The Ethiques of Aristotle, that is to say, precepts of good behaviour and perfect honesty, now newly translated into English.    

The preface HIS RIGHT Honourable Lord and Master Edward Earl of Derby, His humble and obedient Servant John Wylkinson, Saluteth.  
ALthough the feeble and weary body, (right honourable lord and Master) be satisfied with a resting place: yet the mind cannot be so quieted or reposed, but that of necessity it is evermore busi. Therefore it shall be good for every man to provide for some virtuous occupying, against the multitude of phanta sies, wherein may be fixed the labour of the mind, so that it stray not to far in vain. I therefore intending to discharge a part of my duty toward your Lordship have translated this book of the Ethiques of Aristotle, out of Italian into our vulgar tongue, not for that your Lordship hath not seen them herebefore in the Italian tongue, but for the instruction and edifying of others that have not seen them in English. Yet I can notboldli beseech your Lordship nor others being of more knowledge than I am to allow this my simple doing: but rather to correct the same, and not to judge or dame in me any presumption.  
The end of the preface.   

The Ethiques of Aristotle.  

Of Artes. The first Chapter.  
Every art, every doctrine, every operation, and every election, seemeth to require sonthing to be good: them it was well said of the Philosophers. Good is that which every thing desireth. According unto diverse arts, divers intentions: Some been finished in works, & other that been no works. Although they be many Arts or crafts, every one hath his final intention.  
¶ Example, Physic intendeth health, & knighthod victory, ship work intendeth sailing: Governance of housolde intendeth to have riches. There be Arts general and arts also that be special. ¶ Example, The science of knighthood is general under the which been contained other arts particulars, as Sa delars, Armourers, & other crafts which may be needful in battle, and these universal be more worthy & more noble than been the particulars, because, the particulars be for the universals, as things which be made by nature, and been an utter and final understanding, unto the which been ordained all the operation of these crafts. As a man that shooteth at his prick for his mark: So every craft hath his final intent which doth set forth the work. Then the art Civil that teacheth to rule Cities is principal and sovereign of all other arts, for under her been contained diverse arts. Rhetoric is also right noble, for why? she doth dispose and set in order all the other that be contained under her: The fullness whereof and end, is the fullness and intent of all the other. Than the wealth that followeth her science is the wealth of man, Because, it doth constrain from enyls. The right doctrine is that a man proceed therein according as his nature may sustain.  
¶ Example, He that teacheth Geometry, aught to proceed by strong arguments, which been named demonstrations: & he that teacheth Rhetoric ought to proceed by arguments sembla bless or very like. And this is for to wit, that every artificer should judge well and say the truth of that which appertaineth to his craft. The science of ruling of cities belongeth not to children, nor to men that followeth their own wills: For they be not wise in two sorts, neither in age nor in manners, yet sometime old of time and young in manners, and child of time and old in manners, then to such is convenient to be rulers of cities which be no children of manners nor followers of their own wills.  
¶ There be things which be manifest unto nature, and things that be manifest unto us, from whence this science ought to be given. Of the things that be manifest unto us, a man that should study in this science and learn it, ought to use himself in things good, just and honest. Also he ought to have his mind naturally disposed to science. But a man that hath none of these things is unprofitable to this science.   

Of the three lives. Ca two.  
THe lives of name & fame been three: the one is the life of concupiscence, the other is the life Civil: that is to say the life of honour and prudence: the third is the life contemplative. There be many that live bestly, which is called the life of concupiscence, for that they follow their wills, and eachone of these lives is for their proper intent, divided one from the other: as the art of Physic is divided from the art of knighthode, and as the Physician intendeth health, so the knight will have battle and victory.   

Of good. Capi. iii.  
GOod is considered in two sorts, the one is good for himself, another good is that a man desireth for other. Good for thyself is beatitude. Good for other is honour and virtue. And why would a man have these things, but for to be happy? A natural thing it is to every man to be a citizen and to be accustomed with Artificers, and not naturally to inhabit in deserts there where is no company which naturally a man loveth. Beatitude is a thing complete that needeth none other thing without itself, by the which the life of man is laudable and glorious. Then is beatitude the greatest wealth and the most soveraive thing a man can have.   

¶ Here is divided the powers of the Solle. Capi. iiii.  
THe Solle of man hath three powers, one is called the life vegetable: in the which man is partner with trees & with plants: The second power, is the life sensible in the which a man is partner with beasts, for why all beasts have life's sensible. The third, is called soul reasonable, by the which a man differeth from all other things, for there is none reasonable but man. And this power reasonable is sometime in act, and sometime in power, from whence the Beatitude is when it is in act and not when it is in power.  
¶ Every work that a man doth, is either good or evil, and that man that maketh his work good, is worthy to have the perfection of the virtue of his works: as we would say, he that harpeth well, is worthy to have the praise of his art, and the evil to have the contrary. Then if the life of man, be according to the operation of reason, than his life is laudable, when he leadeth it according to his proper virtue. But when many virtues be gathered together in one man's living, than the life of that man is most best and much honoured & much worthy, so that it can be no more. For it is not one virtue that maketh a man blessed or happy, No more than one Swallow is a perfect token of the new spring. Then it is not in a little time of the life of man, that he doth good works, nor can be said, that man is happy.   

¶ Of three manner of wealths. Capitulo .v.  
VUelth is divided in three parts, the one is the wealth of the soul, the other is the wealth of the body, and the other is the wealth with out the body. And of these three the wealth of the Solle is most worthy, and the form thereof is not known but in works, which be with virtue. ¶ Beatitude consists in the obtaining of virtues & in the using of them. But when beatitude is in a man in habit and not in deed or act, than he is virtuous as a man that sleepeth, whose virtue and whose works are not manifest, but of necessity must needs work according to the art, and is in similitude to him that standeth in travers and feightes, obtaineth & hath the croune: although there be no more stronger than he that hath the victory, yet he hath not therefore the crown because he is most strong, except he feighte: Albeit by his power he get the battle. And so the rewards of virtue, a man hath not if he bestow not himself in virtue actually: and this is for because the reward is the Beatitude which he hath so long as he worketh the works of virtue.  
¶ The just man delighteth in justice, the wise man in sapience, the virtuous man in virtue. And every work which is done by virtue, is fair and delectable in itself. Beatitude is a thing Jocund & pleasant.  
¶ beatitude that is in earth hath need of outward health, for it is impossible to a man to do fair works and to have Art, which is seeming to good and virtuous living, with abundance of friends. prosperity of fortune, without good outwardly. And therefore it is needful to have without forth, whereby may be the more manifest the honour & value of man. And if any gift be given to man in this world from the glorious God, it is a worthy thing to believe this to be the Beatitude, because it is the best thing that may be in man. For why? it is an honourable and come plet form of virtue. There is no generation nor kind that can have virtue and beatitude but man. There is neither child nor beast that can have Beatitude, for why? there works be not according to virtue. Beatitutde is a thing steadfast and fyrm according to very disposition, wherein neither falleth variance nor permutation, as for to have now well and now evil, but evermore well, and this is the goodness that is in the works of man▪ The pillars of beatitude be the operations which a man doth according to virtue. The pillars of the contrary, be those that a man doth according to vice.  
These works be steadfast and stable in the mind of man, and the virtuous man is not moved nor troubled in himself for any thing that may happen contrary, for than he should never have felicity it he be troubled, because sorrow taketh away pleasure from felicity.  
There be things which be hard to be born: but when a man hath borne them patiently, he hath showed the strength of his mind: and there be things also which be light to be borne, in the sustaining whereof there is no great prudence showed therein. A hard thing it is to sustain sickness & death of children: yet although they be strange and hard, they movenot a man from his Beati tude. The happiness of the man that is well fortuned, is so much to be praised, as a thing sent from God, and is so much to be honoured & commended: that their laud & praise can not be spoken: & spe cial, it shall become us to glori fie, honour & magnify almighty god above all things, & we ought to think him in himself to have in his thought algoodnes & felicity, For why? he is the beginning & cause of algoodnes. Felicite & beatitude are one certain act, the which proceedeth of the solle & of the body. And like as the perfect physician seeketh & searcheth dt ligently the nature of the body of man to th'intent to confirm it in hell the: Likewise tt belongeth unto good rulers & governors of cities to look studi & provide tocon serve the form of felicity in the mides of their citizens, & for to put them in comfort to work according to virtue which is the pre cious fruit that cometh of felicity.   

The powers of the soul, Chapiter vi  
The soul of man hath divers powers, as one called the power irracional: that is to say unreasonable, wherein a man differeth not from plants & brute beasts. And therefore this is not the proper power in man. For by this power man may work his operation sleeping. The other is the power intellective, according to whose work after the form aforesaid, is good and evil. And this power worketh not in sleeping but manifestly, & therefore it is said, that the miserable differeth not from the good in the limits of this life. For in the time of sleep, which is the good, such is the evil, and is because that man resteth from the work by the which he is called good and evil: but this is not truth generally, because the minds of the good, seeth sometimes in visions and dreams many good things and profitable, Which be not seen in the minds of evil men. The other power that the sollc hath, although it be not racionall. Yet it taketh part with reason, therefore it ought to obey unto the virtue of reason, and this is called the virtue con cupissible. And a man ought to know that in the solle there are sometime contrary movings Like as are in the body, as when one member moveth in the Paralitico or Palsy it must move against nature: but this contrary is manifest in the body, and in the solle hid and secret. ¶ The power racional is to be said in two sorts, the one is the power which is very reasonable: that learneth deserneth and judgeth. The other power, unreasonable, that is to say, the power concupissible, and is called reasonable as long as it is obedient & under the power of that which is veri reasonable, as the good child unto the father, which receiveth his correction.   

Of two manners of virtues. Chapter vii  
THere be two virtues, one is called Intellectual, as Sapience science and prudence: the other is called Moral, as chastity, liberality and humility, then if we will praise a man in virtue Intellectual, we say this is a wise man and subtle in understanding, and when we will praise a man for his moral virtues, that is to say in his manners, we say this is a chaste man and a liberal.   

How virtue groweth in man. Chaptter viii  
Although there be two. virtues, the one intellectual, & the o there moral, the Intellectual engendereth and groweth by doctrine & learning. And the moral like wise engendereth & groweth by good use and custom, and this virtue moral is not in us by nature, for natural things can not be moved from their dispositions by contrary use.  
¶ Example, the nature of the Stone is to go down ward, and cannot be cast so high but that it presseth down again. The nature of the Fire is to go up: and can not be driven so far down but that it presseth upward. And universally, nothing natural can naturally work against nature Then these virtues be not in us by nature: the power to receive them is in us by nature, the accomplisshing is in us by use. Then these virtues be not put in to us by nature, but the roots and fulfilling of the receipt of them, is in us by nature: and the fullness and perfection of the uncommeth to us by use. Every thing that is in us by nature, is in us first by power: and after cometh to the act, as it cometh to the senses of man. For first a man hath power to see & to here: and after by this power he heareth and seeth: and a man seeth not nor heareth before he have the power to hear and see: then now we see that in these things of nature: the power goeth before the act, and in things moral, all contrary, for the act and the work goeth before the power.  
¶ Example, A man hath the virtue that is called Justice be cause he hath done oft-times the works of Justice: Also the virtue of Chastity: for that he hath diverse times wrought the works of Chastity. And so it is of Artificers, a man is called a Carpenter because he hath wrought long in that art & craft: Art will not be had without long time bestowed therein. Like as the Minstrel, by the long use of Instruments, beareth the name of that art: and the good man is good by his good works, and evil for doing evil: one self thing engendereth in us virtues & corrupteth. If this thing be done diversly, it is by virtue as it is by health, for one self thing done in divers fashions is both cause of health & corruption.  
¶ Example, labour temperate is health to man, and if it be little it corrupteth, to much or to little corrupteth, & to keep the mean conserveth. ¶ Example, fear & foolish hardiness corrupteth the valiantness of man, for why? the fearful fleeth from every thing. And the hardy assaileth every thing, believing in himself to bring it to pass: neither in the one nor in the other there is no doutinesse, for prudence is in keeping the mean between fear and foolish hardiness. For a man ought to slay & assail there where it is to assail. And so it is to be understand in all virtues, as it is to be understand in prudence: that virtue is gotten & kept by holding of the mean.   

How a man is virtuous chapter ix  
Now it is needful to make distinction and put a difference between habit, which are without virtue by grief or by joy, which be done in their works.  
¶ Example, he the sustaineth carnal wills, & of the abstaining from them rejoiceth, is called chaste, & he that sustaineth carnal will and mourneth is called lecherus, & specially he that sustaineth terrible things & not troubled therewith, is called prudent and strong, and he that sustaineth perilous things and troubled with them is called fearful. Every operation and every fashion followeth pleasure or displeasure. Then every virtue is with delight or with grief: and therefore the governors of Cities do honour delectations and pleasures duly taken: and scourge with divers torments delectations not duly taken.   

¶ The three desires of Man. Chapter ten  
THe things that man willeth & desireth be three: one is profitable, the other delectable & the third good. The things contrary be also three, neither profitable, delectable, nor yet good. He that useth reason in these things is good: And he that useth not reason in these things is evil. And specially in delectation, for why? it is nourished with us from our nativity. And therefore it is a great thing for a man to have right measure in delectation. Then all the understanding of this our book, is to have delectation with reason: and to have reason in hard things it behoveth to have art. Then the understanding of arts was out of the science Civil: So that it giveth delight unto his citiesens, in things which be convenient, as where, when & how much, and who that useth of these things well, is called good: & he that doth contrary is evil.   

¶ How a man is virtuous. Chapi xi  
TO demand how a man is just according to the works of justice, and how he is temperate, doing the works of temperance, a man might say that it is like unto these two virtues. As of gran mer, and to that man that is called a Gramarion, that speaketh according to Grammar: but in troth it is not like, from the art to virtues, for why? in art, that a man be good it needeth not but to know, but in virtue knowledge sufficeth not, without work: for to know without work it availeth not. Like unto this is the sick which under standeth all the commandment of the Physician, and doth not thereafter. Such sickness is far from health, so be men far from Beatitude if they have virtues and work them not.   

How virtues are inhabit, chapter xii  
IN the soul of man are three things habit, power, and passions. Passions be these, joy, desire, love, envy, and hate: the powers be natural by the which we may do the foresaid things. habit is where a man is praised or dispraised, them I say that virtue is no power nor passion but habit: for neither by passion nor power, man is praised nor dispraised: but rather by habitee standing and permanent in the soul of man.   

¶ What virtue is Chapter xiii  
Virtues be found in things that have a mean between extremities, which are either to much or to little: and this mean is in two. sorts, one according to nature, & tother by comparison, & is called mean according to nature, this in all thing is one self thing ¶ Example, if ten be to much & vi. is to little. then ii is to be a mean, for why? vi. be so much more than ii as they be les than x. the mean by comparison to us is this, neither to much nor to little.  
¶ Example, if taking a great quantity of food be to much, and a little quantity to little, the mean may be understand in our handling, neither to much nor to little. Every artificer in his art enforceth himself to keep the mean, from thextremities. Then the moral virtues be those works, in the which to much and to litellbe avoided and abolished, and the mean to be praised. Then virtue is one willing habit, that standeth in the midward to us, from whence the reason is determinate.  
¶ There is but one wait only to do well, and many ways to do evil: & therefore it is a hard thing and a laborus to be good, and a light and easy thing to be evil: & there be more of the evil sort then of the good. There be things in the which there can no mean be found, because they be nought at all, as thette, manslaughter, treason, and adultery: so there be things which be virtues, and have no extremities: As temperance and fortitude: for the mean hath no extremity in itself. Fortitude or strength is a mean between fear and foolish hardiness: & chastity is mean between the man that followeth his will, and he that utterly forsaketh it. liberality is the mean between prodigalite & Avarice, for the prodigal is less in receiving, than he is in giving, and the covetous contrary, but the man that is liberal keepeth the mean between these two extremities. liberality, truth, and prodigalite in little and mean things: but in great things the mean is called Magnificence, the suꝑabundance hath no name in Latin, but in Greek it is called Pleonasmonus, & the little is called Pernesa, Mean in the will is equanimite, that is to sat, equalness, Equanimite are those that will not to much. The Magninimus is he that willeth to much, and he that will not is called pusillanimus. A man that angreth with a thing so much as it veho veth, is called meek: & he that is angri with a thing withoutcause is called Ireful: and he that is not so angry as he should be is called Iniracibile or angerles, truth is in the mids between the two extremees, that is between overmuch and to little. Those which keep the mean between these two things, be called trusty, and they that overpass be called vaunters or boasters. And those that be to short in these things, be called humble: and they that keep the mean in thes things of sport & play, be called in Greek Metrocalor and they that overpass, be called scoffers, and they that lack, be called haskardes: and he that keepeth the mean in company is called companiable: and he that passeth the mean looking for no gains, is called a good fellow: and he that passeth the midst, and all forgaines, is called a flatterer. Shamefastness is a passion of the mind and no virtue, and they that hold the mean in shame, be called shamfaste, and they that be more ashamed than need is, be called in Greek Recoples and they which shame, less than they should are called shameless.   

¶ How to know virtues. Chaptter xiiii  
Three dispositions been in the works of man: that is to say, much, little and mean. And all thes three things been contrary amongst themselves. For little is contrary to much, and the mean is contrary to them both: that is to say, to little and to much, whence if thou wilt make comparison, between the mean and much, we may say to much: and if we will make comparison, between the mean and little, we may say to little: whence if thou wilt make comparison, between prows and fear, their prows shallbe called hardiness, and if a man will compare, between prows and hardiness, verily their prows shallbe called fear. But it is to be known that there is a greater contrary from the one extreme to the other, than it is from the mean to the extremes, yet the one is more near to the mean than is the other.  
¶ Example, hardiness is more nearer to prows then is fear, and prodygalitee is more nearer to liberality then is Avarice, but the sencibilite of the carnal will, is more near unto chastity, than it is to Lechery, and that is by two reasons, the one reason is according to the nature of the thing, the other is of our part by nature, and this is the reason whereof that fear is more contrari unto fortitude, then is hardiness of our part: because the extremities unto the which we been most ready to fall by nature, been the furthest from the mean, and therefore we fall more readily unto carnal desires, than we do to the contrary. Then in so much that virtue is in the mean, and to take the mean there needeth so many considerations, it is a hard thing for a man to become virtuous. Every art apperteneth to every man, & every man ought to learn, specially such as are wise and expert therein, for every man cannot find the point of the circle, but he only that is wise in Geometry. Can do and will do the thing, is lightly said, but to do with all dew circumstance appertcineth only to them that be wise in that art. Every operation that keepeth the mean is fair and worthy reward, and for this cause we ought to incline our mides, contrary to our desires whereby we may come to the mean, although it be a hard thing at the first. Then in all things the mean is to be praised, and the extremities to be blamed.   

¶ How a man doth well and evil. Chapter xu  
THere be operations which a man doth not with his will, that is to say by force or by ignorance, as if the wind should take a man and carry him into another country. There be other operations, which a man doth willingly by his own consent as a man that doth a work of virtue or vice by his proper wil And there be other operations which be part by his will, and part not according to his will: as if a man being upon the Sea in time of tempest and casteth forth his harness & stuff to save himself: or as it hath been seen, that the lord hath commanded his subject to slay his father or mother in pain of life. Such operations be not compounded of the works of will nor enforced: yet if thou do it, thou dost it by thy will, although thou do it by commandment, therefore such works have praise and dispraise. A man ought rather to die, then to doc so fyithy a thing, as to kill father or mother, or to do any such like things. Lack of wit and discretion is the cause of all evil, for lack of knowledge what is to be done, & what is not to be done, is the only cause of the in crease of evil men. In this know lage, the mind seeth not the evil name and peril that they run in to. Think you a drunken man and Ireful, when he doth any evil deed, that he doth it by ignorance without knowledge, all though he be ignorant in his deed. Nevertheless, the cause of the malice is not without him, for why? the science of a man can not departed from him. Then the cause of the concupiscence of this evil, is but in the evil doer, that followeth his will: for it is impossible, that a man may do well by his will, and evil without his will. And likewise the will is more common and more general than is the election. For why? the operation of the will, is common with Beasts and children, but the election appertaineth not but to him that abstaineth himself from concupiscence. Sometimes a man would have a thing that is possible, & yet doth chose for it that which is impossible. Also the will is th'intent, but the election is an antecedent unto th'intent, for why? election goeth before the operation: & the operation goth after. And a man is called good or evil by the work: but by the election he is neither called good nor evil.  
¶ Also the opinion is of truth or falsehood: but the election is of well or evil. And like opinions are of those things that a man knoweth not sureli. But the election is of those things which a man knoweth of a surety. yet every thing is not to be chosen, but those wherein a man hath had council before. And yet council is not to be kept in every thing: But of those wherein wise men take council, but of the things whereof fools council is no council to be made, but these things which be weighty and may be done by us, the Issue being doubtful, that is to say doubtful in the end. There be things which be to have council, as to give medysyns to a sick man or like things. Of other things, which appertaineth not to us, needeth no counsel, as to keep council upon things that be perpetual, and of necessity: as whether the son rise in the morning, or if it rain or not: nor yet to council of things that come by chance, as too find a Purse or other treasure: nor yet to council upon the end, but rather upon the things that go before the end.  
¶ The Physicyan counseleth upon the life of the sick, and counseleth how he may heal him. The Rhethorician counseleth not upon persuasions: and he that maketh the law, counseleth not of the beatitude, but rather every man counseleth in those things by the which they may come to the things that be needful to their art, by him or by his friends, as he would to himself. The will is the end or the intent as it is said above, where it seemeth to some men that to be good which please them, & other there be to whom it seemeth that all is good that the most would have commonly: but according to the truth it is not so, but good is that which seemeth good to them that be good, that judge things as they be, and judge as doth the whole man, that judgeth that sweet, which is sweet, and that bitter, which is bitter. But the sick man doth all contrary, for he judgeth bitter to be sweet, & the sweet bitter, and so unto an evil man that which is good seemeth evil, and that is evil good, and this is because the evil man taketh not delight to be good, but that he delighteth to be evil: and there be many sick of this naughty sickness, because the works good and evil be in their judgement. Then it is in us to do well, & also it is in us to do evil, and sometimes it is by the works of man as it is with children, put the case that some be nought, the father thinketh him good. And that good and evil is in us, it appeareth by them that made the law, which scourgeth them that do evil with dyverie pains, and giveth honour to them that do well. The laws put men in comfort to do well, and constrain them from evil, and no man comforteth another to do that thing that is not in his power. There is none that will advise a man to mourn for that thing that he should sorrow: nor there is none that will bear a man in hand, he shall not warm standing near the fire, & that he be not thrusty nor hungry: and they that made the laws punish men for such Ignorance wherein they be guilty. And it is to be known that there is double ignorance, one is this of the which a man is notcause, as the ignorance of the fool, and for this a man is not to bepunished, another ignorance whereof a man is cause, as the ignorance of a drunken man, And for that a man ought to be punished, for every man that passeth the commandments of reason and of the law, aught to be punished, and every man that is just, or evil, is such, because he will be such. But when a man is made just or e-evill, he is not become just, because he would become just: As it happeneth to a man that was wont to be whole and is sick and is not healed because he had no will that he would not belief the Physician, nor use the things that conserveth health And such like is he that casteth a stone, that before he casteth it, it is in his power to hold it: But when he hath cast it, it is not in his power to hold it nor in his will. And so it is in a man that becometh evil: in the begin ning it is in his power to be come good.  
❧ Malice is not only in man by will: But more over it is in the body. As a man to be blind andlame: and these evils may be in two sorts, the one is by nature, as he that is borne blind & lame, the other may come by a man's own folly. As by them that drink theimselfes blind, or fall to stealing or other evil dedees. Of such there is no petty to be taken except they repent and amend theim selfes. Then every man is the cause of his own imagination, for that a man hath natural understanding to know good and evil. Then ought we to will to do well and to fly from evil. And it is the best thing, and not impossible to take a custom and doctrine in goodness, and he that taketh it at the beginning and continueth, such a man hath a good nature and perfect. And who that taketh the contrary hath an evil nature But although it be evil he may make it good if he will: For it is in him to take what he will, than virtue and vice is according to the will of man. But mark this, that operation and habit be not according to the will of man in one sort but in diverse. For why? The operations from the beginning to the end is in the power and will of man. But the habit is not in the power nor in the will of man if it be not at his beginning.   

¶ The xuj Chapter. ¶ Of Fortitude.  
LEt us speak now of every habit, & begin at strength. I lay that strength is according as it is said before, a mean between fear and hardiness. For there be things that a man ought reasonably to fear, as vices and every thing that putteth a man in an evil name: and they that be not afraid of these things be shameless and worthy to be blamed: And they that be afraid of these are to be praised▪ There be men that be hardy in battle and there be that be liberal in spending money: but the very strong man is neither more nor less than needeth, and is ready in all these things as needeth to sustain: But the ireful man exceedeth in these things, and the fearful man lacketh in them. The things that be to be feared be not of one nature but of many sorts. For there be diverse things that are to be feared of all men that have wit and understanding: for he that feareth not thondre and the waves of the sea is not wise. And there be other things that every man feareth not, and those things be according to the more or less: that is to say, according as on thing is more to be feared then another. And as I say of things that be fearful, so it is to be understand of hardiness. For there be men that will show them selves hardy before they come to the deed, and make a great face, but when they come to the deed bear themselves not valiant. But a bold man & strong doth the contrary, that before he cum to the deed holdeth him still: and when he cometh to the deed he is hardy & strong. Strength is in five sorts, the first is civil strength, because that men of cities suffer much and many perils to have honour and to be blameless of their citizens. The second sort is by wit and policy that a man hath in his office: As we see of men that be wise in feats of arms, that do great things trusting in their Science, and be not strong according to the truth, because that when these the danger of bat tail, they flee being more afraid of death then of shame. But he that is strong according to the truth, aught to do the contrary and to stand fast in battle, and fear more shame than death.  
❧ The third sort is by fury as we see in wild strength, that be strong and hardy by the great furor that is in them, this is not the very strength, for who so ever putteth himself in peril by ire or fury, is not to be called strong. But they that put theim selfes in peril by a right understanding, those be strong  
The fourth sort is by strong moving of concupiscence, as we may see of brute beasts in time of their copulation, and so many men let theimselfes fall lightly, and they that keep well themselves be strong.  
The fift sort is by surety where a man hath had oft times victory: as he that fighteth with one that he hath oft overcomen, but when he fighteth with an other, there he loseth his hardiness & strength. These five sorts be not the very strength: for strength is a more worthy thing than chastity, for it is a lighter thing for a man to abstain himself from carnal concupissence, than it is in things of grief.   

¶ The xvij Chapter. ¶ Of chastity.  
Chastity is the mean between following all the delectations of the body or not to follow. For a man to delight himself in things convenient: where and when, and how much, there needeth no chastity. For seeing of fair things, & hearing of merry tales, and smelling of flowers: how much when and as it behoveth, there needeth no chastity. For Chastity needeth not but in two senses of the body, that is to say, in the taste and feeling, in the which we begin with brute beasts very strongly, as delighting themselves in things that they eat, drink, and touch: and specially in touching is great delectation, and therefore it is a beastly thing to follow to much the delectation of touching For in the taste, a man delighteth not somuch as in touching For the delectation of tasting is only when a man examineth the savour. There be natural delectations in the which a man may have measure, as in not to much eating and drinking. This measure may be called chastity, for the unchaste is in the delectations of the body and not in things of grief, for in things of grief the mean is to be understand, strength. Some time a man is not temperate nor chaste when he delighteth more than is due, and when he may have the things that he desireth, it is hard to find a man that delighteth himself less than he should in carnal delectations, such one hath no name set. Then they be chaste that keep the mean in delectations, that is to say, delight to much in ha' ve of them, nor sorrow not to much in losing them, but delight himself temperately, content with sufficience to the good life of man. It behoveth a man to withstand the desire of delectations, for if a man let reason be overcome, it remaigneth under desires, therefore it is needful to man to be chaste from youth and to live under commandments, or else shall remain with him, desire to a greater age. And therefore it behoveth us to study that reason may remain above desire or concupissence.   

¶ The xviij Chapter. Of liberality or Largesse.  
liberality is a mean in giving & in receiving of money: then he is liberal that useth money conveniently: that is to say, he that giveth it, where when, and how much it behoveth, and to whom. Prodigal or a waster, is he that exceedeth in giving & wanteth in receiving And the covetous is the contrary. And it is meet that liberality be more in giving then in receiving: For why? It is a lighter thing, not to receive, them to give. And it is a more laudable thing to give the thing where it is convenient, then is to receive the thing that is convenient. And generally, it is a more worthy thing in virtue to do well, than it is to abstain from evil. Nevertheless in these things ought to be an equalities, that is to say little praise to them that receive temperately but they that give temperately are to be praised, because they profit him that receiveth the gift. He is not liberal that is sorry for his gift: For he giveth it not by liberality, but rather for shame, or other cause.  
Then he is liberal that giveth cheerfully: he that is liberal is content with little, so that he may do for many much or little. For he ever enforceth himself to work liberality, according to his faculty it, is hard to find a man liberal & rich, for riches increaseth not by giving: but increaseth by receiving. And it is oft seen that the riches that a man hath without labour maketh him liberal. And great marvel it is when a man is rich by great labour if he be liberal. The Prodigal man is not so evil as the covetous, for the covetous is neither good to himself nor other, & therefore every man hateth him. Also the Prodigal may be remedied diverse ways But the covetous cannot be healed: and naturally a man is more given to Avarice then to prodigalite: and departeth further from the mean. There be many sorts of liberality, and seldom it can be found in a man that is covetous in keeping his own, that he is not also covetous in desiring of other men's. There ●e that cannot keep their own: But in desiring of other men's they be insatiate, and go about to get by every filthy gains, as by maintegning of bawdry, in keeping of ruffians and hores, usury, play. And such sort of people sin grievously in Prodigalitee.   

¶ The xix Chapter. Of magnificence.  
MAgnificence is a virtue that works in riches, only in great expenses, & the nature of the Magnificus or noble man ought to be diligent, that his works be done with great honour and great expenses. For he that restraineth and will do his business with little cost: is not Magnificus, but rather fearful in spending. The virtue of magnificence is understand in great and marvelous things, as to make temples & churches where god is worshipped from whom it is sent & all goodness cometh. Likewise in making great feasts, with costly banquets and sumptuous lodging & great presents. The magnificus or noble man thinketh not only upon his expenses, but thinketh more over to make other. In magnificence it needeth not only that there be abundance of things, but it needeth therewith for a man to order and spend things where it behoveth, for himself or men of his stock. And whosoever he be, that wanteth in these two things and under taketh, is scorned, if he will take upon him magnificence, a man that doth exceed in these things above said, is he that expendeth more than he ought to do, and he that may expend little and expendeth much, is as he that giveth to iuglars and scoffers & as he that casteth purple in the way, and doth not these for the love of virtue, but for to apere glorious to the people.  
❧ Nigarde's is he that in great things goth about to spend little, and marreth the beauty of of his deed for a little spending, loseth great cost and great honour, and these be the two extremites of magnificence. But they be not to be blamed so that they hurt not according to their vice. Magnanimus is he that is ready to do great deeds, and is joyous and merry in doing of them. But he that undertaketh to do great deeds & is not able, is called vainglorious: And he that is worthy to have honour & dignity, & is afraid to receive them, is called simple And immagnanimite is extremity by comparison of things, but as to the operation it is mean. The very magnanimity is only in great things: that is to say in things by the which a man may or doth serve almighty God. And the very beatitude is in thinking of those so high things, so great & so honourable, that of this thought cometh all goodness, after so great adversities: the which cannot be esteemed. The man that is magnanimus is the greatest man and most honourable that is, & moveth not for little things, nor doth not incline his magnanimity to any foul things. Then magnanimity is an ornament & crown of all virtues, and therefore it is no light thing to find the man magnanimus, but it is hard. For he is not only good to himself, but also to many other. If a man be Magnanimus he rejoiceth not too much in great honour done to him, & yet so much honour cannot be done to answer to his goodness and greatness. And more over, the magnanimus rejoiceth not much in prosperity that cometh to him, nor troubled for adversity. nobility of blood riches & antiquity helpeth a man to be magnanimus And he is very magnanimus that hath in him two things by the which he ought to be honoured, these be those that be afore said, the surety & goodness of a man magnanimus, is as much that he passeth not upon any peril, for that he doubteth not but to bring his life to good order, and taketh pleasure to do for other, and is ashamed to take of other, because it is a more noble thing to give then to receive. And when he hath received benefit he doth study to recompense: he is slow in little expenses, but in great things where it is convenient he is not slow. The man that is Magnanimus loveth other, and if he will evil, it is openly and not closely, because he thinketh great vileness to hide his will. He is sharp and showeth himself cruel, except in things of mirth: he is conversant with men merely, and hateth flaterars, as babblers and Scoffers, because slaterars be bondmen and remembreth wrongs, but he despiseth them and careth not, boasteth not himself, nor praiseth other, he passeth more on precious things then upon vile things. As a man that sufficeth to himself, when he moveth, he is not in haste, but gravely, and steadfast in words. And this is the definition of the Magnanimus: and he that overpasseth these: is called vainglorious, and they that take upon them great honours as if they were worthy, where they be not. As in making costly apparel and other great appearance, and think there by to be exalted: I say unto you, wise men take them for fools.  
❧ Pusillanimus, is he that is worthy to have great honours, and is afraid to take them upon him and hides him from himself: and this is evil, for every man ought to desire honour and benefit convenient to himself. Then every man erreth that departeth from the mean: But there be not many evil in this sort. In honour is found means and extremities, and in less things: for in these things be found more less than mean. For a man may desire more honour than he ought to have: And such have no name but ●omen, as it is said before in the comparison between the large and the Magnanimus, and between their extremes. Therefore these be the greatest things and those the least, the mean is to be honoured and the extremities to be blamed.   

¶ The twenty Chapter. Of Ire and meekness.  
INire is a mean & an extreme, & thextremities have proper names, and the mean is called meekness, and he that keepeth the mean, is called meek, and he that doth habound in ire is called Ireful. And he that is less angry than he ought to be is called Iniracible or irelesse. And the very meek if he be angey with whom, when & where's, he is called ireful & reported that he that passeth the mean in these things, some angry some soft and that is the best that is in him. For if all evil things should be together: it should not be suffered. A man that is not angry where it behoveth, when and with whom and where is not to be punished. For he sustaineth vituperation in that that is not justly done to him or to his friends, sometime we praise such men that make no great thing, and sometime the ireful: saying, that they be strong men and hardy. And verily it is a hard thing to determine by words the circumstance of ire, but so much we ought to know, that to keep the mean is to be praised, and the extremities is a thing to be vituperat.   

¶ The xxi Chapter. Of the conversation of man.  
AFter we must speak of things which happen in company and in the conversation of men and in comunication, for keeping the mean in these things is to be praised, and the extremities to be blamed. And the mean is, that a man be pleasant in speech and conversation with folks: and it behoveth to be companable panable in things convenient to whom, when, how & wherefore for such company is near like unto friendship. There is difference in this, that friendship hath compassion and humble courage and conversation hath not. For why? A man may company with men that he knoweth not. And the man that doth exceed in these things, is he that meddleth himself uncomely to be acquainted with a stranger & with a man that he knoweth not, neighbour or not neighbour without respect: such one is called a merry fellow, if it be of nature: But he that maketh mirth for gains, is called a flatterer, and he that is sad is called rude and uncherfull.   

¶ The xxij Chapter. Of Truth and lying.  
Truth and liynges be the most contrary things that can be in the world, and be used in word & in deed. A honourable man and of a good courage useth truth in word & deed: and the vile minded the contrary. The very man is he that keepeth the mean between the vaunter that cracketh upon himself more than he is, & he that dispraiseth himself in hiding the goodness that is in him: In somuch that the very man affirmeth the goodness that is in him neither more nor less, but he that dispraiseth is of better disposition, then is he that vaunteth himself: For the vaunter lieth in word and in deed. Worse in these things a 'bove said, is he that knoweth not himself, and therefore he is more vituperable than other, the truth is to be praised, and lies to be despised. For the liar speaketh such words as he maketh in his mind: a man that is true, for the love of truth, is better than he that is true for profit that he may have thereby. He that boasteth and presumeth for gold or silver, is like vituperable to the vainglorious. But he that vaunteth himself for honour or profit is not so blamable. There be men that rejoice themselves in lies, and other lie to be regarded: the humble man dispraiseth himself to fly strife & business as did Socrates to have quiet life. and he that exalteth himself in little things is nothing to be named   

¶ The xxiij Chapter. ¶ How a man is known by his moving.  
THe man that laugheth to much is vituperable, and he that never laugheth they say he is sad and uncherful. But a man that is companiable with his fellow & loureth not, nor moveth not other by foul boarding & playing, for sometime jesting moveth a man to lechery, and is forbidden in the law, but to keep good and loving company such a one is to be praised.  
❧ Shamefastness is a passion that is engendered with fere: for why? He that is a shamed changeth colour with every thing, & also sometime they that be afraid Shamefastness is wit in youth & not unconuentent to boys and wenches: for it withdraweth them from sin, but shame is to be blamed in old men, for age should do nothing whereof to be ashamed.   

¶ The xxiiij Chapter. Of Justice.  
Justice is a commendable habit, by the which a man is made Just and doth the works of Justice, and willeth and loveth things that be just insomuch as it is the habit of justice, the which is virtue. Then injustice which is the contrary, must needs be vice: Justice is said to be in three sorts, and the unjust is also in three sorts, he is called unjust that doth against the law, and he that passeth the nature of equality, and he that meddeleth with unlawful and dishonest gains. And likewise a man is Just in three sorts, for even so many sorts as is in the one, so many are in the other. So that the just man is he that doth observe the law, and the nature of the equality, and those that be content with lawful gains.   

¶ The xxv Chapter. ¶ Of the Law.  
THe law is just, and all things of the law be just, for it commandeth the works of virtue: which works make a man happy, and conserveth the works of happiness in him, and forbiddeth all evil in cities and tountrees, and commandeth unto good men great works: as to order & array battles, and commandeth the men beware of fornication and lechery, and commandeth that men be peaceable from hurting one another and forbiddeth unclean speech. And generally it commandeth the works of justice, and to fly vice. Justice is the most noble thing & the most strongest virtue that is. Wise men do love the works of justice, having more mar vel of the goodness of them then of the shining star, or the setting of the sun, or rising thereof, for it is the most perfect virtue of all other. And the just man useth justice in himself & in his friends: for a man that is not good to himself nor to his friends, is worst of all other people. For a man to be good it sufficeth not only to be good to himself, but also to his friends. Justice is not part of virtue, but al. And wrong is not part of vice, but all vice. There be kinds of vices openly for bidden, as these, adultery, enchantment false witness, treason fraud and deceit. And there be kinds of vices, which be injurious, as killing, smiting, & other like things, in the which the just man is sometime equaller, and sometime measurer: in comparison he is called equaller between ii and a measurer between many things and few, and is in relation in four things. So the just man can be no less then in four things. There be two persons between whom Justice is to be do en, & ii be causes: that is to say, right and wrong, and yet in these selfthinges may be equalite: for if there might be no disequalnes there should be no equalness, and so Justice is in proportion of number. And as justice is equal so is wrong unjust & unequal, and therefore the Lord of the laws laboureth to bring everithig equal. Wherefore he killeth one and scourgeth another, & other he sendeth to prison, until the party have satisfied, & so laboureth to bring to much and to little in to a mean. Therefore he taketh from one and giveth to another, till they be equal, and therefore the form thereof is to be known, to the intent that his subjects may live steadfastly in the midst:   

¶ Yet of Justice, Chapter xxvi  
THe inhabitors together in Cities, do take and give one to another, and every one yieldeth too there according to the quantity of their things, and all to come to the midst: for we put the case, that the Smythe hath a thing that is worth one, & the Shoemaker hath a thing, that is worth two, the Carpenter hath a thing that is worth three, then the Smith must needs take of the Shoemaker his work: and the Shoemaker must take of the Carpenter his work, yet the work of the one, may be better than the other, therefore it is needful to some man of equalytee, that may return them to a mean: and therefore was found money. For money is a mean by the which a man may bring every unegal into equal, and thereby may be taken and given great things & little things, & is an instrument, whereby judges may do justice. Money is a lifeless law, but the judge & the laws have life. god is the universal law of all things, the vigour & strength of equalness standeth fast by the observation of the law of cities, and the labourers of the fiel des & rilthe likewise increaseth thereby, & for lack of justice fall in ruin. The prince is the obser ver of justice and equalness: and therefore he giveth not the goods whereof he is Lord more to himself, than to other. Wherefore it is said honours and lordships maketh a man known. The people presupposeth that liberality is cause of principality and Lordship, and some say that riches is the cause, other put nobility of blood. But the wise man saith, and believeth that virtue is the cause, that a man is worthy to have Lordship. Justice is in two sorts, one is natural, and another according to the law: the law natural is one self nature in every man, as the fire, wheresoever it be, it goth upward: the other which is according to the law, hath many diversities, as we see in sacrifices, which be diversly done, some by beasts and some by certain generations of trees, and in both these justices, equality is to be under stand. He that rendereth the thing that he hath in keeping, not willingly but by fear: is not just by himself, but by other: but he that yieldeth by himself because of honesty with a good will, he is just. The hurts which be commonly done amanges men, be in three sorts. The first by error and by ignorance, the other is by ignorance with will to hurt, the third by thought malice and in will to hurt. By ignorance is when a man in his deed, hath not studied as other and as he should, and these two sorts be not imputed unjust, for why? their deeds proceed not of malice, but when a man doth hurt by malice prepenced or by proper will, there is no circumstance, that can excuse his malice, for it is very evil and vituperable. There be two manners of ignorances, one natural, as the na tural fool, an other whereof a man is cause, as when a man is igno rant, because he will not study to know the thing that he ought to know of troth and well. Above justice is better than justice, but according to the truth in the very mean, there is no the vision: and the very justice is not that which is in the laws, but that justice which is in the Almighty & glorious God, & is given to man, by the which justice man maketh himself like unto god.   

Of prowess, Cha, xxvii.  
THere be two kinds of virtues, the one is called moral, the which belongeth too the life sensible, which hath no reason, another virtue intellectual or reasonable, the which is understanding and discretion. Then the life sen syble, doth, fleeth and persecuteth without any delyberation: and therefore it is said that this virtue desireth concupisbence, but the understandying affirmeth and maketh no election without him, then the beginning of the election is desire intellectual, because of some thing. And no man useth the election in the thing that is passed before, because that which is done can not be undone: for there upon is no power, nor there falleth no election in things of necessity, as in rising & setting of the sun that riseth by nature.  
❧ In the soul of man be five things, of the which may be spoken truth, affirming and denying, that is to say: Art, science, Prudence, Sapience, and understanding. Scyenceis by such demonstration which can not be otherways, and neither doth engender nor corrupt, and every science or discipline that is in use, so may be taught.  
And every thing that is learned, must needs be learned by principles, the which be manifest by them, and the demonstrations be ever true, and never lie. For why? they be of things necessary. The disposition of the art is of very reason: the wise and prudent man can council himself and other, in things that be good and evil, which be appertaining unto men. Then prudence is an habit, with the which a man may council with very reason in things toward men good and evil.  
Sapience is an advancing or ioiing ofartificers that hath obtained science. And when it is said of one that he is wise in his art, there is showed the goodness and greatness of his art. The understanding is it that taketh the commandment of things, reason science & understanding be of those things that be naturally noble. There may be found young men, which be wise of discipline: but not in prudence: to be wise in prudence would be had a long knowledge in many particular things, the which cannot be had but by long time, The adolescente and young man hath but short time. Prudence measureth the beginning & the end of every thing, and by & by conscnteth to a good council.  
¶ wiliness, is of prudence, with the which a man cometh to the intent by great subtlety of his understanding, in things that be good, but the subtle is called quality, in things that be evil. As enchantmentes, witchcrafts. Such are not called wise, but counsellors of strife and wilybegylars.  
¶ felicity is not a thing to be chosen for other, but for himself as health, the actions of the soul be according to the measure of Moral virtues, and according to the measure of Prudence and of subtlety, then vertue-setteth forth the right purpose of man, & prudence, that is to say knowledge confirmeth it, and maketh it good and conduceth him untoiustice. Thes moral virtues make a man strong chaste and just from youth, as in children & some manner of beasts, than these virtues be by nature, and not by understanding. But the Lordship of all virtues belongeth unto the virtues intellectual, for there can be no election without the understanding, nor cannot be accomplished with out moral virtue, & so prudence teacheth to do that which ought to be done, but moral virtue setteth forth the deed, to fulfil the work.   

¶ Of strength. Chapter xxviii  
strength is a laudable habit & good for the man that is very strong sustaineth many terrible things, and despiseth death, in assailing those which behoveth, and doth the works of strength, not to have honour or delectation, but only for virtue. There be men which be constrained to work the works of strength for shame, and to i'll reproach, & to get them honour put themselves in peril of their lives, rather than to live with shame.  
Wild strength is this that a man doth in furor: as when a man is angry for any thing done against him, and would be revenged. Bestial strength is the fulfilling of a man's lust burnynglye desired. Spiritual strength is that which a man doth to obtain honour and fame. strength divine is that which strong men naturally love. And God's men be very strong.   

¶ Of chastity, Chapter xxix  
chastity is a temperance in eating and drinking and in delectations, and he that bestoweth himself temperately in thes things is to be praised, and he that exceedeth in thes things is to be blamed, but few and seldom be found. chastity is a fair thing, for it delighteth but when, where, & so much as behoveth, also there is a secular delectation which is departed from the moving of nature, and without comparison more vituperable than fornication or adultery, that is to say, Masculine with Masculine To be enchased is in divers sorts for why? it may be in eating and drinking & other filthy things▪   

¶ Of meekness, Chapter xxxi  
meekness is an habit to be praised between being to ireful and to dull, and so is Malyncoly in long perseverance. Malicious ire demandeth great vengeance for little offence. But he that is not stirred for wrong or offence done to him nor to his kin, is as a manthat hath lost his feeling.   

¶ Of liberality. Chapter xxxii  
LIberalytee, magnificence, & Mananimitee hath a community amongst themselves, for why? they be all in receiving and giving money: where when and how much it behoveth. And it is a more fearful thing to give then to receive, and such men flee from filthy gains, and the covetous man is a great desyrer, and therefore the liberal possesseth not so much as doth the covetous.   

¶ Of magnanimity. chapter. xxxiii  
THe Magnanimus doth deserve great honours, & praises, and is evermore ready to set his mind upon great things, and despiseth the little and vile things, but he that expendeth where he should not, is called Prodigal.  
Envious is he that is sorry for the prosperity both of the good and evil, without any difference Contrary to him is he that rejoiceth in the prosperity of them that be good & evil, the mean between them is he that joyeth in the prosperity of them that be good, and sorroweth for the evil, he that is a shamed of every thing is called shamefast: He that cracks upon himself and despiseth other men is called a proud vaunter.   

¶ The xxxiij Chapter. ¶ Of company.  
THere be men with whom it is painful to live, because they of their nature be not tractable. There be other that be flatterers of every body: and there be other that keep a mean, and those be they that use themselves, as where when, with whom, & how much and such manner of men be verily to be praised. Scoffers be those which compaignieth amongst folks with laughing boarding & jesting upon themselves, their wives and children, and not only upon them, but also upon other men. Contrary to him is he that looketh evermore as he were troubled, lowering, and is never merry amongst folks, nor cannot be with them that be merry. And he that keepeth the mean amongst such, is he that useth measure The just man is he that is called Equal or Equaller, and the just equalleth things in two sorts, one sort is in dividing of money, offices, and honours. The other in healing the hurts that one man taketh of an other, for men have business together in two sorts, the one is by will, that is to say, when the beginning of the deed is in our arbitre. And out of the will is this when a man hath to do with an other, and will do it by force or guile, as rapine, stealth and other like things.   

¶ The xxxiiij Chapter. ¶ Of Justice:  
THe factor of the laws, are the equals, which are the contraries the be between to much and to little. The equal judge divideth money & honour, & maketh the vision between two at the least: Justice parts between four things, the which things have proportion from the first to the second, and from the third to the fourth, and the equalness of them is according to the proportion self: And Justice judgeth amongst them according to the quality of the virtue, and of the merit. The maker whole that healeth the fashion of the deeds that be done between men, is he that maketh the laws: For he decerneth and doth justice between them that do wrong and them that take it, and rendereth inheritance to them that have right thereto, and taketh from them that possesseth wrongfully. Some condemn in person and some in their goods, and some maketh equal the little with the much, because he that receiveth the injury is lessoned by him that doth it, the judge is equallar between them according to the measure of Arismethique que. Therefore men go to the judge because the judge is said to be in similitude the life of Justice, because he ordereth justice according moderately as it is possible, and justices is not in every place in such sort, that to him that doth, be done somuch as he hath done: and that from him that did take, be taken somuch as he hath taken. For why? The moderate equalness standeth not evermore in this, and as the just man is contrary to him that is not Just, so the equal is contrary to the unequal and the mean is sometime more contrary to the one extreme, than it is to the other: and the one extreme is more contrary to the other, than it is to the mean. The Justice of cities is a mean, between losing and getting: and cannot be done without taking and gevyngchange. As he that weiveth cloth for other things that he needeth. The smith giveth Iron for other things that he needeth, and therefore in these changes was great strife so was found the thing that might equal all things together: This that is more worth with that that is worth less, and this thing was money, which maketh equal the work of the Carpenter with the work of the shoemaker. Above justice is more than Justice. Then the man that is better than the good man, is good in all sorts that may be. And he that is more Just than he that is just, is just in all sorts that may be. Natural justice is better than justice that is compounded by man, as the honey that is sweet by nature, is better than the like honey that is made by craft.  
❧ The just man liveth by life of life, that is to say, the great delectation that he hath to justice natural. It for itself, belongeth and useth the just thing, looking not to the punisher of the laws to put it generally in all generations, for because it is unpossible that the general rules be followed and kept in all these things, the which be not universal. Then the words of the law ought to be particulars, because they iudgen of things corporal.   

¶ The xxxv Chapter. ¶ Of Vice.  
THere be three manner of vices that be very evil, from the which every man ought to fly, that is to say: Malice Cruelty and Lechery. And yet there be to these three contrary virtues, that is to say: benignity pity and chastity. There be some men which be of a divine nature, by the abundance of the virtues that be in them, and such an habit is all contrary to Cruelty, and such men be Angelic divine, and the virtues of them be above the virtues of other men. Like as the virtues of God be above all the virtues of men, so there be other men cruel in their manners and be of wild nature: and such be far of from virtue. There be other men that be of the nature of beasts, in following of their desires and their delectations, and those be in similitude like unto Apes and to hogs, and those men that follow their will les be called Epicures, that is to say: men that think not but of their bodies. Men that be called divine and men that be wild of custom: there be but few in the world, and specially wild men, yet there be found in th'extreme regions, in the which they dwell, that is in the south parts where as they find slaves, it is said of the divine man that he is chaste and continent, for that he abstaineth himself from evil concupiscence, according to the power of the virtue intellectual.  
❧ Man hath his limits unto the which he moveth naturally, wherein he walketh as in the mean, except his nature inclineth too the nature of beasts, which if they be loosed, follow the moving of their own desires in running thorough pastures, not abstaining themselves from any thing that their nature leadeth them unto. And in this wise a man goeth from his terms and limettes, & such a man is worse than a beast, by the evil life that he chooseth, because the science of man is truth. But that man that learneth science according to the nature of Moral virtue and virtue divine & intellectual, remaigneth within his bonds and, useth universal propositions which conducteth him unto true knowledge.   

¶ The xxxvi Chapter. Of Delight.  
THere be delectable things which be delectable by necessity, and there be things delectable by election. And of those, there be that are to be chosen for ourselves, & also of those that are to be choose for favour of other. The necessari delectations that a man hath, be in eating, in drinking and in lechery, and in all other corporal delectation, there where is no measure, those which a man chooseth or electeth for himself, be these, that is to say, certentye of knowledge and divine reason. Elections which be elect for favour one of another be these, victory, honour, riches and all other things good in the which beasts is comen with us: Who that keepeth the mean in these things is to be praised, and who that wanteth in these things is to be blamed.  
❧ There be natural delectations and beastly delectations. Also there be wild delectations and there be delectations by occasion of time, & there be other delectations by occasion of infirmity, and other that come by use, and other by evil nature. Wildish delectation is in them that make women with child to be opened, because they will see how the child doth lie in their bodies: And as they that eateth man's flesh and raw flesh. delectations of infirmity, or by evil use, is of picking the brows paring nails, eating of coals, and other trifles. Delectation by evil nature is to lie one Masculyne with another, and all other vituperable things of lechery. There be some malicious and wild manners, as be in them that be unbridled, mad, and Melancholy, and like unto them, the furious man thinketh that all that pleaseth him is against all other men. If he have a little cause to be angry runneth in as a foolish servant to do a thing before he be commanded and doth as a dog that barketh both at friends and enemies. And this incontinence which is in Ire cometh of a light mind and by violence of moving. And therefore he is more to be pardoned than he that incontinent followeth his concupiscence. For as soon as he seth the thing that delighteth him, he tarrieth not the judgement of reason, but rather searcheth for the thing that he desireth. Then the incontinence of Ire is more natural than is thin continence of concupiscence and demandeth dark places. And therefore it is said of concupiscence that she overthroweth her son. The man that doth evil and repenteth him not, can not be correct: but the man that doth evil and repenteth, there is hope. They that have no understanding be better than they that have it, & bestow it not. Therefore they that let themselves to be overcome with concupiscence by delight of understanding, be like unto them that be drunken with little wine, by feebleness of the brain. The continent man that hath understanding, affirmeth himself and continueth in very reason and wholesome election, and departeth not from the right moderation. It is a more light thing to move custom then nature, yet a hard thing it is to break custom, for custom is like nature. There be men to whom it seemeth no delectation to be good, neither to himself nor yet to other. And there be other to whom it seemeth that some delectations be good and some evil, & to some it seemeth that all manner of delectations be good: delectations without respect is not good. For why? It is of sensuality: than it is not like unto things complete. The chaste man flieth delectations because they make understanding dron ken and maketh man to forget goodness. Children and beasts demand delectations. There be some delectations that make a man seek and bring trouble, than a man that is of good understanding, demandeth the pleasures of the body but moderately.   

¶ The xxxvij Chapter. ¶ Of Chastitet.  
chastity and continence, are not all one thing: for Chastitieis an habit, the which is fixed in the mind of man by long time, having overcome the desires of the flesh, so that it fealeth no assaults of temptations: but continence is an habit by the which a man sustaineth hard temptations, much molested: But nevertheless consenteth not thereto, so much reason is in him. Then chastity and continence are not all one. The enchased is an habit by the which a man sinneth in delectable things, with out great instance of temptations, as a man not constrained and goeth searching delectations. Then the incontinent is he that is overcome with temptations, which prick him strongly. But the unchaste man is he that letteth himself to be overcome with temptations that pricketh him not. And the incontinence is such by debility of reason, and by little trust. Then there is no mean at all, but standeth as an evil mean, & may be correct, if virtue & hope lie together. But the inchaste can never be correct, for virtue hath no power in malice to much used. For the reason oft times corrupteth by two much concupisbence: And the act of the malicious is known, for virtue is whole in reason, but in malice, reason is corrupt.   

¶ Of Constancy. Chapter xxxviii  
THere be three manners of stableness, one is that a man be stable in all his works true or false, whatsoever they be. The second is contrary to this. The third is a man that will stand in the thing that is good, and lightly departed from a thing that is evil. But generally the man that is constant, is better than the man that is mutable, for the mutable moveth with every wind, but the constant moveth not for any strong desire, but sometime by his noble delectation moveth from his false credence, and consenteth to the truth. It is impossible that a man be wise and incontinent to gather. For prudence is but only in the work, oft times incontinence and wiliness be together: and so subtlety is divided from prudence: And prudence is in those things which be good: But subteltee is both in the good and in the evil. And the wise man that worketh not according to his science, is like to him that sleepeth and is drunk. The light and wanton man is the pit of carnal desires, afflict and swallowed in the works of reason, and is as a drunkard which hath bound his wit and is smothered in his brain by the vapours of wine for to much wine perverteth the right judgement. The frendful man is he that wrongs other by council prepensed, and by I remaketh election without reason, which is evil without remedy.   

¶ Of amity. cha. xxxix.  
amity is one of the virtues of almighty God and of man, and is much needful to thelife of man, and a man hath need of friendship in this life as of other things. And the mighty rich princes of the earth have need of friends, to whom they may be beneficial and of whom they may receive thanks, honours and services. A great surety it is to a man to have friends, for so much as aman is in the degree of greatness, the more equal he is to fall, and his fall most perilous. Then friends are most needful in the time of strife and adversity. And therefore it is a good and a sure refuge. For a man that hath no friend, is alone in his deeds: And when he is with his friend, he hath company and help to bring his work to pass. For why? of two perfect persons cometh perfit work and understanding. The makers of the law put their Citizens in comfort to have charity together with Justice. For why? if every man were just, yet charity should be needful. But if every man were friendly to other, Justice should not need: for why? friendship destroyeth all strife, and every discord that may be.   

¶ Of the kinds of amity. Chapter xl  
THE kinds of amity be known by the things that a man loveth, which be three, that is to say: Good, Profitable, and delectable. And he that is such one according to the truth, loveth him that is like him. The kinds of amity been three, the one is loved for good, another for gains, and the other for delectations, and to every one it is needful to manifest tribulation. For they that love, beareth good will commonly one to another, and verily love the things by the which they be friends, that is to say, delectation & profit: whence the amity endureth so long as endureth the delectation and the perfit, and therefore they be friends and enemies. The friendship is in old folks, but the friendship of delectation is amongst them that be young, howbeit the perfit Amite is in them that be good, and that be like in virtue, and bear good will one to another, because they be like in their virtues. And this friendship is a way that containeth all goodness, and amongst themthere is no delectation nor evil. And therefore this friendship cannot be be between the good man & the evil. but only amongst them that be good. But the amity that is by delectation or for profit may be amongst good & evil, howbeit it contyne weth not long. Amite is a laudable adornment to them that company together and is a fair life, by the which they live together in tranquillity: and the tranquillttee that is amongst them, doth not departed by the diversity of places, and should not stand if they were far of, this may be a departing & going out of the myndfulfrendship, and therefore it is a proverb, that long viages depart friendship. A well-beloved thing hath some noble goodness, and therefore friends love together, & not because of food or repast, but because of habit, and every friend loveth his wealth, and rendereth one to another according to equality.   

How that the substance of the good should be comen. Chapter xli  
THe participation of them that be partners together in good and evil, in merchandise and in conversation together, is ever a beginning of friend ship, and according to the quan titee of the things, so is the quantity of friendship, and they that have friends ought to common amongst them. For amity is a thing of comment, and every commonty desireth like concupiscence. And therefore is made the solemnity of Pasch, oblations and offerings, so that of thes things may grow company and love amongst neighbours, of the which thing proceedeth honour and exaltation of almighty God. And in old time they kept their solempnitees after Corn Harvest, because at that time men were most able to help their friends, and to give thanks to God for his benefits received.   

¶ Of Principalitees. Chapter xlii  
THere be three principalitees, the first of the King, another of the Commonalte, and the third of the Father upon his children, and eachone of these hath his conntrary. For the King enforceth his subjects to goodness, and is studious to procure their good estate, as the Herdemanne is studious upon his stock. It is a difference between the Lordship of the king and other in this: For the king is Lord universal of the people, the father is the cause of the generation of his children and of the bringing up of them.  
Then the father is natural lord of his children, and their love is great. Therefore the father ought to be honoured with the honour dew unto him. The Justice of every man is according to the quantity of his virtue, than whosoever is greatest, ought to be most loved and honoured. The love of brothers is as the love of fellows, because they come together and hath one similitude when there cometh adversytee.  
❧ The Lord and the subiectc have one religion together. Like as the crafts man and his instrument, and as the body and the solle. And he that useth the Instrument profiteth thereby, and therefore he loveth it, but the Instrument loveth not him that wearethe it.  
❧ And likewise the body loveth not the soul: The Instrument is as the bond man which loveth not his Lord. The father loveth the son, and the son the father, because the one is made of the other: but the love of the father is more stronger than the love of the son, & the reason is: for that the father knoweth his son to be of him in short time after his birth: But the son knoweth not the father of long after, that is when his wits be come to him and discretion comforteth. More over, the father loveth the son as himself. But the son loveth the father as a thing made of him. Brother's love together as being of one beginning. For they be one thing: although they be departed. And this that comforteth love amongs brethren is that they be nourished and brought up together.   

¶ The xliij Chapter ¶ The love that a man hath with GOD.  
THe love that aman hath with god, and the love that a man hath to his father, is of one nature. For why? Each one of their loves is by a recordation of grace. But the love of God ought to be preferred before the love of the father. For the benefits that a man receiveth of God: be more great and more noble than they which be received of the father The amity of kindred, friends, neighbours and strangers, is more and less according to the diversity of the causes, by the which one beareth good will unto another. Therefore they that be brought up together, being of long time conversant together be of great friendship. The love that is between a man and his wife is love natural, & a more ancient love than is the love of citizens amongst them, and in this love is great profit. For why? the works of the man is diverse from the works of the woman. And that which the one can not do, the other doth, and so they fulfil their business: The children be bonds which bind the woman to the husband in love, because the children be the common wealth of them both.   

How that love is increased by communication of friends chapter xliiii  
Communication joineth them that be good together in one love, by occasion of virtues: which verily be loving together in themselves, for there is not amongst them any strife or contention, nor will to have victory the one of the other: but only to serve and please, for why? It is a great pleasure when a man hath done service to his friends. There be friendships which be called questionalles, and those friendships be in men which receive one of another, whereof cometh great accusations, as when the one saith: I have done thee pleasure, and thou hast done me none: Such friendship cannot long endure.  
❧ amity is like unto Justice and according to justice in two sorts, that is to say: Natural and legal. So is friendship in two sorts, natural and legal: And the legal is called amity, and the particular is a market of change, as she that standeth in giving and receiving naturally from hand to hand. There are diverse men that be pleased with that thing which is well and convenient, but notwithstanding they leave the good & take the profitable. A good thing it is to do good to other without any hope of gains. But profitable is when a man thinketh to have a greater power. This service is it that a man doth to him that is mighty and able to give rewards and change for service done.   

¶ The xlv Chapter. Of the love that ought to be amongst men.  
Love is the price of virtue and thanks or benefits received gains or winning is severally of need, & the greater man ought to give unto the less winning, & the less ought to give unto the greater honour and reverence. And this aught to be according to the deserving of them both: In these ways is conserved friendship. The honour that a man ought to do to almighty God and to his father, is not like other honours; for no man can give sufficient honours and thanks to God & to his father. Although he enforce himself to do what he can, the commendable equalness is to equal the kinds of amity that be diverse, as it is in the ordering of cities, that the shoemaker selleth his shoes as he will, and likewise other crafts men amongst them. One thing is loved by the which all merchandise be made equal and confirmed, this is Gold and silver. When the lover loveth his love for delectation, & she loveth him for profit, they love not the one the other right well, therefore such love is soon lost. Every love that is for light things doth shortly depart. But the reasons that be strong and steadfast causeth friendship, and love to continue that is by virtue, for the good is long lastre. For why? Virtue cannot be removed but profit departeth when profitable is taken away. A man that singeth for gains, if a man should sing one song for another, he would not be content, because he looketh for another reward. Then there shallbe no concord in merchandise, if there be not concord of wills, and that is when a man receiveth for that that he giveth, that he would have. And sometimes it is for that for the which he giveth nothing but honour & reverence, as did Pythagoras the which would have nothing of his Scholars for his doctrine but honour and reverence. And sometime for doctrine a man will have money, as the Mechaniques, but it is not so in Philosophy, for he that teacheth other knowledge; aught to receive of his disciple honour and subjection, as a lord and father. It is needful for a man to know the dignity of men. So that every man may give honour according to his duty. For a man oweth one honour to his father, another to the people, another to the Lord of the host, another to the fellow, another to the neighbour, and another to the stranger. He that useth fraud in friendship, is worse than he that useth fraud in gold and silver, even somuch as friendship is more precious than gold and silver, so much the worse is he that fraudeth amity, than he that deceiveth in Gold and silver. And like as false money is shortly broken, so false friendship shortly departeth.   

¶ The xlvi Chapter. ¶ How almighty God departeth all goodness.  
THE equal part of goodness is almighty God, which giveth too every one according as their nature is apt to receive. The man that is good delighteth in himself, having joy of the good works, and if he be good rejoiceth him much with his friend, which he taketh as himself. But the evil man flieth from the good and noble operations, and if he be very evil he flieth from himself. For when he standeth alone he is rebuked in himself, in remembering the evil works which he hath done, and neither loveth himself nor other, because the nature of goodness is mortified in him in the deepness of iniquity, ●e delighteth not fully in the evil that he doth. For the nature of goodness draweth unto delectation and deu● death in himself. And therefore he is in perpetual trouble & pains full of bitterness and drunken in filthiness and of diversity. Then to such a man no man can be afrende: For a friend ought to have in him a thing to be loved, and such one hath in himself so much misery that there is no remedy, that he may come to felicity. Then let no man fall in to this pit of iniquity, but rather enforce him to come to goodness, by the which he may have delectation and joy in himself. Comfort is not friendship although it be like unto it. The beginning of friendship is pleasure had in times past. As the love of a woman of the which a man hath had pleasure and delectation, and is a bond of love and followeth it inseparable, the desperation of the which proceedeth. Comfort may be friendship by similitude, till it be grown by custom of time and the office of comfort appertaineth unto him that hath in him grace and gravity, and exercised in virtue knit of love and concord: for discord in opinions is to be drawn out of a noble congregation, so that it may remaigne in unity and peace and in concord of wills. Those things that give other verity and dignity to rule be virtuous & their works. And the unite of opinions be found in good men, because they be firm and stable amongst themself in outward things, for they bear good will continually: but seldom men agree in one opinion. And to fulfil their desires they sustain great strife and much business, but not because of virtue. And be solicitous to deceive them with whom they have to do, and ever be in strife and in contention. The benefactors love their beneficiates more than they be loved of them. For the benefactor loveth with pure liberality, but the beneficiates loven their benefaccores by debt of thanks. And moreover the benefactor loveth the beneficiate as creditor: But the beneficiate loveth as a debtor, the creditor rejoiceth against his debtor. The debtor is troubled because he feareth his debtor: then the beneficiates fain to love their benefactors because they would not be rebuked of unkindness. And yet the receipt of the benefit is factor: and in special if he have mind. For why? The uttermost perfection of man is in his operation   

¶ The xlvij Chapter. ¶ How man delighteth him in many things.  
A Man delighteth in three things, that is to say: in things present in using of them: In things passed in remembering of them, and in things to come in trusting of them. The works good and noble continue long and be delectable to remembrance. But the delectable and profitable satisfy but little, and the memory shortly passed. Every man loveth more the things that he getteth with pain, than the thing that he getteth without pain, as it is of money: which when it is gotten with great labour, it is kept with great study and moderately spent. And who that getteth it without labour spendeth it without moderation. And this is the cause wherefore the mother loveth the child more than doth the father. For why? She suffereth great travail and anguish in the birth. Now in somuch that it is a light thing to receive benefits, and a hard thing to give them, the benefactor loveth better his benefactor, than the benificiator loveth his benefactor. There be men that love themselves to much, and that is called a filthy love. The evil man doth every thing upon will, but the good and verteons' man doth the works which be good and virtuous, for the love of virtue and goodness. And there be other men that by the nobility of their minds, be good to their friends, in leaving them their goods. So that their works may remain in perpetual memory. My friend is another. This is a proverb. By a proverb it is said Friends have one life and one blood, and all their things be be equally comen: as the nose to the face, the knee to the leg and the finger to the hand. A man ought to love his friend, for in loving him he loveth himself, and should not be loved for honour or corporal delectation, but rather for the very love of virtue. And the man that loveth his friend in this sort, is a very friend, he helpeth and supporteth with body and goods, and with his life if need be. The full felicity of mankind is in the obteigning of friends, for no man would have all the goods of the world to live alone. Then a man hath need of friends, to whom he may be beneficial, and with whom he may commonly use felicity. It is a natural thing to man to live citezenly, and a necessary thing to a man to accomplish his business of necessity by his neighbores and friends, which cannot be done by himself. To do well it is a noble and delectable thing: and the virtues elect in good deeds be few. But the profitable & delectable be many The friends of pleasure should not be many, for they be but for digestion of meat. There can be but one virtuous friend. As a man can have but one lover that he loveth entirely. For why? That love is of abundance, the which is but to one alone. But counsel honest and convenient, aught to be to every man by duty of virtue. A man hath need of friends in time of adversity and prosperitec to be comen with him in his goods: and living in joy and pleasure, so that men may become the better one by another. And in adversity, so that a man may have help and counsel of his friend.   

¶ The xlviij Chapter. ¶ How Delectation is natural.  
Delectation is borne and nourished with us from the beginning of our nature, therefore children should be taught at the beginning, to delight themselves in things convenient, and likewise against that to mislike the contraries. And this is the foundations of virtue moral, and in process groweth and is known the beatitude of the life. For when a man delighteth in a thing, it is his choice, and when it grieveth, he flieth it. And there be men which be servants to the delectations, wherefore their delectations be destroyed against God of this that they owe. Those men which claim delectations and follow them say against their minds, and say not evil of them concerning the virtue. For the true word doth ever help and amendeth the manners of the life better: but the operation worketh more than doth the word. And therefore the good man informeth his life with good words & good works. The thing that is desired for itself is best and the grief is evil. For why? It is contrary to delectation, & also every thing that is good helpeth unto another thing to make it good. And delectation helpeth other things and maketh them better. Then she is good Plato saith. That delectation was not good, & peradventure he saith not truth. For why? In every thing is naturally some thing that is good, then in delectation is some thing that is good. It is a thing unpossible that one good thing be contrary to the other. And it is impossible that one evil be not contrary to another, and both two are to be fled: But two goods are not contrary together, but rather be like, and both two are to be elect and chosen, but yet the one may be better than the other: As one man may be more wise than the other & more just. Delectation is not moving, for every thing that may move hath tarrying and hasting. But things relative have no moving by themselves, than delectation is not moving.   

¶ The xlix Chapter. ¶ Of Delectation sensible and intellectual.  
Delectation is either sensible or intellectual and there where is the feeling, there is the delectation, than it must needs be that this delectation be in the sensible life. And there where is the understanding is the operation sensible. Then it is of necessity that these delectations be in the mind intellectual. And many times before the delectations of the senses is grief. As before delectation of eating man hath hunger. And before delectation of drinking a man hath first, but before the delectation of herring, seeing, orsmelling: there is no grief. And like as in allthings of delectations intellectual, delectable things be had in men which have perverse nature, and be not to be called delectables, according to the truth. As things that apere bitter to the sick and are not bitter according to the truth. So of every operation: for as the just man delighteth in justice, so the wise man delighteth in the works of Sapience. Every man is pleased with the operations in the which he delighteth, and the delectation maketh the works perfect. Delectation is a complete form which hath no need to her accomplishyng, neither of time nor of moving. That is to say: there is no moving according to her form in the time, but fulfilleth herself out of time, as if there were no moving circular. The sensible delectation is according to the quantity of the feeling, and in the thing that is felt, and in the operation between the one and the other. Then when the senses be strong: the things be more delectable, when the strength of delectacton is given to delight. Because the goodness of the work is in the strength of the thing that doth and is the beginning of the thing that it suffereth.   

¶ The l Chapter. The most delectable delectation.  
THE most delectable delectations be those which be most complete & most perfit. And those which fulfil all the delectations of man. And so long endureth the delectations as the virtue of the things endureth by the which a man delighteth him as youth when it hath the thing that pleaseth. And therefore the delectations cannot suffice: till they become less, as it cometh to age. When the virtue minisheth, the man that desireth life desireth delectation, for delectation is complete of the life The delectation intelligible differeth from the sensible, and every delectation multiplieth and increaseth her works, and by this is multiplied Arts & sciences, because man delighteth in them. There be delectations of operations, which sometime letteth other delectations or operations. As a man that delighteth in Harping, somuch that he forgetteth other works that he hath in hand. delectations that be in noble operations: be noble and are to be followed. And the vile is vile and not to be followed. Those delectations be diverse in kind: which be diverse in operation, in kind as delectations intellectual and sensible. And these be of diverse kinds which be likewise diverse in operations as of the sight and feeling. Every beast hath his delectation in the which he delighteth: but of all other delectations the intellectual is most delectable, and most noble amongst all other delectations. As the gold amongst all other metals, according to the diversities of men, by diverse delectations. But those be very good that apere good to them that be good, and not to the vicious, as a thing that is sweet and bitter to the whole man and not the sick.   

¶ The lj Chapter. ¶ How that beatitude is the fullness of virtue.  
SIth that we have spoken of virtue and delight it therefore behoveth us to speak of felicity and beatitude, which be tha compleshing of all the goodness of man. This felicity is not habit, but rather Act, to the which a man intendeth to comen by himself or by other. Beatitude is a thing out of itself, the man that hath not tasted the sweetness of Beatitude in the which is the delight of the understanding of man: hath his refuge to the pleasures of the body, in the which he hath put his trust. And they be not of a truth to be called delectations. Beatitude is not to be chosen by boys, but verily in this that seemeth to be delectable to them that be good men. Felicite is not in sport and plaic, but rather in things had by labour and study. It is a manifest thing of blessedness, when a man laboureth with virtue in ordinat things & in things of solace. And therefore it is said: that the understanding is a more noble thing than is the nose, for because the most noble member doth the most noble operation, and the best manworketh the best work, by the which it is a worthy thing that felicity be operation of the most noble virtue which is naturally purposed to all things the be given of God to man. And felicity is no nother thing but be steadfast in virtue & in her to works. The most perfect delectations that be, are in th'act of felicity, and marvelous delectations be found in philosophy by the truth & by certainty that is found in the laws. And a more savourous delectation is this, that a man hath when he knoweth the thing, then when he thinketh to know. Then the operation of this virtue is uppermost & supreme felicity. The wise man hath need of things that be necessary to the life as other hath. For virtue is busied in outward things: as in Justice▪ chastity and strength, and in other ordinate operations: because the matter of operation is outward, but the operation of sapience is inward, as to the necessity. But nevertheless if a man have help he worketh more perfightly in his thought. Then this felicity is no nother but hope to know And of thought, felicity representeth battle because of health & of peace, and this appeareth manifestly in the cities which make war to have rest and peace, and like so to all other virtues of battle. For every man intendeth some outward things, but the understanding speculative is ever in peace and in tranquillity. But it hath need of longtyme. For it is not seeming or convenient to felicity, to have any thing imperfect. And when a man cometh to this degree of felicity, he liveth not by the life of man, but liveth by that divine thing which is in man. Then the life that appertaineth to this act is divine life. But the life that appertaineth to the acts of other virtues, is human. Therefore it is not convenient to a good man that his diligence be human, nor his desire be not moral, although it so apere. But yet is bounden to enforce himself to be moral according to his power. And yet ever to enforce himself to live by the most noblest life that is in him. For although a man be but little of person, he is above all other creatures. whence the most delectable life that a man hath is by understanding.   

¶ The lij Chapter. ¶ Of the moral virtue and of the happy man.  
THese virtues moral or Civil will, be in more trouble & more solicit then the intellectualles, for that liberality hath need of riches. The just man is busied with them that command justice, and likewise of the strange man and chaste, but these virtues intellectual have no need, for the accomplishing of their operations of outward things. But rather many times the very perfect men: be sped in these virtues of the outward things. But a man that cannot come to the perfection of this life, ought to choose a way to live, according to the comen laws. For the operation of the understanding speculative, is in th'end of example of the very beatitude of man: And man is likened to God and his angels. For the other operations be not worthy to be likened to God nor to heavenly things. God and his angels have most noble life, for they be ever in the most best speculation, & their speculation never weareth nor faileth. And the man that enforceth himself most continually to understand & think of these things, is most like unto them that be in the very beatitude.   

¶ The liij Chapter. Of the knowledge of virtues.  
AMan to be happy in this world hath need of moderate conductingin outward things, for because nature giveth not sufficient inwardly of these things. As to be satisfied in breed & of wine, & of other things that be needful to the life of man. But it is not needful to be lord of the sea and of the land, for such things may happen to them that are of less degree of riches, that be more ware to be happy than the Lords of these things. And therefore it is well said of Anaxagoras: that felicity is not in riches nor in lordship his saying is to be noted, for the words of him are to be alleged, whose works agree with his saying. A man that maketh his orision according to the obedience of the order of the understanding: is loved of God, If almighty God have cure of man which is a worthy thing to believe? Then most cure he hath of them that most enforceth themselves to be like unto him, and best rewardeth them, and delighteth him to them, that is to say, with them as one friend with another. Then according to this saying, we ought to think that it is sufficient to obtain felicity, only to know the things written in this book of virtues and friendship, and of other things, but the accomplishyng is in the operations. For this thing that of nature ought to be done sufficeth not only to be said, but to be doen. And in this form is fulfilled the goodness of man.   

¶ The liiij Chapter. ¶ Yet of like matter.  
THE knowledge of virtue maketh a man of power to be admonished unto good works, specially such as have good nature and moved by admonision to do well. Also pain maketh a man to flee from vice, for fear of punishment, and not for the love of virtue, but for fear of pain, & think not well though they do well. It is not possible for them that be hardened in malice to be corrected by words. There be men which be good by teaching. And those men that be good by nature have it not of theim selfes but by the grace of God, which is vetely called good nature. Then the soul of him that hath the garment of goodness and of right love, hateth evil: the moving engendereth virtue in her as doth the seed that is cast upon good ground. And to the intent that a man have a good custom from the beginning, & to use to love things that be good & to hate evil, he ought to be brought up from his youth according to the noble laws, and use the works of virtue: and this ought to be in manner of continence, although it be not delectable to many men, yet the hand may not be withdrawn from chastesing of children, yea and from childhood till they be great. There be men which may not be corrected by words. And there be that cannot be by words but by pain. And there be other which will not be corrected by neither of these sorts. And those be to be taken from other. The good and noble ruler of the city, maketh good citizens, which observe the laws and do the work that it commandeth. They be adversaries that observe not the laws and commandments: although they do well. In diverse cities there is no good rule because they live dissolutly in following their wills. The most convenient rule that may be in cities, is that which is tempered providently in such sort as may be kept not to heavy, and that which man desireth to be observed in him and in his children and in his friends. The good punisher of the laws is he that maketh rules universal, which be determinate in this book, and conjoin them to the particulars which cometh daily in hands, therefore to order the laws well, it is needful to have reason and experience.   
FINIS.   

¶ Imprinted at London in the parish of Christ's Church within new gate by Richard Grafton, Printer too our sovereign lord King Edward the. VI 1547.  
Cum privilegio ad imprimendum solum.  
SUSCIPITE INCITUM VERBUM & JACO. I