TO MASTER ANTHONY BACON.  
An Apology of the Earl of Essex, against those which falsely and maliciously tax him to be the only hinderer of the peace, and quiet of his country.  
HE that eythet thinketh he hath, or wisheth to have an excellent face, no sooner is told of any spot or uncomeliness in his countenance, than he hieth ●o show himself too a glass, that the glass may ●…w again his true likeness unto him. The same cuti●…ie moves me that desires to have a fair mind, to ●…we a true face, and state of my mind, to my true friend, ●…t he like a true glass, without injury or flattery, may 〈◊〉 me whether nature or accident have set so foul a ble●…h in it, as my accusers pretend.  
I am charged that either in affection, or opinion, or ●…th, I prefer war before peace, and so consequently ●…t all my counsels, actions, and endeavours, d●e tend keep the state of England in continual war: espe●…lly at this time, when some say peace may be had, and ●…ly impugn it. But both my heart disclames so bar●…ous an affection, and my judgement so absurd an opinion. And that the reputation of a most faithful subject, 〈◊〉 zealous patriot, which with the hazard of my life and ●…ay of my estate I have sought to purchase, must not ●…o ugly and odious aspersion, that mine actions have caused, maintained, or increased the wars, or had ever any such scope or intent. First; for mine affection in nature it was indifferent to books, or to arms: and was more ●n●●amed with the love of knowledge, then with the love 〈◊〉 fame, witness your rarely qualified brother, and that 〈◊〉 learned and truly honest master Savill: yea, my contemplative retiredness in Wales, and my bookishness fr●● my very childhood. And now if time reason and experience, have taught me to wish that to myself▪ which is be●● for myself, what would I not wish rather then martial employments: In which I have impaired my estate, lost my de●● and only brother, the half arch of mine house, buried many of my dearest and nearest friends, and subjecteth myself to the rage of the seas, violence of tempests, infections of general plagues, famines, and all kind of wants, discontentment of undisciplined and unruly multitudes, and acceptations of events: while I did not only leave my known enemies elbow room to seek their o●● and their friends advancemnts, but was fain sometimes, upon trust of their protestations after new reconcilemen●● to make them the receivers, censurers, and answerers 〈◊〉 all my dispatches. And as mine affection neither in tru●● is (nor if I regard myself) in reason ought to be set upon those courses of the wars: So (in my judgement) I have ever thought wars the diseases and sicknesses, and pea●● the true natural and healthful temper for all estates. I have thought excellent minds should come to the wa●● as surgeons do to their cures, when no easy or ordinary, y●● no other remedy will serve. Or as men in particular questions are allowed to challenge combat, when their is no way but by the sword to prove the truth of their plea, and to obtain their detained right, yea I will go one degre● further: I think that Prince or state offends, as much against justice, and against reason, that omitteth a fair occasion of an Hon: and safe peace, as they which rashly and causelessly move an unjust war. These principles s●●●ing made me conclude this general Thesis' common to all estates, that peace is to be preferred before war, I will come to an Hipothesis proper to the state of England: where most part of the wealth of the land, and revenues of the crown grow by traffic and intercourse, and whereas almost all traffic is interrupted by the wars, where state in largeness of territory and wealth which is the sinews of war, is inferior to that of the enemy: where besides all foreign wars, there is yet besides a great fire of rebellion unquenched, where associates in war give over the quarrel, neighbours are suspected neutrals, and show ill affection, and the people themselves grow weary of the charged and misery of wars, there of all places peace should be embraced, if it be offered and sought for by honourable and fit means, if it may be accomplished, But though wars be diseases, yet I think it better to suffer some sickness, then to venture upon every medicine: But to trust an enemy's faith, when his perfidy shall undo, or extremely endanger us, and infinitely advantage himself, were Medicum haeredem ●acere. It is no cure to bring a state from a doubtful war, to an unsafe treaty: It is no more than to put a feverous body, out of a hot fit into a cold. To conclude, as an unskilful Physician may by weakening a natural body, with his medicines bring it from tertian or quartan fever into an hectic, so an unprovident statesman may with conditions or treaty, so disarm a state of the friends reputation, and the strength it hath, as the cure will prove far worse the● the disease. Therefore it is not the name of war or peace, but the circumstances or conditions of either of them, that should make us flee the one, and embrace the other. Now what are the circumstances of our war or peace with Spain it shall appear in his proper place in the treatise following. But e●re I pàsse further, lest this profession of my disposition and affection too war or peace, be challenged to be but a fair pretence, and these rules which I avowi to hold in judgement, be compared to the doctrine of some divines of our time, farthest of all from their practice: I have thought good to answer some objections of my detractors: who will say mine entering into the action of the low countries, ere I was out of pupil age, my putting myself into the journey of Portugal without charged or licence, my procuring myself the conducting of her majesties succours to the French king in the year 91. my Sea journeys these two last summers, wherein booth myself, and my friends, ventured deeply of our own private means, my near friendship with the chief men of action, and general affection to the men of war of our nation. And lastly my opposing myself against the treaty of peace at this time when others persuade unto it: That all these I say are arguments that I wish not peace, but delight in war: But for my going into the low countries, if neither the company of my father in law, the Honourable charged of the general of the horse in a fair army, when I was but 19 years old, then taking the start of those of mine own ranks, when I saw the state of England not only disposed to great actions, but engaged in them. If these reasons were not sufficient to warrant my course, yet consider what choice I had, or what else could I have done with myself, In the court I had small grace and few friends: In mine own house in the country I had not lived a year, till the opinion of the world obraided me, with more retiredness than was fit for my years, or the present time: And to have gone to travel, when my country sent out so great an army, had been as much as to have turned over books only to gaze at the babies and pictures, whilst others were studying the sense.  
For to justify my going into Portugal, I must plead these circumstances, First, of the person, with whom I went: A poor distressed exiled king, whom I had herd of ten-times repeat the story of his own oppressions.  
Secondly, of the enemies against whom I went: An insolent, cruel, and usurping nation, that disturbed the common peace, aspired to the conquest of my country, and was a general enemy to the liberty of Christendom.  
Thirdly, of the cause in which I went: to deliver the oppressed out of the hands of the oppressors, and by giving the Spaniard his handful at home, to free both mine own country, and our confederates, from the fear and danger of his attempts.  
And lastly, of the time in which I went. A time when mine eyes full of disdain, had so lately seen their falsely called invincible Armado sail by our shores, when all the brave hearts of this kingdom boiled, till they saw that insolent enemy taught both to know himself, and to value us. And when my heart was persuaded by both these circumstances, I engaged my means, kinsfolks, friends, and followers, else neither the adventure had been made up, nor the journey performed, It being no allowed action of her Majesties, but a mere adventure of private men. And when I was so far in, I confess I was not of their humour, that love to wager upon other men's hances, or sit at home like merchants, whilst their hopes and goods are ventured abroad.  
For my going without charge, or leave, I must avow, the one, as out of counsel and excuse, the other, as by necessity. I chose to go without charge, that I might be free to execute the less: I commanded not, that I might not be obnoxious to the success, and because I had overthrown the vioage, If I had stood upon the commission. And I could take no second place, having before the same time and in the same army had place above the general. But though I had no charged, yet I made my brother general of the horse, and my faithful friend Sir Roger William▪ s colonel general of the infantry, 7. or 8 of my fast friends colonels, and 20. at the least of my domestickes, captains, so as I might have authority and party enough when I would. For my want of leave I must plead necessity, her Majesty having resolved to send none of my quality, and many at home showing envy enough to those poor gent▪ that were named, which made me foresee with what success I should have sued for leave.  
For my conducting her majesties forces to the French King in 92. I must allege, that the sending of the succours was resolved on before my name was in question. And if I had not offered myself to the journey, some other noble man that never had place in the wars, might (as the phrase is in the common law) have been promoted p●● Salium: and so I that never had her majesties commission to command in chief, should have seen my puis●●● leap over my head. Also I felt that my fortune had bred me envy, and that envy procured me strong and dangerous opposition, and this opposition would not be over-caryed, but by her majesties great favour, and that the greatness of her majesties favour, must grow out of the greatness of her servants merit: and I saw no way of merit lie so open to me, as by my service in the wars, the times themselves and my own beginning fitting unto it, and at that time none of my country, of my rank disposing himself that way: If besides all this it be considered that I went to a king, who for his admirable valour, and often fight with his own hands, was not only the most famous king, but also the most redoubted Captain of all Christendom. That the intended service was to free the maritine parts of Normandy, from the hands of the league or power of the Spaniard: that thereby the common enemy should find less succour or favour in these Seas If these things be well considered, I doubt not but my French journey will be thought sufficiently justified.  
But perhaps in these actions, wherein either I had no charge at all, or was commanded by others, or offered myself to the service, when the employment was before resolved on, I having no part or interest in that counsel, my Apology will be the better allowed of, then in my two last Sea journeys, wherein I am charged to be the author of the counsel, aswell as the executor of the service, wherefore first for the first.  
For the counsel of going into Spain, I protest I had no more part in that, than my L. Treasurer, my L. Admiral, and master Secretary, who were all privy from the beginning, and did assent, and advice to the journey as much as I did, her Majesty did first move for the defensive, upon intelligence that the king of Spain did both purpose and prepare to assail her, finding that she did strengthen the low countries, and fortify against him, molested him in his Indies, choked him by Sea: So that his counsel resolved that to be the shortest and easiest way to all his ends, to begin with England. And when her Majesty was armed, and able to take the start, it was thought both a wise and safe counsel, not to lease so great, and so fair an opportunity. For the project of going to Cadz I have ever confessed it was my Lord Admirals my colleagues. If any man will single me out to charged me alone with any thing, it must needs be that whè all the charge of preparation was past the army levied & marching to the Rendezvous, and the low country fleet that was to join with us in the way, that then I was as constant in the journey, as I had been all the while before when I might have sold the honour of my Sovereign, the security of my country, the contentment of our confederates, the hopes and almost whole fortunes of hundreds of my friends that I had drawn into that journey, for some private gain unto myself. If any man will use so base a speech, as that we offended the king of Spain so deeply in that journey, as that he is now implacable, and further from peace: I answer vana sine viribus ira, we brought away and burnt his shipping, and destroyed his Sea provisions▪ yea, we put him to such charged and loss, as he shorte●● after played banckrupte with all his creditors. Let me ever see his strength decrease, though his malice increase ●ather than believe in his faith and good nature, when his strength is great. If any man will on the other side object, that though ●e had good hap, yet our designment was nought, for it drew the war to no end, I must confess, I neither performed what I purposed, nor thought that which was done sufficient: I purposed to dwell in a port of the enemies, and so to make a continual diversion of the wars: witness my letters to the Lords of the counsel▪ dated from Plymouth the first of june 96 and delivered by my Secretory Rainolds at Greenwich the 6. of the same month. And when I was possessed of Cadz, I offered to stay with 3. or 4000 men, if that whole fleet could have furnished us but with three months victuals, witness the whole counsel of war. And by these means I doubted not to have brought the wars in those parts to a short end, and also to have made the king of Spain weary of seeking to dislodg me: But my letters was neither answered nor liked here, nor I at Cadz able to feed myself, and the men of war, till a supply might have come. So that except to be of that mind my fellows were, that were called to council, or to have joined with my Lord Admiral when he offered to take an equal commission of commandment with me, both by Sea, and by land, to have sought ●s we could to weaken him, that by all means he can, seeketh to destroy and conquer us: And if to have failed in doing that which I had no warrant nor means to ●●e, be a fault in▪ my journey in 96. I committed no fault.  
For my last journey in 97. let it be remembered how I was brought into it, with what counsel and designs I went out, and what was the true causes of the want of such success, as in our own hopes we promised to ourselves, and that If I undertook more than duty laid upon me, or advised any thing that reason made not probable, or failed of any thing, that any possibility enabled m● unto, I will think the hardest censurer of me do● me no wrong. But first it is well known that her Majesty had armed and victualled 10. of her own ships, and caused the states of the low countries to prepare the like number, before ever I was spoken of to go to Sea. And when my Lord Thomas Howard, and Sir Walter Raulegh, who should have been sent forth with this force, thought their hopes of doing any great service weak and uncertain. And the news of the Adelantadoes preparation at Farroll and the Groin were newly confirmed: a new counsel was called, in which her Majesty resolved that this force prepared, was to great for a discovery, and too little for an attempt. That a fleet inferior to that the Adelantado commanded, might light upon some merchants, o● take fishermen to learn news, but should never be in possibility to take any of the king of Spaine● treasure, or should safely li● on the coasts of Spain and Portugal, being able to command no port, nor daring to fight with the enemy's fleet, when it should come out. And lastly that a fleet without an army to land, might ●ayle from Cape to Cape, and return when their victuals were spent without doing other service: For the Adilantado would not come forth, if he liked not his match, and the Indian fleet might be stayed at the islands, or by the aduise●s direction, so alter their course as they should hardly be intercepted, than a new consideration was had, what might be done by a sufficient force by Sea and land. It was resolved that not only Farroll, where the Adelantado lay, but any port of Spain might be entered, and the ●orces of the king, that should be found in it beaten and destroyed: Or any Port or Island of the enemy taken and fortified, besides the commanding of any fleet of war, or of treasure that should be met with at Sea, if 6. ships of her Majesties and 5000. land soldiers, with 500 Sayle●s to transport them were added to the former preparation. All which conditions being agreed unto, and my Lord admiral ●●cusing himself from the journey, by the indisposition of his body▪ I had warning to prepare myself to take the charge. When I went forth, my first design was upon Farroll, both by her majesties commandment, and mine own choice, for when I had defeated that force, I might go● after whether I listed, and do almost what I listed, (I mean) upon any places upon that coast. And of doing what I would upon that fleet and army at Farr●●▪ I had little cause to doubt, if God had given me a favourable passage and season, to land the army, and enter the port, their preparation to resist being all known, and little moving any distrust of the possibility, or facility of this kind of enterprise. I think I have satisfied you i● some of my former papers, especially in my discourse, written as I came home from Cadz, and I will satisfy ●n● reasonable man, that will speak with me of it. The advantages that would have grown by it are manifest: H●● majesties dominion for a long time, from any invasion from Spain had been secured. The king of Spain hi● fleet both going forth, and coming home, utterly ungarded, the taking of the Spanish and Portugal Isles more easy, the enterprise upon the East and West Indies warranted from two of the greatest dangers, an encounter by Sea, and an invasion by land, whilst her majesties forces were absent: To conclude her Majesty had been such an absolute Queen of the Ocean, and her enemy so disarmed by Sea, as she might either enforce him to any conditions of peac● or make war to her infinite advantage, and his utter ruin, I had also thought upon some places which I might have holden for the diversion of the wars, and if ever the taking of the Indian fleet were likely, I know I should have been in a fair way for it: though I confess these hopes were so uncertain, as I reckoned them but by chance. My first, chiefest, and main design being to assail the Adelantado in Farroll: Farroll was the Rendezvous I gave, to Farroll I directly shaped my course: and at Farroll I had mastered the fleet, that lay there whole years threatening my country, or driven that army into the hills, or sacrificed myself. The causes frustrating this design, were first the violent long tempest, which took us in the height of 46. scattered our fleet, disenabled and almost drowned most of our principal ships, And when we could no longer beat it up against the wind, drove us back upon our own coast: Next that unreasonable stormy weather, which kept us a month after we were put back from attempting to go forth again: and lastly our wants, which forced us to discharge our whole land army saving 1000 men, for mine own excuse how long I dured ere I turned back, and to what desperate case I brought my ships, there be witnesses enough. Also her Majesty and her counsel know, what proffer of service I made her, when I came up post from Plymouth, accompanied with Sir Walter Raleigh, if she would but have let me gone, but with half the fleet, and less than half the land army to such place as myself and the counsel of war had chosen for to be. sure the enemy and not her Majesty should feel the weight and charge of the journey. And when her Majesty accepted not of that offer, even a little before my last going forth, I went to her Majesty to offer the attempting of the fleet in Farroll, if she would give me leave to hazard the 1000 land soldiers, with some number of the fly boats, and merchants ships, and the Saint Matthew and the Saint Andrew for myself, and one other commander to go in, as a guard for the rest, as ●it ships to bear the greatest of the Galleons, leaving all the queen ships and the other principal commanders, without in the Bay, till we had tried our fortune. Of this letter I received answer, tying me to hazard none but these, and yet with some limitations: But I lost the Saint Matthew by breaking the fore mast, and I lost company first of the S. Andrew ere I came to the opening of the Groin: and then the same night while I was fain to lie by the lee, for stopping of a desperate leek, I lost the company of my Lord the vice admiral, by a mischance that fell to his ship, and 30. sail amongst which were many of the companies of the soldiers, so that in effect I wanted all those means that were allotted for my attempt. And then I hovered up and down those coasts, in which I had directed such as should lose company to seek me in, and sent out Pinnaces every way till the Admiral of the squadron that was missing, sent me word, when I was in the height of 40 that the Adelantado was gone forth with his fleet, and gone strait to the Terceras to waste home the Indian fleet, than I resolved after I had called a counsel to go forth to seek him, and though I failed of him, because he never offered to come forth, till long after, yet I miss very narrowly and unfortunately, of the west Indian fleet, if I had met them before they got to the Terceras, there could none of them have escaped: And meet with them I had, if a false intelligence had not made me stand one night a contrary way. But it was the will of God there should be into blow strooken at Sea that year, else when at the same time I returned from the Islands, and the Adelantado bore for the coast of England, we had not so narrowly miss the one the other as we did.  
I have now showed you (worthy Master Bacon) with what mind I undertook these foreign imploimen and actions of the war. A word for my friendship to the chief men of action, and favour general to the men of war: and then I come to the main objection, which is the crossing of the treaty in hand. For most of them which are accounted the chief men of action, I do entirely love them: they have been my companions both abroad and at home: Some of them began the wars with me, most of them have had place under me, and many of them had me a witness of their rising, from Captains, Lieutenants, and private men, to these charges which since by their virtues they have obtained. Now I know their virtue I would choose them for friends, if I had them not, but before I had tried them, God in his providence chose them for me: I love them for my own sake, for I find sweetness in their conversation, strong assistance in their employment with me, and happiness in their friendship, I love them for their virtues sake, for their greatness of mind: For little minds though never so full of virtue, can be but a little virtuous. For their understanding: For to understand little or things not in use, is little better than to understand nothing at all. For their affection: For soft loving men, love ease pleasure and profit. But they that love pains, danger, and fame, show they love the public profit more than themselves. I love them for my country's sake, for they are England's best armour of defence, and weapons of offence. If we may have peace, they have purchased it, if we must have war, they must manage 〈◊〉, yet whilst we are doubtful, and in treaty, we must value ourselves by what may be done, and our enemy will value us by what hath been done, by our chief men of action. That generally I am affected to the men of war, it should not seem strange to any reasonable man: Every man loveth those of his own profession: the grave judge favours the student of the law, the reverend Bishops the labourers of the ministery, And I, since her Majesty hath yearly used my service in her late actions, must reckon myself to the number of her men of war. Before action, providence makes me cherish them, for the service they can do, and after action, experience and thankfulness makes me love them for the service they have done. I know great scandal lieth upon the profession of Arms, as if it were a school of dissoluteness: but that groweth by commandment & charge given to dissolute chiefs, & it is a fault of the professors not of the profession. For a camp ought to be, (and if it be well governed) is the b●st school, to make religion truly felt, and piety and honesty to be duly practised. For myself I am sure, they that love me least, (if thou know any thing of my government when I am abroad) will tax me rather for being to be too severe, than charge me for being to remiss & popular. But I long to leave these disputations, which are but skirmishes, and will come to join with my aduers●●ies in that encounter, wherein they labour both to overthrow my credit, with my Sovereign, and my country. They say that England cannot stand without peace, peace cannot grow but by treaty, treaty cannot be had, but when the enemy offers it, and now when the enemy offers to treat, the doubts I cast, and arguments I frame, do show I would not have her majesties commissione● sent over. I answer in a word: that if I saw them to build upon any true principle, I should not so much dissent from them as I do: but if they will promise themselves, they may have peace without ground, or think that peace may be good for us without reason, or leap blind folded into a treaty, without due circumstances, I say then I do● not suspect too much, but rather they too little. For a ground that we may have peace, it is alleged, that a commission is come to the Cardinal out of Spain, and that by virtue of that commission he offers to send his deputy, to meet with her Majesties. What is the conclusion therefore? The enemy desires and intends peace: Allow this for a good syllogism, and you may put to school all the Logicians in Christendom. It were well concluded, this shows that he meaneth to treat: But remember how heretofore the Spanish king's Lieutenant, and other ministers have pretended commission when they had none: yea have drawn us to treaty, before they had there power from Spain: to conclude, Remember also how that king hath sent a commission from Spain, to be openly showed that treaty might be entertained, when it is notorious to the world, he never meant to conclude any peace, witness of all this the Duke of Parma, his want of commission, when by his letters, he drew my Lord of Derby, Cobham, and other commissioners to the treaty of Berborch. And afterwards that coming of a commission, when their great Navy did presently appear upon our coasts, for the conquest of England. But do they offer to treat, and mean no peace? What is then their meaning? If you will have me to interpret, I will tell you▪ Their first main attempt against England, was in 88 from that time to this present is full ten years, the just time of the siege of Troy, An● now they see open force cannot prevail, they in show retire and give over arms, but they have prepared a Sinon's horse, which cannot enter if we ●ast not down our walls. But because we are thought more credulous than the Tro●an were, the bare letter of a base beggarly traitorous fugitive, assuring us that good faith is meant, is the uttermost stratagem they use to deceive us with: but though some believe it, yet I say, Time● Dan●●s & dona serentes, If they appeal from my exposition, let their actions expound themselves: will they charge us at Berborch with failing to agree to peace, or will they have us to allow that the Duke of Medina came with that huge fleet and army only to be witness to the contract: O● if they had rather their own wo●ds should expound their meaning, than their actions, Here Emanuel Lewes the Portugal, that brought Lopu● and Stephano Ferrara assurance of the 50000. Crowns, to be paid so soon as their devilish conspiracy, against the life of our precious sovereign, should t●ke effect: hear him I say, who at his arraignment in Guild hall London confessed at the bar, that in their Cipher and Targon when they wrote of peace, they intended the murder and death of her Majesty. Or if the peace must not be condemned to be insidious, but under two witnesses, here also Anthony Rolls now prisoner in the tower of London who coming hither out of Spain● with a pretence of making a noverture of peace, and for better colour bringing letters to her Majesty, to yourself and me, from Teswell the jesuit, to that end confessed upon his examination taken by master Secretary, and myself, that his true etrand given him by some of the king of Spain's chiefest ministers, was, to discover the state of our preparations, to assure the Papists of England, that they might shortly expect their deliverance, to win some counsellors about her Majesty, or noblemen in this kingdom to favour their case, and to offer me from the Spanish king, what ever portion or sum of money I would desire, so as I would be won to take their part. Now judge (worthy master Bacon) out of the clearness of your own judgement, how I should understand their offer and speech of peace: and think ●ut of the worthiness of your own heart, what peace my heart could take with them, that have attempted to conquer my country, practised to murder my Sovereign, and sought out me a● a fit man to be tempted to betray both my Queen and country. But if God had not put me back, and arrested by contrary winds this last summer, I should have taught that proud king what effect his offers had wrought in me: And that the longer the will of God, and my Sovereign do restrain me, with the greater interest I hope to pay him in the end. But our peacemakers may allege that times are changed, and with the times the humours of princes and affairs do commonly change: So although heretofore their were no trust to be given to the enemy's word, or fair shows; yet now his humour, or the consideration of his own affairs may dispose him to make peace: For my part erel can believe that he is of a peace able humour, I must know how his ambitious and revengeful humours are satisfied, and quenched. Satisfied they cannot be: for he hath received overthrow in encounters, ill success in all attempts, and loss and scorn in all the war h● hath had with our Majesty. Quenched they are not like to be, for if apprehension of death would have quenched them, he would not the last year, when he came newly out of that trance, which was thought would had been his dead sound, had asked the first word that he spoke, whether the Adelaniado were gone for England: Or if remorse of conscience would have quenched them, he would not in his devotions being at mass, have vowed to be revenged on England, though he sold all the candlesticks upon the altar before him Of the first of these speeches, myself, and some of my fellow commissioners have seen very credible advertisement out of Spain. And the second was delivered both to you and to me by the mouth of a principal jesulte, newly come out of Spain. But we may well conclude that his humour is not like to be changed, for he will never think he hath sufficient part of the earth, till his mouth ●e full of earth▪ And some of his ghostly fathers the Jesuits, will as well persuade that the invasion of other prince's kingdoms is a work of piety: as they, do teach desperate conspirators, that to murder princes is the way to heaven; And if he should die to morrow his sons blood is hotter, and his humour of ambition is like to be greater, he hath been breed in domo Regnatri●i, and his mind shows to be already swollen, veteri atque insita Austriacae samiliae superbia. So as in their peaceable humours there being no hope, let us see what is the present state of their affaites. Princes and states when they do enter into consideration of their own affairs, may dispose themselves to peace, for utility, conveniency, or necessity. For utility if they can get advantage. For conveniency. if peace be sittest to conserve them in the state they are. For necessity: when they have no longer means to make war. That it is like the king of Spain will make peace with us, because he shall get advantage, our peacemakers will not agree, and if they do, it is their own fault: if we fall into the pit▪ which they show us so plainly. That he should not be inclined to peace with England for conveniency, if neither advantage entice him, nor necessive enforce him, I reason thus: All states do stand as much by reputation, a● by strength, especially where there dominions are divided far, and where a few of one nation give the law to great multitudes of many: Now let the Indies, the low countries, Naples, Milla●ne, see that Spain that hath so long tyrannized over them, is glad after so many overthrows, disgraces, and losses to make peace with England, upon equal terms, and they will know that the Spanish are Hombros commo losotos, and that it hath been baseness in them all this while, servitutem suam quotidié emere, quotidié pas●●●e: so as I conclude, by such a peace, the Spanish should lose all reputation of his Arms, and honour of his greatness, and his countries would not be kept from revolting l●y any possibility. And therefore convenienty cannot move him to any peace with us. That necessity or want of means should drive him to it, I think it, both improbable, and impossible, improbable: that he that so lately assailed England, France and the low countries at once, having now brooken the band of league, and divided France from the other two, should think himself unable to make war with us. Impossible: that heè shouldé l●cke means. Wants he treasure▪ his Partido to pay his army, is made with the Genoese for a great time to come: And as his enterprises are his obtides, to make his treasure tun low, so his Indian retou●nes are his floods to fill the banks again. Wants he men? why besides all his new allies, he hath those forces, that were employed in France free to be used against us. Wants he ships▪ he builds every day, and may embarge in Spain as many as he list, and is now both combining himself with the Easterlings, and conspiring with them against us Wants he victuals? beside the helps he was wont to have, he shall now by the peace in France have as much as he list. So as I conclude, which way soever I turn myself I see no likelihood of his disposing himself to peace with us▪ and if no peace be to be had, them no treaty is to be entered into For from him by entertaining treaty, we can draw nothing, nor succour any body, and he may make us and our only confederates so jealous one of the other, as in striviug to take the start, we should strive who should lose themselves first. But if I allow our peacemakers their assurance of peace, let me see what is their purchase, if they can make any peace with Spain good for us, it must be by including our confederates in the low countries, or excluding them, but I suspect neither of these can be good or safe for us, therefore I judge they can make no good peace at all. To include the low countries in our peace it is impossible, except they acknowledge the king of Spain or him that shall claim under him for their Sovereign, as the Duke of Burgu●die which if they do all things else, which should give power to the enemy, and brings slavery upon the Netherlandes, and danger upon, will necessarily follow. The reason is manifest, for when the authority of the general states, and the present form of government, of the united provinces shall be broken and dissolved, a monarchy set up and a prince acknowledged, there shall nothing limit the prince's absoluteness, but his own will The strength of a contract cannot limit it, for neither will he keep faith with those whom he accounteth Heretics, and calleth rebels, neither will they make any longer delay to betray themselves, for province will strive with province, town with town, and man with man who shall be obsequious, and show themselves most servile, all care of defence neglected by minds bewitched with the name of peace, all memory of former tyranny blotted out of their hearts, resolved to accept a Sovereign. Some will seek for charge of soldiers, some for magistracy in towns, some for gathering of custom, and handling of money, some for offices of justice, some for benefices, and spiritual livings, all for trade into Spain and into the Inides, every man for private gain, and no man for pubelique safety. The magistrates and governors cannot limit it, for the chief men which now bare rule in martial and civil government, will provide by flight for their own safetiz, for if the brave Count Edmoundes bought his trust and confidence in his Majesty with the price of his head, what shall any low country subject hope in, when his many memorable services, especially those two memorable battles of Graneline and S. Quintin●, and his putting himself into the Spaniards hands, could not overweigh the suspicion of the combining with the revolters, what hope of future merit shall weigh down the offence of those, which have by counsel or action, maintained the state of the low countries against Spain's garrisons. Nor troops of soldiers cannot limit it, for there will be nothing to pay them, when any thing above the king's ordinary is demanded of the people, it will be answered, is not he our enemy? Why do we acknowledge him as our prince? Is he our prince? Why do we stand out against him as against an enemy? beside all low strangers beside, and the enemy will oppress upon any sudden by force, for his means depend upon himself, the others upon the will of a people that will be glad to spay the purse, when they see present wars, and the enemy's number will be far greater than the States, banish strangers on both sides, yet the enemy shall be strengthened with espaniolized Netherlandes, and the states defended but by such as shall take oath to the enemy. Stipulation of other princes cannot limit it, for the state willbe oppressed on the sudden, when their helps will come too late, and those princes that were glad to make peace, when the enemy was weak themselves united, and the low countries flourishing, will not begin a new quarrel, when the enemy's strength is recovered, themselves divided, and the low countries lost. Yet those that I have named are the least assurances, that either our peace makers can pro pound, or the united provinces receive, I will add further, that as it is certain, no peace is to be had with the united provinces, except a Sovereign be acknowledged: so is it with out all doubt that there can be no peace concluded, except popish religion, be either universally established, or else freely exercised in the towns and provinces where now it is banished, Allow the first, that they banish Gods true service, to bring in idolatry, the leave truth to receive faslhood, they refuse the protection of the most merciful god in heaven, to win the favour of the most tyrannical prince in the earth, Allow the second you bring in a plurality of religions, which is no less crime, and which is against the policy of all states, because where there is not unity in the Church, there can be no unity nor order in the state, for as the mingling of poison with wholesome liquor in one vessel, doth not corrupt that which is Letheal, but corrupteth that which is wholesome, so the poisoned doctrine of these espaniolized Jesuits once brought in, will quickly leave no one professor in all the united provinces. So that I conclude it were both folly and impiety, for them to make any such peace, or for us to draw them to it, yea more folly in us, than ever was committed in any state. For what will not the enemy be able to do upon us, when besides the forces he now hath, he shall have a country in his hands able to find him 60000. or 80000. soldiers, 500 ships of war, besides infinite numbers of transporting vessels, and commodious Ports that are but a days sailing from the very heart of England. But the low countries shall be given to the Infant, she married to the Archduke Albert, and so that state divided from the crown of Spain in a far safer hand. For the disuniting of them, I answer, the Infant is (if the Prince of Spain have no children) to be heir to her brother, and her brother in like case to her, and then are the states united, the only likelihood of their remaining severed is if they both have children, and yet since none of that house do marry farther of then cozen Germans, I see n●t why we should not suspect their conjunction by such a match. But allow them severed, is not Albert son in law to the late king, and brother in law to the presents is he not to be backed by the force of Spain, and maintained by the purse of Spaine● will he not serve the Spanish kings turn aswell to join in war against England, as the Duke of Savoy that married the other sister did in war against France? Nay hath he not a suspected streng●● of his own, by being brother to the present Emperor, and in no unlikely hope, to be Emperor himself hereafter 〈◊〉 Nay is not the Infant, the person whose title to the cro●● of England, Parsons so laboured to prove? Is not the low countries the rise by which he must leap into England Is not such a peace as this in hand, the means to assure her of all the lowe Countries, Is not the army which is now under her new husband, the force on which the enemy for his enterprise of England must set his rest? yes yes this coherence is manifest, and their design clearly discovered. And it is too plain what is to be expected of our peace if we include the low countries. Now let us consider how good it may be if we abandon them, I have ever thought that such a peace might be good for us, if they that persuade unto it, c●● prove three things. First, that they of the low Countries will have both will and strength to maintain th● war, though we make peace and forsake them. Secondly, so we leave them we may have good conditions 〈◊〉 ourselves. And thirdly, that as our affairs now stand a neutrality can be possible kept by us, while the united provinces and the enemy are in war. In the will of 〈◊〉 lowe Countries to continue war, and to refuse all conditions that the enemy shall offer, I understand the resolution and counsel of the governors of the state, 〈◊〉 the conformity of the people to such a resolution (In t●● strength I mean aswell the strength of the governors to force the people if they be adverse, as the strength and sufficiency of their means to endure so great and so sharp a war, as will fall upon them.) Of the chief governors resolving there, may be these doubts, that they shall be tempted by the enemy's offers, who if he can will purchase the severally, that he may reduce them universally. And that they shall be terrified with the danger of counsel, for it sounds both harshly aforehand, and is ●●e to fall out unsuccessinely at the first, the enemy being so much master of the fields as some place will be carried. I know they do pretend to be resolute one way, and protest against giving ear to treaty, but that may be either to move us by example or to make us to leave pressing of them to a treaty, or to seem to hold out to the last that we may seem rather to have undone them, than they to undo themselves. But if they upon mature deliberation should choose the continuance of the wars as the less of the two evils, yet that they people will be like affected it is not probable, for when a people that hath been long cited with the misery of the war, shall hear the pleasing name of peace, when they that had two mighty Princes joined with them in a strait defensive and offensive league, shall see themselves abandoned first by France, and then by England, when one the one side for the maintenance of the wars, they shall have new and great contributions demanded of them, and one the other side they shall be offered all plausible conditions of peace, nay when they shall see England by making peace, get the trade of Spain from them, and they alone by standing out, shall be barred of that Navigation which hath made them so mighty in shipping, and so increased in wealth and riches, what then the multitude is like to choose, is it not easy to judge? And if the people be not conformable of themselves, how by the authority of the governors of the state (which are called the general states) they may be forced I do not see, First because it is not an absoluten and necessary, but a limited and voluntary obedience which they yield. Secondly because the state hath not (as the state of Rome had, and the state of Venice hath) one place that as the head doth command and direct all the parts of the body, but is compounded of equal parts▪ Zealand is as absolute as Holland, Friesland as either of them, yea not only the least province, but the least town holds itself to have a kind of Sovereignty, and will have as free a voice as the greatest. Thirdly because of the former manner of proceedings, which hath not been to send commandments to bind, but deputies to persuade: not to resolve and conclude in the greatest causes in any one counsel, or assembly, but to sound and feel the disposition of every province, and so to win them to like of that they have devised of. And l●stly because that even amongst themselves, they are for the time general states, there is not like to be unanimity in opinion, and then though they that descent (being sew) will not bear the envy to stand in counsel against the greater part, yet it is easy for them, when they come home to work in the particular provinces and towns, such a distrust of that which shall be generally propounded to all, as the resolution will stick, and the whole business be overthrown, it being unsafe for them to deny liberty of voice to any, such liberty being the true cause of their taking arms, and standing out against the common enemy. But admit both by the governors of state and people, it were resolved that the low Countries alone should remain in war, how are their means, or is their strength like to maintain war. Of all foreign help they are utterly destitute, France makes no diversion, England can yield no succours, and in all Christendom their is no other prince or state likely or able to back them. Their own means and ability grow either by the fruit of the earth, or by traffic and merchandise, for the fruits of the earth, that means is like to be but small, for the enemy being master of the fields, and able to divide his forces into diverse places, will every day either win from them, part of that they hold, or at the least, so infect those parts that are already in the State's obedience, as except it be in Holland, or Zealand, which the enemy cannot yet come unto, the husbandry will be ill followed, and yield little profit. And as for their means by traffic, it is unlikely that merchants, that may remove their dwelling, to peaceable places near hand, where they may have safe and free trade, will remain in the Low countries, which only is in war, of all these parts of Christendom: and if they keep their dwelling, yet will the Spaniarde without doubt banish them the trade into Spain, when both France, and England, and the Easterlings shall supply him, and will seek both to banish and impeach them of other trade, as much as he can, pretending that they are now the only perturbe●s of the peace of Christendom. So as I conclude, when I think with myself what the governors of the state of the united provinces are like to resolve, what the people in general will be like to desire, how hardly the multitude will be forced against their liking, or the means of the Low Countries make them subsist to themselves, I see nothing but danger that the enemy will shortly and suddély be master of all the country: which how it importeth us to prevent, it hath been before made plain. I will now consider what conditions we are like to have for ourselves, so we will forsake our confederates, restitution of places we can not demand, as France did, for the enemy holds none of ours. Reparation of damage we can as little seek for, for from him we have sustained no loss. And trade into the Indies our zealous peacemakers will not stand for, lest the enemy offended will grant no peace. Traffic into Spain and Portugal we shall have, and that is the only condition that carries any show of advantage to us. But if we consider how greedy our merchants will be of such a trade at first, and how easy it will be for a faith breaking enemy to confiscate all our countrymen's goods, and to embarge and use English shipping against England, we would not brag to much of this advantage. But on the other side he will require alteration in our government, or in the execution of our laws for matters of religion, delivering up the towns her Majesty hath in the Love Countries, and reparation of all the damages sustained in the wars. The first is a condition only for a conqueror to impose, and unfit for a brave state (that in all the wars heretofore hath had the better) once to hear mentioned. The second should never be asked of a Queen so just, as she will not yield up the keys of a country, delivered by her best confederates, into the hands of her greatest enemies, nor of a prince so wise, as she will not add strength to him, whose strength already she holdeth so much suspected, nor enable him to invade, whose ambition and malice thirsteth after invasion and conquest. The third condition is unpossiblè to be granted, for the loss the king of Spain hath received in these wars, amounteth to a greater sum than the treasure of all the kings in Christendom. If It be asked how I know that these conditions will be demanded, I answer, I learn Albertus mind of Albertus himself, and the Spaniards conditions out of the instruction given to the Spanish commissioners If it be said though in the intercepted letters and instructions, such conditions were to be asked but never meant, they should be insisted upon, I answer, that in the instruction to the Spanish commissioners, it is expressly set down in the first and third condition: the lega●e shall be pressed to urge the French king, to stand with them in obtaining them: and for the second, if the English commissioners do cut of all hope of delivering the towns, that then the treaty shall instantly break of, which is as much as if he should say, except England will give us the keys of the Low Countries, whereby we may reduce them, and let us have the Port of Flushing in which our Galleys may winter, and from which we may set out our fleet for the conquest of England whensoever we will break, we will have no peace with England at this time. But if it be granted that the Low Countries will maintain the wars alone, and that Spain will grant us good conditions so we will abandon the states, how will it appear that it is possible for us betwixt these two to hold a neutrality. If we do not the united provinces some favour underhand, at least by letting them be served by such of our nation, as will voluntarily offer themselves unto them, their state cannot be maintained, nor they kept our friends whom we suffer to perish. On the other side, if we do them in this kind or any other, any favour which shall keep them from perishing, we give the Spaniard and the Archduke a new quarrel, and so make them of new become our enemies. Besides her Majesty hath bestowed in the action in the Low Countries at the least 4 millions of crowns, and she hath in pawn for the debt which the states owen her, the towns of Flushing and the Brill: to reimburse that which is due, and to maintain the wars the states are unable, to deliver the towns without reimbursement were utterly to lose all the treasure spent, and the authority and bridle which her Majesty hath upon that people, which is one of the greatest securities of her state: to keep them (especially Flushing) and to remain in new treaty in my understanding seems altogether unpossible, for when the enemy shall see that neither by treaty, nor offer of his large conditions, the states will be won, he will assail them by force, yea he will take that way which will be shortest and easiest for the reduction of the whole, which will be to bring his Galleys into the rivers, and to transport men into the Islands, for so by piercing into zealand, he shall make his way into Holland, and if he have once good sooting in these 2. provinces, he is strait master of the whole state, If Flushing which is the only bulwark against the Islands and the Castle of Ramnekins, which commandeth the river of Stoad shall notimpeach nor offend the enemy, he will carry all the roast of the Island of ●aterezen, and so consequently all Zealand: if after he is become her majesties friend, he be used as an enemy, by that places she holds the peace is broken, but though it were proved never so fully, that the peace which we might have (if we may have any at all) is full of dangers & inconveniences, yet some are so zealous of it that they will say it is the misery of our state, that we neither have a good peace, nor a good war, and of the two evils it is better to have a practised peace, than an insupportable war. But injurious are these to the men of war that fight for them, and defend them, in thinking our Arms which have ever done honour to our country, stricken terror to the hearts of our enemies, less able to defend our country, than their treaties which have never been free from scorn and disadvantage. Injurious are they to the country which bred them, which being one of the bravest, strongest, and happiest states of Christ endome, is judged by these men as weak as their own weak hearts, Injurious they are to her Majesty who hath ruled them, who being so great, so glorious, so victorious a Queen, shall be judged unable to maintain war, when she cannot have peace but at the pleasure of her enemy. Injurious and most unthankful to God himself are they that hitherto fought for them, in that for an unsase peace with an Idolatrous and irreligious nation they would leave an honourable and just war: when they have done all that they can, it the enemy will not conclude peace, we must have war. And shall not reasonable men then aswell be persuaded by necessity of reason, as by necessity of fortune. But wherein do they find such insufficiency to maintain the wars? our Navy, as also that of the confederates was never stronger: nor the enemy in shipping half so weak: our nation generally was never so martial, nor never had so many able leaders. Our confederates in the Low Counteys who being firmly knit unto us, are of more use than all the friends in Christendom, (that ever we had or can have) they I say were never more resolute, France hath left us, we are cased of many charges, and shall make war in fewer places, Ireland is chargeable, that charge may well be borne, when it is almost the sole burden that lieth upon us, yet if there be any weakness in our means to make war, it is in our treasure. But if it be considered how for this present year Spain hath no ability to assail us, how the next year the yearly subsidies will begin to be paid, how in France we have an end of all charges, and are to receive reinbursement of that is due, how in the Low Countries her majesties expense may alsocease, and she receive some help towards her other charges, yea, though her majesties treasure be drawn deep into, and the poor husbandmen by these late hard years, hath now scant means to live, yet if our sumptuous buildings, surfeiting diet, our prodigality in garments, our infinite plate, and costly furniture of houses be considered, England cannot be thought to be poor. Can we exceed all nations in Christendom in expenseful vanities? and can we not arm ourselves against one nation which we have always beaten for our necessary defence? was Rome so brave a state as the very Ladies to supply the common treasure to maintain the wars, spoiled themselves of their jewels and rich ornaments? And is England so base a state, that the men in it will not bestow some of their superfluous expenses, to keep themselves from conquest and slavery? did the kings and religious people of the old Testament to maintain the wars against the enemies of God, sell the ornaments of the Temple, and things consecrated to holy uses? and shall not we which have as holy a war, spare those things which we have dedicated to our idle and sensual pleasures? and could our nation in those former gallant ages, when our country was far poorer, than it is now, levy arms, make war, achieve great conquests in France, & make our powerful arms known as far as the holy land? and is this such a degenerate age, as we shall not be able to defend England? no, no, there is some seed yet left of the ancient virtue. Remember with what spirit and alacrity, the Gentlemen of England have put themselves into our late actions, There will ever be found some Valerij that so the state may stand and flourish, care not though they leave not where with all to bury themselves, though other bury their money not caring what case they leave the state. We have thanks be to God a Queen, who never hath been wasteful in her private expenses, yet will sell her plate and jewels in the tower, ere her people shall be undefended. We are a people that will turn our silken coats into iron jackets, and our silver plate to coats of plate, rather than our Sovereign shall be unserved, but why should either prniceor people be put to that extremity: If her Majesty will but bestow 60000, pound a year which the Low Countries do cost her, and 20000. pound a year which the States do offer her, and 20000 pound more which I doubt not may be drawn, by way of reimbursement from the French king, this 100000. pound a year, with half as much more bestowed by the States, who to engage her Majesty in maintenance of the war, will never shrink for their portion, this sum I say of a 100000. pound put into the hands of an honest and sufficient treasurer for the wars, and to be issued by warrant of a counsel of war, well chosen, will fully and sufficiently maintain the war with Spain, yea, if this be doubted, it shall be made plain that with 250000. such a force shall be maintained, that her Majesty having a convenient number of her ships, and furnishing them as she yearly doth, the enemy shall bring no fleet into the Seas, for England, Ireland, and the 〈◊〉 Countries, but it shall be beaten, nor seek to gather any in Spain, but the parts of it shall be defeated, before the whole be assembled, yea, those services shall be done upon the enemy, that the poorest Prince and state in Christendom shall have little cause to fear his malice. But of this question, whether we should think the peace good for us, which the peacemakers will procure I have stood long enough. I come now to the last question of all, whether they do enter into the treaty of it with due circumstances. My purpose is not to deal with complemental circumstances, or the Pantilios of honour (though I judge them in their proper time and place worthy of good consideration) but the material circumstances which any prince or state should weigh before they enter into treaty, I judge to be these. The time of treating, whether it yield most advantage for peace or war. The persons of the treators, whether or no the enemy with whom we treat may make advantage by pretence, if nothing be concluded. The assurance of the treaty, or strength of the knit which is tied, and the state and condition we are like to be in, whensoever it breaks and dis●●olues. The only reason which they that would have peace do use to prove that this season is fittest, and yealds most advantage for peace, is, that now the king of Spain is so weak and poor, that he will be brought to that, which he neither would heretofore, nor will hereafter ever agree unto. Therefore say they this is the only time for peace, but sure except they were better Logicians or could frame better arguments, I would scarce wish them to be trusted with arguing for a treaty. The conclusion is directly contradictory to their own proposition: for is he now unablest of all times to encounter us in war? then is this of all times the fittest season to make war. Is this the season he chooseth to recover himself by peace? then of all times peace now should least be granted. Now, now is the fittest time to make war upon the Spaniard, his losses are not recovered, his coffers are not filled, his fleet not made, his Sea provisions not supplied, his Indieses not quiet, his son in law in new Sovereignty not settled. But her majesties late batteries have made way to her greater and higher attempts: Terror accompanies the powerfulness of her Armies, fear possesseth the hearts of her enemies, and God himself by the success hath judged her cause: All the world hath seen what hath happened, and the actions past. The common conclusion is, Victrix causa, quia dijs placuit. So on the other side, now of all times is the unfittest season to make peace, when the state of our best confederates is so undetermined by practice, threatened by force, and solicited to their own undoing by foreign princes, as except we both encourage them, and cleave fast to them, their ruin is at hand. Now it is no time to make peace with the chief enemy of our religion, when a conspiracy is in hand, against all the professors of it The news is too rise, and too credible, that this undertaking Pope, after his victories so glorious in Ferrara, and his powerful reconciling of two great kings, in the heat of so great a war: that now he will not leave, till he make a general league against all such, as do not, or will not acknowledge the omnipotency of his Bulls. Now if we show ourselves so weak, that we follow not the advantage we have, we shall hereafter be thought so weak, as we may have any conditions be enforced upon us Now if we refuse the conditions, which our friends will offer to purchase in our constancy, we must resolve, hereafter to take such conditions as the enemy will give, though it be to our loss. But if we will needs slatter ourselves, that our agreeing to peace, when the enemy desires it, can make any sound and durable league betwixt us: we shall undoubtedly find when it is too late to say, Inter victos victoresque nunquam solida fides coaliscit. And unto the circumstance of time the circumstance of persons, and it will appear that the pretence and beginuing to treat of peace, without concluding, is like to be very gainful to the enemy, and prejudicial to us: for if he, which now is not able to guard his Indian fleet, may but while we are talking, have one or two returns in safety, if he which never feels the strength of England and the Low Countries; as they are united, can for the present sever them in counsel and affoction, as he may here after more easily divide them in parts, If he that never wants malice, but now wants strength, can sing us a s●eepe with the name of peace, till he may rouse us from sleep by a thundering war, his gain, and our loss by this bare pretence will quickly appear. Then for assuring, we give the enemy as good as he can desire, in forbearing him when he is weakest, and letting go our advantage, when it is greatest, we show, that nothing can draw us to war, if we may have peace. On the other side, if a nation that yet never treated with us, but to deceive us, and thinks our religion but heresy, our church schismatical, our Queen excommunicated, so as by their own principles, they are neither to keep faith with us, nor let us receive good by a contract with them: what assurance, I say, can we have of such an enemy, and in such a bargain? First to deceive us, and serve their own turn, by making peace and then breaking of it, they hold it no fault. Next if they did purpose to keep it, the Pope's dispensation would take it away. And lastly if the Spaniard will keep a show of good form, and not voluntarily break faith when his turn is served: the Pope may to charged him to break with us▪ as conscience and obedience shall cover his malice and perfidiousness. Last of all let us consider, what our state and condition is like to be, whensoever that running, knot, or unsure contract doth break or dissolve. Are we the breakers? that say that we discover how grossly we have been cozened, and how far the enemies proud and mischievous designs are advanced: doth the enemy break it? then think that his injuries to our state are all made up. And when he makes them play, he will quickly after give the assault: his fleet that now is weak, shallbe supplied but with those Galleons he builds, and with all the good ships of Christendom that will be bought or hired, his coffers that now are emptied, will be so full of treasure, as he will be ●ble not only to trouble kingdoms by war, but also to purchase them with money, his ministers and best instruments for practice, that dare not venture themselves to come over, shall then have free access, and our hollow hearted malcontents, if we have any that now want traffic, will be then ready and confident to entertain any practice, the Low Countries that now are his strong enemies, either universally by treaty, or in part by conquest shall be reduced to be his obedient subjects, our victories willbe forgotten, these men of war we have shall either be driven to seek new countries and new fortunes, or to be consumed in a miserable beggarly Irish war, our nation generally grow unwarlicke, in love with the name, and bewitched with the delight of peace, and the Spaniard courage will be recovered together with their strength, which is the natural root of all confidence.  
These, these (worthy Master Bacon) are my apprehensions and doubts, that make me afraid to treat: Let this be answered, cleared, and resolved, or let any man show me, how we shall have an honourable, safe, and stable peace, and i will embrace both it and him, with both mine arms. But till then I say: justissimum ij● bellum, quibus necessarium, copia arma, quibus nulla, nifi in armis, spes est.  
FINIS.   

La. Rich to her Majesty in the behalf of the Earl of Essex.  
Early did I hope this morning, to have had mine eyes blessed with your majesties beauties, but seeing the same depart into a cloud & meeting with spi●●tes, that did presage by the wheels of their chariots, some thunder in the air, I must complain and express my fears, to that high Majesty and divine oracle, from whence I receive a doubtful answer: unto whose power I must sacrifice again, though tears and prayers of the afflicted, that must despair in time, if it be too soon to importune heaven, when we feel the miseries of hell: or that words directed to that sacred wisdom, should out of season be delivered for my unfortunate brother, whom all men have liberty to defame, as if his offences were capital, and he so base dejected a creature, that his love, his life, his service to your beauties, and the state had deserved no absolution after so hard punishment, or so much as to answer in your fair presence: who would vouchsafe more justice and favour, than he can expect of partial judges. For those combined enemies, which lay open false grounds to build his ruin, urging his fault as criminal to your divine honour, thinking it heaven to blaspheme heaven, when their own particular malice and counsels, have practised only to glut themselves in their private revenge, not regarding your service, or loss, so much as their ambitious end to rise by his overthrow▪ And I have reason to apprehend that if your fair hand do not check the course of their unbridled hate, that the last course will be his last breath, since their evil instruments that by their office and cunning, provided for the feast, have sufficient poison in their hearts to insert to the service, which they will serve, shall be death to digest, till it be tasted, and then it will prove but preparation for greater mischiefs, concealed among such crafty workmen, as would not only pull down all the obstacles of their greatness, but when they are in their full strength like the Giants make war against heaven. But your majesties gracious conclusion in giving hope of the void, is all the comfort I have: which if you hasten not, before he take full surfeit of disgraces, they will say, the spots they have cast upon him are too foul to be washed away: And so his blemished reputation must disable him, for ever serving again his Sacred Goddess, whose excellent beauties and perfections will never suffer those fair eyes, to turn so far from compassion, but at the least, if he may not return to the happiness of his former service, to live at the feet of his admired Mistress, yet he may sit down to a private life without the imputation of infamy: That his posterity may not repent, their fathers were borns of so hard a destiny, two of them porishing by being employed in one country, where they would have done you loyal service, to the shedding of their last blood, if they had not been wounded to the death by their faction, which care not on whose necks they unjustly build the walls of their own fortune: Which I fear will grow more dangerously high, then is yet discovered, if God do not hinder the work, as the tower of Babel, and confound their tongues, that understand one another too well. And lastly since out of your Majesties own princely nature, and unstained virtue there must needs appear, that mercy is not far off from such beauty, I most humbly beseech you to make it your own work, and not to suffer them to take advantage, that lie in ambush, thinking so soon as they recover a relenting compassion in your worthy mind, to take the honour upon them, as means of our salvation, not out of charity, but pride: But all must be attributed to them, and your sacred clemency abused by forcing us to go through Purgatory to Heaven. But let your majesties divine power be no more eclipsed than your beauty, which hath shined throughout the whole world, and imitate the highest in not destroying those that trust only in your mercies. Which with humble request, I presume to bless your sacred hands, vowing the obedience and service of your Majesty.  
Your most dutiful and loyal servant.