OBSERVATIONS, UPON THE FIVE FIRST BOOKS OF CAESAR'S COMMENTARIES, SETTING FOURTH THE PRACTICE OF THE ART MILITARY, IN THE TIME OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE. WHEREIN ARE HANDLED ALL THE CHIEfest points of their discipline, with the true reasons of every part, together with such instructions as may be drawn from their proceedings, for the better direction of our modern wars.  
BY CLEMENT EDMUNDS.   printer's device. 
P S  
AT LONDON, Printed by Peter Short, dwelling on Bredstreet hill at the sign of the Star. 1600.   

TO HIS HONOURABLE FRIEND AND MOST Worthy knight, Sir Francis Vere, chief commander of her majesties forces in the service of the states, in the united Provinces, and Governor of the Cautionary town of Briele, in Holland.  
SIR, having at length ended this task of observations, it falleth necessarily under your patronage, as well in regard of the continual encouragement, which I received from the favour you bear to such employments; as also for that this work of Caesar hath always been held in your particular recommendation, as the breviary of soldiers; and thought worthy of as great regard, as ever M. Brutus attributed to Polybius, or Charles the fifth to Philip de Commines. I must acknowledge the beginning of this work to have proceeded from Sir john Scot, a knight deserving great honour for his judgement and skill in matter of war, whose desire to understand the true sense of this history, and the mystery of that discipline, first moved me to undertake this labour. The observations which I have taken, are such as offer themselves to vulgar wits, upon the consideration of such points as are handled in this discourse: for as an old Governess well experienced in error, directeth her young charge to virtue, by such documents as rise from her own mistake; so the fruit of this work riseth chiefly from thence, where the benefit of good direction is manifest; or where ill achievement beareth witness of an error. The specialties of greater consequence, which are either skilfully shadowed, or necessarily implied in the history, I leave to the wisdom of judicious commanders, as an object fit for such judgements, and impertinent to conceits of an inferior condition. That which is already handled shall serve to witness, that Caesar's works contain matter sufficient to entertain the greatest wits, and that my desire is to gratify our soldiers with my best labour, which I recommend chiefly to your Lordship, and rest  
Ready to do you service, C. EDMUNDS.   

TO THE READER.  
I Have adventured to entertain our soldiers, with a relation of part of Caesar's actions, upon that encouragement which he himself gave to a fisherman, not to despair of a good passage because he carried Caesar and his fortunes: wherein I have not tied myself to a litter all translation of the history, but followed the sense; not daring to make any resemblance of the sweetness of that style, but desirous to gratify our better sort of soldiers, with the portraiture of that discipline. If my labour be accepted with that affection as I offer it, I shall think it well spent, and employ more time to do them service. Howsoever, I hold it reasonable to leave to every man the free censure of his judgement, as best fitting him that readeth with profit, and not to be taken from any reader whatsoever: and as I look not to be approved of all; so I make no question but I shall find some favourers, which is as much as any writer can boast of, Farewell.   

READING AND DISCOURSE, ARE REQVISITE TO MAKE A Soldier perfect in the Art military, how great soever his knowledge may be, which long experience and much practice of Arms hath gained.  
WHEN I consider the weakness of man's judgement in censuring things best known unto itself, and the disability of his discourse in discovering the nature of unacquanted objects; choosing rather to hold any sensible impression, which custom hath by long practise enured, then to hearken to some other more reasonable persuasion: I do not marvel that such soldiers, whose knowledge groweth only from experience and consisteth in the rules of their own practice; are hardly persuaded, that history and speculative learning are of any use in perfecting of their Art, being so different in nature from the principles of their cunning, and of so small affinity with the life of action; wherein the use of Arms and achievements of war seem to have their chiefest being. But those purer spirits embilished with learning, and enriched with the knowledge of other men's fortunes; wherein variety of accidents affordeth variety of instructions, and the mutual conference of things happened, begetteth both similitudes and differences, contrary natures, but yet jointly concurring to season our judgement with discretion, and to install wisdom in the government of the mind: These men I say, mounting aloft, with the wings of contemplation, do easily discover the ignorance of such Martialistes, as are only trained up in the school of practice, and taught their rudiments under a few years experience, which serveth to interpret no other author but itself, nor can approve his maxims, but by his own authority; and are rather moved to pity their hard fortune, having learned only to be ignorant, then to envy their skill in matter of war, when they oppose themselves against so manifest a truth as this: that a mere practical knowledge cannot make a perfect soldier.  
Which proposition that I may the better confirm, give me leave to reason a little of the grounds of learning, and dispute from the habitude of Arts and sciences; which are then said to be perfectly attained, when their particular parts are in such sort apprehended, that from the variety of that individuality, the intellectual power frameth general notions and maxims of rule, uniting terms of the same nature in one head, and distinguishing diversities by differences of properties, aptly dividing the whole body into his greatest and smallest branches, and fitting each part with his descriptions, duties, cautions and exceptions: for unless the understanding be in this sort qualified and able by logistical discourse, to ascend, by way of composition, from singularity to catholic conceptions; and return again the same way, to the lowest order of his partitions, the mind cannot be said to have the perfection of that Art, nor instructed in the true use of that knowledge: but guiding herself by some broken precepts, feeleth more want by that she hath not, than benefit by that she hath. Whereby it followeth, that a science divided into many branches, and consisting in the multiplicity of divers members, being all so interessed in the Bulk, that's Maim of the smallest part causeth either debility or deformity in the body, cannot be said to be throughlie attained, nor conceived with such a profiting apprehension as steeleth the mind with true judgement, and maketh the scholar master in his Art, unless the nature of these particularities be first had and obtained.  
And for as much as no one science or faculty whatsoever, in multitude and plurality of parts, may any way be comparable to the Art military, wherein every small and unrespected circumstance quite altereth the nature of the Action, and breedeth such disparity and difference, that the resemblance of their equal participating properties is blemished with the dissimilitude of their disagreeing parts; it cannot be denied, but he that is acquainted with most of these particular occurrences, and best knoweth the variety of chances in the course of war, must needs be thought a more perfect soldier, and deserveth a title of greater dignity in the profession of Arms, than such as content themselves with a few common precepts and overworn rules: without which, as they cannot be said at all to be soldiers, so with them and no more, they no way deserve the name of skilful and perfect men of war. Now whether mere experience, or experience joined with reading and discourse, do feast the mind with more variety and choice of matter, or entertain knowledge with greater plenty of novelties, incident to expeditions and use of Arms, I will use no other reason to determine of this question, then that which Franciscus Patricius allegeth in his parallely, where he handleth this argument which I entreat of.  
He that followeth a war (saith he) doth see either the course of the whole, or but a part only. If his knowledge extend no farther than a part, he hath learned less than he that saw the whole: but admit he hath seen and learned the instructions of one whole war, he hath notwithstanding learned less than he that hath seen the proceeding of two such wars. And he again hath not seen so much as another that hath served in three several wars: and so by degrees, a soldier that hath served ten years, must needs know more than one that hath not served so long. And to conclude, he that hath received 22 years stipend (which was the just time of service amongst the Romans before a soldier could be dismissed) hath greater means of experience than another that hath not so long a time followed the camp, and cannot challenge a discharge by order and custom: And hence it consequently followeth, that if in one or more or all these wars, there have happened few or no actions of service, which might teach a soldier the practice of Arms; that then his learning doth not countervail his labour. And if the war through the negligence, or ignorance of the chief commanders have been ill carried, he can boast of no knowledge, but that which acquainted him with the corruptions of military discipline; if the part which he followed were defeated and overthrown, he knoweth by experience how to lose, but not how to gain: And therefore it is not only experience and practice which maketh a soldier worthy of his name, but the knowledge of the manifold accidents which rise from the variety of human actions, wherein reason and error, like merchants in traffic, interchange contrary events of fortune, giving sometime copper for silver, and balm for poison, and repaying again the like commodity as time and circumstances do answer their directions. And this knowledge is only to be learned in the registers of antiquity and in histories, recording the motions of former ages.  
Caius julius Caesar (whose actions are the subject of these discourses) after his famous victories in France, and that he had gotten the provinces of Spain, broken the strength of the Roman Empire at Pharsalia, was held a soldier surmounting envy and all her exceptions; and yet notwithstanding all this, the battle he had with Pharnaces king of Pontus, was like to have buried the glory of his former conquests, in the dishonourable memory of a wilful overthrow: for having possessed himself of a hill of great advantage, he began to encamp himself in the top thereof. Which Pharnaces perceiving, (being lodged likewise with his camp upon a mountain confronting the romans) imbattelled his men, marched down from his camp into the valley, and mounted his forces up the hill, where the romans were busied about their entrenchments, to give them battle. All which, Caesar took but for a bravado: and measuring the enemy by himself, could not be persuaded that any such foole-hardines could carry men headlong into so dangerous an adventure, until they were come so near, that he had scarce any time to call the legions from their work, and to give order for the battle: which so amazed the romans, that unless, as Caesar himself saith, the advantage of the place and the benignity of the gods had greatly favoured them; Pharnaces had at that time revenged the overthrow of Pompey and the Senate, and restored the Roman Empire to liberty. Which may learn us how necessary it is (besides experience, which in Caesar was infinite) to perfect our knowledge with variety of chances: and to meditate upon the effects of other men's adventures, that their harms may be our warnings, and their happy proceedings our fortunate directions.  
And albeit amongst so many decades of History, which pregnant wits have presented to these latter ages, we seldom or never meet with any one accident which jumpeth in all points with an other of the like nature, that shall happen to fall out in managing a war, or setting forth of an army; and so do seem to reap little benefit by that we read, and make small use of our great travel. Yet we must understand that in the Audit of Reason, there are many offices, which through the sovereign power of the discursive faculty, receive great commodities by whatsoever falleth under their jurisdiction, and suffer no action to pass without due trial of his nature, and examination of his state; that so the judgement may not be defrauded of her revenues, nor the mind of her learning: for notwithstanding disagreeing circumstances, and differences of forms, which seem to cut off the privilege of imitation, and frustrate the knowledge we have obtained by reading, the intellectual faculty hath authority to examine the use, and look into the inconveniences of these wants and diversities, and by the help of reason to turn it to her advantage; or so to counterpoise the defect, that in trial and execution it shall not appear any disadvantage. For as in all other sciences, and namely in geometry, of certain bare elements, and common sentences, which sense admitteth to the apprehension, the powers of the soul frame admirable Theorems and Problems of infinite use, proceeding with certainty of demonstration, from proposition to proposition, and from conclusion to conclusion, and still make new wonders as they go, besides the strangeness of their Architecture, that upon such plain and easy foundations, they should erect such curious and beautiful buildings: so in the Art Military, these examples, which are taken from histories, are but plain kind of principles, on which the mind worketh to her best advantage, and useth reason with such dexterity, that of inequalities she concludeth an equality, and of dissimilitudes most sweet resemblances; and so she worketh out her own perfection by discourse, and in time groweth so absolute in knowledge, that her sufficiency needeth no further directions: 
Lib. 3.  but as Lomazzo the Milinese, in that excellent work which he writ of picturing, saith of a skilful painter, that being to draw a portraiture of graceful lineaments, will never stand to take the symmetry by scale, nor mark it out according to rule; but having his judgement habituated by knowledge, and perfected with the variety of shapes and proportions; his knowledge guideth his eye, and his eye directeth his hand, and his hand followeth both with such facility of cunning, that each of them serve for a rule whereby the true measures of nature are exactly expressed. The like may I say of a skilful Soldier, or any Artisan in his faculty, when knowledge hath once purified his judgement, and tuned it to the key of true apprehension.  
And although there are many that will easily admit a reconciliation of this disagreement, in the resemblance of accidents being referred to the arbitrement of a well tempered spirit; yet they will by no means acknowledge, that those monstrous and inimitable examples of valour & magnanimity (whereof antiquity is prodigal, & spendeth as though time should never want such treasure) can any way avail the manners of these days, which if they were as they ought to be, would appear but counterfeit to the lustre of a golden age, nor yet comparable to silver or brass, or the strength of iron, but deserve no better title than earth or clay, whereof the frame of this age consisteth. For what resemblance (say they) is between the customs of our times, & the actions of those ancient Heroes? They observed equity as well in war as in peace: for virtue rather flourished by the natural disposition of men, then by law and authority; the tenure of their Empire was valour in war and concord in peace; the greatest treasure which they esteemed, were the deeds of arms which they had achieved for their country, adorning the temples of their gods with piety, and their private houses with glory, pardoning rather than prosecuting a wrong, and taking nothing from the vanquished but ability of doing injury: But the course of our times hath another bias, for covetousness hath subverted both faith and equity, and our valour affecteth nothing but ambition, pride and cruelty tyrannize in our thoughts, and subtlety teacheth us to carry rather a fair countenance, than a good nature; our means of getting are by fraud & extortion, and our manner of spending is by waist and prodigality; not esteeming what we have of our own, but coveting that which is not ours; men effeminated and women impudent, using riches as servants to wickedness, and preventing nature's appetite with want on luxurity; supplanting virtue with treachery, and using victory with such impiety, as though iniuriant facere, were imperio uti: and therefore the exemplary patterns of former times wherein true honour is expressed, may serve to be gazed upon, but no way to be imitated by this age, being too subtle to deal with honesty, and wanting courage to encounter valour. I must needs confess, that he that compareth the history of Livy with that of Guichardine shall find great difference in the subjects which they handle; for Livy triumpheth in the conquests of virtue, and in every page erecteth trophies unto valour, making his discourse like Cleanthes table, wherein virtue is described in her entire majesty, and so sweetened with the presence & service of the graces, that all they which behold her are rapt with admiration of her excellency, and charmed with the love of her perfection: but Guichardine hath more than Theseus' task to perform, being to wind through the labyrinths of subtlety, and discover the acquaint practices of politians, wherein public and open designs are oftentimes but shadows of more secret projects, and these again serve as foils to more eminent intentions; being also discoloured with dissimulation, and so ensnared in the sleights of subtlety, that when you look for war, you shall find peace; and expecting peace, you shall fall into troubles, dissensions and wars: So crabbed and crooked is his argument in respect of Livies fortune, and such art is required to unfold the truth of these mysteries.  
But to answer this objection in a word, and so to proceed to that which followeth, I say those immortal memories of virtue which former time recordeth, are more necessary to be known, than any stratagems of subtler ages: for equity and valour being truly apprehended so season the motions of the soul, that albeit in so corrupt a course, they cannot peradventure stir up imitation; yet they oftentimes hinder many malicious practices, and devilish devices, when evil is reproved by the knowledge of good, and condemned by the authority of better ages. And if we will needs follow those steps which the present course of the world hath traced, and play the Cretian with the Cretian; this objection hindereth nothing, but that history, especially these of latter times; affordeth sufficient instructions to make a soldier perfect in that point.  
Let not therefore any man despise the sound instructions which learning affordeth, nor refuse the helps that history doth offer to perfect the weakness of a short experience, especially when no worth can countervail the weight of so great a business for I take the office of a chief commander, to be a subject capable of the greatest wisdedome that may be apprehended by natural means, being to manage a multitude of disagreeing minds, as a fit instrument to execute a design of much consequence and great expectation, and to qualify both their affections and apprehensions according to the accidents which rise in the course of his directions; besides the true judgement, which he ought to have of such circumstances as are most important to a fortunate end, wherein our providence cannot have enough either from learning or experience, to prevent disadvantages, or to take hold of opportunities. Neither can it be denied, but as this knowledge addeth perfection to our judgement, so it serveth also as a spur to glory, and increaseth the desire of honour in such as behold the achievements of virtue, commended to a perpetual posterity, having themselves the like means to consecrate their memory to succeeding ages, wherein they may serve for examples of valour, and reap the reward of true honour. Or to conclude, if we thirst after the knowledge of our own fortune, and long to foresee the end of that race which we have taken, which is the chiefest matter of consequence in the use of Arms; what better conjecture can be made, then to look into the course of former times, which have proceeded from like beginnings, and were continued with like means, and therefore not unlikely to sort unto like ends?  
And now if it be demanded whether reading or practice have the first place in this Art, and serveth as a foundation to the rest of the building? Let Marius answer this question, 
Sallust. de bello jugur.  who envying at the nobility of Rome, saith thus. Qui postquam consules facti sunt, acta Maiorum & Graecorum militaria praecepta legere caeperint: homines praeposteri, nam legere quam fieri, tempore posterius, re & usu prius est. Whereas (saith he) reading aught to go before practise (although it follow it in course of time, for there is no reading, but of some thing practised before,) these preposterous men, after they are made Consuls and placed at the helm of government, begin to read, when they should practise that which they had read; and so bewray their insufficiency of knowledge by using out of time that, which in time is most necessary. This testimony gave Marius of reading & book learning, being himself an enemy to the same, for as much as all his knowledge came by mere experience. But howsoever his judgement was good in this point: for since that all motion and action proceedeth from the soul, and cannot well be produced, until the Idea thereof be first imprinted in the mind, according to which pattern the outward being and sensible resemblance is duly fashioned; how is it possible that any action can be well expressed, when the mind is not directed by knowledge to dispose it in that sort, as shall best agree with the occurrentes of such natures, as are necessarily interessed both in the means and in the end thereof? And therefore speculative knowledge as the Tramontane, to direct the course of all practice is first to be respected.  
But that I may not seem partial in this controversy, but carry an equal hand between two so necessary yoakefellowes, give me leave to conclude in a word, the benefit of practice, and define the good which cometh from experience; that so nothing that hath been spoken may seem to come from affection, or proceed from the forge of unjust partiality. And first it cannot be denied, but that practice giveth boldness and assurance in action, and maketh men expert in such things they take in hand, for no man can rest upon such certainty, through the theoric of knowledge, as he that hath seen his learning verified by practice, and acknowledged by the testimony of assured proof: Besides, there are many other accomplements gotten only by practice, which grace the presence of knowledge, & give credit to that which we have read; as first to learn the use and advantage of the arms which we bear; secondly, by frequent aspect and familiarity of dangers, and accidents of terror, to learn to fear nothing but dishonour, to make no difference between heat and cold, summer and winter, to sleep in all places as on a bed, and at the same time to take pains and suffer penury, with many other difficulties which custom maketh easy, and cannot be gotten but by use and practise.  
And thus at length, I have brought a shallow discourse to an abrupt end, wishing with greater zeal of affection than I am able with manifest proof of reason, to demonstrate the necessity, that both these parts were by our soldiers so regarded, that neither practice might march in obstinate blindness without learned knowledge; nor this again be entertained with an idle apprehension without practice: but that both of them may be respected, as necessary parts to make a complete nature; wherein knowledge as the intellectual part giveth life and spirit to the action, and practise as the material substance maketh it of a sensible being, and like a skilful workman expresseth the excellency, which knowledge hath fore conceived: wishing no man to despair of effecting that by practise which the theoric of knowledge commendeth. For Cur desperes nunc posse fieri, quod iam toties factum est?   

THE SUM OF THE FIRST BOOK OF CAESAR'S COMMENTARIES, WITH Observations upon the same, discovering the excellency of Caesar's militia.  
THE ARGUMENT.  
IN this first book, are contained the specialties of two great wars, begun and ended both in a summer: the first, between Caesar & the Heluetij: 
Suitchers.  the second, between him and Ariovistus king of the Germans. The history of the Heluetians may be reduced to three principal heads: under the first, are the reasons that moved the Heluetians to entertain so desperate an expedition, and the preparation which they made for the same. The second, containeth their defeat by Cesar: and the third, their return into their country. That of Ariovistus divideth itself into two parts: the first giveth the causes that induced Caesar to undertake that war: the second entreateth of the war itself, and particularly describeth Ariovistus overthrow.  

CHAP. I.  
Gallia described: the Heluetians dislike their native seat, and propound to themselves larger territories in the continent of Gallia. Orgetorix feedeth this humour, for his own advantage.  
GALLIA is divided into three parts, differing one from an other in manners, 
Caesar.  in language, and in laws. The first part is inhabited by the Belgae: the second by the Celtaes, whom we call Galli: and the third by the Aquitanis. Belgia is the North-east part of Gallia, bounded on the East with the river Rhine, and divided from the Celtaes, 
Matrona & Sequena.  with the rivers Marne and Sene. The inhabitants of this Belgia, are without comparison the stoutest and best men at arms amongst all the Galls: for beside, that they are far remote from the civility of the Roman Province, and unacquainted with traffic or intercourse of strangers, they are in continual wars with the Germans, which maketh them hardy, expert and valorous. The Celtaes possessed the greatest part of Gallia, and have the Ocean, Seine, Garum, and the upper part of Rhine for their confines. Aquitania is limited with the river Garume and the Perinaean hills. In each of these parts are divers states and common weals, governed for the most part by the Annual magistracy of their nobility, 
Two states in the duchy of Burgundy.  but all divided into factions and parts; whereof the Hedui and Sequani, are contrary, chief and opposite ringleaders.  
The chiefest reason that moved the Heluetians to forsake their country, was the good opinion they had of their own virtue and magnanimity, and the small capacity and circuit of their territories: For Helvetia being bounded with the famous rivers Rhine and Rhone, 
The lake of Geneva. Mont ioux.  and with the lake Lemanus, and the high hanging rocks of the hill jura; extending itself within these bounds, but 240 miles in length and 180 in breadth, seemed too narrow a room to contain so warlike a people, that long before had overflown the marches of their country, with the conceit they had of their own valour, and that it heard that nature should oppose itself by rivers and mountains against the Prowess, which no enemy could ever resist: and therefore, they resolved to for sake their country, which first gave them breath and being, rather than it should hinder a correspondent proceeding to their warlike nature. These coals of ambition were first kindled, and daily blown, by the earnest persuasions and impulsions of Orgetorix, the chiefest man of authority amongst the Heluetians, both for his wealth and nobility, who not contented to be greatest in that manner he was; but affecting the greatness of princely dignity, thought no means fitter to shadow the alteration of their state, than the change of their soil, and in their new seat and place of rest to lay the foundation of a new government.  

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.  
HE that will examine this expedition of the Heluetians, by the transmigrations and flittings of other nations, shall find some unexampled particularities in the course of their proceeding: for first it hath never been heard, that any people utterly abandoned that country which nature or providence had allotted them; unless they were driven thereunto by a general calamity, as the infection of the air, the cruelty & oppression of a neighbour nation, as were the Suevians, who thought it great honour to suffer no man to border upon their confines; or some other universal, which made the place inhabitable and the people willing to undertake a voluntary exile. But oftentimes we read, that when the inhabitants of a country were so multiplied, that the place was over charged with multitudes of offspring, and like a poor father had more children than it was able to sustain, the abounding surplus was sent out to seek new fortunes in foreign countries, and to possess themselves of a resting seat; which might recompense the wants of their native country, with a plenteous revenue of necessary supplements: And in this sort, we read that Rome sent out many Colonies into divers parts of her Empire: And in this manner the ancient Galls disburdened themselves of their superfluity, and sent them into Asia. The Goths came from the Islands of the Baltic sea, and in Silvius his time swarmed over Germany: besides many other nations whose transmigrations are particularly described by Lazius. But amongst all these, we find none that so forsook their country, but there remained some behind to inhabit the same, from whence as from a fountain, succeeding ages might derive the stream of that overflowing multitude, and by them take notice of the causes, which moved them unto it: for their manner was in all such expeditions, and sending out of Colonies, to divide themselves into two or three parts, equal both in equality and number. For after they had parted their common people into even companies, they divided their nobility with as great equality as they could, among the former partitions; and then casting lots, that part which went out to seek new adventures, left their lands and possessions to the rest that remained at home; and so by industry they supplied that defect which continuance of time had drawn upon them. And this was the means which the first inhabitants of the earth found out after the flood, to people the unhabited places, and to keep off the inconveniences of scarcity and famine.   

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.  
HE that would prognosticate by the course of these several proceedings, whether of the two betokened better success, hath greater reason to foretell happiness to these which I last spoke of, then to the Heluetians; unless their valour were the greater, & quitted all difficulties which hatred and envy would cast upon them: for an action which savoureth of necessity, (which was always understood in sending out a colony) hath a more plavisible passport amongst men, then that which proceedeth from a proud voluntary motion: for as men can be content to tolerate the one, if it concern not their particular; so on the other side, they count it gain to punish pride with shame, and to oppose themselves against the other.   

THE THIRD OBSERVATION.  
ORgetorix, thirsting after princely dignity, discovereth the humour of vain glory. For not contented with the substance of honour, being already of greatest power amongst the Heluetians, and ordering the affairs of the state by his own direction, thought it nothing without the marks and title of dignity, unto which the inconveniences of majesty are annexed: not considering that the best honour sitteth not always in imperial thrones, nor weareth the diadems of Princes; but oftentimes resteth itself in meaner places, and shineth better with obscurer titles. For proof whereof, to omit antiquity, take the family of the Medici's in Florence, and particularly Cosimo and Lorenzo, whose virtue raised them to that height of honour; that they were nothing inferior to the greatest potentates of their time, being themselves but private gentlemen in that state, and bearing their proper names as their greatest titles. But howsoever the opportunity of changing their soil, was well observed by Orgetorix, as the fittest means to attempt an innovation; but the success depended much upon the fortunate proceeding of their expedition: for as a multitude of that nature, can be content to attribute a great part of their happiness, wherein every man thinketh himself particularly interessed, to an eminent leader; and in that universal ecstasy of joy will easily admit an alteration of their state: so if the issue be in any respect unfortunate, no man will acknowledge himself faulty, but every one desiring to discharge his passion upon some object: A chief director is likeliest to be the mark, at which the darts of their discontent will be thrown, and then he will find it hard to effect what he intendeth.    

CHAP. II.  
Orgetorix practices are discovered: his death: the Heluetians continue the resolution of their expedition, and prepare themselves accordingly.  
BUT Orgetorix failed in the first entrance into his projects, 
Caesar.  for seeking to colour his attempt by the example of Casticus, a man of the like authority amongst the Sequani, and Dumnorix among the Hedui, (whom he persuaded) in their several states to climb the same steps of ambition, he revealed his intent, and ended it also: for being called by the Heluetians to answer that treason; before he came to trial, his body was found dead, not without suspicion of murdering himself. The Heluetians notwithstanding continued their determined voyage, making preparations correspondent for the same; and for their better provision of victuals, they thought two years little enough to study tillage, to furnish themselves with convenient store of corn; and in the mean time to provide themselves of carts and carriages, that nothing might be wanting to make the journey easy and the end fortunate. And that no near borderer might interrupt with new troubles, a design of such hope, they made peace with all their neighbour nations, and resolved for their own advantage, to part friends with those, whom they had ever lived with in continual jars. And lastly, considering the mutability of man's nature, which scarce continueth constant the space of one hour, but altereth his determinations, according as he diversly apprehendeth the same subject, lest any of them should change their mind, and suffer the difficulties of the action to oversway the honour that might ensue thereof: in the heat of their forwardness they made a law, which at the end of two years, commanded their departure.  

THE OBSERVATION.  
AS these provisoes were all requisite, so one thing was omitted, which might have furthered their good fortune more than any thing thought of, 
The omission in the Helvetian expedition.  which was to have concealed by all means the time of their departure: for all the beasts of the wood must needs stand at gaze, when such lions roused themselves out of their dens, and be then very watchful of their safety when they knew the instant of time, when some of their spoils must needs be offered to appease their fury: Or at the least it behoved them so to have dealt by hostages and treaty, that such as were likeliest and best able to cross their dessignements, might have been no hindrance of their proceedings: considering there were but two ways out of their country by which they might go, the one narrow and difficult between the hill jura and the river Rhone, by the country of the Sequani: the other through Provence far easier and shorter, but not to be taken but by the permission of the Romans. But howsoever their error was, that after two years provision to go, and having made an exterminating decree which enjoined them to go, when they came to the point they knew not what way to go.    

CHAP. III.  
Caesar denieth the Heluetians passage through the Roman Province: he fortifieth the passage between the hill jura, and the lake of Geneva.  
CAEsar proconsul of the province in Gallia, 
Caesar.  being then at Rome, and hearing what course the Heluetians purposed to take, made great journeys to hasten into the Province, lest it should receive any detriment by them: and to that end he gathered what forces he could at his first arrival, which was but one legion, and caused the bridge at Geneva to be broken down, to hinder their passage what he might: And then too late the Heluetians began to perceive their omissions, for finding themselves ready to depart, they razed all their walled towns being twelve in number, and burnt 400 villages besides private houses, with the rest of the corn which they could not carry with them, and appointed a day to meet all upon the banks of Rhone, which day was the fifth of the kalends of April, in the Consulship of Lu. Piso, and A. Gabinius: at their arrival understanding of the resistance which Caesar made; they sent unto him some of the chiefest of their Tribes, to entreat a quiet passage through the Province. Although Caesar was resolved to deny them their passport, yet for that time he thought it best to stand doubtful of an answer; that he might the better provide himself in the mean time, to make good his denial if it were refused. The reason that moved him to deny them passage, was grounded upon the overthrow which L. Cassius a Roman Consul had received by the Heluetians, wherein the Consul himself was slain, and the soldiers sold for bondslaves: And this accident procured their hindrance for two respects; first, he thought that the people of Rome could not with the majesty of their Empire, show any favour to a nation that had so foiled them, lest they should seem to stand in fear of such as durst make head against their armies, and buckle with the strength of their legions. Secondly, he thought it impossible that the Heluetians having lent them such a blow, could pass through their Province without further violence: and therefore in this time of deliberation, he made a ditch, and a rampire from the hill jura to the lake of Geneva, containing 19 miles in length. The rampire was 16 foot high with an answerable latitude and depth of the ditch: and this he fortified with many castles well manned with soldiers, and stored with munition. Notwithstanding the Heluetians attended peaceably their day of audience; and then returned and received a denial.  

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.  
THis manner of prolonging of time to renforce the troops or get some other advantage, as it was then of great use to Caesar, and hath oftentimes been practised to good purpose; so doth it discover to a circumspect enemy, by the directions in the mean time (which cannot easily be shadowed) the drift of that delay; and so inviteth him with greater courage, to take the opportunity of that present advantage; especially if tract of time may strengthen the one, and not further the other, which is easily discerned by the circumstances of the action.   

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.  
THe request of the Heluetians seemed to deserve a facile answer, being in effect no more than nature had given to the river Rhone, which was to pass through the province, with as much speed & as little hurt as they could: but Caesar looking further into the matter and comparing things already past, with occurrences that were to follow after, found the majesty of the Roman Empire to be interessed in the answer, being either to maintain her greatness by resisting her enemies, or to degenerate from ancient virtue, by gratifying such as sought her ruin, which in matter of state are things of great consequence. And further, he knew it to be an unsafe course to suffer an enemy to have means of doing hurt; considering that the nature of man is always prone to load him with further wrongs whom he hath once injured: not but that he could peradventure be content to end the quarrel upon that advantage; but fearing the other, whom he wronged, to expect but an opportunity of revenge, he gets what advantage he can before hand, and so ceaseth not until he have added a bloody end to an injurious beginning.   

THE THIRD OBSERVATION.  
COncerning this marvelous fortification, between the hill and the lake, how serviceable such works were unto him in all his wars; in what sort, and in how small time, they were made, I will defer the treatise of them until I come to the height of Alesia, where he gave some ground of that hyperbolical speech: An me deleto, non animaduertebatis decem habere lectas quidem legiones populum Romanum, quae non solum vobis obsister sed etiam coelum diruere possent?    

CHAP. FOUR  
The Heluetians failing to pass the Rhone, take the way through the country of the Sequani. Caesar hasteth into Italy, and there inrolleth more legions: and returning, overthroweth part of them at the river Arar.  
THe Heluetians perceiving Caesar's determination, 
Caesar.  resolved to redeem the overslip they had committed in the course of their project, with the power of their forces; and to open a way by valour and arms, where peaceable entreaty had no passage: and therefore, they endeavoured some by boats, and others by fords & shallows, to pass the Rhone, and enter into Province, maugre Caesar and his legion. But being easily repelde by means of the fortification, they made a virtue of necessity, and took the narrow and difficult way, through the territories of the Sequani: of whom by Dumnorix intercession they obtained a friendly thoroughfare. In the mean time, Caesar hasted into Italy, & there enrolled two new legions, and took three more out of their standing camps in Aquileia: and with these five legions returned speedily into Gallia. At his return he understood, that the Heluetians had passed the straits, and were now sacking the territories of the Edui, a state that had always deserved well of the people rf Rome. The Ambari complained in like manner of the same hostility: and so did the Allobroges which inhabited beyond the Rhone. Caesar not thinking it convenient to linger any longer, and understanding that three parts of their troops had already past the river Arar, and a fourth remained to be transported, he thought it not good to foreslow that advantage: and therefore at the third watch of the night, he marched out of his camp with three legions, to the place where they lay, and finding them scattered and dispersed; 
Zuricke.  he put the greatest part of them to the sword, and the rest escaped into the woods near adjoining. This part that was thus defeated, was named Pagus Tigurinus.  

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.  
THis defeat being chiefly a service of execution upon such as were taken at a dangerous disadvantage, which men call unaware, containeth these two advisoes. First, not to neglect that advantage which Sertorius by the hairs of his horse tail hath proved to be very important, that beginning with a part, it is a matter of no difficulty to overcome the whole. Secondly, it may serve for a caveat, so to transport an Army over awater, where the enemy is within a reasonable march, that no part may be so severed from the body of the Army, that advantage may thereby be taken to cut them off all together, and separate them from themselves. The safest and most honourable way, to transport an Army over a river, is by a bridge, placing at each end sufficient troops of horse and foot, to defend the Army from sudden assaults, as they pass over the water; and thus went Caesar over the Rhine into Germany two several times.   

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.  
COncerning the circumstance of time, when Caesar went out of his camp, which is noted to be in the third watch, we must understand that the Romans divided the whole night into four watches, 
The manner of their watch.  every watch containing three hours; and these watches were distinguished by several notes & sound of cornets or trumpets, that by the distinction and diversity thereof, it might easily be known what watch was sounded. The charge & office of sounding the watches, belonged to the chiefest Centurion of a legion, whom they called Primipilus, or Primus Centurio, at whose pavilion the trumpeters attended, to be directed by his hourglass. The first watch began always at sun-setting, and continued three hours, (I understand such hours as the night contained, being divided into twelve: for the Romans divided their night as well as their day into twelve equal spaces, which they called hours) the second watch continued until midnight; and then the third watch began, and contained likewise three hours; the fourth was equal to the rest, and continued until sun rising. So that by this phrase de tertia vigilia, we understand that Caesar went out of his camp in the third watch, which was after midnight: and so we must conceive of the rest of the watches, as often as we shall find them mentioned in history.    

CAP. V.  
Caesar passeth over the river Arar: his horsemen encountered with the Heluetians and were put to the worst.  
THE Heluetians having passed the river, 
Caesar.  Caesar made haste to follow after, and making a bridge he transported over his legions in one day, which the Heluetians could scarce do in twenty: And sending all his horse to the number of four thousand which he had raised in the Province and amongst the Hedui, to discover what way the enemy took, it happened that they fell so near upon the rearguard of the Heluetians, that they were forced to give battle in a place of disadvantage, and by that means some of them were slain, and the rest put to flight. The Heluetians made insolent with this victory, for as much as 500 of their men had put to rout so great a multitude, began now boldly to resist, and sometimes part of their rearward would violently assault the Roman legions. Caesar held his men from giving battle, thinking it sufffcient for the present to keep the enemy from pillaging, forage, and depopulation: and so they marched fifteen days together in such sort, that there was not above five or six miles between the rearward of the Heluetians and the vanguard of the Romans.  

THE OBSERVATION.  
THis example of the Heluetians may lesson a commander, not to wax insolent upon every overthrow which the enemy taketh, but duly to way the true causes of a victory gotten or an overthrow taken; that apprehending the right currant of the action, he may neither vaunt of a blind victory, nor be dismayed at a casual mishap. And herein let a heedful wariness so moderate the sequels of victory in a triumphing spirit, that the care and jealousy to keep still that sweet sounding fame on foot, may as far surpass the industry, which he first used to obtain it, as the continuance of happiness doth exceed the beginning of good fortunes. For such is the nature of our soul, that although from her infancy even to the manhood of her age, she never found want of that which she lusted after; yet when she meeteth with a counterbuff to check her appetite, and restrain her affections from their satisfaction; she is as much troubled in that want, as if she had never received any contentment at all: for our will to every object which it seeketh after, begetteth always a new appetite, which is not satisfied with a former quittance, but either seeketh present payment, or returneth discontentment unto the mind. And as our soul is of an everlasting being, and cannot think of an end, to her beginning; so she seeketh a perpetual continuance of such things which she lusteth after: which he, that meaneth to hold fortune his friend, will endeavour to maintain.    

CHAP. VI  
Caesar sendeth to get the advantage of a hill, and so to give the Heluetians battle: but was put off by false intelligence: the opportunity being lost, he intendeth provision of corn.  
CAESAR being advertised by his discoverers, 
Caesar.  that the Heluetians lay under a hill, about eight miles distant from his camp; and understanding that the ascent unto the top of the hill, on the further side from the enemy was ready and easy: in the third watch he sent Labienus with two legions, to possess themselves of the said hill, and he himself followed with the rest of the Army in the fourth watch. His direction to Labienus was, that as soon as he perceived him to charge the enemy below in the valley, that then he should descend with as violent a shock as he could, and so the Heluetians should be charged both in front and flank at one instant. But this intent was at that time frustrated through the causeless fear of one Publius Considius, a man held very skilful in matter of war, for his experience first under Silvius, and afterward with Crassus; who being sent by Caesar to discover whether Labienus had took the Hill, was strooken with such a terror being so near an enemy of that fame, that seeing the Roman ensigns displayed upon the mountain, could not be persuaded but they were the Heluetians, & returned that advertisement to Caesar: whereupon he desisted for that time from following his purpose, and retired to the next hill, where he imbattailed his soldiers with advantage of the place. This opportunity being thus lost, because the day of measuring corn unto the soldiers, was within two days: he would in no wise omit that care (although peradventure he might have had the like opportunity within a day or two) but turned towards Bibracte a great and opulent city of the Hedui 18 miles distant from his camp, 
Bray in the county of Retell.  and there purposed to provide corn to pay his soldiers.  

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.  
THe getting of this hill as a place of advantage, was marvelous important to the happy success of the battle: for the advantage of the place is not only noted as an especial cause of easy victory, 
Places of advantage in the Roman wars.  throughout this history; but in all their wars from the very cradle of their Empire, it cleared their Armies from all difficulties, to what extremity soever they were put. The first reason may be in regard of their darts and slings, and especially their piles, which being a heavy deadly weapon, could not any way be so available, being cast countremont or in a plain level, as when the declivity and downfall of a swelling bank did naturally second their violent impression: Neither can the shock at handy-blowes be any thing so furious (which was a point of great respect in their battles) when the soldiers spent their strength in franchising the injury of a rising mountain, as when the place by a natural inclination did further their course. And to conclude, if the battle succeeded not according to their desire, the favour of the place afforded them means of a strong retreat, in the highest part whereof, they had commonly their camps well fenced and fortified against all chances. If it be demanded whether the upper ground be of like use, in regard of our weapons: I answer, that in a skirmish of shot, I take the advantage to lie in the lower ground rather than on the hill; for the pieces being hastily charged, as commonly they are after the first volley, if the bullet chance to lie loose, when the nose of the piece is lower than the breech, it must needs fly at random, and be altogether uneffectual: but when the nose shall be raised upward to the side of a hill, the bullet being rammed in with his own weight, shall fly with greater certainty and fury; considering the nature of the powder to be such, that the more it is stopped and shut in, the more it seeketh to enlarge his room, and breaketh forth with greater violence and fury. Concerning other weapons, I take the upper ground in the shock and encounter, to be advantageous, as well for the sword as the pike, and would deserve as great respect, if the controversy were decided by these weapons, as seldom times it is.   

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.  
BY Causidius his demeanour, we see that verified which physicians affirm, that nothing will sooner carry our judgement out of her proper seat, than the passion of fear: and that amongst soldiers themselves, whom custom hath made familiarly acquainted with horror and death, it is able to turn a flock of sheep into a squadron of corselets, and a few canes or osiers into pikes and lancers: which may serve to advise a discreet General, not easily to credit a relation of that nature, when a man of reputation, in so perfect a discipline and so experienced in the service of three famous Chiefs, was so surprised with fear, that he could not discern his friends from his enemies: but I will speak more of this passion in the war, with Ariovistus.   

THE THIRD OBSERVATION.  
IN every relation throughout the whole course of this history, the first words are commonly these, 
Their manner of victualling  Re frumentaria comparata; as the foundation & strength of every expedition, without which no man can manage a war, according to the true maxims and rules of the Art military, but must be forced to relieve that inconvenience, with the loss of many other advantages of great consequence: Which gave occasion to Gaspard de Coligni that famous Admiral of France amongst other oracles of truth, wherewith his mind was marvelously enriched, often to use this saying: That he that will shape that beast (meaning war) must begin with the belly: And this rule was diligently observed by Caesar, who best knew how to express the true portraiture of that beast, in due proportion and lively resemblance.  
The order of the Romans was, at the day of measuring, to give corn to every particular soldier, for a certain time, which was commonly defined by circumstances: And by the measure which was given them, they knew the day of the next payment; for every footman received after the rate of a bushel a week, which was thought sufficient for him and his servant: for if they had paid them their whole stipend in money, it might have been wasted in unnecessary expenses; but by this means they were sure of provision for the time determined; and the sequel of the war was providently cared for by the General.  
The corn being delivered out, was husbanded, ground with hand-milles, which they carried always with them, & made into hasty cakes, dainty enough for a soldiers mouth, by no other but themselves and their servants: Neither could they sell it or exchange it for bread; for Sallust reckoneth this up amongst other dishonours, of the discipline corrupted, that the soldiers sold away their corn, which was given them by the treasurer, & bought their bread by the day. And this manner of provision had many special commodities, which are not incident to our custom of victualling: for it is impossible, that victuallers should follow an Army upon a service, in the enemy's country twenty or thirty days together, with sufficient provision for an Army: And by that means the General cannot attend advantages and fittest opportunities, which in tract of time are often offered, but is forced either to hazard the whole, upon unequal terms, or to sound an unwilling retreat. And whereas the victuallers are for the most part voluntary, respecting nothing but their gain; and the soldiers on the other side, careless of the morrow and prodigal of the present, in that turbulent marmarket, where the seller hath an eye only to his particular, and the buyer respecteth neither the public good nor his private commodity, there is nothing to be looked for, but famine and confusion. Where as the Romans by their manner of provision, imposed the general care of the public good upon the chief commander, whose duty it was to provide store of corn for his Army; and the particular care upon every private soldier, whom it especially concerned to see, that the allowance which the common weal had in plentiful manner given him, for his maintenance, might not be wasted through negligence or prodigality; which excellent order, the nature of our victuals will no way admit. Their provinces and the next confederate states furnished their Armies continually with corn; as it appeareth by this place, that for provision of grain, he depended altogether upon the Hedui: And when they were in the enemy's country, in the time of harvest, the soldiers went out to reap and gather corn, and delivered it threshed and cleansed to the treasurer, that it might be kept until the day of payment. But to leave this frugal and provident manner of provision as unpossible to be imitated by this age, let us return to our history, and see how the Heluetians were led, by a probable error, to their last overthrow.    

CHAP. VII.  
The Heluetians follow after Caesar, and overtake the rearward. He imbattaileth his legions upon the side of a hill: and giveth order for the battle.  
THE Heluetians, 
Caesar.  understanding of the Romans departure by fugitives that came unto them, were fully persuaded that fear was the greatest cause of their retreat: for the day before having the upper ground, they durst not use the advantage of the same: and hoping withal to intercept them from victuals, they followed after them with what speed they could, & as they overtook them they charged upon the rearward. Which when Caesar perceived, he sent his horsemen to sustain the assault, & in the mean time he drew his forces unto the next hill, and in the side thereof about the middle of the hill, he made a triple battle of four old legions, on the top of the hill he placed two new legions, which he had last enrolled in Italy, with the associate forces; and to these he commended the baggage and impediments of the whole Army, and filled all the rest of the hill with light armed men. The Heluetians on the other side, conveyed their carriage and impediments into one place; and having beaten back Caesar's horsemen, with a thick thronged batallion, they put themselves into a phalanx, and so pressed under the first battle of the Roman legions.  

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.  
COncerning the true sense of this triple battle, which Caesar made upon the side of the hill, I understand it according to the ancient custom of the Romans; 
The manner of their imbattailing.  who in the infancy of their military discipline, divided their Army into three sorts of soldiers, Hastati, Principes, and Triarij: for I omit the velites, as no part of their standing battles, and of these they made three several battles from front to back: in the first battle were the Hastati, and they possessed the whole front of the Army, and were called Acies prima. 
By triplex Acies.  Behind these in a convenient distance, stood the Principes, in like sort and order disposed, and were called Acies secunda: and lastly in a like correspondent distance, were the Triarij imbattelled and made Aciem tertiam. Their legion consisted of ten companies, which they called cohortes, and every cohort consisted of three small companies, which they named Manipuli: a maniple of the Hastati, a maniple of the Principes, and an other of the Triarij, as I will more particularly set down in the second book. And as these three kinds of soldiers were separated by distance of place from front to back: so was every battle divided into his maniples; and these were divided by little allies and ways, one from an other, which were used to this purpose: The Hastati being in front did ever begin the battle, and if they found themselves too weak to repel the enemy, or were happily forced to a retreat, they drew themselves through these allies or distances, which were in the second battle between the maniples of the Principes into the space, which was between the Principes and the Triarij, and there they rested themselves whilst the Princes took their place and charged the enemy: Or otherwise, if the commanders found it needful, they filled up those distances of the Principes, and so united with them into one body, they charged the enemy all in gross; and than if they prevailed not, they retired into the spaces between the Triarij, and so they gave the last assault, all the three bodies being joined all into one.  
Now if we examine by the current of the history, whether Caesar observed the same order and divisions in his wars, we shall find little or no alteration at all, for first this triplex Acies here mentioned, was no other thing but the division of the Hastati, Principes and Triarij, according to the manner of the first institution. And lest any man should dream of that ordinary division, which is likewise threefold, the two cornets and the battle, and in that sense he might say to have made triplicem Aciem, let him understand, that the circumstances of the division have no coherence with that division; for in that he saith of the Heluetians, successerunt Aciem primam, pressed near the first battle or vanguard, he maketh it clear that the Army was divided into a triple battle from front to back: for otherwise, he would have said, successerint dextrum aut sinistrum cornu, aut mediam Aciem: for so were the parts of that division termed. Again, in the retreat which the Heluetians made to the hill, when he saith that the first and second battle followed close upon the enemy, and the third opposed itself against the Boijs and Tulingi, and stood ready at the foot of the hill, to charge the legions in the flank and on the back. It is manifest, that no other division can so fitly be applied to this circumstance, as that from front to back.  
But that place in the first of the civil wars taketh away all scruple of controversy, where he useth the very same terms of prima, secunda and tertia Acies: for being to encamp himself near unto Afranius, and fearing lest his soldiers should be interrupted in their work, he caused the first and second battle to stand in Arms and keep their distance, to the end they might shroud and cover the third battle (which was employed in making a ditch behind them) from the view of the enemy; and this kind of imbattailing Caesar observed, in most of his fights: by which it appeareth that he useth the very same order and discipline for imbattailing, as was instituted by the old Romans.  
Concerning the ancient names of Hastati, Principes and Triarij, which Ramus in his Militia julij Caesaris, urgeth to be omitted throughout the whole history: I grant they are seldom used in these Commentaries, in the sense of their first institution: for the Hastati, when the discipline was first erected, were the youngest and poorest of the legionary soldiers. The Principes were the lusty, and able bodied men: and the Triarij the eldest and best experienced. But in Caesar's camp, there was little or no difference either of valour or years, between the Hastati, Principes or Triarij, which he nameth Prima, Secunda and Tertia Acies; and therefore were never termed by those names, in respect of that difference. Notwithstanding in regard of order and degrees of discipline, that virtue might be rewarded with honour, and that time might challenge the privilege of a more worthy place, 
Lib. 1. de bello Civili.  the said distinctions and terms were religiously observed: for in the battle with Perreius at Ilerda in Spain, he mentioneth the death of Q. Fulginius, ex primo Hastato legionis quartae decimae: and in the overthrow at Dirrachium he saith, 
Lib 3. de bello Civili.  that the eagle bearer, being grievously wounded, commended the safety of his ensign to the horsemen, all the centurions of the first cohort being slain, praeter principem Priorem. And for the Triarij, there is no term more frequent in Caesar then Primipilus, which name by the rules of the ancient discipline, but to the chiefest Centurion of the first maniple of the Triarij: whereby it appeareth that the maniples kept the same names in regard of a necessary distinction, although peradventure the Hastati were as good soldiers, as either the Principes or the Triarij. As touching the spaces between the maniples, whereinto the first battle did retire itself if occasion urged them, I never found any mention of them in Caesar. Excepting once here in England, where in a skirmish the Britons so urged the court of guard, which kept watch before the Roman camp, that Caesar sent out two other cohortes to succour them, who making distance between them as they stood, the court of guard retired itself in safety, through that space into the camp; otherwise we never find that the first battle made any retreat into the allies between the maniples of the second battle, but when it failed in any part, the second and third went presently to second them, as appear in the battle following with Arionistus and in divers others.  
Concerning the use of this triple battle, 
Lib. 5. de militia Romana.  what can be said more than Lipsius hath done? where he layeth open the particular commodities thereof as far forth as a speculative judgement can discern of things so far remote from the use of this age, which never imitateth this triple battle but only in a march: for then commonly they make three companies, a vanguard, a battle and a rearward: but in imbattailing, they draw these three companies all in front, making two cornets and the battle, without any other troops to second them. But let this suffice concerning Caesar his manner of imbattailing and his triplex Acies, until I come to the second book, where I will handle more particularly the parts of a legion, and the commodity of their small battailions.   

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.  
THe Macedonian Phalanx is described by Polybius to be a square battle of pikemen, consisting of 16 in flank and 500 in front; the soldiers standing so close together that the pikes of the fifth rank were extended three foot beyond the front of the battle; 
A phalanx described.  the rest whose pikes were not serviceable by reason of their distance from the front, couched them upon the shoulders of those that stood before them, and so locking them in together in file, pressed forward to hold up the sway or giving back of the former ranks, and so to make the assault more violent and unresistible. The Grecians were very skilful in this part of the Art military, which containeth order and disposition in imbattailing, for they maintained public professors whom they called Tactici, to teach and instruct their youth the practice and Art of all forms convenient for that purpose. And these Tactici found by experience, that 16 in flank so ordered as they were in a phalanx, were able to bear any shock how violently soever it charged upon them: which number of 16 they made to consist of four doubles, as first unity maketh no order, for order consisteth in number and plurality; but unity doubled maketh two, the least of all orders, and this is the double: which doubled again maketh the second order of four soldiers in a file, which doubled the third time maketh 8, & this doubled maketh 16, which is the fourth doubling from a unite; and in it they stayed as in an absolute number and square, whose root is 4 the Quadruple in regard of both the extremes: for every one of these places, the Tactici had several names, by which they were distinctly known. But the particular description requireth a larger discourse, then can be comprehended in these short observations: he that desireth further knowledge of them, may read Elianus, that lived in the time of Adrian the Emperor: and Arianus in his history of Alexander the great: with Mauritius, and Leo imperator, where he shall have the divisions of Tetrafalangia difalangia, Phalangia unto a unite, with all the discipline of the Grecians.  
The chiefest thing to be observed is, that the Grecians having such skill in imbattailing, preferred a phalanx before all other forms whatsoever; either because the figure in itself was very strong, or otherwise in regard that it fitted best their weapons, which were long pikes and targets. But whether Caesar termed the battle of the Heluetians a phalanx in regard of their thick manner of imbattailing only, or otherwise, for as much as besides the form, they used the natural weapon of a phalanx which was the pike, it remaineth doubtful. Brancatio in his discourses upon this place, maketh it no controversy, but that every soldier carried a pike and a target, the target is particularly named in this history: but it cannot so easily be gathered by the same, that their offensive weapons were pikes. In the fight at the baggage it is said, that many of the legionary soldiers were wounded through the cart wheels, with tragulas & materas, which are commonly interpreted spears and javelins: and I take them to be weapons longer than common darts, but whether they were so long as the sarissas of the Macedonians, I cannot tell. Howsoever, this is certain, that the Heluetians have ever been reputed for the true phalangitaes, next unto the Macedonians; and that in their thick and close imbattailing; they failed not at this time of the form of a phalanx: for they roofed it so thick with targets, that Caesar saith they were sore troubled, because many of their targets were fastened and tied together, with piles darted through them: Which argueth that their phalanx was very thick thronged, whatsoever their weapon was.    

CHAP. VIII.  
Caesar sendeth away all the horses of ease: exhorteth his men: and beginneth the battle.  
BOTH the Armies being in this forwardness, 
Caesar.  Caesar to take away all hope of safety by flight, first caused his own horse and then all the private horses of ease, of the Legates, Tribunes, and the rest of the chief leaders, to be carried out of the battle, and using some motives of courage, according as the circumstances afforded him occasion, he gave the sign of battle. The Romans casting their piles with the advantage of the hill, did easily break the Helvetian phalanx; and then taking themselves to their sword; they did second the fury of the pile with a rude and violent close.  

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.  
THe ancient sages found it necessary, 
Speeches of encouragement before they gave battle.  to a faithful and serious execution of such an action, to prepare the minds of their men with words of encouragement, and to take away all scruple out of their conceits, either of the unlawfulness of the cause, or disadvantage against the enemy: for if at any time that saying be true, that oratio plus potest quam pecunia, it is here more powerful and of greater effect. For a donative or liberanca, can but procure a mercenary endeavour ever yielding to a better offer, and do oftentimes breed a suspicion of wrong, even amongst those that are willingly enriched with them; and so maketh them slack to discharge their service with loyalty: yea oftentimes of friends to become enemies. But in as much as speech discloseth the secrets of the soul, and discovereth the intent and drift of every action, a few good words laying open the injury which is offered to innocency, how equity is controlled with wrong, and justice controlled by iniquity (for it is necessary that a commander approve his cause, and settle an opinion of right in the mind of his soldiers, as it is easy to make that seem probable which so many offer to defend with their blood, when indeed every man relieth upon another's knowledge, and respecteth nothing less the right) a few good words I say, will so stir up their minds in the ferventness of the cause, that every man will take himself particularly engaged in the action by the title of equity; and the rather for that it jumpeth with the necessity of their condition. For men are willing to do well, when well-doing agreeth with that they would do, otherwise the Act may formerly be effected, but the mind never approveth it by assent. And this manner of exhortation or speech of encouragement, was never omitted by Caesar in any conflict mentioned in this history: but he still used it as a necessary instrument to set virtue on foot, and the only means to stir up alacrity: Or if it happened that his men were at any time discouraged by disaster or cross accident, 
Lib. 7. de bello gallico.  as they were at Gergobia, and at the two overthrows he had at Dirrachium; he never would adventure to give battle until he had encouraged them again, and confirmed their minds in valour and resolution. But this age hath put on so scornful a humour, that it cannot hear a speech in this key, sound it never so gravely, without scoffing and derision: and on the other side discontinuance of so necessary a part, hath bred at length such an inutilem pudorem in our chief commanders, that they had rather lose the gain of a great advantage, then buy it with words to be delivered in public.   

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.  
IN this Chapter we may further observe the violence of the Roman pile, 
The Roman Pile described  which being a heavy deadly weapon, could hardly be frustrated with any resistance, and in that respect was very proper and effectual against a phalanx, or any other thick and close battle, or wheresoeever else, the stroke was certain, or could hardly deceive the aim of the caster: for in such encounters it so galled the enemy, that they were neither able to keep their order, nor answer the assault with a resisting counterbuff. By which it appeareth that the only remedy against the pile was, to make the ranks thin, allowing to every soldier a large podisme or place to stand in, that so the stroke might of itself fall without hurt, or by foresight be prevented; as it shall plainly appear by the sequel of this history, which I will not omit to note, as the places shall offer themselves to the examination of this discourse. But as touching the pile, which is so often mentioned in the Roman history, Polybius describeth it in this manner. A pile (saith he) is a casting weapon, the staff whereof is almost 3 cubits long, and it hath palmarem diametrum, a hand breadth in thickness. The staves were armed with an head of iron, equal in length to the staff itself: But in that sort that half the head was fastened up to the middle of the staff, with plates of iron like the head of a Halberd: and the other half stuck out at the end of the staff like a pike, containing a finger's breadth in thickness, and so decreasing less and less unto the point which was barbed. This head was so slender toward the point, that the weight of the staff would bend it as it stuck, as appeareth in this battle of the Heluetians. This weapon was peculiar to the Romans, and was called Pilum, as Varro noteth of Pilum a Pestle, quod Hostes feriret ut Pilum. 
Lib. 3. de militia Romana.  Lipsius' finding that Palmarem diametrum, was too great a thickness to be managed by any man's hand, interpreteth it to be four inches in circuit, if the staff were either round or square, for they had of both sorts, and so he maketh it very manageable; but nothing answerable to the description given by Polybius either in form or weight. Patricius in his Paralleli, maketh the staff to have palmarem diametrum in the butt end, 
Lib. 5.  but the rest of the staff he maketh to decrease taper wise, unto the head of iron, where it hath the thickness of a man's finger; and so it answereth both in form and weight to a Pestle, as may be seen by the figure, and I take it to be the meaning of Polybius. Patricius in that place setteth down four discommodities of the Pile. First a furious and hot spirited enemy will easily prevent the darting of the pile, with a nimble and speedy close: And so we read, that in the battle which Caesar had with Ariovistus, the Germans came so violently upon them, that the soldiers cast away their piles, and betook them to their sword. And likewise in that worthy battle between Catiline and Marcus Petreius, 
Sallust.  they cast away their piles on either part. The second discommodity was, that the piles being so heavy, could not be cast any distance, but were only serviceable at hand. Thirdly, they could not be cast with any aim, or as they say point blank: And lastly the soldiers were to take advantage of ground backward when they threw them, which might easily disorder their troops, if they were not very well experienced.   

THE THIRD OBSERVATION.  
THe last thing which I observe in this speciality is, that the legionary soldiers had no other offensive weapon, but one pile or two at the most, and their sword. By which it may be gathered, that all their victories came by buckling at handy-blowes, for they came always so near before they cast their pile, that they left themselves no more time than might conveniently serve them to draw their sword: neither would their arms of defence, which was complete, besides a large target which they carried on their left arm, suffer them to make any long pursuit, or continued chase whensoever a light armed enemy did make any speedy retreat, as will more plainly appear by that which followeth.    

CHAP. IX.  
The Heluetians fainting in the battle, retire to a hill, the Romans follow after, and the battle is continued.  
THE Heluetians were sore troubled with the Roman piles, 
Caesar.  which stuck so fast in their shields, that they were neither able to pull them out, nor to use their targets to any purpose: and therefore after a wearisome toil, they chose rather to cast them away, and to hazard their nakedness upon agility and readiness; then to betray their life with an unmanageable weapon: but at length fainting with wounds, they began to give place, and made their retreat to a hill not far off, the better to save themselves from the fury of the Romans. 
Them of Borbon and Lorraine.  The hill being taken, and the legions following on to drive them from thence, the rearguard of the Heluetians, which were the Boy and Tulingi, consisting of 15000 men stood ready at the foot of the hill, to charge the Romans in flank and to environ them round about: which the Heluetians no sooner perceived but they returned and began a fresh from the hill to renew the battle, and so the legions were set upon both in front and flank at one instant. To remedy this difficulty, conversa signa bipartito intulerunt, saith the history: the first and second battle fought against the Heluetians that returned from the hill and the third battle turned themselves to bear the assault of the rearward, which stood ready to enclose them about, and to charge them on the back. And here the fight was doubtful and vehement for a long time, until at length they were no longer able to endure the violence of the legionary soldiers, part of them fled to the top of the hill, and the rest betook themselves to the place, where their baggage and impediments were lodged. And hitherto, here was not one man seen to have turned his back in all the conflict, although the fight continued from the seventh hour until the evening.  

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.  
COncerning the ensigns of the Romans: 
The ensigns of the Romans  we are to understand that the chiefest ensign of every legion was an Eagle, which always attended upon the Primipile or chief Centurion of the said legion. The ensign of a maniple was, either a Hand or a Dragon, a wolf or a Sphinx, as it appeareth (besides the testimony of history) by the Column of Trajan in Rome, wherein the ensigns are figured, with such purtraitures: so that these ensigns, resembling the proportions of living creatures, had their fore parts always carried that way which the legions were to march, or where they were to fight: and therefore in this history, by the aspect and carrying of the ensigns, the front of the Army was commonly noted: as in this 
THE BATTLE WHICH CAESAR HAD WITH THE HELVETIANS  place it is said, that the ensigns of the first and second battle were carried towards the hill, whither the Heluetians had made their retreat; and the ensigns of the third battle looked an other way, towards the Boijs and Tulingi, which stood of the foot of the hill: By which is signified, how the legions were divided to resist the brunt of the double encounter.   

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.  
COncerning the time of the day: 
The division of their day.  we are to understand that the Romans used not the same division of the day as we commonly do: for they divided their artificial (which is the space between sun rising and setting) into 12 equal parts, which the Astronomers called unequal or planetary hours. The first hour of the day began always at sun rising; the sixth hour was always high noon; and the twelfth hour was sun setting. And as the day waxed longer or shorter, so these hours were either greater or less: neither did they agree with equal or equinoctial hours, such as are now used, but only at the Acquinoctium: so that by this manner of reckoning, ab hora septima ad vesperum, is meant the battle began about one of the clock according to our Computation, and continued until the evening. The like we must understand, throughout this whole history, as often as there is mention made of the circumstance of time.    

CHAP. X.  
The Heluetians continue their fight, at the carriages: but at length they left the field, and marched towards Langiers.  
THE like courage was also showed on either side at their baggage, 
Caesar.  the place being fortified with carts and wagons in steed of a rampire, which so troubled the Romans that they could not win it until it was late in the night: for the Heluetians being fenced with their carriages, so galled the legions with darts and tavelins, under the chariots and from between the wheels, that the victory was not easily achieved. At last being able no longer to resist, they left the place and marched all that night, without any intermission; and the fourth day they came into the Confines of the 
* Langiers.  Lingones, being about 230000 that escaped in the battle.  

THE OBSERVATION.  
IF we consider the nature of the action, and look into the true causes of their overthrow, as far as the right sense of the history shall direct our judgement, we shall find valour not to be wanting in the Heluetians, but rather superlatively abounding in the Romans. For that vehement opinion of their valiancy and manhood, which carried them out of the straits of the country, to seek larger fortunes in other kingdoms, was not so abated with the losle of the fourth part of their Host at the river Arar; nor with the terrible fury of those veteran legions: but it yielded this effect, which Caesar in his estimate of valour thought memorable, that for five hours space or more, there was not one man seen to have turned his back. Their manner of imbattailing, had not the Romans been the enemy, was unresistible: for being cast into a phalanx, which in the plains of Asia had made Alexander the great and the Macedonians famous, they did as far surpass any other form of imbattailing (supposing that the conveniency of the place did fit that disposition) wherein the strength of the whole is divided into many particulars, as the violence of a great body exceedeth the force and motion of his parts, when it is divided into smaller cantons. For as in a phalanx, many particular soldiers are by a close and compact order incorporated into one entire body: so their several virtues are gathered into one head, and are as parts united into one general force, which easily swalloweth up the ability of many other lesser quantities, into which a greater strength is equally divided.  
The advantage of the place which they got by retreat, and the double charge wherewith they engaged the Romans both in front and flank, was able in an indifferent conflict to have made fortune fugitive, and bear arms on their side; or at the least so to have steemed the swelling tide of victory, which carried the Romans so violently in the chase, that they might have been equal sharers in the honour of the day: had it not flowed from an Ocean of valour, whose course could not be hindered with any stops and oppositions, until it came to that height, which true valour and unexampled resolution affected. And yet the height of this courage could not so allay the heat of the Heluetians fury; but it broke forth into dangerous flames, when they came to the place where their carriages were laid, and cost much blood and many men's lives before they quitted the place: for they fought with that spirit and industry, as though they meant to make trial whether their fortune would prove no better in the night than it had done in the day.  
The overthrow of the Tigurine Canton at the river Arar, proceeded rather from want of good directions (which is the less to be marveled at, considering they had no chief commander as we read of) then from any defect of valour: for the rules of military government require especial care in passing over a water; 
Periculum semper ab hostibus gravissimum sustinet divisus & inordinatus exercitus.  for then especially an Army is in greatest danger, when it is disordered and divided. And therefore the Romans achieved this victory by the horrible vigilancy as Tully calleth it, of their commander: who always watched oportunitates rei bene gerendae, as necessary and speedy means to overcome in all his wars.    

CHAP. XI.  
Caesar after three days respite, followeth after the Heluetians: he taketh them to mercy, and sendeth them back again to the country.  
CAESAR abode three days in the place where the battle was fought, 
Caesar.  as well to bury the dead, as to refresh the wearied spirits of his over-laboured soldiers, that their wounds might the better be cured: and in the mean time he sent letters to the 
* Langres.  Lingones, not to furnish the Heluetians either with corn, or any other provisions: for if they did, he would esteem of them as of enemies, and take them in the number of the vanquished Heluetians; and at the three days end, he made after them with all his forces. The Heluetians constrained through penury and want of necessary supplements, sent ambassadors to Caesar to entreat an acceptation of rendrie: who meeting him on the way, threw themselves at his feet, and with many tears and supplications, they craved such favourable conditions of peace, as might best comfort a distressed people, and beseem the glory of so famous a Conquest. Caesar first sent them word to attend his coming in the place where they were: and at his coming he commanded them to deliver unto him a sufficient number of hostages and pledges, 2. to give up all the Arms and weapons they had, 3. and to deliver up the fugitives that were fled unto them in the time of the war. Whiles these things were a doing, part of the Heluetians to the number of 6000, stole out of the camp in the night, and took their journey towards the Rhine, and the Confines of the Germans: which when Caesar understood, he sent presently to those cities, through whose territories the Heluetians had passed; and commanded them to bring them back again: which being diligently performed, he welcomed them with the entertainment of an enemy, and put them all to the sword. The rest he commanded to return into their country from whence they came, and because they had neither corn nor any other sustenance, he caused the 
* Savoyens.  Allobroges to supply their necessities, and willed the Heluetians to re-edify their towns and cities which they had before destroyed, and to inhabit in those friendly places which had given to their ancestors and themselves greater fortunes, then could elsewhere be afforded them: Wherein he was the more careful, lest if their country lying waste, the fertility of the soil might invite the Germans from beyond the Rhine to taste the sweetness which the Galls enjoyed, and so the province should be sure of an unquiet neighbour. In the camp of the Heluetians was found a register, containing the particular sums of all that were in that journey, amounting to the number of 368000, whereof 92000 were fight men: they that returned and saw the fortune of both their states, were 110000. And thus ended that war.  

THE OBSERVATION.  
THe directions concerning their rendrie and return, were very sound, and of good consequence. For first in that he commanded them to attend his coming in the place where they were, he took away all motions of new trouble which often removes might have caused, by the opportunity of some accident which might have happened: assuring himself that their abode in that place would increase their miseries, and consequently ripen that desire of peace which they made show of; considering that the Lingones in whose territories they were, durst not for fear of Caesar's displeasure, furnish them with any necessaries in that extremity. Touching the security which the Romans required of the loyalty of such people as they conquered; their manner was, to take as hostages a sufficient number of the men children of the chiefest men of that nation, whose lives depended upon their parent's fidelity, and ended with the first suspicion of their rebellion: which custom besides the present good, promised the like or better security to the next age, when as those children by conversation and acquaintance should be so affected to the Roman Empire, that returning to their own country, their actions might rather tend to the advancement thereof, than any way be prejudicial to the same. And lest the love of liberty and freedom should prevail more with them, than that affection which nature had enjoined them to bear to their children: he did what he could to take away the means and instruments of their rebellion, by causing them to deliver up such Arms and weapons as were there present: and so to become suitable to that petition of peace, which they had made. The sum of all is this. He corrected the insolency of a furious people, & reduced them to a feeling of their own madness. He kept them from sacking the possessions of many thousands, in the continent of Gallia; and sent them back again to continue their name and nation in the place, where they first inhabited; which continueth unto this day. And thus we see, that there is no humour so headstrong, nor so backed with strength of circumstances, but it may meet with a remedy to qualify the insolency thereof, and make it subject to correction and controlment.    

CHAP. XII.  
The states of Gallia congratulate Caesar's victory: they call a council, and discover their inward grief concerning Ariovistus, and his forces.  
THE Helvetian war being so happily ended, 
Caesar.  the Princes and chief men of all the states of Gallia, came to Caesar to congratulate the happiness of his victory: and with all they besought him that with his good liking, they might call a General council; wherein they had matters of great importance to be handled, which they desired with a common consent, to prefer to his consideration. Which being granted, and the day of meeting appointed, they bound themselves by oath not to reveal the causes of their assembly, but to such as they should make choice of, to be their Orators. The council being ended, the same Princes returned to Caesar, and in lamentable manner cast themselves at his feet, contending with as great earnestness, that those things which they delivered might not be revealed, as they did to have their petition granted: forasmuch as they saw, that the discovery of such declarations as they propounded, would necessarily pull on most grievous afflictions. Divitiacus the Heduan was made speaker for the rest, and in effect delivered these words.  
That Gallia was unhappily divided into two factions, 
The people of Awergne.  the Hedui were the head of the one, and the Auerni of the other. These two states contending many years for the principality, the Auerni with the Sequani their Clients, finding themselves the weaker party, hired the Germans to take their part, who at the first sent them 15000 men to strengthen their faction: but afterward tasting the sweetness and pleasure of the Galls, the barbarous people so liked the country, that now there were no less than one hundred and twenty thousand, that were come out of Germany and seated in their Territories. With these the Hedui and their Clients had once or twice fought, hoping by their prowess, both to chastise the malice of the Sequani, and to clear their country of a barbarous enemy: but their labour effected nothing but their own calamity, and the utter overthrow of their nobility and Senate: for they were driven to deliver the chiefest of their city, as pledges to the Sequani, and to bind themselves by oath never to seek their release or freedom, nor to implore the aid of the people of Rome, but ever to remain their perpetual bondmen: Only Divitiacus amongst all the Hedui could never be brought to that thraldom, but using that liberty which his resolution afforded him, he went to Rome and boldly opened his distressed case unto the Senate. But in the end, the victory became as grievous to the Sequani, as to the Hedui. For Ariovistus king of the Germans, was already possessed of the third part of their Territories, and at that instant he commanded them to let go another third part: for there were 24000 Germans come newly unto him, that were allotted to that inheritance. If this violent course were not stayed by the opposition of some greater motion, the Galls would soon be driven out of their country, and beforced to imitate the Heluetians in seeking new habitations and seats of rest, far remote from the cruelty of the Germans. Caesar might by his own authority, or by the presence of his Army, or by the renown of his late victory, or by the name of the people of Rome, keep the Germans from transporting any more Colonies into Gallia.  

THE OBSERVATION.  
IN this relation, there are divers points worthily recommended to the discretion of such, as are willing to be directed by other men's misadventures. As first into what extremities ambition doth drive her thirsty favourites, by suppressing the better faculties of the soul, & setting such unbridled motions on foot, as carry men headlong into most desperate attempts: for as it had deserved commendation in either faction so to have carried their emulation, that by their own means and strength applied to the rule of good government, their authority might wholly have swayed the inclinations of the weaker states; so was it most odious in the Sequani, to call in foreign forces to satisfy the appetite of their untempered humour, and in the end were accordingly rewarded. Secondly, it appeareth how dangerous a thing it is, to make a stranger a stickler in a quarrel which civil dissension hath broached, when the party that called him in, shall not be as able to refuse his assistance upon occasion, as he was willing to entertain it for advantage. lastly, the often discontents of these states show the force of a present evil, which possesseth so vehemently the powers of the soul, that any other calamity either already past or yet to come, how great soever, seemeth tolerable and easy in regard of that smart which the present grief inflicteth. So the Sequani chose rather to captivate their liberty to the Barbarism of a savage nation, then to endure the Hedui to take the hand of them: and again, to make themselves vassals to the Romans, rather than endure the usurping cruelty of the Germans: and finally (as the sequel of the history will discover) to hazard the loss of life and country, then to suffer the taxes and impositions of the Romans: So predominant is the present evil in men's affections, and so it prevaileth at the seat of our judgement.    

CHAP. XIII.  
The reasons that moved Caesar to undertake this war.  
TO these petitions of the Galls Caesar made an answer, 
Caesar.  comporting the mildness of his natural disposition, promising them his best furtherance in the cause, and doubted not but that Ariovistus would be entreated in any reasonable matter: and so he dismissed the assembly. Amongst many inducements, there were two of especial importance, which urged him to undertake this war: the first was the dishonour and blot of infamy, wherewith the present age might have noted the Roman Empire, if upon complaint and imploration of aid, they should have suffered a barbarous nation to have held the Hedui in thraldom, who in the majesty of their Senate had oftentimes been called their brethren and kinsmen, and graced with such titles of respect, as by the tenure of loyalty and sincerity of affection, might command greater duties than these which were required. The second reason was the fear he had, lest the Germans accustoming more and more to transport the superfluity of their increasing families over the Rhine, and to plant them in the fertile seats of the Galls, the Roman Province might at length he endangered, and Italy itself attempted. And therefore it seemed best unto him, to send ambassadors to Ariovistus, to will him to think of some convenient place of parley, where they might meet to entreat of matters concerning the public good.  

THE OBSERVATION.  
I May here take an occasion, 
The authority of the Roman Generals  to speak somewhat concerning the authority of the Roman Generals, which we see to be very large, considering that Caesar of himself, without any further leave of the Senate and people of Rome (for what may be gathered by this history) did undertake a war of that consequence, and put in jeopardy the Legions, the Province, or what other interest the Romans had in Gallia. Wherein we are to understand, that when the state of Rome did allot the government of any Province to a Proconsul, they did likewise recommend unto him the careful managing of such accidents, as might any way concern the good of that regiment. For considering that such causes as may trouble a well ordered government, are as well external and foreign, as internal and bred within the bounds of that Empire: it had been to small purpose to have given him only authority, to maintain a course of wholesome government at home, and no means to take away such oppositions, which foreign accidents might set up against him: And so we see that Caesar undertook the Helvetian war, in regard of the safety of the Province: And this again with Ariovistus, lest the Germans should so multiply in Gallia, that the Province itself might at length be endangered. Neither had their General's authority only to undertake these wars, but the absolute disposition also of the whole course thereof, whether it were to treat, capitulate, compound, or what else they thought convenient for the advancement of the common weal, did wholly rest upon their direction: repub. bene gesta, being the style of the warrant for all their actions. Neither may we think that any subordinate or depending authority can be so powerful in the course of businesses, as that which absolutely commandeth without controlment, and proceedeth according to the opportunity of time and occasion, further than either prescription or limitation can direct it. And therefore whensoever the Roman affairs were distressed and driven to an exigent, they created a Dictator that had regiam potestatem, such an absolute command, that whatsoever power rested either in the Consuls, or in the Tribunes, in the Senate or in the people, it gave way to the greatness of that magistrate; that there might be no let or retracting power to weaken that course, which nothing but an absolute command could establish, for the good of the common weal. And yet notwithstanding this absolute government, they attributed such power to the course of human actions, that by the punishment which they inflicted upon dissolute and unfortunate leaders, they seemed to acknowledge that no man, how circumspect soever, could promise more than likelihoods or probabilities of good fortune, as far forth as his means and industry could achieve it. 
Livy lib. 8.  For old M. Fabius, pleading for the life of his gallant son, and opposing the rigour of Papyrius the dictator with examples of antiquity, saith: Populi quidem, penes quem potestas omnium rerum esset, ne iram quidem unquam atrociorem fuisse in eos qui temeritate atque inscitia exercitus amisissent, quam ut pecunia eos multaret: capite anquisitum ob rem male gestam de imperatore nullum ad eam diem esse. The people (saith he) in whom the sovereign power of things consisteth, never showed greater displeasure against such, as had lost an Army either by rashness or unskilfulness, then imposing a fine upon them: but to bring the life of a General in question for failing in his endeavours, was never heard of to that day.  
The condition of the inferior officers of their camp, was far otherwise in regard of military discipline: for prescription guided them in all their services, and the chiefest part of their duty was obedience; although they saw evident reason to the contrary, & found their directions unperfect in that behalf: And therefore Caesar saith upon that occasion: 
Lib. 3. de bello Civili.  aliae sunt legati partes atque imperatoris, alter omnia agere ad praescriptum, alter libere ad summam rerum consulere debet. The office of a legate or lieutenant, differeth from that of a general: The one doing all things by prescription; and the other freely deliberating of whatsoever may concern the cause. And this course the Romans held, concerning the authority of their Generals.    

CHAP. XIIII.  
Ariovistus his answer: a second embassage, with the success thereof.  
TO that embassage Ariovistus answered, 
Caesar.  that if his occasions had required Caesar's assistance, he would have furthered them with his own presence. And he thought it as reasonable that if it were in his means to pleasure the Romans, Caesar ought not to think much of the like labour: for his own part, he durst not come into those quarters without an Army, neither could he levy an Army without great charge. The thing that he most wondered at was, what the Romans had to do in that part of Gallia, which the law of Arms had made his inheritance. Upon the return of this message, Caesar framed a second embassage, the purport whereof carried this sense: For as much as he thus requited the honour wherewith the people of Rome had beautified his best dignity (for in Caesar's Consulship by that controlling authority of their Empire, they had vouchsafed to esteem of him as a king in his dominions, and as a friend unto their state) that he disdained to admit of a Parley concerning the common good: let him know that these were the things which he required to be performed by him. First that he should not suffer any more savage troops of the Germans to be transported over the Rhine into Gallia: secondly, that he should deliver up those Hostages which he had from the Hedui and Sequani, and should cease to molest them with further injuries. These things if he did perform, Caesar would assure him of a grateful acceptation, in the behalf of the people of Rome: otherwise, for as much as he himself was Proconsul of the Province in Gallia, his charge extended by the same commission to the defence of their associates and friends; and therefore he would not neglect the injury of the Hedui.  
To these mandates Ariovistus thus answered: the law of Arms kept this tenure among all nations, that a conqueror might govern a subdued people according as he thought best for his own safety. The people of Rome did not direct the course of their government by another man's prescript, but by their own arbitrement: and as he had not directed the Romans, so ought not they to hinder the course of his proceedings. The Hedui having tried the fortune of the war, and having hazarded their life and liberty in the casualty of many battles, were by right become stipendary to his Empire, whose Hostages he would retain according to the covenants by which they made their peace. If Caesar would needs undertake that quarrel; let him know that no man ever contended with Ariovistus, but to his own destruction. Try when he would, he should find what valour consisted in the Germans, that for 14 years space were never covered with any other roof than the Heavens.  

THE OBSERVATION.  
ANd thus far proceeded Caesar with Ariovistus, in debating the wrongs and agreevances of the Hedui: Wherein appeareth the difference between a matter handled, according to moral civility in terms of mildness and pleasing accent, and that which is rudely delivered, and dependeth rather upon the plainness of the project, then suited with words fit for persuasion. For that which Ariovistus alleged, to make good his interest in Gallia, was as consonant to reason, as any thing to the contrary urged by Caesar. But as the Lacedaemonian said of one, that he spoke the truth otherwise than it should be spoken: so it may be said of Ariovistus answer, that it wanted that sweating humanity which giveth credit to verity itself; for as much as it proceedeth from a well tempered spirit, wherein no turbulent passion seemeth to control the force of reason, nor hinder the sentence of true judgement; but rather seasoning her conceptions with humility, doth covertly complain of open wrong, and strengthen her assertions with a pleasing delivery. And therefore how great soever the controversy be, that party which exceedeth not the bounds of modesty, but maketh mildness his chiefest advocate, will so prevail in any auditory, that albeit equity doth disallow her title; yet the manner of his carriage will clear him from offering wrong, in that he useth the sequels of innocency to prove his interest in that which he demandeth. But to leave this circumstance, as only to be noted; let us proceed to the war itself, which I made the second part of this history.    

CAP. XV.  
The Treviri bring news of one hundred townships of the Swevi that were come to the Rhine. Caesar taketh in Besanson: his soldiers are surprised with an extreme fear of the Germans.  
AT the same instant, 
Caesar.  as this countermessage returned from Ariovistus, there came messengers from the Hedui and 
* Triers.  Treviri unto Caesar: the Hedui complained that the 
* The country about Constance in Germany.  Harudes, which were lately come into Gallia, did sack their country and spoil their territories: neither could they conclude any peace with Ariovistus; but by giving sufficient pledges for their allegiance. The Treviri brought news of one hundred towneshippes of the Suevi that were come unto the river Rhine to seek a passage into Gallia, conducted by Nasua and Cimberius two brethren. Whereat Caesar being moved thought his best means of prevention to consist in celerity, lest the difficulty of resisting should grow greater, when those new forces of the Suevi were joined with that power which was already with Ariovistus. And therefore having provided corn, he made haste to seek the Germans, and having gone three days journey on his way, he had intelligence that Ariovistus with all his forces was going to take in Besanson, and that he was three days journey on his way already. Caesar knowing how much it imported him to prevent that disadvantage (for as much as the scite of the town, was of that strength that he that commanded it might prolong the war at his own pleasure, being encircled with the river 
* Le doux.  Alduabis, excepting a small space of 600 foot, which was fortified with an exceeding high hill, and the hill strengthened with a wall, and so joined to the town) made all the haste he could to take in the town, & left a strong garrison in the same. And as he rested there a few days to make provision of corn, his whole Army was surprised with such an extraordinary fear, that their minds were not a little troubled therewith. For the Romans inquiring of the Galls and marchant-men, concerning the quality of the Germans, understood that they were men of a huge stature, of courage invincible, and of great practice and experience in feats of Arms: Whereof the Galls had oftentimes made trial, for when they encountered them they were not able to endure so much as the sternness of their countenance, or the fierceness of their looks: whereat the whole Army conceived such a fear, that the courage of his men was wonderfully appalled. The fear began among the Tribunes, and Prefects, and such other as accompanied Caesar in this journey, and had small or no skill in matter of war, these men feigning some one excuse, and some an other of very earnest business which called them home, desired leave to depart. The rest whom shame would not suffer to forsake the camp, bewrayed the like passion by their countenances and haviour: For hiding themselves in their tents, they either bewailed their destiny secretly to themselves; or otherwise with their acquaintance and familiar friends, they lamented the danger they were all like to fall into: so that throughout the whole camp there was nothing but making and signing of testaments. And through the talk and fearfulness of these men, the old soldiers and Centurions and such as had great experience in the camp, began by little to apprehend the terror, wherewith the rest were amazed: and those that would seem to be less fearful, said they feared not the enemy, but the narrowness of the ways, the greatness of the woods that were between them and Ariovistus; or otherwise they cast doubts where they might have provision of corn; and many stuck not to tell Caesar, that whensoever he should give commandment to march forward or to advance the standards, the soldiers would refuse to do it.  

OBSERVATIONS.  
WHerein, for that we find a strange alteration, no way answerable to that courage, 
The nature of fear.  which a late gotten victory doth usually breed in noble spirits; it shall not be amiss a little to insist upon the quality of the accident, and to gather such brief instructions from their weakness, as may best serve to qualify the amazement of horror, and mitigate the frenzy of so violent a passion. And albeit my ignorance in the works of nature cannot promise any such learning, as may discover the true means and secret motions, whereby a sore conceived fear doth trouble the senses and astonish the mind; yet since the history offereth it to our scanning, give me leave only to note the strangeness of the circumstance, & rudely to delineat the portraiture of a beast oftener seen then well known, using the unwieldy pile for my pencil, and suiting my speech to a warlike auditory. I know not how it happeneth, but thus it may happen, that when the senses receive intelligence of an eminent evil, which may either dispossess the soul of this earthly mansion, or trouble the quiet wherein she resteth: the spirits (as it seemeth) by the direction of their sovereign mistress, retire themselves into the inner cabinets and secreter pavilions of the body, where the chiefest part of the soul is most resident, and so they leave the frontier quarters of her kingdom naked and ungarrizoned, the better to strengthen that capital city of the heart, out of which the life cannot fly but to the utter ruin and destruction of the whole body: For fear is not only a perturbation of the soul, proceeding from the opinion it hath of some evil to come, but it is also a contraction, and closing up of the heart, when the blood and the spirits are recalled from the outward parts, to assist that place which giveth life and motion to all the rest. In this chaos and confusion of Humours and spirits, when the multiplicity of faculties (which otherwise require an ordinate distinction in their service, and by the order of nature should be disposed into several instruments, and be dilated throughout the body) are thus blended confusedly together, the conceptions of the mind, which presently rise from these advertisements, are suddenly choked with the disordered mixture of so many several properties, and are stifled as it were in the throng, before they can be transported to our judgement, or examined by reason, for want of that ordinate uniformity of place which nature requireth in the powers of the mind. And hence proceedeth that amazedness and astonishment, which so daunteth the hearts of men when they are taken with this passion, that because the soul giveth no counsel, the body can afford no motion, but standeth frozen through the extremity of the perturbation, benumbed in sense, and forsaken of the spirits. So we read that Theophilus the Emperor in an overthrow which he had given him by the Hagerans, was strooken with such an excessive fear, that he could not betake himself to flight, Adeo pavor etiam auxilia formidat, until one of his chief commanders shaking him by the shoulder, as though he were to awake him out of a deep sleep, threatened him with present death if he would not prevent the ruin of the Empire, by using that means, which was only left for his safety.  
Again, if in that turbulent consistory, the spirits chance distinctly to receive any apprehension proceeding from the forging faculty of the soul, they carry it presently to execution before it be examined by reason, and follow the action with such vehemency, that they leave no place for better advice and reknowledgment. And this is the cause that oftentimes through extremity of fear to avoid one evil we run headlong into a worse, and find a greater danger in the means we use to avoid a less, because reason did not first try the apprehension before it was delivered to external agents. And so we find in the battle between Germanicus and the Almains, that two gross troops of soldiers were driven into such an ecstasy of fear, that taking contrary courses to avoid one and the same danger, they eihther of them fled to that place, which the other had quitted: neither could they be advised by each others flight, that the places which they sought after afforded them no remedy.  
And albeit reason be called to counsel, when a parley is summoned of composition, yet it beareth so small a sway in the consultation, that the will of itself concludeth to betray virtue to dishonour; and so to purchase peace with the loss of the soul's chiefest treasure: which ought ever to be estimated at a higher rate, than any other happiness which can betide the mind. For among all the sensible things of this world, there is no creature that hath such a confused fear, or is more amazed therewith, then man is: neither is there any misery greater, or any bondage more shameful, servile, or vile, than this which maketh men very abjects, of all other creatures, to redeem the evil which the danger threateneth: and then doth shame follow after so base a part, and aggravatethe burden of the sin with loathsome disgrace, and penitent discontentment, adding oftentimes aloes to wormwood, and making the end grievouser than the beginning. And thus doth danger breed fear, and fear yieldeth to dishonour, and dishonour bringeth shame, and shame being always mingled with wrath and anger, revengeth itself upon itself, and bringeth more peril than the first danger could threaten. Whereby it appeareth, that as the affections of the mind are bred one of another: so on the contrary part, some are bridled and restrained by others; for as envy, hatred and anger, rise oftentimes of love; so is joy lessened with grief, envy with mercy, and fear with shame.  
But for as much as all such perturbations proceed of ignorance and inconsiderateness, whereby we think that the evil is greater than indeed it is; let us consider what disposition of our judgement best moderateth the violent heat of these affections. And first touching the passages, whereby the soul receiveth her advertisements, as they are of divers natures, the chiefest whereof are the eye and the ear, so are their avisos different in quality, and require a several consideration to be rightly discerned. The intelligence by the eye is more certain, then that which cometh by the way of hearing: forasmuch as the eye is a witness itself of every action, whereof it taketh notice; neither is it deceived in her proper object: and therefore the judgement is not much troubled, to determine definitively how great or how small the danger is, when the relations carry always that certainty. And albeit the ear in like manner be not deceived in her proper object, for it faithfully giveth up that sense, which sound hath delivered unto it: yet for as much as the fantasy hath greater scope to coin her vain conceptions, in regard of the absence of the action, it is necessary that the discoursing faculty be called for an assistant before the judgement can truly determine: and then it will appear, that the truth doth not always answer the report which is made thereof, in as much as diseased spirits will not stick to dilate or qualify relations, according to the key wherein they themselves are tuned. And therefore this first cometh to be considered of in all such violent commotions, by which of these two senses the first intelligence was received. But concerning the judgement itself this is most certain, that the more it is infected with the corruptions of the flesh, the more violent are the affections of the soul: And again, the purer the judgement is, and the higher it is lifted up from earthly natures, being no further interessed therein, then to hold a resolution of well doing, the fewer and lighter are the affections, which trouble and molest it; for than it better discerneth the truth and falsehood, good or evil that is in things.  
To redress this inconvenience, Caesar betook himself to the fittest & most proper remedy, which was by the authority of his speech to restore reason to her former dignity, & by discourse which fear had interrupted in them, to put down a usurping passion which had so troubled the government of the soul; recalling it to the mean of true resolution, which was to moderate audacity with wariness, but not to choke valour with beastly cowardice: for these Oratory inducing persuasions were not the least point of their discipline, considering how they framed the inward habit of the mind (being the fountain and beginning of all motion) to give life and force to those actions which the severity of outward discipline commanded. For as laws and constitutions of men enforce obedience of the body: so reason and persuasions must win the soul's consent, according to that saying, homines duci volunt, non cogi.    

CAP. XVI.  
Caesar his speech to the Army, concerning this fear.  
CAESAR call a Council of war, 
Caesar.  wherein the Legates, Tribunes and Centurions of all the orders and degrees were assembled, he greatly blamed them: First, that any man should be so inquisitive as to imagine to himself, whither and upon what service they were carried. Concerning Ariovistus, he had in the time of Caesar's consulship, most earnestly sued for the friendship of the people of Rome; and why then should any man misdeem, that he should so unadvisedly go back from his duty? For his own part he was verily persuaded, that if Ariovistus once knew his demands, and understood the reasonable offers that he would make him, that he would not easily reject his friendship, nor the favour of the people of Rome. But if he were so mad, as to make war upon them, why should they be afraid of him? or why should they despair either of their own prowess, or of Caesar's circumspectness? For if it came to that point, the enemy that they were to encounter, had been tried what he could do twice before. First, in their father's days, when the 
* Cimbri, a nation came out of Germany and drove out the Aduatici and are now the Zelanders. Teutoni, Germans.  Cimbri and the Teutoni were vanquished by Marius; and now of late again in Italy, at the insurrection of the bondmen, who were not a little furthered through the practice & discipline which they received of the Romans, whereby it might be discerned how good a thing it is to be constant and resolute: in as much as whom for a time they feared without cause being naked and unarmed, the same men afterwards (although well armed and Conquerors withal) they nobly overcame. And to be short, these were no other Germans, than those whom the Heluetians had vanquished in divers conflicts, not only in their own country where the Heluetians dwelled themselves, but also even at home at their own doors; and yet the same Heluetians were not able to make their party good against our Armies. Concerning the Galls, they were overcome more by cunning & policy, then by force; which although it took place against savage and unskilful people, yet was not Ariovistus so simple as to think that he could ensnare our Armies with the like subtleties. As for those that feigned the cause of their fear to be the difficulty of provision of corn, and the dangerousness of the way, they took more upon them then became their place, in presuming to teach their General what he had to do, as if he had not known what pertained to his duty. The Sequani and Lingones had undertook that charge, and what the ways were, should shortly be seen: Whereas it was reported that the soldiers would not obey his mandates, nor advance their standards, he little esteemed it; for he was well assured, that if an Army refused to be obedient to their General, it was either because he was thought unfortunate in his enterprises; or else for that he was notoriously convicted of Avarice: but the whole course of his life should witness his innocency, and the overthrow of the Heluetians his happiness. And therefore that which he was minded to have put off for a longer time, he would now put in execution out of hand: for the night following at the fourth watch he would dislodge from thence, that without further delay he might understand, whether shame and respect of duty would prevail more with them, than fear and cowardice. And though he wist that no man else would follow him: yet notwithstanding he would go with the tenth legion alone, of which he doubted nothing, and would accept it as the chief band and guard of his person. Upon the making of his speech, the minds of all men were wonderfully changed: for it bred in every one a great alacrity and desire to fight: neither did the tenth legion forget to give him thanks by their Tribunes, for the good opinion he had of them, assuring him of their readiness to set forward to the war.  

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.  
IN the speech itself are presented many specialties, both concerning their discipline and military instructions, which deserve examination; amongst which I note first, the extraordinary number admitted to the Council, Omnium ordinum ad id concilium adhibitis Centurionibus: Whereas there were usually no more admitted to their council of war but the Legates, Questor, Tribunes, and the Centurions of the first orders, which I understand to be the first Hastate, the first Princeps, and the first Pilum of every legion. And this is manifestly proved out of the fifth Commentary where Cicero was besieged by Ambiorix, in which amongst other there were two valiant Centurions, Pulfio, and Varenus: between whom there was every year great emulation for place of preferment, & iam primis ordinibus appropinquabant, saith Caesar, that is, they had passed by degrees through the lower orders of the legion, and were very near the dignity of the first cohort, wherein as in all the rest there were 3 maniples, and in every maniple two orders.   

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.  
THe first motive which he useth to recall their exiled judgement, discovered their breach of discipline: for contrary to the course of military government, they had presumed not only to make inquiry, but to give out whither, and upon what service they were carried; which in the rigour of camp policy, could not pass without due punishment: for what can more contradict the fortunate success of an expedition, then to suffer to be measured with the vulgar conceit? or weighed in the balance of such false judgements? especially when those weak Censors are to be Actors, and executioners of the design: for then every man will suit the nature of the action according to his own humour, although his humour be led with blindness, and have no other direction, than an uncertain apprehension of profit or disadvantage. And in this case there cannot be a better precedent than nature hath prescribed: for as natural Agents, whilst they concur to produce a work of absolute perfection, neither know what they do, nor can discern the things they look upon; but yield themselves to be guided by a moderator of infinite knowledge: so ought a multitude to submit their ability to the direction of some wise and prudent captain, that beholdeth the action in true honour; and balanceth the loss of many particulars, with the health and safety of the public good. For if every man should prescribe, who should obey? Tam nescire quaedam milites, quam scire oportet, saith Otho in Tacitus upon the like disorder: and again, parendo potius quam imperia ducum sciscitando res militares continentur; which proveth that the greatest virtue which is required in a soldier is obedience, as a thing wherein the force of all discipline consisteth.   

THE THIRD OBSERVATION.  
IN the reason which he useth to prove their disparity of valour, 
Whether men have greater courage in their own or in a stranger's country.  in regard of the Romans, being superior to the Heluetians that had oftentimes overthrown the Germans; he strengtheneth the argument with the advantage of the place, and saith that the Heluetians had put them to the worst, not only where the Heluetians dwelled themselves; but even in their own country, and at home at their own doors: as though an enemy were charged with greater fury in the presence of a man's own country and dearest friends, then in a strange and unknown land. This question was handled in the Roman Senate, by Fabius Maximus, and Scipio surnamed Africanus, when they sat in counsel how to rid their country of that subtle Carthaginian, that for sixteen years space had fretted like a canker the beauty of Italy, wasted the land and brought it to desolation: sacked their confederates, or alienated them from their duty, overthrown their Armies, slain their Consuls, and threatened their imperial city with ruin and destruction. Fabius upon the motion to make war in Africa, thought it agreeable to nature, first to defend that which was their own, before they attempted other men's possessions: when peace was established in Italy, then let war be set on foot in Africa; and first let them be without fear themselves, before they went about to terrify others: for those forces afforded little hope of victory in another kingdom, that were not able to free their own country from so dangerous an enemy. Alcibiades overthrew the Athenian common weal with the like cowsel: and concerning Hannibal, let them be sure of this, that they should find him a sorer enemy in his own country, then in an other kingdom. Scipio on the other side, carried on with the honour of so glorious an enterprise, wanted neither reasons nor examples to impugn Fabius his authority: for he showed that Agathocles the Syracusian king, being a long time afflicted with the Punic war, averted the Carthaginean from Sicily, by transporting his forces into Africa: but how powerful it was to take away fear, by retorting danger upon the oppressor, could there be a presenter example than Hannibal? There was great difference in the nature of the action, between the spoil and waste of a stranger's country, and to see their own native country wasted with sword and destruction: plus animi est inferenti periculum, quam propulsanti, for he that invadeth an others kingdom, easily discovereth both the advantage which may be taken against the enemy, and the strength whereupon he resteth: And amongst the variable events of war, many unexpected occasions arise which present victory to him that is ready to take it; and many strange chances so alter the course of things, that no foresight can discern what may happen. With these and the like remonstrances, this question of no less doubt than importance, was handled by two famous and worthy Captains, whose minds as it seemed, were entangled with such particular affections for the present, as might rather draw them to wrest reason to their own humour, then to determine in sincerity of judgement, upon what specialties the truth was grounded, in the contrariety of their positions. But to leave other commodities or disadvantages, which are annexed unto either part, I will only set down some reasons to prove how valour and courage may either grow or be abated, by the accidents which rise in a war of that nature. And first this cannot be denied, the testimony of an unfallible truth being grounded upon the property of man's nature; that as advantage bringeth hope of victory, and hope conceiveth such spirits as usually follow, when the thing which is hoped for, is effected; and thereby the courage becometh hardy and resolute in victory: so on the other side disadvantage and danger breed fear, and fear so checketh valour, and controlleth the spirits, that virtue and honour give place to distrust, and yield up their interest to such directors, as can afford nothing but diffidency & irresolution: Neither can it be denied, but he that setteth upon an enemy in a strange country, and so preventeth such attempts as might be made upon his own territories, hath that advantage which giveth life unto action, and steeleth his enterprise with resolution; for besides the commodity of leaving when he list, and proceeding as far forth as he shall find his means able to fortunate his attempts; he knoweth that the strife and controversy is not for his native country, which he quietly enjoyeth, and is reserved at all times to entertain him, howsoever fortune shall favour his designs: but for a stranger's kingdom which his ambition thirsteth after; wherein for as much as the riches and wealth of that state are laid before them as the recompense of their labour, besides the honour which is achieved thereby, every man's valour soareth at a high pitch, and their courage is increased without any trouble or disturbance of the other faculties of the mind. But when a Prince shall be assaulted in his own kingdom, and in the sight of his subjects have his land consumed with ruin and destruction: the danger will so disturb the powers of the soul, that through the turbulent disorder of the weaker parts, the better faculties will lose their prerogative of advising how the enemy may be best resisted; when as every man shall apprehend the terror of the danger, and few or none conceive the true means to avoid it. And albeit the presence of such things as are dearest to his soul, as the piety and respect of aged parents, the tender affection towards wife and children, are sufficient to raise valour to the highest point of resolution: yet the motives are of such weight as will rather make them diffident of their own worth as unsufficient to maintain so great a cause, then hold them in that key which true honour affecteth: for as much as the terror and fear of so great a danger will present a greater measure of woes to their mind, than the hope of victory can afford them joy. Hence therefore groweth the difference between him, that seeketh to maintain that estate which he hath in possession by force of Arms; and an other, that seeketh to increase his means by valour. For the former is presented with the danger of losing all his estate, which affrighteth and troubleth, having no other reward propounded unto him; and the other looketh upon the advantage, which he gaineth by overcoming; which much increaseth his valour, without any loss or disadvantage, if he chance to be put to the worst. And therefore there is always great odds between him that hath already lost his goods, and is by that means become desperate, having nothing further to lose; and another, that yet keepeth his substance, but is in danger to lose it: for fear will so dismay his mind, that he will rather distrust his own ability, then entertain a resolution of valour. To prove this, we need not seek other examples, than those imperial cities, in whose cause this controversy was first moved. For when Hannibal was come into Italy and had defeated Sempronius the Consul at Trebeas, the Romans were driven into such an ecstasy of terror, that they believed verily that the enemy was then coming to assault the city; neither had they any hope or aid in themselves to keep or defend the same. On the other side, Scipio was no sooner landed in Africa, but there was such a tumult in Carthage, as though the city had been already taken: neither could the opinion of victory, which Hannibal by a conquering Army in Italy had confirmed for sixteen years together, prevail in the apprehension of so imminent a danger: And then that which Fabius borrowed of nature to teach the Romans (that first men ought to defend their own, before they seek other men's possessions) was carefully followed by the Carthaginians: for with all speed they sent for Hannibal out of Italy, to be their Champion against young Scipio. If therefore other things be correspondent, as there are many other particularities concerning the power and strength of either nation to be considered, I take it much better for a Prince to invade an enemy in his own country, then to attend him at home in his own kingdom.   

THE FOURTH OBSERVATION.  
THe last circumstance which I note in this speech, was the trust which he reposed in the tenth legion, being in itself peradventure as faulty as any other: wherein he showed great art and singular wisdom. For he that hath once offended and is both burdened with the guilt of conscience, and upbraided with the reproach of men, can hardly be persuaded that his fault can be purged with any satisfaction. And although the punishment be remitted, yet the memory of the fact will never be blotted out with any virtuous action; but still remaineth to cast dishonour upon the offender, and to accuse him of disloyalty: And therefore it oftentimes happeneth, that an error being once rashly committed, through despair of remission admitteth no true penitency, but either draweth on more grievous crimes, confirming that of the Poet, Scelere scelus luendum est; or maintaineth his error by wilful obstinacy: as it is said of the Lion that being found by hunters in a cave, will rather die in the place then quit it, for shame that he was found in so base a place of refuge; and therefore his property is thus expressed, ingrediendo caecus, exeundo proteruus. This did Caesar wisely prevent, by cleared the tenth legion of that, which he accused the rest of the Army, which made them so much the more earnest to answer his expectation, in as much as they were witness to themselves of a common error: and the other legions, envying at their fortune, resolved to show as great alacrity in the sequel of the war, and to deserve more than the judgement of the Emperor had imputed to their fellows.    

CHAP. XVII.  
The treaty between Caesar and Ariovistus.  
THE rest of the legions in like manner dealt with their Tribunes and chiefest Centurions, 
Caesar.  to satisfy Caesar of their obedience, affirming that they never doubted nor feared, no nor so much as thought that it belonged to them, to determine any thing concerning the course of the war, but that it was only left to their Emperor; their purgation accepted, and good instructions being taken by Divitiacus, in the fourth watch he marched forward according to the purport of his former speech. The seventh day as he continued on his journey, his espials brought him word, that Ariovistus with all his forces was within 24 miles of that place: who assoon as he understood of Caesar's coming, sent ambassadors unto him, declaring that forasmuch as he was come somewhat nearer, and that he might do it without danger, he was content to admit of a parley, upon this condition, that Caesar would bring no footmen to the meeting (for he feared to be surprised by treachery) but only horsemen, and in that sort he would meet him. Caesar accepted of the condition, hoping at length that he would hearken to reason and desist from wilful obstinacy: and because he durst not commit himself to the French horsemen, he thought it best to take their horses, and to set the soldiers of the tenth legion upon them, that if he stood in need he might have a faithful guard of his friends about him. There was a great and open plain, and in the midst thereof a rising mount, and thither they came to the parley: the legion which Caesar had brought with him on horseback, he placed 200 paces from the said mount; and likewise the horsemen of Ariovistus stood in the same distance: Ariovistus requested that they might talk on horseback, and bring each of them ten persons to the parley. Their expostulations were the same in effect, with those messages which were carried between them by ambassadors. Much unkindness took by Caesar, considering the friendship which the Romans had showed unto Ariovistus, that he would not vouchsafe to treat with them: and on the other side as great injury conceived by him, forasmuch as the law of nations gave no such prerogative to any one people that they should challenge in other countries by desert: but that generally it had given dominion to valour, and kingdoms to conquering armies. But while the treatise thus continued, it was told Caesar that Ariovistus his horsemen were coming nearer unto the mount, and that they began to skirmish with his soldiers; whereupon Caesar broke off the treaty, and withdrew himself to his men, commanding them that they should not cast a weapon at the enemy: for although he perceived that without peril of his legion he might have encountered with Ariovistus men, yet he would not give occasion by putting them to flight, to have it said, that he had entrapped them under pretence of parley. At his return, when it was reported to the common soldiers, how arrogantly Ariovistus had carried himself in the treaty, forbidding the romans all Gallia, and that his men of arms did offer to assault the legion, insomuch that the treaty was thereby broken off; the soldiers were more desirous of battle then before, and by these degrees they obtained it. Two days after Ariovistus sent again to Caesar, to have those things perfected which were begun in the treaty. Caesar thought it not good to make any further meeting in his own person, and the rather because the Germans had no stay of themselves the day before, but they threw darts and stones at his men; and whom soever of his men he should send unto him should go into great danger, as cast into the hands of a savage people. The best way he could think of was, to send Valerius Procillus, a well accomplished young man, that spoke the French tongue well, and had no way offended the Germans, and with him he sent Marcus Titius, a man well known to Ariovistus, using sometimes to resort as a guest unto him: To these he gave in charge that they should diligently mark, and justly report unto him what Ariovistus said; But assoon as Ariovistus saw them in his camp, he cried out to them in the presence of his army, ask them what they and to do there, and whether they came as spies? And as they went about to make their answer, he would not hear them, but caused them to be cast into irons. The same day he removed, and encamped under the side of a hill 6. miles from Caesar's camp; the next day he came two miles beyond Caesar, nearer to the midst of Gallia, of purpose to cut off all corn and convoie as should be sent unto the Romans, by the Hedui and Sequani. From that day forward, by the space of five days together, Caesar imbattailed his men before his camp, to the intent that if Ariovistus pleased to give battle, he might have liberty when he would; but Ariovistus all this while kept his army within his camp, and daily sent out his horsemen to skirmish with the romans. This was the manner of fight which the Germans had practised: there were 6000. horsemen, and as many strong and nimble footmen, whom the horsemen had selected out of the whole host, every man one for his safeguard; these they had always at hand with them in battle, and unto these they resorted for succour; if the horsemen were overcharged, these ever stepped into help them, if any one were wounded and unhorsed, they stood about him and succoured him: if the matter required either to adventure forward, or to retire speedily back again; their swiftness was such through continual exercise, that hanging on the horse main by the one hand, they would run as fast as the horses.  

THE OBSERVATION.  
IT may seem strange unto the soldiers of our time, that the footmen should be mingled pell-mell amongst the horsemen, 
Foot men intermingled amongst horsemen.  without hurt and disadvantage to themselves: so unlikely it is that they should either succour the horsemen in any danger, or annoy the enemy: and therefore some have imagined that these footmen in the encounter cast themselves into one body, and so charging the enemy assisted the horsemen. But the circumstances of this place, and of others which I will allege to this purpose, plainly evince that these footmen were mingled indifferently amongst the horsemen, to assist every particular man as his fortune and occasion required: and therefore the choice of these footmen, was permitted to the horsemen, in whose service they were to be employed, that every man might take his friend in whom he reposed greatest confidence: When they were overcharged these stepped in to help them; if any man were wounded or unhorsed he had his footman ready to assist him; and when they were to go upon any speedy service, or suddenly to retire upon advantage, they stayed themselves upon the main of the horses with one hand, and so ran as fast as the horsemen could go: which services they could not possibly have performed without confusion and disorder, if the footmen had not severally attended upon them, according to the affection specified in their particular election. The principal use of these footmen of the Germans consisted in the aid of their own horsemen upon any necessity, not so much regarding their service upon the enemy, as the assistance of their horsemen. But the Romans had long before practised the same Art to a more effectual purpose, namely as a principal remedy not only to resist, but to defeat far greater troops of horse, than the enemy was able to oppose against them. Whereof the most ancient memory which history mentioneth, is recorded by Livy in the second punic war, at the siege of Capua, under the regiment of Quintus Fuluius the Consul: where it is said, that in all their conflicts, as the Roman legions returned with the better; so their cavalry was always put to the worst: & therefore they invented this means to make that good by Art which was wanting in force. Out of the whole army were taken the choicest young men, both for strength & agility, and to them were given little round bucklers, and seven darts apiece in steed of their other weapons; these soldiers practised to ride behind the horsemen, and speedily to light from the horses at a watchword given, & so to charge the enemy on foot: And when by exercise they were made so expert that the novelty of the invention no whit affrighted them, the Roman horsemen went forth to encounter with the enemy, every man carrying his foot soldior behind him, who at the encounter suddenly alightning charged upon the enemy with such a fury, that they followed them in slaughter to the gates of Capua: And hence saith Livy grew the first institution of the Velites, which ever after that time were enrolled with the legions. The author of this strategem is said to be one Q. Navius a Centurion, & was honourably rewarded by Fuluius the consul for the same. Sallust, in the history of jugurth, saith, that Marius mingled the Velites with the Cavalry of the associates, ut quacunque invaderent equitatus hostium propulsarent. The like practice was used by Caesar, as appeareth in the third book of the Civil war; saving that instead of the velites, he mingled with his horsemen 400. of the lustiest of his legionary soldiers, to resist the cavalry of Pompey, while the rest of his army passed over the river Genusum, after the overthrow he had at Dirrachium, qui tantum profecere, saith the text; Vt equestri praelio commisso, pellerent omnes, complures interficerent, ipsique incolumes ad agmen se reciperent. Many other places might be recited, but these are sufficient to prove, that the greatest Captains of ancient times strengthened their cavalry with footmen dispersed amongst them. 
Lib. 6.  The Roman horsemen, (saith Polybius) at the first carried but a weak limber pole, or staff, and a little round buckler; 
Lib. 3. de excid.  but afterwards, they used the furniture of the Grecians, which josephus affirmeth to be a strong lance or staff, and three or four darts in a quiver with a buckler, and a long sword by their right side. The use of their lance was most effectual when they charged in troop, pouldron to pouldron; and that manner of fight afforded no means to intermingle footmen: but when they used their darts, every man got what advantage of ground he could, as our Carbins' for the most part do, and so the footmen might have place among them: or otherwise, for so good an advantage, they would easily make place for the footmen to serve among them: But howsoever it was, it appeareth by this circumstance how little the romans feared troops of horse, considering that the best means to defeat their horse was by their foot companies. But to make it more plain, of many examples I will only allege two; the one out of Livy, 
Lib. 3.  to prove that the Roman horsemen were not comparable for service to footmen: 
De bello Africano.  the other out of Hirtius, to show the same effect against strangers, and Numidian horsemen, In the Consulships of L. Valerius, and Marcus Horatius: Valerius having fortunately overthrown the Equi and the Volsci, Horatius proceeded with as great courage in the war against the Sabines, wherein it happened, that in the day of battle, the Sabines reserved 2000 of their men to give a fresh assault upon the left cornet of the romans, as they were in conflict, which took such effect, that the legionary footmen of that cornet were forced to retreat. Which the Roman horsemen being in number 600. perceiving, and not being able with their horse to make head against the enemy; they presently forsook their horses; and made haste to make good the place on foot; wherein they carried themselves so valiantly, that in a moment of time they gave the like advantage to their footmen, against the Sabines; and then betook themselves again to their horses, to pursue the enemy in chase as they fled. For the second point. The Numidians, as Caesar witnesseth, were the best horsemen that ever he met with, and used the same Art as the Germans did, mingling among them light armed footmen: an Ambuscado of these Numidians charging the legions upon a sudden, the history saith, that primo impetu legionis Equitatus & levis armatura hostium, nullo negotio, loco pulsa & deiecta est de colle. And as they sometimes retired, and sometimes charged upon the rearward of the army, according to the manner of the Numidian fight; the history saith, Caesariani interim, non amplius tres aut quatuor milites veterani si se convertissent & pila viribus contorta in Numidas infestos coniecissent, amplius duorum millium ad unum terga vertebant. So that to free himself of this inconvenience, he took his horsemen out of the rearward, and placed his legions there, ita vim hostium per legionarium militem commodius sustinebat. And ever as he marched he caused 300. soldiers of every legion to be free and without burden, that they might be ready upon all occasions, Quos in Equitum Labieni immisit. Tum Labienus, conversis equis, signorum conspectu perterritus turpissime contendit fugere, multis eius occisis, compluribus vulneratis, milites legionarij ad sua se recipiunt signa, atque iter inceptum ire caeperunt. I allege the very words of the history, to take away all suspicion of falsifying, or wresting any thing to an affected opinion. If any man will look into the reason of this disparity, he shall find it to be chiefly the work of the Roman pile, an unresistible weapon, and the terror of horsemen, especially when they were cast with the advantage of the place, and fell so thick, that there was no means to avoid them.  
But to make it plain, that any light armed footmen could better make head against a troop of horse, than the Cavalry of their own party, although they bore but the same weapons: Let us consider how nimble and ready they were, that fought on foot, either to take an advantage, or to shun and avoid any danger; casting their darts with far greater strength and more certainty, than the horsemen could do. For as the force of all the engines of old time, as the Balistae, Catapultae and Tolenones, proceedeth from that stability and resting Centre, which nature affordeth as the only strength and life of the engine; so what force soever a man maketh, must principally proceed from that firmness & stay, which nature by the earth or some other unmovable rest, giveth to the body, from whence it taketh more or less strength, according to the violence which it performeth; as he that lifteth up a weight from the ground, by so much treadeth heavier upon the earth, by how much the thing is heavier than his body. The footmen therefore, having a surer stay to counterpoise their forced motion, than the horsemen had, cast their darts with greater violence, and consequently with more certainty.    

CHAP. XVIII.  
Caesar preventeth Ariovistus of his purpose, by making two Camps. The superstition of the Germans.  
WHEN Caesar perceived that Ariovistus meant nothing less than to fight, 
Caesar.  but kept himself within his camp; lest peradventure he should intercept the Sequani and other of his associates, as they came with convoys of corn to the Romans, beyond that place wherein the Germans abode about 600 paces from their camp; he chose a ground meet to encamp in: and marched thither in three battles, commanding two of them to stand ready in Arms, and the third to fortify the camp. Ariovistus scent 15000 footmen, and all his horse to disturb the soldiers, and to hinder the entrenchment. Notwithstanding Caesar as he had before determined, caused two battles to withstand the enemy, and the third to go through with the work: which being ended, he left there two legions, and part of the associate forces, and led the other four legions back again into his greater camp, and so he rested secure concerning the convoys from the Sequani, and by his greater camp cut off the passages between Ariovistus and the Rhine. The next day Caesar according to his custom, brought his whole power out of both his camps, and marching a little from the greater camp, he put his men in array and proffered battle to the enemy; but perceiving that Ariovistus would not stir out of his trenches, about noon he conveyed his Army into their several camps. Then at length Ariovistus sent part of his forces to assault the lesser camp: the encounter continued very sharp on both parts, until the evening; and at sunsetting after many wounds given and taken, Ariovistus conveyed his army again into their camp. And as Caesar made inquiry of the captains what the reason was, that Ariovistus refused battle: he found this to be the cause, The Germans had a custom, that their women should by casting of lots, and soothsaying, declare whether it were for their behoof to fight or no, and that they found by their Art, the Germans could not get the victory if they fought before the new moon.  

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.  
FIrst we may observe what especial importance, this manner of encamping carried in that absolute discipline which the Romans observed, and by which they conquered so many nations: for besides the safety which it afforded their own troops, it served for a hold well fenced and manned, or as it were a strong fortified town in any part of the field, where they saw advantage, and as oft as they thought it expedient, either to fortify themselves, or impeach the enemy by cutting off his passages, hindering his attempts, blocking up his camp, besides many other advantages, all avetring the saying of Domitius Corbulo: dolabra vincendum esse hostem: a thing long time neglected, but of late happily renewed by the commanders of such forces as serve the states in the united provinces of Belgia: whom time and practise of the wars hath taught to entertain the use of the spade, and to hold it in as great reputation as any weapons whatsoever, which may be thought worthy executioners of the deeds of Arms.   

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.  
IN the second place we may observe, that there was no nation so barbarous (for I understand the Germans to be as barbarous in regard of the motions of religion as any known nation of that time, being in a Climate so near the North, that it afforded no contemplation at all) that could not make use in their greatest affairs, of that superstition to which their mind was naturally enthralled; and forge prophecies and divinations as well to stir up as to moderate the irregular motions of a multitude, according as they might best serve to advantage their proceedings. Neither did Caesar let slip the occasion of making use of this their religion: for understanding by their prisoners, that their divinations forbade them to fight before the new moon, he used all the means he could to provoke them to battle; that their religious opinion of mischieving might prejudice their resolution to return conquerors: Which may serve to prove that a superstitious people are subject to many inconveniences, which industry or fortune may discover to their overthrow. It is recorded that Columbus, being General of some forces, which Ferdinando king of Castille sent to discover the west Indies, & suffering great penury for want of victuals in the I'll of jamaica: after that he had observed how the Islanders worshipped the moon, and having knowledge of an Eclipse that was shortly after to happen, he told the inhabitants that unless they would furnish him with such necessaries as he wanted for the time, the wrath of their God should quickly appear towards them, by changing his bright shining face into obscurity and darkness: which was no sooner happened, but the poor Indians, strooken with a superstitious fear of that which the course of nature required, kept nothing back that might assist their enemies to depopulate, and over run their own country.    

CHAP. XIX.  
Caesar seeketh means to give them battle, and the Germans dispose themselves thereunto.  
CAESAR foreslowed not that advantage: 
Caesar.  but the next day in the morning leaving a sufficient garrison in each of his camps, for as much as the number of his legionary soldiers was small in respect of the multitude of the Germans, he placed all the auxiliary troops, for a show before the lesser camp, and putting his legions into a triple battle, he marched towards the camp of Ariovistus. And then at length were the Germans constrained to bring out their power, setting every tribe & people by itself, in a like distance and order of battle, and environing their whole Army with their carts and carriage, that there might be no hope at all left to save any man by flight, that durst not abide the fortune of the battle: In these chariots they placed their women, that they by their outstretched hands and tears moving pity, might implore the soldiers as they descended by course into the battle, not to deliver them, the authors of their life and being, into the bondage and thraldom of the Romans. Caesar assigned to every legion a Legate and a Quaestor, that every man might have an eye witness of his valour: and he himself began the battle with the right cornet; for as much as he perceived that part of Ariovistus Army to be the weakest.  

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.  
THE romans even from the infancy of their state were ever zealous admirers of true honour, and always desired to behold with the eye, to what measure of virtue every man had attained; that the tongue with greater fervency of spirit might sound out the celebration of Macte virtute, which imported more honour than any wealth that could be heaped upon them. Neither was this the least part of their wisdom, considering that the most precious things that are, loose much of their worth, if they be not suited with other correspondent natures, whose sympathy addeth much more excellency than is discerned, when they appear by themselves without such assistance. For how small is the beauty which nature hath given to the eye-pleasing diamond, when it is not adorned with an artificial form? or what perfection can the form give without a foil to strengthten it? or what good is in either of them if the light do not illuminate it? or what avail all these where there wanteth an eye to admire it, a judgement to value it, and an heart to embrace it? such a union hath nature imprinted in the diversity of creatures concurring to perfection, and especially in moral actions, in whose carriage there is a far greater exactness of correspondency required to approve them honourable, then was requisite to make the jewel beautiful. And this did Caesar in all his battles; amongst the rest that at Alesia is particularly noted in this manner, Quoth in conspectu imperatoris res gerebatur, neque recte aut turpiter factum celari poterat, utrosque & laudis cupiditas & timor ignominiae ad virtutem excitabat. And when Livy would express how valiantly an action was carried, he saith no more but in conspectu imperatoris res gerebatur, which is as much to say, that forasmuch as the romans were diligent observers of every man's worth, rewarding virtue with honour, and cowardice with reproach; every man bend his whole endeavour to deserve the good opinion of his General, by discharging that duty which he owed to the common wealth, with all loyalty and faithfulness of spirit.   

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.  
THe romans had four forms of the front of their battle, the first was called Acies recta, when neither the cornets nor the battle was advanced one before another, but were all carried in a right line, and made a strait front; and this was their most usual manner of imbattailing.  
The second form of the front was called obliqua, when as one of the cornets was advanced nearer unto the enemy than the rest, to begin the battle: and this was commonly as Vegetius noteth, the right cornet: for the right cornet of an army had great advantage against the left of the enemies, in regard of their weapons and furniture: But Caesar did it in this place, because he perceived that the enemy was weakest in that part; following a maxim of great authority, that the weakest part of an enemy is in the beginning to be charged with the strength of an army: for so favourable are men's judgements to that which is already happened, that the sequel of every action dependeth for the most part upon the beginning, Dimidium facti qui bene caepit habet, (saith a Poet) and not without great reason, so forcible continually is the beginning, and so connexed to the sequel by the nature of a precedent cause, that the end must needs err from the common course, when it doth not participate of that quality which was in the beginning. Neither can there be any good end without a good beginning: for although the beginning be oftentimes disastrous and unlucky, and the end fortunate and happy, yet before it came to that end there was a fortunate beginning: for the bad beginning was not the beginning of a good, but of an evil end. And therefore that his men might foresee a happy end in a good beginning, it behoved him with the best of his army to assault the weakest part of the enemy.  
The third form of the front is called Sinuata, when both the cornets are advanced forward, and the battle standeth backward off from the enemy, after the fashion of a half moon. Scipio used it in Spain, having observed some days before, that the enemy continually so disposed of the battle, that his best soldiers were always in the midst; and therefore Scipio put all his old soldiers in the cornets, and brought them out first to charge upon the weakest part of the enemy, that those might decide the controversy, before the other that were in the midst could come to fight.  
The last form is called gibbosa or gibbera Acies, when the battle is advanced, and the two cornets lag behind. This form did Hannibal use in the battle of Cannae, but with this Art, that he strengthened his two cornets with the best of his soldiers, and placed his weakest in the midst, that the romans following the retreat of the battle, which was easily repelled, might be enclosed on each side with the two cornets.    

CHAP. XX.  
The battle between Caesar and Ariovistus.  
THE sign of battle was no sooner given, but the romans charged upon the enemy so fiercely, 
Caesar.  as though they meant to give themselves the lie: for seeming to acknowledge that they once conceived any fear of the Germans; and the enemy on the other side returned so speedy a counterbuff, that the legions had no time to cast their Piles, and therefore they speedily betook them to their sword. But the Germans putting themselves according to their manner into a Phalanx, received the force of their swords, without any danger or loss at all. In the battle there were many legionary soldiers, that were seen to keep upon the phalanx, & to pull up with their hands the targets that covered it, and so to wound & kill those that were underneath: and by that means, they broke & dispersed it, and so the left cornet of the enemy, was overthrown & put to flight. Now while the right cornet was thus busied, the left cornet was overcharged with an unequal multitude of the Germans, which young Crassus the Perfect of the horsemen no sooner perceived (having more scope and liberty than any of the commanders that were in the battle) he sent tertiam Aciem, the third battle, to rescue and aid their fellows that were in danger, by means whereof the fight was renewed, and all the enemy was put to flight and never looked back until they came to the Rhine, which was about five miles from the place where they fought; where some few of them saved themselves by swimming, others found a few boats and so escaped; Ariovistus lighting upon a little bark tied to the shore, with much a do recovered the other side of the Rhine, and so saved himself: the rest were all slain by the horsemen. As Caesar pursued the Germane horsemen, it was his chance to light upon Valerius Procillus, as he was drawn up and down by his keepers, bound with three chains, which accident was as grateful to him as the victory itself; being so fortunate to recover his familiar friend, whom the barbarous enemy, contrary to the law of nations, had cast into prison; & in his own presence had three several times cast lots upon his life, whether he should be then burned or reprieved unto another time; and still he was saved by the fortune of the lots: and Marcus Titius was found in like manner and brought unto him. The fame of this battle being carried beyond the Rhine: the Suevi that were come to the banks of Rhine, returned home again, whom the inhabitants belonging to the said river pursued, and slew a great number of them. Caesar having thus ended two great wars in one summer, he brought his Army into their wintering camps, somewhat sooner than the time of the year required.  

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.  
THis phalanx here mentioned, can hardly be proved to be the right Macedonian Phalanx; but we are rather to understand it to be so termed, by reason of the close and compact imbattailing, rather than in any other respect: and it resembled much a testudo, as I said of the Helvetian phalanx. Secondly, I observe, that Caesar kept the old rule concerning their discipline in fight: for although the name of Triaries be not mentioned in his history; yet he omitted not the substance, which was, to have primam, secundam, & tertiam Aciem; and that prima Acies should begin the battle, and the second should come fresh and assist them; or peradventure if the enemy were many and strong, the first and second battle were joined together, and so charged upon the enemy with greater fury and violence: but at all adventures, the third battle was ever in subsidio, as they termed it, to succour any part that should be overcharged; which was a thing of much consequence, and of great wisdom. For if we either respect the encouragement of the soldiers, or the casualty of fortune; what could be more added to their discipline in this behalf, then to have a second & a third succour, to give strength to the fainting weakness of their men, and to repair the disadvantage which any accident should cast upon them? or if their valour were equally balanced, and victory stood doubtful which of the two parties she should honour, these always stepped in, being fresh, against weary and over laboured spirits, and so drew victory in despite of casualty unto themselves.   

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.  
COncerning use of lots, 
The use of lots.  it shall not be amiss to look into the nature of them, being in former times so general, that there was no nation civil or barbarous, but were directed in their greatest affairs, by the sentence of lots. As we may not refuse for an undoubted truth, that which Solomon saith the 16 of Proverbs: The lots are cast into the lap: but the direction thereof belongeth to the Lord: Through the knowledge whereof, josua was directed to take Achan, the Mariners jonas, and the Apostles, to consecrate Mathias. So whether the heathen and barbarous people, whose blindness in the way of truth could direct them no further then to senseless superstition, and put them in mind of a duty which they owed; but could not tell them what it was, nor how to be performed: whether these I say, were persuaded that there was any supernatural power in their lotteries, which directed the action to the decree of destiny, and as the Gods would have it, it remaineth doubtful. Aristotle the wisest of the heathen, concerning things natural, nameth that event casual, or proceeding from fortune; of which the reason of man could assign no cause, or (as he saith) which hath no cause: So that whatsoever happened in any action besides the intent of the agent and workman, was termed an effect of fortune, or chance of habnab. For all other effects which depended upon a certain and definite cause, were necessarily produced; and therefore could not be casual or subject to the inconstancy of chance: And because many and sundry such chances daily happened, which like terrae filii had no father, and could not be warranted, as lawful children, either to nature or to reason, by the appearance of an efficient cause, they reduced them all to the power of fortune; as the principal efficient and sovereign Motor of all such unexpected events, that is, they made nothing else the governess, and directress of many things: which afterward grew to such credit amongst men, that it surpassed in dignity all natural causes, and was deified with celestial honour, as the Poet saith, Nos te facimus fortuna deam caeloque locamus. By the providence of this blind goddess which held her deity by the tenure of men's ignorance, were all casual actions directed, and especially lots; the event whereof depended only upon her pleasure and decree: neither could their direction be assigned to any other power, for then their nature had been altered from chance to certainty, & the event could not have been called Sors, but must have been reputed in the order of necessary effects, whereof discourse of reason acknowledgeth a certain foregoing cause. Whereby we see upon how weak an axle-tree, the greatest motions of the godless world were turned, having irregularity and uncertainty, for the intelligentiae, that governed their revolutions. All herein all sorts of men, (although in divers respects) rested as well contented, as if an Oracle had spoken unto them, and revealed the mysteries of fatal destiny.  
Rome directed the main course of her government, by the fortune of this mock destiny. For although their Consuls and Tribunes were elected by the people, who pleased their own fancy with the free choice of their commanders, and suited their obedience with a well liking authority: yet the public affairs, which each Consul was severally to manage, was shared out by lots. For if an enemy were entered into their confines to depopulate and waste their territories, the lots assigned this Consul for the government of the city; and the other to command the legions, and to manage the war. If forces were to be sent into divers provinces and against several enemies, neither the Senate nor the people could give to either Consul his task: but their peculiar charges were authorized by lots. If any extraordinary action were to be done in the city, as the dedication of a temple, the sanctifying of the Capitol after a pollution, Sors omnia versat, did all in all. And yet (notwithstanding the weak foundation of this practice in their Theology & deepest divinity) we may not think but these skilful Architectors of that absolute government, wherein virtue joined with true wisdom, to make an unexampled pattern: we may not think I say, but they foresaw the manifold danger, which in the course of common actions could no otherway be prevented, but by the use of lots. For when things are equally leveled between divers objects, and run with indifferency to equal stations, there must be some controlling power, to draw the current towards one coast, and to appropriate it unto one channel, that the order of nature be not inversed, nor a well established government disturbed: So the state of Rome casting many things with equal charge upon her two sovereign magistrates, which could not be performed but by one of them; what better means could there be invented to interest the one in that office and to discharge the other, then to appoint an arbiter, whose decree exceeded human reason? Of which it could not be said why it was so, but that it was so: for if the wisdom of the Senate had been called to counsel, or the voices of the people calculated to determine of the matter; it might easily have burst out into civil discord, considering the often contentions between the Senate and the people, the factions of Clients, & the constant mutability of every man's private affections necessarily inclining unto one, although their worth were equal & by true reason indiscernible; which might have made the one proud of that which peradventure he had not, and cast the other lower than would have well beseemed his virtues: And therefore to cut off these, with many other inconveniences, they invented lots; which without either reason or will might decide such controversies. By this it appeareth how little the ancient lawmakers respected the ground & reason of an ordinance, so the commodity were great, and the use important to the good of the state: for as they saw the thing itself to be casual, so they saw that casual things are sometimes more necessary, then demonstrative conclusions: neither ought the nature, and speculative consideration of laws and statutes, belong to the common people: but the execution and obedience thereof maketh the common weal flourish. And thus endeth the first Commentary of Caesar his war in Gallia.     

THE SECOND COMMENTARY OF THE WARS IN GALLIA.  
THE ARGUMENT.  
LIke as when a heavy body lieth upon the skirt of a larger continued quantity, although it cover but a small parcel of the whole surface; yet the other quarters are burdened & kept under with a proportionable measure of that weight; and through the union and continuation which bindeth all the parts into one totality, feel the same suppression which hath really seized but upon their fellow part: In like manner the Belgae, inhabiting the furthest skirt of that triple continent, seemed to repine at that heavy burden, which the Roman Empire had laid upon the Province, the Hedui, and other states of that kingdom. And lest it might in time be further removed and laid directly upon their shoulders, they thought it expedient whilst they felt it but by participation to gather their several forces into one head, and try whether they could free their neighbour nations from so grievous a yoke; or at the least keep it from coming any nearer unto themselves: And this is the Argument of this second book, which divideth itself into two parts: the first containing the wars between Caesar and all the states of Belgia united together: the second recording the battles which he made with some of the states thereof in particular, as time and occasion gave him means to effect it.  

CHAP. I.  
Caesar hasteth to his army, marcheth towards the confines of the Belgae, & taketh in the men of Rheims.  
THE report of this confederacy being brought unto Caesar, whilst he wintered beyond the Alps, 
Caesar.  as well by letters from Labienus, as by the common hearsay of the world: he levied two new legions in Lombardy, and sent them by Q. Pedius into Gallia, and assoon as there was any forage in the fields he himself came to the army. At his arrival, understanding by the Senones & the rest of the Galls that bordered upon the Belgae (to whom he gave in charge to learn what was done amongst them,) that there was nothing in Belgia but mustering of soldiers, and gathering their forces into one head: he thought it not safe to make any further delay, but having made provision of corn, he drew out his army from their wintering camps, and within fifteen days he came to the borders of the Belgae. Assoon as he was come thither, which was much sooner then was looked for; the men of Rheimes being the uttermost of the Belgae, next adjoining to the Celtaes, thought it best to entertain a peaceable resolution, and sent Iccius and Antebrogius, two of the chief men of their state, unto Caesar, to submit themselves and all that they had, to the mercy of the Roman Empire; affirming that they were innocent both of the counsel of the Belgae, and of their conspiracy against the romans: For proof whereof they were ready to give hostages, to receive them into their towns, and to furnish them with corn or what other thing they stood in need of. That the rest of the Belgae were all in arms, and the Germans on the other side of the Rhine had promised to send them succour: yea their madness was so great, that they themselves were not able to hold back the Suessones from that attempt, being their brethren and kinsmen in blood, and using the same laws and customs as they did, having both one magistrate and one form of government; but they would needs support the same quarrel which the rest of the Belgae had undertaken.  

THE OBSERVATION.  
I Might here take occasion to speak somewhat of a particular reuoult in a general cause; and how a confederate state may in regard of their own safety forsake a common quarrel, or whatsoever the universal society hath enacted prejudicial to their common weal: but that I only intend to discover warlike practices, leaving these questions of law and policy to men of greater judgement and better experience. Only I observe in the behalf of the Roman government, that such cities as yielded to the Empire, and became tributary to their treasury (howsoever they were otherwise combined by confederacy) seldom or never repented them of their fact, in regard of the noble patronage which they found in that state, and of the due respect observed towards them.    

CHAP. II.  
The power of the Belgae, and their preparation for this war.  
CAesar enquiring of the Ambassadors which came from Rheimes what the states were that had taken arms, 
Caesar.  and what they were able to do in matter of war: found the Belgae to be descended from the Germans; who passing over the Rhine time out of mind, drove away the Galls and seated themselves in their possessions: and that these only of all the Galls kept the Cimbri and Teutoni from entering into their country: and in that regard they challenged to themselves great authority, & vaunted much in their feats of arms. Concerning their number they had these advertisements; the 
a The country about Beawois.  Bellovaci exceeded all the Belgae in prowess, authority, and number of men, and promised 60000. men: and in that regard they demanded the administration of the whole war. The 
b The country about Soissons  Suessones inhabiting a large and fertile country, and having 12. walled towns, promised to set out 50000. The 
c The people about Turnai  Neruij as many; the 
d Arras.  Attrebatij 15000. the 
e Amiens.  Ambiani 10000 the Velocassij, and 
f Vermandois.  Veromandui as many; the 
g Terwene  Morini 25000. the Menapij 7000. the Caletani 10000 the Catuaci 19000. the 
h Liege. 296000 in al.  Eburones, Condrusones, and others 40000. Caesar encouraging the men of Rheimes to persist their faithfulness to the Roman Empire, propounded unto them great offers and liberal promises of recompense, and commanded all their senate to come before him, and bring with them their noble men's sons to be given up for hostages, which they diligently performed by a day appointed. And having received two especial advertisements from the men of Rheimes, the one concerning the multitude of the enemy; and the other touching the singular opinion which was generally held of their manhood: he provided for the first by persuading Divitiacus the Heduan, that it much imported the whole course of those businesses, to keep asunder the power of the enemy; and to withhold their forces from making a head, that so he might avoid the dange of incountering so great a power at one instant. Which might easily be brought to pass, if the Hedui would enter with a strong power into the marches of the Bellovaci, and sack their territories with sword and confusion, which Divitiacus promised to perform, and to that purpose he speedily returned into his country. Upon the second advertisement which presented unto him the great valour and manhood of his enemies, he resolved not to be too hasty in giving them battle, but first to prove by skirmishing with his horsemen what his enemies by their prowess could do, and what his own men durst do.  

THE OBSERVATION.  
THis rule of making trial of the worth of an enemy, hath always been observed by prudent and grave commanders, as the surest principle whereon the true judgement of the event may be grounded. For if the doctrine of the old Philosophers, which teacheth that the word non putabam was never heard out of a wise man's mouth, have any place in the course of human actions, it ought especially to be regarded in managing these main points, whereon the state of kingdoms and empires dependeth. For unless we be persuaded that blind chance directeth the course of this world with an uncertain confusion, and that no foresight can sway the balance of our hap into either part of our fortune; I see no reason why we should not by all means endeavour to ground our knowledge upon true causes, and level our proceedings to that certainty which riseth from the things themselves. And this is the rather to be urged, inasmuch as our leaders are oftentimes deceived when they look no further then to match an enemy with equality of number, referring their valour to be tried in the battle; not considering that the eye of itself cannot discern the difference between two champions of like presence and outward carriage, unless it see their strength compared together and weighed as it were in the scale of trial: which Caesar omitted not diligently to observe, before he would adventure the hazard of battle. For besides his own satisfaction, it gave great encouragement to his men, when they saw themselves able to countermatch an enemy, and knew their task to be subject to their strength: Neither did he observe it only at this instant, but throughout the whole course of his actions; for we find that he never encountered any enemy, but with sufficient power, either in number or in valour to make head against them: which equality of strength, being first laid as a sure foundation, he used his own industry and skill, and the discipline wherein his men were trained, as advantages to oversway his adversary: and so drew victory maugre fortune unto himself, and seldom failed in any of his battles.    

CHAP. III.  
Caesar passeth his Army over the river 
* La disne.  Axona, leaving Titurius Sabinus encamped on the other side with six cohorts.  
ASSOON as Caesar understood, 
Caesar.  as well by his discourers, as from the men of Rheimes, that all the power of the Belgae was assembled together into one place, and was now making towards him no great destance off; he made all the haste he could to pass his Army over the river Axona, which divided the men of Rheimes from the other Belgae. Whereby he brought to pass, that no enemy could come on the back of him to work any disadvantage: and that corn might be brought unto him from Rheimes, and other cities without danger. And further, that he might command the passage back again, as occasion should serve to his best advantage, he fortified a bridge which he found on the river, with a strong garrison of men, and caused Titurius Sabinus a Legate, to encamp himself on the other side of the river with six cohortes, commanding him to fortify his camp with a rampire of 12 foot in altitude, and a trench of 18 foot in breadth.  

OBSERVATION.  
IF it be demanded, why Caesar did pass his Army over the river, leaving it on his back; and did not rather attend the enemy on the other side, and so take the advantage of hindering him, if he should attempt to pass over? I will set down the reasons in the sequel of this war, as the occurrences shall fall out to make them more evident. In the mean time let us enter into the particularity of these six cohortes, that we may the better judge of such troops which were employed in the services of this war: but that we may the better conjecture what number of soldiers these six cohortes did contain, it seemeth expedient, a little to discourse of the companies and regiments, which the Romans used in their Armies.  
And first we are to understand, 
A legion what it was. Lib. 4. De vita Romuli.  that the greatest and chiefest regiment in a Roman Army, was termed by the name of Legio: as Varro saith, quod leguntur milites in delectu: or as Plutarch speaketh, quod lecti ex omnibus essent militares; so that it taketh the name Legio of the choice and selecting of the soldiers. Romulus is said to be the first author & founder of these legions, making every legion to contain 3000 soldiers: but shortly after they were augmented, as Festus recordeth unto 4000: and afterward again from 4000 to 4200. And that number was the common rate of a legion until Hannibal came into Italy, 
Liu. lib. 22.  and then it was augmented to 5000, but that proportion continued only for that time. And again, when Scipio went into Africa, the legions were increased to 6200 footmen, and 300 horse. And shortly after the Macedonian war, the legions that continued in Macedon to keep the Province from rebellion, consisted of 6000 footmen and 300 horse. Out of Caesar it cannot be gathered, that a legion in his time did exceed the number of 5000 men; but oftentimes it was short of that number: for he himself saith, that in this war in Gallia his soldiers were so wasted, that he had scarce 7000 men in two legions. And if we examine that place out of the 3 of the civil war, where he saith, that in Pompey his Army were 110 cohorts, which amounted to the number of 55000 men: And being manifest as well by these number of cohortes, as by the testimony of divers authors, that Pompey his Army consisted of 11 legions; if we divide 55000 into 11 parts, we shall find a legion to consist of 5000 men. Which number or thereabout, being generally known to be the usual rate of a legion, the Romans always expressed the strength of their Army by the number of legions that were therein: as in this war it is said, that Caesar had eight legions, which by this account might arise to 40000 men, besides associates, and such as necessarily attended the Army. Further we are to understand, that every legion had his peculiar name, by which it was known and distinguished from the rest, and that it took either from their order of muster, or enrolment; as that legion which was first enrolled, was called the first legion; and that which was second in choice, the second legion; and so consequently of the rest; and so we read in this history, the seventh, the eighth, the ninth, the tenth, the eleventh and twelfth legion: or otherwise from the place of their warfare, and so we read of legiones Germanicae, Panonicae, Britannicae, and such others; and sometime of their General, as Augusta, Claudia, Vitellianae, legiones, and so forth. Or to conclude, from some accident or quality, 
Tacitus 3. hist.  as Rapax, Victrix, Fulminifera and such like. And this much of the name and number of a legion, which I must necessarily distinguish into divers kinds of soldiers, according to the first institution of the old Romans, and the continual observation thereof unto the decay of the Empire, before I come to the description of these smaller parts, whereof a legion was compounded.  
First therefore we are to understand, that after the Consuls had made a general choice and sworn the soldiers, 
Velites.  the Tribunes chose out the youngest and poorest of all the rest, and called them by the name of Velites. Their place in regard of the other soldiers was both base & dishonourable: not only because they fought a far off, and were lightly armed; but also in regard they were commonly exposed to the enemy, as our forlorn hopes are. Having chosen out a competent number for this kind, they proceeded to the choice of them which they called Hastati, 
Hastati.  a degree above the Velites, both in age and wealth, and termed them by the name of Hastati; forasmuch as at their first institution they fought with a kind of javelin, which the romans called Hasta: but before Polybius his time they used Piles; notwithstanding their ancient name continued unto the latter time of the Empire. 
Principes.  The third choice which they made was of the strongest and lustiest bodied men, who for the prime of their age were called Principes; the rest that remained were named Triarij, as Varro saith, Quod tertio ordine extremis subsidio deponuntur: These were always the eldest and best experienced men, and were placed in the third division of the battle, as the last help and refuge in all extremity. 
Lib. 6.  Polybius saith, that in his time the Velites, Hastati, and Principes, did consist of 1200 men a piece; and the Triarij never exceeded the number of 600. although the general number of a legion were augmented: 
Lib. 1. de mil. Rom.  whereof Lypsius allegeth these reasons. First because these Triarij consisted of the best of the soldiers, and so might countervail a greater number in good worth and valour. Secondly, it seldom came to buckle with the enemy, but when the controversy grew very doubtful. Lastly, we may well conjecture that the voluntaries and extraordinary followers, ranged themselves amongst these Triaries, and so made the third battle equal to either of the former; but howsoever, they never exceeded the number of 600. And by this it appeareth, that in Polybius his time the common rate of a legion was 4200.  
In this division of their men consisted the ground of that well ordered discipline; for in that they distinguished them according to their years and ability, they reduced their whole strength into several classes; & so disposed of these different parts, 
The use of this division.  that in the general composition of their whole body every part might be fitted with place and office, according as his worth was answerable to the same: & so they made not only a number in gross, but a number distinct by parts and properties, that from every accident which met with any part of the army, the judgement might determine how much or how little it imported the whole body: besides the great use which they made of this distinction in their degrees of honour and preferment; a matter of no small consequence, in the excellency of their government.  
The soldiers, 
The distinction of their companies. Manipuli.  at their enrolment being thus divided according to their years and ability, they then reduced them into smaller companies, to make them fitter for command and fight: and so they divided the Hastati, Principes, and Triarii, each of them into 10 companies, making of those 3. sorts of soldiers 30. small regiments, which they called Manipuli: And again, they subdivided every maniple into two equal parts, 
Ordo.  and called them Ordo, which was the least company in a legion; and according to the rate set down by Polybius, contained 60. soldiers. In every Ordo there was a Centurion, or Captain, and a Lieutenant, whom they named Optio or Tergiductor. The maniples of the Triarii were much lesser than the maniples of either the Hastati or the Principes; for as much as their whole band consisted but of 600. men. The Velites were put into no such companies, but were equally distributed amongst the other Maniples; and therefore the Hastati, Principes, and Triarij were called subsignanos milites, to make a difference between them and the Velites, which were not divided into bands; and so consequently had no ensign of their own, but were distributed amongst the other companies: so that every Maniple had 40. Velites attending upon it. And now I come to the description of a cohort, which the history here mentioneth.  
The word Cohors in latin doth signify that part of ground which is commonly enclosed before the gate of a house, 
Cohors. Lib. 3. de re rust.  which from the same word we call a court: and Varro giveth this reason of the metaphor. As in a farm house, saith he, many out-buildings joined together make one enclosure; so a cohort consisteth of several maniples joined together in one body. This cohort consisted of three maniples; for every legion had ten cohorts, which must necessarily comprehend those thirty maniples: but these 3. maniples were not all of one and the same kind of soldiers, as three maniples of the Hastati, 3. of the Principes, and 3. of the Triarij, as Patricius in his Paralleli seemeth to affirm; for so there would have remained an odd maniple in every kind, that could not have been brought into any cohort: But a cohort contained a maniple of the Hastati, a maniple of the Principes, and a maniple of the Triarij; and so all the 30. maniples were included into 10. cohorts; & every cohort was as a little legion; forasmuch as it consisted of all those sorts of soldiers that were in a legion. So that making a legion to contain 5000. men; a cohort had 500 and so these 6. cohorts, which he encamped on the other side of the river, under the command of Titurius Sabinus, contained 3000. soldiers: but if you make a legion to consist but of 4200. which was the more usual rate, there were 2520. soldiers in these six cohortes.  
By this therefore it may appear, that a legion consisted of four sorts of soldiers, which were reduced into ten cohorts, and every cohort contained 3. maniples; & every maniple 2. orders; and every order had his Centurion marching in the head of the troop; and every Centurion had his optionem, or Lieutenant, that stood in the tail of the troop.  
When a legion stood ranged in battle ready to confront the enemy, 
Alegion ranged in battle.  the least body or squadron that it contained was a maniple; wherein the two orders were joined together, making jointly ten in front, and twelve in file: and so every five files had their Centurion in front, and Lieutenant in the rearward, to direct them in all adventures. In the time of the Emperors, their battailions consisted of a cohort, and never exceeded that number how great soever the army were.  
Polybius distinguishing a maniple into two centuries or orders, 
The first order  saith, that the Centurion first chosen by the Tribunes, commanded the right order, which was that order which stood on the right hand, known by the name of Primus ordo: and the Centurion elected in the second course, commanded the left order; and in the absence of either of them, he that was present of them two, commanded the whole maniple. And so we find that the Centurion of the first place was called Prior Centurio: in which sense Caesar is to be understood, where he saith, 
3. De bello civili.  that all the Centurions of the first cohort were slain, praeter principem priorem. From whence we gather two specialties, first; the priority between the Centurions of the same maniple: for a cohort consisting of 3. maniples, whereof the first maniple were Triarij, the second Principes, and the third Hastati; and every maniple containing two orders; and every order a Centurion: he saith, that all the Centurions of this cohort were slain; saving the first or upper Centurion of the Principes. 
Prima cohors  The second thing which I observe, is the title of the first cohort: for these 10. cohortes, whereof a legion consisted, were distinguished by degrees of worthiness; and that which was held the worthiest in the censure of the Electors, took the priority both of place and name, and was called the first cohort: the next, the second cohort; & so consequently unto the tenth and last.  
Neither did the legions want their degrees of pre-eminence, both in imbattailing & in incamping, according either to the seniority of their enrolment, or their favour of their General, or their own virtue: And so we read that in these wars in Gallia, the tenth legion had the first place in Caesar's army. And thus much concerning the divisions, and several companies of a legion, and the degrees of honour which they held in the same.  
Upon this description it shall not be amiss, briefly to lay open the most apparent commodities depending upon this discipline; 
The benefit of this discipline  the excellency whereof more plainly appeareth, bein compared to that order, which nature hath observed in the frame of her worthiest creatures: for it is evident, that such works of nature come nearest to perfect excellency, whose material substance is most particularly distinguished into parts, and hath every part endued with that property, which best agreeth to his peculiar service. For being thus furnished with diversity of instruments, and these directed with fitting abilities; the creature must needs express many admirable effects, and discover the worth of an excellent nature: whereas those other bodies, that are but slenderly laboured, and find less favour in nature's forge, being as abortives, or barbarously composed, wanting the diversity both of parts and faculties; are no way capable of such excellent uses, nor fit for such distinct services, as the former that are directed with so many properties, and enabled with the power of so well distinguished faculties. Which better works of nature the Romans imitated in the Architecture of their army, dividing it into such necessary & serviceable parts, as were best fitting all uses and employments: as first into legions, and legions into cohorts, and cohorts into maniples, and maniples into centuries or orders, and these into files; wherein every man knew his place, and kept the same without exchange or confusion. And thus the universal multitude was by order disposed into parts, until it came unto a unity: for it cannot be denied, but that these centuries were in themselves so sensibly distinguished, that every Soldier carried in his mind the particular Map of his whole century: for in imbtttailing, every century was disposed into 5. files, containing twelve in a file, whereof the leaders were always certain, and never changed but by death or some other especial occasion: and every leader knew his follower, and every second knew the third man, and so consequently unto the last.  
Upon these particularities it plainly appeareth, how easy a matter it was, to reduce their troops into any order of a march or a battle, to make the front the flank, or flank front, when they were broken and disrankt to rally them into any form, when every man knew both his own and his fellows station. If any companies were to be employed upon sudden service, the general Idea of the Army being so deeply imprinted in the mind of the commanders, would not suffer them to err in taking out such convenient troops, both for number and quality, as might best agree with the safety of the Army, or nature of the action: At all occasions and opportunities, these principles of advantage offered themselves, as ready means, to put in execution any design, or stratagem whatsoever; the project was no sooner resolved of, but every man could readily point out the companies that were fit to execute the intention. And which is more important, in regard of the life and spirit of every such part, their sodality was sweetened, or rather strengthened with the mutual acquaintance, and friendship one of another, the captain marching always in the head of the troop, the ensign in the midst, and the lieutenant in the rearward, and every man accompanied with his neighbour and his friend; which bred a true and unfeigned courage, both in regard of themselves, and of their followers. Besides these specialties, the places of title and dignity depending upon this order, were no small means to cut off all matter of civil discord, and intestine dissension: for here every man knew his place in the file, and every file knew his place in the century, and every century in the Maniple, and every Maniple in the Cohort, and every Cohort in the Legion, and every Legion in the Army; and so every soldier had his place, according to his virtue; and every place gave honour to the man, according as their discipline had determined thereof.  
The want of this discipline hath dishonoured the martial government of this age, with bloodshed and murders; whereof France is too true a witness, as well in regard of the French themselves, as of our English forces that have been sent thither to appease their tumults: for through defect of this order, which alotteth to every man his due place, the controversy grew between Sir William Drury and Sir john Bowrowes, the issue whereof is too well known to the world: wherein as our commanders in France have been negligent, so I may not forget to give due commendation to the care which is had of this point amongst the English troops, in the service of the states in the united provinces, where they are very curious in appointing every man his place in the file, and every file in the troop, and find much benefit thereby, besides the honour of reviving the Roman discipline.  
To conclude this point, 
The benefit of small battailions: and the disadvantage of great squadrons.  I will only touch in a word the benefit, which the Romans found in their small battailions, and the disadvantage, which we have in making great squadrons. And first it cannot be denied, but that such troops stand best appointed for disposition and array of battle, which standing strong to receive a shock, bring most men to fight with the enemy: for the principal things which are required in setting of a battle, are so to order the troops, that the depth in flank may serve conveniently to withstand the assault, taking up no more men than may well serve for that purpose; and giving means to the rest to fight with the enemy; and in these two points, were both their defensive and offensive considerations comprehended. But smaller troops and battalions afford this conveniency better than great squadrons, which drown up many able men in the depth of their flanks, and never suffer them to appear, but when the breaking of the squadron doth present them to the butchery of the enemy. The Macedonian Phalanx, as I have noted in the first book, never carried above 16 in flank, and brought 500 to fight in front. And these little battalions (considering them as they stood in battle ray) made as great a front or greater, then that of the Phalanx, keeping a depth answerable to the same; besides the 2 and 3 battle, which always were to succour them, which the Phalanx wanted: neither would their thick and close imbattailing admit any such succour behind them. Now if we compare the advantages & discommodities, which by place and accident were incident to either of these, we shall find great odds between them. These great squadrons are not faisable, but in plain and open places, where they may either stand immovable, or make easy and slow motions without shaking, or disordering their body: but the lesser are a scantling for all places, champion or woody, level or uneven, or of what site or quality soever. And to conclude, if two or three ranks of these great battalions chance to be broken and disordered, the whole body is as much interessed in the disorder, as the said ranks are; and hath less means to rally itself, than any other lesser company: but if any violence chance to rout a maniple, it proceedeth no further in the Army, than that part which it taketh: Neither can the disranking of any one part, betray the safety of the Army to disorder and confusion; for as much as their distinction served to cut off such inconveniences, and yet no way hindered the general uniting of their strength into one body. More may be said concerning this matter, but I only point at it, and leave the due consideration thereof, to the judgement of our commanders, & return to our history.    

CHAP. FOUR  
The Belgae attempt the surprise of 
* Bray in the county of Retell.  Bibrax: Caesar sendeth succour unto it.  
THere was a town called Bibrax, belonging to the state of Rheimes, about eight mile from Caesar's camp; which the Belgae thought to have surprised, as they came along to meet with Caesar, and suddenly assaulted it with such fury, that the townsmen could hardly hold out the first day. The Celtaes and Belgae use one and the same manner, in assaulting a town: for having beset the whole compass of the wall with ranks of soldiers, they never cease flinging of stones until they find the wall naked of defendants; and then casting themselves into a Testudo, they approach to the gate and undermine the walls. Assoon as the night had made an end of the assault, Iccius of Rheimes, a man of great birth and authority in his country, who at that time was governor of the town, and had been before with Caesar, to treat and conclude a peace: sent him word by messengers, that if there came not present succour, he was not able to hold out any longer. The same day about midnight (using the same messengers for guides) he sent both Numidian and Cretian Archers, and slingers of the Isles of Baleares, to relieve the town; by means whereof, the townsmen were put in good hope to make their party strong, and the enemy made hopeless of winning the town: and therefore after a small stay, having populated their fields, and burned their villages and out-buildinges, they marched with all their power towards Caesar's camp, and within less than two miles of his Army, they encamped their whole host: which, as was gathered by the smoke and fire, occupied more ground than eight miles in breadth.  

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.  
IN the description of their assault, we are to observe two circumstances: The first is, 
To take a town by surprise.  the manner they used in a sudden surprise: The second is, the form and quality of a Testudo. Although Caesar seemeth to attribute this manner of assaulting a town, as peculiar, to the Galls; yet we may not think but that the Romans used it, as often as they had occasion to surprise any city: but because the Galls knew no other means to take a town but this, therefore he setteth it down as peculiar unto them. The Romans called this manner of assault Corona; and so we read oftentimes this phrase, Cingere urbem corona: for as much as the soldiers enclosed the town with a circle, and so resembled a crown or garland. Ammianus speaketh of a triple crown of soldiers, which incompased a town: And josephus telleth of jotapatam, which the Romans besieged duplici peditum corona: and besides these, there was a third circle of horsemen utmost of all. There is no further matter to be observed but this, that in surprising a town, they encircled it round about with thick continued ranks of men, and where they found the wall weakest, there they entered as they could.   

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.  
THe Testudo requireth a larger discourse, 
A Testudo described. Lib. 44.  and is lively described in Livy, after this manner. In the amphitheatre, where the people did often assemble to see strange sights and public shows, were brought in (saith he) 60 lusty young men, who after some motion, and seemly march, cast themselves into a square troop, & roofing their heads close with their targets, the first rank which made the front of the Testudo, stood upright on their feet; the second rank bowed itself somewhat lower; the third and fourth ranks did more incline themselves, and so consequently unto the last rank, which kneeled on the ground, and so they made a body resembling half the side of an house, which they called Testudo. Unto this squadron thus strongly combined together, came two soldiers running some fifty foot off, and threatening each other with their weapons, ran nimbly up the side of the roof; and sometimes making as though they would defend it against an enemy, that would have entered upon it; sometimes again incountering each other in the midst of it, leapt up and down as steadily as if they had been upon firm ground. And which is more strange, the front of a Testudo being applied to the side of a wall, there ascended many armed men upon the said Testudo, and fought in an equal height with other soldiers, that stood upon the said wall to defend it. The dissimilitude in the composition was this, that the soldiers that were in front, and in the sides of the square, carried not their Targets over their heads, as the other did; but covered their bodies with them, and so no weapons either cast from the wall, or otherwise thrown against it, could any way hurt them; and whatsoever weight fell upon the Testudo, it quickly glided down by the declivity of the roof, without any hurt or annoyance at all.  
Thus far Livy goeth, neither do I know what to say further of it: the chiefest use thereof was in a surprise or sudden attempt against a town, before the towns men were thoroughly prepared to defend the same. This invention served them to approach the wall with safety, and so either to undermine it, or to climb up: and to that end they oftentimes erected one Testudo upon another. Tacitus saith, that the soldiers climbed upon the wall, super iteratam testudinem, by one Testudo made upon an other; and this was the ancient form and use of a Testudo in a sudden assault or surprise.  
Dio Cassius in the acts of Anthony, 
Lib. 49.  saith, that being galled with the Parthian Archers, he commanded his whole army to put itself into a Testudo, which was so strange a sight to the Parthians, that they thought the romans had sunk down for weariness and faintness; and so forsaking their horse, drew their sword to have made execution: and then the romans at a watch-worde given, rose again with such a fury, that they put them all to sword and flight. Dio describeth the said Testudo after this manner, They placed, saith he, their baggage, their light armed men and their horsemen, in the midst; and those heavy armed footmen that carried long gutter-tiled Targets, were in the utmost circles next unto the enemy; the rest which bore large oval Targets were thronged together throughout the whole troop, and so covered with their Targets both themselves and their fellows, that there was nothing discerned by the enemy but a roof of Targets, which were so tiled together, that men might safely go upon them.  
Further, we oftentimes read, that the romans cast themselves into a Testudo, to break through an enemy, or to rout and disrank a troop. And this use the romans had of a Testudo in field services, and only by the benefit of their Target. It was called a Testudo, in regard of the strength, for that it covered and sheltered, as a shell covereth a fish. And let this suffice concerning a Testudo.   

THE THIRD OBSERVATION.  
THirdly we may observe, 
The necessity of good discovery.  how carefully Caesar provided for the safety of such succours, as he sent unto Bibrax: for he commanded the same messengers to direct them that came from the town, as the best and surest guides in that journey, lest peradventure through ignorance of the way, they might fall into inconveniences or dangers: a matter of no small consequence in managing a war, but deserveth an extraordinary importunity, to persuade the necessity of this diligence. For a General that hath perfectly discovered the nature of the country, through which he is to march, and knoweth the true distances of places, the quality of the ways, the compendiousness of turnings, the nature of the hills and the course of the rivers, hath all these particularities as main advantages, to give means of so many several attempts upon an enemy: And in this point Hannibal had a singular dexterity, and excelled all the commanders of his time in making use of the way, by which he was to pass. But he that leadeth an army, by an unknown and undiscovered way, and marcheth blindfold upon uncertain adventures, is subject to as many casualties and disadvantages, as the other hath opportunity of good fortune. Let every man therefore persuade himself, that good discoverers are as the eyes of an army, and serve for lights in the darkness of ignorance, to direct the resolutions of good providence, and make the path of safety so manifest, that we need not stumble upon casualties. Caesar in his journey to Ariovistus used the help of Divitiacus the Heduan, in whom amongst all the Galls, he reposed greatest confidence to discover the way, and acquaint him with the passages; and before he would undertake his voyage unto 
* Now England.  Brittany, he well informed himself by merchants and travailers, of the quantity of the Island, the quality of the people, their use of war, and the opportunity of their havens: Neither was he satisfied with their relations, but he sent Caius Volusenus in a ship of war, to see what he could further discover, concerning these points. Suetonius addeth moreover, that he never carried his army, per insidiosa itinera, unless he had first well discovered the places.  
Concerning the order, which skilful leaders have observed in discoveries, 
The order which is to be observed in discovery.  we are to know that this point consisteth of two parts: the one in understanding the perfect description of the country; and the second in observing the motions of the enemy. Touching the first, we find as well by this as other histories, that the Romans used the inhabitants of the country for guides, as best acquainted with their native places, that they might not err in so important a matter; provided always, that their own scouts were ever abroad to understand what they could of themselves, that they might not altogether rely upon a stranger's direction. The motions of the enemy were observed by the horsemen, and these for the most part were Veterani, well experienced in the matter of war, and so the general received sound advertisements: and yet they were not too forward upon any new motion, unless they found it confirmed by divers ways: for some espials may err, either through passion or affection, as it happened in the Helvetian war. If therefore the use and benefit, which prudent and wise commanders made of this diligence, or the misfortune which the want of this knowledge brought upon the ignorant, have any authority to persuade a circumspect care herein, this little that hath been spoken may be sufficient, for this point.   

THE FOURTH OBSERVATION.  
THe soldiers which Caesar sent to relieve Bibrax, 
Slingers with their art and use.  were Archers of Creta and Numidia, and slingers of the Isles Baleares, which are now called Maiorica, and Minorica: which kind of weapon, because it seemeth ridiculous to the soldiers of these times, whose conceits are held up with the fury of these fiery engines; I will in brief discover the nature and use of this weapon.  
The Latins (saith Isodore) called this weapon funda: quod ex ea fundantur lapides. Pliny attributeth the invention thereof to the Insulairs called Baleares. Florus in his third book and eighth chapter, saith, that these Baleares used three sorts of slings, and no other weapon beside: for a boy had never any meat given him, before he had first struck it, with a sling. Strabo distinguisheth these three sorts of slings, which the Baleares used; and saith that they had one sling with long rains, which they used when they would cast a far off: and another with short rains, which they used near at hand: and the third with rains of a mean size, to cast a reasonable distance. Lipsius saith, that in Columna Antonina at Rome, he observed that the Balearean was made with one sling about his head, another about his belly, and the third in his hand; which might be their ordinary manner of carrying them. The matter whereof they were made was threefold, the first was hemp or cotton, the second hair, and the third sinews: for of either of these stuffs, they commonly made them: the form and fashion of a sling resembled a plaited rope, somewhat broad in the midst, with an oval compass; and so by little and little decreasing into two thongs or rains. Their manner of slinging was to whirl it twice or thrice about their head, and so to cast out the bullet. Virgil speaking of Mezentius saith, Ipse ter adducta circum caput egit habena. But Vegetius preferreth that skill, which cast the bullet with once turning it about the head. In Suidas we find, that these Baleares did commonly cast a stone of a pound weight, which agreeth to these dames in Caesar, fundas, librales. The leaden bullets are mentioned by Sallust, in the war with jugurth; and by Livy, where he saith, that the Consul provided great store of arrows, of bullets, and of small stones to be cast with slings. This weapon was in request amongst divers nations, as well in regard of the readiness, & easy reiterating of the blow, as also for that the bullet fled very far, with great violence: the distance which they could easily reach with their sling, is expressed in this verse, Fundum Varro vocat, quem possis mittere funda. Which Vegetius interpreteth to be 600 foot: 
Lib. 2.  Their violence was such, as the same author affirmeth in his first book and sixteenth chapter, that neither helmet, gaberdine, nor corselet could bear out the blow; but he that was hit with a sling, was slain sine invidia sanguinis, as he saith in the same place. Lucrece, Ovid, and Lucan, three of the Latin Poets say, that a bullet skilfully cast out of a sling, 
Lib. 2. natu: questions.  went with such violence that it melted as it flew: whereof Seneca giveth this reason, motion (saith he) doth extenuate the air, and that extenuation or subtility doth inflame: and so a bullet cast out of a sling melteth as it flieth. But howsoever, Diodorus Siculus affirmeth, that these Balearean slingers broke both target, headpiece, or any other armour whatsoever.  
There are also two other sorts of slings, the one mentioned by Livy; and the other by Vegetius: that in Livy is called Cestrophendo, which cast a short arrow with a long thick head: the other in Vegetius, is called fustibalus, which was a sling made of a chord and a staff. But let this suffice for slings and slingers, which were reckoned amongst their light armed soldiers, and used chiefly in assaulting, and defending towns, and fortresses, where the heavy armed soldiers could not come to buckle; and present the place of our Hargebusiers, which in their proper nature, are levis armaturae milites, although more terrible than those of ancient times.    

CHAP. V.  
Caesar confronted the Belgae in form of battle, but without any blow given: the Belgae attempt the passing of the river Axona; but in vain, and to their loss: they consult of breaking up the war.  
CAESAR at the first resolved not to give them battle, 
Caesar.  as well in regard of their multitude, as the general fame and opinion conceived of their valour: notwithstanding he daily made trial by light skirmishes with his horsemen, what the enemy could do, and what his own men durst do. And when he found that his men were nothing inferior to the Belgae, he chose a convenient place before his camp and put his Army in battle: the bank where he was encamped rising somewhat from a plain level, was no larger than would suffice the front of the battle; the two sides were steep, and the front rose a slope by little & little, until it came again to a plain, where the legions were imbattailed. And lest the enemy abounding in multitude, should cirumvent his men and charge them in flank as they were fight, he drew an overthwart ditch behind his Army, from one side of the hill to the other, 600 paces in length; the ends whereof he fortified with bulwarks, and placed therein store of engines: and leaving in his camp the two legions which he had last enrolled in Lombardie, that they might be ready to be drawn forth when there should need any succour, he imbattailed his other six legions in the front of the hill, before his camp. The Belgae also bringing forth their power, confronted the Romans in order of battle. There lay between both the Armies a small Marish, over which the enemy expected that Caesar should have passed; and Caesar on the other side, attended to see if the Belgae would come over, that his men might have charged them in that troublesome passage. In the mean time the Cavalry on both sides encountered between the two battles, and after long expectation on either side, neither party adventuring to pass over, Caesar having got the better in the skirmish between the horsemen, thought it sufficient for that time, both for the encouraging of his own men, and the contesting of so great an Army; and therefore he conveyed all his men again into their camp. From that place the enemy immediately took his way to the river Axona, which lay behind the Romans camp, and there finding fords they attempted to pass over part of their forces, to the end they might either take the fortress which Q. Titurius kept, or to break down the bridge, or to spoil the territories of the state of Rheimes, and cut off the Romans from provision of corn. Caesar having advertisement thereof from Titurius, transported over the river by the bridge all his horsemen and light armed Numidians, with his slingers and archers, and marched with them himself▪ the conflict was hot in that place, the Romans charging their enemies as they were troubled in the water, slew a great number of them; the rest like desperate persons, adventuring to pass over upon the dead carcases of their fellows, were beaten back by force of weapons: and the horsemen encompassed such as had first got over the water, and slew every man of them.  
When the Belgae perceived themselves frustrated of their hopes, of winning Bibrax, of passing the river, and of drawing the Romans into places of disadvantage, and that their own provisions began to fail them: they called a council of war, wherein they resolved, that it was best for the state in general, and for every man in particular, to break up their camp, and to return home unto their own houses: and into whose confines or territories soever, the Romans should first enter to depopulate and waste them in hostile manner, that thither they should hasten from all parts, and there to give them battle, to the end they might rather try the matter in their own country, than abroad in a strange and unknown place; and have their own household provision always at hand to maintain them. And this the rather was concluded, for as much as they had intelligence, that Divitiacus with a great power of the Hedui, approached near to the borders of the Bellovaci, who, in that regard, made haste homeward to defend their country.  

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.  
FIrst we may observe the Art, which he used to countervail the strength of so great a multitude, by choosing out so convenient a place, which was no broader in front then would suffice the front of his battle; and having both the sides of the hill so steep, that the enemy could not ascend nor climb up, but to their own overthrow; he made the back part of the hill strong by Art, & so placed his soldiers as it were in the gate of a fortress, where they might either issue out, or retire at their pleasure. Whereby it appeareth how much he preferred security and safety before the vain opinion of foolhardy resolution, which savoureth of Barbarism rather than of true wisdom: for he ever thought it great gain, to lose nothing; and the day brought always good fortune, that delivered up the army safe unto the evening; attending, until advantage had laid sure principles of victory: and yet Caesar was never thought a coward.  
And now it appeareth, what use he made by passing his army over the river, and attending the enemy on the further side, rather than on the side of the state of Rheimes: for by that means he brought to pass, that whatsoever the enemy should attempt in any part or quarter of the land, his forces were ready to trouble their proceedings; as it happened in their attempt of Bibrax: & yet notwithstanding, he lost not the opportunity of making slaughter of them, as they passed over the river. For by the benefit of the bridge which he had fortified, he transported what forces he would, to make head against them, as they passed over; and so he took what advantage either side of the river could afford him.   

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.  
ANd here the reader may not marvel, if when the hills are in labour, they bring forth but a mouse; for how soon is the courage of this huge army abated? or what did it attempt worthy such a multitude? or answerable to the report which was bruited of their valour? But being hastily carried together by the violence of passion, were as quickly dispersed upon the sight of an enemy, which is no strange effect of a sudden humour. For as in nature all violent motions are of short continuance, and the durability, or lasting quality of all actions, proceedeth from a slow and temperate progression; so the resolutions of the mind that are carried with an untemperate violence, and savour so much of heat and passion, do vanish away even with the smoke thereof, and bring forth nothing but leasurable repentance: and therefore it were no ill counsel for men of such natures, to qualify their hasty resolutions, with a mistrustful linger, that when their judgement is well informed of the cause, they may proceed to a speedy execution.  
But that which most bewrayeth their indiscreet intemperance, in the hot pursuit of this enterprise, is, that before they had scarce seen the enemy, or had opportunity to contest him in open field, their victual began to fail them: for their minds were so carried away with the conceit of war, that they had no leisure to provide such necessaries, as are the strength and sinew of the war: It was sufficient for every particular man, to be known for a soldier in so honourable an action, referring other matters in the care to the state. The states in like manner thought it enough to furnish out forty or fifty thousand men a piece, to discharge their oath, and to save their hostages, committing other requisites to the general care of the confederacy: which, being directed by as unskilful governors, never looked further than the present multitude, which seemed sufficient to overthrow the Roman Empire. And thus each man relied upon an others care, and satisfied himself with the present garb; so many men of all sorts and qualities, so many helmets and plumed crests, such strife and emulation, what state should seem in greatest forwardness; were motives sufficient to induce every man to go, without further inquiry, how they should go. And herein the care of a General ought especially to be seen, considering the weakness of particular judgements, that having the lives of so many men depending altogether upon his providence, and engaged in the defence of their state and country; he do not fail in these main points of discipline, which are the pillars of all warlike designs. To conclude this point, let us learn by their error, so to carry a matter (especially of that consequence) that we make it not much worse by ill handling it, than it was before we first take it to our charge; as it here happened to the Belgae. For their tumultuous arms sorted to no other end, then to give Caesar just occasion to make war upon them, with such assurance of victory, that he made small account of that which was to follow, in regard of that which had already happened: considering that he should not in all likelihood, meet with the like strength again, in the continuance of that war. And this was not only gravius bellum successori tradere, as it often falleth out in the course of a long continued war; but to draw a dangerous war upon their heads, that otherwise might have lived in peace.    

CHAP. VI  
The Belgae broke up their Camp; and as they return home, are chased and slaughtered by the romans.  
THIS general resolution being entertained by the consent of the whole Council of war; 
Caesar.  they departed out of their Camp with a great noise and tumult, without any order (as it seemed) or government: every man pressing to be foremost on his journey in such a turbulent manner, that they seemed all to run away: Whereof Caesar having notice by his spies, and mistrusting some practice, not as yet perceiving the reason of their departure, he kept his army within his Campe. In the dawning of the day, upon certain intelligence of their departure, he sent first his horsemen to stay the rearward, commanding Labienus to follow after with three legions; these overtaking the Belgae, and chase them many miles, slew a great number of them: And while the rearward stayed, and valiantly received the charge of the romans, the vantguarde being out of danger, and under no government, assoon as they heard the alarm behind them, broke out of their ranks and betook themselves to flight; and so the romans slew them as long as the sun gave them light to pursue them; and then sounding a retreat, they returned to their camp.  

OBSERVATION.  
IT hath been an old rule amongst soldiers, that a great and negligent error committed by an enemy, is to be suspected as a pretence to treachery. We read of Fuluius a Legate in the Roman army, lying in Tuscanie, the Consul being gone to Rome to perform some public duty: the Tuscans took occasion by his absence to try whether they could draw the romans into any inconvenience; and placing an ambuscado near unto their camp, sent certain soldiers, attired like shepherds, with droves of cattle to pass in view of the Roman army, who handled the matter so, that they came even to the rampire of the camp; whereat the Legate wondering as at a thing void of reason, kept himself quiet until he had discovered their treachery, and so made frustrate their intent: In like manner Caesar not persuaded that men should be so heedless, to carry a retreat in that disorderly and tumultuous manner, would not discampe his men to take the opportunity of that advantage, until he had found that to be true, which in all reason was unlikely. And thus 296000. Belgae were chased and slaughtered by three legions of the romans, for want of government and order in their departure.    

CHAP. VII.  
Caesar followeth after the Belgae into the Country of the Suessones; and there besiegeth 
* Noyon:  Noviodunum.  
THE next day after their departure, 
Caesar.  before they could recover themselves of their fear and flight; or had time to put themselves again in breath: Caesar as it were continuing still the chase and victory, led his army into the country of the 
* Soyssons.  Suessones, the next borderers unto the men of Rheimes: and after a long journey came unto Noviodunum, a town of good importance, which he attempted to take by surprise, as he passed along by it. For he understood, that it was altogether unfurnished of defensive provision, having no forces within to defend it: but in regard of the breadth of the ditch and height of the wall, he was for that time disappointed of his purpose: and therefore having fortified his camp, he began to make preparation for a siege. The night following the whole multitude of the Suessones, that had escaped by flight, were received into the town: howbeit when the Vineae were with great expedition brought unto the wall, the mount raised, and the turrets built; the Galls being amazed at the highness of the works, such as they had never seen nor heard of before, and the speed which was made in the dispatch thereof, sent ambassadors to Caesar, to treat of giving up the town, and by the mediation of the men of Rheimes obtained their suit.  

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.  
IN this relation we may observe the industrious art, which the Romans used in assaulting, and taking holds and towns; wherein we find three sorts of engines described, Vinea, Agger, and Turres.  
Vinea is thus described by Vegetius: 
* Lib. 4. A vinea or vine described.  A little strong built house or hovel, made of light wood, that it might be removed with greatest ease; the roof was supported with divers pillars of a foot square, whereof the foremost were 8 foot high, and the hindmost 6; and between every one of these pillars, there was 5 foot distance: it was always made with a double roof; the first or lower roof was of thick planks, and the upper roof of hurdles, to break the force of a weight, without further shaking or disjoining the building: the sides were likewise walled with hurdles, the better to defend the soldiers that were under it: the whole length was about 16 foot, and the breadth 7: the upper roof was commonly covered with green or raw hides, to keep it from burning, Many of these hovels were joined together in rank, when they went about to undermine a wall: the higher end was put next unto the wall, that all the weights which were thrown upon it might easily tumble down, without any great hurt to the engine: the four sides and groundsils, had in every corner a wheel, & by them they were driven to any place as occasion served: the chiefest use of them was to cover and defend the soldiers, as they undermined or overthrew a wall. This engine was called Vinea, which signifieth a vine, for it sheltered such as were under the roof thereof, as a vine covereth the place where it groweth.  
Agger; 
Agger or mount.  which we call a mount, is described in divers histories to be a hill or elevation made of earth and other substance, which by little and little was raised forward, until it approached near unto the place, against which it was built; that upon this mount they might erect fortresses and turrets, and so fight with an advantage of height. The matter of this mount, was earth and stones, faggots, and timber. josephus saith, that at the siege of jerusalem, the Romans cut down all the trees within 11 mile compass, for matter and stuff to make a mount. The sides of this Agger were of timber to keep in the loose matter; the forepart which was towards the place of service, was open without any timber work: for on that part they still raised it & brought it nearer the walls. That which was built at Massilia was 80 foot high, and that at Auaricum 80 foot high and 30 foot broad. josephus and Egesippus writ, that there was a fortress in judea, 300 cubits high, which Silvius purposing to win by assault, raised a mount 200 cubits high; and upon it, he built a castle of stone 50 cubits high, and 50 cubits broad; and upon the said castle he erected a turret of 60 cubits in height, and so took the fortress. The Romans oftentimes raised these mounts in the mouth of a haven, and commonly to overtoppe a town, that so they might fight with much advantage.  
Amongst other engines, 
Towers or Turrets described.  in use amongst the Romans, their movable Turrets were very famous; for they were built in some safe place out of danger, and with wheels put under them, were driven to the walls of the town. These Turrets were of two sorts, either great or little: the lesser sort are described, by vitrvuius, to be 60 cubits high; and the square side 17 cubits; the breadth at the top was a fifth part, of the breadth at the base; and so they stood sure without any danger of falling: the corner pillars were at the base, 9 inches square; & 6 inches at the top: there were commonly 10 stories in these little turrets, & windows in every story. The greater sort of towers were 120 cubits high, and the square side was 24 cubits, the breadth at the top was a fifth part of the base; and in every one of these were commonly 200 stories. There was not one and the same distance kept between the stories, for the lowest commonly was 7 cubits, and 12 inches high: the highest story 5 cubits, and the rest 4 cubits, and a third. In every one of these stories, were soldiers and engines, ladders, and casting bridges, by which they got upon the wall and entered the town. The forepart of these Turrets were covered with iron, and wet coverings, to save them from fire. The soldiers that removed the tower to and fro, were always within the square thereof, and so they stood out of danger. The new waterwork by broken Wharfe in London much resembleth one of these towers.   

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.  
Upon the building of these mighty engines, it was no marvel if the Suessones submitted themselves to such powerful industry. For whatsoever is strange and unusual, doth much affrighte the spirits of an enemy, and breed a motion of distrust and diffidency, when as they find themselves ignorant of such warlike practices: for novelty always breedeth wonder, in as much as the true reasons and causes being unknown, we apprehend it, as divers from the usual course of things, and so stand gazing at the strangeness thereof: and wonder as it addeth worth to the novelty; so it inferreth diffidency, and so consequently fear, the utter enemy of martial valour.    

CHAP. VIII.  
Caesar carrieth his Army to the Territories of the Bellovaci, Ambiani and the Neruij.  
CAESAR taking for pledges the chiefest of their city, 
Caesar.  upon the delivery of all their Arms, received the Suessones to mercy: and from thence led his Army against the Bellovaci; 
The Bellovaci taken to mercy.  who having conveyed both themselves and their goods into the town, called Bratispantium, and understanding that Caesar was come within five mile of the place, all the elder sort came forth to meet him, signifying their submission, by their lamentable demeanour. For these Divitiacus became a mediator (who after the Belgae had broken up their camp, had dismissed his Heduan forces and was returned to Caesar) the Hedui (saith he) have always found in the Bellovaci, a faithful and friendly disposition to their state: and if they had not been betrayed by their nobility, (who made them believe, that the Hedui were brought in bondage by the romans, and suffered all villainy and despite at their hands,) they had never withdrawn themselves from the Hedui, nor consented to conspire against the romans. The authors of this counsel, perceiving into what great misery they had brought their country, were fled into Brittany: wherefore not only the Bellovaci, but the Hedui also in their behalf besought him to use his clemency towards them. Caesar in regard of the Hedui and Divitiacus, promised to receive them to mercy; but forasmuch as the state was very great and populous, he demanded 600. hostages: Which being delivered, and their armour brought out of the town, 
The Ambiani yield up themselves.  he marched from thence into the coast of the Ambiani, who without further linger, gave both themselves and all that they had into his power. Upon these bordered the Neruij, of whom Caesar found this much by inquiry, that there was no recourse of merchants unto them; neither did they suffer any wine, or what thing else might tend to riot, to be brought into their country: for they were persuaded, that by such things their courage was much abated, and their virtue weakened. Further, he learned that these Neruij were a savage people, and of great valour, often accusing the rest of the Belgae, for yielding their necks to the Roman yoke, openly affirming, that they would neither send ambassadors nor take peace upon any condition.  
Caesar having marched three days journey in their country, 
The Neruij.  he understood that the river 
* Sambre near Namours.  Sabis was not passed ten miles from his camp; and that on the further side of this river, all the Neruij were assembled together, and there attended the coming of the romans: with them were joined the Attrebatij, and Veromandui, whom they had persuaded to abide the same fortune of war with them. Besides, they expected a power from the Aduatici; the women and such as were unmeet for the field, they bestowed in a place unaccessible for any army, by reason of fens and bogs, and marshes. Upon this intelligence, Caesar sent his discoverers and Centurions before, to choose out a fit place to encamp in.  
Now whereas many of the surrendered Belgae, and other Galls were continually in the Roman army, certain of these (as it was afterward known by the captives) observing the order which the romans used in marching, came by night to the Neruij and told them, that between every legion went a great sort of carriages; and that it was no matter of difficulty, assoon as the first legion was come into the camp, and the other legions yet a great way off, to set upon them, upon a sudden, before they were disburdened of their carriages; and so to overthrow them: which legion being thus cut off, and their stuff taken, the rest would have small courage to stand against them. It much furthered this advice, that, forasmuch as the Neruij were not able to make any power of horse, that they might the better resist the cavalry of their borderers, whensoever they made any road into their marches; their manner was to cut young trees half asunder, & bowing the tops down to the ground, plashed the boughs in breadth, and with thorns and briars planted between them, they made them so thick, that it was impossible to see through them, so hard it was to enter or pass through them; so that, when by this occasion, the passage of the Roman army must needs be hindered, the Neruij thought the foresaid counsel not to be neglected.  
CAESAR'S march where in every Legion had his Cariadges in front  
CAESAR'S march where the Enemy was nearer at hand  
The place which the romans chose to encamp in, was a hill, of like level from the top to the bottom, at the foot whereof ran the river Sabis: and with the like level, on the other side, rose an other hill directly against this, to the quantity of 200. paces; the bottom whereof was plain and open, and the upper part so thick with wood, that it could not easily be looked into: within these woods the Neruians kept themselves close, and in the open ground, by the river side were only seen a few troops of horse, and the river in that place was about 3. foot deep,  
Caesar sending his horsemen before, followed after with all his power; but the manner of his march differed from the report which was brought to the Neruii: for inasmuch as the enemy was at hand; Caesar (as his custom was) led 6. legions always in areadines, without burden or carriage of any thing, but their arms: after them he placed the impediments of the whole army. And the two legions which were last enrolled were a rearward to the army, and guarded the stuff.  

OBSERVATIONS.  
THis treacherous practice of the surrendered Belgae, hath fortunately discovered the manner of Caesar's march, 
The manner of the Roman march.  as well in safe passages, as in dangerous and suspected places: which is a point of no small consequence in martial discipline, being subject to so many inconveniences, and capable of the greatest art that may be showed in managing a war. Concerning the discreet carriage of a march; 
The two respects which Caesar had in ordering a march. 1 Safety. 2 Conveniency  by this circumstance it may be gathered, that Caesar principally respected safety: and secondly conveniency. If the place afforded a secure passage, and gave no suspicion of hostility, he was content in regard of conveniency, to suffer every legion to have the oversight of their particular carriages, and to insert them among the troops, that every man might have at hand such necessaries as were requisite, either for their private use or public discipline. But if he were in danger of any sudden attempt, or stood in hazard to be impeached by an enemy; he then omitted convenient disposition, in regard of particular use, as disaduantageous to their safety: & carried his legions in that readiness, that if they chanced to be engaged by an enemy, they might without any alteration of their march, or encumbrance of their carriages receive the charge, in that form of battle, as was best approved by their military rules, & the ancient practice of their fortunate progenitors.  
The old Romans observed likewise the same respects, for in unsafe & suspected places, 
Agmen quadratum.  they carried their troops agmine quadrato, which as Livy seemeth to note, was free from all carriage and impediments, which might hinder them in any sudden alarm. Neither doth that of 
* Lib. 8. de bell. Gall.  Hirtius any way contradict this interpretation, where he saith, that Caesar so disposed his troops against the Bellovaci, that 3. legions marched in front, & after them came all the carriages, to which the 10. legion served as a rearward; & so they marched, pene agmine quadrato. 
* 60. Epistle.  Seneca in like manner noteth the safety of agmen quadratum, where he saith, that where an enemy is expected, we ought to march agmine quadrato, ready to fight. The most material consequence of these places alleged is, that as oft as they suspected any onset or charge, their order in a march little or nothing differed from their usual manner of imbattailing; and therefore it was called agmen quadratum, or a square march, inasmuch as it kept the same disposition of parts, as were observed in quadrata Acie. For that triple form of imbattailing, which the romans generally observed in their fights, having respect to the distances between each battle, contained almost an equal dimension of front and file: and so it made Aciem quadratam; and when it marched, Agmen quadratum.  
Polybius expresseth the same in effect, 
Lib. 6.  as often as the place required circumspection; but altereth it somewhat in regard of the carriages: for he saith that in time of danger, especially where the country was plain and Champion, and gave space & free scope to clear themselves, upon any accident, the Romans marched in a triple battle, of equal distance one behind an other, every battle having his several carriages in front: And if they were by chance attacked by an enemy, they turned themselves according to the opportunity of the place, either to the right or left hand, and so placing their carriages on the one side of their army, they stood imbattailed ready to receive the charge.  
The contrary form of marching, where the place afforded more security, & gave scope to conveniency, 
Agmenlongun  they named agmen longum; when almost every maniple or order, had their several carriages attending upon them, & strove to keep that way which they found most easy, both for themselves & their impediments. Which order of a march, as it was more commodius than the former, in regard of particularity, so was it unsafe and dangerous, where the enemy was expected: And therefore Caesar much blamed Sabinus and Cotta, for marching, when they were deluded by Ambiorix, 
Lib. 5. de bell. Gallico.  longissimo agmine; as though they had received their advertisements from a friend, and not from an enemy.  
And albeit our modern wars are far different, in quality, from them of ancient times; 
The use that may be made of this in our modern wars  yet in this point of discipline, they cannot have a more perfect direction, then that which the romans observed, as the two poles of their motions, safety and conveniency: whereof the first dependeth chiefly upon the provident disposition of the leaders; and the other will easily follow on, as the commodity of every particular shall give occasion.  
Concerning safety in place of danger, what better course can be taken then that manner of imbattailing, which shall be thought most convenient, if an enemy were present to confront them? for a well ordered march must either carry the perfect form of a battle, or contain the distinct principles and elements thereof, that with little alteration it may receive that perfection of strength, which the fittest disposition can afford it. First therefore, a prudent and circumspect leader, that desireth to frame a strong and orderly march, is diligently to observe the nature and use of each weapon in his army, how they may be placed for greatest use and advantage, both in respect of their different and concurring qualities, as also in regard of the place wherein they are managed: and this knowledge will consequently infer the best and exactest disposition of imbattailing, as the said forces are capable of; which if it may be observed in a march, is no way to be altered. But if this exactness of imbattailing will not admit convenient carriage of such necessary adjuncts, as pertain to an army; the inconvenience is to be relieved, with as little alteration from that rule, as in a wary judgement shall be found expedient: that albeit the form be somewhat changed; yet the principles and ground wherein their strength and safety consisteth, may still be retained.  
Neither can any man well descend to more particular precepts in this point: he may exemplify the practices of many great and experienced commanders; what sort of weapon marched in front, and what in the rearward, in what part of the Army the Munition marched, and where the rest of the carriage was bestowed, according as their several judgements thought most expedient, in the particular nature of their occurrences. But the issue of all will fall out thus; that he that observed this rule before prescribed, did seldom miscarry through an unsafe march. Let a good Martialist well know their proper use in that diversity of weapons in his Army; how they are serviceable or disaduantageous, in this or that place, against such or such an enemy: and he will speedily order his battle, dispose of his march, and bestow his carriages, as shall best fall out both for his safety, and conveniency.  
Caesar's custom was, to send his Cavalry and light armed footmen, before the body of his Army, both to discover and impeach an enemy; for these troops were nimble in motion and fit for such services: but if the danger were greater in the rearward then in the front, the horsemen marched in the tail of the Army, and gave security where there was most cause of fear. But if it happened that they were found unfit to make good the service in that place, as oftentimes it fell out, and especially in Africa against the Numidians: he than removed them, as he best found it convenient, and brought his legionary soldiers, which were the sinews and strength of his forces, and marched continually in the bulk of the Army, to make good that which his horsemen could not perform. And thus he altered the antic prescription, and uniformity of custom, according as he found himself best able to disadvantage an enemy, or make way to victory.    

CHAP. IX.  
The Romans begin to fortify their camp: but are interrupted by the Neruij. Caesar maketh haste, to prepare his forces to battle.  
THE Roman horsemen, 
Caesar.  with the slingers and archers, passed over the river, and encountered the Cavalry of the enemy: who at first retired back to their companies in the wood, and from thence sallied out again upon them: but the Romans durst not pursue them further than the plain and open ground: in the mean time the six legions that were in front, having their work measured out unto them, began to fortify their camp. But assoon as the Neruij perceived their former carriages to be come in sight, which was the time appointed amongst them to give the charge, as they stood imbattailed within the thicket, so they rushed out with all their forces, and assaulted the Roman horsemen: which being easily beaten back, the Neruij ran down to the river, with such an incredible swiftness, that they seemed at the same instant of time to be in the woods at the river, and charging the legions on the other side: For with the same violence, having passed the river, they ran up the hill to the Roman camp, where the soldiers were busied in their entrenchment. Caesar had all parts to play at one instant, the flag to be hung out, by which they gave the soldiers warning to take arms, the battle to be proclaimed by sound of trumpet, the soldiers to be recalled from their work, and such as were gone far off to get turf and matter for the rampire, to be sent for; the battle to be ordered, his men to be encouraged, and the sign of battle to be given: the most of which were cut off by shortness of time, and the sudden assault of the enemy.  

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.  
AS the Romans excelled all other nations in many good customs; 
The description of the Roman camp, with all the parts belonging unto it  so especially in their campe-discipline, they strove to be singular: for it seemed rather an Academy, or a city of civil government, than a camp of soldiers: so careful were they both for the safety, and skilful experience of their men at arms. For touching the first, they never suffered their soldiers to lodge one night without a camp; wherein they were enclosed with ditch and a rampire, as in a walled town: neither was it any new invention or late found out custom in their state, but in use amongst the ancient Romans, and in the time of their kings; their manner of encamping was included within these circumstances.  
The Centurions, 
The Centurions made choice of the place.  that went before to choose out a convenient place, having found a fit situation for their camp, first assigned the standing for the emperors pavilion, which was commonly in the most eminent place of the camp; from whence he might easily overview all the other parts, or any alarm or signum pugnae, might from thence be discovered to all quarters. This pavilion was known by the name of Praetorium, 
The Praetorium.  for as much as amongst the ancient Romans the General of their Army was called Praetor: in this place where the Praetorium was to be erected, they stuck up a white ensign, and from it they measured every way 100 foot, and so they made a square containing 200 foot in every side, the Area, or content whereof, was almost an acre of ground: the form of the Praetorium was round and high, being as eminent among the other tents, as a temple is amongst the private buildings of a city: and therefore josephus compareth it to a church. In this Praetorium was their Tribunal or chair of the estate, and the place of divination, which they called Augurale, with other appendices of majesty and authority.  
Between the tents of the first maniples in every legion and the Praetorium, there went a way of 100 foot in breadth throughout the whole camp; which was called Principia; 
Principia.  in this place the Tribunes sat to hear matters of justice; the soldiers exercised themselves at their weapons, and the leaders and chief commanders frequented it as a public place of meeting; and it was held for a reverent and sacred place, and so kept with a correspondent decency. On either side the emperors pavilion, in a direct line to make even & strait the upper side of the Principia, 
The tents of the Tribunes.  the Tribunes had their tents pitched, every Tribune confronting the head of the legion whereof he was Tribune: above them, towards the head of the camp, were the Legates and Treasurer: the upper part of the camp was strengthened with some select cohorts and troops of horse, according to the number of legions that were in the Army.  
Polybius describing the manner of encamping which the Romans used in his time, when as they had commonly but two legions in their Army, with as many associates, placeth the Ablecti and extraordinarij, which were select bands and companies, in the upper part of the camp; and the associates on the outsides of the legions.  
The ditch and the rampire, that compassed the whole camp about, was 200 foot distant from any tent: 
The space between the tents and the rampire.  where of Polybius giveth these reasons; first, that the soldiers marching into the camp in battle array, might there dissolve themselves into maniples, centuries, and decuries, without tumult or confusion: for order was the thing which they principally respected, as the life and strength of their martial body. And again, if occasion were offered to sally out upon an enemy, they might very conveniently in that spacious room, put themselves into companies and troops: and if they were assaulted in the night, the darts and fire works, which the enemy should cast into their camp, would little endamage them, by reason of the distance between the rampire and the tents.  
Their tents were all of skins and hides, held up with props, and fastened with ropes: there were 11 soldiers, as Vegetius saith, in every tent, and that society was called Contubernium, 
Contubernium.  of whom the chiefest was named Decanus, or Caput Contubernij.  
The ditch and the rampire were made by the legions, 
The ditch and the rampire.  every maniple having his part measured out, and every Centurion overseeing his century; the approbation of the whole work belonged to the Tribunes. Their manner of entrenching was this: the soldiers being girt with their swords and daggers, digged the ditch about the camp, which was always 8 foot in breadth at the least, and as much in depth, casting the earth thereof inward; but if the enemy were not far off, the ditch was always 11. or 15. or 18. foot in latitude, & altitude; according to the discretion of the General: but what scantling soveer was kept, the ditch was made directis lateribus, that is, as broad in the bottom as at the top. The rampire from the brim of the ditch was three foot in height, and sometimes four, made after the manner of a wall, with green turfs cut all to one measure, half a foot in thickness, a foot in breadth, and a foot and a half in length. But if the place, wherein they were encamped, would afford no such turf; they then strengthened the loose earth, which was cast out of the ditch, with boughs and faggots, that it might be strong and well fastened. The rampire they properly called Agger: 
Agger.  the outside whereof, which hung over the ditch, they used to stick with thick and sharp stakes, fastened deep in the mound, that they might be firm; and these for the most part were forked stakes, which made the rampire very strong, and not to be assaulted but with great difficulty. Varro saith, 
Vallum.  that the front of the rampire thus stuck with stakes, was called vallum, a varicando, for that no man could stride or get over it.  
The camp had four gates, 
Praetoria porta.  the first was called praetoria porta, which was always behind the emperors tent: and this gate did usually look either toward the east, or to the enemy, or that way that the army was to march. The gate on the other side of the camp opposite to this, 
Porta Decumana.  was called Porta Decumana a decimis cohortibus, for the tenth or last Cohort of every legion, was lodged to confront this gate: by this gate the soldiers went out to fetch their wood, their water, and their forage, and this way their offenders were carried to execution. 
Portae principales. Laeva. Dextra.  The other two gates were called Portae principales, forasmuch as they stood opposite to either end of that so much respected place, which they called principia, only distinguished by these titles, laeva principalis and dextra, all these gates were shut with doors, and in standing Camps fortified with Turrets, upon which were planted Engines of defence, as Balistae, Catapultae, Tolenones and such like.  
Porta Proetoria THE ROMAN CAMP  
The use and commodity of this encamping, 
The commodity of this encamping.  I briefly touched in my first book: But if I were worthy any way to commend the excellency thereof to our modern soldiers, or able by persuasion to restablish the use of encamping in our wars; I would spare no pains to achieve so great a good, and vaunt more in the conquest of negligence, then if my sense had compassed a new found out means; and yet reason would deem it a matter of small difficulty, to gain a point of such worth, in the opinion of our men, especially when my discourse shall present security to our forces, and honour to our leaders, majesty to our armies, and terror to our enemies, wonderment to strangers, and victory to our nation. But sloth hath such interest in this age, that it commendeth vain glory and foolhardiness, contempt of virtue, and derision of good discipline, to repugn the designs of honour, and so far to overmaster reason, that it suffereth not former harms to bear witness against error, nor correct the ill achievements of ill directions: and therefore ceasing to urge this point any further, I will leave it to the careful respect of the wise.   

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.  
THe fury of the enemy, and their sudden assault, so disturbed the ceremonies which the Roman discipline observed, 
The ceremonies which they used in their preparation to battle  to make the soldiers truly apprehend the weight and importance of that action, which might cast upon their state either sovereignty or bondage; that they were all for the most part omitted; notwithstanding they are here noted under these titles, the first was vexillum proponendum, quod erat ensign cum ad Arma concurri oporteret: for when the General had determined to fight, he caused a scarlet coat or red flag to be hung out upon the top of his tent, that by it the soldiers might be warned, to prepare themselves for the battle; and this was the first warning they had, which by a silent aspect presented blood and execution to their eyes, as the only means to work out their own safety, and purchase eternal honour. The second was Signum tuba dandum; this warning was a noise of many trumpets, which they termed by the name of classicum a calando, which signifieth calling: for after the eye was filled with species suitable to the matter intended; they than hasted to possess the ear, and by the sense of hearing to stir up warlike motions, and fill them with resolute thoughts, that no diffident or base conceits might take hold of their minds. The third was, milites cohortandi, for it was thought convenient to confirm this valour, with motives of reason, which is the strength and perfection of all such motions. the use and benefit whereof I somewhat enlarged in the Helvetian war, and could afford much more labour to demonstrate the commodity of this part, if my speech might carry credit in the opinion of our soldiers, or be thought worthy regard to men so much addicted to their own fashions. The last was signum dandum, which, as some think, was nothing but a word, by which they might distinguish and know themselves from their enemies. Hirtius in the war of Africa saith, that Caesar gave the word Felicity; Brutus and Cassius gave Liberty; others have given Virtus, Deus nobiscum, Triumphus Imperatoris, and such like words, as might be ominous to a good success: Besides these particularities, the manner of their delivery gave a great grace to the matter. And that was distinguished by times, and cues: whereof Caesar now complaineth; that all these were to be done at one instant of time: for without all controversy, there is no matter of such consequence in itself, but may be much graced with ceremonies and compliments, which like officers or attendants add much respect and majesty to the action; which otherwise being but barely presented, appeareth far meaner and of less regard.    

CHAP. X.  
The battle between Caesar and the Neruij.  
IN these difficulties, 
Caesar.  two things were a help to the Romans; the one was, the knowledge and experience of the soldiers: for by reason of their practice in former battles, they could as well prescribe unto themselves, what was to be done, as any other commander could teach them. The other was, that notwithstanding Caesar had given commandment to every Legate, not to leave the work or forsake the legions, until the fortifications were perfected; yet when they saw extremity of danger, they attended no countermand from Caesar: but ordered all things as it seemed best to their own discretion. Caesar having commanded such things as he thought necessary, ran hastily to encourage his soldiers, and by fortune came to the tenth legion, where he used no further speech, then that they should remember their ancient valour, and valiantly withstand the brunt of their enemies. 
And therefore I rather take it to be something else than a word.  And for as much as the enemy was no further off, than a weapon might be cast to encounter them, he gave them the sign of battle: and hastening from thence to another quarter, he found them already closed and at the encounter. For the time was so short and the enemy so violent, that they wanted leisure to put on their head-pieces, or to uncase their targets: and what part they lighted into from their work, or what ensign they first met withal, there they stayed; lest in seeking out their own companies, they should lose that time as was to be spent in fight. The Army being imbattailed rather according to the nature of the place, the declivity of the hill, and the brevity of time, then according to the rules of art; as the legions encountered the enemy in divers places at once, the perfect view of the battle being hindered by those thick hedges before spoken of, there could no succours be placed any where; neither could any man see what was needful to be done: & therefore in so great uncertainty of things, there happened divers casualties of fortune.  
The soldiers of the ninth and tenth legion, as they stood in the left part of the Army, casting their piles, with the advantage of the hill, did drive the Attrebatij, breathless with running & wounded in the encounter, down into the river; & as they passed over the water, slew many of them with their sword: Neither did they stick to follow after them over the river, and adventure into a place of disadvantage, where the battle being renewed again by the enemy, they put them to flight the second time. In like manner two other legions, the 11 and the 8, having put the Veromandui from the upper ground, fought with them upon the banks of the river; and so the front & the left part of the camp was well near left naked. For in the right cornet were the 12 and the 7 legions, where as all the Neruij, under the conduct of Boduognatus, were heaped together; and some of them began to assault the legions on the open side, and other some to possess themselves of the highest part of the camp.  
At the same time the Roman horsemen, and the light armed footmen that were intermingled amongst them, and were at first all put to flight by the enemy, as they were entering into the camp, met with their enemies in the face, and so were driven to fly out another way. In like manner, the pages and soldiers boys, that from the Decumane port and top of the hill, had seen the tenth legion follow their enemies in pursuit over the river, and were gone out to gather pillage, when they looked behind them, and saw the enemy in their camp; betook them to their heels as fast as they could. Which accident so terrified the horsemen of the Treviri (who for their prowess were reputed singular amongst the Galls, and were sent thither by their state, to aid the Romans) first when they perceived the Roman camp to be possessed, by a great multitude of the enemy, the legions to be overcharged and almost enclosed about, the horsemen, slingers, and Numidians to be dispersed and fled, that without any further expectation they took their way homeward, and reported to their state, that the Romans were utterly overthrown.  
Caesar departing from the tenth legion, to the right cornet, found his men exceedingly overcharged, the ensigns crowded together into one place, and the soldiers of the 12 legion so thick thronged on a heap, that they hindered one another; all the Centurions of the fourth cohort being slain, the ensign bearer killed and the ensign taken, and the Centurions of the other cohorts either slain, or sore wounded; amongst whom Pub. Sextus Baculus, the Primipile of that legion, a valiant man, so grievously wounded, that he could scarce stand upon his feet; the rest not very forward, but many of the hindmost turning tail and forsaking the field; the enemy on the other side, giving no respite in front, although he fought against the hill, nor yet sparing the open side, and the matter brought to a narrow issue, without any means or succour, to relieve them: he took a target from one of the hindmost soldiers (for he himself was come thither without one) and pressing to the front of the battle, called the Centurions by name, and encouraging the rest, commanded the ensigns to be advanced toward the enemy, and the Maniples to be enlarged, that they might with greater facility and readiness use their sword.  

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.  
THis Publius Sextus Baculus was the chiefest Centurion of the 12 legion, 
The place and office of a primipile.  being the first Centurion of that Maniple of the Triarij, that was of the first Cohort in that legion; for that place was the greatest dignity that could happen to a Centurion; and therefore he was called by the name of Centurio primipili, or simply Primipilus, and sometimes Primopilus, or Primus Centurio. By him were commonly published, the mandates and edicts of the Emperor, and Tribunes: and therefore the rest of the Centurions, at all times had an eye unto him; and the rather for that the eagle, which was the peculiar ensign of every legion, was committed to his charge and carried in his Maniple. Neither was this dignity, without special commodity, as may be gathered out of divers authors. We read further, that it was no disparagement for a Tribune, after his Tribunality was expired, to be a Primipile in a legion; notwithstanding, there was a law made, I know not upon what occasion, that no Tribune should afterward be Primipile. But let this suffice concerning the office and title of P. S. Baculus.   

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.  
ANd here I may not omit to give the Target any honour I may, 
The Target described.  and therefore I will take occasion to describe it in Caesar's hand, as in the place of greatest dignity, and much honouring the excellency thereof. Polybius maketh the Target to contain two foot and an half in breadth, overthwart the convexsurface thereof; and the length four foot, of what form or fashion soever they were of: for the Romans had two sorts of Targets amongst their legionary, the first carried the proportion of that figure, which the Geometricians call oval, a figure of an unequal latitude, broadest in the midst, and narrow at both the ends, like unto an egg, described in Plano: the other sort was of an equal latitude, and resembled the fashion of a guttertile; and thereupon was called Scutum imbricatum. The matter whereof a target was made, was a double board, one fastened upon another, with lint and Bulls glue; and covered with an Ox hide, or some other stiff leather; the upper and lower part of the target were bound about with a plate of iron, to keep it from cleaving; and in the midst there was a boss of iron or brass, which they called Vmbo. Romulus brought them in first amongst the Romans, taking the use of them from the Sabines. 
Lib. 16. c. 40.  The wood whereof they were made, was for the most part either sallow, alder, or figtree: whereof Pliny giveth this reason, for as much as these trees are cold and waterish, and therefore any blow or thrust that was made upon the wood, was presently contracted and shut up again. But for as much as the Target was of such reputation amongst the Roman Arms, and challenged such interest in the greatest of their Empire, let us enter a little into the consideration of the use and commodity thereof; which cannot be better understood, then by that conference, which Polybius hath made between the weapons of the Romans and the Macedonians: and therefore I have thought it good to insert it in these discourses. And thus it followeth.  

Of the difference of the Roman and Macedonian Weapons.  
I Promised in my sixth book that I would make a comparison, between the weapons of the Romans, and Macedonians. And that I would likewise write of the disposition of either of their armies; how they do differ one from another: & in what regard, the one, or the other, were either inferior, or superior: which promise I will now with diligence endeavour to perform. And for as much as the armies of the Macedonians have given so good testimonies of themselves by their actions, by overcoming the armies as well of those of Asia, as of Greece; and that the battles of the Romans have conquered, as well those of Africa as all the Eastern countries of Europe: It shall not be amiss, but very profitable, to search out the difference of either; especially seeing that these our times have not once, but many times seen trial, both of their battles and forces; that knowing the reason why, the Romans do overcome, and in their battles carry away the better: we do not as vain men were wont to do, attribute the same to fortune, and esteem them without reason happy victors; but rather looking into the true causes, we give them their due praises, according to the direction of reason, and sound judgement. Concerning the battles between Hannibal and the Romans; and concerning the Romans their losses, there is no need that I speak much. For their losses are neither to be imputed to the defect of their Arms, or disposition of their Armies; but to the dexterity and industry of Hannibal: but we have entreated thereof when we made mention of the battles themselves, and the end itself of that war doth especially confirm this our opinion. For when they had gotten a captain equal with Hannibal, even consequently with all his victories vanished. And he had no sooner overcome the Romans, but by and by, rejecting his own weapons, he trained his Army to their weapons, and so taking them up in the beginning, he continued them on unto the end.  
And Pyrrhus in his war against the Romans, did use both their weapons and order, and made as it were a medley both of the cohort, and phalanx: but notwithstanding it served him not to get the victory, but always the event by some means or other, made the same doubtful: concerning whom it were not unfit, that I should say something, lest in being altogether silent, it might seem to prejudice this mine opinion. But notwithstanding I will hasten to my purposed comparison.  
Now touching the phalanx, if it have the disposition, and forces proper to it, nothing is able to oppose itself against it, or to sustain the violence thereof; as may easily by many documents be approved. For when an armed man doth stand firm in the space of three foot in so thick an array of battle, and the length of their pikes being according to the first basis, or scantling sixteen foot; but according to the true and right conveniency of them, 14 cubits, out of which are taken four allowed for the space between the left hand, which supporteth the same, and the butt end thereof, while he stands in a readiness to attend the encounter: being thus ordered, I say, it is manifest that the length of ten cubits doth extend itself before the body of every armed man, where with both his hands he doth advance it ready to charge the enemy: By which means it followeth, that some of the pikes do not only extend themselves before the second, third, and fourth rank, but some before the foremost, if the phalanx have his proper and due thickness, according to his natural disposition, both on the sides and behind, as Homer maketh mention when he saith, that one target doth enclose and fortify another; one headpiece is joined to another, that they may stand united and close together.  
These circumstances being rightly and truly set down, it must follow, that the pikes of every former rank in the phalanx, do extend themselves two cubits before each other, which proportion of difference they have between themselves: by which may evidently be seen the assault, and impression of the whole phalanx, what it is, and what force it hath, consisting of 16 ranks in depth, or thickness; the excess of which number of ranks above five. For as much as they cannot commodiously couch their pikes, without the disturbance of the former, the points of them not being long enough to enlarge themselves beyond the foremost ranks, they grow utterly unprofitable, and cannot man, by man, make any impression, or assault: but serve only, by laying their pikes upon the shoulders of those which stand before them, to sustain and hold up the sways and giving back of the former ranks, which stand before them to this end, that the front may stand firm and sure; and with the thickness of their pikes they do repel all those darts, which passing over the heads of those that stand before, would annoy those ranks which are more backward.  
And farther by moving forward, with the force of their bodies, they do so press upon the former, that they do make a most violent impression. For it is impossible that the foremost ranks should give back.  
This therefore being the general and particular disposition of the phalanx: we must now speak on the contrary part, touching the properties and differences, as well of the arms, as of the whole disposition of the Roman battle. For every Roman soldier for himself, and his weapon is allowed three foot to stand in, and in the encounter, are moved man, by man, every one covering himself with his target; and mutually moving whensoever there is occasion offered. But those which use their sword, do fight in a more thin and distinct order; so that it is manifest, that they have three foot more allowed them to stand in both from shoulder to shoulder, and from back to belly, that they may use their weapons with the better commodity. And hence it cometh to pass, that one Roman soldier taketh up as much ground, as two of those which are to encounter him of the Macedonian Phalanx: so that one Romain is as it were to oppose himself against ten pikes, which pikes the said one soldior can neither by any agility come to offend, or else at handy blows otherwise annoy: And those which are behind him, are not only unable to repel their force, but also with conveniency to use their own weapons. Whereby it may easily be gathered, that it is impossible, that any battle being assaulted, by the front of a phalanx, should be able to sustain the violence thereof, if it have his due and proper composition.  
What then is the cause that the romans do overcome, and that those that do use the phalanx are void of the hope of victory? (Even from hence) that the Roman armies have infinite commodities, both of places, and of times, to fight in. But the the phalanx hath only one time, one place, and one kind, whereto it may profitably apply itself: so that if it were of necessity, that their enemy should encounter them at that instant, especially with their whole forces, it were questionless not only, not without danger, but in all probability likely, that the phalanx should ever carry away the better. But if that may be avoided, which is easily done: shall not that disposition then, be utterly unprofitable, and free from all terror? And it is farther evident, that the phalanx must necessarily have plain & champion places, without any hindrances, or impediments; as ditches, uneven places, valleys, little hills and rivers: for all these may hinder & disjoin it. And it is almost impossible to have a plain of the capacity of 20. stadia, much less more, where there shall be found none of these impediments. But suppose there be found such places, as are proper for the phalanx: If the enemy refuse to come unto them, and in the mean time, spoil, and sack the cities, and country round about; what commodity, or profit shall arise by an army so ordered? for if it remain in such places, as hath been before spoken of; it can neither relieve their friends, nor preserve themselves. For the Convoys which they expect from their friends, are easily cut off by the enemy, whiles they remain in those open places.  
And if it happen at any time, that they leave them upon any enterprise, they are then exposed to the enemy. But suppose, that the Roman army should find the phalanx in such places, yet would it not adventure itself in gross at one instant; but would by little & little retire itself, as doth plainly appear by their usual practice. For there must not be a conjecture of these things by my words only, but especially by that which they do. For they do not so equally frame their battle, that they do assault the enemy altogether, making as it were but one front: but part make a stand, and part charge the enemy, that if at any time the Phalanx do press them, that come to assault them and be repelled; the force of their order is dissolved. For whether they pursue those that retire, or fly from those that do assault them, these do disjoin themselves from part of their army; by which means there is a gap opened to their enemies, stauding and attending their opportunity: so that now they need not any more to charge them in the front, where the force of the phalanx consisteth: but to assault where the breach is made, both behind, and upon the sides. But if at any time the Roman army may keep his due propriety, and disposition, the phalanx by the disadvantage of the place, being not able to do the like: doth it not then manifestly demonstrate the difference to be great, between the goodness of their disposition, and the disposition of the phalanx?  
To this may be added the necessities imposed upon an army, which is to march through places of all natures, to encamp themselves, to possess places of advantage, to besiege, and to be besieged; and also contrary to expectation sometimes to come in view of the enemy: For all these occasions necessarily accompany an army; and oftentimes are the especial causes of victory, to which the Macedonian phalanx is no way fit, or convenient: Forasmuch as neither in their general order, nor in their particular disposition, without a convenient place, are able to effect any thing of moment: but the Roman army is apt for all these purposes. For every soldier amongst them, being once armed and ready to fight, refuseth no place, time, nor occasion; keeping always the same order, whether he fight together with the whole body of the army, or particularly by himself, man to man.  
And hence it happeneth, that as the commodity of their disposition is advantageous: so the end doth answer the expectation.  
These things I thought to speak of at large, because many of the Grecians are of an opinion, that the Macedonians are not to be overcome. And again, many wondered, how the Macedonian phalanx should be put to the worst by the Roman army, considering the nature of their weapons.  
Thus far goeth Polibyus, in comparing the weapons and imbattailing of the romans, with the use of arms amongst the Macedonians: wherein we see the Pike truly, and exactly ordered, according as the wise Grecians could best proportion it with that form of battle, which might give most advantage to the use thereof: so that if our squadrons of Pikes jump not with the perfect manner of a phalanx, (as we see they do not) they fall so much short of that strength, which the wisdom of the Grecians and the experience of other nations, imputed unto it. But suppose we could allow it that disposition, in the course of our wars, which the nature of the weapon doth require; yet forasmuch as by the authority of Polybius, the said manner of imbattailing is tied to such dangerous circumstances of one time, one place, and one kind of fight: I hold it not so profitable a weapon, as the practice of our times doth seem to make it, especially in woody countries, such as Ireland is; where the use is cut off by such inconveniences, as are noted to hinder the managing thereof. And doubtless, if our commanders did but consider of the incongruity of the Pike & Ireland, they would not proportion so great a number of them in every company, as there is; for commonly half the company are pikes, which is as much to say in the practice of our wars, that half the army hath neither offensive nor defensive weapons, but only against a troop of horse. For they seldom or never come to the push of pike, with the foot companies, where they may charge & offend the enemy: & for defence, if the enemy think it not safe to buckle with them at hand, but maketh more advantage to play upon them a far off with short; it affordeth small safety to shake a long pike at them, and stand fair in the mean time, to entertain a volleie of shot with the body of their battailion. As I make no question, but the pike in some services is profitable, as behind a rampire, or at a breach; so I assure myself, there are weapons if they were put to trial, that would countervail the pike even in those services, wherein it is thought most profitable.  
Concerning the Target, we see it take the hand, in the judgement of Polybius, of all other weapons whatsoever, aswell in regard of the divers and sundry sorts of imbattailing, as the quality of the place wheresoever: for their use was as effectual in small bodies and centuries, as in gross troops and great companies; in thin and spacious imbattailing, as in thick thronged Testudines. Neither could the nature of the place make them unserviceable; for whether it were plain or covert; level or unequal; narrow or large, if there were any commodity to fight, the Target was as necessary to defend, as the sword to offend: besides the conveniency, which accompanieth the Target in any necessity imposed upon an army, whether it be to march through places of all natures, to make a fast march, or a speedy retreat, to encamp themselves, to possess places of advantage, to besiege and to be besieged, as Polybius saith, with many other occasions which necessarily accompany an army. The use of this weapon hath been too much neglected in these latter ages, but may be happily renewed again in our nation, if the industry of such as have laboured to present it unto these times, in the best fashion, shall find any favour in the opinion of our commanders. Concerning which Target, I must needs say this much, that the light Target will prove the Target of service, whensoever they shall happen to be put in execution: for those which are made proof, are so heavy and unwieldy, (although it be somewhat qualified with such helps as are annexed to the use thereof,) that they overcharge a man, with an unsupportable burden, and hinder his agility and execution in fight, with a weight disproportionable to his strength. For our offensive weapons, as namely the Hargebusiers and musketeers, are stronger in the offensive part, than any arms of defence, which may be made manageable and fit for service. Neither did the Romans regard the proof of their Target further, then was thought fit for the ready use of them in time of battle, as it appeareth in many places, both in the civil wars and in these Commentaries: for a Roman pile hath often times darted through the Target, and the body of the man that bore it, and fastened them both to the ground, which is more than a musket can well do; for the bullet commonly resteth in the body. And although it may be said that this was not common, but rather the effect of an extraordinary arm; yet it serveth to prove, that their Targets were not proof to their offensive weapons, when they were well delivered and with good direction. For I make no doubt, but in their battles there were oftentimes some hindrances, which would not suffer so violent an effect, as this which I speak of: for in a volley of shot, we must not think that all the bullets fly with the same force, and fall with the like hurt; but as armour of good proof will hardly hold out some of them; so slender arms and of no proof, will make good resistance against others. And to conclude, in a battle or encounter at hand, a man shall meet with more occasions, suiting the nature and commodity of this light Target, than such as will advantage the heavy Target of proof, or countervail the surplus of weight, which it earieth with it.  
Some men will urge, that there is use of this Target of proof, in some places and in some services: which I deny not to those, that desire to be secured from the extremity of peril: but this falleth out in some places and in some particular services, and hindereth not but that the universal benefit of this weapon consisteth in the multitude of light Targeteers, who are to manage the most important occasions of a war.  
This much I am further to note, concerning the sword of the Targeteers, that according to the practice of the romans, it must always hang on the right side; for carrying the Target upon the left arm, it cannot be that the sword should hang on the left side, but with great trouble and annoyance: And if any man say, that if it hang on the right side, it must be very short, otherwise it will never be readily drawn out. I say that the sword of the Targeteers, in regard of the use of that weapon, aught to be of a very short scantling, when as the Targetier is to command the point of his sword within the compass of his Target, as such as look into the true use of this weapon, will easily discover. But let this suffice concerning the use of the pike and the Target.     

CHAP. XI.  
The battle continueth, and in the end Caesar overcometh.  
AT the presence of their General, the soldiers conceived some better hopes; 
Caesar.  and gathering strength and courage again, when as every man bestirred himself in the sight of the Emperor, the brunt of the enemy was a little stayed. Caesar perceiving likewise the seventh legion, which stood next unto him, to be sore overlaid by the enemy, commanded the Tribunes by little and little, to join the two legions together, and so by joining back to back, to make two contrary fronts; and being thus secured one by another from fear of being circumvented, they began to make resistance with greater courage. In the mean time the two legions, that were in the rearward to guard the carriages, hearing of the battle, doubled their pace, and were descried by the enemy upon the top of the hill. And Titus Labienus, having won the camp of the Neruij, and beholding from the higher ground what was done on the other side of the river, sent the tenth legion to help their fellows, who understanding by the horsemen and Lackeys that fled, in what case the matter stood, and in what danger the camp, the legions, and the General was, made all the haste they possibly could. At whose coming there happened such an alteration and change of things, that even such as were sunk down, through extreme grief of their wounds, or leaned upon their Targets, began again to fight a fresh, and the Pages and the boys perceiving the enemy amazed, ran upon them unarmed, not fearing their weapons: the horsemen also striving with extraordinary valour, to wipe away the dishonour of their former flight, thrust themselves in all places before the legionary soldiers. Howbeit the enemy in the utmost peril of their lives, showed such manhood, that as fast as the foremost of them were overthrown, the next in place bestrid their carcases, and fought upon their bodies: and these being likewise overthrown, and their bodies heaped one upon another, they that remained, possessed themselves of that mount of dead carcases as a place of advantage, and from thence threw their weapons, and intercepting the piles, returned them again to the Romans. By which it may be gathered, that there was great reason to deem them men of haughty courage, that durst pass over so broad a river, climb up such high rocks, and adventure to fight in a place of such inequality. The battle being thus ended, and the nation and name of the Neruij being well near swallowed up with destruction, the elder sort with the women and children, that before the battle were conveyed into islands and Bogs, when they heard thereof; sent ambassadors to Caesar, and yielded themselves to his mercy; and in laying open the misery of their state affirmed, that of 600 Senators they had now left but three; and of 60000 fight men, there was scarce five hundred that were able to bear Arms. Caesar, that his clemency might appear to a distressed people, preserved them with great care, granting unto them the free possession of their towns and country, and straightly commanding their borderers, not to offer them any wrong or injury at all.  

OBSERVATIONS.  
ANd thus endeth the relation of that great and dangerous battle, 
Li. de militia Iu. Cae.  which Ramus complaineth of as a confused narration: much differing from the direct and methodical file, of his other Commentaries. But if that rule hold good, which learned rhetoricians have observed in their Oratory, that an unperfect thing ought not to be told in a perfect manner; then by Ramus leave, if any such confusion do appear, it both savoureth of eloquence, and well suiteth the turbulent carriage of the action, wherein order and skill gave place to fortune, and providence was swallowed up with peradventure. For that which Hirtius saith of the overthrow he gave to Pharnaces, may as well be said of this; that he got the victory, plurimum adiwante deorum benignitate, qui cum omnibus belli casibus intersunt, tum praecipue iis quibus nihil ratione potuit administrari. For so it fell out in this battle, and the danger proceeded from the same cause, that brought him to that push in the battle with Pharnaces: for he well understood that the Neruij attended his coming on the other side the river Sabis: Neither was he ignorant how to fortify his camp in the face of an enemy, without fear or danger, as we have seen in his war with Ariovistus; when he marched to the place where he purposed to encamp himself with 3 battles, and caused two of them to stand ready in arms to receive any charge, which the enemy should offer to give, that the third battle in the mean time might fortify the camp. Which course would easily have frustrated this stratagem of the Neruij, and made the hazard less dangerous; but he little expected any such resolution, so contrary to the rules of military discipline, that an enemy should not stick to pass over so broad a river, to climb up such steep and high rocks, to adventure battle in a place so disaduantagious, and to hazard their fortune upon such inequalities. And therefore, he little mistrusted any such unlikely attempt, wherein the enemy had plotted his own overthrow, if the legions had been ready to receive them. Which may teach a general that which Caesar had not yet learned, that a leader cannot be too secure in his most assured courses; nor too careful in his best advised directions; considering that the greatest means may easily be prevented, and the safest course weakened with an unrespected circumstance: so powerful are weak occurrences in the main course of the weightiest actions; and so infinite are the ways, whereby either wisdom or fortune may work. Neither did this warn him, to provide for that which an enemy might do, how unlikely soever it might seem unto him, as appear by that accident in the battle with Pharnaces: which practice of attempting a thing against reason and the art of war, hath found good success in our modern wars; as appear by the French histories: notwithstanding, it is to be handled sparingly, as no way savouring of circumspect and good direction, forasmuch as temeritas non semper felix, as Fabius the great answered Scipio.  
The chiefest helps which the romans found, were first the advantage of the place; whereof I spoke in the Helvetian war. secondly, the experience, which the soldiers had got in the former battles, which much directed them in this turbulent assault; wherein they carried themselves as men acquainted with such casualties: lastly, the valour and undaunted judgement of the General, which overswaied the peril of the battle, and brought it to so fortunate an end. Wherein we may observe, that as in a temperate course, when the issue of the battle rested upon his directions, he wholly intended wariness & circumspection, so in the hazard and peril of good hap, he confronted extremity of danger with extremity of valour, and overtopped fury, with a higher resolution.    

CHAP. XII.  
The Aduatici betake themselves to a strong hold, and are taken by Caesar.  
THE * Aduatici before mentioned, 
Caesar. either Douai or Bosleduke in Brabant.  coming with all their power to aid the Neruij, and understanding by the way of their overthrow, returned home again; and forsaking all the rest of their towns, and castles, conveyed themselves and their wealth into one strong and well fortified town, which was compassed about with mighty rocks and steep donwfalls, saving in one place of 200. foot in breadth, where there was an entry by a gentle and easy ascent, which passage they had fortified with a double wall of a large altitude, and had placed mighty great stones and sharp beams upon the walls ready for an assault. This people descended from the Cimbri and Teutoni, who in their journey into Italy had left such carriages on this side of the Rhine, as they could not conveniently take along with them, in the custody of these forces; who after the death of their fellows, being many years disquieted by their neighbours, sometimes invading other states, and sometimes defending themselves, at length procured a peace, and chose this place to settle themselves in. At the first coming of the Roman army, they sallied out of the town, & made many light skirmishes with them: but after that Caesar had drawn a rampire about the town of 12 foot in height, 15 miles in compass, and had fortified it with castles very thick about the town; they kept themselves within the wall: And as they beheld the vines framed, the mount raised, and a tower in building a far off; at first they began to laugh at it, and with scoffing speeches from the wall, began to ask: with what hands, & with what strength, especially by men of that stature (for the romans were but little men in respect of the Galls) a tower of that huge massy weight should be brought unto the walls? But when they saw it removed, and approaching near unto the town, as men astonished at the strange and unaccustomed sight thereof, they sent ambassadors to Caesar, to entreat a peace with this message: They believed that the romans did not make war, without the special assistance of the gods, that could with such facility transport engines of that height, & bring them to encounter at hand, against the strongest part of their town: and therefore they submitted both themselves, and all that they had, to Caesar's mercy; desiring one thing of his mere clemency, that he would not take away their arms, forasmuch as all their neighbours were enemies unto them, and envied at their valour; neither were they able to defend themselves, if they should deliver up their armour: so that they had rather suffer any inconvenience by the people of Rome, then to be butcherly murdered by them, whom in former time they had held subject to their command.  
To this Caesar answered, that he would save the city rather of his own custom, than for any desert of theirs; so that they yielded before the Ram touched the wall: but no condition of remedy should be accepted, without present delivery of their arms; for he would do by them as he had done by the Neruij, and give commandment to their neighbours, that they should offer no wrong to such, as had commended their safety to the people of Rome. This answer being returned to the city, they seemed contented to do whatsoever he commanded them, and thereupon casting a great part of their armour over the wall into the ditch, insomuch as they filled it almost to the top of the rampire: and yet (as afterward was known) concealing the third part, they set open the gates, and for that day carried themselves peaceably. Towards night Caesar commanded the gates to be shut, and the soldiers to be drawn out of the town. But the Aduatici having consulted together before, forasmuch as they believed that upon their submission, the romans would either set no watch at all, or at the least, keep it very carelessly; partly with such armour as they had retained, and partly with Targets, made of bark or wrought of wicker, which upon the sudden they had covered over with leather, about the third watch where the ascent to our fortifications was easiest; they issued suddenly out of the town with all their power: but signification thereof being given by fires, as Caesar had commanded, the Romans hasted speedily to that place. The enemy fought very desperately, as men in the last hope of their welfare, incountering the Romans in a place of disadvantage, at length with the slaughter of 4000 the rest were driven back into the town. The next day when Caesar came to break open the gates, and found no man at defence, he sent in the soldiers, and sold all the people and spoil of the town: the number of persons in the town amounted to 53000. bondslaves.  

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.  
IN the surprise, 
Circunuallatio  attempted by the Belgae upon Bibract, I set down the manner, which both the Galls and the romans used in their sudden surprising of a town: whereof if they failed (the place importing any advantage in the course of the war) they then prepared for the siege, in that manner, as Caesar hath described in this place. They environed the town about with a ditch and a rampire, and fortified the said rampire, with many castles and fortresses, erected in a convenient distance one from another; and so they kept the town from any foreign succour or relief: and withal secured themselves from sallies or other stratagerns, which the townsmen might practise against them. And this manner of siege was called circumuallatio; the particular description whereof, 
In the seventh commentary.  I refer unto the history of Alesia, where I will handle it, according to the particulars there set down by Caesar.   

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.  
THe Ram, 
Aries or the Ram.  which Caesar here mentioneth, was of greatest note amongst all the Roman Engines, and held that place which the Canon hath in our wars. vitrvuius doth attribute the invention thereof, to the Carthagimans, who at the taking of Cadiz, wanting a fit instrument to raze and overthrow a castle, 
Cales.  they took a long beam or timber tree, and bearing it upon their arms and shoulders, with the one end thereof they first broke down the uppermost rank of stones: and so descending by degrees, 
Aries simplex  they overthrew the whole tower. The romans had two sorts of Rams, the one was rude and plain; the other artificial and compound: the first, is that which the Carthaginians used at Cadiz, and is purtraited in the column of trajan at Rome.  
The compound Ram is thus described by josephus; 
Aries composita.  a Ram (saith he) is a mighty great beam, like unto the mast of a ship, and is strengthened at one end with a head of iron, fashioned like unto a Ram; and thereof it took the name. This Ram is hanged by the midst with ropes unto an other beam, which lieth cross a couple of pillars, and hanging thus equally balanced, it is by force of men thrust forward, and recoiled backward; and so beateth upon the wall with his iron head: neither is there any tower so strong, or wall so broad, that is able to stand before it. The length of this Ram was of a large scantling, for Plutarch affirmeth, that Anthony in the Parthian war had a Ram eighty foot long: and vitrvuius saith, that the length of a Ram was usually 106. and sometimes 120; and this length gave great strength and force to the engine. It was managed at one time with a whole century or order of soldiers: and their forces being spent, they were seconded with another century; and so the ram played continually upon the wall, without intermission. josephus saith, that Titus, at the siege of jerusalem, had a ram for every legion: it was oftentimes covered with a vine, that the men that managed it might be in more safety. It appeareth by this place, that if a town had continued out until the ram had touched the wall, they could not presume of any acceptation of rendrie; for as much as by their obstinacy, they had brought in peril the lives of their enemies, and were subdued by force of Arms, which affordeth such mercy as the victor pleaseth.   

THE THIRD OBSERVATION.  
THe Aduatici, as it seemeth, were not ignorant of the small security, which one state can give unto another, that commendeth their safety to be protected by it: for as Architas the Pythagorean saith, a body, a family, and an Army are then well governed, when they contain within themselves the causes of their safety; so we must not look for any security in a state, when their safety dependeth upon a foreign protection. For the old saying is, that Neque murus, neque amicus quisquam teget, quem propria arma non texere. Although in this case the matter was well qualified, by the majesty of the Roman Empire, and the late victories in the continent of Gallia, whereof the Hedui with their associates were very gainful witnesses: but amongst kingdoms, that are better suited with equality of strength & authority, there is small hope of safety to be looked for, unless the happy government of both do mutually depend upon the safety of either nation. For that which Polybius observed in Antigonus king of Macedonia, taketh place for the most part amongst all Princes; That kings by nature esteem no man, either as a friend or an enemy, but as the calculation of profit shall find them answerable to their projects. And chose, it cutteth off many occasions of practices & attempts, when it is known that a state is of itself able and ready to resist the designs of foreign enemies, according to that of Manlius: Ostendite modo bellum, pacem habebitis: videant vos paratos ad vim, ius ipsi remittent.   

THE FOURTH OBSERVATION.  
THe manner of signifying any motion or attempt by fire, 
To give notice of an Alarm by fire.  was of great use in the might leason, where the fortification was of so large an extension: for fire in the night doth appear far greater than indeed it is, for as much as that part of the air, which is next unto the fire, as it is illuminated with the light thereof, in a reasonable distance cannot be discerned from the fire itself, and so it seemeth much greater than it is in substance: and chose, in the day time it showeth less than it is; for the clear brightness of the air doth much obscure that light, which proceedeth from a more gross and material body: and therefore their custom was to use fire in the night, and smoke in the day, suiting the transparent middle with a contrary quality, that so it might more manifestly appear to the beholder.   

THE fifth OBSERVATION.  
ANd albeit after the victory, the Romans inflicted divers degrees of punishment, 
Lib. 25.  according to the malice which they found in an enemy; yet as Flavius Lucanus saith in Livy, there was no nation more exorable, 
The punishments which the Romans laid upon a conquerednation.  nor readier to show mercy, than the Romans were. The punishments which we find them to have used towards a conquered nation, were these; either they punished them by death, or sold them for bondslaves, sub corona, or dismissed them sub jugum; or merced them, in taking away their territories; or made them tributary states.  
Of the first we find a manifest example in the third of these Commentaries, where Caesar having overthrown the Veneti by sea, in as much as they had retained his ambassadors by force, contrary to the law of nations, he put all the Senate to the sword, and sold the rest sub corona.  
Festus saith, that an enemy was said to be sold sub corona, in as much as the captives stood crowned in the market place, where they were set out to sale; as Cato saith in his book de re militari, ut populus sua opera potius ob rem bene gestam coronatus, supplicatum eat? quam re male gesta coronatus vaeneat. And Gellius affirmeth the same thing, but addeth also another reason, for as much as the soldiers that kept them while they were in selling, encircled them round about, to keep them together; and this round-about-standing was called Corona. Festus saith, that oftentimes they used a spear; and therefore they were said to be sold sub hasta: for as much as amongst the greeks, by the spear or pike, was signified the power of Arms, and majesty of Empires.  
When they dismissed them sub jugum, their order was to erect three trees like a pair of gallows, under which they caused all the captives to pass, as a sign of bondage: for they had so conquered them by force of Arms, that they laid upon their neck the yoke of thraldom. Livy saith, that Quintius the dictator dismissed the Aequos' sub jugum; and this jugum was made of 3 spears, whereof two were stuck upright in the ground, and the third was tied overthwart them. The soldiers that passed sub jugum, were ungirt, and their weapons taken from them, as Festus saith.  
Sometimes again they took away their lands and territories, and either sold it for money, & brought it into the treasury, or divided the land amongst the Roman people, or let it out to farm rend: of all which Livy hath many pregnant examples.    

CHAP. XIII.  
Crassus taketh in all the maritimate cities that lie to the Ocean: the legions are carried into their wintering camps.  
THE same time Pub. 
Caesar.  Crassus, whom he had sent with one legion to the maritimate cities that lay to the Ocean, advertised him that all those states had yielded themselves to the people of Rome: The wars being thus ended, and all Gallia being settled in peace, there went such a fame of this war among other barbarous people, that from nations beyond the Rhine there came ambassadors to Caesar, offering both hostages and obedience to whatsoever he commanded them. But Caesar willed them to repair unto him again in the beginning of the next summer, for as much as he then hasted into Lombardy, after he had placed his legions in their wintering camps. 
Of this supplication I will speak in the latter end of the 4 book.  For these things, upon the sight of Caesar's letters, a general supplication was proclaimed in Rome for 15 days together, which honour before that time had happened to no man. And thus endeth the second Commentary.    

OBSERVATIONS UPON THE THIRD BOOK OF CAESAR HIS COMMENTARIES.  
THE ARGUMENT.  
THis Commentary beginneth with an Accident, which happened in the latter end of the former summer; wherein the Belgae had so lean a harvest: and then it proceedeth to the war between Caesar and the Veneti; Crassus and the Aquitanis; Titurius Sabinus and the Curiosolitae: And Titus Labienus, with the Treviri.  

CHAP. I.  
Sergius Galba, being sent to clear the passage of the Alps, was besieged by the Seduni and Veragri.  
CAESAR taking his journey into Italy, 
Caesar.  sent Sergius Galba with the twelfth legion, and part of the horsemen unto the Nantuates, Veragri & Seduni: whose territories are extended from the river Rhone, and the lake Lemanus, unto the tops of the highest Alps. The end of this voyage was chiefly to clear the Alps of thieves and robbers, that lived by the spoil of passengers that traveled between Italy and Gallia: Galba having order, if he found it expedient to winter in those parts, after some fortunate encounters and the taking of some castles and holds, he concluded a peace, and resolved to place two cohortes of his legion, amongst the Nantuates; and himself to winter with the other cohortes, in a town of the Veragri, named Octodurus. This town being sited in a narrow valley, and encircled about with mighty high hills, was divided by a river into two parts, whereof he gave one part to the Galls, and the other he chose for his wintering camp, and fortified it about with a ditch and a rampire. After he had spent many days of wintering, and given order, that corn should be brought thither for provision; he had intelligence upon a sudden, that the Galls, in the night time, had all left that part of the town that was allotted unto them; and that the hills which hung over the valley, wherein the town stood, were possessed with great multitudes of the Seduni, and Veragri. The reasons of this sudden commotion were chiefly the paucity of the Roman forces, not making a complete legion; for as much as two cohorts wintered amongst the Nantuates: besides many particulars, that were wanting upon necessary occasions. And to make them more contemptible in regard of themselves, the place afforded such advantage, that they were persuaded by reason of the steep declivity of the hill, that the Romans would not endure the brunt of the first assault: besides this, it grieved them exceedingly to have their children taken from them, under the title of hostages; and the Alps, which nature had exempted from habitation, and placed as bounds between two large kingdoms, to be seized upon by the Roman legions, and united to their Province.  
Upon these advertisements, Galba not having as yet finished the fortification of his camp, nor made provision of corn and forage for the winter season, in that he little feared any motion of war, being secured of their amity, and obedience, both by hostages and rendrie: he presently called a council of war, to determine what course was best to be taken. In which council the minds of many were so amazed, with the terror of so unexpected a danger, when they beheld the hills pestered with armed soldiers, the passages taken and intercepted by the enemy, and no hope left of any succour or relief, that they could think of no other way for their safety, then leaving behind them their baggage and impediments, to sally out of their camp, and so to save themselves by the same way they came thither: notwithstanding the greater part concluded, to refer that resolution to the last push; and in the mean time, to attend the fortune of the event, and defend the camp.  

THE OBSERVATION.  
WHich advise although at this time sorted to small effect; yet it better suited the valour of the Romans, and savoured more of tempered magnanimity, than that former hazard, which argued the weakness of their minds, by their over hasty and too forward resolution. For as it imported greater danger, and discovered a more desperate spirit, to break through the thickest troops of their enemies, and so by strong hand to save themselves by the help of some other fortune; so it manifested a greater apprehension of terror, and a stronger impression of fear, which can afford nothing but desperate remedies: for desperate and inconsiderate rashness riseth sooner of fear, then of any other passion of the mind. But such as beheld the danger with a less troubled eye and qualified the terror of death with the life of their spirit, reserving extremity of help to extremity of peril, and in the mean time attended what chances of advantage might happen unto them, upon any enterprise the enemy should attempt; I say, they so gave greater scope to fortune and enlarged the bounds of changing accidents.    

CHAP. II.  
The enemy setteth upon the wintering camp: Galba overthroweth them.  
THE council being dismissed, 
Caesar.  they had scarce time to put in execution such things, as were agreed upon for their defence: but the enemy at a watchword given assaulted the camp, on all sides with stones and darts, and other casting weapons: the Romans at first when their strength was fresh, valiantly resisted the brunt of the charge; neither did they spend in vain any weapon which they cast from the rampire; but what part soever of their camp seemed to be in greatest danger, and want of help, thither they came with succour and relief; but herein they were overmatched. For the enemy being spent and wearied with fight, whensoever any of them gave place and forsook the battle, there were always fresh combatants to supply it: but the Romans by reason of their small number, had no such help. For their extremity in that point was such, that no man was permitted neither for weariness nor wounds, to forsake his station, or abandon his charge. And having thus fought continually the space of six hours, when both strength and weapons wanted, the enemy persisting with greater fury to fill the ditch and break down the rampire, and their hopes relying upon the last expectation: P. Sex. Baculus the Primipile of that legion, whom we said to be so sore wounded in the Neruian battle, and Caius Volusenus Tribune of the soldiers, a man of singular courage and wisdom, ran speedily to Galba and told him, that the only way of safety was to break out upon the enemy, and to try the last refuge in that extremity. Whereupon they called the Centurions, and by them admonished the soldiers to surcease a while from fight, and only to receive such weapons as were cast into the camp; and so to rest themselves a little and recover their strength: and then at a watchword to sally out of their camp, and lay their safety upon their virtue; which the soldiers executed with such alacrity and courage of spirit, that breaking out at all the gates of the camp, they gave no leisure to the enemy to consider what was done, nor to satisfy his judgement touching so unexpected a novelty. And thus fortune being suddenly changed, they slew more than the third part of 30000, and put the rest to flight, not suffering them to stay upon the hills near about them.  

OBSERVATIONS.  
WHich strange alteration lively describeth the force of novelty, 
The force of novelty turning the for tune of a battle.  and the effectual power of unexpected adventures: for in the first course of their proceeding, wherein the Romans defended the camp, and the Galls charged it by assault, the victory held constant with the Galls, and threatened death and mortality to the Romans. Neither had they any means to recover hope of better success, but by trying another way; which so much the more amazed the Galls, in that they had vehemently apprehended an opinion of victory, by a set fight continuing the space of six hours, without any likelihood of contrariety, or alteration. Which practice, of frustrating a design intended by an indirect and contrary answer, served the Romans oftentimes to great advantage; as besides this present example, in this Commentary we shall afterward read, how Titurius Sabinus defeated the Vnelloes, with the same stratagem; and overthrew them by eruption and sallying out, when they expected nothing but a defensive resistance from the rampire. From whence a commander may learn, to avoid two contrary inconveniences, according as the quality of the war shall offer occasion: first (if other things be answerable, which a judicious eye will easily discover) that a sally made out at divers ports of a hold, will much mitigate the heat of a charge, and control the fury of an enemy. And on the other side, he that besiegeth any place what advantage soever he hath of the defendant, may much better assure himself of good fortune, if he appoint certain troops in readiness to receive the charge of any eruption, that the rest that are busily employed in the assault may provide to answer it, without disorder or confusion. Which order, if the Galls had taken, they had not in likelihood so often been deceived.    

CHAP. III.  
Galba returneth into the Province: the Vnelli give occasion of a new war.  
THE enemy being thus defeated, 
Caesar.  Galba was unwilling to try fortune any further; and the rather for that he wanted both corn and forage: and therefore having burned the town, the next day he returned towards the Province, and without let or resistance, brought the legion safe into the Nantuates; and from thence to the 
* Savoiens.  Allobrogae, and there he wintered.  
After these things were dispatched: Caesar supposing for many reasons, that all Gallia was now in peace, and that there was no further fear of any new war, the Belgae being overthrown, the Germans thrust out, and the Seduni amongst the alps subdued and vanquished; in the beginning of the winter, as he went into Illyricum, having a great desire to see those nations: there grew a sudden tumult and dissension in Gallia upon this occasion. Pub. Crassus wintering with the seventh legion in Anjou near unto the Ocean, and finding scarcity of corn in those parts; he sent out the Prefects of the horsemen, and Tribunes into the next cities to demand corn, and other provisions for his legion, of whom Titus Terrasidius was sent unto the 
* Le perch.  Venelli, Marcus Trebius to the 
* Cornoaille in Bretaine  Curiosolitae, Q. Velanius, and Titus Silius to the 
* Vannes.  Veneti. These Veneti were of greatest authority amongst all the maritimate nations in that coast, by reason of their great store of shipping, with which they did traffic into Brittany, and exceeded all their neighbour states in skill and experience of seafaring matters; having the most part of such as used those seas, tributaries to their state: These Veneti first adventured to retain Silius and Velanius, hoping thereby to recover their hostages which they had given to Crassus. The finitimate cities induced by their authority and example, for the same reason, laid hold upon Trebius and Terrasidius; and sending speedy ambassages one unto another, conjured by their Princes and chiefest magistrates, to approve their fact by common consent, and to attend all the same event of fortune; soliciting also other cities and states, rather to maintain that liberty, which they had received of their Ancestors, then to endure the servile bondage of a stranger.  

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.  
THe circumstance in this history, which noteth the sudden breaking out of wars, when the course of things made promise of peace: showeth first, 
The weakness of our judgement in regard of the knowledge of future times.  what small assurance our reason hath of her discourse, in calculating the nativity of After-chances; which so seldom answer the judgement we give upon their beginnings, that when we speak of happiness, we find nothing but misery: and chose, it goeth often well with that part, which our Art hath condemned to ill fortune. And therefore I do not marvel, if when almost all nations are at odds, and in our best conceits, threaten destruction one to another, there happen a sudden motion of peace; or if peace be in speech, soothing the world with pleasing tranquillity, and through the uncertainty of our weak probabilities, promise much rest after many troubles: there follow greater wars in the end, than the former time can truly speak of. Which being well understood, may humble the spirits of our haughty politicians, that think to comprehend the conclusions of future times, under the premises of their weak projects, and predestinate succeeding ages, accorto the course of the present motion: when an accident so little thought of, shall break the main stream of our judgement, and falsify the Oracles which our understanding hath uttered. And it may learn them withal, how much it importeth a wise commander, to prevent an evil that may cross his design, (how unlikely soever it be to happen) by handling it in such manner, as though it were necessarily to confront the same. For then a thing is well done, when it hath in itself both the causes of his being; and the direct means to resist the repugnancy of a contrary nature: and so hap what will, it hath great possibility to continue the same.   

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.  
THis practice of the Veneti may instruct a circumspect Prince in cases of this nature, to have a more watchful eye over that Province or city, which shall be found most potent and mighty amongst the rest, then of any other inferior state of the same nature and condition: for as example of itself is of great Authority, 
The Authority of example.  making improbabilities seem full of reason, especially when the intention shall sympathise with our will; so when it shall happen to be strengthened with powerful means, and graced with the Act of superior personages: it must needs be very effectual to stir up men's minds, to approve that with a strong affection, which their own single judgement did no way allow of. And therefore equality bringeth this advantage to a Prince, which differency can not afford, that albeit example do set on foot any rebellious motion, yet no supereminency shall authorize the same.    

CHAP. FOUR  
Caesar having advertisement of these new troubles; hasteth into Gallia and prepareth for the war.  
ALL the maritimate states being by this means drawn into the same conspiracy, 
Caesar.  they sent a common embassage unto Crassus; that if he would have his men again, he must deliver up the hostages, which he had taken from them. Whereof Caesar being certified by Crassus, in as much as he was then a great way distant from his Army, he commanded Galleys and ships of war to be built upon the river 
* Ligeris.  Loier, which runneth into the Ocean; and that galley men, Mariners, and Shipmasters should be mustered in the Province: which being speedily dispatched, assoon as the time of the year would permit him, he came into Gallia. The Veneti and the rest of the confederacy, understanding of Caesar's arrival, and considering how heinous a fact they had committed, in detaining the ambassadors and casting them into irons, whose name is held sacred and inviolable amongst all nations: prepared accordingly to answer so eminent a danger, & especially such necessaries, as pertained to shipping & sea-fights.  

THE OBSERVATION.  
FRom hence I may take occasion, 
The grounds of that reverent opinion which is held of ambassadors.  briefly to touch the reverent opinion, which all nations, how barbarous soever, have generally conceived of the quality and condition of ambassadors: and what the grounds are of this universal received custom, which in all ages, and times hath held Authentical. And first we are to understand, that all man kind (as endued with the same nature and properties) are so linked together in the strict alliance of human society; that, albeit their turbulent and disagreeing passions (which in themselves are unnatural, as proceeding from corruption and defect) drive them into extreme discord and disunion of spirit, and break the bonds of civil conversation, which otherwise we do naturally affect: yet without a necessary intercourse and traffic of society, we are not able to keep on foot the very discord itself, in terms of reason and orderly proceeding, but all parts will be blended with disordered confusion, & go to wrack, for want of these mutual offices performed by messengers: so straight are the bonds of nature, and so powerful are the laws which she enacteth. And therefore if it were for no other end, which might sort to the benefit of either party, (as there are many good uses thereof) yet to hold up the quarrel and keep it from falling, making war, according to the grounds of reason, the intercourse of messengers is not to be interrupted, nor their persons to be touched with hateful violence: but that which the common reason of nations hath made a law, aught as religiously to be observed, as an Oracle of our own belief. Secondly, for as much as the end of war is, or at the least should be, peace: which by treaty of mutual messengers is principally to be confirmed, to the end that no people may seem so barbarous, as to maintain a war; which only intendeth blood, and proposeth as the chiefest object, the death and mortality of mankind, no way respecting peace and civil government: such as refuse the intercourse of messengers, as the means of amity and concord, are justly condemned in the judgement of all nations, as unworthy of human society. Last of all, it is an injury of great dishonour, and deserveth the reward of extreme infamy, to revenge the master his quarrel upon a servant, and punish ambassadors for the faults of their state: considering that their chiefest duty consisteth in the faithful relation of such mandates, as they have received, which may as well tend to the advancement and honour of that city, to which they are sent; as to the dishonour and ruin of the same, whereof the messengers take no notice. And therefore whether we desire war or peace; the free liberty, and holy order of ambassadors, is reverently to be respected, and defended from brutish and unnatural violence.    

CHAP. V.  
The proceedings of either party, in the entrance of this war.  
THE Veneti conceived great hope of their enterprise, 
Caesar.  by reason of the strength of their situation: for as much as all the passages by land were broken and cut off, with arms and creeks of the sea; and on the other side, navigation and entrance by sea was so troublesome and dangerous, in that the Romans were altogether unacquainted with the channels, and shelves of the coast. Neither did they think that the Roman Army could long continue there without corn, which was not to be had in those quarters. And if it happened, that the course of things were carried contrary to this probable expectation; yet they themselves were strong in shipping: whereas the Romans had none at all: Neither had they knowledge of the flats and shallows, Ports and islands of that coast, where they were to fight. And to conclude, they should find the use of Navigation in that narrow sea, to be far different from that, which they were accustomed unto, 
Lendriguer. Lysieux. Nantes. Aurenche. Leondoul. Cities in little Britain.  in the vast and open Ocean. In this resolution, they fortified their towns, stored them with provision, and brought all their shipping to Vannes; against whom, Caesar (as it was reported) would begin to make war, taking the Osisimi, Lexovij, Nannetes, Ambivariti, Morini, Menapij, Diablintres, as consorts and partakers in this quarrel. Notwithstanding these difficulties, many motives stirred up Caesar to undertake this war: as namely, the violent detaining of the Roman knights: their rebellion, after they had yielded themselves by rendrie, and given hostages of their loyalty: the conspiracy of so many cities, which being now neglected, might afterward incite other nations and states to the like insolency. And therefore understanding, that almost all the Galls were inclining to novelty and alteration, and of their own nature, were quick and ready to undertake a war; and further, considering that all men by nature desired liberty, and hated the servile condition of bondage: he prevented all further insurrections of the other states, with the presence of the Roman forces: and sent Titus Labienus with the Cavalry, unto the 
* Triers.  Treviri, that bordered upon the Rhine: to him he gave in charge, to visit the men of Rheims and the rest of the Belgae, to keep them in obedience; and to hinder such forces, as might peradventure be transported over the river by the Germans, to further this rebellious humour of the Galls. He commanded likewise Pub. Crassus, with 12 legionary cohortes, and a great part of the horse to go into Aquitaine, lest there might come any aid from those nations. He sent also Q. Titurius Sabinus with three legions, unto the Lexovij, Curiosolitae, Vnelli, to disappoint any practice which rebellious minds might intend. And making D. Brutus chief Admiral of the navy, he gave him in charge, to make towards Vannes, with what speed he could: and he himself marched thitherward with the rest of the foot forces.  

THE OBSERVATION.  
IN the first book, I observed the authority which the Roman leaders had to undertake a war, without further acquainting the senate with the consequence thereof: in this place, let us observe the care and circumspection, which the Generals had, not to undertake a troublesome and dangerous war upon a humour, or any other slender motion: but diligently weighing the circumstances thereof, and measuring the peril and hazard of the war, with the good and consequence of the effect; informed their judgements of the importance of that action; and so tried whether the benefit would answer their labour. And thus we find the reasons particularly delivered, that moved Caesar first to undertake the Helvetian war: and then the causes which drew him on to the quarrel with Ariovistus: then followeth the necessity of that war with the Belgae; and now the motives which induced him to this with the maritimate cities of Bretaine: and so consequently of his passage into Germany, or what other enterprise he attempted: which he layeth down as the grounds and occasions of those wars, and could not be avoided but with the loss and dishonour of the Roman Empire.  
Further, let us observe the means he used to prevent the inclination of the Galls, and to keep them in subjection and peaceable obedience, by sending his men into divers quarters of that continent; and so settling the wavering disposition of the further skirts, with the weight of his Army, and the presence of his legionary soldiers, which he sent ready to stifle all motions of rebellion in the beginning, that they might not break out to the prejudice and diminution of the Roman Empire, and the good success of his proceedings: besides the advantage, which he gained in the opinion of the enemy; whom he so little feared concerning the upshot of that quarrel, that he had dispersed the greatest part of his Army upon other services, the rest being sufficient to end that war.    

CHAP. VI  
The manner of their shipping, and their sea-fight.  
THE scite, 
Caesar.  of almost all these cities was such, that being built in points and promontories, they could not at full sea, which happened always twice in 12 hours, be approached by foot forces, nor yet with shipping neither; for again▪ in an ebb, the vessalles were laid on the ground, and so left as a pray to the enemy. And if the Romans went about to shut out the sea, with mounts which they raised equal to the walls of the town, and were at the point of entering & taking it: yet the townsmen having such store of shipping, would easily convey, both themselves and their carriages, into the next towns, and there help themselves with the like advantage of place. And thus they deluded Caesar the greatest part of the summer: for the Roman fleet by reason of continual winds and foul weather, durst not adventure to put out of the river Loier into so vast a sea, wherein the havens and roads were few, and far distant one from another, and the tides great. The shipping of the Galls was thus built and rigged: the keel was somewhat flatter then the Roman shipping, the better to bear the ebbs, and shalowes of that coast: the foredecke was altogether erect and perpendicular: the poop was made to bear the hugeness of the billows, and the force of the tempest. And in a word, they were altogether built for strength: for the ribs and seats were made of beams of a foot square, fastened with iron pins of an inch thick: in steed of cables, they used chains of iron; and raw hides and skins for sails, either for want of linen or ignorant of the use thereof, or because sails of linen would hardly serve to carry ships of that burden.  
The meeting and conflict of the Roman navy, with this kind of ships was such, that they only excelled them in celerity and speedy nimbleness, with force of oars; but in all other things, either concerning the nature of the place, or the dangers of the foul weather, were far inferior unto them: for the strength of them was such, that they could neither hurt them with their beake-heads, nor cast a weapon to any purpose into them, by reason of their altitude, and high built bulks. And if any gust chanced in the mean time to rise, that forced them to commit themselves to the mercy of the weather, their shipping would better bear the rage of the sea; and with greater safety shelter itself amongst flats and shallows, without fear of rocks or any such hazard: of all which chances the Roman navy stood continually in danger.  

OBSERVATIONS.  
ANd here, 
The causes of the ebbing and flowing of the sea.  let it not seem impertinent to the argument which we handle, considering the general use which we Insulairs have of navigation, briefly to set down the most eminent causes of the flowing and ebbing of the sea, as far forth as shall seem necessary to the knowledge of a soldier: which, albeit may fall short of the true reasons of this great secret; yet for as much as they stand for true principles of regularity, and well approved rules in our Art of navigation, let us take them for no less than they effect, and give them that credit in our imagination, which tract of time hath gained to those forged circles in the heavens: that albeit their chiefest essence consisteth in conceit and supposal; yet for as much as they serve to direct our knowledge to a certainty, in that variety and seeming inconstancy of motion, we esteem of them as they effect, and not as they are.  
Considering then the globe of the world, as it maketh a right sphere (for in that position, the Naturalistes chiefly understand celestial influence to have operation in this liquid element of the water) it is divided by the Horizon and Meridian into four quarters: the first quarter is that, between the east horizon and the noon meridian, which they call a flowing quarter: the second, from the noon meridian, to the west horizon; which they make an ebbing quarter: the third, from the west horizon to the midnight meridian; which they likewise call a flowing quarter: and again, from the midnight meridian to the east horizon, the second ebbing quarter: And so they make two flowing quarters, and two ebbing quarters of the whole circuit of heaven. The instruments of these sensible qualities, and contrary effects, are the sun and the moon, as they are carried through these distinct parts of the heaven. And although experience hath noted the moon to be of greatest power in warrie motions; yet we may not omit to acknowledge the force, which the sun yieldeth in this miracle of nature.  
First therefore we are to understand, that when the moon or the sun begin to appear above the right horizon, and enter into that part of the heaven which I termed the first flowing quarter, that then the sea beginneth to swell: and as they mount up to their meridian altitude; so it increaseth until it come to a high flood. And again, as those lights passing the meridian, decline to the west, and run the circuit of the ebbing quarter: so the water decreaseth and returneth again from whence it came. Again, as they set under the west horizon and enter into the second flowing quarter; so the sea beginneth again to flow, and still increaseth until they come to the point of the night meridian: and then again, it refloweth, according as the sun and moon are carried in the other ebbing quarter from the night meridian, to the east horizon.  
And hence it happeneth that in conjunction or new of the moon, 
Spring tides.  when the sun and the moon are carried both together in the same flowing, and ebbing quarters; that then the tides and ebbs are very great: and likewise in opposition or full of the moon, when these lights are carried in opposite quarters, which we have described to be of the same nature, either ebbing or flowing; that then in like manner the tides are great: forasmuch as both these Planets, through the symbolising quarters wherein they are carried, do join their forces, to make perfect this work of nature in the ebbing and flowing of the sea. And chose, in a quadrate aspect (as the Astronomers call it) or quarter age of the moon, when as the moon is carried in a flowing quarter; and at the same instant, the sun doth happen to be in an ebbing or decreasing quarter, as the course of nature doth necessarily require: then are the tides lessoned, as daily experience doth witness.  
And for as much as both the right horizon and the meridian also, divide every diurnal circle, which either the sun or the moon maketh in their revolutions, into equal parts; it followeth that every tide is continually measured with the quantity of 6 hours: and therefore that which Caesar here saith, must needs be true, that in the space of 12 hours, there are always 2 high tides. And lest any man should imagine, that every inland city, standing upon an ebbing and flowing river, may take the computation of the tide according to this rule: let him understand that this which I have delivered, is to be conceived principally of the sea itself; and secondarily of such ports and havens, as stand either near or upon the sea: but where a river shall run many miles from the sea, and make many winding meanders, before it come to the place of calculation; it must needs lose much of this time before mentioned. And thus much I thought convenient to insert in these discourses touching the ebbing and flowing of the sea, as not impertinent to martial knowledge.  
Concerning the shipping of the Romans, 
The manner of their shipping.  whereof posterity hath only received the bare names, and some few circumstances touching the manner of their Equipage, the Critics of these times have laboured to set forth a fleet, answerable to that, which the terms and title mentioned in history seem to report: but yet the gain of their voyage doth not answer their charge. For many men rest unsatisfied, first touching the names themselves, whereof we find these kinds,  
Names 

Longas.  
Onerarias.  
Actuarias.  
Triremes.  
Quadriremes.  
Quinqueremes.    
The first we may understand to be Galleys or ships of service: the second ships of burden: the third, ships that were driven forward with force of oars, and the rest sounding according to their Names; for I dare not entitle them with a more particular description. Now whether these Names Longas and Actuarias, were a several sort of shipping by themselves; or the general Names of the Quadriremes, Triremes, and Quinqueremes, for as much as every kind of these might be called both Longas and Actuarias, as it yet remaineth in controversy: so it is not much material to that which we seek after. But that which most troubleth our sea-Critickes, is in what sense they may understand these vocabularies, Triremes, Quadriremes, and Quinqueremes, whether they were so termed in regard of the number of rowers, or watermen that haled continually at an oar, as the custom of the Galleys is at this day; or otherwise, because a Trireme had three orders of oars on either side, a Quadrireme four, and a Quinquereme five: whereof they took their distinction of Names.  
Such as hold, 
Lib. 27.  that a Trireme had on each side three ranks of oars, and so consequently, of a Quadrireme and Quinquereme; allege this place of Livy, to make good their opinion. In the wars between Rome and Carthage, Laelius meeting with Adherball in the straights of Gibraltar, each of them had a Quinquereme, and seven or eight Triremes a piece, the current in that place was so great that it gave no place to Art, but carried the vessailes according to the fall of the Billow: in which uncertainty the Triremes of the Carthaginean, closed with the Quinquereme of Laelius: which either because she was pondere tenacior, as Livy saith, or otherwise, for that pluribus remorum ordinibus scindentibus vertices facilius regeretur; in regard of the plurality of banks of oars, which resisted the billow and steamed the current, she sunk two of the Triremes, and so got the victory. From hence they prove, that a Quinquereme had plures remorum ordines, than a Trireme had; and therefore it took the name from the plurality of banks of oars, and not from the number of men that rowed at an oar.  
But the contrary opinion doth interpret Ordo Remorum, to be a couple of oars one answering another, on each side of the vessaile, which we call a pair of oars: So that a Quinquereme being far greater and longer than a Trireme, had more pairs of oars than a Trireme had, and those oars were handled with five men at one oar, according to the use of our Galleys at this day.  
But to leave this, 
Their manner of sea-fights.  and come to their manner of sea-fights, we must understand that the Romans, wanting the use of Artillery and managing their ships of war with force of oars, failed not to make use of their Art, in their conflicts and encounters by sea: for all their ships of service, which we term men of war, carried a strong beakhead of iron, which they called rostrum, with which they ran one against another, with as great violence and fury, as their oars could carry them. And herein Art gave great advantage; for he that could best skill to turn his ship, with greatest celerity, and so frustrate an offer; or with speedy and strong agitation follow an advantage: commonly got the victory.  
In the battle, 
Lib. 2. de bello civili.  which D. Brutus had with the Massilians, we read that two Triremes charging the Admiral, wherein Brutus was one at the one side, and the other at the other; Brutus and his Mariners so cunningly handled the matter, that when they should come to the hurt, they speedily in a trice of time, wound themselves from between them, and the two Triremes met with such a career one against another, that one broke her beakehead, and the other split with the blow.  
For this skill and fortune withal, Euphranor the Rhodian was of great fame in Caesar's time; although his end found too true the saying of the Historian, that Whom fortune honoureth with many good haps, she oftentimes reserveth to a harder destiny; as other seamen besides Euphranor, can truly witness.  
This first brunt being ended: when they came to grapple and boarding one of another, than the art and practices of their land services came in use: for they erected turrets upon their decks, and from them they fought with engines and casting weapons, as slings, arrows, and piles; and when they entered, they fought with sword and target. Neither did the legionary soldier find any difference, when he came to the point, between their fight at sea and that at land: saving that they could not be marshalled in troops and bands, in regard whereof the sea service was counted more base, and dishonourable; and the rather, in as much as it decided the controversy, by slings and casting weapons: which kind of fight was of less honour, then buckling at handy-blowes.    

CHAP. VII.  
The battle continueth: and Caesar overcometh.  
THE manner of their fights being this, 
Caesar.  as I have described, neither Brutus, nor any Tribune or Centurion in his navy, knew what to do or what course of fight to take: for the shipping of the Galls was so strong, that the beakhead of their Quinqueremes could perform no service upon them: and although they should raise turrets according to their use, yet these would not equal in height the poop of the enemies shipping, so that therein also the Galls had advantage: neither had they any means, whereby they might foil so great a navy, which amounted to the number of 230 ships of war. One thing there was amongst their provisions which stood them in great steed: for the Romans had provided great sharp hooks or sickles, which they put upon great and long poles, these they fastened to the tackling which held the main yard to the mast; and then haling away their ship, with force of Oars, they cut the said tackling, and the main yard fell down: Whereby the Galls, whose only hope consisted in sailing and you're turning of their ships, lost at one instant▪ both their sails and the use of their shipping: And then the controversy fell within the compass of valour, wherein the Romans exceeded the Galls; and the rather, inasmuch as they fought in the sight of Caesar and the whole Army, no valiant act could be smothered in secret; for all the hills and cliffs, which afforded near prospect into the sea, were covered with the Roman Army.  
Their main yards being cut down, and the Romans endeavouring with great fury to board them, failed not to take many of their ships: which the Galls perceiving, and finding no remedy nor hope of resistance, began all to fly, & turning their ships to a forewind, were upon a sudden so becalmed, that they were able to make no way at all. Which fell out so fitly for the Romans, that of so great a navy, very few through the help of the evening escaped to land, after they had fought the space of 8 hours: with which battle, ended the war with the Veneti, and the rest of the maritimate nations. For all sort of people both young and old, in whom there was either courage, counsel, or dignity, were present at this battle, and all their shipping was taken and lost; so that such as remained, knew not whither to go, nor how to defend their towns any longer: and therefore yielded themselves to Caesar, in whom he used the greater severity, that he might thereby teach all other barbarous people, not to violate the law of nations: for he slew all the Senate with the sword, and sold the people for bondslaves.  

THE OBSERVATION.  
IN this battle I chiefly observe the good fortune, 
The force of industry.  which usually attendeth upon industry: for amongst other provisions, which the diligence of the Romans had furnished out to the use of this war, they had made ready these hooks, not for this intent wherein they were employed, but at all occasions & chances, that might happen, as service able compliments rather than principal instruments: and yet it so fell out, that they proved the only means, to overthrow the Galls. Which proveth true the saying of Caesar, that industry commandeth fortune and buyeth good success, with extraordinary labour: for industry in action is as importunity in speech, which forceth an assent beyond the strength of reason; and striveth through continual pursuit, to make good the motives, by often inculcations; and at length findeth that disposition, which will easily admit whatsoever is required: In like manner diligence and laboursome industry, by circumspect and heedful carriage, seldom fail either by hap or cunning, to make good that part wherein the main point of the matter dependeth. For evetie action is entangled with many infinite adherents, which are so interessed in the matter, that it succeed according as it is carried answerable to their natures. Of these adherentes, some of them are by wisdom, foreseen; and directed to that course which may fortunate the action: the rest being unknown, continue without either direction or prevention, and are all under the regiment of fortune; for as much as they are beyond the compass of our wisest reach, and stand in the way either to assist or disadvantage: Of these, industry hath greatest authority; in as much as she armeth herself for all chances, whereby she is said to command fortune.    

CHAP. VIII.  
Sabinus overthroweth the 
* La perch.  Vnelli, with the manner thereof.  
WHILE these things happened in the state of Vannes, 
Caesar.  L. Titurius Sabinus entereth with his forces, into the confines of the Vnelli, over whom Viridovix was made chief commander, having drawn the 
* Rhone.  Aulerci and the 
* Eureux.  Eburonices, with a great number of vagabonds and thieves into the same conspiracy: Sabinus encamping himself in a convenient place, kept his soldiers within the rampire. But Viridovix, being lodged within less than two miles of Sabinus his camp, brought out his forces daily, and putting them in battle gave him opportunity to fight if he would: which Sabinus refused in such sort, that he began not only to be suspected by the enemy of cowardice, but to be taunted with the reproachful speeches of his own soldiers; which opinion of fear being once settled in the minds of the enemy, he used all means to increase it, and carried it so well, that the enemy durst approach the very rampire of the camp. The colour that he pretended was, that he thought it not the part of a Legate, in the absence of the General, to fight with an enemy of that strength, but upon some good opportunity, or in a place of advantage. In this general persuasion of fear, Sabinus chose out a subtle witted Gall, whom he persuaded with great rewards, and further promises, to fly to the enemy, and there to carry himself, according to the instructions, which he should give him. This Gall, coming as a reuolter to the enemy, laid open unto them the fear of the Romans: the extremity that Caesar was driven into by the Veneti; and that the night before, Sabinus was about to withdraw his forces secretly out of his camp, and to make all the haste he could to relieve Caesar. Upon which advertisement, they all cried out with one consent, that this opportunity was not to be omitted; but setting apart all other devices, to go and assault the Roman camp. Many circumstances persuaded the Galls to this resolution; as first the linger & doubt which Sabinus had made, when he was offered battle: secondly the intelligence which this fugitive had brought: thirdly the want of victuals, wherein they had been negligent and unadvisedly careless: fourthly the hope they conceived of the war of Vannes; and lastly, for that men willingly believe that which they would have come to pass. The force of these motives was so strong, that they would not suffer Viridovix, nor the rest of the captains, to dismiss the council until they had permitted them to take Arms, and go to the Roman camp. Which being granted, they gathered rubbish and faggots to fill up the ditch, and with cheerful hearts, as though the victory were already gotten, they marched to the place where Sabinus was encamped, which was the top of a hill rising gently from a level, the quantity of 1000 paces: hither the Galls hasted with all expedition; and to the intent the Romans might not have so much time, as to put on their armour, the Galls for haste ran themselves out of breath.  
Sabinus encouraging his soldiers, gave the sign of battle, and sallying out at two several gates of his camp, it fell out that through the opportunity of the place, the weariness and unexperience of the enemy, the valour of the Roman soldier and their exercise in former battles, that the Galls could not endure the brunt of the first encounter; but presently took themselves to flight, of whom very few escaped. And so it happened that at one time, Sabinus had news of the overthrow at sea; and Caesar of Sabinus victory by land. Upon these victories, all the cities and states yielded themselves to Titurius: for as the Galls are prompt to undertake a war; so are they weak in suffering, and impatient of the consequents and calamities thereof.  

OBSERVATIONS.  
THis practice of a counterfeit fear was often put in use by the Roman leaders, 
The use which the Romans made of a counterfeit fear. Lib. 5.  as well to disappoint the expectation of an enemy, as to draw them into an inconvenience, & so to defeat them of their greatest helps in time of battle. Caesar coming to succour the camp of Cicero made such use of this Art, that he put to rout a great Army of the Galls, with a handful of men: which I will refer unto the place, where it is particularly set down by Caesar.  
The chiefest thing in this place, which brought them to their overthrow, was disappointment: for it is a thing hardly to be digested in businesses of small consequence, to be frustrated of a settled expectation, when the mind shall dispose herself to one only intent, and in the upshot meet with a counterbuff to cross her purposes, and so defeat her of that hope which the strength of her reason hath entertained: how much more than in things of such importance, when we shall proceed in a course of victory, and humour our conceits with that we wish and would have to happen; and in the end meet, either with bondage or death; must our best wits be appalled? having neither respite nor means, to think how the evil may be best prevented. Which the wise Romans well understood, and counted it no dishonour to be reproached with shameful cowardice, by such as knew not the secrets of wisdom; while they in the mean time foresaw their good fortunes, shrouded under the cloak of a pretended distrust.  
Let these examples instruct a leader, so to take the opportunity of any such fortune, that in the execution he omit not the chiefest points of order and discipline, as well for the better effecting of the design, as for his own safety and the security of his Army. For order is as the sinews and strength of martial discipline, uniting the particular members into the firm composition of a well proportioned body: and so it maketh it more powerful than any number of disunited parts, how able or infinite soever. I might here allege infinite examples to confirm this truth: but let the battle of Drux serve for all; wherein the protestants overcharging the catholic Army, followed the retreat so hard, that they quickly became masters of the field: and then neglecting martial discipline, fell in confusedly with the broken multitude, to make the victory more glorious by slaughter and mortality: the Duke of Guise all this while bouged not a foot: but in unexampled patience kept his regiment close together, and would not suffer them to rescue their general that was taken, until the regiment of the Prince of Condie was likewise dispersed and broken; and then perceiving no difference of order, between the Victor Protestant, and the vanquished Catholic; he dissolved that terrible cloud that had hung so long in suspense, and so changing the fortune of the day, that he took the chiefest of their Prince's prisoners, with little or no loss of his own men: so powerful is order in the deeds of Arms, and of such consequence in obtaining victory. And thus we have first seen the inconveniences, which a counterfeit fear well dissembled, may cast upon a credulous and unadvised enemy, when pretence and appearance hath brought them into an error, which their own credulity doth afterward avouch: and secondly, what strength and safety consisteth in order; and how powerful it is to throw down, and to set up.    

CHAP. IX.  
The Proceedings of Crassus in Aquitanie.  
AT the same instant of time it happened also, 
Caesar.  that Pub. Crassus' coming into Aquitania, (which both in regard of the large extension of the country, as also for the multitude of the inhabitants, was named the third part of Gallia) and considering that he was to make war in those parts, where L. Valerius Preconius the Legate was slain, and the Army over thrown; and where Lucius Manilius was fain to fly with the loss of his carriages; he thought that his affairs required no mean diligence: and therefore having made provision of corn, and mustered many auxiliary forces, and sent for many valiant and prudent men from Tolouse and Narbone, he carried his Army into the confines of the 
* Euocati.  Sontiates, which was no sooner known but they levied great forces both of horse & foot, and with their horse charged upon the Romans in their march: which being easily repelled, as they followed the retreat, the infantry of the Galls showed itself in a valley as it lay in ambush. These setting upon the Romans renewed the battle, and there the fight continued hot a long time; the Sontiates being animated with the former victories, saw all the hope of Aquitanie rely upon their virtue: and the Romans on the other side, desired to show what they were able to do of themselves, without their grand Captain, and under the conduction of a young soldier: At length the enemy overwaged with prowess, and wearied with wounds, betook themselves to flight; of whom the Romans slew a great number. And then marched directly to the town of the Sontiates, and laid siege unto if; the siege grew hot on both sides; the Romans approached the walls, with vines, turrets and mounts: the townsmen defended themselves some time, by sallying out; sometimes, by undermining the mounts and fortifications, wherein the Aquitanis are very skilful. But when they perceived the industry of the Romans to exceed all that they were able to do, they entreated Crassus to accept their rendry: which being granted, and all the army intending the delivery of their Arms; Adcantuanus their chief magistrate, fled out in the mean time at an other port of the city, with 600. devoted companions whom they called Soldurij: but as they attempted to escape, the soldiers that kept that part of the fortification, as they signified his cuasion by a clamour and shout, the rest be took themselves to arms; and so repelled him again into the town, where he desired to be taken in the number of the submissive multitude. Crassus' having taken hostages of them, went into the confines of the Vocontij.  

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.  
THese skilful and experienced men, which Crassus sent for out of all the Cities in Aquitaine, 
Euocati.  were those, whom the Romans called Euocati: such as were free from warfare, and exempted by their laws from giving their names in musters, either by reason of their years, or the magistracy which they had borne, or for some other causes, which gave them that privilege: And in that regard were sent for by letters, entreating their assistance in the carriage of that war, as men well acquainted with the nature of such businesses. Their places were nothing inferior to the Centurions, for advise and direction, although they had no part in command or authority.   

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.  
IN this fight we may further observe, their manner of defence against Mounts, and Cavalieroes; which we find chiefly to be mines. josephus in the jewish war saith, that the Romans having raised an exceeding high mount, the jews undermined the same with such Art, that as they digged underneath; they supported the mount with huge props and planks, that it might not shrink: and watching a time of greatest advantage, they set all the timber work, which underpropped the mount, on fire, which taking fire with the help of brimstone and pitch, the mount fell upon a sudden, to the great terror and amazement of the Romans.  
At the siege of Auaricum, 
Lib. 7. de bello Gall.  we find how the Galls by undermining, did take the earth from the mount, as fast as it was carried unto it by the Romans; and so kept it from rising, and made it uneffectual. But if it were for the most part made of wood, or other combustible matter, they sought then by all means to burn it; as it happened at the siege of Massilia: and oftentimes when both burning and undermining failed, they confronted it, with an other mount within the walls, to disappoint the disadvantage by equal contesting of it; and so made it unprofitable. Concerning mines, this much may I say, without prejudice to that Art: that the chiefest points to be respected are these: First, the true distance to a designed place, which is best got by instrument and help of Geometry, where other marks of certainty are wanting: secondly, the direction of the mine, that we may not err in our course which the compass affordeth: thirdly, the strengthening of the mine with timber work, if need require: lastly, the countermining and crossemeeting: All which parts have very many circumstances, and require a larger discourse, then may be thought pertinent for this place.   

THE THIRD OBSERVATION.  
THe strange contract between these Soldurij, and their chieftain, may well deserve a place amongst these observations, especially considering the obligatory conditions, which either party stood bound to observe: for the Captain was to make his Soldurij partakers of all his happiness in this life; in regard whereof, they were to take part of whatsoever ill chance or disaster should happen to befall him. If death, which is the last end of all sensual misery, took hold of their head, these devoted were tied voluntarily to follow him the self same way: neither in any memory was there over man found, that refused to die, if he to whom he was devoted, chanced to be slain. Which bloody league of amity, as it was repugnant to the course of nature, multiplying particular destiny to a general calamity: so was it dangerous in a well ordered state, if the ringleader were either ambitious, or sought to practise any thing contrary to good government: for he himself would presume much upon the assistance of his Soldurij; and they on the other side, must needs wish well to his attempts that were so interessed in his life & death.    

CHAP. X.  
The Galls raise new forces, against Crassus.  
THe barbarous Galls were much troubled, 
Caesar.  that a town of that strength should so soon be taken; and therefore they sent ambassadors into all quarters, conjured one with another, confirmed their covenants with mutual hostages, and levied what power they were able to make: sending for aid out of Spain, and from other states that bordered upon Aquitaine; at the coming of these forces they began to make war, with a great power, and with many soldiers of great fame. For they appointed such leaders as had seen the experience of Sertorius his wars, and were great in the opinion of men, for their skill and knowledge in the art military; these according to the custom of the people of Rome, began to take places of advantage, to fortify their camp, and to intercept the romans from free passage of conu●ies and necessary intercourses. Which when Crassus perceived, and considering withal that his own forces were so few, that he could not well dismember them upon any service or advantage; and that the enemy went out at his pleasure, kept the passages, and left notwithstanding, a sufficient garrison in his camp; by which means their corn and provision would in time grow scarce, and the enemy waxed every day stronger: he thought it his best course not to linger any longer, but presently to give them battle. The matter being referred to a council of war, when he understood that all men were of the same opinion, he appointed the next day to give them battle; and in the dawning putting his men in a double battle, and placing the auxiliary forces in the midst, he attended to see what the enemy would do. The Galls, although they were persuaded, that they might adventure battle both in regard of their multitude and ancient prows of war, as also in respect of the paucity of the Romans; yet they though it better to block up the passages, and so cut off all carriages, and convoys of corn; and so the victory would follow without bloodshed: and if the Romans for want of corn should offer to make a retreat, they would then set upon them as they marched, wearied with travel, and heavily laden with their burdens. This resolution being approved by the whole council of the Galls, when the Romans imbattailed their forces, they kept their men within their camp.  

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.  
THis Sertorius had followed the faction of Marius and Cinna, 
Sertorius.  and when Sylla had overthrown both the elder and younger Marius, he fled into Spain, and there maintained the quarrel on foot against Pompeie and Metellus; and overthrew them in many battles: but in the end was treacherously slain by Perpanna at a banquet. He was a man of great spirit, and of admirable dispatch; and under him were these captains brought up, which Caesar commendeth for their skill in arms.   

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.  
IN histories, 
Two means to achieve victory and to overmaster their enemies  propounding to our consideration the deeds and monuments of former ages, we may observe two especial means, which the great commanders of the world have entertained to achieve victory, and overmaster their enemies: the first by cunning and wise carriage of a matter, before it come to trial by blows: the second, by forcible means & waging of battle; the one proceeding from wisdom and the better faculties of the soul; and the other depending upon the strength and ability of the body. Concerning the first, it hath ever been held more honourable, as better suiting the worth of the spirit and the divine essence of our nature, so to direct the course of an action, that the adverse part may be weakened by wit, and prevented in the projects of their better fortunes, by anticipation of means and occasions, & so through advantages taken from their own proceedings, to be driven to that exigent, which may determine of the controversy before they come to blows, & conclude the matter by terms of art, taken from the directions of good providence. For to speak a truth, 
Tubalcaine by war and Naamah by the flood.  the action of battle, as it is the last part in that faculty; so it is the worst in regard of christian duty, and better fitteth the progeny of Lamech his second wife, which the Divines do note to be borne to the ruin and destruction of mankind, than the children of grace, whose joy consisteth in peace and love.  
Caesar in the first of the civil wars respected the same thing, but from other grounds: for having shut up Afranius, and Petreius in a place of disadvantage, and might have cut them off without further trouble; yet forasmuch as he foresaw the victory coming towards him without blow or wound, he thus answered his Captains that were earnest upon the enemy: Cur etiam secundo praelio aliquos ex suis amitteret? cur vulnerari pateretur optime de se meritos milites? cur denique fortunam periclitaretur? And this course did these Galls take, which under Sertorius had learned the Roman Art, and the Roman industry; and were now become so expert, that they had almost beaten the Romans at their own weapon. This first means is principally to be embraced, as the safest way in these uncertain and casual events: for that which resteth upon corporal strength, and maketh execution the means to a conclusion, is very terrible even to the better party, full of hazard and of little certainty. For it were a miracle of fortune never heard of yet, so to carry a battle upon what advantage or means whatsoever, that the victor army should buy so great a fortune without bloodshed or loss of men; and erect a Trophy to honour at the sole cost of the enemy, without loss or expense of his own treasure. And for the uncertainty in a battle, who knoweth not what infinite chances and changes may happen in every small moment of time, to turn the fortune of the day to this or that party, and make both sides unconstant in their affections, by presenting them interchangeably with hope and fear, joy and sorrow? and therefore Caesar thought it not best to tempt the waie-wardnes of fortune, when by other means he might obtain his desires. This I say is chiefly to be embraced, if our means will afford us that happiness: but howsoever I hold it wisdom so to entertain this course of victory, that we omit not the chiefest helps of furtherance when it cometh to blows, but to think of this conquest by art and wit, as necessary, if our means will serve us to compass it; and of the other, as necessary whether we will or no: for the history maketh it plain, that when Brutus found himself destitute of means to undertake that course of victory, which proceedeth from providence and discreet carriage; he than betook himself necessarily to the latter, and by the help of battle, sought to free himself from those disadvantages, into which the Galls had brought him.   

THE THIRD OBSERVATION.  
I Observe further out of this place, 
Not to forego an advantage  that what course soever be taken, a discreet leader will not easily forego an advantage, without great assurance of a better fortune: nor change the certainty of a benefit, upon probabilities of other hopes, until it have paid him the interest of his expectation, and wrought that effect which it promised to perform. For so he might forego his fortune by presuming too much upon the favour of future chances, which are oftener seen to cross our purposes, rather than to further the way which is taken.   

THE FOURTH OBSERVATION.  
further I observe, this double battle to be answerable to the paucity of the Roman forces: for their usual manner was, to make a triple battle, that the first might have a second, and a third help: but where their number would not afford that commodity, they then made two battles, that there might be the succour of a second supply. But they never fought with one single battle, for aught that may be gathered by their histories.   

THE fifth OBSERVATION.  
THe last thing which I observe, 
The place where suspected forces are best bestowed in battle.  is the place, where Crassus bestowed the auxiliary forces, in the disposition of his troops to battle; which is here said to be, in mediam Aciem: for as their Armies were divided into three battles; so every battle was divided into three parts; the two cornets, and the battle, wherein these auxiliary forces were in this service bestowed: of these he afterward saith, that in as much as he durst not put any confidence in them, he commanded them to serve the Romans in time of battle, with stones and weapons, and to carry earth and turf to the mount. The reason why suspected troops are placed in the battle, rather than in either of the cornets, is, for that the battle hath not such scope to fling out, or take advantage of place to do mischief, as the corners have: for wheresoever there hath been set battles fought, the strength of their army consisted always in the cornets, as the two principal instruments of the battle; and as long as these stood sound, the victory went always certain on that part: for the cornets kept the enemy both from encompassing about the body of their Army, and had the advantage also of charging upon the open side of their adversary. At the battle of Cannae Hannibal put the weakest of his forces in the battle, and advancing them towards the enemy, left the two cornets behind: so that, when the enemy came to charge upon the battle, they easily beat them back, and as they followed the retreat fell in between the two cornets, wherein the strength of the Army consisted, and being by them encompassed on each side, were defeated and overthrown. And thus we see the advantage which a General hath, when his two cornets stand firm; although the battle shrink in the encounter. Hannibal in the battle he had with Scipio in Africa, placed the strangers in the front and in the rearward, according peradventure as he found their number and the use of their Arms, which are circumstances to be considered in this case, and depend rather upon the judgement of a general, then of any prescription that can be given in this matter.    

CHAP. XI.  
Crassus taketh the camp of the Galls: and with their overthrow endeth that war.  
CRASSUS understanding their drift, 
Caesar.  and finding his men willing to set upon their camp, encouraged his soldiers; and to the contentment of all men, went directly to the place where they were lodged: and as some began to fill up the ditch; and others with casting weapons to beat the Galls from the rampire, he commanded the auxiliary forces, of whom he had no great assurance, to bring stones and weapons to the soldiers that fought, and to carry earth and turf to the mount; that so they might make a show of fight. And on the other side, as the enemy began valiantly to make resistance, and to cast their weapon from the higher ground, to the great hurt of the Roman soldier; the horsemen in the mean time riding about the camp of the Galls, brought word to Crassus that the rampire at the Decumane port, was not fortified with such diligence, as they found it in other places, but would admit an easy entrance. Crassus' dealt earnestly with the commanders of the horse, to encourage their men with great promises and rewards; and instructed them what he would have done: they, according to their instructions, took four cohorts that were left in the camp, and carrying them a further way about, that they might not be discovered by the enemy; while all men's eyes and minds were intent upon the fight, they speedily came to the place of the fortifications, which the horsemen had found to be weak, which being easily broken down, they had entered the camp before the enemy could well tell what was done. And then a great clamour & shout being heard about that place, the Roman legions renewing their force, as it falleth out always in hope of victory, began to charge them a fresh with great fury: the Galls being circumvented on each side, and despairing of their safety, casting themselves over the rampire, sought by flight to escape the danger. But for as much as the country was open and champion, the horsemen pursued them with that execution, that of 50000 there scarce remaineth the fourth part.  

THE OBSERVATION.  
FRom this place Brancatio taketh occasion to dispute, 
Lib. 3. Auertimento secundo.  how an enemy that is strongly encamped, and for some advantage will not remove, may be dislodged, whether he will or no. A point of great consequence, in matter of war: and therefore deserveth due consideration. Concerning which he layeth this down for a maxim, that all forts and strong holds are taken by the foot, and that camps and lodgings are taken by the head: By which is meant, that he who purposeth to win a fortress well manned and provided, must first get the foot and take hold of the ditch; and then seize himself upon the rampire, and so get the place: for he saith, that mounts and eminent elevations are of little use against fortresses or sconces, unless they overtop them; which may be easily prevented by raising the parapet of the fortress in front, and the curtain in flank, according as the enemy shall carry his mounts aloft; and so they shall never come to overtop the holds. But all camps and lodgings are taken by the head: That is, by mounts and elevations, which by the advantage of their height command the champion. For he holdeth it impossible, to raise a mount within the camp in so short a time, to contest that, which the enemy shall make without. This foundation being laid, he proceedeth to discover a way, how to raise a mount maugre the enemy, which shall dislodge them by force of Artillery, or murder them all within their trenches. And this he taketh from Caesar at the siege of Gergobia. 
Lib. de bello Gallico.  The substance of the matter consisteth in a double ditch, running like unto the line which the Geometricians call Helicall; by this double ditch, he maketh his approach to any place of most advantage, where he may in a night, raise a mount high enough for the ordinance to play upon any quarter of the camp. The censure of this practice, I refer to our judicious soldiers, which may, if it please them, take a better view of the particularities of this stratagem in Brancatio himself. This much I dare affirm in the behalf of these works, that they were of high esteem amongst the Romans, when daily experience and exigents of hazard had taught to find out the readiest means, both for security and victory. And if our soldiers could be brought to taste the commodity of these works, either by persuasion or impulsion, it were the best part of their warlike practices: but our men had rather fly upon desperate adventures, and seek victory in the jaws of death, then to clear all hazard, with pains and diligence.    

CHAP. XII.  
Caesar undertaketh the war with the Menapijs and Morini.  
AT the same time also, 
Caesar.  although the summer was almost at an end, yet for as much as all Gallia was in peace, and the 
* Terovine  Morini only with the 
* Cleve and Gueldres.  Menapijs stood out in arms, and had never either sent ambassador, or otherwise treated of peace; Caesar thinking that war might quickly be ended, lead his Army into their country. At his coming, he found them to carry the wars far otherwise, than the rest of the Galls had done: for understanding that the greatest nations of Gallia, which had waged battle with the Romans, were beaten and overthrown; and having whole continents of woods and bogs in their territories, they conveyed both themselves and their goods into those quarters: Caesar coming to the beginning of the woods, began to fortify his camp, not discovering any enemy near about him; but as his men were dispersed in their charges, they suddenly sallied out of the woods and assaulted the Romans; but being speedily driven in again with the loss of many of them, as the Romans followed them far into the woods, had some few of their men slain. The time that remained, Caesar resolved to spend in cutting down the woods; and lest the soldiers might be taken unawares, while they were busied in that work, he caused them to place all the trees which they cut down, on either side of the Army; that they might serve for a defence, against sudden assaults. A great quantity of ground was thus rid within a few days; so that their goods and cattle was taken by the Romans: but they themselves were fled into thicker woods. At which time there happened such a continual rain, as forced them to leave of the work; and the soldiers could no longer endure, to lie in tents of skins: and therefore Caesar, after he had wasted and spoiled their country, burned their towns, and their houses; he carried back his Army, and placed them in such cities to winter in, as were subdued by the late wars.  

OBSERVATIONS.  
THe Irish rebels, having the like commodity of woods and bogs, do entertain the like course of war, as the Morini did with Caesar: the means which he used to disappoint them of that practice, was to cut down the woods, which if it be thought monstrous in this age, or ridiculous to our men of war; let them consider that the Roman discipline wrought greater effects of valour, then can be made credible by the use of these times. For besides their exquisite discipline, which of itself was able to frame patterns of unexampled magnanimity; their industry was admirable in the execution thereof, and carried it with such uncessant travel, that the soldiers thought it great happiness when they came to wage battle with the enemy; and could have means to quit their continual travel, with the hazard of their lives. Neither let it seem strange, that the Romans undertook to cut down the woods; but rather let us admire their facility in so difficult a task: for as the history witnesseth: magno spacio paucis diebus confecto, incredibili celeritate: a great quantity of ground was rid in a few days with incredible speed. And after the woods were cut down, they took more pains in placing it on each side of the legions, to hinder any sudden assault, than they did in cutting it down: which deserveth as great admiration, as the former part. There is another place in the sixth book of these Commentaries, which expresseth more particularly the nature of such wars, and may serve to acquaint us with that which Caesar did in these difficulties.  
The Eburones or the men of Liege, had the like commodity of woods and bogs, and made use of them in the war they had with Caesar: The matter (saith he) required great diligence, not so much in regard of the peril of the whole Army, (for there could no danger come from an enemy that was frighted and dispersed) as the safety of every particular soldier, which in part did pertain to the welfare of the whole Army. For the desire of booty carried many of the soldiers far from the body of the Army: and the woods being full of unknown and secret passages, would not suffer them to go either thick together or close imbattailed. If he desired to have the war ended, and the race of those wicked men to be rooted out, he must of force make many small companies, and divide his men into many bodies: but if he would have the maniples to keep at their ensigns, as the discipline and custom of the Roman Army required; then the place was a shelter and defence to the enemy: neither did they want courage to lay ambushments, and to cirumvent such as they found alone, straggling from their companies. In these difficulties, there was as much done as diligence could do; providing rather to be wanting in the offensive part (although all men's minds were set on fire with revenge) then to hurt the enemy with the loss of the Roman soldier. Caesar sent messengers to the bordering states, to come out and sack the Eburones, and they should have all the pray for their labour: that the life of the Galls rather than his legionary soldiers might be hazarded in those woods; as also that, with so great a multitude, both the race and name of that people might be quite extinguished.  
There are many particularities in this relation, which concern the true motion of the Irish wars, which may be better observed by such as know those wars by experience, then by myself that understand them only by relation: and therefore to prevent such exceptions, as my rule shall make of the parallel in these two cases: I will leave it to be done by themselves. And thus endeth the third Commentary.     

THE FOURTH COMMENTARY.  
THE ARGUMENT.  
THe Vsipetes, and Tenchtheri are driven to seek new seats in Gallia; they drive the Menapij out of their territories: but in the end are overthrown by Caesar. That war being ended, he made a bridge upon the Rhine, and carried his Army over into Germany. He taketh revenge upon the Sicambri; and giveth liberty to the Vbijs: returneth into Gallia, and carrieth his Army over into Brittany, with the occurrences of that war.  

CHAP. I.  
The 
* Those of Zutpnen.  Vsipetes, and 
* Of Hassia.  Tenchtheri bring great multitudes of peoples, over the Rhine into Gallia: the nature of the Suevi.  
THE winter following, 
Caesar.  Pompeie and Crassus being Consuls, the Vsipetes and Tenchtheri, two German nations, passed over the Rhine, with great multitudes of people; not far from the place, where it falleth into the sea. The reason of their flitting, was the ill entreaty, which for many years together they had received of the Suevi, the greatest & warlikest nation amongst the Germans. For these Suevi had one hundred Cantons or shires, which yearly furnished their wars, with 1000 men a piece; and kept as many at home to maintain both themselves, and their Armies abroad: and these the year following were in Arms; and the other stayed at home, and performed the like duty; and so by this means, they all continued their experience both of tillage, and matter of war. They lived chiefly upon cattle and milk, and used much hunting, which was the cause (what through the quality of their diet, their continual exercise, and liberty of life, being never tied to any discipline, nor urged to any thing against their disposition) that they were strong and of a large stature, using skins and hides for their clothing, which covered but part of their body, the rest being naked. Their horsemen oftentimes, in time of battle, forsook their horse, and fought on foot; being taught to stand still in one place, that when they would they might return unto them. Neither was there any thing more base, or dishonest in the course of their life, then to use furniture for horses: & would adventure to charge upon great troops of horse, that used Equipage, with a few of their own quality. They admitted no wine to be brought in unto them, lest it might effeminate their warlike inclination, or make them unapt for labour. The greatest honour in their opinion, was to have their bordering Territories lie waste and desolate: for so it would be thought, that many states together, would not resist, their conquering valour: and it was reported, that the country lay waste from them one way 600 miles together.  

THE OBSERVATION.  
BY this practice of the Suevi, it appeareth, how little a naked resolution of valour availeth, when it wanteth the ornaments of moral carriage and civil discretion, to make use of that greatness which prowess hath obtained: for notwithstanding that they were a nation both warlike, and of good ability, they were so vainly carried on with a conceit of manhood, that it sorted to no other end, then to maintain barbarism at home, and desolation abroad; where as true valour is always subordinate to the preservation of common weals, and is as the defensive arms of civil society. Which I have the rather noted, in as much as it resembleth an humour that aboundeth in this age, especially in the particular haviour of our young gallants, whose naked valour reveling itself only in the lie and in the stab, for want of other assistant virtues to temper the heat of so brittle a metal, leadeth them into such inconveniences and disordered actions, that it changeth the nature thereof, into giddy headed rashness; and in lief of virtues guerdon, is repaid with irrision.    

CHAP. II.  
The motives, inducing the Vsipetes to come over the Rhine into Gallia.  
NEXT unto these Suevi, 
Caesar.  inhabited the Vbijs, a very ample and potent state: and through their intercourse and traffic with merchants, somewhat more civil, than the rest of the Germans. With these, the Suevi had often waged battle: and albeit they could not expel them out of their country, forasmuch as their state was very great and populous; yet by continual incursions they brought them under, and much weakened their estate. In the same case were the Vsipetes and Tenchtheri: for having made head against the Suevi for many years together, they were constrained in the end to forsake their possessions; and wandering the space of three years through the continent of Germany, at last they arrived where the 
* Geldres and Cleeve.  Menapijs inhabited the banks, on both sides the river Rhine: but being terrified with the arrival of such a multitude, they forsook all their dwellings beyond the river, and planted themselves on this side of the water, to hinder the Germans from further passage.  
The Vsipetes with their associates, having tried all means, and not finding themselves able to pass over by force, for want of boats; nor by stealth, by reason of the diligent watch of the Menapijs, feigned a retreat to their old habitation: and after three days journey, their horsemen in one night speedily returned again, and slew the Menapijs, both ungarded and unprovided. For they upon the departure of the Germans, feared not to return over the river into their towns and houses: these being slain, and their shipping taken, they got over the river, before the rest of the Menapijs had any notice of their coming: by which means they easily dispossessed them of their dwelling places, and lived that winter upon the provision they found there.  
Caesar understanding of these things, and fearing the weakness of the Galls, in as much as they are sudden and quick in their resolutions, and withal desirous of novelty: he durst no way trust their unconstancy; for it was their practice and custom to stay travelers and passengers, and inquire of them what they either heard or knew, concerning any thing that had happened; and the common people would flock about merchants in fairs and markets, and learn of them whence they came, and what news they brought from thence: and by these rumours and hearesays they directed the main course of their actions; whereof they could not but repent themselves, being grounded upon such weak intelligence, as was usually coined to please the multitude. Which custom being known, Caesar to prevent a greater war, hasted to his Army sooner than he was wont to do.  

OBSERVATIONS.  
Such as have spent their time in the contemplation of nature, and have made diligent search of the temperature & quality of climates and nations, have all with one consent made choler the regent of the French complexion; distinguishing the people, with such attributes, as the said humour usually breedeth. Neither have these conditions, which Caesar so long ago observed in the ancient Galls, any disresemblance from that, which the learned of this age have delivered, concerning the nature of the said inhabitants: but that irresolute constitution, which breeds such novelties and contrarieties of actions, continueth the same unto these times, in the inhabitants of that country, notwithstanding the alteration of customs, and people, or what else so long a time hath changed; which argueth the unresistible power of celestial influence, establishing an uniformity of nature, according as the site of the place lieth capable of their powerful aspect.  
The cause of the diversity in the temperature of nations, which are differenced by North and south, is not without apparent cause, attributed to their propinquity, or distance from the course of the sun, which distinguisheth by heat and cold the Northern and Southern climates of the earth; and separateth the inhabitants thereof, by the dominion of their active qualities. But the reason why two nations which are both in the same climate, and under the same parallel, receiving the virtue of the celestial bodies, by the same downefal and rebound of their beams, being differenced only by East and West; are so much disunited in nature, and so unlike in disposition, is not so apparent: whether it be as some have imagined, for as much as the all enclosing sphere, which remaineth quiet and immovable above the circuit of the first motor, hath his parts diversly distinguished with variety of properties; which by continual reference and mutual aspect, are imprinted in the correspondent quarters of the earth; and so keep a perpetual residency of one and the same quality, in one and the same place; and make also the variety of fashions in such parts, as otherwise are equal favourites of the heavens majesty, by receiving an equal measure of light, heat and virtue; or whether the said quarters of the earth are in themselves diversly noted, with several qualities, which appropriate the self same influence to their particular nature, and so alter it into many fashions; or whether there be some other unknown cause: I will leave every man to satisfy himself with that which seemeth most probable unto him, and proceed to the discovery of this choleric passion. Wherein I will endeavour to show how impatiency, sudden resolution, and desire of novelty, are natural adjuncts of this humour: And if Caesar made use of this philosophy in the managing of that war, let it not be thought impertinent to the knowledge of a General, to enter into the consideration of this learning. Wherein first, I must lay for a maxim that which long experience hath made authentical, that the motions of the mind are either quick or slow, according as the complexion is tempered, either with heat or cold: for as the flegmaticall humour, is of a moist, cold and heavy nature, begetting weak and gross spirits, and benumbing the instruments with a liveles disability; so is the motion of the internal faculties, proceeding likewise after a slow manner, according to the quality of the instruments, whereby it moveth: and therefore men of this waterish constitution, are no way apt to receive an impression, nor to entertain any sensible apprehension, unless it be beaten into them, with often and strong repetitions; and then also they proceed as slowly in discoursing of the consequence, and linger in the choice of their resolutions. On the contrary part, this flava bilis, being of a hot piercing nature, and resembling the active virtue of the fire, doth so purify the instruments of sense, and quicken the spirits with the vivacity of motion, that they take the first impression as perfectly, as if it had been oftentimes presented unto them, with many strong circumstances. And thence it happeneth, that inasmuch as the Species is so readily received, and possesseth the apprehending faculty, with such facility of entrance, that it moveth the other powers of the soul, with as great efficacy at the first conception, as if it had been brought in with troops of probabilities, and strengthened with manifest arguments of undoubted truth: It followeth therefore (by reason of the subtle and fit disposition of the instruments, which proceedeth from heat the chiefest quality in choler) that the object is at the first moment so strongly settled, in the first receiving faculty, that the other powers of the mind, with as great speed manifest their offices, concerning the apprehension; and deliver a sentence answerable to the strength of the first conception: which maketh them so impatient of delay, and so suddenly to alter their former resolutions, not suffering the discursive power to examine the substance thereof, by conference of circumstances; nor to give judgement according to the course of our intellectual court. It behoveth therefore every man, in that unsteady disposition, especially in matter of moment, to be suspicious of his own credulity, and not to give place to resolution, before his judgement be informed, by discourse of the strength or weakness of the conceived opinion.  
But to leave these speculative meditations, to Philosophers of learned conceit: for as much as the right use of passions is either true wisdom, or cometh nearest to the same; I will only touch in a word what degree of choler best befitteth a soldier; or how it availeth, or disaduantageth in matter of war. And first it cannot be denied, that there is almost no passion, that doth more eclipse the light of reason, or sooner corrupteth the sincerity of a good judgement, than this of anger, which we now speak of: Neither is there any motion that more pleaseth itself in his own actions, or followeth them with greater heat in the execution. And if the truth chance to show itself, and convince a false pretended cause, as the author of that passion, it oftentimes redoubleth the rage even against truth and innocency. Piso condemned a soldier for returning from foraging, without his companion, being persuaded that he had slain him: but at the instant of the execution, the other that was missing, returned, and with great joy of the whole army, they were carried to the general, thinking to have much gratified him, with the manifestation of the truth: but he through shame and despite, being yet in the torture of his wrath, redoubled his anger, and by a subtlety which his passion furnished him withal, he made three culpable for that he found one innocent; the first, because the sentence of death was passed against him, and was not to be recalled without the breach of law: the second, for that he was the cause of the death of his companion: and thirdly, the executioner, for not obeying his commandment.  
Concerning matter of war, as it consisteth of differenced parts; so hath choler divers effects. In case of discourse and consultation, when as the powers of the mind ought to be clear of all violent affections, it greatly darkeneth the understanding, and troubleth the sincerity of a good judgement, as Caesar noted in his speech to the senate concerning Catiline: 
Sallust.  and therefore a commander must, by all means endeavour to avoid, even the least motions of so hurtful a passion; and season his affections, with that gravity and constancy of spirit, that no turbulent disposition may, either hinder his understanding, or withhold his will from following that course, which reason appointeth, as the best means to a fortunate success: always remembering, that all his actions are presented upon a stage, and pass the censure of many curious beholders, which applaud grave and patient motions, as the greatest proof of true wisdom; and disallow of passionate, and headstrong affection, as derogating from the sincere carriage of an action, how just soever otherwise it seemeth.  
Concerning execution and fury of battle, I take anger to be a necessary instrument to set valour on foot, and to overwage the difficulties of terror, with a furious resolution: for considering that the noblest actions of the mind, stand in need of the impulsions of passions, I take anger to be the fittest means, to advance the valiant carriage of a battle: for as fear is treacherous and unsafe; so anger is confident and of an unquenchable heat; and therefore a Commander ought by all means, to suggest matter of anger against an enemy, that his men may behold them with a wrathful regard, and thirst after the day of battle, to satisfy their fury with the blood of their adversaries. If any urge that it hath been heretofore observed of the Galls, that in the beginning of a battle they were more than men, and in the latter end they were less than women; and therefore a choleric disposition is not so fit for service, as we seem to make it. I answer, that there is a difference between a disposition to choler, such as was observed in the Galls, and the passion of anger, well kindled in the mind: for the first is subject to alteration and contrariety of actions; but the other is furious, invincible, never satisfied but with revenge. And so that of Aristotle is proved true, that anger serveth oftentimes as a weapon to virtue; whereunto some answer very pleasantly, saying, it is a weapon of a strange nature: for we do manage other weapons, and this doth manage us; our hand guideth not it, but it guideth our hand; it possesseth us, and not we it, as it happened in the reign of Tiberius, amongst the mutinous legions at Vetera: 
Tacit. 1. Anal.  and therefore a Commander ought to take great heed, whom he maketh the object of that anger, which kindleth in his army: for as it is a passion of terrible execution, and therefore needeth to be wisely directed; so is it dangerous in regard of obedience, which was the only thing which Caesar required in his soldiers.  
But to leave this hasty matter, and fall nearer that which we seek after. I may not omit the prognostication, which Caesar made of the consequence of this accident, by the natural disposition of the people; the event whereof proved the truth of his predictions; which showeth what advantage a learned general that hath been somewhat instructed in the school of nature, hath gained of him, whom only experience hath taught the active rudiments of the war, & thinketh of no further lesson in that art, then that which the office of a sergeant or lanceprizado containeth.    

CHAP. III.  
Caesar cometh to his army, marcheth towards the Germans, and by the way treateth of conditions of peace.  
CAESAR being come to his army, 
Caesar.  found that to have happened which he before suspected: for some of the states of Gallia had sent messengers unto the Germans, to leave the banks of Rhine, and to come further into the continent, where they should find ready, whatsoever they desired. Whereupon the Germans began to make further incursions, and to waste the land as far as the confines of the 
* Liege.  Eburones. The Princes of the Galls being called together, Caesar thought it best to dissemble what he had discovered, concerning their revolt; and confirming their minds with an approbation of their loyalty, he commanded certain troops of horse to be levied, and resolved to make war upon the Germans; and having made provision of corn, he directed his march towards them. From whom as he was on the way, within a few days journey of their camp, he received this message: The Germans as they were not willing to make war upon the Romans, so they would not refuse to make trial of their manhood, if they were justly provoked; for their ancient custom was to answer an enemy by force, and not by treaty; yet this much they would confess, that they came thither very unwillingly, being driven by violence out of their possessions. If the Roman people would accept of their friendship, and either give them territories to inhabit, or suffer them to keep that which they had got by the law of arms, they might prove profitable friends unto them. They only yielded to the Suevi, to whom the Gods in feats of arms were inferior; any other nation they would easily conquer.  
To this Caesar answered what he thought fit; but the purport of his speech was, that he could not make any league with them, if they continued in Gallia: neither was it probable, that they that could not keep their own, would get possessions out of other men's hands. Gallia had no vacant place to entertain so great a multitude: but if they would they might find a welcome, amongst the 
* Colonia Agrippina.  Vbijs, whose agents were at that instant in his camp, complaining of the injury of the Suevi, and desiring aid against them; this much he himself would entreat of the Vbijs. The messengers went back with these Mandates, promising within three days to return again to Caesar: in the mean time, they desired him, not to bring his army any nearer their quarters; which request Caesar denied: for understanding that a few days before, a great part of their Cavalry were passed over the Mosa, he suspected that this delay imported nothing more than the return of their horsemen.  
When Caesar was come within twelve miles of their camp, their Ambassadors returned; and meeting him on the way, entreated him earnestly to march no further towards them: but being denied of their suit, they besought him to send to those troops of horse, which marched before the army, that they should not fight nor make any hostile encounter; and that he would give them leave to send messengers to the Vbijs, of whose entertainment they would willingly accept, if the Princes and senate would swear faith & safe continuance unto their people: Neither would they require more than 3. days, to negotiate this business. Caesar conceived this treaty to import nothing else, than the return of their horsemen that were absent in pillage, whom they expected within 3. days; notwithstanding he promised them to march but four miles further that day, to a convenient watering place: in the mean time he sent to the commanders of the horse that were before, not to provoke the enemy to fight; and if they were set upon to sustain the charge, until he came nearer with the army.  

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.  
FIrst we may observe his dissembling of the practice of the Galls, with the Germans; & the encouragement which he gave them in a faithful and loyal affection to the people of Rome, when he himself knew they had started from that duty, which both their honour and a good respect of their friends required: for he well understood that his presence did take away all scruple of any further motion in that kind; & therefore to have objected unto them their errors, had not been to heal, but to discover their wound: only he took the way, to cut off their hopes of any practices, which they might attempt against the Roman people; and held them in the mean time in the appearance of faithful friends, that they might not be discouraged, by the detection of their revolt.   

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.  
SEcondly, upon this resolution that there was no league to be made with the Germans, if they continued on this side the Rhine; we may observe how he entertained a treaty of peace, with such consents and denials, as might manifest his readiness to further what he made show of, & not weaken the means of his best advantage. For as he was content they should take a quiet farewell of Gallia, and plant themselves in the possessions of the Vbijs; so was he loath to yield to any condition, which might disadvantage his forcible constraint or weaken his command, if persuasion failed: for he well knew that powerful means to effect that which he required, would further the course of a peaceable conclusion, and carry more authority in a parley, than any other motive, how reasonable soever.  
Moreover we may observe, 
Vincitur haud gratis iugulo qui provocat hostem.  how careful he was not to impose upon the Germans a necessity of fight; but opened a passage (by propounding unto them the association of the Vbijs) by which they might avoid the hazard of battle. Which thing was always observed by Commanders of ancient times, who diligently searching into the nature of things, found that neither of those noble instruments, whereby man worketh such wonders (I mean the hand and the tongue) had ever brought so many excellent works to that type of perfection, unless they had been forced thereunto by necessity: and therefore we are wisely to handle the course of our actions, lest while we stand too strict upon a violent guard, we give occasion to the enemy, by the way of Antiperistasis, to redouble his strength; and so furnish him with that powerful engine, which Vetius Mescius calleth ultimum and maximum telum, the last and greatest weapon; the force whereof shall better appear by these examples.  
Some few of the Samnites, 
Liu. lib. 9  contrary to the articles of peace between them and the Romans, having made incursions into the territories of the Ramaine confederates; the senate of that state sent to Rome, to excuse the fact, and to make offer of satisfaction: But being rejected, Claudius Pontius general of their forces, in an excellent oration which he made, showed how the Romans would not hearken to peace, but chose rather to be revenged by war: and therefore necessity constrained them to put on arms: justum est bellum (saith he) quibus necessarium, & pia arma quibus, nisi in Armis, spes est.  
Caius Manlius, 
Liu. lib. 7.  conducting the Roman legions against the Veijs, part of the Veian army had entered the Roman camp; which Manlius perceiving, he hasted with a band of men to keep the breach, and to shut in the Veij: which they no sooner perceived, but they fought with that rage and fury, that they slew Manlius; and had overthrown the whole camp, had not a Tribune opened them a passage, by which they fled away.  
In like manner Camillus, the wisest of the Roman Captains, being entered into the city of the Veijs, that he might take it with greater facility, and disarm the enemy of that terrible weapon of necessity, he caused it to be proclaimed, that no Veian should be hurt, that was found unarmed. Whereupon every man cast away his weapon, and so the town was taken without bloodshed.  
Let a soldier therefore take such hold of occasions, and opportunities that are offered unto him, that in time of battle he may seem to cast necessity upon his own cause, and retain it in his pay: considering how the power thereof altereth the works of nature, and changeth their effects into contrary operations, being never subject to any ordinance or law; and yet making that lawful which proceedeth from it.    

CHAP. FOUR  
The Germans, contrary to their own request made to Caesar, set upon the Roman horsemen, and overthrew them.  
NOtwithstanding the Germans request, 
Caesar.  concerning the truce, assoon as they saw the Roman horsemen, which were in number 5000, (whereas the Germans had not above 800. hearse) they charged upon the Romans, not expecting any hostile encounter, inasmuch as their ambassadors were newly departed from Caesar, and had obtained that day of truce; but being set upon, they made what resistance they could. The Germans, according to their usual custom, forsook their horse, and fight on foot, did easily put the Romans to flight; who never looked back, until they came into the sight of the legions: in that battle were slain 74. Roman horsemen. After this battle, Caesar thought it not safe, either to hearken to any conditions, or to receive any message from them, that by fraud and deceit had songht for peace, and meant nothing but war: And to attend any longer until their horsemen returned, was but to give them that advantage against him, especially considering the weakness of the Galls, amongst whom the Germans by this battle had gained great reputation; and therefore he durst not give them space to think upon it.  

OBSERVATIONS.  
THis cunning of the Germans offereth occasion to speak somewhat, concerning that main controversy of policy, which is, whether the actions of Princes and great commanders, are always to be attended with integrity, and faithful accomplishment thereof. Wherein I will only set down such arguments, and grounds of reason, which virtue and moral honesty on the one part, (for we will make it no question to a Christian mind) and the daily practice of states men on the other side, allege, to make good their contrary assertions.  
The great Politicians of the world, that commend virtue in a show, and not in esse and being, and study to maintain their states only with human reason, not regarding the authority of divine ordinance, set this down as a maxim in their Art; That he, that is to negotiate a matter, and meaneth to bring it to an end sorting to his contentment, must in all respects be like qualified, both in judgement and disposition, as the party is, with whom he dealeth: otherwise he cannot be sufficiently prepared, to hold himself strong in the matter, which he undertaketh. For a wrestler that cometh with mere strength to encounter an other that hath both strength & cunning, may beshrew his strength that brought him thither, to be cast by skill, and be laughed at, as an unworthy champion for serious sports: in like manner in this universal confusion of infidelity, wherein subtlety flieth at so high a pitch, he that thinketh with simplicity of spirit to wind through the labyrinths of falsehood, and avoid the snares of deceit, shall find himself too weak for so difficult a task, and beshrew his honesty, if he regard his commodity: for it is the course that every man taketh, which must bring us to the place, to which every man goeth: and he that opposeth himself against the current of the world, may stand alone in his own conceit, and never attain that which the world seeketh after. Forasmuch therefore, as craft and deceit are so general, it behoveth a man of public negotiations, to carry a mind apt & disposed to these qualities. This was signified by that, which ancient writers report of Achilles, who was sent to Chiron the Centaur, half a man & half a beast, to be instructed in the rudiments of princely carriage; that of the brutish part, he might learn to strengthen himself, with force & courage; & of the human shape, so to manage reason, that it might be a fit instrument to answer or prevent, what soever man's wit might forge to overthrow it. Neither ought a private man to wonder at the strangeness of these positions; considering that the government of kingdoms, and Empires is carried with another bias, then that which concerneth particular affairs in a well ordered state: wherein truth-breakers and faithlesse-dissemblers are worthily condemned, inasmuch as they necessarily enforce the ruin thereof. But these that sit at the helm of government, and are to shape the course of a state, according to the variation of times and fortunes, derive their conclusions from other principles, whereof inferior subjects are no more capable, than men are able to understand the works of the Gods: and therefore they are called arcana imperij, to be reverenced rather, then looked into.  
To conclude, the affairs of particular persons are of so short extension, and encircled in so small a compass, that a mean capacity may easily apprehend the advantages or inconveniences, which may ensue upon the contract: and therefore it is requisite they should stand to the adventure, and their judgement is worthily taxed with the loss: but the businesses of a common weal are, both subject to so many casualties of fortune, and rely upon such unexpected accidents, that it is impossible for any spirit, how provident soever, to foresee the issue, in that variety of chances. Besides that, every particular subject is much interessed in the fortune of the event, and may justly, challenge an alteration of the intended course, rather than suffer shipwreck through the error of their Pilot: And so the safety of the state doth balance out the loss of credit in the Governor.  
On the other side, such as zealously affect true honour, affirm virtue to be the same both in prince and people; neither doth condition of state, or calling, or the quality of public or private businesses, alter the nature and essence of goodness: for to deprive the tongue of truth and fidelity were to break the bond of civil society, which is the basis and ground plot of all states and commonweals. They do not deny but that a wise Prince may so carry a treaty, that he may seem to affect that most which he lest intendeth; or answer doubtfully concerning the propositions; and that he may use with great honour the practices and stratagems of war, when the fortune of both parties consisteth upon their own industry: but to break any covenants agreed upon, may well get a kingdom, but never honourable reputation.  
And thus they contend concerning the means, whereby a state is continued in happy government: whereof this much I dare say by the warrant of this history, that he who falsifieth his words upon advantage, howsoever he regardeth his honour, had need to pay them home in regard of his own safety: for if they once recover the loss, and get any advantage against those truth-breakers, they will find as little favour, as the Germans did with Caesar.    

CHAP. V.  
Caesar marched directly to the camp of the Germans, and cut them all in pieces, and so ended that war.  
UPON these considerations, 
Caesar.  Caesar manifesting his resolution to the Legates, and Questor; there happened a very fortunate accident. For the next day, very early in the morning, most of the Princes and chiefest of the Germans came unto Caesar into his camp, to excuse their fraudulent practice; and withal to continue their petition of truce. Whereof Caesar was exceeding glad, and caused them to be kept in hold; and at the same instant, brought his Army out of the camp, commanding his horsemen to follow the legions, because they had been daunted with so late an overthrow: And making a triple battle, marched speedily eight miles, and so came upon the Germans, before they had notice what had happened; and being terrified with our sudden arrival, and the departure of their own leaders, knew not whether it were their best course, to bring forth their forces, or to defend their camp, or otherwise to seek their safety by flight. Which tumult and fear was no sooner perceived by the Roman soldier, but calling to mind their perfidious treachery, they broke into the camp, and were at first a little resisted; in the mean time, the women and children fled every one away: which Caesar perceiving, sent his horsemen to pursue them. The Germans hearing the clamour and schriching behind their backs, and seeing their friends pursued and slain, did cast away their weapons, and fled out of the camp, and coming to the confluence of the Maze and the Rhine, such as had escaped cast themselves into the river; where, what through fear, and weariness, and the force of the water, were all drowned. In this conflict the Romans lost not a man: the number of the enemy was 430000 with women and children. To them, whom he had retained in his camp, he gave leave to depart; but they fearing the cruelty of the Galls, desired that they might continue with the Romans: which Caesar agreed unto.  

OBSERVATIONS.  
THis relation affordeth little matter of war, but only a severe revenge of hateful treachery: notwithstanding I will hence take occasion, to discover the offices of the Quaestor and the Legates; and show what place they had in the Army. And first concerning the Quaestor, we are to understand, that he was elected by the common voice of the people, in the same court, which was called to create the General. His office was, to take charge of the public treasure, whether it came out of their Aerarium, for the pay of the Army; or otherwise was taken from the enemy. Of him the soldiers received their stipend both in corn and money; and what other booty was taken from the enemy, he either kept them, or sold them, for the use of the commonweal.  
The Legates were not chosen, by the people, but appointed by the Senate, as assistants & Coadjutors to the Emperor, for the public service, and were altogether directed by the General, in whose absence they had the absolute command: and their number was for the most part uncertain; but proportioned according to the number of legions in the Army.    

CHAP. VI  
Caesar maketh a bridge upon the Rhine, and carrieth his Army over into Germany.  
THE Germane war being thus ended: 
Caesar.  Caesar thought it necessary, to transport his Army over the Rhine into the continent of Germany, for many causes: whereof this was not the least, that seeing the Germans were so easily persuaded, to bring their colonies and their vagrant multitudes into Gallia: he thought it good to make known unto them, that the Roman people could, at their pleasure, carry their forces over the Rhine into Germany. Moreover, those troops of horse, which were absent at the late overthrow of the Germans, were fled into the confines of the Sicambri; to whom, when Caesar sent messengers to demand them to be sent unto him, they answered, that the Roman Empire was limited by the Rhine: and if the Germans were interdicted Gallia, why should Caesar challenge any authority in their quarters? Lastly, the Vbijs, who amongst all the rest of the Germans had only accepted of Caesar's friendship, and given pledges of their fidelity, had made earnest suit unto him, to send them aid against the Suevi; or at the least to transport his Army over the Rhine: for the name and opinion of the Roman Army was so great, and of such fame, what with Ariovistus overthrow, and this last service, that it sounded honourable amongst the furthest nations of Germany. For these reasons, Caesar resolved to pass the Rhine: but to carry his Army over by boat, was neither safe, nor for the majesty of the people of Rome. And albeit it seemed a matter of great difficulty, by reason of the breadth, swiftness, and depth of the river, to make a bridge; yet he resolved to try what he could do, otherwise he determined not to pass over at all: and so he built a bridge after this manner.  
At two foot distance, he placed two trees of a foot and half square, sharpened at the lower end, and cut answerable to the depth of the river: these he let down into the water with engines, and drove them in with commanders, not perpendicularly, after the fashion of a pile, but gable wise and bending with the course of the water: opposite unto these he placed two other trees, joined together after the same fashion, being 40 foot distant from the former, by the dimension between their lower parts in the bottom of the water, and reclining against the course of the river: these two pair of couples thus placed, he joined together with a beam of two foot square, equal to the distance between the said couples, and fastened them at each end on either side of the couples, with braces and pins: whereby the strength of the work, and nature of the frame was such, that the greater the violence of the stream was, and the faster it fell upon the timber work, the stronger the bridge was united in the couple and joints. In like manner, he proceeded with couples, and beams, until the work was brought unto the other side of the river: and then he laid strait planks from beam to beam, and covered them with hurdles; and so he made a floor to the bridge. Moreover, on the lower side of the bridge, he drove down supporters, which being fastened to the timber work, did strengthen the bridge against the force of the water; and on the upper side of the bridge, at a reasonable distance, he placed piles to hinder the force of trees or boats, or what else the enemy might cast down to trouble the work: within ten days, that the timber began to be cut down and carried, the work was ended, and the Army transported. Caesar, leaving a strong garrison at either end of the bridge, went into the confines of the Sicambri.  

OBSERVATIONS.  
IT shall not be amiss, to enter a little into the consideration of this bridge; as well in regard of the ingenious Architecture thereof, as also that we may somewhat imitate Caesar, whom we may observe to insist with as great plenty of wit & eloquence, in presenting unto us the subtlety of his invention in such manner of handy works, as upon any other part of his actions; as this particular description of the bridge, may sufficiently witness: besides the fortifications at Alesia, and the entrenchments in Brittany, for the safety of his shipping, with many other works, which he might well record, as the greatest designs of an heroic spirit, and the wonderful effects of magnanimous industry; that succeeding ages might not boast either of Art or prows, which his virtue had not expressed; or otherwise might wonder at that worth, which they themselves could not attain unto: And to that purpose he entertained Virtwius, the father of architecture, and as worthily to be imitated in that faculty, as his master Caesar is in feats of arms. By whose example a great commander may learn how much it importeth the eternity of his fame, to beautify his greatest designs with art; and to esteem of such as are able to entreat the Mathematical muses, to show themselves under the shape of a sensible form; which albeit through the rudeness of the matter, fall far short of the truth of their intellectual nature, yet their beauty expresseth such a majesty of Art, that no time will suffer the memory thereof to perish.  
The workmanship of this bridge consisted chiefly in the oblique situation of the double posts, whereof the first order bending with the stream, and the lower rank against the stream, when they came to be coupled together with overthwart beams, which were fastened in the couple with braces, which he nameth Fibulas; the more violent the stream fell upon the work, the faster the joints of the building were united, as may better appear by a model of that making, then can be expressed by any circumstance of words.  
I might hence take occasion to speak of the diversity of bridges, and of the practices which antiquity hath devised to transport Armies over rivers: but inasmuch as it is a common subject for all that undertake this military task, and hath been handled by Lipsius, 
Lib. de Machi.  upon the occasion of this bridge; I will refer the reader to that place; and only note the singular disposition of this action, in as much as Caesar made the means correspondent to that end which he intended. For considering that the chiefest end of his passage was, to let the Germans understand, that the power of the Roman Empire was not bounded with the Rhine; and that a river could not so separate their Territories, but that they were able to join both the continents together, and make a common road way, where it seemed most unpassable: he thought it best to pass over his Army by a bridge, that so the Germans might know the power of his forces, and also conceit their Territories, as united unto Gallia; or to be united at the pleasure of the Romans, with a firm Isthmus & plain passage by foot, which in times past had always been separated by a mighty river. Neither would a transportation by boat have wrought that effect, for as much as the daily use thereof was so familiar to the Germans, that it nothing altered their imagination, of an unaccessible passage: but when they saw so strange a thing attempted, and so suddenly performed, they would easily understand, that they were not so far off, but that they might be overtaken; and so direct their demeanour accordingly.  
Let this suffice therefore to prove, that a passage over a river by a bridge, is more honourable, safe, and of greater terror to the enemy, than any other way that can be devised; especially if the river carry any depth, such as the Rhine is otherwise, if it have either shallows or fords, whereby men may wade over, without any great encumbrance, it were but lost labour to stand about a bridge; but rather to think of it, as of a place encumbered with such hindrances, as men often meet with in a march.    

CHAP. VII.  
Caesar taketh revenge upon the Sicambri: giveth liberty to the Vbijs; and returneth again into Gallia.  
THE Sicambri, 
Caesar.  understanding that Caesar was making a bridge over the Rhine, prepared themselves to fly; and at the persuasion of the Vsipetes, forsook their country, and conveyed selves and their possessions into woods, and solitary deserts. Caesar continuing a few days in their quarters, having set on fire their villages and houses, and burned up their corn and provision; he came to the Vbijs, promising them aid against the Suevi: by whom he understood, that assoon as the Suevi had intelligence, that he went about to make a bridge, calling a council according to their manner, they sent unto all quarters of their state, that they should forsake their towns, and carry their wives and children, and all that they had, into the woods: and that all that were able to bear Arms, should make head in one place, which they appointed to be the midst of their country, and there they attended the coming of the romans, and were resolved in that place to give them battle. Which when Caesar understood, having ended all those things, in regard whereof he came into Germany, which was chiefly to terrify the Germans, to be revenged upon the Sicambri, to set the Vbijs at liberty; having spent in all 18 days beyond the Rhine, as well in regard of his own honour, and the good of the commonweal: he returned into Gallia, and broke up the bridge.   

CHAP. VIII.  
Caesar thinketh of a voyage into Brittany: he inquireth of merchants, concerning the nature of that people.  
ALTHOUGH the summer was almost spent, 
Caesar.  and that in those parts the winter hasteneth on a pace, inasmuch as all Gallia inclineth to the North; notwithstanding he resolved to go over into Brittany; forasmuch as he understood, that in all the former wars of Gallia, the enemy had received most of their supply from thence. And although the time of the year would not suffer him to finish that war; yet he thought it would be to good purpose, if he went only to view the Island, to understand the quality of the inhabitants, and to know their coast, their ports, and their landing places; whereof the Galls were altogether ignorant: for seldom any man, but merchants, did travel unto them. Neither was there any thing discovered but the sea-coast, and those regions which were opposite unto Gallia: And therefore calling merchants together from all quarters, he neither could understand of what quantity the Island was, what nations, or of what power they were that inhabited it; what use or experience of war they had; what laws or customs they used; nor what havens they had to receive a navy of great shipping.  

OBSERVATIONS.  
AS the Germans had oftentimes stirred up motions of rebellion amongst the Galls, by sending their superfluous multitudes into their kingdom; so the Britaines had upheld most of their wars, by furnishing them with such supplies, as from time to time they stood in need of. So that if Caesar, or the Roman people, would rest secure of their quiet and peaceable government in Gallia, as they had chastised the insolency of the Germans, & sent them back again, with greater loss than gain; so was it necessary to make the Britain's know, that their assistance in the war of Gallia would draw more businesses upon them, than they were well able to manage. For as I have noted in my former discourses, the causes of an unpeaceable government are as well external and foreign, as internal and bred in the body; which need the help of a Physician, to continue the body in a perfect state of health, and require as great a diligence to qualify their malicious operations, as any internal sickness whatsoever.  
In the second Commentary, I briefly touched the commodity of good discovery; but because it is a matter of great consequence, in the fortunate carriage of a war, I will once again by this example of Caesar, remember a General not to be negligent in this duty. Suetonius in the life of our Caesar reporteth, that he never undertook any expedition, but he first received true intelligence of the particular site, and nature of the country, as also of the manners and quality of the people; and that he would not undertake the voyage into Brittany, until he had made perfect discovery by himself, of the magnitude and situation of the Island. Which Suetonius might understand by this first voyage, which Caesar would needs undertake in the latter end of a summer, although it were as he himself saith, but to discover.  
It is recorded by ancient writers, that those demi-gods that governed the world in their time, gave great honour to the exercise of hunting, as the perfect image of war in the resemblance of all parts, and namely in the discovery and knowledge of a country; without which all enterprises, either of sport in hunting, or earnest in wars were frivolous and of no effect. And therefore Zenophon in the life of Cyrus, showeth that his expedition against the king of Armenia, was nothing but a repetition of such sports, as he had used in hunting. Howsoever, if the infinite examples registered in history, how by the dexterity of some leaders it hath gained great victories, & through the negligence of others, irrecoverable overthrows; are not sufficient motives to persuade them to this duty: let their own experience in matters of small moment, manifest the weakness of their proceedings, when they are ignorant of the chiefest circumstances of the matter they have in hand. But let this suffice in the second place, to prove the necessity of good discovery; and let us learn of Caesar, what is principally to be inquired after in the discovery of an unknown country; as first the quantity of the land: secondly, what nations inhabit it: thirdly, their use of war: fourthly, their civil government: and lastly, what havens they had to receive a navy of great shipping. All which circumstances are such principal Arteries in the body of a state, that the discovery of any one of these demands would have given great light, concerning the motion of the whole body.    

CHAP. IX.  
Caesar sendeth C. Volusenus, to discover the coast of Brittany; and prepareth himself for that voyage.  
CAESAR sent out Caius Volusenus, 
Caesar. Teroanne, or Monstrell.  with a galley to discover what he could concerning these things; and to return again unto him very speedily: he himself marched in the mean time, with all his forces, unto the Morini; forasmuch as from thence lay the shortest cut into Brittany. Thither he commanded that ships should be brought from all the maritimate cities of that quarter, and namely that fleet, which he had built the year before for the war at Vannes. In the mean time his resolution being known, and carried into Brittany by merchants and others, many private states of that Island sent ambassadors unto him, promising him hostages of their loyalty, and signifying their readiness to submit themselves to the Roman Empire. To these he made liberal promises, exhorting them to continue in that obedience; and so sent them back again: And with them he sent Comius, whom he had made king of Arras, whose wisdom and virtue he held in good account, and knew it to be of great authority in those Regions: to him he gave in charge to go to as many of the states as he could, and persuade them to accept of the friendship of the Roman Empire, and that Caesar himself would presently follow after.  
Volusenus, having taken what view of the country he could; for he durst not go on shore to commit himself to the barbarism of the enemy; after five days returned to Caesar: and while he stayed in those places for the furnishing of his fleet, the Morini sent messengers unto him, excusing their former faults, and manifesting their readiness to obey his mandates. Caesar not willing to leave any enemy behind him, or to neglect his voyage into Brittany, for such small matters; he willingly accepted of their submission, having first received many hostages of them, and having made ready eighty ships of burden, which he thought sufficient to transport two legions, he divided the Galleys to the Quaestor, the Legates and the commanders of the horse. There were also eighteen ships of burden more, which lay windbound at a port eight miles off, and them he appointed for the horsemen: the rest of the Army he committed to Q. Titurius Sabinus, and L. Arunculeius Cotta, commanding them to go to the confines of the Menapijs: and appointed P. Sulp. Rufus, a Legate, to keep the port, with a sufficient garrizon.   

CHAP. X.  
Caesar saileth into Brittany, and landeth his men.  
THESE things being thus dispatched: having a good wind in the third watch, 
Caesar.  he put out to sea, commanding his horsemen to embark themselves at the further port, which was but slowly performed: he himself arrived upon the coast about the fourth hour of the day, where he found all the cliffs possessed with the forces of the enemy. The nature of the place was such, that the hills lay so steep over the sea, that a weapon might easily be cast, from the higher, ground upon the lower shore: and therefore he thought it no fit landing place; notwithstanding he cast anchor until the rest of the navy were come up unto him. In the mean time▪ calling a council of the Legates and Tribunes, he declared unto them what advertisements he had received by Volusenus, and told them what he would have done; and withal admonished them that the course of military affairs, and especially sea matters, that had so sudden and an unconstant motion, required all things to be done at a beck, and in due time. The Council being dismissed, having both wind and tide with him, he weighed anchor, and sailed eight miles from that place, unto a plain and open shore. The Britain's perceiving the Romans determination, sent their horse and chariots before, and the rest of their forces followed after, to the place where the Romans intended to land. Caesar found it exceeding difficult to land his men, for these respects: the ships were so great, that they could not be brought near unto the shore: the soldiers in strange and unknown places, having their hands laden with great and heavy weapons, were at one instant to go out of the ship, to withstand the force of the billow, and to fight with the enemy; whereas the Britain's either standing upon the shore, or making short sallies into the water, did boldly cast their weapons in known and frequented places, and managed their horses as accustomed to such services.  
The Romans being terrified with these things, and altogether unskilful of this kind of fight, did use the same courage, as they were wont to do in land services: which when Caesar perceived, he caused the Galleys, that were both strange to the Britain's, and readier for use, to be removed from the ships of burden, and to be rowed up and down, and laid against the open side of the enemy; that from thence with slings, engines & arrows, the enemy might be beaten up from the water side; which stood the Romans in good steed: for the Britain's, being troubled with the strangeness of the Galleys, the motion of their Oars; and the unusual kind of engines; were somewhat dismayed, and began to retire back, and give way to the Romans: but the soldiers still linger, and especially for fear of the depth of the sea, the Eagle-bearer of the tenth legion desiring the Gods, that it might fall out happily to the legion: If you will (saith he) forsake your Eagle, O ye soldiers, and betray it to the enemy, for mine own part I will do my duty both to the common weal, and to my Imperator, and having spoken this, with a loud voice, he cast himself into the sea, and carried the Eagle toward the enemy; the romans exhorting one another, not to suffer such a dishonour to be committed, they all leapt out of the ship: which when others that were near at hand perceived, they followed them with as great alacrity, and pressed towards the enemy to encounter with them. The fight on both parts was very eager, the romans not being able to keep any order of battle, nor to get any firm footing, nor to follow their ensigns, forasmuch as every man kept with those ensigns, which he first met withal, were wonderfully troubled: But the enemy acquainted with the flats and shallows, as they beheld them from the shore to come single out of their ships, putting spurs to their horse, would set upon them encumbered and unprepared, and many of them would overlay a few; others would get the advantage of the open side, and cast their weapons amongst the thickest troops of them: which when Caesar perceived, he caused the shipboates and smaller vessels to be manned with soldiers, and where he saw need of help, he sent them to rescue such as were overcharged. As soon as the romans got footing on the firm land, they made head together and charged the enemy, and so put them to flight; but they were not able to follow them, nor take the Island at that time, for want of horsemen, which thing was only wanting to Caesar's fortune.  

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.  
Upon this circumstance of landing, I may justly take occasion to handle that controversy, which hath been often debated by our English Captains, which is, whether it be better in question of an invasion, and in the absence of our shipping, to oppose an enemy at his landing upon our coast; or quietly to suffer him to set his men on shore, and retire our forces into some inland place, and there attend to give him battle? It seemeth that such as first set this question on foot, and were of an opinion, that we ought not by any means to encounter an enemy at his landing; for so we might much endanger ourselves and our country; did ground themselves upon the authority of Monsieur de Langey, not observing the difference between an Island and a continent. For where he setteth down that position, he plainly aimeth at such Princes, as border one upon an other in the same continent: but where their territories are disjoined by so great a bar as the Ocean, and have not such means to surprise one an other, it were mere folly to hold good that rule, as shall better appear by the sequel of this discourse. Wherein I will first lay down the reasons, that may be urged to prove it unsafe to oppose an enemy at his landing, not as being urged by that party; for I never heard any probable motive from them which might induce any such opinion, but set down by such as have looked into the controversies, both with experience and good judgement.  
And first, it may be objected, that it is a hard matter to resist an enemy at his landing, as well in regard of the uncertainty of place, as of time: for being ignorant in what place he will attempt a landing, we must either defend all places of access, or our intentions will prove mere frivolous; and to perform that, it is requisite that our defensive forces be sufficient, according to the particular quality of every place subject to danger: which considering the large extension of our maritimate parts, and the many landing places on our coast, will require a greater number of men, than this Island can afford. And although it could furnish such a competent number, as might seem in some sort sufficient; yet the uncertainty of the time of the enemy's arrival, would require that they should be lodged, either upon or near the places of danger, many days at least, if not many weeks, before the instant of their attempt, which would exhaust a greater mass of treasure, then could be well afforded by the state.  
Secondly, it may be objected, that all our landing places are of such disadvantage, for the defendants; that it were no safety at all to make head against him at the landing: for in as much as such places are open and plain, they yield no commodity to shelter the defendants from the fury of the artillery, wherewith the enemy will plentifully furnish their long boats and landing vessailes; which beating upon the beach (for most of our landing places are of that quality) will so scatter them, that no man shall be able to endure the inconvenience thereof.  
The third objection may arise from the disparity both of numbers, and condition of the forces of either party: for the first it must needs be granted, that the defendants being to guard so many places at once, cannot furnish such numbers to every particular place for defence, as the assailants may for offence. Concerning the quality of the forces, it is without question, that a great and potent Prince, (for such a one it must be, that undertaketh to invade the territories of so absolute and well obeyed a Princess as her Majesty is) would draw out the flower of his soldiery wheresoever; besides the gallant troops of voluntaries, which do commonly attend such services. Now these being thus qualified, and drawn into one head, and being to make as it were but one body: how can it be reasonably imagined (the time and place of their attempt being uncertain) that the defendants should equal them with forces of like virtue and experience?  
These are the reasons, which may be drawn from the disadvantage, which they have that go about to oppose an enemy at his landing: the rest that have been urged, by such as maintain this opinion, are either impertinent to the question, or taken altogether from false grounds. But before I proceed to the answer of these reasons, I will lay this down for a principle. That it is impossible for any foreign Prince how puissant soever, to make such a preparation as shall be fitting to invade a state so populous, and respective of their soveragine, (notwithstanding the pretences devised to dissemble the same) but it must of necessity be discovered, before it can be made able to put any thing in execution: which I might enlarge by particularizing the infinite equipage, which is required for so great a fleet. But I will rest myself in the example of the year 88 which proveth the discovery of the pretended invasion, before it could come to execution.  
Concerning therefore the first objection: it cannot indeed be denied, but the place of the enemies landing will be doubtful, 
Answer to the first objection.  and therefore our care must generally extend itself to all places of access: but that our defensive forces are not sufficient in a competent manner to guard all such places, according as the necessity of them shall require, that is the point in question. To prove that our forces are sufficient: we must necessarily enter into particularities, wherein I will take Kent for a precedent, as not altogether unacquainted with the state thereof; which, if I deceive not myself, is a shore of as large extension upon the maritimate parts, as any other within this kingdom, for the breadth thereof enlarging itself from the point of Nesse by lid, which is the uttermost skirt upon the coast of Sussex, unto Margate upon the coast of Essex; is by computation about twenty four miles: but notwithstanding this large circuit, who knoweth not that the sixth part thereof is not subject to the landing of such an enemy, as we speak of, partly in regard of the hugeness of the cliffs, which do enclose a great part of that skirt; and partly in regard that much of that quantity, which may be landed upon, hath such eminent and difficult places near adjoining, as an army that should put itself there on shore, should find itself being opposed but by a small force, so straightened, as they would not easily find a way out, without apparent ruin of their whole forces. Further it cannot be denied, but that generally along the coast of Kent, there are so many rocks, shelves, flats, and other impediments, that a navy of great ships can have no commodity to anchor near the shore: and for the most part the coast lieth so open to the weather, that the least gale of wind will put them from their Anchor: all which particularities duly considered, it will appear that this large skirt of Kent will afford a far lesser part fit for the landing of an army, than was thought of at the first. And were it that so public a treatise as this is, would admit with good discretion such an exact relation, as falleth within my knowledge concerning this point, I would undertake to make it so evident, by the particular description both of the number, quantity and quality of the places themselves; as no man of an indifferent judgement would imagine our forces to be insufficient, to afford every of them such a safe and sure guard, as shall be thought requisite for the same. But forasmuch as it is unfitting to give such particular satisfaction in this public discourse, give me leave, submitting myself always to better judgements, to give a general taste of that means as would secure all places, with a competent number of men.  
Having showed you before the circuit of the maritimat parts of Kent, I would observe this order: first, to make a triple division of all such forces, as shall be appointed for this service; as for example, I will suppose the number to be 12000 of which I would lodge 3000. about the point of Nesse, and 3000. about Margate, & 6000. about Foulkston, which I take to be as it were the centre: for my greatest care should be so to dispose of them, as they might not only succour one an other in the same shire, but as every shire bordereth one upon an other; so they should mutually give help one unto an other, as occasion should be offered: as if the enemy should attempt a landing about Nesse, not only the 6000. lodged as before, should march to their succours, but such also of the Sussex forces as were near unto that part; and so likewise of the rest: by which you may see how great a force would in few hours be assembled, for the renforcing of any of these out skirts; and the rather, forasmuch as the one half of the whole forces are thus lodged in the centre of the shire, which is nearer to all parts then any other place whatsoever. There would also in the quartering of them, an especial care be had to the places of danger, as might be answerable to the importance thereof: for my meaning is not to lodge them close together, but to stretch them out along the coast by regiments and companies, as the country might afford best opportunity, to entertain them.  
Now concerning the latter part of this objection, which urgeth the uncertainty of time, when the enemy shall make his approaches: I hold it most requisite that our defensive forces should be drawn into a head, before the enemy should be discovered near our coast ready to put himself on shore: for it were a gross absurdity to imagine, that companies could upon such a sudden be assembled, without confusion; and make so long a march, with such expedition, as the necessity of the occasion would require. Now for that husbanding respect of her majesties coffers, which is urged to such extremity, as it would be unsupportable for this state to bear: as I doubt not but good intelligence would much qualify that supposed immoderate expense; so I assure myself, that men of sound judgement, will deem it much out of season to dispute about unnecessary thrift, when the whole kingdom is brought in question of being made subject to a stranger: 
Vt iugulent homines surgunt de nocte latrones,  
Non expergesceris, ut te ipsum serves?  the enemy (peradventure) hath kept 30000. men in pay 2. months before, to make havoc of our country, and to bring us into perpetual thraldom; shall we think it much to maintain sufficient forces upon our coast, to assure ourselves, that no such enemy shall enter into our country? the extremity of this charge would be qualified by our good espial, which would proportion our attendance, with the necessity which is imposed upon us to be careful in businesses of this nature. Let this suffice therefore to prove, that our forces are sufficient to keep the sea cost; and that the uncertainty of time, when the enemy will make his attempts, ought not to hinder us from performing that duty, which the care and respect of our Prince and country imposeth upon every good subject, which is the substance of the first reason, which I set down in the beginning of this discourse.  
Now concerning the second reason, which urgeth the disadvantage of the place, 
The answer to the second reason.  in regard of the fury of the enemy's artillery. True it is, that such places as yield the enemy commodity of landing, are for the most part plain and open, and afford naturally no covert at all. What then? shall a soldier take every place as he findeth it, and use no art to qualify the disadvantages thereof? or shall a man forego the benefit of a place of advantage rather, than he will relieve with industry the discommodity of some particular circumstance? I make no question but an ingenious commander, being in seasonable time lodged with convenient forces upon any of those places, yea upon the beach itself, which is unapt to make defensible, as any place whatsoever; would use such industry as might give sufficient security to his forces, and overwaie the enemy with advantage of place; especially considering that this age hath afforded such plentiful examples of admirable inventions in that behalf: but this cannot be done, if our forces do not make head before the instant of the enemy's attempt, that our commanders may have some time to make ready store of Gabions, handbaskets, with such movable matter as shall be thought fit for that service.  
Neither let this trouble any man, for I dare avouch it, that if our forces are not drawn into a head before the enemy be discovered upon the coast, although we never mean to oppose their landing, but attend them in some inland place, to give them battle; our Commanders will be far to seek of many important circumstances, which are requisite in a matter of that consequence. And therefore let us have but a reasonable time to bethink ourselves of these necessaries, and we will easily overcome all these difficulties, and use the benefit of the firm land to repel an enemy, weakened with the sea, tossed with the billow, troubled with his weapons, with many other hindrances and discouragementes, which are presented unto him both from the land and the sea. He that saw the landing of our forces in the Island of Fiall, in the year 97. can somewhat judge of the difficulty of that matter: for what with the working of the sea, the steepness of the cliffs, the troublesomeness of their arms, the soldiers were so encumbered, that had not the enemy been more than a coward, he might well with 200. men have kept us from entering any part of that Island.  
Concerning the third objection, 
The answer to the third reason.  this briefly shall be sufficient, that we are not so much to regard that our forces do equal them in number, as to see that they be sufficient for the nature of the place, to make it good against the enemies landing: for we know that in places of advantage and difficult access, a small number is able to oppose a great; and we doubt not but all circumstances duly considered, we shall proportionably equal the enemy, both in number and quality of their forces: always presupposed, that our state shall never be destitute of sufficient forces trained, and exercised in a competent manner, to defend their Country from foreign enemies. For the neglect thereof, were to draw on such as of themselves are but too forward, to make a pray of us; and to make us unapt, not only to oppose an enemies landing, but to defend ourselves from being overrun, as other nations living in security, without due regard thereof, have been.  
And this much concerning the answer to those three reasons, which seem to prove that an enemy is not to be resisted at his landing. Now if we do but look a little into the discommodities, which follow upon the landing of an enemy, we shall easily discover the dangerousness of this opinion: as first, we give him leave to live upon the spoil of our country, which cannot be prevented by any wasting, spoiling, or retiring of our provisions, in so plentiful a country as this is, especially considering that we have no strong towns at all to repose ourselves upon. Whereof we need no further testimony, then is delivered unto us out of the seventh book of these Commentaries, in that war, which Caesar had with Vercingetorix.  
Secondly obedience, which at other times is willingly given to Princes, is greatly, weakened at such times; whereby all necessary means to maintain a war is hardly drawn from the subject. Thirdly, opportunity is given to malcontents and ill disposed persons, either to make head themselves, or to fly to the enemy. Fourthly, the madness to adventure a kingdom upon one stroke, having it in our disposition to do otherwise, with many other disadvantages, which the opportunity of any such occasion would discover.   

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.  
THe word imperator, 
Of the name Imperator.  which the Eagle-bearer attributeth to Caesar, was the greatest title that could be given to a Roman leader: and as Zonaras in his second Tome saith, was never given but upon some great exploit, and after a just victory obtained; and then in the place where the battle was fought, and the enemy overthrown, the General was saluted by the name of Imperator, with the triumphant shout of the whole army; by which acclamation, the soldiers gave testimony of his worth; and made it equivalent with the most fortunate Commanders.  
This ceremony was of great antiquity in the Roman Empire, as appeareth by many histories, 
3. Annal.  and namely by Tacitus, where he saith, that Tiberius gave that honour to Blesus, that he should be saluted Imperator by the legions; which he showeth to be an ancient dignity belonging to great Captains, after they had foiled the enemy, with an eminent overthrow. For every victory was not sufficient, whereby they might challenge so great an honour, but there was required (as it seemeth) a certain number of the enemies to be slain. Apian in his second book saith, that in old time, the name of Imperator was never taken, but upon great and admirable exploits: but in his time 10000 of the enemy being slain in one battle, was a sufficient ground of that honour. Cicero saith, that 2000 slain in the place, especially of Thracians, 
Phil. 14.  Spaniards or Galls, did worthily merit the name of Imperator. Howsoever it seemeth by the same author, that there was a certain number of the enemy required to be slain, 
Lib. 2. epist. 9  where he saith, Se insta victoria Imperatorem appellatum.    

CHAP. XI.  
The Britain's make peace with Caesar, but break it again, upon the loss of the Roman shipping.  
THE Britain's being overthrown in this battle; 
Caesar.  assoon as they had recovered their safety by flight, they presently dispatched messengers to Caesar to entreat for peace, promising hostages and obedience, in whatsoever he commanded. And with these ambassadors returned Comius of Arras, whom Caesar had sent before into Brittany. Caesar complained, that, whereas they sent unto him into Gallia to desire peace, notwithstanding at his coming they made war against him, without any cause or reason at all; but excusing it by their ignorance, he commanded hostages to be delivered unto him: which they presently performed in part; and the rest being to be fet further off, should likewise be rendered within a short time; in the mean while, they commanded their people to return to their possessions, and their Rulers and Princes came out of all quarters to commend themselves and their states to Caesar. The peace being thus concluded; four days after that Caesar came into Brittany, the eighteen ships which were appointed for the horsemen, put out to sea with a gentle wind, and approaching so near the coast of Brittany, that they were within view of the Roman camp: there arose such a sudden tempest, that none of them were able to hold their course, but some of them returned to the port from whence they came; othersome were cast upon the lower part of the Island, which lieth to the West ward; and there casting anchor took in such seas, that they were forced to commit themselves again to the sea, and direct their course to the coast of Gallia. The same night it happened, that the moon being in the full, the tides were very high in those seas; whereof the romans being altogether ignorant, both the Galleys which were drawn up upon the shore were filled with the tide, and the ships of burden that lay at anchor, were shaken with the tempest, neither was there any help to be given unto them: so that many of them were rend, and split in pieces; and the rest lost both their anchors, Gables and other tackling: and by that means became altogether unserviceable. Whereat the whole army was exceedingly troubled; for there was no other shipping to recarry them bcke again: Neither had they any necessaries to new furnish the old: and every man knew that they must needs winter in Gallia; for as much as there was no provision of corn in those places where they were. Which thing being known to the Princes of Brittany, that were assembled to confer of such things as Caesar had commanded them to perform, when they understood that the romans wanted both their horsemen, shipping, and provision of corn, and conjecturing of the paucity of their forces, by the small circuit of their camp; and that which was more important than all the rest, that Caesar had transported his soldiers without such necessary carriages, as they used to take with them: they thought it their best course to rebel, and to keep the romans from corn and convoys of provision, and so prolong the matter, until winter came on. For they thought that if these were once overthrown and cut off from returning into Gallia, never any man would afterward adventure to bring an army into Brittany: therefore they conspired again the second time, and conveyed themselves by stealth out of the camp, and got their men privily out of the fields, to make head in some convenient place against the Romans.  

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.  
COncerning the ebbing and flowing of the sea, and the causes thereof; it hath already been handled in the second book, to which I will add this much, as may serve to show, how the romans became so ignorant of the spring tides, which happen in the full and new of the moon. It is observed by experience, that the motion of this watery element is altogether directed by the course of the moon, wherein she exerciseth her regency, according as she findeth the matter qualified for her influence. And for as much as all mediterrean seas, and such gulfs as are enclosed in sinews and bosoms of the earth, are both abridged of the liberty of their course, and through the smallness of their quantity, are not so capable of celestial power; as the Ocean itself: it consequently followeth, that the Tuskane seas, wherewith the Romans were chiefly acquainted, were not so answerable in effect to the operation of the moon, as the main sea, whose bounds are ranged in a more spacious circuit; and through the plenteous abundance of his parts, better answereth the virtue of the moon. The Ocean therefore being thus obedient to the course of the celestial bodies, taking her course of flowing from the North, falleth with such a currant between the Orcadeses, and the main of Noruegia; that she filleth our channel between England and France, with great swelling tides; and maketh her motion more eminent in these quarters, then in any other parts of the world. And hence it happeneth, that our river of Thames, lying with her mouth so ready to receive the tide as it cometh, and having withal a plain leveled belly, and a very small fresh currant, taketh the tide as far into the land, as any other known river of Europe. And for this cause the Romans were ignorant of the spring tides in the full of the moon.   

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.  
Such as either by their own experience, or otherwise by observation of that which history recordeth, are acquainted with the government of common weals, are not ignorant with what difficulty a nation, that either hath long lived in liberty, or been governed by commanders of their own choosing, is made subject to the yoke of bondage, or reduced under the obedience of a stranger. For as we are apt by a natural inclination to civil society; so by the same nature we desire a free disposition of ourselves and possessions, as the chiefest end of the said society. And therefore in the government of a subdued state, what loss or disadvantage happeneth to the victor, or how indirectly soever it concerneth the bond of their thraldom, the captive people behold it as a part of their adversaries overthrow; and conceive thereupon such spirits, as answer the greatness of their hope, and sort with the strength of their will, which always maketh that seem easy to be effected which it desireth. And this was the reason, that the Britaines altered their resolution of peace, upon the loss which the Romans had received in their shipping.    

CHAP. XII.  
Caesar new trimmeth his late shaken navy: the Britain's set upon the Romans as they haruested; but were put off by Caesar.  
CAESAR although he had not discovered their determination, yet conjecturing of the event by the loss of his shipping, and by their delay of giving up hostages; he provided against all chances: for he brought corn daily out of the fields into his camp; and took the huls of such ships as were most dismembered, and with the timber and brass thereof he mended the rest that were beaten with the tempest, causing other necessaries to be brought out of Gallia. Which being handled with the great industry and travel of the soldiers, he lost only twelve ships, and made the other able to abide the sea.  
While these things were in action, the seventh legion being sent out by course, to fetch in corn, and little suspecting any motion of war; as part of the soldiers continued in the field, and the rest went and came between them and the camp; the station that watched before the gate of the camp, gave advertisement to Caesar, that the same way which the legion went, there appeared a greater dust than was usually seen. Caesar suspecting that which in deed was true, that the Britaines were entered into some new resolution, he took those two cohorts which were in station before the port, commanding other two to take their place, and the rest to arm themselves, and presently to follow him, and went that way, where the dust was descried. And when he had marched some distance from the camp, he saw his men overcharged with the enemy, and scarce able to sustain the assault, the legion thronged together on a heap, and weapons cast from all parts amongst them. For when they had haruested all other quarters, there remained one piece of corn, whither the enemy suspected the Romans would at last come; and in the night time conveyed themselves secretly into the woods, where they continued, until the Romans were come into the field, and as they saw them disarmed, dispersed and occupied in reaping; they suddenly set upon them, and slaying some few of them, routed the rest and encompassed them about with their horsemen, and chariots. Their manner of fight with chariots, was first to ride up and down and cast their weapons, as they saw advantage; and with the terror of their horses & ratteling of their wheels, to disorder the companies; and when they had wound themselves between any troops of horse, they forsook their chariots and fought on foot: in the mean time the guiders of their chariots would drive a little aside, and so place themselves, that if their masters needed any help, they might have an easy passage unto them. And thus they performed in all their fights, both the nimble motion of horsemen, and the firm stability of footmen; and were so ready with daily practice, that they could stay in the declivity of a steep hill, and turn short or moderate their going, as it seemed best unto them; and run along the beam of the coach and rest upon the yoke, or harness of their horses, and return as speedily again at their pleasure. The Romans being thus troubled, Caesar came to rescue them in very good time: for at his coming, the enemy stood still; and the soldiers gathered their spirits unto them, and began to renew their courage that was almost spent. Caesar, thinking it an unfit time, either to provoke the enemy, or to give him battle; he continued a while in the same place: And then returned with the legions into the camp. While these things were a doing, and the romans thus busied; the Britain's that were in the field, conveyed themselves all away.  

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.  
BY this we plainly find, that there were usually two cohortes (which according to the rate of 120 in a maniple, amounted to the number of 720 men) which kept the day watch before the gate of the camp, and were always in readiness upon any service. The commodity whereof appeareth by this accident, for considering that the advertisement required haste and speedy recourse, it greatly furthered their rescue to have so many men ready to march forward at the first motion, that they might give what help they could, until the rest of their fellows came in.   

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.  
THeir manner of fight with chariots, is very particularly described by Caesar, and needeth not to be stood upon any longer: only I observe, that neither in Gallia, nor any other country of Europe, the use of chariots is never mentioned: but they have ever been attributed, as a peculiar fight, unto the eastern countries, as suitable to the plain and level situation of the place, whereof we find often mention in the scripture: which may serve for an argument to Geffrey of Monmouth, to prove the Britain's descent from Troy in Asia, where we likewise find mention of such chariots.   

THE THIRD OBSERVATION.  
THirdly we may observe, the discreet or moderate temper of his valour, and the means he used to make his soldiers confident in his directions: for notwithstanding the Britain's had exceedingly urged him, to make hazard of a present revenge; yet finding it an unfit time, (inasmuch as his men had been somewhat troubled, with the fury of the Britain's) he thought it best to expect some other opportunity. And again, to avoid the inconveniences of a fearful retreat, he continued a while in the same place, to embolden his men with the sight of the enemy. And this manner of proceeding wrought a full persuasion in his soldiers, that his actions were directed with knowledge, and with a careful respect of their safety; which gave his men resolution when they were carried upon service, being assured that what service soever they were employed upon, was most diligently to be performed, as a matter much importing the fortunate issue of that war: whereas if they had perceived that headstrong fury, which carrieth men on with a desire of victory, and never looketh into the means whereby it may be obtained, had directed the course of their proceedings, they might with reason have drawn back from such employments, and valued their safety above the issue of such an enterprise. And hence ariseth that confident opinion, which the soldiers have of a good General; which is a matter of great importance in the course of a war.    

CHAP. XIII.  
The Britain's make head, with their forces; and are beaten by Caesar: his return into Gallia.  
AFTER this; 
Caesar.  for many days together, there followed such tempests and foul weather, that both the Romans were constrained to keep their camp, and the Britaines were kept from attempting any thing against them: But in the mean time, they sent messengers into all quarters, publishing the small number of the Roman forces, and amplifying the greatness of the booty, and the easy means offered unto them of perpetual liberty, if they could take the Roman camp. Shortly upon this, having gathered a great company, both of horse and foot; they came to the place where the Romans were encamped. Caesar (although he foresaw the event by that which before had happened, that if the enemy were beaten back, he would avoid the danger by flight) yet having some 30 horse, which Comius of Arras had carried with him, at his coming into Brittany; he imbattailed his legions before his camp; and so gave them battle. The enemy not being able to bear the assault of the Roman soldiers, turned their backs and fled: the Romans followed them, as far as they could by running on foot; and after a great slaughter, with the burning of their towns far and near, they returned to their camp. The same day the Britain's sent messengers to Caesar, to entreat for peace; whom he commanded to double their number of hostages, which he commanded to be carried into Gallia. And forasmuch as the Aequinoctium was at hand; he thought it not safe to put himself to the winter sea, with such weak shipping: and therefore having got a convenient time, he hoist sail a little after midnight, and brought all his ships safe unto the continent. Two of these ships of burden, not being able to reach the same haven, put in somewhat lower into the land: the soldiers that were in them being about 300, being set on shore, and marching towards their camp: the Morini, with whom Caesar at his going into Brittany had made peace, in hope of a booty, first with a few of their men stood about them, commanding them upon pain of death to lay down their weapons; and as the Romans, by casting themselves into an Orb, began to make defence, at the noise and clamour amongst them, there were suddenly gathered together about 6000 of the enemy. Which thing being known, Caesar sent out all the horsemen to relieve them: in the mean time the Romans sustained the force of the enemy, and fought valiantly the space of four hours; and receiving themselves some few wounds, they slew many of the enemy. After the Roman horsemen came in sight, the enemy cast away their weapons and fled, and a great number of them fell by the horsemen.  

OBSERVATIONS.  
OF all the figures which the Tactici have chosen to make use of in military affairs; the circle hath ever been taken for the fittest, to be applied in the defensive part, as enclosing with an equal circuit on all parts whatsoever is contained within the circumference of that Area: and therefore Geometry termeth a circumference a simple line, for as much as if you alter the site of the parts, and transport one arch into the place of another; the figure notwithstanding will remain the same, because of the equal bending of the line, throughout the whole circumference. Which property, as it proveth an uniformity of strength in the whole circuit, so that it cannot be said that this is the beginning, or this is the end; this is front, or this is flank. So doth that, which Euclid doth demonstrate in the 3 of his Elements, concerning the small affinity between a right line, and a circle (which being drawn to touch the circumference, doth touch it but in a point only) show the greatness of this strength in regard of any other line, by which it may be broken. Which, howsoever they seem, as speculative qualities, conceived rather by intellectual discourse, then manifested to sensible apprehension; yet forasmuch as experience hath proved the strength of this figure, in a defensive part, above any other manner of imbattailing; let us not neglect the knowledge of these natural properties, which discover the causes of this effect: neither let us neglect this part of military knowledge, being so strong a means to maintain valour, and the sinew of all our ability: for order correspondent to circumstances, is the whole strength and power of an Army. Neither aught there any action in a well ordered discipline, to be irregular, or void of order: and therefore the Romans did neither eat nor sleep, without the direction of the Consul, or chief commander; otherwise their valour might rather have been termed fury then virtue: but when their courage was ranged with order, and disposed according to the occurrences of the time; it never failed as long as the said order continued perfect.  
It appeareth therefore, how important it is for a commander to look into the diversity of orders for imbattailing, and to weigh the nature thereof; that he may with knowledge apply them to the quality of any occasion. The Romans termed this figure Orbis, which signifieth a round body both with a concave, and a convex surface: in resemblance whereof, I understand this Orb of men imbattailed to be so named; which might peradventure consist of five or more or fewer ranks, enclosing one another after the nature of so many circles, described about one Centre: so that either the midst thereof remained void, or otherwise contained such carriages, and impediments, as they had with them in their march. This form of imbattailing was never used, but in great extremity: for as it was the safest of all other; so it gave suspicion to the soldiers of exceeding danger, which abated much of their heat in battle, as will hereafter appear by the testimony of Caesar himself, in the fifth Commentary, upon the occasion which happened unto Sabinus and Cotta.    

CHAP. XIIII.  
THE next day, 
Caesar.  Caesar sent Titus Labienus a Legate, with those legions which he had brought out of Brittany, against the revolted Morini; who having no place of refuge because their bogs & fens were dried up, where they had sheltered themselves the year before, they all fell under the power of his mercy. Q. Titurîus, and A. Cotta the Legates, who had led the legions against the Menapijs, after they had wasted their fields, cut up their corn, burned their houses, for the Menapijs were all hid in thick woods; they returned to Caesar: these things being thus ended, Caesar placed the wintering camps of all his legions amongst the Belgae; to which place two only of all the cities in Brittany, sent hostages unto him: the rest neglecting it. These wars being thus ended: upon the relation of Caesar's letters, the senate decreed a supplication for the space of 20 days.  

OBSERVATIONS.  
IN the end of the second Commentary, we read of a supplication granted by the senate, for 15 days; which was never granted to any man before that time; since the first building of the city; but forasmuch as in this fourth year of the wars in Gallia, it was augmented from 15 unto 20 days, I thought it fit to refer the handling thereof, unto this place. We are therefore to understand, that whensoever a Roman General had carried himself well in the wars, by gaining a victory, or enlarging the bounds of their Empire; that then the senate did decree a supplication to the Gods, in the name of that captain. And this dignity was much sought after, not only because it was a matter of great honour, that in their names the Temples of their Gods should be opened, and their victories acknowledged, with the concourse and gratulation of the Roman people: but also because a supplication was commonly the forerunner of a triumph, which was the greatest honour in the Roman government: 
Li. 15. fami. Cicero.  And therefore Cato nameth it the prerogative of a triumph. And Livy in his 26 book saith, that it was long disputed on in the senate, how they could deny one that was there present to triumph, whose absence they had honoured, with supplication, and thanksgiving to the Gods, for things happily effected? The manner of the Ceremony was; that after the Magistrate had publicly proclaimed it with this form or style, quod bene & faeciliter rempublicam administrasset; the Roman people clothed in white garments and crowned with garlands, went to all the temples of the Gods, and there offered sacrifices, to gratulate the victory in the name of the General. In which time they were forbidden all other businesses, but that which pertained to this solemnity. It seemeth that this time of supplication, was at first included within one or two days at the most, as appeareth by Livy in his third book, where he saith, that the victory gained by two several battles, was spitefully shut up by the senate in one days supplication: the people of their own accord keeping the next day holy and celebrating it with greater devotion than the former.  
Upon the victory which Camillus had against the Veijs, there were granted four days of supplication; to which there was afterward a day added, which was the usual time of supplication unto the time that Pompey ended the war, which they called Mithridaticum; when the usual time of five days was doubled, and made 10, and in the second of these Commentaries, made 15, and now brought to 20 days. Which setteth forth the incitements and rewards of well doing, which the Romans propounded both at home and abroad, to such as endeavoured to enlarge their Empire, or manage a charge, to the benefit of their commonwealths. And thus endeth the fourth Commentary.     

THE fifth COMMENTARY OF THE WAR, WHICH CAESAR MADE IN GALLIA.  
THE ARGUMENT.  
CAesar caused a great navy to be built in Gallia: he carried 5 legions into Brittany, where he made war with the Britain's, on both sides the river Thames: at his return into Gallia, most of the Galls revolted; and first the Eburones under the conduction of Ambiorix, set upon the camp of Q. Titurius the Legate, whom they circumvented by subtlety; and then besieged the camp of Cicero: but were put by, and their Army overthrown by Caesar.  

CHAP. I.  
Caesar returneth into Gallia: findeth there great store of shipping made by the soldiers, and commandeth them to be brought to the haven Iccius.  
LUCIUS Domitius, 
Caesar.  and Appius Claudius, being Consuls; Caesar at his going into Italy, gave order to the Legates to build as many ships that winter, as possibly they could; commanding them to be built of a lower pitch than those which are used in the mediterranean sea, for the speedier lading & unlading of them, and because the tides in these seas were very great: and forasmuch as he was to transport great store of horse, he commanded them to be made flatter in the bottom them such as were usual in other places, and all of them to be made for the use of Oars, to which purpose their low building served very conveniently. Other necessaries and furniture for rigging, he gave order to have it brought out of Spain. Caesar after the assembly of the states in Lombardie, and that he set free Illiricum from the incursions of the Pirustae, he returned into Gallia; where he found 600 ships built, by the extraordinary industry of the soldiers, notwithstanding the penury and want of all necessary matter, with 28 Galleys ready furnished, which in a few days might be launched: having commended the soldiers and overseers of the work, he commanded them to be brought to the port called Iccius, from whence he knew the passage into Brittany, was not above thirty mile over.  

THE OBSERVATION.  
THis Iccius Portus Floide thinketh to be Caleis; others take it to be Saint Omer, partly in regard of the situation of the place, which being in itself very low, hath notwithstanding very high banks, which encompass the town about; and in times past was a very large haven. To this may be added the distance from this town, to the next continent of the Island of Brittany; which Strabo maketh to contain 320 stadia, which agreeth to the French computation of 13 leagues. Caesar maketh it thirty mile: this is the haven, which Pliny calleth Britannicum portum Morinorum.    

CHAP. II.  
Caesar saileth into Brittany: landeth his forces, and seeketh the enemy.  
CAESAR having prepared all things in readiness, 
Caesar.  he left Labienus in the continent with three legions, and 2000 horse, both to keep the haven and make provision of corn; and also to observe the motion of the Galls: and with five legions and the like number of horse, as he left in the continent, about sunset he put out to sea, with a soft south wind, which continued until midnight; and then ceasing, he was carried with the tide until the morning, when he perceived that the Island lay on his left hand: and again, as the tide changed, he laboured by rowing to reach that part of the Island, where he had found good landing the year before: wherein the soldiers deserved great commendation; for by strength and force of Oars, they made their great ships of burden to keep way with the Galleys. About high noon, they arrived in Brittany, with all their ships: neither was there any enemy seen in that place; but as afterward Caesar understood by the captives, the Britain's were there with a great power; but being terrified with the infinite number of shipping, which they discovered from the shore (for there were in all above 800) they forsook the shore, and hid themselves in the upland country. Caesar having landed his men, and chosen a convenient place to encamp, assoon as he understood by the captives where the enemy lay, in the third watch of the night, he marched towards them; leaving ten cohortes and 300 horse, for a garizon to his shipping: which he the less feared, because it lay at anchor in a soft and open shore: he marched that night about 12 mile before he found the enemy: The Britain's sending out their horse, and chariots to a river that ran between them and the Romans, and having the advantage of the upper ground; began to hinder the Romans, and to give them battle, but being beaten back with our horsemen, they conveyed themselves into a wood. The place was strongly fortified both by art and nature, and made for a defence (as it seemeth) in their civil wars: for all the entrances were shut up with great trees, laid overthwart the passages. And the Britaines showed themselves out of the wood but here and there, not suffering the Romans to enter the fortification: but the soldiers of the seventh legion, with a Testudo which they made, and a mount which they raised, took the place and drove them all out of the woods, without any loss at all; saving some few wounds which they received. But Caesar forbade his men to follow after them, with any long pursuit, because he was both ignorant of the place, and a great part of that day being spent, he would employ the rest thereof in the fortification of his camp.  

OBSERVATIONS.  
CAesar, having taken what assurance of peace he could with the Galls, both by carrying the chiefest of their Princes with him, and by leaving three legions in the continent, to keep the vulgar people in obedience: he embarked all his men at one place, that they might be all partakers of the same casualties, and take the benefit of the same adventures, which being neglected the year before, drew him into many inconveniences for want of horse, which being embarked at an other haven met with other chances, and saw other fortunes; and never came to him into Brittany: The place of landing in this second voyage, was the same where he landed the year before; and by the circumstances of this history, may agree with that which tradition hath delivered of Deal in Kent, where it is said that Caesar landed. In the first year we find, that he never removed his camp from the sea shore, where he first seated himself; although his men went out to bring in corn, as far as they might well return again at night: but now he entered further into the Island, and within twelve miles' march came unto a river, which must needs be that of Canturbury, which falleth into the sea at Sandwich.  
In that he saith that the garizon of his shipping consisted of ten cohortes, which I have said to be a legion: we must understand, that Caesar left not an entire legion in that garizon; but he took ten cohorts out of his whole forces, peradventure two out of every legion, and appointed them to take the charge of his shipping.    

CHAP. III.  
Caesar returneth to his navies to take order for such losses as had happened by tempest the night before.  
THE next day early in the morning, he divided his forces into 3. companies, and sent them out to pursue the enemy: 
Caesar.  but before they had marched any far distance, and came to have the rearward of the enemy in view; there came news from Q. Atrius, with whom he left the ten cohorts, and the charge of the shipping, that the night before there was such a tempest at sea, that the whole navy was either sore beaten or cast on shore; and that neither anchor nor Gable could hold them, nor yet the Sailors endure the force of the weather; and that there was great loss in the shipping, by running against one another, in the violence of the tempest. Upon these news; Caesar caused the legions to be called back again, and to cease for that time, from following the enemy any further, he himself returned to the navy, where he found 40. ships lost, and the rest not to be repaired but with great industry and pains: first therefore he chose shipwrites and Carpenters out of the legions, and caused others to be sent for out of Gallia; and writ to Labienus to make ready what shipping he could. And although it seemed a matter of great difficulty and much labour; yet he thought it best, to hale up all the ships on shore, and to enclose them within the fortification of his camp: in this business he spent ten days, without intermission either of night or day, until he had drawn up the ships, and strongly fortified the camp; leaving the same garrison which was there before to defend it.  

THE OBSERVATION.  
WHerein we may behold the true image of undaunted valour, and the horrible industry (as Tully termeth it) which he used to prevent fortune of her stroke in his business, and comprehend casualties and future contingents, within the compass of order and the bounds of his own power, being able in ten days space, to set almost eight hundred ships from the hazard of wind and weather; and to make his camp the Road for his navy, that so he might rest secure of a means to return at his pleasure.    

CHAP. FOUR  
The Britain's make Cassivellaunus general in this war: the Island, and the manners of the people described.  
CAESAR returning to the place from whence he came, 
Caesar.  found far greater forces of the Britan's there assembled, than he left when he went to the navy. And that by public consent of the Britain's, the whole government of that war was given to Cassivellaunus, whose kingdom lay divided from the maritimate states, with the river Thames, beginning at the sea, & extending itself 80. mile into the Island. This Cassivellaunus, made continual war with his neighbour states: but upon the coming of the Romans, they all forgot their homebred quarrels, and cast the whole government upon his shoulders, as the fittest to direct that war.  
The inner part of Brittany is inhabited, by such as memory recordeth to be borne in the Island; and the maritimate coast by such as came out of Belgia, either to make incursions or invasions; and after the war was ended, they continued in the possessions they had gained, and were called by the name of the cities from whence they came: the country is very populous, and well inhabited with houses, much like unto them in Gallia. They have great store of cattle, and use brass for money, or iron rings weighed at a certain rate. In the mediterranean parts there is found great quantity of Tyn, and in the maritimate parts iron: their brass was brought in by other nations. They have all sorts of trees that they have in Gallia, excepting the fig and the Beech. Their religion will not suffer them to eat, either Hair, Hen, or Goose; notwithstanding they have of all sorts, as well for novelty as variety. The country is more temperate, and not so cold as Gallia. The Island lieth triangle wise, whereof one side confronteth Gallia, of which side that angle, wherein Kent is pointed to the East, and the other angle to the South: this side containeth about 500 mile. Another side lieth toward Spain and the West, that way where Ireland lieth, being an Island half as big as England; and as far distant from it as Gallia: in the midway between England & Ireland, lieth an Island called Mona, besides many other smaller islands, of which some write that in winter time for 30. days together, they have continual night, whereof we learned nothing by inquiry, only we found by certain measures of water, that the nights in England were shorter than in the Continent. The length of this side, according to the opinion of the inhabitants, containeth 700. mile. The third side lieth to the North and the open sea, saving that this angle doth somewhat point towards Germany; this side is thought to contain 800. miles: And so the whole Island containeth in circuit 2000 miles. Of all the inhabitants, they of Kent are most courteous and civil; all their country bordering upon the sea, and little differing from the fashion of Gallia, Most of the inland people sow no corn, but live with milk and flesh, clothed with skins, and having their faces painted with a blue colour, to the end they may seem more terrible in sight: they have the hair of their head long, having all other parts of their body shaven, saving their upper lip. Their wives are common to ten or twelve; especially brethren with brethren, and parents with children; but the children that are borne, are put unto them, unto whom the mother was first given in marriage.  

OBSERVATIONS.  
IN the descriptions of the ancient Britain's, we may first observe their pedigree, according to the Haraldry of that time: wherein we must understand that in those ages, the Ntiaons' of the world thought it no small honour, to derive their descent from a certain beginning, and to make either some of their Gods, or some man of a famous memory, the father of that progeny, and founder of their state; that so they might promise a fortunate continuance to their government, being first laid and established by so powerful a means. But if this failed, they then bragged of antiquity, and cast all their glory upon the fertility of their soil, being so strong and fruitful, that it yielded of itself such a people, as they were: and so we read how the Athenians, for as much as they were ignorant from whence they came, ware an Oaken leaf, in token that they were bred of the earth where they dwelled. And hereupon also grew the controversy, between the Egyptians and the Scythians, concerning antiquity: wherein the Egyptians seemed to have great advantage, because of the fertility and heat of their country; whereas the Scythians inhabited a cold climate, unfruitful and an enemy to generation. Of this sort were the Britain's, that inhabited the mediterranean part of the Island: who not knowing from whence they came; nor who first brought them thither, satisfied themselves with that common received opinion, that they were borne and bred of the earth. The sea coast was possessed by such as came out of the continent and retained the names of the cities from whence they came, as a memorial of their progenitors.  
The form of the Island is very well described, and measured out, according to the scale of our modern Geographers. For concerning the difference of longitude between the Eastern angel of Kent, and the furthest point of Cornewal, they make it eight degrees; which in a manner jumpeth with Caesar's dimensuration: the other sides are somewhat longer; and therefore. Tacitus in the life of Agricola, compareth it to a Carpenter's Axe, making that side which bordereth upon France to resemble the Edge; and the other two sides to incline by little and little, one towards an other; and so make the Island narrower at the top, according to the form of that instrument. He setteth down the whole compass of the Island, according to the manner of the ancient Geographers, who by the quantity of the circuit, did usually judge of the content, not considering that the Area of every figure dependeth as well of the quantity of the angle, as the length of the side. Concerning the temperature of Brittany, in regard of the cold winters in France, we must understand that Brittany hath ever been found of a more temperate constitution, in regard of sharp and cold winters, than any other country lying under the same parallel: whether the cause thereof may be imputed to the continual motion of the sea about the Island, which begetteth heat, as some have imagined; or to the site thereof, in regard of other Continents from whence the wind always riseth, and carrieth with it the nature of the country by which it passeth; and so the Island having no other continent lying North to it, from whence the wind may rise, but all for the most part upon the South, hath no such cold winds to distemper it, as other parts of Germany, which are under the same parallel; but the Southern wind, which is so frequent in Brittany, tempereth the air, with a mild disposition, and so keepeth it warm; or whether it be some other unknown cause, our Philosophers rest unsatisfied. But as touching Gallia, it may be said, that forasmuch as it beareth more to the South, than this Island doth, the air thereof by reason of the continual heat, is of a far purer disposition; and so pierceth more than this grosser air of Brittany, & carrieth the cold further into the pores; and so seemeth sharper and of a far colder disposition.  
This Island, which Caesar nameth Mona, is known at this time by the name of Man, and lieth between Cumberland and Ireland. Ptolemie calleth it Monaeda, Tacitus calleth Anglesey by the name of Mona, peradventure from the nomination of the Britain's, who calleth it Tire mon, the land of Mon.  
Concerning those places, where the night continueth in the midst of winter for 30. days together, they must be sited 6. degrees beyond the circle Arctic, and have a day in summer of like continuance, according to the rules of Astronomy. In that he found the nights in Brittany shorter than in the continent, we must understand it to be only in summer: for the more oblique the horizon is, the more uneven are the portions of the diurnal circles which it cutteth; and the nearer it cometh to a right horizon, the nearer it cometh to an equality of day and night: and hence it happeneth, that in summer time, the nights in France are longer than here in England; and in winter shorter. The like we must understand of all Southern and Northern countries.  
To conclude, I may not omit the civility of the Kentish men, and their courteous disposition, above the rest of the Britain's, which must be imputed to that ordinary course which brought civility unto all other nations: of whom such as were first seated in their possessions, and entertained society, were the first that brought in civil conversation, and by little and little were purified, and so attained to the perfection of civil government. So we find that first Assyrians and Babylonians (as nearest to the mountains of Armenia where the Ark rested, and people first inhabited) reduced their states into common weals, of monarchies of exquisite government, flourishing with all manner of learning and knowledge; when as yet other countries lay either waste, or overwhelmed with Barbarism. From thence it flowed into Egypt; out of Egypt into Greece; out of Greece into Italy; out of Italy into Gallia; and from thence into England: where our Kentishmen first entertained it, as bordering upon France; and frequented with merchants of those countries.    

CHAP. V.  
divers skirmishes between the Romans and the Britain's.  
THE Cavalry of the enemy and their chariots, 
Caesar.  gail a sharp conflict to the Roman horsemen, in their march: but so, that the romans got the better every way, driving them with great slaughter to the woods and hills, and losing also some of their own men, being too venturous in the pursuit. The Britaines after some intermission of time, when the Romans little thought of them, & were busied in fortifying their camp, came suddenly out of the woods and charged upon those that kept station before the camp. Caesar sent out two the thickest cohorts of two legions, to second their fellows: these two cohortes standing with a small alley between them, the other that were first charged, being terrified with that strange kind of fight, boldly broke through the chiefest of the enemy, and so retired in safety to their fellows. That day Quintus Laberius Durus a Tribune of the soldiers, was slain; the Britain's were repelled with more cohortes, which Caesar sent to second the former. And for as much as the fight happened in the view of all the camp, it was plainly perceived, that the legionary soldiers, being neither able for the weight of their armour, to follow the enemy as he retired, nor yet daring to go far from his ensign; was not a fit adversary to contest this kind of enemy: and that the horsemen likewise fought with no less danger, inasmuch as the enemy would retire back of purpose, and when they had drawn them a little from the legions, they would then light from their chariots and encounter them, with that advantage, which is between a footman and a horseman. Furthermore, they never fought thick and close together, but thin and in great distances, having stations of men to succour one another, to receive the weary, and to send out fresh supplies.  

OBSERVATIONS.  
Upon this occasion of their heavy armour, I will describe a legionary soldior in his complete furniture, that we may better judge of their manner of warfare, and understand wherein their greatest strength consisted. And first we are to learn, that their legionary soldiers were called Milites gravis armaturae, soldiers wearing heavy armour, to distinguish them from the Velites, the Archers, slingers, and other light armed men. Their offensive arms were, a couple of Piles, or as some will, but one Pile, and a Spanish sword, short and strong, to strike rather with the point then with the edge. Their defensive arms were, a helmet, a corselet, and boots of brass, with a large Target; which in some sort was offensive, in regard of that umbonem which stuck out in the midst thereof. The Pile is described at large in the first book, and the Target in the second: the sword (as Polybius witnesseth) was short, two edged, yerie sharp, and of a strong point: and therefore Livy in his 22. Book saith, that the Galls used very long sword without points; but the romans had short sword, readier for use; these they called Spanish sword, because they borrowed that fashion from the Spaniarde. The old romans were so girt with their sword, as appeareth by Polybius, and their monuments in Marble, that from their left shoulder it hung upon their right thigh, contrary to the use of these times, which as I have noted before, was in regard of their target, which they carried on their left arm: this sword was hung with a belt of leather, beset with studs as Varro noteth, and these were their offensive weapons. 
Lib. 4.   
Their Helmet was of brass, 
Pli. lib. 10.  adorned with three Ostrich feathers of a cubit in length, by which the soldier appeared of a large stature, and more terrible to the enemy, as Polybius saith in his 6. book. Their breast plate was either of brass, or Iron, jointed together after the manner of scales, or plaited with little rings of iron: their boots were made of bars of brass, from the foot up to the knee. And thus were the legionary soldiers armed, to stand firm rather then to use any nimble motion, and to combine themselves into a body of that strength which might not easily recoil, at the opposition of any confrontment; for agility standeth indifferent to help either a retreat or a pursuit, and nimble footed soldiers are as ready to fly back, as to march forward; but a weighty body keepeth a more regular motion, and is not hindered with a common counterbuff: so that whensoever they came to firm buckeling, and felt the enemy stand stiff before them, such was their practice, and exercise in continual works, that they never fainted under any such task; but the victory went always clear on their side. But if the enemy gave way to their violence, and came not in but for advantage, and then as speedily retired, before the counterbuff were well discharged; then did their nimbleness much help their weakness, and frustrate the greatest part of the Roman discipline. This is also proved in the overthrow of Sabinus and Cotta, where Ambiorix finding the inconvenience of buckeling at handy blows, commanded his men to fight a far off; and if they were assaulted, to give back; and to come on again as they saw occasion: which so wearied out the romans, that they all fell under the execution of the Galls. Let this suffice therefore to show, how unapt the Romans were to fly upon any occasion, when their armour was such, that it kept them from all starting motions, and made them suitable to the stayed and well assured rules of their discipline, which were as certain principles in the execution of a standing battle; and therefore not so fit either for a pursuit, or a flight.  
Concerning the unequal combat between a horseman and a footman, it may be thought strange, that a footman should have such an advantage against a horseman, being overmatched, at least with a Sextuple proportion both of strength and agility: but we must understand, that as the horse is much swifter in a long career; so in speedy and nimble turning at hand, wherein the substance of the combat consisteth, the footman far exceedeth the horseman in advantage, having a larger mark to hit by the Horse, than the other hath. Besides, the horseman engageth both his valour, and his fortune in the good speed of his horse, his wounds and his death do consequently pull the rider after, his fear or fury maketh his master either desperate or slow of performance, and what defect soever riseth from the horse, must be answered out of the honour of the rider. And surely it seemeth reasonable, that what thing soever draweth us into the society of so great a hazard, should as much as is possible, be contained in the compass of our own power. The sword which we manage with our own hand, affordeth greater assurance than the harquebus, wherein there are many parts belonging to the action, as the powder, the stone, the spring, and such like; whereof if the least fail of his part, we likewise fail of our fortune: but how probable soever this seemeth, this is certain, that in the course of the Roman wars, the horse were ever defeated by the foot, as is manifestly proved in the first of these books.    

CHAP. VII.  
Caesar giveth the Britain's two several overthrows.  
THE next day, the enemy made a stand upon the hills a far off from the camp, 
Caesar.  and showed themselves not so often; neither were they so busy with our horsemen, as they were the day before: but about noon, when Caesar sent out three legions, and all his Cavalry to get forage, under the conduction of the Caius Trebonius a legate, they made a sudden assault upon the foragers, and fell in close with the Ensigns, and the legions. The Romans charged very fiercely upon them, and beat them back; neither did they make an end of following them, until the horsemen trusting to the succour of the legions which were behind them, put them all to flight, with the slaughter of a great number of them; neither did they give them respite either to make head, to make a stand, or to forsake their chariots. After this overthrow, all their auxiliary forces departed from them; neither did they afterward contend with the Romans with any great power. Caesar understanding their determination, carried his army to the river Thames, and so to the confines of Cassivellaunus, which river was passable by foot but in one place only, and that very hardly; at his coming he found a great power of the enemy to be imbattailed on the other side, and the bank fortified with many sharp stakes, and many other also were planted covertly under the water. These things being discovered to the Romans by the Captives and fugitives; Caesar putting his horse before, caused the legions to follow suddenly after, who notwithstanding they had but their heads clear above the water, went with that violence, that the enemy was not able to endure the charge, but left the bank and betook themselves to flight.  

THE OBSERVATION.  
THis attempt of Caesar seemeth so strange to Brancatio, that he runneth into as strange conclusions, concerning this matter, as first that he that imitateth Caesar, may doubt of his good fortunes: for his proceeding in this point, was not directed by any order of war; and that a great commander hath nothing common with other leaders: but especially, he crieth out at the baseness of the Britain's, that would suffer themselves so cowardly to be beaten. But if we look into the circumstances of the action, we shall find both Art & good direction therein; for being assured by the fugitives, that the river was passable in that place, & in that place only, he knew that he must either adventure over there, or leave Cassivellaunus for an other summer, which was a very strong inducement to urge him to that enterprise. The difficulty whereof was much relieved by good direction, which consisted of two points, first, by sending over the horsemen in the front of the legions, who might better endure the charge of the enemy, than the footmen could, that were up to the neck in water; and withal, to shelter the footmen from the fury of the enemy. Secondly, he sent them over with that speed, that they were on the other side of the water, before the enemy could tell what they attempted: for if he had lingered in the service, and given the enemy leave to find the advantage which he had by experience, his men had never been able to have endured the hazard of so dangerous a service. It is hard to conjecture at the place, where this service was performed; for since the building of London bridge, many fords have been scoured with the current, and fall of the water, which before that time carried not such a depth as now they do.    

CHAP. VII.  
The conclusion of the British war: Caesar returneth into Gallia.  
Cassivellaunus having no courage to contend any longer, dismissed his greatest forces, and retaining only four thousand chariots, observed their journeys, keeping the wood countries, and driving men and cattle out of the fields into the woods, for fear of the Romans; and as their horsemen strayed out either for forage or booty, he sent his chariots out of the woods by unknown ways, and put their horsemen to great peril: in regard whereof, the horsemen durst never adventure further than the legions, neither was there any more spoil done in the country, then that which the legionary soldiers did of themselves. In the mean time, the Trinobantes, being almost the greatest state of all those countries (from whom Mandubratius had fled to Caesar into Gallia, for that his father Imanuentius holding the kingdom, was slain by Cassivellaunus) sent Ambassadors to Caesar, to offer their submission, and to entreat that Mandubratius might be defended from the oppression of Cassivellaunus, and sent unto them to take the kingdom. Caesar having received from them forty pledges, and corn for his Army, sent Mandubratius unto them. The Trinobantes, being thus kept from the violence of the soldiers, the Cenimagni, Seguntiaci, Anacalites, Bibrocassi, yielded themselves to Caesar. By these he understood, that Cassivellaunus his town was not far off, fortified with woods and bogs, and well stored with men and cattle. The Britain's call a town a thick wood, enclosed about with a ditch and a rampire, made for a place of retreat when they stood in fear of incursions from the borderers. Thither marched Caesar with his Army, and found it well fortified both by art and nature: And as he assaulted it in two several places, the enemy unable to keep it, cast himself out of the town by a back way, and so he took it. Where he found great store of cattle, and slew many of the Britain's.  
While these things were a doing, Cassivellaunus sent messengers into Kent, wherein there were four several kings, Cingetorix, Caruilius, Taximagulus, and Segonax, them he commanded with all the power they could make, to set upon the camp where the navy was kept. These kings coming to the place, were overthrown by a sally which the Romans made out upon them, many of them being slain, and Cingetorix taken prisoner. This battle concurring with the former losses, and especially moved thereunto with the revolt of the forenamed cities, Cassivellaunus entreated peace of Caesar by Comius of Arras. Caesar being determined to winter in the continent, for fear of sudden commotions in Gallia, and that the summer was now far spent, and might easily be lingered out, he commanded pledges to be brought unto him, and set down what yearly tribute the Britain's should pay to the Romans: the hostages being taken, he carried back his Army to the sea, embarked his men and arrived safe with all his ships upon the coast of Gallia.  

THE OBSERVATION.  
ANd thus ended the war in Brittany, which affordeth little matter of discourse, being indeed but a scambling war, as well in regard of the Britain's themselves, who after they had felt the strength of the Roman legions, would never adventure to buckle with them in any standing battle, as also in regard that there were no such towns in Brittany as are recorded to have been in Gallia, which might have given great honour to the war, if there had been any such to have been besieged, and taken in by Caesar. And although Tacitus saith, that Brittany was rather viewed then subdued by Caesar, being desirous to draw that honour to his father in law Agricola; yet we find here, that the Trinobantes, which were more than either the skirt, or the heart of Brittany, (for our Historians do understand them to have inhabited that part, which lieth as far as Yorkshire and Lancashire) were brought under the Roman Empire by Caesar: who was the first that ever laid tribute upon Brittany, in the behalf of the people of Rome; or cast upon them the heavy name of a subdued people.    

TO THE WORTHY KNIGHT SIR ROBERT DRURY.  
SIR, my purpose was to have concluded these discourses, with the end of the British war: reserving the latter part of this fifth book, for an entrance unto such observations, as may be gathered from the sixth and seventh Commentaries, which I intent to make a second part of this work: but your desire to see the errors of Sabinus and Cotta discovered, and the famous fight of Q. Cicero in his wintering camp, hath brought them forth somewhat before their time, annexing that to the first part which was meant for the latter. If my labour shall be found too weak to deserve well of military designs; yet I think it very well employed in that it pleaseth you to give it the reading, and so rest  
Ready to do you service, C. EDMUNDS.   

CHAP. VIII.  
Caesar disposeth his legions into their wintetering camps.  
AFTER he had put his ships in harbour, 
Caesar.  and held a council of the Galls at 
* Either Cambraz, Amiens or S. Quintin  Samarobrina; forasmuch as that year by reason of the drought there was some scarcity of corn in Gallia; he was constrained to garizon his Army, and to disperse them into more cities than he had done the years before. And 1 he gave one legion to Caius Fabius, to be led among the Morini; another to Q. Cicero, to be carried to the Neruij; another to L. Roscius, to be conducted to the Essui; a fourth he commanded to winter amongst the men of Rheimes, in the marches of the Treviri under T. Labienus; three he placed in Belgia, with whom he sent Marcus Crassus his Quaestor, L. Munatius Planus, and C. Trebonius Legates; he sent one legion, that which he had last enrolled, beyond the river Po in Italy, with five cohortes, unto the Eburones, the greatest part of whose country lieth between the Maze and the Rhine; with them he sent Q. Titurius Sabinus, and Lucius Arunculeius Cotta. By distributing his legions in this manner, he thought to remedy the scarcity of corn; and yet the garrizons of all these legions, excepting that which Roscius carried into a quiet and peaceable part, were contained within the space of 100 mile: and until his legions were settled, and their wintering camps fortified, he determined to abide in Gallia.  

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.  
I Have heard it oftentimes contradicted by some, that understand not the weight of a multitude, when it was said, that an Army keeping head continually in one part of a kingdom, was more burdensome to the commonwealth in regard of the expense of victuals, then when it was dispersed into particular cities and families, before the time of the muster and enrolment: for (say they) in the general account of the public weal, it differeth nothing, whether a multitude of 30000 men be maintained with necessary provisions in one entire body together, or dispersed particularly throughout every part of the country: forasmuch as every man hath but a competent quantity allotted unto him, which he cannot want in what sort or condition of life soever he be ranged; neither doth the charge of a multitude grow in regard they are united together, but in regard they amount to such a multitude wheresoever. But such as look into the difference with judgement, shall find a marvelous inequality, both in regard of the portion of victuals which is spent, and the means whereby it is provided: for first we must understand, that an army lying continually in one place, falleth so heavy upon that part, that it quickly consumeth both the fat and the flesh (as they say) and leaveth nothing unspent, which that part can afford them; and without further supply of provisions, would in a small time come to utter destruction. This want then must be relieved by taking from the plenty of other bordering quarters, to furnish the wants of so great a multitude: wherein there cannot be observed that proportion of moderate taking, to victual the Army with a sufficient competency, but the partial respect which the purveyors, and vittailers will have to their private commodity, will quickly make an inconvenience either in the country, from whence it is taken; or in the Army, for which it is provided; according as the error may best advantage their particular, what discipline soever be established in that behalf. Whereas on the contrary part, when every particular man of that multitude shall be billeted in a several family, throughout all parts of the kingdom, the charge will be so insensible, in regard of the expense of the said families, that the country will never feel any inconvenience. And if every householder that had received into his house one of the said army, should give a true account of that which riseth above his ordinary expense; by the addition of one man, it would fall far short of that treasure, which is necessarily required, to maintain the said number of men united together into one body. Neither doth the difference consist in the quantity of victuals, which every man hath for his portion, whether they be dispersed or united; but in the manner of provision, and the means which is used to maintain them: wherein every master or steward of a family, endeavoureth to make his provisions at the best hand, & so to husband it, that it may serve for competency, and not for superfluity; and by that means, the general plenty of the country is maintained, & the commonwealth flourisheth by well directed moderation. But in the victualling of an army, there is no such respect had, which may any way advantage the public good; for there the gain of the purueier riseth by experience & superfluous wasting, rather than by thrift and saving frugality: and so the commonwealth is weakened by the ill husbanding of that great portion of victual, which is allowed for so great a multitude. And if they should have such variety of viands in an Army, as they have when they are in several families, it were unpossible it should continue any time together. And therefore the Romans, notwithstanding the exactness of their discipline, could afford their armies no other provision but corn, and lard, as well in regard of the commodity which that kind of diet afforded them in the course of their wars, as also for the good of that country, wherein they were resident. And if it so fell out, that the extremity of the season, or any other cause, had brought a dearth into the land, there was no readier way to help that inconvenience, then by dispersing their Armies into divers quarters; which Caesar disposed with that care, that they might be as near together as they could.   

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.  
COncerning the choice of their soldiers and their manner of enrolment, I had rather refer the reader to Polybius, then enter into the particular discourse of that action; which was carried with such gravity and religious ceremonies, as might best serve to possess their minds of the weight and consequence of that business: but for as much as the largeness of their Empire, and the necessity of their occasions would not admit, that the enrolment should still be made at Rome amongst the citizens, as it appeareth by this legion which was enrolled beyond the river Po; it consequently followeth, that such Ceremonies, which were annexed to the place, were altogether omitted: and therefore I cannot speak of that which the old Romans did in that part of their discipline, as a thing continued unto Caesar's time. But he that desireth to see the manner of their choice, with such compliments as might add both a reverent respect, and a Majesty to the work; let him read Polybius of that argument.    

CHAP. IX.  
Ambiorix attempteth to surprise the camp of Sabinus and Cotta; and failing, practiseth to take them by guile.  
FIFTEEN days after the legions were settled in their wintering camps, 
Caesar.  there began a sudden tumult and rebellion by the means of Ambiorix, and Catiunculus, who, having received Sabinus & Cotta into their confines, and brought them in corn to the place, where they lay; at the inducement of Induciomarus of Triers, they stirred up their people to rebellion: and suddenly surprising those that were gone abroad to get wood, came with a great power to assault the camp. But when our men had took Arms, and were got up upon the rampire, and had overmatched them in a skirmish of horse, which made a sally out of the camp upon the Galls: Ambiorix despairing of good success, withdrew his men from the assault; and then after their manner, they cried unto us, that some of our company should come and speak with them: for they had somewhat to discover touching the public state, whereby they hoped all controversies might be ended. Whereupon Caius' Carpineius a Roman horseman, and one of Titurius his familiar friends, and one junius a Spaniard, who divers times before had been sent by Caesar to Ambiorix; were sent out to treat with them. Ambiorix first acknowledged himself much indebted to Caesar; for many courtesies, in that by his means he was freed from a pension which he paid to the Aduatici; and for that both his own son, and his brother's son, whom the Aduatici had held in prison under the name of hostages, were by Caesar released and sent home again. And touching the assault of the camp, he had done nothing of himself, but by the impulsion of the state, among whom such was his condition, that the people had as great authority over him, as he himself had in regard of the people: who were likewise enforced to this war, because they could not withstand the sudden insurrection of the Galls, whereof his small means might be a sufficient argument. For his experience was not so little, to think himself able with so small a power to overthrow the people of Rome; but it was a general appointment throughout all Gallia, upon this day to assault all Caesar's garrizons, to the end that one legion might not give relief unto another: Galls could not easily deny the request of Galls, especially when it concerned their public liberty. Now having satisfied that duty which he owed to his country, he had respect to Caesar and his benefits, in regard whereof, he admonished them, and prayed Titurius for the hospitality that had been between them, that he would look to the safety of himself, and his soldiers. There were a great number of Germans that had already passed the Rhine, and would be here within two days: and therefore let them advise themselves, whether they thought it good before the next borderers perceived it, to depart with their soldiers out of their wintering places, either to Cicero or Labienus, of whom the one was not passed fifty mile off; and the other a little further: for his own part, he promised them this much, and confirmed it by oath, that they should have safe passage through his territories; for so he should both do a pleasure to his country, in disburdening it of garrizons, and show himself thankful to Caesar for his benefits. This speech being ended, Ambiorix departed, and Carpineius and junius made report thereof to the Legates.  

OBSERVATIONS.  
LEander his counsel, to use the fox's skin where the lions faileth, doth show, that the discourse of our reason is sooner corrupted with error, than the powers of our body are overcome with force. For oftentimes the mind is so disquieted, with the extremity of perturbation, that neither the apprehension can take sound instructions, nor the judgement determine of that which is most for our good: but according as any passion shall happen to reign in our disposition; so are we carried headlong to the ruin of our fortune, without sense of error, or mistrust of welsucceeding: where as the body continueth firm in his own strength, and is subject only to a greater weight of power, by which it may be subdued and overthrown. It behoveth us therefore to take good heed, that our surest hold be not unfastened by the subtlety of the fox, when it hath continued firm against the force of the Lion: and that the treachery of the spirit do not disadvantage those means, which either our own power or opportunity, hath gained in our actions. Wherein a commander cannot have a better rule for his direction, then to beware, that violence of passion do not hinder the course of sound deliberation: and withal, to be jealous of whatsoever an enemy shall, either by speech or action, seem to thrust upon him, how colourable soever the reasons may be, which are alleged to induce him thereunto. For first, if the mind be not confirmed by the virtue of her better faculties, to resist the motion of fruitless apprehensions, it may easily be seduced either by fear or vain imagination, diffident conceptions or over easy credulity, with many other such disturbing powers, from that way, which a good discretion and an understanding, free from passion, would have taken. First therefore I hold it necessary, to have the consistory of our judgement well settled, with a firm resolution, and with the presence of the mind, before we enter into deliberation of such things, as are made happy unto us by good direction. And then this, amongst other circumstances, will give some help to a good conclusion; when we consider how improbable it is, that an enemy, whose chiefest care is to weaken his adversary, and bring him to ruin, should advise him of any thing that may concern his good; unless the profit, which he himself shall thereby gather, do far exceed that which the contrary part may expect. I grant that in civil wars, where there are many friends on either party, and have the adverse cause as dear unto them as their own; there are oftentimes many advertisements given, which proceed from a true and sincere affection, and may advantage the party whom it concerneth, as well in preventing any danger, as in the furtherance of their cause; and therefore are not altogether to be neglected, but to be weighed by circumstances, and accordingly to be respected; whereof we have many pregnant examples in the civil wars of France, and particularly in Monsieur La Nou his discourses: But where there are two Armies, different in nation, language and humour, contending for that which peculiarly belongeth unto one of them; where care to keep that which is dearest unto them, possesseth the one, and hope of gain stirreth up the other; there is commonly such an universal hatred between them, that they are to look for small advantage, by advertisements from the enemy: which if the Romans had well considered, this subtle Gall had not dispossessed them of their strength, nor brought them to ruin.    

CHAP. X.  
The Romans call a council upon this advertisement, and resolve to depart, and join themselves to some other of the legions.  
THE Romans being troubled at the suddenness of the matter, 
Caesar.  albeit those things were spoken by an enemy, yet they thought them no way to be neglected; but especially it moved them, for that it was incredible that the Eburones, being base and of no reputation, durst of themselves make war against the people of Rome: and therefore they propounded the matter in a council, wherein there grew a great controversy among them: L. Arunculeius and most of the Tribunes, and Centurions of the first orders, thought it not good to conclude of any thing rashly, nor to depart out of their wintering camps, without express commandment from Caesar; forasmuch as they were able to resist never so great a power, yea even of their Germans, having the garizons well fortified: an argument whereof was, that they had valiantly withstood the first assault of the enemy, and given them many wounds. Neither wanted they any victuals, and before that provision which they had was spent, there would come succour from other garizons and from Caesar. And to conclude, what was more dishonourable, or savoured of greater inconstancy, then to consult of their weightiest affairs, by the advertisement of an enemy? Titurius urged vehemently to the contrary, that it then would be too late for them to seek a remedy, when a greater power of the enemy, accompanied with the Germans, were assembled against them; or when any blow were given to any of the next wintering camps he: took Caesar to be gone into Italy, for otherwise the Eburones, would not have come so proudly to the camp. Let them not respect the author, but the thing itself; the Rhine was not far off, and he knew well that the overthrow of Ariovistus, and their former victories, were grievous to the Germans. The Galls were vexed with the contumelies they had received, being brought in subjection to the Roman Empire, and having lost their former reputation in deeds of arms. And to conclude, who would imagine that Ambiorix should enterprise such a matter, without any ground, or certainty thereof? but howsoever things stood, his counsel was sure, and could bring no harm: for if there were no worse thing intended, they should but go safely to the next garizons; or otherwise, if the Galls conspired with the Germans, their only safety consisted in celerity. As for the counsel of Cotta, and such as were of the contrary opinion, what expectation could be had thereof? wherein if there were not present danger; yet assuredly famine was to be feared by long siege. The disputation being thus continued on either part, and Cotta with the Centurions of the first orders, earnestly repugning it; do as please you, since you will needs have it so, saith Sabinus; and that he spoke with a loud voice, that a great part of the soldiers might well hear him. For I am not he that most feareth death among you, let these be wise: and if any mischance happen unto them, they shall ask account thereof at thy hands, inasmuch as if thou wouldst let them, they might join themselves within 2. days to the next garizons, & with them sustain what chance soever their common destiny should allot them; and not perish with famine and sword, like a people cast off and abandoned from their fellows. After these words, they began to rise out of the council; but hold was laid upon them both; entreaty was made that they would not obstinately bring all unto a desperate hazard; the matter was all one whether they went or stayed, so that they all agreed upon one thing; whereas in disagreeing, there was no likelihood of well doing: the disputation was prolonged until midnight; at length Cotta yielded, and the sentence of Sabinus took place. And thereupon it was proclaimed, that they should set forth by the break of day: the rest of the night was spent in watching, every soldior sought out what he had to carry with him, and what he should be constrained to leave behind him of such necessaries, as he had prepared for winter: all things were disposed in such sort, to make the soldiers believe, that they could not stay without danger.  

OBSERVATIONS.  
BY the resolution in this disputation, it appeareth how little a grave and wise deliberation availeth, when it is impugned with the violence of passion, according to the truth of my former observation; for the matter was well reasoned by Cotta, and his positions were grounded upon things certain, and well known to the whole council: and yet the fear of Sabinus was such, that it carried the conclusion by such supposed assertions, as the quality of his passion had ratified for true principles; being grounded altogether upon that which the enemy had suggested, and not upon any certain knowledge of the truth: neither is it often seen, when a Council disputeth upon matters of such consequence, that their deliberations are altogether clear from such troublesome motions, but that it will somewhat incline to the partiality of a strong affection; so powerful is passion in the government of the soul, and so interessed in the other faculties. And this is one cause of the uncertainty of man's judgement, from whence all contrary and different opinions do arise. Neither is this so strange a matter, that a council of war should so much vary in case of deliberation, when as many especial points of military discipline remain yet undecided; having the authority of the great Commanders of all ages, to ratify the truth on either part; whereof I could allege many examples. But concerning the issue and event of our deliberations, what can be more truly said then that of the Poet?  
Et malè consultis pretium est, prudentia fallax,  
Nec fortuna probat causas, sequiturque merentes;  
Sed vaga per cunctos nullo discrimine fertur:  
Scilicet est aliuà quod nos cogatque regatque  
Maius, & in proprias ducat mortalia leges.  
Notwithstanding, forasmuch as our wisdom is not so subject to fortune, but that it may comprehend within itself, the good direction of most of the occurrences, which fall within the course of our business; or if we must needs miscarry, yet it somewhat helpeth our ill fortune to think, that we went upon best probabilities; it shall not be amiss to set down some rules for the better directing of a mature consultation. Wherein we are to understand, that as all our knowledge ariseth from some of our senses, and our senses comprehend only particularities, which being carried unto the apprehension, are disposed into forms and degrees, according as they either concur or disagree in their several properties: from whence there arise intellectual notions, and rules of Art; wherein the science of the said particulars consisteth: so he that intendeth to debate a matter, with sound deliberation, must descend from confused conceptions and a knowledge in general, to the exact distinction of particular parts, which are the occurrences to be directed, and the material substance of every action: he therefore that can give best direction, either by experience, or judicious discourse, concerning such particularities as are incident to the matter propounded, can best advise which is the safest way to avoid the opposition of contradicting natures. But to make this somewhat plainer, I will allege 2. examples: the one modern in case of consultation; the other ancient, and may seem not so pertinent to this matter, in regard it is a mere Apology, yet forasmuch as it freely censureth the quality of particular circumstances, it may give great light to that which we seek after.  
The modern example is taken out of Guicherdin, 
Lib. 9  from the wars which Lewis the French King had with the Pope and the Venetians, concerning the state of Ferrara and the Duchy of Milan: wherein there arose a controversy among the French captains, whether it were better to go directly to seek the enemy, who albeit were lodged in a strong and secure place, yet there was hope, that with the virtue of arms and importunity of artillery, they might be dislodged and driven to a retreat: or otherwise, to take the way either of Modina or Bolognia, that so the enemy for fear of losing either of those towns, might quit their hold, and by that means Ferrara should be freed from the war. Monsieur Chaumont the General of the French, inclined to the former advise: But Triwlce, a man of great authority and experience, having been an executioner in 18. battles, reasoned thus in particulars to the contrary. We debate (saith he) to go seek the enemy to fight with him; and I have always heard great captains hold this as a firm principle: Not to attempt the fortune of a battle, unless there be either an offer of an especial advantage, or otherwise, compulsion by necessity. The rules of war give it to the enemy that is the invader, and hath undertaken the conquest of Ferrar, to seek to assail and charge us; but to us, to whom it is sufficient to defend ourselves, it cannot be but impertinent to undertake an action, contrary to all direction and discipline of war. I am of opinion, which is confirmed by evident reason, that there is no possibility to execute that devise, but to our harms and disadvantage: for we cannot go to their camp but by the side of a hill, a straight and narrow way, where all our forces cannot be employed; and yet they with small numbers will make resistance, having the opportunity of the place favourable to their virtues: we must march by the rising of a hill, one horse after another; neither have we any other way to draw our Artillery, our baggage, our carts and bridges, but by the straight of the hill: and who doubteth not but in a way so narrow and cumbrous, every artillery, every cart, or every wheel that shall break, will not stay the Army a whole hour at the least? By which impediments every contrary accident may put us to disorder. The enemy is lodged in covert, provided of victuals and forage; and we must encamp all bare and naked, not carrying with us that which should serve for our necessary nurture, but expect the things to come after; which in reason ought to go with us. To attempt new enterprises, whereof the victory is less certain than the peril, is contrary to the gravity and reputation of a leader; and in actions of the war, those enterprises are put to adventure, that are done by will and not by reason. Many difficulties may compel us to make our abode there, two or three days; yea the snows and rains joined with the extremity of the season, may suffice to detain us: how shall we then do for victuals and forages? What shall we be able to do in the wars, wanting the things that should give us strength and sustenance? What is he that considereth not, how dangerous it is to go seek the enemy in a strong camp, and to be driven at one time to fight against them, and against the discommodity of the place? If we compel them not to abandon their camp, we cannot but be enforced to retire; a matter of great difficulty in a country so wholly against us, and where every little disfavour will turn to our great disadvantage, etc.  
And thus proceeded that grave discourse, in the discovery of the particular occurrences, incident to that enterprise; which being laid open to their confused judgements, did manifestly point at the great disadvantages, which were to be undergone, by that attempt.  
The other example is of more antiquity, 
Anal. 6.  taken out of Tacitus, and concerneth the arraignment of certain senators, for the friendship that had passed between Scianus and them. Amongst whom M. Terentius thus answered for himself; according as it hath of late been published by translation.  
It would be peradventure less behoveful for my estate to acknowledge, then to deny the crime I am charged with: but hap what hap may, I will confess that I have been Sejanus friend, and that I desired so to be, and that after I had obtained his friendship, I was glad of it. I had seen him joint officer with my father, in the government of the praetorian cohort; and not long after in managing the city affairs, and matters of war: his kinsmen and allies were advanced to honour, as every man was inward with Sejanus, so he was graced by Caesar: and chose, such as were not in his favour, lived in fear, and distressed with poverty. Neither do I allege any man for an example of this; all of us who were not privy to his last attempts, with the danger of my only estate I will defend: not Sejanus the Vulsiniensis, but a part of the Claudian and julian family, which by alliance he had entered into; thy son in law Caesar, thy companion in the Consulship, and him, who took upon him thy charge of administering the commonwealth, we did reverence and honour. It is not our part to judge of him, whom thou dost exalt above the rest, nor for what considerations: to thee the highest judgement of things the gods have given; and to us the glory of obedience is left. We look into those things which we see before our eyes, whom thou dost enrich, whom thou dost advance to honours, who have greatest power of hurting or helping, which Sejanus to have had, no man will deny. The Prince's hidden thoughts, or if he go about any secret drift, it is not lawful to sound, and dangerous; neither shalt thou in the end reach unto them. Think not only Lords of the senate, of Sejanus last day; but of sixteen years, in which we did likewise fawn upon and court Satrius, and Pomponius; and to be known unto his freed men and partners, was reckoned for a high favour. What then? shall this defence be general, and not distinguished, but a confusion made of times past, and his latter actions? no, but let it by just bounds and terms be divided: let the treasons against the common wealth, the intentions of murdering the Emperor be punished; but as for the friendships, duties, pleasures and good turns, the same end shall discharge and quit thee, O Caesar, and us! The constancy of this Oration prevalled so much, that his Accusers were punished with exile. And thus we see how particularities decide the controversy, and make the way plain to good direction.    

CHAP. XI.  
The romans take their journey towards the next legion; and are set upon by the Galls.  
AS soon as the day light appeared, they set forth of their Camp, 
Caesar.  like men persuaded that the counsel had been given them not by an enemy, but by Ambiorix an especial friend, with a long tailed march, and as much baggage as they were able to carry. The Galls understanding of their journey, by their noise and watching in the night; secretly in the woods some two miles off laid an Ambuscado, in two several places of advantage, and there attended the coming of the romans; and when the greatest part of the troops were entered into a valley, suddenly they showed themselves on both sides the vale, pressing hard upon the rearward, and hindering the foremost from going up the hill; and so began to charge upon the romans in a place of as great disadvantage for them as could be. Then at length Titurius, as one that had provided for nothing before hand, began to tremble, ran up and down, and disposed his cohorts, but so fearfully and after such a fashion, as if all things had gone against him, as it happeneth for the most part to such, as are forced to consult in the instance of execution.  

THE OBSERVATION.  
IT now plainly appeareth, by this negligent and ill ordered march, and the unlooked for encounter which the Galls gave them, that fear had ratified in the judgement of Sabinus the smooth suggestion of Ambiorix, with an approbation of a certain truth; and laid that for a principle, which a discourse free from passion would have discerned to be but weak, and of no probability: which so much the more amazed Titurius, by how much his apprehension had erred from the truth, and betrayed good counsel to a course full of danger; which as Caesar noteth, must needs fall upon such, as are then to seek for direction when the business requireth execution. I have handled already the inconveniences of disappointment; and therefore at this time will but bring it only into remembrance, that we may take the greater care to prevent an accident of that nature: wherein, as the best remedy for an evil is to foresee it, according to the saying, praevisa pereunt mala; so the greatest mischief in an evil, is when it cometh unthought of, and besides our expectation; for than it falleth upon us with a supernatural weight, and affrighteth the mind with a superstitious astonishment, as though the divine powers had prevented our dessignements, with an irremediable calamity, and cut off our appointment with a contrary decree: although peradventure the thing itself carry no such importance, but might be remedied, if we were but prepared with an opinion, that such a thing might happen. It were no ill counsel therefore, what resolution soever be taken, to make as full account of that which may fall out to cross our intentions, as that which is likely to happen from the direction of our chiefest projects; and so we shall be sure to have a present mind in the midst of our occasions, and feel no further danger, then that which the nature of the thing enforceth.    

CHAP. XII.  
The Romans cast themselves into an Orb; and are much discouraged.  
BUT Cotta, who had before thought that these things might happen by the way, and for that cause would not be the author of the journey, was not wanting in any thing that concerned their common safety: for both in calling upon the soldiers and encouraging them, he executed the place of a Commander; and in fight, the duty of a soldier. And when they found, that by reason of the length of their troop, they were not able in their own persons to see all things done, and to give direction in every place; they caused it to be proclaimed, that they should all forsake their baggage, and cast themselves into an Orb: which direction, although in such a case be not to be reproved; yet it fell out ill favoredlie: for it both abated the courage of the Romans, and gave the enemy greater encouragement, inasmuch as it seemed that that course was not taken, but upon a great fear and in extremity of peril. Moreover, it happened, as it could not otherwise chose, that the soldiers went from their Ensigns, to take from the carriages such things as were most dear unto them: and there was nothing heard amongst them but clamours and weep. But the Barbarous Galls were not to learn how to carry themselves: for their Commanders caused it to be proclaimed, that no man should stir out of his place; for the pray was theirs, and all that the romans had laid apart, was reserved for them: and therefore let them suppose that all things consisted in the victory. The Romans were equal to the Galls, both in number of men and valour▪ and albeit they were destitute of good Captains, and of good fortune, yet they reposed in their manhood all the hope of their safety: and as often as any cohort issued out, they failed not to make a great slaughter of the enemy on that part.  

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.  
I Have already handled the nature of an Orb, with such properties as are incident to a circle; wherein I showed the conveniency of this figure, in regard of safe and strong imbattailing: I will now add this much concerning the use thereof, that as it is the best manner of imbattailing for a defensive strength, and therefore never used but in extremity; so we must be very careful, that the sudden betaking of ourselves to such a refuge, do not more dismay the soldiers, than the advantage of that imbattailing can benefit them. For unless a leader be careful to keep his men in courage, that their hearts may be free from despair and amazement, what profit can there arise from any disposition or body soever, when the particular members shall be senseless of that duty, which belongeth unto them? for order is nothing but an assistance to courage, giving means to manage our valour with advantage. In the war of Africa we read, that Caesar's legions being encircled about with great multitudes of enemies, were forced to make an Orb; but he quickly turned it to a better use, by advancing the two Cornets two contrary ways, and so divided the enemy into two parts; and then beat them back to their great disadvantage.   

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.  
I Need not stand upon this order which the Galls here took, concerning pillage, that no soldior should forsake his station, or disrank himself in hope of spoil; which is a thing that from the very infancy of wars hath often changed the fortune of the day, and sold the honour of a public victory, for private lucre and petty pilfering. Amongst other examples, 
Lib. 20  let that which Guichardine reporteth of the battle of Taro, suffice to warn a well directed army, as well by the good which Charles the eighth of that name, King of France, received at that time, as by the loss which the Italians felt by that disorder, not to seek after pillage until the victory be obtained.   

THE THIRD OBSERVATION.  
THe insufficiency of these Commanders, whereof Caesar now complaineth as the only want, which these Romans had to clear themselves of this danger; bringeth to our consideration that which former times have made a question, which is, whether it were the virtue of the Roman leaders, or the valour of their soldiers, that enlarged their Empire to that greatness, and made their people and senate Lords of the world? Polybius weighing the causes of a victory, which the carthaginians gained of the Romans, by the counsel and good direction of one Zantippus a Grecian, having before that time received divers overthrows, during the time of those wars in Africa; concluded, that it was more in the worthiness of the Commanders, then in any extraordinary virtue of the soldiers, that the Romans achieved so many conquests. And besides the present example of Zantippus, he confirmed his opinion with the proceedings of Hannibal; who from the beginning of the second punic war, still gained of the Roman Empire, enlarging the territories of Carthage, and streightening the jurisdiction of mighty Rome, until it had got a leader matchable to that subtle Carthaginean, and found a Scipio to confront their Hannibal. To this may be added that 
SABINUS AND COTTA  famous battle between the old Romans, and the last Latins; wherein both parties were equally ballaunced, both in number and quality of their soldiers, having both the same Arms, the same use of their weapons, and the same discipline, as if it had been in a Civil war: neither could fortune tell by the presence of their Armies, where to bestow her favour, or where to show her disdain; but that the worthiness of the Roman leaders brought the odds in the trial, and made Rome great with the ruin of the Latins. Whereby it appeareth, how much it importeth the whole fortune of an Army, to have a leader worthy of the place which he holdeth: forasmuch as nothing doth make a greater difference of inequality between two equal Armies, than the wisdom and experience of a grave commander, or the disability of an unskilful leader; which are so powerful in their several effects, that there is greater hope of a heard of Hearts led by a Lion, then of so many Lions conducted by a Heart.    

CHAP. XIII.  
Ambiorix directeth the Galls how they might best fight with advantage, and frustrate the weapons of Roman soldiers.  
THE which thing when Ambiorix perceived; 
Caesar.  he commanded his men to throw their casting weapons a far off, and keep themselves from coming near at hand, and where the Romans charged upon them to give way; and again, as they saw them retire to their ensigns, then to pursue them. Which commandment was so diligently observed by the Galls, that as oft as any cohort sallied out of the Orb to give an assault, the enemy gave back as fast as they could; and in the mean time there was no help, but that part must be left naked and open to the inconvenience of casting weapons; and again, as they retired to their place, they were circumvented as well by them that had given place unto them, as by such as stood next about them: And if they went about to keep their ground, they could neither help themselves by their manhood; nor standing thick together, avoid the darts that such a multitude cast upon them: and yet notwithstanding these inconveniences besides the wounds which they had received, they stood still at their defence, and having so spent the greatest part of the day (for they had fought eight hours together) they counted nothing dishonourable or unworthy of themselves.  

THE OBSERVATION.  
I Have spoken already of the manner of the Roman fight, consisting altogether in good disposition of imbattailing, and in firm standing, and buckling at handy-blowes: as may appear by this circumstance, where Ambiorix forbiddeth his men to buckle with them, but to give back and follow on again, as the lightness of their Arms gave them opportunity. In like manner in the first book of the Civil wars, in the battle between Caesar and Affranius, it appeareth, that Caesar his soldiers were bound to keep their array, not to leave their ensigns, nor without a weighty occasion to forsake their stations appointed them: whereas the Affranians fought thin, and scattered here and there; and if they were hard laid unto, they thought it no dishonour to retire and give back, as they had learned of the Portugals, and other Barbarous nations.    

CHAP. XIIII.  
The Romans are overthrown.  
THAN T. Baluentius, who the year before had been Primipile of that legion, a valiant man and of great authority, had both his thighs darted through with a javelin: and Q. Lucanius, of the same order, valiantly fight to succour his son, was slain: and L. Cotta the Legate, as he busily encouraged all the Cohortes and Centuries, was wounded in the mouth with a sling. Titurius moved with these things, as he beheld Ambiorix a far off encouraging his men, sent C. Pompeius unto him, to entreat him that he would spare him and his soldiers. Ambiorix answered, that if he were desirous to treat, he might: for he hoped to obtain so much of the people, to save the soldiers: but for himself he should have no harm at all; for the assurance whereof, he gave him his faith. Titurius imparted the matter to Cotta, who absolutely denied to go to an armed enemy, and continued resolute in that opinion. Titurius commanded such Tribunes and Centurions that were present, to follow him; and when he came near to Ambiorix, being commanded to cast away his arms, he obeyed, and willed those that were with him, do the same. In the mean time while they treated of the couditions, and Ambiorix began a solemn protestation of purpose, Titurius was by little and little encompassed about and slain. Then according to their custom, they cried victory, and taking up a howling, charged the Romans with a fresh assault, and routed their troops. There L. Cotta fight valiantly was slain, with the most part of the soldiers with him. The remnant retired into their camp, amongst whom L. Petrosidius the eagle-bearer, when he saw himself overcharged with enemies, threw the Eagle within the rampire, and fight with a great courage, before the camp was slain. The rest with much ado endured the assault until night, and in the night being in despair of all succour slew themselves every man: a few, that escaped from the battle, came by unknown ways through the woods to Labienus, and certified him how all things had fallen out.  

OBSERVATIONS.  
ANd thus have we heard of the greatest loss, that ever fell at any one time upon Caesar his Army, from the time that he was first Proconsul in Gallia, unto the end of his dictatorship. For in the two overthrows at Dirrachium, he lost not above 1000 men, and in that at Gergovia not so many: but here fifteen cohortes were cut in pieces, which amounted to the number of 7000 men, or thereabout. Which maketh cowardice, and ill direction the more hateful, in regard that the great victory, which his valour obtained in Pharsalia, cost him but the lives of two hundredth men. The resolution of such as returned to the camp, witnesseth the exceeding valour of the Roman soldier, if a valiant leader had had the managing thereof; or if Cotta alone had been absolute commander, there had been great hope of better fortune in the success: but here it happened as it commonly doth, that where there are many that are equal sharers in the chief authority, the direction for the most part followeth him that is more violent in opinion then the rest: which being a property rather of passion then of judicious discourse, forceth a consent against the temperate opposition of a true discerning understanding; and so consequently it falleth out, that one coward, having place and authority in the council, doth either infect or annihilate the sound deliberations of the rest of the leaders: for his timorousness flieth always to extremities, making him rash in consultation, peremptory in opinion, and base in case of peril; all which are enemies to good direction, and the only instruments of mischieving fortune.    

CHAP. XV.  
Ambiorix hasteth to besiege Cicero; and stirreth up the Aduatici, the Neruij; and so raiseth a great power.  
AMBIORIX took such spirits unto him upon this victory, that with his horsemen he went immediately unto the Aduatici, being the next borderers upon his kingdom, without intermission of night, commanding his footmen to follow him: The advatici being stirred up to Commotion, the next day after he came to the Neruij, exhorting them not to let slip this occasion of taking to themselves perpetual liberty, and revenging them of the Romans for the wrong they had received. He told them that two Legates were already slain, and a great part of the Army overthrown: it was now no great matter, suddenly to surprise the legion that wintered with Cicero; to the performance whereof, he offered himself to be their assistant. These remonstrances easily persuaded the Neruij, and therefore they dispatched speedy messengers to the Centrones, Grudij and other people under their dominion, and raised verte great forces, and with them they hasted to the camp where Cicero wintered, before any inkling of the death of Titurius was brought unto him.  

THE OBSERVATION.  
THe ambitious and working spirit of Ambiorix, that could attempt to raise the baseness of a small and ignoble state, to so high a point of resolution, that they durst adventure upon the Roman legions, being settled in the strength of their Empire, by the memory of so many victories in Gallia: wanted now no means to make an overture to a universal commotion, propounding liberty and revenge to the Galls, two the sweetest conditions that can happen to a subdued people, if they would but stretch out their hands to take it, and follow that course which his example had proved sure and easy. Which may serve to show, that he that will attempt upon doubtful and unsafe Principles, will take great advantage from a probable entrance, and make a small beginning a sufficient means for his greatest designs.    

CHAP. XVI.  
Cicero defendeth his camp from the surprise of the Neruij, and prepareth himself against a siege.  
IT happened to Cicero also (as it could not otherwise choose) that many of the soldiers, that were gone into the woods for timber and munition, were cut off by the sudden approach of the enemy's horsemen. These being circumvented, the Eburones, Neruij, and Aduatici, with all their confederates and clientes, began to assault the camp. The Romans betook them speedily to their weapons; and got upon the rampire, with much ado they held out that day: for the Galls trusted much upon celerity, hoping if they sped well in that action, to be victors ever after. Cicero dispatched letters with all speed to Caesar, promising great rewards to him that should carry them: but all the ways were so forelaid, that the messengers were taken. In one night there was built in the camp 120 towers, of such timber as was brought in for fortification, & whatsoever wanted of the rest of the work, was perfected. The enemy the next day with a far greater power assaulted the camp, and filled up the ditch: the Romans made the like defence, as they had done the day before; the like was continued divers days after. The romans made no intermission of their work at any part of the night, nor gave any rest either to the sick or the wounded. Whatsoever was needful for the next days assault, was provided in a readiness the night before; a great number of stakes hardened in the fire were prepared, and many mural piles were made; the towers were floored in their stories, Pinnacles and Parapets were set up of hurdles: and Cicero himself being sickly, and of a weak constitution, took not so much leisure as to rest himself in the night time; so that the soldiers of their own accord compelled him, by entreaty, to spare himself.  

THE OBSERVATION.  
THis Q. Cicero is said to be the brother of Marcus Cicero the famous Orator, & to him were the letters sent which are found in his Epistles, directed Quincto fratri. In this action his carriage deserved as great reputation, in the true censure of honour, as ever his brother did for his eloquence, pro Rostris. And if it had been the others fortune to have performed the like service, he would have made it the greatest exploit that ever Roman had achieved by arms: wherein particularly may be commended the diligence and industry, which was used in raising so many towers, in so small a time; for providing the night before, such things as were necessary for the next days defence; for making so many stakes hardened at the end with fire, for the defence of the rampire; and for the store of these mural piles, which resembled the form of the ordinary pile, but were far greater and weightier in regard they were to be cast from the rampire; which gave them such advantage, by reason of the height, that being cast by a strong and well practised arm, they were very effectual and of great terror.    

CHAP. XVII.  
The Neruij propound the same things to Cicero which Ambiorix had done to Sabinus; but are rejected.  
THAN the Princes and chief commanders of the Neruij, which had any entrance of speech and cause of acquaintance with Cicero, signified their desire to speak with him: which being granted, they propounded the same things they had used to deceive Sabinus; all Gallia was in Arms; the Germans were come over the Rhine; Caesar and the rest were besieged in their wintering camps; Sabinus and his men were cut in pieces; notwithstanding they carried this mind to Cicero, that they refused nothing but their wintering among them, they might depart in safety whither they would, without disturbance or fear of danger. Cicero only made this answer: that it was not the custom of the people of Rome, to take any article or condition from an armed enemy; but if they would lay their arms aside, let them use his furtherance in the matter, and send some to negotiate it with Caesar; there was great hope in regard of his justice and equity, that they should not return unsatisfied.  

THE OBSERVATION.  
THe first attempt, which Ambiorix made upon the camp of Sabinus and Cotta, was but short; but here what with the pride of the former victory, and the great multitude of the assailants, they continued it longer, in hope to carry it by assault: for the first assault of a place, especially when it cometh by way of surprise, is of greater hope to the assailant, and of greater danger to the defendant, than such as afterward are made in the sequel of the war: for after the first brunt, the heat of the enemy is much abated, as well through the nature of a hot desire, which is most violent in the beginning, and afterward groweth cold and remiss, as also with the harms and peril which they meet with in the encounter; and on the contrary side, the defendants having withstood the first fury, wherein there is most terror and distrust, grow more confident and better assured of their manhood, and in experience of their strength stand firm against any charge whatsoever.    

CHAP. XVIII.  
The Neruij besiege Cicero, with a ditch and a rampire, and work means to set fire on their tents.  
THE Neruij disappointed of his hope, carried a ditch and a rampire round about the camp; the rampire was 11 foot high, and the ditch 15 foot deep; which they had learned of the romans, partly by being conversant among them certain years before, and partly by the prisoners and captives which they had taken; but they had no iron tools fit for that purpose, but were driven to cut up turf with their swords, and gather earth with their hands, and carry it away with their mantles and gaberdines. Whereby may be gathered, what a multitude of men there were at the siege; for in less than three hours, they finished the fortification of fifteen miles in circuit. The days following, the enemy built towers to the height of the rampire, prepared great hooks and strong penthouses, or savegardes of boards and timber, according as the captives had given them instruction. The seventh day of the siege being a very windy day, they cast hot bullets of clay out of slings, and burning darts upon the cabins of the Romans, which after the manner of the Galls, were thatched with straw: these cabins were quickly set on fire, which by the violence of the wind was carried over all the camp; the enemy pressing forward with a great clamour, as though the victory were already gotten, began to bring their Turrets and Testudines to the rampire, and to scale it with ladders. But such was the valour of the Roman soldiers, that albeit they were scorched on all sides with fire, and overcharged with multitude of weapons, and saw all their wealth burned before their face; yet no man forsook the rampire, or scarce looked back at that which had happened, but they all fought valiantly, and with an exceeding courage.  

OBSERVATIONS.  
THis one example may serve to show the excellency of the Roman discipline, and the wisdom of the first founders of that Art: for they perceiving that the fortune of wars consisted chiefly in the mastering of particular occurrences, trained their soldiers in that form of discipline, as might struggle with inconveniences, and strong oppositions of contradicting accidents; and so overwage all difficulties and hindrances, with a constant perseveration and a courage invincible. For the great attempting spirit of an ambitious commander, that seeketh to overtop the trophies of honour, with the memory of his exploits, will quickly perish by his own direction, if the instruments of execution be weaker, than the means which lead him to his dessignments. For where the weight is greater than the strength, the engine will sooner break, then lift it up. Let a discreet leader therefore so level his thoughts, that his resolution may not exceed the ability of his particular means; but first let him be well assured what his soldiers can do, before he resolve what he will do: or otherwise, let him so enable them by discipline and instructions, according to the example of the old Romans, that their worth may answer the height of his desires and follow his aspiring mind, with a resolution grounded upon knowledge and valour; and so making their ability the ground of his designs, he shall never fail of means to perform what he intendeth. The want of this consideration hath, within these late years, repaid our commanders in many parts of Christendom with loss and dishonour; when as they measured the humour of their poor needy and undisciplined soldier, by the garb of their ambitious thoughts, and so laid such projects of difficulty, as were very unsuitable in the particularity of occurrences to that, which their soldiers were fit to execute.    

CHAP. XIX.  
The emulation between two Centurions, Pulfio, and Varenus, with their fortunes in the encounter.  
THERE were in that legion two valiant men, Titus Pulfio, and L. Varenus Centurions, coming on a pace to the dignity of the first orders: these two were at continual debate which of them should be preferred one before another, & every year contended for place of preferment, with much strife and emulation. Pulfio at a time, that the fortification was very sharply assaulted, called to Varenus, and asked him why he now stood doubtful? or what other place he did look for to make trial of his manhood? this is the day (saith he) that shall decide our controversies; and when he had spoken these words, he went out of the fortification, and where he saw the enemy thickest, he fiercely set upon them: then could not Varenus hold himself within the rampire, but followed after in a reasonable distance. Pulfio cast his pile at the enemy, and struck one of the multitude through that came running out against him; he being slain, all cast their weapons at him, giving no respite or time of retreat: Pulfio had his target struck through, and the dart stuck fast in his girdle: this chance turned aside his scabbard and hindered his right hand from pulling out his sword, in which disadvantage the enemy pressed hard upon him; Varenus came and rescued him: immediately the whole multitude, thinking Pulfio to be slain with the dart, turned to Varenus, who speedily betook him to his sword, and came to handy-strokes, and having slain one he put the rest somewhat back. But as he followed overhastely upon them, he fell down: him did Pulfio rescue, 
CICERO BESIEGED  being circumvented and in danger; and so both of them having slain many of the enemy, retired to their camp in safety, to their great honour. Thus fortune carried as well the contention, as the encounter of them both, that being enemies, they nevertheless gave help to save each others life, in such sort, that it was not to be judged which of them deserved greatest honour.  

OBSERVATIONS.  
CAEsar inserteth this accident of the two Centurions, as worthy to be related amongst the deeds of arms contained in these commentaries: wherein we are first to observe the grounds of this quarrel, which was their continual strife for place of preferment, which they sought after by showing their valour in time of danger, and approving their worth by the greatness of their desert; a contention worthy the Roman discipline, and may serve for a pattern of true honour full of courage, accomplished with virtue. For these Simultates, which desire of honour had cast between them, brought forth emulation which is the spur of virtue, far from enmity or hateful contention: for the difference between these two qualities is, that enmity hunteth after destruction, and only rejoiceth in that which bringeth to our adversary utter ruin, dishonour or ill achievement: but emulation contendeth only by well deserving, to gain the advantage of an other man's fame, that useth the same means to attain to the like end; and is always mixed with love, in regard of the affinity of their affections, and the sympathy of their desires, not seeking the overthrow of their Competitor, but succouring him in time of danger, and defending him from foul and unfortunate calamity, that he may still continue to show the greatness of his worth by the opposition of inferior actions, which are as a lesser scantling of desert to measure the estimation of the others honour.  
A virtue rare and unknown in these days, and would hardly find subjects to be resident in, if she should offer her help in the course of our affairs, or sue to be entertained by the crooked dispositions of our times: for we can no sooner conceive the thoughts that breed emulation, but it turneth presently to hatred, which is followed to the uttermost of our malice, and resteth better satisfied with the miserable end of our opposed partner, then with thousand of Trophies deservedly erected to our honour. Which maketh me wonder, when I look into the difference of these and those ages, whether it were the discipline of that time, which brought forth such honest effects of virtue, to their glory and our ignominy, having learned better rules than were known unto them; or whether the world weakened with age, want strength in these times to bring forth her creatures in that perfection, as it did in those days; or what other cause hath made our worst affections so violent, and our better faculties so remiss and negligent, that virtue hath no part in us but words of praise, our whole practice being consecrated to actions of reproach. The injuries, murders, scandalous carriages of one towards an other, which in these days are so readily offered, and so impatiently digested, will admit no satisfaction but private combat, which in the first monarchies was granted only against strangers, and foreign enemies, as the only objects of arms and wrath, and capable of that justice, which the private sword should execute: for they well perceived that these single battles were, as sparkles of civil discord, and intestine wars; although not so apparent in the general view of their state, yet as odious in particular, and as dishonourable to good government. And if there were a true record of such, as have been either slain or wounded within these forty years, either in this kingdom, or in France, or in Germany, by this licentious and brutish custom; I make no question, but they would amount to a number capable of that fearful style, which is attributed to civil wars.  
Neither is there any law how rigorous or hard soever, that can give relief to this disorder, but the restraint will draw on as great enormities, and as untolerable in a good government. Rotaris king of the Lombard's forbade his subjects this manner of combat; but shortly after, he was constrained to recall the edict, for the avoiding of greater evils; although he protested the thing to be both inhuman, and barbarous. The like edict was published in France by Philip the Fair, but was within two years revoked again, at the instant request of his subjects, in regard of the murders and assasinats committed in that kingdom. The only remedy, that I find to take effect in this case, was that of late time, which the Prince of Melphe in Piedmont, invented to prevent this evil: for perceiving how ordinary quarrels and bloodshed were in his camp, he assigned a place between two bridges for the performance of the Duellum, with this charge; that he that had the worst should always be slain, and cast from the bridge into the water; the danger joined with dishonour (which by this decree attended such as undertook private combat) made the soldiers wiser in their carriage, and put an end to their sedition and civil discords. But that which is yet worst of all, is that custom hath now made it so familiar, that every trifle seemeth sufficient to call the matter to a private combat; a cross look calleth an others man's honour in question; but the word lie is of as great consequence, as any stab or villainy whatsoever. Whereat we may well wonder how it happeneth, that we feel ourselves so much exasperated at the reproach of that vice, which we so ordinarily commit; for in the custom of these times to cast upon us the lie, is the greatest injury that words can do unto us; and yet there is nothing more frequent in our mouth. It may be a property in our nature, to stand chiefly in the defence of that corruption unto which we are most subject: I speak not this to qualify the foulness of this vice; for I hold a liar to be a monster in nature, one that contemneth God and feareth man, as an ancient father saith; but to show the crookedness of our disposition in disdaining to acknowledge that fault, which we so commonly commit. But I would fain learn when honour first came to be measured with words, for from the beginning it was not so. Caesar was often called to his face thief, and drunkard, without any further matter; and the liberty of invectives, which great personages used one against an other, as it began, so it ended with words. And so I think our lie might too, for I take him that returneth the lie, and so letteth it rest until further proof, to have as great advantage in the reputation of honour, as the former that first gave the disgrace.    

CHAP. XX.  
Cicero sendeth to Caesar, at whose coming the siege was raised, and the Galls overthrown.  
AT length Cicero found means, by a Gall to advertise Caesar of the danger wherein he was: who speedily hasted with two legions to give him succour; the Neruij understanding of Caesar's approach, forsook the siege and went to meet him. Caesar finding the enemy to be 60000. strong, and himself not to have above 7000. men, encamped himself in a place of advantage; and sought by counterfeiting fear, to draw the enemy to come and assault his camp, which he handled with that dexterity, that the Galls came up unto him, with a full assurance of victory: but Caesar sending out two sallies at two several gates of the camp, overthrew the greatest part of them, and dispossessed the rest of their arms; and so ended that war.  
FINIS.