A DISCOURSES OF THE STATE ECCLESISTICALL OF THY Kingdom, in relation to the Civil.  
Considered under three CONCLUSION With a DIGRESSION discuss some ordinary Exceptions against Ecclesiastical Officers.  
By C. D.  
OXFORD, Printed by WILLIAM TURNER. 1632.   

TO THE RIGHT HONOURABLE WILLIAM EALRE Of Salisbury, Viscount Cranburne, Lord Cecyll of Esendon, Knight of the most Illustrious order of the Garter, and one of his Majesty's most honourable Privy Council.  
MAY It please your honour to accept this present discourse as an acknowledgement of your Lordship's favour toward  
your observant Chaplain, Calybute Downinge.   

ERRATA.  
PAge 8. marg. for text, read tit. p. 15. marg. Clayman, r. Clapmar. p. 17. l. 15. with state, r. with the state. p. 21. l. 28. sic stantibus, r. exstantibus p. 35. l. 18. ordinar. r. ordinario. p. 39 l. 1. add à farlo. p. ib. Angliterra, r. Anghtlterra. p. 52. l. ib. 506. r. 56. p. 54. marg. Hallandes' affairs. p. 55. l. 8. Common, r. Cannon Law. p. 57 l. 18. Conatus, r. Canutus. p. 59 marg. Francum, r. aerarium. p. 67. l. 24. vacant prudentissimus, r. vacant; sèd prudentissimus. p. 94. l. vlt. deal Othobone upon.   

CONCLUSION I. That the present State Ecclesiastical is most convenient, and best agreeing with the Civil.  
WIth what care and cost States and Kingdoms, which uphold and derive all happiness to man, as he is a sociable and a feeble creature, should be preserved, none will deny; especially since they are so subject to decay, and the causes of their corruptions so many. 
Senec. 117.  For the best tempered commonwealth is not of any constant continuance, but full of changes, and those at last, will after much interchange, drive it to a full and fatal period. It must therefore be the care of the present age, to see that it receive no detriment while they are in it: for they may be so orderly, as to work no distemper, but conserve it in health and wealth, or at least keep it from decaying so fast, that having some space to fall in, it may recover, or they have time to leave it, and not fall with it, nor that fall upon them. Now the best, and all that the passing, present generation can do, is either to keep things in primitive order, or to reform them to it. The first of which is difficult to continue, the other dangerous if long discontinued. Yet Kingdoms must be conserved, by the same means they were first established. This labour, and care then will be to best purpose bestowed upon those parts which are most necessary, and uphold the rest as essential and fundamental, being the principles of the intrinsical, 
Polybius hist. lib. 6.  original good: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, or upon those that secure these, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Now that which is the only infallible ground of these, must needs be principally respected by those that are undertakers for the public good; and that ground is true religion. For though ill manners are per accidens the cause, or rather the occasion of making good laws, yet they are better in the executing, best when they are obeyed. Now good manners cause obedience, and religion naturally begets good manners. But religion cannot subsist without public exercise and action, and so the requisites of it are times, places, and some persons who ought to be set apart, and wholly and only employed in it; and they must be in the commonwealth. Therefore seeing it is necessary to have a religion to preserve the commonwealth, it is by consequent as needful, to have preservers of religion, that may not overturn the commonwealth by overruling religion. Wherefore the choice of them need to be such, that seeing they must be in the commonwealth of necessity, they may be of the commonwealth for universal safety. And yet they are to be distinguished by state, and order, to avoid confusion; nor doth their distinction enforce any such form, after which they must govern, as may be inconvenient to the public civil state, whereby they are to be governed. The care then of the wisest must be either to preserve, or restore that form of the Clergy, which is most agreeing with the Civil State, and that will be the means to prolong the age of the state, by preserving concord amongst societies; which, though at last it come to an end, yet it may outlast our days, that we be not unhappy in the ruin; for it is not the infelicity of States which have long flourished to decay, or be destroyed, but the unhappiness of those men, whose hap it is then to live, and not when they did flourish. Now every form of a Clergy will not fit, 
Guic hypor Poli●  but according to divers countries, they have been several, suiting to the times, places, and people. The first was the original, domestical discipline in private families, before God made choice, and actually separated a nation to himself. Then followed the levitical Nationall regiment, compounded and composed of, and according to the ceremonial and judicial Laws. Both these forms were not only by divine permission, but also by injunction; yet not perpetual nor universal. Neither of these than are the government we must choose, because that manner of exercising religion is antiquated. We must then consider of a form, which may be conformable to the present practice of true religion, in relation to Gods revealed Will, which may withal be suitable, and sorting with this present state, that so they may uphold each other; which form, though it be not according to God's express mandate in some particulars, yet it is not against it, but with his permission of approbation in all points. Now in this choice, we must consider our own form of Civil government, and whether that were imposed upon us by conquest, or by our own consent; if by free consent, and of long continuance, it will with more ease and desire be preserved, and with greatest danger altered; if by conquest, the more Charters of privileges are granted to us under it, the more it is endeared to us, and esteemed happy; but our form of state is a free Monarchy, erected and protected by free consent, and of long continuance, not imposed but confirmed and reform to the first freedom by a happy conquest, and endeared unto us by many Charters of wholesome privileges. Therefore we must seek or keep such a form of state Ecclesiastical, as may best accord with our form of Civil policy,  
§. 2. This present State Ecclesiastical is the form that best agrees with the Civil State. That it is not against the Law of God, I will not go about to prove, because I hope none will question it: neither that it was the primitive, and should still be the government of the present visible Church, because that is already proved without all contradiction by many most judicious and orthodox Divines: But my undertaking is (as fare as God shall give me understanding) to discourse, how it is most agreeable with this Kingdom. All States have always endeavoured, as to have a religion, so to frame the exercise of it according to their own dispositions: but some with more doting indulgence, have at last changed it into that which they were most naturally disposed to, and did not alter and order their inclinations by it. As the four grand Monarchies, the Chaldean with whom the Persian may well be joined, these turned the acts of religion into philosophical considerations, inquiries, and explications of nature. The Egyptians (a principal branch of these Monarchies, and from whom some think the Chaldeans were derived, and that Belus Neptuni Libiaeque filius in Babyloniam colonos ex Aegypto traduxisset, 
Diodorus Siculus Biblioth. lib. 1.  & ex iis Sacerdotes quos Chaldeos Babylonii vocant, qui more Aegyptiorum astra observant, etc.) These Egyptians naturally 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, superstitious in religion, curious in mysteries, transformed religion into all kind of superstitions, and by trying conclusions and chemical experiments upon it, conceited the substance of it into unexpected fancies, furthered by mimical expressions, leading into, and leaving in mystical mazes. The Grecians by nature 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, intelligent, able to find out, and loving to contend, drew religion into disputes, and would believe no more than they could find out by search of reason, and apprehend by force of fancy; and that they obstinately maintained, by a wanton working wit, which they might with more ease do, seeing their language was so happy for expression. The Romans by nature inclined to dominion, fitted the frame of their religion to a Monarchical form under the Pontifices; 
Cujaci● Origin lies, §. 1  yet they seemed to seek a Monopoly of all the Gods in the world: (for they received and worshipped the Gods of all the nations they conquered.) These nations framing religion to these ends, 
August Civit 〈◊〉 20. cap  had a form of government, under religious persons, suitable to further, contrive, and compass by all means, their particular purposes, and therefore they gave them power, of a most large extent, yea they were ruled by them; for the Chaldeans were originally Priests, and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a priest, 
Synesiu 126.  and a Prince were all one with them. So the Magi amongst the Persians, the Priests of Apollo at Delphos amongst the Grecians did what they would. 
Pomp● Orig. I  And the Romans were led by their Pontifices and Augurs, but it was whither they would, namely to a Monarchy. We having not the ends of these nations in our religion, must not use the same form of Clergy. For I conceive the aim of the best and wisest with us, is to preserve the Church and Commonwealth together. Now that cannot be, where the state of the Clergy governs, but where it is governed. Our aim being such, let us consider what form will be best governed under this Commonwealth. There are but three distinct forms of Ecclesiastical government in Christendom, as the Monarchical, Aristocratical, democratical; of these, the Aristocratical is most conformable to the rule of this Realm. In proving of which assertion, I will not only insist upon the proof of past and present experience, that it is so, but discourse in reason why it should be so. And first in opposition to the other forms of Ecclesiastical government: what they are likely to produce, woeful experience hath long since felt in the one, and what we may expect, upon probable conjecture, from the other, is not to be desired by any that understand, and love the happiness of this Civil State. For all their principles, fundamental in their grounds, of augmentation in their growth, of conservation in their height, 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Polybius lib. 6.  and of reparation in their decays are most dangerous for this Monarchy, and the causes of their corruption would be so incorporated into the body and bowels of the Civil State, that if it fall not before them and into their hands, they would go near to pull it down with them when they fall. Not so speak of their power, which they must have, and the exercise of it, either in an ordinary and lawful course, or by indulgence or usurpation, and the manner of their proceed in the execution of it, what instruments they use in counsel and action, how much they trench upon the power, undermine the government, countermine the proceed, countermand the edict, and confront a Monarchy, I leave it to wise and active men to consider.  
§. 3. First to speak of the Monarchical, which is now the Papal government. How this Monarchical form hath heretofore agreed with this State, all know; and it is not likely that it should now so well accord with it, because the reasons of that little agreement then, the present particular interest, in which this State used that Monarchy, are ceased; for than we aimed to enlarge our dominion by the right of succession in France, by the right of conquest in Scotland and Ireland. But the causes of disagreement still remain, and are in their part aggravated to an utter opposition; so that as before it was dangerous, so now it is a desperate case to re-entertaine that form of Clergy, which can and will rule us, and must necessarily alter, and so work the ruin of the present state. Under this form this Kingdom was no Monarchy, but a Province, under a foreigner, an usurper and a tyrant. This was our best condition when that Clergy ruled us, though as favourable as they could, or did any Monarchy in Europe. The laws and privileges of the land were continually broken and infringed by them, especially those laws that did most immediately uphold the King's prerogative. Against them they continually promulgated particular edicts, for the decrees were too general to be applied to occasions, and therefore they added the decretals, so called, because they gave wings to the decrees for quicker dispatch. And we shall find, 
Duare● benefici● Prooem  that most of the Decretal epistles, which concern jurisdiction, were written to English Prelates. And (as I conceive) some reason might be, because the laws of this land are more contrary to the Canon Law, than the laws of any other States in Christendom, being they are more ruled by the Civil Law, from which the Canon is derived, and so more causes might arise here amongst us, either out of the contrariety of the Laws, or out of the narrower extent of the Common Law, and also partly out of the ignorance of the proceed of this State, which was then likely to be most, because intercourse and intelligence with Rome for that time was abridged; (for Henry 2. being then at variance with Thomas Becket, who was sheltered by the Pope Alexander the third, permitted not any Legate to reside in the kingdom; but as soon as Vivian was arrived, he was questioned, and that by the Bishops of Winchester and Ely, how he durst land without the King's special licence.) And partly they writ the oftener to English Bishops, because they suspected them, and justly, to be more partial for their Prince, than the Prelates of any other kingdom, as appears by their readiness to examine this Legate, and also by an epistle Decretal of Alexander the third to the Bishop of London, 
Lib 4. t●●t. 17. c●p. 7. qui filij legitimi. Sarisburiensis de nugis curial: lib. 7. cap. 24  who then was Gilbert Foliot (a man much commended by Matthew Paris and john Sarisburiensis) in that epistle he curries favour with him in a cause which he knew was of Ecclesiastical cognizance, and was so judged here in the King's court, (as appears out of Glanvill then Lord chief justice) I think in the very particular case. 
Glanvill, lib. 7. cap. 15. Ad Regem Angliae pertinet de possessionibus iudicare. johannes de Parisijs contra Bonifacium octavum. cap. 12.  But he feared, seeing the Bishop could do so much with the King, and would do so much for his King, lest he should find some way to entitle it to the Crown: and he had good reason to fear, since the Bishop had so often in the King's behalf opposed Thomas Becket and him. These may be some reasons why the Popes sent so many epistles into England, and I am the more confirmed in them, because I find they were for the greatest part written by the most Pragmatical Popes, who busied and bestirred themselves most in setting up orders, and new fresh Fryes, and fraternities of Friars; and in pulling down the powers both of our Kings and Bishops: to wit, from those seven Popes (who were the thirds; and I think the worst of their names, I am sure of their predecessors.) As for the most part they were written from Alex. 3. Lucius tertius, Vrbanus tertius, Clemens tertius, Coelestinus tertius, Innocens tertius, and Honorius tertius; these men did and undid very much, because they were active and lived long. If then this form of Clergy was thus prejudicial to our state before it was opposed and incensed by the statute of Proviso and Praemunire, and cast off by the King's just reassuming their power, (which shows that all their right was nothing but our sovereigns wrong;) surely now we are not to expect so much favour from them: and therefore as the State then thought it necessary and right to cashier it, and brought their purpose fully to pass; so it is now more necessary and just to keep it out, since it is infinitely increased in tyranny, since that unhappy, unadvised, ill advised conventicle at Trent.  
§. 4. Those nations shall have the best use of that form, who propound a civil state as large as their Ecclesiastical; and to whom he hath first sought too for assistance: and withal are able to overrule it. For after justinianus the last of the true Roman Emperors, and Gregory the last of the good Popes, that See clavae to Phocas; who named the Pope Universal Bishop, that he might proclaim him Catholic Emperor. But when in the next Centurie the Eastern Emperors were infested with Saracens war, began to pull down images as some cause of the wars, which the Pope endeavoured to set up again: then by the second Council of Nice, whether because they did him wrong in disobedience, or rather because they could do him no good; the Greek Pope Zachary fell off to the French before the next Centurie. And then Pipin used him to confirm, not to confer his new achieved Kingdom; for in those days they gave no such power, neither did Pope Zachary claim it: for he deposed not Childericke, but consented to the deposing, which was by the Peers of France; neither did he set up Pippin in his room: but they that deposed the other only sent to Rome to have Zacharies advise in it, 
Bulla 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉  because it might pass more plausibly in the world by the consent of so grave an Oracle: as it hath always been good wisdom to wind in the conscience of one who is esteemed an upright judge, for the countenance of an unusual cause humorously undertaken by the first Author; especially there being then a faction amongst the Bishops of France: 
Baro● nal. 〈◊〉  so that this inquiry of his judgement in point of fact did none submit to any claim of right. And Gotefridus Viterbrensis affirms, and Baronius confesses, Francos non Zachariae paruisse decreto, 
Baro● nal. 〈◊〉  sed acquievisse consilio: and there is great difference betwixt an absolute injunction, and a politic advice, which is only an answer out of discretion and left to discretion, implies no obligation of necessity. But this is without question, Pipin being ambitious of the Kingdom, and desirous to cover and colour it with religious ends, used the Pope to countenance and compass his design; who would not withstand him, being engaged to him for protection and by bounty, or which is likelier, he durst not, being too much in his power. But howsoever it was, he clavae fast unto the French for that Century: especially to Charles the great, the repairer of the Western Empire; from whom the Caroline succession continued till Otho the third. But then the French Kings being distracted by wars at home, 
Augustinus de A●cona de potest. Papae: quaest. 37. Art. 5.  could no more assist them: Gregory the fift an Almain transferred it to the Almains, chose those seven Electors, but they agreed not well together: after the Almain Pope was dead and Italians succeeded, they presently began to quarrel with the Emperor, and to send challenges of right into Italy; knowing that the Emperor was not able to do much for them in giving them as the French had done, and perceiving he was more unable to hold from them that which they would have: 
Segebertus thron. passim.  so that the Emperors were continually imbroiled by them, being not able to rule them, decreasing as fast as they rose. Then the opposition betwixt many particular Popes and Emperors, as betwixt Gregory the seaventh and Henry the fourth, and Alexander the third with Frederick Barbarossa, was very strong. But after it grew to such a height that they were settled into factions of separations, as the Ecclesiastiques and Imperialists, especially in Italy; 
Nabrigensis hist. Anglicana lib. 4. cap. 13.  which the Italians quickly perceiving, because earnestly desiring the Emperor's power over them to be loser, began to make use of the Papal present opposition to procure their full liberty: 
Abbas Vnspergensis chron. passim.  and therefore these factions were most strong there. Yet that grand faction distinguished by many formalities, was principally maintained under the names of the Guelves and Gibellins, which swallowed up all the private and petty family factions of Italy. As the Ursini in Rome were Guelfes, 
Mat hist. Ann  the Collonensi Gibellins, the Uberti in Florence were Gibellins, the Bondelmonti Guelfes, and so it was in Naples, Venice, Milan: which strife continued hot till Boniface the eight, who perceiving how much his predecessors had gained upon the Emperor, and saw but little more for him to get; began to practise the like domineering humour upon the other Potentates of Christendom, sending his letters of claim to the Kings of France, England, Scotland, Denmark, Poland, Hungary. But being opposed by Philip le Beau King of France, he did fly back to the Emperor for succour, who then was Albertus, the first Emperor of the house of Austria (for though his father was Emperor, yet he was not of the house of Austria, neither of the old Marquesses nor late Dukes, but Earl of Hansburg, who had conquered the Dukedom of Austria for his son.) This Boniface the Spaniard first began the faction betwixt the Kingdom of France and the house of Austria, by giving the Kingdom of France to Albertus. These two better agreed then any, because the Pope had taken off the Emperor from seeking his own right in Italy, by employing him as his champion to enlarge his dominion in other Kingdoms: and partly because the Emperor had good hope to continue the Empire in his family, as it hath near four hundred years. From which time the Emperors and Pope's disagreements were not so frequent, but only when some French favourers were Popes, and they sat at Avinion, as Clement the fifth with Henry the seaventh, and during the times of the Counsels of Constance and Basill. But by reason of the schisms in the Roman See, they did one another neither much good nor harm, until the time of Alexander the sixth, a Spaniard, who was exactly ambitious, a great lover of his country, and one that did much for it. 
Anonymus Hisp. in vita Alex.  For he joined with Ferdinand the first Catholic King, helping him to subdue Spain, and therefore first brought in the Inquisition Contra los judios y mores, que le aviantornado Christianos, which Caranza Archbishop of Toledo, saith Ferdinand, conceived himself bound in conscience to use, by virtue of an oath taken with an imprecation by one of his predecessors in the fourth Council of Toledo, 
Baronius Annal. An. 637.  which Baronius so much commends. This Pope also bestowed upon him the then discovered Indies, with many other favours, and for his sake, and in opposition to the French, he was as fast a friend to the House of Austria, as his deep dissimulation would suffer him; 
Philip. Cominoeus, lib. 8.  and the rather, because they had lately matched with the House of Burgundy, which much weakened the French force, and strengthened their factions. 
Thuanus hist. lib. 4.  But then most when Philip, the heir of the House of Austria and Burgundy, incorporated himself with Spain. So that I will conclude these things considered, that this form is only safe and convenient for those kingdoms that propose conquests, and can rule it as the protectors of it.  
§. 5. So then seeing this Clergy is not for us, I will consider of the other, which for distinct proceeding, we may call democratical. When the three Prime Potentates of Christendom, were Charles the fifth, Henry the eighth, Francis the first, such as deserved and desired to have all the sovereign power that could of right belong unto them, and yet were contrariwise usurped upon, and deprived of all their eminent supremacy, in those things that most concerned them; & perceiving (some beginning to question the Pope) a course of relieving themselves, they began to urge a Council for reformation, not only in doctrine and manners, but also in point of Ecclesiastical government. But it was so long urged by them, to no purpose, that Henry the vl advisedly wrote to the other; That seeing the Pope had so long put it off, 
Histo. Trid.  and now intended to hold it within his own territories, it were the best course for every one, to reform his own Kingdom, and he did so with the advice, consent, and desire of the Church and Stat● representative. No sooner was a reformation in any degree settled, but presently it was excepted against by some that favoured the Church of Geneva, as not fully reform, because not agreeing with their new neat platform; & that was urged upon us, as the only Apostolical government of the Church. But I marvel how such an exact government should be so suddenly framed, or else which is more strange, that they could so conceal their happy invention; as that Francis the first, a King of France, that searched into his government as much as any, should not know of it. For I am very much deceived, if he had not been much mistaken, knowing of this project, to desire the Council might be held at Geneva, being it was Diametrically opposite to the Roman. But our State had no reason to receive it. 
Hist. Trid.  For though it was necessary, not only in reason of State, but also out of conscience, that (after we perceived the indisposition of the Roman Clergy to reform themselves, (which they seem to hold impossible.) For though every Cardinal takes an oath in the vacancy, yet it cannot bind him when he is Pope; we should then perform our duty, especially seeing it stood with the public good.) Yet neither of these considerations did engage us to accept of such a form of Clergy, as seemed to run a clean contrary course, seeing we propounded not an innovation, but a reformatioa; that being as dangerous, as this was necessary, it could not here be entertained without an universal innovation. Now all stirring changes are dangerous, especially when the body of the commonwealth is full of diseased, discontented humours. Because all alteration sets the humours a working, and one humour being afoot, stirs up all the rest, either alluring by sympathy, or provoking by antipathy; and when they are once afoot, it is to be feared, that they will not only disburden the body of malignant oppressing cru●●ties, but weaken it in the most principal parts, causing it to receive a disposition to the like distemper, upon every small distaste. But it is most dangerous to innovate in that part of a commonwealth, that is most essentially active, and hath been lately recovered, especially if the matter proposed do minister any cause of relapse. Both which seem too true in this new discipline, which gave an occasion to the Clergy to revolt in the denying the supremacy, which they lately acknowledged. And being a foreign French devise, might seem to come within the compass of a praemunire for intrusion. as well as that of the Church of Rome for usurpation. But this was only propounded, not brought in, and that by men who were by some believed to be faithful to our State. And it may be, they had no dangerous aim in it, yet it would have been very dangerous for our kingdom, since it did necessarily induce an alteration in the profession and practice of the laws, which by reason of their long use, are as it were naturalised, into the manners and disposition of our nation. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. 
Arist. Rhetor. l. 2. cap: 11.  It must necessarily have conferred ruins upon our schools of learning and hospitals of charity, razed the foundations of our Churches, confounded divisions of parishes, changed the right and custom of paying tithes, with many such miserable inconveniences, which were so in the Apostles times of miseries, in persecution. So that the State then would not venture to try conclusions upon itself, by this new receipt, but chose rather to feel the supposed pain, than to take the pill: and yet it hath subsisted, though not in that height of health, which that form of government promised; yet in such a good competent continuance of reasonable well, that the present state also had rather endure the worst of the disease, than make the best use of the remedy. And if it must have made such a change in the entrance, what would it have done in the continuance? how would it have agreed with this Monarchy, that must have entered with such oppositions? so that I need not to say much to discard it, for it hath enough in it at the first sight to keep it out. And I confess, that if I would, I cannot say much of it with any confident certainty, because indeed I do not know, neither do I think that any of them do, or at least ever have set down, in positive and plain terms, the whole frame and face of this platform, as they would have it received in this Kingdom. But as much as I conceive of it, and at the best and purest, it is a mixed democratical discipline, and it is not likely, that a dissolute Democracie should long agree with this Monarchy. It is not my intent here to discourse of the nature of a Democracie, 
Clayn Arc.  that I should show the manifold consequent, coincident inconveniences, that do naturally flow in with it, and follow it (notwithstanding that machivel in many of his discourses upon Livy, doth prefer a Democracie before any other form, but rather wittily, out of a Paradoxical contradicting humour, than wisely, out of the weight and worth of sincere, sage, and serious arguments. And Plato saith thus much for it, in his Idea of a Commonwealth, 
Plat● lib. 5  〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 inter iniquas formas optima, inter legitimas deterrima. For if it begin to degenerate into an ochlocraty, (as I cannot conceive it possible, but it must, considering that liberty is the end and excellency of it) than it turns to a most headstrong, intolerable tyranny. For I am not of their opinion, that hold it a contradiction, that where a Democracy prevayles, there can be a tyranny. For the Ephori of Sparta, were as the Tribunes of the people of Rome, chosen by the people, and out of the common people, and the conservators of their liberty. Yet I think there are but few that discourse of these Ephori, but they conclude, and condemn their government of tyranny. They cast Pausanias into prison, and Thucydides saith, that they usurped that power over, and against their Kings, for they put Agis junior to death, 
Plato de leg. lib. 4.  as Plato, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and they were set up to restrain their Kings. It is a hard matter to keep that liberty within its limits, in any commonwealth, where it hath the supreme government, and therefore with much difficulty will it submit to be governed by a free Monarchy, especially a Democracie of that new nature, which makes the same persons civil subjects, and ecclesiastical superious, those lay Elders that are neither Ministers nor Magistrates, and yet must be governor's in the Church, whose jurisdiction doth destroy the nature of a Monarchy. For all public government in the Church, derived from Christ, the fullness of it, is either Prophetical, Sacerdotal, or Regal; and they assume not any of these, but the Regal, which is given in charge to supreme Christian Magistrates in a Monarchy; and therefore, if they derive not this power from him, they establish a regiment against him. So that if his power, doth not include theirs, they exclude his; and he having no supereminent power over them, as they impeach his right, so they will enlarge their own liberty, till it be dissolved into a lose licentious libertinism: 
Polybius hist. lib. 6.  〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, (as Polybius well expresses it.) And if they did not thus, it were the greater virtue, seeing they must have such power limited by laws left to discretion. And they would find it a hard peeece of patience, to abstain and contain themselves within such bounds of obedience, as this State necessarily requires. Can men that profess themselves popular pass plausibly and please the vulgar if they do not to their utmost uphold them in their highest insolences? 
Tull● 2. co● Agra  Tully found this impossible when as he withstood the people in Lege Agraria, for they cast him off, and clavae to Rullus, who would be popularis though it were but in populatione: and as it cannot stand with the power of our government, so it withstands the honour of our governor, debasing the majesty of a Monarchy into a popular parity, without respect of His most sacred person. In this it is truly Democritall; for as it was received for liberty, so it must be upheld by equality: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 cannot be fully free without 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, 
Poly● lib. 6  and I cannot then conceive how any could apprehend it as a form likely to agree with state; so that this government at the best would be like the spleen in the body, which is the subject of the dregs and settlings of the humours, as a Democracie is la feccia della plebe, 
Gui● Hist.  and as the spleen being not able to move itself is not troublesome, so long as it is not pressed upon by the heart, but permitted full and equal liberty, nor disturbed by a Flatus hypocondriacus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, but once moved 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 affects the head and heart with turbulent distempers; 
Hipp notio  so in a Democracie as long as they have all at their lose list, and are not compelled to keep within compass, but apprehend themselves equal to the highest in all respects, and are not moved by some seditious spirit, they are quiet enough; Nam multitudo, sicut mare, per se immobilis est, 
Livi Psal 〈…〉 Ide●  but if once they perceive that any go about to oppress or cross them in their false and fugitive liberty (as they are very suspicious upon the least cause) they presently are ready, but tentare magis quàm tueri libertatem: and if any one dare but begin to blow a Trumpet of sedition, (as they do not easily) statim ferox erit si non ad bellandum, saltem ad rebellandum. I do confess that this form of government may be of good use in some states at some times, as in a popular state where these Lay Elders may be both Church and City Burgesses; as the democratical Helvetians approved it: so also as for the enlarging of a Monarchy, 
Machivellus, l. 1. cap. 5.  the Monarchical is best; so for the settling of a Monarchy, that Democreticall may be safest, and so may be the best government when a state is not settled but newly erected: for than it is not safe to use severity a● when our state was not fully settled. Martin Mar-Prelate dared to vent his discontented humours in salt rumours, 
Curtius' Histor. lib. 5.  as men in rheums: In novo & precario imperio no●statim jugum rigidum cervici imponendum, but it is good taming them by degrees, for then a Magistrate hath little power to command, much less to restrain; & therefore it hath been found the best course to let them take their course: for Mos est vulgo, 
Tacitus Histor. lib. 1. Livius lib. 11. Histor.  mutabili subitò, & tam prono in misericordiam, quàm immodicum saevitiâ fuerat, and so by indulgence find lascivire magis plebem quàm saevire. And I am persuaded that this discipline was only chosen for that time when the Apostles were under persecution, and there were no Christian Magistrates to repair to for justice: then they appointed some to judge betwixt brother and brother. But it doth not appear that they were Ecclesiastical judges, certainly no such lay Elders in the Apostles times as the Separatists now plead for, but rather civil arbiters to make agreement betwixt them in civil controversies, 
1 Cor. 6.4.5. Histor. Con. Trid. lib. 3.  (as may appear out of the place) though the author of the History Concil. Tridentini make that a ground for Episcopal jurisdiction. For the Apostles had no reason to delegate the cognizance of spiritual causes, because in those days they were so few, and needed no proof to them; because they had the gift of discerning of spirits, and of knowing of secrets, having the gift of prophesying. And I do not believe that it can be proved that they gave commission to any to receive accusations, (which is much less than to give judicial censures and decisions) to any but to the Bishop of Ephesus: 
1 Tit  but I intent not to enter into controversies, neither need I, seeing so much hath been already written in that point to good purpose by many most reverend Fathers of our Church. But to return to my intended discourse; this state of the sovereignty of these seniors I grant to be of some use in free Cities in time of tumult; and so I do believe Mr Calvin intended it, yielding to a popular party, and not as an universal perpetual government for all truly reformed Churches. For though such a wise respected man as he was, might during his time preserve it in the same correspondent conformity to his proposed pattern, (as Polybius saith) the Theban Democracie 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; it stood not by the good temper of their policy, 
Polyb  but by the virtue of their governor's 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: so might it be said of the Geneva Church government, that though for the transgression of it many were the rulers of it, being a Democracie: 
Pro. 〈◊〉 Nil m prodest curari lunt. Senec● Mach● lib. 1. ●  yet by a man of understanding and knowledge, the state thereof was prolonged; for he could do much to appease seditions, as Franciscus Bishop of Volterra sooner settled a tumult in Florence by his grave presence, than the Magistrates could by the weight of their authority. It is plain then out of this that hath been spoken, that this government by popular Presbytery is not for this state.  
§ 6 Neither of these being convenient, and there is but another, and it hath always been the government in this state; it must necessarily follow without any more proof, that this is most agreeable with the Civil. Those that are no well willers to our state have struck at our Church government, with which there is such a happy hearty unity, as dare bid the world do as she would be done to (as that absolute Statse-man the Earl of Salisbury replied.) And it is no marvel, since it is not only the primitive ancient government of the Church in general; but the only form also that ever was received in this state, according to the ancient laws of this Island, though it seem to be brought in under Henry the eight, when it was only reform from the evils, and restored to the former state: for our Clergy was never of right subject to the Pope, neither as he was Patriarch to the West, nor in his province. And this Aristocratical form hath most happy qualifications that dispose it to the peace, profit, honour, & safety of this state: I could now wish with Tully when he was to write against democratical Agrarian laws, 
Ad Atticum, l. 2. epist. 3.  utinam Theophrastum 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. Vbi multa scribuntur 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. After this Kingdom with many others had long laboured under a lingering consumption, being continually sucked, and in a manner exhausted by the continual supplying of the Pope's Exchequer, which drew away the vital spirits, weakened the sinews of war; causing extensions and convulsions: and farther also in respect of domestic peace, it had not a just proportion of power to exercise its only civil and lawful authority: insomuch that many who should have known what in possibility of state might be done for a recovery of a temporality, distempered and distressed by the malignant humorous power of an usurped spirituality, like a fever in the spirits caused by obstruction; 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Hippocrat: lap. 5. prog.  All those men gave it over for desperate, some conceiving the disease incurable in its own nature, because, that non obstante the help of so many strong statutes and purging provisoes, the distemper was as violent, and more virulent than before; & they saw no safe and certain course of preventing physic, for it was so far spent, as that it seemed to have passed the period of curing: but as when men are brought to a desperate point they will try conclusions, and they that drive them to it do often repent it; so the Pope putting and passing our state upon desperate hazards, forced it to try its strength, which is soon found; necessity driving, and opportunity drawing: Acerrima virtus est, quam ultima necessitas extundit: 
Senec●a men. l  and so it cast such an unreasonable unruly rider, who thought, and so did all christendom, that he had sitten closer and faster upon our skirts, and would not believe that it was possible for a Parliamentary power representing the state, ever to have been able to dissolve the great Abbeys, though they durst fully resolve it; until they saw them begin with the little ones; then they had reason to grant it possible: 
Arist. R lib. 2. c  〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Yea they found it fully finished, and that on such a sudden, that as it wrought admiration in the beholders, so it procured safety to the actors. For in actions of that nature, haste only makes good speed. That the event of this action was good, is proved by the deliverance of the state. But for the action in itself considered, as I do not commend it, so I will not condemn it, because I am not able to sift and search into the circumstances of it; but I will only say thus much of it, That actions that aim at, and make great alteration, though to the best, do seldom keep a just mediocrity, especially in respect of that part of the commonwealth, which is the subject of the alterations: as a strong, stirring Chemical spirit-purge doth in a natural body, that stirs up more than should be moved, and purges out good, as well as ill humours. But no sooner was our State thus delivered from under the tyranny of the Ecclesiastical Monarchy, but it as soon pitched upon the Aristocratical government, as suitable and fitting best with the weale-publick. And as all the Christian world did then in sincere judgement of State rebus sic staantibus approve their choice, so we have ever since found the happy effects of it, in the safety, honour, and treasure of the State. Consider it first, how it wrought little or no alteration in the receiving, being according to the laws, taken by their own choice, restrained with the limitations of the Civil State. For all the turmoil and tossing tumult, was only in casting out the other form, as a privation, before the induction of a new form in natural bodies. It was received without force, as most natural to the Civil State, and no other could have been brought in with such certain good security of the state: for the Monarchical that time could not be received, 
Histor. Concil. Trid. lib. 2.  but either upon their repentance of what they had done, and by procuring of a pardon from the Pope, (as it was in Queen Mary's days: and do but consider, how evil that was for the State) or else by help of foreign force joining with domestic rebellion, as was often attempted. But this was not any thing safe for the kingdom, as is already proved. And for the democratical discipline, there was great and certain danger in receiving of that, for it could not possibly be conceived to be received, but with a schismatical sedition, since it was approved but by a faction. Now do but consider, how dangerous seditions are in an ancient kingdom; if it were now a settling, happily the vigour of youth would bear it out, as one main reason (as I conceive) why the Roman Monarchy was not ruined by those four first grand seditions, was because it was but secunda aetas, & quasi adolescentia: 
Lucius Florus lib. 1. cap. 22.  But when a State is growing old, seditions are desperate courses to procure changes, though it be for the best. For though the events of them be but doubtful, yet the deciding-place is certain of loss. But for this present form, as it reentered without a State-earthquake, without any shaking of the ground of the Civil government, so it hath ever continued peaceable, and a pacifier of growing differences, being the middle State of three, carrying itself as a moderating mediator betwixt the King and the Subjects. And all this good, and much more proceeds from the temper of the form of government. For it is the only form fit to be under this Monarchy, because it will only be easily ruled and ordered by the State, when as both the other will rule where they are entertained, although after a divers manner; one having dominion over the Civil, the other without it. But this is under the Civil, in relation to the head; and in it, in relation to the body. And as it is easily ruled, so it will not easily be disordered, as the other will, though they should submit to be ruled for a time, till they be able to resist. For ambition is so perniciously provident, that it will be something able to resist the power of its opposite, to get from under it, before it try to go about it. First, taking care not to be oppressed, before it endeavour to oppress; for all the branches of rebellion, are rooted and hid in the depths of dissembled disobedience. But this is not so inclined; for if any form of policy degenerate, it must be either into a Tyranny, an Oligarchy, or a dissolute Ochlocraty. Now an Aristocracy cannot be immediately dissolved, either into a tyranny, or a tumultuous popularity. And it is not easy to conceive, how it should by any means, by the course of State corruption, ever degenerate into a headstrong popularity of it own accord, without external force. And as little reason there is, why this should advance itself to a tyranny, by turning the Church into a court, 
Earl 〈◊〉 bury hi● to scan● papers.  and religion into a vassal to ambition; for it must be reduced and restrained into an oligarchy: and there is no great reason in this point, to fear the Clergy in this kingdom, all things considered. It is true (as all Historians and Politics observe) that an Aristocracy is subject and prone to be corrupted into an oligarchy: But do but observe the end of an oligarchy, and you will find, that an Aristocracy can have no such aim; for their end is, to grow rich, as the States of Venice and the Belgic provinces, and their counsels drive at that end, 
Arist. Rhet. lib. 1. c. 8.  〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; and according to this end, and this counsel to it, he that will prevail in persuading with them, must deliberate, 
Sen. Suasor. 1.  in libera civitate, non ut apud reges, quae delectant, sed quae prosunt suadenda sunt. But our Ecclesiastical Aristocracy is not to be so persuaded, having no such counsels, because not the same end; only they may be rich, if they did desire it, because being poor, they are a fit subject of wealth. The poverty of this Clergy hath charmed it against active ambition, so that one of the Optimates do not look higher than his peers, set with him in equal power and honour, in relation to their several Dioceses, though the power of jurisdiction be in some cases larger, in the provincial Prelate, Nemo nostrum Episcopum se Episcoporum esse dicit, 
Augustinus contra Donat. lib. 4. cap. 1.  neque tyrannico terrore ad obsequendi necessitatem, collegas suas adigit: so that per accidens, the impoverishing of the Clergy in Henry the eight, when it seemed in the eye of some too rich for the Civil State, did this good, to preserve them from an oligarchy; even as to take so much blood away in a pleurisy, as to bring a man to a deep consumption, is a probable preservative against dying of a burning fever. So that alteration of this State is not much to be feared, in respect they have no reason to alter it; and withal it is not easily altered, if they had this or any other ground to do it. For an Aristocracy in itself considered, is a government of a most constant, continuing constitution, especially, when it is mixed and tempered with a Monarchy. For the reason of its constancy is not only the slowness of the motion, either to augmentation or diminution, like a great engine moving with many joints, in which point a Monarch will much advantage in advancing & setting faster forward, if not their deliberations, yet their determinations; and with ease and speed stay all their errors and declinings, while they are but in the breed, beginnings, and beget; but then also the force of their factions (which breaking out, are the common ruin of Aristocracies) will be abated, as it may be seen in the Spartan and Venetian States, opposed to the Athenian and Florentine. For these had an Aristocracy without a Monarchy, and were continually tossed with seditions and factions. As that long lasting faction of the Guelphs and Gibilines, which could never be fully taken away, but by the ruin of one party, when as the Venetians their neighbours (whose Duke was then not a Simulachrum imperij) kept the faction out of their commonwealth, though they did declare themselves sometimes on one side, and sometimes on another, lest they should have been hated of all, as negligent neutrals; but they did not nourish the faction amongst themselves, but maintained it in other Countries, as they would do wars. But the State of Milan could never be free from it, until it was extinguished by Francisco Sforza, 
Paulu● hist. lib  (who was a free Prince, though an usurper) so that the mixture of a Monarchy, and the predominancy in an Aristocratical State, doth not only make it actively more able to offence, but more passively powerfully defensive, not only by preventing preservations from domestic dangers, but also by recovering it out of them. And our present State Ecclesiastical is thus mixed. 
Bellar summ● cap. 3.  (for I do not urge a strict Aristocracy; 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 (as Aristotle) and therefore hath the best means of conservation in respect of the forme●. And it hath one more prevalent preservative in the Optimates themselves, which is, that they are strongly disposed to this kind of government, not only by being of quiet contemplative natures, but also Academical College government, which doth first possess them and fully please them, is Aristocratical, having the proper aim of that form of government; 
Arist. Rhet. lib. 1. cap. 28.  〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, discipline according to law, is the end of that form of government. And they then that aim at that, are most likely to preserve it, by persevering in their intentions; when as others that will devise new platforms, and platform discipline, and will seem wiser than the laws, do suddenly subvert or disturb this most safe and settled form of government. 
Thucydides l. 3.  Witness the Athenians and the Florentines, who being of a stirring over-active temper, and always doing, though it were to the undoing of things well done, changed this form of State seven times, which corrupting transmutations, I hope machivel their Countryman doth not call and commend under the terms of reformation, 
Machivellus lib 3. c. 10.  and reduction to their primative principles, without he will grant their prime original order, to be raised out of confounded confusions. When as the Venetians, who have been calm and cold, and constant in provident proceed, have kept to the same form without any fundamental alterations, and that because they will be ruled by laws; whereas the Florentine is so overweeningly wise, that he thinks he should Emperour-like rule and make laws 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. 
Arist. Rhet. lib. 1. cap. 11.  So that Bodinus judgement of them, and the Neopolitans is true; and approves him to be a most rational statist; 
Bodinus de repub. l. 5. c. 1.  Dignos se esse imperio singuli arbitrentur ad populare imperium, magis quàm Optimatum inclinati. But suppose this government should be disordered, it is easiliest reform again, which is a point of very great safety, it may be done without any stirs of tumults, and speedily, for it hath not that power to resist authority, which the other two forms have; and that because it useth not the means they do to procure it. For the Monarchy of the Church of Rome, and the democratical discipline, stir up the vulgar, and rely and rest upon them for assistance, and defence, and therefore they endeavour to woo and win their hearts, that they may use their hands and purses: yet they do it divers ways. As the Romanists, amongst many other ways, they get into their hearts at their ears by auricular confessions, they hold them by their ears, and by their eyes; they fascinate their fond fantasies with superstitious ceremonies, exquisitely intricate, full of mystical and magical mazes, broached by fancy, continued and countenanced by fables, consisting in the massy materiality of bodily exercise, as may be seen in the austerity and State of an Austrian penance, or in a Pontifical procession, where all is done with such concealed secrecy and silence, that nothing is prostituted to be polluted by the unsanctified view of the vulgar. Thus by fear mixed with delight in superstition, they can lead them as they list, and engage them in their quarrels, and bequeath to them their dangers they have pulled upon themselves. The Disciplinarians are not only endeared to them, for the form and frame of their government, and for their novelty, but they make use of superstition also to hold them, and to have them at their beck; but in a course clean contrary to the other, for they undo all the other have done, in point of ceremony, without consideration, whether it be good or bad and that out of a superstitious rage, as the other did out of fear: (for superstition is grounded upon either of those passions.) And as their fear was mixed with pleasure in the end, so theirs is mixed with profit, when in the destroying of superstition they every themselves with the spoils, and save charges in ornaments. Which profaneness of theirs, is in some respects worse than their superstition, and it many times ends in Atheism. For though they were consecrated after a false manner, yet they were dedicated and devoted to the true God, and should not be profaned to common uses, but sanctified by a new and true consecration, as well as the Churches wherein they were. Thus those forms of Church-government have power to withstand the reforming rod of authority. But our present State useth no such means to stand out a rebellion, because if it offend, it rather proceeds out of weakness than wickedness, from scholastical indiscretions, that deserve rather pity than punishment. For it is not likely, that they would disturb the State, who shall certainly lose that little they have by it, rather than get more. I find, that amongst those Prelates that have troubled and turmoiled kingdoms, Peter's pretended successors have only gained, by fishing in such troubled waters. And as they can have no end worth their stirring, so their natural inclination is not so perniciously pragmatical, they are fare from the tricks of tumbling projectors, and all actions proceed either from our general end, or particular inclination; and this inclination is fortified and confirmed, if not form and framed by their studies, which have a great influence into the disposition. I have not in this discourse, entered much into the commendation of an Aristocracy in general, preferring it before a Monarchy, partly because I fear, lest some should serve me as Castellanus, a French Phisolophy reader (who, as I conceive, was Ramus his Tutor) served his antagonist Bigotius. For when Francis the first was desired by some of his Nobles, to read Bigotius his Disputations, Castellanus told his Majesty, he was an Aristotelian, and Aristotle preferred an Aristocracy before a Monarchy, 
Thuanus, hist. l●b. 6.  & so took off the King's affection from him. But he might be so excused, because I do not believe it was Aristotle's judgement, but his policy, to dissuade all others from affecting it, that his Master Alexander might effect it. But I did purposely forbear it, because it was not my proposition, that an Aristocracy is simply a more convenient form of State than a Monarchy; but that this Aristocracy is more convenient for this State at this time, considering that it was received with an universal consent and desire of all, and hath its right according to the laws; is most easily ruled by them, not easily nor suddenly disturbed or disturbing; and most easily reform if it be disordered: so that I may now undeniably conclude, that the present state Ecclesiastical is most convenient and best agreeing with the Civil.  

A DIGRESSION DISCUSSING Some ordinary exceptions against Ecclesiastical Officers.  
THough none be more loath and fearful to come within the lists of controversies; yet seeing all that I have already positively discoursed, is not only controversed but also contradicted by these exceptions; I resolved to dissolve and dispel them, lest they should by a dark reflection cloud my clear proceeding. And I am not a little confidenced in my purpose, when I consider whose cause it is that I undertake, even the most able advocates of the Church, such powerful pleaders as are infallibly sufficient to defend both their cause and me their poor defendant; for they are absolutely able (if their conscience would but dispense with their understanding) to make a bad cause if not good, yet to put it in a good case by making it plausible, so that I am encouraged to undertake it with this consideration; that where I am found weak and wanting, they are sufficient and ready to secure and supply; if they shall apprehend the exceptions peremptory and pertinent, and any impeachment to their practice and power. As they that have made trial of their strength have found, 
D. Couzius his apology for proceeding in high Commission.  though they were of the strongest and most popular party, which they the more wondered at, since they knew they had but few friends, and themselves small in number, especially in the beginning of the reformation when there was such scarcity of Civilians, that the Universities took little notice of their degrees or profession, or the Courts of their practice: but now we have a most happy and hopeful increase, and it were to be wished that the land were more stored with able Civilians, though they ●●e not pragmatiques; I mean that the knowledge of the Civil law were more regarded, though the practice keep but the same degree of respect; for than should we have more able commonwealths men at home, and more absolute Statesmen abroad; for all the nations round about are ruled by the Civil law, as we are by the Common law: only they have some particular decrees, manifestations, and sanctions, as we have statutes and Acts of Parliament; and so by that law the treaties we make for matters in question are to be decided by that law that which is determined by consultation, and agreed upon, is to be concluded: so that it must needs be, that he that is well seen in the Civil law is best able to treat with them with more honour and less danger to the state, for in them there is only the fear and danger of perfidiousness, whereas the other may want honesty and ability both, though their instructions be never so punctually accommodated. And this is one main reason (as well as the Pope's power) why many Deans, Bishops, and Lord Chancellors, who were Doctors of the Civil law were sent Ambassadors, when the Nobility had not so much law and learning as now they have; so that for this last present age we have not lost so much in treating with France where the Civil law is most practised, 
Com● 11. li  as to confirm or continue the proverb which I find mentioned in Phil. de Cominaeus; Paectio nulla inter Gallos' & Anglos— in which the French did not get the better, adeoque proverbio dicitur apud Anglos, quoties cum Gallis proelio certaverint, victores plerunque fuisse, quoties verò cum illis pacti sint detrimentum semper aliquid accipisse, which was most verified from the time of Edward the 3. to Queen Elizabeth, but it is probable their overreaching was much helped forward by dishonesty, where they found any little want of ability: but grant it were the disability of our agents, especially in the ignorance of the proceed and advantages of the Civil law in bu●●●es of trans-action wherein the French were defendants and passive; yet it was not any honourable advancement to them, though it were some small disadvantage to us: for it is a disgrace for a Prince to stand strictly upon terms, tricks, and turnings of law in the interpretation of treaties; as Maurice Duke of Saxony told Charles the fift, 
Carolus Molinaeus cons●●lio secundo in causa Philip. Lond. grave: Hassiae.  when contrary to agreement, he detained Philip Landgrave of Hessen; at ego (saith he) te tanquam Imperatorem, non tanquam iuris-consultum & legistam, volo pactiones & foedera interpretari. But since treaties are too often so interpreted, it is in all probability a great assurance of safety in treating to understand the Civil law, at least in the proceed; and hence it is as I conceive that in France and Italy it is so much esteemed; so that in France most of the ancient Nobility were students in it, and had amongst other privileges, that they may take the degree of Bachelor at law in three years, as it is plain in the pragmatical sanction; which particular is also confirmed by the Concordata Galliae, 
Prag. sanctio tit. de collationibus. Concordat Galliae tit. idem.  by Leo the tenth; Bacchalaureo iuris Civilis si ex utroque nobilis, triennium satis erit. In Italy also it hath been highly esteemed, especially in the first receiving of it under Lotharius secundus, in the year 1125: for he found a copy of the Digest and gave it to the Pisans, which was then called litera Pisana; but when the Florentines took Pisa (as Laurence de medicis told Politian) it was translated to Florence and made Pandectae Florentinae; 
Angelus Polit. epist. lib. 1. estist. 4.  ibi verò in curia loco celeberrimo summa religione servatur: and they did not use in those days in the first erecting of their Dukedom, to esteem any thing which they found not beneficial for the state. But I leave the commendation of the knowledge of the Civil law to those that know it better, and have found the help of it in long public practising; and betake myself to my undertake, to discard some exceptions against the professors of it, who are Officers practising in Ecclesiastical affairs.  
They are excepted against by some that are of the faction of irregular Protestants; 
Exc●  that though the Church of England approve not the Geneva discipline, yet the principal point is practised in it; in these our Lay Elders: thus they seek to defame our government by reporting it to be confused and wanting uniformity. But to di●●●● and discover this groundless exception, the very supposition whereon it is grounded is absolutely false; for though we will not deny that our Ecclesiastical Officers be Lay men, yet we will not grant them to be Elders of the Church: we have no such Church Burgesses, neither do they take any such Eldership upon them, since they know full well that it belongeth only to spiritual persons; which they confess and profess they are not: as that profound Civilian Dr Ousins, 
D. 〈◊〉 his a● proce● high sion. cap. 2  we are no spiritual persons as some term us, but Ecclesiastical: now in my understanding there is as much difference betwixt a Spiritual person and Ecclesiastical, as betwixt Ecclesiastes and Ecclesiasticus; the one of which is Canonical, the other Apocryphal; though he be a Canonist, I dare without any scruple grant them to be Lay men, not only because it takes away the ground of the exception, but also because it is not any hindrance to their being Ecclesiastical Officers; for the Cannon law which is very strict in this point admits a threefold division of Ecclesiastical persons; as primò, in sacris; secundò, in sacris & sacerdotio; tertiò, nec in sacris, nec sacerdotio, ut monachi & legistae ecclesiastici: and such do the chiefest among them account themselves, for they are well contented to go for Commons in the high court of Parliament. Yea a most eminent Chancellor of late refused when his Bishop would have chosen him a member of the Convocation house, and that because he held himself a Lay man; and so they live in our particular Parishes as other Lay Parishioners, paying Church dues, and are alike subject to the jurisdiction of their appointed Pastors in foro conscientiae; and in thus doing they do declare their exact knowledge in the Cannon law, and pure practice of the Civil: for by the Common law where Doctores divini & humani are opposed, 
Guymer Comment: in prag: sanction: proaemio. Brissonij Lexicon. 11.  Doctors of the Civil law, yea & Cannon also are counted humane, and Lay Doctors: for the Clergy (as Brissonius defines it out of Suidas) is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. But fully to cast of this exception, I deny them to be Elders of our Church; for Elders here I understand in relation to Church government, and in that sense there are no Elders with us in our Church but Ordinaries; and our Ecclesiastical Officers are not Ordinaries, neither do they usurp any such power; but their modesties are many times forced to take the title and tune of the title from some obnoxious fawning Clergy men, who are more sordidly slavish than they would have them: so that though of discretion they will not say to them as Tiberius did to the servile senate, 
Tacitus Annal. lib. 3 Extrav. fol. 22. tit. execrabilis, §. caeterum. Linwood lib. 1. de sequestrationibus. S. Thom. Smith de repub. Ang. lib. 3. cap. 8.  O homines ad servitutem paratos, yet they cannot choose but think so, for they know that by the Cannon law there is no Ordinary june but a Bishop, per Ordinarios jure intelligimus Episcopos, neither any by privilege and custom but a Dean, or an Archdeacon. And they do as fully understand that in this Church there are none but what the Cannon law allows: as S Thomas Smith in his discourse of the Commonwealth of England, saith, by an Ordinary we understand a Bishop, or sometimes an Archdeacon or a Dean, who are so by privilege; or a long prescribed custom. Now they are not Archdeacon's nor Deans as I would they were, and many of them have been heretofore, as Petrus Blesensis Archdeacon of Bath, who was Chancellor of Canterbury, and Chaplain to Henry the second: for then this exception and all others would be of no force. But they are now no such Ordinaries as are Church Elders with us, I will grant them in a large sense to be Ordinaries, 
Cor pr● tit. §. Gla  (as Guymerus the pragmatique) Ordinarios latè volo collatores beneficiorum, & patronos Ecclesiasticos, (as Glanvill calls Patrons) advocatos Ecclesiae, in such a large sense it is properly extended to these Ecclesiastical Officers; but Ordinaries properly they are not, and that appears out of the offices they execute in relation to these Ordinaries, for they are their Deputies, Deligates, Vicars, officials, or Commissaries, which are officers distinct and derived from their Ordinaries: of all these the Bishop's Vicar hath most reason to be termed an Ordinary, & yet he is none; not only by the Civil law which makes him a minister of his Ordinary, Vicarius est qui suo Ordinan subministrat, 
Bri ver● Pra con ve● Par tali dict Du● spec 1. t● deal Sir Ri● of 〈◊〉 and  but also by the Cannon law, (as Prateus) Vicarius & Ordinarius distinguuntur, nam vicarius est quasi servus in peculio: (or as Suidas calls him) à substitute, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; and Panormitanus, jurisdictio Ordinaria non extinguitur per mortem illius qui dat, jurisdictio vicarii est suspensa suspenso Episcopo, and Durantus affirms as much; Vicarii nequeunt officia sua exercere Episcopis eorum excommunicatis, and therefore they do well in claiming no such power; as Sr Thomas Ridly learnedly discovering the original and reason of their practice in the Church, concludes, that Civilians or rather Legists who were anciently called Church Lawyers, or Ecclesiecdici, were brought into the Church to direct Bishops; and the Chancellors at this day are the very same in office with them, being assistants of the Bishops in their jurisdiction. 
Sir contion jest●  And Sr Francis Bacon in his cautious consideration of Church government, agrees with him in the approbation of a Bishops being attended by his Chancellor, who should be learned in the Civil law for his better instruction in points of formality, in the proceed and courses of their Courts: And for the same purpose should Deans and Archdeacon's have their officials and Commissaries to enable them to run through the multiplicity of causes, to cut off or shorten delays, which in all business, especially Ecclesiastical, are tedious and odious: and indeed none are more able in this case to assist them, and reduce causes into order, brevity, and paucity; as Thomas Aquinas saith, 
Thomas. Aquin. praefa●● to his sums.  he compiled his sums to compose and compound controversies, take up and take away all questions. And therefore I do not a little wonder at Dr cowel who was a most able Civilian, that he should account Commissaries or Officiales foraneos, only useful in petty peculiars, 
D. Cowel. interpreta●● verb. Commissary. Duaren. de benef. & officijs Eccles.  exempt from the jurisdiction of the Archdeacon, otherwise to be superfluous and a needless vexation and oppression to the Country: surely he meant it of some such scandalous Courts as Duarenus (another learned Civilian) complains of. Auditoria Vicariorum & officialium Episcoporum, quaecunque profana tribunalia, imposturis & strophis forensibus, longè superant: but let him think what he will, I am sure we see of what good use they are, and yet they are not Lay Elders of the Church.  
Exception 2 Excep. 2. Is, that the power of jurisdiction Ecclesiastical, cannot be granted to Civilians, that are mere Laymen.  
I could soon answer this exception, by denying them to be mere Lay men, and so I would, if I had no other way to avoid it. But I am willing to give them satisfaction, and not to cavil, and therefore will answer punctually: and that I may so do, and they so apprehend it, let them but consider with me a twofold power of Ecclesiastical jurisdiction, 
Linwood. lib. 5. tit. ne praelati vicar. verb. ad firmam.  Ordinary, and Delegate; the later and lesser of which, may be lawfully granted to them; especially, if we admit the differences and degrees of their commission, which are approved and practised in our Church government; both in relation to the power that grants them, and in respect to the extent of the grant. First for the power granting them, they are all originally derived from the Crown; but some have their power more immediately, as the high Commission have it under the broad Seal: others receive it more mediately, from their Bishops, Deans or Arch-Deacons: so for the largeness of the Commission, which is ad universitatem causarum tanquam Ordinarius, as the audience of high Commission (and not without good reason, since no cause is to be there determined, at least not sentenced, without the consent of four of the Quorum, which must be, as I am informed, Bishops:) There is also a special Commission of Oyer and Terminer, in some particular causes; and lastly, a Commission, which, according to Law, is restricta ad instantia, 
Linwoo● tit. de verb. of● alis.  which Linwood Official of Canterbury saith, doth belong officialibus principalibus, which we call Chancellors: Yet I do not believe (by his leave) that they are so restrained, as to a bare cognition, without a definitive sentence, though the phrase, that is used to express business of instance, be, matters of Ecclesiastical cognizance; for, Cognitio non est jurisdictio, 
Cujaci● orig. Iu● §. Cons●  especially now since the Laws have ordered, that if they be not in sacred orders, they must be assisted by a surrogate, who is a Minister, and he is to pronounce sentence as principal judge; which practice hath made some of opinion, that anciently they were assistant to the surrogate, as assessors; which seems probable, because the exact knowledge of the Law is expected from an assessour, not from the principal judge (according to the most conscionable Casuists:) Ignorantia juris non est peccatum in judice, sed est in assessore, 
Navar● judicis.  as the Masters of the Chancery, who are assessors to the Lord Chancellor or Keeper, there is required exact knowledge, though not in the superior judge, as in the assessors of the Praetor amongst the Romans: 
Cuj●cius obser. lib. 23. c. 40.  Si Praetor per imperitiam iuris iniquum ius statuerit, non punitur; assessor eius punitur, quia adsessor se pro iurisperito agit.: So that though this opinion be not true, because surrogates are not of such antiquity; yet I persuade myself without any doubt, that they were, and still are tanquam assistentes assessores Episcopis & Archidiaconis; though they have also a delegated power. And this kind and degree of Ecclesiastical power may be granted to them, though they be mere Laymen; and I believe our Church would not have disliked the Geneva government so much, if they would have chosen such for their Lay-Seigniours, as had knowledge in the Ecclesiastical Laws; as if Doctor Hottoman, professor there, and Reader of the Civil Law, had been joined with reverend Beza, than Divinity Reader.  
Exception 3 Another Exception of like nature and moment, arising from the former, is, That under the colour of a delegated jurisdiction, they take upon them Episcopal jurisdiction, and perform all the offices of a Bishop, in relation to Ecclesiastical government.  
This Exception is not peremptory, but dilatory and declinatory, full of impertinent surplusage, urging nothing, or that which is false; for no man will undertake to answer what they do, but what they should do: iure nostro Ecclesiastico, I am sure iure nostro Canonico Anglicano, publicly known, and by the old Canon Law which may here be practised, (where it is not contrary to the Laws of the Land) they are not to exercise any such power, 
25. Hen. 8. c. 3. Summa bullarij in Pio 4.  as doth personally belong to a Bishop, either as he is Dioecesane, or as he is Ordinary, in puris spiritualibus: neither do I find, that ever any Vicar did usurp or desire any such power, but only Cardinal Wolsie, who desired Clement the seventh suo vicario universale in Francia, in ●ng●●terra, & in Germania, mentre stava in prigione, 
Guic●. hist. li  his Vicar general in France, England and Germany during his imprisonment; which he could not do by Law, being his Ordinary and suspended, if not ab officio, yet á beneficio: and if it had been lawful, yet the Pope had betrayed his weakness much to grant it, with that condition, during the time of his imprisonment; for the Cardinal would without doubt have endeavoured to keep him there still, to continue his vicarship. And moreover this, I find that by the Canon Law, sede vacant, the Dean or Chapter is successor, or rather administrator to the Bishops in their jurisdiction, and guardian of the spiritualties; and no marvel, for they are called fratres Episcopi, Cardinals Papae; they can dispense in causis Episcopo reservatis, and call Convocations, 
Laeliu●us de p● capitu  to which the Bishop's Vicar may not be admitted; & possunt condere & revocare statuta. And during the life of the Bishop, the  is his Vicar iure (as Zerola) vicarius natus, 
Zerola Episc. Archi●  (as Hostiensis) which they understand in respect of jurisdiction in spiritualibus; for not they, but the Archipresbyter is Vicar in divinis, which is, in spiritualibus, in relation to the power of order: So that you see, they take not any such ordinary power upon them, but leave it to the Bishops, and their most natural and lawful Vicars in that power; 
Form● tattor●●ensis.  and yet they may be their Vicars in Pontificalibus (as the Canonists express it) which is, in those causes that belong to their Sees, as they have peculiar and prerogative Courts; and such may be Laymen according to the most moderate modern Decretists; Syndicos (saith Duarenus) sive defensores, 
Duar● officijs l. 1. c.  & apocrisiarios sive responsales laicos posse esse; though by the old Canon Law Vicarius Episcopi debet esse Clericus. And it is counted one of the insolent rare actions of the Popes, causas Ecclesiasticas Laicis delegare: This jurisdiction they may have without any trenching upon the office of a Bishop in his personal jurisdiction, which I conceive ●●nnot be delegated to a lay person; 
Durand. de orig. juris. Eccl. Con. 2.  being that jurisdiction, whereby he doth exercise and execute his corrective, coercitive, coactive power, which is the instrument of his pastoral paternal care over his Clergy, and proceeds from the power of consecrated order, and is inseparably united to it: which power, I find fully, yet briefly expressed by St Cyprian, speaking of a contumacious Deacon to his Bishop; 
Cypr. Epist. Rogat. Episc.  he adviseth the Bishop, vigore Episcopalis cathedrae aut deponas eum aut abstineas, either to degrade or suspend him; neither of these will a Lay delegate do; yet I grant he may suspend, if not ab officio, yet à beneficio. And for their visitations, which are an act of ordinary jurisdiction, they perform them not ex officio, but by a special commission. And for the form and force of their inquisition in them, it is not general concerning the doctrine and manners of the Clergy, but directed and restrained according to the Bishop's Articles, 
Formula visit. Dioecesis Coloniensis.  and without requiring an oath of the party presented; visitatores interrogabunt absque exactione iuramenti; yet I do not disaprove that an oath should be required upon a fame, because it respects as much the purgation, as the conviction of the jurant.  
And for the sentence of excommunication, which some make the process of spiritual Courts, in point of contumacy; I am not able, I confess, fully to satisfy in that point, but I dare subscribe to what judicious Bishop Bilson saith of it, to clear it; who, I am sure, could and would say as much in the behalf of Ecclesiastical officers as any Bishop of his time, who speaking of the power of Excommunication, 
De perpetua guber. Eccl. cap. 14.  saith, Nequaquam sibi clavium potestatem assumunt, sed poenam ob contumaciam infligunt, quâ omnes illae animadversiones continentur, quae legibus in eos sancitae sunt, qui claves Ecclesiae temerè contemnunt, quocunque nomine appelletur, sive suspensio, sive condemnatio, aut excommunicatio nil refert, dummodo ne potestatem hanc divino, sed humano iure sibi vendicent, nil causae tunc est, quin judices civiles delinquentem in poenam Canonis incidisse declarent. But the main ground of these, and such like exceptions, is, because Civilians are not in orders with us, as most Canonists be beyond the Seas, (though they have no title, and are but Presbyteri Vtopiani, as Duarenus calls such) if then our Ecclesiastical officers were all in orders, as some of them are, than they could not with any reason except against them for Laymen, no more than they can against the Pontificial Canonists, who have fare more Ecclesiastical power, especially the modern Legists, and are as able to judge of heresy, as the Duke of Bavaria under Zachary, who condemned Virgilius Bishop of Saltzburge of heresy, because he affirmed, 
Aventi● nal. lib.  that there were Antipodes; when as Isidorus Hispalensis was not condemned for holding hell to be at the Antipodes, 
Tho. Aq suppl. cue Art. 9  near three hundred years before. Yet these are the only men that are now judges of heresy, which makes modest Melchior Canus complain, 
Melchio● lib. 8. c●  Non video quonam consilio in cognition haereseos, parts postremae, ne dicam nullae theologis permittantur; jurisconsultis verò vel primae, vel etiam omnes. When as with us, 
1. Eliz.  not our Chancellors nor Commissaries, nor our Bishops alone may determine of heresy: and yet I believe any of them have as infallible assurance of truth, as immediate vocation, commission, assistance by inspiration, as all they; but only they are in orders, ours are not; as the twelve auditors of the overruling Court of the Rota are the Pope's Chaplains by their office, (as Lelius Zecchius de auditoribus Rotae) and so are those irrefragable referendaries: and the Popes find great good in having them in orders; for you shall not find, but the Canonists have always stood for the Pope's prerogative; but only in Concilio Pisano Guicciardine saith) they that were for the Council which was called against julius secundus, by some of Lewis the twelfthes' faction, 
Guicc. hist. l. 9  Che de canonisti autoritata del convocare i Concilii, nelle risedere solament, persona del Pontifice. But it was not so much the Canonists, as one principal one, which was Philippus Decius of Milan, where the Council began, 
Car. Mol. annot. in Deccis Consil. 37.  who defended the cause, as appears out of Carolus Molinaeus his Annotations upon Decius counsels; so that the Popes knew what they did, when they shown and granted so many favours and privileges to the University of Bononia; as Gregory the ninth dedicates his Decretals to Bononia, so Boniface the eight his sixth, and john the two and twentieth his Clementines, and Extravagants; thus they are formally qualified by orders; and because our Ecclesiastical officers are not so, some take and make these exceptions: so that I will conclude this brief Digression, with this wish, not altogether void of hope: I would more of our learned Civilians were Divines, 
Abbas Panorm. Lect. in Decr. 120.  or more of our judicious Divines Civilians, Cum Theologia & Ius Canonicum fraternizent.    

THE SECOND CONCLUSION. That under the dominion and protection of this Civil State, this State Ecclesiastical is most likely to enjoy all those rights that can any way belong unto it.  
THough they that sit at the tops and stearnes of States, amongst all their great and grave cares, do little regard the opinion or censure of private men, since they are no bound to give a reason of their laws, no● an account of their actions, their administration being absolute. Yet if by these laws, private persons deserve and suffer public punishment, not onl for offering private wrongs, but also for with-holdi● particular rights: surely these lawmakers and Administrators of justice, that will not suffer injuries unpunished, will be so fare from doing wrong, though it be but to poor and private men, that they will fear, though they cannot fly the suspicion of it, and be as careful to observe a just and geometrical proportion in the distribution of dues and duties. Now if private and common subjects are not only secure from injuries, but also according to due desert publicly regarded, and rewarded for their particular service to the commonwealth, though their aim be but at their own personal and private profit; one may safely conjecture, that the public and politic parts and pillars, the distinct and settled societies of that State shall be as strongly secured from detriment by wrongs, and as freely and fully favoured by advancement in rights. Yea it may be fully presumed, where a State is so framed, that they are all united in one head, without dependence and subordination to each other. As in a Monarchy, which with an equal impartial proportion, gives protection, distributes rewards; when as if their union and communion be continued by a collatorall relation, and mutuality of members, their equality of power and desert would breed emulation, if not envy and indignation, and make them ingrateful to each other, if they be not injurious. 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Arist. lib. 2. c. 12.  As it is where the government is Aristocratical, which may be seen in the envious ostracismes of the Athenian, Ephesian, Venetian States: Thucydides historicus in exilium pulsus erat, quae fortuna optimo cuique Optimatum Athenis accidere solet, (as Paulus jovius saith of the Venetian commonwealth. 
Cicero de Orat. lib. 2. ) Neminem temerè ex Optimatibus qui vel insigni virtute, vel spiritu in gerendis rebus, caeteris antecellat, potentem & clarum fieri patiuntur. 
jovius Histor. lib. 1. Machi vel. discur. l. 1 c. 29.  So that it is but a perverse and peevish paradox in machivel, to hold, that a princely Monarch uses to be more ungrateful, than free and popular States, when as they either return malice and mischief in reward of singular merits; or if suspicion, which he makes one ground of ingratitude, do not make them, at least to suspend them by a relegation; yet avarice, which is his other ground, will make them really ingrateful, though formally they pretend a reward. For if they give any thing, it will not be worth the taking, in statu populari & liberis civitatibus, praemia liberalitatis plus habent honoris quàm utilitatis; they bestow nothing but vain, vanishing, 
Bodi● pub●  empty, and aery titles, which are blown up, blown out, and blown away with the breath and voice of the vulgar that gave them, so that they do him that is gratifyed no right and real good: 
Aris● 2. ca●  〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; it is not gratifying to give things that are contemptible, for no man will confess that he hath need of them, but these toyish titles do men more harm than their ingratitude could. For titles without proportionable estates; do not only fall under the miserable succour of other men's pity, but are also a temptation to provoke all men to contemn them. But one main reason of this difference in rewarding is, that Aristocracies respect themselves in it, when as a Monarch to whom all give due and loyal respects, doth powerfully protect and royally reward with respect to all. But as all our modern Monarchies are distinguished into societies, as in some Kingdoms there are five States; 
Thesa● Apotel  as in Denmark, France, and in Britain three, which as they are subordinate and inferior one to another, so the supreme Governor doth regard and respect them with different degrees of favour and care, with consideration of what consequence they are to him, and so proportions pensions, and of what need they stand of him; and so affords protection, searching into the several circumstances of their employments and abilities, as of what use they are in point of necessity, utility, and honour. Now all these three States are necessary, profitable, and for honour of the Prince, but not equally at any time, nor constantly at all times; neither in respect of peace or war, domestic or foreign: so that as one state doth make itself more necessary in relation to an extraordinary time of need, so another may be more profitable in the continual supplying of ordinary expenses: and the third may be more for the honour of a King, both in ordinary and extraordinary actions. Now a King that prefers his honour before his profit, at all times will more respect that state which stands strongest for his honour at all times, then that which is more profitable at all times; so will he more esteem that which certainly supplies his ordinary continual charges, then that which may be more necessary, si coelum ruat, upon an extraordinary unlooked for occasion: because wisdom is not employed in preventing, and providing against what may be in possibility, but against what is likely in probability: so that in the natural body though there be more continual intercourse and mutuation of needful supplies reciprocally betwixt the head and the heart, especially from the heart: yet those external members that are nearest united to the head, have more external honour, as the eyes, the ears: so in the body politic, there is a constant interchange of succours and supplies between the state Civil and Ecclesiastical, 
His Majesty's instructions to the Bishops. 1626.  yet the state of the Nobility especially taken for the Council, is of highest assistance, which are as it were the eyes and ears of the King in public providence and intelligence, 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Zetzes Histor. Clibias. 1.  (as Dion Chrysostomus) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  
These principal Peers that are so closely united to the head, that they communicate with it in the most secret and serious advise, deservedly enjoy the fairest fortunes and favours; for it is great reason that Kings should heap and bestow upon the watchtowers of the state the greatest and highest honours in the state: that as they are nearest, so they may be dearest, being his right trusty and well beloved Counsellors. And their employment is no more immediately eminent than the trust of it troublesome and dangerous.  
§ 2 And the next state in high estimation with Christian Protentates, and with many the most esteemed in all respects is their Clergy, the state Ecclesiastical; upon which they have heaped favours to the very exhausting of their treasures. 
Tac● lib. 2  Imperium amore religionis semetipsum exhausisse, etc. I am not able to reach the reason in point of state, of that extraordinary extravagant large liberality: but thus much I am able to compass and conceive, and shall endeavour to make it plain; that whatsoever right and reason any King in Europe hath had for this 400 years to uphold his Clergy, and confer favours and honours upon it; our present supreme head of our Civil state hath all that right, and more reason to be as royally indulgent to our present state Ecclesiastical, as none can deny: but as he that hath chiefty of power over the whole body of the Commonwealth, may rightly and justly favour, bestow rewards, privileges and power upon any public society, or private person in the same: so none will affirm that all that have supreme power have the same equality of right, to endow with privileges, or enrich with rewards; because that all do grant that all Kings have not Dominion in the same equal altitude and latitude, and so cannot so highly advance in privileges, lest they surmount their petty prerogative: nor so largely give them power and revenues, lest their extension shorten their own. And the grounds of this inequality are divers, in handling of which I will neither follow machivel, nor junius Brutus; because I find them to run into two extremes, the one granting it to all out of the looseness of a wanton wit; the other denying it to all, being carried by the stream of innumerous particular authorities; & that because, as the other wanted conscience, so he wanted experience: or rather because machivel lived when all Princes in Italy claimed and usurped equal and full power, and so writ what they did, not what they should do; and Brutus might endeavour to diminish the power of all, because he would not have the French King have so much, which he might think too much for the present: if he considered it with the times before Lewis the eleventh, wherein as the Peers and Parliaments had too much, so the Kings had too little: so that their difference of Dominion is not according to that fullness Princes can make it when they are once in possession of a Kingdom; nor according to that diminution wherewith disloyal subjects impair it, when they threaten and raise a rebellion; but it is according to the several means whereby they attain or obtain their Kingdom. Now all supreme Dominion in a Monarchy is attained by conquest or succession, or obtained by election: Kings that come to it by the right of conquest may have as much power as they will take; they make their own Charters: those that come to it by succession have as much power as their ancestors, accepting of such laws as they find; those that have it by bequest, 
Cujacius observ. lib. 7. cap. 7.  and are adopted heirs (for adoption is good by last will and testament) have the same right that a natural successor hath, if the adoption stand good. 
Hottoman. illustr. quaest. 1.  As the Kingdom of France was given to Edward the third by Charles the sixth: but those that are called to it only by election, their power is restrained and kerbed with cautionary conditions, and stands limited by them.  
Now if all these have great power in their supreme government, by any one of these rights to attain a Kingdom; surely he that hath it by all these rights conjoined, hath more power than any hath that is entitled to it but by one, 
Brissonius de Regno Persico. lib. 1.  especially by election. But our present gracious Sovereign hath it by lineal succession from an absolute Conqueror, which was confirmed to his father of pious memory, by the Nuncupative will of his sacred predecessor, 
Anno jacobi: A just recogni●on of an undoubted succession.  who then adopted him, and all was made sure unto him by the elective assent of the supreme Nobility, without any crosse-course conditions, (as falls out) when the soldiers or people elect. And as it is plain that he holds by all these, so I do conceive I could make it appear, that most Kings in Christendom hold primarily and principally but by one of these, and that of least power. But that I am loath to touch the ticklish and tender titles of foreign Potentates; neither will I speak any thing of them as their states now stand, but only in a word show what anciently they were: for in my poor judgement their government may be as good and lawful, if they have had the power and opportunity to cast off and free themselves from these bridles and curbs of government: for not the most limited power, but the best rectified is safest both for Prince and people.  
§ 3 To show then how it was with them heretofore, and to begin with the Empire after it was translated to the Almain. Long hath that Empire continued by the election of the high Chamber of the Septem-viri, the seven selected Electors of Germany; and some of the best Emperors have so well liked it, that they have not only been willing to take the promissarie oath containing divers strict conditions, but have also granted them new free Charters; and large prerogatives; as Charles the 4. in his Bulla aurea, and so held so lose and light a hand over them, that one of the Electors, the Bishop of Mentzes, in the Council at Frankford, said, the government was Aristocratical, which might be well taken if he meant it with reference to the Council. 
Clap Arca lib. 5 Com● 10. 〈◊〉 Gra● cia l. man● Guic hist. Iere●  The Kingdom of France seems not to have been anciently so absolute and unrestrained as now it is, for the twelve Peers of France, qui sunt ut in Germania principes electores, had not only royal privileges, and did not owe simple subjection, but respective homage; and had a regal authority in their several Provinces, and the command of the chief forces: but also had the power, if not to elect their King, (as Nauclerus saith) and as it seems true, because they have deposed them; yet to determine, when there is no great doubt who shall succeed: and their setting always upon an heir male (which is the course of elective state) shows it to be somewhat elective; for the restraining of it to the heir male, did not primarily proceed from the Salic law, because many of their Kings have been Lorraines; 
Hottoman. apollogia Catholica. §. 6.  which Dukes, (the French Civilians say) do not observe, nor are under the Salic law: but if it be not elective, it seems not to be so clear a succession, because it is a masculine feud entailed upon the heir male: yea the predominant extravigant power of the Parisian Parliament seems to intimate, that the ancient state was not so free and absolute a Monarchy; for they called in the King's edicts, sent forth the contrary: and no appeal lay from their sentence. Contra illud tantum supplicare licet, a petition of right only was permitted; 
Gymerus Comment. in prag. sanct. tit. de autoritate Conciliorum.  so that this state which is most absolute of all others, seems to have been anciently not so free and uncontroleable in its government, as a free Monarchy ought to be. The next is the Kingdom of Spain, which hath of old been so disquieted with the continual incursions and invasions of the Moors and Saracens from the South, and Goths from the North, that it hath scarce time to settle, as water tossed. But when it did pitch upon the form of a Monarchy, it was elective, as appears out of the Council of Toledo; 
Condil. Toletan. 5. cap. 3.  Si quis ad Regiae Majestatis pervenire fastigia ambit absque electione nobilitatis Anathema sit: yea and in their latter days their form of inauguration, doth import and imply the same: for thus it runs, Nos qui vale mos, tanto comme vos, y podemos mas quae vos, vos elegemos. 
Hieronymus de Blanca de Hist. ●egamine.  Rey, con estas, y estas conditiones, intra vos, y nos: yea and the Justice of Arragon hath had as much power as ever the Parliament of Paris; as in plain, not only in their unlimited immunities, but also the power they used against the King's edicts: as may be seen in their writs, called los manifestadoes, y iure firmos; from which power, 
Idem Thua  though the Inquisition have freed the Kings since Ferdinando: yet I do not conceive how that state should be more free than before, because it is under the power of a tyrannical Inquisition. So that the Kings of Spain had done more providently in preventing their prevailing greatness, if we consider their domestic freedom in government; though their advancement may advantage them to bring foreign states under their servitude. But it was hard to hinder them from at least so much power as they were able to take from the other, so that Tully had no great reason to ask Atticus, (and that in Greek as a secret, 
Ad A 9 ep  not to be understood of any that should intercept his letters) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, few doubt it, and this may be most unquestionable with Spain, witness Naples and Milan. These Inqiusitors are like Ephori in the Spartaine republic, whose Kings are observed to have the most restrained power: 
Thu●  for the chief of these Inquisitors hath a great power over the King in his own Court. Inquisitor generalis, qui Aulam Regiam sequitur, 
Thes lit.  cum adjunctis conciliarijs Ecclesiastici ordinis potestatem contra ipsum Regem usurpari potest: so that by all this it is plain, that the Spanish Monarchy hath not long been a free Monarchy at home. But that which makes most, to prove these states not absolute, is because an appeal will lie from any of them to the Optimates and orders of their Kingdoms, for extrema provocatio is one principle; inter summa iura imperii: 
Clap Arc● lib.  In imperio tamen Germanico, (ut testantur pragmatici) ad sacram & supernam Cameram provocatur, apud Gallos ad octo curias matores, apud Hispanos ad quatuor curias; even as a general Council is above the Pope being elective. As for the other states of European Monarchies, without all question they are at this present elective; as Poland which made their King Miecislaus send Lampartus Bishop of Cracovia to Pope Benedict the seaventh, ut Regem se Polonorum & posteros suos esse iuberet, 
Herbert. histor. Poloniae lib. 1.  sed ea res propter iustas causas, ad aliquod tempus dilata fuit: yea, it was never obtained, but it still continues elective; Moderata est principis Poloniae potestas, 
Thuaenus hist. lib. 50●.  quia non naturae legibus in paternum regnum succedit, sed communibus suffragiis senatorii & equestris ordinis & publica exclamatione nobilitatis eligitur. Hungary also is elective, although the Spaniard hath entailed it upon the match with the Infanta, which will easily be cut off, and suffer a recovery into the former freedom. In Hungaria liberam habent electionem, 
Cominaeus lib. 10. Coment.  & inde ab eius morte proceri Budae conveniunt: I might show the like of Denmark, but no more of that, I know not how this may be taken; but I hope well, because in this I deliver only what is licenced intelligence, even as Honorius and Theodosius did interdict, ne alicuius regni arcana scrutarentur; 
Guiccardino Hypomneses Polit. 106.  but it was with this Proviso: Legatus tamen reversus omnia narrare debet.  
§ 4 These instances are sufficient to prove that our present Prince hath most unresistible power, and so most unrestrained right to favour, and freely bestow immunities, privileges, and revenues upon any single society, or singular person within his Dominions. Now the next thing to be proved is, that as he hath more right to show favour to what state he will; so he hath more reason than they all to favour his Clergy most. This government of our King is not more free in itself than it is freely and willingly sustained; which shows that it is the ancient equal, and as it were the most natural government of this Island, and therefore the power is most right; because naturallized by custom when as in other Kingdoms, yea in many petty particular states; that little power they have improved by force, they keep and exercise by the same means. Hence it is that they dare only trust foreigners to be their guards: as the French have the Scots, and Suitzers; the Dukes of Florence, the low Dutch, which choice doth either proceed from tyranny in the Kings, or perfidiousness in the nation, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, as for instance, 
Arist. R 1. cap.  the first Dukes of Florence were esteemed no less, for it was libell-wise written over the door of Cosmus, De Medici's (the first Duke) where he was sick, and took physic, qui Medicè vivit, miserè vivit, which they understood of the Medicean tyranny, both in respect of his fears, and their wrongs in his oppression. And in this age there were some, that would have brought an Italian guard into France and Scotland, but it was when they aspired to usurp them both; 
Thuan● lib. 23.  Guisiani Italorum custodias quòd assuetis negotiis suis, non satis fiderent, adhibent, sui potiùs quàm regni, aut regis munimento; when as our Kings have found out by long experience that to be true, which Dion chrysostom told Trajane the Emperor, 
Dion Ch 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, so that they regard no guard, but the love of the subject. But to return: It is no small encouragement to me, before I argue it in any point, and a strong argument for me, that a sacred Sovereign hath and doth prove it true, in his most royal and religious practice. For I do not believe, that there hath been any Emperor, Monarch, or Potentate since Charles the first and the great, that did ever so truly and constantly favour, and carefully protect a poor Clergy as he hath done. But let us consider what great reason of this favour there is: wherein I will not search vainly into his Majesty's particular reasons, for I should not be able to find them out, because a King's heart is not to be sounded and searched by a private head, that is not able to conceive the height of their ends: but I will discourse of it a he is our King; ●f from a single relation, there do arise as singular respect, surely a double portion of respect will follow a double relation. Now this Aristocratical Clergy have not only relation to their Prince, as he is a crowned King and they his lawful subjects, but also as he is the Lords anointed, defender of the faith, according to his just title (as his Majesty pleases to speak in his declaration before the Articles.) For they also are the Lords anointed, delivering that faith; and the Primate of them, the immediate instrument of his consecration; so that as by the crowning, they are by right his subjects, so this anointing of God, superinduceth a brotherhood betwixt Kings and Bishops (as Sr Francis Bacon in his Book to King james) for this relation is only ancient in our Kings amongst the Princes of Christendom; for though, as our Sovereign is crowned by the Archbishop of Canterbury, so the Emperors when they were Kings of France, began to be anointed and crowned by the Archbishops of Mentz, Collen, and Trier, as they were Emperors; and by the Archbishop of Rheims, as they were Kings of France. Yet the Kings of France of the first line, at least, were not anointed (as one of the freest Historians confesses) De la primiere Lignèe oinct ny sacre à Rheims. 
Girarddu Hallon des affords l. 2.  And though the Kings of Spain are crowned by the Archbishop of Toledo, the Kings of Denmark by the Archbishop of Vpsale, the Kings of Polonia by the Archbishop of Guesire, the Kings of Hungary by the Archbishop of Strigon, the Kings of Navarre by the Bishop of Pampolune, yet none of them were anciently anointed. Now it cannot be denied, but as this real relation doth more peculiar and appropriate the State Ecclesiastic to our King, 
Vid. Legibus saucti Edvardi.  so it makes him not only the supreme head and governor, but also the chief guide and guardian: for by it he is more than a mere Layman; he is a mixed person, having supreme Ecclesiastic as well as Civil government, Reges sancto oleo uncti sunt spiritualis iurisdictionis capaces. Which sentence was applied to our King, in the time of Edward the third: 
33. Ec● Aide l● grime 12. §.  And Guymer in his Comment on the pragmatical sanction of France, is peremptory quòd Reges inuncti non sunt meri Laici; and adds, inde Reges Angliae conferunt beneficia. So that by this is there some addition granted to the power of Princes over the Church. Though the old gloss upon the Clementines avouch, quòd unctio nil addit ad potestatem Imperatoris, which the Gregorian edition of the Common Law did well to dislike, 
Cleme● tit. 6. Regis.  but they should have done better, not to have given a worse. And if it add to their power over the Church, then as they have more right by it, so they have more reason from it to do what good they please for the Clergy. So that, do but consider the quality and qualifications of our King's person, to do for his Clergy, and you will say, he hath greatest reason of any Prince. Consider again the reasons on the part of the present State Ecclesiastical, and you shall find, that they deserve more of their Prince, than any Clergy these four hundred years.  
§. 5. But I must presuppose before that will be granted, that our Monarch of great Britain hath not any reason to give or bestow means and revenues upon any foreign State Ecclesiastical. No Prince hath reason to bestow ●is free favours upon any, over whom he hath (for the present) no right to rule, nor hath heretofore promised it, neither by himself, or by his predecessors, and thereby bound himsesfe to farther and favour them. So that, though the Roman Clergy doth claim and clamour for revenues and privileges from our King, yet as they have no right to claim them, so they have no reason to expect them: for they are so fare from being his deserving domestic subjects, that they are his deadly enemies, though they be imbred and homebred. They have not then any right; for neither our K. nor any of his lawful predecessors, did ever bind themselves to any such performances. Later & better learned writers of the Romish faction, finding by the careful and curious examination of sundry passages in infinite interpreters, how hard a thing it was, to prove their universal supremacy in temporalibus, by direct evidence out of God's word, resolve to prove it by Charter-grant, and privilege from Prince's pieties, as Augustinus Steucus (Librarian to Pope Paul the third) sets down the claim the Pope laid to all the kingdoms in Christendom, grounding all from the particular grants from the Kings, but especially Boniface the eights letter of Demands. As for instance, from Constantine the first and the best, one Phocas the first and the worst, from the universal gifts of those universal Emperors, they ground a general right in all kingdoms. The Bononian Canonists deal cunningly, and seem to deal ingenuously, playing the sophisters more than the sycophants in this point, discoursing of this donation of Constantine; for they lay it down as a presupposed presumption in the Law: That there is such a true deed, notwithstanding there be no mention made of it in any part of the sincere Civil Law. Sed quae notabiliter fiunt, specialiter notanda sunt. But they never question it de facto, but inquire quo iure, and, a sit revocabile; and since they do not full affirm, that he gave it up ● will not so much as show the falsity of it, but refer all to the most judicious and modestly moderate amongst them. But for Phocas his grant, 
Cov●●●u vias 〈◊〉. quest. c. 1 mem. 9 Decius Consil. 130.  a faithless usurping tyrant, I leave it to be judged of, by those that choose to measure claims and titles, by the line of equity, and not by the Last of ambition. Yet thus I will infer against it, that a Charter granted as this was, chief upon a ground of cunning, with a purpose to maintain a plot, by party, which was undertaken and begun by fraud, might have been after revoaked by himself, or annulled or repealed by his successors. And farther I say, that though this grant were authentic in all points, yet the Popes could have no right to this kingdom by it, because this kingdom was excluded from the care, protection and providence of the Roman Empire, near two hundred years before Phocas. For Aelius L. Lieutenant for Valentimanus in the parts of France, 
Poly● cap. 1  sent word to the Britain's, that they were to look for no more aid from the Empire, which was fallen into faction, scarce able to support itself, being thus abandoned, all laws did free them from duty and dependence. 
Baron nal. 4  But to make these general grants the stronger, they pretend particular grants from our own Kings, as from Ina King of the West Saxons, that was indeed religious, and from King john, that was impious, as well sans foye, as his title was sans terre (as the King of France, 
Math 1216.  Philip the second said) johannes nunquam fuit verus Rex; neither of these bind our State; for ●he Peterpences contributed to Rome by Ina, are called in the laws of Conatus, Larga Regis benignitas: and in the abstract (which is the best of the confessors and conquerors decrees) Regis Eleemosynae, which imports not due nor duty, but charity, and the Popes to be his beadsman, not the King to be his homager. There were many manifest nullities in King john's grant, for he had no right to hold the Kingdom, and if he had held it by right, yet he could not grant any thing in prejudice of the whole State, without the consent Regni universitatis, (as Matthew Paris termeth the Parliament) and a third mullitie is in the force of the grant, where, whatsoever is passed in the body of the grant, is resumed by this proviso in the conclusion, 
Math. ibidem  Salvis nobis & haeredibus nostris, justitiis liberalitatibus & regalibus nostris: which being luckily inserted salves all, and makes it absolutely void. But the main grant which Baronius relies upon, is a donation from Ethelulphus King of the West Saxons which seems very lawful, if it were (as he saith) salubri consilio Episcoporum & Principum, 
Baron. Annal. Anno. 854.  but yet that deed (if we free it from being forged) was void, if you do but consider amongst many other things, the incompetency and incapacity of the person, to whom the deed was made. Now Baronius is peremptory, that it was made to the immediate successor of Leo the fourth, which according to all the truest writers of the Pope's lives, was john the eight, which they conclude was a woman fu una donna natio de Inghilterra che vacata là sede Apostolica, 
Petro de Mexia della silva cap, 9  per la morte di Leon quarto, fu eletta per sonno Pontifice di Roma (as Petro de Mexia) and Boccacio de las mugeres illustres: the King might perhaps have done much for his country woman, if he had known it, but she was not capable to receive such a deed to her use, and therefore, the jurists have reason to make this question, 
Hottoman. quaest. illust. 17.  Vtrum acta Iohannis octavi in papatu rata esse debent: And if what she did was void, what was done for her i● not firm, being it was given, supposing she was capable. So it is plain, that this engine is not able to uphold this claim, being so lose, and hanging together in the joints like sick men's dreams, showing their inconsiderate inconstant humours, their proofs being as weak as their imagination is strong, all standing upon slender supposals, particular interest, making partial. But they have another ground for a presumption of their right, because some poor oppressed Princes have desired to hold their kingdoms from them, as some usurpers sought to obtain dominions by their gift, who depose Kings, that they may dispose of their kingdoms. But this is nothing, and they stand not upon it, but when they have nothing else to say. I do not by this go about to deny, that our Kings have been bountiful Benefactors to the Roman Clergy, but this only I stand upon, that they have no reason to continue so still, since they were never lawfully bound to it. Neither do I deny, that any Prince should confer favours upon some foreign Ecclesiastical State with this caution, that he be not prejudiced by the kindness, & may have so good use of their thankfulness: As suppose any Prince should be called into Germany, or Italy, 
Dies nu● transit, 〈◊〉 aliquod p● fecerit, s● ut Aera● non eve● (ut de Se● Lampr.  or any other kingdom, by an oppressed State Ecclesiastical, that Prince may do royally to invest them into their former spiritual possessions, and yet never impoverish or enslave his own kingdom to them, and also bind them to him for protection. Thus did Pipine, Charles the great, Lodovicus pius, they relieved the Roman Clergy, and bestowed very much upon them in large territories, but they gave them nothing in France, but only what they recovered for them in Italy: it is then evident, 
Guicc li hist. Ita●  that our King hath no reason to bestow honour or power, revenues or privileges upon any foreign State Ecclesiastical; and it is as plain, that he hath the greatest reason of any Prince in Christendom to bestow them all upon his own domestic Clergy.  
§. 6. The Nobility and the Clergy are the prime pillars of a Monarchy, and the Commonalty is the ground whereon they stand. And this they well know that intent the ruin of it, for they will be sure to strike at these two props, knowing that than it will fall, and the ground and foundation remain to them to erect anew; (as Ball a Masse-Priest, Chaplain to Wat Tyler, advised his chieftane to destroy all the Clergy and Nobility; so Garnet did the Traitors in the powder-plot, (as the Earl of Northampton well observeth:) and therefore Philip the second of Spain, who was seldom in an error about the upholding or enlarging a Monarchy, advises his son Philip the third, to stick fast to the Clergy, los Clerigos amigo, as I have been; but yet so, as you disregard not the Nobility, otherwise they will hate you, and envy them, and ruin all. Now if the Kings of Spain have reason so highly to favour their Clergy, as to fear, lest their kindness to them, should kindle indignation in the Nobility; surely our Prince hath more reason so highly to secure his Clergy, as that it may not be the object of the contempt of the vulgar. For the Clergy of Spain and all the Romish faction are not simply subject to them, but deny Civil obedience always to their Prince, where Canonical obedience commands the contrary, or privileges above it; when as our Clergy, are as true subjects as any State, & renounce all obedience to any other Potentate. So that this hearty adherence to his Majesty, is one reason, yea they bestow all their labours in God's service, only in dominions expect favour from none but his highness; and they are more beneficial to their King than any Clergy in Christendom to his native Prince, or any State in this kingdom to the Crown. For though the revenues of other Clergies, as of Spain, be infinitely above ours, 
Nicholaus Ol●ev●● de regno Hispaniae.  as one of their Historians, Opens Ecclesiasticorum paenè aequales sunt secularium unà cum Regis. Yet they are not so constantly beneficial to the King, but to the Pope: and if the King get any good sum or subsidy out of them, it is either la cruzada, or tenths called el excusado, granted to him by the Pope's indulgence; or if he cannot procure a Bull of faculty, he must get all they give by striving and force (as Cardinal de Ossat in his letter to Henry 4. 
Ossatns epist. 274.  of France speaks of Philip the thirds sacrilege.) Rex Hispaniae omnem argenteam supellectilem Ecclesiarum & Ecclesiasticorum sacrilega manu usurpare tentat: when as our Clergy, which have not the tithe of the tenth part of that means is not only now and then profitable in small matters. And if Francis 1. believed that for a great kindness from Pope Leo the tenth, in their conference at the interview, to have the tenths of Ecclesiastical live in France for one year; 
Guicc. hist. lib. 12.  as Guicciardine in a judicious slighting of the favour: Promise se il Pontifice, all re dargli faculta, di riscuotere, per vn anno la decima delle cheise, deal Ream, de Francia that the King took the proposal into consideration, and communicated it to his Council; who thought it a great benefit if he might have them, non secundum antiquum valorem beneficiorum, 
Concord's liae tit. d libus.  but as they are improved; surely a fare greater benefit it is to have the tenth every year: Subsides most years, and first fruits the first year, and that not according to the present value which is much fallen from the ancient revenues, but according to the Pope's books, in most, when as Ecclesiastical preferments are abated half in half. So that as all other states are more charged, so their revenues are improved accordingly; but the means of the Clergy is much impaired, and yet their charges increased in many things; in all things keep the old rate, so that notwithstanding the poverty (as S Nicholas Bacon at the Council table) we have no reason to exact or expect any subsidy from the spiritualty, who are so exhausted; yet it is constantly the most beneficial state of this Realm to the Crown, both in ordinary and extraordinary revenues. In these two considerations amongst many, we see they deserve much, and there is one thing that makes it more safe for our King to bestow greater honour and privileges upon them, than any other Prince; which is, because he hath not the reason to suspect them of ambitions aspiring to a Monarchy, since they have cast off their Church Monarchies, as the Romans never suspected any of a tyrannical usurpation, after they had by one consent cast out the Kings: so that though the Pope seem to favour the Clergy upon good reason, yet our King hath as much, and this reason more than the Pope hath, for he hath not only all the power of jurisdiction the Pope had over them, 
1. Eliz.  but also the revenues also the Pope had from them: and yet is without fear and danger of being rebelled against by them, or dis-throned. But in one thing it is more capable of a royal Potentate's bounty and protection, than any foreign Clergy is, in respect of its own Civil supreme head, or any state in our own Kingdom is of our King; and that is, that it is so poor and obvious to injuries, that it will make the ordinary bounty of a Prince magnificent, and make his power long, and delight to protect such an innocent state, being neither able to resist, nor strong to endure and suffer wrongs: thus from the power of Dominion passeth the influence of protection.   

THE THIRD CONCLUSION. That all the rights and respects that the state Ecclesiastical enjoys or desires are originally derived from their relation and dependence on the Civil.  
HE that hath public power and an opportunity to do a great good turn for endearing a private friend that depends upon him, will have much ado to forbear to do it, though the weal public suffer some detriment by it. Yet if his friend do so much tender the public good, that he will not desire any thing to the prejudice of it; surely then the public person out of his engagements and respects to the public good, will leave off his present purpose and pleasure his favourite in some things that may do him good, and the Commonwealth no harm. Even so our supreme Regent of great Britain, hath great and transcendent power, and never wants an opportunity to do good, & bestow favours upon the well deserving state of the Clergy; and it were impossible for him to hold his royal bountiful hand, if this Clergy should not in all its petitions; consider the public good, apprehending itself as a member of the Civil state. And hence it is, that though the King hath more power than I believe was ever tried, or can be defined, to do his Clergy good, yet they have not any thing conferred upon them; which is not according to the laws, customs, and liberties of this Commonwealth. All that the state Ecclesiastical enjoys, belongs to it as to a principal member of the body politic; and is derived to it from the supreme Civil head on which it doth depend, and in whom it is united to the Civil state. It is no debasing or derogation to a spirituality, to be thus subject to the Dominion of a sacred Sovereign; for though servitude according to the Civilians proceed not from the law of nature, but of Nations, or at lest from nature corrupted, (as the Schools) yet orderly subjection and superiority proceed from the instinct of pure nature: for in Heaven there is order amongst the blessed Angels, and in the state of innocency there was superiority, not only betwixt man and all other creatures, but also betwixt man and woman; and had they lived in Paradise till there had been father and son, there should have been Patria potestas, or else the fifth Commandment is not moral: and when there had been many families, there must necessarily have been Regiae potestas, or else the best and most happy life must have been without the greatest happiness of life, which is order. Now the superiority of our Prince over his Clergy is not an enslaving tyranny, but a sweet and a lawful Sovereignty, which government as it is due, so it is our duty to obey it; for government and obedience are relatives of equal extent. And as it is no disparagement to the state Ecclesiastical to be subject to our supreme Magistrate, so it is great benefit to the Clergy, and a satisfaction to the Laiety, that all the rights and respects that they enjoy or desire, are derived from that Prince whom both so willingly obey.  
§ 2 All that the state Ecclesiastical doth enjoy or claim, may be reduced to these two heads; of power, and of honour: and they derive these from one sole supreme governor, who is fully qualified by his personal eminent authority, to transfer and confer these rights and respects to them, and upon them: for as these two the power and honour of the Clergy are inseparably derived from the supreme Sovereign, then in being, and not communicable to any other state: so the particular powers and regalities by which they are more especially conveyed; are inseparably and incommunicably appropriated to his royal person. As for instance, the power of the state of the Clergy is originally derived from his Ecclesiastical supremacy, the honours from his laws and royal prerogative. All Kings I confess have not Ecclesiastical government, and that because many give up their right; some know it not, as many of our Kings for many years were bereft of it, in whole, or in some principal parts, by giving and granting to the Pope an inch in breadth with them, and he taking an ell in height above them. But when the first defender of the faith Henry the eighth was weary of the weight of that intolerable usurpation, especially when he perceived that the Pope's ambition soared upon the wings and wind of the spiritual supremacy, to a temporal superiority; The King like julius Caesar, that he might fully recover into his power the temporality, potestatem Pontificiam, 
jacob origin §. 9  cum Caesaria potentia coniunxit: he resumed the Ecclesiastical power, finding that it was impossible in the course of the modern policy of the Popes, to be supreme agent in temporal affairs, while they were the highest in spiritual government; especially since these powers cannot rest really divided in a Monarchy, though they be really distinct in a Monarch being a mixed person. So that the statutes in the vicesimo quintò of Henry the eighth, and primo of Elizabeth, which determinately set down this power of supremacy, are not laws inductory of a new, but declaratory of the ancient authority of our Prince, with the solemn signification of their reas-sumption. And our sacred Sovereign doth not alone take this power for his right, but many other Potentates in Christendom that have not so much reason: As the Kings of France, Spain, 
Thesaurus Polit. Apoteles. 50. Guiceiardino hist. lib. 4.  Denmark, Poland, Hungary, and Sicily: which three last states have more nearer dependence upon the Pope than any in Europe; for Sicily hath been held of him as a spiritual feud, as Poland and Hungary were both in one Pope's days. Benedict the seaventh converted from Paganism, 
Herbert. histor. Poloniae lib. 2. cap. 7.  and one would think, and so it seems wholly at the Pope's disposal, especially in spiritual affairs. Yet in Sicily the Kings of Spain do not only claim supremacy of over-seeing, but also superintendency in doing in Ecclesiastical employments; 
Baron. Anal. Anno 1209.  and the Kings of Poland, whose power is moderated by the limits and conditions of an election; 
Thuanus hist. lib. 56.  Archiepiscopos, Episcopos coenobiarchas dicunt, suoque arbitrio eligunt: and the Kings of Hungary do use the same power, and with as much reason (in a Canonists opinion) as we do, for though they cannot de iure, yet, Reges Angliae & Hungariae conferunt beneficia & privilegi● Papae. 
Guymer. Comment. prag. sanct. tit. de Innatis.  The Kings of France have always been at defiance with the Pope for this power, renewing continually pragmatical sanctions in defence of it, especially in the time of Charles the seaventh, therefore called Carolina sanctio: 
Duarenus pro libertate Eccles. Gallicanae. §. 4.  which was of that force by virtue of that approbation of the free Council of Basile, that it kerbed and cashiered the Pope's power, causing them to impeach it by appealing from it almost in all causes; which Pius the second perceiving, solicited Lewis the eleventh the son of Charles, to abolish and repeal that sanction, 
Concordat. Galliae Leonina Constit.  being enacted in a seditious schismatical conventicle, which he well approved for a general Council when he was a private Aeneus Silvius, Secretary to Frederick the third. The King for the present called it in, but his wisdom presently found the mischief, and rewarded Cardinal Balve very well for urging him to it; as the Pope's Legate, 
Prot● gis ad cil. 〈◊〉 apud histor Phili lib. 9 Conc● Guic● hist. 〈◊〉  Rex Cardinalem Balvam in carcerem detrusit ob detrimentum, consilio suo emergens; and with so much displeasure, that Philip de Comynes saith, Cardinalis Balvensis carcerem horrendum excogitavit in quem inclusus primùm erat & quatuordecem annos detentus, non obstante Pontifice Romano. The Kings of France were ever after stout in the defence of that sanction, till Francis the first; in his interview with Leo the tenth, did remit the force of it in the Concordata Galliae; which made his serious Secretary Budaeus say, Palladium Galliae proditum esse. 
Budae lib. 5  The Kings of Spain in Casteile have some limited spiritual power, by a late privilege of Adrian the sixth, granted to Charles the fifth; but when they see their time, 
Mar● della  they take so much as shall serve their turn; as Philip the second seized upon the temporals of the Archbishopric of Toledo, (the Bishop Caranza being apprehended for suspicion of new heresy) and when Sixtus Quintus sent to him to undertake a war against England, and told him that he would remit to him all the revenues that arose of that Bishopric, seed vacant prudentissimus princeps respondet se nil de suo Pontifici largiri: 
Thu● lib. 7  & though at home his power is but what he pleases to take, yet in other of his territories it is lawfully as large as another Princes; as in Burgundy and Belgia he hath the same right the King of France once had, as Charles the fifth made a statute of Mortmanie. Nullis personis Ecclesiasticis, vel locis sacris licet ullam rem immohilem, 
Thes lit. 4  absque principis licentia acceptare, vel habere. And Philip the second his son publishing the Council of Trent in the Low-Countries, did not let it pass in all points with the full strength of an Ecclesiastical law, but restrained it with an express clause of special privision, that it should in no wise prejudice or diminish any privilege the King enjoyed touching possessary judgements or Ecclesiastical live, or concerning nomination thereunto. 
Boter. Heroic. quast. lib. 1.  But I will not now inquire whether our Prince hath such a supreme power iure positivo Pontificio; I am sure it is iure divino Apostolico: and supposing such a power, I will for more distinct proceeding, consider the several streams and strings of this Ecclesiastical power; and how they flow and are fastened to the head and top of Sovereignty, paralleling them in the several parts and points of this honour, discovering how they are annexed to these powers, and how they arise, are raised and stand by his Majesty's laws and Regal prerogative.  
§ 5 All power Ecclesiastical is either power of order, or of jurisdiction, 
Durandus de origine jure Civ. conclus. 2.  and both these depend upon the power of supremacy. For though these powers of order and jurisdiction be immediately derived from Christ the mystical head of the Church, in respect of their institution, commission, internal qualification, and deputation to persons to perform them; yet they are mediately derived from our Prince, the ministerial head of our particular Church, in relation to their execution. For the power of order cannot be lawfully exercised in these dominions, without the licence and permission from the power of jurisdiction; which power is originally derived from the King's dominion, 
1. Eliz. cap. 1.  over Ecclesiastical causes and persons. So that it is plain in general, that they are dependant on his Crown and supremacy: To omit the jurisdiction in foro conscientiae, that depends upon the power of order, I will for a more particular view of this dependent derivation, consider the several proper acts and works of this Ecclesiastical supremacy, which (as I conceive) may be reduced to these four. The first work is reformation of the Church in Doctrine, manners, and ceremonies. The second is convocations of Counsels and Synods, for the reformation. The third is promulgation of the laws and edicts, proceeding either from his Highness' pleasure in public declarations, or the Canons & constitutions decreed or confirmed in his Counsels. The 4th is, in receiving of appeals, & giving definite, determinate decisions, restitutions, and deprivations belonging to causes & persons Ecclesiastical. Now all these acts have their effects in the power of jurisdiction; for the reforming power of it, is ordinarily & perpetually derived to Archbishops & B. de iure, to Arch-deacons and Deans, de consuetudine, to be executed by them in their Provincial, Triennial, and Annual visitations: but it is principally restrained to the correction of manners. This power is extraordinarily ad tempus granted to the Church representative in Convocation. It is not turned into a running regency, rolling round to every particular Presbyter, though it be not an ordinary standing court, the calling of which is the second work of supremacy. To this Convocation thus called, there is given power and licence, to deliberate of, to order, and do all such things as shall concern the settled continuance of the doctrine and discipline of the Church of England, obtaining his Majesty's royal consent in the proceeding and determinations (as it is plain in his Highness' declaration.) And the laws they make, take their first force from the work of his promulgation. But before I proceed any farther, I must of necessity take a little time (though to some it may seem an impertinent parenthesis) rejoicingly to consider the gracious countenance, our pious Prince so freely shows to this discountenanced, disabled house of Convocation. Little did any think, (no not that able absolute Statesman, the last Lord-Chancellour, though wished it) that his Majesty could have been so fully and faithfully informed of the ancient power and privileges of it, as to think of restoring them, seeing not only in the opinion of the people, but also in the practice of the lower house of Parliament it hath been long dismembered from that high Court, and lost all the power and privileges as escheated to the same, insomuch, that it is questioned by some, whether ever it was a member of the Parliament or no. But it seems his Majesty did soon apprehend it to be an essential part of it, and upon a short search discovered, that though heretofore it was a member, whose nerves were wrested, distorted, distracted and racked from its natural head, by extension to a foreign: yet there was no dissolutio continui (as the Physicians speak) from the head, and therefore not from the collateral members; and seeing it was but a discontented discontinuance that did cause it to be suspected and suspended, it being now again contracted and knit most firmly to the head, is united as closely to the members, & may safely exercise and enjoy all the power and privileges that did of right belong unto it, with the Parliament; for though it was no reason, that it should have the privileges of the Parliament, when it was distracted from it, and assembled without it by virtue of the Pope's Legates writ, and so the power and purpose of it was foreign, and justly came within the compass of a Praemunire, for the Clergy than was no true member of the commonwealth, and so the Convocation cut off from the Parliament; yet when as it is now assembled with it by the same writ of the King, and the Parliament is not complete without it, being one of the three Orders, and that State which makes it have competent power in matters Ecclesiastical, that it is not a mere temporal Court, and that in the judgement of those that had least reason so to esteem it; for we find 1. Philip. & Mariae, c. 8. 
1 Phil. & Mar. c. 8.  That the Legate of julius the third took great care to have Statutes repealed, made against the Pope's supremacy, wherein he granted them to be authentically made, and consequently, that they had Ecclesiastical power to enact them, otherwise by reason of nullity, they had been canceled and abrogated in themselves. And Antonius de Florebellis, an Italian Prelate in his Panegyric, de restituta religione in Anglia saith, it is done honorifico universi Anglorum consilii decreto, in which speech, 
Florebe● rat. ad Marian  he supposed their power to decree it, which he would not have done, if he had held it to be a mere temporal Court; and he must necessarily have so accounted it, if he did not reckon the upper and lower Convocation Houses, as members of it, exercising equal power with equivalent privileges. As it was plain in a particular example in that Parliament; 
Fox Act pag. 16  for when  Philpot was questioned for some words that passed from him in the Convocation House, he pleaded, that he was privileged to speak them, since the Convocation was a member of the Parliament; and this plea was not refused, but neglected. For they were not ignorant what was enacted by Henry the sixth, to wit, that all the Clergy, 
8 Hen.  which be called to the Convocation by the King's writ, shall fully use and enjoy all such liberties, as the great men, and Commons of the Realm have, that are called to the Parliament. And as they had some privilege, so it is plain by a Statute vicesimo quarto of Henry the eight, 
24. He●  (though now abrogated) that they had once as much power in their receiving appeals from inferior Courts Ecclesiastical, when it was a Praemunire to appeal to Rome, or elsewhere. The words of the Statute, printed in the year 1550, are: The party grieved, may appeal to the spiritual Prelates, Abbots, Priors, and Proctors, convocate by the King's writ, in Convocation. So that the restitution of the Convocation, was a worthy consideration in his Majesty, seeing it is as nearly and dearly annexed to his supremacy, as the Parliament is: for his Majesty having two capacities of government in him, the one spiritual, the other temporal, by both these he hath supremacy, and this supremacy is chief exercised in the calling, presedencie, and dissolving of the great assembly of the three States, which high Court is not competently correspondent to both those powers in the King, unless the Parliament consist collective of spiritual and temporal persons, which it hath anciently (if the Book De modo tenendi Parliamenti be authentical) for he makes the upper House consist of three States, the King's Majesty, the Lords spiritual and temporal; and lower of the Knights, 
Ridleys' view of Ecclesiastical Laws.  Procurators for the Clergy, and the Burgesses; which both answer the Kings mixed supremacy. So that as he is supremus Iustitiarius totius Angliae, in relation to the temporality; so he is supremus, or (as Constantine truly entitled himself in the Council of Nice) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, 
Eusebius in vita. lib. 3.  in respect of the spiritualty. But to return to my present promise, and purpose, which was to show how the acts of supremacy have their effects in the Ecclesiastical jurisdiction, derived to the Clergy: And I am now to show, what effect the power of promulgation of laws hath, which is in consenting, confirming, and publishing the Ecclesiastical Laws which are agreed upon in Convocation (not excluding the advice of the Parliament, because the State Ecclesiastical is not an independent society, but a member of the whole:) hence it is, that they are called the King's Ecclesiastical Laws, by which the Clergy is ruled in spiritual causes, according to which they exercise their jurisdiction in foro exteriori & contentioso; hence it is, that for this last age, the Ecclesiastical Laws of this Realm have so well agreed with the Civil, because they pass not without the assent of the supreme governor. And it were much to be desired, that Christian Princes would not only permit laws to be made, and give force to them by their authority, but also that they would vouchsafe their personal presence, to be Precedents in all assemblies for that end, for than they would proceed and conclude to better purpose. As Isidorus Pelusiota writes to the Emperor Theodosius the younger, to be resident and precedent in the Council of Ephesus: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: which is, that if he would be pleased to take so much time, as to be present there, he did not fear, that any thing that should pass, could be faulty; but if he leave it all to be done by turbulent suffrages, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; 
Isiodoru● lus. lib. 311.  Who can free that Synod from scornful scoffings? his counsel was safe and seasonable, because the cause of fear was very probable and eminent. For in a Council, where there is a Monarchical authority, a supreme power in one, there will be more dispatch in deliberations, more expedition in executions, than where multitudes of equals sit alone, for they will be many of them over-wise, and most over-wilfull to agree in one point; when as every singular person will broach his particular project, and propose it as a public law, with resolution to be a recusant to all their laws, if they will not be Protestants to his: and so it comes to pass too often, that they are forced to yield to one another, or else no law should pass. Hence is that multiplicity, uncertainty, confusion & contrariety of laws in some diseased States, than which nothing discovers a State to be more desperately declining, though they are good in their particulars; for they show the multiplication of ill manners, which per accidens begot them, and they are likely to make them worse, because they being appointed to amend them, are disappointed and disabled by their own cross contrarieties. As in a natural body, overgrown and overflown with ill humours. If a Philosopher that considers only a body neither sick nor well, gives that which is good. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, (as Hypocrates calls it) and when he hath done an Empiric come that considers it as sick, but he knows not of what, nor the temper of the constitution, but boldly and blindly gives one medicine to all, for all diseases, and at last the judicious Physician come and consider it as it is, and know what to do, he must first undo all the other have done, before he dare administer that which should first have been taken, and by this time, the body is either past cure, or desperate conclusions must be tried to recover it. Therefore happy is our State Ecclesiastical, in whose Convocation our supreme Sovereign is Precedent, so that the Laws passing with his royal consent, are certain, and easy to be obeyed, by reason of their rareness and paucity, which makes them pertinent, distinct, and free from confusion. And therefore I do not a little marvel at learned Baronius, 
Baronius Annal. Anno. 528.  that since he doth not deny justinianus the Emperor the power of making Ecclesiastical Laws, he should so scrupulously and busily inquire, what should move him to meddle with the making of them; when as I do not doubt, but the Clergy than might request him to it. This last act of supremacy, is to receive appeals, and give determinate decisions, and this hath its effect, and is exercised in the Ecclesiastical Courts. And they do not exercise any power, that is not derived from this supremacy, either immediately, or mediately. So that as the laws they execute, are the King's Ecclesiastical Laws, so these Courts are the Kings, and all the processes and courses approved by his Majesty's Laws. Therefore now there is no ground for a praemunire in them, though the words of the Statute run (to Rome or elsewhere) for by (elsewhere) seems to be meant, the Romish power, 
Babylonem● Gallicam, ut Petrarch. epist. 123.  or Court, which was not then at Rome, because the Pope's seat was then at Avignion in France, and not our Bishop's consistory: For I believe, that Statute was made to free them as well from the foreign usurpation, as any other of the King Courts, as the pragmatical sanction of France doth, which was of the nature, and in imitation of it about the same time, by Charles the seventh, brother-in-law to Edward the third. But however it was then meant, I am sure it cannot extend to them now, unless we will deny the King's supremacy over all causes and persons Ecclesiastical; and then they are not the King's Courts; but if we grant the King's supremacy, we must deny that any of his Courts can incur a praemunire. A prohibition, I grant, may lawfully lie there, because it is safe for the whole State, that every jurisdiction should have its bounds, and keep, or be kept in them. But yet I will not say so in general, but we must admit them with distinction of prohibitions, one of Law, another of Fact. Now that prohibition which is of Law, according to the express words of the Statute, (which are commonly large enough) is the prohibition that is lawful, as for a prohibition of fact, which is by a sophistical suggestion sucked and squeezed out of the copy of the libel, without judgement of the King's Courts upon it, in my opinion is not right, and is many times the cause of wrong, either in unjustice or delays; yea and in abusing of the Statute with the King's Courts. For the prohibition of law, the most I conceive it infers is, to make all the proceed void, Coram non judice. But if I might know, what degree and quality of offence it is, for a Court temporal to hold plea of a mere Ecclesiastical cause, I should more easily apprehend the scandalous nature of the ground of a prohibition, which it may be, is the same with a writ of error in the temporal Court; since that a consultation doth not ensue upon that, but after a prohibition grounded upon a suggestion. So then, all the proceed of these Courts, have their power from this last act of supremacy, as well in primative processes of inquisition, as in punitive processes of execution. As this authentic authority is most seen in the proceed ex officio, which are not only, nor always by oath, (as many are mistaken.) These are by immediate commission, where an Ecclesiastical cause is criminal, and prosecuted as criminal: And so also the utmost punitive process Ecclesiastical, which is a writ de Excommunicato capiendo, is evidently derived from the King's power, and issueth immediately from his favour to the Church, that it may be more easily obeyed, 
johan. de Paris. de Potestate Reg. Concl. 1.  and is divers and variable in sundry governments, and executed by temporal power, being nothing of the nature of the spiritual excommunication, but an accession concessâ permissione ex devotione Principum (as johannes de Parisiis saith against Boniface the eight.) As for the judgements of Bishop's consistories, as they are derived from the power and law of Christ the great Bishop: so they are like the judges of them, who are rather arbiters & amicabiles compositores (as Panormitane) than judges, ruling by the austerity of authority, so that poor defendants may fly to them, as to their altars, who are Ministers of the altar: and in this sense, that which Architas speaks is most true, 
Arist. Rhet. lib. 3. c. 11.  〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Idem esse arbitrum & Aram. And though they have no forcing power, but from the King, and no power of any force against the King; yet the greatest and best Kings have yielded to them in their advice, not as Prelates, but as they are Fathers in God, (as Alexander the great said to his father King Philip) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: 
Dion. Chrysost. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  fare unlike the Bishops of Rome, who will rule the highest Princes, and yet profess themselves servants of servants; which makes me call to mind, the observation of the wisest King Solomon, 
Proverb. 30.  that one of the chiefest instruments whereby the earth is shaken, is, a servant that rules over Princes. And as they usurp rule, so they usurp the sword of temporal Princes, and carry it in the spiritual scabbard; and drawing it, do more hurt in their passion, than they can help by their privilege; when as they found it soberly and orderly put up by St Peter when Christ was at his elbow to heal the greatest wound that he could make. Thus is it somewhat plain, how Ecclesiastical power is derived from the King, as he is supreme head in lawful and full authority over all causes and persons; which double power in my conceit, the custom of the ancient Persians at the death of their Monarch doth fully and fitly express, for the laws are silent: 
Brisso● Regne lib. 1.  〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, yea and their 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 their holy eternal fire which every one worshipped in his private house as his household god, was put out when the Emperor died.  
§ 4 The next thing which I promised to declare, was how the honour of the state Ecclesiastical is annexed to the power by the King's laws and royal prorogative. The honour of the Clergy is contained in revenues and privileges, 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 A● lib. 1.  which are united to their powers of order and jurisdiction; which powers although we should grant that simply considered in themselves, they are not distinguished jure divino; yet I am sure none will deny that they are distinct, quoad extensionem, permissione & approbatione divinâ, as johannes de Parisiis doth distinguish the power given the Apostles into six parts, in respect of so many several acts of execution, the fift of which is potestas dispositionis ministrorum, secundum quosdam quoad determinationem jurisdictionis Ecclesiasticae ut vitetur confusio. 
joh. de cap. 1  And as they are thus distinct according to the execution, and stand so confirmed by the positive laws of the land; so they have distinct portions and privileges according to the same laws: yet after a different manner, especially in respect of the portion. For the power of order which hath maintenance of divers kinds, as tithes, oblations, Gleabland and mortuaries holds them all according to the laws of this land, as due to the Clergy, for executing the power of order, but by different acts of these laws; as Mortuaries are permitted, and Gleablands granted, Tithes and Oblations confirmed, and all constrained to be paid. Now tithes that are only confirmed by the King's positive laws, are supposed to be due by some other law of higher nature than the Kings, which is not any foreign law, 
Bellar. de Cler. lib. 1. cap. 10.  as Ius Ecclesiasticum (as Bellarmine calls the Cannon law) it must be then by law divine; or immediately arising from supernatural and moral considerations, which law we grant to be positive; yet not merely humane, 
Hooker Eccles. Polit. l. 1. §. 15.  nor changeable in respect to us: and they must necessarily run into many gross errors, that take only such laws for positive as are invented by men; and thence conclude them mutable. And therefore I presume that the learned Selden doth so understand the positive law, by which he holds tithes to be due, not in opposition to divine and moral; but as specially divers from it (as it partly appears in the whole drift of his history) where I do not believe that any can find that he ever delivers his judgement, denying them to be jure divino: so that in my apprehension, and I hope not against his intention, he may do the Church much good in his relating what wrongs the Clergy in all ages have sustained. For his history is only de facto, what hath been done; he gives not his judgement de iure what ought to have been done, which if he had, he would assuredly have pronounced for them; and this I am forced to believe, when I consider his exact general knowledge, and the reverend respect he bears to authentic antiquity. I do not in this confess that they are not iure divino, because I affirm not them to be due by the law of Moses, that is no direct consequence upon my proposition; for not only the judicial law which was the commend, and I believe in most points is still the counsel of the most wise God (especially in this particular where the ground of the command is moral) doth proportion a tenth part as necessary then to be paid; and though the same necessity binds us not now, yet the correspondency of the conveniency (as I conceive) doth hold us as strongly to it as it did that state. For I see no inconvenience in tithes-paying in our state more than in theirs, but only they were brought home unto Priests (which only exception Mr Cartwright makes against tithes: 
Annot. i● Test. 7. ) But I stand not only upon this, but I am also partly persuaded, that they were confirmed by Apostolical approbation, though it be not in express words so set down. For though the Apostles did all preach the Gospel, yet they did not all write, neither did those that did write commit all to writing which they did teach: 
2 Thes.  for St Paul adviseth the Thessalonians to keep the traditions they had been taught either by word or epistle. And therefore it is freely acknowledged by a famous Orthodox divine of our own, non omnia esse scripta in libris voteris & novi Testamenti, 
Whittak● Bellar. q● cap. 6.  quae Apostoli aut docuerunt aut fecerunt; sed fatemur Apostolos ritus & consuetudines sanxisse, non autem scripsisse; hence it is probable, that they might by consent confirm them, because it was not only a custom and a law then in force, and they did not delight to innovate, but upon necessity: but also because we do not find one word of their abrogation or alteration. Yea it seems to me that the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews entitles the Ministers of the Gospel to them by a more particular right, 
Heb. 7.  (as Bishop Andrew's calls it) jure Benedictionis, for it is not only said that Abraham paid Melchizedeck tithes as he was the highest Priest, 
Benedixit tantùm v● vatus ex ●tione, sed perior ex ●ritate.  but that he received them and blessed him; which implies blessing to be the duty he performed for them. And whatsoever we hold of these tithes, I assure myself the Primitive Church did so conclude, otherwise they would not with such a general consent have bound themselves to that means and portion of maintenance. I speak of the Church in statu pacato, it was otherwise with them I confess in statu perturbato, in persecution; but not out of good choice, but hard chance: For observe but from the first general Council of Nice, (not to reckon upon Provincall Synods, because they do not bind our state but only in point of doctrine and example) peruse them till the last of the Lateraine, and you shall find they are plain and peremptory. And not only in the acts which in some Counsels are erroneous, (as in the second Council of Nice) being the seaventh general, there is a Cannon very particularly passed with a general consent; so in the Council of Lateraine under Innocent the third, 
Balsomon council. Nicen. secundo can. 12. Concil. Later. 4. can. 54.  where it is particularly set down, that the English Ambassadors were present. There is a Canon that runs thus, Statuimus quòd solutio decimarum praecedat exactionem tributorum. We have national Counsels also as at most Coronations of the Kings before the conquest, and also immediately upon the conquest; and many general Charters wherein tithes have been confirmed to the Clergy, and that with solemn vows and imprecations, which dedication to God, if there be no other divine right, puts the detainers of them into Ananias and Saphira's case; 
Acts 5.  because that though while it was wholly with them, it was their own; yet when it was thus separated by their solemn vows, then sanctified by the solemn act of Bishops; not only ratifying the Founder's vow, but consecrating them with the Church to divine uses, the nature, property, with the propriety was changed. So that I will conclude from these premises, that the positive law by which tithes are due to the Clergy, is not merely humane but mixed and preternatural, because it binds men as they are members of the supernatural society of the Church visible: and because they have bound themselves by it in divine considerations. But yet they are enjoyed by the confirmation and constraining power of the King's laws: And were it not for the laws, as they are an undoubted due, so they would be a perpetual debt with many; and that out of several grounds: some desiring to have stipends in stead of tithes, do too willingly remit them for a sufficient stipend though it be uncertain, especially to their successors. But I hope this ground will never be general, as long as this Kingdom is a Monarchy, for if it is a misery of free Cities and Democracies, 
Arist. 〈◊〉 4. cap.  〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉— yet I must needs confess that at the first original of Vicarages they had but stipends, but it was ; 
Linwoo● cio Vica roch.  Vicarii stipendio sunt contenti, which was but a permitting provincial constitution. Another means whereby the due payment of tithes is impeached, is, the customs of many places: which are lawful and laudable with these conditions; if they were not the inventions of men, but begotten by time, and if they be as reasonable as ancient; 
Cujaciu● pus Vlpi● 10.  nam debent esse tàm necessariae continuatione quàm rectae in ortu: and where the law is defective, for customs against law are void by the Civil law, if they be not expressly confirmed by the supreme power. With these conditions let customs be enjoyed. 
L. Sacra Q. de leg  But the next pretence is prescription against tithes once paid, and that we may admit with his limitations; as that it extend not to those things that cannot be alienate, that are annexed to the Crown, 
Dier. rep 31●1.  or if it stand not contra statutum postea editum, and be granted upon a good custom, and the person qualified, to possess the thing claimed; for lawful prescription cannot proceed without as lawful possession. The want of these lawful limitations made the Council of Lateran under Alexander the third, condemn and control the grand prescription of Clyentary tithes continued from Charles Martellus. 
Duarenus' nef. l. 6. 〈◊〉  The taking away of which shirking shifts made many devise another, which privilege is either of societies or persons, granting immunities from payment of tithes, which pretence of all others (as far as I understand) cannot be made good by the most favourable forced interpretation that may be; for they are void and nullified according to all the restraining Prouisoes that bond a privilege. For they were granted against the law of God and nature, not only besides it; there are some revoked by the same power that granted them, as Innocent the third in the fourth Council of Laterane. And in this particular Kingdom Henry the fourth made many statutes to restrain those privileges granted to the Friars, 
4. Hen. 4. c. 7.  especially providing that none should have any de novo; but that which proves them void in this Kingdom, is, that not only the particular persons, but also their whole societies are dissolved and destroyed; and so they are expired and extinguished with them: 
Bartolus in D. Q. Sodales. tit. 24. Idem ibidem.  Destructo Collegio pereunt privilegia, especially when their revenues are confiscate, & non privilegiatus praescriptione, non succedat privilegiato. But when other means began to be restrained, they procured appropriations and annexions' of benefices presentative, not only in point of patronage, but also they took the whole due without discharging any of the duty; which last and worst pretence I will not deny but the wit of man may make it plausible, yet I am sure it will never be pleasing to the will of God. Monks and Friars were the authors of these immunities and appropriations, (to omit customs and prescriptions, because they do not so much wrong, and have more ground of right:) I do not accuse the Monks who lived in the first five hundred years after Christ, who lived holy, and laboured in their callings, and had no such privileges: Neither do I condemn Benedict who was the father and first founder of all that professed a regular life in a sequestered cloister in the Western Church. 
Hospinianus de origine Mona●hat.  For he had good reason so to do, considering the tumults and many broils that fell out under the government of justinian, & by reason of the continual incursions of the barbarous nations into Italy. But when he was thus shut up, many resorted unto him, admiring his devotion; at last they took rules from him, and grew into a fraternity of the Benedictines: and from them sprang many other orders; who living a life far different from other men, bred great wonderment in all, and that admiration procured adoration of their profession, & made those that were able bestow great revenues upon them: Yea they did so dote upon them, that after a while they endowed them, if not with the greatest, yet I am sure the best and fattest part of their Countries; insomuch that most of the most pious Princes of Christendom were forced to make a statute of Mortmain, (like Moses, 
Exo.  who made the first statute of Mortmain) for these revenues which they possessed were in a dead hand, that did no good to the Commonwealth. Whence we may observe that this statute was rather for the benefit of the Commonwealth, than made out of the dislike of the Church means; especially since these Friars were not of the Clergy, but mere Laymen; and the Clergy had as much reason to desire a law for Amortization as the Commonwealth, because as they had conferred lands and goods upon them, (for not only Princes, but Popes were taken with admiration of them) so they were also more charged with the public, and had less means. And this statute gave the occasion to them to procure privileges and immunities from payment of tithes. For though at first for a time they came to their Parish Churches, yet when they procured to have Churches or Chapels of ease for their fraternities; then they obtained under Alexander the third in the Lateran Council, when he condemned prescription, 
Dua● nef. l●  to be confirmed privileged from payment of tithes of those lands which they tilled themselves; when as Adrian the fourth our countryman, his immediate predecessor had revoked or restrained the immunities granted to them by Paschall the second. 
Flavius Chen. Compend. Bulla tom. 1. Paschal.  But when Innocent the third, who loved to be doing and undoing, restrained the grant of Alexander the third, which they perceived did much prejudice their plentiful profit, they procured dispensations from the Pope to have parsonages appropriate to their houses in more great abundance. For I deny not but some were annexed before, as to the Abbey of Crowland, and others; yet these were granted more by the Pope's licence then the Prince's authority. And then began the Schoolmen to entangle the right of tithes, and their curiosity and their covetousness enabled them, and put them upon it: for when under Innocent the third, they multiplied into multitude, (as there were sixteen orders set up in that Century) and he limited and lessened their revenues, they sought to maintain that by right which before they had obtained by wrong, and retained by protection and privilege. Then began the contention between the Schoolmen and the Canonists about the right of tithes; and I conceive Innocent the third to be of the Canonists part, because he was the first great advancer of them in the Church, and no free friend to the Friars. This I have conceived by comparing Church histories with the Cannon law, especially decretals: these wrongs of the Clergy were so brought in and upheld, so continued in our Kingdom till Henry the eighth of famous memory; who either intending a reformation in religion, seized upon the revenues of religious houses; or aiming at their revenues set upon, rather than finished a reformation, confiscated them to his use, as escheated as their lands were, and seizes upon their appropriations which were not theirs; but mortgaged as it were in commendam to them, and he possessed the Crown of them, and sold them to private men; which hold them by as much right as the Monasteries did, & no better. Though some would willingly persuade themselves that they hold them by as right and just law, as they do any purchased inheritance; for they say, though they were once spiritual, yet now they are made temporal, & lay-fees by the laws of dissolution; especially in the two and thirtieth of Henry the eighth. It is true that those statutes apply divers law terms, (I will not call them mere law fictions) to those things that properly belong to temporal inheritances, and have made them demandable by original writs, and given order of conveyance, by deed, fine, and act of Parliament; which act, as it is bootless, so it is contumacy in any private subject to question: only thus much I hope I may say without general offence, since I conceive it the truth, and yet not all the truth; I do not yet understand how that can be made manifest to be a free Parliament in that point. For I do not believe, that the lower House did either propose, or generally approve it, though they assented to it. Neither do I think, that King Henry the eight did freely propound it out of his own choice, but that the necessity of the present time did put him upon it. And I hope he intended to call it in, if he had lived. As Dionysius the King of Syracuse in Italy, when his treasure waxed too short for a great employment: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: 
Poly● Strat  he commanded to take the treasures of Asclepius his temple, and to proclaim them to be sold in the market, as profane and common commodities, which the Syracusans were very eager to buy, because they had Church-bargaines. But when he had gotten what his necessity required, he presently sent forth an edict, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, that if any one had bought those devoted treasures, they should again restore them to the Church. This course had been somewhat just, if he had let them enjoy the treasures, until they might have regained by them what they cost, (as perhaps most purchasers of Impropriations have.) But that which most hinders me from apprehending it to be a free pure act, is, because the most active and spiritual part in Parliament, was pitifully passive in it, it was at best mixed by reaction in the patiented Clergy, who did neither absolutely obey, nor resolutely resist, but silently suffer that to pass, which was not right; and therefore the act was not free from wrong. Neither do many of the judicious sages of our law so fully approve of it. 
Consideration 6.  Yea Sr Francis Bacon in his considerations of the Clergy of England, dedicated to King james of peaceable memory, confesses, that he was of opinion, that all the Parliaments, since the twenty seventh, and thirty one of Henry the eight, stand obnoxious and bound in conscience to God, to do somewhat for the Church, to reduce that patrimony; or, that since they have debarred the Church of her dowry, they should make her a competent jointure. Which opinion of his, is more ingenious, in my apprehension, and advantageously pertinent than theirs, who only inveigh against the Parliament, and Henry the eight the head and ruler of it: which act (admitting the necessity then that urged him to use the power of Ecclesiastical dominion) is not altogether inexcusable, (though this reformation did more wrong to the Clergy, than the conquest:) For what he was to do, was to be done in haste; and in that routing-rush of reformation, who could expect but the part corrected, must needs be for the time, near to utter ruin; though happily, if the author of the reformation had lived to finish it, amends would have been made in some measure. But Henry the eight did rather put down the Roman Church, than set up ours; as Alexander the great pulled down the Persian Monarchy, but set not up the Grecian. But to pull down one was the only way to set up another; as Aristotle rooted out all the opinions of the former Philosophers, to set up his own; or as Hypocrates, who being their 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 (as Zetzes in his Chiliads) he burned the books of all the ancient Physicians, to set us his own, 
Chil. 155.  or theirs as his. So that if a public reformer begin once to alter, he must of necessity, for the time, stir, if not remove more than he first intended, especially if he be crossed and kerbed by an adversary, that stands strongest by that part which needs reformation, and by that in it, which will best help him in the performing of it. For he that will prevail against an encroaching enemy, that hath a party in his kingdom, must be sure with all apt industry, to observe and oppose him in his counsels, by bereaving him of his counsellors and agents, either by taking them away at once, or putting them as exiles from him, or pulling them to himself, which is the safest and honourablest course. Now the Pope, who was the absolute insolent adversary to Henry the eight, stood by the Monkish part of the Clergy, and chief by their rich revenues; and therefore, it behoved the King, either to reconcile them to himself, or utterly to ruin them (as fell out because they rebelled.) And in the persecution of them, he ran a clean contrary course to the Pope. As I remember, when Cyrus took Babylon, he drew Euphrates dry, and made all land; And Xerxes when he went against Athens, would have made all sea, 
Dion. C 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉  〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: So Henry the eight made all Lay and land, when he intended to be free from the usurpation of the Pope, and the Pope made all spiritual and his See, when he aimed at his absolute unrestrained extravigancie both in See and Sceptre. This heat and height of opposition made the King proceed too fare, which, I believe, he did somewhat perceive, in that he did retract in some particulars, from the first course: As in erecting some Episcopal Seats, and more Cathedral Churches, out of the ruins of Monasteries and Priories. And in that he made of the appropriation of Royston, 
33. Hen. 8.  a Parish-Church. And I presume, he might have proceeded farther, if he had not been soon after cut off by death, and hindered by profane and sacrilegious instruments while he lived, who, I persuade myself, were the same men and means, that tried to procure the dissolution of the Bishopric of Durham by act of Parliament, during the nonage of Edward the sixth. So that the unhappiness of Henry the eight, is, because men judge by the event, not knowing the intent (as Paulus jovius exclaims of him. 
jovius de vir. illust. ) In my mind, he may be well paralleled with Charles Martellus, the Champion of the Church, who, when he defended the Pope, was the first that was called Christianissimus among the French Kings, by Gregory the third; yet he was the first that rob the Clergy in France, by giving Clientary tithes, 
Baronius Anno 759.  which they call feudal to his followers: yea and he deposed the Archbishop of Reemes, and disposed of the Bishopric to one Miloeo Cavaleire. So Henry the eight had first the title of the Defender of the Faith, for publishing a book against Luther, 
Bellarm. de script. Eccles.  which (Bellarmine saith) Roffensis wrote, and presently after fell foul upon the Clergy. So that, (I believe) the Pope repent of the title, and was ready, no● to give him so good a title, as his predecessor julius the second gave Lewis the twelfth of France, in his Bull, which Guicciardine notes to proceed of malice, 
Guicc. hist. l. 11.  Nella nominon dolo, non piu Christianissimo, ma illustrissimo. But let him be as bad as they will make him, yet I dare excuse him, as Baronius doth Martellus, and say of him as Guicciardine said of the Popes, 
Guicc. Hypomn. Polit. 123.  that he was an honest man, because he was not more wicked than most men. I have in this as fare as I am able with a good conscience, cleared our State from the foreign fame of sacrilege. But I cannot free particular men from it, which have no pretence for what they detain, or take from the Clergy, but only that they are not convinced that there is such a sin as sacrilege; and that because they hold not tithes due iure divino, and that because they desire still to hold them by the law of the land. And that they may more colourably continue it, they hold no such sin as Simony, that the presented may make a symonaicall contract, whereby they are confirmed and corroborated in their sacrilegious usurpations. But I will not dispute the point, whether there be any such sin as Simony, in relation to a private presentation without respect to orders taken with it. But I am sure, none will deny, but where is a symonaicall contract, there is perjury in the Instituted. As for sacrilege, I grant it is not easy for men that are guilty of it, to be convinced that it is a sin. For sins of omission cannot so quickly and sharply, touch the conscienee, because they are the breach of an affirmative law, which doth not so strongly check the vice, as inform to the duty; especially when pleasure or profit have bribed the judgement. For I fear, some hold stolen tithes, the sweetest part of their inheritance, as it is said by the Epicures; 
Zetzes Chil. 7  〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: who doting upon voluptuous sweet delicates, called honey the tenth part of the Ambrosia; and perhaps that sect set up the trade of Bee-mongers in Athens, (as Synesius) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. 
Synesiu● 136.  So I am afraid, the tickling sweetness of tithes, is the cause, why the smart and sourness of sacrilege is not felt, nor tasted. And therefore, in my opinion, 
Thom. 〈◊〉 q. 155.  Thomas Aquinas doth well, to make sacrilege, speciem luxuriae; so that it may be a sin, and yet they never be convinced of it. I am sure, not only the ancient Fathers of the most pure primitive Church, but even the godly Emperors did esteem it a sin, and that in a high degree, that when they granted general pardons at Easter, and other solemn tim●s, they excepted sacrilegious persons: As Theodosius the great, 
Theod. tit. de Indulg. Crim.  ob diem Paschae, quem intimo corde celebramus, quos reatus astringit, carcer inclusit, solvimus; attamen sacrilegus maximè à communione istius munieris separetur: So also Gratian and Valentinian; Religio anniversariae observationis hortatur, ut omnes periculo carceris, & à metu poenarum eximi iubeamus: verùm eos excipimus, quos scelera graviora compulerunt, 
Theod. eodem tit.  ut qui sunt sacrilegi & sepulchri violatores. So in many of the Novels; 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, upon Easter day set all persons free 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, 
Harmenopulus Promp. jur. Civ. l. 6. tit. 5.  but if any be guilty of sacrilege, set him be kept still in hold. So that you see, it was reckoned inter extraordinaria crimina in those days; and so it would be thought with us, if profit did not blind the judgement in the payer of tithes, and indiscreet covetousness lead many Clergymen to make no distinction betwixt free and friendly compositions with a bountiful Patron and sacrilege. In my poor judgement, the Canon Law is but just, 
Quicunque c. 6. q. de jur. Patronatus.  in decreeing, that Si patronus Laicus ad inopiam fuerit redactus, he must have some competent sustenance from the incumbent, especially if he have not been sacrilegious, and so by God's judgement brought to it. And I do conceive, that this may be, notwithstanding they do not charge any parsonage with annuity rents, which is prohibited by the statute of Elizab. 
3 Eliz. c. 2.  Thus it is plain, that the revenues and maintenance of the Clergy are possessed by the King's Laws, and may be demanded as due by them.  
§. 5. The other part of the honour of the Clergy, annexed to the power of order, is in privileges, & immunities, by which this power is exercised with more ease, delight, and respect; and, as it were, with the whole man without distraction. Now all the privileges the Church doth enjoy or desire, arise, and are raised by the King's laws, and royal prerogative. As that ancient-often-confirmed Magna Charta doth fully confirm all former privileges of the Clergy. 
Mag● ta cap  And that was then favour enough, for than they had privileges to a surfeiting surplusage, but now the Clergy stands in more need of them, and they humbly expect them only from the favour of their Prince, who hath a plenitude of power, to grant more and larger privileges, than ever they will desire. For all privileges are granted in relation to some Law, and the power of an absolute Prince is above all Laws, (as Dion chrysostom told just Trajane) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: 
Dion 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Cujac vat. li●  or as the same Counsellor to the same Emperor, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: which Cujacius explains and limits to coactive corrective Laws, which Dion saith, began in Augustus' days, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: 
Dion  none of the ancient Romans were freed from laws, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, that is from the necessity of obeying. And I do believe, that the Scriptures (seeing that they say more for the right of Kings, than any book in the world) do, if not fully set down this power, yet permit it with approbation in some cases, especially for the public good of the Church, which, I am sure, is a fare more conscionable and commendable course, than to accommodate religion to serve the turn of the State (as that judicious Amiratus upon Tacitus) Bisogna accommodar la ragione di stato alla religione, & nan la religione, alla ragione di stato.  
Our King then being a most absolute Monarch, hath this prerogative, and from that we have and hold our privileges, not from that written prerogative, abstracted out of Fitzherberts' Abridgement, by Sr William Stanford, whereby the King's Exchequer hath many privileges, and peculiar processes (as the Civilians call them privilegia fisci, fiscus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 habet. 
Cujaci● serv. l. 2 ) But from an unwritten unrestrained right of dominion, whereby he hath plenary power, not only to make legal propositions of validity, or void in their first institution, or to interpret them either by declaring them to be corrected in some points and cases, especially if he correct them by a more particular express pressing law, as he may correct the law of nature by the law of nations; the law of nations, by the law of arms; the law of arms, by the law of particular Leagues; and all by the power of dominion: or restrain them in respect of some persons, or public societies; but he may dispense also with them, since some penal statutes are made with relation to his power of pardon after the act; therefore it is not so much to exempt them from being obnoxious to the punishment, by pre-interpreting that it was not intended to extend to such persons; for so the privilege is not against law, but besides it, or above it. Yea there are statutes dispensatory; as that of the plurality, and non recidencie which the Archbishop of Canterbury limits by his approbation. 
Eccl. Anglicanae Canon. 41.  And privileges must necessarily be where there are multitudes of statutes, which be so strict in point of injunction, as if the makers of them had not considered, that politic laws must be made with respect to moral possibility, as what men may do; and yet the punishment of their transgression is not expressed, but left to the pleasure or displeasure of the King. But these are not the privileges that the King's royal prerogative doth grant, as immunities and impunities, for then the laws should be only punitine, if there were only use of protections and pardons: but as laws are also remunerative, so Princes have power to reward after a privileging manner, and chief in our Kingdom, where it seems to be on purpose omitted by the written laws, and left to the King's pleasure and power; especially concerning Ecclesiastical persons, who have most need of them, and may now as freely enjoy them as any other persons. For though heretofore it was prejudicial to our Kings to grant privileges to all Ecclesiastical persons, when they were so increased in multitudes, and overgrown in magnitude for the whole Kingdom, and the Popes would confirm them as irrevocable: yet now they are but few in number and small in power, and the King may call them in when he pleases. This want of these privileges hath been the cause of much evil in the Church, and the more they are impeached by those that profess themselves the maintainers of the King's peace, laws, and royal prerogative, the more will the state Ecclesiastical run to ruin. And they are much infringed in our Universities, which I am forced to complain of, with fear, lest that fall out which happened to the University of Prague; which was utterly ruined by Charles the fift, taking the privileges away at Don Le●is desire. Whereas Francis the first of France fearing and favouring the University of Paris, restored all the privileges which Lewis the eleventh had taken away upon a just ground of sedition, 
Dino hist. 〈◊〉  which hath made it to revive and flourish ever since. But there are some politiques that hold it a needless thing, to be any way indulgent to silly Scholars, 
Cuja● sent. 1. tit  as Cujacius saith out of Galen, that they expressed weak men under the title of scholastici: they make mere 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, john a noakes of them, but the fault is in themselves according to the French Proverb, Qui se fait brebis le l●up la mange: For though the Clergy be weak of itself, and tempt the contemners of it to overtop and overturn it: Yet since we have a pious prudent Prince, that is royally ready upon the first appeal, to protect and relieve his poor Clergy: we are not to be pitied, if we neglect to implore his supreme assistance. And thus it is something evident how the honour of the Clergy annexed to the power of order, is granted and sustained by the King's laws and royal prerogative. I must now in brief show the like of the honour annexed to the power of jurisdiction.  
§ 6 The power of jurisdiction which I do here intent, is not that deligated power which is in Bishops, Vicars, or officials; nor that power Archdeacon's and Deans enjoy, either by custom or privilege: but that ordinary power which is in Bishops. To this power of jurisdiction there is honour annexed by the laws of this land, and the King's royal prerogative: which I divide as before, into revenues ordinary, and privileges; the revenues are their temporals, and part of the perquisits, called the Census Cathedraticus: the first of which are given and granted by the King's royal bounty, & confirmed by the laws; the other are set down and approved by the same laws. Bishop's temporals are annexed to their sees by the King's gift, 
Stanford praerogat. cap. 1.  and are as it were their Gleab, but are indeed their Baronies which they hold of the King in capite, and perform services for them; and therefore they are as it were wards to the King during the vacancy: quae ratione Baroniae (as Linwood) ad Episcopum spectare possunt, 
Linwood de immunitatib. Ecclesiae. Duarenus de beneficijs. l. 3. c. 11.  Dominus Rex custodiam habet; (as Duarenus says of the Kings of France) Princeps quàm diu vacat Episcopalis sedes, feudorum lege, praediorum omnium administrationem suscipit. But these temporals are not to be restored till consecration, and so seem to be annexed to the power of order in Bishops; 
Augustinus de Ancona de potest. P. P. quaest. 22. Art. 9  for their consecration (according to the scholastical Canonists) is but perfectio characteris, which they at first received when they took the order of Priesthood, and so seem not properly annexed to the power of jurisdiction: for before consecration, upon election and confirmation they may exercise the power of jurisdiction, though not of order. Episcopus electus & confirmatus potest exercere quae sunt jurisdictionis, 
Panormitan. in Decret. Ver. Cons. §. 6.  non quae sunt ordinis Episcopalis ante consecrationem, (as Othobone upon Linwood) suspendere potest à beneficio, non ab officio; 
Linwoo● de consti● Glanvil cap. 10.  quia ab officio suspendere, est à potestate ordinis ordinaria. But justice Glanvil seems to intimate that they were restored, when they were but Lords elect, because electi ante consecrationem homagia sua facere solent, but whether it were de jure or de gratia (as the learned in the Common law distinguish,) I leave to them to determine; and think it great happiness for the Bishops, and the great honour of our modern Kings, that they are so fully restored at all, since they have as much power, and may pretend as much reason to seize the temporals into their hands as well as others.— But our Royal Sovereign's pious Father, 
1. jacob.  set a good example to his Majesty to follow; for in the first year of his reign he enacted a statute to prevent all diminution of Episcopal revenues, though it were to alienate them to the use of his Crown: yea though it were but in exchange for impropriations, (a course which was too common in Queen Elizabeth's days,) instead whereof our Kings have out of royal indulgence given some licences for Mortmaineses. If this redress had come before they had been too much impaired: Bishops would not have desired so many Commendams, nor Rectors of Parishes made use of the statute of plurality. To their revenues in these temporals, there are many honourable privileges annexed, as they are Barones'; So that Bishops have the privileges of Barons in the Parliament, and that upon good ground, since they hold of the King, and perform the services belonging to them; 
Matthew Hen. 2.  (as Matthew Paris) Episcopi de rege tenent in capite Baronias, & faciunt omnes consuetudines regis, & sicut caeteri Barones debent interesse iudiciis regis cum Baronibus. Now the Bishops (especially since the reformation) are ready and willing, not only to take the oath of homage, which some denied heretofore, as Thomas Becket, and Glanvill, who was the chief justice, seems to countenance it, by saying Episcopi consecrati non solent Domino Regi homagium facere de Baroniis suis, 
Glanvil. lib. 9 cap. 1.  sed fidelitatem. The present Clergy I say is not only ready to take the oath in the old favourable free form, [salvo ordine,] but as it is now more strictly obligatory by putting in these words, [in verbo veritatis;] and leaving out the former. Which oath may be taken without any suspicion of Simony, (as Panormitan) Homagium, vel fidelitas ab Episcopo praestari possit, citra periculum Symoniae: and Cajetaine the learned schoolman doth in this agree with this ancient able Cannonist; 
Cajetan in secund. second. q. 184. art. 5.  Episcopus legitimè iurare potest Homagium quoddam vel fidelitatem, quia nil in isto iuramento continetur, circa curam animarum; for that is taken in relation to their temporals which they have from the King's favours; not in relation to their consecration, which they have from the qualifying grace of God, which was well expressed anciently in their stile [Dei gratiâ Episcopus] and now by [providentia divinâ,] so that seeing they perform the same services, they may enjoy the same privileges with the Barons. Now as all privileges, so these that they enjoy common with them, are besides and above the common course of law. For instance, as they are Assessors in Parliament, they may appear by Proxy; as they are witnesses, they may swear only Visis Evangeliis, verbo sacerdotis; as Barons, by their honour; and when they are at any time Delinquents, they should be tried by their Peers, (if they were tried as Bishops, and not first degraded;) and so some have been tried, until one appealed from them to the Pope. And good reason in those days they had, (if not now) to be so tried, because many of the Bishops of those times were of the Princes of the nobility; (as may be seen in Bishop Godwins Catalogue of Bishops:) so that when Peers were Bishops, why should not Bishops be Peers. It seems in Richard the seconds days they were so accounted, for when he did make up the number of the twelve Peers of the land, he chose Brentingham Bishop of Exeter one of them, which (I conceive) he would not have done if he had not been a Peer before: and I am the rather persuaded so to think, because Richard the second extends the statute of Scandalum magnatum, to Bishops as well as Dukes, 
2. Rich  Earls and Barons under the title of Peers of the land. Besides these privileges which they have as they are Barons, the Kings of this land have been pleased out of their Princely favours to bestow many freedoms upon them, especially on the Archbishop of Canterbury as amongst other ordinary and known, 
Stamfo● rogat. c.  one against his Majesty's written prerogative, as that the land held of that Bishop shall not be Ward to the King. And I believe the high estimation of that See abroad might move them to it, for they are not only styled Primates of all England, and Metropolitans, 
Duaren● gradibus cap. 9 Laelius Z● statu Leg  but patriarchs; Patriarchae minorum gentium sunt Cantuariensis, Aquiliensis, Biturgiensis, & Gradensis, and the most lawful Legates of the Apostolical See: Legati nati dignitas Archiepiscopatui Cantuariensi, Remensi, Eboracensi, & Pisano annexa est. This foreign respect might move them more particularly to honour them, though they have always most highly favoured Bishops in general, in somuch, that they have made them not only á sacris, but à secretis, which is safe for a King, and no distraction to a Bishop in his calling; 
Lipsius' A● 3. Polit.  with Lipsius' limitation interest eos posse imò debere, sed rarenter cùm de rebus planè seriis agitur, & quae tangunt vnivers●● statum; then should not Princes need to forbid Bishops the Court without they were sent for, (as Baronius saith, justinian was fain to do). Thus I have brifely discoursed, 
Baron. A● Anno 528  though not fully discovered some thing of the relation betwixt the state Ecclesiastical and the Civil; which I have done without advising in any thing to an alteration, or devising any thing for innovation; and with submission to the licence of authority and the judgement of the learned.  
FINIS.