THE YOUNGER BROTHER HIS APOLOGY BY ITSELF.  
OR A Father's free power disputed, for the disposition of his lands, or other his fortunes to his Son, Sons, or any one of them: as right reason, the Laws of God and Nature, the Civil, Canon, and Municipal laws of this Kingdom do command.  
By I. Ap-Robert Gent.  
Nisi Dominus aedificaverit domum: in vanum laboraverunt, qui aedificant eam.  Psal. 126. 
Unless our Lord build the house: they have laboured in vain that build it.  
¶ Imprinted, Anno M. DC. XVIII.   

TO ALL FATHERS AND SONS OF WORTHY FAMILIES, Whom Virtue, Birth, and Learning have justly styled Gentlemen: Health, Happiness, and Increase of the best Knowledge.  
AS in the front of this brief Discourse, there is (Right Worthy Gentlemen) already delivered unto you some light of that which concerneth the Quality, Reason, and Scope of the same: so do I here sincerely profess, that I did not privately write it at first but for private satisfaction; neither do I now make it public, but with due relation to the general good of Great Britain, and for the exercise of Honourable Spirits, in this our much-speaking, & Paradoxical Age.  
Not upon the least presumption of a self-sufficiency, to confront thereby any received Custom (if any such be) nor to diminish the natural Reverence, due by Younger Brothers to their Elder; not to enkindle emulations in families; nor to innovate any thing to the previdice of public; or private quiet (which none I hope willbe so ill affected as to suppose;) neither mine inoffensive zeal for younger brothers (among whom I am ranked one;) nor the absolute consent of Imperial and Ecclesiastical Laws (which I having a little studied, do not a little respect;) nor the particular honour I bear to the usages, in this point, of our ancient Britan's (from whom I am descended;) nor desire to maintain and justify an act in this Kind, done by a Friend, (whom I must ever reverence;) nor yet the hope of bettering my private fortunes (which moves men much in these our times) hath drawn me to this undertaking: but principally (as before is somewhat touched) the singular Respect which (as a Patriote) I bear to the glory, and good of gentlemen's Houses, whose best Originals, surest means of Maintenance, and principal Ornaments are Virtue, or Force of mind: The want whereof, is a common cause of ruin.  
The free Power therefore of You who are Fathers, is here in some special cases argued and defended, to give you occasion thereby to consider with the clearer eyesight, for the establishment, and continuance of families. Hear also the Natural rights of us that are children, be so discoursed and discussed, as that we younger Brothers may have cause and courage, to endeavour by virtuous means, to make our selves (without the least wrong to any) capable (if need shallbe) of the chiefest uses. And both, and all are so handled, as that no offence can reasonably arise in any respect: much less for that the whole is conceived, and written in Nature only of an Essay or Problem, to which I bind no man to afford more belief, than himself hath liking of, & is free to refute the whole, or any part at his pleasure, as he feels himself able and disposed.  
If I may seem among some, to have handled this subject with more earnestness and acrimony than they think expedient: let them be pleased to weigh the Decorum of Disputes, which is principally herein observed their Nature absolutely requiring quickness, and vehemency on whether side soever. Neither let this length of Epistle seem unto you like the gates of Myndus, which were so great and the City so little, that they ministered occasion to the Cynic to scoff at the disproportion, bidding the Townsemen shut their Gates, for fear the City should run out through them, seeing that in a new Matter a necessity lieth upon me to use so large a Preparation.  
As for the remedies of Evils, by way of enacting Laws, that is the proper office of Magistrates, and Courts of public Counsel: nevertheless to speak and treat of them (under the favour and correction of Superiors, to whom I do always very dutifully submit) is a thing which may well belong to every man. But as for those grave, and learned Censors, unto whom I may seem to have bestowed my pains in very needless arguments, because no less than I myself, they hold the case (as here it is put) to be most clear, and out of Controversy: to such I answer, that I wrote it not for them, unless perhaps to confirm their judgements; but for others, who are not altogether so persuaded. Nor to any, as to prescribe, or bind further than their own Consciences shall think good. For that were far too peremptory.  
Finally, nothing being here defended but by Authority, Reason, and Example, nor any person taxed, nor particular personal vices; if nevertheless I have not performed my part in the work so well as I desire, or as the Cause deserves (which I fear I have not:) yet my hope is (Right Worthy Fathers, and Worthy Sons of Right Worthy Families) that for my honest meaning, and good intentions sake, your will ever conceive well of, and taken into your special protection,  
Your unfeigned well-wisher, I. Ap-Robert.   

THE YOVNGER BROTHERS APOLOGY.  

CHAP. I. The Occasion of writing this Apology, is to prove, that Fathers may in some cases dispose of their worldly Estates to which of their Sons shall reasonably please etc. for so much thereof as they will; and that to be Lawful by the Law of God, of Nature, and of Nations.  
NOT many months since being invited by a dear friend of mine to a solemn Feast, made by him to many of his well-deserving friends, it was my fortune at that Meeting to acquaint myself with many gentlemen of no mean discourse: Whereby I feasted as well my understanding with their pleasant society, as my taste with the variety of most excellent meats. With what our Senses were delighted, I let pass to recoumpt, since neither profit, pleasure, nor praise can arise thereof, either to the writer or reader. Only my intent is, to make my Reader acquainted what accident caused me to write this small Treatise, and emboldened me to publish the same to the common view of this al-reprehending age. In which nevertheless I do rather hope for allowance, then in any sort to fear displeasure.  
For though my subject be new, yet I hope it shall want at the first rather age & strength, which grows by years, then probable arguments, yea forcible reasons to defend itself. As for friends, I hope it will find some; and peradventure more than enemies, if it deserve well. For, as younger Brothers be more in number then elder, so are they generally more free in bestowing their deserved love. For want breeding understanding, makes them know & prise their friends according to their worth. Whereas the elder, either seated in their Father's wealth and possessions, with more than hopes to enjoy their Fortunes, do somtynes neither love truly themselves, not any man else; but abusing that which indeed might gain the love of God and Man, and easily maintain their hereditary honour, lose themselves in Vanity, & most idle courses; yea, in their Father's lives, so strangely carry themselves as though the law of God, of Nature, and all other Canon, Civil, & National laws, constitutions, & customessprung from them, could not either in reason or religion bar them of that which they expect; or give to a well-deserving younger Brother any little hope lawfully to share with them the least part of their Father's inheritance; much less to expect an elder Brother's fortunes; oron any terms, or for any cause by a Father's favour, to step before them.  
Which argument among many others, was then handled by the Company Pro and Contra, so doubtfully, that it gave unto me an occasion to write this present discourse, concerning the free power of some Fathers. Wherein I intent to displease no elder Brothers; no, not them, who not inheriting their Father's Virtues, strive not to maintain their Ancestors honour, in preserving their Noble Names, and Families; by which, as a reward to their virtues and travels, men have alwates laboured to live to all succeeding ages their Posterity.  
But my intent is to show, how opinion & inconsideration makes oftentimes the wise to be scrupulous, and through superstitious zeal, not only to fear to do that which reason may, or might have commanded; but rashly to condemn other men's acts as unlawful, and irreligious. Which according to reason and Religion have been done & ratified; using themselves that Custom for the overthrow throw of their families, which was indeed only devised for their preservation; and being hood winked with false conceits, do wittingly leave that, which they and their Ancestors had gotten, as the reward in this life of their virtues, to be the future fuel of all inordinate desires, & Bestial sensuality, which in their providence they could willingly otherwise have disposed of.  
All which I doubt not but to make clear to the impartial reader: proving by the law of God and Man, that a Father's freedom is such that he may Lawfully, and Religiously, give his lands and goods, or other his fortunes to any of his Children, for the Preservation of his Name, and Comfort of his Posterity, without all scruple, as right reason, or the better deserts of a Son shall persuade him, void of all tenderness, or blindness of affection, which oftentimes leads a Father's will, and corrupts his understanding: so as he be true Lord thereof, not tied by consideration of Money received, or Contract made by Marriage of his Son, which may alter the Case, and make the Son Lord, and the Father to have but the use only during his life, as all our Common Lawyers well know. In which Case, we also have experience, that our Law permits many times to alter the Title, and to undo what by former times was held not to be controlled. But of this point I will not treat. Only I mean to argue, whether a Father possessed in fee-tail, may in law and equity, upon the former considerations, make any child which he hath, his Heir, leaving to the rest a competency; & do an act, which according to equity and Religion may stand good and valuable.  
In this my present discourse let not any expect many quotations of authors; for I never read any of this subject. What I bore away of the discourse made by my friends, that I will set down: and what other reasons my understanding shall afford, which I hope shall prove so demonstrative, that they shallbe of Authority sufficient to satisfy my reader, or incite some better pen and understanding, to treat of the same more largely & substantially. And lastly & chiefly, to clear some of my Worthy friends from those imputations, which I find the ignorant to lay upon them: which if I may do, I shall think my time and pains well employed.   

CHAP. II. That the grounds of all good Constitutions being in Nature; yet she, neither before, nor after the law of Propriety established did command, that all should be left to any one, more than to another.  
SUCH are the wise & temperate works of Nature, that nothing is done by her rashly, or unaduisedly. For though in the infancy of the world, she had an invincible power to produce all effects, which the had their Original in her: yet being studious to please mankind, not only with variety, but also with rarity, successively discovereth, and daily doth disclose to the searching wits of the world her secrets: as Time and Place either hath, or doth daily beget Occasion; still as it were keeping in store her heavenly treasure, till man's necessity best moves her liberality.  
For what can the wit of man devise, or what doth time, or Art make known, which good is; that Nature, from the first time she began to work, had not in her (though to herself only known) the ground thereof, either to produce the particular or general effect which wisely she left to be tempered according as the reason of man (whose glory she pretends) should think fittest to give the form; as time, place, and the Nature of the thing should require.  
For though that Marriage, as it is a conjunction of man and woman, containing an inseparable society of life, be of Nature itself; and (as Divines and Canonists hold) to have his Original in the state of innocency, which undoubtedly was then ordained for issue's sake, from which a lineal succession was also intended: yet until necessity in forced man to make division of the Blessings of God and Nature, the claims, and rights which follow lineal succession to inheritance, were not discovered. For all things being common among men many ages were numbered from the world's beginning, before any man laid proper claim to any thing, as due to himself alone. Whereby it well appears that hereditary succession, or Title to a Parent's lands or goods, could not then be in use, or so much as thought of.  
This, I persuade myself, was the law of Nature undepraved. To the which I incline my will the sooner to credit; because, I find that all sorts of people, as well Christians as others, who have perfection in Natural Society, or a perfect Religious life in a Natural and worldly conversation of men have; & do daily imboace this natural, and blessed community. Which happy law of Nature (as I have said) for many age: and without doubt had longer continued, had not sin (which breaks all union and depraves all natural perfection) gotten such dominion in the minds of men; that in natural equity all things could not longer be used in common.  
For as some being possessed with an unsatiable desire to get rule and reign, sought the oppression of others, by taking from them that freedom which Nature had giué them: so others given to sensuality and idleness, sought to live of other men's labours. Whereas by Nature's laws every one ought to live by his proper industry, within the rules of justice and honesty. Whereupon natural reason persuaded, that all things being divided, every man should know his own: otherwise no peace or concord could be maintained in human society. For, all things being Common, the way lay open to every man at his pleasure to abuse others, and as it were to rob them of God his Blessing.  
Hereupon, Aristotle judged the division of all worldly goods, to have been agreeable to the law of Nature, which the precept of our Decalogue seems to approve,  NON FURTUM FANCIES. 
For the Law of God is never contrary to the Law of Nature: neither doth Nature ever contrary itself, though some may perhaps think that herein she hath. For albeit at the Creation of all things together with man in the state of grace, a community was intended: yet was it not so absolutely resolved of by Nature, but that by necessity (I mean by fall of man from God's grace) she did dispense with this law, and left free to man's choice to embrace, upon her warrant, either the one or the other, as best might fit the time, place, and natures of men, which ever since the world began have given occasion of the making of all laws.  
Whereby we see, that though Nature give the grounds to laws: yet man's understanding still gives the particular form. For Nature creating man, gave unto him those worldly blessings to use well, with warrant either to hold them in Common, or in Proper, as reason from time to time could best persuade his will. But, when reason and will had agreed, that it was fit that every man should enjoy his part in proper; Nature moved man further, and told him, that now he might lawfully think on his succession; and not only live in his species, but breath as it were to the world's end, in a lineal Posterity by honourable deeds and virtuous Acts; with which desire, Nature as a wife mother so inflamed man her noblest child after his fall from grace, that some men by Nature's light only, have done acts almost above Nature; and none hath hardly been so base, but desirous to live, and leave an honourable memory behind them.  
Which, that they may the better do, Nature hath not only given them power, to leave their well got wealth, but in a manner their habitual virtues to their issue; in which this worldly honour (the soul's worldly life, and virtues temporal reward) may live free from all-killing tyme. Yet, did she not then by any Command, leave it to any one in particular, but giving a general suggestion of the fitness of the thing, left the form to their best discretion. For had she not done so, all Nations had been tied to observe one form, in leaving their goods, and fortunes to their Posterities; for Nature being one, without change to all, of necessity prescribes no binding rule to any in particular, but to all in general; no man being able to say, that this Nature's law Commands me to do, and yet binds not any other to do the like. Which is evident in the matter of succession, or claims of inheritance; no one Country observing the form held by another, or tying itself without control to observe his own, as I shall hereafter declare.  
For albeit (as I have said) the conjunction of man and woman, which we call Marriage, or Matrimony, together which the desire of issue, be of Nature, from whence also are sprung not only a division of goods, and the fortunes of this world: but also a laudable desire to preserve a family, and name, by the ordination of heirs, to well gotten possessions; yet did Nature never set down as a law, that those fortunes should be left to the elder brother or younger, or to any one in particular, or to all, but to whom the Father, being true & free Lord thereof, should best devise by will guided by reason. For it was never yet averred by any sound Divine, Philosopher, or lawyer, that Nature makes immediately heirs, but men, whom the positive laws of every Country ordain by that form, and power of law, where such an act should be done. And this is (I presume) without control, what the law of Nature commanded touching the matter in question. Next let us see, what the laws of God do command.   

CHAP. III. That the breach of some written laws of God upon warrant of the primary law of Nature, is without sin: and that therefore there can be no such right in Primogeniture, which is not in the Father's power to avoid, though there were a precept to the contrary, as there is not.  
IF Nature, being taken for the principal, and all-producing cause of the whole frame of the Universe with all creatures therein, be nothing else, but the working. Will of the Highest, and first Mover, as Divines and Philosophers do hold; then surely must Natures law be his will, which he cannot contradict or command to the contrary, except he should be contrary to himself, which he cannot. For, what is in God, is God; therefore Constant, & Immutable.  
Out of which ground it is easily proved: That if the law of God teach that which the law of Nature hath ordained, the right of inheritance cannot be tied to any other person or persons, then to those which the Father's will approves, according to power given him by the laws of the Nations where he lives. Which power derived from Nature's law, cannot err from the law of God. For whosoever shall consider but of God's Commandments given to man, shall well find, that God thereby hath still seconded his former ordinances given by Nature. For so long as man kind lived in a sort, after the innocency which Gods grace in his first Creation had wrought in him, God gave him no other law; but when as by sin those sparks which remained after his fall were quite extinguished, he gave him new laws, yet agreeable to Nature.  
As for example, in our present affairs. When man had made by Nature's privilege partition of Gods and Nature's blessings; then God said to his people by the mouth of Moses, Thou shalt nor steal: Thou shalt not covet thy Neighbour's house, his wife, his ox, his Ass, or any thing that is his. As also, Thou shalt not kill. Which with all other his commandments teaching what sin is, are agreeable to the law of Nature, yet are dispensed withal as far as the laws of Nature ever permitted. For, though that the express commandment of God be; Thou shalt not covet any thing that is thy Neighbours, nor kill, yet in some cases, both may lawfwlly be done. The one in extreme want of present food: the other in defence of life and goods; in which, the law of God is good, by the original law of Nature, which made all for the sustenance of man; and gave leave to defend life with the loss of another's blood, yea life, if otherwise it cannot be. Upon which ground I argue thus.  
Suppose the law of God did at this present commaund maund (which indeed it doth not) that the in heritance should be left to any one particular person, and namely to the elder Brother: yet in some Cases it would not bind the Father to observe it. For as in the former Commandments upon some considerations, the Commandment may be dispensed withal, so in this. For, it is not sufficient to be the elder Brother, or the nearest in blood to gain an inheritance, in the Case which I have now proposed; for other circumstances must concur, which if they be wanting, bare propinquity or ancienty of blood may justly be rejected: and he that is second, third, fourth, fifth, or last may lwafully be preferred before the first, and this by all law divine and human, and by all Reason, Conscience, and Custom of nations Christian.  
For if it should fall out that the next in blood, should be a Natural fool, or a madman; or being taken by the Turks or Moors in his infancy, and brought up in their religion would maintain the same: or if any other such accident, ministering cause of just exception should fall out; is it likely that any law would allow, that such a man should be admitted to the inheritance Wherefore how idly should they talk, that would have that it was his birthright, or that God and Nature had made him heir, since that neither God nor Nature doth immediately make heirs, as I have said before. True it is, that God and Nature makes men, who by the mediation of the laws and customs of nations may come to be heirs. Upon which ground our cómon Lawyers say, that no heirs are borne, but men and law make them.  
True it is, that in holy Writ, great respect is had of the first begotten, & a blessing is held to come to parents thereby. But this blessing (I presuppose) to be, that thereby the fear of sterility was taken away, which in the old Law was held to be a great punishment of God, and in respect thereof parents had of themselves, and by the national laws and customs, a great regard of their first begotten, and preferred them to the better part of their possessions: yet not by any command from God, as a precept to bind his elect people under pain of sin. For, had any such Law bound them, under such a penalty; then should it bind all Christians now, on the same conditions. For we see it by general practice of all countries to be otherwise. Therefore it follows directly, that it was not God's commandment, but a Nationall Law. For God both is, and ever was one, without change to all his people; and so ever were, and willbe his Laws positive, made for them that truly worship him.  
The claim which Esau made to his Birthright was not by the law of God, as some ignorantly affirm, but by the laws of his country. For, should the law of God have commanded it, it had been sin in his Mother, and brother, by cunning to have gotten it from him. Neither could the Father or the State wherein they lived, upon no just cause known but to God alone, without sin, have settled the same upon his Brother. jacob, as it was, and as it may seem by allowance from God, and as it may be judged by the success. Whereby it is thought, that God ordained it as a punishment of the one, and blessing of the other: which by the permission of sin to be committed, God doth never do.  
Neither did the Nationall law or custom of the jews (as it is said) absolutely command the Father to leave unto his first begotten, all, or the greatest part of his goods and fortunes. But if in case he died, not disposing thereof by act in his life, or will at his death, than the custom of the Nation, laid a double portion on the eldest or first begotten, providing for the rest proportionably.  
By all which you may gather; that neither the law of God, or man, in this case, commanded that Esau should have the inheritance; but power to do the contrary was given to the Father in his life time; even by the law itself. For many Divines hold, that Esau selling his Birthright (as it is termed) sold not goods, or lands, but his claim of being high Priest after his Father, which by custom was to come to him, being his Father's eldest son. Of which dignity God seeing him unfit, permitted him to passeaway his right in his Father's life, as we read in holy writ, and which God seemed to approve. And thus (I hope) this objection is answered.  
Further, if it were true, that the effect of Eldership were such by the law of God, as some passionately defend: that is, that the whole inheritance should of right pertain to the eldest; then sure it followeth by good consequence; that there should, nor ever could, have been but one temporal Lord of all the world. For of necessity Adam's inheritance should have gone still to the next in blood; which how absurd it is, let all men judge.  
Moreover, we read, that Nöe having three sons, and the whole world to leave unto them, gave it not all to the Eldest, but equally divided it among them, and their posterity, as all authentical histories do witness. God requiring obedience of children to parents, promised a reward, saying, Honour thy Father & Mother, that thy days may be long in the land which the Lord shall give thee. This surely was not spoken to one, but to all the children of men. For with God there is no exception of persons: but as a just and pions Father, he gives every one according to his deserts: Terram autem dedit filijs hominum.  
We read also in holy writ, how the prodigal child, being weary or his Father's house, came unto him, and boldly said: Pater, da mihi portionem substantiae meae, quae me contingit. This child of which the Gospel speaks, was the younger brother: yet you see how boldly he said: give unto me that portion of goods which belongs to me. By which words it is evident, that a division, or partition of a Father's fortunes was then in use: and that any child as well younger, as elder had power by law, to demand his legitimate, or child's part, according to the Nature of the Civil and Canon Law, as you have heard. For the words following in the text are these: Et divisit substantiam illis. Thus we see, that the privilege of Eldership was then excluded; which now in our country by custom only is gotten to be of such force.  
But it may be objected, that this was a parable only (as indeed it was) and cannot be alleged as law. True it is; yet it cannot be denied, but that all similes, parables, or examples, which ever were alleged by the wise and learned, to represent the truth, have ever been derived from the customs and nature of things, according to the known truth in that time, place, and to those to whom the speech, or discourse is directed. And shall we think, that our Saviour Christ being wisdom and truth itself, treating of so important an affair as he did then in the Gospel, would use an unknown discourse, or strive to make the truth appear to our weak understandings by a Parable which in equity could not be true? No surely. For it appears by Solomon his succeeding to his Father David, that David had power by the laws of god and man, to give his Kingdom to the worthiest, which hedeeming to be Solomon, gave unto him his Kingdom, though he was the youngest son.  
Neither was there any just exception made against Adonias his eldest Brother, or against some other of his Brethren, why they should be disinherited by their Father David, contrary to the common practice of those times, in settling inheritances. But, the only known reason of this act in Scripture, was David promise made to salomon's Mother, together with her great entreaty made to David to perform the same. Which surely he would not have done, except he had found a lawful power in himself, to have executed the same. And thus much concerning what may be said out of Scripture, or law of God in our present question.   

CHAP. FOUR That nations beginning to device sundry forms of settling Inheritances, the Romans especially therein respected the free power of Fathers; the right of Children to their Father's estates beginning only at their Father's Death.  
HAVING now declared in the former chapter what the laws of God, and Nature do determine of our present question; we intend to examine in brief, what is commanded by the law of Man, aswell civil of other Nations as common of our own Gontry. And first touching the civil Law thus.  
Though that all Law, which ever had but the name or credit of Law, doth surely derive her original from the Law of Nature; whereupon Cicero many hundredth years since said, that the ground of all law making, is to be taken from the chief law, which was borne before any law was written, or City builded: yet do they differ much in form. For as it is no law, but tyranny, which wholly disagrees with the law of Nature, as Aristotle saith: so if it agree in all with the law of Nature without limitation, or difference it must of force be the very law of Nature itself, and not the law of man. Which surely is nothing else, than a temper, or form of equity, drawn by right reason from the grounds of Nature's laws; according as time, place, and the Natures of men either gave or shall give the occasion. For though new laws be daily made of new & several accidents: yet all are agreeable to the old, and ancient grounds of reason in Nature, the just Mother of all law. Wherefore, having set down before, what the law of Nature is, touching the matter in question, I shall need only now to show, what temper or form hath thereunto been added by the Civil Lawyer.  
After that mankind was enforced (yet by Nature's warrant) as I have said to make a partition of the Blessings of God, and Nature: and that men were possessed by the same right of goods and lands, which they desired to leave to posterity; lawmakers, and in particular the Civilian, devised by little and little certain forms of inheritance, and ordination of heirs, at the first somewhat rigorous; giving to Parent's power of life and death over their Children, & a free disposition of all their fortunes to any one of them in his life: but dying intestate, than all which was the Fathers, to be equally divided among the Children, as well daughters as sons. Which Constitution was afterward upon good grounds altered: The Father being bound to leave every Child a portion, which the Civil Lawyer calleth a legitimate, others a Patrimony; which at the first was the eight part of the Father's substance equally to be divided (as I have said:) which after a while seeming little, the law commanded, that the fourth part should be left without control: except, that upon just cause the Testator did disinherit him or them who by course of law were to succeed him: still upholding the former laws, that aswell daughters, as sons, should equally succeed to their Parents dying intestate; herein assigning fourteen Causes, why an heir might lawfully be disinherited.  
Many hundred years passed, from the establishing of the Civil law, and before that it was ordained by force of law that Parents should leave a Child's part (as it is now called) or that he could not disinherit, without expressing the cause thereof in his last Will: yet, in all this time, nor until this present day, the privilege of engrossing all by Primogeniture was not once heard of, or at least wise not admitted, but rather excluded; as by many texts in the same Law it well appears: The end of the Imperial, or Roman Civil law, being only to maintain moral justice inthree short precepts, Live honestly; Hurt no Man; Give unto every one his own. So he who observes these three, fulfils this law, yea the law of Nature, from whence this law is sprung. Now, if any Brother can prove, that his Father either in life by deed, or by will at his death disposing of his goods & lands, no otherwise then I have set down, doth none act against these three; then why should he not content himself, either with the fruits of his Father's love, or his own deserts whatsoever they be.  
True it is, that in Natural justice, children during their Father's life, have Ius ad rem, and not Ius in re to a Father's goods. Whereupon the Law calleth them Quasibonorum patris Dominos. Which their right only takes effect after their Father's death. For during life, he hath power to alter, alien, sell, and give as it shall please him according to form of law; but being dead without will, or disposition thereof, they fall upon his children (as I have said) according to the law of nations. This law embraceth a two fold justice; the one in exchange, the other in distribution. The first hath not to do with our cause: the other surely rather commends, then condemns a Father, who upon good occasion, that is, for the bad demerits of his eldest son, and for the preservation only of his family, shall give, or convey his lands & goods to the younger. For the Nature of distributive justice, is not only to give proportionably to the well deferuing: but also to forbear to place benefits upon any one who shall abuse them; or use them to any other end, then to that good for which they were lent him, and he shall leave them. And this is, Ius suum unicuique tribuere. For no man can give or sell his goods to an evil end, or to any one whom he assures himself will use them to the dishonour of God; or the wrong of those who shall live with him, or by him; of which I will speak more in the last chapter, being there to handle what a Father may in conscience do, or not do, in our present question, with sin, and without sin. And thus much of the Civil and Canon Lawyer's averment of an elder brothers right to his Father's fortunes.   

CHAP. V That the present custom in our Country of giving all, or almost all to the Eldest, was never so begun, that it meant to exclude just remedies for such evils, as should grow out of the abuse of that custom, when it may make Fathers guilty of their sons faults, and of their families ruins.  
I Have of purpose reserved to treat of the laws of our country in the last place, because (I assure myself) that they are of most force to sway the matter in question. For many things may be permitted by the laws of God and Nature; and yet they on the contrary are forbidden, or practised by course of law in several States of the world, as the lawmakers, and the customs of the countries do allow or command. I do confess, that the general practice of our time among parents is to leave either all, or the most part of their lands to their eldest begotten son. This without all question, was (as it hath been said) first devised in former ages, for the preservation of a family, and to raise some one, who might be a comfort to his brothers, sisters, and family, and in whom his progenitors virtues might line to the world. Moreover, I will not deny, but the partition of lands may bring, in the end, a goodly estate to nothing, or to so little, as it may be like an Atomie in the sun: yet I find in Natural reason, that, ex nihilo nihil fit, or at , that,  
Haud facilè emergunt, quorum virtutibus obstat Res ang ista domi.  
But if men do fail of those happy ends to which this general custom should guide, than would I wish, that they would not use that for their destruction, which was meant for their preservation. For who doth not see, in these our times, may unbridled youths, to be so violently carried away with the humour of spending, that they neglect brother, and sister; yea, bring to extreme misery their Natural Mothers after their Father's death by their unthristines. What help for this hath law left unto us? no means to put a bridle to these unruly colts if they become heirs according to the custom of our time? no truly. For some starting hole willbe found to untie the knot which a Father's care once tied. How then? must many an hopeful, and well-de serving brother and sister, be left to the mercy of this whirlwind? There is no necessity in it. For our law hath given power to a Father, & free will to dispose of his own, according as reason shall guide his will, without all obligation to his heir. Besides, this custom takes place, only after a Father's death, if he dispose not of what is his by deed in life, or by will at his death.  
But lest my words be more generally taken, than they are meant; I mean those Fathers, who are possessed of their lands in fee, or fee-tail; that is, are absolute of themselves, and have not upon good consideration, conveyed their lands from themselves. For all our lawyers do agree, that such parents may alien, sell, and give by power of our law their lands to whom they will, without respect of person or eldership. But me thinks I hear one say, that the custom is otherwise; and that this custom is a law. True, it is the custom. But let us see whether it binds sub peccato, or as a custom, which rather invites than commands. There never was any command to tie a Father under a penalty which admits no limitation; but it was ever left indifferent, and then only to take place where former provision according to course of law is not made; the surely a parent is free from this devouring custom, and may in good consideration prevent what evil it may bring to his posterity, yea reason commands it should be so. For, Interest reipublicae ut quilibet re sua bene utatur, as saith the civil law. For if a man can neigh there sell, nor set, much less can he give any thing to another, which he thinks in his conscience will use it to the dishonour of God, the ruin of himself, or others.  
Some Divines hold, that it is not lawful to sell, or let an house to any that he thinks assuredly would make thereof a stews; or to sell, give, or lend a weapon to a man who intends therewith to do murder. Excommunications are imposed on them, who sell arms offensive, or defensive to Turks, though they be not assured that they will use them against Christians.  
Thus we see, the rule of conscience, not only to command a man to use well those fortunes which God hath bestowed upon him: but forbids him, either upon affection, or gain, to part with them to others who will abuse them; lest he be partaker of others sin; which a parent may be after death who leaveth his lands to a desperate unthrift. But what religion, and conscience doth command, shallbe declared in the following chapter. In which upon grounds drawn out of these former four Chapters, it shallbe argued, what sin may be contracted by the parting of an estate among sons, or by disinheriting of an eldest son, upon just cause; and unto whom the Father is only tied by the Custom of the Country, without obligation of promise, or contract in Marriage, which may alter the Case.   

CHAP. VI That it is no offence before God for a Father, being tenant in feesimple, to disinherit the eldest, or to parcel his estate upon cause: & that extreme vices of Heirs apparent, together with the fewer means which younger Brothers have now to live on, than heeretosore, crieth out against the contrary opinion.  
THE right of these insociable inheritors, of which we now treat, may grow (as I magine) out of three titles, or claims, which they may pretend to a Father's inheritance, & whereby it may be deemed (as they think) sin in a Father, upon what desert soever, to bar them of the said right. These three titles, are Purchase, Custom, and Entail. Of each severally. And of the first, which is Purchase; surely in the judgement of the good and learned, there is no question in law, or conscience, but that a Son joined Purchaser with his Father, hath Ius in re, and by equity must, surviving his Father, inherit such lands as were purchased in their names. Now of the other two, though it be as clear, as the noon light; that a Lord in Fee simple, or Tenant in tail, may sell, or give by course of our Common law, at his pleasure, all such lauds held by him in that kind, according to those forms of law, which the learned in our laws have, and can set down: yet there seems to arise a great difficulty how such an act, or acts may in conscience be executed. I have heard some say, in this our Case, Summum ius, summa iniuria.  
Of these points therefore I will speak, saluo meliori judicio, what may in Conscience, upon good and just occasion given by the son to his Father, be put in execution. It is well known to all divines (as I have said) that holy writ hath not prescribed any direct, or precise form to the Children of God, whereby they are bound in Conscience to dispose of their lands & goods, but hath absolutely left them to the customs of their Country, where any act of that kind shallbe executed, only as confirming all forms of devices which by public consent, and authority, either have, or shall in rightful manner be devised, or ordained.  
Out of this ground and others before mentioned; let us examine, whether a Father parting his fortunes by power of law, and on just cause; shall do a wrongful, and a sinful act as some pretend to make it.  
I confess, that every act in itself, or by Circumstance evil, and which upon no occasion can be justified, is both before God, and man sin; and is by no means to be executed by a Christian. But that the parting of an inheritance, or the disinheriting of an eldest son, upon just cause, and according to course of Law, is an act of that nature, doth not appear. For I do not find, that either the Law of Nature, or grace, nor yet the Laws of man, common, civil, or Canon, ever forbade such acts, whereby sin may be imputed to those who do them on good considerations. Sure I am, that the Cannon, and Civil Law, are so far from forbidding them, that they command, as a thing in equity, the Father either to divide his inheritance, or allow him, according to his affection, to give to one, more than to another: yet with this proviso; that he who hath the least have his child's part, which the Law doth also assign, except on just desert he do disinherit any one; which at this day may, yea must be by will, with the cause of disinherision named therein. Of which causes the Imperial Laws have set down fourteen, as it shall well appear to them who are desirous to understand more thereof. So it is evident, that by these two Laws, no sin can grow upon such acts, being done upon their warrant, and upon such consideration, as hath been before often by me set down.  
As for the common Laws of our Realm sure it is, that they allow no less, and with a greater privilege. For a man may by this law, give his lands held in Fee, either by deed in his life, or by will at his death, to any of his Children; yea, to a stranger, without rendering a reason why he doth so. True it is, that a Father, not disposing thereof in such sort, the Custom gives the whole estate to the eldest: yet in some parts of our Country, the youngest Brother by Custom is to have the land, held by some kind of tenure, if the Father in his life time do not dispose thereof.  
As yet therefore I cannot see how any sin is committed, or contracted by the former acts, being neither done against the law of God, or man, as we have proved; except it should be said to be sin, not to leave it to the power of a custom; which cannot be except the former law shallbe proved not to be of force, and no way to be executed, which can no way be done. For though I must confess, that the custom of leaving the child-estate to the eldest son, hath of later times been much embraced by our Gentry, for the preservation of their families, for which it was invented: For the times have so ruled, that men of sort being either idle, or not possessed with a covetous humour, have contended themselves with their Father's fortunes, and have preferred their younger sons by those means, which the times did afford; which preferments were then better than now they are namely by many commendable courses; as either by service of spiritual men, whereby many were raised or by professing a spiritual life, whereby the younger brother hath oftentimes in honour stepped before the elder. But this manner of life is not so grateful to our English gentlemen's Natures as it hath been.  
The trade of the Merchant, the Military profession, the courtiers life, advanced many more, than now they do; and lastly, the elder brothers were the of better temper in spending: and if they had no humour to get, yet had they a care to keep what was left unto them; and ever held themselves bound by religion to provide for their younger brothers and sisters, left to their dispose, which now is far otherwise. For an elder brother is found to spend more in a year idly, than would prefer, or maintain a whose family nobly; and to suffer their brothers and sisters to shift, which as these times shape, is oftentimes to live either lewdly, or most miserably: being forced either to forget their good education, or to lay aside all badges of gentry, who otherwise with some reasonable helps, might do God, their Country, and Family much honour.  
Since we have gone so far, let us see on what grounds this custom first hath risen. Surely for the maintenance of a family, yet led with, an ambition, at the example of princes, who finding some difficulties in the admitting of many to a government, and feeling what inconveniences the parting of an estate brought, devised that one should govern; sometimes the worthiest, sometimes the eldest was elected, according as the order was agreed upon, and yet the other brothers were maintained like Princes. And thus, custom also among them hath been broken, without imputation of sin. For to go no further than our later times; it is well known that Ferdinand (Charles the fifth his brother) being settled in the Empire, divided his estate. To Maximilian his eldest son, he left the Empire, with Austria, Hungaria, and Bohemia. To Charles his second son, Styria, Carinthia, and other dominions, And to Ferdinand the youngest, he gave the Earldom of Tyrol. All which, if in his life time he had not disposed of, had come to the eldest. Philip the second, late king of Spain, gave to his Daughters the 17. Provinces, which were of right to have descended to his son after his death, if he had not disposed thereof in his life tyme. This is, and was deemed lawful by the Divines of this age, otherwise surely they would never have done it.  
But doth this custom in meaner degrees work that effect which it hath done in them? No truly. For as we have proved, it is rather the overthrow then the preservation of many families. And let us see withal, whether families florithed not as much and more than now they do, before this custom was received. Livic saith that three hundred of the Faby, being all of one name and family, issued out of Rome gates at one time on their own cost, to the defence of their city, which was done before this custom was dreamt of.  
In Scotland 300. of the name and family of the fraser's, gentlemen, were at one time slain in a fight by their enemy's neighbours; and 140. gentlemen of one name in Yorkshire waited upon their chief, or principal man of their house being at that time high Sheriff. In other countries many Noble families, from the Romans downward, have continued where this custom hath been deemed unjust, as by their laws it is manifest: whereas in our country, in these our times, if there be one family in a Shire, which is of three hundred years continuance, very many others are scarce of five descents in a blood.  
Why should our age then, seeing the fruit of this custom to be so small, embrace it with such zeal, as to deem the breach thereof, being warranted for good and just by the Law of God, of Nature, and of man to be a sin? Is it possible that it is held both lawful, and expedient, for the preservation of a family, that degrees of kindred should be dispensed with to marry, being known contrary to the general practice of god's Church: and can it be lawful before God and man, for preservation of our goods, to venture our lives, and to kill a Thief who shall assault us, and that perhaps for a trifle: and yet that for preservation of our whole estate, and maintenance of a family, it shallbe held sin to break a bare custom, under no penalty obligatory, yea always allowed by law? I have never heard, that a custom was of force, to abiogate a law so far that it should be deemed a sin to follow the said law; though it have power to dispense with the law, which other wise to break were sin, especially, when as the law is both more pious, and more natural than the custom is. For how far is it from the law of Nature, and from the practice of fatherly piety, the Father dying intestate, the eldest son to become absolute Lord of all his Father's lands, and not to be bound by law to provide for brother or sister, but at his own good liking. Aliud tempus alios mores postutat. Men of virtue, men of learning & virtue, both now, and in former ages in this our country have broken this custom, as the world knows, upon good consideration, and just causes; not upon spleen, or false suppositions persuaded to leave their fortunes to strangers, or to a lustsuil issue, as some have done.   

CHAP. VII. That Father's being tenants in Fee-tail, may likewise without scruple of Conscience, discontinue the state-taile upon cause, and devise the same at their reasonable pleasure.  
HAVING treated largely, and (as I presume) proved sufficiently, that lands held in feesimple, may either be parted, or upon just cause wholly given away to a younger son; I intent now to speak of the lawful freedom of a Father in like sort, and on the same causes; moved to dispose of his lands entailed: of which there seems more doubt than of the former.  
Every human act, which of itself is not forbidden by the law of God or Nature, is to be judged good or evil, lawful or unlawful; either by the law of the place where the act is done or by intention of him who shall do the act. For, as the law of God commands somethings to be done, & other things to be avoided, under pain of sin: so the third sort of actions are left free (by the said authority) from sin; except the law of man shall forbid them, and so make them sin; or else evil intention make them (being of themselves lawful) to be a sin, and unlawful; according to that principle of Moral Philosophy, Finis specifical actum. For as an act of itself lawful, being done against law is sin: so a good act commanded by law, yet done with an evil intention, may be sin.  
Out of these grounds let us see, whether the Common law of our Country, and the intention of a Father, which are to be the judges of our Cause, can allow the cutting offan entail, the parting of an inheritance, or (upon proportionable cause) the disinheriting of a son. First, it is clear, that the act of itself, by law, may be done; but whether such an act be summum ius, which may be summa iniuria, that is the doubt. What shallbe the trial? By other laws, it is either made lawful, or left indifferent. Our law which makes this tie, gives leave to undo it without any exception. Ergo, to a good end, and upon just cause it may be done. But it may be said, that the eldest son during this entail, is quasi Dominus, yet having neither Dominium directum, nor indirectum, he, during his Father's life, hath only ius ad rem, and not in re. Whereby no change is forbidden to be made by the Father, according to the form of the law under which he liveth, and by which the son is to make claim, if the Father shall create no new estate in his life. For it is lawful for every man to dispose of his own, as far as the law shall permit him; if it be not forbidden by some other law; but such an act is not forbidden by any other law; Ergo it is lawful and no sin.  
But it may be said, that the intention of him who entailed the land was, that it should not be untied, or the state changed. To which I answer. That no act done by law, can be free from change, further, or longer, than the law that made it a binding act shall allow. And it is well known to the learned in our laws, that every man's intention is to be construed according to law, by which his act, and intentions are directed. Whereupon the Civilian saith in like Cases, valeat quantum valire potest. Neither is it thought, that any man, who conveyeth his lands by entail, can intend an act beyond law; or desire that his son, whom he makes tenant entail (as our lawyers term him) shall in no case no, not for the preservation of his family, or relief of many others of his Children, have power to cut off this entail, and to be able to alien, sell, or give his lands, as reason, law, and religion shall permit. For it may be judged, that he who doth an act to a good end, as namely to preserve his family, will always assent to another act, which shall with better assurance than his own, strengthen his intention. To the former considerations we may add, what incoveniences may follow of this general position. For if in Conscience the whole inheritance of the Father, is to come without comtroule to the eldest son, then must it of necessity be inferied, that the Father, without this consent, cannot give to pious uses, or set out for the advancement of his other Children any other thing after his death. So that if God should bless a Father with many Children, and cross him with as many misfortunes; his other Children, and all other his pious intentions should be provided for only at his sons, or heirs courtesy. Which how absurd it is all men know. For hereupon all donations to pious uses, and to younger Brothers for their preferment, may be called in question.  
It is an ordinary thing in these our times, when the land is let to the Heir general, to alter the estate, if the land so conveyed shall come to Daughters, and to leave it to a Brother's son, or to some other of the same name, though peradventure many degrees removed, for preservation of the name and family. If this may be deemed lawful and no sin, being done against a well deserving child, for whom Nature, and her deserts plead her worthy to be her Father's heir: then without all compare, if the preservation of a name and family, might not justly be laboured for, according to power given by the law of God and man: what may be lawfully acted against an unthrifty heir, who in any reasonable man's judgement is likely in his shroud, to bury the memory of all his Ancestors virtues, which should live in him, and his offspring, as his forefathers have done in theirs.  
It is neither new, nor strange, in the practice of our times, in causes of this Nature, to overthrow in tended perpetuities, and by act of parliament to give leave upon some good considerations to sell lands, which otherwise by no laws can be sold from the heir, the Father being but tenant only for term of his life. Which surely by no power under God could be done, if the thing in itself be unlawful & sin. Out of which it may be argued a fortiori: If power may be given to a Father being tenant for term of life, to sell his sons lands, only to pay his own debts (peradventure idly made) though it be to the overthrow of his Family; because natural equity (say they) doth will, that every one should be relieved with his own, for so it may be deemed, though in love to his child he hath passed the estate, yet that he ought to be preserved from thraldom therewith in his necessity: which if it be so (as all men do confess it) how reasonable a thing, yea how commendable, and far from sin is it, for a Father truly Lord of his own, without all tie of law, either divine, or human (as I have proved) to dispose of his lands, to the honour of God, and comfort of his family, to a younger son, when as it is most probable that the elder will neither use it to the one, nor the other, but rather to nourish sin and sensuality.   

CHAP. VIII. That unthriftiness is one known name of many hidden sins, and is alone a sufficient cause of disinherison, proved by the Law of God and man..  
HAVING thus upon good consideration beyond my first intention (as it appeareth by my Preface) enlardged this my discourse with the precedent Chapter; I have resolved myself, upon my Readers favour, and on the former grounds, to argue one question more, which I hold very necessary for the perfecting of this small work: which is; whether a Father may disinherit his eldest son, or heir at common law, for such an unthriftiness as in most men's judgements, is like to be the ruin of his family?  
Though many foul sins, besides the abusing of gods blessings, be concomitant to unthriftiness, yet because they are not apparent to the world, and de abscondit is non judicat Praetor, I will only briefly argue, whether in reason, or conscience a desperate unthrift may be disinherited.  
It is well known to all the wise, and temperate, whose judgements passion doth not oversway, how great an enemy prodigality, or unthriftiness is to all manner of goodness; and how cunningly she not only hinders the increase of all virtues in those in whom she reigneth: but also unjustly oftentimes cuts off the virtuous reward of many a worthy predecessor, yea, gives occasion to the evil to detract, to the good to suspect their deserts. All which, how great a wrong it is to a Noble family, I leave to the indifferent reader to censure. I will not deny but there may be many sins in a man, which in the sight of God, and judgement of men, of themselves are more heinous, and deserve afar greater damnation than Prodigality doth: yet, since that sins in this world are to be punished, 
Those sins more punishable which are more offensive to common society, though less heinous in their particular Nature.  not as they are in themselves, but as they by circumstance are offensive to the society, peace, and honour of mankind, which God and Nature, ever as the reward to all moral virtues, and as the chief end of man's life, intended. For otherwise usury, detraction, forgery, adultery, fornication, swearing, and drunkenness, all which and many more, which are as grievous offences in the eye of heaven, as theft, should be punished with death, as theft is. But since they do not offend so much the peace of a public weal (at which the Civil magistrate aims) as theft doth; they are not censured with such severe punishment at it is. All which shows directly, that offences by circumstance are made in a Civil society against which they are committed, either great error lesser; and are accordingly to be punished: and no less doth the reason, and right rule of state command.  
Out of which grounds it is evident, that all forms of government do most punish that offender, who directly or indirectly seeks to disturb the peace, or overthrow the liberty, or disgrace the state wherein he lives: yet many greater offences than these may be committed, as Incest, and Apostasy, which are not so sharply punished by the Civil Magistrate. For every one, to whom God hath given power on earth, doth chief seek the end, for which his power from above is given unto him; and doth censure and punish in the highest degree those offences, which tend to the overthrow of a well settled state, and by good and lawful power confirmed.  
Now to come upon these premises to the matter in question, & to apply that which hath been said to our purpose. It is well known to the world, that a family is a civil society, yea the only common weal which God and Nature first ordained, and from which all societies, Commonwealths, & species of Government first took their original. For the mantainance of which society, there is no question, but God hath given many privileges to a Father, as well to reward the well-deserving, as to punish an evil child, or member of his body: not only, by depriving them of their expected fortunes; but by cutting them of from his body, either by banishment, or by death itself. For it is evident by the Civil law, that a Father had for many years, not only free power to disinherit, but also power of life and death our his children, who should grievously offend him or his, living under his Civil government. But since that things unknown are grown out of use, and may seem as well incredible as strange: I cannot in discretion pass over the matter in question so lightly, as that it may worthily be subject to sharp censure, or rashly be branded with the mark of untruth.  
Therefore laying aside the testimony of the old Roman laws, in the case of a Father's sovereign power over the life of his child, given to him by the laws of the twelve Tables, where it is written, that 
* Leg. 12. Tabular. cap. 3. Dionys. Halicarnass. Lib: 2. Antiquitat.  Paterfamilias haberetius vitae; yea more: terque filium venundandi potestatem, I will briefly, and effectually prove what I affirm herein, out of the sacred Text itself. There then it plainly appears, that Fathers had power among the jews, to cause their children for riot, disorder, or unthriftiness, to be stoned to death. Ergo power to disinherit. 
Deuter. 21.  For the greater doth ever include the less. And not to seem to speak without book, it shall not be amiss to set down Moses' words, which are as follow.  
If a man shall beget a stubborn, and unruly son, who shall not hear the commandment of his Father, and Mother; and being chastised shall contemn to obey, they shall apprehend and bring him to the seniors of that City, and to the gate of judgement. And they shall say to them: This our son is headstrong, and disobedient, contemns to hear our admonishments, gives himself over to rioutous excess, and is a drunkard. The people of that City shall overwhelm hini with stones, and he shall die, that ye may take evil from among you; and that all Israel bearing it may fear.  
Out of which place in God's word, we may gather how odious a vice unthriftiness was among the people of God; & what ample power a Father had to punish the same in his child. For if we do well observe the manner of the process, between the Father and the child in this case, we shall find that the Father was accuser, witness, and as it were judge of his own cause. For we find not, that the Seniors of the City did give sentence, or further examined the proofs of the Father's accusation, but their presence giving as it were allowance to a Father's power, and intention to punish his son, the people might without more inquiry, stone to death so evil a deserving child. Which being by my reader well considered, my hope is, that it will never hereafter seem unlawful, though somewhat strange, that a Father should disinherit his eldest, or any other son of his, for the cause only of unthriftiness.  
And although the world, of men is grown●●● to that greatness, that it is necessary, that one general Father, or politic head should be in a Kingdom, or State, which may justly abridge some of those privileges, and abate a Father's power; all Father's being become children to the Father of all Fathers, their Lord and King under God: yet the power to raise and maintain a family by good and lawful means, is still both allowable, and commendable in a Parent. Who may from time to time reward, according to distributive justice, all those who live under him, by leaving his fortunes to them, as in justice they shall deserve, and law shall allow. So that there is no question, but he may still disinherit, according to the power of that law under which he lives. For no other tie is over him; God and Nature allowing that, at this day, and for ever, which once they gave unto him. Which authority he not only may, but aught also to execute, as far as the law of man shall permit; otherwise he shall err in his Paternal justice.  
For a Father is not only to beget and nourish his Children in his life, but by Nature's law must provide to his power, that they live both in his life, & after his death to the honour of God the service of their Country, and Comfort of their family: which were the only ends for which God created man a civil & a reasonable Creature. All which, if it shall assuredly be thought by a Father, that any Child of his will wholly neglect, or rather execute the contrary; than no question, a Father is not bound to leave him any more than shall honestly suffice the necessities of Nature. For as I have said before, no man may give, or lend his goods to any one, who will in all men's judgements assuredly abuse them.  
But let us see, whether a desperate unthrift may be arraigned, and adjudged guilty of these accusations. Surely it is clear; that all unthrifty courses are displeasing to God, and contrary to his honour. And how can he be able to serve his Country, who in short time will not be able to serve himself with necessaries wherewith to live, but must of force be maintained like a Drone in a Common wealth, out of others labours. As for his family, what greater discomfort can it have, than an absolute overthrow: whereby the Noble acts and honour gotten to it by their Predecessors virtues, are buried in oblivion; and the present, and future hopes of all worldly and lawful honour (virtues temporal rewards) are taken away. And shall not all this deserve disinherison? Can there be a greater sin committed against the honour, and essence of a family, as it is a family, then to be spoiled of her honour, & life itself? For in these our times welgotten goods, and used as they ought, are the only soul, by which a family, and all the virtuous acts which it hath done, may live.  
Since therefore the highest is sought and aimed at in this sin, surely according to the proportion of distributive justice, the greatest punishment is in equity due to the same, according to the reason of the precept, ●us suum unicuique tribuere. Nature teartheth the silly Bees in their Common wealth, to do to death their Drones, who live of others labours; and shall it then be thought unlawful for a Father so to punish an incorrigible unthrift, who will not only live of others labours; but also subvert the honourable endeavours of his Noble Ancestors?  
Thus if sons may be deemed & domed by the offended, having power to do both, according as the offence done against them shall by circumstance be of quality (as we have proved they may and aught;) then certainly it is lawful for a Father so to do, as I have formerly set down But because example in all doubtful questions, do make their side the stronger; it shall not be amiss, for the cleared of all the premises, to add some few to the former, drawn as well from Kings (by whose patterns totus componitur orbis) as from inferior persons, whose qualities best fit the condition of our present subject. And if kingdoms and Common wealths have favoured it, then certainly by all arguments à maiori ad minus, it may much rather be done, and aught to be suffered in private families.   

CHAP. IX. The main points of the Premises exemplified in divers particular Facts, aswell of Princes, as of private Men.  
It is not fit perhaps to urge the better acceptance with God, of Abel's offering above Cayns the elder Brother, but of that estate which Abel had in Adam's Patrimony. 
Abel.  Nor will I reinforce the memory of japhets' share in his Father's right to the whole world, though he being the youngest son of three, had Europe for his inheritance, which in all arts, and uses of life, far excelleth Africa, Asia, and all the rest of the earth. Whereas, according to the pretences of those customary challenges, 
japhet.  Sem should either have had all, or been Lord Paramount of all, & Cham, and japhet with their posterity but Farmers, or Fre-holders' under him.  
I will not also (as if there were penury of resemblances) again use for example Esau's disinherision, though that were enough for our present purpose. For if it had been sin (which josiphus the jew, neither in his Antiquities, or Scripture faith) the Mother could not have procured it, God would not have prospered it, nor jacob himself, being a good man, have accepted it, nor Esau (whose anger jacob feared) have left it unrevenged. Neither is there in Scripture, nor in any written Law under heaven, any commandment to restrain the Father's power, but rather the contrary. For such is the law of Nature that they who are, exaequo, one man's children, should, if not exaequo, yet not exiniquo, be provided for.  
Against which partiality, the Imperial Laws admit so forcible a remedy, under the title of an inofficious Testament, as it shall enable the younger child, to a certain proportion of estate, whether the deceased Father would or no if he had no just reason for omission, or disavowment in his last will. The example certainly of the same holy Patriarch jacob, in preferring Ephraim before Manasses, 
Ephraim.  the younger son before the elder, being his grandchilds, against the set purpose of joseph their Father, seems unanswerable on behalf of the power of parents for transferring, or distributing their blessings. Of which it may truly be said, Qui prior in benedictione est potior in iure.  
Of Solomon I have spoken before, who was not the eldest son of David, 
Solomon.  but Adonai after Absalon was slain: as David himself was not the eldest son of less his Father, but the youngest, and yet chosen by God (who sees not as man doth, for with him there is resp●ctus personarum) to govern Israel, though he was not set before his brothers in the private inheritance of his family. And in the Gospel it is apparent by the Parable of the workmen, who came at unequal hours into the vineyard, and yet had equal wages, that first and last are to him a like, who though he created things in number, weight, and measure, yet he squares not his favours by priority of being, but of well-deserving.  
Augustus Caesar, the most renowned of all the first Emperors, settled the succession of his Empire, not upon his only Grandchild Agrippa Posthumus, 
Agrippa Posthumus  the son of his daughter & sole heir the lady julia, though Tacitus saith that he was nullius stagitij comp●rtus (than what if he had indeed been a notorious unthrift) but upon Tiberius a stranger in blood, and his son by no other, but by a civil title of Adoption, because he reputed him far the fit to govern.  
Chosroas King of Persia, 
Medarses.  made Medarses his younger son companion in his Empire, and left out his eldest son Sinochius.  
But let foreign examples pass for briefness sake, wherewith of all times, & places books are full.  
In our Country we might allege the fact of Brutus, 
Brutus.  the reputed founder of our Nation, who divided Albion, afterward called Britain, to his three sons, leaving only the best portion to Locrine, anciently called Loegres; Albania (now Scotland) to Albanact; and Cambria, or Wales to Camber.  
Leir, long after, knew he had so much power in himself as a Father, even against the evidence of his own act of partition, by the original law of Nature; as for the ingratitude of his own children, to confer the kingdom wholly upon his younger child Cordeilla in prejudice of his grandsonnes' M●rgan and Cunedage, 
Cordeilla  borne of his eldest daughters.  
I know that some will deny credit to Brutus' history, which in this case they might with the more reason do if the ancient Weal, or British Custom, did not answer in the practice thereof, to that act of Brutus. For, not only king Roderick divided his kingdom of Wales to his three sons, according to that distinction of the country into North-wales, South-Wales, and Po●island, but others since have done the like among them.  
As for Brutus' History, 
Brutus' History,  an it hath some enemies so also hath is many friends, and those of special worth and note Henry Archdeacon of Huntingdon, Matthew of Westminister, & others among the ancient. And of later times, Sir john Price, William Lambert, Humphrey lloyd's, Doctor White of Basingstoke Count Palatine in right of the Civil law Chair (an honour due to the just number of years by him passed) & innumerable others. Above all the rest, Edward the first King of England, with all the Earls & Barons of this Realm, by their authentic deed or instrument, confirmed in Parliament. But let us proceed.  
They who know the old fashions of Ireland, either by report, or by the printed Statutes of that Nation, may testify of their most ancient Tenure, 
Irish. Tavistry.  or Fundament custom, which there is called Tavistry. By which the land and chiefest of a Name, after the predecessors death, is not a warded to the eldest son but to the worthiest (if I misremember not) the judgement whereof is left with the people and such Tenants about as have interest and right of voice. As Alexander the great though (as it is apparent in the Maccabees) very falsely is said to have left his Empire. And the custom of equal shares may be in other places also, which never borrowed their equal partitions from Gavelkind: A custom, I grant, which some have very lately altered in their private families by Parliament.  
In Scotland, there is scarce any thing in their most ancient Records, more often found concerning their succession to the Crown thereof, than Uncles to reign before Nephews, ever by Nationall Custom, as is averred. But the abundance of foreign examples must not carry me from home.  

Arthur?  Arthur the Great was left heir to the crown by his Father King Uther, surnamed Pendragon, or Dragon's head, though begotten in Bastardy, rather than the sons of Lot king of Picntland, being borne of Uther's sister or, as some writ, of his daughter Anne: an history which even Buchanan relateth out of the Scottish Monuments, on Arthur's behalf, for very true. To come nearer in the same kind.  
Athelstane, that victorious king of England, 
Athelstane  being a Bastard, was notwithstanding preferred before the lawful eldest son, even by his Father King Edward, surnamed Signior, to whom (saith Florentius Wigornienss, an author above 500 years old) R●gni gubernacula rnacula reliquit, and not to any of his sons by his wife & Queence. Little cause is there to seek examples so far off. William the Conqueror preferred William his youngest son, before Robert the eldest in the Kingdom of England: and Henry the first was surrogated to Rufus his Brother: 
William Rufus.  and still kept Robert out.  
The title of more sufficiency, not of more propinquity made Stephen, 
K. Stephen  as being then a man grown, to step in before Matildes the Empress, and her Infant son Henry Plantagenet.  
I will not speak of King john's succession before his nephew Arthur, the son of Geffr●y, the elder brother to john. Henry the 4. 
K. john.  King of England, did in open Parliament pretend a descent from Edmund Earl of Lancaster, 
Edmund Earl of Lancaster.  son of Henry the third king of England, in prejudice of king Richard 2. avering that Edmund was disinherited for deformity, and his brother Edward (afterward by the name of king Edward 1.) preferred. Which, though it were not so, yet is it sufficient to show that Henry 4. did hold, that his ancestor king Henry 3. might have done such an act, if the cause had been sufficient.  
And what interest had Henry of Ri●hmoud to his Diadem, being neither of the right blood nor of the Royal Name, when nevertheless of the true: Plantagenets sundry Males were alive; and one of them at that very time king of England also in possession.  
But to lean King's affairs. If all must necessufily have gone to one, how came it then to pass, that in this kingdom there were at one time, so many great and honourable families of one blood; disinyned in their seats, and distinguished in their Annories by different arguments? Our whose to meanly seem in our antiquities and stories, as not to know it was so? And that many renowned houses (to speak as de magis notist) Plantag●nets, 
Sundry grint Families of one 〈◊〉 at a tyme.  Mortiniers, Beauford's, B●●●champ●, 1 Disla-Poles, Nevil, Gray's, and the like, have grown and flourished out of one common Ancestor? It can never be refelled.  
Of disinherisions in worthy Families, M. William Cambden ●● L●renceaux King of Arnies gives us two eminent examples. And who is he that remembers not one or other, in this own knowledge, or acquaintance?  
janc, Daughter of Hugh Courtney, and heir to her Mother▪ 
Carews  wife of Nirold Lord Carew, disinaerited her eldest son Thomas, cùm mirùs reverenter matrem haberet; and parted her lands (which were goodly) among her three younger sons, of whom are sprung three several worshipful bouses of the Carewes, called Haccombe, Anthony, and Bury. So that God hath by the success confirmed the lawfulness of the fact. And this is the first of Master Caindens examples.  
The other is this. Bryand Lile, or Fitz-Earle, Lord of Abergeuenny having two sons, 
Brientius de insula.  both leprous, built for them a Lazaretto, or spittall, & gave to Miles Earl of Heresord far the greatest part of his patrimony from his Children. The one of these examples is in the description of Devonshire, and this other in Monmouthshire. And this Chapter may suffice for the illustration, and clearing the former Doctrine, and the subject of this whole discourse by examples.   

CHAP. X. That the Law of Natural Equity & Reason confirm just Disinherision. & that the riotous lives of Elder Brothers deserve that vehement reproof with which the Author closeth up this Treatise.  
LET us now look into the Nature of equity, and examine whether in Natural reason, which is the law of all laws, the temperate aught to be subject to intemperate. Fools & Madmen, to whom no law imputes sin, are not punished for theft, or murder, or for any other offence which they do, being mad, or unreasonable. For though humanly they cannot offend: yet in this sort, according to equity, they many be punished. The reason is; That all law being grounded on Natural equity (for otherwise it is no law) doth not only punish offences committed; but also prevents offences which may be done, by reasonable or unreasonable creatures. And since that Fools and Madmen cannot offend to be punished, or by punishment can be reform; and yet they with whom they shall live, shall surely be offended, if not overthrown by them having power, as Namely Brothers, Sisters, and all their whole family put in danger of misery and ruin: the law, according to all Natural equity takes all power from them.  
I have inserted this clause according to Natural equity, for that it is against Nature, that men should be subject to beasts, or insensible creatures. hereupon Aristotle disputing the nature of rule and subjection, saith: That none are borne slaves, but such as Nature hath abridged of the use of reason, who being truly slaves, are altogether unfit to govern. Upon which ground also the same great Philosopher; disputing whether a Monarchy or Comonweale is the better form of Policy; he saith, a Comonweale: Because the wisest & best men are admitted to sway therein.  
But, it may be said, What is all this to our purpose? Yes; thus far it may be well applied. If Nature, intent to make all mankind reasonable according to their species, being hindered by some inevitable accident, shall so blemish and maim those, in whom such want, and Natural weakness shallbe found, that they, according to divine, and human law, may and aught to be deprived of all right and claim to any thing more than to sustain Nature; as other creatures may do, and not to give unto them any sovereignty, rule, or government, which by law, or custom might otherwise have fallen on them: Because, according to natural & divine equity, neither man, nor yet the creature made for man's use, aught to be governed by Beasts: and such do fools and madmen seem.  
If this be so (as according to Nature's rule it cannot be otherwise) what punishment shall we think due to that reasonable creature, borne in a civil society of men, unto whom Nature hath not been a Stepdame in bestowing of her blessings; & whose name and Family hath been ennobled, and enriched by the industry and virtue of many worthy Predecessors, who shall through disorder, and inordinate desires, habituated in him by custom & evil conversation, become unreasonable, yea a sinfull-creature a wilful, and most punishable madman, and a thing unworthy the name of man, a Prodigal; who contrary to all rule law, or order of the most barbarous society of men, takes away the soul (as I have said before) of all his Ancestors, who being dead, yet long might live in their posterity; and consumes the womb (his family I mean) wherein he was borne: and without all remembrance of his obligation to the dead, (whom as having his being from them, he ought to honour) or respect to the huing (to whom he should be a comfort) devours in some sort, them of his own species, society, and blood. All which the Anthropophages do not.  
For though they feed on their species, which are men like to themselves; yet they hunt after strangers, and nourish then nearest blood with others flesh, observing still some law of society among themselves, which our civil monster doth not. For he, contrary to all course of Nature sucks out oftentimes the broud of his nearest, and dearest friends; namely his children, brothers, and sisters: 
Ariotous heir is a civil Monster.  yea some have brought their all-tender-harted parents to the greatest of all woes, ●b●●●ary in, their old age: And all this to maintain by force, of fraud, a damned crew of Devils in the shapes of men.  
Nature hath given, yea she so strongly hath inhabituated a laudable desire in all creatures to preserve them species, that directly, or in directly, to undergo the contrary, wore not only unnatural and monstrous, b●●●worthy also of severest punishment, Families, let them be Princely, Noble, Gentle or Vulgar, are in a manner particular kinds; or species allowed of by Nature's law to be raised; or maintain of, under, or in their chief genus, mankind universal: which to overthrow either directly, or indirectly, let the Philosopher either Natural, or Moral: the Lawyer either Ciull or Ca●●●●; the Divine, Scholeman, or Casuist, judge how punishable.  
Moral Lawmakers for many ages, pretermitted to make laws, against this sort of oftenders: being asked why? they answered: That no man could be so ingrateful or inhuman.  
By which we see how grievous the offence was deemed by them, and how severe punishment (were they to make laws in these our corrupted times) they would prescribe for such offenders. Thus much for our present matter in question. In the arguing whereof, if what I writ in defence of younger Brothers, as here the case is put, I seem to have taken upon trust, rather than upon knowledge, or reading: the wiser sort will (I hope) not blame me. For my intent was nor, but only as at first I promised, to set down a Table-discourse, and not a Controversy discussed in Schools.  
If I have spoken according to dialectical reason as I believe) then may I safely think; that my discourse is armed with strong Authority. For what hath been spoken heretofore truly, which reason hath not dictated to all Author's pens? If therefore I were able to cite a thousand great Writers for what I have said; yet should they be no more, but that which Natural reason hath, or may teach daily. All which, with myself, I entrust to the gentle and equal Censure of my Courtuous Reader.  
FINIS.