THE DIFFERENCES OF THE AGES OF MAN'S Life: Together with the Original causes, Progress, and End thereof.  
Written by the learned HENRY CUFFE, sometime Fellow of Merton College in Oxford.  
Ann. Dom. 1600.  
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LONDON, Printed by Arnold Hatfield for Martin Clerk. 1607.   

TO THE RIGHT HONOURABLE and Noble Lord, ROBERT Lord Willughby, Beak, and Eresby, in earth the ground, and in heaven the accomplishment of all true happiness.  
My very good Lord,  
I Do (not unlike unto bank-rupt-debters) pay what I own with another man's purse. For which, notwithstanding I could plead prescription from beyond the memory of man, and deduce precedents for excuse above the low flats of necessity: The greatest do it; why not the meanest? For the actions of superiors be rules of action unto inferiors, & virum magnum sequi est penè sapere, as the world goeth: yet this I dare profess unto your Honour, the payment is in good and lawful money, as good as any that goeth current with Merchants; and if the trial be true, by touch or teste, far beyond the alloy of ordinary mintage. A coiner it had, whom Fame hath reported (for myself did never, de fancy, know him) as skilful a Master in this trade, as our shops have brought forth any. Who though he verified that ancient byword, that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 are 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, yet hath he washed off from the walls of Lycoeum, that black aspersion of Petronius; Ego arbitror adolescentulos in scholis stultissimos fieri, quia nihil eorum quae in usu habemus, aut audiunt, aut vident. The work carrieth both parts of perfection: to Delight, and give Profit. To Delight the affection with pleasing variety, and endow the mind with excellent forms: which like the two handmaids of Queen Hester, should sustain every passage of learning, though it come not to the presence of royal Ahashuerosh. To Profit, by the matter discussed and cleared, which is, in part, the knowledge of ourselves, that which the Poet said, Came from Heaven, a good means to effectuate that, which the Prophet desired; Teach me O Lord to number my days, that I may apply my heart unto wisdom. To please in profit, which itself is Content; and also in the manner wherein it is carried very perspicuous, and in good method, for which cause I have not added any marginal directions, to stand, as Mercury's statues, in highways of old, pointing the finger unto consequents. It came unto my hands, ut è naufragio tabula, and I return it to your Lordship as Lord of the soil whereon it was cast. For unto your Honour I own myself, both in respect of private service, as also of that right-woorthy house, into which by marriage your Honour is inserted, whereto I stand obliged in my best endeavours. You have it whole and entire, as it came unto my hands, without any purloining or imbeazeling, a sincere transcript from the first original, which I am informed was his own; I durst not adventure, though happily I could, to add any thing at all unto that table, in which Apelles pencil had been. Thus craving the continuance of your Honourable respect, and acceptance of my tendered duty by proxey, until my own means do enable my sufficiency, (which hitherto hath been nipped in the bud by the frosts of the night, or withered in the blade for want of moisture) I thrice humbly take my leave, and rest your Honours  
in all services, R. M.   

The Preface.  
THe learned Heraclite no less elegant than enigmatical, among other his acquaint speeches, hath this saying of special remembrance and observation: That the greedy metal mongers, in their too eager search for the measured world's wealth, after long toil and trouble, find parvum in magno, a little pure substance in a great deal of unprofitable earth. Contrarily it fareth in the inquisition and pursuit of learning, where we often find with a little abstractive speculation, magnum in parvo, much matter in few words, every short golden sentence and particle thereof containing incredible store of most pure substance. For as the cunning Cosmographers, draw the whole compass of the wide World, into the narrow precincts of a small Map; so have our learned Artists contracted the unconceivable amplitude of the Liberal Sciences, into volumes of small quantity. But as gold, the purest of all metals, howsoever couched in a little compass, is many times beaten out into a marvelous amplitude; so the short Aphorisms of Philosophy, in the circuit of a small period, comprehend substance sufficient to fill whole volumes. Which truth is confirmed, or rather manifested by the present matter we entreat of, whereby, as Pythagoras finding the print of Hercules his foot guessed thereby at the proportion of his whole body; so we by the view of this so little and neglected a piece of Philosophy, may gather what we are to think of the whole body (that I may so speak) of learning. Which I observe the rather, because I see many shallow headed artificers oftentimes condemn us of folly, that spend our whole Life in the study of good Letters, and yet, (such is our gross conceit) we never come to the requisite perfection of Knowledge. As if our Arts were like the mechanical sciences of base Prentices, that may be thoroughly learned in the compass of seven years. It was well said of one, Ars longa, vita brevis, we have a great task, and a short time. I have read of some who in the compass of three years have sailed about the world, but I never yet heard of any who in the whole course of his life, how laboriously so ever passed over, was able to compass the whole circle of Sciences. And therefore Theophrastes a learned Philosopher lying on his death bed, accused Nature of unkindness or rather want of discretion, that so inconsiderately doth bestow the inestimable benefit of long life upon brute beasts and sensible creatures, that can neither acknowledge so high a favour, nor by their length of days benefit themselves and others; but man that might in time restore decayed nature by perfecting the imperfect arts, hath his enduring but as a moment: implying that the whole course of a man's life, was not time sufficient to work perfection in. And therefore, well said Sigismunde the Emperor to a Doctor of Law, whom for an excellent Stratagem against the enemy he had knighted not long before, when at an assembly of his Peers and Counsellors, the Doctor doubted to whether company he might with greatest credit join himself, Is it doubtful, said the Emperor, whether learning or military experience is more honourable? I can in one day make a thousand good soldiers; but I am not able in a thousand years to make one tolerable Doctor. So that it is no marvel though Socrates, after his long time of life, yet on his death bed confessed he had many things to learn. And me thinketh these nimble witted tradesmen, do not so much magnify their own quick conceit, as publish the facility of their sciences. For as Apelles said well unto a Painter that bragged of his speedy workmanship, when showing his picture he said, This I drew even now: Surely, said Apelles, though thou hadst said nothing, yet should I easily have guessed by the workmanship that it was done in haste. So may we well say to these quick-witted mechanical tradesmen, a man that hath but a little insight into their trade may well think their crafts are soon learned: and I rather marvel, (as Apelles said) that they learned no more in the same quantity and length of time. But it fareth with their gross fantasy as it doth with our eyesight in an unequal distance from the object: for as being far off we conceive of the unmeasurable greatness of the most huge hills to be but as a point: so the infinite excellencies of the heavenly Arts being too far removed from their gross, or rather narrow capacity, come into their conceit as things of less moment: which if their dim or rather weak eye sight were able to behold in their divine nature, they would soon confess their surpassing excellency, and exceeeding difficulty. But to leave them to their pleasing opinions, and to come to our purpose, which is, in brief to handle the differences of the Ages of Man's life, as also the causes thereof, together with the incident qualities to every of them, which being in some sort available to the knowledge of ourselves, the highest point of knowledge which can be attained unto, by the judgement of the wise Apollo, as also either altogether omitted or very slightly handled by others, I hope my small pains and less ability shall be accepted in good worth and accounted of, rather according to the good intent of the author, than the worthiness of the work. In which hope of acceptation for my good endeavours, and favourable pardon of my manifold errors, I come without any longer Preface to the substance of the Treatise.   

THE DIFFERENCES of the Ages of man's Life: Together with the original causes, progress, and end thereof.  
MAN the Epitome of the whole world, Lord of the creatures, in regard of that perfect analogy and resemblance between him & the great world's frame, is not unfitly by the Learned, both Divines and Philosophers, termed, The Lesser world: for there is nothing in the vast compass of this universal circumference, whose likeness and lively representation we have not summarily comprised in man, as in a most perfect compendium and abridgement. For as the first-moved-sphere carrieth with its motion, the subject inferior circles; so the servile underfaculties, as the sensual desire & appetite, are by nature subdued to the dominion and guidance of the more principal and mistris-power of the soul, which we call reason. And as in the midst of heaven there is situated the Sun that enlighteneth all things with his rays, and cherisheth the world, and the things therein contained with his life-keeping heat: so the heart of man, the fountain of life and heat, hath assigned to it by nature, the middle part of our body for his habitation, from whence proceedeth life and heat, unto all the parts of the body, (as it were unto rivers) whereby they be preserved and enabled to perform their natural and proper functions. But not to be infinite in prosecuting the particulars of this well known comparison, as in other things we see a perfect proportion, so also, beside the analogy we may observe a mutual coexistence. For as the world at the beginning was created for man, so with man it shall also be abolished: for it is an undeniable principle in Philosophy, that God and Nature, or rather the God of Nature neither effectually worketh, nor permissively suffereth any thing, but unto some good end. For being infinitely wise, nay wisdom itself, how can we imagine so high a point of folly, resident in his Godhead, as to allow of vanities, things so hateful, and so abhorring from all mediocrity of wisdom? Wherefore man having a determinate date of endurance which he cannot pass, the world also, which is only for man's use and service, must of necessity have an end of being. Now because there is (as we said) a mutual coexistence of the world and man, as the world is not but for man, so neither is man, but in and by the world. For as in Navigation, those that are in the ship, have rest and motion with the moving & cessation of the ship, so we that are tossed in the rough sea of this world, in our voyage unto heaven our safest haven, when our vessel of carriage once perisheth, we also perish together. For as Aristotle said truly, that whatsoever hath being, hath of necessity being in some place; so from thence ariseth this necessary illation, that when there is once left no place to be in, then shall there remain no longer being. So that intending to show this truth as very pertinent to our purpose, viz. that man hath an appointed time of being, which he cannot pass, the Question of the world's eternity is fitly incident, especially, seeing, as is aforesaid, the world is for man's sake, and man by means of the world.  
Now if any man shall call into question, the pertinency of this question, for his satisfaction and resolution in that behalf, let him consider, how necessarily upon the variation of our temperature (whence the distinction of ages proceedeth) a final destructition, by an unperceiveable lingering decay of purity in our substance, doth depend. For as in the violent motion of things natural, we see it comes to pass, that the virtue or power of moving, imprinted by the unnatural mover, by little and little decaying, at length by continuance of moving, or rather by the resistance of the bodies about it, is clean extinguished: So in the natural proceeding toward the enemy and end of nature, death the preserving means of life (either by the toilesomenesse of their never-ceasing operation, or by the corruption and mixture of impure moisture, infecbled and disabled to the sufficient performance of their functions, more and more every day) at length of force yields to the oppressing violence of their resisting adversaries, not able any longer to maintain their conquering action, so that the discussing of this controversy is very homogeneous to the series of this treatise. For till there be granted an end of man's life, the mutation of the temperature by decay of nature may well be doubted of, forasmuch as a successiuc impairing alway importeth a final dissolution.  
First therefore touching the continuance of the world, whether as it had a beginning, so it shall have an end, or rather whether it ever had beginning, or shall have an end of being. Dionysius in his book de Divinis nominibus, distinguisheth things that are, according to the difference of their endurance; the distinction is after this sort. The whole number of things, how many and divers soever, may be summarily comprised under these three several heads. There are some things, or rather there is one thing Eternal, which neither had beginning nor shall have end, and such is God alone, who only being immutable, subject to none, no not the least alteration, is therefore only from everlasting to everlasting, for that cause termed in holy writ, the Ancient of days: amongst the old Egyptians resembled to a decrepit-old-man, and portrayed like a youth in the prime of his flourishing years: by that first Image signifying his long continuance from before, by the second, his liveliness and immunity from all manerdefect and alteration by cankered corrupting time. For as his power is infinite, extended not only to all things in the world, but even unto things which are not: as first he made all things of nothing, as his greatness is unmeasurable, not limited or bounded by any place or compass, and therefore said to have his centrum ubique, from which the essence of all things is drawn, as lines, and where they end and are all conjoined, & his circumference no where: finally, as all his attributes are infinite, and immeasurable, so is his continuance altogether boundless. Wherefore not to enter at all into this inextricable Labyrinth of God's infinite continuance, let us proceed unto the next part of the distinction. Beside God, who is only Eternal, there are other things in a middle degree, termed by the modern Philosophers, eviternal, having beginning from God, the fountain of being, yet without end, either of annihilation, or corruption; such are all spiritual creatures, Angels, and the Souls of men. Where notwithstanding there is a doubt to be answered: For in the whole History of the Creation recorded by Moses, we find no mention of the making of Angels, nor any word of them till the narration of the Woman's treacherous seduction by the devil in the serpent, so that either they were not created, and so were from everlasting, or else, Moses his Chronicle is in this point defective. But we may well answer, that they had a beginning, seeing that eternity is Gods peculiar attribute, and the same, though inclusively, expressed by Moses in his book of beginnings: for by Heaven is signified, not only the body of heaven, but the things also therein contained. Now of the indirect, and inclusive mention made of these admirable creatures, there may this reason be given: The men of those times being very superstitious, and given unto Idolatry, (for the Egyptians even at that time worshipped the Sun, & the hosts of heaven) Moses fearing to give new occasion to their false will-worship, of purpose refrained from express mentioning of their names, or natures in his history. For if these bodily visible creatures, wrung from them such divine worship, the Angels, by how much more excellent their nature is, would have so much the more added new fuel to their begun fire of superstition. Secondly, lest the detractory Nature of corrupted man, should have ascribed some part of the glory of the world's creation to those heavenly creatures, the wise penman of this excellent story, of purpose concealed what he knew either of their Creation or Nature: so that Moses his history is in this regard not defective, howsoever giving no express notion of the creation of Angels. Neither are the Angels, though most excellent creatures, void of beginning, there being but one thing, which one made all things, of itself, eternal. The third degree is of those things that had both beginning with time, and shall have their end in time; such are all bodily creatures as well simple as mixed, although touching the celestial bodies there be some doubt.  
Now as concerning the world, the question is, to which of these three kinds, it may and aught to be referred. And I find three several opinions. The first is of them that make the world eternal, wanting beginning, and incapable of end. The second of them that grant both beginning and end of being. There is a third sect that parts these two opinions, affirming, that it had a beginning and shall have no end. But lest we stick in the words, let us in one word or two, set down the sense and meaning of the Question: and because that crror is the child of confusion, distinguish the things doubtful, lest through the equivocation of the words, by mistaking, we come unto a contrary sense. By the world therefore, sometime is meant the whole compass of things that are, as well spiritual as bodily, extended in this sense even unto God himself. Secondly it is taken for all things, only God excepted, even the whole work of the Creation, excluding no creature how excellent soever, no not the Angels. Thirdly it signifieth only the circuit of bodily Creatures, whether you interpret bodily things to be such as have bodies as parts of them, or such as, though in regard of composition have no bodies, yet have their being only in creatures bodily, as those things which we call Accidents. For the first acception it concerneth not our purpose. For Nature itself excludeth God from all kind of beginning, and it is a principle both in reason, and in religion that God is from everlasting. In the second sense we may take it, comprehending all things both spiritual and bodily: for even the Angels as is before said, had their beginning by creation: but we rather hold ourselves unto the last signification, as being most usually meant by those that handle this controversy. And this also according to its threefold consideration, hath three several acceptions? For first it is taken for that Idea & type preconceived of the Maker God, by which he was ruled and directed in the building thereof. And this is termed by Plato, the Ideal or exemplary world, as it were the copy which God followed in the creation: whereby if he understand Gods decree to create, we may without error entertain it; otherwise it is somewhat harsh: for we are not to imagine that God needeth any long premeditate or fore-conceived type of his works, as our finite artificers do, but as his wisdom, and power is infinite, so doth he, in an unutterable manner at the same moment, devise the manner and perform the work, and yet, not rashly, but most wisely, and with great deliberation. For as he said in another sense, so may I say in this case, One day with God, is as a thousand years, and a thousand years as one day; length of time adding nothing to his ability and wisdom, nor fewness of days, any way detracting from the perfection of his workmanship. Secondly it is taken for the university of things contained within the compass and cope of heaven and earth, now really and actually subsisting; and this is called of Plato, the world real, as having an actual and external being in Nature, not only in conceit and intention. Thirdly man is called the lesser world, in regard of that perfect analogy and similitude, betwixt him and this greater world, wherein there is nothing whose likeness and resemblance may not be seen in man: and this you may call the Analogical world. Now by the world in our question, we principally understand, the frame of all things in heaven and in earth: less principally Man, as being but a part thereof. As for the other term, namely Eternal, that also hath two acceptions; for things are said to be Eternal two ways: First improperly, that which never shall have end, more fitly called eviternal or Immortal. Properly that is said to be Eternal which neither had beginning, nor shall have end, nor as Boethius addeth, any succession. Now Eternal, we take in the more proper and latter sense. So that the Question may thus more plainly be expressed, Whether the heaven and earth, with the bodily Creatures therein contained, had a beginning, or shall have an end of being.  
But because that part of the opinion which concerneth the world's eternity, a part ante, as the schoolmen speak, that is, its being from everlasting, is not so directly pertinent unto our purpose, we will with all possible brevity run over the special reasons, and foundations thereof, the rather because the authors and maintainers thereof from the want of beginning, infer the uncapableness of an end. Now the chief Patron and defender of this opinion in regard of authority, though not of time, was Aristotle, who, as I take it, rather affecting singularity, than for any soundness of the matter or strength of argument, tanght it in his Lycoeum. For the Philosophers which lived before him, with general consent agreed in the contrary opinion: Trismegistus, who with his learning watered the then barren country of Greece, as Diodorus Siculus witnesseth in his first book of Antiquities, Musaeus, Orpheus, Linus, Epicharmus, Hesiodus, and Homer, amongst the Poets; Zoroaster, Anaxagoras, Melissus, Empedocles, Pherecides, Philolaus, Democritus, and Plato, as Philo Indaeus Laertius Diogenes, Sulcitius Severus, Alexander Aphrodisiensis, Plutarch, and Tully witness, which also his books entitled Timaeus, and Critias, together with those De Republica do testify. Only Aristotle in a self-conceit of singularity, howsoever elsewhere honouring antiquity, rather liketh in this case a new broached opinion of his own, contrary to so many foregoing Philosophers: and therefore Hierophantes, a devout, though idolatrous Priest, condemned him of arrogancy, and self-love, not only because, contrary to the common received opinion of his country, continued so many ages ungainsaied, he denied the plurality of Gods, but also, and much more for that he stuck not to teach, that the world was from everlasting, which all Greece confessed to have had beginning in time.  
But to fetch the beginning of this fantastical opinion somewhat higher: we will begin with Democritus, the archpatron of fortune, who will have the World Eternal, and withal chanceable: But Eternity and Chance, being (as the learned Sir Philip observed) things unsufferable together; If Chanceable, than not Eternal. Again, what is more absurd then to think the World was made by the untended, and casual concourse of indivisible substances? for whence came these substances? If you say they came from Everlasting, & so were Eternal, can you conceive such chanceable effects to proceed from so certain & necessary causes? Nay rather, if you will needs maintane the infiniteness of these diminutive bodies, grant they had beginning from that Infinite One that glued the Infinite parts of your Infinite. All, together, by his unmeasurable Power and Wisdom. For can we imagine such a perfect Order and Stability to consist in these disjoined substances? Order & Constancy are children only of Wisdom: & sooner may we prove Darkness to proceed from the Sun, than Constancy and Order from inconstant chance, constant in nothing but in Inconstancy. Finally, we must either exclude God's Wisdom and provident care of the World made, or else Fortune from making of the World: (for the World is God's possession, only by right of creation) unless we imagine a deed of gift passed by Fortune at her death: or Fortune the true Owner, (if the true Maker) disinherited, & by violence driven out of her dominion by God as an Usurper. But God having nothing to plead for his title unto his kingdom, but the right of creation, if that plea be improved, God cannot any longer call the World his own, and therefore without cruelty may cast off all care of this his supposed offspring. For it is only God's Fatherhood that binds him unto his Providence.  
Therefore not to stay long in this opinion of Fortune, let us now come unto Nature, deified especially by Strato a Naturalist: who fearing to oversway God with the weight of this burden, either in the making, or governing of the World, hath granted him a Remedy, or Otium as they term it, thinking it more reason that God should have an exemption from trouble, than God's priests, who for his sake be dispensed withal. But let us see, what this Nature may be, so highly by Strato magnified. There is a particular Nature, and there is a general or universal Nature. The particular is that which in every several single substance, ministereth Essence to the whole compound: and withal, is author of such action, and motion, as is agreeable to the subject wherein it is, as the Nature of fire, causeth the fires ascension, the Nature of earth, the earth's going downward: and in regard of this Nature, we say it is Natural to the fire to ascend, to the earth to descend, the bodies having in them, cven of themselves, by their inherent form a promptness, and inclination unto these motions. Now if by the conspiring of these many & manifold Natures, this All, we now speak of, were made, as if the Elements, & Ethereal parts should in their town-house set down the bounds of every one's office; then consider what followeth, that there must needs have been, a wisdom overruling power, which made them concur: for their natures being so divers and contrary, would rather have wrought each others destruction, than so friendly have consorted, to make up so unexpressible an harmony. For, to grant knowledge unto them whereby to moderate the extremity of their natural fury, or intendment of such agreement, were to enter into a bottomless pit of absurdities, seeing that knowledge alway presupposeth roason, & reason sense; both which are never found, either jointly, or in part, in bodily senseless creatures. Now touching the Universal Nature, which some will have to be nothing, but an influent virtue, helping & furthering the actions of every particular natural body, others, an Universal overruling, and as it were, an Ideal Nature subsisting. For as the particular nature of every particular body, causeth and mainetaineth the particular actions of the body wherein it is; so this general Nature is the author and maintainer of all actions and bodies: to which, the single several bodies are in subjection, by their obedience acknowledging a kind of superiority, in that nature which we call universal. And in the respect of this nature, the fire is said, in some cases, to go downward, by nature, as to hinder the discontinuitie of things in the world, and so, that emptiness which nature so much abhorreth. Now, if by this universal nature, they understand a nature of wisdom, and goodness, and pronidence, which with knowledge performeth its actions, and so of purpose, & deliberately hath knit togethet these so many points to such an excellent unity, this Nature we reject not, but retain, as that God and Maker of all things, that by his infinite irresistible power bathe conjoined the disagreeing parts of this visible world, and of things contrary made a perfect harmony, permitting in their nature a mutual resistance; yet so, as they hinder not their friendly copulation in the world's composition. In sum, touching Nature and Fortune, they are thus only (saith Scaliger) to be interpreted: that Nature signifies Gods ordinary power; and thus, things extraordinary may be called unnatural: Fortune his unrevealed will, and thus may we call things chanceable that are beside expectation or beyond reason.  
Now touching the Epicure, who (as Tully saith) derived his opinion from Democritus, we will in one word answer his reason, recorded by Tully in his second book de Natura Deorum, and so come unto Aristotle, and his Scholar the Atheist. The Epicures reason is briefly thus propounded by way of interrogation: What eyes (saith he in his scoffing impudence) had Plato, to behold the framing of this so great a work? Or what tools, and fellow-workemen had God to make the World withal? The answer is, that Plato his eye, was the eye of reason, gathering by necessary consequence, both the being of the Deity, as also confusedly apprehending the infiniteness of God his power and wisdom shinig in the world, as in a most clear glass reflecting, in some sort, the Image of God's invisible Nature, upon the eyes of all the beholders. Touching absence of instruments and fellow-workemen, whereby the Epicure would infer the impossibility to create in God, we are not to think, that God, infinite in power, is tied to the help of secondary instrumental causes, they being but supplies of defects, and helps of wants, in the otherwise insufficient agents: and therefore not requisite, to the eternal infiniteness of God's ability. Nay we may add further, which is God's privilege, God of nothing, is powerful enough to make all things, much more without instruments. Now a possibility of creating in God, may thus briefly be shown: according to the manner of being of every thing, so also is the order of working; but Gods being and beginning dependeth upon nothing but himself: why then should it be thought impossible, that God's action is not tied unto any matter? And indeed, the reason (as far as I can perceive) why other things require a subject whereon to work, is only the impotency of the Agents, but God all-sufficient, and powerful, who can out of the rocks bring water, out of darkness light, can also (as he hath done) make all things of nothing. another reason may be this, taken from the difference of the principal efficients, God, Nature, Arte. Art, alway presupposeth a thing really and perfectly subsisting: Nature only a matter with a power to be God, (a far more powerful Agent than either Art or Nature) is able, of that which is nothing at all, to make a thing of actual and real subsistence. For, if Nature can of a thing in the lowest degree of being, and next to a not being, make a thing actually subsisting, God All-sufficient, and infinite in power, can of nothing create any thing in what degree of being soever.  
Now touching the Atheist, out of Aristotle his Philosophy he hath drawn this subtle Interrogatory, which he propoundeth with so unsavoury scorn: If the world were not from Everlasting, but made by the God you talk of, I would know of you, where he lived before the time that he made the world; how he busied himself all the time before? for it is an absurdity, even among us, to say, he was idle: as also what he did, if he did not make it from everlasting? Touching the place of his being, and the manner of his work, I may not unfitly answer, as a learned Father of the Primitive Church did unto the same demand; He was in a wood providing fuel for that fire, which should in heltorment such curious pryers into matters beyond their reach. But for his location, I may thus more fitly answer: that God is tied to no place, being in all places to fill them with his goodness, in no place to be circumscribed by the circumference. Touching his action we answer, that howsoever the external work, (the after-fruit of his external working) had no external sensible being, yet was he not unoccupied, his very decreeing being an action, and that also having relation unto the creatures, which should afterward have being. The Hebrews (who many times do but trifle in matters of weight) give unto this frivolous question, as frivolous an answer, saying, that God to keep himself unoccupied, spent that time in trifling experiments, now making a world on this fashion, now on that, then by and by dissolving his lose & displeasing work; at length by many trials, to have light upon this world, & this fashion, which for his conceived liking, he established. But these learned Rabbins, meant a more serious matter then their words bear show of: and that was, that God did not rashly; nor without great deliberation make the world on this fashion rather than any other, and that he saw he might have made it many other ways, and sooner, and more worlds, but would not: alluding, as I take it, to Gods counsell-taking, at the dedecree, touching the time and manner of the world's creation, which was the sum of our first given answer. But more sound and to the purpose we answer, that the actions of the Deity are of two sorts, immanent & internal: or external and transeunt: the immanent actions, are those which be in the Deity from one person unto another, as to love together, and such like: the transeunt actions are those, that pass from the Godhead to some external object: they may both be thus illustrated. As in the element of fire there is a faculty of heating and enlightening, whence proceedeth heat and light unto the external near bodies, and beside this faculty there is also in it a natural power to go upward, which when it cometh into act, is received in no other subject but the fire itself: so that, if fire could by abstractive imagination be conceived of, as wanting these two transeunt operations, yet could we not justly say it had no action, forasmuch as it might move upward, which is an immanent and inward action. So, and much more so, though we grant that there was no external work of the Godhead, until the making of the world, yet can there be no necessary illation of idleness, seeing it might have, (as indeed it had) actions immanent included in the circle of the Trinity: Again, thus reason these blasphemous Atheists against the truth: If for man's sake God made the world, and all things therein, how cometh it to pass, that there are in the world so many noisome creatures, as vipers and such like, which procure rather our annoyance, than serve any way for our use and benefit? For to say they are chanceable, or of a voluntary & self procreation, is (in our Philosophy) absurd, especially, seeing we extend God's power, and providence unto very flies, and such like creatures. But we may answer, first that there is nothing so cumbersome, which is not some way serviceable. Or, if now disobedient, yet not so created, but, for man's rebellion against God, permitted or rather directed to arm themselves against him, for whose use and help they were created: like unto that sword, which Hector gave Ajax, which so long as he used against men his enemies, served for his help and defence; but after that he began to use it, or rather to abuse it, to the hurt of hurtless beasts, it turned into his own bowels. For until the transgression Adam lived as Lord of the creatures, having the now most dangerous and pernicious creatures under him in subjection. For the devil, that subtle seducer, was not so simple a sot, as to make choice of the serpent to beguile him with enticements, if he had known, or but suspected any resident fear in man of the serpent, by some foregoing remembered mischief; for that had been rather to terrify him from all attention, than any way to allure him to follow his counsel. So that, all things which now are unto corrupted man most cumbersome, as punishments of his disloyalty, were by creation ordained for his furtherance. Nor need they wonder, that God's power and knowledge should stretch itself unto flies and such diminutive creatures, as they term them: nay it is far more insensible, that the estate of flies should be unknown unto him, for that were to bond the infiniteness of his knowledge.  
But to leave the professed Atheist, who though from Aristotle his school he sucked his noisome error, yet went far beyond Aristotle in impiety: For Aristotle (at least in words) confested Gods being, an infiniteness, which also he went about to prove and confirm by reason, whereas these godless Heretics do not only deny both in their works, and by consequence of words, but even shamelessly with direct speeches, not only his omnipotency, but even his very being: let us therefore come to Aristotle and his less profane followers. The Peripatetics principal and most subtle argument, which also they urge with greatest vehemency, is briefly this; say they, either the world was from everlasting, or else made anew, proceeding from not being, unto this being which now it hath. But it was not made a new; for then, either it proceeded from a power and fitness which it had to be unto this actual being, or else it was made of nothing. If before it was actually subsisting, it had a being potential from everlasting (seeing things that are potentially, though in the basest degree of being, yet are not merely nothing) it followeth, that it always was (at least potentially) and so eternal. If we say that it was made of nothing, that is (in their Philosophy) an absurd impossibility. For it is with them a principle not questionable, That every making presupposeth a subject. Now if we object, that the necessary presence of a real subject dependeth only upon the Maker's infirmity, and imperfection: they answer, that the disability of doing impossibilities is not defect or imbecility. To which said argument of theirs (as they would have it) there may be a double answer given. For first, we affirm that the world proceeded, from not being to being. To the proposition of their prosyllogism we answer by denial thereof, and reject their distinction as sophistical, putting contrariety (the greatest opposition) betwixt things, not only agreeing, but even all one. For there is a potential being, incident to things that are not at all, and therefore do the Schoolmen distinguish of the potential being after this manner: A thing (say they) may be said to have a potential being two ways: first, that is said to be potentially which is not yet, either in whole, or in part subsisting in nature, which having no real, or actual cause of being, may notwithstanding afterward have a true cause of its essence and existence. So that it is not any thing, in, or of itself, but is virtually contained within the ability of some thing, that may afterward bring it unto a true and real being. As for example, there is a potential being of more worlds than one, inasmuch as God by his unresistible, undecaied power is able, as well to make more worlds, as he was to create this one world which we behold and inhabit: yet, who will say, that there are more worlds than one, either totally or partially, really and truly now being in nature? Indeed it is a thing within the compass of God's omnipotency, to bring in a multiplicity of worlds, and therefore we may not untruly say, that this multiplicity of worlds hath a being potential. So likewise, who will deny, that a man sound and without maim or lack of his limbs, that never set foot over his threshold, hath power (with supposition of health and strength) to travel over the whole circuit of the country; yet is it absurd to say, that this journey of his, is any way in nature, either wholly or in part. Secondly, that may justly and is more properly said; to be potentially, that having an actual and real subsisting, even separate from it efficient cause, wherein it was before virtually contained, yet lacketh somewhat, which by nature it is capable of. As for instance hereof, a child altogether unlettered, may justly be said to be potentially disposed toward the receipt of learning, inasmuch as it hath a reasonable soul, which is alway accompanied with a capacity of learning. To apply this distinction unto our purpose, we say that to be potentially in the first degree, is indeed to be nothing; because this potential being is a mere not being: & so was the world from everlasting, having such an ability and capableness (that I may so speak) of being, forasmuch as God by his omnipotency was from everlasting powerful enough to create the world, as in time he did actually make the same. Now for that other kind of potential being, incident unto things only that have received an actual being from their causes, it was in that rude Chaos created by God, the first day of the begunmaking of the world, and was afterward perfected in the work of distinction (as the Schoolmen call it) when God out of that confusion, or rather upon that rude lump, brought this admirable variety and difference of creatures, for the ornament of the world: for that the world was in this sort potentially only at the creation of the first matter, which was in the time by Moses mentioned. Secondly we answer, that it is not impossible for God of nothing to make things really and truly subsisting, as we before proved. To their Axiom or principle, which they call undeniable, we answer, that there is a twofold faction or making: One natural, incident to creatures, commonly called Generation; the other supernatural, the privilege of God himself, which we term Creation. Now every making which is a Generation, requireth a really-being subject, because it is either a motion or mutation, which supposeth a matter wherein it is received: but the making of Creation, is alway without any matter subject, being defined to be, A making something of nothing: But these adversaries admit of no such duplicity of making, holding it a mere impossibility, for any Agent in this sort to create: Thus therefore somewhat otherwise we answer: There be two sorts of Agents or Efficients, the one Universal, the other Particular or Partial. They differ thus: That the Efficient universal is cause of the whole being and essence of it effect, making both matter and form: and this action of this Agent, is not Motion or Mutation, but a bare Emanation. The Particular Agent is not cause of the whole essence of that it maketh, seeing it alway requireth the preexistence of the matter, and the action thereof is truly called Motion or Mutation. So then, it is impossible for a partial or half efficient (as you may term him) to work or make a thing of nothing; but for an universal, it is not only possible, but even easy. And is it not (think you, to answer every point of their reason) an infirmity in the maker, not to be able to make a thing without matter? for why is the existence of the matter necessary, but because the efficient can do nothing: and doth not this import a defect of the workman's ability? No, say the adversaries, for it is no imperfection to be unable to do things impossible: but we deny that this is unpossible unto any, but unto particular agents natural; as for God to whom nothing is unpossible (but to deny himself) as he is the whole and sole cause of being, so is he able, even from a not being, to bring things to the highest and most excellent degree of being. Secondly, say they, unless we grant an ever-being of motion, we must needs admit either of a proceeding in infinitum, or else of this senseless contradiction, that before the first motion there was a motion more ancient; two main absurdities, the one in reason, the other in nature. For the progress in infinitum, they think it is thus proved; for before the motion, whereby the first moved body was made, there was of necessity requisite some potential being thing, because that motion is only incident unto things of a potential existence. If that be granted, than they infer, that there was some motion whereby this subject had it being, and so in infinitum. But to stop their long journey, we may hinder this infinite proceeding by granting a creation. It is true indeed that there must needs be a thing capable of motion before there can be any moving: for in every motion there is a thing moving, and a thing moved; but there is no necessity that this movable should have its being by motion; for it was made by creation, which was no motion, but a simple and bare emanation: For there is a twofold mediate action, whereby a cause is said to work, according to which duplicity of action, they have thus distinguished of causes efficient. There is, say the Schoolmen, a double efficient or working cause, one called Efficiens per transmutationem, that is, such a cause, whose operation is alway joined with some change in the thing working, according as is the resistance, either of the body between it, and the patiented, or of the thing whereon he worketh, which doth more or less withstand his impression. The other is, Efficiens per emanationem, as when without any repugnancy of any patiented or labour of the agent, the effect or work doth voluntarily and freely arise from the action of the working cause: as the shadow from the body: such is God, whose unresistible power by his bare word of command, even of nothing made this admirable work of the world, as the shadow and obscure representation of his wisdom and omnipotency: not changed in his nature, there being nothing by Reaction to imprint any thing in the impassionable Godhead. And this is the full and sufficient answer to the second argument. Thirdly they reason thus: There is an eternal mover, therefore there hath been an eternal motion and a thing moved, in as much as these relatives cannot be but together in nature. For answer whereto we must remember, that there is an absolute, both consideration, and being of God. Absolute I say and out of relation, otherwise Gods being should be only in relation. It is true indeed that relatives are alway together in nature beginning to be, and finishing their being, in one and the same moment. For instance, a father is not a father until he have a son, nor is he a father longer than he hath a son. And yet for all that those things which are Relatives, may have being, one before another, though not as Relatives, yet as things really subsisting in nature. For example, who can deny that Adam was in nature, before either conception or birth of his bloody son Cain? yet was he not a father until God had blessed him with that after-cursed-ofspring. And who seethe not, that the Carpenter had being in Nature before he builds the house, although he be no actual builder till the house be in making? So God that was from everlasting before all times, had his being without motion, though not as a mover, yet as a thing really and perfectly existing: but when in fullness of time (according to the free determined purpose of his will) he began the frame of the world, than also began he to be a Relative, a builder in respect of this goodly house and palace, the world; a Father, that is, the Beginning of being unto the child of the creation, the image of his greatness; and indeed, in these and such kind of controversies, we must warily use these terms of relation, especially in regard of the creatures, lest we bind God only unto a relative being, and so make his existence dependent on the creatures.  
Their fourth argument is in substance this: If God so long before had being, without being a Creator, there was doubtless some defect in the foregoing time, the supply whereof in the moment of creation moved him to make the world rather at that time than any other. For there is no new action but presupposeth some new incitement, which moved the Agent to undertake the work, more than before; but there could be nothing at this time more than before, that could move God the principal and perfectest workman, to take in hand this busienesse and work rather now, than before; for then how could he be the primary and principal cause? But this in short may be the answer; Indeed there was all this time an impediment, forasmuch as God would not actually create, until the time foreappointed in his secret purpose was accomplished. Nay, but say the adversaries, God until this time was indifferent to create, or not to create, therefore there was in the instant of the creation some thing that restrained this his indifferency. But we may answer, That there was no such indifferency, (as they talk of,) God having from all eternity, purposely determined at this time to begin the work of the creation. So that unto the forementioned demand of the Atheist, why God deferred the creating of the world until this moment of time, we may answer, that of the choice of this time, rather than any other, for this his work, there can no other reason be given, but his most free-will, that in his decree of creation restrained, and bound itself to this time, rather than unto any other. Now if they shall reply, that we are not to imagine God's will unreasonable, and therefore no doubt there was some reason that moved him to this limitation of his will: we may answer, That we do not deny but God had some reason (though not without himself) of this his prorogation. Nay we may without offence, go so far, as to give some reason of this dilation, in general: That God would not from everlasting create the world, to show the independency of his existence in regard of the creatures: as also, to give us understand, that not for any hope of benefit, which should proceed to him from the creatures, he undertook this work: but rather (as it is the property of goodness to communicate itself) out of the overflowing fountain of his indefective goodness, to derive some commodity unto us his creatures: for he that could so long be without us, might without any inconueniency unto himself, for ever have continued in that state of loneliness. So that, of the deferring of the creation, in general, there may be a reason given; but why he began at this time rather than at any other, either before or after, there is no other reason, but his own free-will, known unto us. But here ariseth a doubt, whether God could have begun sooner, or put off longer this work of creation. The answer is, that he could by his potential and absolute power; he could not by his actual and conditional. For God's power hath a twofold consideration, the one absolute, without regard of any his decrees whatsoever, whereby he is able to do all, even those things, that he will not; the other conditional, joined with the consideration and respect of his will, whereby he is able to do all things which he will, and only those things which he will. God therefore, respected without his decree, was able, sooner or later to create the world; but if we consider him together with his purpose, he could not either have prevented, or deferred this his intended work of the creation: Nor do we hereby rob God of his freedom, or bind him to any part of the contradiction, but if he be bound, sure he hath bound himself, having this law only prescribed him, that he deny not himself, that is indeed to take away his Godhead. But if God would not from everlasting make the world, how is he not changed in his will? The answer is, that God would from everlasting make the world, but he would not make the world from everlasting; that is in plainer terms: God had from everlasting a will and purpose to create the world, but it never was his will, that the world should have a coeternal being with himself; so that Gods will is still the same altogether unaltered. But they farther urge this argument, demanding how God by an everlasting and old action of his will, could in time create the world anew, remaining himself unchangeable. To which we may answer, that a continued action of his will, how ancient soever, executing only that which he before intended, may well stand without admission of alteration: as for example, If the purpose of my will to day, be to journey toward London the next week, which also according unto purpose I perform; will any man say my will is changed? In like sort, God from everlasting decreeing to create the world at such a time, if at the time purposed this his decree be put in execution, is not thereby changed. Nay rather he is thereby to be thought more unchangeable, for as much as he performeth that which before he did determine. Why but, say they, God is not freed from alteration, because that of a Non-creator, he was made a Creator. The answer is, That God was not hereby changed, albeit there was indeed some change (though improperly so called) when as the world proceeded from not being unto being: for the succession of a being, after a not being, importeth some alteration, though not in the author of the new being, but rather in the thing that received that being; we shall make it plain by this supposition. Let us imagine a vault or other close place, so fenced from the Sun beams that no light, not the least glimmering can pierceit, which afterward by digging or some such means, may have passage made through it, for the suns access; would we say that the Sun were by this means altered, because it enlighteneth a place which before was full of darkness? Even so, and much more so, God the fountain of Light, (whose Spirit moving upon the waters, whereas before there was darkness upon the face of the deep, enlightened that darkness, distinguishing those things which before were confusedly mixed, or rather bringing them from nothing, to this their perfection) is not at all altered, but still remaineth the same, ever unchangeable. And indeed, if every new work of God should make him changeable, how should he not be often changed, creating daily the souls of now living men? For to say they have being before their joining unto the body, is plainly heretical, and Origen was in that behalf accused of a very gross error. Nor is it likely, nor yet indeed possible, they should come by traduction or propagation from our parents. For our souls being as the Angels are Spiritual substances, are as far from that ability of procreation, as the Angels are, those supernatural celestial creatures: and there is the like reason for both. The Angels by reason of their spirituality, are void and uncapable of procreation, men's souls also being no less spiritual than the Angels, are also unfit for procreation: therefore one soul begets not another, much less comes it of a corporal seed, itself being spiritual. It remains therefore that they are then anew created by God, and so coupled unto their bodies. Neither is God for this cause changed, seeing, as is aforesaid, he doth now only put in execution, that which before he had in intention; and therefore (to conclude this whole argument, with that saying of Hugo de Sancto Victore) Gods will was eternal, and the work of his will was temporary; for always even from Eternity, he had a will to create the world; yet never was he purposed to make the world from everlasting, but his purpose and will was to make that in time which he purposed before time to make in time. Therefore by his ever being goodness he for ever purposed: by his eternal wisdom he alway disposed that, which by his everlasting power he once composed. Fiftly, they reason from the Eternity of time, in this sort. Time is Eternal, therefore there is also an Eternal motion; for Time is the measure of moving. Now the antecedent is thus proved: That which hath been alway, and shall be for ever, is Eternal; but such is the condition of time: for you can design us no moment or instant before which, Time was not, and after which, Time shall not remain. For, as Aristotle saith, every now, or instant of time is the end of time past, and beginning of time to come: as in a right line, every middle point is the end of the forepart of the line, and the beginning of the part following. To which we may answer by rejecting this their description of time, for, (as Scaliger hath well observed) motion is rather the measure of time; and thence it is (as I take it) that Plato called the Sun and Stars times Instruments, and as it were the jacobs' staff of time; because by their motion and dircumuolution we measure the endurance of the world. And therefore also (as I conceive of it) the Poets called Saturn, that is Time, heavens Son, because that from their circular moving, came the distinction of Days, and Months, and Years. And to say the truth, there is a more general, and true definition of times than this of Aristotle; and it is this: The past, present and future endurance of things: Which also the authors of this description distinguish into it kinds. There is (say they) a time perpetual, or eternal, Gods own peculiar attribute, who alone endureth from generation to generation; and there is an endurance or Time momentary, incident unto the creatures. In this sense therefore it is no absurdity to say, there was a time when Aristotle's time was not: for he maketh time of the same age with the heavens motion, so that, until the heavens began to be moved, Aristotle's time was not: yet was there time before the heavens creation, that is a long space of endurance, in which God alone had being: But because time is indeed proper unto the creatures, being as (other bodily and spiritual creatures) in scripture said to be made by God, let us follow Aristotle in his own Definition, and to his objection out of his Schoole-interpreters we may fetch this answer: That every Now, and instant of time is not both beginning of time to come and end of time past: for there is a threefold instant or Now. The first is instans, or Nunc initiatiwm, an instant only of beginning. The second they term, Nunc continuatiwm, a continuing instant, and that is both beginning in respect of time following, and end in regard of time past. There is a third instant or moment, and that they call Nunc finiens, or terminatiwm, and that is such an instant, as only is an end of time foregoing: They may all be thus illustrated, as in a strait line, the first prick or point is only the beginning of the line, the last point only the end of the same, the rest in the middle are both, the end of that part of the line which was before drawn, and the beginning of the hinder part. So in time, we may point out an instant that is only beginning, another that is only an end, a third that is both a beginning and end. Aristotle his authority therefore can truly be understood only of the continuing and coupling instant. But against this distinguishing answer, Aristotle hath this exception: If there be any such instant, as is only a beginning in respect of time allowing, and no end of that time which went before, then before this instant there was no time. What then? Therefore there was an Ant without time, which is absurd. For Ant and Post, before and after, are differences of time: As for example: When we say, Philip lived before Alexander, this word before, signifies a difference in time, betwixt Philip and Alexander his sons being. But who seethe not more subtlety than soundness in this reply of Aristotle; for we will in like sort thus reason against him. In his Physics he hath this Position, Extra coelum nullus est locus: Beyond heaven there is no place; therefore, there is some extra, in which is no place. For extra and intra, without and within, are differences of place; as for example: when we say he is without doors, our meaning is, that he is in some place without the house. Now if we should thus reason against Aristotle: There is out of heaven a room or place to be in; for extra without, is a difference of place, things being said to be without only in regard of place. But Aristotle saith extra coelum, therefore there is without the inward hollow compass of heaven an external outroom: would he not strait (and that justly) reprove our sophistry? for Aristotle his meaning in that place is, that all things whatsoever are contained within the inside of the body of heaven: and it is as if he had said, there is no place, but within the inside of the overcast circle of heaven. In like sort, when we say that before this first moment of the heavens motion, there was no time; our meaning is, that all real time had beginning with the heavens moving. Real time, I say; for there is time only imaginary, improperly called time, as being rather a part of eternity, and of that endurance and long continuance, which we conceive to have been in God before the creation of the world. And thus shall we read the words, Before, and After, used among the ancient Writers both Christian and Profane: for so did Ovid use it in the beginning of his Metamorphosis; Ante mare & terras, & quod tegit omnia coelum: Before that heaven and earth was made. So in the Scripture: Before the foundations of the world were laid, thou art God from everlasting, world without end. Where it signifies no true and really subsisting time, for this time began only with the motions of the heavens, as Aristotle himself witnesseth. In brief therefore, to shut up this argument and this whole controversy: The first instant and moment of time real (before mentioned) was both a beginning and end; a beginning of time real, and an end of time imaginary: nor is it any absurdity to say, that time imaginary was before true and really subsisting time.  
And thus have we with all possible speed run over the reasons which be usually brought to prove the world's being from everlasting; let us now with like or less brevity pass over those reasons which serve to improve this error: and they are only two, which we will but propound, avoiding over-tedious long discourse; and so go on to the other part of the question. First then, from our own experience we reason thus: It is a truth confirmed by the trial of all times, that the quantities of men's bodies have a perceivable impairing, as also the length and continuance of their lives: so that, if in that infinite space of foregoing time men had had being (as without question, the world was never void of men, the principal and most noble member thereof) through continual and incessant decay, their bodies had been brought to as little a quantity as they are capable of, if not clean consumed: but we see their quantity is not yet come unto the lowest; therefore had they not being from everlasting. Secondly and more specially, had this world been from everlasting, infinite also had been the propagation of man; and so we should bring into the world an actual infiniteness, as absurd in Nature as Parologismes be in Logic: for in this infinite space and generation there had been an infinite number of men's souls, which being by Nature uncapable of mortality, we can not say, that as one was created another was destroyed, and so should there be an infiniteness in regard of number, actually subsisting in Nature. And thus hoping that small power will serve to confound an adversary already overcome, we pass to the other part of the Question, purposing as much brevity as its difficulty and obscurity will bear.  
The Question is touching the world's immortality, whether, as it had a beginning of being, so it shall also have an end. Aristotle when he first heard of their opinion, who appointed an end unto the world, scoffingly burst out into these words: I was once afraid that my house, either by force of tempest, or by injury of time, or lastly by some defect in the workmanship, should have suddenly overwhelmed me, but now I have great cause to fear my own and my houses ruin, because of those that in words go about to pull down the world. But for the plainer and more speedy proceeding in the controversy, let us in one word set down the true meaning of the question. There is a twofold end, the one of corruption; the other of annihilation: the end of corruption, I call that whereby a thing is changed from being to a not being, not simply as if it ceased altogether to be in nature, but because it loseth that being which before it had; as for example, when wood by force of fire is turned into ashes, we may not untruly say, there is a corruption of the wood, forasmuch as it ceaseth to be wood, & is become ashes; yet can we not say, here is any annihilation, for we see there is a substance remaining, but the matter which before was under the form of wood, hath now put on the form of ashes, & so of wood corrupted are ashes generated, according to that worn axiom of Aristotle, That the corruption of one thing is the generation of an other. The end of annihilation is, when a thing so loseth its present being, that no part thereof, neither matter nor yet form abideth any longer in nature; but as it first was made of nothing, so is it again turned into nothing. The question then (as I take it) must be thus understood, that the world shall have an end, though not of annihilation, yet of corruption; that is in other terms, though it shall not utterly be abolished and turned unto nothing, (for the matter thereof shall still remain) yet shall it be changed into another estate and condition. The first part of the assertion is proved by the authority of the learned. For Plato witnesseth in his Timaeus; so saith Bochus and Methodius, and Damascene in his second book viz. of Orthodoxal faith: testified also by the wise Solomon, Eccles. 3. I have learned (saith the Preacher) that all the works of the Lord endure for ever. that is, as I interpret it, though not without corruption, yet without annihilation. Now whether they have this state of corruption by nature or no, there is a great question: but we may probably answer, that of themselves and their natural disposition infused by God, they have no natural inclination, or desire of corruption, much less of annihilation, forasmuch as every thing hath a natural love of its being, and an innated hatred of all things that be enemies unto the same, testified by that natural Sympathy and Antipathy which may be observed in things destitute of reason: for so we see in experience the lamb which never had experience of the wolves cruelty, even at the first sight doth tremble and fly for fear. Nay, in creatures of a lower degree than these, termed by Aristotle, Plant-animals, we may observe, the like antipathy. Scaliger reporteth of a tree, growing in the Province which he calls Pudefatamea, that at a man's near approaching, for modesty, draweth in his farre-spreadding boughs, at his departure spreeds itself again, for that cause termed by the inhabitants, the shame-fast-tree. But we may more probably attribute this it contraction, to a natural divining (as it were) and fore-feeling that it hath of some harm, whereof it is in danger, as may be proportionably gathered by the like behaviour in other things of the same kind. For so Aristotle writeth of the Sponges that (when a man puts forth his hand to displace them, as also before a tempest) shrink up together on a heap, a if they meant to shift for themselves, either by flight, or else by uniting their dispersed forces, for the stronger resistance: which are evident proofs of that natural engrafted desire in all things to preserve there being. For whereas the first matter is said to desire corruption, for that as not contented with the form it presently enjoyeth, it desireth an other, whereupon follows the expulsion of the former before inherent: the answer it, that in this labouring to procure an other form, then that it had: it intends not corruption, but rather perfection, not disliking the form incumbent, seeing it desireth both; but as Esopsdogge, snatching greedily at the shadow which he thought had been a substance, meant not to lose that which he had fast hold of in his teeth. So the first matter greedily carried to the desire of many forms wherein indeed consisteth its perfection, loseth that which before it had: for as much as by a law of Nature, Two forms of divers, not subordinate, kinds, are at the same time unsufferable together. So than it desires perfection, but in steed thereof accidentally gaineth corruption & expulsion of the pre-existent form. Nothing therefore simply desires it own corruption, but so as it may tend to it further perfection, & consummation, much less its utter abolition. For as much as it is far better to be in the vilest and most base degree of being, than not to be at all. Therefore the annihilation of the world shall not be of itself, nor yet by any means internal. Nor can it proceed from any external natural agent, no not that universal forementioned nature is able to bring it unto nothing: For as nature cannot make some thing of nothing, so neither is she of power sufficient to bring a thing from being, to an utter not being at all, having a limited and finite power. To which purpose a learned friar said excellently well. That, the first maker of all things in respect of its being and not being, is subject only unto God's will, permitted to the rule of Natural agents only in regard of transmutation. For a Natural agent may induce or expel a form either substantial or accidental. But how far soever man's Power or Nature is carried in fury, labouring by might and main towards an utter ruinating, and destruction of things, yet shall it never attain unto Annihilation. They may indeed by tyrannous inflicting of death, make that which is near the matter of a man, the matter of a carcase, they may also with fire, burn the dead corpse, but though a thousand thousand woods should be spent in burning of one poor carcase, yet were they never able utterly to annihilate and bring it unto nothing. So that Nature is too weak to cause Annihilation. But yet say the scrupulous adversaries, God who by his infinite and supernatural power was able of nothing to make the world, is by the same his boundless power able at his pleasure to return it to nothing. It is true indeed & out of question, that God by his absolute undecaied power, is sufficient as well to destroy the world as he was at the beginning, to make it: by his absolute power (I say) considered without regard of his will, but if we respect his power, restrained by his will: that is regard what he will and hath decreed to do if by his word we may learn his will, we may truly answer, that God himself cannot annihilate the word, because he can do nothing that implieth contradiction, or that any way importeth mutability, whereby of God he should be made no God. Nor do we hereby take away his omnipotency, nay rather we establish his power, it being a chief point of infirmity and weakness, to be capable of change, and able to deny itself: but God hath decreed not to annihilate the world, therefore he cannot now turn it unto nothing, how then (may some man say) shall it have an end, for if neither of itself it incline, nor can be by any means natural enforced to Annihilation, no nor God himself can turn it into nothing, what end shall it have? The answer is, that as man hath his end by death, whereas, notwithstand his soul is immortal, his body is only changed into its first matter, not turned into nothing: so the world though incapable of annihilation, as hath been proved, yet hath in it an end unevitable, when it shall be changed from the present corrupt estate into a far more excellent and heavenly condition of endurance and immortality. But here ariseth a doubt, moved by those scoffers that Peter prophesied should come in the last days, which demand, Where is the promise of his coming: For since the father fell on sleep, all things have continued alike from the beginning of the creation. Where by the way, let us observe that they make the time of Christ's coming, and the end of the world, things of one and the same signification, so that as many testimonies of scripture, as warrant the certainty of Christ's coming, serve also to prove the world's end and dissolution. To their reason we may answer with Peter, that the world's long and hither to unchanged continuance, is no sure proof of impossibility to be destroyed. For God that by his bare word could of nothing make the world, can now also with as great facrlity alter the state of the same. But their supposition is most untrue, for the world hath not from the beginning continued in the same state unaltred, the whole earth being in Noah's flood overwhelmed with waters. But to this they may answer, that it was no general or universal destruction, being extended only to the living creatures, & they also in part preserved in Noah's ark. It is true indeed, that this was only a particular or partial destruction, the heavens remaining altogether untouched, the other elements also incorrupted. But yet this showeth a change in the world's estate which they seemed to deny. Touching the general distinction of all things, Peter after answereth; to which place we will refer them: But that wherein the difficulty of the whole controversy consisteth is the immutable estate of the heavenly bodies wherein hath been observed by experience of all ages, a constancy almost admirable: when in this sublunary region of elementish bodies, there hath been as great variety, and almost a circular alteration. And indeed, were the heavens capable of corruption, how could the sphere of the Moon, situated so near the fire have continued so long unconsumed. Let us therefore a little examine how the cause stands: with the heavens in the matter of corruption.  
There are two different opinions of them that make the heavens incorruptible, some to deliver them from corruption, have made them void of all matter, others allot them a matter, but in a distinct kind from that of the sublunary bodies, all agreeing, that they be incorruptible. The chief of the first sect, is Averroes, a learned Turk, who expostulating the matter with us, demands by what means we came to know the matter of the heavens? For the only means to prove the existence of matter in any thing, is, as he calleth it, Substantial transmutation; or more plainly, the succession of forms. But in heaven there hath been no such succession, no nor any alteration of qualities, therefore the heavens are immaterial. But we may answer, first that the being of matter in any thing is known as well by accidentary, or local, as by substantial transmutation. But the heavens have a local Motion, or Mutation, at least in their parts, therefore they consist of matter. Secondly we answer thus, that although the heavens have all this while lasted without change in their substance, yet seeing they are capable of future transmutation, we may thence conclude the presence of matter in them. For who would say that there is in a sucking child no reasonable soul because he seethe in him no actual use of reason, or present conceit of learning, we know that his potential disposition and fitness to conceive, is testimony sufficient of that soul which is in him. Their second argument is this, all things consisting of a corporal matter, are withal corruptible for the ability of receiving the yet absent forms being a property inseparable from the matter, which also is accompanied with a longing desire to supply its defects, there must needs be granted an expulsion of the incumbent form for induction of a new successor, wherein is corruption; or else this, The matters inclination and engrafted desire, as it were, must be alway frustrate, which folly, the most wise God of Nature detesteth: therefore there is in the heavens no such matter as we talk of. To which argument, they that make the matter of the celestial bodies different from that of the sublunary creatures, frame this answer: Indeed (say they) whatsoever is compounded of such a matter as this is, of the sublunary creatures, is subject unto corruption; but the heavens have a matter of a different and far more excellent state than these under elements, and that is the sum and foundation of Aristotle his opinion and reason touching the heavens incorruptible condition. But we that make one matter of both, may thus somewhat probably answer: That though such a matter is alway accompanied with a capableness of corruption, yet may it by some superior overruling power be preserved from all actual cotruption. And so standeth the case with the heavens, which never had been able of themselves so long to have continued without alteration, but by the help of some higher power; not as the Peripatetics and Platonics fond imagine the Angels or Intelligences (which Alcinous calleth Lesser gods) but by the sovereign appointment of God, who to moderate and stay the too frequent and overhasty alteration of the under bodies, hath allotted the heavens this regularity and uniformity of motion. But here they will demand a reason, what hath so fulfilled the matters desire of interchangeable succession of forms, that it remaineth contented with that form which it presently enjoyeth. The answer is: That either the excellency of the form present causeth this contentment, or else God's appointment overswayeth its desire. How then? Are we Patrons or rather Authors of violence in those excellent agreeing bodies? Nay rather, by the limitation of the matters unstaid indifferency, we do more establish that their excellent harmony. For as in a city situate on the confines of two disagreeing kingdoms, of itself inclining to neither side, but indifferent for entertainment of either conquering adversary, if after valorous conquest performed by one party, it yieldeth itself to the vanquishers dominion, and by the provident industrious care of the new supervisor, be fortified against the violent irruption of the forevanquished adversaries; by this new restraint of its old indifferency suffereth no violence, but rather is confirmed in a quiet and peaceable condition within itself: so the matter of the celestial bodies, howsoever naturally indifferent to entertain any form, if by the conquering action of some prevailing Agent it be possessed of so excellent and powerful a form, as admits of no outward new impression in this limitation of its equal instable for disposition, is not any way violenced, but rather fit for the intended harmony of the celestial bodies. And that may serve for a sufficient reason of the hitherto-incorrupted condition of the celestial bodies. Now touching their future estate, we shall after dispute, if first we have their fourth argument for disproof of the matter, as also the substance of their opinion. Averroes therefore saith, that heaven is a form of a selfe-subsistence; immaterial, dimensional, locally movable, participating light and other accidents; wherein (me thinketh) is a plain contradiction: for to omit the disquisition, whether any form can consist without matter, what is more absurd then to imagine quantity really separate from the matter, quantity having its basis and foundation in the matter, and only limitation from the form? farther, whatsoever is capable of real division, hath this capability (that I may so term it) from the matter: Real division, I say, for the Mathematicians proportionably to their mental abstraction or separation of quantity, have also a mental division, but whatsoever hath quantity, is capable of such a division, therefore also it hath a matter. Over and beside all this, whatsoever is perceivable by sense, hath a matter; for the form of nothing can be perceived by sense, but is understood and conceived by its operation in the matter: but the heaven is sensible, therefore also material. To this add Averroes his own testimony, set down in his Comment upon Aristotle his seventh book of Metaphysics, wherein himself confesseth, that accidents are inseparable companions of the first Matter; but the heaven (by his own authority in the first alleged place) hath in it light and other accidents inherent, how then is it altogether void of matter? Other arguments taken from the inherency of qualities peculiarly incident unto things material, for brevities sake I omit, hastening to the second Patrons of the heavens immortality, that do acknowledge a composition of a matter and a form in the celestial bodies, but will have it a different and a distinct kind from the elementish matter of the under bodies.  
Touching the sense of the question, Plato and some of his followers in this error, interpret it, as if when we say, the heavens consist of elementary matter, we meant that they are so compounded of the elements, as are mixed bodies here below: whereupon some of the more ancient sectaries in this kind, as Heraclitus and Pythagoras thought that it was made of fire: Thales and Anaximenes, of earth; Empedocles, of a medley of air and fire; Plato himself, of the four elements, or (as Proclus recordeth his opinion) of the quintessence of them: whose refutation we omit, as impertinent unto our purpose: for our meaning is not that the elements are the matter whereof the heavens be made, but thus we understand it, that the matter of the Ethereal and Elementish bodies is of the same kind; the whole first matter being divided into these principal parts, as into halves, the one half united unto the forms celestial, the other half coupled unto the forms of the elements: and so (as I conceive) is that place in the beginning of Genesis to be understood, where it is said, that In the beginning God created the Heaven and the Earth, that is, the matter whereof heaven and the elements were afterwards made, signified unto us by the name of those waters whereupon the spirit of God was moved: and me thinketh the argument is very sound, which is commonly alleged by our partakers: for as in other kinds of causes, there is one, first & principal whereunto all the rest are reduced, so also in this kind of the Matter, there being the like reason of al. But if we distinguish the Matter of the heavens from that of the elements, we can not come to one first Matter of all things; therefore there is the same Matter both of the celestial & inferior bodies, to which we may add that threadbare argument of the Philosophers, Without necessity we must not imagine a plurality in Nature, forasmuch as Nature abhorreth vanity: but there is no necessity of the matters plurality; for the main ground of this distinction (for aught that I can see) is, lest they should be forced to grant a power in the heavens tending to corruption, which (as is before said) hath no necessary illation, forasmuch as the excellency of the form present, restraineth the wandering indifferent desire of the matter, resisting the violent impression of foreign qualities that should breed rebellion of the subject creatures, against their commander the heavens. But touching their reasons, (in my poor opinion) they are very insufficient: for first thus they dispute: The forms of the sublunary bodies may be separated from their matter, but the heavens form is unseparable: when in my judgement they prove rather a distinction of forms, than any diverfity of the matter. Or if they thence prove a diversity of matter, because the forms incident, are of greater and less excellency, one in respect of an other, we may as well say, that the body of a man is of distinct matter from that of the other more base creatures, because his form is so passing excellent. Or if they restrain their comparison only to the power of separation, that because the matter of the heavens is joined inseparably to the form, when contrariwise the elementish matter hath often separation, therefore there is not the same matter of both: we answer, that the same matter in kind, may so inseparably be united to its form, as that it can never be sejoined: not that we deny a power of future separation of the heavens matter from the present form, but that this may be a sufficient reason of their hitherto inseparable union. A second argument is that of Aristotle, saith he, whatsoever things participate the same matter, are capable of mutable transmutation, but the heavens can never be changed into the inferior bodies, for somuch as the elements are altogether passively disposed for receipt of the heavens action, without any reaction upon the heavens, therefore there is not the same matter of both. To which we answer, that the proposition or first sentence must be understood of a potential transmutation, and that with this exception; unless the matters imperfection be perfected by the forms inherent excellency, or resistance be made of some superior form, to turn away the violence of the oppugning agent. We say that the form now being in the heavens, is of so powerful and unconquerable a nature, as that no natural contrary agent is able to compasie any the least new impression. Thirdly thus they reason: Were the heavens of the same matter with the bodies of the elements, then in like fort should they (at least by nature) be corruptible; but the corruption is altogether abhorrent from the heavens nature. To which assumption Damascen answers by a flat denial, for even the heavens in his Philosophy are naturally subject to corruption. To which accordeth that of Plato in his Timaeus, that attributes the heavens incorruptiblenes to a superior more powerful cause. For so he brings in the maker of the world speaking unto the celestial bodies; By nature you are dissoluble, but through my will preserved from dissolution. Nor shall the destintes of death prevail over you, to destroy you, because my will is a bond of more power to keep you from corruption, than that wherewith at your first making you were holden together. And thus have we hastily run over the difficult question of the heavens matter. Touching the certainty and means of their dissolution we will briefly speak by and by, after the resolution of the other ar-arguments for the non-dissolution of the world.  
Simon Magus, as it is recorded lib. 3. Recog. Beati Petri. cap. 3. (if the records be true) thus replied upon the learned Apostle for the world's immortality: If God be infinitely and only good, and the world also good, how shall God in the end destroy the world? If he destroy that which is good, how shall himself continue good? If he pull it down because it is evil, how shall he then be free from evil, that made it evil? To which we answer with S. Peter in the same place: That the world in its first original state was good, yet so as it was foreordeined to dissolution: nor do we thereby detract from God's goodness; for the heavens (the most excellent part of the world) being not made for themselves, but for some end after to be revealed; how good soever, yet were to be dissolved, that that for which they were ordained might appear: which also Peter thus familiarly showeth; Who seethe not how cunningly an eggshell is framed, yet for manifestation of the end of its making, it must be broken of necessity. So must the present estate of the world, of necessity, be destroyed, that the more excellent condition of the kingdom of heaven may be made manifest: at which time also this degenerated evil state of corruption shall be done away, that a more glorious estate of incorruption may be restored. So then, that the world shall have an end, I take it, it is manifest; and that, not an end of annihilation, but of corruption: which indeed shall be a way unto its perfection. Now concerning the times and seasons of the world's dissolution, we will not take upon us curiously to determine, seeing God, the beginning and end of all things, hath left the time unrevealed unto us. Touching the means and manner of the dissolution, the Stoics glanced at it a far off, being of opinion, that the world should by fire be dissolved. For thinking the stars and the skies fire, to have a wasting action upon the inferior elements, their nourishing moisture by little and little decaying, when neither the earth can have refection by the water, nor the air procreation after its absolute consumption, there shall-remaine nothing but fire to consume both the heavens and the earth, of which afterward a new world should be made: whose opinion is very consonant unto that of Peter, save only that they thought this destruction should come of a natural necessity, for Peter also taugnt, it should be by fire, wherewith God (withdrawing his hand of preservation) should consume this world, and of the ashes hereof create a new; yet so, as neither the seat of the blessed souls in heaven, nor the dungeon of the damned in hell should be destroyed; that neither the iotes of the Saints, nor the torments of the wicked should be interrupted. As for the firmament and the other inferior spheres, together with the elements, they shall be endued with another & that a far more excellent cnodition, putting off these accidents and affections of corruption fit for the continual generation and corruption of the natural bodies, and receiving other qualities, agreeable to the incorruptible estate of the world to come; so that their substance shall be all one, howsoever they altar their qualities. As in the resurrection men's bodies shall be of the same substance, but of a different disposition. For this corruption must put on incorruption, and this mortal must put on immortality. So that as Saint Paul said, our imperfect knowledge which we have in this life, shall in the after-world be abolished, because than we shall have a moreful and perfect knowledge of God and his Christ. So may we well say this world shall be destroyed, because it shall lose this present estate of imperfection and put on a more glorious condition fit for the world to come. And so, as I take it, are those places of scripture to be understood, where niention is made of the world's perishing, that is, the present estate of this world shall be abolished, and the same substance endued with a more glorious condition. To which accordeth that of David, Psa. 102. They shall perish, but thou shalt endure, they shall all wax old as doth a garment; as a vesture shalt thou change them and they shall be changed: plainly signifying, that the perishing of the creatures shall be only an alteration, which God shall bring upon them.  
Now to that fruitless question of the heavens motion or rest, we may answer probably, that they shall have an end of moving, for their motion being ordained only for ordering things below, especially for continuance of their generation, seeing all propagation of the species in living creatures, as also mutual procreation in the elementish lifeless bodies being ended, to what purpose should the heavens moving longer endure? Which may also semblably be answered touching the action and passion of the elements, as also for the being of things compounded of their mixture, as plants and sensible creatures, being things ordained only for man's help, and sustenance, who in that blessed state of immortality without the least defect shall need no such supply of his wants; which quiet & restful estate of these under-bodies, is not, as some have fond imagined, to be attributed only unto the quiet rest of the heavens; for when at the prayers of joshua the Sun stood still, and with it the rest of the celestial bodies, (unless we imagine the whole course of them to have been perverted) yet ceased not the natural actions of things below, for even at that time did joshua fight? But the true cause of their rest from motion is the will of the first cause, without whose adiwant-fellow-working, the secondary causes are quite disabled to perform their functions. From hence therefore, namely from the certainty of the world's dissolution we thus reason for our main position. For if the world uncapable of eternity, have a limited time of endurance which it cannot pass, then hath man also his continuance bounded, at least within compass of the world's lasting. For location being a thing inseparable from existence, the world, man's habitation, and mansion house being dissolved, man the principal inhabitant, must have ajoint and fellow dissolution. But for the more through-handling of this undoubted truth, our purpose is more particularly to treat thereof; therefore to leave this far fetched, though not impertinent reason, taken from the world's inevitable destruction, we will come to a nearer and more proper disquisition, holding ourselves within the compass of man's own nature.  
I have read of a late living learned Physician, Paracelsus by name, who had such confidence in the absolute perfection of his skill, that he doubted not to profess himself able by Physic to preserve a man in so perfect a temperature, that he should never die by sickness: but his own hasty leaving of his life, was confutation sufficient, of his either false ostentation, or extreme madness. For himself either not able, which bewrayed his unskilful impotency, or else unwilling, which showed his wilful folly, ere he came to the prime of his age, before he was thirty years old ended his days, learning at length by his own experience, that art can never overcome the necessity of nature; nor man's cunning prevent or pervert the decrees of the destinies. But to the matter in hand, the question is, whether man by nature is subject unto death, the end of nature? To which we answer, that man's nature hath a double consideration; first in the incorrupt stare and purity of creation; secondly in the degenerated condition of corruption, which although it were altogether unknown unto the Gentilish Philosophers, yet is its consideration in part Philosophical, & therefore not wholly to be omitted. Now in the first consideration of nature, we answer negatively, forasmuch as undefiled nature was uncapable of the soul's separation from the body, between which there was so absolute and perfect an harmony and consent, that as the underfaculties of the soul, were in subjection to the reasonable and most principal part thereof, without the least jar and disagreement; so fared it in the body, though compounded of the contrary natures of the four elements, yet so well tempered by proportion, that there could be no observance of the least discord. But after that man's pride set abroach by the devils suggestion, ventured to taste of the forbidden fruit for desire of knowledge; the light of reason being the life of the soul, overcast by the unavoidable clouds of ignorance, there grew a disagreement and quarrel among the subject inferior parts of the soul, from whence followed the war of the elements in the body, never to be ended till the field were lost by blood: and therefore excellent was the speech of the Friar Ferus; The diseases of the body came from sin the soul's sickness, the death of the body from the death of the soul; and who dares say, the dealing is unequal, that he should incur the death of the body, who wilfully rejected the life of the soul? or who marvels that the devil by God's sufferance tormenteth the body with diseases, that gave the devil a place of dwelling in his soul? so that the death of the body being the separation of the soul from the body, was a punishment inflicted for man's wilful sequestration of himself from God; and it is a good collection more than conjectural, that the body had never been subject to the corruption of destruction, had not the soul been tainted with the corruption of defiling. Man therefore in his primary state of creation, was not naturally subject unto death, but in the defiled condition of corrupted nature, death is become inevitable; and therefore Thales Milesius, one of the seven wise men, was wont to say, that there was no difference between a man's life and his death, being both things agreeable unto nature; and thence proceeded their resolute contempt of death, because they thought it was inevitable: whereupon the Epicure himself considering the inevitablenesse of deaths coming, was (as Maximus witnesseth) wont to say; that against other things we must find some defence and remedy, only death was unresistible: our body (the undefenced city of our soul) being all unsufficient to withstand the violent assaults of death. But to leave the infinite testimonies of the learned, grounded upon so long experience, let us deal with reasons more artificial, and show this truth first in particular, that every man hath his endurance dated which he cannot pass; afterward go unto the species, to declare it also in the whole kind.  
The principal and main reason is taken from his composition; for man consisting of a matter and a form, as do also the other bodily living creatures, though the spiritual substance of his soul be immortal, yet his body being made of the first matter, whose inseparable companion is a desire of change, there must of necessity follow dissolution; for God and nature (according to our presupposition) doing nothing in vain, this insatiable appetite of receiving new forms, shall not finally remain wholly frustrate: if therefore we grant an induction of a new form, we must withal grant an expulsion of that that before was inherent, for as much as two forms of divers kinds are unsufferable together in the same subject, whereupon doth follow the corruption of the whole compound: But if we shall make a more diligent and narrow inquiry into the causes of this dissolution, we may find plenty of reasons ministered to confirm this truth. Now the first cause natural of natural death, is contrariety in the compound; for all corruption presupposing alteration, which is only betwixt, and by means of contrary qualities, contrariety of the inherent qualities, (being the only cause of alteration) is also cause of the compounds corruption, which is farther manifested by exprience, for so we see things wherein is least disagreement, to be of longest continuance; and the immaterial substance of the creatures spiritual, void of all contrariety, uncapable also of corruption; so that the inherence of contrariety is one special cause of the compounds dissolution. Man therefore whose body consists of the ever-iarring elements, Far, Air, Water, Earth, hath also an unresistible home bred cause of dissolution. Furthermore, the consent of all Philosophers, and reason itself hath set down this truth as undeniable, that man's life and the chief maintenance thereof, consisteth principally, if not wholly, in the due and just proportionable temperature of the four first qualities, Heat, Cold, Dryness, Moisture, and till their disproportion, there is no danger of death, or any growing sickness: whereupon Averroes hath this definition of sickness; That it is nothing else, but the unnatural disproportion of those four qualities, whereby the part whereinto the same is incident, is disabled to perform its natural functions. whereout ariseth this collection as necessary, being almost all one with those things foresaid, viz. that the disproportion of the four first qualities, and their swerving from their just temperature, is cause of their subjects dissolution: but in every man we see a declining from his engrafted natural complexion, which also increaseth more and more according as his ages are altered, therefore man's dissolution cannot be avoided: where (by the way) we must not let pass the saying of the Philosopher; that man's life consisteth in heat, which also is thereby proved, because in the presence thereof, if it be not excessive, we see a kind of clarity and vigour as it were newly infused, at its departure, the wont or rather far greater recourse of languor. But we are not so to understand that saying of the Philosophet, as if heat were the sole & only cause of life; for even by Aristotle his own witness, the temper of the four first qualities, is the truest & most proper continent cause of life: but the meaning is, that our natural heat is the chief instrument of the soul to exercise the vital functions, as nutrition, augmentation, and such like, yet so tempered, that it exceed not the proportionable measure of our natural moisture, the food and nourishment of our heat. And hence is that of Ficinus, that our life, as light, consisteth in heat, whose food and maintenance is of an airy and fat moisture, not unlike unto oil, whose immoderate excess and impurity or defect, are all wasters of our vital heat; so that there was as great necessity of moisture as of heat in the performance of our natural vital functions, whence came the necessity of nourishment: for our congenerate heat having a consuming action upon our moisture, the resistance: thereof being altogether unable to withstand the heats assaulting action, Nature, that like a kind mother is never wanting to the necessities of her of spring, hath bestowed on our soul a faculty, whereby to restore our decayed moisture, through the assimilation of the nourishment applied unto the wasted substance. Now the especial means of this decay, as is aforesaid, is our heats assaulting action, whereby the soul continually engendereth of our humidity, new spirits, for maintenance of the vital and sensual actions, which being wasted by their never-ceasing operation (as nothing is able long to continue without interchangeable rest) have of necessity a supply from our humidity, and our moisture also equally decayed, hath the like supply made by nourishment which we receive, lest there should follow a sudden destruction: hence therefore, that is from the necessity of continual nourishment, we infer a decay of natural moisture, for otherwise whereunto is nutrition directed?  
But here remaineth a doubt; for if there be restitution of the lost natural moisture, made by the receipt of nourishment, whence cometh death the end of nature? for our heat having alway what to feed upon, either by nature or by this outward supply of nourishment, and death never assailing us, but by the banishment and extinguishing of this natural heat, where is this necessity of ending our life? The answer is, that the impurity of the outward nourishment inwardly applied, by degrees tainteth that natural engendered humidity, and by its continual mixture at length wholly corrupteth it. For as in the mingling of water with wine, the greater the infusion of water is, the more is the enfeebling and weakening of the wines force, till at length it be clean oppressed and extinguished: so is it in the case of nutrition, wherein though at first our natural heat and moisture retain their purity and natural quality, yet at length by continual mixture of the alimentary humour, there followeth a total and perfect corruption of their integrity. Now if by the restorative faculty of the soul there could be supply made of as pure moisture as that which was lost, the creature might (for any thing in nature) be preserved alive for ever. And therefore Ficinus beside the just proportion of moisture unto the heat, requireth also purity and incorruption in the moisture, for as every moisture is not a preserver of the light of a lamp, but though oil maintains the flame, yet water doth quench it: so is it in the case of our life which principally consisteth in heat, for the waterish humidity doth clean extinguish it. And thence it is that old men when they are nearest unto their end abound with a waterish humour, yet are they said to be cold and dry, as wanting indeed that moisture which is the fittest for their heat to feed upon.  
So that the truth of the position is manifest in the particulars, namely that every man hath an end and term of endurance which he cannot pass. Now this end cometh either by means natural and growing in him, or by violent and unnatural means. Whereupon they have distinguished death into two kinds, one Natural, the other Violent: Natural death is where our native moisture is by means of our haturall heat (continually working upon it) consumed & dispatched, whence followeth a lingering, languishing and pining of our natural heat as wanting what to feed upon; contrary to the subtle opinion of the faultfinding julius Scaliger, that thought our natural heat to be weakened, and in the end clean consumed only by want of interchangeable rest, and ceasing from its operation. For as we see fire not wasted by much use, but lingeringly extinguished by decay and want of fit fuel for to feed upon; so our homebred natural heat not tired with over-working, but languishing with the decay of fit food, is at length together with our moisture its natural provided food, clean consumed. To which may be added that saying of Fernelius to this purpose, that though Aesculapius himself, the God of Physic had the guiding of the most temperate complexioned man that can be imagined, and that from his birth, to keep him from all outward annoyances whatsoever, yet hath he in himself an homebred enemy by little and little to spoil him of his life. Unnatural and violent death, is when our natural heat either with too much cold, or excessive external heat, or with an immoderate measure of moisture is extinguished. According to which two kinds of death, the learned Schoolmen have devised a double term of our life: There is, say they, A term of nature, and there is, A term beside nature. The natural term, is that utmost time, that a man by his complexion can reach unto, which is farther off or nearer according to the differences of men's temperatures. The term or limit beside nature is when man's life either cometh short of that length which by his complexion he may attain unto, or is protracted and prolonged beyond the course of nature, & that they call the end or term of God's prescience, & fore-appointment in his unreaveled will, which a man can neither prevent, nor yet prolong: and this hath for the most part place in violent death; and was therefore also propounded by those devout Schoolmen, lest men should not think they depended only upon chance, or fell out without God's especial counsel and disposing. For so we see in daily experience, many men in the prime of their years and strength of their age, either by riot, or famine, pestilence or sword, suddenly cut off, and we are many times moved with pity in that behalf, bewailing their estate that in our judgements might have lived a great deal longer: as indeed they might, if we respect what they were capable of by their complexion; but in regard of God's decree and purpose it was impossible for them to pass that moment and point of time: for God's prescience can never be deceived. And this, to avoid tediousness, may briefly serve for the certainty of the end of particular men.  
Now for the endurance of man in specie (in which regard only he is said to be a part of the world) we may pass over unto it by way of Prolepsis, or preoccupation. For it may be objected, that though there is a limited endurance of particular and single men, yet there may be a perpetual preservation of the species, or kind: and therefore God hath bestowed on man a faculty of procreation to propagate his kind; that though every man must (of a natural necessity) die, yet might he leave an other of his own kind behind him, that so there might be a continual and everlasting succession. To which we answer, that if they grant a corruption in the particular, they must withal grant it in the species. For the species being a thing existent only in imagination, not having any real being, but as we conceive of it in the particulars, it is a necessary illation, that from the corruption of all the particulars, we may conclude the like of the general. But to show it more plainly, by a demonstrative proceeding, we may observe the like course of decay in the species as there is in the individuum. For as nutrition is to the particular, so is generation to the species, in the case of their continuance and preservation: wherefore as by the nourishment we take for restitution of our natural moisture, there being supplied not so pure humidity as was lost, the particulars decaying by little and little, are at last clean consumed: so by procreation, the maintenace of our species, the purity of our complexion being by degrees and by time diminished, at length there follows, even of necessity, an absolute corruption. Now (as I conceive of it) the decay cometh thus, for the particulars, whose function this generation is, being by continual mixture of outward nourishment corrupted, the seed, the matter and means of propagation cannot but be tainted with like corruption. And that is the chief reason amongst other less principal, that men in this age of the world are of less continuance than they were in former time. From all which we thus conclude; if the natural vigour of the species, be by little and little continually weakened, there must of necessity in the end follow a full and perfect corruption. For (as Aristotle said of the division of any thing finite, that by often detraction, though but of a little quantity, the whole becometh at length uncapable of division) so by continual wasting of the virtue of the kind, there followeth at length even of necessity, a total and inevitable extinguishing.  
Now to that frivolous fruitless question, whether this end and destruction be of nature, or proceedeth from any effectual operation of God; we may thus answer: that we dispute not what shall be in this case, but what may be: and according to that sense we say, that even of ai natural necessity (though God should not untimely cut off the thread of our life) yet even of its own accord, should whole mankind have an end; which is manifest by that forenamed continual curtalling of our life, observed by experience, and noted out of the legends of antiquities: for before that universal deluge in Noah's time, we read of some that lived, six, seven, eight, nine hundred years; as Adam, Noah, Methusalem, and others. After the flood, he that lived longest, recorded in holy history, exceeded not the age of a hundred and twenty years: some few years after, in David's time, it fell to seventy years, or if there were any overplus, it was mingled with labour and sorrow, more worthy the name of death than life. So that we may hence conclude, that it is impossible for mankind to last for ever, having inwardly in his nature sufficient and unpreventable causes of dissolution.  
Having thus evidenced the truth of our two positions, that there is a set time of endurance unto every man and unto all mankind, and learning by experience, the natural and true mother of knowledge, that among the particulars so me have a longer, some a shorter time of continuance, and that even by nature; it remaineth that with all possible brevity and perspicuity, we set down the causes natural of this natural difference, which we can no otherwise do, than by propounding the received causes of the length and shortness of man's life, and according as they are more or less in any man, so judge of their effects. Aristotle (in his preface to this treatise) premiseth a word or two touching the divers consideration of this difference according to the diversity of that subject unto which they are incident. For in these terms, of length, and shortness of life, we may compare either things of the same kind, as man with man, or things of divers kinds, as reasonable creatures with lifeless & sensible things; for there are some unreasonable creatures longer lived than man, for so Hesiodus reporteth of the Crow, that he liveth out nine men's lives (measuring every 〈◊〉 to be 100 years) the heart, by the same author's witness, thrice as many: the Raven trebleth the Heart's endurance: and thence was that plaint of dying Theophrastus, and complaint of nature's inequality & as it were blindfolded disposition of her benefits, especially in this kind, that to Hearts and Crows so thanklesly had given so long time of continuance, which was denied unto man, that could and would have better employed that benefit. Which complaint was personally renewed and aggravated by Bewaldus, an old Grammarian, for the sticks not in the person of some captious Atheist to expostulate the matter with God, why our life (in these times) is so curtailed, that for the many hundreds of years which in the first age of the world men lived, we have our stint and limits within the compass of little more than half an hundred? But josephus in his first book of Antiquties, giveth these reasons, and first of all the wholesome goodness of their nourishment, and the outward compassing elements which they inhabited. For their corrupted nature was not greedily carried with desire of their corruptions increase as headlongly & on the sudden to engulf itself into all extremity, but by degrees and lingeringly, as upon constraint by little and little descendeth from that top & perfection of corruption. And as every thing was nearest unto that beginning, so was it clearest and less tainted with corruption. We therefore in the last age and exteremity of the world, are in a more extreme degree of corruption by reason of that frequent alteration in the elements when every mutation addeth somewhat to the begun impurity. A second reason was God's will & bountifulness, the benefit whereof was not bounded in that small compass and limit of time, but extended also unto us and to our posterity. For God therefore granted them a longer continuance, for revealing of many hidden mysteries, especially in Astrology; for the course of many of the celestial bodies could never have been learned, no not so much as in any mediocrity, had not God given some of them at least six hundred years to live in, in which time, the great year as they call it, is fulfilled and perfected. To which we may add the fewness of the earth's inhabitants in the beginning of the world, God preventing the dispeopling of the new world, and providing for its store and replenishing. And yet (if we believe Anacroon, I know not how credible a witness being a Poet) within these few ages last passed, Arganthonius king of the Tartessians, lived an hundred and fifty years; Cinyras of Cyprus, an hundred and sixty years; Eginus two hundred; and as Alexander and Cornelius report, there was one in Illyrium called Dodon, that lived the full and complete term of six hundred years; and Xenophon writeth of one, who in the isle of the Latins, lived eight hundred years. But I am of opinion with Pliny, that it is very unlikely, seeing it may be that they erred in their computation, not knowing how according to diversity of nations in former ages, there were manifold and sundry measures of the years; for the old Arcadians made four years of one of ours, allotting unto every year three months. The Egyptians made as many years as months, according to the Moons finished and renewed course: and according unto this reckoning, it will be no strange thing, that a man should even in these days live a thousand years. But not to prosecute the divers continuance of things in divers kinds, as also to let pass the farther examination of the decayed estate of man's life, lest we again revive the now quenched fire of godless indignation, at the shortness of our life, we will come to the most pertinent comparison of man with man in this kind, if first we shall only remember what was Pliny's opinion of the shortening our lives, namely, that God herein did greatly gratify us, by cutting off these days of misery: agreeable to which, Silemus being demanded what was the greatest happiness and good that God could do a man, made answer, Never to be borne; and the next unto that, to die quickly.  
But touching the causes of long life, we may thus briefly dichotomise them, for they are either inward or outward; the inward causes are such as either we have naturally engrafted, or else gotten by art, industry & wisdom: that of nature is the good temperature and proportionate mixture of the four first qualities in the body; for moderate heat that is unproportionate to the quantity of moisture, rather hasteneth death by the too speedy consumption of its moist food, than any way prolongeth life, as we see in men of choleric constitution. So also, too great cold, that is overswaying the quantity or virtue of our natural heat, shorteneth our life: and thence it is that old men the nearer they draw unto their ends, have their bodies overgrown with cold: whereupon all the Astrologians have observed Saturn to be a Planet enemy unto life, as having a virtue of cold and drought, & accordingly (as some imagine) was he painted with a scythe in his hand, cutting down as it were and kill men with the operation and infusion of these two deadly qualities: which may also be said of the excess of the other two contrary qualities, moisture and drought; for too much moisture oppresseth the natural heat, as we see green-wood quench an unequal quantity of fire: and thence it is, that willows and such like, whose almost natural place is the rivers side, are of short continuance, because their too much & too waterish moisture drowneth their heat. So that hereby (as I take it) it is manifest, that none of these qualities singly and by themselves, are true causes of long life, but jointly all in a good and just proportion.  
Now if any man shall (out of Aristotle) object, that the two qualities of life, namely heat and moisture, are only causes of long life: we may answer, that these two by themselves procure not length of life, but in a certain measure & proportion. Now the rebater of the heats too too active quality, is his contrary, cold; and the moderator & temperer of the moistures access is drought: so that in every man the four first qualities are requisite; yet were two only mentioned by Aristotle, as being those only which directly cause long life; the other two only inclusively set down, as being no otherwise effectually profitable for life, than as they temper and abate the excess of the two principal. But because every moisture is not cause of life, nor the best moisture in every quantity, there are one or two requisite conditions annexed: first concerning the quality, that it be not too thin and fluid, such as is the natural disposition of water; but more cleaving and fat, such as may resemble the nature of oil, for its better preservation from putrefaction: secondly, that it have some competent degree of heat, to keep it from congealing; last of all, that it be pure, not mingled with excremental superfluities; forasmuch as all mixture of superfluities is against nature, enemy to good digestion, and sound nutrition. Those things thus observed, our moisture shall be sufficiently qualified for our lives maintenance. Touching the quantity, in a word, (as is before said) it must neither be excessive, lest the too great quantity oppress our heat, as we see infusion of too much oil oftentimes put out the lamp; nor yet defective, lest the devouring action of our heat, too soon consume it: but in a competent mediocrity, such as the heat may neither overhastily vanquish, nor with the violence of excessive inequality too suddenly be extinguished. Where briefly we may see the reason, why man is longer lived than other creatures of more vast bodies; for though in the large capacity of their great receivers, they have a greater quantity of this natural moisture than is incident unto man's small body, yet have they it not so well tempered and proportioned to their heat, which may well be gathered by their slow and seldom breathing. So that it is true which the Philosopher hath, that the great or little quantity of the body, is no sufficient cause of long life. And yet this is withal most true, that where there is greatest store of humidity with a competent proportion of heat, there is greatest fitness naturally for long life. And that is the reason why those that in their infancy are most subject to a languishing diseasednesse, are afterward most healthful, and for the most part longest lived. For the abundance of their natural moisture hindereth the too speedy prevailing of the heat, by resisting its action: and so is it the less mingled with foreign impurities. For as we see the Smith's fire, by the moderate sprinkling of water, though at first for a time its force is somewhat abated, yet it at length having overcome its weak adversary, as in triumph burneth the clearer, and lasteth longer; so fareth it in our bodies: for our heat not able on the sudden to oversway our multitude of moisture, is the longer hindered from consuming it, whence proceedeth long life, and after it hath gotten the upper hand, performeth with more facility its natural functions, whence cometh healthfulness; where we may also explain that Problem, why children that are too ripe witted in their childhood, are for the most part either shortest lived, or else toward their old age most sottish, according to our Proverb; Soon ripe, soon rotten: for hence we may gather, that from the beginning they had but little moisture, over which their heat soon prevailed; for much humidity is cause of blockishness and folly: whence is that of Galen, that phlegm being a cold waterish humour, is of no force for ornament of good conditions: and Plato doubted not to say, that look how much moisture there is in us, so much also is our folly; and thereof it is, as the same Plato observeth, that children and women are for the most part most foolish. For the glorious light and sun-like splendour of the soul, is therewith as with a cloud obscured and intercepted, which is an evident proof of the small store of moisture in these quick witted forward children, over which the heat so much the sooner obtaining dominion, and in process of time drying the brain, the subordinate instrument of understanding, either quite destroyeth it, and so bringeth death, or else so corrupts it, that it is altogether unable and unfit to steed the inner senses in their functions, whereon the understanding in this prison of the body principally dependeth: which may no less fitly serve for answer unto that consequent demand, why those infants for the most part are soon able to walk, to talk, to conceive, to remember, and such like; the reason is taken from the little quantity of moisture; which may be gathered by the contrary disposition in the otherwise affected subjects, as also by that which we see in daily experience in creatures of other kinds. For whereas man by reason of his fluid, unsettled substance, hath for the better strengthening of his joints his body swathed, and is a long time before he is able to stand or walk, or perform any such like his vital functions; we see other creatures almost in the same moment, borne and enabled to stand, walk, and such like; for their unequal quantity of heat, prevailing over the little store of moisture, soon sitteth them for the performance of vital actions, that being the souls chief instrument in the discharge of her duties. Now if any man shall ask what this just proportion is, and when they are tempered so as may best be available for long life, the answer is, that heat and moisture are then well proportioned when neither the moisture with its too great quantity devoureth the heat, nor the overmuch heat, too suddenly consumes and eateth up the moisture. Yet must the heat have a kind of dominion over the moisture, else can it not be able to nourish the body. For in nutrition the thing nourished, by reason of the instrument ordained for that purpose, must actually work upon that, whereby it is nourished. And because that every Agent must be proportioned unto the patiented, in the inequality of excess, therefore must the heat being the souls sole active instrument of nutrition, have dominion over the moisture, the subject matter of that faculty.  
Touching the complexions, the question is, which of them is best disposed and fitted for length of life. To take that for granted which Fernelius doubteth of, namely, that there are four, if not only yet chiefly, notable complexions; we answer that those of a sanguine constitution are by nature capable of the longest life; as having the two qualities of life best tempered. And therefore is compared unto the air, which is moderately hot and in the highest degree moist. Yet not with that too thin and fluid waterish moisture, but more oily; oil itself resembling the true nature of the air. Therefore the sanguine complexion is fittest for long life. For choler is an humour like unto fire, extreme hot and moderately dry, and so unsufficient to make supply of moisture to the devouring operation of that fiery heat, which is in it. In the phlegmatic the copiousness of that humour resembling water, oppresseth the heat and so hindereth good digestion, whence proceed crudities in the stomach and liver, from whence they are diffused into the veins, and so unto all the parts of the body, and at length the body is overgrown with corruption. Lastly, melancholy resembling the earth and its qualities, cold and drought, both enemies to life, hasteneth the destruction of the body whereunto it is incident.  
The second inward cause of long life is, the moderation of our affections. Whether it be that natural appetite of meat and drink for nourishment, or those other of anger, love, joy, lust, sorrow, and such like. For all these are available both ways, either in excess to kill, or in moderation to save. Touching the moderate use of meats and drinks, what need we seek far for proof of its profitableness to preserve life, when we see so many daily by surfeiting & overcharging their stomachs with too much and too riotus use of meats, untimely end their days: and contrariwise, men very crazy and sickly by temperancy and moderation many times protract their lives almost to an incredible length? For so is it reported of one Herodicus, a student in Aristotle his days, the most weak and sickly of any that lived in that time by the testimony both of Plato & of Aristotle; who notwithstanding, by his diligent care and guidance of himself lived full out 100 years; and no marvel, for so did he repair the daily decay of his humidity, by supply of nourishment, and neither overwhelmed his heat, with the abundance of moisture, nor mingled his radical moisture with too much external superfluous impurities. Where we may resolve that doubt, how it comes to pass, that often drinkers of wine for the most part hasten their death; The reason is, that the vehement heat of the wine, consumeth their moisture, and so by detraction of the heats food, in time also extinguisheth the heat. Now if any man shall require me to prescribe a diet unto him; though I be no Physician, yet will I refer him unto that of the excellent Emperor, who never eat till he was hungry, nor ever proceeded to a gluting satiety. For the extremes are dangerous both excess and defect; too much meat hindering good digestion and engendering crudities, & too little giving occasion of the heats too sudden prevailing over the moisture, both which are friends of death: Not would I counsel men strictly to tie themselves unto set hours; for that, saith Paracelsus, is dangerous, causing many times, either delay of applying nourishment, or too speedy ministering before the former digestion is finished.  
And here we may seasonably annex the use of exercise, for that is a thing very available to digestion; dispersing the nourishment into the parts of the body, and being (as it were) the bellows to kindle and revive our natural heat: for overmuch rest and ceasing from motion cooleth the body. And as the elementish fire which we use, unless it be sometime blown and fed as it were with air is extinguished: so our natural heat without exercise and motion is after a sort cast on sleep, or rather benumbed, whence proceedeth that other daughter of dullness, collection of excremental superfluities, the heat being not able to digest our received nourishment; & thence is that corruption and rottenness which overtaketh these slow-backes; as we see standing water soon putrefy and gather filth. Wherefore Aristotle inquiring the causes of the toilsome travel of some women in childbirth over others, setteth down this as principal among the rest, namely their idleness and want of exercise; for his experience of women in other countries so accustomed to pains taking, had taught him; for to them childbearing was not so painful, their labour consuming those excrements that are the usual impediments of ease in that kind. Nor will I take upon me to limit any man to any kind of exercise rather than an other, or appoint any time; although this caveat will not be amiss prescribed, that they use not to stir themselves more violently than is ordinary, before the through digestion of meat; for than they clog their stomachs and make them unfit for after concoction, and withal fill their bodies with raw humours, which by exercise are dispersed through the veins into all the parts of the body: only as inother things, so especially in exercise of what kind soever, either for delight, or of pains, let them remember moderation, that it be neither too much, nor to little. Not too much, that is, neither too vehement, nor yet continual, but interchangeable, for both these by consuming of the spirits, are alike hurtful; not too little, for continued rest and idleness (as is afore said) engendereth putrefaction. Where the consideration of the moderate use of sleep and waking is very incident, for they are both things necessary for maintenance of life in their mediocrity, both as hurtful if beyond measure. For immoderate and unseasonable watching wasteth the spirits, and by consuming of the vital juice, causeth leanness in the body, enfeebleth the parts thereof, hindereth the operation of the senses, drieth the marrow and the brain: insomuch that oftentimes it proceedeth to doting and frenzy. So likewise too much sleep hindereth our health and welfare by losing the parts of the body, dulling the natural heat, consuming the moisture, and such like. But moderately used and interchangeably they are notable means of procuring and preserving health, not only because this variety and change is very delightsome and refreshing, but much more by restoring or hindering the decay of Nature.  
Now touching these other affections, as anger, joy, sorrow and such like, though we read not of many that have suddenly died for anger, yet by reason of that sudden emission of hear into the outward parts of the body, and kindling as it were the fire of choler, it must needs be very hurtful, when as all suddenness, especially joined with vehemency, is an horror unto nature. And choler inflameth the blood, whence proceedeth that unreasonableness & raging, usually observed in men overmuch angered. But examples are plentiful of such as with sudden and immoderate joy have died; as Pliny reports of Sophocles and Dionysius the Sicilian Tyrant, that immediately upon tidings of victory gave up the ghost. And Livy maketh mention of two mothers at Rome, that after the bloody battle of Cannae, for joy of the safe and unexpected return of their sons, suddenly fell down dead: the one meeting her son at the City gate, the other in her house bewailing the reported death of her son, when on the sudden beside her expectation, safely presented himself to her sight. The like also Gellius writeth of one dingness of Rhodes, that having his three sons, for the mastery obtained at the games, in one day crowned, after his sons embracements and the people's applause, suddenly yielded up the ghost. The means of this death was the sudden dilatation of the heart, the vital spirits and the heat whose beginning is the heart, being too far carried from their fountain. So also read we of Aristotle, that not able to find the reason why Euripus, (a part of the sea situated between Aulis of Bootia and Eubaea) ebbed & flowed seven times a day, for very grief died: the means and manner of his death being the too great contraction of the spirits, whereby the heat was as it were with smoke chaoked. The like is reported of Diodorus a logician, who for shame that he could not at the first answer the trifling question which Stilpo put out, suddenly ended his days. Which is also written of Homer, who in the I'll jos sitting on the sea shore, demanded of the fishermen if they had taken any thing, they thus obscurely in riddle-wise made ananswer; Those that we took we left behind, those that we could not catch, we bring with us. For in the sunshine (as they say it is shipmen's fashions) they made inquisition for their backbiting familiars, and some they took, and cruelly pressed unto death, leaving their lifeless carcases to be devoured of the fishes: those that craftily had insinuated themselves either into their flesh, or into the inside of their apparel, they were feign to bring away with them. But quick witted Homer, not able on the sudden to expound this problem, for shame, (as Plutarch and Herodotus write of him) gave up the ghost. For the spirits and blood (as in all kind of fear it falleth out) retiring to the inward parts, as to a tower of defence, by their sudden retreat, and reverberation, redouble the heat and so inflaming the heart, not able to be cooled again by respiration, stifles the patiented.  
Concerning Venery, death's best harbinger, I shall not need to recite the infinite examples of them, that by means thereof have hastened their deaths, nor indeed is it possible to number those innumerable troops that through lust either before the actual accomplishment, or after the too frequent satisfying the same have ended their youthful days. It was well said of one, that Venus provideth not for those that are already borne, but for those that shallbe borne, and therefore Auicenna, a learned Philosopher & Physician, doubted not to say, that the emission of a little seed more than the body could well bear was a great deal more hurtful than the loss of forty times so much blood. For it wasteth the spirits, weakeneth the stomach, enfeebleth and drieth up the brain and marrow, whereby especially it hasteneth death. And the truth hereof Aristotle proveth by his experimental observation, for so hath he noted the cocke-sparow by immoderate and too frequent use of Venery, very seldom to live out the term of two years, and the same reason he giveth why the Mule a mixed creature begotten between an horse & an ass is longer lived, than either of them, for his jousting in that kind, is but once only through the whole course of his life. To which we may add the diversity of the sex, for the male according unto Aristotle in every kind almost, is by nature better fitted for long life than the female, having greater force of heat, and the moisture more firm & better able to resist than the fluid substance of the female; and thence it is that women for the most part are sooner perfected than men, being sooner fit for generation, sooner in the flower and prime of their age, and finally, sooner old, for their heat though little, yet sooner prevaileth over that fluid thin substance and moisture of theirs, than it possibly can over that solid and compact humidity which is in man.  
But lest our Treatise grow too big, we will proceed to those other outward causes of long life, such as be the influences of the Stars, either in our conception and birth, or in the country & soil wherein we live, as also the goodness of the soil itself, both of the earth & air. For though it be true that the celestial bodies have no direct action either of inclination or constraint upon the reasonable soul of man, which is immaterial, yet is it as true that they have singular and especial operations upon our bodies; for so we see the fruitfulness and barrenness of the earth depends upon the heavens good and bad aspect; the sea follows the motion and alteration of the Moon, the year distinguished into its four parts, according to the access or farther absence of the Sun; and therefore Galen, the father of Physicians, counseled his scholars to have especial respect unto the conjunction of the Planets in their signs, whensoever they undertake any cure: and, which is more fit for the present purpose, the Astrologers have assigned unto every Planet a monthly dominion over the child conceived in the womb, according to their order and situation. The first month is allotted unto Saturn: the second unto jupiter, and so forth in order, until they have all finished their dominion, and then they begin again: which is the especial reason alleged by some, why the child that is borne in the eight month, for the most part dieth, when as oftentimes those that are brought forth a month sooner or later, live in very good health: for Saturn is a planet whose influence causeth cold and dryness, which both are qualities enemies unto life. Now followeth the last, though not the least cause of long life, and that is the goodness of the soil, and wholesomeness of the air: for it is so recorded in Histories, and approved by the testimony of our late travelers, that in that part of India which is called Oner, the inhabitants are very long lived, and for the most part very healthful, insomuch that many of them live until they be above an hundred years old; and we see by experience in our country, how perilous not only pestilent air is, but even the unholesomnes of the fenny countries, that are often annoyed with stinking and unsavoury fogs. Aristotle in his treatise of the length and shortness of life, maketh choice of a hot country, as fittest for preservation and maintenance of life; for so he observeth it, that serpents bred and brought up in hot countries, are generally bigger bodied than those that are found in colder climets: and those fishes that breed in the red sea, are also longer than those in the seas which are not so hot, and that, though they be of the same kind; which is a manifest proof of their longer continuance: else how cometh it to pass, that they have greater growth? and again, those creatures that live in cold climets, have a more waterish kind of humour, and fit for congelation; whence followeth the speedier destruction of the inhabitants: but the truth is, that neither hot countries, nor colder climets, are of themselves any furtherance unto long life, for those that are of a choleric fiery constitution, live longer in cold countries, and such as be of colder complexion, live best and longest in hot regions, but according to the diversity of men's complexions, so live they better or worse in divers countries. Those that are too hot of constitution, by my counsel, shall make choice of a country in some measure and degrees cold, lest the outward heat of the circumiacent air increase the fire within, and make it more vehement; and thence is it that those in the hottest part of Ethiopia are shortest lived, having that natural excess of heat set on fire with the access of the external heat of the air. Now for such as abound with too much moisture, their best habitation in my judgement is in hot and dry regions, that the heat and drought of the soil may abate the superfluity of the humour. But there are some of a moderate and well proportioned constitution, and if any man shall ask what country is best for them to dwell in, I answer, that there are two sorts of men thus tempered; some are of a more weak and less hardy disposition, and to them I would prescribe a dwelling in countries rather hot then cold, that the heat of the place may comfort and strengthen the heat of their bodies. Others again are more hardy & better able to endure any not extreme violence of cold; and for them it is best to live in colder climates, for so is their heat better enabled to perform it functions of digestion and such like; and therefore Aristotle in his Politics saith; that Northern men, and generally such as dwell in colder countries, are stronger and bigger bodied, and most an end better couraged, and longer lived: for the coldness of the compassing air, reflects the heat into the inward parts; and by that reflection, the heats force is increased, and the parts gathered better and closer together, which both further the performance of its duties. And that is the reason why men in Winter are more hungry and devouring than in Summer, as experience teacheth us all: for the stomach is strengthened by the heats compression, to the better concocting of the received nourishment. Thus therefore may we conclude with the exposition of Aristotle his opinion in this case, when he saith, that hot places are fittest for long life, in his book of the Length and shortness of man's life; and in his Politics, The inhabitants of colder climates, are stronger and longer lived: for thus may we reconcile this apparent contradiction: that for men of more cold complexions, hot places are most preservative and healthful; and for the contrary complexioned men, contrary affected places; so that, if two of the same constitution (imagine them both to be hot) live, the one in a cold, the other in an hot region (if their heat was not accordingly proportioned to their moisture, but unequally in the excess) he that made choice of the colder habitation, provided best for his life. And thus have we briefly set down the common-received causes of long life, whereout by the consequence of contraries we may deduce the causes of short life. And they are, first the small quantity and watrishness of the moisture. Secondly, the superfluous abundance of excrements. Thirdly, the badness and unholesomenesse of the soil. Fourthly, the ungentle aspects of the Stars, that ruled either in our conception or birth. Fiftly, want of good nourishment. Sixtly, intemperance either in our diet, or exercise, or obeying of our affections. To which some add the fewness or tenderness of teeth, for that is a sign of thickness in the bone of the head, the matter allotted to the teeth generation being turned into the substance of the skull, which also importeth the weakness of the brain, which is by means thereof unfit for breathing, and therefore being of a moist disposition, the more fit for putrefaction, as standing-waters soon putrefy and gather filth: but this I take rather for a sign then a cause of short life.  
Now come we to that we first and principally intended, to show the differences of men's ages, and the causes thereof, together with their several and singular properties, wherein we will deal so much the more sparingly by reason of those doubts and difficulties removed in the former part of the treatise, so that we shall not need to digress into any by-controversies but keep a direct and a strait course. And to begin with the Definition, (for more orderly proceeding) it may thus briefly be described: An age is a period and term of man's life, wherein his natural complexion and temperature naturally and of its own accord is evidently changed. For such is the disposition and nature of our body, that by the continual combat and interchangeable dominion of the ever-iarring elements it often changeth its primary constitution, so that though there were no outward cause of transmutation, which notwithstanding are many and manifold, yet have we that homebred cause within us that would in time alter our temperature, for our natural heat uncessantly working upon our natural moisture doth, though not suddenly, change the proportion into extremes, yet by degrees perceivably prevaileth more and more over the humidity. For so see we the same body in our youth and childhood, diversly tempered, our infancy full of moisture, as the fluid soft substance of our flesh manifestly declareth: our youth bringeth a farther degree of solidity: our riper age ever temperate: thence still declineth our body unto cold and dryness, till at length death ceaseth upon our bodies, being the last end and period of our life. But every slight change of the four qualities proportion changeth not our temperature, for than we should every day have a divers complexion, our bodies eftsoons with wine and exercise changed from cold to heat, and by the contrary from heat to cold: yet by reason of the short endurance of these distemperatures, the body returning to its former constitution, we cannot say there is a new complexion wrought in the body: for a temperature or complextion is a firm and standing habit of the body. Nor yet must we imagine the tallness and growing of the body or the new budding of hairs, to be causes sufficient to procure this distinction; but the variation of our original constitution is the true and proper cause of this diversity and difference. And yet not every change of the complexion, but that only which proceedeth from that inwardly engendered cause of destructions; for many times by the unseasonable and immoderate heat of the air, as also by intemperate and riotous living, men even in the most mild & temperate countries, altar their complexions, and with the Aethiopian, become even decrepit old men (if we respect their constitutions, and those other incident qualities of old age) before they have finished the full term of thirty years; and therefore was it added in the description, that it must be a natural and a selfe-alteration. Now according to these natural and evident alterations of heat and moistures proportion, so may we best & most properly divide the ages. Pythagoras divides them into four kinds, or rather setteth down their number, which be according to his reckoning four in number, Childhood, youth, manhood, old age, proportioning our life to the four parts of the year, our Childhood to the spring, wherein all things together with a pleasant verdour and greenness flourish and by a plentiful supply of moisture continually increase in growth. Our youth unto Summer, for that grown strength of the body and mind. Our man-age unto the Autumn or Harvest, when after the manifold turmoils and dangers of our fore-spent life, the good gifts and endowments of our mind (as we see it fall out in the fruits of Nature) receive a kind of seasonable and timely ripeness. Our old age he resembleth unto the cold and troublesome winter season, very fitly thereby expressing the cumbersome coldness of the latter end of our life. Aristotle setteth down only three distinct ages, childhood, floursshing man-age, and old-age; the first plentifully abounding with heat and moisture; the middle age having the same two qualities of life, aswell tempered as their nature possibly can be; old age declining and swerving from that good and moderate temper, and by little and little decaying in both these qualities, till at length they be both of them consumed. Now that our life is thus often, and thus in order changed in the temperature, it will easily appear, if we consider the matter whereof we are all made, and that is semen & sanguis parentum, both abounding with heat and moisture, whereout ariseth this consequence, that in the first entrance into life, we have groatest store of those two lively qualities, which decay not but by length of time; and that in our infancy we are fullest of moisture, our experience and sense teacheth us, for so we see infants flesh most fluid and almost of a waxed disposition, ready to receive impression of any light touch; and as for heat, Galen and Hypocrates both consent, that man is most hot in the first day of his birth, though by reason of the great store of moisture, the heats power doth not so evidently appear: and because the heat without any the least intermission or pause, worketh upon our moisture, and by little and little consumeth it, itself also in time decaying, who seethe not that the best part of our life, even necessarily is most cold and dry? whence also this may be inferred; that the space between the two extremes, is most temperate, forasmuch as Nature never passeth from one extreme unto the other, but by the mean: and this is the warrant of Aristotle's tripartite division of ages; the severals are thus briefly defined.  
Childhood is the first part and age of a man's life, wherein their generation and growth is perfected, and this lasteth (for the most part) until we be five and twenty years old, and this age is proportionable unto the Spring, hot and moist, for in this time our natural heat supplieth greater store of vital aery moisture, from the nourishment received, than was spent of that our natural store; & thence it is, that within compass of this time, our bodies grow bigger and taller. But according to the successive decay and diminution of our heat and moisture, it hath pleased antiquity to point out certain degrees of this first age; the first is our infancy, and that lasteth until the third or fourth year of our life, and is always best stored with moisture: the next is our boy hood, and that lasteth other five years: the third our budding and blossoming age, when our cheeks and other more hidden parts begin to be clothed with that mossy exerement of hair, which is prorogued until the eighteenth year: the last our youth, lasting until we be five and twenty years old; and these are the parts of our growing age. The next is our flourishing and middle age, and this is, when a man is come to the highest degree of perfection in the temper of his body, & continueth in that flourishing liveliness, without any notorious decay or impairing his heat, supplying the just quantity of moisture from the nourishment, which in the former action of it, was consumed; and this is compared to the Summer, hot and dry, or rather moderately moist, dry only in comparison of the former age, not simply, lest the heat should too soon dissolve the body; and this also hath it parts; the first is our youth, (for so the penury of our English tongue warranteth me to call it) when our growth is stayed, and our natural heat beginneth to be most flourishing; you may call it our Prime, for then indeed are we in our prime and most flourishing estate; it lasteth from the five and twentieth to the five and thirtieth or fortieth year of our life: the second part of our middle age, is our Manhood, the most constant and settled part of our life, as having our lifequalities most firm and in greatest mediocrity, wherein notwithstanding our natural heat begins a little to decay and decline from its vigour; yet so, as it cannot by sense be perceived, and this lasteth oftentimes till we be fifty years old. The last is old age, when not only the augmentative faculty of the soul ceaseth to increase the quantity of our bodies, but also by reason of our heats and moistures decay, there is a manifest declining from our former lustiness and livelihood, our bodily strength together with the weak and feeble operations of our soul in her functions sensibly impaired. And this last part of our life is resembled unto Winter, for that although it be in itself hot and moist, (as life consisteth wholly in these two qualities) yet in comparison of the former ages, and in regard of death, unto which it leadeth us, is accounted cold, and this hath also its degrees or parts: the first wherein our strength and heat are evidently impaired, yet not so much, but that there remaineth a will and readiness to be doing; and this lasteth usually from our fiftieth year unto our threescore and five. The second part of this last part of our life, which they call decrepit old age, is when our strength and heat is so far decayed, that not only all ability is taken away, but even all willingness, to the least strength and motion of our body: and this is the conclusion and end of our life, resembling death itself, whose harbinger and forerunner it is: and so have we seven several parts of our life, comprising our Pubertatem and adolescentiam, under one: accordingly whereto the Astrologers have assigned to every of them their peculiar predominant Planet: our Infant age is allotted to the moons mild and moist dominion, cherishing us with her sweet influence which she hath especially upon moist bodies: our Boy-hood, Mercury hath charge over, inclining us to sportfulness, talk, and learning: Venus guides our blossomming lustful age: our youthful prime, by the suns lively operation is lifted up from base delights, to a loftier and more man like resolution and liveliness. Mars the stern god of war, hath the precincts of his dominion limited within compass of our man-age, adding courage to our livelihood, and whetting our otherwise dull spirits, unto a more venturous boldness in quarreling combats: Old age from jupiter receiveth gravity and staidness: Decrepit crooked age, from the angry aspect of dry Saturn, sucketh the poisonous infirmities of crazy sickness and wayward pettishness: and this is briefly the summary explication of the differences of man's ages, and the causes of this distinction, together with those properties which the Astrologians mystically and darkly have propounded, as proper and peculiar to every and all of them, to which if we add the exposition of some few problems incident to this Treatise, we will presently annex our Epilogue.  
The first doubt is, What the reason may be of our crying and lamenting at our very first entrance into the world. There are that attribute this mourning unto a divining, and natural forefeeling as it were of the calamities to come: but I rather think it ariseth from those infirmities and griefs which we presently feel, aswell for want of some good thing which we desire, as also for some mislike and grievance of some incumbent misery: as first that violent motion from that before so quietly enjoyed bed (as it were) in the womb. Secondly the strait narrowness of that passage by which we enter into the world. Thirdly, the cold and hungry entertainment which we have, driven out of our warm harbour in the close imperceiveable habitation of our mother's womb, and barred of that nourishment which we before had uncessantly ministered unto us; and thence is it, that presently we betake ourselves to that dary-house of nature, even by a natural instinct and direction, where when we have well battled ourselves, & by the enwrapping in our clothes, are armed against the cold airs injuries, our begun lamentations are pacified and turned into a quiet contentedness.  
Secondly, it may be demanded, why children in their sucking age are naturally more given unto sleep, then when they be of more ripe years. The reason is nature's mother-like providence that for the better strengthening and speedier perfection of her of spring, useth this as a means to increase the virtue, and operation of the heat, and for that purpose hath stored their head with moist vapours, fitted through their rarity and thinness, for the brains cool operation upon them. For as united forces are strongest, either for assault or resistance, so the scattering discontinuity of the thin vapours is an occasion of the colds easier impression, and so of their thickening & better stopping of the passages of the spirits unto the outward senses. Another cause may be the brains coldness, as having in so little time received no great annoyance from the stomachs distemperature, itself also abounding with moistuure & fit matter for procuring of sleep. Thirdly, the good digestion of that mild milky substance, whence ascendeth into the head the soundest and most pure exhalations. And therefore are their sleeps (for the most part) without any the least painfulness and molestation, whereas contrarily we see surcharged stomachs breed unquiet sleeps.  
Thirdly, the question may be, why the natural vital actions, as nutrition, augmentation, and such like, are in infants so powerful, and those other of sense so feeble and uneffectual. The answer is, that the good performance of those actions of life dependeth principally upon our natural heat; For our soul, the prince of our body hath assigned to our heat the administration and ordering of that province: no marvel therefore if those duties be well performed in our infancy, when the author of them is at that time most powerful and plentiful. Now the reason of the senses weak operation is the fewness of spirits deputed to that function: for the instrumental spirits of sense being to be made in the shop or workhouse of the brain by the brain, that excellent spiritual artificer, the workman howsoever he be his craftsmaster, as having been Nature's Apprentice, yet by reason of his imbeeillity and weakness is not able in so short space to make many or at least not so forcible instruments, as may serve for the high function & duty of the soul. To which we may add the abundance of moisture, wherewith the celles of the brain are in our infancy overflown hindering the actions of the souls sensitive parts, and dulling her thereto ordained faculties.  
Where also we have opportunity to resolve a fourth doubt, why children have so slippery and short memories. The reason thereof is, their brains too great humidity, whereby it is disabled to keep the impressions of the outward senses objects. For there are two especial annoyances of the brain that hinder our memorative faculties, immoderate dryness and too great moisture. For the excess of drought causeth excess of hardness to resist the impressions. And therefore it is that old men for the most part have so bad memories, their natural moisture being by the heats long continued operation almost wasted. And Galen in his treatise of the memories, failing because of dryness, maketh mention of a Student, that through immoderate watching and studiousness had so excessively dried his brain, that he had almost quite lost his remembrance: as also of an husbandman that by too much pains in that his painful vocation, and the slenderness of hungry-fare, was in danger of the like forgetting inconvenience. And as dryness by not admitting the impression, is an impediment to the memory, so is also too much moisture by not preserving the imprinted species. For so see we water howsoever most yielding, yet least fit to retain any figure imprinted. Children therefore so moist brained must needs be short remembranced.  
The next question is, Whether speech be natural or wholly from discipline. The answer is, that it is natural, as virtue and other good habits be, nature having given a disposition and fitness, together with instruments fit for that purpose. But as wax howsoever capable of any impression by reason of its pliable nature, yet without the putting to of some outward seal, hath no actual print or resemblance of any thing; so our nature, though as fit to receive any thing taught as wax is to receive impression from the seal, yet without the help of some outward instructor, is not actually and fully endowed with any how proper so ever a quality, especially such as are available for knowledge. In the which kind this of speech hath a special prerogative; but lest I should seem to be needlessly busied in this question, I refer the Reader for his farther satisfaction to that excellent French Poet Du Bartas, in his Babylon, Englished by master William L'isle.  
A sixth question is, Why children in their infancy have no actual evident use of their reason. The cause is, the abundance of moisture incident to that age, whereby the functions of the inward senses as with a cloud are either obscured, or else quite hindered: whence was that forementioned speech of the learned Plato, That there is a little mixture of folly and moisture in men: and therefore Galen was wont to say, that phlegm the most waterish of all bumors, was little or nothing profitable for the attainment of learning. In the seventh place it is demanded, why children most fretful are usually shortest lived? the reason is, their plenty of heat in comparison of their small store of moisture; for therefore are choleric complexioned men most pettish, because their blood is by the fiery heat of that humour so soon inflamed: whereupon the Egyptians avouched the Fly to be the Hieroglyphic of anger, and pertinacy, because (as Pierius observeth) it is of so choleric and fiery a disposition, and we see in experience, men in anger fiery coloured, which proceeds from their heats inflaming of the blood. Now heat unproportioned unto the moisture (as is aforesaid) quickly consumeth that small store of moisture provided for its food and so procureth death.  
To these may be added that welknowen Problem of Aristotle: why children breathe faster and with less intermission than do better grown men. The answer is, their great store of heat in comparison of that small measure in the afterages, causeth nature for its better preservation, to draw the air oftener for the cooling of the heart's heat: and that is the reason that men who have been any long time troubled with an ague, or any such like distemperature, are always very short wound: The contrary Aristotle witnesseth to follow, in things contrarily affected, for so he prooneth the horse and exe not to have so much heat in them; because they take not their breath so thick together; implying that the cold temper of the heart and other innards, is cause of longer breath; which is also evident in reason, for the attraction and emission of the air being ordained only for the cooling and tempering of the heart's heat, according to the necessity thereof, must breathing be either oftener or more seldom. What is the reason that in our youth we are more hungry, and have a greater desire of meat, than in our declining and elder ages? The reason is, our sound & speedy digestion of fore-received nourishment performed by means of our natural heat, whence ariseth a new sucking of the veins, and so an incitement of the appetite.  
Whence is it that old men are commonly so jealously suspicious? The cause is their incredulity & hardness of belief, which itself also proceedeth from their much experience of men's wily practices, according to that, The  child dreadeth the fire. For such is the extreme badness of our nature, that still we go from one extreme unto another; & so become of men extremely credulous, in our last age extremely suspicious. And that indeed was Aristotle's remedy, who to draw us from covetousness, bids us incline unto prodigality: and yet only with this condition, if we cannot at the first instant after our long custom in the one extreme, light upon the mediocrity between both. What maketh them so sottishly devoted to the things of this world; that when they are nearest unto death, they are most desirous not only to keep that which before they had gotten, but more & more to increase their store? The reason is given by Aristotle in his Rhetorics: and it is their exceeding great desire of life, even after those many days which they have forespent. Whence proceedeth that other inordinate desire of things necessary for life-maintenance, they having in their experience observed how hardly things necessary are gotten, how easily also they are lost. What is the cause, why old men are so talkative and full of words? Either because nature loves to exercise that part most which is least decayed: or that knowledge, the only thing old age can brag of, cannot be manifested but by utterance: or that old men, the nigher they are to their end, they much more desire to have their memory not only by children and posterity, but even by the speeches and deeds fore-uttered and performed in their life: or that wisdom (as all good things naturally communicate their good properties) makes them desirous to profit others.  
Whence is that frosty hoariness that usually lighteth upon men's heads in the winter and coldest age of their life? There are some, that imagine it to proceed from the dryness of those excrements: which also they go about to prove by the like experiment in bones, which after their humour is drawn out by seething, grow more and more white, till at length they come unto a perfect and full whiteness. But the untrue resolution of the doubt propounded, is thereby discovered, because that men who use to cover their hair, are sooner gray-headed than those that use no covering, when as notwithstanding it is manifest, that covered hair hath more store of moisture than that which hath been exposed unto the injurious tossing of the wind, and the scorching heat of the sun. Therefore I rather allow of Aristotle's reason, namely the put refaction of that excremental humour, whereof our hair is made: for our natural heat through its unintermitted operation, being disabled fully to digest that excrement sent from within to that outmost covering, our skin, for the hairs nourishment, it putrefieth and corrupteth. Now that there is such a rottenness and putrefaction in the hair, it is evident by experience of such as by long sickness have become untimely grayheaded: for after the recovery of their disease the feebleness of their heat being together with their health restored, the hair receives its former flourishing and (that I may so speak (unwasted greenness, which restitution can be attributed unto no other cause but only to the through concoction of that undigested excrement by the restored heat. The like whereof we see also in corn and grass, that having lost its flourishing greenness, by the continual beating upon and overwhelming of the waters, afterward being by the suns lively heat cherished and revived, resumeth its natural vigour and viridity. And that this hoariheadednesse proceeds from a defect of heat, it is farther evidenced by a strange example recorded by Scaliger, of a man who in one night's space had his head overgrown with hoariness. The cause was this. The Prince of Mantova, Francis Gonzaga, had upon suspicion of traitorous conspiracy, either against his person or state, imprisoned one of his kin & alliance that for his age was wholly uncapable of that alteration: and upon the next morrow news was brought unto the Prince that his head was all upon the sudden grown hoarily grey; which almost miraculous alteration moved the Prince's mind to grant him life and free use of his former liberty. Now if any man should demand the reason of this sudden change, it is given by the Philosophers, and is nothing else but the extremity of his grief and fear, whence proceeded that withdrawing of the dispersed heat unto the inward parts, and so was the humorous nourishment of the hair for want of concoction turned into rottenness.  
And thus have we briefly run over the diversities of man's ages together with the true causes and properties of the particulars, having premised the determination of those usually incident controversies for our better and more direct proceeding in the principal treatise: not as Prolegomena or preface to the purpose, but as things essential and of the substance of our matter. Wherein if I have either omitted any thing pertinent, or admitted aught that is superfluous, I hope, the eye of favour will wink at my missing; as for the malicious, seeing I cannot look for favourable acceptance, I weigh not their verdict: only as the Poet saith, Equitem mihi plaudere curo:  
The base sort I care to please no more;  
One if I please, enough is me therefore.  
FINIS.