manifest, not only in the places before rehearsed, but also in these following, here briefly noted, yea and abundantly throughout the whole Scripture. Gene. 4. a. Reg. 24. b. 1. Para. 21. b. Pro. 3. d. Eccle. 15. c. 4. Esd. 7. b. d. &. g. e. &. 9 a. Luk. 10. d. &. f. joan 1. b. Act. 5. a. 1. Cor. 7. g. &. 9 a. &. 10. c. &. 14 f. 2. Cor. 13. c. Phil. 4. c. Heb. 11. Against this evil opinion, also do all the ancient Doctors with one consent vehemently write, as they by themselves cannot deny, except only Augustine, which because of his exceeding obscurity and darkness in divers places, he is often alleged of both parts.  
Also against this opinion, writeth earnestly Philip Melancthon the chiefest and best learned of all the Germans: In like manner doth Bullenger, the chiefest and most excellent of all the Switcers. The same doth also Erasmus Cercerius, and many other of the best learned Protestants, whose sayings were profitable here to rehearse, but that their judgement in this matter is well known to all the learned, and my determination is at this present, rather briefly and simply, to declare what part of doctrine I and many other mislike, than with long discourse and many authorities to disprove the same.  Crowley. 
In a multitude of places (saith Cerberus) the word of God crieth out against the doctrine of the necessity of God's Predestination: manifestly proving that, through the grace and help of God, men may choose, and are neither driven by absolute necessity, nor compelled by God's Predestination, to commit murder, theft. etc. As for example, Moses saith. Deut. 30. Choose life. etc. Have I said that man is driven by absolute necessity? Or that he is compelled by the compulsion of God's Predestination to commit murder, theft. & c? I am sure Cerberus is not able to show it, in any of my writings. And I think he hath not seen it in any of the writings of them that he writeth against.  
But this is his manner, when we speak of such a kind of necessity as followeth upon the prescience of GOD, which can not be deceived: then will he make the world believe, that we affirm an absolute necessity, wherein the will wresteling and striving to the contrary, is enforced to give place, and violently driven to do that it would not: And when we speak of that compulsion, that God useth in delivering the wicked and obstinate sinners into a reprobate sense, to commit things that are unseemly: that by sinning, their former sin might be punished: then Cerberus would have men to believe that we mean of a violent compulsion, which man striveth against, but is not able to resist the force & violence of it.  
Well, I doubt not but the indifferent Readers of this Apology, will have a better opinion of us than so. For it doth plainly appear by the words hereof, that we teach no such necessity, violent driving, nor compulsion.  
But we say, with the Scripture, and ancient and all sound Fathers: that God's prescience, providence, & Predestination, can not be disappointed, but must needs come to pass, as he hath foreseen, and in providence predestinated that it should: and yet not without the consent of the will, in those whom God did know before would consent, and in foreknowledge did appoint to consent, and to choose the things which he knew before that they would choose.  
The Scriptures therefore, that Cerberus citeth out of Moses, josua, judges, David and isaiah: are nothing against us, for we confess as much as is taught by them. We confess also, that man may by the grace and help of God choose to refuse murder, theft, etc. What is it then that Cerberus hath said against us? He would feign have men think that we teach, that God is not able with his grace and help to make men able to refuse the which is evil, and to choose to do that which is good. As though we should think no better of our God, than the heathen Poets did of their jupiter. Whom they bring in, lamenting that he was by the destinies letted so, that he could not do that good for his dear children, that he would gladly have done for them. But we know, that our God is able to do what he will do, and that he is present in all places, and doth in all places all that he is willing to do. Yea, we do confess with S. Paul, that by 
Phil. 4.  his help that doth comfort & strengthen us, we are able to do all things. So far are we from thinking, that man is not, or may not be able by God's help to refuse to commit murder. etc.  
But Cerberus saith it is plain, that as choose and can not choose do agree together: so doth our opinion agree with the Scripture. And then he setteth mere necessity and violent compulsion, against Christian liberty. That doctrine may be his own. We refuse it as none of ours. But if Cerberus would come to talk: a man might ask him in what points the Christian liberty doth consist. Whether he mean that it consisteth in an absolute power to do what we will, because he maketh mere necessity and violent compulsion, the contraries to it. If he mean so, then doth he not mean as S. 
Galat. 5.  Paul doth mean in his Epistle to the Galathians, where he exhorteth them to stand in that liberty wherewith Christ hath made us free: As may well appear to as many as will read the Text. Well, I will leave this matter, till I may know Cerberus and talk with him mouth to mouth.  
As for those that be so scrupulous in the words of choice, let them (if there be any such) answer for themselves. For my part, I can be well contented to read them and hear them too: but to apply them as Cerberus doth, I think no man can be to scrupulous, that will not agree with Cotta, who would rather that God should not know of things before they came to pass, than that man should not have free choice to do what he will. And yet do I not follow the spirit of Pelagius: as I have showed before upon that ninth Article that Cerberus speaketh of: neither have I, in seeking to escape the dangerous Hurlepoole, dashed my ship against the perilous Rock, as Cerberus would have men to think that I and such other have.  
But if God's predestination be the cause. etc. Then, saith Cerberus. etc. This (if) is already answered. I will not therefore trouble the Reader with it any more.  
But if God's predestination work all: then the Devil, man, laws, doctrine, and prayer, do nothing. This is the very reason that Cotta and Cicero made (as S. Austen declareth in his sift book De Civitate Dei. Cap. 9) And in the tenth Chapter of the same book, he doth answer this objection, declaring to what use, laws, doctrine and prayers do serve. His words are these: Malè autem vivitur, si de Deo nòn benè creditur: unde, absit à nobis eius 
August. De Civi. Dei. lib. 5. Cap. 10.  negare praescientiam, ut liberi esse velimus, quo adiuuante sumus liberi, vel crimus. Proinde, nòn frustra sunt leges, obiurgationes, exhortationes, laudes, & vituperationes: quia & ipsas futuras praescivit, & valent plurimum, quantum illas valeturas praescivit: & praeces valent ad ea impetranda, quae se praecantibus concessurum esse praescivit: & justa premia bonis factis, & peccatis supplicia constituta sunt. Neque enim ideo peccat home, quia Deus illum peccaturum praescivit: imò, ideo nòn dubitatur ipsum peccare cùm peccat: quia ille, evius praescientia fallinòn potest, nòn fatum, nòn so●túnam, nòn aliquid aliud, sed ipsum peccaturum praescivit, qui si nolit, omnino non peccat: Sed si peccare noluerit: etiam hoc ille praescivit. That is to say. The life of man is evil, when his belief concerning God is not good. Wherefore, be it far from us, that we, to the end that we ourselves would be free, should deny the prescience of him, by whom we are or shallbe free. Therefore, laws, reprehensions, exhortations, commendations, and sharp rebukes, are not in vain: because that both he did know before hand that they should come to pass, and also they are of great force, even of as great force as he did foreknow that they should be. And just rewards are appointed for good works, and punishments for sins. Neither doth man sin, because God did know before that he should sin. Yea rather, it is therefore out of doubt that he doth sin, when he doth sin: because he, whose foreknowledge can not be deceived, did know before, that it was not destiny, nor fortune, or any other thing, that should sin, but he himself. Which if he be not willing: he sinneth not at all. But if he should not be willing to sin: God did also know that before.  
Here may Cerberus see (as it were in a glass) how far unlike S. Austen he is in this matter: and how lively he doth resemble his old friends Cicero and Cotta. For fear of granting any necessity to follow upon the prescience and predestination of God: he will rather grant that God may be deceived, and that he is altogether careless, and predestinateth nothing so certainly, but that man may by the power of his will alter and change it. And this is in effect, as much as to deny that there is any God at all.  
But the word of God is exceeding plain and manifest against this opinion (saith Cerberus.) For Genes. 4. 2. King. 24. etc. are places most manifestly against it. But all those places I leave to be weighed by the Reader, who keeping in mind that which I have written in the former part of this Apology, may easily understand how they make against that opinion that we hold. And to give the Reader some occasion to conceive a good opinion of Cerberus in the citing of his Scriptures for his purpose: I will set down the judgement of his own Austen, in those questions ex utroque testamento, that Cerberus and I have spoken of before: wherein shall appear how that Austen understandeth the first of Cerberus Scriptures, which he citeth out of the fourth of Genes. His words be these. Itaque non quia obtulit reprehensus est, sed quia indigna obtulit. Neque ex co damnatus est, sed quia factum noluit emendare commonitus. Adte enim ait conversio cius, & tu dominaberis cius. Hoc est, me nòn accipiente, ad tuum dominium conversum est munus à te oblatum, ut de caetero seiret quid faceret. That is to say: Therefore he was not rebuked, because he did offer a sacrifice: but because he did offer those things that were too vile to be offered. No, he was not condemned for that neither: but because he would not amend his fact when he was told of it. For he saith, thine offering shall return to thee again, & thou shalt be Lord of it. That is, where as I do not receive thine offering, it is returned again to thine own rule, so that he might know how he should use the rest.  
Now let the indifferent Reader judge, how this place may by the judgement of this Austen: be applied as Cerberus would here have it to be applied. And if Cerberus will have this place serve his purpose, he must sight with his own Austen be he never so loath to do it. But least this Apology should increase too much, and pass the quantity that I would have it to grow unto: I will leave the rest of the places that he citeth, to the consideration of the diligent Reader, assuring the same, that not one of those places shallbe found to make against us.  
All the ancient Doctors also (saith Cerberus) and the best learned of the Protestants. etc. do vehemently write against our opinion. And Austen only because of his exceeding obscurity. etc. is alleged on both parts. But when Cerberus shall cite their words that they have so vehemently written against us: there shall none of them be found to maintain his opinion. Which is, that in Christ all mankind is elected. As it appeareth in the former part of this Apology. Neither shall any of them be found to write against that which we maintain, whentheir words and ours shall be well weighed, and our purposes perceived, as all the learned may well understand and know, though Cerberus be blind on that side.  Cerberus. 
Wherefore, to conclude. Take this one note, in this matter of cannot choose, or of necessity, both for the better understanding of the thing itself, and also of those which writ thereupon.  
They commonly speak of two kinds of necessity. The one is, of necessity absolute, and the other, of necessity of consequence, or mere necessity, and necessity upon condition, which division, all learned and good Authors do use, and it is very profitable to be considered. For touching the one, there is neither reason, law, counsel or doctrine, neither fair promise, nor sharp threatening, nor any other thing whatsoever it be, which may help or hinder, add or take away, hurt or profit. Wherefore, there is never any of all the aforesaid ways or means used in any of all those things, which come to pass by absolute necessity.  
As for example: It is of mere necessity, that the Devil is and ever shall be damned, that the soul of man shallbe everlasting, and not come to an end, like to the lise of beasts: nor the life of beasts be immortal as the soul of man, and such like. Wherein it were more than madness, to endeavour, either by reason, law, or counsel, or any other way whatsoever it were, to alter, change, withstand or remove any of those things, seeing of mere necessity they must needs be so, and can not be altered.  
For as Austen saith: Omne enim quod prohibetur, ideo prohibetur, ne (quia potest sicri) siat. Si autem fati esset, nòn posset fieri, neque, prohiberetur. Vet. & novi testament. Quest. 115. Whatsoever is forbidden (saith Austen) therefore it is forbidden, because it might be done, and yet ought not to be done. But if it were of destiny, then could it not be done, nor should not be forbidden.  
These words of Austen being few, contain much matter, if they be truly weighed.  
Now to the necessity of consequence, or necessity of condition, whereof Melancthon saith: Neque, enim haec consequentia libertatem voluntatis tollit. Neither doth this consequence take away the liberty of the will. And this necessity is not repugnant to diligence, prayer, laws and doctrine. For therefore (that I may use again the words of Austen) things are forbidden to be done, because they might be done, but ought not to be done. And this necessity groweth upon former causes, granted or wrought. As it is of necessity, or needs must be, that sects and heresies shall grow in the Church, because the wicked seek their own glory, and Satan stirreth their hearts, to imagine & set forth abominable errors, wherein they serve the Devil, with all the diligence of their power. Wherefore, it must follow: that sects and heresies shall grow.  
Neither doth this necessity prove, that they could not choose but commit such evils: but seeing they do refuse the light, and embrace the darkness, this must necessarily follow, this must needs be the end, that heresy & much mischief shall spring. Or as when a man presently beholdeth with his eyes murder, theft, drunkenness, or any other wickedness, it must needs be true, that such things are committed according to that which a man doth see plainly before his eyes. Yet doth it not follow, that those wicked doers could not choose but commit those outrageous crimes. But seeing that they do commit such things, it must needs be true by the necessity of consequence, that such things are committed of them. These two kinds of necessity, doth Austen notably declare, how, & after what sort they spring out of God's predestination. Lib. De Praedest. Dei. Cap. 2.  
First of all (saith Austen) it is horrible iniquity to say, that God doth predestinate any thing: saving only that which is good. But of predestinations, some be of binding or of bondage, and other be of condition. These are of justice, and those of power. And that it may be the more manifest, it shall be declared (saith he) by example, which are of binding and power: and which are of condition and justice. God created heaven and earth, sun and moon: further, he did foreordeyne or predestinate that the heaven should ever be turned, and the unmovable earth should be in place of a centre unto the turning heaven. The Sun and Moon should rule the day and night. The day & night should succeed one another in certain times appointed. These predestinations are of power and of binding. For every one of those things aforesaid: is so bound unto his work, by the predestination of God, that it can not be moved from the same. But God created man, and did predestinate him, that if he were obedient, and did abstain from the taste of the forbidden apple: he should live, but if he were disobedient, he should abide the sentence of death. This predestination is of condition and of justice. For God before the fall of man, did not by the power of binding so predestinate him to die, that of necessity he must needs die, but under that condition, if he sinned. Because therefore man did sin, it was a righteous thing, that he should die. If he sinned not, he should not be bound to death by any chain of God's predestination.  
All these are the words of Austen. And this division, is often repeated and commended, by the best learned of the Protestants.  Crowley. 
Now Cerberus will shortly come to an end. For he will conclude with one note in this matter of can not choose or necessity. etc. And this note is of the two sorts of necessity, one absolute, and the other of consequence. Or mere necessity and necessity upon condition. etc.  
And to make men believe, that all that we do, is to persuade men, that all things do come to pass of mere necessity: he putteth for example the damnation of the Devil, the immortality of man's soul, and the mortality of the brute beasts. As though the thoughts, words and deeds of men were like unto these. And therefore it should as little avail, to usexeason, law, counsel, doctrine, fair promises or threatenings, to pull men from evil thought, words or deeds, and so from damnation, which doth necessarily follow upon those doings, as it were by the same means to go about to make the Devil a saved spirit, man's soul mortal, & the life of a brute beast everlasting.  
But we speak not of that necessity which is mere or absolute: but we speak of the other, which is of consequence or condition. And therefore his Austin's words are cited out of place (I say his Austin's words, because they are the words of the same Austen that I have noted before not to be the Bishop of Hippoe) for these words of this Austen are spoken of the thoughts, words and deeds of men, which, though they do come to pass by a certain necessity, as God did without beginning foresee that they should: yet doth man use the liberty of his will therein. For he doth neither think, speak, nor do any thing without the consent of his will. And there is no impossibility in man, but that his thoughts, words and deeds may be contrary to that they are.  
As for example. There was no impossibility in Cerberus but that he might have refrained, both the weiting, and publishing and casting abroad of this answer to his friends letter. Neither was it impossible for me to refrain from writing this Apology. And Cerberus and I both have herein used the liberty of our will. And yet did God foresee & predestinate both his doings herein and mine. And as he did foresee that we should choose to do as we have done: so did he also predestinate our doings herein. So that choosing to do as God did foresee and predestinate that we should choose to do: we have done it by that necessity that all learned Authors do call the necessity of consequence or condition.  
And God doth foresee, whether this Apology shall persuade Cerberus to be of one mind with us or not. And if it shall be so: then hath God predestinated my labours so that end. If not: then shall my labours serve to some other purpose that God knew before. And yet do I herein use the liberty of my wi●●, and so shall Cerberus. use his. For neither of us is or shallbe enforced to do that which our will would not have us do.  
This is all the matter that the words of Cerberus his Austen do contain, when they be truly weighed.  
As for the sentence of Pelancthon, it maketh nothing against us, for we speak of the same necessity that he speaketh of: and we affirm with him, that it taketh not away the liberty of man's will.  
The same Melancthon, writing De necessario, in his book which he doth entitle Erotematum dialectices: sayeth that there be four sorts of necessities. One absolute. As that God is true, liberal, just. etc. Another of desinitions or demonstrations: as a three cornered stone must of necessity have three corners, and virtue must needs be a thing that agreeth with the rule of Gods will. The third is natural, in things which are so ordered in nature, that they can not otherwise be, in and by that order. But this necessity may be altered at God's pleasure, as by examples we see it hath. As at the red sea when the water stood still on heaps like hills, and when at the word of josua, the sun stood still and moved not. etc. The fourth and last, is that which all the business is about. And Cerberus would feign make all men believe, that we make no difference between this fourth and the first.  
Of this necessity, doth Melancthon write thus. Quartus gradus est mutabilium, quae tamen vocantur necessaria, necessitate consequentiae, id est, quae suns quidem re ipsa mutabilia: sed nòn mutantur, vel quia sic à Deo decreta sunt, vel quia sequuntur ex causis, quae nòn mutantur, cum tamen mutari potuissent, vel quia cum su●t, contradictoriae simul verae esse nòn possunt. etc. That is to say. The fourth degree of necessities, is of those things which are mutable, which are notwithstanding called necessary, by the necessity of consequence. That is to say, which are in deed mutable: but are not changed, either for that they be so decreed of God, or else for that they do follow upon causes that are not changed, where as notwithstanding they might have been changed. Or else, for that when they be done, the fiat contraries of them, can not at the same time be true.  
What have I written against Shaxton more than this? The thoughts, the words, and the deeds of men, are of themselves mutable: but as God hath decreed, so shall it come to pass, in all men's thoughts, words and deeds.  
It followeth therefore, that though the teachers of sects, the muderers, the thieves and the drunkards, might have withholden the consent of their wills from those wicked doings: yet God having decreed to punish either them or others by that mean, the thing must fall out according to that decree: and yet God remain just, and man's will unconstrained, as I have before sufficiently declared.  
As touching the Text of Austen, that Cerberus citeth out of his book De Predestinatione Dei. Cap. 2. I will first note what Erasmus and the rest of the learned sort, do think of that book. Hoc opusculum de Praedestinatione Dei, non esse Augustini, vel ipsa brevitas arguit. Deinde, hoc docot, quod Augustinus fortiter refellit, praedestinationem esse ex operibus nostris. Videtur fragmentum alicuius libri, cuius studiosus quispiam, prooemium & clausulam attexuit. That is to say. This little work of the predestination of God: is by the very shortness thereof, showed not to be of Austin's writing. Moreover, it doth teach that predestination is of our works, which thing Austen doth mightily refel. It seemeth to be a scrap of some book, whereunto some man, being desirous thereof, hath fastened a poem and conclusion.  
Here thou mayst see (gentle: Reader) of what authority this book is, that Cerberus maketh so much of. I will not therefore spend any time in answering these words.  Cerberus. 
Many things do offer themselves in this matter to be spoken, but my purpose of briefness causeth me to grow to an end. I have thought good therefore in few words, to note one point more of evil doctrine, which now a days is taught, and it springeth also out of this foresaid proposition, that God's predestination causeth all sin and wickedness, & this it is, that sin is not the cause of Reprobation, nor of God's hatred towards the wicked which are damned, which thing in deed, to be short, I grant must needs follow, if the former conclusion be true, that sin cometh of God's predestination, or that God's predestination was the cause of Adam's fall, which was the original of sin. For if sin, or the original thereof came of God, or of his ordinance, and from God cometh nothing but that which is holy, just and good, then is sin, no sin, and cannot be the cause of God's hatred towards them that perish, except we should say, that God hateth them for that thing, which is holy, just, and good.  
And lest I should be thought, through pretence of brevity, to pass over, without plain proof of that which I say, that this part of doctrine, is also set forth and taught. I will rehearse one sentence of theirs published in print, which is so open and manifest, that it may serve as well as a thousand: I read in the forenamed book translated out of French into English, toward the latter end of the book, upon this place, thus noted in figures, and these very words follow. Rom. 9 c. 11. 12. 13. He saith not only that Esau was ordained to be hated, before he did any evil: for in so saying, he should not seem to exclude any thing, but an actual sin & incredulity. But he saith expressly, before he was borne: whereby he excludeth original sin, and all that which might be considered in the person of Esau by his birth from the cause of hate.  
Touching the Text, whereupon it is spoken, assuredly Ink serveth not worse to make ivory white: than these words, to open the mind and sense of the Apostle, as it were easy to prove, if shortness would suffer to make a digression, but touching that part of doctrine: thou feast that he speaketh of two opinions: the one that actual sin or incredulity, should be the cause of God's hatred toward the wicked: The other, that original sin, is the cause of God's hate toward them. This man against them both, taketh occasion upon this example of Esau: to exclude all that is in man, either outward sin or inward, either original sin or actual, from the cause of God's hate, so that (if it be true which they say) God doth hate men: neither for their outward wicked life, nor for their inward devilish lust, but for his own pleasure only.  Crowley. 
The purpose to be brief, causeth Cerberus to cut of many things that offer themselves to be spoken. Yet for all the haste, he must needs note one point more of evil doctrine. Which is, that sin is not the cause of Reprobation. etc.  
I would feign know how Cerberus could answer this Argument. All causes are in order before their effects: but sin was not before Reprobation: Ergo sin could not be the cause thereof. Cerberus will deny the minor. For he holdeth that sin was before Reprobation. The minor therefore must be proved thus. Whatsoever was before Reprobation, is eternal: but sin is not eternal, Ergo sin was not before Reprobation. If Cerberus will doubt of the maior, it shall be proved thus. Whatsoever was before Election, is eternal: but Election and Reprobation are of like antiquity: Ergo, whatsoever was before reprobation is eternal. The mayor is manifest by the words of S. Paul to the Ephesians. Cap. 1. Sicut elegit nos in ipso ante mundi constitutionem. As he elected us in him before the world was made. And if Cerberus will doubt of the minor (as perhaps he will) then let him show us, how there can be a choice where none are refused.  
This might suffice for our defence in this matter that Cerberus doth now charge us withal. But because he saith that this our conclusion is the sequel of a proposition that we affirm, that is, that God's predestination causeth all sin and wickedness: I must take some what more pain in the defence of that which we have written.  
First, I must say that Cerberus hath belied us: For we say not that God's predestination doth cause any sin. Then I must also deny, and have already proved, that Adam's fall was not the original of sin. Thirdly, we deny that the original of sin came of God: wherefore the conclusion that Cerberus maketh is not against us.  
But Cerberus hath found one sentence of ours so open and manifest, that it may serve as well as a thousand. It is in the latter end of the forenamed English book translated out of French, upon the words of Paul Rom. 9 c. He saith not only. etc. Cerberus can not see how this Text of Paul may by those words be better opened, than jourie may be made white with ink. But for haste to come to an end, he will not stand to prove this, although he might easily do it, as he saith.  
But touching the two opinions, one that actual sin or incredulity, the other that original sin, is the cause of God's hatred towards men: this fellow (saith Cerberus) taketh occasion upon the example of Esau to exclude all that is in man. etc.  
A little help would make this man of one mind with Origine, who writing upon this part of Paul's Epistle to the Rom. and these verse words, jacob have I loved, but Esau I have hated: saith, that jacobs' soul being yet without a body, did purge itself, and when God saw the pureness of it, he took it, and put it into that body wherein jacob was borne, and Esau his soul which had not cleansed itself, he put into a body made out of the same lump, but not to honour as the other was, because the soul of Esan was not worthy of such a body. So he loved jacob (as Origine thinketh) because jacobs' soul had cleansed itself before it came into the body: & he hated Esay, because his soul had not cleansed itself.  
If a man should ask this question of Cerberus: why did God love jacob and hate Esau? what could he answer, if he will not say, Quia voluit? because he would, If he will say, that God respected the actual righteousness and sin that was in them: then shall he be found to join with Origine. If he shall say that he respected original sin in Esau, and did therefore hate him: then may it be asked why he did not hate jacob for the same. For both were defiled therewith alike. But if Cerberus will say, that God had respect to the works that they should do in the time of their life; then doth he join with the Papists: And that he would not seem to do.  
His best way therefore, shallbe to join with us, and say: That God loved jacob and hated Esau, because it pleased him so to do. And if any man shall stand up to dispute the matter any further: then to answer with S. Paul. O homo tu quis es, qui respondeas Deo? O thou man, who art thou, that darest take upon thee to reason with God?  Cerberus. 
That very same thing saith Knox in the. 141. pag. of his foresaid book: where his words are these. Further I say: that if Esau was hated for his evil deserving, then must it needs follow, that jacob was loved for his well deserving, by the Argument following: of the nature of contraries.  
As well it might be said, it must needs follow by the contraries: that if a King or Prince hate one man, which hath well deserved his hate, by stealing from him his ring, his chain, or some great jewel, them doth he not love any other man, but he which hath well deserved his love, by giving to him a ring, a chain, or some great treasure, as though he should say: because justice worketh on the one side, therefore mercy hath nothing to do on the other side, or as though God were not both just & merciful: Just in damning for their offence, those which are damned: and merciful in saving without their desert those which are saved.  
And who seeth not that neither simile, nor dissimile, neither like things, nor things contrary, do hold in all points, for nothing is so like, which in something is not unlike, neither any thing so contrary, which doth in all things vary. Christ is likened to a Lion, but did he ever ravish, or devour, and shed any innocent blood? Latimer wisheth, that all Bishops were like Bishop Devil in diligence, them ought not the Devil and a Bishop to differ in all things. And most specially and plainly, doth the Scripture beat in our heads: above all other things, that the nature of contraries, do not hold in both sides of God's reward, & man's deserving. For as they are inseparable relatives in the one part, so on the other side, the one hath never any relation to the other, for as God's hatred and vengeance, hath ever relation to man's deserving: so hath God's love and mercy never any relation to man's merit. Yea, all the Scripture teacheth us, that God never hateth, or punisheth man without his own deserving. For as the wise man saith: Et cum qui nullam poenam commeritus 
Sapient. 12.  sit condemnasse, a tua potentia iudicas alienum. And thou Lord (saith he) esteemest it a thing contrary to thy power, to have condemned him which hath not deserved punishment.  
What should be said of the Canaanites and the Israelites, if the nature of contraries do always hold, and have such relation of the one to the other, must it not then necessarily follow (as he saith) by the nature of contraries: that if the Canaanites were cast out of the fortunate land that floweth with milk and honey, for their evil deserving: that on the other side the Israelites were brought and planted into that same happy and blessed rest, for their well deserving? But what saith the Scripture? Speak not in thy heart, after that the Lord thy God hath cast them out before thee, saying: for my righteousness 
Deut. 9  the Lord hath brought me in, to possess this land, nay, but for the wickedness of those Nations, the Lord doth cast them out before thee. So plainly speaketh the holy ghost here, that thou mayst easily perceive, how gross and vain their saying is, which affirm: That if God hate an evil man for his own evil deserving, then must it needs follow, that he loveth a good man for his own well deserving. For the hatred of God and everlasting damnation are just rewards of man's evil deserving: but the love of God and everlasting life are free gifts 
Rom. 6.  of God, for Christ's sake without any part of man's own deserving.  
Take therefore this saying of theirs: No sin neither original nor actual, is the cause of God's hate or eternal death, and put the same into the one side of the balance, then take, and put into the other side, this saying of S. Paul to the Romans: was 
Rom. 7.  that then that was good, made death unto me? God forbidden, but sin was made death unto me. Then weigh both these sayings together with the hand of good advisement, in the indifferent balance of upright judgement, and put not in above three grains of wilful partiality: thus shalt thou plainly see, that the Apostle agreeth far better with the Majesty of God, and hath a much more reverent opinion of his judgements, than these men have, yea, thou shalt easily perceive (whatsoever they say) that neither God's pleasure, nor God's ordinance, or predestination, nor none other thing that is good, is made death, or the cause of God's hatred, against any man, but sin is the very grounded cause, why God hateth, taketh vengeance, and punisheth man by death and destruction, according to that which the same Apostle saith: Death is the reward of sin. And the words 
Rom. 6. Osee. 13.  of O see are also manifest & plain where he saith: O Israel thou dost destroy thyself, but in me only is thy help. In which words of the holy ghost, thou seest how manifestly God doth, as it were purge himself, from being the cause or worker of man's destruction, so that the perdition and destruction of man, is altogether to be attributed unto himself: And God being clear, neither accessary, nor partaker thereof, as the chief and high judge of heaven and earth, unspotted and without blame, giveth the sentence of everlasting death upon man, for his own wicked deserving and offence.  
But on the other side saith God unto man, in me only is thy help. In God only, only in God is our help and salvation, in him only, and of him altogether, and not of ourselves: cometh our salvation, and all whatsoever belongeth thereunto. The same is also set forth by all those Scriptures, which are before rehearsed, to prove that sin and evil, cometh not of God's predestination, for upon that conclusion dependeth also this proposition, that sin is not the cause of Reprobation, or of God's hatred towards man.  Crowley. 
Yet once again hath Cerberus a snatch at Knox. Whether he do report his words truly or not, I know not: for I have not seen that book of his, neither have I cause to think, that all is Gospel that Cerberus saith. Much more ado than needeth doth Cerberus make, to prove that an Argument à contrarijs, simile and dissimile: doth not always conclude necessarily. For as he saith, who seeth not, that they do not hold in all points? This therefore that Cerberus hath here written, is but dalliance, and as it were dancing about the bush. The question is, whether the sequel be good in the matter that Knox doth use it in, or not. We must therefore consider the matter, and how Knox doth apply this manner of reasoning to this matter. The matter therefore, is a question moved concerning the cause why Esau should be hated of God, and jacob beloved, before any of them had done either good or evil, yea and before they were borne, and therefore, before there could be in them any deserving at all. Now, Knox saith, that if Esau were hated for his evil deserving: then must it needs follow, by an Argument following of the nature of contraries, that jacob was beloved for his well deserving.  
Now, I must think well of Knox, for I know him to be not only learned but also godly, and therefore not like to overshoot himself so far, that he would stretch an Argument, taken out of the place of contraries, further than the nature thereof will suffer. I must think therefore, that he meant, that if God do in choosing and refusing, in loving and hating, respect nothing but the well deserving of one sort, and the evil deserving of the other (as the common opinion of the Papists is) than it must needs follow, by an Argument of the nature of contraries, that if he hated Esau for his evil deserving, he must needs love jacob for his well deserving.  
If Cerberus be not satisfied with this, let him look for further answer at Knox's own hand, for he is yet living and able to answer for himself.  
As for the similitude of a King or Prince, that Cerberus useth to deface Knox's Argument withal: may serve him among such as know not that God is free from all men's affections, and that he can not be moved to love us the better for the gifts that we bestow upon him, nor the worse, for that we take from him and spoil him of any treasure that he ought to have.  
The nature of God is not to hate but to love. For S. john saith, God is love. And as the wise man saith, he 
1. johan. 4. Sapient. 11.  loveth all things that be, and he hateth none of the things that he hath made. Neither hath he ordained or made any thing, hating the same that he ordained or made. For in that he made or ordained them, they are all exceeding good. Wherefore, when we say, or when it is said in the Scriptures, that God doth hate any of his creatures, (as it is said that he hated Esau) it is meant that he loved not Esau or those other creatures, whom he is said to hate, so well as he loved the others, of whom it is said that he loved them.  
It can not be denied, but must needs be confessed, that God loved all his creatures, in that he would make them some thing, where as before they were nothing, and in that he would give them some part of that which is proper to himself. For to be, is proper to God. And whatsoever hath any being: it hath the same of God. When God giveth a being to his creatures, he showeth that he loveth them: but when he giveth them an everlasting and blessed being, than he loveth them so, that the other love in comparison of that, seemeth but an hatred. And therefore it is said that he hateth them, whom he appointeth not to that everlasting blessed being, but leaveth than to themselves, that in them he may have occasion to exercise his justice, and by them to give occasion to his dearly beloved to see and consider the exceeding greatness of his love and mercy towards them.  
But Cerberus seemeth to have the whole Scripture on his side. For he saith, that all the Scripture teacheth us, that God never hateth and punisheth us without our own deserving. Which saying, I grant to be true, but not in that sense that Cerberus would have us to understand it. For Cerberus would have us to think that God could not be counted just, if he should refuse any man in whom there were not sin, that might move God to refuse him, and to that end he citeth the words of the wise man. For this is his opinion, as it appeareth 
Sapient. 12.  before, that in Christ all mankind is elected, and so consequently, that Esau was elected in Christ. But by sin he made himself a reprobate, and was not refused before he sinned.  
But let us see, how this place of the wise man maketh for his purpose. The words are these, as Cerberus citeth them. Et cum qui nullam poenam commeritus sit condemnasse: a tua potentia iudicas alienum. And thou Lord, esteemest it a thing contrary to thy power, to have condemned him that hath not deserved punishment. All the Scripture is now, by Cerberus, brought into a short sum. For it is knit up in less than two lines, written in the twelve Chapter of the book of wisdom.  
Of what authority that book hath aways been thought to be: I think Cerberus is not ignorant. And how divers readings there be of that place which he citeth: I suppose he knoweth. The Tygurine Bible is it that Cerberus followeth. Other translations there be, that differ from that, and from the old also. The old translation hath it thus.  
Cum ergo sis justus, justè omnia disponis: ipsum quoque qui nòn debet puniri, condemnas, & exterum aestimas à tua virtute. That is. Forasmuch as thou thyself art just, thou dost dispose all things justly: him also that ought not to be punished, thou dost condemn, and dost esteem him as one exiled from thy power or dominion. belike, when Cerberus cited this place, he supposed that no man should see his book, but such as were not able to discern Chalk from Cheese. What place can make more manifestly against him and for us, than this place doth? For by these words it is plain, that though God do condemn him, that hath not by any deeds deserved to be condemned: yet is God never the latter, just, and doth dispose all things justly.  
Yea, and the circumstance of the Text doth show that this translation is more nigh the meaning of the writer, than is that which Cerberus followeth. For the sentence going immediately before, is thus. Neque Rex, neque tyrannus, in conspectu tuo inquirent, de hijs quos perdidisti. That is: Neither King nor tyrant, will in thy presence make inquisition for them that thou hast destroyed.  
And the sentence that doth immediately follow, is thus. Virtus enim tua, justitiae initium est: & ab hoc quod omnium Dominus es, omnibus te parcere facis. That is. For thy power is the beginning of justice, and because thou art Lord of all, thou dost make thyself to spare all.  
But because there is such diversity of translations in the Latin, and peradventure Cerberus will say he hath looked in the Greek, and findeth that the Tygurine translation, which he followeth, is most agreeable to the Greek Text, out of which all our Latin translations are taken. It shall not be amiss therefore to set down the Greek Text, that such as have any skill therein, may judge betwixt us.  
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. That is to say (so far as I am able to understand it) Thou being just, dost dispose all things justly, commanding to condemn strange from the land of thy power, him that is not to be judged ignominious. If any can see any other meaning in this Greek text: I will not contend, for I see that many men of great learning, have varied in opinion about the translation thereof.  
But grant that Cerberus have cited that translation that is according to the true meaning of the Text: what hath he won thereby? Shall all the Scripture be on his side, because it is written in the book of wisdom, that God esteemeth it a thing contrary to his power (or more truly after the Latin Text that Cerberus citeth) a thing strange from his power, to condemn him that hath not deserved punishment? I think not. For the book of wisdom, is of that sort of books that must be made to agree with the Canonical books: the Canonical books must not be enforced to agree with it: For it is Apokryphe, that is a book permitted to be read privately, but not of such authority that we may build our faith upon every sentence in it.  
But grant that this book were of as great authority as any other book of Scripture is: should we think that God might not justly refuse such of his creatures as it pleaseth him not to choose, unless the same creatures had first by sin made themselves unworthy to be chosen? We must not restrain God of his liberty, to do with his creatures what he himself will. Neither must we say or think, that any thing that he doth, is or can be other than just, albeit that we can not understand how the same should be just. We must therefore, with reverend sear, seek another meaning of this place than Cerberus doth teach us: let us think therefore, that God speaketh here of thexecution of his judgement, and not of election. And it shallbe good for us to say always with S. Austen, that the cause of God's doings may be secret, so 
Aug. Paulino Quest. 6.  that we can not know them: but unjust they can not be.  
But Cerberus seemeth to himself to have gotten a great advantage by the example of the Canaanites and Israelites. The Canaanites were driven out for their sins, and this was justice: but the Israelites were put in their place without deserving, and that was mercy. Wherefore in refusing, God worketh by justice, and in choosing, he worketh by mercy. As though there were no difference between choosing and refusing of creatures, and the using of them when they be chosen or refused. God chooseth and refuseth without respect of good or evil deservings: but he maketh not his refusal known unto men, till the refused have by their sins showed themselves worthy to be refused. And though the chosen sort, neither do nor can show themselves worthy for their good works to be chosen: yet before they receive the great blessing promised, they show themselves by their works, less worthy to be refused than the other.  
And to this do the Scriptures that Cerberus hath cited out of Moses, Paul, O see and the rest: full well agree. But it followeth not hereof that therefore God had not refused the wicked sort before they sinned.  
It is true, that death is the reward of sin: but it is not true that every one that sinneth, receiveth that reward, for Christ came to save sinners, and the free gift of everlasting life is bestowed upon such sinners, as were elected in Christ before the beginning of the world.  
It is true also, that man destroyeth himself, by the free consent of his will, to do contrary to the commandment of God, & that his help and succour cometh of God alone: & yet doth it not therefore follow, that no man is refused of God before he have committed sin, whereby he destroyeth himself. For when the elect were chosen in Christ, then were the rest refused. For otherwise, it could not be an election, but a general acceptation.  
As for the saying that Cerberus saith is ours, and would have his friend to lay it in the one side of the balance against S. Paul's words to the Romans: I leave to himself to be weighed with the hand of good advisement. etc. And let him put in as many grains of wilful partiality as he will: for the saying is none of ours. For we teach, that sin is the cause of eternal death, in those that be not Gods elect, and were it not that Christ hath washed his chosen slocke in his own heart blood: sin would be their destruction too.  
It is but for his own pleasure therefore, that Cerberus doth thus turn round after his own tail.  Cerberus. 
And upon the same Article dependeth also an other part of doctrine, which they teach, worthy to be misliked of all men, as well for that it importeth a sophistical search of bottomless secrets, in the very essence and nature of God, as also, for that it clearly withdraweth us from Christ, the only stay, and comfort of our weak conscience, delivered unto us in the word of God, for that they might be sure to hold fast the former principle, that all things come of God's predestination, as running streams out of a deep fountain. They affirm, that the free mercy of God in Christ, is but an inferior cause of Election, and that we are taught to ascend unto a higher cause, as unto the eternal purpose and predestination of God, which he determined only in himself. So saith the printed book before named, translated out of French into English.  
That same thing we read also, lately set forth in English print, in the gloze of the last translated Bible. Rom. cap. 9 with these words. As the only will and purpose of God, is the chief cause of Election and Reprobation, so his free mercy in Christ is an inferior cause of salvation. etc.  
But for my part, I trust in mind, never to ascend unto that high cause of Election, and in heart never to taste of that eternal purpose or predestination, which God hath determined only in himself, without or above his free mercy, which is in Christ. For surely, that eternal purpose, which cometh not of God's free mercy in Christ, is to destroy, and not to save. Again, if that eternal purpose spring out of God's free mercy, then is that free mercy of God, the chief cause, and not an inferior cause why he purposeth to save us, for a great dishonour it were to the mercy of God: to be put to an inferior place, touching election and salvation of man. For if ever God's mercy be above all, it is in the saving of miserable man: and mercy there is not in God toward man, but only in Christ.  
Therefore S. Paul Ephes. 3. b. calleth it the eternal purpose, which he purposed in Christ jesus our Lord: In Christ therefore was this eternal purpose, and for his only sake, God the Father eternally purposed to elect and save us. Consider and mark it well, whence cometh this purpose or will of God to save us: but of his free mercy? If his purpose to save us, spring out of his free mercy, why is then his mercy inferior to his purpose, or how is the fountain inferior to the springs that come thereof?  
Also, what may be said in God at any time, or in any respect to be higher or greater than his mercy, seeing it is written, that his mercy is as great as himself. Ecclesiast 2. d. Yea, and most specially it is so to be said, that his mercy passeth all, when we speak of this matter: For of this it is written, that mercy 
jacob. 2. b.  rejoiceth against judgement, and why? all the judgements of God in this behalf are not to be compared unto his mercy, for though it were not true, which David sayeth, that his mercy is above all his 
Psal. 45. b  works, yet were it clear, that in Election and Redemption and salvation of man, God's mercy in Christ, hath ever the highest place: and those which in the salvation of our souls, make the free mercy of God an inferior cause, how base a room will they assign unto his free mercy, in nourishing and preserving our bodies. Let them reach as high as they can, I trust to go no further, but to hold me fast by the everlasting mercy of God, and by the hem of Christ's garment, for the Scripture describeth God unto me, without Christ as a wrathful and most terrible judge, but in Christ, and for his sake, as a father whose wrath is pacified, and he well pleased, reconciled, agreed, and at one: and to speak of a higher cause or purpose, to elect and save only in God, beside or without this free mercy in Christ, or that Christ and God's free mercy in him, is not the chiefest cause which worked and obtaineth the decree, and purpose of God, to elect and save, it is plainly nothing else, but to deny the mercy of God in election, reconciliation, redemption and salvation, by Christ, in Christ, and for Christ: As easily it may be perceived, if a man do but weigh and consider, what eternal purpose an Election, and a reconciliation is, seeing Christ is our Advocate, Mediator, Peace, Reconciliation & Atonement, as in these Scriptures following, and many other, it doth plainly appear. Psal. 84. a. Math. 1. a. Ephe. 1. a. 2. b. Rom 5. a. b. Coloss. 1. c. 2. Corin. 5 d. 1. joan. 2. a. Heb. 5. b. c. and. 7. a. b. c. d. e. 2. Timoth. 1. c.  
And although it be true according to the Scriptures, that God so loved the world, that he gave his only begotten son. etc. yet did he neither love the world, nor give his son without the intercession & mediation of his son, for if God loved the world without the reconciliation and mediation, or before he was reconciled, entreated, and pacified by Christ, then is Christ in vain come to late to be our mediator, seeing God the Father is without him already reconciled. But horrible false is this opinion: For like as the son of a King might entreat his Father for the servant, whom for his offences, the King in his displeasure, were ready to cast, not only out of his service, but also into perpetual prison: even so Christ our only Saviour, and Gods only son, did offer up himself, as a ransom unto his Father for us, whereby he pacified the wrath of his Father, and adjoined us with himself, to be son and heirs of his Father's glory. And this hath Christ done, not only now in time, but also everlastingly in the most high and eternal purpose of God, before the foundation of the world was laid.  
Thus I end, thinking it sufficient for this present, that I have in these few words purged myself of those things which you lay to my charge, & set forth unto your judgement, the errors of Pelagius, that you may the better diseerne, who they are, which are worthy to be called after that sect: and also plainly declared, in what points my conscience differeth, from certain teachers of our time: and upon what ground, I am moved so to misslike some part of their doctrine, which things if you diligently weigh and consider, reading the same without partiality: then have I my desire.  Crowley. 
I am glad, that Cerberus is now come to an end. Much ado he had to let slip so many things as offered themselves to be spoken off. But now he hath concluded, consenting himself with few words, in purging himself of those things that his friend charged him with, and setting forth the Pelagians errors. etc.  
Yet, even in the winding up of the matter, he hath found one part of doctrine, hanging upon the Article of God's eternal predestination, which is to be misliked of all men (if Cerberus be not deceived) and that is: That as the only will & purpose of God is the chief cause of Election and Reprobation: so his free mercy in Christ is an inferior cause of salvation. etc. Here Cerberus doth of purpose leave out the end of that gloze, shutting up the matter with his. etc. I will therefore set down the words that follow, which are these: and the hardening of the heart an inferior cause of damnation. Now this gloze is some thing more plain than it was before, as Cerberus hath cited it with his. etc. He thought belike, that the Bible wherein he findeth this gloze, is not in every man's hand, and therefore his. etc. should cause men to think that the rest of the gloze must be as good stuff as he thinketh the first part to be. That is worthy to be misliked of all men, importing a sophistical search of bottomless secrets, and drawing from Christ. Such shifts doth Cerberus use, to make men mislike with that which he himself liketh not.  
But to prove this part of doctrine to be such as Cerberus assirmeth it to be: he useth two reasons. One is, that the eternal purpose of God, springeth out of his free mercy in Christ: wherefore that free mercy cannot be inferior to God's eternal purpose, more than the fountain, from which streams of water do slow, can be inferior to the streams that flow from it. The other is of the mediation of Christ. For if God did in his eternal will and purpose, elect us before Christ had appeased his wrath, by his mediation: then was it but a vain thing for Christ to be a Mediator, neither had we any need of his mediation.  
Although I would gladly content myself, to have defended mine own writings, and other men's wherewith Cerberus findeth fault, even with as few words as he useth in purging himself and other, of that which his friend layeth to his charge: yet may I not so shortly slip over this matter wherewith Cerberus hath shut up his answer.  
For if Cerberus would have sought how to have set forth to be seen, his own wilful ignorance, and error in the chief points of our Religion: he could not have found a better mean, than he hath used in these two reasons that he maketh against the doctrine contained in the gloze wherewith he misliketh.  
For what greater error can there be, than to hold that with God there is time past, and time to come: and that any of the essential properties of God do spring out of other in time, as though there had been or could have been a time, wherein God lacked those properties? Or that the son of God, the second person in Trinity, should in his divine nature in time, make mediation to God the Father, that thereby he might purpose to save man, whom he was before purposed to destroy. For striving against him that hath said, that the only will and purpose of God, is the chief cause of Election and Reprobation: and that his free mercy in Christ is an inferior cause of salvation. etc. He saith that the purpose or will of God to save us, must needs spring out of the free mercy of God, and that therefore the will or purpose of God in saving, must of force be inferior to his mercy, even as streams that issue from fountains, are inferior to the fountains that they come from.  
And to prove this, he citeth the words of Ecclesiasticus the. 2. Chapter. Secundum enim magnitudinem ipsius: sic & misericordia illius cum ipso est. That is: Even according to his own greatness, so is his mercy with him. He citeth also the saying of S. james. Cap. 2. of his Epistle, where he saith. judicium enim sine miscricordia: illi qui nòn sacit miscricordiam. Gloriatur autem miscricordia adversus judicium. That is: He that showeth no mercy, shall have judgement without mercy. But mercy rejoiceth against judgement. And again, he citeth the words of David in the Psalm. 145. Miscricordia eius super omnia opera eius. That is: His mercy is upon all his works.  
All this ado he maketh, to prove that Gods will and purpose are inferiors to his mercy. But how well that is by these Scriptures proved, I refer to the judgement of the indifferent Reader. Sirach saith, that those which fear the Lord will prepare their hearts, and humble their souls before the Lord. Let us fall into the hands of God, and not into the hands of men: For even as his greatness is, so is his mercy. Sirach his purpose is to set forth the effect of the fear of God, which worketh in the hearts of men, a true turning to God, with an assured hope of forgiveness at his hand, because they be persuaded, that he is no less ready to forgive penitent sinners, than he is able to punish the impenitent.  
S. james saith, that the merciful shall find mercy, minding to persuade all men to show mercy one to another. Assuring themselves, that unless they do so, they can find no mercy with God, and on the contrary, if they do show mercy, they shall not need to fear judgement, for mercy shall prevail against judgement.  
And David the Prophet hath said, that God's mercy is upon all his works, although it please Cerberus to cite his words otherwise, for his purpose. For he saith, that David hath said, that the lords mercy is above all his works. Which words though they be true, yet hath not David so said, neither may I suffer Cerberus, to cause the Prophet David to speak as he would have him, that his fantasy might be maintained by the prophets words. David's meaning is to teach that the Lord God showeth mercy upon all his works, so that there is not one of the works of God, that hath not cause to praise him for his loving kindness and mercy. Both the Hebrew and Greek Text, and all the translations in Latin, and English too (so many as I have seen) do give this sense of the prophets words.  
How can Cerberus prove then, by these Scriptures, that the mercy of God is the fountain of his will & purpose? All that he doth therefore is nothing else but a setting forth of his own wilful ignorance, whereby he is fallen into the filthy error of them that imagine of God, as of a man, and that he is moved with affections as men be. Whereas, in God: His understanding, his unmeasurable power, his unsearchable wisdom, his merciful goodness, his truth and justice, his chastenesse and freedom in all points, to will what he lusteth, to do what it pleaseth him, and to purpose & appoint what liketh him: are essential properties, without which he neither is, nor can be God. To imagine therefore, that there was a time wherein God was purposed to destroy man, and that his mercy in Christ hath changed that purpose, and caused him now to purpose and will to save man: is to imagine that there was a time wherein God was not so merciful as he is now, & so, not so perfectly God as he is now. And that by experience he hath learned some what more wisdom than he had at the first, and therefore, may be wiser hereafter than he is now. How great absurdities these are, I leave to the judgement of the indifferent Readers.  
But Cerberus will say, that though I have said some thing against him, yet I have said nothing for him whose words I have taken in hand to defend: but in my words I seem to fight against them both. I answer: I have not taken upon me to defend, either mine own or other men's words, sucder than in conscience I think them to be true. And if I did think that the writer of that gloze did mean as grossly, as I perceive by his open words that Cerberus doth: I would not spare him more than I have spared Cerberus: but for as much as his words seem not to me, to have any such meaning as to teach that there was a time, wherein God was merciless towards man, & that his mercy first sprang out of his will and purpose (as Cerberus doth plainly teach, that his will and purpose sprang out of his mercy) I must not refuse to take that good meaning of his words, which may seem to me to be according to the truth of Christian religion.  
The words of Paul, whereupon this note is made, are these. I will have mercy on him, to whom I will show mercy. Upon this it is noted in the margin, that as the only will and purpose of God is the chief cause of Election and Reprobation: so his free mercy in Christ is an inferior cause of salvation: and the hardening of the heart an inferior cause of damnation. I understand the meaning of these words to be, that as the only will & purpose of God is the chief cause, that there was an Election and choice of some, and a refusal of other some: so the showing forth of his mercy in Christ, is an inferior cause, that is, an instrumental cause whereby salvation is wrought in the elected, according to Gods will and purpose, and the hardening of the hearts of the reprobates, an instrumental cause of damnation, in the reprobates, according to the same eternal will and purpose.  
He therefore that saith we must ascend to an higher cause of Election, than that which appeareth in the execution of God's mercy in Christ, doth not teach to set up the essential properties one above another, as though one were fountain of another, and that God lacked the one till it sprang out of the other: but he teacheth that the same mercy that we see executed in Christ in time, was decreed in the eternal will and purpose of God before all time, and so was the refusal of them whose hearts we see hardened in time. If any man do see cause to judge otherwise of this gloze: I am well pleased that the same use his own judgement in enterpreting the meaning thereof. And if I may perceive any man's judgement herein to be sounder than mine, I trust I shallbe ready to condescend to that.  
And lest any man should think, that herein I do follow mine own fantasy, without example of any thing that I see in the ancient Fathers: I will set down the words of S. Austen, that have been a mean to confirm me herein.  
In his. 14. book, De Civitate Dei, 〈◊〉. 11. Chapter: S. Austen writeth thus. Sed quia Deus cuncta prescivit, & ideo hominem quoque peccaturum ignorare nòn potuit: secundum id quod praescivit, itque disposuit, civitatem Dei debemus asserere, nòn secundum illud quod in nostram cognitionem pervenire nòn potuit, quia in Dei dispositione nòn fuit. Nec enim homo peccato suo, divinum potuit perturbare consilium, quasi Deum, quod statuerat, mutare compulerit: cum Deus praesciendo utrumque prevenerit, id est, & homo quem bonum ipse creavit, quam malus esset futurus, & quid boni, etiam sic de illo esset ipse facturus: Deus enim etsi dicitur, statuta mutare: unde tropica locutione in Scriptures sanctis, etiam poenituisse legitur deum, juxta id dicitur quod homo spera 〈…〉 rat, vel naturalium causarum ordo gestabat: nòn juxta id, quod se omnipotens facturum esse praesci 〈…〉 rat. That is to say: But because God did know all things before hand, and therefore could not be ignorant that man should sin: we must teach that the holy City is such a thing as he did foresee and appoint that it should be, not such as we could not come to the knowledge of, because it was not in that disposition or order that God made. Neither was man, by his sin able to disorder the purpose of God, as though he should have constrained God to change the thing that he had once decreed: seeing that God by his foresight did prevent both, that is to say, both how the evil man should become (whom he had created good) and also what thing he would make of him, even when he should in such wise become evil. For although it be said that God doth change his purposes (whereof it cometh that by a figurative speech, it is read in the holy Scriptures, that God did repent) the same is spoken according to that which man hoped for, or that which the order of natural causes did import: not according to that, which the almighty did know before hand that he himself would do.  
Again, the same Austen in his book De diversis questionibus. 83. and the. 15. 16. 17. questions saith thus. Deus omnium quae sunt causa est. Quod autem omnium rerum causa est: etiam sapientiae suae causa est. Nec unquàm Deus sine sapientia sua: Igitur sempiternae sapientiae suae, causa est sempiterna, nec tempore prior est quam sua sapientia. Deinde, si patrem sempiternum esse inest deo, nec suit aliquandò non pater: nunquam sine filio fuit. Omne praeteritum iam nòn est. Omne futurum nòn dùm est. Omne igitur & praeteritum & futur 〈…〉 non deest. Apud d 〈…〉 m autem nihil deest: Nec praeteritum igitur, nec futurum, sed omne praesens est apud deum.  
That is to say: God is the cause of all those things that be. And in asmuch as he is the cause of all things: he is the cause of his own wisdom. Neither was God at any time without his own wisdom: therefore he is the everlasting cause of his own everlasting wisdom, neither is he in time more ancient than his own wisdom. Furthermore, if to be an everlasting Father, be a thing that is in God, and that he hath not at any time not been a Father: then hath he never been without a son. Whatsoever is past, is not now. Whatsoever is to come, is not yet. Therefore, whatsoever is past or to come, is wanting, but with God there is nothing wanting. There is with God therefore nothing past or to come, but all present.  
These sayings of Austen do seem to me sufficient to stay a man in that mind that I am of, concerning the cause of God's Election and Reprobation. His will and purpose which could never be wanting in him, neither can by any means be altered, changed or letted, may well be called the cause why he hath chosen some, and rejected some other some. And this Election is in him everlasting as he himself is: neither may it be thought that there was ever any time wherein he had not elected those that be elected, and refused those that be refused. But we hold not that this is done without Christ, and therefore Cerberus laboureth more than needeth to prove by Scriptures that our Election is in Christ. For we account Christ to be eternal as his Father is, and his incarnation to be always present with God. And therefore, that the Election that is in God's purpose and will, is not without Christ the mercyseat and mediator betwixt God and man. Thus much for the first of Cerberus his two reasons.  
Now a few words to his second reason, and so an end. First, Cerberus doth in this reason flatly affirm, that God did not love the world, nor give his son for the world, before his wrath was appeased by the mediation of his son. Whereupon it followeth, that there was a time, wherein God was wroth with the world, and not pacified by his Son. Which doctrine is as much as to deny Christ to be a mediator. But in the closing up of the matter, he overthroweth that again, affirming that Christ hath pacified the wrath of his father, not only now in time, but also everlastingly in the most high and eternal purpose of God before the foundation of the world was laid.  
Hitherto he hath fought against us: but now in the conclusion he joineth with us, calling the purpose of God eternal and most high. And what is that but to affirm all that we teach concerning the cause of Election and Reprobation.  
As touching the mediation of Christ: we hold that which S. Austen writeth in his Homely, De ovibus. Non mediator homo praeter Deitatem, Non mediator Deus praeter humanitatem. Ecce mediator. Divinitas sine humanitate non est mediatrix. Humanitas sine divinitate, non est mediatrix. Sed inter divinitatem solam, & humanitatem solam, mediatrix est, humana divinitas, & divina humanitas Christi.  
Man without the Godhead, is not mediator. God without the manhood is not mediator: Lo here is the mediator. The divinity without the humanity is not mediatrix. The humanity without the divinity is not mediatrix: but the human divinity and the divine humanity of Christ, is the mediatrix between the divinity alone and the humanity alone. And this mediation do we hold (as in his conclusion, at unwares I think, Cerberus hath confessed) to be everlasting in the eternal and most high purpose of God: according to the saying of Saint john in the second of his first Epistle. We have an Advocate with God the Father, which is jesus Christ the righteous. To whom with his Father and the holy Ghost be all honour and glory. Amen.  
Thus in as few words as I could: I have defended that doctrine of God's Providence & Predestination, which I and others, have taught, and as occasion serveth, do teach, both in preaching and writing. Beseeching the Christian Reader to call upon God, for the aid of his holy spirit to assist us, and to make us able to continue in the teaching of true doctrine, in this and all other Articles that concern Christian religion, that by us, as the ministers of God, the congregation of jesus Christ may be edified.  
And if the Author of the answer, do find himself grieved for that I have talked of him under the name of Cerberus: my desire is, that he would make his right name known to me either by word or writing, and if he think himself able to disprove aught that I have written in this defence, he shall either find me able to maintain my writing by good authority, or else ready to yield to better. But if he will lurk still in secret, and cast abroad such libels as is this answer to his friend's letter: I will not trouble myself any more in defending myself & others against him that dare not show his face. Farewell. If thou profit in reading, I have the gain that I sought in writing.  
Seen and allowed according to the order appointed.